

Gabriel Vazquez of Belmonte.
Frontispiece portrait placed before the title page for this English edition.

COMMENTARIES AND DISPUTATIONS

on the First Part of St. Thomas - Volume One

Containing the first twenty-six Questions, by Father Gabriel Vazquez of Belmonte, Theologian of the Society of Jesus.

To the Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord Don Pedro Portocarrero, Bishop of Cuenca, and High Inquisitor of Heresies in the Kingdoms of Spain. With privilege.

*

Complutum (Alcala), from the press of the widow of Ioannes Gratianus. 1598.

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Disputatio LIV - Whether some creatures according to their proper formal reasons are seen successively in the Word

Caput I- Two opposing Thomist opinions *(Disputatio LIV)*

Caput II- How, on the foregoing foundations, the blessed can receive new revelations, and also see in the Word, with a succession of time *(Disputatio LIV)*

Disputatio LV- Whether Moses in this mortal life clearly saw the divine essence

Caput I- The opinion of St. Augustine and St. Thomas *(Disputatio LV)*

Caput III- From the Scripture of Exodus 33 it not only does not follow that Moses clearly saw the essence (*essentia*) of God, but the opposite also is not obscurely gathered. *(Disputatio LV)*

Caput IV- What Moses asked in those words of Exodus 33, "Show me your glory." *(Disputatio LV)*

Disputatio LVI

Caput I- Two opposing opinions. *(Disputatio LVI)*

Caput II - On others to whom some think a clear vision of the divine essence was conceded. *(Disputatio LVI)*

Quaestio XIII- On the names of God

Articulus I- Whether any name befits God *(Quaestio XIII)*

Articulus II- Whether any name is said of God substantially *(Quaestio XIII)*

Articulus III- Whether any name is said of God properly *(Quaestio XIII)*

Articulus IV- Whether the names said of God are synonymous *(Quaestio XIII)*

Articulus V - Whether those things which are said of God and of creatures are said univocally of them *(Quaestio XIII)*

Articulus VI- Whether names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God *(Quaestio XIII)*

Articulus VII - Whether the names which import a relation to creatures are said of God from time *(Quaestio XIII)*

Articulus VIII- Whether this name, God, is a name of the nature *(Quaestio XIII)*

Articulus IX- Whether this name "God" is incommunicable *(Quaestio XIII)*

Articulus X- Whether this name "God," said of God by participation and by nature and by likeness, is equivocal *(Quaestio XIII)*

Articulus XI - Whether the name "Who is" is God's proper name, and more suited to the divine nature *(Quaestio XIII)*

Articulus XII- Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God *(Quaestio XIII)*

Disputatio LVII - On whether a name can be imposed upon God that signifies His essence quiditatively

Caput I- The various opinions of the theologians *(Disputatio LVII)*

Caput II - The assertion that not only the blessed but also wayfarers can signify God essentially and quiditatively *(Disputatio LVII)*

Disputatio LVIII- Concerning the doctrine of the article

Caput I- What the Fathers thought about this name, God *(Disputatio LVIII)*

Caput II- The opinion of St. Thomas on the same matter *(Disputatio LVIII)*

Caput III- In what sense the name "God" can be said to be connotative *(Disputatio LVIII)*

Disputatio LIX- Whether "Who is" is the same as the Tetragrammaton

- **Caput I**- Two extreme opinions; the prior opinion of St. Thomas *(Disputatio LIX)*
- **Caput II**- The truer opinion *(Disputatio LIX)*
- **Caput III** - The latter part of the opinion, that the name WHO IS, and the tetragrammaton, are the same *(Disputatio LIX)*

Quaestio XIV- On the knowledge of God

- **Articulus I**- Whether in God there is knowledge *(Quaestio XIV)*
- **Articulus II**- Whether God understands himself *(Quaestio XIV)*
- **Articulus III**- Whether God comprehends himself *(Quaestio XIV)*
- **Articulus IV**- Whether God's understanding is his substance *(Quaestio XIV)*
- **Articulus V**- Whether God understands things other than himself *(Quaestio XIV)*
- **Articulus VI**- Whether God knows things other than himself by a proper cognition *(Quaestio XIV)*
- **Articulus VII**- Whether the knowledge of God is discursive *(Quaestio XIV)*
- **Articulus VIII**- Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things *(Quaestio XIV)*
- **Articulus IX**- Whether the knowledge of God is of non - beings *(Quaestio XIV)*
- **Articulus X**- Whether God knows evils *(Quaestio XIV)*
- **Articulus XI**- Whether God knows singulars *(Quaestio XIV)*
- **Articulus XII**- Whether God knows infinite things *(Quaestio XIV)*
- **Articulus XIII**- Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingents *(Quaestio XIV)*
- **Articulus XIV**- Whether God knows enunciables *(Quaestio XIV)*
- **Articulus XV**- Whether the knowledge of God is variable *(Quaestio XIV)*
- **Articulus XVI**- Whether God has practical knowledge concerning things *(Quaestio XIV)*

Disputatio LX- Whether God knows all things in Himself

- **Caput I**- Two opposing opinions *(Disputatio LX)*
- **Caput II**- Secunda sententia *(Disputatio LX)*

Disputatio LXI- On whether the knowledge of God is of non - beings

- **Caput I**- The ground of doubting *(Disputatio LXI)*
- **Caput II**- How non - being is referred to the intellect of God *(Disputatio LXI)*

Disputatio LXII- Whether God knows the malice of sin through his goodness

- **Caput I**- Whether God can, by his own goodness, know the evil which is of fault *(Disputatio LXII)*

Caput II- The opposed sentence, more probable: that God does not by himself, but through the opposite virtue, understand every sin *(Disputatio LXII)*

Disputatio LXIII - Whether God knows actually infinite things, not only possibles but also futures

Caput I- What is certain among all *(Disputatio LXIII)*

Caput II- The opposite sentence more probable *(Disputatio LXIII)*

Caput III- Solutions to the arguments of the prior opinion *(Disputatio LXIII)*

Disputatio LXIV - Whether God knows future contingents certainly by their real presence in eternity

Caput I - According to the Catholic faith and philosophical reason, that God foreknows all future things *(Disputatio LXIV)*

Caput II- According to the opinion of Richard and of some Thomists, future contingents are present in eternity, and thus are known certainly by God *(Disputatio LXIV)*

Caput III- The truer opinion holds *(Disputatio LXIV)*

Caput IV- On testimonies of the Fathers; against naming God's knowledge of future things "foreknowledge"; and on the distinction between the science of vision and of simple intelligence *(Disputatio LXIV)*

Caput V- What St. Thomas thought about this presence *(Disputatio LXIV)*

Disputatio LXV - Whether any account of the certainty of the knowledge by which God knows future things can be assigned

Caput I- Various scholastic opinions *(Disputatio LXV)*

Caput II- From the decree of the divine will a sufficient, though remoter, cause of the certainty of knowledge can be assigned *(Disputatio LXV)*

Caput IV - From the truth of futures and the infinity of the divine intellect is best inferred the certainty of His knowledge *(Disputatio LXV)*

Disputatio LXVI- Whether a singular proposition about a future contingent is true

Caput I- What Aristotle and certain Scholastics thought *(Disputatio LXVI)*

Caput II- On the principal reasons for that interpretation *(Disputatio LXVI)*

Caput III- The same truth is proved by a philosophical reason *(Disputatio LXVI)*

Disputatio LXVII- Whether future conditionals are certainly known by God

Caput I- The opinion of certain theologians of our time *(Disputatio LXVII)*

Caput IV- The arguments of the opposing opinion are dissolved *(Disputatio LXVII)*

Disputatio LXVIII- Whether the prescience of God takes away our free will

Caput I- The Catholic doctrine is set forth against the heretics *(Disputatio LXVIII)*

Caput II - The first argument of Wyclif against our liberty, to which Catholics reply in various ways *(Disputatio LXVIII)*

Caput III- Two other solutions to the same argument *(Disputatio LXVIII)*

Caput IV- The true solution of Wyclif's argument *(Disputatio LXVIII)*

Caput V- The subsequent argument of Wycliffe against the same liberty *(Disputatio LXVIII)*

Caput VI- That the foundation already laid must be strengthened; against the newer opinion that a thing is or will be because known by God, not conversely *(Disputatio LXVIII)*

Caput VII- Corollaries of the whole Disputation *(Disputatio LXVIII)*

Disputatio LXIX- Circa doctrinam Articuli

Caput I- What Scotus held *(Disputatio LXIX)*

Caput II- The true opinion *(Disputatio LXIX)*

Quaestio XV- De Ideis

Articulus I- Whether ideas exist *(Quaestio XV)*

Articulus II- Whether there are many ideas *(Quaestio XV)*

Articulus III- Whether of all things God knows, there are ideas *(Quaestio XV)*

Disputatio LXX- In what way creatures are said to exist in God

Caput I- What John Wyclif held *(Disputatio LXX)*

Caput II- The Catholic truth against Wyclif is proved *(Disputatio LXX)*

Disputatio LXXI- On ideas

Caput I - Preliminaries concerning the name "idea" and its reception; that ideas of creatures are in God *(Disputatio LXXI)*

Responsio- I answer that this difference is nothing, such that a thing objected to the intellect should be called an idea.

Disputatio LXXII- By what reason the essence of God is the idea of creatures

Caput I- Various opinions of the Schoolmen *(Disputatio LXXII)*

Disputatio LXXIII- How in God there are many ideas

- **Caput I**- In God there are many ideas distinguished only by reason *(Disputatio LXXIII)*
- **Caput II**- Ideas in God are not distinguished by the divine intellect, nor by the human seeing God, but by the wayfarer only *(Disputatio LXXIII)*
- **Caput III** - In God there are not said to be many arts, or sciences, as there are said to be many ideas *(Disputatio LXXIII)*

Disputatio LXXIV- On divine ideas

- **Caput I** - Idea and exemplar pertain to practical science; but idea can also pertain to speculative *(Disputatio LXXIV)*
- **Caput II** - Not only of species and genera, but also of individuals there are singular ideas in God *(Disputatio LXXIV)*
- **Caput III** - Of matter and of accidents, which are really distinct from substance, peculiar ideas must be posited *(Disputatio LXXIV)*

Quaestio XVI- On truth

- **Articulus I**- Whether truth is only in the intellect *(Quaestio XVI)*
- **Articulus II**- Whether truth is in the intellect composing and dividing *(Quaestio XVI)*
- **Articulus III**- Whether the true and being are convertible *(Quaestio XVI)*
- **Articulus IV**- Whether the good is prior to the true *(Quaestio XVI)*
- **Articulus V**- Whether God is truth *(Quaestio XVI)*
- **Articulus VI**- Whether there is one only truth, according to which all things are true *(Quaestio XVI)*
- **Articulus VII**- Whether created truth is eternal *(Quaestio XVI)*
- **Articulus VIII**- Whether truth is immutable *(Quaestio XVI)*

Disputatio LXXV- Whether the truth of the intellect is only in composition and division

- **Caput I**- The opinion of Ferrarensis and of others *(Disputatio LXXV)*
- **Caput II**- The opposite position *(Disputatio LXXV)*
- **Caput III**- The posterior opinion is proved by arguments *(Disputatio LXXV)*

Disputatio LXXVI - Whether the truth of enunciation is the conformity of the formal concept, or of the objective, with the thing itself

- **Caput I** - The truth of the intellect is the conformity of the objective concept with the thing *(Disputatio LXXVI)*

Caput II - From the foregoing position Durandus and Hervaeus gather certain points worth noting. *(Disputatio LXXVI)*

Disputatio LXXVII- In what way truth is in things outside the intellect

Caput I- So that, for an exact explanation of these articles, it is necessary to understand how truth is in things *(Disputatio LXXVII)*

Caput II- The preceding opinion is refuted *(Disputatio LXXVII)*

Caput III- The opinion of Capreolus and Soncinus *(Disputatio LXXVII)*

Caput IV- The more probable opinion *(Disputatio LXXVII)*

Caput V - From the preceding the doctrine of articles 3 and 4 of this question is elucidated *(Disputatio LXXVII)*

Caput V- On the supreme truth of God in judging, and on the nature of divine truth *(Articulus V)*

Disputatio LXXVIII- On the doctrine of these articles

Caput I- The position of St. Thomas *(Disputatio LXXVIII)*

Caput II- The more probable opinion *(Disputatio LXXVIII)*

Quaestio XVII- On falsity

Articulus I- Whether falsity is in things *(Quaestio XVII)*

Articulus II- Whether there is falsehood in sense *(Quaestio XVII)*

Articulus III- Whether falsehood is in the intellect *(Quaestio XVII)*

Articulus IV- Whether true and false are contraries *(Quaestio XVII)*

Quaestio XVIII- On the life of God

Articulus I- Whether living belongs to all natural things *(Quaestio XVIII)*

Articulus II- Whether life is a certain operation *(Quaestio XVIII)*

Articulus III- Whether life belongs to God *(Quaestio XVIII)*

Articulus IV- Whether all things are life in God *(Quaestio XVIII)*

Quaestio XIX- On the will of God

Articulus I- Whether in God there is will *(Quaestio XIX)*

Articulus II- Whether God wills other things besides Himself *(Quaestio XIX)*

Articulus III- Whether whatever God wills, He wills from necessity. *(Quaestio XIX)*

Articulus IV- Whether the will of God is the cause of things *(Quaestio XIX)*

Articulus V- Whether it belongs to assign some cause of the divine will *(Quaestio XIX)*

Articulus VI- Whether the will of God is always fulfilled *(Quaestio XIX)*

Articulus VII- Whether the will of God is mutable *(Quaestio XIX)*

Articulus VIII- Whether the will of God imposes necessity upon the things willed *(Quaestio XIX)*

Articulus IX- Whether the will of God is of evils. *(Quaestio XIX)*

Articulus X- Whether God has free choice. *(Quaestio XIX)*

Articulus XI- Whether in God the will of sign ought to be distinguished *(Quaestio XIX)*

Articulus XII- Whether the five signs are fittingly posited concerning the divine will *(Quaestio XIX)*

Disputatio LXXIX- Whether God necessarily wills all the things which He wills

Caput I- Opinion of Alexander, St. Thomas, and St. Bonaventure *(Disputatio LXXIX)*

Caput II- The will of God is borne necessarily toward possible things, yet toward future things freely - this is more probable. *(Disputatio LXXIX)*

Caput III- Confirmation of the prior part; and on the necessity or liberty of God's will toward possibles and futures, with replies to difficulties *(Disputatio LXXIX)*

Disputatio LXXX- Whether the free willing of God is something in Him formally

Caput I- Various opinions of the Scholastics *(Disputatio LXXX)*

Caput II- How the divine will, by which God freely willed to create, befits Him *(Disputatio LXXX)*

Disputatio LXXXI - On God's operating ad extra by will, and on whether will is a more proximate cause than intellect

Caput I - That God operates ad extra by will, not by nature, is certain by Catholic faith *(Disputatio LXXXI)*

Caput XXIII - In the third argument he proves that a subject is necessary from which something be made, and therefore that matter is unbegotten; read Gregory of Rimini. *(Disputatio LXXXI)*

Caput II- Whether the divine will operates more proximately than the intellect *(Disputatio LXXXI)*

Disputatio LXXXII - Whether any cause, or at least a final reason, can be assigned for the divine will

Caput I- Two opinions of the theologians *(Disputatio LXXXII)*

Caput II - The truer opinion: that for God nothing other than his own goodness is the reason of willing *(Disputatio LXXXII)*

Caput III - That instances of the prior and the posterior must be assigned in God's decree *(Disputatio LXXXII)*

Caput IV - That authors differ in the way of distinguishing and ordering the instances of reason in the divine decree *(Disputatio LXXXII)*

Caput V - These instances are to be assigned according to the order of the objects among themselves *(Disputatio LXXXII)*

Caput VI - From the divine will alone, without a connection of things among themselves, instants ought not to be ordered. *(Disputatio LXXXII)*

Disputatio LXXXIII - Whether there is in God some will of good pleasure which is not always fulfilled

Caput II - The affirmative thesis: that God has a will of good pleasure regarding the salvation of all and a right life *(Disputatio LXXXIII)*

Caput III- Why this will is called antecedent *(Disputatio LXXXIII)*

Caput IV- In what way the will by which God has an antecedent will of the salvation of men is absolute, and nevertheless is not always fulfilled *(Disputatio LXXXIII)*

Caput V- The arguments of the prior opinion are dissolved *(Disputatio LXXXIII)*

Quaestio XX- On the love of God

Articulus I- Whether love is in God *(Quaestio XX)*

Articulus II- Whether God loves all things *(Quaestio XX)*

Articulus III- Whether God equally loves all things *(Quaestio XX)*

Articulus IV- Whether God always loves better things more *(Quaestio XX)*

Disputatio LXXXIV- On the affections of the will of God in general

Caput I- Which affections do not befit God *(Disputatio LXXXIV)*

Caput II- On the love of God *(Disputatio LXXXIV)*

Caput III- That the affection of hatred befits God *(Disputatio LXXXIV)*

Caput IV- On the wrath of God *(Disputatio LXXXIV)*

Dubium I *(Articulus IV)*

Quaestio XXI- On the justice and mercy of God

Articulus I- Whether there is justice in God *(Quaestio XXI)*

Articulus II- Whether the justice of God is truth *(Quaestio XXI)*

Articulus III- Whether mercy belongs to God *(Quaestio XXI)*

Articulus IV- Whether in all the works of God there are mercy and justice *(Quaestio XXI)*

Disputatio LXXXV- Whether in God there is commutative justice

Caput I- A recent opinion of certain theologians *(Disputatio LXXXV)*

Caput II- The truer opinion: that commutative justice, according to its proper notion, is not in God; and this is supported by the consent of all the theologians *(Disputatio LXXXV)*

Caput III- Certain preliminaries to shaping the reason for the preceding position *(Disputatio LXXXV)*

Caput IV- That in God there is not commutative justice according to its proper notion; it is proved from the ratio of giving and receiving *(Disputatio LXXXV)*

Caput V- The same is shown from the condition of God and the creature *(Disputatio LXXXV)*

Caput VI- That no obligation of proper justice arises in God from a promise *(Disputatio LXXXV)*

Caput VII- The arguments of the prior opinion are solved *(Disputatio LXXXV)*

Disputatio LXXXVI- On whether distributive justice is proper to God

Caput I- The opinion of certain Theologians *(Disputatio LXXXVI)*

Caput II- That distributive justice does not properly exist in God is proved by the authority of the Scholastics and of others *(Disputatio LXXXVI)*

Caput III- The foregoing opinion is proved by reason *(Disputatio LXXXVI)*

Caput IV- The adversaries' arguments are dissolved *(Disputatio LXXXVI)*

Quaestio XXII- On the providence of God

Articulus I- Whether providence befits God *(Quaestio XXII)*

Articulus II- Whether all things are subject to divine providence *(Quaestio XXII)*

Articulus III- Whether God immediately provides for all things *(Quaestio XXII)*

Disputatio LXXXVII- Whether the providence which God has of things is an operation of the intellect or of the will

Caput I- Errors about the providence of God *(Disputatio LXXXVII)*

Caput II- Providence (*providentia*), or predestination (*praedestinatio*), to be an operation of the intellect - such was the view of certain Scholastic doctors. *(Disputatio LXXXVII)*

Caput IV- Divine providence does not always achieve the end to which it ordains and for which it prepares means *(Disputatio LXXXVII)*

Caput V- Predestination is not a subjective but an objective part of providence *(Disputatio LXXXVII)*

Quaestio XXIII- On predestination

Pars I- On those things that pertain to predestination *(Quaestio XXIII)*

Articulus I- Whether men are predestined by God *(Pars I)*

Articulus II- Whether predestination posits anything in the predestined *(Pars I)*

Articulus IV- Whether the predestined are chosen by God *(Pars I)*

Articulus V- Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination *(Quaestio XXIII)*

Articulus VIII- Whether predestination can be helped by the prayers of the saints *(Quaestio XXIII)*

Pars II- On reprobation *(Quaestio XXIII)*

Articulus III- Whether God reprobates any man *(Pars II)*

Pars III- On predestination and reprobation together *(Quaestio XXIII)*

Articulus VI- Whether predestination is certain *(Pars III)*

Articulus VII- Whether the number of the predestined is certain *(Quaestio XXIII)*

Praefatio

Disputatio LXXXVIII- On the nature of grace and its various modes

Caput II- How manyfold is the help of grace through Christ *(Disputatio LXXXVIII)*

Caput IV - What Gregory of Rimini and other recent men thought about this matter *(Disputatio LXXXVIII)*

Caput V- The opinion of Gregory of Rimini is refuted *(Disputatio LXXXVIII)*

Caput VI- The true opinion of the Fathers about operating and cooperating grace *(Disputatio LXXXVIII)*

Caput VII- The same truth is confirmed by the testimonies of St. Augustine *(Disputatio LXXXVIII)*

Caput VIII - The testimonies of Augustine which Gregory of Rimini adduced are explained *(Disputatio LXXXVIII)*

Caput IX- On the various names of operating and cooperating grace *(Disputatio LXXXVIII)*

Caput XI- On the efficacious and the sufficient help of grace *(Disputatio LXXXVIII)*

On both conclusions, as far as was needful, we have spoken above, q. 22, article 3

Disputatio LXXXIX- Whether the election to beatitude preceded the predestination of merits

Caput I- Sententia quorundam Scholasticorum *(Disputatio LXXXIX)*

Caput II- That efficacious election to glory is made from foreseen merits of grace: proved by the authority of the Scholastics and by Scripture *(Disputatio LXXXIX)*

Caput III - By what testimonies of the Fathers the same opinion is approved by others *(Disputatio LXXXIX)*

Caput IV - What Augustine contends against the Pelagians and Semipelagians concerning our election *(Disputatio LXXXIX)*

Caput V- Some notes by which the opinion of the Semipelagians is made clearer *(Disputatio LXXXIX)*

Caput VI - Augustine holds that election to glory is made from foreseen merits of grace *(Disputatio LXXXIX)*

Caput VII - On recent attempts to overturn Augustine's testimonies, and their refutation *(Disputatio LXXXIX)*

Caput VIII - On testimonies of Augustine for predestination and the sense in which they are to be taken *(Disputatio LXXXIX)*

Caput IX- Election to glory after merits is proved a priori *(Disputatio LXXXIX)*

Caput X - A posteriori reasons: against the absurd consequence from the opposing view; on liberty *(Disputatio LXXXIX)*

Caput XI- Another a posteriori argument against the former opinion *(Disputatio LXXXIX)*

Caput XII - Responses to the testimonies which prove that the election to glory was made before merits *(Disputatio LXXXIX)*

Caput XIII- Refutation of two reasons for the opposing opinion *(Disputatio LXXXIX)*

Disputatio XC - Whether at least some exceptionally loved by God were elected to glory before foreseen merits

Caput I- On the opinion of Ockham, Gabriel, and Catharinus *(Disputatio XC)*

Caput II - That all, even the preeminently predestined and the angels, were elected to glory after foreseen merits *(Disputatio XC)*

Caput III- On criticisms leveled against Catherinus, and what in his teaching is false *(Disputatio XC)*

Disputatio XCI - Whether there is some cause of divine predestination on the part of the predestined

Caput I- The state of the controversy is explained *(Disputatio XCI)*

Caput II- Various errors of the heretics *(Disputatio XCI)*

Caput III - With the errors of the heretics now set aside and made manifest, it is necessary to review the sentences of the Scholastics. *(Disputatio XCI)*

Caput IV- That a final cause of predestination is given on the part of the predestined, but not a meritorious or disposing cause (Durandus) *(Disputatio XCI)*

Caput VI- That the cause of the first grace of predestination is the very future good in those themselves from grace itself, with Alexander excluded *(Disputatio XCI)*

Caput VII - Henry and others grant in us only a cause or condition without which not, of our predestination *(Disputatio XCI)*

Caput VIII - The Massilians with Cassian and the Greeks said that the beginning of first grace and predestination is from our free will *(Disputatio XCI)*

Caput IX- Our theologians variously defend these Fathers from this opinion *(Disputatio XCI)*

Caput X- Certain Scholastics in fact agree with the Massilians, though they indicate otherwise in words about predestination *(Disputatio XCI)*

Caput XI - That no cause, or beginning, of the predestination of grace is from us, is proved by authority against the Massilians *(Disputatio XCI)*

Caput XII - On certain recent theologians who concede some moral works to precede and remotely dispose *(Disputatio XCI)*

Caput XIII- On explaining Romans 9 and confirming our position *(Disputatio XCI)*

Caput XIV- The same Catholic position is shown by a priori reason *(Disputatio XCI)*

Caput XV- A posteriori reason for the same position *(Disputatio XCI)*

Caput XVI *(Disputatio XCI)*

Caput XVII- The arguments of the Massilians against St. Augustine *(Disputatio XCI)*

Caput XVIII- Certain testimonies alleged against our position are explained *(Disputatio XCI)*

Disputatio XCII - Whether the predestination of the grace of God is in the power of the predestined

Caput I- Opinion of certain recent authors *(Disputatio XCII)*

Caput II- Predestination is not in our power, the truer opinion *(Disputatio XCII)*

Caput III- The arguments for the first opinion are solved *(Disputatio XCII)*

Disputatio XCIII

Caput II- Neither sin, nor its permission, is an effect of predestination *(Disputatio XCIII)*

Caput III - How justifications and merits impeded by mortal sin are in some way effects of predestination, and in some way not *(Disputatio XCIII)*

Caput IV- On the distinction of natural and supernatural goods, and on whether acquired moral works are effects of predestination *(Disputatio XCIII)*

Disputatio XCIV - Whether the merit and the prayers of Christ, or of some Saint, have merited our predestination and election

Caput I- Various opinions of the Scholastics *(Disputatio XCIV)*

Caput II - That the merit of Christ was the cause of our predestination and election is proved by authority *(Disputatio XCIV)*

Caput IV - By reason it is shown that the merits of Christ were the cause of our predestination *(Disputatio XCIV)*

Caput V- Of the ten arguments by which in the first chapter we confirmed the positions of others, there remain only four which were brought forward for the first opinion. *(Disputatio XCIV)*

Disputatio XCV- Whether on the part of the reprobate any cause of reprobation is given

Caput II- The opinion of Scotus and of others *(Disputatio XCV)*

Caput III - That original sin is the cause of reprobation, as some more recent authors think *(Disputatio XCV)*

Caput IV- Certain notes for an explication of the truer opinion *(Disputatio XCV)*

Caput V- On the cause of reprobation in adults; the truer opinion *(Disputatio XCV)*

Caput VI- On the cause of the reprobation of little ones, what is to be held *(Disputatio XCV)*

Caput VII - The testimonies alleged for the first opinion are explained according to our own sentence *(Disputatio XCV)*

Caput VIII- On Jacob and Esau *(Disputatio XCV)*

Caput X- In what way God is the cause of hardening *(Disputatio XCV)*

Disputatio XCVI- On whether God has provided all infants with sufficient remedies for salvation

Caput I- What is agreed upon in this matter *(Disputatio XCVI)*

Caput II- The common and truer opinion *(Disputatio XCVI)*

Caput III- The refutation of the arguments of the prior opinion *(Disputatio XCVI)*

Disputatio XCVII- Whether God has provided sufficient helps for salvation to all adults

Caput I- The error of Armacanus *(Disputatio XCVII)*

Caput II- Sufficient help (auxilium) is sometimes, on account of prior sins, denied for a time to adults: this was the view of Henry [of Ghent], and others. *(Disputatio XCVII)*

Caput III- Proofs for the common opinion *(Disputatio XCVII)*

Caput IV- That in various ways we need the necessary and sufficient help of God *(Disputatio XCVII)*

Caput V - That for penance and for faith God confers sufficient help not at all moments, but at certain times *(Disputatio XCVII)*

Disputatio XCVIII- On peculiar grace in those who consent to the calling

Caput II- The preceding opinion, understood in three ways, is rejected *(Disputatio XCVIII)*

Caput III- That one who responds to the calling is excited by greater prevenient grace than one who resists is proved, as the more probable view, by testimonies of Scripture *(Disputatio XCVIII)*

Caput IV- Patristic testimonies for the same position *(Disputatio XCVIII)*

Caput V- A triple explanation of the foregoing opinion is refuted *(Disputatio XCVIII)*

Caput VI- Sincere exposition of the later opinion judged truer *(Disputatio XCVIII)*

Caput VII- On dislodging the foundations of the prior opinion *(Disputatio XCVIII)*

Disputatio XCIX

Caput I- Preliminary observations *(Disputatio XCIX)*

Caput II- First assertion. *(Disputatio XCIX)*

Caput III- A fourth opinion of the older Scholastics *(Disputatio XCIX)*

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Caput II- What Gabriel and Scotus thought *(Disputatio CIV)*

Caput III- The opinion of Scotus *(Disputatio CIV)*

Caput IV- The truer opinion *(Disputatio CIV)*

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Disputatio CVI- On whether God can do more than He has done

Caput I- In what manner God operates from necessity of justice *(Disputatio CVI)*

Caput II- What is meant by ordained power and by absolute power *(Disputatio CVI)*

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Caput IV - Not only infinitely many individuals, but even infinitely many species can be made by God *(Disputatio CVI)*

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Caput III- That this universe, its parts remaining, can be perfected *(Disputatio CVII)*

Quaestio XXVI- On divine beatitude

Articulus I- Whether beatitude befits God *(Quaestio XXVI)*

Articulus II- Whether God is called blessed according to the intellect *(Quaestio XXVI)*

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Opera Theologica omnia (Vol. 1)

COMMENTARIES AND DISPUTATIONS on the First Part of St. Thomas. Volume One. Embracing the first twenty-six Questions, by Father Gabriel Vázquez of Belmonte, Theologian of the Society of Jesus. To the Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord Don Pedro Portocarrero, Bishop of Cuenca, and High Inquisitor of Heresies in the Kingdoms of Spain. With privilege. Complutum (Alcalá), from the press of the widow of Juan Gratian. 1598.

THE KING. Inasmuch as on your behalf, Gabriel Vázquez of the Society of Jesus in the College of Alcalá, there was presented to us a report that you had offered certain commentaries and disputations on the First Part of Saint Thomas, of which you made presentation, and you petitioned us to grant you license to print the same, and a privilege for such time as we might be pleased to grant, or as our favor should determine; which matter having been seen by those of our Council, and since, by their order, diligences were made according to what is provided by the pragmatic recently issued by us concerning the printing of books, it was agreed that we ought to order this our royal writ to be issued in the said matter, and we deemed it good so to do: by which we give you license and faculty that for the time of ten years next following, to be counted from the day of the date of this our writ, you, or the person holding your power, and no other, may print and sell the said commentaries, mentioned above, according to the original which was seen in our Council, which bears at the end the rubric and signature of Pedro Zapata del Mármol, our clerk of the chamber of those who reside in our Council; with the provision that, before it is sold, you bring it before them with its original, so that it may be seen whether the said impression conforms to it, or else bring proof in public form that the said impression was seen and corrected by the corrector named by us, according to the original; and we command the printer who thus shall print the said book that he shall not print the title and first quire, nor deliver more than a single copy with the original to the author or the person at whose cost it shall be printed, nor to any other person, for the purpose of the said correction and taxing, until first and beforehand the said commentaries shall be corrected and taxed by those of our Council; and when this has been done, and not otherwise, you may print the said title and first quire; and thereafter he shall insert this our writ, and the approbation that by our order was made of the said commentaries, and the tax and errata, under penalty of incurring the punishments contained in the laws and pragmatics of our realms which provide on this matter. And we command that during the term of the said ten years, no person without your license may print or sell the said commentaries, under penalty that whoever shall print and sell them shall have forfeited and shall forfeit all and whatsoever books, types, and implements that he may have of the said commentaries, and moreover shall incur a fine of fifty thousand maravedís, which said fine shall be one third for our treasury, and another third for the judge who shall sentence it, and the other third for the person who shall denounce it. And we command those of our Council, the president and auditors of our courts, the alcaldes and bailiffs of

our house, court, and chanceries, and all corregidores, assistants, governors, high and ordinary alcaldes, and other judges and justices whatsoever of all the cities, towns, and places of our realms and lordships, as well those who now are as those who in the future shall be, that they keep and fulfill this our writ, and that against its tenor and form they shall not go nor pass, nor allow it to be gone or passed against in any manner, under penalty of our displeasure and of ten thousand maravedís for our treasury. Given in Madrid on the thirteenth day of the month of July, fifteen hundred and ninety-five years. I THE KING. By order of the King our Lord, Don Luis de Salazar.

APPROBATION. The commentaries on the twenty-six questions of the First Part of Saint Thomas by the most excellent Father Gabriel Vázquez of the Society of Jesus, committed to me by order of the Royal Senate, I have read with the diligence I could. In them, not only does nothing appear that is opposed to the orthodox faith or to the instruction of the faithful, but all is full of piety and learning. For besides the fact that on obscure and involved matters the author's easy style and happy talent shed no small light, the constancy of doctrine, the untiring labor in inquiring after the truth, and (what in theological debates has been desired by many) the careful investigation of the sentences of the holy Fathers, not reported on another's unreliable credit (as happens with plagiarists) but weighed with fair examination and to the very line, make the work not unworthy of its author, and, in my opinion, one that, coming forth into the light, will be useful to students of sacred letters not in a common way but with great honor. If there is anything that could displease, it is only that it has lain hidden so long: for perhaps an answer would already have been given to those who, deceived by a vulgar estimation of writers, manifestly impose calumnies on Augustine, Chrysostom, Jerome, and the rest of the lights of the Church, from which things, when they are more closely examined and (as our Gabriel easily provides) compared one with another, anyone sees them to be far removed. In the Augustinian monastery of Burgos, on the Kalends of July. Fr. Gabriel Goldaraz.

APPROBATION. I, Francisco Porres, Provincial of the Society of Jesus of the Province of Toledo, by the power to that effect granted to me by the Most Reverend Father Claudio Aquaviva, our General, grant faculty that there be committed to the press the Commentaries and Disputations on the twenty-six questions of the First Part of St. Thomas, composed by Father Gabriel Vázquez, Theologian of the Society of Jesus, and approved by grave and learned men of our Society. In witness whereof we have given these letters subscribed with our hand and fortified with our seal, on 16 March of the year 1595. Francisco Porres.

PRICE FIXING (TASA). I, Pedro Zapata del Mármol, clerk of the chamber of the King our Lord, of those residing in his Council, attest that, a book written by Gabriel Vázquez of the Society of Jesus having been presented before the lords of the said Council, entitled Commentariorum in primam partem Sancti Thomæ, which, with the license of the said lords, he had printed, they taxed at three maravedís the sheet; and at this price, and at no more, they ordered it to be sold, and that this tax be set at the beginning of each copy of the books that shall be printed by virtue of the said license. And so that this may be known, at the petition of the said Gabriel Vázquez I issued the present, which is made in the town of Madrid, on the second day of the month of July, fifteen hundred and ninety-eight years. Pedro Zapata del Mármol.

INDEX OF ERRORS The first number indicates the page, the second the column, the third the line.

- 5.1.1. "pofsit": read "poffunt".
- 27.1.27. "de Angelis": read "& Angelis".
- 65.2.6. at the end, "obiectum": read "subiectum".
- 67.1.22. "neceffarium": read "neceffariarum"; and in col. 2, last line, "fide apud i": read "fidei apud".
- 73.1.3. at the end, "quinque": read "haec quatuor"; and col. 2, line 16, "eadem": read "eande".
- 91.1.34. "disp.25": read "l.15".
- 95.2.8. "ex nulla": read "ex nuda".
- 102.1.16. at the end, "mysticum": read "mysterium".
- 103.1.25. "vera est": read "vera esset".
- 104.2.19. "argumentu": read "Augustina".
- 117.1.21. at the end, "creaturarum": read "creatarum".
- 120.2.21. "propositione": read "propositionem per se notam"; and v.38, "positionem": read "propositionem".
- 130.1.14. "quae": read "quam".
- 137.1.8. at the end, "interpretarentur": read "interpretaretur".
- 182.1.13. "bonum": read "bonus".
- 193.1.13. "hoc loco": read "sine hoc loco".
- 204.2.16. "finite": read "infinitate"; and v.19, "secundum": read "quintum".
- 208.1.20. "Iob 2": read "Iob"; and col. 1, "coelo": read "coelo"; and v.2, c.39, "ve.": read "vero".
- 213.1.last. "esset deserere": read "esse deserere"; and col. 2, line 22, "prioris": read "posterioris".
- 2.6.1.16. at the end, "in libro": read "cum in codem libro"; and v.21, "Metaph. cap.2 circa finem": read "libro de mundo post medium".
- 250.1.40. "cap.4": read "cap.5".
- 267.1.7. at the end, "homine": read "nomine".
- 303.2.1. "id quod": read "id tamen".
- 304.2.4. at the end, "infinitatis": read "finitatis".
- 305.2.8. "spiritum": read "speciem".
- 306.1.24. "non non": read "non".
- 312.1.18. at the end, "ille": read "illa".
- 313.2.25. "scientia": read "essentia".
- 342.2.6. "obiectum": read "obiecti".
- 353.1.16. at the end, "ego": read "ergo"; and col. 2, last line, "voluit non significari": read "non significavit".
- 361.2.22. "perfecti": read "perfectius".
- 374.1.19. at the end, "nostra": read "natura"; and col. 2, v.8, "visioni": read "visionis".

- 375.1.10. "disp.29": read "disp.229".
- 379.1.10. "clara": read "clare"; and col. 2, line 2, "modo": read "quomodo".
- 394.2.16. at the end, "intuitiva": read "quidditativa".
- 396.1.33. "discerneretur": read "discerneret".
- 412.1.12. at the end, "& neque hoc pacto Deus": read "& hoc pacto Deus".
- 413.1.14. "viventem": read "videntem".
- 416.2.22. "ipsius Dei": read "ipsius, tametsi ea produceretur virtute visionis ipsius Dei".
- 431.1.3. "aut iuxta": read "aut auditur iuxta"; and penultimate line, "docerunt": read "docuerunt".
- 439.col.6. at the end, "nomini, vocum": read "nomini & vocum"; and v.4, "rerum & etiam": read "rerum etiam".
- 440.1.23. "cam": read "eum".
- 446.2.14. "subiectum praedicabile": read "quintum praedicabile".
- 447.2.2. "decendentia": read "decentia".
- 487.1.8. "cognitio": read "cognitionem".
- 500.2.last. "tota illa": read "totam illam".
- 526.1.31. "enunciatione": read "enunciationem".
- 535.1.6. at the end, "vidisset": read "vixisset".
- 539.1.31. "sed fato": read "fato, sed".
- 540.2.46. "praedestinationi": read "praedestinationi".
- 550.1.15. "non ideo": read "ideo".
- 554.2.1. "real": read "rei".
- 564.1. "trconclusio": read "Concilio".
- 567.2.7. at the end, "qua": read "quia".
- 570.1.20. "ipsam": read "ipsas"; and col. 2, line 3, at the end, "spiritus": read "species".
- 580.1.5. at the end, "quia": read "quae".
- 598.2.17. "intellecta": read "intellectu".
- 637.2.25. "comparetur": read "coparatur".
- 643.2.4. "liberi": read "liberum".
- 661.1.2. "in Deo": read "Deo".
- 665.2.2. "Prophetis": read "prophetijs".
- 675.1.16. "fuit": read "fiunt".
- 688.2.1. "ex timore": read "ex amore".
- 690.2.11. "defecit": read "deficit".
- 677.2.31. "decrevisset": read "non decrevisset".
- 692.1.15. "Stoici": read "Epicurei".
- 702.2.24. "negant": read "affirmant".
- 708.1.10. at the end, "non esse": read "esse".
- 715.2.2. "qua": read "qui".
- 734.2.32. "potentia": read "potentias".

- 742.1.2. "intelligunt": read "intelligit"; and v.5 at the end, "quae": read "qui".
- 745.2.3. "effectu": read "effectui".
- 758.2.16. "volumus": read "valemus".
- 763.1.22. at the end, "idemq;": read "idq; eodem".
- 782.1.8. at the end, "loquitur enim Aug. de": read "loquuntur enim de"; and col. 2, last line, "electione": read "de electione".
- 785.1.26. "canones": read "Canones".
- 790.2.last. "gratis": read "gratia".
- 797.1.7. "locandi": read "beandi".
- 798.1.3. "gratiam": read "gloriam".
- 799.1.18. "non": read "nos".
- 818.1.28. "effectum": read "affectum".
- 825.1.37. "occidentis": read "& occidentis".
- 836.1.2. "gratiae": read "gloriae".
- 838.1.28. "retractionem": read "retractatione"; and col. 2, line 18, at the end, "in praedestinatione": read "in praedestinatis".
- 846.2.31. "Fulgentium": read "Faustum".
- 848.1.5. at the end, "quia liqui": read (complete as appropriate).
- 852.1.14. "praedestinationem": read "praeparationem".
- 858.2.33. "defendisset": read "defendisser".
- 866.2.3. "nobis": read "bonis".
- 883.2.3. at the end, "illis": read "illius".
- 888.2.17. "cap.7": read "cap.6".
- 893.1.24. at the end, "Coelestin.": read "coelesti".
- 894.2.27. "gratia, de quam": read "de gratia, quam".
- 902.1.28. "Christum pro meritum": read "Christi meritum".
- 907.1.26. "praescientis": read "praescientia"; and l.11, "illud": read "illum".
- 910.2.15. "esset & ex": read "esset ex".
- 921.2.13. at the end, "cap.3": read "cap.2".
- 923.1.10. at the end, "reprobates": read "reprobationes".
- 924.3.16. at the end, "permissio in": read "permissio cadendi in".
- 925.1.11. at the end, "disp.92": read "93".
- 930.1.32. "ex quo": read "ex qua".
- 931.1.19. at the end, "esse reprobu": read "non esse reprobum".
- 934.1.1. "spectans": read "expectans".
- 935.1.7. "reprobationem": read "reprobationi".
- 942.2.15. "divinat": read "divinitatem".
- 957.1.29. "allegata": read "alligata".
- 971.1.24. "nostra": read "nostre".
- 1011.2.9. at the end, "effectu": read "affectu".

- 1028.1.7. "hoc ens": read "hoc non ens".
- 1041.1.7. at the end, "certum": read "incertum".
- 1042.2.last. "posset": read "esset".
- 1043.1.1. "creatrix": read "creaturae"; and v.20, at the end, "in statu": read "in eo statu".

Licentiate Christopher Orduña.

Dedicatory Epistle - To the Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord Don Pedro Portocarrero, Bishop of Cuenca, and High Inquisitor against Heresy in the Kingdoms of Spain, etc. Gabriel Vázquez sends greetings in the Lord.

Since nothing is dearer to me than to submit whatever I have taught by voice, or have committed to the press, and shall commit, wholly to the censure and judgment of Holy Mother Church, nothing can be more desirable to me than that I might understand my lucubrations to be approved by your judgment, most ample Prelate, and that of your Colleagues. In order the more easily and more surely to attain this, I wished that this first volume of those Commentaries which I now begin to publish upon the whole Summa of Theology of St. Thomas should be dedicated to you under many titles, yours especially in the first place: both because it is the first, and long and much expected, and thus due not only to your time-honored beneficence toward me, but also to your splendor, nobility, and eminence; and because, besides other matters which St. Thomas at the beginning of this First Part disputes weightily and acutely concerning God, it contains that noble controversy which about four years ago stirred so great a dissension and discord among most noble wits and most learned men, that to allay it there was plainly need of your authority and the nod of the Supreme Pontiff. I mean that controversy which gave birth to the twofold question treated both in the tract on the grace of God and in that on predestination: namely, whether, of two who are both prevened by equal grace, it happens that the one responds or resists the calling, and the other does not; and whether, on the part of prevenient grace, besides a congruous calling, there is necessary some further application of the will so that it may consent to the calling, or not.

On which matters, since after a four - year silence the power to dispute and to write without disparagement and censure of the contrary opinion has now been granted to us by the Supreme Pontiff, I judged I should do something worth the effort if I were to enroll you, most illustrious patron and defender, to this very volume, for the sake of the opinions on the same matters which I set forth toward the end of this volume; so that what of itself (unless I be mistaken) would please not a few, might, increased by the shadow of your name and patronage, come forth into the light somewhat more gladly and boldly. Nor indeed (to speak plainly what I think) has nothing been gained by our Schools from the aforesaid controversy arisen among most learned men, and soon after the silence imposed upon the same by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff and yours. For just as it happens to those to whom, being thirsty or hungry, drink or food is denied, that they are forthwith provoked to greater thirst or hunger, so those who were altogether untrained and ignorant in these questions, when they saw their opportunity of learning the same taken away, began with incredible and continual desire to wish to draw in understanding thereof; while those who already had obtained some knowledge of these matters burned the more ardently to

understand those same opinions more fully, and to know more eagerly wherein (as they say) the very knot of the controversy chiefly consisted, and by what weights of arguments the parties themselves were upheld. Wherefore, since of themselves the minds of students are sufficiently aroused to embrace and to labor over those books from which they hope to be able to draw knowledge of the controversies I have mentioned, it seemed to me that these my writings either need no commendation at all, or only a very brief one - especially with you, most illustrious Prelate, who have been wont to hold me and all my things not in the lowest esteem; although, if this work shall be approved by your judgment (as I hope), I am certain you will procure for it the highest commendation among all. Farewell

Ad Lectorem - To the Reader

Although the nature and method of human knowledge, acquired with the help of the senses, moves about, as it were, with timidity and trepidation, not without peril of error, in almost all matters (if you except a few things known of themselves, and some truths handed down by God), who does not see that he undertakes a task most full of toil and almost beyond human strength, who attempts not some ordinary discipline or art, but theology itself in its entirety, that is, the most hidden truths about God and other things which surpass the capacity of man, and that in so great a variety of sects and opinions, to comprehend and to explain them - as is fitting - with weighty and subtle discourse? Especially since that most wise investigator of all heavenly mysteries, Dionysius, calls every knowledge of divine things which proceeds from the feeble industry of men the foolishness of the wise and a mystical darkness, intimating to us that no mortal has ever been, nor will be, so lynx-eyed as to draw out things sunk so deep from hidden darkness, nor so clear-sighted as to survey all and each of the things which lurk in the broad and inexhaustible fields of Theology, nor finally so sharp in contemplation as to be able to grasp in mind all the difficulties which pertain to sacred doctrine. For indeed all divine things, as that Attic bee Xenophon excellently judges, like the most splendid rays of the sun, so bedazzle every eye of understanding with their light, that the more intently we fix our thoughts on contemplating these, the more vehemently, blinded by the everlasting light, we lament our own slenderness.

Accordingly, this labor which is undertaken by us in these studies seems to be nothing else (to use a familiar adage of Nazianzen) than "plous en te nykti," that is, a night voyage wrapped in darkness, which has much both of dread and of difficulty. All which would not only more than once, but not a little, have deterred me, and would likewise have wholly recalled me from bringing to completion and publishing my lucubrations on the whole of Theology, unless it had at some time occurred to me that these our forces, whatever they be - although perhaps less accurate and less ingenious - yet, as for the most part drawn from the monuments of the Fathers and the oracles of the holy Councils, would bring to the Church of God no less utility than the vain works of heretics, whose doctrines, resting on no authority at all either of God or of the holy Fathers, in matters most grave and most hidden, have been able to bring to the same nothing but ruin and deceit, both at every time and in this our age.

To this was added that common saying of the wise, that we are born not for ourselves alone, but for others also. I omit the common good-will of those who once used me as master and guide in the course of Theology in Italy and in our Spain, and the desire of others laboring in the studies of this same science, by which I was admonished not to shut up the slender springs of my industry: the love with which I have always pursued their studies urged me on - especially since I saw not a few both teaching in the Schools and also in books published to the light, boldly selling as their own things which up to now they had taken from me, and daily put up for sale. But even this, to confess the truth, could not have sufficed either to arouse or to impel me thoroughly, unless I were to follow St. Thomas - the most weighty and most acute Doctor given to us by God - going before and, as it were, making a road, in these so toilsome commentaries of ours; whose very distribution - if I say nothing greater - most excellent amid so manifold a variety of theological matters, and whose divine method, will effect that I treat or repeat nothing rashly, nothing out of order. And although so many and such causes existed which first moved me to undertake this work, and soon also to publish it, yet they in no way lightened the labor and the difficulty which I experienced in this same work. For to omit the vast size of this Summa, divided by St. Thomas into three, by later men into four volumes, which whole, in order that we might comment upon it more rightly and more easily solve the frequent difficulties occurring, had to be read and reread again and again; whatever St. Thomas has handed down anywhere in his other works (which are neither few in number nor small in bulk) we carefully read; then those mystical and very wide fields of the Scriptures, both of the recent and of the ancient Testament (which was necessary), we long and much traversed; afterwards the most august decrees of Holy Church and Councils, those most abundant and undoubted fountains of truth and faith, we turned over with all diligence and attention; finally, the monuments of the holy Fathers, as well Greek as Latin - by whose authority we were of necessity to confirm very many things in this work, and very often - we ran through with tireless labor and study. Thus neither the invincible force of the oracles of the Saints nor the most grave authority of Councils nor the most carefully sifted judgment of the most ancient Fathers - most powerful supports of our assertions - will be lacking in these our volumes.

For although in other disciplines perhaps more strength and weight is attributed to reasons and to arguments sought from the nature of things than to the authorities of men, even most learned (because the former are, as it were, nearer to freedom from the peril of error than the latter), yet in Theology the contrary happens: since it treats of matters that flee the grasp of the human mind and the experience of the senses, one must sometimes rely rather upon the most weighty testimonies of men divinely instructed than upon natural reasons - though these are not rejected - provided that they rest upon sound grounds. In the opinions of the ancient Scholastics, and in adducing their supports, I have followed this method: to bring forward only the more select judgments of approved authors, and their force and core, with the greatest brevity; leaving aside not only those by whose aid little or nothing can be confirmed, but also those whose refutation would not greatly illustrate the truth of our own position. I judged I should do this chiefly for two reasons: lest (which is no light vice of this age) I might seem to have crammed our garner with another man's harvest;

and also that, if anything perhaps less truly said or less accurately confirmed should occur in these our works, it might be compensated by the brevity of the style, so that, if I have profited nothing by teaching, at least I might not burden the thrifty reader with a prolixity of things and idle words.

It does not escape me that this first volume of our works has come forth somewhat later than either our promise or perhaps the desire of not a few demanded; yet I would not have this ascribed to sluggishness or forgetfulness - of which there was none at all in me. For when four years ago I had published three little books on the cult of Adoration as a specimen of my lucubrations, and then thought at once to step on to those Commentaries which I had begun upon the whole of Theology - as I remember I then indicated - I was immediately, by order of my Superiors, compelled to return to the public duty of teaching which had been for a while intermitted; whence it happened that, the thread of our efforts being suddenly cut, I was constrained of necessity to bestow no small part of the labor and vigilance which I was going to expend in bringing out our remaining works upon my auditors.

To this at last was added the silence imposed about four years ago by the Supreme Pontiff upon the Spanish Theologians concerning the matter of Grace, to allay certain contentions - about which we were of necessity to say not a little in this work, where the question of predestination is treated. But since now both the pontifical authority and the length of time have at length brought an end to these obstacles and impediments, what remains, friendly Reader, is that as we shall hereafter employ diligence in publishing our works, so you use the same in reading them. For now the second volume of our Commentaries upon this very First Part is under the press, which you will receive very soon. Farewell.

Pars I - With the Commentaries and Disputations of Father Gabriel Vázquez of the Society of Jesus

Prologus - Prologue

The teacher of Catholic truth ought not only to instruct the advanced, but also pertains to him to educate beginners likewise (according to that of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 3: "As to little ones in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not meat"). The purpose of our intention in this work is to hand down the things that pertain to the Christian religion in the way which is suited to the instruction of beginners.

For we have observed that novices of this doctrine are very much hindered by what has been written by various men: partly, indeed, because of the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments; partly also because those things that are necessary for such as these to know are not handed down according to the order of the discipline, but according as the exposition of books required, or as there offered itself an occasion of disputing; partly, again, because the frequent repetition of the same generated weariness and confusion in the minds of the hearers. Therefore,

endeavoring to avoid these and other things of this sort savoring of curiosity, we shall attempt, with confidence in divine aid, to prosecute briefly and clearly the things that pertain to sacred doctrine (*doctrina sacra*), according as the matter will allow.

Praefatio ad primam Quaestionem - Preface to the First Question

Since the science (*scientia*) of Theology treats of God and the other things that pertain to Him as about its proper object, nevertheless in this question St. Thomas, and all the Scholastics in the prologue of the Book of Sentences, accomplish what the writers of all the other natural arts and sciences are wont to accomplish at the beginning of any science: namely, to preface certain prolegomena for explaining the necessity, nature, and method of proceeding of that science. Therefore theological treatment not only disputes about God and about other things that pertain to Him, but also, which is proper to any other science or faculty, it reflects above itself and considers about itself the things which we say. Of these, indeed, not a few would be most useful, were they not handled with boyish curiosity rather than with theological gravity. There are, however, many which seem to have something in common with logical and philosophical matters; from which, so far as can be done without detriment to the explanation of theological truths, I willingly abstain - especially from those which seem to contribute little to explaining theological truths. But because St. Thomas disputed about them, we too shall touch upon certain things, lest we seem at the very outset of the disputations to flee difficulties. In the progress of the work, however, we shall gladly omit many things which will seem purely logical or philosophical, from among those matters debated by more recent Theologians, interpreters of St. Thomas. But we shall examine expressly only those which can be of help for explaining theological difficulties. For, as we shall show elsewhere, this our scholastic Theology relies not only chiefly upon the testimonies of Scripture, Councils, Fathers, and the traditions of the Church, but is also not a little aided by philosophical reasons.[1]

Quaestio I - On sacred doctrine, what it is and to what it extends, divided into ten articles

T hat our intent may be grasped within certain fixed limits, it is necessary first to investigate sacred doctrine (*doctrina sacra*), what sort it is, and to what it extends.

1. Vázquez refers forward to his own discussions: "disp. 12, cap. 2 & 4."

Articulus I - Whether, besides the philosophical disciplines, it is necessary to have another doctrine

Objicitur primo: It seems that it is not necessary, besides the philosophical disciplines, to have another doctrine. For since man ought not to endeavor beyond reason, according to that of Ecclesiasticus 3: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee," but those things which are subject to reason can be sufficiently handed down in the philosophical disciplines; therefore it seems superfluous to have, besides the philosophical disciplines, another doctrine.

Objicitur secundo: Moreover, doctrine cannot be except about being; for nothing is known except the true, which is convertible with being. But about all beings there is treatment in the philosophical disciplines, and even about God: whence a certain part of philosophy is called theology or divine science, as is clear from the Philosopher in the sixth book of the Metaphysics.[2] Therefore it was not necessary to have, besides the philosophical disciplines, another doctrine.

Sed contra: It is said in 2 Timothy 3: "All Scripture inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice." But Scripture inspired of God does not pertain to the philosophical disciplines, which are investigated according to human reason. Therefore it is profitable, besides the philosophical disciplines, that there be another science divinely inspired.

Respondeo: I answer that it was necessary for human salvation that there be a certain doctrine according to divine revelation, besides the philosophical disciplines which are investigated by human reason. First indeed, because man is ordained to God as to a certain end which surpasses the comprehension of reason, according to that of Isaiah 64: "Eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what Thou hast prepared for those that love Thee." But the end ought to be pre-known by men, who must order their intentions and actions to the end. Whence it was necessary for man unto salvation that certain things should be made known by divine revelation which exceed human reason.

Also concerning those things which can be investigated about God by human reason, it was necessary ...

Objicitur: It seems that it is not necessary, besides the philosophical disciplines, to have another doctrine. For to the things which are above reason man ought not to strive, according to Ecclesiasticus 3: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee." But the things that are subject to reason are sufficiently handed down in the philosophical disciplines; therefore it is superfluous to have another doctrine besides the philosophical disciplines.

Again, doctrine cannot be except concerning being: for nothing is known except the true, which is convertible with being. But in the philosophical disciplines there is treatment of all beings, and even of God; and a certain part of philosophy is called theology, or "divine science," as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics VI.[3] Therefore it was not necessary, besides the philosophical disciplines, to have another doctrine.

2. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI; cf. the customary designation of "theology" or "divine science" within philosophy.
3. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI.

But on the contrary: It is said in 2 Timothy 3: "All Scripture inspired of God is useful for teaching, for reproving, for correcting, for instructing in justice." But Scripture, being divinely inspired, does not pertain to the philosophical disciplines, which are investigated according to human reason. Therefore it is useful that, besides the philosophical disciplines, there be another divinely inspired science.

I answer: I say that it was necessary for human salvation that there be a certain doctrine according to divine revelation, besides the philosophical disciplines which are investigated by human reason. First indeed, because man is ordained to God, as to a certain end which surpasses the comprehension of reason, according to Isaiah 64: "Eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what Thou hast prepared for those that love Thee." But the end ought to be pre-known by men, who must order their intentions and actions to the end. Whence it was necessary for man unto salvation that certain things should be made known by divine revelation which exceed human reason.

Also concerning those things which can be investigated about God by human reason, it was necessary that man be instructed by divine revelation: because the truth concerning God investigated by reason comes to men by few, and through a long time, and with the admixture of many errors; whereas upon the knowledge of this truth depends the whole salvation of man, which is in God. Therefore, that the salvation of men might be brought about more conveniently and more certainly, it was necessary that they be instructed concerning divine things by divine revelation. Therefore it was necessary to have sacred doctrine through revelation, besides the philosophical disciplines which are investigated by reason.

Reply to the first: Although the things which are higher than man's knowing are not to be inquired into by man through reason, yet the things revealed by God are to be received by faith. Whence in the same place it is added: "Many things beyond the sense of men have been shown to thee." And upon such things sacred doctrine consists.

Reply to the second: A different mode of knowability induces a diversity of sciences. For the same conclusion is demonstrated by the Astronomer and by the Natural Philosopher - e.g., that the earth is round - but the Astronomer through a mathematical medium, that is, abstracted from matter, while the Natural Philosopher through a medium considered about matter. Hence nothing prevents, concerning the same things about which the physical disciplines treat as knowable by the light of natural reason, there being another science which treats of them according as they are known by the light of divine revelation. Whence theology, which pertains to sacred doctrine, differs in genus from that theology which is set as a part of philosophy.[4]

Annotationes circa articulum.

From this article a single conclusion is elicited. It was necessary, besides the philosophical disciplines which are investigated by reason, to have sacred doctrine through revelations.

4. On the philosopher's "theology," see Aristotle, Metaphysics VI; St. Thomas often calls this part of philosophy "divine science."

Before we approach the individual disputations, it will be worthwhile to premise some things so that what St. Thomas hands down in this article may be better understood. First, regarding the etymology of the name: theology, in view of the name, is a discourse about God; and the science which treats about God is called theology. But since treatment about God is twofold - one which proceeds from natural principles, of which sort is metaphysics; another which uses revealed principles (such as the articles of faith) which no one can attain with reason alone as guide - the theology which we call scholastic, and which can be called sacred doctrine, about which we are presently speaking, disputes in the latter mode concerning God, and about other things that pertain to Him.

Second, it should be noted that "sacred doctrine" can be taken in two ways: either for the mere knowledge of the articles themselves, which have been handed down to us by revelation, with their full explication; or for the conclusions which are gathered from those same revealed articles. The former is called faith; to which also pertains prophecy and the gift of interpretation, by which sacred Scripture and the mysteries of our religion are explained; of which it is said in Ephesians 4: "He gave some indeed as apostles, and some as prophets." The latter is the science of theology, which is occupied in gathering conclusions from the articles, and in refuting errors - not only those which are directly opposed to the very articles of faith, but also those which, by good consequence, can be convicted from the same articles. By which reason also we call that part which pertains to this "positive and moral" - we shall speak in Disputation 7, chapter 5.

Third, finally, it should be observed from Cajetan that by "philosophical disciplines" St. Thomas does not understand only those which dispute about natural being composed of matter and form, which they call mobile, but also those which treat of God, like metaphysics, through entirely natural media and reasons.

Quaerit igitur Sanctus Thomas whether, beyond these, there was necessary some other doctrine which does not proceed by natural media; and he answers that, besides the natural and philosophical disciplines, it is necessary that there be some sacred doctrine supernaturally revealed. But it remains to be explained what St. Thomas wishes to mean in this conclusion; which will be done more conveniently by the following doubts.

Prior dubitatio circa textum. The first doubt, then, is what St. Thomas understands by the name "sacred doctrine": whether only faith, or also theology, which is deduced from the articles of faith as from principles. Cajetan proposed this doubt in this article, and he brought an excellent reason for doubting, which is of this sort. Either by "sacred doctrine" he understands faith, or theology. If faith, two inconveniences follow: one is that he would uselessly repeat in II-II q. 2, a. 3, where he asks whether it is necessary for salvation to believe something supernatural; the other is that he would use the name "doctrine" equivocally in this article and in those that follow; for in those it is not taken for faith, but for theology, whose necessity, nature, and mode of proceeding, not of faith, he endeavors to investigate, as we noted at the beginning. Since therefore in this very article he affirms that sacred doctrine is necessary for man, and in the following he also proves that it is a science - yet faith is not a science - it follows that in this article the discourse is not about faith, but

about theology. Or if by "sacred doctrine" he understands theology, it would follow that, besides the doctrine of faith, theology also is necessary for salvation, which is plainly absurd, since the simple can be saved with the knowledge of faith alone and direct their own actions to their end.

Cajetan replies that "sacred doctrine" is not taken for faith, insofar as it is distinguished from theology, nor for theology, as it is distinguished from faith, but for revealed and supernatural doctrine, abstracted from both faith and theology; which on God's part has the ratio of doctrine, but on our part the ratio of discipline. Taken in this way, sacred doctrine is necessary, since a certain species of it - namely, faith - is necessary. And thus those absurdities set down above do not follow: not the first, because the same Doctor does not repeat himself in II-II; for there he is treating of doctrine in general, but here of the doctrine of faith in particular, insofar as it supplies the principles of theology. Nor the second, because the name "doctrine" is not used equivocally by St. Thomas; here it is taken in the genus, abstractly; in the following, however, it is taken in the species for theology. Finally, that other absurdity does not follow on the other side, namely that faith alone does not suffice without theology to direct rightly actions to the end; because we do not there speak of theology, but of sacred doctrine universally, as has been explained above.

This doctrine of Cajetan is indeed true and seems able to be accommodated to the mind of St. Thomas, about which precisely there is the difficulty. Yet still it appears sufficiently difficult that St. Thomas is not speaking of sacred doctrine as it is taken for this science of theology, but only in general, as has been said. First, because St. Thomas in the following article, without any distinction made, asks about sacred doctrine whether it is a science, and answers that it is a science; which he clearly understands of the habit of theology, not of sacred doctrine in general. Second, because in the proemium he has thus: "We shall attempt, with confidence of divine aid, briefly and lucidly to set forth the things which pertain to sacred doctrine." Where by the name "sacred doctrine" he plainly understands this theology in particular, not sacred doctrine in general. Third, at the beginning of the question he says that it is necessary to treat of this doctrine - what sort it is and to what it extends - and first to inquire about the necessity of this doctrine, second whether it is a science, etc.; which clearly seem to be said of the same doctrine. Fourth, in this article, in the solution to the third, he openly speaks of theology, which is sacred doctrine and the science of God; and in particular he says that it therefore differs from the science of metaphysics, which also is about God, yet through different principles; because two sciences through different media can be about the same, not only as to the subject, but also as to the proposition itself.

Recentiores quidam explain St. Thomas in this way: that he speaks of sacred doctrine in particular, insofar as it is a certain science of theology deduced from the principles of faith, which we now have in hand; and that he says it is necessary for man to direct his operations to a supernatural end, although in a different mode than faith: for this is necessary to individuals for salvation; but theology is necessary to the whole Christian commonwealth for the same end. And therefore when he says in this article that it is necessary for man, they explain it not of each and every individual, but of "man" universally, that is, of the human race. This necessity indeed can easily be shown. For once the principles of faith are posited, from Scripture ill-understood, or from one's own brain, many false things can be falsely deduced, which are contrary to the principles of

faith; whence it can happen that someone gradually, with those same principles perturbed by heresies and errors, may overthrow and destroy them. Therefore it was necessary that there be the science of theology, which should most excellently discern what is contrary to the principles of faith, defend them from errors, and preserve them unharmed.

Theology of the Fathers and ours is the same. But when it is said that the science of theology is necessary, it is not to be understood as it is now, after the time of the Master, reduced to method, but in this or another arrangement, such as the Fathers always had from the time of the Apostles, and perhaps an earlier one; although not composed so methodically and in ordered fashion. They, on occasion of errors and heresies, from the principles of faith - especially those expressed in Scripture - against the rising errors, deduced many things most excellently; which in the Catholic Church never ceased. Therefore for this reason this doctrine is specially necessary, not to individuals, but to the universal Church. And such a necessity seems most aptly proved by St. Thomas from this, that for directing operations to a supernatural end, some supernatural knowledge acquired by revelation was necessary. For the science of theology proceeds from revealed principles, and by most acute reasoning preserves from every error, as has been explained.

Disputatio I - On the necessity and notion of sacred doctrine

Caput I - On in what sense theology is necessary to each person and to the Church

It is asked how theology is necessary to man. It is proved: Theology is not only the knowledge and doctrine of conclusions which are deduced from the articles of faith, but also the doctrine of the very articles, which alone have been made known to us by supernatural revelation. Therefore, when St. Thomas says that sacred doctrine is necessary for each one to direct his operations to the end, he understands this our theology, which, although according to its whole latitude it is not necessary, is nevertheless necessary in a certain part, namely insofar as it is of principles, without the knowledge of which a man could not be saved. For it is necessary for salvation to know something supernatural, as is clear from Secunda Secundae, question 2, article 3.

It is objected: But someone will say, how is theology not that science of which St. Thomas treats in the following articles, but faith, of which he treats in II-II, question 2, article 4? Thus we fall into that inconvenience which Cajetan inferred, namely that the same thing is treated twice by St. Thomas.

Solution: We reply that the habit regarding the first principles of theology, that is, of the articles of faith - which also is conversant about conclusions, and is the same as theology itself - is not the habit of infused faith, but an acquired faith; whence it does not follow that the habit of theology is the same as the habit of infused faith. Therefore it is not consequent, as we will say in article 3, that in a heretic, since infused faith does not remain, theology cannot remain; for some principles remain believed by human faith, from which, as before, he deduces.

He [the heretic] draws conclusions; therefore theology remains in him, not only as a habit, but even in act about many conclusions: for instance, if someone erred only in the matter of justification, he could excellently retain the whole science concerning God which does not presuppose what pertains to justification. From this, moreover, it is gathered that the same thing is not treated twice by St. Thomas: for in II-II he inquires only about infused faith, but here about sacred doctrine, which, although he says is from supernatural revelation, he does not, however, assert to be knowledge supernatural in its substance and nature, as infused faith is, of which the Second of the Second treats. For although many things which we believe about God we cannot investigate by natural reason and we hold them only by supernatural revelation, nevertheless we can believe them (supposing human and acquired faith, which in itself and by its nature is not supernatural in substance, except on the side of the cause, that is, of the revealer), as we will show in II-II, q. 1, a. 1, and as Scotus most excellently proves, whom we will also cite there.[5] Therefore, since here St. Thomas taught that a certain sacred doctrine is necessary, he understood the science of theology, not infused faith; and this theology, in so far as it is conversant about principles, he asserts to be supernatural on the part of the revealer, because no one could procure it for himself by investigation of natural reason. And for this reason he said in the conclusion that, besides the philosophical disciplines, which are investigated by reason, a sacred doctrine is necessary, which he called supernatural, not according to substance, but by revelation.

Objicitur. Someone will say, secondly, that the knowledge of acquired faith regarding the principles of our religion is not necessary for a man for salvation and for directing his operations to a supernatural end, but only infused faith.

Respondetur. We answer that the acquired is also necessary, because, as we will show in II-II, q. 1, a. 1, without it the infused is not had; for acquired faith is a necessary condition for that. But since about the thing itself there is sufficient agreement, let what has been said suffice concerning the interpretation of St. Thomas; and thus far about the prior mode in which the author says that sacred doctrine is necessary, namely, for directing operations to a supernatural end. There is, however, also another mode, about which we will speak in the first disputation.

Posterior difficulty concerning the text.

Before we proceed to the latter mode in which theology is necessary, there remains, concerning the reasoning of St. Thomas by which it is proved that sacred doctrine is necessary in that former way, a certain difficulty with Scotus. For he, in I, Prologue, question 9, "Ad quaestionem igitur," and in what follows, says that a doctrine drawn from supernatural revelation is not necessary for this reason, namely, that our end and beatitude is supernatural according to itself. He holds that there is no form and perfection by which we are joined to our end that is supernatural according to its substance, but that every such perfection is natural and perfects a created potency naturally; and that it is called supernatural only on the part of the efficient cause, because that perfection cannot be obtained except from a cause acting in a supernatural mode. Therefore he does not deny that a doctrine is necessary on the part of the efficient [cause], but only that it is supernatural

5. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 1; Scotus, In I Sent., Prologus, q. 9, "Ad quaestionem igitur," and the following.

according to itself and its nature. Against this opinion Cajetan disputes in this article. But we, more at length in disputation 11, chapter 2, against Scotus will show that there is some form which is a supernatural perfection of ours, and such is the attainment of the ultimate end, grace, and other things which we will enumerate there.[6] Wherefore the reasoning of St. Thomas in this article ought to be judged most sound: or at least this is true which he supposes, namely, that our end and the attainment of it is a supernatural perfection of our nature. Now let us pass to another stage.

An sacred doctrine is necessary also for knowing even natural truths without error.

Whether sacred doctrine is necessary also for knowing even natural truths without error

The opinion of Cajetan

After we have set forth all the difficulties concerning the text and the mind of St. Thomas, it remains that we examine more deeply his doctrine itself, as we promised at the beginning. And first of all, whether sacred doctrine is necessary in the latter mode, that is, not only for [knowing] supernatural [truths], but also for [knowing] natural truths without error. In which controversy the prior opinion is that of Cajetan on this article, at the section "Before they are proved." He teaches briefly that for this end sacred doctrine is not simply necessary, but only useful; and that for this reason it is said by St. Thomas to be necessary even for this end, because it is necessary for the well-being (bene esse) thereof. For from Metaphysics V, chapter 5, it is clear that something is said to be necessary in a twofold way: first simply, then for a better or well-being.[7] Therefore, when St. Thomas says that revealed doctrine is necessary, Cajetan understands a necessity for knowing well even those truths which can be known naturally; which the same Doctor seems to have indicated. For after he said that sacred doctrine is necessary with respect to those things about God which can be known by natural reason, upon the cognition of which true [cognition] the salvation of man depends, straightway he subjoins these words: "Therefore, that salvation may come to men more suitably and more certainly, it was necessary that they be instructed about divine things by divine revelation." These words certainly cannot be referred to the knowledge of those things which cannot be investigated by natural reason, but to those which we are able to attain by natural understanding. For these, therefore, revelation is necessary, that they may be known more suitably and more certainly. Perhaps this opinion of Cajetan agrees with what he sets down in I-II, q. 109, a. 1, namely, that a man by the powers of nature, without the help of grace, can know every truth, both speculative and practical, which is contained under natural principles and can be deduced from them; which can be confirmed in this way. If some truth lies within the limits of natural truth, consequently it will be a natural object and of itself accommodated to the human intellect: therefore of itself and without revelation the intellect will be able to attain that truth sufficiently. Why then is the revelation of God himself necessary? And although to some it may seem necessary,

6. Cajetan against Scotus in this article; see also below, Disputatio XI, cap. 2, where it is shown that some form is a supernatural perfection of us, and such is the attainment of the ultimate end, grace, and other items there enumerated.

7. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, cap. 5.

either because of the shortness of life, or because of the trouble of illness, or for some other reason by which men are often hindered from speculation; nevertheless it does not for that reason seem necessary for all, even for philosophers of excellent genius. On which grounds Cajetan, II-II, q. 2, a. 4, teaches that faith, or divine revelation, is necessary not for individual men, but for the whole human community, in which there are many of slower talent, of shorter life, or otherwise impeded, so that they cannot understand every natural truth with certainty and without any error unless they are taught by others; and because not all can have skilled teachers, a common doctrine is necessary, revealed, which without reasonings and in a simple manner may be handed on to all.[8]

Caput II - The true view

Yet the truer opinion is that revealed doctrine, in this mode, is necessary not only for the community and universal multitude of men, but also for individual men of more expert talent. This is gathered expressly from St. Thomas in II-II, q. 2, a. 4, where he teaches that supernatural revelation, or faith, is necessary in three ways. First, that a man may more quickly arrive at the true knowledge of things, than he would attain by demonstration so quickly. Second, that the knowledge of God and of those things that befit God be more common, which he understands generally of the whole human race: because there are many who cannot investigate these things by natural reason, either on account of slowness of talent, or because of the shortness of life, or because of other impediments; and therefore for the community of men doctrine and the hearing of faith are necessary. Third, he adds that this same divine [revelation] is necessary for another reason, namely, for certitude, lest it happen to err: because men scarcely or never fully attain ...[9]

It is objected that man, by the powers of nature, without the help of grace, can know every truth, both speculative and practical, which is contained under natural principles and can be deduced from them; and this can be confirmed thus. If some truth lies within the limits of natural truth, then, consequently, without revelation one will be able to attain it.

I answer: Even if they be philosophers, men scarcely or never fully attain the things which in reality can be investigated by natural reason. For such is the corruption of human nature and the uncertainty of the senses, that individuals in many matters err. And therefore there has not yet been any philosopher, destitute of the revelation of faith, who has reasoned rightly and sincerely about God in those matters which can in some fashion be demonstrated by natural reason. For although someone may have known that God is one, he nevertheless has erred by denying to him knowledge of all future things; another, by denying providence and the governance of the least things. By contrast, Christian philosophers, having reasoned rightly and without error about God, have reached the demonstration of these truths, namely, aided by the light of faith, by divine revelation, and by a good upbringing from their parents. From which it is clear that the aforesaid opinion of Cajetan is false.[10]

8. Cajetan, in II-II, q. 2, a. 4, § Antequam probentur.
9. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 4.
10. Cajetan, in II-II, q. 2, a. 4, against Scotus; cf. the false opinion refuted above.

Objection, and its solution. But if someone says that natural truths are proportioned to our intellect (*intellectus*), and therefore do not need divine revelation in order to be understood: I reply that our intellect, in fallen nature, and even in pure nature, cannot attain every natural truth because of the corruption of the senses; for the body, which is corrupted, weighs down the soul, and the earthly habitation depresses the sense with much thought (Wisdom 9). And in order that some truth be called natural, or naturally intelligible, it is enough if it can be known by Angels, or by a separated soul, or by an integral nature. There is also another impediment, lest even a man of remarkable talent attain all the natural truth about God; namely, the evil disposition of the affections and of the will (*voluntas*) from sin. Although, indeed, in demonstrations the assent of the will and its good disposition is not necessary so that, propositions being grasped, a man should at once give assent of himself to those things which are most well known and which in no way pertain to piety - such as are the mathematical [truths] - yet in those matters which pertain to piety, or are necessary, such as are [the truths] concerning the unity of God, his knowledge, and providence, even if the demonstrations keep within their proper measure, a pious affection is necessary. For since the things are most remote from sense, and consequently they entail certain things which do not please the senses and appetites of man, it happens to many, that on account of their depraved disposition, even if you propose demonstrations to them, they do not assent. In these matters a good affection contributes very much - not, indeed, so that, like the conformity of extremes once seen, the intellect should assent (for in a demonstration assent is already there), but so that it may apprehend the proposition inwardly in such a way and form it as to make the conformity of the extremes appear; which would not be required in mathematics, in the most evident sciences, and in other matters of that sort.

But it still remains to explain what St. Thomas means when he says in this article that sacred doctrine is necessary, so that salvation may come to men more certainly and more suitably; by which words he seems to indicate only usefulness, not the necessity of this sacred doctrine, or of revelation. I answer, therefore, that either St. Thomas was speaking in such a way not in a comparative sense, as if without this revelation and sacred doctrine there could also be some other sufficient science, but in a positive sense, as if he were saying: in order that salvation should come to man with certainty and suitably, this science was necessary; or, if he is speaking comparatively, the comparison is not referred to a less suitable and certain [science] which could be had without this sacred doctrine, but the sense is that without it salvation in no way could be had; because there would be lacking the certain knowledge of natural [truths], which also is required for salvation; and, therefore, he says that it is had more suitably through revelation. For sometimes a comparison is referred to an evil; and a comparison is sometimes made with something that does not participate in the same form.

And when he says that our salvation depends upon the knowledge of those natural truths, this is to be taken thus: not that that [knowledge] is sufficient for salvation, but because it is necessary. For since for salvation faith (*fides*) concerning supernatural truths is necessary, and this

necessarily presupposes also natural knowledge, such as that God exists, that he is one, that he has providence, it follows that the knowledge of natural truths is also necessary for salvation; and, consequently, justification and man's salvation depend upon it.

But if someone wishes to prove that this bare knowledge of natural truths suffices for salvation, because in Romans 1 Paul reproves the philosophers who, when they had known God, did not glorify him as God: I reply that from that [text] there is proved only this, that such knowledge was sufficient so that guilt be imputed to them for not having worshiped God, not that they could be justified thereby. On this more at length below in II-II, q. 2, a. 3 and 7.[11] And in what way, if the Gentile philosophers had made good use of that natural knowledge, God would further have revealed other mysteries so that they might be justified, we shall also say in that article and below in Disputation 97, cap. 5. But what Cajetan has noted in this article concerning the solution of the arguments are assuredly easy matters; and therefore I have judged it more useful to pass them over.[12]

Disputatio II - On the sense of Isaiah 64: "Eye has not seen"

Caput I - Some interpret the place of the mystery of the Incarnation

Not all writers understand in the same way the place of Isaiah which St. Thomas adduces in this article to prove that our end is supernatural, which cannot be investigated by natural reason. Some explain it of the mystery of the Incarnation; and first they prove this, because in this sense that seems to have been said by Isaiah in chapter 64, where, speaking expressly of the very mystery of the Incarnation, he begins with these words: "Oh that you would rend the heavens and come down." With which he continues what he had begun to treat in the preceding [chapter]. All which St. Jerome interprets of the advent of the Messiah. Since, therefore, shortly after he subjoins: "From of old they have not heard, nor perceived with the ears, the eye has not seen, O God, besides you, what you have prepared for those who wait for you," of the same mystery it is to be understood, namely, of that which neither eye ever saw, nor was perceived by the ears, at least by all, but by a few, to whom God deigned to reveal it by his Spirit.[13] In the same way it also seems that Paul recited this sentence of Isaiah, with only the words changed, 1 Corinthians 2. After he had spoken of the mystery of the cross and of the Incarnation (which he called the wisdom of God in a mystery, which God predestined before the ages for our glory, which none of the princes of this age knew; for if they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory), he presently adds: "But as it is written, Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man, what God has prepared for those who love him." Therefore, of that hidden wisdom, which he said the princes of this age did not know, he seems to have said: "Eye has not seen," etc. - which, namely, Christ, if the princes had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory. On this point

11. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 3 and a. 7.
12. Below, Disputatio 97, cap. 5; and cf. Cajetan's notes on this article.
13. Isaiah 64:1 - 4; St. Jerome, on the advent of the Messiah, ad loc.

Ambrose, on that place of Paul, as also Jerome, Theophylact, and Oecumenius in the same place, understand that sentence of Isaiah about Christ himself. Among later writers Adamus follows them on that chapter of Isaiah, and Leo de Castro there, although this latter admits at the same time another interpretation of that passage, following Marius Victorinus, book 1 Against Arius, namely, that it be understood both of the goods of eternal felicity and of the mystery of the Incarnation together, and thus that there be in it a double literal sense.[14]

Caput II - That the same place of Isaiah is to be understood of the goods of the other life; the truer opinion

But I for my part think, according to the common opinion of the Fathers and the only literal sense which Paul followed in 1 Corinthians 2, that it is to be understood only of the goods of beatitude (*beatitudo*), which God has prepared in the other life for those who love him. For what Isaiah said, "for those who wait for you," Paul interpreted as "for those who love him." In this sense Dionysius, in Contemplation chapter 12 of the Celestial Hierarchy, and Jerome, Haimo on that chapter of Isaiah, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Anselm on that passage of Paul, and there also Bede, who in two places gathers certain fragments of Augustine in this opinion, understand the testimony of Isaiah and of Paul (which is the same). Very many others also in various places: Tertullian, in the book On the Resurrection of the Flesh, chapter 26, no. 212; Cyprian, epistle 56 (elsewhere book 4, epistle 6), and in the preface to the book On the Cardinal Virtues of Christ; Marcus the Hermit, in the book On Paradise, and On the Law of God, contained in the third tome of the Sacred Library; St. Patianus, in the Parenesis to Penance, at the end, contained in the first tome of the Library; Theophilus of Antioch, book 1 (at the end), contained in the sixth tome; Arnold the Abbot, in the Treatise On the Praises of Mary, at the end, contained in the sixth tome; Jerome in epistle 148 to Marcel.; Ambrose, in the second prayer of preparation for Mass, at the end. The same is contained in the Mass of St. James, after the consecration of the chalice, which is in the fourth tome of the Library. The Author of the Meditations, cited by Augustine, book 2, chapter 18; and the Author of On the Triple Dwelling, cited by the same Augustine, chapter 1. And indeed this can easily be proved from the context of Isaiah.[15]

First of all, without any foundation is it said that Scripture there argues from the mystery of the Incarnation to the heavenly rewards. For neither the words of Isaiah himself nor of Paul indicate such a manner of arguing; but it is said simply: "Eye has not seen," etc. Therefore it must be understood either of the one mystery or of the other, even if those things which are said literally of the one could be said by accommodation of the other; about the manner of which there is no

14. 1 Corinthians 2:6 - 9; Ambrose, on that place of Paul; St. Jerome; Theophylact; Oecumenius, ibid.; Adamus, on that chapter of Isaiah; Leo de Castro, ibid.; Marius Victorinus, Adversus Arium, lib. 1.

15. Dionysius, De coelesti Hierarchia, cap. 12; St. Jerome; Haimo, on that chapter of Isaiah; St. John Chrysostom; Theodoret; Anselm, on that place of Paul; Bede; Tertullian, De resurrectione carnis, c. 26; St. Cyprian, ep. 56 (alias lib. 4, ep. 6), and in the preface to the book De virtutibus cardinalibus Christi; Marcus Eremita, De Paradiso, and De lege Dei (in Bibliotheca sacra, tom. 3); St. Patianus, Parenesis ad poenitentiam (in Bibliotheca, tom. 1); Theophilus Antiochenus, lib. 1 (in tom. 6); Arnoldus Abbas, Tractatus de laudibus Mariae (in tom. 6); St. Jerome, ep. 148 ad Marcel.; St. Ambrose, in the second prayer of preparation for Mass; the Mass of St. James after the consecration of the chalice (in Bibliotheca, tom. 4); the Author of the Meditations, apud Augustine, lib. 2, cap. 18; and the Author De triplici habitaculo, apud eundem, cap. 1.

controversy. Moreover, that that passage is not to be understood of the mystery of the Incarnation is clear from the words of Isaiah. For after he said, "what you have prepared for those who wait for you," which Paul interpreted, "for those who love him," the same Isaiah immediately explains the very same [thing] more: "You have met with him that rejoices and works righteousness," that is, with spiritual joy doing good works. But if the discourse were about Christ's Incarnation, he would not have said, "You have met with him that works righteousness." Rather, Isaiah said the opposite in chapter 9: "The people that walked in darkness have seen a great light; light has risen to those who sat in the region of the shadow of death." And in chapter 65, and Romans 10: "I was found by those who sought me not; I appeared openly to those who asked not for me." For although Christ deigned in the flesh to appear visibly to the just and to those expecting the redemption of Israel - Simeon, namely, Anna, and others - yet the fruit of the redemption, in which principally that mystery consists, did not befall except the unjust and those not expecting. For the first grace, whence this fruit begins, is not given to those laboring well, nor to those expecting, nor to those asking, as it is defined in the Second Council of Orange, canons 4, 5, and 6, where is adduced that [text of] Isaiah 65 and Romans 10: "but to those sitting in darkness and the shadow of death," not to those seeking, nor expecting. Therefore, when he says, "You have met with him that works righteousness," he now understands [this] of the reward of good works, about which reward he had already said, "Eye has not seen, nor ear heard," etc., and not about the mystery of the Incarnation - since the fruit of that [mystery] does not meet "the one doing righteousness," but, on the contrary, "those sitting in darkness." As to that dative, "to him that works righteousness," or "to those who love him," signifying a cause, it will be proved below in Disputation 89, chapter 2; and from the same testimony reported by Augustine, book 2, chapter 18, and by the Author of On the Triple Dwelling, cited by the same, we will confirm the opinion which says that election unto glory is spoken of as from merits.

Nor does it hinder [our reading] that Isaiah speaks in that chapter of the mystery of the Incarnation, and calls upon Christ, when he says, "Oh that you would rend the heavens and come down," etc. For after he subjoined, "At your presence the mountains would melt," and again, "That your name might be made known to your enemies," etc., he presently, in admiration, added the goods which he has prepared for his friends, in these words: "From of old they have not heard, nor perceived with the ears," etc. I pass over the exposition of Cyril and of some more recent [authors], who explain it this way: "From the constitution of the world we have neither heard, nor have we seen such a God besides you; and indeed only you lavish mercy upon those who wait for you." For these authors translate the Hebrew otherwise than the Vulgate and Paul: for they read, "Nor have our eyes seen God without you"; whereas the Vulgate and Paul put "God" in the vocative case, "O God, besides you."

Caput III - That the same place of Isaiah is alleged by Paul in the same sense

As to the sense in which Paul recited the testimony of Isaiah, it can be shown that he took it in that very meaning...

Christ deigned to appear bodily to those expecting the redemption, in which passage of the Prophet, which Paul cites, there is no mention of the expected one, but of the recompense. The first beginning of the fruit is not to those who sit, but to those who work; nor to those who look, but to those who seek; as is defined in the second canon of the African Council. Therefore it is not said, to sitters in darkness, but, to those sitting in the region of the shadow of death, a light has arisen. When therefore he says, "You met" ("occurristi"), he understands it of the reward of good works. For the prize of good works he had said, "Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, etc."; not, however, of the Incarnation, since the fruit "meets" those who do justice, not those still sitting in darkness. The Vulgate puts it in the dative case, "To him who does justice" ("facienti iustitiam"), which others also explain in the same sense.

The same sense is alleged in many places by Tertullian in the book On the Resurrection of the Flesh, c. 26, St. Cyprian in ep. 56 (alias lib. 4, ep. 6) and in the preface to the book On the Cardinal Virtues of Christ, Marcus the Hermit in the books On Paradise and On the Law of God, St. Patian in the Parenesis to Penance, Theophilus of Antioch, Arnold Abbot in the Treatise on the Praises of Mary, St. Jerome in ep. 148 to Marcella, St. Ambrose in the second prayer of preparation for Mass, the Mass of St. James after the consecration of the chalice, the Author of the Meditations, and the Author On the Triple Dwelling.[16] From the context of Isaiah this can easily be proved.

First of all, it is said without any foundation that Scripture there argues from the mystery of the Incarnation to the heavenly rewards. For neither the words of Isaiah himself nor of Paul indicate such a mode of arguing, but it is said simply, "Eye has not seen," etc. Therefore it must be understood either of the one or of the other mystery - even if the things that are said literally of the one can by accommodation be said of the other - about which "how" there is no controversy. But that the aforesaid place is not to be understood of the mystery of the Incarnation is evident from the words of Isaiah. For after he had said, "What you have prepared for those who wait for you," which Paul interpreted as "for those who love him" (1 Cor 2:9), Isaiah himself, further explaining the same thing, subjoins: "You met one who rejoices and does justice," that is, one who does good works with spiritual joy. But if the discourse were about the Incarnation of Christ, he would not have said, "You met one who does justice." Rather, Isaiah likewise said in c. 9: "The people who walked in darkness have seen a great light; upon those who dwelled in the region of the shadow of death a light has arisen" (Isa 9:2). And in c. 65, and in Rom 10: "I was found by those who did not seek me; I have appeared openly to those who asked not for me" (Isa 65:1; Rom 10:20). For although Christ was to be seen in the flesh by the just and by those expecting Israel - Simeon saw

16. Pseudo-Dionysius, De coelesti Hierarchia, c. 12; St. Jerome; Haimo on that chapter of Isaiah; St. John Chrysostom; Theodoret; St. Anselm on that place of Paul; Bede; Tertullian, De resurrectione carnis, c. 26; St. Cyprian, ep. 56 (alias lib. 4, ep. 6), and in the preface to the book De virtutibus cardinalibus Christi; Marcus the Hermit, De Paradiso and De lege Dei (in Bibliotheca sacra, tom. 3); St. Patian, Parenesis ad poenitentiam (in Bibliotheca, tom. 1); Theophilus of Antioch, lib. 1 (in tom. 6); Arnold Abbot, Tractatus de laudibus Mariae (in tom. 6); St. Jerome, ep. 148 ad Marcellam; St. Ambrose, in the second prayer of preparation for Mass; the Mass of St. James after the consecration of the chalice (in Bibliotheca, tom. 4); the Author of the Meditations, apud Augustine, lib. 2, c. 18; and the Author De triplici habitaculo, apud eundem, c. 1.

him - yet the fruit of redemption was chiefly not received by the just and those expecting, but by the unjust and those not expecting; for grace is a gift, whence it is not given to those who labor well as a debt, nor to those who expect.

Nor does it harm that Isaiah speaks in that chapter of the mystery of the Incarnation, and as if Christ himself were to say, "O that you would rend the heavens and come down" (Isa 64:1). For after he had subjoined, "At your presence the mountains would flow down," and again, "That your name might be known to your enemies" (Isa 64:1 - 2), a little later, admiring, he adds the words: "Eye has not seen, nor ear heard," etc., which he clearly understands of the goods of the future age, about the reward of good works: "You meet him who rejoices and does justice." The Vulgate and Paul put it thus: "To him who does justice," in the dative case. Some Hebrew editors read otherwise, "without you" ("absque te"): "We have not seen a God such," they say - others read, "our eyes have not seen God." But the Vulgate, and Paul, read, "O God, besides you." They who translate, "without you," understand: "Nor have we heard from ages, nor have some received in any way," etc. - which some more recent men explain otherwise; but we say, "we have not heard, except from you," namely, to whom you give, by what things you are bountiful. For they transfer that which the Vulgate and Paul put thus: "Nor has ear heard, O God, besides you," etc., indeed to this: "We have not seen such a God," not to this alone: "those expecting," but also "those not expecting mercy." Cyril's exposition confirms this testimony, which says that election is not from merits.

Someone could contend that that place ought to be understood of the mystery of the cross, or of the Incarnation, about which he was speaking in that chapter. For he says: "But we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, which is hidden; which God predestined before the ages for our glory; which none of the princes of this world knew; for if they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory; but as it is written: What eye has not seen, nor ear heard," etc. Therefore, of that wisdom which he says the princes of this world were ignorant, he seems to interpret the place of Isaiah, "Eye has not seen," etc., so that from there he may prove that it was hidden and unknown to princes.

The context of Paul is indeed difficult, especially if that "which none of the princes of this world," etc., be referred to the hidden wisdom of the cross which Paul preached, as St. John Chrysostom and the other Greeks relate, and St. Ambrose and Anselm on that place of Paul, and Athanasius in the book On the Incarnation of the Word near the end, who does not read "what" ("quam"), but "whom" ("quem"), otherwise than it is in the Greek and Latin text. For thus Paul seems to prove by the testimony of Isaiah nothing other than Christ, whom he calls hidden wisdom, was not known to the princes of this world, and therefore was crucified by them. This sense is especially confirmed by those words of Paul: "If they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory" (1 Cor 2:8). As if he were to say: if they had known this wisdom, that is, Christ, they would never have crucified him, who is the Lord of glory. The difficulty is also increased in the context of Paul's words by the adversative particle "But" ("Sed"), which few expositors press, indeed almost all pass over; which added, if those words, "Eye has not seen," are to be understood of eternal beatitude, as many understand - whom we have already cited - scarcely can they cohere with the preceding; indeed, even if the particle be not added, the context remains

difficult. But it seems much easier if Paul understands Isaiah's words of Christ and his mystery; for thus, with the adversative particle, the context also can be easily arranged in this way: for if they had known him, they would never have crucified him; but, as it is written, "Eye has not seen," etc.; as if he were to say, but because they did not know, as it is written, they condemned him to death.

Yet, these things notwithstanding, it seems to me that Paul cited Isaiah's words in the same sense which, from the common interpretation of the Fathers, we have adduced; understanding, namely, those words, "Eye has not seen," etc., not of the mystery of the Incarnation and of the hidden wisdom of the cross, but of the glory of the other life and of eternal felicity; and also the context of Paul, even with the particle "But," can stand very well, provided that that "which none of the princes of this world," etc., be referred not to the wisdom hidden in a mystery, but to "our glory," to which - and according to the Latin and Greek reading - it can most fitly be referred. The letter and the sense ought thus to be ordered: "We speak wisdom," namely of the cross, "which God predestined before the ages for our glory" - which glory, namely eternal beatitude - "none of the princes of this world knew; for if" - supply "that glory" - "they had known in what manner it was prepared by God for us, never would they have crucified the Lord of that very glory, namely Christ, by whose merit it is prepared for us. But as it is written," namely of that glory, "What eye has not seen, nor ear heard," etc., they themselves did not know it. He subjoins immediately, "But to us God has revealed it through his Spirit." Gagneius tries to dispose the text otherwise, understanding Isaiah's testimony of Christ and of hidden wisdom, and referring that "which" not to "glory," but to "hidden wisdom." But the phrase is more difficult and harsher. For me, however, as I have said, the proposed sense pleases more, because it has been sufficiently proved from the Fathers' opinion that Isaiah said those words not of Christ, but of the glory of beatitude. Wherefore, consequently, Paul ought to have applied Isaiah's text in the same sense. Then, whereas Paul said, "They would never have crucified the Lord of glory," he indicates that particle "which" is to be referred not to wisdom but to glory, which, by amplifying, he very well inserts, when he says that, if they had known that glory, they would never have crucified the very Lord of glory.

Caput IV - Digression on Paul's words, "But the spiritual man judges all things"

But someone will doubt how, if the things cited, "But to us God revealed by his Spirit. For the Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God" (1 Cor 2:10), are true - if it be true that "eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man," etc. - of the same mysteries, Paul says, "But to us God has revealed." Marcella proposed this question to St. Jerome, and he himself replies in epistle 148 to her: we ought not to seek what that is which "eye has not seen, nor ear heard," etc. "For if," he says, "it is unknown, how can it be known?" Whence in this sense the Apostle is to be believed to have said that with carnal eyes and with a carnal ear, with mortal thought, the spiritual things cannot be comprehended: and that, as he testifies that they were revealed to himself and to the saints through the Spirit, it does not straightway follow that he revealed them to others; otherwise, he heard in paradise ineffable words, which he could not narrate to others, or, if he narrated them, they are by no means ineffable. These are the words of St. Jerome. By which he teaches that those things which are in future beatitude were indeed revealed

to Paul and to other saints with some peculiar illumination, but such that they could not themselves explain them so that those mysteries might be perceived by corporeal senses, nor show them so that they might be seen by a corruptible eye.

Yet it seems more congruent to the text of the Apostle if we say that that revelation is not common indeed to all the faithful, but to the spiritual alone and to the adults, not to little ones in the faith of Christ, because only adults can perceive those things. These he signifies when he says, "But to us God has revealed by his Spirit." For immediately he subjoins, "For the Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God." "But we have not received the spirit of this world, but the Spirit who is from God, that we might know the things that have been given to us by God. But the animal man does not perceive the things that are of the Spirit of God; for it is foolishness to him, and he cannot" (1 Cor 2:10 - 14). He judges these things the spiritual man, but not the animal. This indeed is how in c. 3 he begins: "And I, brethren, could not speak to you as to spiritual, but as to carnal, as to little ones in Christ; I gave you milk to drink, not solid food; for as yet you were not able; but neither indeed are you now able; for you are still carnal. For whereas there is among you zeal and contention, are you not carnal?" (1 Cor 3:1 - 3). Therefore Paul says that the things which the princes of this age were ignorant of were revealed to the spiritual, in such a way also that they themselves could speak of them - not to the carnal, but to the spiritual. Therefore, not as St. Jerome thought, were these things revealed to Paul in such a way that he could not reveal them to others; but that he could truly propose them so as to be understood, to those who, however, would truly be spiritual. But to the Corinthians he said that he had not yet explained them, because they were still carnal, that is, serving the passions of the flesh.

Therefore the interpretation of Chrysostom, of Marcus the Hermit, and of the Anselmian places cited, pleases us: by which the difficulty proposed can be most fittingly answered, namely, that when Paul says from Isaiah, "Eye has not seen, nor ear heard," etc., he is speaking of human nature considered from its own proper power. Hence in this sense the Apostle must be believed to speak. For if the Prophets and Apostles acquired not as men, but as Prophets and Apostles heard, this is, as men illustrated by the Spirit of God. Wherefore, what the princes of this world, by their own effort and by human power, did not know nor hear, indeed nor conceive, to the spiritual it has been revealed, namely to the Prophets, to the Apostles, and also to others. But when Paul and Isaiah say, "Eye has not seen, nor ear heard," they deny not only the proper and quidditative concept of those things which could be understood by those words, "Eye has not seen," but any other which could be understood, when he says, "Nor has ear heard." For men by their own power could not even have an affective grasp of the goods of that eternal felicity. But when he subjoins, "But to us God has revealed," he understands a concept which can fit viators under the veil of faith.

From all that we have said it can be gathered how rightly St. Thomas proves that sacred doctrine is necessary to have a true cognition of our end, which remains for us in the other life. For from the testimony of Isaiah and of Paul it is plain that our end, namely the goods which the Lord has prepared for us, cannot only not be seen by corporeal eyes nor be expressed by any human word, but also can be known only by divine illumination. From which, therefore, it is rightly proved that our end is supernatural (supernaturalis), not because its possession is supernatural according to its

substance and nature - this is the question disputed with Scotus, as I noted above, and is to be discussed in its place - but I say it is supernatural because its cognition can be had neither by human reason or study nor by angelic [reason], but only by God's revelation.

Therefore, with good reason, there is required some sacred discipline, acquired by God's revelation, for learning those things which eye has not seen nor ear heard. Which, although they cannot be so rightly perceived by the faithful who are still carnal as by the spiritual, to whom God so reveals them that, by the gift of understanding, they may penetrate them more clearly and understand more of the same mystery; yet to those carnal the same things, by the revelation of faith, though less perfectly, can be known.

Disputatio III - On the utility and method of scholastic theology

- Heretics disparage scholastic theology. Caput I.
- The utility of scholastic theology against heretics is defended. Caput II.
- The first objection of the heretics. Caput III.
- The second objection. Caput IV.
- The third objection. Caput V.
- The fourth objection. Caput VI.

Caput I - Heretics disparage scholastic theology

Now that we have sufficiently treated the necessity of this disputational doctrine, it remains that we say something of its utility, especially as, from the time of the Master of the Sentences, it has in an ordered scholastic way been handed down. The difficulty indeed is not that sacred doctrine, insofar as it gathers certain conclusions from the principles of faith, we should call scholastic, and that the ancient Fathers, and the sacred Councils, drew very great fruit from it; but that which, after the Master, is called by the single name of scholastic, as one discipline and the method of doctrine reduced to this, this the heretics of our time vehemently assail. Luther in the book against Jacob Latomus says that the scholastic way of arguing is nothing other than ignorance of the truth and empty fallacy, which the Apostles and the Colossians most of all warned against. The same enmity is harbored in the book on abolishing the private Mass. And Philip Melanchthon in the Apology against the Parisians says that Scholasticism was born in Paris, and that by it the Gospel was obscured and faith extinguished. From which error, as from a source, the others of these heretics have been thought to have flowed, as Cano supposed in book 8 De locis, c. 1. For the judgment of the schools having been despised, it was necessary to neglect Jerome, and the other Fathers, and by degrees the sacred Councils and the decrees of the Pontiffs. From which it came about that no firm foundation of our faith remained among them, but that the entire definition of faith and the doctrine was placed in their own judgment. But I would rather think that the origin of their errors was derived from their depraved morals. For Luther, kindled by a spirit of ambition

and pride, began to despise the Roman Pontiff, his power and decrees; and since there was no one except the scholastic doctors who at that time could resist his rashness, in order to hold fast to his errors obstinately, he was forced to despise and hiss the scholastic doctrine.

Caput II - The utility of scholastic theology is defended against the heretics

As to that very doctrine which is called scholastic, no one can deny that its greatest utility lies in the method and way of disputing, and of examining questions, which from the time of Peter Lombard we have in the schools. For even before him, as Damascene and Anselm - who nevertheless did not treat much in a scholastic order - handled certain things in this way; but Peter was the first who reduced the universal sacred doctrine to method, on account of which he most deservedly obtained the name of Master in the schools. Those who followed after him were Albert, St. Thomas, and the rest, who indeed perfected the method with greater diligence; and yet the scholastic discipline does not rest in the words, but in the sense, and in the reasoning and disputation, and in the weight of arguments; and the utility of this doctrine is gathered either from the sacred Scripture itself, or from the Councils, or from the ancient tradition of the Fathers, very frequently even from the very nature of the matters sought.

Of the things sought, truth is separated from falsehood; and what is not so certain but is probable on both sides is not handed down as a certain dogma of faith, but as probable. Secondly, the mysteries of our faith, and what can be deduced from them, being arranged by a certain order and method of discipline, are more easily learned and retained in memory. Lastly, how much the scholastic discipline itself and its Doctors have profited the Church for defending the Catholic faith can, in these times, be argued for us from the one Parisian school, mother of the rest; which, amid so many storms of heresies, kept that city and the greatest part of Gaul unharmed. And finally, in the year 1590, during the siege of that city against the Béarnese heretic besieging Paris, it so confirmed the city in the faith that all preferred to die by dreadful and unheard-of famine rather than to admit a heretic as King. And when by certain grandees the commons were urged to rather give themselves up, lest they perish by famine, they always replied that they could not do this with a safe conscience: a fact in which all were thus instructed by their theologians. Luther indeed seems to have caught the scent that the Parisian theologians would sharply assail his errors, when he dared to speak so impudently about them and about scholastic theology.

Caput III - First objection of the heretics

Moreover, there are certain things which at first sight might lead someone to hold scholastic theology in contempt, on account of which the heretics also explode it and hiss it off the stage. First, we cannot deny that there have been in the schools many theologians who have treated theological questions with frivolous reasons; in which testimonies of Scripture are very rare; and those which they employ are used not in the literal sense, but either allegorically or morally - modes which, for disputation, for the most part, profit little; and of Councils, scarcely any mention

is made - although these are the two chief foundations of this doctrine. They also sometimes mix in questions purely philosophically or metaphysically - childish indeed, and little suited to theological matters: all of which ought to be alien to the doctrine of theology.

Solutio objectionis. However, this vice is not of theology itself, but was brought in by the injury of the times, in which wits were not so cultivated and the arts not so polished, nor was there such a supply of books. But now, since the supply of books is greater and the exercise of wits is far greater, our scholastic theology is, more and more each day, enriched with testimonies of Scripture and definitions of Councils, and is treated according to its dignity. Furthermore, although these are its own proper principles and foundations, nevertheless where there is need of philosophical reasoning sought from the very nature of things, it is not to be despised. For this kind of thing is wont to be of very great efficacy for confirming theological truths: as, in the matter of the adoration of sacred things, although some arguments can be drawn from Scripture, nevertheless, if rightly weighed, very much can be proved from the nature of adoration itself. This, however, has especially its place in those matters which pertain to the piety of morals, about which the theologian also disputes; so much so that such a reason can be sufficient, that by it alone, without other testimony of Scripture or of Councils, the mystery yet being supposed, and an article of our faith, some truth can first be declared and defined by the Church. Likewise natural reason itself, deduced from philosophical principles, is of the greatest assistance in the mystery of the Incarnation and in others. Yet philosophical reasons and disputations are to be used with such modesty that they be assumed for this sole end which we have named.

Caput IV - Second objection

Secondly, against scholastic theology certain Catholics also inveigh in this way. Among Catholic Doctors there are very many who seem born for discord, contentious, and divided into sects, to whom it is less a care to investigate truth by disputations than to defend their school and their master, in whose words they seem to have sworn. From which matter a no small injury is inflicted upon theology itself and upon truth. For they who are, as it were, bound and consecrated to certain fixed and settled opinions of some doctor, and are thereby compelled of necessity that even those things which they are not wont to approve they are forced, for the sake of constancy, to defend, and those which they judge more probable, by the same reason to assail - these clearly profess that they are driven to learn or to dispute not so much by zeal for truth as by a spirit of contention.

Solutio. Nevertheless, we ought not on that account to despise scholastic theology itself. For this vice, if it is one, is not of scholastic theology, but of morals. Nor does theology suppose as a certain principle anything unless it is something established either by Scripture, or by the definition of the Church, or by the ancient tradition of the Fathers. Besides these, that which a better reason, deduced from these principles, has proved is embraced as the sounder and better doctrine. Yet this ought not to hinder us from deferring much, in opinions, to the most learned of the scholastics on account of their authority - namely, to St. Thomas and others; but certainly with moderation applied, as Francis Victoria, a disciple of the same St. Thomas and his most ardent defender, was

wont often to admonish, as Cano reports and follows in book 12 On Theological Places, chapter 1.[17] For he used to say that among us the authority of St. Thomas ought to be sufficient for us, if a better reason is not forthcoming; but that the words and reasons of so great a Doctor are not to be received without selection and examination. Nay rather, if it happens that he has said something less probable, we ought to imitate his modesty and industry, who neither withdrew faith from the more ancient Doctors, nor went over into their opinion if reason drove to the contrary. Wherefore he wishes that we ought not to be so attached to the doctrine of St. Thomas that we think it a crime to depart, even a hair's breadth, from some argument, foundation, opinion, or conclusion of his; nor to think all the things which he hands down - whether in the conclusion of an article, or in the reasons by which he confirms a conclusion, or in the solutions of arguments - so certain that we judge nothing to be more certain or more probable; since the school of theologians does not defer so much, in all their opinions, even to Augustine, or to Jerome, or to any of the foremost Fathers of the Church, that it never embraces the opposite, with other Fathers, as more probable.

We see indeed from the school of St. Thomas illustrious men, most zealous defenders of his doctrine, have marvelously illustrated his writings - I mean Cajetan, Francis Victoria, Domingo de Soto, Melchior Cano, Bartholomew Torres - who nonetheless did no injury to the holy Doctor when they sometimes, with mature counsel and due modesty, did not approve some opinion of his. Nor did they believe that the Angelic Doctor had concerning his own doctrine, as to its being embraced by others, any other judgment than Augustine had concerning his own; who in the book On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 21, writes thus: "I do not wish anyone so to embrace all my things as to follow me, unless in those in which he shall have perceived that I do not err. For this reason I now write books in which I have undertaken to revise my little works, so that I may show that I did not even follow myself in all things."[18] In the same sense the same Augustine said in epistle 19 shortly after the beginning that he gave this honor to the sacred writers alone, that he would believe that none of them had erred in writing; but that he read others so as not to think something true because they had written it, but because they persuaded it by canonical authors or by probable reason. He subjoins, speaking to Jerome, to whom he was writing: "Nor do I think, my brother, that you judge otherwise; assuredly I do not suppose that you wish your books to be read as those of the Prophets or the Apostles are read, concerning whose writings it is impious to doubt that they are free from all error."[19]

Yet indeed you may see some who deliberately try to refute the doctrine of St. Thomas, and then at last think they have done something glorious when they have pronounced something against his opinion - which theologians ought rightly to hold in suspicion. These indeed are worthy of no slight rebuke; and there is no doubt that they shut up the road of knowing the truth to themselves.

17. Melchior Cano, De locis theologicis, lib. 12, c. 1; reporting Francis Victoria's counsel regarding the authority of St. Thomas.

18. St. Augustine, De bono perseverantiae, c. 21: "Neminem velim, sic amplecti omnia mea, ut me sequatur; nisi in iis, in quibus me non errare perspexerit. Nam propterea nunc facio libros, in quibus opuscala mea retractanda suscepi, ut nec me ipsum in omnibus me secutum fuisse, demonstrem."

19. St. Augustine, Epistula 19 (ad Hieronymum), post initium: he reserves inerrancy to sacred Scripture; of other authors he accepts what canonical authorities or probable reason persuade. "Nec te, mi frater... quam Prophetarum vel Apostolorum: de quorum scriptis, quod omni errore careant, dubitare nefas est."

Therefore the Thomists aforesaid teach that doubtful and probable matters, which do not pertain to the dogmas of our faith, ought to be treated by the theologian with such purity of mind and right desire of truth that, although much must be deferred to the authority of Blessed Thomas, nevertheless reason, maturely thought out, if ever it happens to be found, should have first place. For in these matters not only the weight of authority in disputing, but also the considerations of reason, must be sought.

Indeed also, as Cicero says, the authority of those who profess to teach is sometimes wont to harm those who wish to argue; for they cease to apply their own judgment, and hold as valid only what they see has been judged by him whom they have as their master. Yet in such matters we are not bound; but we must proceed with mature counsel and after much time, and without rejecting the authority of the scholastics. Therefore, that many theologians do not conduct themselves rightly in treating questions is, as I said, the fault not of theology but of themselves. On that account, therefore, theology itself ought not to be despised.

Caput V - Third objection

Thirdly, what offends some in scholastic theology is the style and uncultivated manner of speaking - too low and popular, and stuffed with barbarisms and solecisms. Hence there are those devoted to Rhetoric and eloquence, who are more delighted by words than by things; who neglect to investigate the natures and properties of things and to explain difficulties: to whom the very name "scholastic" is odious. In which matter indeed they by no means follow the doctrine of Cicero, whom they venerate as an oracle in the art of speaking. For he, making mention of Epicurus in the book On the Ends of Good and Evil and passing judgment on him, says, "The speech of the philosopher himself does not offend: for he embraces in words what he wishes, and he clearly says what he understands; although you would not scorn a philosopher for this not to have eloquence, nor would you have him flee it greatly."[20] We have indeed seen in our own age distinguished men, unskilled even in the vulgar tongue, who nevertheless, by the highest learning in matters, have elicited admiration from the most learned. Therefore, in scholastic writers, it is not so much purity of language as doctrine that should be examined.

Moreover, there are certain words which the scholastics frequently use, which - although barbarous - yet because they express more easily what could scarcely be explained by circumlocution, deservedly ought to be retained by the theologians and used as proper to the art. For it has always been permitted (as Tully says), and already from the beginning the authors of disciplines have claimed for themselves this right: that, whereby they might more conveniently hand down their own matter, they should devise certain words proper and peculiar to themselves. Finally, this barbarism of the scholastics and unskilled logomachy ought rather to be ascribed to the vice and rash injury of men than to be imputed to sacred doctrine itself. For if this be treated in a purer speech, it will not therefore lose its force and learning. Moreover, the matters that are

20. Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, in the judgment on Epicurus: the philosopher's speech should be clear and fitting to the matter, not an orator's florid style.

treated in it and the mode of disputation by which truth ought to be examined require no abundance of words, no excessive eloquence and orators' style; but few words, which are sufficient for explaining difficulties; a style humble, plain, and brief, which nevertheless is not obscure, but more suited to disputation. Therefore, since these things are so, even if some of the ancient and some of the more recent theologians have written barbarously and without polish, on that account theology itself ought not therefore to be judged useless, nor yet pernicious.

Caput VI - Fourth objection

Fourthly, the study of humane letters, they say, flees our theology, because in it curious questions are disputed which altogether neglect to consider the dispensation of our salvation. Such, they say, are questions like this: in what way the Father and the Son are distinguished from the Holy Spirit - namely, whether by the same thing by which they are constituted - which would seem to pertain nothing to piety.

Solutio. But although it may be true that many questions are treated by more recent and by ancient scholastics which are not of great moment either for expounding the dogmas of faith or for deducing theological conclusions from them, and many also which seem to have difficulties in common with the philosophers, only the matter being changed - for instance, whether something is prior on the part of the efficient cause in the influx of grace with the expulsion of sin, and what indeed is prior on the part of the patient - we shall see this elsewhere (q. 113, a. 5). Nevertheless, that inquiry by which the Father and the Son are distinguished from the Holy Spirit is most useful. For, as we shall note below, in Disputation 147, while it is diligently examined whether the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, it will be distinguished from that - in which also the question

Tertia obiectio. The third thing on account of which scholastic theology offends some is the style, and an uncultivated manner of speaking, a low and vulgar speech full of barbarisms and solecisms. These are men devoted to rhetoric and eloquence, who delight more in words than in things, who neglect to investigate the natures and properties of things and to untie difficulties; to whom the very name "scholastic" is hateful. In this, to be sure, they do not at all follow the doctrine of their own Cicero, whom they venerate as an oracle in the art of speaking. For he, in the book On the Ends of Good and Evil, making mention of Epicurus, says: "The speech of this philosopher does not offend me: for he also embraces in words what he wills, he says plainly what I understand: and yet, from a philosopher, if he brings eloquence, I do not despise it; if he does not have it, I do not much demand it." We have indeed seen in our time distinguished men unskilled even in the vulgar tongue, who nevertheless, for the highest learning in matters, were an object of admiration to the most learned.[21]

Therefore, in theologians it is not so much purity of language as doctrine that must be sought. There are moreover certain words which the Scholastics frequently use, which, although they be barbarous, yet because they more easily express what by circumlocution could hardly be explained, ought deservedly to be employed by the theologians themselves, even those of polished speech, as

21. Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, in the place mentioning Epicurus.

proper to the art. For it has always been permitted (as Tully says), and already from the beginning the authors of disciplines have claimed this right for themselves, that, in order to hand on their own matters more conveniently, they should devise for themselves certain proper and peculiar terms.[22] Finally, this barbarism of the Scholastics and clumsiness of speech is rather the fault and injury of the times than something to be imputed to sacred doctrine itself. For if this be treated in a purer style, it will not therefore lose its force and erudition.

Moreover, the things that are treated in it, and the mode of disputation by which truth ought to be examined, do not require a great abundance of words, excessive eloquence, and an oratorical style; but few words, which may suffice to untie the knot of the difficulty; a humble, plain, and brief style, which, however, should not be a cause of obscurity, but more accommodated to disputation. Since therefore these things are so, even if the ancient theologians and some of the more recent have written barbarously and without polish, for that reason theology itself ought not to be judged useless, much less pernicious. Quarta obiectio. Furthermore, students of the humanities mock our theology because in it very many curious questions are disputed which could altogether have been omitted without harm to our salvation. Such, they say, is this: by what the Father and the Son are distinguished from the Holy Spirit; whether, namely, by the same thing by which they are constituted; which seems to pertain nothing to piety.

Solutio. But although it is true that many questions treated by more recent Scholastics and by the ancients are not of great moment, either for explaining the dogmas of faith, or for deducing thence theological conclusions, and many also which seem to have a difficulty common with the philosophers, only the matter being changed - such as this: what is prior on the part of the efficient cause, the infusion of grace, or the expulsion of sin; and what on the part of the patient, as we shall see in I - II, q. 113, a. 8 - nevertheless that question about the relation (*relatio*) by which the Father and the Son are distinguished from the Holy Spirit is most useful. For, as we shall note below, disputation 147, while it is diligently examined whether, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would be distinguished from Him; and in that same question, in what way the Father and the Son are in reality distinguished from the Holy Spirit, the best argument is taken against the Greeks, who, against the dogma of faith, affirm that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

I confess that that question about the order of the infusion of grace and the expulsion of sin, and some others, are truly common with the physicists, only the matter being changed; some also pertain little to piety. But this is not sufficient for condemning scholastic theology as useless; just as neither is the multitude of articles and questions, which others unjustly censure. For if this be a fault, it could easily have crept in through the excessive curiosity of the Doctors; nevertheless many of these curious questions are useful for sharpening minds. Indeed, from that question about the infusion of grace some dogma of faith, in its own place, will not a little be elucidated; and when this happens, a question ought not to be judged curious or useless. Therefore, at least theology which purely and sincerely examines theological questions, and even philosophical ones which can

22. Tully (Cicero) on the right of founders of disciplines to coin proper technical terms.

conduce to theological truths, is not to be hissed down and derided. Let therefore these rhetoricians and those too much devoted to the humanities avail themselves elsewhere; but let us pursue our disputations in the order that we have indicated.

On sacred doctrine, what

Articulus II - Whether sacred doctrine is a science

Objicitur primo. It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every science proceeds from principles known of themselves; but sacred doctrine proceeds from the articles of faith, which are not known of themselves, since they are not granted by all - for "not all have faith" (2 Thess. 3). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.[23]

Objicitur secundo. Further, science is not of singulars; but sacred doctrine treats of singulars, for instance, about the deeds of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and the like. Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.

Sed contra: St. Augustine says in book 14 On the Trinity, about the middle of chapter 1: "To this science is attributed that alone whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened." But this pertains to no science except to sacred doctrine. Therefore sacred doctrine is a science.[24]

Respondeo: I answer that sacred doctrine is a science. But it must be known that there is a twofold genus of sciences. For some there are which proceed from principles known by the light of the natural intellect, such as arithmetic, geometry, and the like. But others there are which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus perspective proceeds from principles made known by geometry, and music from principles made known by arithmetic. And in this way sacred doctrine is a science, because it proceeds from principles known by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and of the blessed. Whence, as the musician believes the principles delivered to him by the arithmetician, so sacred doctrine believes the principles revealed to it by God.

Ad primum: To the first, therefore, it is to be said that the principles of any science are either known through themselves, or are reduced to the knowledge of a higher science; and such are the principles of sacred doctrine, as has been said

Ad secundum: To the second it is to be said that singulars are delivered in sacred doctrine, not because they are treated principally, but they are introduced both as examples of life, as in moral sciences, and also to declare the authority of the men through whom divine revelation has come down to us, upon which sacred Scripture, or doctrine, is founded

23. The objection follows St. Thomas's format; see 2 Thess. 3:2, "for not all have faith."
24. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 14, cap. 1, about the middle.

Conclusio. Conclusion of the article: Our theology, or sacred doctrine, is a science. St. Thomas proves it, because that which proceeds from principles known by the light of a higher science can truly be called a science. But our theology proceeds from principles known by the light of the blessed, which is a higher science; therefore it can truly be called a science.[26]

Disputatio IV - Whether theology is truly and properly a science

Caput I - Status of the controversy

The difficulties which are wont to be treated in this article seem to pertain not so much to the theologian as to the logician: for it is properly the logician's office to hand down the instruments or mode of knowing and demonstrating; therefore he expressly treats of the nature and property of science and of demonstration, which is the proper instrument of knowing; indeed the whole doctrine of logic chiefly tends to this, namely, to hand down the mode of constructing demonstrations. The logician indeed does not designate nor determine this or that matter, but he describes the form which can be accommodated to any matter, and in it generates the assent of science; as an architect, who in some cheap material forms the idea of a house to be built, from which, in a more precious material, another is expressed. Therefore the question whether theology is a science properly belonged to the logician, who, once the nature and quality of the principles which the theologian assumes were known - namely, how they are known to him, and the perfect form of the syllogism by which he gathers conclusions from them - could easily define whether it be properly a science and whether it have the instruments of true science. But because something will also come up in these questions for dispute which pertains to the theologian - and lest we seem at once at the outset to flee difficulties - we have determined to examine those things which have been disputed by other theologians in this article.

The difficulty, therefore, is this: Whether theology be truly and properly a science. By the name "theology" we do not understand any sort of knowledge about God; for in that way faith also could be called theology. Nor is that understood (says Durandus) by which someone knows how to explain and defend the things handed down in sacred Scripture, as Augustine seems to have used the term in book 14 On the Trinity, chapter 1. But by the name "theology" we signify a science by which someone, from principles revealed in Scripture, or established and believed by the authority of councils or the Church's tradition, infers other truths and conclusions by evident consequence. In which sense theology is more commonly taken, as Durandus admits; but, he says, not so truly: a thing which I do not see how rightly it can be said. Indeed, this seems to be the same as that of which Augustine speaks in that place: for he who defends the principles of our faith against heretics ought by that very fact from the principles of faith best to draw conclusions; as against the Apollinarists, who deny in Christ a human will, he ought to gather in this way: In Christ there was true humanity, but humanity is endowed with will; therefore in Christ there was a human will.

26. Compare St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 1, a. 2.

Concerning theology, therefore, thus taken, not as it is busied in the explication of principles, but as it proceeds to elicit conclusions, the controversy is whether it be truly and properly a science or not.

Caput II - The opinion of Francis of Marchia

Thus, the question having been understood, the first opinion is that which Gregory reports in 1, q. Prologi, art. 4, and Ockham, q. 3, of a certain Francis of Marchia - whom some report to be Mairon, but in truth he is not; for Mairon taught the opposite, as we shall say below. He used to say, therefore, that theology is truly and properly a science, because it supposes the principles of that science - which are the articles of faith - to be of themselves and in themselves known, so that there may be had of them an understanding, just as also of the principles of natural science; for all that, however, he did not deny that divine faith is necessary for assent. I pass over the foundations of this opinion, which Gregory reports more at length; for they are frivolous and of no moment. This opinion is refuted by many - Ockham and Gregory in the place cited - in that part in which it says that all the principles of theology which are in Scripture, or in some other way have been handed down to us, are known of themselves and evidently. Yet they could be impugned even by this sole reason. For, besides that, as we have shown in disputation 135, in this life there cannot be had an evidence of the mysteries of our faith, nor can it be communicated by God unless it be intuitive and beatific - whoever has the mystery of the Trinity by an intuition that is, as they say, the vision which is natural to God alone and the mystery of the resurrection in its structure - those things which depend on the will of God are not evident to any wayfarer per se, nor evident by nature. Thence in the mysteries of faith the note of being evident is not to be found, nor can there be a necessary and fixed assent from such evidence. We grant that in some sciences certain evidence can be had about other species of things, if possible, with a notice taken from those things which are known; but those are not in our power in such a way that, by reason of them, the same evidence which mathematics has could be had. What is per se evident is no less certain than that from which any mathematical conclusion is elicited. Therefore in this there is not supposition of our opinion such that we should incur the note of error, as Paul says in 1 Cor. 13: to see now in a mirror, in an enigma; and 2 Cor. 5: to walk by faith, not by sight. It is therefore true, that since we suppose - as we also suppose without doubt - our theology to be true and properly a science, this is saved not by a headlong supposition. Therefore we shall join battle below with all the scholastic controversies, whether it be true and properly a science, insofar as it proceeds from principles only believed.

Caput III - What Henry held

The second opinion is that of Henry [of Ghent], in the Summa, art. 6, q. 1, and Quodlibet 12, q. 2.[27] He says that theology can be had by wayfarers in two ways: in one way, from principles believed by faith alone; in another, from the same principles known evidently - not, he says,

27. Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 6, q. 1; Quodlibet XII, q. 2.

evidently of themselves, but made evident; which can be brought about by exercise and study of faith itself. For faith (he says) first proposes the mystery to be obscurely believed; then, by diligent effort we are able, through the study of faith, to come to an evident understanding of them. And this evidence, which they think is generated by discourse, he says is not the evidence of vision, which they call intuitive, but an inferior evidence, and one which can exist together with the obscure assent of faith. He seems therefore to suppose that this evidence is not quidditative and proximate, but through other species, just as we have, on the way, concerning God. He says, therefore, that if theology be had in the first way, it is not truly and properly a science; but if it be contained in the latter way, it will be truly and properly a science. The former part he proves by a reason common with the first opinion, which we shall adduce for our own position; for in that Henry agrees with us. But the latter is proved thus: because then the good consequence from those principles known evidently will be a true and proper demonstration, or a certain propter quid generating some evidence of the conclusions. Therefore theology, in that mode, will be properly a science; that is, one whose reasons produce general demonstration.

This opinion is impugned by Durandus in 1, n. 9, Prologi. First, because those mysteries of our religion which are believed alone cannot, in this life, become evident to us - a point of which we shall speak below, disputation 135, and 2, quaest. 1, art. 5. Nay rather, we assert that, even by absolute power, it cannot be that to us there be evidence except an intuitive knowledge alone, in which eternal beatitude consists. For now it is enough to suppose that by the exercise of faith there cannot fall to man an evidence of the mysteries; therefore, the theology of the wayfarers also - according to Henry's own opinion - will not be truly and properly a science.

Secondly, Durandus also proves that, even if the principles of faith were to become evidently known, theology would not be truly and properly a science, as Henry contends: for one more readily assents to some proposition on account of the authority of the speaker than on account of whatever evident reasoning; so that, once the authority ceases, either he would not assent, or at least he would not assent in the same way; therefore he is not said to have science by reason of an assent which is rather derived by some other route. But the one who, in the doctrine of faith, by the exercise of it, would arrive at evidence of the articles, would have it in this way: therefore, by force of such evidence, he could not truly have the science of theological conclusions. The third reason that Durandus brings tends only to prove that one cannot have an understanding of the articles of faith such as is had of the principles in some science, about which sort I do not dispute here; but it must be discussed in disputation 135.

However, Durandus's second reason does not prove what he proposed. For if the articles of faith were to become evident to someone, whether by themselves or by something else, the conclusion which would be gathered from them by an evident consequence would be truly and properly science, because assent to it would be evident through discourse. First indeed, if the articles were evidently known from what is posterior: for in subordinate science a conclusion of science is inferred only from inductive principles and from what is posterior and evidently known. Then, if the articles were evidently known from what is prior, whether by themselves or by other principles, science also from what is prior and the reason why would be gathered from them: therefore Henry

rightly inferred that theology would then be truly and properly science, when someone, from evidently known articles, would also infer evident conclusions. But what Durandus said, that it is necessary, chiefly on account of the demonstration, to assent to the conclusion in order to have science of it, is most true. Yet in that case, even if someone, on account of authority, would at the same time believe the articles by faith and would have evidence of them, being nevertheless prepared to believe on sole authority, still it would not be one and the same assent of faith and of evidence concerning the conclusion drawn from the articles; rather, that conclusion would be known by a twofold assent: one indeed from principles believed by faith, and the other from principles evidently known. But this latter assent would not be chiefly on account of authority, but on account of reason alone, as is clear. Then it would happen that there is a twofold assent to the conclusion, because by the same middle terms, known obscurely and clearly, the same assent to the conclusion cannot be gathered: if therefore, as Henry contends, the articles of faith, which are the principles, were evidently known and at the same time believed by faith, the same obscure and clear assent of the same conclusion would not be gathered. The clear assent, therefore, could be truly and properly science.

Caput IV - The opinion of Cajetan

The third opinion is that of those who say that theology can be considered in a twofold way: first according to itself, then in wayfarers. In the former way, they say, it is properly and perfectly a science; in the latter, it is not a perfect science. Thus Cajetan teaches in this article. As to the evidence of this: when he says that in wayfarers there is not perfect science, he understands that it is not truly and properly [science]. He subjoins the reason in these words: Because that is not truly science which cannot truly be resolved into principles of evidentness. He affirms, therefore, that in wayfarers there is imperfect science, that is, not truly and properly science on account of the state [of this life]: and therefore he thinks that St. Thomas did not answer that theology is absolutely a science, but that it is a subordinate science, so as to indicate that it is an imperfect and improper science.

This opinion of Cajetan, insofar as it asserts that the theology of wayfarers is not truly and properly science, will have to be examined below; for to this the whole difficulty of this controversy is reduced. Now, however, I will show briefly in what way that division of theology - "according to itself" and "in us" - laid down by Cajetan and by others, is to be understood. Cajetan, then, takes theology in a twofold way: one he says is that of God and of the blessed; the other of wayfarers. This latter, again, he divides into theology according to itself, and as it is in us. Therefore, when he says that theology according to itself is truly a science, he is not speaking of the theology of God, by which He has [knowledge] of Himself, about which there is no difficulty: for it is most perfect knowledge; but it is not univocal with created [science], especially with that which is through discourse, which Aristotle defines in Posterior Analytics, book 1, chapter 2,[28] and about which there is now controversy. As to what sort of science God's [knowledge] is, we shall teach below, question

28. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 2.

14. Nor does Cajetan speak of the theology which the blessed have of God, which, though it be evident, is not science as it is defined by Aristotle in the cited place: for that requires to be through discourse; but the knowledge of the blessed is without discourse. All the mysteries of faith are to them per se known; just as to the angels are per se known all those things which they naturally know through their proper species, as we shall say below, disputation 221, chapter 2.

Wherefore Scotus is mistaken in question 3 of the Prologue, question 4, lateral, where he says that theology according to itself, that is, in the blessed, is science as it is defined by Aristotle. He thinks that in them it is produced through discourse; he is mistaken, since, just as it will be proved against him concerning the angels that they do not discourse, so the same is to be said concerning the blessed. For they understand the things that they see as they really are, and therefore they are to them per se known. There is also a lapse in Bassolis, in the place to be cited below, when he asserts that theology is truly a science even in God and in the angels, because it is not of the notion of science (so he says) to be generated through discourse. But he errs, since by this alone intellect differs from science, that science is through discourse, but intellect without discourse. In which he agrees with us against Scotus; and therefore he grants that the theology by which God has [knowledge] of Himself is not science as it is defined by the Logicians, but [knowledge] of a higher sort.

Therefore, when Cajetan asserts that theology according to itself is science as it is defined by Aristotle, he plainly understands the theology of wayfarers, not insofar as in them it is an obscure knowledge gathered from principles believed only by divine faith, but considered apart from the imperfection of obscurity: and on this score he says that it is science, because its argument would be a demonstration, if there were had evidence of its principles. There is indeed a certain [analogy with] mathematical science: there are many demonstrations according to themselves which nevertheless do not generate science for someone to whom the principles are not evidently known, but only believed by faith. And in this sense Cajetan's opinion is true. There is, however, a different case as between the mathematical demonstration and the theological: for the mathematical [demonstration] can in some person generate science, namely, in him who has evidence of the principles; but the theological demonstration certainly can in no one generate science through discourse: for the one to whom the principles of a theological demonstration were evidently known could not discourse, unlike him to whom the principles of mathematics are evident. For the theological principles can be evidently known to no one unless to him who clearly sees God; but such a one cannot discourse, as we were just saying. Wherefore the theological demonstration can be an instrument of knowing for no one; yet it is of such a nature that, if the principles were evident in such a way that discourse could at the same time be had, it would generate science - just as if in this life there could be communicated to someone the evidence of the mysteries through alien species. For the present, however, the controversy is only about theology insofar as it is actually found in wayfarers, with the obscurity of the principles, whether it be truly and properly a science.

Caput V - The opinion of Albert and the Thomists

The fourth opinion, which is rather common among the more recent [authors], is that theology of wayfarers, deduced from articles believed by divine faith alone, is truly and properly a science, not only according to itself, but also as it is in the very wayfarers - though imperfect in its own genus. The more recent [authors] think this to be the opinion of St. Thomas; but what he himself holds we shall see in the next chapter. They also relate in favor of this view, among the ancient theologians, the Antisiodorensis, St. Bonaventure, and Ægidius: of whom the Antisiodorensis, speaking of this matter in passing, teaches the opposite. But Ægidius, in the second part of the Prologue, article 4, disputing about the subalternation of theology, says that it can be called a science, and therefore its task requires that the articles of faith, which are its principles, be per se known in another science, namely, that of the blessed.[29] From this, however, it does not follow, according to the opinion of Ægidius, that theology is truly and properly a science as it is in us, but only according to itself, and, as it is in us, imperfect -

Caput VI - That the theology of wayfarers is not properly science is proved by authority

This last view, more common among the Scholastics, affirms that the theology of wayfarers, as it is in them, is not truly and properly science. This is taught first of all by the Antisiodorensis in book 2 of the Summa, tractate 29, chapter 1, question 1 in the middle, where he says that the cognition of precepts acquired by the natural light from principles per se known is properly science; but that the cognition of precepts which is had from the articles believed on faith is not science, but rather faith. The same was taught by St. Thomas, as will immediately be said. Scotus, under question 3 of the Prologue, in question 4 laterally, where he teaches that theology according to itself is science, that is, in God and in the blessed, even if it be without discourse, seems to deny that it is science in us, and that by inference from the articles of faith we properly know anything. So interprets and follows the sentence of Scotus Ockham in question 3 of the Prologue. The same is openly held by many other Scholastics in the Prologue of the Sentences: Durandus, question 1, number 49; Gregory, question 1, article 4, after the middle; Thomas of Argentina, question 2, article ...; Marsilius, question 2, article 3, conclusion 7; Gabriel, question 7, article 1, note 1; Major, question 4; Francis of Mair, who was alleged for the first opinion, question 14 of the Prologue; Bassolis, question 5, article 3 at the beginning, but especially truly on theology; finally Richard, who is reported for the fourth opinion in question 2 of the Prologue, seems rather to incline to this one; and Henry in the place alleged above - if we suppose what is really certain, namely that the principles of our theology are not evidently known to us.[30]

29. Ægidius [Giles of Rome], In II Sent., Prologus, pars II, art. 4; the Antisiodorensis [Hugh of St. Cher or the school of St. Victor] and St. Bonaventure are also cited by later authors for this view.

30. Antisiodorensis, Summa, l. 2, tract. 29, c. 1, q. 1; St. Thomas, De veritate q. 14; John Duns Scotus, Prol., q. 3; William of Ockham, Prol., q. 3; Durandus, In Prol., q. 1, n. 49; Gregory of Rimini, In Prol., q. 1, a. 4; Thomas de Argentina, q. 2; Marsilius of Inghen, q. 2, a. 3, concl. 7; Gabriel Biel, q. 7, a. 1, nota 1; John Major, In Prol., q. 4; Francis of Mair, In Prol., q. 14; Bassolis, q. 5, a. 3; Richard of Middleton, In Prol., q. 2; Henry of Ghent as cited.

Nor does St. Thomas seem any less openly to have been in this view. For in question 14 De veritate, article 9, he says: "Whatever things are properly known by certain science are known by resolution into first principles, which are per se evident to the intellect; and thus all science is perfected in the vision of the present thing; whence it is impossible that the same thing should be of faith and of science." Where he speaks not only of perfect science, but also of that which strictly and properly is science.

He says the same in 2-2, question 1, article 5, in the body. However, in reply to the second, he adds something else which seems to be contrary. For he asserts that from principles accepted by faith something is proved among the faithful just as from what are naturally known among all; and therefore that theology is science, as was said in the beginning of the work. This, however, must be explained so that the holy Doctor not be contrary to himself in so brief a space. He says, therefore, that in the same mode something is proved among the faithful from those principles as among all from principles per se known, only in this respect, because in theology such is the disposition of discourse and of syllogisms from proper principles, that if these were evidently known, without doubt they would generate science in us; just as was generated in all discourse from principles per se known. Now, however, because the principles of theology are received by faith, they generate assent and prove only among the faithful, as principles per se known do among all others. From this he gathers that theology itself is science: which Caietan understands in that article "according to itself," as was explained in the previous chapter; and in the second article of this question he also says that even if St. Thomas calls theology simply "science," yet because he adds that it proceeds from principles demonstrated in a higher science, but accepted by faith and authority alone, he seems (as Caietan says) to call it not simply science, but in some respect. Wherefore on 2-2, q. 1, a. 5, ad hoc dubium, the same Caietan teaches that theology in us wayfarers is "according to itself" truly subalternated science, but does not yet have the status of science until it be joined with the evidence of the principles.

Finally St. Thomas in 3, dist. 33, q. 1, art. 2, little question 4, says that if there were some science which could not be reduced to principles known naturally, it would not be of the same species with the other sciences, nor would it be univocally called "science." From which it is gathered that for the ratio of the assent of science it is necessary that to him who uses demonstration the principles be evidently known, and not believed by faith alone. In this sense, besides Caietan, Thomas Capreolus interprets St. Thomas's mind, in 1, q. Prologi, article concluded, 3, and article 3 ad 1 against the third conclusion; and Hervaeus in Quodlibet 11, q. 18.[31]

Caput VII - The reason by which others are accustomed to prove this opinion

This last view, which we judge more probable, is not proved in the same way by all who follow it. Some use this reason. Science properly so called is not of singulars, but of universals; for it ought to be of those things which cannot be otherwise; but singulars can be otherwise; but our theology is of

31. St. Thomas, De veritate q. 14, a. 9; Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 1, a. 5; In III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiunc. 4; Thomas de Vio (Cajetan), ad 2-2, q. 1, a. 5; Thomas Capreolus, In Prol., q. 1; Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet XI, q. 18.

singulars, as of the mystery of the Incarnation, and of other contingent things, which come to be solely by the will of God, such as the resurrection of the dead, and justification in the sacraments: therefore it is not science. This argument is used by Aureolus, as found in Capreolus in question 1 of the Prologue, article 2, in the fourth argument of the second class against the second conclusion; Gregory in the third proof of the first conclusion; and Bassolis in that article 3 somewhat from the beginning. Indeed, they would be held by the same reason to assert that even if there were evidence of contingent things, there would not be of them properly science; as Bassolis expressly noted.[32]

But this reason has no weight. Wherefore others try to solve it. St. Thomas, in this article 2, ad 2, says that singulars are treated in sacred doctrine not because theology is principally about them, but because they are adduced by way of example. Yet this solution does not seem to satisfy: because the mysteries of the Incarnation, justification, and resurrection are not adduced as examples of doctrine; but of them our theology treats principally. I pass over Albert's solution, question 1, cited, ad 1; and that of Alexander in the same member 1, ad 1 and 2, which satisfies much less. I reply from the doctrine of Scotus, that in that question 4, it is possible to have no less perfect cognition of singulars than of universals, if that be evident, as indeed it can truly be; and so of them there can be science - only under the condition that this evidence be had from singular principles through some discourse. For if it were had without discourse, it would be understanding rather than science. Yet for that reason it is commonly said that science ought to be of universals, because these, for the most part, can be evidently known to us by the natural light, and thus certain, that is, of perpetual truth, so that they can never deceive us. But if there should be had an evident knowledge of some singulars, as indeed there can be had, why, supposing certain things, could not by discourse some evident conclusion be gathered? Why would not that be truly and properly science? Thus among astrologers the news comes: the motions of the wandering stars, and the vicissitude of their orbs, the encounters of the stars and the aspects, have evident demonstration. It is not, therefore, repugnant that there be truly and properly science of singulars, whose affections, even future, are evident and can be certainly known.

Wherefore, if God should communicate the evidence of singulars which we believe by faith alone, as of the Incarnation, of glorification, etc., then there could be deduced evident and necessary conclusions, as that Christ had two wills, that he was capable of laughter, and so forth. This doctrine, it seems, was handed down by Caietan: for to the first he says that of the Incarnation and of other things contingent according to themselves there can be science: because, insofar as they are subject to this science of theology, they are necessary - he understands this by reason of the revelation of faith, as he says, that contingent things, namely, can be known by God.

One thing, however, can stand in the way lest we have science of those singulars which are believed by divine faith. For if the evidence of them were communicated to us, it ought to be of the thing as it is through its proper species, which they call intuitive. But from this there can be no discourse, as we said in chapter 5, which is the proper instrument of knowing. And if we were to call this intuitive knowledge properly and strictly "science," we could also by the same name call

32. Petrus Aureolus, as cited in Thomas Capreolus, In Prol., q. 1, a. 2; Gregory of Rimini, prob. 3 of concl. 1; Bassolis, q. 5, a. 3.

the knowledge of singulars which we know by faith alone. But because science properly, as it is distinguished from the understanding of first principles, is not said to be a cognition of something per se known, but through discourse, therefore it must be said of the singular mysteries of faith that even if God were to communicate to us an evident knowledge of them, it could not be science - not because they are singulars, but because they would be per se known; and from these by a true discourse nothing could be evidently deduced, but all things would at once be known in the same intuition.

Moreover, the common axiom of the philosophers, namely that "there is no science of singulars," is to be understood of the singulars of corruptible things, and of science acquired by human industry and the natural light. For of these, especially as regards their future existence, we cannot have anything certain, because they do not have operations and effects remaining in the same mode, nor a determined existence. I do indeed see that Scotus, in the place cited, not only said but thought this: that there cannot be science of singulars, even if the evidence of them be had through discourse, because he thinks that of the ratio of science, as it is defined by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics I, chapter 2, the universal object is required; and thus that "science," as defined in Ethics 6, chapter 4, is undoubtedly distinguished from opinion. But his view does not please me. For that condition of the universal object does not seem necessary for the ratio of science, even as it is defined in the Posterior Analytics, except in the mode which we explained above. Nay rather, in Ethics 6, chapter 4, the Philosopher says that science is an estimation of universals, of those things which are necessary. Wherefore the science of singulars is not yet that of which it is treated in Ethics 6, if that condition be necessary, as Scotus supposed.

From which it is plain that it is not because of singularity as such that we deny there is science of the singular mysteries of faith; but because, if God were to communicate to us an evident knowledge of them, it would be through intuition proper, not through the discourse by which science is effected.

Caput VIII - The best reason for the last opinion

To confirm the last opinion, which we said is the more probable, by the best reason, two points must be premised. One is that here the question is not about theology according to itself, that is, about the very disposition of arguing and proving which theology uses - namely, whether that disposition of demonstrations would be sufficient to generate science if its principles were evident, as we said above. The other is that we are inquiring whether our theology is truly and properly science, under the name "science" taken in that proper signification in which the philosophers have always employed it; just as when...

If of the singular mysteries of faith there cannot be science as it is, through its proper species, namely that science which they call intuitive, from this, however, no discourse can be made, as we said, which is the proper instrument of knowing. But if we were to call this intuitive knowledge properly and strictly science, we could also by the same name designate the knowledge of singulars which we know by faith alone. Yet because science properly, as it is distinguished from the intellect

of first principles, is not said to be a knowing of something per se known, but through discourse, it must be said that the singular mysteries of faith, even if God were to communicate to us a certain knowledge of them, cannot be science: not because they are singular, but because they would be per se known without discourse, and therefore would be intellect rather than science.

By that same reason it is commonly said that science ought to be about universals, because these, for the most part, can be evidently known to us by natural light, and thus with certainty, that is, with a permanence of truth such that they can never deceive us. Yet if of certain singulars there be had a certain knowledge - as in truth there can be had - and, certain things being posited, some evident conclusion is gathered by discourse, why would there not be of that a true and proper science? As happens to astrologers: for the motions of the heavens, and of each sphere, the conjunctions of the stars, and the aspects of any given one, have demonstration. Therefore it is not repugnant that there be true and proper science of singulars, whose affections, even future, can be known evidently and with certainty. Wherefore, if God were to communicate an evident knowledge of singulars which we believe by faith alone - such as of the Incarnation, glorification, etc. - from these there could be deduced evident and necessary conclusions, as that Christ had two wills, that He was capable of laughter, etc. This doctrine seems to have been handed down by Cajetan in the section "To the first." For he says that there can be science of the Incarnation and of other things which are contingent according to themselves; because, insofar as they are subject to this science of Theology, they are necessary - he understands this by reason of the revelation of faith - just as, he says, there can be science in God of things that are contingent.[33][34]

One thing indeed can stand in the way, lest we have science of those singulars which are believed by divine faith. For if an evident knowledge of them be lacking to us, there ought to be had from those a discourse, rather than any science; but from those a discourse could not with certainty be deduced, but all things together would be known in the same intuition.

But the vulgar axiom of the philosophers, namely, "There is no science of singulars," is understood of the singulars of corruptible things, and of science acquired by human industry and natural light. For of these, especially as regards their future existence and state, we cannot have anything certain, because their operations and effects, as well as their determinate existence, do not remain in the same way. I see well that Scotus in the place cited feels differently: for he asserts that there cannot be science of singulars, even if an evident knowledge of them be had through discourse, because he thinks that, by the account of science as it is defined in Posterior Analytics I, chapter 2, the object must be universal; yet he allows that there can be a higher sort of knowledge than the science defined in that place, or even science as it is defined in Ethics VI, chapter 4 and the following, insofar as it is only distinguished from opinion.[35][36] But his opinion does not please me. For that condition of a universal object does not seem necessary for the account of science, even as it is defined in Posterior Analytics I, unless in the manner which we explained above. Nay

33. Scotus, loc. cit.
34. Cajetan, ad primum.
35. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 2.
36. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, c. 4 sqq.

rather, in Ethics VI, in that very chapter, Aristotle openly says that science is an estimation about universals and about things that are necessary. Wherefore a science of singulars would still not be that which is treated in Ethics VI, if that condition were necessary, as Scotus thought.

The best reason for the last opinion

To confirm the last opinion, which we said is the more probable, by the best reason, two points must be premised. One is that here the question is not about theology according to itself, that is, about the very disposition of arguing and proving which theology uses - namely, whether that disposition of demonstrations would be sufficient to generate science if its principles were evident; for about this we have said enough in chapter 4. The other is that we are inquiring whether our theology is truly and properly science, under the name "science" taken in that proper signification in which the philosophers have always employed it; just as when there is inquiry about God, whether in God there is mercy, justice, or anger, the inquiry is about the proper propriety of that which is asked, with the common and universally received meaning of those names presupposed, and also with the definition by which the philosophers have been accustomed to define the proper significates of those names; otherwise theologians would be free to apply these names to strange significations.

We therefore take here "science" properly, and distinct from the intellect of those things which are per se known. For in a broader signification commonly also received, the intellect of principles is also called science. By this reason, the knowledge which God and the angels have about things has also been accustomed to be called science. We, then, speak only of science as it is distinguished from knowledge per se, which is called intellect, when we inquire whether our theology is properly science.

These points being laid down, if the definition of science which Aristotle and the other philosophers hand down does not suit our Theology, it follows, without doubt, that it is not to be said to be science; nor is the theological argument to be called demonstration; for this is the proper instrument of science. Now we speak of the theological argument as it is referred to the intellect of the wayfarer, to whom the principles of this [science] are obscure, not to the intellect of another to whom they would be evidently known. But now an argument of this sort is not a demonstration to the wayfarer; nor is the assent of its conclusion science. This is proved in this way. For although the principles of our Theology are most true and necessary, and the discourse constructed from them is necessary - indeed, in the nature of consequence it would be evident to us, so that an evident and certain knowledge of the conclusion would be inferred, unless the obscurity of the principles hindered - nevertheless from those there is not generated in us an evident knowledge of the conclusion; and hence neither science: for of its account, as it is defined by Aristotle and commonly by the philosophers, evidence is of the essence. Or else one must say that here "science" and "demonstration" are employed in another way than they have been defined anywhere by the philosophers.

Accordingly, some Thomists, that they might stubbornly defend a fourth opinion, say that for the account of demonstration it is not necessary to proceed from principles evident to him who has the demonstration, but that it suffices if he receive the principles from another who has the evidence of them. And in this way they think that a subalternate science has a true demonstration and science in him to whom the premises are not evident, but are received by faith from him who has the subalternating [science]. This seems to have been taught by St. Thomas in this article, and to be proved from Aristotle, Topics I, chapter 1, who, defining demonstration, says that it is that which proceeds from first principles, or from those things which, on account of the first, have received true credibility.[37][38]

However, this solution has nothing of probability. For he who in perspective assumes principles that are indeed true and necessary, but are to himself known only by human faith, cannot through a syllogism from them attain a greater and more certain knowledge of the conclusion than is the faith of the premises; but since that faith is human, the assent of the conclusion will be only human faith, or certainly opinion. But when St. Thomas says that a subalternate science is science, he says that it proceeds from principles known by the light of a superior science; he is not to be understood as though he thought that from mere human faith in the principles there could be generated an assent of science in a subalternate science; rather, he calls the subalternate faculty "science" (as Cajetan explains) according to itself - that is, he says that the disposition of argumentation which the subalternate faculty uses is truly a demonstration, if otherwise the evidence of the principles be not lacking, as indeed it can be had, not within the limits of a subalternate science, except a posteriori and by induction, but by the light of the subalternating [science]. In the same way he understands our Theology to be science, because it receives its principles from the light of a higher science, namely of the blessed. In this sense Cajetan interprets the mind of St. Thomas. But whether this happens in Theology in the same way as in perspective and other natural subalternate sciences was said in chapter 4.[38]

Finally, the testimony of Aristotle in Topics I, text 2, is frivolous; for he did not say that science is that which is derived from first principles per se evidently known to us, or from first principles received by faith alone - for thus Theology would be science, as the adversaries contend - but he said, [that it proceeds] either from those things which, by reason of first principles, have received credibility. By "faith," however, he understands in general assent, not that peculiar sort which we procure from testimony alone.

These, truly, are said to "receive credibility from first principles," whose assent is acquired not from testimony or from things accepted as probable, but from first principles evidently known. But the principles of Theology are neither per se evidently known to the theologian, nor does he have assent to them from first principles evidently known to himself; rather, they themselves are first principles known only by testimony, or as probable. Therefore it cannot be said of our Theology

37. Aristotle, Topics I, c. 1.
38. Cajetan, in this article; cf. ch. 4 above on subalternate sciences.
38. Cajetan, in this article; cf. ch. 4 above on subalternate sciences.

that it proceeds from those things which, by reason of first principles, have received true credibility, but from things believed by faith alone, which the theologian assents to on testimony, authority, or probable reason; and that is far different.

Others, however, although they admit that within the limits of a subalternate science an assent of science cannot be generated unless someone have evidence of the conclusions which are assumed as principles in the subalternated [science], as was proven in article 3, yet they think our Theology has a different account. For although it proceeds from principles believed by faith alone, yet because that faith is divine, and its assent is so much more certain than that of the things which are evidently certain to us as the testimony of first Truth is more certain than any created truth and reason, therefore they say that our Theology, which elicits conclusions from such principles, is truly science. But neither does the reasoning of these people prove anything. For that the principles be known by divine faith, and therefore that there be had of them an assent more certain than is the evident knowledge of other created things, does not suffice for generating the evidence of the conclusion, which is of the essence of science, as it is defined by Aristotle and by the philosophers commonly. To say, moreover, that that divine certainty without evidence suffices for the account of science, is to define science at one's pleasure, and to employ it otherwise than the philosophers have accepted.

In addition there is this, that a theological conclusion and its assent is not supernatural according to its substance, as commonly the assent of divine faith is said to be, once the infused and supernatural habit for believing has been posited; because the theological assent does not rest immediately upon the testimony of God by a supernatural illumination, as the assent of faith does, but upon a consequence drawn from the articles of faith, sometimes also with an added proposition known by natural light. Whence it follows that the assent to a theological conclusion is not infused in its nature, but acquired. Indeed, some have said probably that the assent of the theological conclusion, and the science thereof, does not depend upon the supernatural assent of the articles of faith, infused by a supernatural light, but upon the firm assent of them obtained from signs, or reason, or the human authority of the Church. Maior, In IV Sentences, q. 9, in the Prologue, grants that a heretic, who does not have infused faith, can be a theologian, and have the habit and act of Theology about many conclusions: therefore this is a sign that the assent of a conclusion is not generated from the supernatural assent to the articles. Otherwise, just as in a heretic who denies one article the assent from infused light does not remain around some other, as we shall say in II - II, q. 5, so neither would there remain a truly theological assent to any conclusion, the same as that which he had when he was faithful: because whenever the assent to principles, or of some principle, in any syllogism is changed, it is necessary that there be changed the assent to the conclusion which is generated from that principle; for the assent to the principles flows into the conclusions.[394041]

39. Below, art. 3.
40. Maior, In IV Sent., q. 9, Prol.
41. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae II - II, q. 5; and II - II, q. 1, a. 1.

Wrongly, then, do certain Thomists concede that the theological assent in a heretic is of another kind than it was in him when he was faithful. For who can perceive that difference in the mode of assenting? Why, therefore, must we assert it without foundation? If we grant a different assent to the articles of faith as from a supernatural light, and as from signs, or from human authority, it is because, with the supernatural habit of faith posited, it is necessary to posit its proper assent, which rests upon the testimony of first Truth, distinct from the assent from miracles or from human authority, or from another mode deduced by reason, as we shall show in II - II, q. 1, a. 1. Finally, in whatever way we say that the assent to theological conclusions is generated, since it does not attain the evidence which the philosophers posit to be of the essence of science, it will not be able to be properly named science, but only in a broader signification, insofar as any knowledge whatsoever, however acquired, can be called science.

But they think that there is a different account of our theology. For although it proceeds from principles believed by faith alone, nevertheless that faith is divine, and the assent of it is so much the more certain than those things which are evidently certain to us, by how much the testimony of the first Truth is more certain than any created truth and reason; therefore they say that our theology, which from those principles so believed elicits conclusions, is truly science.

Refutation. Yet neither does their reason prove anything. For that the principles be known by divine faith, and therefore that a more certain assent be had about them than there is to the evident knowledge of other created things, does not suffice for generating the evidence of the conclusion, which is of the notion of science, as it is defined by Aristotle and by the philosophers commonly. But to say that that divine certitude without evidence suffices for the notion of science is to define science at pleasure, and to usurp it otherwise than the philosophers received it.

To this there is added that a theological conclusion, and its assent, is not supernatural according to substance, as the assent of divine faith is commonly said to be, supposing once for all an infused and supernatural habit for believing: because the theological assent does not rest immediately upon the testimony of God by supernatural illumination, as the assent of faith does, but upon a mediate consequence from the articles of faith; sometimes also by the mere position it is inferred by the natural light alone. Whence it is that the assent to a theological conclusion is not supernatural by nature, but acquired. Indeed certain men have said that the assent to the conclusion and the science are generated from the assent to the supernatural articles of faith by a supernatural light; or again that they are generated only from a firm assent to those articles, compared with either reason or the authority of the Church. Major concedes that even a heretic can have a habit about many conclusions of theology; therefore the assent to the conclusion is generated from the assent to the principles. Otherwise, just as we shall say below at 2-2, q. 1, so too the assent would not remain to any logical conclusion which he had when he was faithful; because as often as the assent is changed, whether of some principle or also of some middle, of necessity the assent of the conclusion which is deduced from that principle is changed. But some Thomists say that the theological assent is of a different kind than when he was faithful. For who will be able to perceive that difference in the mode of assenting? Why therefore ought we to assert it? That there is a different assent, one which is from a supernatural light, another which is from human

authority or from reason, we shall show at 2-2, q. 1, a. 1. Finally, in whatever way we say that the assent to theological conclusions is generated, since it does not attain the evidence which the philosophers posit to be of the essence of science, it will not be able to be properly named science, but only in a broader signification, insofar as any knowledge whatsoever, however acquired, can be called science, especially if it be of necessary matters and without any fear.

About the habit of theology there is to be said in the same proportion as the philosophers propose: for the nature of a habit ought to be discerned from acts.

Response is made to the arguments of the adversaries.

Disputatio V - On the quality of the assent to the theological conclusion, and of the habit concerning it

Caput I - Aureolus's opinion: that the habit of theology is declarative, not adhesive

It must therefore be seen what sort of assent this is of the theological conclusion, and what habit in theology is acquired; in which matter also the theologians vary. The first opinion is that of Aureolus, which Ockham reports: asserting that the habit of theology acquired through discourse is not (as he himself speaks) adhesive, but declarative; as if he said that by such a habit the intellect is not inclined to elicit an act of assenting and of adhering to one part of a contradiction, but only to the act of declaring better and of explaining the mysteries. The first is proved - that a habit is acquired (which in this his opinion Aureolus seems to suppose) - because by the repetition of those acts, eliciting conclusions from the articles of faith, a man becomes day by day more able around them: therefore he acquires some habit which affords him promptitude. From this he proves that through that habit the intellect is not inclined to assent, because if it were to generate assent, it would either be of science or of opinion: not of science, as was shown in the preceding disputation; nor of opinion, for he would fear about the truth of the theological conclusion who assented by opinion alone; but the theologian cannot fear, if he holds the faith of the principles and sees the conclusion to be deduced by evident consequence from them: therefore it remains that it be a declarative habit, because it cannot be any other.

To the first argument of the third opinion, which alone remains for us to be dissolved, response is easy. To the first we say that sacred doctrine is called by the Fathers and Scripture "science" by that general and common reason, not however as it is distinguished from the assent to principles. For neither do the Fathers and Scripture themselves call the very assent of faith, which is the assent to principles and corresponds to the assent which is called "intellect" in other sciences, "science," in that proper and peculiar signification which the philosophers employed to signify only an evident assent and deduced through discourse, but in a broader signification, although without a metaphor, according to which we also say that there is science in God and in the Angels, although the knowledge of God and of the Angels corresponds rather to the intellect of principles, which are evidently known through themselves, than to the knowledge of conclusions, of which alone science

is said to be had, as the adversaries admit, in that proper and peculiar signification which we said. To the reason we respond that what is asserted in it is not enough for there to be science among wayfarers in those things: for evidence is also required, as has been proved. But what sort that assent is to the theological conclusions will be clear in the following disputation.

Caput II - What Ockham and the Nominales think

The second opinion is Ockham's in the cited place, and Gabriel's, q. 7 of the Prologue, a. 1, note 2, and Gregory, q. 1, a. 4, conclusions 2, 3, and 4, and Maior, q. 4 after the middle. They teach first that there is in the theologian not only a habit which they call declarative, but also that through syllogisms drawn from the articles of faith an assent to the conclusions is generated, and that thence an adhesive habit is acquired. Then they assert that this assent, and the habit thence compared, is not of science, as was said above, nor of opinion, nor of infused faith, but of acquired faith, which is either intended through discourse, or is newly acquired when before it had not been acquired.

In the first part of this opinion there agree with the aforesaid authors Marsilius, q. 2 of the Prologue, a. 3, con. 4, and Bassolis, q. 5, a. 3, to the end of the article, who says briefly that there is in the theologian a habit of declaring the mysteries and of assenting to the conclusions; and that the theologian discharges the office of declaring sometimes when by one mystery he declares another, and by one place of Scripture he declares another; which the ecclesiastical writers themselves were accustomed to do. From this exercise the theologian therefore acquires a habit of declaring. Moreover, that habit also to be for assenting they rightly prove against Aureolus Ockham, Marsilius, and Gregory by this reason: As often as discourse from the assent of the premises so moves the intellect to the assent of the conclusion that, if no other cause were present, by that alone the intellect would assent to the conclusion, the discourse is the cause of assenting to the conclusion; but theological discourse is of this sort: for if once a man assents to the premises, whether both be of faith, or one naturally evident and the other of faith, since the discourse and the disposition of them is good and as such appears, of necessity the intellect will be moved to assent to the conclusion: therefore theological discourse is not only for declaring, but also for assenting; and consequently the habit acquired from it will not be merely declarative, but also adhesive.

The latter part of this opinion, namely that the theological assent is not of opinion but of acquired faith, they prove thus: It belongs to the notion of opinion to fear the opposite part; but the assent to a theological conclusion is not with fear, since the form of the inference is evident, and there is an assent to the premises without fear: for either both are of divine faith, or one naturally evident and the other of divine faith: therefore the assent to the theological conclusion is not of opinion, but of acquired faith; and the habit in like manner.

Refutation of the opinion of Ockham and the others. The position indeed of Aureolus, which we reported in the preceding chapter, is sufficiently refuted by Ockham's reasoning and of the others, who prove the first part of their opinion; but we can refute its latter part by this reason. Although the theological conclusion follows without fear, as the aforesaid Doctors of that sentence rightly

prove, nevertheless on that account it ought not to be denied to be an assent of opinion. For to the account of opining an expressed fear, by which someone thinks that thing could be otherwise, is not necessary, as I shall show more fully at 2-2, q. 1, a. 5. For this cause therefore the theological assent ought not to be excluded from the account of opinion. Add that fear seems to belong no less to the account of human and acquired faith than to the account of opinion, since both are from a principle to which of itself it is not repugnant that falsehood be subject. Why then do the aforesaid Doctors rather say that the theological assent is acquired faith than opinion? For acquired faith seems to be the assent most nearly deduced from human testimony, to which he is said to believe who has faith in it; but opinion is said to be had through some probable reason: commonly indeed we use "faith" and "opinion" for the same thing. Wherefore an assent, whether from human testimony alone, or from signs, or from reason deduced, is wont to be called acquired faith. Whether there be fear with it or without it, it matters little, whether it be called faith, or opinion.

Caput III - The true opinion

Therefore that sentence is true, that the assent of a theological conclusion without expressed fear can be called either acquired faith, or also opinion: if we suppose what we said in the previous disputation, namely that theological conclusions are collected from articles of faith not believed by divine faith, but by human and acquired. For thus a theological conclusion will be acquired in a broader signification, or it will be opinion: yet in such a way that the theologian believes it to be most certain. But if we say that a theological conclusion is deduced from articles believed by infused and divine faith, because of the testimony of the first Truth, then it would be called neither opinion nor acquired and human faith; but it would be a certain middle kind of assent between divine and human faith or opinion; and it would differ from divine faith not because the articles would be believed without discourse, but the theological conclusion through discourse, as some think, but because the articles are derived immediately from the testimony of God, the theological conclusion however is collected from the very articles of faith through discourse.

Furthermore, for the explication of this sentence there must be noted the difference between divine faith and the theological conclusion: in divine faith indeed assent is generated through discourse, such that the first principle upon which it rests is that complex "God says," which is the reason for assenting to any revealed and testified article. For he who believes something because God has said it, from the fact that God has said it infers that it is true: nay, he seems also to understand under it another proposition, namely that God is truthful, who can neither be deceived nor deceive. This discourse of faith is not theological, because it is deduced immediately from the testimony of God; but theological discourse is from the believed articles.

But some contend to prove that the assent of divine faith is not generated through discourse, because faith is borne toward one only proposition, namely "God says that he is three and one," to which without another, by the light of faith alone, we assent: but in one proposition there cannot be discourse: therefore the assent of divine faith is not compared through discourse. I answer nevertheless, even if in that one proposition, as it were modal, of "God says" the article be clearly

evident, nonetheless under it a discourse is contained; for it is necessary to assent to both parts, "God says," and also to this, "God is three and one," and to this: "Therefore I assent" - and hence often the intellect should be more expressly instructed, so that it may be more fully explained.

Then there is to be noted the doctrine of Cano, book 6 on the loci, the last chapter, at the tenth little verse, "Sed id postremo"; and of Andreas de Vega, book 9, on the Council of Trent, chapter 39, somewhat at the beginning. They assert that a proposition deduced by evident consequence from articles of faith, or from one de fide and another evident, is a proposition of divine faith, and that to its assent we are straightway inclined by the supernatural light of faith no less than to those things which have been determined by the definition of the Church. Which doctrine some think less true, and in this way they try to refute it. A conclusion always follows the weaker part, whether in the quality of the propositions or also in certitude: therefore when it is deduced from one de fide and another naturally evident, the conclusion will be less certain than if it were de fide; but when it follows from two de fide, at least its assent will be distinct from the assent of faith, because this rests upon the testimony of God as upon a proximate principle, but the assent to the conclusion is deduced proximately from the premises de fide through discourse. Wherefore Catholic faith, which rests proximately upon the testimony, will not incline to the assent of it.

But these Doctors do not seem to have understood the aforesaid sentence of Cano and Andreas de Vega. The reason adduced only proves that the assent to a theological conclusion, insofar as it is inferred from premises de fide, or from one de fide and another natural, is not the assent of infused faith, but either inferior to the assent of the premises, or of another kind. But indeed Cano and Vega, besides this assent which is through discourse and is called theological, contend that there is another produced proximately by the light of faith, which, as a preceding condition, demands the theological assent, even if this is less certain than the assent of faith: which is not wondrous. For as they themselves very well note, and as we shall show more broadly at 2-2, q. 1, a. 1, the assent of infused faith also requires, as a condition, the assent of human faith: for in order that some proposition which has been defined by the Church be believed by infused faith, it is necessary first to believe that the definition was made, either in a Council, or by the Pontiff, which however is known only by human faith. In the same way when a preacher proposes or sets forth the articles of faith, first we believe by human faith; and this being supposed, straightway the higher assent follows from the...

Then, next, the doctrine of Cano must be noted, book 6 On theological loci, last chapter, at the tenth little verse, "Sed id postremo," and of Andreas de Vega, on the Council of Trent, book 9, chapter 39. For Cano and Vega teach that, once an evident consequence from the articles of faith, or from one article of faith and another natural [premise], has been posited as a prior condition, the assent of infused faith follows; for theological demonstration stands to the theologian who demonstrates just as a Council, when it declares something de fide, stands to the whole Church. The only difference is that the Council proposes what it defines to all for belief, so that all are bound to believe; but the theological reasoning proposes [its conclusion] only to those for whom the consequence from the articles of faith is evident. And therefore a proposition contrary to a theological conclusion is commonly called erroneous, not heretical, because it is not proposed to all

as to be believed; but a proposition of Scripture, or a definition of the Church, contrary thereto is called heretical, because that is proposed to all as to be believed. Nonetheless, one who had an evident theological discourse from one premise of faith and another natural, or from both premises of faith, and would not believe the conclusion, would be a heretic, both because, the aforesaid supposition having been made, he was bound to believe it, and also because thereby he would not assent to some premise which is of faith.

Respondetur argumentis contrariis.

For the second agrees with this in what it asserts, namely, that to the assent of a theological conclusion there corresponds an adhering habit, and not merely a declarative [one]. It remains therefore that we explain briefly, concerning the second argument of the first opinion, whether the theological habit is an intellectual virtue (*virtus intellectualis*), as science (*scientia*) is said to be, or not.

I answer first, if we say that the theological conclusion is deduced from articles believed by infused faith, it is without doubt an intellectual virtue, just as we shall say of infused faith itself in 2.2, q. 4, a. 5; because, as infused faith, on the part of the formal object on which it leans, can never incline to the false, so too the habit of Theology cannot move to the false by a consequence drawn from articles believed by divine faith. But this habit is said by Aristotle, Ethics 6, chapters 2 and 3, to be an intellectual virtue that cannot incline to the false; therefore, according to his view, infused faith and Theology are intellectual virtues; and if Aristotle had known such habits, he would without controversy have numbered them among the intellectual virtues.[42]

Then I reply: if we say that the theological conclusion is deduced from articles believed by acquired faith, which some call human, it will perhaps seem to someone to be excluded from the notion of an intellectual virtue, just as opinion is excluded by the same Aristotle, because it sometimes happens that something false is said by opinion. The same line of reasoning seems to apply to acquired faith, and to an assent deduced from it.

Nonetheless it must be said that, even according to Aristotle's view, the theological habit in this way is an intellectual virtue; because acquired faith has been so confirmed through so many miracles and signs, by the holiness of life, and by the authority of the Church, that no intellect, according to the rules of right reason, can believe anything else; indeed, with Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate 1, chapter 2, one can confidently say to God: "If there is error, by thyself we have been deceived. For we see that all these things are confirmed by so many signs and wonders, which cannot be done except by thee." Aristotle, moreover, for that very cause rejects opinion from the notion of a virtue, Ethics 6, chapter 3, because it can happen that by opinion something false is asserted. Wherefore, if such is the confirmation of the articles of our faith, that by no right reason can it be believed that they have been revealed by any other than God, we have no reason to reject from the notion of an intellectual virtue the acquired faith of the articles, and the theological assent deduced therefrom. Otherwise it must be said concerning human faith about other matters, which we easily believe can be false. Yet if there were so great an authority that it would naturally seem

42. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book 6, chapters 2 - 3.

that the contrary could not be true, then even human faith would be an intellectual virtue. Such is that by which we believe that Constantinople or Rome exists. For who does not see that it is naturally impossible that so many men, who bear witness to these things, should have conspired to deceive?

Disputatio VI - On the subalternation of our Theology

Sententia Caietani, et aliorum. cap. 1. - Vera opinio de subalternatione Theologiae. cap. 2. - Respondetur argumentis Caietani. cap. 3.

Caput I - The opinion of Cajetan and others

This question, according to our opinion which we set out in the fourth disputation - that Theology is not a science - could easily be disposed of: for if it is not a science, it cannot be subalternated. But because certain persons who agree with us contend that some genus of subalternation ought to be attributed to our Theology, there can be a controversy whether, besides the defect of evidence, something else is lacking to our Theology by reason of which it is not a subalternated science. The prior opinion is that of Cajetan in this article and in 2.2, q. 1, a. 5, who, although he thinks our Theology in us is truly and properly not a science, as we saw in the fourth disputation, nevertheless affirms that it is truly and properly subalternated. Which opinion was followed by Giles of Rome in the principal part of the Prologue, article 2; and Capreolus seems to have been of the same mind, q. 1, Prolog., a. 1, conclusions 2 and 3, whom he proves by many places of St. Thomas, which in my judgment support nothing of the sort.[43]

Cajetan therefore asserts two things in this article. One is that Theology, according to itself (*secundum se*), is truly and properly a science, and simply subalternated. He understands Theology according to itself, as we explained in disputation 4, chapter 4. The other is that our Theology in us is an imperfect science (I understand "improperly," as I noted there), yet simply subalternated. But, to explain this opinion - which certain recent authors report not quite correctly - he notes that Theology according to itself is not the same as our Theology according to itself. For Theology according to itself is the science which God has of himself; but our Theology is said [to be that] which is in men who are wayfarers and also in the blessed. Wherefore this [latter] too can in turn be divided into the Theology of those who clearly behold God and into the Theology of wayfarers. Finally, Cajetan considers the Theology of wayfarers in two ways: first, as there is in us a certain assent engendered from principles believed by faith alone; then, according to itself. And he understands "according to itself" (even if he does not explain it) not as Theology as it is in the blessed; for he distinguishes the Theology of wayfarers from the Theology of the blessed; and again he distinguishes that of the wayfarers in the two ways which I have said. Accordingly, he understands the Theology of wayfarers according to itself, as I explained from his mind in

43. Cajetan, In 2.2, q. 1, a. 5; Giles of Rome, principal part of the Prologue, art. 2; Capreolus, q. 1, Prologue, a. 1, conclusions 2 - 3; various loci of St. Thomas as cited by Capreolus.

disputation 4, chapter 4: namely, the theological line of argument itself, not as applied to such a subject as we mentioned, to be a true demonstration according to itself, unless the evidence of the principles is lacking.

These positions laid down, Cajetan goes on to prove that the Theology of wayfarers, both according to itself and as it is in wayfarers, is subalternated simply and perfectly to the science of God and of the blessed. He does not say that it is simply a science, but that it is simply subalternated: for as it is in us, he says, it is not simply a science, yet it is subalternated; but according to itself it is a science and subalternated. In both ways, therefore, he says that it is simply subalternated, but only in the latter way is it a science. He proves this by the following reasoning. If anything stood in the way for which reason it would not be subalternated to the Theology of God and of the blessed, it would be that the principles of a subalternated science ought to be conclusions deduced from higher principles from the subalternating science. But the principles of the Theology of wayfarers are the very truths that are first and per se known to God and the blessed, such as that God is triune and one, etc. Yet this does not impede the Theology of wayfarers from being subalternated. For when we transfer to God something that is found in creatures, it must be transferred without imperfection; and therefore we attribute science to him, together with evidence and certitude, but without discursus, which is an imperfection that it has from us. Accordingly, when we say that the Theology of wayfarers is subalternated to the science of God, it is not to be understood as if we attribute to the divine science, as to the subalternating, what created subalternating sciences have - namely, to prove by discourse their conclusions which are assumed as principles in the subalternated science. There is, therefore, no need that the principles of the Theology of wayfarers, which are the articles of faith, be conclusions of the Theology of God and of the blessed; but it is enough if those things which are evidently known to God and the blessed be assumed only as believed by wayfarers in their Theology. Just as, if a Geometer had without any thread of discourse the evidence of his conclusions which he now assumes by way of hypotheses as principles, he would nonetheless be subalternating; and that which is subalternated would be perspicuous, just as it now is.

Such is Cajetan's reasoning and opinion, which he hands down clearly enough, and he confirms it especially by this reason, that in many codices (even the Roman ones, as has been edited, though perilously corrupted by many falsehoods) the reading runs thus: "Et quod subalternare, non quod discursu demonstrationis probentur principia subalternatae, sed quod evidentiam illorum, etc." And those who should have corrected the Roman text ought rather to have expunged the mendacious parenthesis, and restored the words into this form: "Et quod subalternare, non quod discursu demonstrationis probentur principia subalternatae, sed quod evidentiam illorum, etc." And they rightly have this sense, which I have explained as containing Cajetan's opinion.

Caput II - The true opinion on the subalternation of Theology

The opposite opinion is more common and more comprehensive, namely, that our Theology, even if it were true and properly a science, nevertheless could neither be nor be called subalternated. Thus say many recent disciples of St. Thomas; among the more ancient Scholastics, Scotus in the Prologue to the Sentences, after q. 3; in q. 9, a. 8, and the side note ad 4; ad 8; ad quod. Henry of Ghent in the Summa, a. 7, q. 5; the Master of Strasbourg (Argentina), 2, Prologue, art. 3; Durandus, q. 7, Prologue. Likewise this opinion is reported for Aureolus in 1, Prologue, art. 2, in the arguments of the first order against the second conclusion. Hervaeus also agrees, Quodlibet 11, q. 18, who for the sole reason that the principles thereof do not have evidence denies it to be subalternated. Of the others, whom in disputation 4 I alleged on the one side and the other, none, as far as I have read, discusses this matter. Those indeed who said that the Theology of wayfarers is not a science for that reason do not treat of subalternation.

This is Cajetan's reasoning and opinion, which he sets forth rather obscurely, especially for this reason, that in many copies - even those printed at Rome - a certain sentence is very corrupt, in this fashion: "And that the subalternating is not as to the demonstrative discourse for proving the principles of the subalternated, but as to the evidence of them," etc. Yet the words can indeed be emended so as to yield a clear sense: "And that the subalternating is not as to the proving by demonstrative discourse the principles of the subalternated, but as to the evidence of them," etc.; and thus they have the best sense, which we have explained above. Thus far as to reporting Cajetan's opinion.

As to St. Thomas, whom Cajetan and Capreolus adduce in their favor, there is no reason for us to suspect that he held the same opinion as they. He is indeed cited by Capreolus in the work on Boethius's De Trinitate, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 and ad 7, and in De veritate q. 14, a. 9, ad 3; one could also cite him in this article; but nowhere does he assert that the Theology of wayfarers is subalternated to the Theology of God and of the Blessed. Rather, in order to show that nothing hinders Theology from being a science although its principles are taken by us on faith alone, he uses the comparison of a subalternated science, when it takes its principles - believed by faith alone - from the subalternating science in which they are indeed known, which nevertheless is a science. Thus, then, he says: it suffices for the Theology of wayfarers to be a science that its principles be evidently known in the superior. He did not say "in the subalternating," but "in the superior." Therefore St. Thomas neither disputes nor cares about subalternation. Richard taught nothing else in q. 2, Prologue; therefore he ought not to be cited for the opposite opinion.[44]

For a fuller understanding and confirmation of this opinion, first it must be observed that it is not permitted us to philosophize about the subalternation of our Theology otherwise than Aristotle and the other philosophers have spoken about the subalternation of sciences in general; otherwise, as we said in disputation 4, chapter 8, we could attribute to God without metaphor wrath, repentance, and the like, which is false. Therefore, in order that we may know whether our

44. Capreolus, in the work on St. Thomas super Boethium De Trinitate, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 and ad 7; and De veritate, q. 14, a. 9, ad 3. Also Richard, q. 2, Prologue.

Theology is truly and properly subalternated to the Theology of God or of the Blessed, or not, it is necessary to see whether the ratio of subalternation which the philosophers handed down fits it. For if none of the modes of subalternation which the philosophers assign fits it, it will be a fiction and futile to call it subalternated. Wherefore Giles, cited above, is in error: while he strives to defend the former opinion, he plainly admits that no kind of subalternation assigned by the philosophers suits it, but that it is subalternated in a certain new mode.

The true opinion concerning the subalternation of Theology

The opposite opinion is more common and to be embraced, which says that our Theology, even if it were truly and properly a science, could not be, nor be called, subalternated. Thus many recent authors, even true scholastics, disciples of St. Thomas: among the earlier, Scotus after q. 3 of the Prologue, in q. 4 and 5, lateral questions, to 2, 9, and "Sed quid"; Henry in the Summa, a. 7, q. 5; the Master of Strasbourg (Argentina), q. 2, Prologue, art. 3; Durandus, q. 7, Prologue. This opinion is also reported for Aureolus in 1, Prologue, art. 2, in the arguments of the first order against the second conclusion; Hervaeus also agrees in Quodlibet 11, q. 18, who, for the sole reason that its principles are not had with evidence, denies that it is subalternated. Of the others, whom in disputation 4 I alleged on the one side and the other, none, as far as I have read, discusses this matter. Those indeed who said that the Theology of wayfarers is not a science for that reason do not treat of subalternation.

With this posited, what remains is to see wherein the true ratio of subalternation consists. Among the Doctors alleged, Giles treats of this matter in part 2, Prologue, 2, 1; Durandus and Henry in the place cited; therefore it must be noted, second, that for subalternation it is necessary - as Henry and Durandus hold, and Scotus indicates - that the principles of the subalternated be conclusions proved in the subalternating. Wherefore Aristotle assigns in 1 Posterior Analytics, chapter 10, the difference between demonstration That (quia) and demonstration Because (propter quid): which the subalternating science employs; for it proves its conclusions from a cause. But the subalternated science employs That (quia). This is to be understood thus: not because the conclusions of the subalternating - which are principles in the subalternated - are demonstrated from later conclusions of that same subalternated; for that would be a useless circle: but because the subalternated does not have the evidence of the propositions which it assumes as principles from the demonstration of the subalternating and continuity with it, but evidently proves them by induction. For this is an argument that is necessary and produces evidence, if it be made as it ought; as most well known I presuppose from Aristotle's doctrine in Posterior Analytics 2, chapter 18.[45] For since induction consists by its nature in this, that some singulars happen in the same way, it is rightly inferred that in other cases they happen in the same way, because nature is determined to one. But from premises known by induction there is not inferred the Because (propter quid). For

45. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, book 2, chapter 18.

although they are prior to the conclusion itself, nevertheless they are not known a priori, but by induction, which is an argument from what is posterior. Therefore a demonstration drawn from those propositions does not truly show the Because itself, but the That itself.

Third, it must be observed that it does not suffice for the ratio of a subalternated science if its principles are conclusions demonstrated in a superior; for thus the later parts of philosophy would be subalternated to the earlier, which they presuppose; nay rather, a later demonstration of Euclid would be subalternated to an earlier. Therefore, although in every subalternated science the principles are conclusions of the subalternating, nevertheless not every science, or part of a science, which has this, is subalternated to a prior. In two ways, then (says Giles), as is taught in Posterior Analytics 1, c. 10, a science happens to be properly and strictly subalternated; and in each way it is distinguished from the subalternating:

- In one way, when the object of the subalternated science adds an accidental difference to the object of another science whose principles it presupposes. Thus perspective (optics), which deals with the line in a visible thing and with reference to the diverse way a thing appears because of diverse distance, and presupposes as principles the conclusions of Geometry, which deals with the line absolutely, is for that reason subalternated to it. In the same way music, which treats of number as sounding, is subalternated to Arithmetic, which treats of number absolutely. Aristotle adduces the example of each in that chapter, from which we gather the foregoing doctrine.[46] To this mode of subalternation, four things are required according to the opinion of Giles, which there is no need to rehearse.
- The other mode of subalternation is when the subalternating science and the subalternated are about precisely the same object; but the subalternating treats it in a subtler mode, the subalternated in a rougher. In this way the science of machines (mechanics) - an example which Aristotle also adduces - stands to the science of solids; and the science of those things which appear in the heavens, which sailors use and which proceeds in a rougher mode, is subalternated to astronomy, which considers these in a subtler mode.

These two modes are not approved by Durandus; rather, he himself in q. 7, Prologue, says the same, that subalternation only occurs when the objects of two sciences are things altogether diverse, of which one is not included in the other, but is ordered to it as effect to cause, especially the final cause. For example, bridle-making is subalternated to horsemanship; for the bridle serves the movement of horses as a means. Aristotle adduced this example in Ethics 1, chapter 1. And bridle-making presupposes, as principles, the conclusions of horsemanship. However the matter stand, it is necessary for true subalternation that the sciences be altogether distinct; and the objects, and that the object of one not be contained under the object of the other as species is contained under genus. For thus they would rather be parts of the same science than different sciences.

46. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, book 1, chapter 10; and Ethics, book 1, chapter 1.

From all this it is easy to gather the reason why our Theology is not subalternated to the science of God and of the Blessed: both because it does not have the conditions which we have mentioned - and it would be vain for someone to devise another mode of subalternation, as we have already noted - and also because, at the least, for subalternation some distinction seems necessary, both on the part of the objects, even if they be compared to one another as genus and species, and on the part of the propositions, that they not be about the same thing; so that the subalternated tends further than the subalternating, and by the ministry of the subalternating takes its conclusions as principles for inferring others further. But the Theology of wayfarers does not take conclusions and principles from the Theology of God and of the Blessed; rather, the principles of both are the same, and the Theology of the Blessed proceeds from first principles, which presuppose no others, even in a superior science: therefore it is not subalternated to any superior science.

This alone is the difference between the two Theologies, that in that which is of wayfarers the principles are not per se known, but are believed by faith alone, not because the Blessed believe, but because God revealed them to wayfarers; whereas in the science of the Blessed they are per se known. From this, however, there does not follow a subalternation between them, nor that one serve the other as minister. It is otherwise in the other examples of true subalternation: for there, in order that the inferior, subalternated science may proceed to demonstrate its own conclusions, it is necessary that the superior first also elicit its own, which it should hand down to the subalternated as principles; and if the subalternated were to take the same principles which the subalternating has, even if it were to take them under a different kind of cognition, it would not properly be subalternated to it. Thus, too, if someone, from these same principles of some science, which were not per se known to him, but only believed by faith - because perchance he did not have sufficient explanation of them - were to infer the same conclusions which another, who had those same principles per se known, would not be said to have a science subalternated to the science of him to whom the principles are per se known. Auriolus used this reasoning.

But Cajetan replies in this article, at the section Ad secundum dicitur, that our Theology and that of the Blessed are not simply about the same truths: for the Theology of the Blessed is about the articles of faith; ours, however, assumes the articles as principles. He also adds that the object of our Theology has a certain accidental ratio over and above the object of the Theology of the Blessed: for the object of our Theology is God as revealed; but of the Blessed, God according to himself. If this does not satisfy (says Cajetan), at length it must be denied that there is required for the ratio of the subalternated any accidental condition on the part of the object beyond the object of the subalternating.

Yet this doctrine of Cajetan has no foundation. First, because the Theology of the Blessed is not only about the articles of faith, which are expressly set before us to be believed, but also about all other truths which we deduce therefrom: therefore each Theology is about the same things, except that the Theology of the Blessed does not proceed by discourse from articles to conclusions, but all things are per se known to the Blessed; whereas ours does proceed by discourse and from the articles collects other truths. Finally, this is indeed true, that our Theology does not receive conclusions from the Theology of God and of the Blessed as the principles of its own conclusions,

but that the principles of both are the same. Next, what he says about the object of our Theology is frivolous - namely, that it adds an accidental difference, which is revelation, over the object of the science of the Blessed - for this is not some known ratio of the object of cognition such as ought to be the accidental ratio which is included in the object of a subalternated science, but it concurs only on the part of the principle for believing the articles of faith: for this reason they are believed, because we believe them to have been revealed by God. But in theologically deduced conclusions this ratio is certainly not known. And let this suffice for the Theologian concerning subalternation in general.

From these things the solution to Cajetan's argument is clear: for although those things which are attributed to God from creatures ought to befit him without imperfection, nevertheless those things which essentially include imperfection, or something repugnant to God, cannot be transferred to him properly. Therefore, since, for some science to be subalternated to another, it is necessary that the superior hand down to it its conclusions proved by discourse so that they be for it principles, or at least that the same propositions be in each, the Theology of God and of the Blessed cannot be subalternated ...

It is answered: The reply to Cajetan's argument is clear: for although those things which are attributed to God from creatures ought to befit him without imperfection, nevertheless those things which essentially include imperfection, or something repugnant to God, cannot be transferred to him properly. Therefore, since, for some science to be subalternated to another, it is necessary that the superior hand down to it its conclusions proved by discourse so that they be for it principles, or at least that the same propositions be in each, the Theology of God and of the Blessed cannot be subalternated to our theology. Moreover, at the very least, some distinction seems necessary for subalternation, both on the part of the objects - even if they are compared with one another as genus and species - and on the part of the propositions, lest they be about the same thing, so that the subalternated tends further than the subalternating, and by the ministry of the subalternating receives its conclusions as principles for inferring others further. But the theology of wayfarers does not receive from the theology of God and of the Blessed conclusions and principles; rather the same are the principles of each, and the theology of the Blessed proceeds from first things which suppose no others, even in any superior science: therefore it is not subalternated to any superior science.

Only this differs between the two theologies: that in the one which is of wayfarers the principles are not known per se, but are believed by faith alone - not because of the Blessed, but because God revealed them to wayfarers - whereas in the science of the Blessed they are per se known. From this, however, subalternation between them does not follow, nor that one should be subservient to the other. It is otherwise in other examples of true subalternation: there indeed, for the inferior subalternated science to proceed to demonstrate its conclusions, it is necessary that the superior also first elicit its own, which it ought to supply to the subalternated as principles. But if the subalternated received the same principles which the subalternating has, even if it received them with a different kind of knowledge, it would not properly be subalternated to it; just as if someone, from the same principles of some science which were not per se known to him, but only believed by

faith, because perhaps he did not have a sufficient explication of them, were to infer the same conclusions as another who had those same principles per se known, he would not be said to have a science subalternated to the science of him to whom the principles are per se known. In this way Aureolus used to argue.

Cajetan's solution: But Cajetan replies in this article. To the second he says that our theology and that of the Blessed are not simply about the same truths: for the theology of the Blessed is about the articles of faith, while ours assumes the articles as principles. He also adds that the object of our theology has a certain accidental account above the object of the theology of the Blessed: for the object of our theology is God as revealed; but of the Blessed, God according to himself. And if this does not satisfy (says Cajetan), he finally denies that any accidental condition is required for the notion of subalternation, either on the part of the object or on the part of the subalternating.

This, however, has no foundation. For the theology of the Blessed is not only about the articles of faith which are expressly proposed to us to be believed, but about all the truths which we also deduce from them; and about the same things are both theologies, except that the theology of God and of the Blessed does not reason discursively from the articles to conclusions, but all things are per se known to the Blessed; whereas our theology reasons discursively from the articles to other truths theologically deduced. Finally, this is indeed true, that it does not receive conclusions from the theology of God and of the Blessed as principles of its own conclusions, but that the same are the principles of each. Next, it is trifling to posit a difference of object for our theology over against that of the Blessed, to wit, that it is "revelation": for this is an accidental account of the object of cognition, and as such cannot constitute the object of a subalternated science. It concurs on the side of the articles of faith, indeed - for we believe them because we believe that they have been revealed by God - but in the conclusions this account certainly does not concur on the part of the object; rather, in general, the merely accidental note of "being revealed" is not sufficient for the theologian in conclusions.

And thus much about subalternation; this satisfies Cajetan's argument.

It is asked: Whether sacred doctrine be one science.

Articulus III - Whether sacred doctrine is one science

Objicitur: 1) It seems that sacred doctrine is not one science (*scientia*). For according to the Philosopher in the first of the Posterior Analytics, one science is that which is of one genus of subject.[47] But Creator and creature, of which sacred doctrine treats, are not contained under one genus of subject: therefore sacred doctrine is not one science.

2) Moreover, in sacred doctrine it is treated of angels, of corporeal creatures, and of the morals of men; but such things pertain to different philosophical sciences: therefore sacred doctrine is not one science.

47. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, book 1.

But on the contrary: Sacred Scripture speaks of it as of one science: for it is said in Wisdom 10, "He gave her the knowledge of the saints."

I answer: Sacred doctrine is one science. For the unity of a power and habit is considered according to the object (*obiectum*), not indeed according to the material object, but according to the formal account of the object: for example, man, ass, and stone agree in one formal account of being colored, which is the object of sight. Since therefore sacred Scripture considers certain things according as they are divinely revealed (as was said in the preceding article), all things whatsoever that are divinely revealable communicate in one formal account of the object of this science, and therefore are comprehended under sacred doctrine as under one science.

Reply to the first: Sacred doctrine does not determine about God and about creatures from what they are, but about God principally and about creatures secondarily, inasmuch as they are referred to God as to a principle or an end: whence the unity of the science is not impeded.

Reply to the second: Nothing prevents inferior powers or habits from being diversified around those materials which commonly fall under one superior power or habit; because the superior power or habit regards the object under a more universal formal ratio: just as the object of the common sense is the sensible, which comprehends under itself the visible and the audible. Hence the common sense, since it is one power, extends to all the objects of the five senses. And similarly, the things which are treated in different philosophical sciences, sacred doctrine, being one, can consider under one ratio, namely, insofar as they are divinely revealable: and thus sacred doctrine is, as it were, a certain impression of the divine science, which is one and most simple of all.

The conclusion is affirmative. The reason which St. Thomas uses we shall examine in the following disputation.

Disputatio VII - On the unity of this science

Caput I - Durandus holds that our theology is not one science

The present controversy is not whether theology is one simple quality; for this is a question of any habit and science, that is, whether it have one specific ratio of knowing (*ratio sciendi*), so that, even if it be not a simple quality, nevertheless with order to one specific ratio of object it be called one science. For although many judge that philosophy or some other natural science is not one simple quality, yet no one denies that it is one science specifically in the ratio and mode of knowing. Then this controversy has place whether we say that theology is truly a science, which produces assent either only of faith or of opinion; for in either way the assent of conclusions is generated through discourse. The difficulty therefore is whether the mode of inferring conclusions is one specifically; for this is to inquire whether it be one science.

Concerning the question thus understood, the first opinion is that of Durandus: who, in question 4 of the Prologue, seems to teach that theology is not one habit, and even that it is not one science; for he asserts that there are many habits about distinct objects and through distinct media.

And, in number 5 of the same question, in order to explain about what he speaks when he says "theology," he adds that theology is taken in three ways, that is, that three habits can be called "theology." The first is of infused faith, which is conversant about principles; the second and third are conversant about theological conclusions: one is for defending, the other for deducing them from the articles of faith. He thinks, indeed, in number 7 of the Prologue, that theology is sometimes taken for faith alone; but in number 8 he says that more commonly, though less properly, it is used for the habit of conclusions: and thus he says that "theology," taken in the universal, is many sciences, not one. For he supposes, from that same question 4 of the Prologue, number 4, when it is asked whether theology is one science, that it is not the question of a science strictly so called, but as it is extended to faith, opinion, and any assent whatsoever. Thus understood, Durandus's opinion is true, in so far as he says that "theology" in the universal, including infused faith and the habit of conclusions, is not one science. But the present controversy is only about theology, in so far as it is posited as a peculiar faculty about conclusions: and in this way Durandus will plainly admit that it is one science of inferring conclusions from premises, unless perchance he asserts some other peculiar habit for defending the mysteries which are believed by infused faith, which he also calls a peculiar science.

Caput II - The truer and more common opinion

The latter sentence is that of all the Scholastics whom I have read: of whom, although some say that theology is not one simple quality, nevertheless all affirm that it is one science in the mode of inferring conclusions, whether it be called "science" properly or in a broader signification. In this opinion are St. Thomas, Cajetan, and the more recent Thomists in this article, Albert in the Summa, tract. 1, q. 3, memb. 2, and in 1, dist. 1, art. 3, Henry in the Summa, art. 6, q. 3, Aegidius, part 2, Prol., q. 2, Richard, q. 3; who also seem to suppose - or at least do not deny - that it is one simple quality. With these agree Marsilius, q. 2, Prol., art. 4, Ockham, q. 3, the principal question, the annexed little question which is in order the eighth, with the solutions of the arguments added, Gregory, q. 3, especially art. 3, who assert that it is not one simple quality, yet that it is one science. Gabriel, however, q. 8, Prol., only teaches that theology is several habits if we include infused faith and an acquired habit (he understands, moreover, about the articles of faith which are assumed as principles in this science) and the acquired habits both about propositions and about consequences. But whether it be one science like geometry or philosophy he does not define. Not all, moreover, of the doctors cited confirm this opinion in the same manner.[48]

Caput III - Confirmation of the preceding opinion from Cajetan and St. Thomas

St. Thomas's reason: St. Thomas proves that theology is one science because all things which are treated in Sacred Scripture and in sacred doctrine fall under the same formal account of divine revelation (*revelatio*). Now the unity of a science is derived not from the unity of the material

48. The author lists a series of scholastic references in this section, including St. Thomas, Cajetan, Albert, Henry, Aegidius, Richard, Marsilius, Ockham, Gregory, and Gabriel, with their loci indicated in the margin.

object but of the formal. Wherefore if some science considers several material objects under the same formal account, it will be one and the same. Thus also concerning the unity of a power St. Thomas teaches, adducing the example of sight: which, although it is conversant about various things, for instance about man and horse, is nevertheless one faculty of seeing, because all these agree in one formal account of the object of sight, namely of being colored.

This reason, if it be rightly unfolded, is excellent; yet Cajetan and the recent Thomists, in my judgment, have understood it otherwise than St. Thomas.

Cajetan's explanation of the foregoing: Cajetan therefore in this article notes that there is a twofold account of the object: one is, he says, the account "by which," namely the entity itself of the thing which is the cause of its passions and is assumed as the immediate middle in demonstration, just as entity in metaphysics, quantity in mathematics, and so forth. Another is the account "under which," namely abstraction, or the immateriality of the object: for example, abstraction from sensible and intelligible matter in metaphysics, from sensible matter alone in mathematics, and so forth. And this is called the formal account of the object, not as it is a thing, but as it is an object. By the former the object is constituted in the genus of thing; by the latter in the genus of knowables: just as the object of sight, namely color, is under two genera, and in the genus of passible quality - of which the species are odor, taste, color, and sound - and in the genus of sensible - of which the species are visible, audible, etc. And these differences are not real in the very objects, but only extrinsic denominations; whereas the differences of the former genus are real. Therefore (says Cajetan) the distinction of the senses among themselves and the unity of each is not attended according to the distinction or unity of the object in the genus of real being and passible quality, but in the genus of the sensible; and hence one faculty of sensing can be occupied about several objects in the genus of quality, as sight about white and black, etc., because they have the same account of the object under which, that is, in the genus of the sensible. So also the distinction of sciences and the unity of each ought not to be taken from the unity and plurality of objects in the genus of being, but in the genus of the knowable and speculable. With good reason therefore by St. Thomas theology is said to be one science, because all the things which it treats have one account - not indeed in the genus of being, but in the genus of the knowable - namely, divine illumination by revelation. This doctrine of Cajetan is much approved by the more recent authors; yet by Aristotle's testimony and reason it can easily be refuted.

For Aristotle, in book V of the Metaphysics, chapter 15, expressly teaches that science is not referred to the knowable as knowable, nor sight to the visible as visible; but that science is terminated to the thing itself which is known, and sight to color or something else, that is, to the thing; and that in this way they ought to be defined. He proves it thus: otherwise the same would be said twice, that is, there would be a certain useless repetition and a circle; for the thing defined would enter into the definition - as I shall show more fully elsewhere (Disputation 104, chapter 2). This can be confirmed also in another way. For it is prior that science be terminated to the known thing as object than that the thing be denominated "knowable." For something is called "knowable" from this, that a science of it can be had. Now "knowable" is a relative, of that sort of things which, as Aristotle in the same place testifies, are said to be "toward another" from the fact that other

things are "toward them," and therefore they are not the thing itself, but only by name are "toward another," as we shall also show in the place cited. Therefore science has, with respect to the thing itself, a relation to the thing, that is, to the object, prior to that by which the thing is called knowable. And the same is to be said of sight and the visible, and of any other similar case.

...as with any other faculty and its object, it must be learned: therefore a habit of science or a certain faculty does not have specific unity from its order to the thing under that ratio which is called the "under which" (sub qua), and is an extrinsic denomination; but from its relation to the thing itself, and to the object according to its quiddity and nature. Wherefore St. Thomas in this article, when he said that a power takes its species not from the material object, but from the formal, did not understand by "material" the color, and by "formal" the denomination "visible"; but by "material" he understood the very substances imbued with color, such as man and horse; by "formal," however, the ratio of color. Accordingly our theology will not therefore be one science or habit because all the things it considers put on one ratio of revelation, or of the knowable; for this denomination already presupposes unity in the habit itself and in the science from which it proceeds.

Objectio. Yet someone may say on behalf of Cajetan that that ratio of "revealable" in the object of theology is not a denomination from the habit of theology itself, but from the infused light of faith, or from divine revelation that is external. Thus every circle and repetition is removed: for it is prior that a thing be revealed by God than that the science of theology be occupied with it as revealed; and so it could have the character of a formal object conferring species.

Soluitur. However, Cajetan's doctrine cannot be defended in this way. First, because he generally teaches that the species of a science is to be taken from the object under a formal ratio and the denomination "knowable," and the species of sight from color under the ratio "visible," and so in other cases. Therefore he thinks the same of theology, namely, that its species is to be taken from the object under the denomination "knowable": but the argument made above conflicts with this. Next, even God's revelation, whether external or internal through infused faith, is occupied only with the articles of faith, which are assumed in theology as principles, and not with the conclusions as they are deduced by us through discourse. But theology has its unity from the conclusions as they are gathered from principles: therefore the ratio of revelation cannot confer unity on our theology. And although to theological conclusions once deduced through discourse, even divine faith within us may bestow assent, as we said: nevertheless it is prior that the conclusions be deduced than that they be assented to by infused faith: therefore prior to their being believed, there must be in them something from which the unity and species of theology be taken.

Vera explicatio, et defensio posterioris sententiae.

Caput IV - A truer explication and defense of the latter opinion

Two other reasons are brought forward by the other Doctors previously mentioned, which excellently confirm this opinion. The first is of Henry, Albert, Richard, and Marsilius, who say that our theology is one science because all the things that are treated in it have an order to one subject,

which they call a subject "of attribution," not "of predication," namely God: for although not all the things that theology treats can be predicated of God, nevertheless it considers all through a respect to him, as to the end and author. Thus, indeed, it disputes about God so as to show not only what he is in himself, but also how he is an end to be obtained by the rational creature, how he is the author of all things by creation, how he communicated himself by the hypostatic union, and the rest. For the same reason also the theologian treats the things that pertain to the matter of grace and of the sacraments, and to moral discipline, so as to show by what means and helps man can obtain his end, and by what he is hindered from obtaining it. Therefore, it cannot be, says Henry, that our theology, considering such various things under this ratio, is not one science.

The second reason is St. Thomas's, which Henry also indicates in this manner. All the things that theology treats, it considers under one formal ratio of the object; but the unity of a science is taken from the unity of the formal ratio in the object: therefore our theology is one science. Now this formal ratio of the object is not what Cajetan understood, as has been sufficiently proved; but just as the medium of demonstration in any science whatsoever is called the formal ratio of knowing other things, so in theology the medium and the principle which it assumes for inferring conclusions is the formal object of theology itself, and the rest are considered by theology under that respect. In this very way the same Doctor, in 2.2, q.1, a.1, said that the formal object of divine faith is the First Truth, that is (as we shall explain there), the testimony of the First Truth, upon which, as upon a medium and principle of believing, faith rests.[49] Since therefore our theology, in every theological discourse, assumes as principles those things which it believes to have been revealed by God, insofar as it believes them to be revealed, therefore the ratio of the formal object, or of the medium of theological demonstrations, is the same according to species. Wherefore theology is rightly said to be one science. And this is true whether we say that in a theological demonstration there are assumed principles believed by infused faith from the sole testimony of the First Truth, or only believed by human and acquired faith: for in either way we always believe them to be revealed by God; and in either way the theological conclusion deduced from them will be one according to species.

Caput V - How theology uses natural principles, although it is one science

Our theology sometimes assumes, in its demonstrations or in certain syllogisms, some natural principles, which it therefore believes to be God's doctrine because they are evidently known by natural reason: nevertheless it does not assume these alone, but together with another article known solely by revelation. For example, in order to prove that the sins of homicide and fornication must be explained distinctly in confession, we assume this revealed principle: All mortal sins must be explained distinctly in confession; then we subsume from moral philosophy: But killing is a sin distinct from fornication; and we gather the conclusion: Therefore it must be explained distinctly. Wherefore, if we are to defend that theology is one science, it must be said that to it there does not pertain a disputation about a matter that is wholly moral, which, from

49. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 1, a. 1.

principles merely natural, elicits conclusions: for this kind of demonstration has diverse principles, and it gathers evident conclusions. Theology must always proceed from some revealed principle. Therefore, in order to defend that theology is one science, it must be said that to it there does not pertain a disputation about a matter that is wholly moral, which, from principles merely natural, elicits conclusions: for this kind of demonstration has diverse principles, and it gathers evident conclusions.

Someone will ask why, then, are those things which pertain to morals treated so diffusely in theology, from the principles only of natural and civil law (for those things that are proper to canon law seem theological). I answer, as to theology insofar as it is a science distinct from others, these moral matters do not pertain: hence, as regards that part, there will not only be a distinct habit, but even a different science. Nevertheless our theologians have with very good right treated of these matters, because a theologian ought also to be a moral philosopher, so that his theology may be able to profit others. From which it has also come about that moral philosophy, in that part of theology which pertains to morals, has been treated more exactly, and more illustrated, than by the philosophers; and indeed many of our theologians, aided by faith, have found things beyond Aristotle and other philosophers, so that nothing which pertains to morals could be lacking.

Finally it must be observed that when we say theology is one science, we must understand this insofar as it gathers its conclusions from certain principles and by certain consequences. For insofar as it deals in opinions, or argues either from merely probable principles or by merely probable consequences, not only is it not the same habit with that theology which we have said to be one science, but it is not even the same science as that: because it does not have the same genus either of principles or of arguments. Besides, we cannot deny that many things are disputed by the Scholastics which, as to theology insofar as it is one science, do not pertain.

It remained to explain how faculties and powers take their species from their object considered in the genus of thing, when it happens that there is not one univocal ratio of the object in the genus of thing. For by this reason Cajetan seems to have recourse to the ratio "under which," which at times is common to different things in the genus of thing, as was explained above: I say, then, briefly, that for the specification of some power a univocal ratio of the object in the genus of thing is not necessary, neither a generic nor a specific ratio; but that one power is distinguished in species from another only by this, that it is conversant about a distinct object adequate to it. I call "adequate" whatever that is which the power by its operation embraces completely: just as sight has light and color. Nor does it obstruct that something be called the adequate object of one power which also can be referred to by another: because "adequate" is that which the power comprehends as the whole, and nothing else; but that which is adequate to one, can be not adequate to another. Whether indeed anything else is required for the notion of "adequate," we shall say in the following disputation.

Articulus IV - Whether sacred doctrine is a practical science

To the fourth, we proceed thus. It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science. For the end of a practical science is operation, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 2. But sacred doctrine is ordered to operation, according to that of James 1: "Be doers of the word, and not hearers only." Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.

Further, sacred doctrine is divided according to the Old Law and the New. Now law pertains to moral science, which is a practical science: therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.

But on the contrary: every practical science deals with things that are operable by man, as moral science with the acts of men, and the science of building with buildings: but sacred doctrine is principally about God, of whom men are rather the work: therefore it is not a practical science, but more a speculative one.

I answer that it must be said that sacred doctrine (as has been said), being one, extends to the things which pertain to the various philosophical sciences, on account of the formal ratio which it attends to universally: namely, insofar as they are knowable by the divine light. Whence, although in the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, sacred doctrine nevertheless comprehends under itself both; just as God by the same knowledge knows both himself and the things that he does. Yet it is more speculative than practical: because it treats principally of divine things rather than of human acts: of which it treats insofar as by them man is ordered to the perfect knowledge of God, in which eternal beatitude consists. And through this the reply to the objections is evident.

Conclusion, and the sum of the whole article is this: Just as God knows by the knowledge by which he knows himself, and by it also knows other things and what he does; so also is our theology; yet it is chiefly speculative; because it treats of God principally, rather than of other things.

quae the same thing sometimes agrees in different things in the generic order of thing, as was explained above: I say therefore briefly, that the necessity of specification for any power is not from the notion of an object univocally; in the generic order of thing neither generic nor specific; but only so far as one power is distinguished from another by the species from the object that is dealt with concerning a distinct object adequate to itself. Unity of powers is taken from an adequate object in this way: just as sight has both light and color. Nor does it stand in the way, for something to be called the adequate object of one power, that it can also be regarded by another: because that is called adequate which the power's operation can comprehend wholly and nothing else; but that which is adequate to one, can be not-adequate to another. Whether anything else is required for the notion of the adequate, we shall say in the following disputation. Objicitur: 1) It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science. For the end of the practical is operation, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics II, text 3; but sacred doctrine is ordered to operation, according to that of James 1: "Be doers of the word, and not hearers only"; therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.[5051]

2) Besides, sacred doctrine is divided by the Old Law and the New. But law pertains to moral science, which is a practical science; therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.

But on the contrary: Every practical science is about things operable by man, as moral science is about human acts, and the building art about buildings; but sacred doctrine is principally about God, of whom men are rather the works; therefore it is not a practical science, but more speculative.

I answer that: Sacred doctrine (as has been said), being one, extends itself to those things that pertain to the various philosophical sciences on account of the formal reason that it considers in diverse subjects, namely, insofar as they are knowable by the divine light; whence, although in the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred doctrine comprehends under itself both; just as God by the same knowledge knows both himself and the things that he does. Yet it is more speculative than practical: because it treats principally of divine things rather than of human acts; of which it treats insofar as by them man is ordered to the perfect knowledge of God, in which eternal beatitude consists.

And through this the reply to the objections is evident. The conclusion and the sum of the whole article is this: Just as God's knowledge, by which he knows himself and by which he also knows other things, is at once practical and speculative; so too is our theology; yet it is chiefly speculative, because it treats more principally of God than of other things.

Disputatio VIII - Whether our theology is practical or speculative

Caput I - The teaching of St. Thomas and the sentence of Scotus

The teaching of St. Thomas in this article is not only true, but would also be very easy to understand, were it not that Cajetan and some more recent writers, by excessive subtlety, have rendered it more obscure. Nor would so great a debate have been needed in this matter, had not the other Scholastics, supposing the question to be of greater moment, taught so many and such varied opinions. All which disputation I would gladly have omitted, did it not seem more a flight than a care to avoid prolixity. It must therefore be examined whether our theology is practical or speculative. In which question we must also, in passing, treat of practice and speculation; for from these it is gathered what a practical and a speculative faculty is. But, as is our custom, let us first set forth the opinions of others.

The first sentence is that of Scotus, who in Prologue, question 4, and in the second article, teaches two things: one is, that theology, even in that part which is conversant about God and necessary truths, is in us indeed a practical science, but in God altogether speculative. The other is, that theology, in that part which deals with contingent truths - if they be our works - is in us indeed practical, but in God, concerning all contingent truths, is speculative.[52][53]

50. Aristotle, Metaphysics II, text 3.
51. James 1:22.

The chief foundation of either assertion is the definition of practice, which he himself hands down in that question. I say therefore first, in this way: practice (praxis) is an act of another power than the intellect, naturally posterior to intellection, apt to be elicited conformably to right reason, in order that it be a right act. Omitting the explication which Scotus himself employs at length; from this definition he gathers that practice universally is an act of the will elicited or commanded; for this alone is naturally posterior to the intellect, and, as a rule, regards reason itself.

From this principle he proves that theology in us, both that which is conversant about God and necessary truths, and that which is conversant about our operations, is practical: because that habit is practical whose act is truly practice; such is the act of theology concerning all these truths; therefore the habit also will be practical. He proves that the act of theology is practical thus: because that is practical cognition which is naturally prior and by its own nature conform to right reason; which Scotus said to be practice. Now such is theological cognition, even of God himself, considered in itself: for it moves the affect, whether about God himself, or about the other objects of the virtues which it treats; and that affect, without an exterior act commanded, is practice, by the definition posited. By this same reasoning Scotus ought to concede that the clear vision of God is practical, because a love conformable to right reason naturally follows it.

Then he proves that theology in God, which is his knowledge of himself and of creatures, is not practical: for although love follows it, nevertheless that love is not the rule of the will in God, inasmuch as the will of God has rectitude from itself, not from an order to the rule of reason; and hence will in God will not be practice, because it is not by its nature conform to right reason, but has rectitude from itself. With Scotus, in part, agrees Bassolis in question 8 of the Prologue, article 2; for he asserts that theology is not only the knowledge which God has of himself, but also that which the blessed have of God by his clear vision, not to be practical; yet for a different reason than that by which Scotus teaches this. Concerning the theology which God has of himself, he proves his sentence, because to the notion of practical cognition it is necessary that it move to practice by an affect which presides about the end; but the theology which God and the blessed have does not do that, because it is prior to every volition about the end; therefore it is not practical. From which, conversely, he infers that the theology of wayfarers is practical.[54]

However, although the question seems rather about words than about the thing, the sentence and mode of speaking of Scotus do not please. For neither is it permitted to anyone to impose names upon things at will, even if in the thing itself, being unfolded, nothing absurd be contained. Therefore practice and practical ought to be called by all what the Greek philosophers - especially Aristotle - who best understood the force of Greek words, wished to express. Since, therefore, it will be shown below from Aristotle that something else is called praxis, and something else practical, than Scotus has called them, it will also be clear, without foundation, that Scotus spoke thus.

52. Scotus, Prologue, q. 4.
53. "Secundus articulus."
54. Bassolis, q. 8 Prologi, art. 2.

Meanwhile, however, it must be added, as we shall note also below in question 14, article 16, that the reason is of no moment on account of which he himself taught that the science which God has of himself, or of things, is not practical.[55]

Caput II - Two other opinions which Durandus reports

For the will of God not to have, as a first rule, his own cognition, befits any created will as well, as I shall show in First - Second, question 19, article 3. For the first rule of goodness and malice by consonance or dissonance is not the dictate of reason, but the very nature itself of the rational being; whereas the dictate of reason is the proximate rule proposing and judging that which is consonant and dissonant to rational nature: nor does anything hinder our saying that in God also it is thus in the same way. Therefore, if in us that knowledge which moves the affect to right love is, in the sentence of Scotus, practical, so also must we judge concerning the knowledge which God has of himself and of other things. Another reason, by which he peculiarly proves that the knowledge which God has of creatures is not practical, we shall easily refute in that same article 16. For the present, these things against Scotus suffice.[56]

Bassolis also, without foundation, wished to call only that knowledge practical which, from a prior affect about the end, directs to another affect or to a work. For since the knowledge of synderesis in general, and the knowledge of prudence in the singular order - which suddenly dictates something to be done - in first morals, is truly practical, and does not proceed from a prior affect about some end, the condition aforesaid is assigned in vain. Nor does it stand against this that Aristotle, Ethics VI, chapter 1, says the speculative intellect is conversant about universals, but the practical about singulars: for he said this for the reason that the practical intellect is conversant in deliberation about singulars: while the speculative is in considering universals, for the most part, as is usually the case. Yet this by no means hinders that the practical intellect have its universal principles, for deducing singular conclusions by prudence: as Aristotle seems to have handed down in De Anima III, chapter 8, text 59, where he thus says: "But that reason which is attributed to science does not admonish, but abides." By which words he understands, as St. Thomas explains, speculative reason; and of the practical he subjoins: "But since of estimations and of reasons one is universal, another singular: the universal says that every good is to be honored; but this says, that I am good: this opinion moves, not that universal; nay rather both move." Therefore Aristotle concedes that practical reason is also conversant about universal principles. And consonant with this is St. Thomas in First Part, question 79, article 12, when he asserts that practical reason discourses about singular things and operations, and has universal principles for that end.[57][58]

The second sentence is that which Durandus reports in question 6 of the Prologue, number 7, of certain persons who used to say that our theology is simply speculative; not because it is not conversant about works, but because any science receives its denomination simply from its end:

55. Below, q. 14, a. 16.
56. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 19, a. 3.
57. Aristotle, De Anima III, c. 8, text 59.
58. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 79, a. 12.

but the end of theology is our beatitude, which is speculative knowledge; therefore theology will be a simply speculative science. Durandus more at length impugns this sentence; for us, the first reason which he himself alleges will suffice. Because a science is not to be called practical or speculative except from its proper act which it elicits; which if it be practical, the science itself will also be practical, even if it dispose to beatitude as to the end to be obtained; if, however, it be speculative, it will itself also be speculative. It must therefore be seen whether the act which theology has about the things it treats is practical or speculative, or of both conditions; that from this we may gather what the habit of theology itself is. Concerning which act the Scholastics are not sufficiently agreed.[59]

The third sentence, which the same Durandus reports in that same question 6, number 14, is of others who asserted that theology is neither practical nor speculative, but affective; that is, which is ordered to moving the affect. They prove this, because the principal end of it is to arouse the love of God, which theology especially considers: which if it is affective, it will be neither speculative nor practical; because the affective pertains to the will; but the practical and speculative to the intellect. This sentence, with its foundation, Durandus relates. And this he seems to have taught, Aegidius, Fourth Book, Prologue, question 1: for he affirms these three to belong to theology - affective, practical, and speculative: the first principally, the other two...

Caput III - What Henry held

The second opinion is that which Durandus reports, Prologue, q. 6, n. 7, of certain persons who were saying that our theology is simply speculative: not because it does not concern itself with deeds, but because any science whatsoever takes its denomination simply from its principal end; but the end of theology is our beatitude, which is speculative cognition; therefore theology will be a simply speculative science. This opinion Durandus attacks at greater length; for us the first reason which he himself alleges is sufficient. For a science is not to be called practical or speculative except from the proper act which it elicits; which, if it be practical, the science itself also will be practical, even if it dispose toward beatitude as toward an end to be obtained; but if it be speculative, it itself also will be speculative. Therefore it must be seen whether the act which theology has concerning the things which it treats is practical or speculative, or of both conditions, so that from that we may gather what the habit of theology itself is (habit, habitus). About which act indeed the Scholastics do not sufficiently agree.

The third opinion, then, is that which the same Durandus reports there, q. 6, n. 14, of others, who were asserting that theology is neither practical nor speculative, but affective; that is, which is ordered to moving the affect. They prove this because its principal end is to stir up love of God, which theology especially considers; which if it is affective, it will be neither speculative nor practical, because the affective belongs to the will (voluntas); but the practical and speculative to the intellect (intellectus): thus Durandus reports this opinion with its foundation. And this Giles seems to have taught, Fourth Book, Prologue, q. 1, for he affirms these three to belong to theology -

59. Durandus, Prologue, q. 6, n. 7.

affective, practical, and speculative: the first principally, the other two improperly. And the reason of this is that a science takes its denomination from the principal end; but the principal end of theology is to stir the affect to love.

I, however, do not see why our theology should not be practical and speculative, even if it be affective, that is, even if it move the affect to love: for the affective does not belong to the will but to the intellect; for that which moves the affect is either the intellect itself, or belongs to the intellect: therefore it is not repugnant that one and the same science be in the intellect equally practical and speculative, and at the same time affective. For consideration itself, whether practical or even speculative, sometimes moves the affect to love of the thing which it considers: therefore the affective is not distinguished from the practical or the speculative in cognition. Scotus impugns the same opinion, Prologue, q. 4, by the fourth path. For he judges that theology cannot be called an affective science, if the affective is posited as something distinct from the practical; but if it be said to be the same, he judges it to be vain. And he says this because he thinks praxis to be an act of the will, either elicited or commanded; but the practical act of the intellect is a cognition which moves the affect, as we reported above. But since praxis is not only an effect of the will, nor is a practical cognition always that which can move the affect; because a speculative cognition can also move it, as we will say; nothing stands in the way whereby one and the same science can at once be speculative and affective; just as also practical and affective. Albert is seen to have handed down Giles's opinion, on I, dist. 1, art. 4, where he teaches that theology is an affective science, but does not deny that it is speculative and practical: indeed in the Summa, Part 1, tract. 1, memb. 3, he says it is practical, because it is occupied about the work of virtue. He seems, however, to call it practical only because, even if it considered God, nevertheless it refers the consideration to love: and he takes praxis in the way Scotus does: explicitly, however, he does not deny that it is speculative. But we say that, even if theology is an affective science, nevertheless it must also be said to be practical and speculative, if the other conditions do not fail, about which we will speak afterward.[60616263]

A varied opinion of Henry is found in Henry, art. 8, q. 3, who asserts that theology is simply speculative: he does not deny that it is practical, nor does he expressly affirm that it is at once practical and speculative, but he calls it simply speculative; because although in part it directs to action, nevertheless since this is ordered to the contemplation and speculation of God, whom he thinks to be the principal end of theology, it must simply be called, he says, speculative, not practical: just as, on the contrary, moral philosophy, even if it speculates truths, nevertheless because it orders speculation to work, is said to be simply practical. He seems, moreover, to suppose that a practical cognition is not, as Scotus thought, that which moves the affect, but that which has operation for its object.

This opinion, in what it supposes, is true: for if it admitted that theology is at once practical and speculative, but simply speculative, that is, principally, it would not differ from the opinion of St. Thomas and of others, which I think to be truer: but if it says absolutely that it is speculative, or

60. Durandus, Prologue, q. 6, n. 7; q. 6, n. 14.
61. Aegidius (Giles of Rome), IV Book, Prologue, q. 1.
62. Scotus, Prologue, q. 4, by the fourth way.

that it has no act of practical cognition at all, it can easily be refuted from the things which we will say below. From which also it will be clear that a practical cognition, even if it be assumed as a means and disposition to contemplation, is not speculative, but remains within the limits of the practical: therefore if our theology has the act of practical cognition and of speculation, as will be proved, it ought not to be called simply, that is, altogether, speculative, but indeed simply, that is, principally speculative.[64]

Caput IV - The opinion of Durandus

The fifth opinion is Durandus's, in Prologue, q. 6, n. 20, who allows theology to be taken in three ways; as he had noted before in Prologue, q. 1, n. 6, and q. 5, n. 6. First, for the habit whereby we believe the things which are handed down in Sacred Scripture. Second, for the habit whereby the same things are declared and defended. Third, for the habit whereby from the articles of faith conclusions are deduced. He says therefore there, Prologue, q. 6, n. 20: First, that in the first mode theology is simply practical. He proves it because that science which has some work for its object is simply practical; but theology in the first mode has meritorious work for its object, for everywhere it exhorts to good works: therefore in this way it is simply practical. Now if sometimes in Scripture something is proposed which pertains altogether to speculation, it is not a wonder; because this rarely happens, and for the most part those things are handed down which pertain to morals. He teaches the same altogether there in q. 6, n. 25, about the habit of faith according to its whole latitude.

Second, he teaches that in the second mode, namely the habit of declaring and defending the principal articles of faith, theology is simply speculative. He proves it, both because the object of it is not some operation, but God himself under the notion of Savior, which pertains not to work but to speculation; and also because that is a simply speculative habit, whose operation is the cognition of truth, and there it rests: but the habit which is posited for defending the mysteries serves only to the end that the truth be known: therefore it is speculative.

About the third mode of theology he says nothing in the body of the question, because he thinks it falls back into the first mode and has the same reason with both. Wherefore, in Durandus's opinion, about that third mode it must be said that theology, which deduces conclusions from the articles, about which our principal controversy is, is simply practical: which doctrine he also hands down there, Prologue, q. 6, in solution 2, where he also assigns a special reason for this, which he had likewise said before, q. 5, n. 21. He says therefore that theology, which is the habit for deducing conclusions from the articles of faith, is so practical that even from articles which pertain to mere speculation it does not deduce a speculative conclusion, but an altogether practical one: for when something speculative is deduced from the articles of faith, it is not a new conclusion, but serves rather to declare the article itself alone; yet that which is inferred as a proper conclusion is simply practical.

63. Albertus (Albert the Great), In I Sent., dist. 1, art. 4; Summa, Part 1, tract. 1, memb. 3.
64. Henry (Henricus), in... lum., art. 8, q. 3.

He proves the first point, that no speculative conclusion is deduced from the articles, because such an inference either amounts to nothing, or only slightly perfects the intellect. Next he proves that many practical conclusions are collected. For from this, that Christ emptied himself, we do not gather this to declare it, but in order to collect a new conclusion, namely that we must live also in humility: in which way Peter argues in his First Epistle, chapter 2, when he says, "Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example," etc. (1 Pet. 2). And thus he judges about the others. But from Durandus's opinion we have that a practical cognition has for its object some operation, nor is it sufficient that it move to love, as Scotus taught.

This opinion approves itself to me much less than Henry's opinion. First, for he distinguishes in vain the habit of theology whereby the mysteries of religion which are contained in Scripture are known, from the habit whereby all those things are defended: for the same habit of faith which teaches the truths, also defends and declares them; or at least, if faith does not furnish this in any man whatsoever, theology furnishes it, which is engaged about the conclusions deduced from the articles. For often the same habit proves the truths which are gathered from the articles, and consequently satisfies the things which could be objected against them, by deducing to the absurd, or by arguing otherwise. Philosophy also greatly contributes, which is wont to be a help to theology, as is known. Finally, if the habits are to be distinguished, two seem to be sufficiently distinguished, namely one habit of faith about the articles, another of theology about the conclusions.

But come, let us concede to Durandus three habits of theology, as he contends; at least theology in that first mode cannot be said to be simply practical, if "simply" signifies that which is altogether, or in every part, as Durandus seems to understand it. For that is nothing other than the faith of the mysteries of our religion, which considers many mysteries altogether speculatively, as the mystery of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, of the Resurrection, etc.: therefore theology in the first mode is good on the side of the speculative. But what he says, that in Scripture more things are found which pertain to practical cognition than those which pertain to sole speculation, matters little: for it is enough that there be thus speculative, that there are certain mysteries which solely pertain to speculation: indeed, if these be rightly counted up, they are not a few.

Second, what he teaches, that theology in the second mode, for the habit namely of declaring and defending the mysteries, is only speculative, is false. For if Durandus once admits that theology in the first mode, that is, the faith of the mysteries, is simply practical, surely the habit itself of declaring and defending these mysteries, which is theology in the second mode, will also be practical. For when a definition and a declaration are ordered, through single propositions set down, to the inquiring and investigating of truth, in no way is that a practical operation; but it is truth which is declared, and it is defended, and that is practical. Third, as to what Durandus says, namely that theology in the third mode, about which there is now controversy, is altogether practical, besides that this seems false in its effect, reason also, which he assigns there, Prologue, q. 6, solution 2, and repeats, q. 5, n. 21, proves it little: at least, the articles themselves, which consist in speculation, cannot be inferred; neither can any practical thing be manifestly inferred: for if theology in the first mode, that is, the faith of the articles, sometimes is turned toward the object of mere speculation, it neither receives nor admits anything into itself that is inferior, by which

something pertaining only to speculation can be inserted as if a proper conclusion; nor can a practical thing be inferred from mere speculation. In the matter concerning the Incarnation and the assumption of the human nature, and all that follows from it likewise human, and not only divine, some things can indeed be inferred; thereafter the human works of Christ should not be adopted as the sole condition. For although more often Scripture speaks about things pertaining to morals, nevertheless all of them are reduced to a few heads, namely of precepts and counsels, which are more often repeated in Scripture; therefore theology in this way is not for the greater part, nor simply and altogether, practical. But if that "simply" signify the same as "principally," Durandus ought rather to say that it is simply, that is, principally speculative: as St. Thomas asserted about our theology, which deduces conclusions: for those things which it chiefly considers, as God, and the things which pertain to him, pertain to speculation, not to practical cognition.[65]

Third, it is false what he teaches, that theology in the second way, namely for the habit of declaring and defending the mysteries, is only speculative. For if Durandus once admits that theology in the first way, that is, the faith of the mysteries, is simply practical, certainly the habit itself of declaring and defending these mysteries, which is theology in the second way, will be practical too. For when a definition and declaration are ordered through single propositions according to the object which faith has, theology in the first way obtains the same reasons and conditions. For although the habits of defending and declaring and investigating truth are distinct, nevertheless nothing is more practical than that truth be declared and defended as practical.

About the third, as we said of Durandus, namely theology in the third way, which is now controversial, that it is altogether practical, besides that this seems false in effect, reason also seems weak which he brings, and we will treat it in its place: at least he himself supposes that articles which consist in speculation do not infer anything, not even the practical; but he also manifestly supposes this: if theology in the first way, that is, faith, sometimes is turned toward the object of mere speculation, he does not receive into it anything inferior, just as from articles of speculation something most human is inferred; and not only the divine but also human can be inferred: then the human works of Christ are not to be adopted as the sole condition; that he, as a servant, did not remain, that his works were suitable for the redemption of the human race, and many other things, which not only explain and declare the article itself revealed, but also contain some new truth which consists altogether in speculation: and although it conduces to fuller understanding of the article, nevertheless they should not therefore be rejected from the ratio of speculative science: for there is no demonstration which, by the truth of the conclusion which it demonstrates, does not also more explain the principles from which it is inferred.

Caput V - Notes for the explication of the truer opinion

Among all others the more probable opinion is that of not a few, who assert that theology, which is engaged about conclusions to be deduced from the articles, is at once practical and speculative. This St. Thomas hands down in this article; Cajetan likewise; and recent authors too; Ockham in

65. St. Thomas.

the principal question of the Prologue, article ...; Gabriel; Gregory, question the last, article 4; joined also with the doctrine of other articles, Capreolus, article 1, conclusion c.; Major, question 6, conclusion 2; and Canus, book 2 De locis, chapter 1. But because they do not sufficiently agree in its confirmation, I judged it necessary to premise certain things, by which it is explained and, by the aforesaid Doctors, is more probably received. Then I will briefly set down the points on which they themselves disagree among themselves.[66]

- First, since this controversy seems more to be of words than of things, and names are not to be used at one's pleasure, one must see what is called by the philosophers, and especially by Aristotle, the intellect itself, or mind, and the practical and the speculative, and how the division is made. ()

Although Scripture often speaks of matters pertaining to morals, nevertheless all things are reduced to a few heads, namely of precepts and of counsels, which are frequently repeated in Scripture; therefore theology in this mode is not for the greater part, much less simply and altogether, practical. But if that word "simply" signify the same as "principally," Durandus ought rather to have said that it is simply, that is, chiefly speculative; as St. Thomas asserts concerning our theology which deduces conclusions: for those things which it chiefly considers, such as God and the things that pertain to him, do not belong to practical cognition.[67]

Secondly, it is false what he teaches, that theology in the second mode - namely the habit of declaring and defending the mysteries - is solely speculative. For if Durandus once admits that theology in the first mode, that is, the faith of the mysteries, is simply practical, assuredly the very habit of declaring and defending these mysteries, which is theology in the second mode, will also be practical. For since the defense and declaration, proposition by proposition, have the same object which faith has, or theology in the first mode, it follows that both are of the same rationale and condition. For although the habit of defending and declaring is ordered to investigating truth, nevertheless it will be practical if the truth which is declared and defended is practical.

Third and finally, what Durandus teaches - namely that theology in the third mode, about which there is now controversy, is altogether practical - besides being false (as we shall easily show in chapters 5 and 6), is supported by a reason which manifestly supposes a falsehood: namely, because from articles of faith which consist in speculation nothing can be inferred unless it be practical. For if theology in the first mode, that is, the faith of the articles, sometimes turns upon an object of pure speculation - which cannot be denied - how can nothing be inferred therefrom that pertains to speculation alone? For in the matter of the Incarnation, from the fact that we believe the Word to have assumed humanity, we infer that he also had a human mind and not only a divine; further, that that humanity was not adopted; moreover, many other points are gathered which explicate and declare some new truth ordered to speculative understanding; and even

66. Cajetan; Ockham, principal question of the Prologue; Gabriel; Gregory; Capreolus, art. 1, concl. c.; Major, q. 6, concl. 2; Melchior Canus, De locis theologicis, l. 2, c. 1.

67. St. Thomas, passim on the character of sacred doctrine; cf. 1-2, q.57; 2-2, q.179; and his teaching that the conclusions deduced in theology chiefly consider God and what pertains to him, which do not belong to practical cognition.

though these contribute to a fuller apprehension, they nevertheless belong wholly to speculative science. For no demonstration of a conclusion is of greater moment than the exposition of the principles from which, according to the truer account, the explanation proceeds.

The more probable opinion: that the theology which deduces conclusions from the articles is at once practical and speculative

The more probable opinion - held by not a few - is that theology, which deduces conclusions from the articles, is at once practical and speculative. This is taught by St. Thomas, by Cajetan, and by more recent authors there; Ockham, Gabriel, Gregory, Capreolus, Major, and Canus agree on this point.[68] But because in the confirmation they do not sufficiently agree among themselves, I judged it necessary to premise certain points by which the matter is explained and, from the aforesaid doctors, is received as more probable. Then in a few words I shall report wherein they disagree among themselves.

First, since this controversy seems to be more about words than about things, and names are not to be used at one's pleasure, one must see what is called by the philosophers, and especially by Aristotle, the intellect itself, or mind; he indeed was the first of all to divide the intellect into the practical and the speculative. By the same rationale by which the intellect is called practical, the habit will also be so called. Therefore the mind is said by the philosophers to be of one kind, productive (which in Greek they call poiētikē), and of another kind, active (which the Greeks call praktikē), which we in Latin commonly render "practical." The productive is so called because it has production for its end; the practical, because it has action.

But if we trust St. Thomas (1-2, q.57, a.4), who holds that "action" is said only of what is immanent, but "production" of what is transient, it follows that the active intellect or mind is that which by its cognition directs to some immanent action and has it as object; while the productive is that which regards a transient [work] and is the principle thereof. This distinction between action and production seems to have been handed down by Aristotle, Metaphysics 9, c.9, where he calls transient actions "operations," because they are said to regard a work; but he calls immanent ones "actions," because from them no made work remains.

Yet in this matter Aristotle seems to have varied: for in Ethics 6, c.5 he says that the end of production is something other than the production itself, but not always the end of action - as if he thought that from action there sometimes remains something else besides the action itself; and in Metaphysics 6, c.1 he distinguishes these two in another way: for he teaches that the eligible and the doable are the same, around which, he says, the active or practical mind is conversant. Wherefore he holds that this [mind] is only about moral actions, but the productive pertains to art. Hence, according to him, only prudence will be practical or active; but art will be productive or operative. Finally, in Magna Moralia 1, c. ult., he uses these two in yet another way: for he says, "In

68. St. Thomas; Cajetan; Ockham, principal question of the Prologue, art. 3; Gabriel, q. 12 in the Ordinatio; Gregory, q. ult., art. 4, together with the doctrine of other articles; Capreolus, q. 2, art. 1, concl. 6; Major, q. 6, concl. 2; Melchior Canus, De locis theologicis, l. 2, c. 1.

those who make and in those who act the makeable and the doable are not the same; for of makeable things there remains, besides the making, another end." He gives the example of house-building; but in those things which fall under action there is no other end, besides, for instance, playing the cithara. By which he plainly teaches that action also can be called transient. This division is indeed followed by Alexander of Aphrodisias on Metaphysics 6, c.1. If this be retained, then not only prudence, but also some operation of art will pertain to the active mind. Nevertheless, the doctrine of that last chapter of the Magna Moralia can be easily reconciled with what Aristotle taught in Metaphysics 9, c.9, if we say that in that chapter he calls "operations" those acts which are transient, not always, but for the most part: because from most of them a made work remains. For since he himself says in Magna Moralia 1, c. ult. - and experience attests - that from some transient acts no work remains, as from playing the cithara and the like, it follows that some transient acts are not to be called "operations" according to that usage. Therefore, since in the present discussion we are confounding the practical and the productive mind in order to distinguish both from the speculative, by the same name "operation," or "praxis," we understand both production and action.

Secondly, it must be supposed that praxis, taken universally, is either an action, or also an operation of any power whatsoever, and not only of the will, as Scotus thought: although in the sense in which Aristotle, in the place cited, says that praxis is only action as it differs from operation; nevertheless, since we are now confounding the practical and the productive so as to distinguish both from the speculative, therefore by the same name "operation," or "praxis," we understand both production and action.[69]

Accordingly, we ought to use praxis as opposed to speculative, for the same use, both for action and for operation or production, as Gregory most aptly noted.[70] In this way Capreolus also used praxis, in the proofs of the fourth conclusion in that article, to such a point does he think it true as to maintain that the praxis, from which the intellect, or the habit, or the act is called "practical," is not only external action - as St. Thomas seems to indicate (1-2, q.57, a.1, ad 1; 2-2, q.179, a.2) - but also the internal act of the will, to whose service pertains the practical act of prudence, of which St. Thomas treats (2-2, q.47, a.5); and even the act of the intellect itself, insofar as it is voluntary and is directed by another through choice. He proves this from St. Thomas (2-2, q.47, a.2, ad 2), where he teaches that the object of prudence is also an act of speculative reason, insofar as it falls under choice. But what falls under choice and prudence is praxis; for prudence is practical, and therefore it has praxis for its object: therefore speculation itself is rightly called praxis. Nor is he inconsistent with himself when, in art. 3, ad 1, about the fourth conclusion, he denies that an act of the intellect is praxis: for he is speaking of the act of the intellect according to itself, not insofar as it is voluntary and falls under choice; as he himself explains in the solution to Gregory's argument against the same conclusion. He adds, however, that logic is not a practical but a speculative science, even if it direct to the work of reason, because it does not direct by means of choice, but immediately by its own speculation. In this, nevertheless, he errs: both because no operation of reason, such as the

69. Scotus had restricted praxis to the will; cf. his position ad loc. Aristotle, Metaphysics 9, c. 9; 6, c. 1; Ethics 6, c. 5.
70. Gregory, q. 5, Prol., art. 1.

construction of a syllogism is, is directed or effected by another operation of the intellect except through choice - for from choice a man applies his intellect to making this or that syllogism - and also because even if logic were to direct to the operation of reason without choice, still in this way it would have to be called practical, since by its operation it would direct to praxis, by that very fact that it directs to the operation of the intellect. How logic is at once practical and speculative will be shown below.

Therefore, since logic is commonly divided into teaching (docens) and using (utens), I would understand this division thus, that by "teaching logic" I would mean the very habit and act of logic by which a man considers and advances the works of reason according to the rules set forth in it; but "using logic" is called praxis and the work of this art, namely the very construction of a proposition and of a syllogism in this or that matter, which indeed is found in all the sciences; and for this reason logic is numbered among the arts, because it is occupied about a work. I pass over the various acceptions of praxis which Gabriel and Ockham adduce.[71] Of the four acceptions, they think that only the latter two pertain to the present question: the third, namely, whereby praxis is said to be any operation, both good and bad, which is in our power; and the fourth, which they say is the most proper, and is called a studious operation. In either way the operation of the intellect can be called praxis, as we noted above from the mind of Capreolus, and as Gabriel and Ockham expressly admit.

Third, it must be noted that it is not enough, in order that an act of the intellect be called practical, that praxis follow from it - even if by a kind of natural consequence. And on this account Scotus was deceived when he said that every act of the intellect which is followed by love or delight is practical: for these can arise from speculation itself, as we shall say below; but it is necessary that the act of the intellect be conversant about praxis as about its object, by thinking how such an action or operation ought, or can, be done: as when someone thinks how a statue is to be made or a building constructed; how it is good to love or to hate, or even to speculate. Thus have taught Ockham, Gabriel, Major, Gregory, Capreolus, and indeed also St. Thomas, who in the places cited teaches openly that there is no practical knowledge from the fact that it moves the affection to the love of the known thing, but only from this, that it regards the operation itself and praxis; and this is, he says, to direct knowledge proximately to praxis; remotely, however, speculation also is said to direct when love follows upon it. Wherefore simple and incomplex intellection, taken precisely and properly speaking, will not be practical, as Ockham, Gabriel, Major, and Gregory have noted.[72]

Practice is sometimes opposed to the speculative, and sometimes the same word "practice" (*praxis*) is used for action (*actio*) itself as well as for operation or production; as Gregory very well noted.[73] In this way Capreolus too employed "practice" in q. 2, art. 1, in the proofs of the fourth conclusion; and he thinks this so true that he maintains that practice, from which the intellect, or habit, or act is called "practical," is not only an exterior action, as St. Thomas seems to

71. Gabriel, q. 20, art. 1, notation 2; Ockham, q. 4, Prol., art. 1.

72. Ockham, q. 4, Prol., art. 2 (placed as q. 10 in the order); Gabriel, q. 11, art. ...; Major, q. 6, prop. 2; Gregory, q. 5, art. 2; Capreolus, q. 2, art. 5, concl. 5; St. Thomas, De veritate q. 14, a. 4; In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 3, q. 2.

73. Gregory, q. 5, Prol., art. 1.

indicate (1-2, q. 57, a. 1, ad 1; 2-2, q. 179, a. 2), nor only an interior action of the will, to which the practical act of prudence is subservient (2-2, q. 47, a. 5), but also an act of the intellect itself, insofar as it is voluntary (*voluntarius*) and, by another reflecting through choice (*electio*), is directed and determined.

It is proved from St. Thomas in the same question, q. 47, a. ..., ad 2, where he teaches that the object of prudence is also an act of speculative reason, insofar as it falls under choice. Now what falls under choice and prudence is practice; for prudence is practical, and therefore has practice for its object: therefore even speculation is rightly called practice. Nor is he at odds with himself when in a. 3, ad 1, around the fourth conclusion he denies that the act of the intellect is practice: for he is speaking of the act of the intellect according to itself, not as it is voluntary and falls under choice; as he himself explains in the solution of Gregory's argument against the same conclusion. Yet he adds that logic is not a practical science but speculative, even if it directs to the work of reason, because it does not direct by means of choice but immediately by its speculation. In this, however, he is mistaken: first, because no operation of reason - such as the construction of a syllogism - is directed or performed by another operation of the intellect except by means of choice; for by choice a man applies the intellect to make this syllogism or another; secondly, because even if logic, without choice, did direct to the operations of reason, nonetheless in that way it ought to be called "practical," since by its operation it would direct to practice precisely insofar as it directed to the operation of the intellect. In what way logic is at once practical and speculative will appear below.

Wherefore, since logic is commonly divided into "teaching" and "using," I would understand this division thus: I would call "teaching logic" the habit and act of logic itself, by which one considers and judges the reason's operation, according to the rules of the art; but "using logic" I would call the use of this art, namely the very composition and construction of proposition and syllogism in that matter which in fact occurs in all disciplines; and on account of this logic is counted among the practical arts, because it is engaged with practice, and with constructions in this, or in that, or in some operation, in which kinds of things the sciences are numbered among the arts which are about a work.

I pass over the various senses of "practice" that Gabriel adduces,[74] and Ockham likewise,[75] from which senses two will matter for the present question; the third, namely, by which any operation, whether good, which is in our power, or otherwise, they say to be "practical" and to be a "studied operation" - in which way indeed an operation can in some fashion be called practice, as we noted above according to the mind of Capreolus and expressly of Gabriel and Ockham.

Note that it is not enough, for an act of the intellect to be called practical, that practice should follow upon it, even by some consequence arising from it - here Scotus was deceived when he said that the act of the intellect which is an act of pleasure or delight is practical, and that delight itself springs from the very speculation. Rather, it is necessary that the act itself be engaged with practice as with its object, by thinking how such an operation should be done, or can be done: as when

74. Gabriel, q. 20, art. 1, not. 2.
75. Ockham, q. 4, Prol., art. 1.

someone considers how a statue, or a building, ought to be constructed; or that it is good to love, or to hate; even if he be just speculating. Thus Ockham teaches,[76] and Gabriel,[77] and Major,[78] and Gregory,[79] and St. Thomas: in De veritate q. 14, a. 4, and in III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 3, q. 2 he expressly teaches that some knowledge is not practical from the fact that it moves the affection to love of the known thing, but from the fact that it regards the work itself and the practice; and this is what it is to "direct immediately to practice": indeed, it is said also to direct speculatively when love follows upon it: but a simple and incomplex speculation cannot properly and strictly be practical; as Ockham, Gabriel, Major, and Gregory have maintained.

But Gregory: for simple knowledge does not regard as its object action or operation.

Furthermore, that a practical act always is engaged with practice is plain from Aristotle, De anima 3, c. 10, text 50, where he thus speaks of the practical intellect: "and this, without appetite, differs from the speculative, as if to say it regards a different object." He shows this difference more clearly in Metaphysics 2, c. 2, when he says: "For speculative science the end is truth, but for practical, work (*opus*)." By "work" he understands that practice is the end or object of practical science, and consequently that cognition too is practical when it has practice for its object. And in Ethics 6, c. 1 he himself divides the intellect and reason into one part by which we contemplate those things that are necessary; and this is speculative: and into another by which we discern those things that can be otherwise; and this is practical: and to this, Aristotle says, belongs deliberation about contingent matters, namely about our actions, about which alone it can be; as we shall say at 1-2, qq. 13 and 14. Therefore, according to Aristotle's view, practical knowledge is not engaged with external things and with those that are not in our power: wherefore, if some consideration of eternal things should move the affection, nonetheless it will be speculative.

It is proved also by reason: for if it were enough for the nature of the practical to move the affection, then no cognition would be speculative; for both physical science and metaphysics, which by the judgment of all are called altogether speculative, could most justly be called practical too. For speculation about those things that are considered by them can give rise to delight and love of the known thing. For, as Aristotle says (Ethics 10, c. 7 and 8), from perfect speculation perfect delight can be born. It remains therefore that that knowledge alone be called practical which is engaged with practice and has it for end and object.

Certain recent authors teach, however, that in two ways some knowledge can be called practical from the end, just as "end" itself can be taken in two ways. First, from the end under the notion of end, which is compared only to the affection: and in this respect they say the practical depends on the will, indeed on right will alone; and on that account they think Aristotle assigned only these two habits to the practical intellect, prudence and art. Secondly, something is said to be practical from the end not under the formal notion of end but materially; that is, from the thing itself which is the end, although it is not regarded under the notion of end and good; and in this way they affirm

76. Ockham, q. 4, Prol., art. 2 (placed as q. 11 in the order).
77. Gabriel, q. 11, art. 1, not. 2.
78. Major, q. 6, prop. 2.
79. Gregory, q. 5, art. 2.

moral science to be practical, because it regards practice as object, which in reality is the end: although it does not regard it under the notion of good from a right affection concerning it, for one can have this knowledge even from a depraved affection.

This distinction of "end" as to the nature, or the distinction, of practical knowledge or habit seems to pertain nothing at all; nor does Aristotle teach it anywhere; nor in that place therefore does he assign those two habits to the practical intellect only because only those are practical. For there he does not enumerate in detail all the [habits] that belong to the practical mind. Therefore the above opinion is refuted by the preceding reason: because knowledge does not seem to be called practical or operative from the fact that it proceeds from the will; as above, against Bassolis, we noted that there can be practical knowledge which precedes every will, if nonetheless it proposes something to be done: simply therefore it is called "practical" from practice, which it has for its object. Aristotle, moreover, said that the speculative reason and the practical differ by end, not because the practical operates by the end through the affect; otherwise even the speculative would operate by the end, since it too is said to differ from the practical by an end; but because they differ by object; and he called the object "end."

Fourth, it must be observed that it is not enough for the nature of practical knowledge to be engaged with practice - although this is necessary, as is clear from the third notation; but it is also necessary to be engaged with it in a peculiar certain way, in which it directs to work, which people commonly express by saying "to be engaged with a workable thing, and in a workable mode." This St. Thomas has most excellently explained below in q. 14, a. 16, where he says thus: If a builder considers how some house can be made, not ordering it by the intention of end to operation, but to knowing, the consideration will, as to the end, be speculative: nonetheless it will be about a workable thing. As if he were to say: by its mode, and formally, it will be speculative; by its object, however, and materially, it will be practical, because it is about some work to be done. Hence he gathers that a science which is speculative even from its object, because it is not about any work, is simply speculative - that is, by object and by mode; but that which is about a work, although it has the mode of speculation, is speculative in a qualified sense - that is, in some respect; yet he does not deny that it is formally speculative.

That same thing seems to have been taught by Aristotle in Metaphysics 2, c. 2, text 3, in these words: "For speculative science the end is truth, but for practical, work. Therefore, if the manner in which things stand is considered, one does not consider a cause for its own sake, but for something else; and at that time they speculate practically." As if he were to say, as the Commentator explains, that reason is practical when, if it considers the cause of a thing, it does not contemplate it so as to know the truth - and this is not to consider the cause for its own sake or according to itself - but so as to do what it considers: therefore not only is it required for knowledge to be practical that it consider the nature of the work, but also that it think it for the sake of operating. And this is the consideration of the practical intellect, which is truly practical knowledge. Cajetan in that a. 16; Ferrarensis, 3 Contra Gentiles, c. 20; Iavellus, 6 Met., q. ...; Sozinianus, q. 4; Aureolus in q. 3, Prol., a. 2; whom Gregory reports, q. 5, art. 2.[80]

Nor, indeed, is it enough for knowledge to be practical that it be ordered to a work solely from the will of the agent: for thus the work itself would be the end of the science per accidens, from the scientist's will alone: but it must be ordered to a work as to an end per se, that is, as to its proper object. Yet it can be ordered to this end in a twofold way. First, from itself, without a preceding will to operate: so that it moves to a work, nor detains the knower in the mere contemplation of truth. Such are the dictates of synderesis, which precede every will. Further, it can move to a work from a preceding will of the work itself, such as is the knowledge of an art to perform its works: and in both ways knowledge is practical from the end of the agent, in such a way that also from its proper end and object it is practical. And in this way those Doctors alleged for this opinion are to be understood when they say that knowledge is practical from the end of the agent, not from the end of the science itself: because it is not enough that the end and object of the science be practice, but it must in the mode we have said direct to work. But when some contend, on the contrary, that knowledge ought not to be called practical from the end of the agent, but from the end of the science itself, they understand that from the end of the agent alone, which is extrinsically added to the science and is not its object, it cannot be called practical: for instance, if someone were to speculate some truth, even with the intention that afterwards he might help and dispose to operating, that knowledge would not be called practical, even if it had work for its object. And when someone learns the works of an art, or considers a work made by some distinguished craftsman, so that he may become more learned in the art, without the intention then of using those things, he will be said to speculate and to contemplate rather than to have practical knowledge. I do indeed notice that Ockham has taught the contrary, q. 4, Prol., a. 2 (which in the order is put as q. 11), and Gabriel, q. 11, art. 1, not. 2, and Gregory, q. 5, art. 2; who think that from this alone some knowledge is to be called practical, that it has work and practice for its object. Otherwise it would follow, says Gregory, that the same habit would successively be practical and speculative about the same conclusion. I, however, do not think that absurd: because it is not repugnant that someone consider a work in order to do it, or solely for the sake of looking upon and contemplating its truth and nature: and thus the same habit, about the same conclusion, can at once be practical and speculative; although the same knowledge cannot at the same time be both. The habit, however, is at once practical and speculative, because at least successively it can operate in each way.

Caput VI - Theology is simultaneously practical and speculative

We have now laid down the foundations by which the final opinion is to be confirmed and explained, namely that Theology is one science, simultaneously practical and speculative. Now it is proved thus. That science is to be called practical whose act is practical knowledge; but speculative, whose act is mere contemplation and speculation: if, then, some science can have acts of each kind, at once it will be practical and speculative; for the habit of a science takes its denomination from its proper act. But Theology can elicit both acts; therefore at once it is practical and speculative. For

80. Cajetan, on that art. 16; Ferrarensis, 3 Contra Gentiles, c. 20; Iavellus, 6 Met., q. ...; Sozinianus, q. 4; Aureolus, in q. 3, Prol., a. 2; reported by Gregory, q. 5, art. 2.

from the foundations already established it will be easy to see that both acts can be elicited by Theology: for practical knowledge is that which has practice for its object - as was said in the third notation - and is engaged with it in that mode by which it directs to a work - as we explained in the last notation. Speculation, however, is either about such an object as is not itself the practice of what is known, or, although it has the work itself for object, yet is engaged with it for the sake only of contemplating the truth, not of operating, as was noted in that same ultimate foundation. But Theology has acts of each kind: on one side it considers God, the mystery of the Incarnation, and other such things, which do not have the nature of practice; on the other side it considers many things placed in operation; and these in two ways also: either with the sole contemplation of truth, or for the sake of operation: for the Theologian can use Theology after the manner of prudence, so as to move himself to act rightly: therefore it has the act of each, namely the practical and the speculative, not only about diverse conclusions, but about the same as well, as has been explained.

They add, nevertheless - St. Thomas, Capreolus, and other Thomists - that Theology should chiefly be called speculative: which I too deem true, not because for the greater part it is speculative (for even this, if all be well computed, is true), but because its chief object, to which the other things that are treated in it are ordered, and on account of which they are said to pertain to it as true science, is God, who can be the object only of speculation. From all which it is sufficiently clear that this is the truer opinion: because it employs "practical" and "speculative" in the same manner in which Aristotle and the other philosophers received them. From these points too the several opinions that we set down at the beginning can be impugned; for their authors employed the denominations of practical and speculative without any foundation, as seemed good to them. But if there are any arguments for those views, from what has been said they are easily dissolved.

Disputatio IX - On how the practical and the speculative belong to Theology

- The Nominalists hold the same science of Theology, but not the same habit, to be practical and speculative. Cap. I.
- Cajetan teaches that the habit of Theology is practical and speculative eminently. Cap. II.[81]
- Truer opinion: that the same habit of Theology is not only eminently, but formally practical and speculative. Cap. III.

With the foundations laid, it is easy to see that Theology can elicit acts of both kinds: for practical knowledge is that which has practice for its object (*obiectum*), as was said in the third notation, and it is occupied with it in such a way as to direct to action, as we explained in the last notation. But speculation is either of such an object as is not the knower's own practice, or, though it should have the knower's work for its object, yet it is occupied about it for the sake only of contemplating the truth, not of acting, as was noted in that same last foundation. Now Theology has acts of both rationales: on the one hand it considers God, the mystery of the Incarnation, and other things of that sort which do not have the rationale of practice; on the other hand it considers

81. Cajetan, in his commentary on this article, in the body; cf. also the note cited earlier: Cajetan on that article.

many things placed in operation; and these also in two ways - either for the mere contemplation of the truth, or for the sake of operation: for the theologian can use Theology in the same way as prudence, to move himself to act rightly. Therefore it has acts of both sorts, namely the practical and the speculative, not only about diverse conclusions, but even about the same conclusion, as has been explained.

St. Thomas, Capreolus, and other Thomists add that Theology ought chiefly to be called speculative; which I also judge to be chiefly true, not because it is for the greater part speculative - though this too, if all things are rightly reckoned, is true - but because its principal object, in relation to which the other things treated in it are said to pertain to it as to one science, is God, who can be an object of speculation alone. From all which it is sufficiently clear that this is the truer opinion: because they admitted the practical and the speculative in the same way as Aristotle and other philosophers admitted them. From these points the several opinions also can be impugned which we recounted at the beginning; for their authors, without any foundation, used the denominations of practical and speculative as they pleased. And if there are any arguments for them, they are easily dissolved by what has been said.

How the practical and the speculative can belong to the same science. Disput. 9.

Caput I - On those who say the same science is both, but not the same habit; refutation

There remains a difficulty among the Doctors who followed the last opinion in the preceding disputation, namely, how it can be that the practical and the speculative - which seem not only to be essential differences and opposites of habits (*habitus*), but even of faculties, as Aristotle teaches - should belong to the same Theology, or to the same habit.[82] In this difficulty the first opinion is that of Ockham, Gabriel, Gregory, and Major: they affirm that the same science of Theology is at once practical and speculative, yet not in the same habit. For they think that Theology, and any science whatever, consists of many habits; indeed, that it consists of habits about single conclusions. Thus any science consists of many habits; and yet, though Theology consists of all of them in order, it is one - not, however, in the genus of quality. And because there are in it various conclusions, some wholly in speculation, such as those about God, some about practice; therefore they say that Theology is practical and speculative at once, not according to the same habit about the same conclusion, but practical by reason of one, speculative by reason of another. From the commentaries of certain authors Gregory does not wish to concede the same habit to be practical and speculative about the same conclusion, as we reported at the end of the preceding disputation.[83]

But the opinion and foundation of these men do not please me. First, because I hold that one science (*scientia*) is one simple quality, though I do not dispute that point expressly: I am persuaded of it for this reason. The habit of science ought to be a quality distinct from intelligible species; for science cannot be a coordination of species. It can scarcely be understood, much less

82. Aristotle, De Anima III, c. 10, text 53.
83. Gregory, at the end of the place cited above; cf. Gregory, q. 5, Prol., art. 1 - 2.

explained, what that order of species should be which some have said to be the habit, since it is not an order according to position, nor according to any substantial change of the species themselves. But that it is one simple quality distinct from the species, and not several around single conclusions, could be shown thus: for things which are really distinct can be separated from each other, if they are distinct as thing from thing; but the habit about the posterior conclusion cannot exist without the habit about the prior, just as the demonstration of the posterior cannot exist without the demonstration of the prior. It is therefore a sign that there are not several habits and qualities, but the same in a different mode.

I say "in a different mode," because just as the same quality is found less intense and more intense, and for that reason is said to have a latitude, so too the same quality about the first and second conclusion has a latitude which we call a latitude of extension. Nay more, by the same reasoning I would believe that the habit of conclusions and of the principles from which those are deduced is not two habits, but the same more extended one, which essentially supposes the other, so that the posterior - about conclusions - cannot exist without the prior, which is about principles. Therefore Aristotle in Ethics VI, ch. 3, said that wisdom is at once science and understanding of those things which are most honorable: he calls it science, insofar as it is of conclusions; and understanding, insofar as it is of principles, in the same faculty.[84] He therefore thinks it is the same habit about principles and about conclusions, but more extensive; for he there numbers wisdom as one habit.

Then, as we said in the last notation, about the same conclusion there can be practical and speculative knowledge; therefore the habit too can in the same way be practical and speculative. Wherefore, even if the object of Theology were operation alone, as is the object of moral philosophy, nevertheless Theology would at once be practical and speculative; just as moral philosophy and logic are, because it could consider things in either mode.

Caput II - Cajetan's account: practical/speculative as essential only in finite sciences; evaluation

A second opinion is that of others who assert Theology to be one habit and a simple quality; which, indeed, they affirm of any science whatsoever; and that it is at once practical and speculative, because it is partly occupied about operation, and partly about things that do not fall under operation. Of this opinion Cajetan seems to be.[81] But to explain the difficulty proposed - namely, how the practical and the speculative can belong to the same habit - he devised a way of philosophizing more subtle than true; which the recent writers in this part marvelously praise and embrace. He says then in his commentary on this article, in the body, that Theology is neither purely practical nor purely speculative, but in a higher rationale, which others call "eminently," it contains both in itself.

84. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, c. 3.
81. Cajetan, in his commentary on this article, in the body; cf. also the note cited earlier: Cajetan on that article.

To explain this, he notes that the practical and the speculative are not per se essential differences first dividing science universally; just as neither do sight and hearing divide sense generically at the first step. Rather, as sense is first divided into common and particular, and then the particular into sight and hearing, so science in general, by an essential division, is first distributed into finite and infinite science, that is, of a finite and of an infinite object; and then finite science into speculative and practical. Wherefore, if the practical and the speculative are referred to science universally, they are not essential differences: because they are found together in the same science which has an infinite object, as Theology has. But referred to finite science, they are essential differences: because in one finite science - that is, of a finite object - both rationes are not found together. Thus ordination to the visible and to the audible and to other sensibles in particular are not differences of sense universally; because in a certain sense, namely the common interior sense, both regards are found; but in the particular senses they are essential differences, and are not found together in one.

The reason, moreover, why a science of an infinite object can be practical and speculative is this: because things dispersed in lower orders are united in higher ones; wherefore the practical and the speculative, which cannot at the same time belong to the same habit about the same finite object, are found in the habit of Theology, which is occupied about an infinite object. For an infinite thing is of such excellence that it can be the object of speculation and the rule of praxis. From this doctrine some recent writers infer that Theology is not formally practical, nor speculative, taking practical and speculative as they are differences of finite science; in which position they think Cajetan stands, indeed even St. Thomas, because they assert that Theology, if it is compared with other inferior sciences, stands to them as the interior sense stands to the exterior senses. But then (say the Thomists) no difference of the exterior sense belongs formally to the interior sense: therefore neither the practical nor the speculative - which are per se differences of finite science - can belong formally to Theology, which is a higher and common science. Yet again, I know not by what reason, these same Thomists grant it to be probable, in the sense just said, that Theology is formally speculative, taking speculative as it is a difference of a lower science; but not formally practical, taking practical in the same way; whereas the rationale of each seems altogether the same, if it is taken in the same way.

Caput III - The truer opinion: the same habit of Theology is formally both practical and speculative

I for my part judge that our Theology is not only eminently, but formally practical, just as other sciences of a finite object are practical. And in order to show how the practical and the speculative can formally belong to the same science, it must first be noted that some habit falls under the rationale of the practical or of the speculative from this alone, that it is a principle either of speculation or of practical knowledge (*notitia practica*): sometimes, however, only one rationale belongs to a habit, sometimes both together; for example, the rationale of the speculative belongs to Metaphysics, the rationale of the practical to prudence, but both to moral philosophy and to our

Theology. Nor does the otherwise specific and essential difference hinder a unified rationale of the practical and of the speculative - of a common denomination and not essential - from belonging to diverse habits and powers that are occupied about the same thing.

Next it must be noted that from the rationale of the practical and of the speculative, even if it is a common and, as it were, accidental denomination, there can sometimes be inferred an essential difference of habits - namely, whenever a habit is wholly practical or wholly speculative. For then the adequate object of these habits is an altogether different thing; and from the diversity of adequate object an essential difference of habits is most fitly inferred. For although different habits and powers can be occupied about the same thing, yet they never regard it adequately: just as the common sense and sight operate about color, yet not adequately. Therefore in habits which are either only practical, as prudence, or only speculative, as Metaphysics, though the rationale of the practical and of the speculative is the best indication of an essential difference - because then each seems to follow upon adequately diverse objects - yet in Theology, and in other sciences which are at once practical and speculative, the rationale of the practical or of the speculative cannot be a sufficient sign of a distinction according to species. For since they belong together to the same habit according to reality, they cannot be the cause of a different adequate object according to species. Thus it does not conflict that the practical and the speculative be found together in the same habit and in the same faculty. Then not only are they not essential differences of a habit or of a faculty, but from them such a difference cannot be inferred.

And if the practical and the speculative were to constitute an essential difference in the intellect, then in the same way the opinable and the demonstrable in the same intellect, and in sight the regard to white and the regard to black, and in the common sense the regard to color and to sound, would infer a distinction according to species - which is absurd. For this reason St. Thomas, below, I q. 79, a. 11, teaches that the practical and the speculative cannot distinguish the faculty of the intellect according to species: because each rationale regards only accidentally...

Articulus V - Whether sacred doctrine is more worthy than the other sciences

It is asked in the fifth way as follows. It seems that sacred doctrine is not more worthy than the other sciences. For certitude (*certitudo*) pertains to the dignity of a science. But other sciences, concerning whose principles it is not possible to doubt, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine, whose principles - namely the articles of faith - admit doubt; therefore other sciences seem to be more worthy than this one.

1. Moreover, it belongs to an inferior science to receive from a superior, as Music receives from Arithmetic; but sacred doctrine receives something from the philosophical disciplines. For St. Jerome says in the Epistle to Magnus, the orator of the city of Rome, that the ancient doctors wove their books so much from the doctrines and opinions of the philosophers that you do not know in them what you ought first to admire, the learning of the age, or the science of the Scriptures. Therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to other sciences.

But on the contrary: Other sciences are called its handmaids: "She has sent forth her handmaids to call unto the citadel" (Prov 9).

I answer: Since this science is in a certain respect speculative, and in a certain respect practical, it surpasses all the others, both speculative and practical. For among speculative sciences, one is said to be more worthy than another, both on account of certitude and on account of the dignity of the matter. And as to each, this science exceeds the other speculative sciences. As to certitude indeed: because other sciences have certitude from the natural light of human reason, which can err; but this science has certitude from the light of the divine science, which cannot be deceived. As to the dignity of the matter, because this science is principally about those things which by their loftiness transcend reason; whereas the other sciences consider only those things which are subject to reason. Among practical sciences, that one is more worthy which is not ordered to a further end, as civil science is to military: for the good of an army is ordered to the good of a city. But the end of this doctrine, inasmuch as it is practical, is eternal beatitude (*beatitudo*), to which, as to the ultimate end, all other ends of the practical sciences are ordered. Whence it is manifest, in every way, that it is more worthy than the others.

Reply to the first: Nothing prevents that which is more certain by nature from being less certain for us, on account of the weakness of our intellect, which stands with respect to the most manifest things of nature as the eye of the owl to the light of the sun, as is said in Metaphysics II. Hence the doubt which occurs in some with respect to the articles of faith is not on account of the uncertainty of the thing, but on account of the weakness of the human intellect; and yet the least that can be had of knowledge of the loftiest things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge which is had of the least things, as is said in the eleventh book On Animals.

Reply to the second: This science can receive something from the philosophical disciplines, not because it necessarily needs them, but for the greater manifestation of those things which are handed down in this science. For it does not receive its principles from other sciences, but immediately from God by revelation. And therefore it does not receive from other sciences as from superiors, but uses them as inferiors and handmaids, just as architectonic arts use their subordinates, as the civil uses the military. And this very fact that it thus uses them is not on account of any defect or insufficiency of itself, but on account of the defect of our intellect: who, from those things which are known through natural reason (from which the other sciences proceed), is more easily led by the hand to those things which are above reason, which are handed down in this science.

Explanation of the doctrine of the article.

The conclusion of the article is: Our Theology, inasmuch as it is speculative and inasmuch as it is practical, is more noble than all other sciences. From this conclusion it is plainly evident what the Blessed Thomas intends in his last words when he says: "Hence it is manifest, in every way, that it, namely Theology, is more worthy than the others." For he says "in every way," not because it is more noble on account of the note of evidence and other properties, but because it excels the others both inasmuch as it is practical and inasmuch as it is speculative - this is what "in every

way" means. It remains, then, to explain why in both ways it is absolutely more worthy than the others. First, as to the notion of the practical, St. Thomas proves this very well, and Cajetan explains it in this article; wherefore we need not dwell on it here. But as regards the dignity of speculation, St. Thomas gives two reasons by which he proves that Theology excels the other sciences; of which the latter is the better, taken from the nobility of the object, by which also the dignity of a science ought to be weighed. And although Metaphysics treats of God as a principle among other things, as does our Theology, nevertheless each considers God under a different formal notion: for Metaphysics considers only those things which men can grasp by natural light; but Theology considers only those things which are deduced from revealed principles; for those things that are known by natural reason it supposes as foundations.

A doubt about the first reason of the article.

The first reason by which St. Thomas proves the same point is not free of difficulty: namely, that our Theology is more certain than all other sciences. And the difficulty is whether he speaks of Theology "according to itself," or as it exists in wayfarers. However, for the sake of what must be said, a certain division of certitude must first be set forth, which we shall explain more fully below, II-II, q. 4, a. 8. Certitude can be taken in three ways. First, for the determined assent to one side without doubt. Second, for the truth of cognition, which is taken from the conformity of the intellect with the thing. Third, for the reflex act by which one judges that in no way is one deceived about what one is thinking.

These things being supposed, Cajetan, in this article, interprets St. Thomas as speaking of Theology "according to itself," not as it is in us: for thus he judges that it is not more certain than the others. He gathers this from the answer to the first objection, where the Blessed Thomas teaches that what is more certain by its own nature can be less certain for us; and so concerning the articles of faith, which are by their nature most certain according to themselves, there can sometimes occur in men doubt or fear.

Yet, to me, the mind of St. Thomas, understood in this way, seems very difficult; nor do I have sufficiently clear whether he speaks only of the object itself, that is, of the things that are treated in Theology, or rather of the very science. And indeed, if he spoke of the object, he ought not to have said that it is more certain according to itself. For, as will be proved below, disp. 68, c. 5, and II-II, q. 4, a. 8, things are not said to be more or less certain, but more or less necessary; while certain or less certain, like fallible and infallible, are referred to cognition. But if St. Thomas speaks of the science and cognition according to itself in some intellect, namely either the divine, or of those seeing God, so that in this way Theology be abstracted from imperfection, then it does not seem rightly to compare Theology - which is of predicates supernatural - to all the other sciences of created things; since the science about God Himself, according to predicates naturally known of Himself, ought not to be compared: because in God, and in those seeing Him, there is the same certitude and in the same mode. And in the same way Theology about God, according to either set of predicates, is certain, in whatever way you take certitude. Compared, however, with other sciences, it is without doubt more certain, if certitude is taken in the second way: because the truth of the cognition which God has of Himself is greater than that of the cognition of other things. Yet,

with certitude thus taken for truth, Theology about God is as certain in us as in God Himself; therefore it is in vain to distinguish Theology "according to itself" and "as in us." But if certitude be taken in the first and third way, it will be futile to distinguish Theology according to itself and in us; nor, according to itself, is it not more certain than other sciences taken likewise according to themselves: for in the divine intellect any science whatsoever is as certain as Theology about Himself, in those two modes of certitude. In vain, then, would anyone compare Theology according to itself, that is, in the divine intellect, with other sciences as they are in us. It remains, therefore, that Theology, as it is in us, compared with other sciences of created things - even of God Himself as naturally known - be called more certain and more noble.

The second opinion is that of other Thomists, who teach that Theology in us is more certain than the other sciences by the same reason whereby infused faith is more certain - on the part, namely, of the formal object on which it rests. For just as infused faith, which even concerns created things, is more certain because it rests on the testimony of First Truth, as will be explained at II-II, q. 4, a. 8; so also our Theology will be more certain, because at least remotely it rests on the testimony of First Truth, and proximately on the articles of faith believed on the testimony of First Truth. And in this way certitude is taken by these Doctors, for truth and the conformity of the intellect to the thing. Nor does it stand in the way that theological discourse sometimes proceeds from only one premise of faith and from another naturally known, so that the conclusion be less certain, as if it were deduced only from both premises naturally known: for although the conclusion follows the weaker part - even in certitude - nevertheless the conclusion, which is constituted by terms of both premises, to the assent of which the premise of faith gives help, cannot but have greater certitude than if it were deduced from both premises naturally known. That proposition, "The conclusion follows the weaker part," is true only in this sense, that the conclusion, insofar as it is gathered by the syllogism, is not believed by infused faith, as the other of the premises is. Otherwise, for this opinion to be true, it is necessary to assert that the theological conclusion is gathered from articles believed by divine infused faith, and not only by acquired faith - which, however, is not certain. But if we say that it proceeds from articles believed by acquired faith, it cannot be asserted.

Supplement to the preceding discussion (from the close of the previous chapter).

It regards the adequate object (*obiectum adaequatum*) of the intellect. For when the object is taken universally, it is accidental to be something for practice, or something subject only to speculation - just as it is accidental to an animal to be a man or a horse. From mere reference to various objects, unless they are adequate, the difference of a habit or faculty according to species cannot be gathered; but things cannot be adequate which, in reality, belong to the same faculty or habit. However, supposing a real distinction of faculties or of habits, various objects are the cause of diversity according to species in habits or faculties, because the various objects are adequate: as color and sound, which could not distinguish, according to species, the faculty of the common sense, because the same faculty in reality embraced both; whereas in sight and in hearing they are the cause of distinction according to species, because, the real distinction of powers being supposed, they have the ratio of an adequate object.

Against this doctrine only Aristotle seems to stand, who in De Anima III, text 53, writes thus: "It is also plain that those who divide the parts of the soul, if indeed they divide the very powers and separate them, must grant that there are several principles, of nutrition, sensation, understanding, deliberation, and appetite." There he distinguishes the power of understanding, which we call speculative, from the power of deliberating, which we call practical. I answer first that it is manifest that these faculties of understanding and deliberating are not really distinct, nor in any way by nature: for the same power of the soul speculates and deliberates. This being supposed, neither can they be distinguished by our reason according to species, as is gathered from the reasoning of St. Thomas set out above; in which St. Thomas rightly taught that otherwise the faculty of opining and that of demonstrating would have to be distinguished - something no one grants. Then I say that Aristotle, when he there distinguishes powers, did not so much attend to their specific distinction as to the variety of operations, from which, by a certain common rationale, he wished to name the diverse parts of the soul, or powers. In the same way that place must be explained in Magna Moralia I, c. 35, when, speaking of the parts of the soul, he enumerates the practical and the speculative; and in Ethics VI, c. 1, where he says that the practical and the speculative differ in kind

Articulus VI - Whether sacred doctrine is wisdom

Third and true opinion. It remains, then, that we say that theology in us is more certain than the other sciences, if certitude be taken in the third way, which we said to be in the reflex act of the intellect, by which one judges that the cognition which one has of some thing cannot be false, or be otherwise than it is known to be. Thus without doubt our theology is more certain than any other science - that is, we are more certain that the cognition which we have through theology cannot be deceived than we are of any other science whatsoever. For we believe that it has its origin from God's testimony, to which falsity is more repugnant than to any created science.

Objicitur 1. It seems that this doctrine is not wisdom. For no doctrine that supposes its principles from elsewhere is worthy of the name wisdom, because it is the part of the wise to order, and not to be ordered, as is said in Metaphysics I; but this doctrine supposes its principles from elsewhere (as is clear from what has been said). Therefore this doctrine is not wisdom.[93]

Objicitur 2. Further, it belongs to wisdom to prove the principles of the other sciences; whence also it is called the head of the sciences, as is clear in Ethics VI. But this doctrine does not prove the principles of the other sciences. Therefore it is not wisdom.[94]

Objicitur 3. Further, this doctrine is acquired by study; but wisdom is had by infusion, whence it is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, as is clear in Isaiah 11. Therefore this doctrine is not wisdom.

But on the contrary: Deuteronomy 4, at the beginning: "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of the peoples."

93. Aristotle, Metaphysics I; cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 1, a. 6.
94. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, c. 7.

I answer that this doctrine is most of all wisdom among all human wisdoms, not indeed only in some particular genus, but simply. For since it belongs to the wise to order and to judge, and a judgment about higher causes is had concerning lower things, he is called wise in any given genus who considers the most exalted cause of that genus; as, in the genus of building, the craftsman who disposes the form of the house is called wise and an architect in relation to the lower craftsmen who fit the timbers or prepare the stones. Whence it is said in 1 Corinthians 3: "Like a wise architect I laid the foundation." And again, in the whole genus of human life, the prudent man is called wise, insofar as he orders human acts to their due end. Whence it is said in Proverbs 10: "Wisdom is prudence to a man." Therefore he who considers simply the most exalted cause of the whole universe, which is God, is called most wise. Whence also wisdom is said to be the knowledge of divine things, as is clear from St. Augustine, On the Trinity XII. But sacred doctrine most properly determines concerning God according as He is the most exalted cause: for it not only considers, as far as that which is knowable of Him through creatures (which the philosophers knew, as is said in Romans 1: "What is known of God is manifest to them"), but also as far as that which is known to Him alone of Himself, and is communicated to others by revelation. Whence sacred doctrine is most properly called wisdom.[95]

Reply to the first: Sacred doctrine does not suppose its principles from any human science, but from the divine science, from which, as from the highest wisdom, all our cognition is ordered.

Reply to the second: The principles of the other sciences are either self-evident and cannot be proved, or they can be proved by some natural reason in some science. But the proper cognition of this science is that which is through revelation, not that which is through natural reason. And therefore it does not pertain to it to prove the principles of the other sciences, but only to judge about them. For whatever in the other sciences is found to be repugnant to the truth of this science is condemned as wholly false. Whence it is said in 2 Corinthians 10: "Destroying counsels and every height that exalts itself against the knowledge of God."

Reply to the third: Since judgment pertains to the wise according to a twofold mode of judging, wisdom is taken in a twofold way. For it happens that someone judges in one way by way of inclination, as one who has the habit (*habitus*) of virtue judges rightly about those things that are to be done according to virtue, insofar as he is inclined to them. Whence also in Ethics X it is said that the virtuous man is the measure and rule of human acts. In another way, one judges by way of cognition, as someone instructed in moral science (*scientia*) can judge about the acts of virtue even if he does not have the virtue. The first mode of judging about divine things pertains to the gift (*donum*) of the Holy Spirit, according to 1 Corinthians 2: "The spiritual man judges all things"; and Pseudo-Dionysius says in the Celestial Hierarchy II that Hierotheus was taught not only by learning but also by suffering divine things. But the second mode of judging pertains to this doctrine according as it is had through study, although its principles are had from revelation.

Confirmation of the doctrine of the article. The conclusion is that our theology is the greatest wisdom among all wisdoms. The whole difficulty of this article, just as of almost all the preceding ones, seems to lie more in words than in the thing itself - namely, whether theology, of which so

much has been said above, can be called wisdom. There is no one who denies this; but by what rationale St. Thomas proves it can be gathered from the text. In the explanation of which Cajetan notes some things which, being easy, I willingly pass over. However, it can be proved from the doctrine of Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 2; Magna Moralia I, c. 35; and Ethics VI, c. 7, where he treats of wisdom and teaches that, by a certain general rationale, he calls wise the one who in his art or science is most exact, and who not only knows the things that can be deduced from principles, but also is thoroughly skilled in the principles, and at once has science (*scientia*) and understanding (*intellectus*); and that wisdom is the most exact science or art which comprehends both. Yet, most properly, he calls wisdom the most exact science of those things which are worthy of the highest honor, which he himself calls metaphysics. By how much more reason, then, ought we to call our theology wisdom, which treats principally of God Himself; and it not only considers those things which natural reason can investigate, but also very many others utterly unknown to the philosophers and wise men of this world, which have been handed down by divine revelation.[96]

Articulus VII - Whether God is the subject of this science

Objicitur 1. It seems that God is not the subject (*subiectum*) of this science. For in any science one must suppose concerning the subject what it is, according to the Philosopher in the beginning of the Posterior Analytics; but this science does not suppose concerning God what He is: for St. John Damascene says, "To say what God is is impossible." Therefore God is not the subject of this science.[97]

Objicitur 2. Further, all the things that are determined in some science are comprehended under the subject of that science; but in Sacred Scripture many other things are determined than about God, namely about creatures and about the morals of men. Therefore God is not the subject of this science.

But on the contrary, that is the subject of a science of which there is speech in the science; but in this science there is speech about God (for it is called "theology," as it were, "speech about God"); therefore God is the subject of this science.

I answer that God is the subject of this science. For the subject stands to a science as the object (*obiectum*) to a potency (*potentia*) or habit (*habitus*). Now, properly that is assigned as the object of some potency or habit under whose rationale (*ratio*) all things are referred to the potency or habit; thus man and stone are referred to sight insofar as they are colored; whence "the colored" is the proper object of sight. But all things are handled in sacred doctrine under the rationale of God, either because they are God Himself, or because they have an ordering to God as to principle and end. Whence it follows that God truly is the subject of this science. This also is made manifest from the principles of this science, which are the articles of faith (*fides*), which are about God. Now the subject of the principles and of the whole science is the same, since the whole science is virtually

95. St. Augustine, De Trinitate XII; Romans 1:19; 1 Corinthians 3:10; Proverbs 10:23.
96. Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 2; Magna Moralia I, c. 35; Nicomachean Ethics VI, c. 7.
97. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa III, c. 24.

contained in the principles. Certain persons, however, attending to the things that are treated in this science, and not to the rationale according to which they are considered, have assigned otherwise the subject of this science - either "things and signs," or "the works of restoration," or "the whole Christ," that is, head and members. For of all these indeed there is treatment in this science, but according to their order to God.

Reply to the first: Although we cannot know what God is, nevertheless we use His effect in this doctrine - either of nature or of grace - in place of a definition, for those things which in this doctrine are considered about God; just as also in the other philosophical sciences something is demonstrated about a cause through its effect, taking the effect in place of a definition of the cause.

Reply to the second: All the other things which are determined in sacred doctrine are comprehended under God, not as parts, or species, or accidents, but as somehow ordered to Him.

Conclusion: God is the subject of this science. The rationale by which St. Thomas proves it, which seems difficult, will be examined in the following disputation together with the doctrine of the whole article.

Disputatio X - On the subject of theology

Status quaestionis

Caput I - State of the question

Although the present controversy is not of great moment, yet because it seems to be not entirely about the name, as many of the preceding are, but about the thing, it is not to be passed over in silence. For its sake two points must be supposed. One is that it has no place either in the view of those who think theology to be truly a simple quality (that is, one single habit), or in the opinion of others who teach that there are many, each concerning its own conclusion, out of which, in order, a certain one science is constituted. For when we inquire about the subject of theology, we do not inquire about the subject of any conclusion whatsoever, but about the subject of the whole science, to the extent that, as will appear below, we can reduce each conclusion to the common subject of the whole. The other point is what Durandus very well noted in the Prologue to the Sentences, question 1, no. 6.[98]

Caput II - The opinion of Durandus

Very many sentences are wont to be reported in this question, at first glance not a little diverse; some of which do not pertain to the question proposed, nor are they among themselves, nor to others that we shall report, truly contrary. The first is of the Glossa of Cassiodorus at the beginning of the Psalms, and of Hugo of St. Victor in the Prologue to book 1 of De sacramentis, c. 2, who say that the matter of the divine Scriptures is the works of human restoration, namely the Incarnation

98. Durandus of St. Pourçain, In Sententias, Prologue, q. 1, no. 6.

and its sacraments, whether those that preceded or those that later followed. The second is of Alexander, who in part 1, q. 1, memb. 3, asserts that the matter of Sacred Scripture can be assigned both according to essence, and thus he says it is God, and according to operation, and thus he says it is the work of restoration; and according to virtue, and thus he says it is Christ himself; and hence that the whole matter of Theology is the divine substance to be known through Christ in the work of restoration. Yet these sentences do not pertain to the present question, nor do they oppose either themselves or others that we shall report. For these Doctors seem to speak not about the subject, but about the object. But now the controversy is solely about the subject, in the manner explained above - about which, nevertheless, there are still various sentences of the Scholastics.

The first is that of Durandus, who in q. 5 of the Prologue, just as elsewhere, takes Theology in a threefold acceptation. First, for the habit by which we assent to the things handed down in Sacred Scripture; and in this way he thinks Theology and faith are the same. Second, for the habit by which our faith and the things handed down in Scripture are defended and explained. Third, for the habit that deduces theological conclusions from principles. About the subject accordingly he teaches three things. The first is that the subject of Theology taken in the first way is meritorious act; thus he teaches in q. 5, no. 9; he asserts the same in no. 21 about Theology taken in the third way, concerning which there is now a special controversy.

He proves this by two reasons. The first is of this sort. That is the subject in some discipline the knowledge of which is the proximate end of that discipline. For in any faculty the knowledge of the subject according to itself and according to the things attributed to it is sought as the proximate end; for, just as in a speculative science the proximate and simply ultimate end is the perfect knowledge of the subject, which is ordered to nothing else; so in a practical science the knowledge of the subject is not the ultimate end, because it tends to work, yet it is the proximate end. But the proximate end of Sacred Scripture, which is Theology in the first way, is the knowledge of meritorious act, or of that which has an order to beatitude; therefore that is the subject of Theology in the first way. Now that the proximate end of Sacred Scripture is the knowledge of meritorious act, Durandus proves from 2 Timothy 3: "Every Scripture divinely inspired is useful for teaching, for reproving, for correcting, for instructing in justice, that the man of God may be perfect, instructed to every good work." Therefore, that a man be instructed in justice and piety is the proximate end of this Scripture.[99]

A posterior reason. That is the subject of some faculty which is chiefly considered in it, and the other things regard it and are in a certain way attributed to it; as is gathered from the second note. Of this sort in Theology is meritorious act: for whatever are handed down from the beginning of Genesis to the end of Apocalypse regard meritorious act and in a certain way belong to it - things which are either precepts or counsels for living well, or examples ordered to this very thing, or, finally, the punishments and rewards which Scripture proposes to those who act well or ill; nay rather, even those things which are written about God in himself and about God incarnate, and are handed down as to be believed, have an order even to meritorious act itself; as it is said in John 20:

99. 2 Timothy 3:16 - 17; cf. John 20:31. Hugo of St. Victor, De sacramentis I, Prol., c. 2; Glossa of Cassiodorus at the beginning of the Psalms; Alexander, I, q. 1, memb. 3; Durandus, In Sent., Prol., q. 5.

"But these are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in his name." Some things, too, are proposed as a rule of meritorious work. Finally, Durandus confirms the same by many testimonies of Scripture, in which Sacred Scripture is called the science of salvation; therefore the subject of Theology taken in the first way is meritorious act.

About Theology, however, taken in the third way, inasmuch as it deduces conclusions, he teaches the same; he proves it thus. Either from the articles of faith there is deduced something speculative, or something practical. If something speculative, the subject of the habit that deduces conclusions from the articles is the same as the subject of the habit of faith about the articles themselves, from which that is gathered. For the subject of a conclusion in a demonstration, or in a syllogism directly concluding, is the subject of the minor proposition; but the minor proposition of a theological demonstration is always an article of faith; therefore in the conclusion itself the subject will be the same as in the article of faith; and hence the subject of Theology taken in the first and in the third way will be the same. That the minor proposition in a theological demonstration is an article of faith, Durandus shows by the example of this demonstration: Where there is a unity of essence in three supposits really distinct, there cannot be a distinction by absolutes; but in God there is a unity of essence in three persons; therefore in God there is not a distinction by absolutes.

Second, Durandus teaches that the subject of Theology taken in the second way - which is for explaining and defending the mysteries of faith - is God. Thus he asserts in no. 13. He proves it, however, because Theology which declares and defends the mysteries of our religion is chiefly conversant about the articles concerning God according to himself and concerning God incarnate. For although Scripture and our faith hand down not only things that pertain to God according to himself or to God incarnate, but also things that regard our justification and meritorious works, yet those, however, chiefly hold the principal place.

The former reason he proves by two reasons. The former reason is of this sort: that is the subject in any discipline, the knowledge of which is the proximate end of that discipline; for knowledge of the subject according to itself, and according to the things attributed to it, is sought as the proximate end in any faculty whatsoever. For in any speculative science the proximate, and simply the ultimate, end is perfect knowledge of the subject, which is ordered to nothing else; but in a practical science, knowledge of the subject is not the ultimate end, because it tends to work, yet it is the proximate end. But the proximate end of Sacred Scripture, which is therefore the same as Theology in the first way, is knowledge of the meritorious act, or of that which has an order to beatitude: therefore that is the subject of Theology in the first way. That the proximate end of Sacred Scripture is knowledge of the meritorious act, Durandus proves from 2 Tim. 3: "Every Scripture inspired by God is useful for teaching, for arguing, for correcting, for instructing in justice, that the man of God may be perfect, furnished for every good work" (2 Tim 3:16 - 17). Therefore that a man be instructed in justice and piety is the proximate end of this Scripture.

The latter reason. That is the subject of any faculty which is especially considered in it, and the rest all look to it and are in a certain way attributed to it, as is gathered from the second notation. Such in Theology is the meritorious act: for whatever things are handed down from the beginning

of Genesis to the end of the Apocalypse look to the meritorious act and in a certain way are suited to it, because either they are precepts of living well, or examples that are arranged, or finally rewards which for good or evil ... Scripture proposes: indeed the things about God in himself and about God incarnate, and the things that are handed down to be believed, are already ordered to the meritorious act, as it is said in John 20: "These are written, that you may believe that Jesus is the Son of God, and that believing, you may have life in his name" (John 20:31). Certain things moreover are set forth which pertain to a meritorious work. Finally, the same Durandus gathers from many testimonies of Scripture, by which Sacred Scripture is called the way of salvation: therefore the subject of Theology taken in the first way is the meritorious act.

But of Theology in the third way, which derives conclusions, he teaches the same: namely, because either something speculative or something practical follows from the articles of faith. If something speculative, the same subject belongs to such a habit deducing the connection from the articles, and to the habit of faith about the articles from which that is gathered; for the subject of the conclusion in a demonstration, or in a syllogism directly connecting, is the subject of the minor proposition; but the minor proposition of a theological demonstration is always an article of faith: therefore in the conclusion itself the subject is the same as in the article of faith; and consequently the same is the subject of Theology taken in the third way. That the minor proposition in a theological demonstration is an article of faith, Durandus teaches by the example of this demonstration: "There is unity of essence in three really distinct [persons]; there cannot be a distinction by absolutes: but in God there is unity of essence in three persons: therefore there is not a distinction by absolutes."

The second part of Durandus's opinion about Theology in the second way is as follows. Thus he asserts in n. 13. Theology which declares and defends the mysteries of our religion is chiefly conversant about the articles concerning God according to himself and concerning God incarnate: although, indeed, Scripture and our faith hand down not only the things that regard God according to himself or God incarnate, but also the things that regard our justification and meritorious works; yet those, however, have the notion of a principle in sacred doctrine, and are more difficult; whereas these have the notion of a conclusion, nor do they present any peculiar difficulty, the articles about God as principles being supposed. For if we suppose that he who said in John 14, "He who loves me shall be loved by my Father," was the Son of God incarnate, we very well and very easily gather that love of God is meritorious before God, and so of the others. Therefore Scripture and our faith do not need defense or declaration with respect to the conclusions that it gathers, but with respect to the principles from which it deduces; and since the principles are the articles about God according to himself, or about God incarnate, but the conclusions concern our meritorious works, as was said; it follows that the subject of Theology which is engaged in the defense of faith is not the meritorious act, but God.

Third, finally, he asserts that the subject of Theology in this way is not God under the absolute aspect (*sub ratione*) under which God is, but under the determined and relative aspect of Savior: thus he hands down in that q. 5, n. 16 - 17. He confirms it by this reason. The subject of Theology taken in this way is the same as the subject of the habit of faith itself; for the same is the subject of

one habit from which a conclusion is deduced, and of the conclusion which that habit deduces: but the conclusion which the habit of Theology in this way deduces is the article of faith itself: therefore the subject of Theology and of the articles of faith is the same. But in the articles of faith God is the subject, not under the absolute aspect, but under a determined aspect. For as he had said in q. 1, n. 42: God is not the subject of faith under the aspect of the knowable, under which many things can be demonstrated of him; otherwise some article of faith could be evident to a wayfarer. But about God under the absolute aspect, under which God is, many things can be demonstrated, as that he is one, intelligent, omnipotent, etc. Wherefore God under the absolute aspect is not the subject of faith; therefore neither of Theology. Lastly, that God is the subject of Theology taken in the second way under the aspect of Savior, he proves in n. 17 of that q. 5. First, because this notion falls primarily under faith: for in every state there has been faith in God the Savior; then also, because under this aspect many other mysteries are contained. Moreover, under that aspect God is the subject of the articles of faith, under which especially he has an order to the meritorious work, for the reason that the articles ... as principles have of themselves a relation to the conclusions; but the articles of faith are principles with respect to those things which are concluded in Sacred Scripture about the meritorious work, as was said above: wherefore what is the subject of the articles of faith ought to have a relation to the meritorious work: but God, rather under the aspect of Savior than under another, has this order: therefore under that aspect he ought to be subject. He proves the latter minor by a certain reason of his own, which I purposely pass over.[100]

Confutatur sententia Durandi.

Caput III - The opinion of Durandus is refuted

To refute this opinion point by point from the very principles of Durandus himself will not be difficult. Therefore, that division of Theology being admitted, it appears false what he teaches first, namely that the subject of Theology in the first and third way is the meritorious act. For if we speak of Theology in the first way, that is, of the faith of mysteries which are handed down in Scripture or otherwise, the conditions of a subject, which Durandus himself assigned at the beginning, cannot befit the meritorious act: because it does not belong to the notion of a subject to be that which he said in the first reason, namely to be the proximate end of the science; but, as in the second reason he taught, and as we noted above, this is the condition of a subject, that all other things be attributed to it, and in a certain way look to it. Although therefore the meritorious act were the proximate end of Theology in the first way, yet if it is not that to which all other things are attributed, but this is rather God, the subject of Theology will not be the meritorious act, but God. But indeed all other things are not attributed to a meritorious act: for the mystery of the Trinity does not regard the meritorious act as subject - even if to believe this mystery is meritorious -

100. The citations "q. 1, n. 42" and "q. 5, n. 17" refer to Durandus's discussion in the Prologue, where he treats the subject of faith and Theology under diverse formal aspects.

rather the meritorious act is attributed to the Trinity, which is proposed to us to be believed, because it is the author of that act: therefore not the meritorious act, but God has that first condition of a subject.

Moreover, from the fact that the mystery of the incarnation is proposed as a rule of the meritorious act, the act itself ought not to be compared as subject with the mystery of the incarnation, but rather the contrary. Whence it also follows that Theology in the third way does not have the meritorious act for its subject, as Durandus also falsely thought: because whether from the articles of faith there follows something speculative or something practical, the same account of this subject ought to hold as of Theology taken in the first way, as he himself also admits. Since therefore it has now been proved that the subject of Theology in the first way is not the meritorious act but God, so also must it be said of Theology in the third way.

As to the second point which Durandus asserts - namely, that the subject of Theology in the second way is not the meritorious act but God - even if it be true, nevertheless it is not sufficiently consonant with the doctrine already set down by himself. For if the subject of Theology in the first way - namely, for the faith of the mysteries - is the meritorious act, not God, the same will hold of Theology in the second way, which defends the same mysteries. First, because defense and declaration are not only necessary, as he supposed, for the articles about God according to himself and about God incarnate, but also for the articles of justification, of merits, and of the sacraments; against which there have been no fewer errors than against others, and day by day there can arise more. Therefore, if faith has the meritorious act for its subject, the defense of that faith will have the same. Wherefore, even if we concede to Durandus that those mysteries which we have about justification and merits are conclusions of the articles which we believe concerning God according to himself and incarnate, nevertheless there will be difficulty not only in the articles themselves, but also in the conclusions about justification and merits drawn from them; which without controversy is not clear, in what manner the Lord in Scripture has handed down the things that pertain to the notion of merit and justification. For which cause certain persons, while admitting the articles about God and Scripture itself, taught many things wrongly understood about justification and merits. Next, it cannot be said that all the articles about God are principles of the articles about merits and justification: for these, and all the rest, only seem to suppose that God is, and that he handed down those articles to us. But the mystery of the Trinity and of the incarnation, as to all things, do not seem to be supposed as principles, as Durandus thought.

Third, finally, what he said seems to have not even a semblance of probability: for ...[101]

Caput IV - Two other opinions

Therefore, since they are predicated absolutely, God rather under the notion of God (*ratio Dei*) than under the notion of Savior is the universal subject. Moreover, it is not necessary, as Durandus contended, that God be the subject of Theology under that notion under which He is referred

101. John 14:21; 2 Timothy 3:16 - 17; John 20:31.

rather to a meritorious work, but under that which is incomplex, and thus universal, so that to it the rest may be attributed in the way we said; which without doubt He has under the absolute notion of God.

Thus far we have fought against Durandus from his own principles in such wise that at the same time all his arguments are left dissolved. Now let us report the opinions of others, who all, making no distinction in Theology, answer the question absolutely: for however it be taken, it has the same subject.

• Two other opinions.

The second opinion, then, is that of St. Bonaventure, q. 1, Prologue; Ockham, q. 3, a little before the end; and Gabriel, q. 9, art. c.; with whom Albertus seems to agree, 1 p. Summae, tract. 1, q. 9, c. 3, memb. r., and in 2, d. 1, ar. 2, of those who affirm that the subject of Theology can be taken in three ways; of which, in the third way, it ought rather to be called object (*obiectum*) than subject (*subiectum*).[102] According to this mode they say that the universal, or common, subject, under which are contained all the things treated in Theology, is signs or things. But, besides the fact that the subject taken in this way does not pertain to the present question, as I noted above in chap. 1, still in this way the common ratio (*ratio*) of the object of the whole of Theology is not rightly assigned. First, because this is not the adequate ratio of all the things which are treated in Theology, but much more universal: for under it are comprehended other things and signs about which Theology does not discourse; then also because by the same reason we could call things in general the object of philosophy or of metaphysics. Besides, it is not necessary to assign to habits or faculties one adequate and common ratio of object, as I said in the preceding chapter; especially this:

• The subject of Theology is endowed.

Therefore, with that third acceptation omitted, the aforesaid Doctors affirm that the subject of Theology is employed in two other ways. First, they say, there is a radical subject; so St. Bonaventure calls it: or that which is first in perfection; so Ockham and Gabriel call it; Albertus, however, calls it the principal; and in this way the first subject of Theology is God, because in dignity He is prior to all the others, and as it were the integral foundation of them. Then it is called the integral subject; so St. Bonaventure calls it: Gabriel, however, and Ockham call it the subject of containment; and in this way they say that Christ is the subject of Theology, because He integrally contains the human and the divine nature. St. Bonaventure adds that Christ in this way is not only the very person with two natures, but with all also the mystical members and the things that pertain to that person. In this way of speaking they seem only to assign a common subject containing all the things treated in the science: about which, as we have already said, there is not much need to be concerned. Indeed, if it were so, there would be no need to assign that third acceptation which we reported above; since Christ in this way is the universal object of Theology.

102. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., Prol., q. 1; Ockham, In II Sent., Prol., q. 3; Gabriel, q. 9, art. c.; Albertus, I p. Summae, tract. 1, q. 9, c. 3, memb. r.; and in II, dist. 1, ar. 2.

Accordingly, the opinion of these writers is approved by us only in this, that they assert that God is the subject of Theology: for to Him those conditions of a subject belong, as will be clearer below. Wherefore Albertus also is mistaken, when he asserts that Christ, according to His person in two natures, is the subject, of which passions are demonstrated in Theology: for, just as God as glorifier or Savior cannot be the subject, as Ockham and Gabriel also admit, because the subject ought to be something incomplex; no predication is supposed to have been made of it; so neither now can God be man. With other arguments Scotus impugns this opinion under q. 3, of the Prologue, in the lateral question 2.5. From the foregoing it appears; which I pass over deliberately.[103]

The third opinion is that of others who assert that God indeed is the first subject of Theology, not under the notion of God absolutely, but under the notion of glorifier. Thus taught Gregory, q. 4, Prologue, ar. 2; and Marsilius, q. 2, ar. 3, proposition 1, 2, and 3. Albertus agrees in 2, d. 1, ar. 2, who, with the common notion of subject omitted, which in the second opinion we reported, wherein with St. Bonaventure and others he agrees, pronounces that the special subject of Theology is God, not absolutely, but in so far as He is alpha and omega, that is, principle and end. For all the things that Theology treats it considers in so far as they are from Him and for Him. Therefore Albertus agrees with the others, but adds another peculiar notion, under which also God is subject, namely the notion of principle. The same is asserted by Aegidius in Prol., r. p., q. 3, except that he refers the notion of principle only to the restoration of our salvation.[104] He proves this opinion first by Gregory from St. Augustine, book 14, De civitate, c. 1, where he says that the Theology which he in that entire chapter calls wisdom, treats of those things by which the most health-giving faith, which leads to true beatitude, is begotten, nourished, defended, and strengthened.[105] It is manifest, moreover, that he is not speaking of faith alone: for he subjoins, "By what science the faithful are not very powerful, although they are very powerful by faith itself": therefore he is speaking of the science of Theology, by which the mysteries are proved and defended, and on that account he said that by this science faith is begotten: for Doctors skilled in Theology, converting very many to the faith, beget faith in them, nourish and strengthen it, while day by day more and more they inform them by the doctrine of the mysteries. Wherefore, when Augustine says that this science is about those things that lead us to beatitude, he openly indicates that God is under the same notion the object of this science, under which He is also the object of beatitude, to which the very things that are treated in it lead. The same opinion could be urged by the reasons with which Gregory and others prove that God under the absolute notion of God is not the subject of Theology; these, however, because they directly clash with the truer opinion, we shall set forth below.

This opinion is impugned by Ockham and Gabriel in the cited place with this very good argument. The notion of Glorifier, Redeemer, and other such like, are not notions of subject, but of predicate: because, as we were saying above, in this complex "God glorifier," some enunciation is presupposed in which "glorifier" is the predicate and "God" the subject: but the subject of a science

103. Scotus, Prol., q. 3, lateral q. 2.5.
104. Aegidius, In Prol., r. p., q. 3.
105. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei 14.1.

ought to be incomplex, of which we enunciate something: therefore "God glorifier" is not the subject of Theology, but God absolutely. Secondly, Scotus, q. that second, lateral 9; and Bassolis, q. 4, Prologue, ar. 1: Secondly, I prove; they refute the same opinion for this reason. The subject of a real science cannot be a being of reason (*ens rationis*), nor can the formal notion of the subject be a being of reason: but the notion of Glorifier is a being of reason, just like whatever things in God have a respect to creatures: therefore under that notion He cannot be the subject. They also bring forward other reasons, which can be reduced to the first.[106]

Yet this reason, although it does not assume what is true - namely, that a real science cannot be about a subject which is only a being of reason - nevertheless in Theology it is most true: because although it considers many things in God by a respect to creatures (which, however, is of reason), nevertheless not all the things that it treats have a respect of reason, nor under the same subject which is a being of reason; but it considers them about God Himself. And if someone should reply that the notion of Glorifier is not taken for that respect to creatures, but for the very divine essence, by which we are beatified, this indeed is real: true, as Bassolis noted, if God under this notion were the subject of Theology, He would indeed be so under the notion of deity (*deitas*), under which He is the object of beatitude. Whence even a third reason is taken against Gregory: for if, as he himself admits, the subject of Theology is the same as the object of beatitude, then God under the notion of God will be the subject of Theology: for under this very notion we are also beatified; the notion of glorifier is a certain extrinsic denomination proceeding from the act of beatitude, just as the denomination "knowable" from the act of knowing; which are not of the ratio of object or of subject, in so far as the science is referred to it; as is clear from the doctrine delivered in disputation 7, chap. 3.[107]

Deum sub ratione absoluta Dei esse subiectum Theologiae, truer opinion.

Caput V - That God under the absolute notion of God is the subject of Theology

The last opinion is most approved by me, which affirms that God under the absolute notion of God is the subject of Theology: St. Thomas, Cajetan, and certain recent authors have handed this down in this matter; Henricus in the Summa, ar. 19, q. 1; Richard in the Prologue, q. 6; Scotus, q. 3 in 2, lateral question s.; as is evident from what has been said, § to the first question, and elsewhere. Now, however, we must see -

Bassolis, q. 4, a. 2; Capreolus, q. 4, a. 1, concl., adding also the doctrine which he delivers at the end of the article; Major, q. 7, near the end. Canus, book 12 De locis, c. 2. But what Henricus says in Quodlibet 12, q. 1, namely, that God under the notion of infinity is the subject of the science which God has of Himself, not, however, of the science which the Blessed or wayfarers have of Him, is not against the aforesaid opinion. For in that Quodlibet he asserts that God under the notion of infinity formally is the subject of the science which He Himself has of Himself; not only because God knowing Himself sees Himself to be infinite (for the creature too knows that God is infinite), but

106. Ockham, loc. cit.; Gabriel, loc. cit.; Scotus, q. 2, lateral q. 9; Bassolis, Prol., q. 4, ar. 1.
107. See above, disputation 7, chap. 3.

because God knows Himself to be infinite, and in an infinite mode, in such wise that the perfection of the cognition of the thing known adequately corresponds: and therefore he asserts that He has infinity on the part of the very subject which is known formally; whereas the cognition of the creature is of finite perfection, and thus, although it understands the infinity of God, it does not adequately correspond to it. And for this reason Henricus said that God is not under the notion of infinity formally the subject of created science, but has infinity only concomitantly. Therefore, when this last opinion asserts that God under the absolute notion of God is the subject of Theology, it understands God not by comprehending His infinity or any other attribute: for He demonstrates infinity and the other attributes as passions of God. Whether, however, the ratio of the infinite be compared formally with the subject of Theology, or concomitantly according to the sense of Henricus, is not of the present controversy.

Next it must be observed that God is the subject of Theology not only with respect to that part which deals with necessary truths, but also with respect to that which is about contingent things, as about justification, the Incarnation, etc., as Scotus admonishes; for the rest speak without distinction, except Bassolis, who in that article, § "De Theologia vero," holds that with respect to that part which deals with contingent things God is not the subject under the notion of Deity, but under another notion, as we shall say in the following chapter. In confirmation of this opinion St. Thomas and Henricus use this reason: the subject stands to science as the object (*objectum*) to a potency (*potentia*) or habit; but that is the object of a potency or habit under whose notion all other things are referred to the potency or habit: just as color is therefore the object of sight, because other things, as stone and man, are referred to sight since they have color: therefore that will be the subject of Theology under whose notion all things are referred to it; but all the things which Theology treats are considered in it either because they are God Himself, or because they have an order to Him as to their principle and end: therefore God is the proper subject of Theology.[108]

This is the first reason of St. Thomas, which proves excellently, if the proposition assumed in it be rightly understood. Therefore the comparison between the object of a habit and the subject must be understood thus: just as nothing is the object of a potency or habit which does not have that common notion of object, either essentially as "white," or accidentally as "wall," and in this way something is the object of sight, namely either per se or per accidens, as it partakes of the nature of color; so also all the things which a habit considers have some order or look in some way to the subject of that habit, not that subjection befits them in such wise that it belongs to them by predication, but that in some way those things are said of the subject itself directly or obliquely, and therefore have some order to it.

To this reason can be referred the reason of Scotus, who in q. 2, that lateral question 5, in defending this, assigns as the sole property of the subject that it contains in itself all the truths which are considered in the science; for it ought to be the cause and principle of all those, as induction shows. Wherefore, in the Contra, answering to the first reason which he brought against it, he says that the object is compared with a potency or habit in a different way than the subject:

108. St. Thomas; Henricus, Summa, ar. 19, q. 1; Richard, Prol., q. 6; Scotus, q. 3 in II, lateral q. s.; Bassolis, q. 4, a. 2; Capreolus, q. 4, a. 1, concl.; Major, q. 7, near the end; Canus, De locis theologicis, book 12, c. 2; Henricus, Quodlib. 12, q. 1.

the former is compared as that which moves only, that is, as that which is understood or known, which indeed fits whatever property or conclusion which some habit considers about a thing; but the subject is compared as the cause of all the other things about which that habit is occupied. From which remains proved what St. Thomas assumed in the major proposition; namely, that that is the subject of Theology, under whose notion -

But what Henricus says, namely, that God under the notion of infinity is the subject of the science which God has of himself, not, however, of the science which the blessed or wayfarers have of him, is not contrary to the foregoing opinion.[109] For in that Quodlibet he asserts that God, under the notion of infinity formally, is the subject of the science which he himself has of himself, not only because God, knowing himself, sees that he is infinite (for even a creature knows that God is infinite), but because God understands himself to be infinite, and in an infinite mode, such that the perfection of the cognition adequately corresponds to the thing known; and therefore he asserts that he has infinity on the part of the very subject which is known formally. But the cognition of a creature is certainly of finite perfection; and thus, although it understands the infinity of God, it does not adequately correspond to it. And for this reason Henricus said that God is not, under the notion of infinity formally, the subject of a created science, but that he has infinity only concomitantly. Therefore, when by this latter opinion he asserts that God, under the absolute notion of God, is the subject of Theology, he understands God not as comprehending his infinity or another attribute; for he demonstrates the infinite and the other attributes of God as passions of God. Whether, however, the notion of infinity is compared formally with the subject of Theology, or concomitantly according to the sense of Henricus, is not the present controversy.[110]

Note first: It must then be observed that God is not only the subject of Theology with respect to that part which is occupied with necessary truths, but also with respect to that which is about contingents, as about justification, the Incarnation, etc., as Scotus admonishes; for the rest speak without distinction, except for Bassolis, who in that article 2 judges that, with respect to that part which is occupied with contingents, God is not the subject under the notion of Deity, but under another notion, as we shall say in the following chapter.[111]

In confirmation of this opinion St. Thomas and Henricus use this reason: The subject stands to the science as the object to the potency or to the habit (habitus): but that is the object of the potency or habit, under whose notion all other things are referred to the potency or habit; as color is the object of sight, because all other things are referred to sight inasmuch as they have color: therefore that is the subject of Theology, under whose notion the rest are referred to it; but the rest, which Theology treats, either are God himself, or are considered by us by way of a property, or they have been made by him and are said of him as of a cause: therefore, God under the absolute notion of God is the subject of Theology.[112]

109. Henricus, Quodlibet 12, q. 1.

110. On whether the notion of infinity is compared formally or concomitantly with the subject of Theology, see Henricus as cited; the present dispute does not address it expressly.

111. Scotus, as cited above; Bassolis, In co. art. 2, f.; see also disputation 81, c. 1.

112. St. Thomas, and Henricus, as cited.

This is the first reason of St. Thomas, which is excellently explained, if it is rightly understood. The comparison between object and potency, or habit, must be understood thus: just as nothing is an object potentially which does not have the notion of an object, either essentially or accidentally, so too something is an object either per se or per accidens; and for this reason in the part of the Philosopher which considers color, he considers not only the parts of color, but whatever order or species of being is referred to the object of that potency, to which predication it belongs that in some mode those things are said of the subject either directly or obliquely, and hence they have some order.

To this reason the account of Scotus is recalled, who in question 2, laterally the second, assigns that alone as the subject in which, according to genus, all the things which we adduced at the beginning are contained and are, as it were, comprehended; but St. Thomas, according to Caetanus' exposition, does not think that the conclusions of some science must be contained in the subject as in a sufficient and adequate cause, but only as in a first cause, and sufficient in its order. He says "in its order," because, with something adjoined which participates in that common notion, they are sufficiently obtained from it. Wherefore some generic notion can be the subject in some one science according to species; as number, commonly taken, is the subject in Arithmetic: for, the common notion of number having been posited, and the notion of a particular number being added, there follow singular truths which are contained in number as in a first and sufficient cause, in its own order. The Doctor does not set forth this doctrine expressly in the article; yet Caetanus excellently gathers it from this, that, according to the doctrine of the holy Doctor and the common opinion of all, there can be one science according to species, about some one subject according to genus: such is Arithmetic about number, Philosophy about mobile being, etc. But as pertains to the present controversy, since the subject of Theology, namely God, is one according to species, indeed according to number, he will contain all the truths of this science as an adequate and sufficient cause of them.[113]

Another reason of St. Thomas in this article is of this sort: the same is the subject of the principles and of the whole science; for the whole science is virtually contained in the principles: but God is the subject of the articles of faith, which are the principles of Theology; for we believe about God all the things which are enunciated in the articles: therefore God is the subject of Theology.[114]

A distinction between St. Thomas and Scotus. Caetanus notes on this article that St. Thomas and Scotus do not sufficiently agree in the mode in which they assert the subject to contain virtually the conclusions which are demonstrated in the science. For Scotus holds that they are contained in the subject as in a sufficient and adequate cause, though not proximate: he says not proximate, because a second passion is not contained unless the first is the mean; he says, however, sufficient and adequate, because he thinks it is not possible that something common

113. Caetanus, on this article; cf. the common doctrine that a single science according to species can be about one subject according to genus, e.g., Arithmetic about number, Physics about mobile being.

114. St. Thomas, in this article: "the same is the subject of the principles and of the whole science"; the principles of Theology are the articles of faith.

according to genus be the subject of some peculiar science, but only according to the most special species, which he calls the sufficient and adequate cause of all the conclusions. Scotus seems to have indicated this opinion in that question 2, lateral, in the solution of the second argument "Against that." But Caetanus himself explains otherwise the doctrine of St. Thomas. For he holds that it is necessary that the conclusions of some science be contained in the subject, not as in a sufficient and adequate cause, but only as in a first cause, and sufficient in its order: he says in its order, because, with something adjoined which participates in that common notion, therefrom they sufficiently arise. Wherefore some generic notion can be the subject in some one science according to species, as number, commonly taken, is straightway in Arithmetic: for the common notion of number being posited, and the notion of a particular number being added, there follow the singular truths which were contained in number, as in a first and sufficient cause, in its own order. The Doctor does not hand down this doctrine expressly in the article; yet Caetanus excellently gathers it from the fact that, according to the doctrine of the holy Doctor, and the common opinion of all, there can be one science according to species about some one subject according to genus: such is Arithmetic about number; Physics about mobile being, etc. But as regards the present controversy, since the subject of Theology, namely God, is one according to species, indeed according to number, he will contain all the truths of this science as an adequate and sufficient cause of them.[115]

Non solum Deus est subiectum Theologiae respectu veritatum necessariarum, sed etiam contingentium.

Caput VI - On the difficulty with Bassolis's opinion

There still remains a difficulty with the opinion of Bassolis, whether by the same reason God is the subject of Theology with respect to necessary truths and to contingents. For he himself, as we have previously recounted, thinks that he is the subject with respect to contingent truths according to the notion, not of Deity and essence, but of will: forasmuch as God is not the cause of things inasmuch as he is, but inasmuch as he wills, as we shall show in disputation 81, chapter 1. But I, for my part, am very much pleased with the opinion of Scotus in that question 2, lateral, where he teaches that under the notion of Deity alone God is the subject with respect to both kinds of truths; but that he cannot be the subject under the notion of will is easily proved from the fundamental principle posited at the beginning and repeated in chapter 4. For the subject ought to be something incomplex, such that in the science there is no enunciation made about it supposed beforehand: for which reason we said in chapter 4 that God, under the notion of Glorifier, cannot be the first subject of Theology; because in him there is already some enunciation supposed, namely that God is a glorifier. But by the same reason God, insofar as he is conceived by us under the notion of willing, is not something incomplex; but an enunciation is already made about him, namely that he wills some thing to be done: therefore under this notion he cannot be the first subject of Theology.[116]

115. Scotus, q. 2, lateralis; Caetanus, in this article.

116. Scotus, q. 2, lateralis; see the fundamental principle posited in cap. 1 and repeated in cap. 4; on "Glorifier" as not the first subject, see cap. 4.

But what Bassolis was asserting for his opinion is of no weight. For although God is not the cause of things and of contingent truths inasmuch as he is, but inasmuch as he wills, nevertheless the first subject, of which all things are predicated, is God himself, inasmuch as he is. For the predications, however, of those truths include an act of will, by reason of which something is enunciated about God: therefore the notion of will is rather on the part of the predicate than of the subject; just as the notion of Glorifier is of the same sort, as Bassolis himself above taught.[117]

Scotus, however, notes in that question 2, lateral, to the first question and the following, that God, under the notion of Deity, is not in the same mode the first subject of Theology with respect to necessary and contingent truths. For he says that he is a necessary subject because he contains them virtually from the nature of the thing and necessarily; of which there still is not the same mode of subject in Theology taken according to itself and as it is in wayfarers. For in Theology according to itself, which has the evidence of these truths, God is thus the first subject, that the evidence of himself makes the evidence of all those truths: but in the Theology of wayfarers, by that reason alone, that he contains all those truths in himself and is by his own evidence apt to generate their evidence, if that evidence were had. But with respect to contingent truths, God indeed (he says) is the first subject, not because he contains all those virtually, but because he is the first to which there must inhere the first predicate of the first contingent truth, which is "to be the first subject of every predication." I, for my part, would not deny that God is thus the subject of Theology as related to both kinds of truths, that he contains them in himself, even if he be said not to contain them in the same way. For he contains contingents freely, as their efficient cause; but the necessary truths he contains necessarily from the nature of the thing, which Scotus called virtually; because in him they seem to be included virtually by the very fact that they belong to him from the nature of the thing.[118]

I also think, against Scotus, that God is not the subject of necessary truths in Theology according to itself: for this is either the Theology of God, or the vision of God himself as he is: but each is the most simple knowledge of him and of all necessary truths which, in our mode of understanding, are ascribed to him in predication; but in simple knowledge there is no subject and predicate: therefore only in us wayfarers, who enunciate composite truths about God, does God have the notion of a subject, about which our Theology enunciates and treats something: but with respect to contingent truths God is certainly the subject of Theology according to itself; for the blessed with a single simple intuition see the essence of God and creatures, as we shall show below, disputation 50, chapter 7. Therefore they can both enunciate composition about God, and deny division of those things which are outside of him. Yet there is another mode of Theology which God has about himself: for he by a single intuition knows himself and all things; wherefore, with respect to the cognition itself, we cannot assign in God either subject or predicate distinctly according to our mode of understanding, although in God we distinguish both.[119]

117. Bassolis, supra, in the same matter.
118. Scotus, loc. cit.
119. On the vision of the blessed and their mode of cognition, see below, disputation 50, c. 7.

Caput VII - Arguments that can be opposed

Against this last opinion there are arguments from which some third opinion seems able to be proved

First argument: No science proves about its own subject whether it is and what it is; but it supposes these two, as is said in Posterior Analytics I, chapter 1: but Theology not only proves what God is, but also whether he is: therefore God is not the subject of it.

Solution: I answer that in Theology, from its own principles, which are known only by revelation, these two are not properly proved, but are thus supposed: that God is and that he is the first being, the principle and cause of all things, as that he is Trinity and one, and the other principles which are called the articles of faith. But the Theologian, after another fashion than the Philosopher, proves by reasons from the posterior that God is and that he is one, since among the most base men there are not lacking those who either deny that there is one God, or, what is worse, deny that he is. For we said above that the Theologian is greatly helped by good philosophy. But although faith teaches that God is and that he is one, these two are not numbered among the articles of faith among all; but they are among the things necessarily required for the articles, as St. Thomas teaches.[120]

It is further supposed what God is, by a generic concept which wayfarers can have for this state by the species of other things, by adding and subtracting, as Aegidius notes in that question 3, ad 3, and Henricus in the article cited ad 3; of which kind of cognition we shall speak in disputation 22, chapter 4.[121]

Second argument of St. Gregory: St. Gregory argues secondly in that article 24, in confirmation of the second conclusion: If God under the notion of God were the subject of Theology, he could also be comprehended by Theology; for it pertains to the habit of some subject to consider the things which belong to it, and which can belong (that is, to be able to attain even those): but God cannot be comprehended by Theology: therefore he cannot be its subject.

Solution: I reply: it is not necessary for a habit to know of its subject or of its objects so perfectly as to comprehend them, and to reach them in such wise as to know all the things which can belong to them. And although there may be some habit posited in a creature which comprehends its created subject or object, nevertheless none can be so perfect that it can operate after this mode about God, even if it clearly intuited him. Therefore it is sufficient for the habit of a science about some subject to know many things about it and to deduce them from its principles.

Others also try to infer something absurd, as St. Gregory reports, if the last opinion be true: namely because it would follow that there is some Theology which would know infinite truths about God; since infinite things can be enunciated about him under the absolute notion. But that absurdity does not follow, if we should say that God is the subject of Theology, but in that peculiar

120. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 1; St. Thomas, II - II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3.
121. Aegidius, q. illa 3, ad 3; Henricus, in the article cited, ad 3; on this kind of cognition see disputation 22, c. 4.

way. Yet this too is trifling: for the perfections and predicates of God which are said to belong to him are not infinite in number. For either the discourse is about perfections according to themselves and about the things themselves; and in this mode they are not many, much less infinite: for in God there is most simple essence, without any other distinction than of the persons; infinite according to existence (*esse*), yet not according to number and multitude. But if we speak about the perfections of God as known by some intellect, even then they are not infinite; first indeed in the divine intellect and that of the blessed: for they do not distinguish in God the attributes and perfections among themselves and from the essence, as we shall say in 113, chapter 2.[122] Then neither are they infinite in the intellect of wayfarers: for no one thus far has conceived infinite things about God or discovered perfections. Finally, although the perfections of created things, which, when referred to God, can in some manner be predicated of him as an effect of a cause, are distinct, and infinite too if you include the possibles, nevertheless there is no need to posit in God a created knowledge which would know all of them: but it is enough if it considers some chief ones. St. Gregory, moreover, does not deem it absurd that there be some created knowledge which at once knows God and infinite creatures, as we shall show below, disputation 50, chapter 7. Therefore by this argument St. Gregory proves nothing.[123]

Third argument of Aegidius: Aegidius argues thirdly, if God under the absolute notion of God, not under some particular one, were the subject of Theology, this doctrine would not be distinguished from Metaphysics, which also is called Theology or divine science: for diverse faculties ought to have diverse subjects about which they dispute, and one science is of one kind of subject, according to Aristotle.

Solution: We reply that, first, the subject of that Theology which is Metaphysics is not God, but being universally; nor does Metaphysics refer all the things it considers to God as to its formal object: and besides this difference, which is had from the unity of the subject, not only must the unity of the subject be considered, but also the unity of the formal object, that is, of the principles from which it proceeds. And because Metaphysics proceeds from the principles of natural light, but our Theology from revealed principles, diverse sciences are constituted about the same subject. But this difference could not be known to Aristotle, who did not know such a kind of principles as our Theology has.[124]

Articulus VIII - Whether sacred doctrine is argumentative

To the eighth, one proceeds thus.

122. See 113, c. 2.

123. St. Gregory, in the place cited; see also disputation 50, c. 7.

124. Aegidius, in the argument; cf. Aristotle, on the unity of science by subject; on the distinction between Metaphysics and sacred Theology by their formal principles, see the discussion in this chapter.

It seems that this doctrine is not argumentative. For Ambrose says in the book On the Sacraments: "Remove arguments where faith is sought." But in this doctrine faith is sought chiefly; whence it is said in John 20: "These are written that you may believe." Therefore sacred doctrine is not argumentative.[125]

1. Further, if it be argumentative, either it argues from authority or from reason. If from authority, this does not seem congruent with its dignity (for, according to Boethius, the locus from authority is most infirm). If also from reason, this does not agree with its end: because, according to St. Gregory in a homily, "faith has no merit where human reason supplies experience." Therefore sacred doctrine is not argumentative.[126]

But on the contrary: it is said to Titus, concerning the bishop, that he should "embrace the faithful word according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to argue with those who contradict."[127]

I answer that, just as certain sciences do not argue in order to prove their own principles, but argue from principles in order to show other things within the sciences themselves, so this doctrine does not argue to prove its own principles, which are the articles of faith; but from them it proceeds to show something, as the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 15 argues from the resurrection of Christ to prove the common resurrection.

Nevertheless, it should be considered in philosophical sciences that the lower sciences neither prove their own principles nor dispute against one who denies the principles, but leave this to the higher science; while the highest among them, namely Metaphysics, disputes against one who denies its principles if the adversary concedes something; but if he concedes nothing, it cannot dispute with him; it can, however, solve his reasons. Thus sacred Scripture, since it has no superior, disputes with one who denies its principles, indeed arguing if the adversary concedes something of those things which are held by divine revelation - just as by the authorities of sacred Scripture we dispute against heretics, and by one article against one who denies another. But if the adversary believes nothing of the things that are divinely revealed, no further way remains for proving the articles of faith by reasons, but only for solving the reasons, if he brings any, against the faith. For since faith rests upon infallible truth, it is impossible that the contrary be demonstrated about the true; hence it is manifest that the proofs which are brought against the faith are not demonstrations, but arguments to be solved.

Reply to the first: Although arguments of human reason do not have a place for proving the things that pertain to faith, yet this doctrine argues from the articles of faith to other things, as has been said.

Reply to the second: To argue from authority is most proper to this doctrine, because the principles of this doctrine are had through revelation. And thus it is necessary that authority be believed of those to whom revelation has been made. Nor does this derogate from the dignity of

125. Ambrose, De Sacramentis; John 20.
126. Boethius, Topica; St. Gregory, Hom. 26 in Evangelia.

this doctrine; for although the locus from authority, which is founded upon human reason, is most infirm, nevertheless the locus from authority which is founded upon divine revelation is most efficacious. Sacred doctrine, however, also uses human reason: not indeed to prove the faith (for by this the merit of faith would be taken away), but to make manifest certain other things which are handed down in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not take away nature, but perfects it, it is necessary that natural reason serve faith, just as the natural inclination of the will obeys charity. Whence also the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 10: "Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ." And from this it is that sacred doctrine also uses the authorities of the philosophers, where by natural reason they were able to know the truth: just as Paul in Acts 17 adduces the word of Aratus, saying, "As also some of your own poets have said, 'For we are his offspring'." Yet this doctrine uses authorities of this kind as extrinsic arguments and probable ones. But it uses the authorities of canonical Scripture properly and from necessity in arguing. The authorities, moreover, of other Doctors of the Church it uses as arguing not from their own, but probably. For our faith rests upon the revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets, who wrote the canonical books; not, however, upon the revelation, if any there was, made to other Doctors. Whence St. Augustine says in the epistle to St. Jerome: "To the books of Scripture alone, which are called canonical, have I learned to pay this honor, that I most firmly believe that none of their authors erred in writing anything. But other authors I so read, that however much they excel in sanctity and doctrine, I do not therefore think true, because they thus perceived or wrote."[128]

Summary and confirmation of the whole article.

From the body of the article three conclusions can be elicited.

- First: Our Theology does not use arguments to prove its own principles, but proceeds from the things supposed to prove other things.
- Second: Just as it pertains to Metaphysics to dispute against those who deny its principles, if they admit something as true from which one may argue - wherefore among the natural disciplines Metaphysics is more noble - so also it is the office of Theology to confirm the articles of faith, which are the principles of this science, against heretics from Scripture, which they themselves admit, or from another locus in which they agree with Catholics.
- Third: If someone denying the principles admits nothing from which the Theologian can argue against him, there only remains that he respond to his arguments made against the same articles. Finally, in the solution of the second [objection], St. Thomas enumerates the theological loci, from which Theology draws its arguments.[129]

From all which things is gathered the response to the question proposed in the title of the article; namely, that Theology is argumentative; that is, that it pertains to it to use arguments and reasons, as Paul testifies in 2 Timothy 3: "All Scripture, inspired by God, is useful for teaching, for arguing," and this is, for refuting and convincing false dogmas: in which sense all the Latin and

127. Ad Titus, on the qualification of a bishop.

128. St. Augustine, Epistle to St. Jerome: "Solis enim scripturarum libris, qui canonici appellantur..."

129. St. Thomas, in the solution to the second objection of this article, on the theological loci.

Greek Fathers interpret Paul. Now two kinds of false dogma can be refuted by Scripture: one of those which directly fight against the articles of faith, which are the principles of Theology, such as the error of those who deny the divinity of Christ; and against these Theology argues in the manner said in the second conclusion. The other kind of false dogma is that which is not directly and expressly against an article of faith, yet from it something against an article follows. And this kind of error is against the conclusions of Theology itself, and this the Theologian refutes from Scripture or other loci in the manner which we have said in the first conclusion: by which kind of arguing very many truths in the Church have been defined and contrary opinions condemned: such as that concerning the formal cause inhering in our justification, concerning the adoration of the Saints and of images, and other things of that kind. The Lord Christ also, employing this kind of arguing, in the Gospel convicts the Pharisees; and he convinces by example: in Luke 6 he adduces the example of David, who, under urgent necessity, ate the loaves of proposition (1 Kings 21). Then in Matthew 19 Christ proves that it is not lawful to dismiss a wife for any cause whatsoever, and elsewhere very often from Scripture. Sometimes too he argues by most excellent reason. Thus in Luke 11 he rebukes the malice of the Jews by reason, and proves that he casts out demons by the finger and by the power of God.

Both kinds of arguing against heretics are frequent among the holy Fathers; wherefore by no right do the heretics of our times defame our Theology, that it applies itself so diligently to the forming of "the best reasons" and arguments. For they say that by scholastic argumentations and diverse disputations the doctrine - which the Fathers in a wonderful manner commend - is so disturbed, that it seems to have been devised rather for deceiving or for contention than for teaching; indeed for stirring up new heresies, since by philosophical reasons the wit is sharpened beyond measure. For which cause St. Jerome, in the treatise to Ctesiphon against the Pelagians, seems to call the philosophers the patriarchs of the heretics; and in Epistle 127, on the forty-two mansions, he named the heresies themselves the firstborn of philosophy; and in the first act of the sixth General Synod he says that Arius drew his error from the books of the philosophers.

But these are the subtleties of the heretics, who do not lack slanders, that they may falsely reprove the Theologians. But if the heretics themselves, by perverse interpretations of Scripture and captious arguments, most miserably deceive the ignorant peoples, it will not be a fault against the truth if our Theology should apply itself to dissolving these reasons and use against the same heretics arguments more efficacious and truer. Moreover, if at some time the Church has used logical and even sophistical disputations - St. Augustine, when he was engaging the Manichees; likewise Tertullian publicly disputing against the same - it will not be useless, but necessary, that there be in the Church Theologians who may be skilled in the art of arguing, and may know how to dissolve the captious argumentations of heretics; nor is simplicity and the truth of doctrine thereby taken away, but rather explained and defended; and if any false opinions arise anew, they are more easily refuted. Heretics indeed are not born in the Church from philosophy rightly understood; nor are philosophers well instructed in sacred doctrine the masters of heretics, but rather they have been their most keen assailants. Deservedly therefore does our Theology use arguments and

reasons, and is sometimes helped by true and sound philosophy. We do not deny that many Theologians sometimes sin in their exercises, disputations, and questions, either disputing too contentiously or mixing in things useless; yet these vices are theirs, not Theology's.

Dubitatio circa textum.

About the first conclusion of this article more recent Thomists vary in explaining the mind of the holy Doctor: for there are some who think he taught only this, that it does not pertain to the Theologian to prove evidently and necessarily his own principles, which are the articles of faith and other things defined by the Church or handed down in Scripture; yet that they can be commended by a Theologian negatively by probable reason. For it does not belong to him only to explain his principles, but also to show them in some way by reason: wherefore in 2-2, q. 1, a. 5 many Theologians strive to show by probable reasons the credibility of the mysteries of our faith. They say therefore that our Theology differs from philosophy in this, that the latter can manifestly prove even posteriorly its own principles, whereas Theology can prove neither a priori nor a posteriori, nor show necessity, but only probable reasons, as was said.

Others assert that this commendation also - by which Theologians demonstrate the particular credibility - is not from the habit of Theology; because it does not proceed from revealed principles, but from human reasons and from effects by which the credibility of things can be humanly demonstrated. Wherefore it does not pertain to the Theologian, as Theologian, to prove his principles; nor is this kind of proof to be had from that source, but from another, namely that Theology, whatever it teaches, should have the faith of human faith. This indeed shows ...

Christ also, the Lord, in the Gospel convicted the Pharisees by the best kind of arguing, by reason and orderly sequence; and, in order to prove that it was lawful for the Apostles on the Sabbath to pluck ears of grain to refresh themselves, he adduced, Luke 6, the example of David, who, because of urgent necessity, ate the loaves of the proposition (1 Reg. 21). Then in Matthew 19 Christ proves that it is not lawful to dismiss a wife for just any cause; and elsewhere very often from Scripture; sometimes too he argues by most cogent reason. Thus in Luke 11 he refutes the malice of the Jews by argument, and proved that he had cast out demons by the finger and the power of God.

Both kinds of arguing, especially against heretics, are frequent among the holy Fathers. Wherefore, without cause do the heretics of our times reproach our Theology (Theology, Theologia), because it so diligently applies itself to the framing of most fitting reasons and arguments. For they say that by scholastic arguments and disputation-circles the simplicity of doctrine, which is marvellously commended by the Fathers, is so disturbed, that it seems invented rather to deceive, or to contend, than to teach; indeed useful for nothing else than to stir up new heresies, while minds are sharpened more than is expedient by philosophical reasons. For this cause St. Jerome, in the tract to Ctesiphon against the Pelagians, seems to have called philosophers the patriarchs of the heretics; and in Epistle 127 on the forty-two mansions he called the heresies themselves the first-born of philosophy; and the Sixth general Synod, act 1, says of Arius that he drew his error from the books of the philosophers.[130]

But these are the quibbles of heretics, who do not lack cavils, so that they may falsely reprehend our Theology. And if the heretics themselves, by perverse interpretations of Scripture and captious arguments, most miserably deceive unlearned peoples, it will not be a fault of our Theology if it endeavors to refute those arguments, and employs against those same heretics more efficacious and truer ones. Moreover, if at some time the Church complained of logic and sophisms - for when St. Augustine was a Manichee, he urged that God should be publicly prayed to for deliverance from them - it will not be useless, but necessary, that there be in the Church theologians who are well skilled in the art of arguing and know how to dissolve the captious arguments of heretics; nor on that account are the simplicity and truth of doctrine taken away, but they are explained and defended; and the false opinions which thereupon arise are the more easily refuted. Heresies, however, do not arise in the Church from philosophy well understood; nor have philosophers well instructed in sacred doctrine been the teachers of heretics, but rather their most ardent assailants. Rightly, then, does our Theology employ arguments and reasons, and is at times aided by true and sound philosophy. We do not deny that theologians do sometimes sin much in their disputation-circles, disputations, and the handling of questions, either by differing too contentiously, or by mixing in useless things: yet these vices are theirs, not Theology's.

Dubitation concerning the text.

Concerning the first conclusion, the principles (principles, principia) of this article the more recent Thomists vary in expounding the mind of the holy Doctor. There are theologians who think he taught only this, that it does not pertain to the Theologian to prove evidently and necessarily his own principles, which are the articles of faith and other things defined by the Church or delivered in Scripture; yet he did not deny that they can be commended by the Theologian with probable reason. For it does not belong to him only to explain his principles, but also to show them by some reason. Wherefore, in 2.2, q. 1, a. 5, very many theologians endeavor to show by probable reasons the credibility of the mysteries of our faith. They say, therefore, that our Theology differs from philosophy in this, that the latter can at least a posteriori evidently prove its own principles, whereas Theology neither a priori nor a posteriori evidently or necessarily demonstrates, but only by probable reason, as has been said. Others assert that even this proof, by which the Theologian demonstrates the credibility of our articles, is not from the habit of Theology; because it does not proceed from revealed principles, but from human reasons drawn from effects by which the credibility of things can in a human way be demonstrated. Wherefore it will not pertain to the Theologian, as Theologian, to prove his principles; and so this kind of proof will belong to another habit, which they say is the habit of human faith. For this shows by the best right that those things are to be believed which have been received with highest veneration by an innumerable multitude of men distant in places and times, distinguished by sanctity and letters, without any advantage of riches, pleasure, or honor, so lowly and contrary to human sense.[131] On which matter Eusebius says

130. St. Jerome, Ad Ctesiphontem contra Pelagianos; Ep. 127, De XLII mansionibus; Sixth Ecumenical Council (Constantinople III), act 1, on Arius.

131. That is, the common human signs of credibility taken from the universality, sanctity, learning, and disinterest of believers across times and places.

many things, book 1 of the Preparation for the Gospel; Justin, in the Exhortation to the Greeks; and St. Augustine, De civitate Dei 12, chapters 10 and 18; and book 13, On the Trinity, chapters 5 and 6. [132] Wherefore with good reason St. Thomas, in the second conclusion, compared Theology in this respect to Metaphysics, because it is nobler than the rest, and therefore is called wisdom.[133]

But if those admit no principle of this sort who deny the articles of faith, there remains no argument against them within the bounds of Theology; but it serves only to dissolve their reasons, as St. Thomas expressly noted in the third conclusion. Wherefore the later Thomists rightly used to say that those reasons by which the credibility of our faith is wont to be proved do not pertain to the Theologian as his proper ones; yet we can and ought to use them against those who deny the mysteries of our faith, if they admit no place at all to Scripture, tradition, or the definition of the Church. With such men one must proceed rather by human reason: first to show the error of their faith, then the probability of ours, especially from the kinship which it has with the true law. These reasons, therefore, are not proper to Theology: otherwise St. Thomas would not have said that, against those who deny all the principles of Theology, nothing else remains for the Theologian than to dissolve their arguments.

Vera explicatio St. Thomas. Easier to my judgment is the mind of St. Thomas, and that the truest; namely, that the principles of Theology are not proved by it absolutely, but are supposed as true - unless in the case of the second conclusion, that is, against those who deny them. For with those who are well instructed in the Catholic faith and ready to believe what the Roman Church proposes, Theology does not treat of proving the articles, but among them it supposes them as certain, and from them argues to infer new conclusions and truths. It does indeed prove those aforesaid articles, which it ought to have supposed, when they are denied by heretics. However, as St. Thomas says in the conclusion, in this way Theology can argue only when certain articles are denied and others admitted: for the principles of Theology are of such a sort, and so connected, that they can mutually aid one another and one be proved from another - namely, Scripture by the definition of the Church and by tradition, and conversely; but only among those who admit some of them. Likewise, the same universal principle, if granted, proves the particulars which are contained under it; and this too pertains to the Theologian. For example, if a heretic admits some book of Scripture, yet denies some truth contained in it from a perverse understanding and interpretation thereof; the Theologian, who ought to be versed in Scripture, can within the proper bounds of Theology convict him: likewise, if someone admits the authority of some Council, yet denies what is defined in the same, in like manner he is to be convicted by the Theologian. By this reason our Theology ought to be called wisdom, and the Theologian wise. For, according to Aristotle, Ethics 6, chapter 7, the wise man must not only know those things which are known from principles, but also pronounce concerning first things, by explaining and declaring them.[134]

132. Eusebius, De praeparatione evangelica, book 1; Justin Martyr, Oratio paraenetica ad Graecos; St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, book 12, chs. 10, 18; De Trinitate, book 13, chs. 5 - 6.

133. St. Thomas, in the second conclusion of the present question/article, comparing Theology to Metaphysics.

134. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, ch. 7.

And if they admit no principle of this sort, who deny the articles of faith, there remains no argument within the bounds of Theology against them; but it serves only to dissolve their reasons, as St. Thomas expressly noted in the third conclusion. Wherefore the later Thomists rightly used to say that those reasons by which the credibility of our faith is wont to be proved do not pertain to the Theologian as his proper ones; yet we can and ought to use them against those who deny the mysteries of our faith, if they admit no place at all to Scripture, tradition, or the definition of the Church. With such men one must proceed rather by human reason: first to show the error of their faith, then the probability of ours, especially from the kinship it has with the true law. These reasons, therefore, are not proper to Theology: otherwise St. Thomas would not have said that, against those who deny all the principles of Theology (essence, essentia; existence, esse; relation, relatio; person, persona; supposit, suppositum), nothing else remains for the Theologian than to dissolve their arguments.

Disputatio XI - Whether the Theologian can evidently dissolve the adversaries' arguments

Caput I - The opinion of Durandus

Concerning the third conclusion of the article it remains to dispute whether our Theology dissolves the adversaries' arguments by showing evidently that they prove nothing. In this difficulty Durandus thought, in Quodlibet, Prologue, n. 42, that the Theologian cannot dissolve evidently, but only probably, the arguments that are made against our mysteries of faith. He proves this, because either the reason adduced against an article has a defect in form, or it assumes some false proposition: the former can be evidently known, and therefore, if in some way this argument be solved, it will be evident about its solution. But the latter cannot be evident: for just as there cannot be evident certainty about the truth of the mystery, so neither about the falsity of that which is assumed to prove the contrary; for of both there is the same reason. As, if someone argues against the mystery of the Trinity in this way: wherever there is distinction of persons, there is also distinction of nature; but in the divine there is distinction of persons: therefore also of nature. The argument indeed has no other defect than that it assumes the major proposition to be false, since in the Infinite, according to essence, it can at once be that there is a singular nature and a plurality of persons. But if by faith the falsity of that were evidently established, evidently too would appear the truth of the contradictory proposition, namely, that in some singular nature there can be more supposits (supposita). Thus the mystery of the Trinity would be evident.

Caput II - What Caietanus holds

But Caietanus, in this article, concerning the third, seems to have taught the contrary. For he asserts two things. One is, that all contrary reasons can be dissolved evidently within the limits of Theology itself, and thus that the Theologian can respond to them not only from propositions

believed, but also from those evidently known: not indeed positively, but negatively. For the explanation of which he notes that contrary reasons can be dissolved evidently in a twofold way. First, negatively; not because there is evidence of the opposite proposition, but because it is evident that what is assumed in the argument does not convince the intellect to its assent. As, in the example posited by Durandus, that major proposition can be denied, in every nature where there is distinction of persons, there is also of essence; since it does not appear how universally true is what is there said. Then, some argument can be dissolved evidently positively, because the truth of the contradictory of what is assumed evidently stands. As, if in the same example the truth of the major proposition should appear, namely, that in some singular nature there are several persons; and in this latter way all the arguments against the mysteries of our faith cannot be dissolved: because, as Durandus well proves, there would be had an evidence of the mysteries themselves. Therefore Caietanus wished to teach nothing else, when he said that the Theologian does not fulfil his office unless he evidently dissolves the arguments, than that the well-instructed Theologian evidently dissolves the arguments negatively, by this very fact that he is not forced to assent to the assumed proposition, nor by doubt is moved from the true doctrine.

From which Caietanus infers that they are deceived who think that the reasons brought against our faith can be dissolved not evidently, but obscurely. For there is a difference, says he, between the proof of some proposition and the solution of a contrary argument; namely, that, in order that the proof be evident, it must assume propositions of which it is not only not clear that they are false, but their truth is also evident, so that from them an evident positive assent to the conclusion may follow; but that the solution of a contrary argument be evident, it is enough if something is denied whose truth does not appear, which would convince the intellect to assent. For to one to whom there does not appear something from which he should assent, but rather he believes the contrary, even if he believes it obscurely, it is evident that that argument does not efficaciously prove. As if someone denies that the stars are even in number, and another wishes to prove it to him from a certain number he shall have assumed at pleasure; if the assumed proposition does not appear true to him, its negation will be an evident way of dissolving such an argument, that is, of showing it proves nothing. But in order that the even number be evidently proved, propositions must be assumed which engender an evident assent. Wherefore the opinion of Caietanus, rightly understood, does not oppose the position of Durandus: for the latter speaks only of positive evidence, which Caietanus does not grant in the solution of arguments; while here he speaks of negative evidence, as has been explained, which Durandus would not deny.

Posterior part. The other thing which Caietanus teaches is that nevertheless some arguments at least can be dissolved evidently positively, from the fact that the opposite of what is assumed in the argument is evidently known: as if someone should argue against the mystery of the Eucharist that accidents in it cannot be...[135]

135. Durandus: Quodlibeta, Prologue, n. 42; Caietanus: commentary on II - II, q. 1, a. 5, and allied places, as referred to in the text.

Durandus rightly proves that arguments against the mysteries cannot be dissolved evidently; therefore Cajetan wished to teach something different, when he said that the theologian has done his task if he resolves the arguments made against him, rather than that the theologian should evidently, by a negative, argue them down, by the very fact that he does not grant the assumption, the doubt about the proposed point being thereby removed.

Cajetan adds that they are mistaken who do not distinguish between an evident proof of a conclusion and the solution of an argument. For, there is, he says, a difference between the proof of some proposition and the solution of an argument against it. In order that a proof be evident, it must assume propositions of which it is not only not uncertain that they are false, but whose truth is evident, so that from them there may arise an evident assent to the conclusion. But for the solution of an argument it is enough, if something be shown from which the truth of the conclusion does not appear, which prevents the intellect from assenting. And if there does not appear something from which that conclusion follows, but rather the contrary is obscurely believed, it is evident that the argument does not efficaciously prove it. For if someone were to deny, for example, that the stars are equal, and wished to prove it from a certain number arbitrarily assumed; if that assumed proposition does not appear true to him, to deny such an argument is to dissolve it - that is, to show that it proves nothing. Therefore, in order to prove evidently a number or the like, it is necessary to assume propositions that generate an evident assent.

Properly understood in this way, the opinion of Cajetan does not contradict that of Durandus: for Durandus speaks of positive evidence; it is not a positive evidence of the solution of arguments that Cajetan intends; rather, Cajetan speaks of negative evidence, as has been explained, which Durandus would not deny.

However, what Cajetan teaches is, in its latter part, nevertheless true: that at least some arguments can be dissolved evidently and positively from the fact that the opposite of what is assumed in the argument is evidently known. Thus, if someone contended against the mystery of the Eucharist that accidents in it cannot be without a substance, because their being and nature is to be-in (inesse), this argument can be evidently and positively solved, because in good philosophy it is evidently known that the essence (*essentia*) of accidents is not an actual existence (*esse*) in a substance, but a total aptitude and ordination to inhere; and so the assumption can be denied with the evidence of the contrary proposition. This, however, will not be done in the case of other arguments to be solved. Cajetan also adds that this mode of responding evidently and positively pertains to the theologian, as he is a theologian, even if the solution of the argument be taken from principles of philosophy. For theology makes alien principles its own, when it uses the ministry of other faculties for the defense of its own doctrine; for which reason he himself calls these principles theological ministerially.

Nevertheless, Cajetan falsely asserted that it pertains to the theologian, as he is a theologian, to solve evidently and positively such an argument which indirectly fights against the mystery: for that the theologian does, insofar as he is a philosopher. Nor do the principles of philosophy become proper to the theologian, unless when, with articles of faith being granted, they are used to infer some conclusion; then indeed he receives them from philosophy, because theology is in a certain

manner subordinated under philosophy, as was said above in Disputation 7, cap. 5.[136] But when the theologian disputes from the principles of philosophy alone, as happens in the solution of the aforesaid arguments, he does not exercise the office of a theologian, but of a philosopher; whence it follows that the theologian, as he is a theologian, dissolves no argument evidently and positively.

Caput III - The more probable view: that no argument directly against a mystery can be evidently positively solved by the theologian

This opinion of Cajetan, except for its latter part, does not please me; and so I think, universally, that no argument which directly fights against a mystery, as it is an article of faith, can be dissolved evidently and positively, but only negatively. Enough has been said, in the explanation of Cajetan's opinion, about an evident negative solution; but as for an evident positive one, our opinion is now proved: because, if some argument which directly fought against a mystery were to be evidently and positively dissolved, there would thereby be an evidence of the mystery itself, as the reasoning of Durandus most rightly convinces. I said, an argument that directly fights against the mystery; because the arguments that fight by consequence, or directly against something natural which an article supposes, not only some, but all, can be evidently and positively solved; and in this sense Cajetan's opinion would be true. Such is that argument adduced against the mystery of the Eucharist; for it does not fight directly against the article, which consists solely in this, that after the words are properly pronounced the accidents now remain without a subject; the argument indeed does not directly prove that the accidents do not remain in that way, but deduces it by consequence, because so to be cannot happen; now, that this can be, is not known by the oracles of faith and by revelation alone, but is something that can be known by natural reason and is necessarily presupposed to the article. Similar would be the argument, if someone wished to prove against the article of the resurrection, and to this end assumed that the soul is mortal, and has no potency toward the past. For this argument could be evidently and positively solved, because it does not directly conflict with the article itself, which consists only in this, that there will be a future resurrection.

Finally, Cajetan falsely asserted that it pertains to the theologian, as he is a theologian, to solve evidently and positively such an argument which indirectly fights against the mystery: for he does that insofar as he is a philosopher. For the principles of philosophy do not become proper to the theologian, unless when, with articles of faith being granted, they are used to infer some conclusion; but then he receives them from philosophy, because theology is in a certain manner subordinated under philosophy, as was said above in Disputation 7, cap. 5.[136] But when the theologian disputes from the proper principles of philosophy alone, as in the solution of the aforesaid arguments happens, he does not exercise the office of a theologian, but of a philosopher; whence it follows that the theologian, as he is a theologian, dissolves no argument evidently and positively.

136. Above, Disputation 7, cap. 5.
136. Above, Disputation 7, cap. 5.

Disputatio XII - On the loci of Theology and on treating theological questions

- Caput I - What is a theological locus, and how many kinds there are.
- Caput II - On the use of the five prior loci.
- Caput III - On the authority of the Scholastics, of the philosophers, and on philosophic reason.
- Caput IV - On human history.
- Caput V - The difference between human history and philosophic reason.

Caput I - What is a theological locus, and how many kinds there are

The argument about the theological loci in our own time Melchior Canus has treated excellently through twelve books, in which he not only set before our eyes the number of the loci, but also, concerning each, handed down much, and recalled into discussion various matters fetched from here and there. But our present plan will be, with a simple narration, to review the loci which seem to pertain to the theologian, and briefly to set out the weight of each and the use.

We call theological loci, not the subjects about which theology treats, which are also called commonplaces, as concerning justification, merit, etc., but rather the seats and storehouses from which theological arguments are drawn. Just as Aristotle in the Topics shows various loci, either from definition, or from contraries, etc., from which in any proposed question one can fetch probable arguments; so it will now have to be set forth whence the theologian can produce his reasons and arguments. And although every argument, universally, is made either from authority or from reason, nevertheless ten theological loci are customarily enumerated. Whether indeed all of them pertain to the theologian as legitimate and proper, we shall say in this disputation.

The first locus, therefore, is the authority of Sacred Scripture. The second, the authority of the traditions of Christ and the Apostles. The third, the authority of the Catholic Church. The fourth, the authority of Councils. The fifth, the authority of the Roman Pontiff. The sixth, the authority of the Fathers. The seventh, the authority of the Scholastic theologians, together with which there is wont also to be reckoned the authority of the jurists, in that part in which the theologian treats of the doctrine of right. The eighth, reason, deduced by natural light. The ninth, the authority of the philosophers. The tenth, the authority of human history. Of these Canus judges the first seven to be proper to the theologian, in book 1 De locis, the last chapter; the three latter, however, to be adscititious and borrowed from elsewhere: in what way this is true I shall explain briefly; for it is not our purpose to teach what sacred Scripture is, in what manner it was written and revealed, what tradition is, and of what authority; nothing, moreover, that pertains to the firmness and strength of the decrees of Councils and Popes; but we presuppose that there are five most solid foundations of theology, from which its most principal arguments are derived, and contain one and the same truth of divine revelation, as will be shown more at length in 2 - 2, q. 1, a. 10, in the special treatise about all these.[137] For this reason St. Thomas embraces these four loci under one only, namely under the authority which is had from divine revelation; for the firmness and strength of truth is the same from divine testimony, although it be expressed in different modes.

This energy of truth, however, the other loci do not have from themselves. I except the common consent of the Fathers in the explication of some sense of Scripture which pertains to a dogma of faith, and also in eliciting traditions of faith; for in these the same authority is had as with the true sense of Scripture and with true Christian tradition, for no other reason than that the Catholic Church receives and holds Scripture thus explained, as the Council of Trent defines, session 4, in the decree on the edition and use of the sacred books, and embraces the traditions themselves preserved continuously by the common consent of the Fathers.[138] From itself, however, the authority of the Fathers is human, and from them alone does not have the weight of an incontestable truth. The other four loci ought to be placed in a lower grade of certainty; nevertheless, in what way they can contribute to theological conclusions and to eliciting articles of faith, and what the use of each ought to be, we shall say in due course.

Caput II - On the use of the five prior loci

From the use of these loci let us first establish this, that from the prior five the theologian can argue in a twofold way: first, as we noted in the explanation of the article, against those who deny the principles, or some particular contained under them, in the manner there explained. Wherefore against those who deny the definition of the Church or of the Pontiffs we can argue from Scripture; and against those who deny Scripture, from the definition of the Church, when adversaries admit something from these. Finally, against those who deny some particular on account of a perverse understanding of the Scripture which they receive, we ought to argue from Scripture itself rightly

137. St. Thomas, 2 - 2, q. 1, a. 10.
138. Council of Trent, session 4, Decree on the edition and use of the sacred books.

understood; for the proving of which it can and ought to be added the passage from the Fathers, according to whose interpretation in the dogmas of faith, as I have said, Scripture is to be understood.

Next, from all these loci, and with the authority of the Fathers accepted in the same way, we can argue and from them deduce our conclusions; and this yet in two ways, either by an evident inference, or by a probable one. In the former way, a theological conclusion is deduced, and such a consequence, if both propositions are assumed from the aforesaid loci, or if one of the premises is evident by natural reason, is sufficient to determine in a Council a conclusion of faith; in the latter way, however, a conclusion only probable is inferred, about which, without harm to the faith, there can be controversy among theologians, and a dissent of opinions. Nor ought this mode of arguing probably and opining be judged useless, provided excessive contentiousness be absent: in this way not only are talents exercised fruitfully, but many truths also are brought out of darkness by assiduous disputations. I myself saw, not many years ago, in the matter of grace and predestination, some questions among theologians so obscure on both sides, that the defenders of each side judged that nothing certain could be had in that matter, in which, however, an easy way has begun to appear. On the other hand, I saw some who, lightly and without foundation, clung so to their own opinions, that they thought the contrary opinion exposed to the danger of error: which, however, a prudent theologian ought to beware of, always judging maturely about matters, nor condemning anything rashly. By assiduous disputation it has been brought about that, with Scripture and the books of the Fathers diligently examined, the matter now appears easier, and where danger seemed to be, truth itself shines.

It remained that we should treat of the sense of Scripture, which can serve for theological disputations; for about its authority, and about the number of the canonical books, and about other rules of faith, I have already promised a special treatise. About the sense, however, accommodated to disputation we shall defer to the following disputations. Now, however, I wish to admonish this only, that the theologian - what I promise, so far as it can be done - I will observe, that in his disputations he always derive his arguments from some of those loci which seem to be proper to him; nevertheless, he should little care for the arguments which pertain solely to the subtlety of metaphysics, unless insofar as they can illustrate theology.

Caput III - On the authority of the Scholastics and the philosophers, and on philosophic reasoning

Then it must be said of the sixth locus, which is called the authority of the Scholastic theologians, and, by the way, also of the ninth, namely, of the authority of the philosophers, to which philosophic reason itself also pertains. The authority of both cannot, from itself, generate a greater certainty than that of opinion: the theologians indeed in a theological matter, the philosophers in a philosophical matter; which, since it can also serve the theologian for deducing his own conclusions, even the authority of philosophers can be of use in theological disputations for arguing probably; unless when the common sense of the Scholastics is such that, as to a dogma

of faith, and of the philosophers, as to a principle and definition of some philosophical thing, they agree. Then a greater certainty is generated not from their authority, as it is theirs, but from the very principle in which they agree. In what manner, moreover, regard ought to be had, in the choice of the opinions of the Scholastic Doctors, we shall say in 1 - 2, in the tractate on conscience. When it is rash to opine against the common sentence of all the Scholastics, we shall say in 2 - 2, q. 11, a. 2, where it will be necessary to treat of the qualities of propositions.

Finally, philosophic reason, or the principles taken from philosophy - which are called the eighth locus - are of very great service, so that we may have some conclusion, either natural or moral, elicited from its own principles, which the theologian then assumes, so that with another truth of faith he may infer a theological conclusion: for example, to prove that Christ's humanity was not adopted by God, we presuppose the true definition of adoption from the principles of moral philosophy; which, once established...

Caput IV - On human history

We apply the proposition of faith, namely, that in Christ the human nature was united substantially to the Word of God, and from this we gather that it was not adopted; as in the particular disputation on this matter we have already demonstrated. We observed the same in another disputation to prove that the humanity in Christ did not retain a servile condition, and in other such matters of this sort.

Therefore a reason altogether natural or moral is not the theologian's, as he is a theologian, but he presupposes it, as we have said; wherefore, although in this way it serves the theologian, yet, strictly speaking, it is foreign to his institute; however much it may serve the theologian to infer a theological conclusion, it is not the theologian's proper locus, but an adscriptitious one. And as philosophical reason can conduce to a theological demonstration, so also to probable argumentation, either by assuming propositions in philosophy that are probable together with other revealed ones, or that are evident in philosophy - yet from these still inferring only probably. From this there is also clear in what way the authority of the philosophers can be a theological locus.

But how the theologian acts by philosophical reason alone in moral matter, and whether that part pertains to the theologian, we said elsewhere.[139]

The sixth locus, namely human history, is so necessary to the theologian that I should not call it on loan from elsewhere, but proper. I mean not any history whatsoever, but that which narrates the acts of Councils and Pontiffs, the traditions of the Church, and the contrary heresies, against which action was taken in the Councils. From this indeed we have the undoubted authority of a Council, not because the definition of a Council relies on human history as a principle (*principium*) of truth, but because, unless from undoubted historical testimony it is established concerning the Council, and its authority by which it was convened and confirmed, from it we shall not be able to deduce a firm argument.

139. Above, Disputation 7, cap. [number not given in this chunk].

Then too, it is not enough to know those things, which we have said, about the Council; but one must have a clear view of the heresies of that time, and the opinions against which fighting took place therein. For if someone is ignorant of these, it will often happen that he by no means grasps the mind of the Council: which, in our own age, has happened to not a few concerning the definition of the Second Council of Orange, who, thinking that it had been convened against the Pelagians and not knowing to distinguish them from the Semipelagians, against whom especially its canons were issued, many of them have interpreted it wrongly, as will be clear below in Disputation 91, cap. 11, and likewise in the second part in the matter of grace.[140]

Another sort of history, even about ecclesiastical matters, for the most part can serve more for ornament than for the doctrine of theological questions; whence it is not so much the theologian's proper locus, nor frequently accommodated to his principal institute. Indeed, this history of the Church - and even of the Gentiles - is sometimes useful for a clearer understanding of Scripture, as St. Augustine testifies in On Christian Doctrine, book 2, cap. 28; but rarely as regards that part which serves the dogmas of faith, from which the theologian must argue and draw conclusions; and hence it does not so frequently pertain to the theologian, as the things that contain the acts of Councils, traditions of the Church, and the contrary heresies.

Caput V - The difference between human history and philosophical reason

Lastly, a difference must be observed between the locus of history, which we said properly regards the theologian, and the locus of philosophical reason, which sometimes can help the theologian; because that locus of reason is not included in the very principles which the theologian assumes, but is presupposed as prior: for from natural principles it deduces a conclusion, which must serve in the theological syllogism as a principle; but history is in a way a part of a theological principle: for it is assumed by the theologian together with the very definition of a Council for inferring conclusions, if indeed it pertains to the theologian to seek a firm foundation of the principles which he assumes from the definition of the Council, and to hold also its legitimate sense and the true interpretation of them: to these matters, as we have said, history contributes very much.

Wherefore, just as Aristotle said of the wise man, Ethics 6, c. 7, that it belongs to him not only from principles to collect conclusions, but also to say true things about the principles, so too it will pertain to the theologian - who is deservedly called wise - to set out the foundation of his principles, and to speak many true things about them: which he will suitably accomplish if he knows best the ecclesiastical history. Nor for that do we deny that the principles of theology are to rest on the authority of divine revelation; but we assert that history also concurs together as one of the conditions. For if we say that the theological principles are assumed as believed by infused faith as such divine, then human history will be a condition only that is required, without which the assent of infused faith is not had, as will be explained at 2-2, q. 1, a. 1.[141] But if we say that the

140. Below, Disputation 91, cap. 11; and in the second part, in the matter of grace.
141. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 1, a. 1.

theological principles are assumed only as believed by acquired faith, then human history will not only be a condition on the part of the principles, but also a reason for assenting to them, yet in such a way that we believe these things to be true as delivered by God and confirmed by his authority.

Articulus IX - Whether Sacred Scripture ought to use metaphors

To the ninth we proceed thus.

Objection 1. It seems that Sacred Scripture ought not to use metaphors. For that which is proper to the lowest doctrine does not seem to befit this science, which, among the others, holds the supreme place, as has been said. But to proceed through various similitudes and representations is proper to poetry, which is the lowest among all doctrines. Therefore to use such similitudes is not befitting to this science.[142]

Objection 2. Moreover, this doctrine seems to be ordered to the manifestation of truth: whence a reward is promised to its manifesters, Ecclesiasticus 24: "They who elucidate me shall have everlasting life." But by such similitudes truth is concealed. Therefore it does not befit this divine doctrine to deliver under the similitude of corporeal things.

Objection 3. Moreover, the more certain creatures are sublime, the more they approach to a divine likeness. If therefore something is transferred from creatures to God, then such a transposition ought especially to be made from more sublime creatures, and not from the lowest. Yet in the Scriptures this is frequently found (to be otherwise).

But on the contrary is what is said in Hosea 12: "I have multiplied visions to them, and in the hands of the prophets I was assimilated." But to deliver something under a similitude is to speak metaphorically. Therefore it pertains to sacred doctrine to use metaphors.

I answer that, it is fitting to Sacred Scripture to deliver divine and spiritual things under the likeness of corporeal things. For God provides for all things according as their nature requires: but it is natural to man to come to intelligible things through sensible things, because all our knowledge takes its beginning from the senses. Whence it is fitting that in Sacred Scripture spiritual things are set forth to us under metaphors of corporeal things; and this is what Pseudo-Dionysius says in the first chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy: it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us otherwise, unless it be enveloped by the variety of sacred veils. It also befits Sacred Scripture, which is proposed in common to all (according to that Romans 1: "To the wise and to the unwise I am a debtor"), that spiritual things be proposed under corporeal similitudes, so that at least in this way the unlearned may grasp them, who are not apt to grasp intelligible things according to themselves.

Reply to the first: The poet uses metaphors for the sake of representation; for representation is naturally delightful to man. But sacred doctrine uses metaphors for necessity and usefulness, as has been said.

142. The marginal references appended to this objection in the source include: "1. Prol. art. 9. Et distinct. 34. 3. art. 2. Et 3. contra gent. c. 150. Et quodl. 4...." and similar scholia.

Reply to the second: The ray of divine revelation is not destroyed because of the sensible figures with which it is veiled, as Dionysius says, but it remains in its truth; and the wise man, to whom the revelation is made, does not allow it to remain in similitudes, but he raises it up to the cognition of intelligible things; and through these those, to whom the revelation was made, others also are instructed about these matters. Whence those things which in one place of Scripture are delivered under metaphors, in other places are more expressly expounded. And the very hiding of figures is useful for the exercise of students, and against the mockeries of unbelievers: of whom it is said in Matthew 7: "Do not give the holy to dogs."

Reply to the third: As Pseudo-Dionysius teaches in the second chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy, it is more fitting that divine things in Scripture be delivered under the figures of vile bodies than of noble bodies, and this for three reasons. First, because by this the human mind is more freed from error. For it is manifest that these things are not said of the divine according to their propriety, which could be doubtful if the divine were described under the figures of noble bodies - especially among those who know how to conceive of nothing else more noble than bodies. Secondly, because this mode is more fitting to the cognition which we have of God in this life. For more is manifested to us of a thing by what it is not than by what it is. And therefore the similitudes of those things which are more removed from God make for us a truer estimation that what we say of God is above, whether by adding something, or even by detracting: but the metaphors which Scripture uses are taken from corporeal things to explain spiritual things, as induction shows. Thirdly, because by this mode divine things are more hidden from the unworthy.

Explanation of the doctrine of the article.

The conclusion is: Sacred Scripture uses metaphors quite suitably, and (as is gathered from the reply to the first) for some reason this is even necessary.

So far St. Thomas has disputed concerning sacred doctrine, and the faculty of theology, and has expounded its nature, properties, the mode of proceeding, and the ways of drawing out reasons: but because among the principal loci from which he draws arguments one is Sacred Scripture, which among all the rest is not only commonly explained by the Doctors, but also is to such a degree fecund that it contains many senses under the same words, therefore with good reason in this and in the following article he disputes about finding the true sense of Scripture, according to which the theologian ought to argue in his disputations - which it is not necessary to note with respect to the other theological loci, namely ecclesiastical traditions, definitions of Councils and Pontiffs: for of these principles there is plainly one sense, which from the force of the very words, from history, and from the knowledge of heresies can easily be investigated.

In this article St. Thomas gives the reason why Scripture uses so many metaphors; which is this. It is natural for man to ascend from corporeal and sensible things to the cognition of spiritual and intelligible things, because our intellect, conjoined to the body, even receives from it the species of corporeal things, so that after the likeness of them it may understand incorporeal things, whether by adding something, or also by detracting. Therefore the metaphors which Scripture uses are taken from corporeal things to explain spiritual things, as is evident by induction; therefore quite

suitably does Scripture use metaphors. For this cause Scripture attributes to God members and human affections, by which it shows forth his various virtues. For this same reason St. John Chrysostom used parables in homilies 38 and 45 on Matthew, to show why Scripture uses parables. [143]

Moreover, St. Thomas teaches in the reply to the third that it is more suitable to take metaphors in Scripture from abject and lowest corporeal things than from the more noble: for thus it is made more manifest that such things do not befit God.

Moreover, St. Thomas teaches in the reply to the third that in this life it is more known to us what God is not than what he is; and therefore, when we affirm something of God, we must always add, as we shall show below in Disputation 22, cap. 4, that this is said according to a likeness taken more easily, says St. Thomas, from the likeness of lower things than of higher; therefore more suitably is the metaphor (*metaphora*) taken from those. I, for my part, judge the cause of this to be also that things lowest and common to our sense are very familiar to us, and hence are more apt, so that after the manner of them we may understand spiritual things and those remote from sense.

Observations concerning the doctrine of the article.

For the further explication of this doctrine, certain things are to be noted. First, that there are various figurative modes of speaking in Scripture, about which Sanctes Pagninus disputes very copiously, book 1 of the Isagoge to the Sacred Letters from cap. 12 up to 29; the knowledge of whose variety is very necessary in our theological disputations: let it suffice in general to have noted the reason on account of which metaphor is employed in Sacred Scripture.[144]

Second, it is to be noted that then it is necessary to understand a trope or metaphor in Sacred Scripture when, if the passage be explained without figure, it would contain something absurd; as when Christ is called a vine, the Apostles branches, John 15. Thus admonishes St. Augustine, book 3 De doctrina Christiana c. 5, 15, and 16; which is followed by Sanctes Pagninus in cap. 19 and 20. [145]

Third, it is to be noted that, if metaphor be taken properly, as Quintilian defines it, book 8, c. 6, namely the transference of a word from the thing which it properly signifies to signify another because of likeness, its use is not simply necessary, but only useful, in Sacred Scripture. But if metaphor be taken in the broader way for any kind of translatio, by which a word is extended from the signification of one thing to another, it is then necessary in Sacred Scripture, indeed in any disputation about spiritual things, so that without it we cannot say anything. For since all names first bear concepts, and these concepts are first had from corporeal things, names also were first imposed to signify these corporeal things; then either by negation or by extension analogically they are brought down to signify divine things; indeed even created spiritual things are signified by us by names first imposed to signify corporeal things. This extension of names is such that, according to propriety, even spiritual and divine things are signified; created things indeed univocally, divine

143. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 38 and 45 on Matthew. Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, c. 1 - 2. Romans 1; Ecclesiasticus 24; Hosea 12; Matthew 7. Augustine, De doctrina Christiana 2, c. 28. Aristotle, Ethics 6, c. 7.

144. Sanctes Pagninus, Isagoge ad Sacras Literas, book 1, cap. 12 - 29.

145. St. Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, book 3, cc. 5, 15 - 16; Sanctes Pagninus, cap. 19 - 20.

things however only analogically, as will be more broadly explained below, Disputation 22, cap. 4. In this way we call God strong, not because he has bodily strength and vigor, for which the name seems first to have been imposed to signify, but because he has spiritual power and stability in good, and so of others.

But in that prior kind of metaphor, the word thus signifies a perfection in God, that first it denotes another thing of which it is the likeness that expresses what is in God, not by an extended signification of the name, but by the very thing signified by the name to show that which is in God. For which cause such names are said of God improperly, because the primary signified is not in God, but is a certain created thing manifesting to us what is in God. In this way, by a certain pact of understanding, we call the intellect of God an eye, because the name "eye" was never extended to signify spiritual intellect, but always remained in its primary signification of a corporeal instrument for seeing. But because the operation and cognition of this instrument is apt, so that by its likeness we may understand and explain spiritual intelligence, therefore the faculty of understanding is called metaphorically and improperly the eye of the mind.

From which it is gathered that metaphor, properly taken, is not simply necessary in Scripture, because by other names which properly, by extension, signify spiritual things, Scripture can express divine mysteries; indeed, by words accepted only by metaphor in the prior mode, the mysteries could not be suitably explained. But when St. Thomas in the reply teaches that it is necessary for Sacred Scripture to use metaphors, it ought neither to be understood simply, nor in every respect, but sometimes - not indeed because without metaphor a thing could not be explained, but because not so effectively without metaphor as with metaphor could it be expressed.

There are also other reasons not to be despised, on account of which Scripture uses metaphors, parables, and similitudes. The first is for the exercise of the wits of the faithful, which Augustine assigns, 11 De civitate Dei c. 19, and 2 De doctrina Christiana c. 6; Jerome in the epistle to Eustochium De virginitate; Gregory, homily 20 on Ezekiel; Theophylact on Luke c. 8; the second, that we more assiduously ask intelligence of Scripture from God. Thus Origen, hom. 7 on Ezekiel; Jerome on Isaiah c. 18; and Theophylact on Matthew c. 13. The third, that many spiritual senses be elicited for the edification of the faithful. This is Augustine, book Contra mendacium c. 10.[146]

Other causes also are often alleged, which I purposely pass over. Nevertheless I judge this no less true, that, although the ecclesiastical writers wrote with the Holy Spirit assisting and governing their mind and pen, they nevertheless retained a phraseology customary to their homeland. Thus Paul, writing in the Greek tongue, frequently uses a Hebrew phrase. Now to the Palestinians a figurative manner of speaking, with the use of parables and similitudes, was very familiar; and on that account Scripture is accustomed to speak thus so very often. By what reasoning an argument is to be drawn from a place where Scripture speaks metaphorically will be made clear from the things that must be said in the next article.

146. St. Augustine, Contra mendacium, c. 10; Jerome, Epistle to Eustochium De virginitate; St. Gregory, Hom. 20 in Ezechiel; Theophylact, on Luke c. 8; Origen, Hom. 7 in Ezechiel; Jerome, on Isaiah c. 18; Theophylact, on Matthew c. 13.

Articulus X - Whether sacred Scripture under one letter has many senses

The tenth proceeds thus. It seems that sacred Scripture under one letter does not have several senses - namely the historical or literal (*sensus literalis*), the allegorical, the tropological or moral, and the anagogical (*anagogicus*). For a multiplicity of senses in one Scripture gives rise to confusion and deception, and removes the firmness of arguing: whence from multiple propositions no argumentation proceeds; but rather on account of this certain fallacies are assigned. But sacred Scripture ought to be efficacious to show the truth without any fallacy. Therefore in the same letter multiple senses ought not to be handed down.

1. Besides, Augustine says in the book De utilitate credendi that Scripture, which is called the Old Testament, is handed down fourfold, namely according to history, according to etiologia, according to analogia, according to allegoria. But these four seem altogether alien to the four aforesaid. Therefore it does not seem fitting that the same letter of sacred Scripture be expounded according to the four senses aforesaid.[147]
2. Besides, beyond the aforesaid senses there is found a parabolic sense, which is not contained among those four senses.

But on the contrary: what St. Gregory says, Moralia, book 20: Sacred Scripture transcends all the sciences by the very manner of its speech, because with one and the same expression it narrates the deed and discloses the mystery.[148]

I answer that the author of sacred Scripture is God, in whose power it is to accommodate not only voices to signify (which man also can do), but even the things themselves. And therefore, whereas in all the sciences voices signify, this science has proper to itself that even the things signified by the voices also signify something. Therefore that first signification, by which the voices signify things, pertains to the first sense (*sensus*), which is the historical or literal sense; but that signification by which the things signified by the voices in turn signify other things is called the spiritual sense (*sensus spiritualis*), which is founded upon and presupposes the literal.

Now this spiritual sense is divided threefold. For as the Apostle says to the Hebrews 7, the old law is a figure of the new law; and the new law itself, as Pseudo-Dionysius says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, is a figure of future glory. In the new law also, the things that were done in the Head are signs of the things that we ought to do. Therefore, according as the things of the old law signify the things of the new law, there is the allegorical sense; but according as the things done in Christ, or in those things that signify Christ, are signs of the things we ought to do, there is the moral sense; but according as they signify the things that are in eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense.[149]

147. St. Augustine, De utilitate credendi.
148. St. Gregory, Moralia, book 20.
149. Hebrews 7; Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, cap. 5.

But because the literal sense is that which the author intends - and the author of sacred Scripture is God, who comprehends all things at once with his intellect - it is not unfitting, as Augustine says, Confessions 12, c. 18, 19, 20, 24, that even according to the literal sense there be many senses in one letter of Scripture.[150]

Reply to the first: The multiplicity of these senses does not make an equivocation, nor another species of multiplicity; because, as has been said, these senses are not multiplied on account of this, that one voice signifies many things, but because the very things signified by the voices can be signs of other things. And thus no confusion follows in sacred Scripture, since all the senses are founded upon one, namely the literal, from which alone an argument can be drawn; not, however, from those things which are said according to allegory, as Augustine says in the letter against Vincent the Donatist. Nor does anything of sacred Scripture thereby perish, because nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which Scripture does not somewhere manifestly hand down by the literal sense.[151]

Reply to the second: Those - history, etiologia, analogia - belong to the one literal sense. For there is history, as Augustine himself expounds, when something is proposed simply; etiologia when the cause of the said is assigned, as when the Lord assigned the cause why Moses permitted the license of repudiating wives, namely because of the hardness of their heart (Matthew 19); analogia indeed is when the truth of one Scripture is shown not to be repugnant to the truth of another. But only allegory among those four is posited for the three spiritual senses, just as Hugh of St. Victor, under the allegorical sense, also includes the analogical, positing in the third book of his Sentences only three senses, namely the historical, the allegorical, and the tropological.[152]

Reply to the third: The parabolic sense is contained under the literal: for by the words something is signified properly and something figuratively; nor is the literal sense the figure itself, but that which is figured. For when Scripture names the arm of God, the literal sense is not that in God there is a member of this bodily kind, but that which is signified by this member, namely operative power; in which it is plain that the literal sense of sacred Scripture can never be false.

Summary of the article.

From the body of the article two conclusions are elicited. The first is: Under the same letter there can be several senses. The second is: Under the same letter there can be several senses not literal. The first is to be understood absolutely and universally of any sense; which the Doctor proves from this, that under the same letter sometimes one sense is historical or literal, another spiritual or mystical. In the latter conclusion, however, the discussion is only of the historical or literal sense. Yet the truth of this doctrine must be elucidated and examined more amply in some disputations.

Whether the same place of Scripture under the same letter has many senses. Disputation 13. - The error of the heretics, cap. 1. - The Catholic truth, cap. 2.

150. St. Augustine, Confessions, book 12, cc. 18 - 20, 24.

151. St. Augustine, Epistle against Vincent the Donatist.

152. Hugh of St. Victor, in the Prologue of De sacramentis and in the third book of the Sentences, where he enumerates three senses.

But on the contrary: Pseudo-Dionysius, in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, says that it is a figure of the glory to come; and in the New and Old Law the things that were done in the Head are signs of the things we ought to do. Therefore, insofar as the things of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the allegorical sense (sensus allegoricus); but insofar as the things that were done in Christ, or in those which signify Christ, are signs of the things that we ought to do, there is the moral sense (sensus moralis); and insofar as they signify the things that are in eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense (sensus anagogicus). And because the literal sense (sensus litteralis) is that which the author intends, while the author of Sacred Scripture is God, who comprehends all things at once by his intellect, it is not unfitting, as St. Augustine says (Confessions 12, cc. 18 - 20, 24), that even according to the literal sense one and the same letter of Scripture should have multiple senses.[153]

Reply to the first: The multiplicity of these senses does not produce equivocation, nor any other species of multiplicity of that kind; for, as has been said, these senses are not multiplied because one utterance signifies many things, but because the things signified by the words can themselves be signs of other things. And thus neither does any confusion follow in Sacred Scripture, since all the senses are founded upon one alone, namely the literal, from which alone an argument can be drawn, and not from those things which are said according to allegory, as St. Augustine says in the Epistle against Vincent the Donatist.[154] Nor does anything thereby perish from Sacred Scripture, because nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which Scripture does not elsewhere hand down manifestly through the literal sense.

Reply to the second: Those three, namely history (historia), aetiology (aetiologia), and analogy (analogia), belong to one literal sense; for, as St. Augustine himself explains in the Argument on Genesis, history is when something is simply set forth; aetiology is when the cause of what is said is assigned; but analogy is when the truth of one Scripture is shown not to be contrary to the truth of another.[155] Moreover, allegory is reckoned among four as if it were put in place of the three spiritual senses; so too Hugh of St. Victor, under the allegorical sense, also includes the anagogical, positing in the Prologue of De sacramentis of his Sentences only three senses, namely the historical, the allegorical, and the tropological.[156]

Reply to the third: The figurative sense (sensus tropicus) is contained under the literal; for by words something is signified either properly or figuratively; nor is the literal sense itself the figure, but that which is signified by the figure. For when Scripture says the arm of God, the literal sense is not that in God there is a member of this corporeal kind, but that which is signified by this member, namely operative power; in which it is clear that falsehood can never lie under the literal sense of Sacred Scripture.

153. Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, cap. 1; St. Augustine, Confessions, book 12, cc. 18 - 20, 24.

154. St. Augustine, Epistle against Vincent the Donatist.

155. St. Augustine, in the Argument on Genesis (cf. De Genesi ad litteram), on the threefold division of history, aetiology, and analogy.

156. Hugh of St. Victor, in the Prologue of De sacramentis and in the Sentences, where he enumerates three senses.

Sum of the article. From the body of the article two conclusions are elicited. The first is: Under the same letter there can be several senses. The second is: Under the same letter there can be contained several literal senses. The first is to be understood absolutely and universally of any sense whatever: the holy Doctor proves it from this, that under the same letter at times one sense is historical, that is, literal; another is spiritual, that is, mystical. In the latter conclusion, however, the discourse is of the historical, or literal sense alone. Yet the truth of these two must be further elucidated and examined in some disputations.

Disputatio XIII - That under the same letter there can be many senses

Caput I - The error of the heretics

The present controversy, which ought to be about the matter of the first conclusion concerning the senses (sensus) of Scripture taken as a whole, around which there have been not a few errors. I pass over certain fanatics and heretics of our own time who have reproved all study of the sacred books directed either to eliciting the literal or the mystical and spiritual sense. One was Otho Brunsfels, as Cochlæus attests, On the Authors of Scripture, chs. 3 and 4. Another was Gaspar Suencesfeld, as Palladius reports in his book on the heresies of our time; and Federicus in the book On the Concord of the Lutherans.[157] For the error of these men will be sufficiently refuted in II - II, q. 1, a. 10, in the disputations on Scripture, where we will the more fully establish its authority. But from Scripture itself we shall not be able to convince those who think that its interpretation altogether rests upon a merely cabalistic and human figment.

Now, with its authority posited, we must treat of the mode of interpreting it, so that from it we may know how to draw theological arguments. In this matter too many have erred.

First error, that of Porphyry. First indeed Porphyry, as Eusebius reports (Ecclesiastical History, book 3, ch. 17), impudently derided the multiple and various interpretations of Scripture, about which in book 3 Against the Christians he says: Christians (namely) cling to the inept Jewish Scriptures, in which, when there is no completion or explanation, they turn to certain incongruous tales which are not so much explanations as speeches which, where things are more obscure, bring applause to those disputing. For those things which Moses wrote in a rustic and simple style, they confirm by saying they are most holy and laden with figures and riddles, and, puffed up with enormous mysteries, they are disturbed in mind, and, subjecting them to the judgment of human reason, they think they are sacraments in which the unskilled and rustic writer was not able to explain himself. So Porphyry. And a few lines later he affirms that the author of this evil was Origen, whom he testifies that, when he was a little boy, he had known.

With this same spirit of blasphemy, Erasmus too was carried away, in his Epistle to the Emperor, which he prefixed to his Paraphrase, saying: The Doctors of the ancient Church in explaining allegories partly differ, partly act in such a way that they seem to me to be playing

games. Finally, Luther, the offspring of Erasmus, writes thus of Dionysius the Areopagite: He plays with allegories, which is the pursuit of idle men. To these there seems to lend favor Abulensis, q. 57 on Matthew 2, where he asserts that there is no mystical sense according to the mind of the Holy Spirit, but that all are the fictions of preachers. He teaches the same at q. 28 on ch. 13 of Matthew, and the marginal Postil on Abulensis himself at q. 74 on ch. 6 of Joshua.

Caput II - The Catholic truth

But then, how impudently Porphyry has lied is sufficiently shown by what Philo the Jew relates in the book On the Contemplative Life; for he writes that this kind of mystical interpretation among the Essenes, men distinguished for religion and holiness among the people of the Hebrews, was very frequent. For from dawn till evening they were accustomed to devote entire days to the reading of the sacred Scriptures, which they tried to apply to allegorical and mystical senses. Moreover, Christ himself and his Apostles, as will appear in Disputation 15, very often used this mode of interpretation. The same too Philo, as Eusebius reports in the second book of the History, ch. 17, praises the Christians of that time, in the aforesaid book On the Contemplative Life, in these words: The treatise of the sacred volumes has this character, that it delights more in allegorical opinions, because to those men all law seems similar to a living soul, which indeed has the letter as its body, and those things which are designated according to the letter; but it has, hidden in the letter, the spiritual and invisible sense, which they, as if scrutinizing it from their authors, behold as more sublime and nobler, as if looking into a mirror. Therefore the custom is older than Porphyry supposed; and this kind of interpretation ought to be held in great esteem and honor, because not only the ancient Fathers, the sacred writers, and the Apostles, but also Christ himself used it, as will be seen in Disputation 15; from which also the shamelessness of Erasmus and Luther will appear.

Assenting therefore are Catholics, whom we will soon afterwards adduce in place, that Sacred Scripture is to be explained not only historically, that is, literally, but also mystically, that is, spiritually; and first, that it can be so explained: which is confirmed most excellently by the testimony of Philo just alleged, and of Josephus in Antiquities, book 3, ch. 11. For he teaches that in the sacred vestments things were mystically signified, which, after he had explained them one by one, he subjoins at the end of the chapter: Let these things have been made clear, lest perhaps the virtue of the legislator should more often be able to be set forth opportunely.[158]

From the Fathers, however, this same doctrine has been handed down to us by Origen, book 10 on ch. 15 of the Epistle to the Romans, and book 4 of the Periarchon, ch. 2, and Homilies 2 and 7 on Genesis, and 11 on Numbers; by St. Jerome, in the great Commentaries on Galatians 4, on that which Paul adduces about the two sons of Abraham, and in the book On the Passover, and in the Epistle to Hedibia, which is 150, q. 12; by St. Augustine, in many places, in the Imperfect Work on Genesis, ch. 2, in the first book On Genesis to the Letter, ch. 1, in On True Religion, ch. 50, Epistle

157. Cochlæus, De scriptoribus auctoribus, chs. 3 - 4; Palladius, on the heresies of our time; Federicus, De concordia Lutheranorum.

158. Josephus, Antiquities, book 3, ch. 11.

49, to the last question 15, in City of God, book 17, ch. 3, in On the Usefulness of Believing, ch. 3, and book 3 of Christian Doctrine; by St. Gregory, in the Preface to the Moralia, chs. 3 and 4, and book 22, ch. 22; by St. Cyril, book 1 on Leviticus at the beginning, and book 5 about the middle; by St. Ambrose, Sermon 14, and on Psalm 108, on the first verse, and book 3 on Luke on that of chapter 3, Who was Pharez; and book 5 on Luke, on that of chapter 6, And Jesus answering; while he explains that which Achimelech did, and the deed of the Centurion, which is had in chapter 7, and on that, They beckoned to their partners, chapter 11, and book 6 on that of chapter 6, And Jesus answering; by Eucherius, in the book On Spiritual Forms at the beginning; by Bede at the beginning of Genesis; by Bernard, Sermon 61 On the Little Ones; by Hugh of St. Victor, book 6 of the Didascalicon, chs. 3 and 4.[159]

From the Scholastic theologians, very many have taught this very thing: St. Thomas and Cajetan in this article; Nicholas of Lyra in Prologue 2 and 3 of the Postil on the Bible; Paul of Burgos in the edition on both Prologues; Alphonsus de Castro, book 1 Against Heresies, ch. 3; Driedo, book 2 On Sacred Scripture, ch. 2; Catherinus in the Opuscule On the Keys of Scripture, chapter On Various Senses; Sixtus of Siena, book 3 of the Bibliotheca Sancta at the beginning; Pagninus in the Isagoge, chs. 18 and following; Adam in the Prologue on Isaiah; likewise Michael Medina, book 6 On Right Faith in God, ch. 25; where from Petrus Galatinus he reports that among the Hebrews the mystical sense was held in such esteem, that their tongue by the ancients called it dabar gadol, that is, the great word; but the literal sense it named dabar qaton, that is, the small word. It ought therefore to be indubitable that, in one and the same place of Scripture, not only the literal and primary, but also the mystical and secondary sense is sometimes contained. Moreover, that many testimonies in the New Testament were used by Christ and the Apostles in the mystical sense will be made plain from those things which we will say in the two following disputations.[160]

But when we say that under the same letter the mystical sense also lies hidden, we do not understand that sense which anyone at his own discretion can elicit, and by a certain resemblance, which differs little from accommodation, is not uselessly employed by preachers for the people: solely for which reason Abulensis, q. 18 on Matthew 13, unjustly thought that besides the literal a mystical sense can be under the same letter. Rather, we say that, besides the literal sense, a mystical sense also lies hidden under the same letter from the intention of the Holy Spirit, who is

159. Origen, on Romans, book 10 on ch. 15; Periarchon, book 4, ch. 2; Homilies 2 and 7 on Genesis, and 11 on Numbers. St. Jerome, Commentaries on Galatians 4; De paschate; Epistle to Hedibia (Ep. 150), q. 12. St. Augustine, Imperfect Work on Genesis, ch. 2; De Genesi ad litteram, book 1, ch. 1; De vera religione, ch. 50; Ep. 49; City of God, book 17, ch. 3; De utilitate credendi, ch. 3; De doctrina Christiana, book 3. St. Gregory, Preface to the Moralia, chs. 3 - 4; book 22, ch. 22. St. Cyril, book 1 on Leviticus, in principio; book 5, ante medium. St. Ambrose, Sermon 14; on Psalm 108, on the first verse; book 3 on Luke, on ch. 3; book 5 on Luke, on ch. 6; on ch. 7; on ch. 11; book 6 on ch. 6. Eucherius, De formulis spiritualibus, in principio. Bede, In principium Geneseos. Bernard, Sermon 61, De parvulis. Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon, book 6, chs. 3 - 4.

160. Nicholas of Lyra, Postilla, Prologues 2 - 3; Paul of Burgos, in the edition on both Prologues; Alphonsus de Castro, Adversus haereses, book 1, ch. 3; Driedo, De sacra Scriptura, book 2, ch. 2; Catherinus, Opuscule De clauibus Scripturae, chapter on various senses; Sixtus of Siena, Bibliotheca sancta, book 3; Pagninus, Isagoge, chs. 18 and following; Adam, Prologue on Isaiah; Michael Medina, De recta in Deum fide, book 6, ch. 25; Petrus Galatinus, as cited there.

the principal author of Scripture; and because such a sense is from the Holy Spirit, it can rightly be said of it that something has been fulfilled or prophesied, as will be evident in the following disputation.

This doctrine is not obscurely gathered from the Fathers and Doctors alleged, and will be illustrated by examples in the following two disputations: where we will also show that it is proper to Scripture to contain both senses, namely the literal and the mystical. But if the opinion of Abulensis were true, in that he said the mystical sense is not from the Holy Spirit, it would not be proper to Scripture to contain such a sense: it would rather be only a kind of accommodation which can fit any writing whatever. Therefore we have not adduced Abulensis for this opinion, even if he concedes a mystical sense: for he does not think this to be from the intention of the Holy Spirit, as we contend. And thus far we have fought against the first error of the heretics.

They err in the second place, who so follow the spiritual sense that they completely abandon the letter; among whom seems to be Sebastian Franck, in ...[161]

Disputatio XIV - On the use of accommodation in Scripture

Recte ergo reprehenditur is qui in praefatione sua De Paradoxis, dum affirmat "the letter is the sword of Antichrist, with which the Saints are to be slain." Yet those are not altogether unlike him who, in extracting allegories and the mystical sense, have bestowed excessive labor with the literal sense altogether omitted; of which sort St. Augustine testifies that, among the Jews, Philo was one - otherwise a most wise man - Contra Faustum, book 2, ch. 39, who, because he did not have Christ to whom he might refer what he was saying, found no doorway and, as Augustine says, fell into various errors.[162]

Thirdly, they also sin who readily admit both senses of Scripture; yet in the literal they neither retain the proper signification of words when there is no need of a trope - according to what we said in the preceding article - nor do they carefully consider the context of Scripture: or, abandoning the common and Vulgate edition, they have recourse to the Greek and Hebrew; or finally, being poorly instructed in the dogmas of faith, they twist Scripture to that sense which favors heretics - something that not rarely happens to those explaining St. Paul; or they endeavor to draw out the spiritual sense before the literal, or the spiritual sense even from all places of Scripture in which it is not found, as we shall say in disputation 16.

Accordingly, with good reason Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 2 on Pascha, which is the 42nd, reproves those who admit no other sense than the literal; and also those who are excessive in extracting the spiritual, writing in this manner: "Let us, however, proceed by a certain middle way between those who are of wholly gross understanding and those who are led by an excessive zeal for contemplation and anagogy, so that we neither remain altogether inert and torpid, nor again be

161. The continuation treats of those who discard the literal sense altogether in favor of the spiritual, with Sebastian Franck named among them.

162. St. Augustine, Contra Faustum, book 2, ch. 39.

more curious than is fitting, and so fall away from our proposed argument and wander; for the one is, as it were, a certain Judaizing and maimed thing, the other inept and worthy of a dreamer of conjectures; and both alike deserve censure: in this way, let us discourse of these matters neither too absurdly, nor ridiculously." He then explains the mysteries which were contained in the eating of the Paschal lamb. The same is had by Nicetas, his commentator, on those words.[163]

Therefore he will walk the right road who will be careful to avoid all these rocks, and will first elicit the literal sense, and, where it can conveniently be done, the spiritual; yet with that moderation, that he not think any spiritual sense whatsoever to have been intended by the Holy Spirit, but only that which shall have been approved either by the sacred writer or by the common sentence of the Fathers.

Caput I - Not only the Fathers, but ecclesiastical writers too have used Scripture by accommodation

By "accommodation" of sacred Scripture nothing else is meant than this: to apply some of its words, by a certain extension, to a matter which neither the sacred writer understood, nor willed to signify by those words, not only primarily and historically, but not even secondarily and mystically - something which will be made more manifest in the following disputation from the definition of the literal sense. Now indeed this definition can be illustrated by examples.

The Church sings of any Bishop and Confessor: "He was found just, and in the time of wrath he was made reconciliation." Yet Ecclesiasticus said this of Noah (Ecclesiasticus 44), intending no one else by those same words. For in that chapter he praised the glorious men of a past age, among whom he numbered Noah. The Church, however, uses those words which were spoken of him, because the thing which Scripture signified about Noah by those words fits in some manner any Pontiff and Confessor: for he was found just by the holiness of his life, and, praying for the people, appeased God. The Church also often employs a like accommodation of Scripture in Masses of the Blessed Virgin or of the Saints.

Nor does the Church only in her chant and office do this; but the sacred writers too sometimes refer the words of another, earlier Sacred Scripture solely by accommodation. Thus in Apocalypse 11, about those two men who are to prophesy in the time of Antichrist for 1,260 days, John foretold, saying: "These are the two olive trees and the two candlesticks standing before the Lord of the earth." Many and grave Doctors have thought that Zechariah had previously said those words, with little change, of Jesus the priest, son of Josedec, and of Zorobabel, leader of Judah (Zacharias 4); and Ambrose, Gregory, Prosper, and Richard handed down that the two of whom John prophesied are Enoch and Elijah. And indeed, in whatever way we may wish to investigate the sense of Zechariah and of John, there is no doubt that the same words are used of diverse things; and therefore it is necessary that some accommodation be present there. The Church also accommodates the same words in a certain antiphon to the holy martyrs John and Paul. In the same way Tob. 2 receives the words of Amos 8, "Your feast days shall be turned into lamentation

163. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 42 (2 on Pascha); Nicetas, Commentator on the same oration.

and mourning," and the first book of the Maccabees, ch. 1, alludes to the same words when it says: "The feast days were turned into mourning." This method of treating Scripture is frequent among the holy Fathers in sermons and homilies to the people - most useful indeed: for the words of Scripture very often carry before themselves with the Fathers a certain wonderful weight and energy, so that they are most apt for persuading. And what we have said so far is without controversy.

Yet in our age there is no light difficulty among those skilled in Scripture, whether some places of Scripture are recited by accommodation by the Evangelists - of which we must speak in what follows.

Caput II - Many things are recited by accommodation by the Evangelists, as Iansenius asserts

Some very grave men there are, who even assert that many things which otherwise seemed prophetic are used in the Gospel by accommodation. Thus Cornelius Iansenius, in the Concordia Evangelica, ch. 11, judges that those words of Hosea 11, "Out of Egypt I called my son," recited by the Evangelist Matthew, ch. 2, were said literally of the Israelite people, whom the Lord through Hosea called his son, so that they are not to be understood of Christ in a mystical and secondary sense. He teaches the same of those words of Isaiah 29, which Matthew, ch. 15, reports: "This people honors me with their lips," etc.; and of those of Isaiah 6: "Hearing you shall hear, and shall not understand"; and of Psalm 77: "I will open my mouth in parables," which Matthew, ch. 13, cites - not, he says, for any other reason than that they very well fitted the things then being done. First, indeed, because the Jewish people then honored Christ only with their lips, but were far removed in heart, just as that same people in the time of Isaiah honored God only with their lips. Secondly, because those same Jews received the words of Christ with the ear of the body, but did not grasp them with the understanding of the mind so as to profit unto salvation - a thing which likewise in the time of Isaiah happened in the same way. Thirdly, because Christ the Lord was then truly speaking by similitudes and parables, just as Asaph, the author of that Psalm, did in his own time: finally, that saying of Jeremiah 31, "A voice was heard in Rama," which Matthew, ch. 2, reports, Iansenius thinks is to be taken in no other way.

Caput III - Others, however, affirm that all testimonies of the Old Testament are recited by the Evangelists in the literal sense

But, on the other hand, other men no less learned and pious vehemently reprove the opinion of Cornelius, to the point of branding it with the name of rashness - not because they think that by the sacred writers another sacred Scripture is never used by accommodation (for that cannot be said, as remains proved by manifest examples), but because Matthew reports the aforesaid places of Scripture in such a way that he seems to allege them as true prophecies in testimony of what he narrates. This they prove by two reasons.

The first is: Matthew wished to confirm his history by the testimonies of Scripture - a history which he knew would be read and impugned by many, especially Jews; but it would be frivolous to produce testimonies of Scripture by mere accommodation in confirmation, especially against the adversaries of the Gospel and of Christ. For besides the fact that a place by accommodation proves nothing, but only somehow illustrates the thing itself, in the same way he could also have accommodated to his design and narrative words from any profane author whatsoever.

The second reason: if the Evangelist had said that that saying of Isaiah, or of Jeremiah, or of the Psalm, fitted excellently the matter which he was treating, he would certainly have indicated that he was using those testimonies merely by accommodation. But since he says: "Well did Isaiah prophesy of you"; and again, "There is fulfilled in them that of Isaiah"; and again, "That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Isaiah," etc.; and finally, "That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Lord through the Prophet, 'Out of Egypt I called my son,'" we are surely compelled to understand a prophetic sense in the aforesaid testimonies. For this phrase and mode of speaking do not well suit a locution accommodated. For if someone, wishing to signify the remarkable solicitude of a certain father for his sons, should use that Virgilian line, "All a father's care centers in Ascanius," he could say that that Virgilian fits him; but that "in him that saying of Virgil has been fulfilled" would be said not only ineptly, but even falsely; and far less could it be said that "Virgil rightly prophesied" of him. Therefore the modes of speaking of the Evangelist, which we have reported, indicate something more than accommodation and verbal allusion.

Wherefore the theologians already alleged, for the second opinion, think not only that the cited testimonies are not to be taken by accommodation, nor only in the mystical and spiritual sense - which also presupposes the literal and is secondary - but that there is also a prophetic sense in those places.

Because, however, they cannot deny that, according to the letter and historically, all those things also suit other matters, they affirm that in each of those places there is a twofold sense of the letter equally proximate. Accordingly, that saying of Hosea 11, "Out of Egypt I called my son," they think to have been said not by figure but prophetically both of the people of Israel - of whom without doubt the prophet was speaking - and of Christ himself, as Abulensis taught, question 57 on Matthew, ch. 2.[164] In the same way they interpret the two other testimonies of Isaiah of men of both ages - namely of Isaiah's time and of Christ's - laboring under the same vice. But that of the Psalm they interpret of the author of the Psalm and of Christ; and finally, the testimony of Jeremiah, "A voice in Rama," of the Babylonian captivity which Rachel - that is, the women of that region - were lamenting, and of the slaughter of the innocent children - historically to be understood. They assert the same of that saying 2 Reg. 7, which Paul cites, Hebrews 1, "I will be to him a father, and he shall be to me a son," that it is to be taken both of Solomon and of Christ. For this reason they are unwilling to admit a mystical sense, because it has no strength for confirming the truth of the Gospel; a point which especially has place in this last testimony, by which Paul strives to demonstrate Christ's divinity against the Hebrews.

164. Abulensis (Alonso Tostado), on Matthew, ch. 2, q. 57.

Caput IV - A middle opinion: these are cited neither by mere accommodation nor in an equally proximate literal sense, but in a mystical sense

Here indeed a middle opinion is to be approved, which moderates both the license of the former and the excessive severity of the latter: namely, that in the cited places the testimonies are recited by the Evangelists neither altogether by accommodation, nor in the literal sense equally proximate with the first, but in a mystical sense. I call it mystical because the fact which the Evangelist narrates was prefigured by those earlier realities. I except those two testimonies of Isaiah, of which we shall speak in the following chapter. Into this opinion the same Iansenius at length, as if compelled, consented, because that earlier opinion seemed to him not very well established. In the same way St. Jerome, on that chapter 3 of Hosea; St. John Chrysostom, homily 8 on Matthew; and the Glossa...[165]

They do not deny that elsewhere another sacred Scripture is sometimes employed by accommodation (for they showed by manifest examples that this cannot be gainsaid and stands firm); but they say this because Matthew reports those accommodated places in such a way that he seems to assert them to have been true prophecies in testimony of that which he narrates. They prove this by two reasons. The first is: Matthew wished to confirm his history by the testimony of Scripture, which he knew would be read and attacked by many, especially Jews; but it would be frivolous to bring forward testimonies of Scripture by mere accommodation for the sake of confirmation, most of all against the adversaries of the Gospel and of Christ among the Jews. For besides the fact that a passage by accommodation proves nothing, but only after a fashion illustrates the very thing, he could likewise have done the same out of any profane author he chose, and have accommodated words to his narration.

The second reason: if the Evangelist had said that that saying of Isaiah, or of Jeremiah, or of the psalm suited very well the matter he was treating, he would assuredly have indicated that he had employed those testimonies by mere accommodation; but since he says, "Well did Isaiah prophesy of you," and again, "There is fulfilled in them that saying of Isaiah," and again, "That what was spoken might be fulfilled, I will open my mouth in parables," and finally, "That what was spoken by the Lord through the prophet might be fulfilled, Out of Egypt I called my son," we are constrained to understand a prophetic sense in the said testimonies. For this phrase and mode of speaking do not fit well a speech accommodated by accommodation. For if someone, wishing to signify a father's marvelous solicitude for his sons, were to employ that Virgilian: "All a father's care is for Ascanius," he could say that that Virgilian line "All his care..." fits him. But to say that "that line of Virgil was fulfilled in him" would be said not only ineptly, but also falsely; and much less could it be rightly said that Virgil prophesied about him. Therefore the modes of speaking of the Evangelist, which we have related, indicate something more than accommodation and allusion of words.

Wherefore those Theologians already cited think - so as to carry through their opinion - that the testimonies cited are not to be taken only by accommodation, nor only in the mystical and spiritual sense (which also presupposes the literal, and is secondary), but also that they are to be understood

as prophecies in the literal sense. Because they cannot, according to the letter, all be referred to other things as well, they affirm that in each of those places there is equally the sense of the letter about Christ. And concerning that of Hosea 11, "Out of Egypt I called my son," and about the people, about which without doubt the prophet was speaking, they do not think it was spoken of Christ by figure, but prophetically; Abulensis, on Matthew, ch. 2, q. 57, teaches the same. Likewise they interpret two other testimonies of both Testaments about Isaiah and Christ with the same severity. But as for that testimony of Jeremiah, "A voice was heard in Rama," historically they understand it of the Babylonian captivity, when great slaughters were made in Rama, but nevertheless they say it can be taken of the slaughter of the Innocents in a spiritual sense. The same they affirm about 2 Kings 7, which Paul cites: "I will be to him a father, and he shall be to me a son," as said of Solomon and of Christ. For this reason they are unwilling to admit the mystical sense in these places, because it would bring nothing to the truth of the Gospel; which especially in this last testimony, where Paul strives to demonstrate to the Hebrews the divinity of Christ, they contend would have no place.

But that the Evangelists employed the testimonies not by accommodation but in the mystical sense, is the truer opinion.

The mean between the extremes: mystical, not merely accommodated nor strictly literal

Here, however, a middle opinion is approved, which moderates the excessive severity both of the former and of the latter: namely, that the testimonies cited by the Evangelists are neither altogether by accommodation, nor in the literal sense equally signifying the same thing as in the former [figures], but in a mystical sense. I call it mystical because the fact which the Evangelist relates was prefigured by those earlier realities. I except those two testimonies of Isaiah, of which we shall speak in the following chapter. Into this opinion the same Iansenius at length, as if compelled, consented, because that earlier opinion seemed to him not very well established. In the same way St. Jerome on that chapter 3 of Hosea; St. John Chrysostom, homily 8 on Matthew; and the Glossa ordinaria.[166]

And the Glossa ordinaria of that place, which Paul of Burgos in the first addition of that chapter highly praises, Theophylact, St. Thomas, Cajetan, and Titelman on Matthew, Driedo, book 2 On Sacred Scripture, ch. 2, and Adam in the preface to the Commentary on Isaiah, affirm that that testimony of Hosea 11, "Out of Egypt I called my son," is cited by Matthew in the mystical sense.[167] Wherefore also that of Jeremiah 31, which Jerome in that place understands historically of the time of the captivity of Israel, when great slaughters were made in Rama, can be taken of the slaughter of the Innocents in the spiritual sense. The same is taught by Jerome on Matthew 13 concerning

165. St. Jerome, on Hosea, ch. 3; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 8 on Matthew; Glossa ordinaria. Ambrose, Gregory, Prosper, and Richard are cited above on the two witnesses (Enoch and Elijah).

166. St. Jerome on Hosea 3; St. John Chrysostom, Homily 8 on Matthew; Glossa ordinaria.

167. Paul of Burgos, Addition to Matthew 2; Theophylact; St. Thomas; Cajetan; Titelman; Driedo, De sacra Scriptura, II, ch. 2; Adam, Preface to the Commentary on Isaiah.

those words of Psalm 77, "I will open my mouth in parables," etc. For he says that in that Psalm the going forth of the children of Israel from Egypt is described, in which hidden mysteries were contained, and therefore that it must be understood parabolically of Christ. If this mode of interpreting those places is approved by Jerome and others, there is no reason why it should displease more recent Theologians.

Wherefore perhaps Osiander's audacity might be noted in his Annotations on book 1 of the Gospel Harmony, ch. 11, who, although he affirms that all the interpreters of the old Scripture understood that testimony of Hosea allegorically of Christ, himself thinks it must be taken in the historical sense; and while in this way he strives to defend the sacred writer honorably from the calumnies of adversaries, he exposes him far more to them.[168]

It is proved indeed that the aforesaid opinion is true, because no one can deny that Exodus 12, "You shall not break a bone of it," must be understood in the literal sense only of the paschal lamb, about which alone there was discourse there, not of Christ; and yet John says in ch. 19 that it was fulfilled in Christ: "These things were done," he says, "that the Scripture might be fulfilled, You shall not break a bone of it." Therefore the mystical and prefigurative sense suffices, so that it be said that in Christ Scripture was fulfilled, or that that prophet predicted it: for even a figure, just as also a prophecy itself, is well fulfilled in the reality and in the event. Wherefore the latter reason made against the former opinion can have no weight against ours. Nor does it at all stand in the way, what Theophylact says on Matthew 13, namely, that the Evangelist cites the prophet predicting the preaching of Christ in parables: for also that which is prefigured by a mystical type is rightly said to have been predicted by the Prophets, just as also to have been fulfilled.

Therefore Abulensis fell into error in ch. 13 on Matthew, q. 28, when he thought that the testimony cited from Exodus 12 is not referred by John in the mystical, but in the literal sense, because he thinks that no Scripture can be fulfilled in the mystical sense, but only in the literal. But that the place cited from Exodus 12 is recited by John in the mystical sense is taught by St. Augustine, tractate 120 on John; St. John Chrysostom, homily 84; Theophylact; and St. Thomas on that place; Driedo, book 2 On Sacred Scripture, ch. 2; and Michael Medina, to be cited below.[169] Since therefore that place is recited by the Evangelist in the mystical sense, and nonetheless Scripture is said to have been fulfilled in the figurative sense, the same seems to have to be said of the others about which there is controversy.

But by the latter reason the adversaries press us more: because an argument drawn from the mystical sense has little or no force; therefore it is not to be believed that the writers of the New Testament used it, especially against incredulous and insolent Jews, unless when the mystical sense is not only known to the writers, but also ought to be clear to others, as from the doctrine of the Fathers we shall note in Disputation 16, ch. 5; on which ground John rightly adduced the aforesaid testimony of Exodus 12 in the mystical sense, since it ought to have been manifest to the

168. Osiander, Annotations on the Gospel Harmony, bk. 1, ch. 11.

169. St. Augustine, Tractate 120 on John; St. John Chrysostom, Homily 84; Theophylact; St. Thomas on John 19; Driedo, De sacra Scriptura, II, ch. 2; Michael Medina, cited below.

Jews that the paschal lamb had been a figure of Christ, the true lamb, of whom Isaiah says ch. 53: "Like a lamb before his shearers he shall be silent," and again ch. 16: "Send forth, O Lord, the lamb, the ruler of the earth"; and Jeremiah 11: "I am as a mild lamb that is carried to sacrifice."

For my part, I confess that an argument taken from the mystical sense is weak and scarcely valid, unless that sense ought to be known to the hearers, either from other places of Scripture - as in the aforesaid testimony of Exodus 12 - or be proved by most apt reason, as in that of Deuteronomy 23, "You shall not muzzle the ox when he treads out the grain," of which we shall speak more at large in that Disputation 16, ch. 4. But, since the Evangelists report the aforesaid testimonies, about which there is controversy, not to persuade and to convince the Jews (as the context shows), but in a simple narration of the history, it was not necessary to recite them only in the literal sense, or at least in the mystical sense known to all; but it was enough, in the very history - which no one could call false, since those things had been done in the sight of all - to show also by a simple demonstration how in those things there appeared to be fulfilled those things which in the Old Testament were figured and obscurely foreshadowed; a point which not a little illustrates the truth of the history itself.

But if Paul did not adduce that of 2 Kings 7 and 1 Chronicles 17 and 22 in a simple narration of history, but to prove the divinity of Christ - of which it is quite clear that it was said of Solomon - nonetheless it is not necessary that it be recited in the literal sense, as the latter opinion contends; for since Paul had brought forward many other most firm testimonies in the literal sense, it is not surprising if he alleged this one only in the mystical sense; since it also ought to have been very well known to the Jews that Solomon and his kingdom had been a figure of the Christ to come. Nor is there need to understand all of that chapter 7 as said only of Christ, as St. Augustine wishes in City of God 17, ch. 8, although not a few things suit Christ alone. From which the Hebrews ought to have concluded that Solomon had been the figure of the true Messiah. Michael Medina taught that this testimony was referred by Paul in the mystical sense, book 6 On Right Faith in God, ch. 25; nor did Lyranus in the second Prologue, already cited, think the opposite; for although he says that this testimony must be taken of Christ in the literal sense, nonetheless he calls it mystical in a certain respect, inasmuch as in Solomon, as in a figure, Christ was contained; but he called that truly literal, because that had been intended by the Holy Spirit; which concession we likewise grant; but how the literal differs from that which commonly is called mystical we shall see in the following Disputation.[170]

I return to the testimony of Hosea 11, and I prove that it must be understood of Christ not to the letter, but mystically, from this, that the antecedents and consequents suit only the Israelitic people, as will be easily clear from a reading of that selection. But the adversaries respond that it is customary for the Prophets to mingle times and to conjoin things very far removed. Yet I do not see, in the example at hand, what can be brought forward, where things so diverse, without any occasion, and in so brief a space, be conjoined. But Osiander objects: it cannot be that an unchangeable people be the figure of one man; therefore in the allegorical sense that testimony

170. Michael Medina, De recta in Deum fide, VI, ch. 25; Lyranus, Prologue II.

cannot be employed. But this is frivolous: first, because the Fathers cited for our opinion plainly affirm that that people in that deed bore the figure of our Savior; then also, just as in one man one people was, as it were, contained in figure - Genesis 25, "Two nations are in thy womb," etc. - so in one people one Christ can be signified. Add that the things by which something is signified mystically are wont to be of a quite different ratio from the things signified; what marvel, then, if the people of Israel was a figure of the Savior? How, moreover, that people was a figure of Christ journeying in Egypt and returning thence, Rupert more fully explains on that place of Matthew.[171]

Caput V - Certain by accommodation, which, however, approach much to the literal, are alleged by the Evangelists

It remains that we say something about the two other testimonies of Isaiah, which, in my judgment, must be taken in an accommodated sense, yet so that they do not differ much from the literal, indeed are so deduced from it by a certain marvelous relation that they have not a little energy against the Jews, to whom Christ reproached hypocrisy and hardness of heart.

First, then, is that from ch. 29: "This people honors me with their lips." This can be more easily taken in this way: it must not be denied that in that passage the Prophet spoke with the people and men of his own age, and with those words rebuked their hypocrisy and hardness; this, however, is enough, that much later the Evangelist not only employed the same words with respect to their sons, but also said that he prophesied very well about those Isaiah - not because he understood it of those in the literal sense, or even in the mystical, but of their parents, whose hypocrisy and hardness the sons seemed to have received by a kind of hereditary succession. For it frequently happens that certain vices, which are, as it were, native to a people, derived from its natural temperament and inclination, are also transmitted to its posterity. And that the vice of hypocrisy and obduration was most familiar to that people is attested by the Scripture of the Prophets and of the Gospels.

In the same mode Paul, to Titus 1, admonishes him that he should sharply reprove the Cretans, because they were very evil men; he proves their life by the saying of Epimenides, whom he calls a prophet: "The Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, lazy bellies"; and he confirms it then with these words: "One of themselves, a prophet of their own, said: The Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, lazy bellies"; and shortly after: "This testimony is true; for which cause rebuke them sharply, that they may be sound in the faith." Where, first, note that this testimony of Epimenides is adduced by Paul to upbraid the life of the Cretans - not only of those who were in the time of Epimenides, but of those in the time of Paul; for these alone Titus had to reprove. Second, Paul concludes that that testimony is true, and understands it as referred even to the Cretans of the present time, of whom he then was speaking; otherwise he would in vain have alleged it and said it was true. Third, it is certain that Epimenides did not say that by a prophetic spirit of the future Cretans, but described in those words the native life of that nation, which through long experience he had come to know. And since, as is commonly said, this sort of vices, as if innate, for the most part are derived into

171. Rupert of Deutz, on Matthew.

posterity, the testimony of Epimenides, which he pronounced about the Cretans of his own age, is also true of those after; and in this way the prophecy of Isaiah is in some sense efficaciously verified in the words of the Gospels - namely, that this sort of vice in their parents should be noted. Therefore Christ used that testimony not by pure accommodation, but in a certain mode which, though small, does not fall back from the literal sense, but is the best and most natural according as it is deduced out of it, as I have said. Thus must St. John Chrysostom be understood on that place of Matthew, homily 2, when he says: "On account of the malice of the times he spoke in parables" - that is, because Christ was speaking to the Jews, as if that vice were naturally transfused into them, as from original sin, what we called the vice of hypocrisy - so that in those he seemed to say that the prophecy of Isaiah was fulfilled in this sense, in which we have explained the aforesaid testimony.

There is also another place of Isaiah, ch. 6, which Matthew 13 reports in this way: "Therefore I speak to them in parables, because seeing they do not see," etc.; "And the prophecy of Isaiah is fulfilled in them: With hearing you shall hear and not understand, and seeing you shall see and not perceive; For the heart of this people has been made gross," etc. This place must be recited by the Evangelist in the same mode. For it is evident that the vice of obduration was so very ancient in the people of Israel, that long before it had been reproved by the Lord in Exodus 32: "This people is stiff-necked"; and elsewhere with these words: "This is a people of stiff neck." Wherefore it is not marvelous if, while the same vice was seen in the Jews with whom Christ was speaking, as if it were naturally transfused, as the sin of hypocrisy, he seemed to say that in those the prophecy of Isaiah had been fulfilled, not because the Prophet had prophesied of the sons rather than of the parents, or because the events of the latter times had been specially intended by a particular memory and recording of future generations' animosity, but because he described the present people of the sons, in whose parents such a vice had been noted. Christ the Lord thus in common calls the hypocritical Jews his contemporaries by that head, and rebukes them under the pretext of a legacy, and wills that the obstacles put up by the fathers to salvation be recognized in the sons, in whom that vice was peculiarly noted.

Therefore Christ used that testimony not by accommodation only, but in a certain mode, and the best and most natural, as it is deduced out of the literal sense, as I have said. Thus also does St. John Chrysostom, in the place cited on Matthew, homily 2, understand: "He spoke in parables because of the malice of the times," that is, because he speaks to the Jews; in whom it seemed that this vice, common to the fathers and the sons, had passed down, as a kind of native thing; therefore, in those, as if in the very stock of that people, he says that the prophecy of Isaiah was fulfilled.

Of this hereditary transmission of vice in one people 4 Kings, ch. 17, beautifully gives a description: "And the Lord testified to Israel and to Judah by the hand of every prophet and seer," etc., and a little below: "A people of stiff neck." Which is not to be wondered at, if this vice, which Christ reproaches in the later, had been as it were native to the earlier, since the Prophets often speak in this way; and we said above in many places that the appellations of this or that nation are assigned on account of the reasons of these habits, which are not at all to be said now for the first time.

Sic therefore the Lord Christ, in Matthew 15, most fittingly applies to the Jews of his own age the words of Isaiah 29 and says: "Well did Isaiah prophesy of you, 'This people honors me with their lips, but their heart is far from me'." In which words he indicates that vice as found, not only of old, but as in a certain way native to them; and so he rightly reproaches them severely, that they may be sound in the faith. Here first observe that this testimony of Isaiah is brought forward by Christ to convict the vices of the Jews, not of those who were in the time of Isaiah, but in the very time of Christ himself: for these alone Christ had to reprove. Second, when he says "Well did Isaiah prophesy of you," he understands it as also related to the Jews of the present time, of whom he was then speaking; otherwise he would have adduced it in vain and said that it was fulfilled. Third, it is certain that Isaiah did not say that with a prophetic spirit or sense about the future Jews of the time of Christ, but he described, with those words, the native vice of that nation which he knew by long experience; and because, as we said a little above, these vices are, as it were, for the most part passed down into their posterity, that testimony of Isaiah, which he pronounced about the Jews of his own age, is also true when related to their descendants, and in a certain respect can be said to be prophetic; indeed Isaiah himself can be said to have prophesied well about them: for it is the same thing to have prophesied and to have foretold. He is said, however, to have prophesied, not because he was then thinking about future things, but because it is the same thing to describe the native vices of a nation and to predict the morals of posterity; and for this reason I think that Christ used the testimony through accommodation (*accommodatio*), yet in such a way that it departs little or nothing from the literal sense, and that what he was contending ought to be inferred with a best and natural reason from the same testimony. So St. John Chrysostom ought to be understood on this place, Matthew, homily 52, when he says: "I see that in earlier times, too, their wickedness was foretold," for what Christ was bringing as a charge was foretold by Isaiah much before.[172]

There is another place, Isaiah 6, which Matthew 13 cites in this manner: "Therefore I speak to them in parables, because seeing they do not see, and hearing they do not hear nor understand; and in them is fulfilled the prophecy of Isaiah, saying: 'By hearing you shall hear and shall not understand; and seeing you shall see and shall not perceive; for the heart of this people has been made gross'." I think that place is to be cited by the Evangelist in the same way. For it is well known that the vice of obduracy was common and native to the people of Israel, which long before the Lord had attested in Exodus 32 and 33 and elsewhere with these words: "This people is of a stiff neck." Wherefore it is no wonder if this same vice seemed as it were transfused naturally into those Jews to whom Christ was speaking, just as we said about the sin of hypocrisy, so that thus it might rightly be said that the prophecy of Isaiah was fulfilled in them in that sense in which we have explained the testimony above. For the Prophet was attributing this vice to the Jews of his time in such a way that he said it was common to the people and therefore as it were native: wherefore in some manner he also prophesied what would befall their descendants when Christ was preaching.

172. St. John Chrysostom, Homily 52 on Matthew.

A description of the as-it-were hereditary transmission of this vice in that same people is beautifully set down in 4 Kings 17: "And the Lord testified in Israel and in Judah by the hand of all the prophets and of all the seers, saying: Return from your most evil ways," etc., who did not hear, but "hardened their neck like the neck of their fathers, who would not obey the Lord." And Stephen in the Acts of the Apostles, chapter 7, says: "Stiff-necked and uncircumcised in heart and ears, you always resist the Holy Spirit, as your fathers did, so do you also." And the Lord in Luke 11: "Truly you bear witness that you consent to the deeds of your fathers, because they indeed killed them," namely the Prophets, "but you are willing to kill the Lord of the Prophets." Of whom Matthew, chapter 23, said: "Nevertheless, fill up the measure of your fathers," about which testimony we have more in book 3, disputation 3, chapter 3.[173]

Caput VI - The various use of Scripture by accommodation

It must be observed, however, that in this kind of treating Scripture by accommodation not only words and sentences can be used, but even examples and histories can be brought forward to persuade virtue and to detest vices. But how the accommodation of words is made is clear from what has been said; of histories, when they serve only as example, so that in those events, according to the intention of the Holy Spirit, there is not set any mystical signification - about which we shall speak in disputation 5 - and this is one difference between a history which contains a mystical sense and that which is brought forward as an example by accommodation: another is, that the mystical sense is always contained in a history of a different kind, whereas examples are wont sometimes to be adduced by accommodation from things of the same nature.

This kind of accommodation is understood in Romans 15: "For whatever was written was written for our instruction, that through the patience and the consolation of the Scriptures we might have hope." For when Paul was persuading the Romans that each one should please his neighbor unto good, he brought forward the example of Christ: "Who did not please himself," etc.; and immediately he subjoins the words which we have reported. Now the example of Christ serves only through accommodation for us: for, as Peter says in 1 Peter 2, "he left us an example that we should follow his steps"; and yet in Christ, as in a figure, there was not contained that which Paul was urging as a mystical sense. In the same way is that passage understood, 1 Corinthians 10: "All these things happened to them in figure," namely to the Jews: although in that same place the Apostle reports that the Jews "were baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea," and that "all ate the same spiritual food," and "all drank the same spiritual drink from the rock which was Christ," in which we cannot but understand the mystical sense of baptism and of the Eucharist; nevertheless that which he adds below, "All these things happened to them in figure," is not referred to those mystical senses, but to that which immediately preceded, namely: "But with most of them God was not well pleased. For they were overthrown in the desert": for he immediately subjoins, "Now these things were done in figure for us, that we should not be lustful of evil things, neither become idolaters, as some of them"; and he recounts many other punishments, and when

173. Vazquez, De Adoratione, book 3, disputation 3, chapter 3.

these have been enumerated he repeats those words, "Now all these things happened to them in figure; but they were written for our correction." Therefore Paul in that place does not understand by "figure" that which contains the mystical sense, but the example, which, by accommodation, avails very much for persuasion; therefore he said, "for our correction."

Caput VII - How Scripture is useful for arguing by accommodation

From what has been said one may gather what pertains to our undertaking, namely that this place by accommodation has no weight for proving the truths and dogmas of our faith: because under that letter there is not contained that sense primarily or secondarily according to the mind of the Holy Spirit. But I say this when words and sentences alone are accommodated; for the accommodations of histories, from which an argument is drawn that is called ab exemplo or a simili, besides the fact that they very much avail for persuading love of virtue and hatred of sin, are also effectively useful in morals for showing what is lawful or how far something is forbidden. Christ's manner of arguing is of this sort in Luke 6, where by the example of David, who, because of pressing necessity, ate the loaves of proposition, he excused the deed of his disciples and defended them from the malice of the Pharisees, deducing thence the true understanding of the precept concerning the observance of the Sabbath. In the same way, in book 2 On the Adoration of Images, disputation 6, chapter 2, we proved that the veneration and honor of inanimate things is holy, because by the precept of the Lord the ark of the covenant was always in veneration and honor. On the other hand, those things which heretics adduce from example to prove that the veneration and adoration of the Saints is not lawful, which at first sight seem to prove something, have been sufficiently explained by us in book 1, disputation 5, chapter 3; and so in all other matters this is how Scripture, by accommodation, is to be understood.[174]

Disputatio XV

Quid sit sensus literalis.

- Sententia Lyrani, cap. 1.
- Opinio Abulensis, cap. ...
- Verior sententia de sensu literali, cap. 3.
- Defensio litterali parabolarum, cap. 4.
- Corollaria praeceedentis doctrinae, cap. 5.
- Regula ad eruendum sensum literalem, cap. 6.

174. Vazquez, De Adoratione imaginum, book 2, disputation 6, chapter 2; and De Adoratione, book 1, disputation 5, chapter 3.

Caput I - The opinion of Lyranus

That under the same letter of Sacred Scripture there lies hidden a sense which they call mystical or spiritual, and another sense which they call literal, the Fathers and Catholic writers, alleged in disputation 13, chapter 2, constantly affirm. But what the literal sense is, what in truth the mystical and spiritual and how manyfold, does not seem sufficiently to be agreed among them; nor is the disagreement, as some suppose, only about words, but also about things. Therefore we shall set forth the opinions of each distinctly and faithfully, from which afterwards it will not be difficult to choose the truer. In the first place, then, we must treat of the historical or literal sense, which is, as it were, the foundation and basis of the spiritual and mystical sense. I said "literal," or "historical"; for by these two names it is also called by the Fathers, who take letter and history for the same thing, confusing the common with the particular notion. For every history is a literal sense; not conversely.

On the literal sense, therefore, the first opinion is that of Lyranus, who in that third Prologue of the Postils on the Bible says that the proper literal sense is that which is signified by the very words; but the mystical, that which is expressed through the things signified by the words. Then he adds that some place of Sacred Scripture is without a literal sense and is contained only by a spiritual sense, whenever Scripture uses a metaphor or a parable: as when Christ said in Matthew 5, "If your hand scandalizes you, cut it off"; and Judges 9, "The trees went forth to anoint a king over them," etc. He proves this, because otherwise it would follow that the sense of Scripture is false or absurd: for if there were any literal sense, it would be that which is signified most closely by the words; but it would be absurd to say that the hand of the body must be cut off, and that the trees of the woods wished to choose a king for themselves. Therefore the sense of those places is only spiritual, signified not by the words themselves most closely, but by the things through the words signified: for by "hand" is signified the proximate occasion, from which we ought to be separated, if it is a scandal to us; and by "the trees of the woods" are signified the men of Shechem, who assembled to choose a king for themselves. Wherefore, according to the mind of this Doctor, in order that a sense be called literal, it does not seem enough that it be signified most closely by the words; but there is need that by the intention of the Holy Spirit the words so express as to signify that other thing, and not be transferred to signify another thing: and if some translatio (metaphor) occurs, this author judges that there is no literal sense simply and properly, but only a mystical one in such a place

This is the opinion of Lyranus, which more recent theologians have understood otherwise, not according to his own mind. It can, however, be confirmed first from Cassian, Collation 8, chapter 3, where, to show that various dishes are served for the human intellect in divine Scripture as in a splendid banquet, he says that some things so shine with the plain signification of the letter that they do not need a more refined interpretation, but simply...[176]

Therefore, concerning the literal sense the first opinion is that of Lyra, who in that third Prologue on the Bible says what the literal sense is, namely, that which is expressed by the very words signified. He adds that there is some place of sacred Scripture which lacks the literal sense and is contained only under the spiritual, as often as Scripture uses a metaphor or a parable: as when it said in Matthew 5, "If your hand scandalizes you, cut it off," and in Judges 9, "The trees went to anoint a king over themselves," etc. He proves this, because otherwise it would follow that the sense of Scripture is false or absurd: for if there be any literal sense, it would be that which is signified most proximately; it would be absurd to say that the hand of the body must be cut off, and that the trees of the forests chose a king for themselves. Therefore the sense of those places is only spiritual, the thing itself being signified proximately, not by the words: for by "hand" the proximate thing signified is that which we must separate, if it be our scandal; but by the "trees of the forests" are signified the men of Shechem, who came together to choose a king. Wherefore, according to the mind of this Doctor, for one to say that something is the literal sense, it is not enough that it be signified proximately; there is further need that, by the intention of the Holy Spirit, the words be extended and transferred to signify another thing: and if some transference occur, this author judges that there is simply and properly no literal sense of such a place, but only a mystical.

This is the opinion of Lyra, which more recent theologians have understood otherwise, not according to his own mind. It can, however, be confirmed first from Cassian, Collation 8, chapter 3, where, to show that various dishes are served for the human intellect in divine Scripture, as in a splendid banquet, he says that some things so shine with the plain signification of the letter that, with sobriety of interpretation, they do not need a more refined exposition, but are abundantly sufficient to the hearers by the simple sound of the letter; as is that: "Hear, Israel: the Lord your God is one Lord"; and that, "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart" (Deuteronomy 6). And immediately he subjoins: "But certain other things, unless they have been thinned down by an allegorical explanation and softened by the testing of spiritual fire, in no way pass over into saving nourishment for men without the stain of corruption." Such he says is that in Luke 12, "Let your loins be girded," and Matthew 10, "He who does not take up his cross," etc. And for that reason he charges monks with imprudence, who, understanding this passage simply, not according to knowledge, made for themselves wooden crosses, which brought, not edification, but laughter to the beholders. Therefore Cassian thinks that certain places of Scripture must be understood so spiritually that, if they be understood only according to the letter, they do not bring salvation to the soul, but death; and yet the sense of Scripture, even the literal, is never harmful, but always salutary. Therefore some place lacks the literal sense and is contained by the spiritual alone.[177]

Second, St. Gregory, Moral. 4, chapter 1, teaches that certain places of Scripture, such as that Job 3, "Let the day perish on which I was born," cannot rightly be understood according to the rind of the letter itself, but that the spirit must be sought there.[178]

176. John Cassian, Collationes, 8, chapter 3.
177. John Cassian, Collationes 8, c. 3.
178. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob 4, c. 1.

Third, St. John Chrysostom, homily 39 on John, on that, "If I bear witness of myself," says that we must not insist upon the bare words.[179]

Fourth, St. Jerome, on Isaiah 11, refers those words, "The wolf shall dwell with the lamb," to a spiritual understanding, and contends that they are not to be taken according to the letter. The same likewise on that, Isaiah 29, "Lebanon shall be turned into Carmel, and Carmel shall be accounted a forest."[180]

Fifth, most clearly of all Origen seems to teach this, On First Principles, book 4, chapter 1, in the beginning, where he affirms that the Jews were deceived because they expected that many things foretold concerning the time of the Messiah would come about according to history. Such, he says, is that in Isaiah 11, "The wolf shall dwell," etc. And in homily 2 on Genesis, near the end, he writes thus: "But because in the divine Scriptures the historical sequence cannot always stand fast, but sometimes fails - for example, when it is said, 'A thorn shall spring up in the hand of the drunkard,' etc. - for this reason, and things like these, the ark is woven not only as three-storied, but also as two-storied, that we may know that in the divine Scriptures there is not always a threefold sense, since the historical does not always remain."[181]

Caput II - Opinio Abulensis

The second opinion is that of Abulensis on Matthew, chapter 13, question 28, if the text of that passage be read emended: where he seems to teach that the literal sense of sacred Scripture is that which the author willed to signify, whether by the words themselves proximately, or remotely, and proximately by the things signified by the words. He himself calls "history" in a broader signification, not only that which the words primarily signify: then it is history in the proximate signification, when the words are taken in their proper signification; but the remote, when they are taken metaphorically, or are asserted according to a parable, as very often happens: for the proximate signification of those words which are used metaphorically or are brought into a parable is that which is properly denoted by the words themselves and is contained in the rind of the letter; and Abulensis thinks that this is not the literal sense of Scripture, because it is not from the intention of the Holy Spirit. The words of Abulensis in that question 28 are these: "The literal sense is that which the letter makes; and it also seems to be historical, because by it a bare history is signified, which Scripture reports, taking history broadly for everything which is signified immediately by the letter of Scripture; but not that which the author willed to signify: which is said on account of parables and metaphors; because that which is signified there in the rind of the letter is not the sense, as when it is said, 'The eyes of the Lord are upon the just,' because it is not the sense that the eyes of the Lord are upon the just, since the literal sense is always true, and it is false that God has eyes; but the literal sense here is that God always has care of the good."

179. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 39 in Ioannem.
180. St. Jerome, In Isaiam, c. 11; c. 29.
181. Origen, Periarchon (De Principiis) 4, c. 1; Hom. 2 in Genesim.

These things Abulensis seems to teach; first, that history, in the broader signification by which it renders the literal sense, is that which is signified immediately by the letter itself, not that which the author wished to express: in which he seems to have followed the opinion of Lyra. Then he says that, where there is a metaphor or parable, the literal sense is not that which lies under the rind of the letter, as if one should say it is the proximate signified, but that to which the words are transferred, as in the testimony alleged it plainly appears, according to his own exposition. But, to be consistent with himself, he would have to say that, in that place where there is a metaphor, there is no literal sense, as Lyra said.

I, for my part, think that through the carelessness of scribes an error crept into Abulensis's writings, and that they should have cast that negation, enclosed by slashes, back onto the former part of the sentence, in this way: "Taking history broadly, not for everything that is signified immediately by the letter, but for that which the author willed to signify," etc. Thus indeed the opinion of Abulensis excellently holds together, and is that which we have related in this chapter; but because in this way it would not sometimes confound the literal and the mystical sense - for the mystical is always denoted by the words remotely, but by the things proximately, as will appear below according to the common opinion - therefore, in that question 28, and question 57 on Matthew 2, and in other places cited above, disputation 13, chapter 1, he teaches that there is never any mystical sense contained in the letter by way of repetitions of the words, but that it all depends on the preacher's judgment and will; which reason, although from his opinion the literal is sometimes hidden and signified secondarily, is not to be called mystical. St. Thomas could be referred for this opinion in this Article to the third reply, where he says thus: "The parabolic sense is contained under the literal: for by the words something is signified properly, something figuratively: nor is the literal sense the figure itself, but that which is figured: for when Scripture names the arm of God, the literal sense is not that in God there is a member of this corporeal kind, but that which is signified through this member." He therefore holds in that case that by the name "arm" the member is signified proximately, and by the member, the power of God; and thus that the power of God is denoted, not proximately, but remotely, by the very word.[182]

Caput III - The truer opinion on the literal sense

The other Doctors, in one and the same accord, seem to agree upon one opinion, which to me is more probable, although several other definitions are reported by some more recent theologians: namely, that the literal, or historical, sense is that which the author of Scripture, the Holy Spirit, willed first to signify, whether by words under their proper and usual, or under their metaphorical, signification. This definition, either in the same words or with a few changed, St. Thomas handed down in this Article in the body, with an added solution to the third, and the more recent theologians in this same Article. For St. Thomas teaches that the parabolic sense, which the words by translation signify first, is itself literal, not however that which those words, without translation, signify. Burgensis agrees, in the Addition to either Prologue of Lyra at the first doubt, and in the

182. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 1, a. 10, ad 3.

solution of the fourth principal argument of the question; Alphonsus de Castro, book 1 Against Heresies, chapter 3; Driedo, book 2 On Sacred Scripture, chapter 2; Sixtus of Siena, book 3 Bibliotheca Sancta, chapter 2; Adam in the preface to the Commentaries on Isaiah.[183] The definition set down must, however, be explained more fully. For which purpose it must be noted what the difference is between the mystical sense and the historical or literal in general: for by the comparison of each the distinction of the aforesaid definition will be illustrated.

Therefore all the Doctors just cited say - and from Driedo and Adam it is plain - that the mystical sense is never signified proximately by the words, but by the things; so that the words, by which it is had, first signify some thing, and then that thing is a sign of another, which it is said to denote mystically and spiritually: and therefore it is called mystical, or spiritual, because it is in the things, as though it were according to the mode of mysteries, and, as it were, like a spirit hidden in a body. But the literal is that which is signified first by the words themselves, whether properly or metaphorically.

This foundation being set, it remains that we expound the aforesaid parts of the definition; by the declaration of which the whole definition stands manifest. The first is the particle "first." Now this is set in opposition to that which is contrary; and it teaches that the literal sense is signified first by the words, not by the things: just as the mystical is proximately by the things, remotely by the words; and secondarily by the very words. Driedo and Adam have expressly posited this particle; but from the mind of all the rest the same doctrine is clearly gathered. In its explanation, however, it must be observed that words which have a proper and a metaphorical signification do indeed signify two things, yet not so that one be ordered through the other, as it happens in the mystical and literal sense of the same place, but so that both alike designate proximately: as equivocal terms signify by the same name; except that they denote one thing by the first imposition and properly, but another by a secondary and metaphorical imposition, which is called transference; which, since it is not a first signification and imposition, is transferred to another new imposition, and therefore does not remain in the first. Whence it happens that by the same word that thing is signified proximately also by the transference. For example, that of Abulensis, "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just," which we have set down to explain: for there Scripture, by the name "eye," does not denote first the corporeal instrument of seeing, and, under that aspect, an instrument is not understood, since it says "the eyes of the Lord," and in God there is no instrument of this bodily kind; it therefore signifies proximately the intellect of God, which by transference it calls by the name of "eye," because it is, as it were, like to bodily instruments which for us are coapted. Therefore, although in the same word there be a secondary imposition of the letter, which is translation, nevertheless there is never a remote signification of one thing through another.

Nor indeed is that doctrine contradicted by what Alphonsus de Castro says, namely, that the literal sense is had in many ways; sometimes from the bare signification of the words: he understands this when they are used properly; sometimes not from the words themselves, but from

the things signified by the words: he understands this of the metaphorical signification: for by these words he does not contend that that metaphorical sense, which is understood and is literal, is signified by the words remotely or proximately through things, but that that sense was taken from the likeness of things, on account of which the words themselves, having been transferred to a secondary signification, designate something metaphorically; in which mode he himself explained his own opinion a little. In the same way one ought to understand St. Thomas in that solution 3, which we set down above as the best test against the opinion of Abulensis clearly, when he said that the literal sense is that which the words signify, whether properly or metaphorically: the mystical, however, on the contrary is that which is designated by the things themselves, which the same words signify, as he says, as well as that which is signified remotely by the words.

The second part of the definition, which must be explained, is, "under the common and usual, or the metaphorical, signification": which are set forth to exclude the mystical sense: for this, since it is denoted by the words remotely, but proximately by the things, can sometimes not be signified by the words taken in their common and usual signification, nor in the metaphorical signification: as when Scripture says that Jonah was in the belly of the fish three days, by the usual signification of the words the history of Jonah is expressed: but Christ in the sepulcher is not denoted by the usual signification, nor by the metaphorical signification of the words, but proximately by the things themselves, namely, by that history of Jonah; and by the words remotely, insofar as by their usual signification they signify the history of Jonah. I said "sometimes," because sometimes even the mystical sense can be referred to the words in their common signification, when, namely, both of the history and of the mystery they can first be said in the usual signification. Such is that in Hosea 11: "Out of Egypt I have called my son," which can be said, in the common signification of the words, both of the people Israel and of Christ; for each is called "son" in the common use of the term.

The mystical sense is never signified proximately by the words, but by the things, in such a way that the words, under which it lies, first signify some thing, and then that thing is the sign of another, which is said to be denoted mystically and spiritually. Therefore it is called mystical, or spiritual, because there lies hidden within things, as it were, a recondite mystery and, as it were, a spirit in a body. But the literal is that which is first signified by the very words, either properly or metaphorically.

With this foundation laid, it remains to set forth the three principal parts of the definition, by the declaration of which the whole definition will become manifest. The first is the particle "First." We have inserted this on purpose, because the literal sense is first signified by the words, not by the things, just as the mystical is signified proximately by the things, but remotely and secondarily by the words. This particle was expressly posited by no one except Driedo and Adam, yet it is clearly gathered from the opinion of all. In the unfolding of this part it is to be observed that words which have both a proper and a metaphorical signification signify two things in such a way that they do

183. Paulus Burgensis, Additiones ad Prologos Lyrae; Alphonsus de Castro, Adversus haereses, lib. 1, c. 3; Johannes Driedo, De sacra Scriptura, lib. 2, c. 2; Sixtus Senensis, Bibliotheca sancta, lib. 3, c. 2; Adam (Adamus) in praefatione ad Commentaria in Isaiam.

not signify one through the other in ordered fashion, as happens in the mystical and the literal sense of the same passage, but they denote each alike as equivocal terms are signified by the same name - except that one they denote by first imposition and properly, the other secondarily and metaphorically, which is called a transfer, by which the name, from its first signification and imposition, is carried over to another new one, and hence does not remain in the first. Whence it is that by the transfer it also proximately signifies that second thing. We can explain this by Abulensis's example: "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just," etc. For there the Scripture, by the name "eyes," does not first denote a bodily instrument of seeing; and since in God there is not such an instrument, it denotes intellect, which it calls an "eye" by translation, because we conceive it as taking the place of a corporeal instrument.

Nor, indeed, is this doctrine met by what Alphonsus de Castro says, namely, that the literal sense is had in many ways: sometimes from no signification of the words - he means, when they are used properly; sometimes not from the words themselves, but from the things signified by the words. He means this of metaphorical signification. By these words he does not contend that the metaphorical sense, which is at times literal, is signified by the words remotely and proximately by the things themselves, but that that sense took its very rise from a similitude of things, on account of which the words themselves, by secondary signification transferred metaphorically, designate something else; in which manner he briefly explained his own position. In the same way St. Thomas is to be understood in that third reply which we reported in favor of Abulensis; for in the body he plainly taught that the literal sense is that which is signified by the words, and the mystical, on the contrary, that which is denoted by the things themselves - which is the same as to say, signified remotely by the words.

The second part of the definition which must be explained is: "Under the common and usual, or metaphorical, signification." This is set down to exclude the mystical sense; for this, since it is denoted remotely by the words themselves and proximately by the things, can sometimes not be signified by words taken in their common and usual signification, nor in their metaphorical signification; as when Scripture says, "Jonah was in the belly of the fish three days," the history of Jonah is expressed by the usual signification of the words; but Christ is not denoted by the usual signification concerning the sepulcher, nor by the metaphorical signification of the words, but proximately by the things themselves, namely, by that history of Jonah; and by the words remotely, insofar as by their usual signification they signify the history of Jonah. I said "sometimes," because sometimes even the mystical sense can be referred to the words in their common signification, when, namely, both of the history and of the mystery they can first be said in the usual signification. Such is that in Hosea 11: "Out of Egypt I have called my son," which can be said, in the common signification of the words, both of the people Israel and of Christ; for each is called "son" in the common use of the term. If, however, it be joined to what precedes and follows, it proximately signifies only the people Israel, to whom alone the words there refer; but Christ remotely, by means of the intervening thing, namely, the people Israel, as was explained above.

The last particle of the definition is: "What the author of Scripture willed to signify." This is necessary in order that there be some literal sense, although it does not suffice, as Abulensis falsely supposed. For, as we shall show in the next disputation, the mystical sense, which nevertheless ought to be called literal, is not contained together with the literal under the same passage by the intention of the Holy Spirit. Therefore it does not suffice, in order that there be some literal sense; still, it is required as necessary. For since it can happen that by the same word or speech various things can be signified proximately (as in those expressions which are wont to be used either properly or metaphorically), it must be said of necessity that the literal sense of the word or speech is that which the author willed to express, properly or metaphorically; and since the principal author of Sacred Scripture is the Holy Spirit, in order that a sense be literal, it is necessary that it be expressed from His intention. Whether, however, the human writer himself knew every literal sense, and whether it depends upon his intention, we shall say in disputation 17. Although, therefore, the aforementioned particle does not suffice, still with the others it most fittingly completes the definition.

Caput IV - On the literal sense of parables

As to the literal sense of parables, whether it is that which is brought in the similitude and as an example, or that to which the parable itself is applied, Alphonsus de Castro seems to leave it under doubt in the place cited; for he says: "As to the sense of parables, if one wishes to confine it within the literal, he will not do amiss; if, however, he is unwilling, I do not oppose." But since from the particle of the definition shortly before explained it is clear that the literal sense is that which is first signified by the very words, it is easy to gather that the sense of parables is that which is in the example adduced.

But first it must be observed that in parables there are two parts: one that brings in the thing by way of likeness, the other that applies it; the former is, as it were, a history; the latter is, as it were, an explanation of a mystical and hidden sense. The former, therefore, has that sensible and rough thing as the literal sense, which is, as it were, the history; the latter, however, has the mystery and spiritual thing, to which the parable is applied. For example, when it is said in Matthew 13: "The kingdom of heaven is like leaven, which a woman took," etc., in the literal sense there is truly signified the woman's act, who out of leaven and flour prepares a mass so that bread may be made; and this is the thing which is brought forward as an example in the former part of the parable; but in the latter part, in which the application of that parable is contained, the word of the Gospel and its efficacy is literally denoted. This sense can be called mystical if it be referred to the former part, in that it is hidden under the sensible thing; but referred to the latter part of the parable, it is truly literal.

Secondly, it is to be noted that sometimes in Scripture the application of parables is made; sometimes it is not expressly made: then, however, the latter part is understood, to which the parable ought to be applied; and that has its literal sense, as has just been explained. In this way Christ sometimes spoke to the crowds, and in general only applied the parable, as when in Luke 7

he said: "The kingdom of heaven is like a man who sowed good seed in his field," etc.; but the distinct application of the parable he set forth only to the disciples. There is also another rather long parable in Scripture which Solomon employed in the Song of Songs, where he introduces the Bridegroom and the Bride under the persons of shepherds, and the sweetest words of love between them, so that under that parable and sensible example he might display the sweetness of spiritual love between God and the soul, Christ and the Church. There, therefore, there is a twofold sense: one of the thing which is brought in a parable, and this is material, namely, the things as if done among shepherds - not that it really so happened, but because it is brought forward in a parable, so that under those persons that which is spiritual be signified; as when the Bride says to the Bridegroom (Cant. 1): "Tell me where you feed and where you rest at midday," and the Bridegroom answers: "If you do not know, O most beautiful among women, go out and follow after the tracks of the flocks," etc. In which the Bride asks about the shelter, where at midday the Bridegroom was covered from the burning of the sun; and he answers: "If you do not know," etc., that is, "If you are ignorant, go after your flocks and the kids; for they of their own accord graze in the pasture into which you lead them." But the latter part is to be understood, in which the parable was applied: the literal sense which the Holy Spirit willed properly to express will be that which is referred to spiritual love and charity, as the interpreters variously explain that place.

Thirdly, observe what Alphonsus de Castro also noted from St. Augustine: namely, that the history of a parable is not to be taken as that which really happened as it is narrated, but as that which at least could have happened. Such is that of Matthew 20: "The kingdom of heaven is like a householder, who went out early in the morning to hire laborers into his vineyard," etc. Since this is brought forward by way of similitude, it is not necessary that it be a thing that really happened; sometimes, however, what is brought in a parable truly happens, either in natural things - as that of Luke 13: "The kingdom of heaven is like a grain of mustard," or again among men, as is that parable of the leaven. These two modes of parables are more frequent in Scripture. Finally, sometimes there is brought forward in a parable some impossible and fabulous thing, as in Judges 9 it is said: "The trees went forth to anoint a king over them," etc. This, however, occurs more rarely. In whatever mode, nevertheless, a parable is set forth, the sense of it as regards the former part is always true, although the thing which is narrated did not happen in reality, nor even could have happened; because that which is proposed in a parable is not recounted as that which truly happened, but as that which could have happened, or at least is supposed as if it were possible, although in reality it is impossible: as in the likeness of that fact among even inanimate things something moral among men is better expressed. In this there is no falsehood, just as neither when one advances a fable so that from it a moral sense may be elicited.

Caput V - Corollaries of the preceding doctrine

From the preceding doctrine it may be gathered, first, that the opinion of Lyra is false, which he set down in the first chapter, when he asserts that the literal sense is properly that which the words express, and hence that Scripture sometimes lacks such a sense, which he asserts on account of metaphors. It is refuted, however, because wherever there is metaphor, the literal sense is that

which the words signify by a secondary, as it were, imposition, which is transfer; but this is signified proximately by the words, and therefore is not mystical, as Lyra supposed, nor is it denoted by the things themselves but by the words, as was proved in chapter 3.

More absurd still is it that Scripture sometimes lacks the literal sense, which, besides the reason just alleged, is shown thus. For Scripture always signifies something, either properly or metaphorically; that the proper sense is literal, no one doubts; and about the metaphorical it was proved by this reason. For the spiritual and mystical sense is so called either because a mystery lies hidden, or because, like a spirit in a body, it does not appear; but a metaphorical sense does not so lie hidden, but is very well known even commonly, and from the antecedents and consequents, according to the subject matter, is easily understood by all not unskilled in language. For metaphor is a certain transfer and, as it were, a subsequent imposition or extension of a name; but the mystical sense, since it is contained under things which of themselves do not signify unless as Scripture, at its own discretion, employs them, is not known to all as the metaphorical is, but, as it were, a mystery and a spirit lies hidden in things. Therefore, the metaphorical sense is not mystical, but literal, a sense which Scripture at least never lacks.

As to the testimonies of the Fathers alleged for Lyra's position, I answer that they sometimes call that sense "spiritual" which is contained under a metaphor, because in a certain way, like a spirit in a body, it is enclosed under the prior signification of the words; they also call it "allegorical," as we shall say in the next disputation, chapter 3. Then, indeed, when they speak of the "bark" of the letter, they mean the very words in their first signification, which are transferred; thus sometimes "history fails," as Origen used to say; yet, properly and strictly speaking, the metaphorical sense is literal, and that Scripture never lacks such a sense has been sufficiently proved.

Next, from what has been said it is no less gathered that Abulensis was in error.

Abulensis was deceived, when without reason he thought that the metaphorical sense is signified remotely by the words, and proximately by the things. For, as we showed a little above, a word taken metaphorically does not denote that thing which by its prior imposition it properly signified; rather, it is transferred to signify another thing in such a way that it expresses that alone: therefore it will signify that other thing proximately, not remotely. Thus, when I say, the meadow laughs, I do not signify a man's laughter, and through it the greenness of the meadow, but proximately the very greenness which I call "laughter."

But Abulensis erred worse, when he said that whatever mystical sense is contained in Scripture is from the mere will of the men who use it, and not from the intention of the Holy Spirit. This will be refuted more fully in the following disputation.

Finally, one must take diligent care to observe the context of any passage of Scripture, especially of the New Testament. For although it is familiar to the Prophets, once they have taken up an argument, to pass on to other mysteries, being rapt with the very prophetic Spirit, this does not happen in the New Testament, especially in the epistles of the Apostles. Since these deal with handing on moral precepts and doctrine, they commonly follow out the argument proposed in one

context, yet nevertheless drawing from it conclusions in their own order. Nothing, however, contributes more to understanding the whole sequence of the context than to determine the force of the particular particles which the writers use; and indeed, one thing above all must be observed, which is wont to introduce no small difficulty, namely, that a particle does not always refer to what immediately precedes, but to what had been said earlier. This, however, becomes evident at once whenever it does not square with what immediately precedes. As for other rules for explaining Scripture at length, to set them out is not the business of our present undertaking.

Caput VI - Rule for eliciting the literal sense

In order to investigate the true literal sense (*sensus litteralis*) of any passage, one must have before one's eyes first what the Council of Trent admonishes, session 4, in the decree on the use of sacred books, namely, how great is the authority of the common consent of the Fathers; for no one is permitted in matters of faith and morals pertaining to the edification of Christian doctrine to interpret sacred Scripture contrary to the unanimous consent of the Fathers.[184]

Second, knowledge of the languages is most helpful, which ought to serve with such moderation that it defends, to the extent of its powers, the Vulgate of our edition. The customary phraseology of Scripture itself, well understood, also opens a way to the understanding of Scripture itself. Thus, when a collation has been made and by assiduous reading of Scripture it comes about that it explains itself.

Third, Scholastic Theology, the definitions of the Councils, and even the history of heresies contribute very much to understanding at least that part of Scripture which deals with the dogmas of our faith. Therefore, if someone, instructed only in the skill of languages and trained in the assiduous reading of Scripture, should undertake to explain the epistles of Paul, especially that to the Romans and to the Galatians, he would find himself in very great danger.

Disputatio XVI - On the mystical and spiritual sense

Quid sit sensus mysticus. Cap. 1.

Quotuplex sit sensus mysticus. Cap. 2.

Quatuor sensus Scripturae exemplis illustrantur. Cap. 3.

Corollaria praecedentis doctrinae. Cap. 4.

Quomodo mysticus sensus utilis sit ad argumentum. Cap. 5.

That the mystical, or spiritual, sense is, is clear from the foregoing disputation: according to the common opinion of the Doctors whom I cited there, it is that sense which is signified neither properly nor metaphorically by words proximately, but which is enclosed under the things signified

184. Council of Trent, session 4, decree on the use of sacred books.

by the words, as under a shadow and figure - on account of which reason it is called "mystical," that is, hidden and secret. It is called "spiritual," because it lies hidden under the things, as a spirit under a body.

For greater clarity of this definition, as a foundation one must first establish that the internal concept of the mind is wont to be signified not only by words used properly or metaphorically, but also by other things, as is clear in the symbols and hieroglyphics of the Egyptians; in the bee they signified mercy, and in the king armed with a goad, justice, and other things of that sort. From such things Pythagoras and other distinguished philosophers used to hand down many salutary lessons for moral instruction, which are commonly called proverbs.

Nevertheless, although this is so, the statement remains true which says that it is the peculiar property of sacred Scripture under the same letter to contain both history and mystery. St. Gregory expressed this view, Moral. bk. 20, c. 1, when he asserts that sacred Scripture surpasses all other sciences in this, that with the same discourse, while it narrates the text, it also discloses the mystery.[185] St. Thomas taught the same in this article, and in Quodlibet 7, a. 8; for the mystical signification in the things themselves is found among the sacred Scriptures in a far different manner than it ever was among the pagan philosophers.[186]

To explain this difference more clearly, note secondly that there are three kinds of signs by which things can be signified. The first is that of words. The second is that of lower things which, at one's discretion, whether fictitious or even truly done, are adduced to signify greater things; and in both ways it is common to men to signify other things, as we said about the hieroglyphics of the Egyptians, who were wont by animals or also by other fictitious things to express marvelous matters. The third kind is that which God alone uses in Scripture, namely of things which truly happened among men, whose history He Himself willed to denote a mystery that would be many years later. Such was the calling back of the sons of Israel from Egypt, by which it was signified that Christ was to be called back from Egypt long afterward. Also the manna falling from heaven, by which He not only fed the people for forty years, but also willed to indicate the future sacrament of the Eucharist, and other things of that kind. To contain the mystical sense by this third kind of signs, and, as Gregory said, to narrate the history and express thereby the mystery, is the proper characteristic of sacred Scripture.[185]

And although men among themselves can also use things done, nevertheless this is done by them only after the fact, by bringing them in as a parable, example, or similitude. But it is proper to Scripture not only to present true events in a parable, but also to narrate simply those things which truly happened, in such a way that the Author of Scripture intends to denote loftier mysteries to come.

Third, it is to be observed that the mystical sense is not always in Scripture expressed by lower things; sometimes, too, lower things are signified by higher. For the passion of Christ outside the gate represents what is less, as Paul noted to the Hebrews 13, namely: "Let us go forth therefore to

185. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 20, c. 1.
186. St. Thomas Aquinas, in this article; and Quodlibet 7, a. 8.
185. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 20, c. 1.

him outside the camp, bearing his reproach" (Heb 13). Yet more frequently by lower things higher are denoted. Lastly, as the Doctors already mentioned in disputation 13 warn, the mystical sense is not to be sought everywhere in Scripture. For the evangelical precepts and counsels are to be understood to the letter, such that no spiritual sense is contained in that letter. Likewise in other places, any mystical sense explained according to each man's fancy ought not at once to be considered as signified according to the mind of the Holy Spirit, who is the principal author, although such a use of Scripture may be reckoned as suitably useful in sermons.

How manifold this mystical sense is does not seem sufficiently settled among the Doctors; who, although they say different things, nevertheless are not at odds with each other. Therefore, the sense of Scripture considered universally is twofold: one, the literal or historical; the other, the spiritual or mystical - their difference having been explained in general up to this point. Moreover, the spiritual or mystical is wont to be divided variously.

First, a certain distinction is asserted from St. Augustine, On the Usefulness of Believing, c. 3, which Sixtus of Siena, Bibliotheca sancta, bk. 3, c. 3, arranges in this way: Sacred Scripture has a twofold explanation - namely, historical and allegorical. Again, the historical is either analogical or aetiological. The allegorical, however, is threefold. The first accommodates the figures of past things to present things, and takes the name "allegorical." The second looks to morals, and is called "tropological." The third looks to the unchangeable condition, and is called "anagogical."[187]

Yet in that place Augustine assigns only four modes by which the Scripture of the Old Testament is handed down: according to history, according to aetiology, according to analogy, according to allegory - though he testifies that he preferred to use those names because he had received them so from others. And, as Driedo rightly observes, On Sacred Scripture, bk. 1, c. 2, after the middle, Augustine did not say that there is a fourfold sense of Sacred Scripture, but that it is handed down or taught in four modes. First, according to history, when what was done, or not done, is narrated. Second, according to aetiology, when it is shown what was done or said for what cause. Third, according to analogy, whereby the concord of the two Testaments is perceived. Fourth, according to allegory, when it is taught that the things written are not to be taken to the letter, but figuratively.

By these four modes the Lord Christ and the Apostles used to proceed, as Augustine there also attests. Christ used the first mode in Matthew 12, when He brought forward the history of David, 1 Kings 21, who ate the loaves of the proposition. He used the second mode in Matthew 19, when He showed the cause on account of which Moses allowed the Jewish people a bill of divorce. Of the third mode he brings forward no example. Finally, Scripture is brought forward in the fourth mode in Matthew 12, where it is said: "A sign shall not be given to it, except the sign of Jonah the Prophet." And although by these four modes the Scripture of the Old Testament is handed down, yet all of them are found in the New, in which the whole Old Scripture is adduced in various ways.

187. St. Augustine, De utilitate credendi, c. 3; Sixtus of Siena, Bibliotheca sancta, bk. 3, c. 3; J. Driedo, De sacra Scriptura, bk. 1, c. 2.

Therefore, Sixtus of Siena, in the mind of Augustine, has in vain numbered the senses of Scripture in that order, since Augustine neither treats of the senses of Scripture, nor distinguishes so many members.

St. Jerome, moreover, in epistle 120 to Eustochium, q. 12, affirms that only three can be understood in Sacred Scripture; he does not say "handed down" or "taught," but "understood." Whence it follows that a threefold sense of Scripture is handed down by us: namely, the first according to history; the second through tropology; the third into the spiritual understanding which they call "theoria." About the first there is no dispute. The second, he says, is when that which in the former people was carried out carnally is drawn into a moral interpretation of the passages, and we convert it to the profit of our soul. In the third, finally, as Jerome says in sum, the mind is raised to serenity and to the spirit concerning the beatitude of future things. This third mode Sixtus of Siena divides again into the allegorical and the anagogical.

There is, moreover, a widespread and commonly received division of the senses of Scripture, which Eucherius hands down in the preface to the Spiritual Formulae, and Cassian in Conference 14, c. 8, where they assert that there are four ways of illustrating Sacred Scripture; from which four the Theologians commonly, with St. Thomas in this article, derive the senses of Scripture. Thus Lyranus, Burgensis, Abulensis, Driedo, and others, whom I cited in disputation 13, say. The first is the historical, about which enough was said in the preceding disputation. The second is the tropological, or moral, which is referred to the correction of life. The third is the allegorical, when in a narration of deeds and in the history some mystery is said to be indicated. The fourth, finally, is the anagogical, which is referred to those things that are of eternal beatitude. These are contained in the two verses commonly cited: "The letter teaches deeds; what you should believe, allegory; what you should do, morality; where you should aim, anagogy."

These four senses seem to be indicated by Augustine, On Genesis ad litteram, bk. 1, c. 24, where he speaks thus: "In all the holy books there ought to be sought what from eternity is intimated; what deeds are narrated; what things future are foretold; what things to be done are commanded, or are advised." Of all which we will set forth examples from the New Testament in the following chapter.

From all these it becomes clear that under the first and literal sense there is not only contained the mystical and spiritual, but that this latter is also so various, as Eucherius said; and that these four senses reduce every sense to two modes only - namely, the literal and the spiritual. And although the ancients do not always distribute the mystical into those three enumerated parts, nor is the division one so much of things as of words; nevertheless it cannot be denied that the mystical sense is referred both to morals and to the mysteries of eternal beatitude.

Second, it is referred to morals, and is called the tropological. Third, it is referred to unchangeable eternity, and is called the anagogical.

But truly St. Augustine assigns only four modes by which the Scripture of the Old Testament is handed down: according to history, according to aetiology, according to analogy, according to allegory; and he bears witness that he preferred to use these Greek names, because he had received

them thus from others; and, as Driedo rightly observed in that place, book 2 On Sacred Scripture, chapter 2, after the middle, Augustine did not say that the sense of Sacred Scripture is fourfold, but that it is handed down or taught in four modes.[188] First indeed according to history, when what was done, or not done, is narrated. Second, according to aetiology, when it is shown what was done or said for what cause. Third, according to analogy, whereby the congruence of both Testaments is made plain. Fourth, according to allegory, when it is taught that certain things written are not to be taken according to the letter, but figuratively.

That Christ the Lord and the Apostles used these four modes, Augustine bears witness there. Christ used the first at Matthew 12, when he brings forward the history of David, 1 Kings 21, who ate the loaves of proposition. He used the second at Matthew 19, when he shows the reason for which Moses permitted to the Jewish people a bill of repudiation. He adduces no example of the third mode. Finally, the fourth mode of Scripture is adduced at Matthew 12, when it is said: "A sign shall not be given to it, except the sign of the prophet Jonah." And although by these four modes the Scripture of the Old Testament is delivered, yet they are all found in the New, wherein the Old Scripture is brought forward in such varied ways. Therefore, in vain did Sixtus of Siena, according to Augustine's mind, number so many senses of Scripture in that order, since Augustine treats neither of the senses of Scripture, nor distinguishes so many members.[189]

St. Jerome, however, in epistle 120 to Hedibia, question 12, affirms that Sacred Scripture can be understood in a threefold manner: he does not say "delivered" or "taught," but "understood." From which it follows that he taught us a threefold sense of Scripture. The first is according to history. The second is through tropology. The third is according to the spiritual understanding, which they call theoria. Of the first there is sufficient evidence. Of the second he says that it is when that which in the former people was done carnally, we interpret according to the literal place and convert to the profit of our soul. Finally, of the third: "To higher things," says Jerome, "we pass; we abandon earthly things; we discourse concerning the beatitude of future things." This third mode Sixtus of Siena again divides into the allegorical and the anagogical, so that the division of Jerome may agree from every side with the vulgate and common one; yet not according to Jerome's mind: for he, as we said, enumerated only three senses of Scripture.

But there is a widespread and commonly received division of the senses of Scripture, which Eucherius, in the preface of the book On Spiritual Forms, and Cassian, in Conference 14, chapter 8, hand down, where they assert that there are four kinds for illuminating Sacred Scripture, from which the four senses of Scripture the theologians commonly, with St. Thomas in this article, derive. Thus do Lyranus, Burgensis, Abulensis, Driedo, and others whom I report in disputation 13, teach.[190] The first is the historical, about which enough was said in the preceding disputation. The second is the tropological, or moral, which is referred to the correction of life. The third is the allegorical, when in the narration of deeds and in the history some mystery of our faith is

188. John Driedo, De sacra Scriptura, book 2, chapter 2 (post medium), commenting on St. Augustine's four modes.

189. Sixtus of Siena (Sixtus Senensis), in Bibliotheca sancta, attempts a numerical ordering of senses drawn from Augustine.

190. Eucherius of Lyons, Praefatio to the Spiritualium formarum; John Cassian, Collatio 14, c. 8; Nicholas of Lyra; Paul of Burgos (Burgensis); Alphonsus Tostatus (Abulensis); Driedo; cf. St. Thomas, in this article; and see our disputation 13.

contained. Finally, the fourth is the anagogical, which is referred to those things that belong to eternal beatitude; and these are contained in these two verses: "The letter teaches what has been done; allegory, what you should believe; the moral, what you should do; anagogy, whither you should tend."

These four senses seem to be indicated by St. Augustine, book 1 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 1, where he thus speaks: "In all the holy books one must look for what things therein may be intimately eternal, what things may be narrated as having been done, what things may be foretold as future, what things may be prescribed or admonished as to be done." Of all of which we shall bring forward examples from the New Testament in the following chapter.

From all these it becomes clear that under the first and literal sense there is contained not only the mystical and spiritual, but that this latter is also so various, as Eucherius said; and although it is free to divide and to include every sense into only two modes, namely, the literal and the mystical, and not to distribute the mystical further into those three enumerated parts (since here there is a small disagreement of words, not a great disagreement of things), nevertheless it cannot be denied that the mystical sense is referred both to morals and to the mysteries of faith and to the heavenly fatherland; whether you wish to call this by this, or by another, name. For not all the Fathers have enumerated so many members of the mystical sense under those names as Eucherius, Jerome, and Cassian. Concerning Jerome it is now clear that in the place alleged he reports only three, in the second of which he includes the sense that pertains to morals and to the mysteries of faith.

He himself too, in his commentaries on the Prophets, and St. Augustine, book 1 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 2, and Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy, chapter 2, and in epistle 9 which is to Titus, Origen, and other Fathers, as I allege in disputation 13, enumerate only two senses, namely the literal and the mystical. Cyril, however, book 5 on Leviticus about the middle, Ambrose, book 3 on Luke, on that passage, chapter 3, "Who was Phares," and Bernard, sermon 61 of the lesser sermons, besides the historical, also enumerate the moral and the mystical; perhaps they do not distinguish the moral from the literal, but from the historical, taking history in the strict and proper sense for the narration of deeds; for although every literal sense is historical, not every historical is moral; for in Scripture not only deeds are narrated, but also moral precepts and matters of life are delivered.

For which reason Ambrose, book 5 on Luke, chapter "On the Centurion's Servant," in that which he did for the same, takes the literal and the moral sense, from which also he draws the mystical concerning the death of Christ; and book 5 on Luke, chapter "On that which was on the second-first Sabbath," concerning the deed of Ahimelech, 1 Kings 21, says: "But this in history is moral, in the mystery prophetic." With whom Bede seems to agree, in the preface to the Psalms, who teaches that Sacred Scripture pertains to three things: to history, to morals, and to mystery. But in that place he does not assign various senses of Scripture, but reduces to three heads the totality of what is contained in Scripture. Finally Hugo of St. Victor, besides the literal, treats of the other two: for

in book 6 of the Didascalicon of learning, chapter 3, he deals with the literal; chapter 4 with the allegorical, which he says pertains to the mysteries of faith, under which we can also include the anagogical; and chapter 5 with the tropological, which he calls the moral.[191]

Yet, notwithstanding these things, for the sake of clarity, the sense of Scripture is conveniently divided into those four members enumerated according to the opinion of Eucherius and Cassian, examples of which stand out in the New Testament, as we shall see in the following chapter. I pass over another, little-used kind of explaining Scripture, namely the elementary exposition, which is taken from the letters of the very words; and again it is assigned into the physical and the prophetic; about which Sixtus of Siena has very extensively written, book 3 of the Bibliotheca sancta, chapter 5 and the following.[192]

Caput III - The four senses of Scripture are illustrated by examples

The four senses which, from Eucherius and Cassian, we have enumerated, one city Jerusalem presents to us by way of example. For in Sacred Scripture "city" is, according to the letter, the earthly city; according to tropology, it is the soul; according to allegory, it is the Church; by anagogy, it is the heavenly fatherland. There are also many marked examples of these in the New Testament, which can be looked at together in one place, in the epistle to the Galatians, chapter 4. For it is said: "Abraham had two sons, one by the handmaid, and one by the free woman" (Gal 4). In which part the literal sense plainly appears. What follows, however, he subjoins: "Which things are said by allegory: for these are the two testaments," and what follows, pertains to the allegorical sense. It then follows: "But as then he who was born according to the flesh persecuted him who was according to the spirit, so also now," which is referred to the tropological or moral. Finally, when he adds: "But that Jerusalem which is above is free, which is our mother," he explains the anagogical sense.

Other also in the New Testament manifest examples of the three spiritual senses are found. To the moral pertains that, 1 Corinthians 9: "You shall not muzzle the ox that is treading out the grain." Which the Apostle cites from Deuteronomy 25, but refers in the moral sense to the ministers of the Gospel, whom he judges worthy of their wage, namely food and sustenance. For the Apostle did not understand that it had been said of the very oxen according to the letter in Deuteronomy 25, as some think; otherwise the Apostle's argument, drawn from the mystical sense, would be weak. For it is certain that the Jews, by the express precept of the law, did not muzzle the ox that was treading; but since that matter would seem most slight, as if God had care only of that, and had willed to signify nothing greater by it, the Apostle most rightly infers that by that fact God also indicated that the ministers of the word of God are by right to be nourished and sustained; for which reason he subjoined: "Does God care for oxen? or does he not speak entirely for our sake?" as if he were to say, In that law and precept God looks not only to oxen, which are a viler thing, but

191. Hugo of St. Victor, Didascalicon, book 6: c. 3 on the literal, c. 4 on the allegorical (pertaining to the mysteries of faith, under which the anagogical may be included), c. 5 on the tropological (the moral).

192. Sixtus of Siena, Bibliotheca sancta, book 3, chapter 5 and following, on the "elementary" exposition (from the letters themselves), and its assignment also into the physical and the prophetic.

also to what is more worthy, to the sustenance of ministers; nor does the Apostle deny that God also had care of oxen, since the law speaks of them according to the letter. Wherefore also the argument of the Apostle has no small strength, even if it be drawn symbolically and from the mystical sense. For the mystical sense is easily gathered from that letter.

That place also is commonly adduced as an example of this moral sense, 1 Corinthians 10: "Now these things were done in figure of us," etc. But in disputation 14, chapter 6, it was proved that that Scripture which the Apostle cites is used not in the mystical sense, but by accommodation.

Examples indeed of the allegorical sense are very many in the New Testament: John 3 adduces the brazen serpent, which was an express figure of his cross; and Matthew 12 and Luke 11 allege the sign of Jonah, by which his burial and resurrection were foreshadowed. To this also pertain those testimonies Hosea 11 and Jeremiah 31, which we have shown in disputation 14 to be accepted only in the mystical sense. And since it is referred to the mysteries of faith, the sense of those is called allegorical. But that of the brazen serpent so in all respects squares with the cross of Christ and with its marvelous effects that the mystical sense straightway appears in it. Wherefore it is not permitted to concede only accommodation in it. But in the sign of Jonah the mystical sense is more evident: for when the Pharisees demanded from Christ a sign by which he might be acknowledged by them as the true Messiah, he granted them only that sign, nor did he wish then to exhibit to them some express sign.

Finally, a most apt example of the anagogical sense is with Paul to the Hebrews, chapters 3 and 4, where he treats that place of Psalm 94: "Today, if you shall hear his voice," etc., and below, "To whom I swore in my wrath, if they shall enter into my rest," which, according to the letter, was said of the people of the Jews, who, because they had been unbelieving at the waters of contradiction, God swore should not enter the land of promise. Therefore when Paul, chapter 4, subjoins: "For to us it has been announced just as to them," he clearly judges that God also swore to the unbelievers that they should not enter the heavenly fatherland, of which that land of promise was a figure; and after a little: "Since then it remains for some to enter into it," namely into the rest of the Lord, "and those to whom it was first announced did not enter in because of unbelief, again he designates a certain day, 'Today,' saying in David after so long a time, as it is said above: 'Today, if you shall hear his voice;'" "for if Jesus [i.e., Joshua] had given them rest, he would not afterwards have spoken of another day; therefore there remains a sabbath-rest for the people of God" (Heb 4). As if he were to say, Therefore, long after, David said "Today," to indicate that there are still others remaining who are going to enter, not indeed the land of promise, but eternal happiness. For if Jesus Nave had afforded to the people of Israel the full rest, which in the Psalm is called "My rest," that is, the rest of the Lord, he would never have made mention of another by saying: "Today, if you shall hear his voice." But he said this because there yet remains for the people of God a sabbath-rest and the rest of eternal life. The same rest of the heavenly fatherland Paul says was figured, Genesis 2, when the Lord "rested from all his work." For thus, after the labors of this life, that eternal rest and happiness await us. Therefore here the anagogical sense is included in that which befell the people of Israel, which not only does Paul elicit from that history, but also affirms to have been expressed by the Prophet in that Psalm, so that David himself from the shadow of that earthly and temporal

rest, which God kept for the believing Israelites after forty years, understood mystically the rest of the heavenly fatherland, which still remains for us; and that this is the literal sense of the Psalm, which is the anagogical of that event in the people of Israel, Paul in my judgment thought.

There is also an anagogical sense explained by Paul at Hebrews 8, where, concerning the material temple of Solomon in which the Levitical priests ministered, he says that it is a shadow of future things. For of the priests he says: "Who serve a shadow of the things to come" (Heb 8:5): that is, of the temple of Solomon, by which the future tabernacle of heavenly glory, not made by hand, was foreshadowed; which also he prosecutes in the same chapter.

Caput IV - Corollaries of the preceding doctrine

- I add certain observations, worthy of note, for a greater clarity of the things we have said.
- First: Sometimes the Fathers call the literal sense, when it is hidden under metaphors and tropes, "allegorical," or even "spiritual." St. Augustine called it "allegorical" in Epistle 48, that is to say in the last notation, insofar as something is signified metaphorically; for a metaphor can be called a kind of allegory, or "spiritual," as the same Augustine testifies (On the Trinity 15, c. 9). Origen, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, and Cassian - mentioned in the preceding disputation, c. 1 - called "spiritual" what is, as it were, contained somewhat obscurely under the very bark of the letter; yet properly it ought to be called "literal," as we there at length proved. On the other hand, the mystical sense is sometimes called "literal," when it is from the intention of the Holy Spirit, as we shall see in the following disputation.
- Second: Among all these senses of Scripture, the literal is the principal, if we consider the formal notion of sense, not the thing signified, or the intention of the Holy Spirit. For the signification of words is primary and proximate, and therefore the proximate signified, according to the nature of the signified, will be principal. Of this sort is the literal sense. The mystical is secondary and remote from the words: for it is denoted proximate by the things themselves. And in this way true is the sentence of Paul of Burgos, in the addition upon both prologues of Lyra, to the sixth doubt, question principalis, when he teaches that the literal sense is principal in Scripture according to the dignity of certitude, since it is more certain than the spiritual when referred to the speculation of the intellect; it would in truth be true if he said this only in this respect, namely, that as to our intellect the literal sense is signified most nearly by the words and is not hidden, as is the mystical. Otherwise, since the mystical also is signified from the intention of the Holy Spirit, it must be said to be equally certain and true absolutely. I pass over two other considerations, by which he teaches the literal sense to be more excellent, which seem of less moment. But if we attend to the very thing signified, the mystical, for the most part, is more noble; although the opposite sometimes happens, as we said in c. 1. Still more noble and principal it can be called if we consider the intention of the Holy Spirit; for Scripture was inspired for that mode of signifying as its principal end.

- The Apostle indicated this dignity of sense and the primary intention of the Holy Spirit, 1 Corinthians 9, around that Deuteronomy 25: "You shall not muzzle the ox that treads the grain." When he said, "Does God care for oxen? Or was it not altogether for our sakes that this was written? For it was written for our sakes, because he who ploughs ought to plough in hope." For since in the literal sense something less worthy is signified, and in the mystical something more worthy and more divine, the mystical sense will not therefore be more noble for this reason, nor, according to the intention of the Holy Spirit, primary. In this latter way Paul of Burgos plainly concedes it to be the sense of those who teach the mystical to be principal. Yet in vain is that of Paul, 2 Corinthians 3: "The letter kills, the spirit gives life," brought forward to prove this. For if there the Apostle were speaking about the literal and spiritual sense of Scripture, not only would the literal sense be less noble, but even harmful. For he did not say, "The letter is less noble," but "kills." But to grant that would be absurd. For the literal sense, truly literal, signified by the Holy Spirit, never kills. I confess indeed that the Fathers - alleged in the preceding disputation, c. 1 - said that the literal sense is sometimes harmful; yet they said that only, as I noted there, c. 2, whenever the place is metaphorical. For if then it were taken according to the primary signification, not translated, it would truly be harmful. But we shall show there that such a sense is not literal.
- Moreover, in that chapter Paul is not speaking of the literal sense, but of the letter of the law and of the Old Testament, of which Moses was the minister, and of the spirit of grace and faith which he himself preached; he speaks openly, as St. Thomas notes (1 - 2, q. 106, a. 2). Of the letter, then, of the law, if it be destitute of the spirit of grace and of faith, he truly says that it kills, as he admonishes in the Epistle to the Romans: for the law is rather a stumbling-block and an occasion of sin, if the aid of grace by which it may be fulfilled is lacking. Of the spirit, that is, of faith, he rightly asserts that it gives life, for it supplies strength to observe the precepts of the law, "which if a man shall do, he shall live in them" (Galatians 3): not only with a temporal life, by fleeing punishment, but also with a spiritual, by attaining true sanctity before God. I admit, however, that Ambrose also used this testimony of Paul, book 6 on Luke, c. de responsione Iesu Simonem arguentis, where at the effusion of ointment upon the head of Christ the holy Doctor understands spiritually: "The letter," he says, "kills." Yet Paul, as we have already shown, willed to signify another thing. Nor do I quite understand how the material pouring out of ointment, done in the spirit of charity and religion, can kill.
- Thirdly it must be observed that the opinion of certain persons is false, who affirm with the Jews that in every place of the Old Testament there is contained something first done in the prior people, which then is a figure of that which was to be in the Gospel. For there are certain testimonies of the Old Testament which, in the literal and primary sense, ought to be taken prophetically of things future under the New, as Tertullian hands down, On the Resurrection of the Flesh from chapter 26, and in Against the Jews c. 7 and the following, and Against Marcion book 3, c. 5; such as St. Jerome judges that one of Isaiah 7 to be: "Behold a Virgin shall conceive," etc.[193]

- Now this manner of interpreting Scripture, which in these times began to be taught by certain persons in our Spain - I know not by what spirit - was once condemned against Theodore of Mopsuestia, bishop, by Pope Vigilius in the Roman synod, at which twenty bishops were present: it is clear from the collection of the various letters of the Pontiffs, which Antonius St. Augustine, Archbishop of Tarragona, copied out of the Vatican Library. Our Francis Turrianus also mentions this condemnation, in c. 5 of the second book of the Apostolic Constitutions of Clement Romanus, where he reports certain places which Theodore was explaining in this sense, nor did he wish to apply them to those things which were to be in the New Testament.[194]
- Fourth, note that the mystical sense is found not only in the Old Testament, but also in the New; the contrary was thought by Abulensis on Matthew 13, q. 28; and not to mention what St. John Chrysostom says of Christ's entry into Jerusalem, Matthew 21 - namely that Christ so fulfilled the prophecies of the ancients that he himself gave occasion to another prophecy - , in which fact Jerome and Origen also understand a mystery; let the manifest testimony of Hebrews 13 suffice us: "Let us go forth therefore to him outside the camp," etc., where the Apostle interprets that Christ suffered outside the gate not without a mystery. I confess indeed that in the Old Testament, which is full of prophecies and figures, there are more testimonies under which the mystical sense is contained.
- Furthermore Abulensis adduces St. Augustine, who, in the book On the Usefulness of Believing, cap. 3, said that Scripture - not universally, but the Old Testament alone - is taught and is to be learned in those four modes enumerated above; he therefore understood that in the New Testament the mystical sense is not to be found. I answer: the first argument there is not dealing with the senses of Scripture, as was proved above in c. 1, but is handing down diverse ways of treating Scripture. Then I say that Augustine so affirms that of the Old Testament that he does not deny it of the New; but he rather did it of the Old because this variety of senses is more frequent in it.

Caput V - How the mystical sense is useful for argument

- Now indeed, as regards our present undertaking, it is certain among all that the literal sense (*sensus literalis*) is so manifest that from it are drawn most efficacious arguments to prove the dogmas of faith, as Alphonsus de Castro rightly admonishes (book 1 Against the Heresies, c. 3). But as to the mystical sense (*sensus mysticus*), that it does not so serve, this seems to have been taught by St. Jerome, book 2 on Matthew, treating that of c. 13, about the leaven which a woman hid, etc., where, after he had applied it to the Trinity, he subjoins: "A

193. Tertullian, De resurrectione carnis, from chapter 26; Contra Iudaeos, c. 7 and following; Contra Marcionem, book 3, c. 5; St. Jerome, on Isaiah 7:14 ("Ecce Virgo concipiet").

194. On Theodore of Mopsuestia's condemnation by Pope Vigilius in the Roman synod: see the collection of papal letters copied by Antonius St. Augustine, Archbishop of Tarragona, from the Vatican Library; also Francis Turrianus, Apostolicarum constitutionum Clementis Romani, book 2, c. 5, who reports places which Theodore explained in this sense and did not wish to apply to the things of the New Testament.

pious indeed sense, but never can the understanding of a parable and of riddles promote the authority of dogmas." In which sense Dionysius also seems to have said somewhere, in the Epistle to Polycarp: "Mystical Theology does not argue." Nay rather, adds Alphonsus, many have erred, willing to prove their doctrine from the mystical sense: yet the examples which he adduces are of heretics who, by perversely interpreting the letter, were dragging it into their own opinion, and where there was an improper or metaphorical expression, they were using the Scripture without that. In this way Luther, from 1 Peter 2 - "But you are a chosen race, a royal priesthood" - collected that all Christians without distinction are priests to offer to God not only prayers and good works, which in a broader signification are called sacrifices, but also the very proper and true sacrifice of the altar, which belongs only to the priests consecrated in the Church of God.

- Yet since the mystical sense too is from the intention of the Holy Spirit, when it is known to us - as in places where either Christ the Lord or the Evangelical writer brings it to light - without doubt it can be of use to us as efficaciously as the literal; which Alphonsus himself also expressly noted, and seemed to deduce from the words of Augustine, Epistle 48, where he says: "Who would not most shamelessly strive to put something in allegory to be interpreted for himself, when these things are obvious through the manifest testimonies of the saints, whose light shines forth?" Augustine is speaking in that place not about the mystical sense, but about the literal signified through a metaphor - what he himself calls "allegory": about this, therefore, when it is obscure and does not stand by manifest proofs, he says that heretics most shamelessly interpret it for themselves, following only the bark of the letter; as is apparent in the very example which he adduces. For the Donatists, who inhabited the parts of Africa, were contending that the true Church was with them, in confirmation of which they cited that, Canticles: "Where you feed, where you lie down at noon," which partly spiritually - namely of the Church - , and partly even to the letter - understood of the meridional region - they most shamelessly alleged for themselves.[195]
- Nevertheless the sentence of Alphonsus de Castro remains true, when he asserts that the mystical sense is useless for theological arguments, unless from another sacred writer it is established; add: or unless the common sentence of the Fathers interprets the place in the same sense; for thus it will be of great weight, as the literal also is. But because, for the most part, about that it is not so established as about the literal in all places, therefore it is deemed useless for arguing, because it is uncertain for us.
- Still, to the sacred writer himself, a testimony of the more ancient Scripture, which he uses in the mystical sense, could serve in a twofold way. First, for illustrating the history, as is clear from what was said in disputation 14, c. 4: in which way he alleges that of Hosea 11: "Out of Egypt I called my son," and others there enumerated. Then such a testimony could serve, when either beforehand it was established in the mystical sense - as we said of that Exodus 12, "You shall not break a bone of it" - or when by an easy reason such a sense could

195. Augustine, Epistle 48; the Donatists' abuse of Canticles 1:6 - 7 ("ubi pascis, ubi cubes in meridie") is adduced as an example.

be gathered: just as from that Deuteronomy 25: "You shall not muzzle the ox that treads out the grain," Paul deduced that the ministers of the Church ought to be supported, as we noted in c. 2; and in this way the mystical sense was useful to the sacred writer for arguing against all the unbelievers of his age: just as even an accommodated sense could be of use, being well confirmed by natural reason, as was said in that disputation 14, c. 5.

Disputatio XVII - Whether under the same letter several literal senses are contained

- Under the same letter there are never several literal senses, taught Michael Medina, cap. 1.[196]
- Under the same letter there are several literal senses - so the common opinion holds, cap. 2.
- With a certain moderation the latter opinion is proved, cap. 3.
- The solution of the arguments of each opinion, cap. 4.

Caput I - Under the same letter there are never several literal senses, taught Michael Medina

- Since, among the other senses of Scripture, the literal (*sensus literalis*) is principal for arguing, it were best, in order that we might proceed with examination of what we can, that we should handle first what is nearest: for several things are contained under the same letter which pertain only to the literal senses, as we shall say below, which it is more fitting to our disputation to elicit in the present case than those which are more remote. Therefore

Luther, interpreting perversely and dragging the sense to his own purpose, where there was a proper or metaphorical expression, used Scripture. Thus from that 1 Peter 2, "You... a royal priesthood," he collects indiscriminately that all Christians are priests, to offer to God not only prayers and good works, which, in a broader signification, are called sacrifices, but even the proper and true sacrifice of the altar, which belongs only to priests consecrated in the Church of God.

But since the mystical sense also proceeds from the intention of the Holy Spirit, where this is known for us, as in places where either the Lord Christ or the evangelical writer himself elicited it, without doubt it can serve us just as effectively as the literal. This even Alphonsus expressly noted, and he seemed to deduce it from the words of St. Augustine in Epistle 48. For he says: "Who would not most shamelessly endeavor to interpret in his favor something set in allegory, unless he have most manifest testimonies, by the light of which the obscure things are made manifest?" Yet Augustine in that place does not speak of the mystical sense, but of the literal as expressed by a metaphor, or, as he himself calls it, by an allegory-signification. Therefore, when this is obscure and not established by manifest indications, he says, heretics most shamelessly interpret it for themselves, following only the letter, the rind; as in the example which he himself adduces, it appears with the Donatists. For the Donatists, who inhabited parts of Africa, contended that the

196. Michael Medina, as cited in the disputation's plan.

true Church was with them, and for its confirmation they adduced that of Canticles 1, "Where you pasture, where you couch at midday," which, partly spiritually - that is, of the Church - partly also to the letter, understood of the southern region, they most shamelessly alleged for themselves.

Nonetheless true is the aforesaid sentence of Alphonsus de Castro when he asserts that the mystical sense is useless for theological arguments unless it is established concerning it by another sacred writer. Add: or unless the common opinion of the Fathers interprets the place in that sense; for thus it is of great moment, just as the literal. Because, however, for the most part it is not established concerning that as it is about the literal, in all places, therefore it will be judged useless for arguing, because it is uncertain for us.

Moreover, to the sacred writer himself the testimony of the more ancient Scripture, which he uses in a mystical sense, could serve in two ways. First, for illustrating the history, as is evident from what was said in disputation 14, chapter 4, in what manner all are brought together indiscriminately: for that Hosea 11, "Out of Egypt I called my son," and other things enumerated there are adduced. Then, that such a testimony could serve to establish the mystical sense was already established before, as we said of that Exodus 12, "You shall not break a bone of it"; or when by an easy reasoning such a sense could be gathered; as from that of Deuteronomy 25, "You shall not muzzle the ox that is treading out the grain," Paul concludes that the ministers of the Church must be supported, as we noted in chapter 2. And in this way the mystical sense was useful for the sacred writer for arguing against the unbelievers of his age; just as also the accommodative sense could be useful, being confirmed by most excellent natural reasoning, as was said in that disputation 14, chapter 5.

Whether under the same letter multiple literal senses are contained

That under the same letter there are never multiple literal senses, as taught by Michael Medina

Michael Medina in book 6 De recta in Deum fide, chapter 25, expressly defends that in sacred Scripture the same letter never designates multiple literal senses.[197] In favor of the same sentence Adam is reported in the preface on Isaiah, where he says that when the discourse is of divine or heavenly things, there is only one sense of Scripture, and that the literal.[198] But, in my judgment, Adam wanted to teach something quite different, namely, that when Scripture speaks of divine or heavenly things, there is not contained under the same letter a twofold sense of which he had spoken before, that is, the literal and the mystical, but of these one in kind, and that the literal. For this author thinks that under the history of created and lower things a mystical sense lies hidden. Whether under the same letter the literal sense, which is distinguished from the mystical, is sometimes multiple, he does not concern himself. However, to say this in passing against him, he is

197. Michael Medina, De recta in Deum fide, lib. 6, cap. 25.
198. Adam (Adamus), Praefatio super Isaiam.

mistaken in this, that he denies that, with respect to divine and higher things, a lower thing is sometimes denoted mystically; as is clear from what was said in the preceding disputation, chapter 1.

Medina proves his sentence first, that the opposite seems to proceed from a certain empty fear: for many, so that they might defend the testimonies of the Old Testament alleged in the New as being recited in the literal sense, lest the confirmation of the history be weak, said that multiple literal senses are expressed by the same letter. Yet this is not necessary: for sometimes the evangelical writer adduces testimonies in a spiritual sense, which, as we showed in disputation 14, chapter 4, in no way detracts from the force of the history and its doctrine. Second, it can be established by induction that there is no Scripture testimony which under the same letter yields multiple literal senses. Vainly therefore would that be conceded in any genus. Third, the sacred writer proceeds far otherwise than a scribe: for the latter, perceiving by the ear only the sound of the words, draws it with the pen, not understanding the sense of the things themselves; but the sacred writer wished to express in Scripture the concepts of his mind, and what the Holy Spirit wished to designate: therefore that is the literal sense of his Scripture which he himself understood and which the Holy Spirit wished to designate; nor is it to be believed that the sacred writer by the same word signified various things, since that is contrary to the custom of correct writers: therefore the literal sense of his Scripture was unique. Fourth, if under the same letter many literal senses were contained, we would have nothing certain from Scripture, nor could the dogmas of faith be proved by any firm testimony.

Caput II - The common opinion: that multiple literal senses are equally under the same letter

The common opinion is set down which affirms that multiple literal senses are equally under the same letter. Thus taught St. Thomas in this article, question 4 De potentia, article 1, and in 2, distinction 12, article 2, ad 7; Burgensis in the Additiones on each of Lyra's Prologues; Alphonsus de Castro, book 1 Contra haereses, chapter 3; Driedo, book 2 De sacra Scriptura, chapter 2; Abulensis on Matthew 13, question 28; and Catherinus in the book De Clavibus sacrae Scripturae. [199] Lyra is reported into this sentence in the second Prologue of the Bible, as a rule for interpreting Scripture, which, in my judgment, he did not teach: for although he asserts that sometimes multiple literal senses are designated by the same letter, nevertheless he brings forward in example that 2 Kings 7 and 1 Paralipomenon 17, "I will be to him a father," which he says is to be understood to the letter of Solomon, but of Christ in a mystical sense in a certain respect, and literally simply. He calls it mystical in a certain respect, because Solomon was a figure and symbol of Christ; literal simply, because by the intention of the Holy Spirit Christ was figured in the person of Solomon. In

199. St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 4, a. 1; In II Sent., d. 12, a. 2, ad 7; Paul of Burgos (Burgensis), Additiones super utrumque Prologum Lyrani; Alphonsus de Castro, Contra haereses, lib. 1, cap. 3; Jan Driedo, De sacra Scriptura et ecclesia, lib. 2, cap. 2; Abulensis (Tostatus), In Matthaeum, cap. 13, q. 28; Ambrogio Catherino (Catharinus), De Clavibus sacrae Scripturae. St. Augustine, Confessiones, XII, cc. 30 - 31; St. Jerome, Ep. 103 ad Paulinum; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 21 in Genesim; St. Basil, De Spiritu Sancto, prooemium.

this way no Catholic denies that under the same letter multiple senses by the intention of the Holy Spirit sometimes lie hidden, yet so that one is signified by the words and is primary, but another by the things signified by the words and is secondary. But the authors alleged above say that there are multiple literal senses equally signified by the very words, and it is only concerning these that the controversy is proposed, as Alphonsus and Driedo expressly observed.

Nevertheless the aforesaid sentence was taken from St. Augustine, Confessions XII, chapters 30 and 31, where he hands it down in express words: indeed he judges that, when Moses was writing those words of Genesis 1, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," there came into his mind not only whatever of truth human talents were going to find for the explication of those things, but also many other things, which were never going to be devised, yet could be devised, in no way at odds with piety and truth: which he also admits in the same way concerning the other sacred writers, who wrote in the same Spirit.

There are also testimonies of other Fathers, by which some attempt to confirm this very point. The first is of St. Jerome, who in Epistle 103, near the end, to Paulinus, writes thus about the Apocalypse: "John has as many sacraments as he has words; I have said little for the merit of the volume, all praise is inferior; in the single words multiple intelligences lie hidden." This seems to be taken of literal senses; for as to other senses, Scripture of the Old Testament abounds in them more. The second testimony is of St. John Chrysostom, homily 21 on Genesis: but since he is speaking there of Scripture and of the manifold senses of it in general, not regarding the literal sense in particular, his testimony favors little: for it can be explained out of the variety of senses, as was said in disputations 15 and 16. The third testimony is of St. Basil, who in the proem of the work On the Holy Spirit admonishes that in sacred Scripture syllables, letters, points, nay even the very words and orations are to be weighed; but this testimony proves little: for, where even a single literal sense of Scripture exists, that must be done, whether for a better understanding of it, or for eliciting mystical senses; not in all places of Scripture, but in many and those more difficult.

Caput III - With a certain moderation the latter opinion is approved

Indeed this latter opinion, on account of Augustine's authority, recently obtained first place among the Scholastics, especially among the more learned interpreters of Scripture; therefore I will try to defend it, with a certain moderation, lest, while we are eager to commend the fecundity of Scripture, we attribute excessive license of interpreting to the mind of the Holy Spirit. In whose exposition two things must be observed by us. One is that it has not hitherto been defined by the Church that multiple literal senses can sometimes suit the same letter; and although the Fathers, not without fruit of spiritual doctrine for the edification of the Church, variously interpret some places and each one in his manner tries to investigate the mind of the Holy Spirit - indeed the Doctor explains the same place in various ways - yet none of the Fathers, except Augustine thus far, has affirmed that all those senses are under the same letter from the intention of the Holy Spirit. For Jerome, whom we reported for the second sentence, does not speak of the literal but of the mystical sense, which is called a sacrament or mystery; and therefore he said that in that book of

the Apocalypse there are as many sacraments as words; nor indeed is there need that the Old Testament abound more in these senses; or, if he speaks of the literal, yet of the prophetic one, which is rightly called a sacrament, or mystery.

There are also reasons not lacking for this sentence. First is: if God, who is the chief author of Scripture, is so fecund in intelligence that with the single word of his mind he at once expresses infinite things, why can he not by the same written word also signify several things? The second reason: God could designate several things by the same realities, which no one denies; for the same manna, as Paul bears witness in 1 Corinthians 10, represents the Eucharist; but with the author of Wisdom, chapter 16, it represents the Word and the Eloquium of God: why therefore can he not by the same words also denote several things? since words are no less suitable for God for signifying than things are. The third reason is taken from places of Scripture, first indeed from the more obscure ones, which God on that account made difficult, that we might interpret them in various ways. For which cause it is said in Daniel 12: "Shut up the words and seal the book until the appointed time; many shall pass through, and knowledge shall be manifold"; on which place St. Jerome says: "He commands that he fold up the words and seal the book, that many may read and may seek the truth of the history, and, on account of the greatness of the obscurity, may opine different things." Then from other places, under which we are compelled to assign multiple literal senses, which, being examined singly below, I pass over for now.

By way of exaggeration he said that under single words there lie multiple understandings, to commend the fecundity of the revelations of one and the same book; therefore, when no manifest and certain legitimate sense and true meaning of some place appears, which the Fathers variously expound, we ought to look upon their various interpretations, which have nothing contrary to sound doctrine, yet not assert with certainty that this rather than that is according to the mind of the Holy Spirit, although it will be permitted to embrace one of them as more probable than another.

This Augustine plainly taught in On Christian Doctrine, book 2, chapter 27, in these words: When from the words of the same Scripture not some one thing, but two or even more, are understood, even if it is hidden what he who wrote it understood, there is no danger if each of them can be brought into agreement with the truth, as can be taught from other places of the sacred Scriptures: as if he were saying that this alone is permitted, when the mind of the writer is not certainly and determinately known.[200] Therefore, that some place is variously expounded by the Fathers must not for that reason be judged to contain various senses by the intention of the Holy Spirit, but only that various senses are probably assigned by the Fathers; on which account Jerome, just cited a little above, rightly said that the more difficult places in Scripture were left so that, on account of the greatness of the obscurity, the studious might opine different things; he did not say, so that they might assert with certainty various senses, but that they might opine different things. This difficulty of Scripture and this study excites to learning, and renders Scripture itself very commendable; from which it appears that what was alleged in the third reason for the second

200. St. Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, 2.27.

opinion has no weight; for no one denies that the same place can be fruitfully illustrated by various senses, but those who follow the first opinion only contend that but one literal sense is contained under the same letter by the intention of the Holy Spirit. Wherefore the second opinion can only efficaciously be proved, if the same testimony is referred to different things signified historically in Scripture, or if by a definition of the Church, or by the common sentiment of the Fathers, a twofold literal sense is said to be under the same letter.

Next it must be observed that there is no literal sense which not only the principal author of Scripture, who is God, but also the writer did not understand; not so, however, with the symbolic and the mystical. For Augustine seems to have been excessive in Confessions, book 12, chapters 30 and 31 (which, saving the reverence due so great a Doctor, I would say), when he concedes that all and each true thing that anyone can understand under one letter pertains to the literal sense. For it appears difficult to believe that God would have wished the sacred history, which He willed to be written for man, to be so much and so variously veiled, and that, so that he might signify these things at once, He would have impelled the writer to write.

Wherefore I for my part think that under the same letter several literal senses are sometimes contained, whenever it is probable that the sacred writer understood them all, and they fit the context of Scripture and cohere rightly with it. Such, therefore, must be the agreement of the things with one another and with the very words, that one and the other signification not be dissonant to the same letter and context. In this way I would judge that in that place of Isaiah 53, "His generation who shall declare?" two literal senses are contained - of eternal generation and of temporal; for each is so admirable and, to that extent, seems to fall under one and the same consideration, that the Prophet, in wonder, rightly said, "His generation who shall declare?" Both senses, moreover, fit the context very well, as we shall see in the following disputation, where we shall examine many other places of Scripture under which several literal senses seem to be contained; and with this moderation applied, I judge the later opinion to be truer.

But with the mystical there is not the same ratio, since things themselves, not words, are proximately signified. Wherefore the Holy Spirit could have understood some mystical sense which the sacred writer by no means attained. For the writer, who not only took down what was dictated, but also wished to express the conception of his own mind, did enough by using the words themselves for signifying, even if the things to the same effect did not concur; for it belonged to the supreme Author, who moved the writer, to mark out also by the very things narrated in the history something further for posterity. Wherefore it was necessary that both senses, namely, the literal and the mystical, be under the same letter by the intention of the Holy Spirit, even if the writer knew only the literal.

It is proved: for the sacred writer was not like a mere amanuensis, who would only take down dictation, not understanding the sense of the words, but he also wished to write down the conceptions of his own mind; and, in that way, he sometimes used the past tense, or even the future, to signify what would happen to posterity, or to furnish salutary lessons. But if the Holy Spirit had wished to express by the words something else than what the writer understood, either

in whole or in part, the writer would have been an amanuensis and a kind of irrational instrument of the divine Word, which is absurd; and this I judge must be conceded to the first opinion, which it assumed in its third reason.

Nor, indeed, did St. Thomas teach the opposite in 2-2, question 173, article 4, and Cajetan in the same place; for in that place they only dispute about the Prophets, whether they always knew that which they prophesied; and they very well teach that the Prophets sometimes did not know all the things which in their visions, deeds, or words the Holy Spirit intended; and that is because the mind of the Prophet is an instrument of the efficient cause.[201] From which doctrine nothing can be gathered against what we have said up to now; for this is true precisely because the Prophets did not know all things distinctly and in detail; from this, however, it does not follow that there is some literal sense besides the intention of the Prophet himself writing; for those things were noted by them confusedly and in general. The other things, however, which the blessed Thomas teaches there, are not to be understood about the sacred writer, but about those who, with their own word, prophesied some things, while in reality they understood one thing, but the canon (of Scripture) contained something far different; as was the case with Caiaphas, John 11: "It is expedient for you that one man should die for the people, and not that the whole nation perish."[202] I admit indeed that St. Thomas in that article therefore said that there can be several literal senses under the same letter, which he says must be from the intention of the author, because the author of Scripture is God; he did not say, because the writer could at the same time understand and intend them; he does not, however, deny that.

But because, the earlier opinion having been left, the later one has been embraced with a certain moderation, we must satisfy the reasons on both sides which seem to fight against us.

Reply to the first argument of Medina: I reply that not so much on account of that fear which this author suspects, as on account of the authority of Augustine the later opinion obtained credit among many and the chief interpreters; nor is it necessary that those things which in the New Testament are alleged - even if that expression is added, "that it might be fulfilled" - be cited in the literal sense; it is enough that they sometimes be understood in the mystical sense, as was said above in disputation 14.[203]

To the second reason I say that there are not as many places in Scripture as some commonly think, which contain more literal senses, as we shall see in the following disputation; there are, however, some, one of which we have already cited in the preceding chapter.

The third reason very well proves what was said above in the second notation, namely, that several literal senses are thus to be conceded under the same letter, that nevertheless they not be too diverse and little coherent; for this would seem rather a fault of the writer than a fecundity of doctrine. But the variety of senses in the mode stated above takes nothing of strength away from

201. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 173, a. 4; Thomas de Vio (Cajetan), ad loc.

202. John 11:50.

203. Refers to the author's own treatment above, Disputatio 14. Other loci cited in the chapter: Daniel 12:4; Isaiah 53:8; 1 Corinthians 10:1 - 4; Wisdom 16. Michael Medina, De recta in Deum fide, lib. 6, cap. 25.

Scripture for proving the dogmas of our faith. Yet it is very much to be noted that the places of Scripture on which the mysteries of our religion chiefly depend have nothing of obscurity from a multiple sense under the same letter, although some are difficult on account of various readings.

The solutions to the reasons for the second opinion can also easily be given, and the testimonies of the Fathers were explained above in chapter 3. To the first reason, I say that, although God is fecund in intelligence so as to be able to express many, and most diverse, things with one word, nevertheless He did not wish to do that, because Scripture was used only so that He might speak with us and signify deeds or mysteries to men. But signification ought to be weighed not from the fecundity of the speaker, but from the capacity of the hearers; otherwise, He who would not accommodate Himself to the hearers would be worthy of blame; and although, for the reasons said above, God has left many places obscure in Scripture, nevertheless He ought not, beyond the accustomed manner, to express under the same Scripture senses so diverse and so little coherent.

To the second reason I reply that the case is not the same for things and for words; for words of common usage and community among men are received according to vulgar and common signification, by which discourse is composed in the manner of ordinary speech; and the context of those things which are narrated is most aptly adapted to the way in which they are commonly wont to be told, while it is not of the same speech to signify things so various and little coherent. But things themselves, as each one wishes, can be able to denote another thing on account of other reasons; then, indeed, the signification ought to be evident to the hearers by itself; but the other signification, when it is recondite and understood as mystical, is called a spiritual sense. Hence it is said that things themselves especially diverse, and little coherent, denote other things, not so words, which ought to signify.

But to the former part of the third reason about the more obscure places, which in various ways are interpreted in chapter 3, section 5, I say this: after that there will be a place where we shall discuss in what places we recognize several senses to concur; we will speak of this in the following disputation.

Notandum - What it is for there to be several literal senses under one letter: I judge that under the same letter several literal senses are sometimes contained, whenever it is probable that the sacred writer understood them all, and they fit the context and the words such that one and the other signification is not dissonant to the same letter and context. - The mystical sense is not necessarily known to the sacred writer: the Holy Spirit could have intended a mystical sense which the writer did not attain; it suffices that the literal sense be known to him.

Disputatio XVIII - Various passages are to be examined

Various passages are examined.

- Some notes. Caput I.
- The place of Psalm 2: "The Lord said to me." Caput II.
- The place of Genesis 1: "In the beginning God created." Caput III.

- The place of Daniel 9: "And in the temple shall be the abomination." Caput IV.
- The place of Isaiah 53: "Our infirmities," etc. Caput V.
- The place of Isaiah 53: "His generation, who shall declare it?" Caput VI.

Caput I - Some notes

In addition, God used the sacred writer as an instrument endowed with reason and understanding, who signified in writing, after the manner of men, the things which he understood in his mind. Wherefore he ought not to express by the same Scripture such various and least congruent things as the second opinion contends.

To the second reason I answer that the rationale of things is not the same as that of a word with respect to signifying; for words are taken according to the popular and common signification among all, from which also a discourse ought to be composed in such a way that it best fits the context of the things narrated. But it is not customary that so various and least coherent things be signified by one and the same discourse; whereas things do not signify among all according to a usage commonly received, but, as each one will, he can by things denote this or that. Then too the signification by words ought to be manifest to the hearers; the other signification is hidden, and therefore is called the mystical and spiritual sense. From the fact, therefore, that by things many, and those most diverse and least coherent, are denoted, it does not follow that they must also be signified by words.

As to the first part of the third reason, concerning the more obscure places which various Fathers interpret, enough has been said in chapter 3; but as to the latter, concerning places in which we are compelled to concede more senses, we shall speak in the following disputation.

First it must be premised that some bring forward those places which, on account of a variant reading, also contain diverse literal senses: thus indeed many senses are not assigned to one and the same letter, but the same Hebrew text, translated in a different way, signifies various things. Now, however, we inquire about various literal senses under the one and the same letter and reading. The variety of a translation is wont to arise for many causes; and whatever reason has been introduced, even if it be found in the Vulgate edition itself, about it a sense-controversy is not to be understood.

Now there are four principal causes whence the variety of a reading takes its origin, of which the first two pertain to Hebrew codices, the other two to Latin or Greek. The first is the change and variety of the points or vowels: for since the Hebrew scribe, after his native manner, wrote the individual words with the consonants alone, under which the points or vowels were understood from usage, it came to pass that the Seventy Interpreters understood other vowels, and translated otherwise than Jerome and other Hebrews; and this variety is in fact found even in the Vulgate itself. For in Genesis 47 Jerome reads thus: "And Israel, when he swore, adored, turning to the head of the bed"; but Paul, to the Hebrews 11, following the version of the Seventy, renders it thus: "And he adored the top of his staff." And both readings are found in the Vulgate. In this way it is not surprising that under the same place several senses lie hidden. Whether, however, the Holy

Spirit so moved the Hebrew scribe that, writing out the words with those consonants, he willed diverse points to be understood under them, and used the same consonants to express diverse words, is not of this place. We shall speak of this matter later, where we treat of the authority of the Vulgate edition as regards all its parts and individual words.[204]

The second cause of a various reading is the ambiguity of a Hebrew word, whence various versions of the same place have proceeded. But if each version is not in the Vulgate edition itself, it does not pertain to the present question; for anyone can easily say that the Hebrew writer willed to signify only that thing which the Vulgate edition expressed in Latin, from which alone we argue for confirming the dogmas of our faith, because it alone has been proposed as the rule of faith; whereas the others, especially the Seventy, although not to be despised, have not been so approved by the Church as regards all their parts. But if this second kind of diverse reading is found in the Vulgate itself, as was the first, the same is to be said of it as of that.

The third cause of a various reading is the variety of Latin codices, which has arisen either by the error of scribes or in some other way. The fourth cause is the variety of points whereby periods and clauses are distinguished. Wherever, therefore, there shall be such variety of readings, or any other whatever, there cannot but be a variety of literal sense. Now, however, the question must be treated of the variety of this sense under the one and the same reading altogether.

Next it must be observed that there are not diverse senses of the same place, nor diverse readings, whenever they are referred to signify wholly the same thing, even if the things themselves seem various and diverse. Thus it happens in that verse of Psalm 2, "Apprehendite disciplinam," which we have thus from the translation of the Seventy; but others, with no change made in the points, render the Hebrew text literally thus: "Kiss purity"; others: "Kiss purely"; others: "Kiss the Son." Yet the sense comes to the same: for that verse exhorts that all receive with reverence the true Messiah and his law or discipline; and because a kiss is a sign of subjection and reverence, the same is to kiss the Son, that is, to receive himself and his doctrine purely and with reverence.

Now, therefore, with regard to the present question, it remains that we examine some places which under the one and the same letter or reading seem to contain various senses. Of the more recent theologians, who embrace the second opinion set forth in the preceding disputation, almost all admit that there are few such places; those, however, which are wont to be adduced, we shall here subjoin.[205]

204. The author promises to treat this question later: "we shall speak of this matter, 2.2, q. 1, art. ..., where we shall treat of the authority of the Vulgate edition as regards all its parts and individual words."

205. Above, Disputatio 14, on places such as Hosea 11:1 ("Out of Egypt I called my son").

Caput II - The place of Psalm 2: "The Lord said to me"

Setting aside certain Scripture places brought forward, such as that of Hosea 11: "Out of Egypt I called my son," etc., in which we have shown that there are not two literal senses, but one literal and another mystical or accommodated, the first place to be examined by us is Psalm 2: "The Lord said to me: Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee," in which a twofold literal sense has seemed to some to be signified.

First, the eternal generation of Christ is signified, because to prove this Paul recites it to the Hebrews 1, in this manner: "For to which of the angels did God ever say, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee?" Thus do Rufinus and Augustine interpret Paul, as also on the Psalm itself Augustine in the Enchiridion c.49 and in the book or oration on the five heresies c.4, after the middle; Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Oecumenius on chapter 1 of the Epistle to the Hebrews; Tertullian, Against Praxeas c.7 and 11; and Athanasius seems to have understood it in the same way, in the oration against the Arians which is after the four sermons, and in the epistle of the decree against Arius in the Nicene synod.[206] And the word of the past tense "I have begotten," and the adverb of the present "today," beautifully describe the eternal generation: for it has something of the past, namely perfection and consummation; but of the present, perseverance without succession, whereby it embraces all times together. For, as Augustine most aptly noted, "This day neither begins yesterday, nor ends at the beginning of tomorrow; it is always today." Moreover, Paul marks the difference between the Son and the angels, that the Son is called begotten from the Father's substance, whereas the angels are not begotten, but made, according to that Psalm 103: "Who maketh his angels spirits."

Furthermore, in the same place the generation of Christ according to the flesh seems to be signified, which the particle "Today" indicates. Thus understand Gregory of Nyssa in homily 2 on Ecclesiastes, Oecumenius, and Theodoret on Hebrews 1, although Oecumenius asserts both expositions.[207]

Likewise Cyprian, book 2 Against the Jews, testimony 8, and Augustine in the book Questions on the Old and New Testament q.14; namely, because Augustine refers these words to a temporal generation, which he thinks to have been made in baptism, when that voice was heard: "This is my beloved Son," etc.[208] Finally, by the same testimony the resurrection of Christ seems to be signified: for Paul in Acts 13 says thus: "And we announce to you the promise which was made to our fathers: that God has fulfilled this to their children, raising up Jesus, as it is written in Psalm 2: Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee." In which sense Hilary interprets the same place, and

206. Rufinus; St. Augustine on the Psalm; St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 49; the book or oration De quinque haeresibus, c. 4; St. John Chrysostom; Theophylact; Oecumenius on Hebrews 1; Tertullian, Adversus Praxean, cc. 7, 11; St. Athanasius, Oration against the Arians (after the fourth sermon), and the epistle of the decree against Arius in the Nicene synod.

207. St. Gregory of Nyssa, Homily 2 on Ecclesiastes; Oecumenius; Theodoret on Hebrews 1.

208. St. Cyprian, Adversus Iudaeos, lib. 2, Testimonium 8; St. Augustine, Quaestiones in Vetere et Novo Testamento, q. 14.

Chrysostom on that Psalm; whom Ambrose seems to follow, book 3 On the Sacraments c.1.[209] Wherefore, not only from the Fathers, but also from Paul, who used the aforesaid testimony in a twofold way, it seems necessary to gather a double literal sense of that place.

I answer, however, first, that there is none of the Fathers who plainly admits two literal senses of that place; but some of them interpret it in one way, others in another: from which it is not permitted to conclude that there are more literal senses of it. For, as we noted in the preceding disputation, it is far different that the same place be variously explained by the Fathers, and that there be two literal senses of it. Moreover, not only does none of the Fathers say that there are two literal senses of that place, but even expressly Nyssen and Theodoret affirm that it must be understood only of the temporal, not of the eternal, generation. Add that Bede, Lyranus, Dionysius, and Cajetan, on Acts 13, assert that the testimony of that Psalm is cited by Paul not to prove the resurrection, but the divinity of Christ. From whose opinion - although their exposition is not approved by me, as I shall show below - it follows that there are not more literal senses of that place. Why then do certain more recent writers think it indubitable that more literal senses are contained in that place?

Wherefore I judge that there is only a single one, which, in my opinion, Paul in Acts 13 clearly expressed, namely the resurrection of Christ according to his humanity; of whose resurrection's day he understood that, "This day have I begotten thee"; that is, as Hilary expounds, "I have raised thee," which agrees with Ambrose in these words: "When thou didst redeem the people, when thou didst call to the kingdom of heaven, when thou didst fulfill my will, thou didst prove thyself to be my Son." Therefore that "Today" signifies the day on which, the cause of human redemption being accomplished, Christ declared himself to be begotten of the Father. Thus, however, not the eternal generation itself, but its manifestation in the glorious resurrection, is described in that Psalm; just as in Romans 1 it is said: "Who was predestined the Son of God in power by the resurrection of the dead," that is, declared on the day of the resurrection. That Paul willed by that testimony in Acts 13 to prove this, the context itself shows: for when he says, "As it is written," the particle "as" is referred to what preceded; either then to the promise made, or to the fulfillment of the promise: but to neither can it fit; it remains, therefore, that it be referred to that, "Raising up Jesus," etc.

But to the eternal generation or divinity of Christ, I do not see in what way it can be referred, as Bede and others wished. Both because thus there would be no connection of the text, and also because in that passage there is no mention of the divinity or the eternal generation. The circumstances of the Psalm clearly indicate that that part is to be understood of Christ's humanity: for what is said, that he is constituted king by him upon his holy mount Sion, is understood of Christ according to his humanity; as also that: "Ask of me, and I will give thee the nations," etc.; which was fulfilled in the very time of the resurrection, in which Christ, Matthew 28, said: "All power is given to me in heaven and on earth; go therefore, teach all nations," namely those which God had given to him for an inheritance and possession. The resurrection, too, in Scripture is called generation, Matthew 19: "In the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit"; and to the

209. St. Hilary and St. John Chrysostom on Psalm 2; St. Ambrose, De sacramentis, lib. 3, c. 1.

Colossians 1 Christ is called "the firstborn of the dead." Whether, however, that Psalm in the literal sense is to be understood of Christ, or only mystically under the figure of David, is not to be disputed in this place: therefore it is not permitted to understand the mind of those Fathers who think that by this testimony a temporal generation of Christ is signified, as referring to that which was made in the Virgin's womb; but rather, as I have explained, to the resurrection.

Moreover, that this same place of the Psalm is also cited to the Hebrews 1 to prove something else, is not to be denied; yet from this it is not permitted to infer that there are two literal senses of it as regards the same part; for neither...

Therefore that word, "Today," signifies the day on which, the cause of human redemption having been accomplished, Christ declared himself to be begotten of the Father. And this is not the eternal generation itself, but its manifestation in the glorious resurrection, as is described in the Psalm; just as it is said in Rom. 1: "who was predestined the Son of God in power by the resurrection from the dead," that is, declared on the day of the resurrection. That Paul wished to prove this in Acts 13 by the same testimony the very context shows: for when he says, "As it is written," the particle "As" ("Sicut") is referred to what preceded; either, then, to the promise that had been made, or to the fulfillment of the promise. But it can fit neither; therefore it remains that it be referred to this: "Raising up Jesus," etc.

But I do not see how it can be referred to the eternal generation or to the divinity of Christ, as Bede and others wished. Both because thus there would be no coherence of the text, and also because in that passage there is no mention made of the divinity or of the eternal generation. Moreover, the circumstances of the Psalm plainly indicate that that part is to be understood of the humanity of Christ: for that which is said, "I have been established king by him upon Sion, his holy mountain," is understood of Christ so far as his humanity is signified; and likewise that, "Ask of me, and I will give thee the nations," etc., which was impressed at the very time of the resurrection, when Christ said in Matt. ult.: "All power is given to me in heaven and on earth; go therefore, teach all nations," namely those which God had given him for inheritance and possession. Resurrection too in Scripture is called generation: Matt. 19, "In the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit," and in Col. 1 Christ is called "the firstborn of the dead." Whether indeed that Psalm in its literal sense is to be understood of Christ, or only mystically under the figure of David, is not to be disputed in this place; thus, therefore, I would understand the opinion of those Fathers who think that by this testimony a temporal generation of Christ is signified, such that it is referred not to that which took place in the Virgin's womb, but to the resurrection in the manner explained.

However, that this same place of the Psalm is cited in Heb. 1 to prove something else - about generation - must not be denied; from this nevertheless it cannot be gathered that there are two literal senses of that passage with respect to the same part. For it is not referred there to the confirmation of Christ's eternal generation, as the adversaries contend, but only to the manifestation of his eternal sonship. For this purpose the former clause is brought in, "Thou art my Son"; but the other, "Today I have begotten thee," is cited not to prove anything, but as a part of the same verse. For Paul there is not disputing about the eternal generation of Christ, but about his divinity, showing that he is so much more excellent than the angels, as he has inherited a more

excellent name, namely that of Son, which no angel ever obtained. Therefore he said: "For to which of the angels did God say, 'Thou art my Son'?" That is, whom did he ever call his Son? Although therefore Paul does not wish by that testimony to prove the same thing in both places, nevertheless it does not follow that, with respect to the same part, it has a double sense: for in Hebrews 1 Paul presses the particle "Son," but in Acts 13 the particle "I have begotten thee."

On scriptural testimonies alleged for multiple literal senses

Caput III - Locus Genesis 1: "In principio creavit Deus"

The second testimony is Gen. 1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Passing over that variety of senses enumerated by St. Augustine in Confessions, book 12, ch. 20, which he thought to be signified in the same book, chs. 30, 31, both from the intention of the Holy Spirit and even of the very writer (for this is rather difficult), more recent authors still contend, by another more efficacious reason, to show several senses of that place; not because other Fathers interpret that place variously (for this is not enough, as we noted in the preceding disputation), but because from this place two Catholic truths have been defined by the Church. One, that the world began at the beginning of time; the other, that all things, spiritual and corporeal, were created together at the same moment of time. Therefore that, "In the beginning," will signify two things: one, "In the beginning of time"; the other, "before God made anything else." They say that both truths are defined from the same place of Genesis in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, and it is reported in the chapter Firmiter, De summa Trinitate et fide Catholica.[210]

Yet I think that by the aforesaid reasoning it is not rightly proved that there are two literal senses of that place. First, because those two truths are not both defined in the Lateran Council, as the adversaries contend, which will be shown more fully below in disputation 22, ch. 4. Next, because the Council does not adduce that testimony in confirmation of both truths, but of only one.

Caput IV - Locus Danielis 9: "Et erit in templo abominatio"

A third text is wont to be brought forward, Dan. 9: "And in the temple there shall be the abomination of desolation; and even to consummation, and to the end, desolation shall continue." We certainly cannot deny that Christ foretold this would be future, either in the devastation of Jerusalem (Matt. 24), or, as some prefer, in the coming of Antichrist. Also in 1 Macc. 1, under King Antiochus Epiphanes, who set up an idol to be adored in the temple, Scripture shows the outcome of this prophecy. Therefore there is a double prophetic sense of that place expressed in Scripture itself.

But there is no Father who said that in that place those two abominations of desolation were foretold by the prophet Daniel, both the one of which mention is made in the books of the Maccabees and the one which Christ announced would be future. Although interpreters variously understand what would be future after Christ, yet that does not force us to understand several

210. Fourth Lateran Council (1215), cap. Firmiter, De summa Trinitate et fide Catholica.

senses under that place, as was noted above. Moreover, in 1 Macc. 1 the prophecy of Daniel is not reported as if it were then fulfilled, indeed there is no mention of it; rather, the nefarious crime of Antiochus is described, who set up an idol to be adored in the temple and profaned all sacred things. And the author of that book calls the idol "the abomination of desolation," using Daniel's words only by accommodation, which very well suited that abominable idol at the time of that desolation of the sanctuary; just as in the same chapter he applies the words of Tob. 2 and Amos 8 to the feast days of the Jews under that same King Antiochus, saying: "Her feast days were turned into mourning, and her sabbaths into reproach." He does not say the prophecy was then fulfilled, but he narrates the mourning of the same kind, described in the same words. About the accommodation of these places we spoke in disputation 14, ch. 1.[211]

Caput V - Locus Isaiae 53: "Vere languores nostros ipse tulit, et dolores nostros ipse portavit"

A fourth place is Isa. 53: "Truly he himself bore our sicknesses, and our pains he carried," which Peter seems to have understood of our sins in 1 Pet. 2, when he says of Christ: "Who himself bore our sins on the tree," that is, he paid the penalties of them on the wood of the cross. Which sense the very context of Isaiah confirms. But Matthew, ch. 8, narrating bodily sicknesses cured by Christ, cites this testimony, and says: "That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Isaiah the prophet, saying: He himself took our infirmities and bore our sicknesses." We have, therefore, two senses of that place expressed in the New Testament.

That Matthew did not cite this testimony only by verbal allusion and accommodation is clear from what was said in disputation 14, chs. 3 and 4; for the Evangelist said, "That it might be fulfilled," which way of speaking cannot agree with mere accommodation of words, as was shown there. Therefore it is necessary that, at least in a mystical sense, that testimony be alleged; but it does not appear, from the two aforesaid senses, which of them is mystical. Therefore each will be literal. However, it is clear that neither of them is mystical: for either the cure of bodily diseases is signified literally, and the cure of sins, which are spiritual sicknesses, mystically, as Anselm teaches on that place of Matthew; but this cannot be. For Isaiah seems to have spoken of spiritual sicknesses and sins, as hold St. Athanasius in Oration 4 against the Arians somewhat before the middle, Elias Cretensis in the first apologetic oration on St. Gregory Nazianzen explaining those words, "He fights against all," St. John Chrysostom, hom. 28, Theophylact on Matt., and Euthymius on Matt. 8, Nicetas in or. 39 on St. Gregory Nazianzen - which is "On the Holy Lights" - explaining the words, "He indeed became man," and St. Cyril, book 5 on Isaiah; the sense of the words and the context of Isaiah plainly show the same.[212] For he did not say, "Truly he removed our sicknesses," but "he bore them." That is, he took them upon himself by bearing them; and Peter said, "He bore on his body." Next he says: "And our pains he himself carried," that is, he willed to

211. Above, Disputatio 14, ch. 1, on accommodation.

212. St. Athanasius, Oration 4 against the Arians; Elias Cretensis, Oration 1, the Apologetic on St. Gregory Nazianzen; St. John Chrysostom, Homily 28; Theophylact on Matthew; Euthymius on Matthew 8; Nicetas, Oration 39 on St. Gregory Nazianzen ("On the Holy Lights"); St. Cyril, book 5 on Isaiah.

undergo for us the punishments due to our sins, which the Seventy plainly explained thus: "He bears our sins and for us suffers pain." Therefore Isaiah immediately subjoins: "And we thought him as it were a leper, and struck by God." He is speaking, then, of Christ's passion, who, bearing for us the punishments we had deserved, was thought by men a leper, and struck by God for his sins. Therefore "to bear sicknesses" and "to carry pains" with Isaiah is not to remove illnesses and heal infirmities, but to take upon himself our sins to be paid for by the due punishment. Therefore the literal sense ought to be about spiritual sicknesses.

But neither, conversely, can it be said that bodily diseases are mystically signified, and that in that sense the testimony is cited by the Evangelist to confirm Christ's miracle in the cure of diseases. For the healing of sinners ought not to be a figure of the cure of bodily sicknesses, but rather the contrary. Since, then, Matthew says that the above was fulfilled by Isaiah in the cure of bodily diseases, neither can it be understood in a mystical sense, as has been proved; nor is the testimony adduced by mere accommodation, as we were saying above; therefore we are plainly forced to admit a double literal sense of that place.

I, however, think it is not necessary to admit two literal senses of that place, even if by that testimony, understood literally, a double healing can be proved, namely of bodily and of spiritual sicknesses. This first I am brought to believe because none of the Fathers cited, who saw the difficulty proposed, said that there are two literal senses of that place. Secondly, because the letter of Isaiah itself does not exhibit both senses as diverse: for in order that by that testimony the healing of bodily sicknesses be expressly signified, the Prophet ought not to have said, "He himself bore our sicknesses," but, "he removed them"; and, "our pains he himself alleviated." But Christ took upon himself nothing of our bodily sicknesses; for he removed leprosy, but he himself for us was not a leper; he removed fever, but he never for us had a fever. He is said, however, to have borne our sins in himself, because he, who deserved that we pay the penalties, himself paid them, as has been explained; by which reason also he was thought a leper and struck by God. Therefore the words of Isaiah - if we attend to the express force of the words - do not literally signify the cure of bodily sicknesses.

Thirdly, because Anselm, seeing the difficulty proposed, said that the testimony of Isaiah is referred to bodily sicknesses only mystically; whose opinion, although in this I do not approve, is nevertheless true in this, that he does not concede a double and diverse literal sense.

To the difficulty, therefore, proposed I reply, that the testimony of Isaiah is to be understood literally of the satisfaction for sins, which the reasons set forth above sufficiently convince. From the testimony indeed of Blessed Peter this sense cannot be confirmed so openly, since he does not report the prophecy of Isaiah, but only seems to allude to his words; although I do not doubt that Peter, by appropriating the words, wished to explain the true sense of this prophecy. But that Matthew cites this testimony to prove the cure of bodily diseases is of no consequence. For St. Chrysostom, Euthymius, and Theophylact, in the places cited, answer that, even if Isaiah said that of sins, nevertheless it is alleged by the Evangelist for the cure of bodily diseases, because very often they arise from sins. Yet they do not sufficiently explain by what reason Matthew applied the testimony to this end. Euthymius and Theophylact, in the places cited, although they had said that

Isaiah spoke those words of sins, nevertheless say that the Evangelist alleged it for the cure of bodily sicknesses, because often they arise from sins. This is not enough explanation, since Matthew so applied it that he said not merely, "He bore sicknesses or sins," etc., but "he bore them" or "carried them." St. Chrysostom alone seems to answer rightly, namely that the Evangelist historically accepted the testimony of the Prophet and transferred it from the Prophet to the Evangelist: which, if it be understood in this way, that the literal sense the Prophet intended remains, it does not stand against us, as above we have said.

Better, therefore, Rupertus says, and Ticelinus, and other recent authors, that the testimony of Isaiah was referred by the Evangelist to the cure of bodies, not because the words of Isaiah expressly signify this cure, but because, as Rupertus says, He undertook a work which was to operate more gravely upon souls, so that the same might first visibly cure bodies, and then his remedies might come to the souls, and to the care of the sicknesses of souls. Wherefore, as Ticelinus reminds, the testimony of Isaiah is to be understood of bodily sicknesses less principally. For the cure of these was a sign and confirmation of the interior healing. Therefore, when Isaiah says, "Truly he himself bore our sicknesses," by the best reason is to be understood the healing of spiritual sicknesses, such as Christ was operating; that by the very cure of bodily sicknesses it might be signified and confirmed. Yet by those words he expressly denotes only the healing of spiritual sicknesses, but indicates only the cure of bodily ones. Therefore we must interpret the word "bore" otherwise than it was explained above, for that which is "to carry." For it does not refer to bodily and spiritual sicknesses at once, but only to spiritual. For the cure of bodily sicknesses Isaiah did not express by these words, but insinuated it.

Caput VI - Locus Isaiae: "Generationem eius quis enarrabit?"

The last place is Isa. 53: "His generation who shall declare?" which many understand of the eternal generation of Christ: Pope St. Clement in Epist. 1; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, book 11, ch. 2; St. Cyril, On the Trinity, book 5; St. Basil, Against Eunomius; Justin in the Dialogue with Trypho; St. John Chrysostom, Homily on the Incomprehensible Nature of God; and Homily 21 on Matthew; St. Augustine, De symbolo ad Catechumenos, book 1, ch. 3, and book 2, ch. 67. Of the temporal generation it is interpreted by Iustinus, Quaest. 4 on the Gospels; Tertullian, Against the Jews, ch. 13; St. John Chrysostom, Homily on the birthday of John the Baptist.[213]

Dicitur, moreover, that he bore our sins in himself, because he himself fully paid the penalties which we deserved, as has been explained; and for this reason, too, he was thought to be a leper and stricken by God. Therefore the words of Isaiah, if we attend to their express force, do not literally signify the healing of bodily diseases. Third, because Anselm, seeing the difficulty

213. St. Clement I, Epistle 1; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, book 11, ch. 2; St. Cyril, On the Trinity, book 5; St. Basil, Against Eunomius; Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho; St. John Chrysostom, Homily on the Incomprehensible Nature of God; Homily 21 on Matthew; St. Augustine, De symbolo ad Catechumenos, book 1, ch. 3; book 2, ch. 67; Iustinus, Quaestiones on the Gospels, q. 4; Tertullian, Adversus Iudaeos, ch. 13; St. John Chrysostom, Homily on the Nativity of John the Baptist.

proposed, said that the testimony of Isaiah is referred to bodily ailments only mystically; whose opinion, although in this I am not persuaded, is nevertheless true in that he does not concede two different literal senses.

To the difficulty proposed I answer, therefore, that the testimony of Isaiah is to be understood literally of the healing of sins, and that the healing of bodily diseases was both to signify and to confirm that healing, as the reasons set forth above sufficiently prove. From the testimony indeed of blessed Peter this sense cannot be so openly confirmed, since he does not report Isaiah's prophecy, but only seems to allude to his words; although I do not doubt that Peter wished to explain, with the Prophet's words adopted, the true sense of this prophecy. But that Matthew recites this testimony to prove the healing of bodily diseases is no impediment. For Chrysostom, Euthymius, and Theophylact reply in those places that, although Isaiah was speaking of sins, nevertheless it could be alleged by the Evangelist for the healing of bodily diseases, because very many of them arise from sins. Yet they do not sufficiently explain by what reason Matthew applied the testimony to this end. Euthymius says that nothing hinders calling bodily diseases that arise from sin "sins" as well. But in this way I do not see how the testimony of Isaiah could serve Matthew's purpose, since of those diseases Isaiah does not say, "He himself bore our infirmities," that is, he endured or carried them.

Chrysostom answers in one word, namely, that the testimony of the Prophet was taken historically by the Evangelist. But if he understands it in that way because the literal sense is also called historical, it does not agree with the things said above.

Better therefore do Rupert, Titelman, and other more recent writers say that Isaiah's testimony is understood of the healing of sins; nevertheless, that it is referred by the Evangelist to the healing of bodies, not because the words of Isaiah expressly signify this healing, but because, as Rupert says, Christ, whose work is to heal the ailments of the soul, undertook to operate upon the sicknesses of bodies, so that, by first curing those visibly, the true physician might become known, and then at length he might come to cure the ailments of souls. Wherefore, as Titelman admonishes, Isaiah's testimony concerning bodily diseases is to be understood as less principal. For their cure was a sign and confirmation of the interior healing. When, therefore, Isaiah said, "Surely he has borne our infirmities," with the best reason he understood the healing of spiritual diseases, which Christ was going to work, to have been also signified and confirmed by the healing of bodily diseases; yet he expressed in those words only the healing of spiritual infirmities, and indicated that of bodily ones only tacitly. Therefore there is no need to interpret the word "bore" in some other way - as above it was explained for "to carry." For it is not referred to bodily and spiritual diseases together, but only to spiritual ones. For Isaiah did not express the healing of bodily diseases in these words, but insinuated it.

On Isaiah 53: "Generationem eius quis enarrabit?"

The place of Isaiah, "Generationem eius quis enarrabit?" - which some understand of the eternal generation of Christ, namely Clement the Pope in Epistle 1; Eusebius in the Preparation for the Gospel, book 11, chapter 2; St. Cyril, On the Trinity, book 5; St. Basil, Against Eunomius; Justin Martyr in the Dialogue with Trypho; St. John Chrysostom in the Homily on the Incomprehensible Nature of God and Homily 21 on Matthew; St. Augustine, De symbolo ad Catechumenos, book 1, chapter 3, and book 2, chapter 67. Of the temporal generation, however, interpret Justin in the Questions on the Gospels, question 67; Tertullian, Against the Jews, chapter 13; St. John Chrysostom, in the Homily on the Praises of John the Baptist.[214]

There are also three other interpretations of this place, which are approved the more by recent writers. For Isaiah's words are: "By oppression and judgment he was taken away; his generation who shall declare?"

- The first exposition is: "his offspring, who shall declare?" according to that of the same chapter, "If he shall lay down his life for sin, he shall see a long-lived seed."
- The second interpretation takes "generation" for Christ's sojourn in this mortal life.
- The third understands "generation" as the nation of that age: for the Prophet, marvelling at the nefarious crime of that people who stained their sacrilegious hands with the blood of Christ, exclaims, "Generationem eius, that is, that evil age, who shall be able to declare?" For the Hebrew word in other places signifies "age," that is, the men of some age and time: Ecclesiastes 1, "A generation passes, a generation comes"; and passim in the Psalms; and Matthew 12 called the wicked and unbelieving men "a wicked and adulterous generation."

But, as is gathered from the doctrine of the preceding disputation, we ought not so to concede multiple senses under the same letter that they do not in some way agree among themselves, but rather so that they may seem, as it were, to fall under one reason. Such, however, are not the generation of Christ, the offspring of the Christian people, the pilgrimage of Christ, and the depraved people of that age: therefore the Writer did not wish to express all those things together by the same letter. The two prior interpretations, indeed, which we brought from the Fathers, I would readily grant to agree equally with the very same letter; and thus to admit for this place two literal senses: for it does not seem to be beyond the order of the place that the Prophet, when he was speaking of Christ's death, should speak at once of the eternal and of the temporal generation of Christ. For when he foretold the shameful death of Christ, caught up into admiration, in order the more to exaggerate the same, he subjoins: "Generationem eius quis enarrabit?" And each generation of Christ, as being admirable and ineffable, contributes very much, for the same reason, to the extolling of Christ's death; wherefore with good reason the Prophet referred to either. But

214. St. Clement I, Epistle 1; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, book 11, ch. 2; St. Cyril, On the Trinity, book 5; St. Basil, Against Eunomius; Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho; St. John Chrysostom, Homily on the Incomprehensible Nature of God; Homily 21 on Matthew; St. Augustine, De symbolo ad Catechumenos, book 1, ch. 3; book 2, ch. 67; Justin, Questions on the Gospels, q. 67; Tertullian, Adversus Iudaeos, ch. 13; St. John Chrysostom, Homily on the Praises of John the Baptist.

the other interpretations which we have recounted are so diverse among themselves that neither the context nor the sense of the Prophet can stand, if he were to comprehend all those things. Wherefore the translation of Foreirus does not please me, who renders: "his age, who shall declare?" For thus no place is left for the expositions of the Fathers: he ought, therefore, to have rendered with the Vulgate, "Generationem." But if there are other testimonies which contain two literal senses, from the doctrine of the preceding disputation they can easily be discerned.

Distribution and order of the whole treatment. In the prolegomena to the whole theological treatment necessary to it, in Prima Pars, question prologue, St. Thomas approaches the matter set before him, which he divides universally into three parts. He says the first is about God; the second, about the movement of the rational creature into him; the third, about Christ, who is the way by which the rational creature tends to God. Again, he divides the disputation about God, which the first part comprises, into three members: in the first, he says there is treated of the things that pertain to the essence (*essentia*) of God from this question 2 up to 26; in the second, about the Trinity (*Trinitas*) of persons, from question 27 up to 43; in the third, about the production of creatures, which is the work of God, from question 44 to the end. Of all which 64 prior questions, which among others are held to be principal, we have now chosen to be explained and illustrated in these our commentaries and disputations. He begins, moreover, this first part with the disputation about God according to himself, because he is the subject of this theological discipline, so that he may show the scope of the whole treatment, to which all the other things look. He himself indicated this reason briefly in the preface of this question. Let this alone, with other things omitted, suffice for us.

Nor, indeed, does this order by which we serve, in knowing God, the natural mode of inquiry, in any way stand opposed. For although we come into the knowledge of God from the knowledge of created things, on account of which it seemed we ought to treat first about other things; yet, because this our Theology presupposes exact knowledge of created things from philosophy, it ought not at once in the beginning to dispute about those things, but to begin from God, whom it proposed to itself as its scope. Nay more, afterward it ought to treat of other things so soberly that it dispute of them only insofar as they have an ordered relation to God as to cause and end, and that chiefly from revealed principles.

Finally, when we say that the knowledge of God is obtained from the knowledge of created things, it is not to be taken in such wise that we think perfect speculation of other things to be necessary for it. For sufficient is the knowledge of those things which anyone, even unskilled, sees daily, if he would turn some small consideration to them. For by adding to, or taking from, things of that sort, one can know God, and grasp the doctrine of our faith, as far as is possible to a wayfarer. Therefore there was no need that our Theology begin from the consideration of other things. I acknowledge, nonetheless, that for perceiving it exactly, perfect knowledge of philosophy is necessary; yet rightly the whole disputation begins from God himself. But why St. Thomas disputes about the subject of Theology - Whether he is - when, after the manner of other sciences, he ought to have supposed it, has been said above in disputation 10, chapter 7.

Quaestio II - On God

Articulus I - Whether God exists is self - evident

Objicitur primo. It seems that God's existence is self-evident. For those things are said to be self-evident to us, the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as the father says about first principles. But, as St. John Damascene says at the beginning of his book, the knowledge that God exists is naturally inserted in all: therefore that God is is self-evident.

Objicitur secundo. Further, those things are said to be self-evident which, the terms being known, are known at once, which the Philosopher attributed to the first principles of demonstration in the Posterior Analytics I. For, knowing what the whole is and what a part is, at once it is known that every whole is greater than its part. But, once one understands what this name "God" signifies, at once it is had that God is. For by this name is signified "that than which a greater cannot be signified"; but that is greater which is in reality and in the intellect than that which is in the intellect alone; whence, once this name "God" is understood, since he is at once in the intellect, it follows also that he is in reality. Therefore that God is is self-evident.

Objicitur tertio. Further, that truth is is self-evident: because he who denies that truth is, grants that truth is not: for if truth is not, it is true that truth is not; but if something is true, it is necessary that truth be. But God is Truth itself, John 14: "I am the way, the truth, and the life." Therefore that God is is self-evident.

Sed contra: No one can think the opposite of that which is self-evident, as is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics IV and Posterior Analytics I concerning the first principles of demonstration. But one can think the opposite of that which is God's being, according to that of Psalm 52: "The fool said in his heart: There is no God." Therefore that God is is not self-evident.

I answer -

I answer: It happens that something is self-evident (per se notum) in a twofold way, in one way in itself (secundum se), and in another way with respect to us (quoad nos). For some proposition is self-evident from this, that the predicate is included in the notion (ratio) of the subject, as when one says that man is an animal; for animal belongs to the notion of man. If, therefore, what the predicate is and what the subject is be known to all, that proposition will be self-evident to all: as is clear in the first principles of demonstrations, the terms of which are certain common notions which no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and the like. But if among some there be not known what the predicate is and what the subject is, the proposition, as far as it is in itself, will be self-evident, yet not to those who ignore the predicate and the subject of the proposition. And for that reason it happens, as Boethius says in the book On the Hebdomads, that certain are common conceptions of the soul and self-evident only to the wise, as that incorporeals are not in a place.[215]

215. Boethius, De hebdomadibus (On the Hebdomads), around the principles of that work.

I say therefore that this proposition, God is, as far as it is in itself, is self-evident: because the predicate is identical with the subject. For God is his existence (*esse*), as will be clear below. But because we do not know what God is, it is not self-evident to us, but needs to be demonstrated through things that are more known with respect to us and less known with respect to nature, namely through effects.

Reply to the first: To know that God is, in some common way and under a certain confusion, is naturally implanted in us, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude (*beatitudo*); for man naturally desires beatitude, and what is naturally desired by man is naturally known by the same. But this is not simply to know that God is - just as to know that one who is coming is coming is not to know that it is Peter, although it is Peter who is coming. For many consider the perfect good of man, which is beatitude, to be riches; others pleasures; others something else.

Reply to the second: It must be said that the one who hears this name "God" does not necessarily understand something to be signified "than which nothing greater can be thought," since some have believed God to be the world. Granted also that everyone understood that by this name "God" is signified that which is said, namely that than which a greater cannot be thought; nevertheless it does not follow on that account that he understands that what is signified by the name exists in the nature of things, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Nor can one argue that therefore it is in reality, unless it be granted that there is in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought - which is not granted by those who posit that God is not.

Reply to the third: That truth is in general is self-evident; but that the first truth exists - this is not self-evident with respect to us.

By this single conclusion the whole doctrine of the article is contained: That God is, is a proposition self-evident in itself; to us, however, it is not, but needs to be demonstrated through other things.

Disputatio XIX - On the doctrine of this article

Deum esse, even to wayfarers, to be self-evident, was taught by Aegidius and others.[216]

The common and truer position asserts the opposite.[217]

It is proved in the best manner for the aforesaid position.[218]

The arguments of the former position are resolved.[219]

In this controversy the first opinion is that of Aegidius on I, dist. 3, q. 2, with the solutions to the arguments added by Thomas of Argentina, q. 1, art. 3; Albert, Summa, part 1, q. 17, part 2, q.; the author of the Summa of Auxerre, book 1, ch. 2 of the preface; Nicholas of Lyra on Exodus 5 "I do

216. Aegidius (Giles of Rome), In I Sent., dist. 3, q. 2; Thomas of Argentina, q. 1, art. 3; Albert the Great, Summa theologiae, part 1, q. 17; the Summa of Auxerre (Antissiodorensis), book 1, ch. 2 of the preface; Nicholas of Lyra on Exodus 5 ("Nescio Dominum, et Israel non dimittam"); Abulensis (Tostatus) on the same chapter, q. 2.

217. See below, Cap. II: the common position of St. Thomas and the Scholastics.

218. Below, Cap. III.

not know the Lord, and I will not let Israel go"; and Abulensis on the same chapter, q. 2, who affirm that that proposition is self-evident not only in itself, as St. Thomas and others wish, but also to wayfarers. This is what Epicurus seems especially to have taught, whose sentiment Cicero relates and marvelously commends in book 1 On the Nature of the Gods, near the beginning. After he has said that the opinions of the common people about God are found in the greatest inconstancy and ignorance, he adds: "From which one may consider how inconsiderately and rashly they speak who venerate Epicurus, to be counted in the number of those about whom this question is: he alone first saw that there are gods, because nature itself had impressed their notion in the minds of all. For what race of men, or what kind, does not have without teaching a certain anticipation of the gods, which Epicurus calls πρόληψιν, that is, a fore-conception in the mind, or a certain information, without which nothing can be understood or sought or discussed?" This is Cicero. Therefore, since in the judgment of Epicurus the notion of God is impressed by nature, it follows that it is not acquired by ratiocination. For a notion acquired by ratiocination adheres to the soul not by its own nature but by labor and study. He indicates this more clearly when he calls it an anticipation without teaching, because it is generated in the mind without a teacher, and precedes all ratiocination. For without it, he says, nothing can be understood or discussed; which is proper to those principles which are called self-evident.

Moreover, among the Fathers, first St. Gregory Nazianzen taught this, in Oration 24, which is on the coming of the Egyptians, where, speaking of God whom he calls Father, he says: "Now as to the Father there is something that must be said, which we put down as something certain, because this knowledge is naturally implanted in us: namely, that God exists, which also the very created things, and their preservation and government, proclaim with one consent of all." Elias of Crete elucidates these words in this way: "About the Father, therefore, one ought to say nothing as if it were to be proved, but to posit it as certain, because this knowledge - namely that God exists - is naturally implanted in us, which even the very things created, with one and the same consent, concede, as it were by the natural notions of God already imbued and inborn."[220]

Second, St. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 1: "There is no mortal," he says, "to whom this is not naturally implanted by God, that he have a clear perception that God exists; indeed the things themselves that have been created, and their preservation and government, proclaim the majesty of the divine nature." In which place Damascene, besides the notion of God that we acquire from creatures, says that there is also one imparted to us by nature, as Nazianzen and Elias said: which certainly would not be naturally imparted, if that God exists were not self-evident to us.[221]

Third, St. Jerome on Job 36 "All men see him," speaks thus: "By the knowledge of the good of nature, the knowledge of the Creator is in the hearts of men; and although someone be so depraved and cold as to wish to be alien from his Creator, nevertheless there is no one who is utterly without his warmth." And in the commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, which is contained in tome 6,

219. Below, Cap. IV.
220. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 24; Elias Cretensis ad loc.
221. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, ch. 1.

on that place of ch. 1 "When it pleased," he says: "From which it is evident that knowledge of God is born in all by nature. But no knowledge is in us by nature unless of those things which are self-evident to us: therefore that God exists is self-evident to us."[222]

Anselm also adds, who in the book Against the Fool, about God who is that than which a greater cannot be thought, writes thus: "Finally, that it is such that, once thought, its indubitable existence is immediately and certainly perceived by the intellect - this must be proved to me by some indubitable argument." By these words he does not propose that he is going to prove that God exists from that, that than which a greater cannot be thought, but he says that at once, without any other, it appears to any intellect that that is in the nature of things than which a greater cannot be thought; and in the Proslogion, ch. 3, he explains how it can be thought that God is not; and in ch. 4 he shows that the fool said in his heart "There is no God," because he did not conceive in any way the very reality which is God, but had only the concept of the word. Whence he infers that there is no one who can think that God is not, if once he conceive what is signified by the name "God." Nor does he speak of a proper concept, which we call intuitive, but of any other concept of the thing distinct from the concept of the word, which we have of God, as Aegidius has most aptly noted: which truly would not be true unless that proposition, "God is," were self-evident.[223]

It is proved also by the reasoning of Aegidius and of Argentina. A self-evident proposition is recognized by three marks. First, if the predicate is of the notion of the subject: and this is found in the said proposition. Second, if it is such that it cannot be directly denied, as often as it is not directly asserted. I say "not directly," that is, when the signification of the words is not well understood: but this proposition, "God is," cannot be denied by anyone, if he understand the thing signified, as Anselm taught. Third, if the truth of the proposition is so manifest that anyone immediately judges it to be true, if he understands what it signifies: as Boethius taught in the Hebdomads in the book "Whether the being that is is good," around the principles of that work, whose condition falls under the second [mark], and therefore in the same way will fit the proposition "God is." Moreover Albert, Aegidius, and Thomas of Argentina add that that proposition is self-evident, not indeed to all, but to the wise and of sound mind, who perceive the signification of words: for, as Boethius teaches in that place, a common conception of the mind can be self-evident in a twofold way: first to all men, without any distinction; then to the wise alone.

In this article Cajetan and more recent theologians do not consent to the Doctors cited in confirming the same; for they vary in defining a self-evident proposition.[224] First, the authors do not deny St. Thomas's opinion, which lays down that a self-evident proposition is that in which the predicate is of the notion of the subject; they impugn another definition as less sufficient - Scotus, Gregory, and Aureolus - for, as he proposes, that in which a first part of the definition of the subject, and its accident, is predicated, is a proposition lacking a middle; and the first will likewise be self-evident: which Cajetan and Ferrariensis ingeniously take up in the places cited. They excuse

222. St. Jerome on Job 36; Commentary on Galatians, at ch. 1.

223. St. Anselm, Liber pro insipiente; Proslogion, chs. 3 - 4; Aegidius ad loc.

224. Cajetan, in this article, q. 1, art. 2; recent theologians cited in the same context; Scotus; Gregory of Rimini; Aureolus; Ferrariensis.

St. Thomas indeed, that in this place he did not hand down a definition of a self-evident proposition, but only said that then indeed a proposition is self-evident when the predicate is of the notion of the subject, in which he speaks truly, and gives a sufficient cause; yet he did not assign a cause so adequate, and a proper definition of a self-evident proposition. For every proposition in which the predicate is of the notion of the subject will be self-evident: not thus. Wherefore in that same place St. Thomas's proposition, defined in this same way, must be understood with the addition, as Cajetan and Ferrariensis warn, of the particle: "formally," or "virtually," or "proximately," or "remotely." They say this because of a proposition in which some part of the definition is predicated of the subject, which is of the notion of the subject at least virtually or remotely.

On this basis the Holy Doctor teaches this position: that "God is," according to itself is self-evident, because the predicate is of the essence of the subject; yet it is not self-evident to us because of the defect of our intellect, since we do not know what God is: and hence we need some reasoning to assent to it, whereas to someone understanding perfectly it would be self-evident. With St. Thomas agree Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and the more recent [authors]

But on the contrary Scotus, in that question "Since according to their art a proposition is self-evident," divides a self-evident proposition into that which is self-evident "in itself and to us": and he teaches that what is self-evident is that which by any intellect, the terms being perfectly known, is judged to be true of itself: and thus he teaches that this proposition, "God is," is absolutely self-evident ...

But as to whether it is absolutely and in itself self-evident, they vary somewhat as to the manner. This position is expressly handed down by St. Thomas in this very article and in the contrary argument; by Ferrariensis in the place cited; by Ricardus; by the Master of the Sentences; by Scotus in many places; by the Expositor on the Sentences; by Gregory; by Cajetan; by Bañez; by Capreolus; by others.[226]

This foundation St. Thomas teaches for this position: that "God is," according to itself, is self-evident because the predicate is of the essence of the subject; yet to us it is not self-evident properly and in the mode of a first self-evident proposition, since we do not know what God is: and therefore we need some reasoning to assent to it; which, to one perfectly understanding what God is, would be self-evident. And thus St. Thomas teaches; Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and the more recent [authors], follow.

On the contrary, however, Scotus holds in this question: he distinguishes a self-evident proposition in that which is self-evident in itself and to us; but self-evident is what is judged to be true of itself by any intellect, the terms being perfectly known: and thus, he says, this proposition, "God is," is self-evident absolutely

226. St. Thomas, here in Art. I; Ferrariensis, ibid.; Richard; the Master (Peter Lombard); Scotus in various places; Gregory; Cajetan; Bañez; Capreolus; and others.

The common and truer opinion, in which the other Scholastics agree, affirms that the proposition "God exists" is not self-evident (per se nota) to human beings on the way; I do not say that it is not self-evident absolutely, but only that it is not so to wayfarers: in this the rest of the Scholastics consent. Whether, however, it is absolutely self-evident, they differ among themselves.

This opinion thus explained has been handed down by St. Thomas in this article, and in Contra Gentiles, c. 10 and 11; likewise by Ferrariensis there, Richard in I, dist. 3; Ockham, q. 4, post medium; Durandus, dist. 9, q. 3; Gabriel, q. 4, a. 2, n. 2; Scotus in I, dist. 2, q. 2, n. 1; from these to the question; Gregory, q. 1, ar. 2; Bassolis, q. 2; Capreolus, q. 2, ar. 1, concl. 3; Henry in this article; Cajetan and more recent theologians in the same place.[227]

Yet in confirming it the Doctors do not agree: for they vary in defining a self-evident proposition.

First, St. Thomas, in confirming this view, prefaces that a self-evident proposition is that in which the predicate is "of the account" (de ratione) of the subject; a definition which, as less sufficient, is impugned by Scotus, Gregory, and Aureolus: just as the proposition in which a first property (prima passio) is predicated of the definition of the first and adequate subject is a proposition lacking a middle and is first, so also it will be self-evident. This is candidly admitted by Cajetan and Ferrariensis in the places cited.[228] They excuse St. Thomas on the ground that in this place he did not hand down the definition of a self-evident proposition, but only said that then indeed it is such a proposition when the predicate is of the account of the subject - by which he assigned a true and sufficient cause, but not an adequate and proper one, of a self-evident proposition. For every proposition in which the predicate is of the account of the subject is self-evident, though not conversely. And if elsewhere the Blessed Thomas has defined a self-evident proposition in the same way, that definition must be understood - as Cajetan and Ferrariensis warn - with the addition "formally," or "virtually," or "proximately," or "remotely." They say this because of propositions in which a first property is predicated of the definition of the subject, which is "of the account" of the subject at least virtually or remotely.

On this groundwork the Holy Doctor teaches that this position, "God exists," is self - evident in itself (secundum se), because the predicate is of the essence (essentia) of the subject; yet it is not self - evident to us, because of the defect of our intellect: for we do not know of God what he is (quid sit), and therefore we need some reason for assenting to it - which otherwise would be self - evident to one who understands perfectly. With St. Thomas agree Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and more recent authors

But on the contrary, Scotus in that question, § "Quoniam secundum," affirms that it is pointless to distinguish a self-evident proposition into that which is self-evident "in itself" and "to us"; rather, that is self-evident which is judged self-evident by any intellect that perfectly knows the terms; and thus he teaches that this proposition, "God exists," is absolutely self-evident; yet to us it

227. St. Thomas, in this article; Contra Gentiles, c. 10 - 11; Ferrariensis, there; Richard, I, dist. 3; Ockham, q. 4 post medium; Durandus, dist. 9, q. 3; Gabriel (Biel), q. 4, a. 2, n. 2; Scotus, I, dist. 2, q. 2, n. 1; Gregory (of Rimini), q. 1, ar. 2; Bassolis, q. 2; Capreolus, q. 2, ar. 1, concl. 3; Henry, in this article; Cajetan, and later authors.

228. Cajetan, in this article, q. 1, art. 2; Ferrariensis, loc. cit.

is not self-evident that God exists - in which, as I said, he agrees with the authors of the former view. However, he does not for that reason admit the distinction of a self-evident proposition which he had just before rejected; rather, he says that in us wayfarers, for whom it is not self-evident that God exists, there is one proposition in which "being," or existence, is predicated from the objective concept which we have of God; and another in the blessed, which is to them self-evident because the terms are perfectly and quidditatively apprehended.[230]

Finally, Gregory, in that question 1, ar. 1; Gabriel, in that question 4, ar. 1; Ockham, and Bassolis, in the places cited, say that a proposition is self-evident, to the assent of which the knowledge of its own terms suffices, whether intuitive or abstractive; nor do they divide into self-evident "in itself" and "to us," but they say it is self-evident for him to whom, apprehending the terms either intuitively or abstractively, it is known without anything further. Wherefore in their view a self-evident proposition is not said to be such absolutely, but relatively to the knower. They add furthermore that the signification of this proposition, "God exists," is self-evident to one seeing him, but not to us who know abstractively; and that there are two propositions, one in the mind of the one seeing God, the other in the mind of the wayfarer. Wherefore, although the same thing signified can be said to be self-evident by its nature, yet not to us likewise; nevertheless the same proposition is not to be distinguished in this way, since the concept is not the same in the predicate and in the subject with respect to the one seeing God, and with respect to the wayfarer. If they understand this of the very connection and of the concept, insofar as it includes the mode of conceiving, this opinion - wherein also Scotus agrees - seems to me well grounded.

Thus, with respect to things, it can rightly be said that some are self-evident by their own nature, but not to us; while others are also to us self-evident: just as Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 2, said that some things are more known by their own nature, others to us; he said "by their own nature," i.e., with respect to the intellect without imperfection; but "to us," i.e., to an intellect with imperfection from the communication of the senses. Wherefore this opinion also agrees with Henry, and does not differ in reality from the view of St. Thomas and others.

Set this dispute aside, then, it is certain that that is not self-evident which is not known from its own terms, but through another. Wherefore, if "that God exists" becomes known to us through another, it will not be self-evident to us.

But that it becomes known to us through another is proved by Gabriel: first, because one to whom a proposition is self-evident cannot doubt it; but we can doubt this proposition, "God exists"; therefore to us it is known not per se but through another. Next, theologians and philosophers labor greatly to prove that there is one God: therefore that is not self-evident to wayfarers; for the things that are self-evident are either proved easily, or do not need proof.[231]

Caput III - The best reason by which the aforesaid opinion is proved

I judge the aforesaid opinion to be truer, but hitherto not sufficiently proved.

230. Scotus, in the question "Quoniam secundum...," on I, dist. 2, q. 2, n. 1.
231. Gabriel (Biel), q. 4, a. 2, n. 2.

First, from the fact that we do not have a proper and quidditative concept of God, it does not follow that God is not self-evident to us. For that principle, "Whatever is, or is not," under which an angel, and God himself, are contained, is self-evident to us: therefore it is also self-evident that God either exists or does not exist, although we do not have a proper concept of God. Similar is this: every incorporeal thing is not commensurate with place; and yet we do not have a quidditative concept of an incorporeal thing.

Next, Gabriel's first reason proves only that to the foolish and ill-disposed it is not self-evident that God exists: for only they are the ones who can doubt. The opposing opinion, however, does not affirm [that it is self-evident] to all, but to the wise and well-disposed. Nor is anything an obstacle because some have doubted, or even have held that there are many gods: for now the controversy is not about unity, but about the existence of God. And if to the well-disposed and well-prepared some doubt should at times creep in about this matter, it does not prevent God from being self-evident to them: for this happens because the thing is remote from sense; if the mind adheres to it with slight consideration, yet when it considers it fully, every doubt vanishes.

Gabriel's latter reason also proves nothing: for it is not difficult to demonstrate that God exists, except to fools and to those who are foolish in evil.

There is therefore a single reason which best confirms this opinion. It must first be premised that God, absolutely considered in himself, is without any relation to creatures - as we will show in Disputation 104, c. 6 - yet by us he is not known except in relation to them: wherefore all the names of God denote some kind of relation, either of lordship, or of cause, or of another notion; or this is established by induction. Whence it follows that this truth, "God exists," could not be proposed to anyone so absolutely that the signification of the name "God" would not be conceived in relation to the whole universe, either under the mode of Lord, or of Prince, etc.; and thus he conceives not only God but also other created things, of which he acknowledges God to be the common Lord.

From this foundation the aforesaid opinion is shown: for if, upon hearing this proposition "God exists," God were not known by us absolutely and without any relation to creatures, then that God exists would not be self-evident to us - not only not evidently, but not even probably: as certain first opinions are wont to be self-evidently probable. This is quite manifest.

But since God is always apprehended in relation to creatures, then even if, by steady labor and by the constant exercise of discipline, some at once assent and judge that God exists, nevertheless for that reason he is not self-evident to us: for from the creatures themselves, in reference to which God is known, there arises some reasoning, by which we give assent to the aforesaid proposition.

Wherefore, just as it is impossible, in our present state, for God to be thought by us unless he be related to creatures, so also it cannot happen that he become known to us self-evidently and not through other things. Thus this whole machine of the universe, and this mass and amplitude of the heavens, leads us by a certain discourse into the knowledge of a universal Emperor and Governor of all; which knowledge the Epicureans call a certain anticipation without teaching, impressed by God upon the minds of men; but St. Jerome and St. John Damascene, and Elias, call it naturally

inborn; and St. Gregory Nazianzen finally says that by natural reason learned men and the well-instructed arrive at it - not that such knowledge needs no steady labor of discipline as do other truths, but that, from created things, reason collects that there is a Creator and Ruler.[232]

The later argument of Gabriel proves nothing else: for it is not difficult to demonstrate that God exists, except to the foolish and to those obstinately set in evil.

A true reason is brought forward. There is therefore a single reason that best confirms this position. It must first be premised that God in himself is absolute, without any relation to creatures, as we shall show in disputation 104, section 6; yet he is not known by us except in relation to them: wherefore all the names of God denote some kind of relation, either of dominion, or of cause, or of some other account, as is clear by induction. Whence it comes about that this truth, "God is," cannot be proposed to anyone so absolutely that he does not conceive the signified of the name "God" in relation to the universe - either under the mode of Lord, or of Prince, etc.; and thus he conceives not only God but also other created things, whose Lord and Master he acknowledges.[233]

From this foundation the aforesaid position is shown: for if, upon hearing the proposition "God is," absolutely and without any relation to creatures, God were known by us, then it would not be to us self-evident (*per se notum*) that God exists, not only not evidently, but not even probably; just as certain first opinions are wont to be probable of themselves. This is sufficiently manifest. But since God is always apprehended in relation to creatures, even if, without toil and the assiduous exercise of discipline, we at once assent and judge that God exists, nevertheless on that account he is not self-evident to us: for from the creatures themselves, in the order to which God is known, by a certain sudden ratiocination we yield assent to the aforesaid proposition. Therefore, just as it is impossible, in our present state, for God to be thought by us except in relation to creatures, so also it cannot happen that he be known by us of himself and not through other things.

Accordingly, this machine of the universe, this mass of the heavens and their vastness, by a sudden sort of discourse leads us to the cognition of some Ruler and Governor of all. This knowledge indeed Epicurus called an "anticipation," as it were, impressed by God upon the souls of men without teaching; St. Jerome, St. John Damascene, and Elias said it is naturally implanted; and St. Gregory Nazianzen finally said that men are taught and imbued by natural reason, such that this notion does not need the assiduous labor of discipline, as other truths do, but is taken in by the very light of nature from created things.[234]

But because St. John Damascene seems to assign a twofold notion of God - one naturally implanted in us, another deduced from the preservation and governance of the creatures - we, however, assert that the former also is gathered from creatures; it will be worthwhile to point out in how many ways the cognition of that proposition, "God is," is had, from which also the meaning of Damascene will become clear. God is naturally known to us in three ways. The first is through

232. St. Jerome on Job 36; Commentary on Galatians at ch. 1; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, ch. 1; Elias Cretensis ad loc.; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 24.

233. Disp. 104.6.6.

234. Epicurus' term "anticipation"; St. Jerome; St. John Damascene; Elias Cretensis; St. Gregory Nazianzen.

human discipline, the belief which we learned in childhood from the teaching of our parents; this so clings to the mind that it seems to us to be known of itself that God exists, because from childhood, strengthened by the common judgment of men, that knowledge has taken growth with us; although in truth it is not self-evident to us, but believed on the authority of others.

Secondly, we know God not from the authority of others, but because, this universe of things having been seen, without any other toilsome ratiocination it immediately appears that God exists - if not evidently, at least with the highest probability: so that, just as among men we see that in a house, or a city, or a kingdom, there is some supreme governor, thus at once in this universe we believe that there is some Prince of all. This knowledge of God, however, is not without every ratiocination; but it is gathered by so easy a consequence that it seems as if implanted by nature.

Thirdly, finally, from the preservation and governance of creatures, by a more exact consideration and by a discourse from effects to cause, we prove, not only probably but also evidently, as far as is permitted to the natural philosopher, that God exists. St. John Damascene recounts the two latter ways, and he called the prior of these two - that is, the second in order - naturally implanted, the ratiocination being most readily assigned; but the later, which stands in the third place, he distinguished from the prior: because although each is had by ratiocination from creatures, nevertheless the prior is acquired with so easy a business that it seems to be without discourse. Therefore St. Gregory Nazianzen, in Oration 3, which is the second On Theology, somewhat at the beginning - as we shall report his words in the following disputation - asserts that by the law of nature we are all taught that God exists, while reason from the things subject to our sight and placed in right order gathers that there is an author of them.[235]

Caput IV - Refutation of the arguments of the first opinion

It remains that we refute the arguments of the first opinion. As to all the testimonies, except that of Anselm, enough was said in the preceding chapter. To Anselm, however, I first answer that, even if it were the case that God cannot be not thought by us, once we conceive the thing signified by the name, nevertheless that does not come from this, that the proposition "God is" is self-evident; but because from created things it immediately, either evidently or probably, appears that God exists, so that it is not in our power to deny it. I confess, nonetheless, that Anselm, as it were by a hyperbole, said that God cannot be denied by anyone except by him who perceives only the sound and not the signified of the name: which he said in the same sense in which we shall say that in one who sins there is always a defect of cognition, because he grasps the very thing itself so lightly that, like one drunken and tipsy who repeats doctrines, he seems to retain only the consonance of the words, although he still in some way understands the very thing itself. Therefore, because the fool does not penetrate sufficiently what is signified by the name "God," he says in his heart that he is not.[236]

235. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 3 (the second On Theology).
236. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 2.

The argument also of Aegidius and of the Argentinensis is not difficult to overturn. I answer, therefore, that neither all those three conditions, nor any one of them, suffices for something to be called self-evident. The first does not suffice - namely, that the predicate be of the essence (*essentia*) of the subject in the proposition: for in this, "An angel is corporeal," or in this, "An angel is incorporeal," the predicate is of the essence of the subject, yet neither is self-evident, but concerning each there was a variety of opinions. The second also, and the third - which come to the same - likewise do not make a proposition self-evident: for even a proposition evidently demonstrated is at once judged true by all, yet it is not self-evident. And even if both conditions concur in the same proposition, as can happen, they will not make it self-evident: for it can be that such a proposition is proved by an easy discourse.

It is objected: But someone may say that a proposition which is evidently demonstrated and is not self-evident is judged only true and not able to be denied whenever it is conjoined with the demonstration; but taken by itself and separately, it can easily be denied: wherefore that which, taken according to itself, is always judged true, is rightly called self-evident: such as that "God is" seems to be.

It is answered: I answer that this proposition is never separated from a proof: for since God cannot be conceived except in relation to creatures, the aforesaid proposition is always known to us through another; yet because that discourse is easy and sudden, the aforesaid proposition does not seem to be proved through another.

Articulus II - Whether the existence of God is demonstrable

Proceeding in the second way, it seems that the existence of God is not demonstrable.

1. For that God exists is an article of faith; but those things that belong to faith are not demonstrable: because demonstration causes knowing, but faith is of things not appearing (Heb. 11). Therefore the existence of God is not demonstrable.
2. Furthermore, the middle of a demonstration is "what a thing is" (quid est); but concerning God we cannot know what he is, but only what he is not, as St. John Damascene says; therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.[237]
3. Furthermore, if it were demonstrated that God exists, this would be only from his effects; but his effects are not proportioned to him, since he is infinite and the effects finite; but there is no proportion of the finite to the infinite. Since therefore a cause cannot be demonstrated through an effect not proportioned to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.

237. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, c. 4.

But on the contrary: The Apostle says to the Romans (1): "The invisible things of God are understood and seen through the things that are made." But this would not be, unless through the things that are made it could be demonstrated that God exists: for the first thing that must be understood about anything is whether it is.

I answer that there is a twofold demonstration: one which is through the cause, and is called "propter quid" (on account of which); and this is through things prior simply. Another is through effects, and is called "quia" (that it is); and this is through things that are prior as regards us. For when some effect is more manifest to us than its cause, through the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from any effect it can be demonstrated that its proper cause exists, if indeed its effects are more known as regards us. For since effects depend upon a cause, once the effect is posited, it is necessary that the cause pre-exist. Hence that God exists - insofar as it is not self-evident as regards us - is demonstrable through effects known to us.

Reply to the first: That God exists, and other things of this sort, which can be naturally known about God by reason, as is said in Romans 1, are not articles of faith, but preambles to the articles. For thus faith presupposes natural cognition, as grace presupposes nature, and as perfection presupposes the perfectible. Nevertheless, nothing prevents that which is in itself demonstrable and knowable from being accepted by someone as believable, who does not grasp a demonstration.

Reply to the second: When a cause is demonstrated through an effect, it is necessary to use the effect in place of a definition of the cause to prove that the cause exists; and this happens especially in the case of God. For, in order to prove that something exists, it is necessary to take as the middle what the name signifies, not what the thing is in its quiddity: because the question "what it is" follows upon the question "whether it is." But the names of God are imposed from effects, as will be shown later; whence, in demonstrating that God exists through an effect, we can take as the middle what this name "God" signifies.[238]

Reply to the third: Through effects not proportioned to the cause, a perfect knowledge of the cause cannot be had; yet from any effect whatsoever it can be manifestly demonstrated to us that the cause exists, as has been said. And thus from the effects of God it can be demonstrated that God exists, although through them we cannot perfectly know him according to his essence (*essentia*).

Conclusion: The existence of God cannot be demonstrated a priori - something that also befits a proposition self-evident; yet a posteriori, and through effects, it can be demonstrated.

Articulus III - Whether God exists

Proceeding in the third way, it seems that God does not exist.

1. For if one of contraries were infinite, the other would be totally destroyed. But this is understood and signified in this name "God," namely, that he is a certain infinite good. If, therefore, God existed, no evil would be found. Yet evil is found in the world; therefore God is not.

238. "As will be shown later": see q. 13, a. 1.

2. Furthermore, what can be accomplished by fewer principles is not effected by more. But it seems that all things which appear in the world can be accomplished by other principles, on the supposition that God is not: because those things which are natural are reduced to a principle which is nature; but those which are by intention are reduced to a principle which is human reason or will. Therefore there is no necessity to posit that God exists.

But on the contrary is what is said in Exodus 3...

But on the contrary: the Apostle says to the Romans (1): "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood from those things which are made." But this would not be so, unless by those things which are made it could be demonstrated that God exists; therefore God's existence is demonstrable from effect.

I answer that: There is a twofold demonstration. One is through the cause, and is called demonstration propter quid; and this is through things which are prior simply. The other is through the effect, and is called demonstration quia; and this is through things which are prior relative to us. For when some effect is more manifest to us than its cause, we proceed from the effect to knowledge of the cause; and from any effect whatsoever it can be demonstrated that its proper cause exists, if, however, its effect is more known to us. Because since effects depend upon a cause, the effect being posited, it is necessary that the cause pre-exist. Whence God's existence - since it is not self-evident to us - is demonstrable through effects known to us.

Reply to the first: That God exists, and other such truths which can be known by natural reason, as is said in Romans 1, are not articles of faith, but preambles to the articles. For faith presupposes natural cognition, as grace presupposes nature, and as perfection presupposes the perfectible. Yet nothing prevents that which in itself is demonstrable and knowable from being taken by someone as credible, who is not capable of the demonstration.

Reply to the second: When a cause is demonstrated through its effect, it is necessary to use the effect in place of a definition of the cause in order to prove that the cause exists; and this happens especially in the case of God. For in order to prove that something exists, it is necessary to take for the middle term what the name signifies, not what the thing is; because the question "what it is" follows upon the question "whether it is."

Reply to the third: Of effects that are not proportionate to the cause, perfect knowledge of the cause cannot be had; yet nevertheless from effects it can be clearly demonstrated that the cause exists, as has been said; and from the effects of God it can be demonstrated that God exists, although through them we cannot know what he is according to his essence (*essentia*).

The conclusion is that God's existence cannot be demonstrated a priori, since it is not self-evident to us; but it can be demonstrated a posteriori from effects.

Whether God exists

It seems that God does not exist.

1. For if one of contraries were infinite, the other would be totally removed. But in this name "God" there is signified a certain infinite good; if therefore God existed, no evil would be found in the world. But evil is found in the world; therefore God does not exist.
2. Furthermore, what can be accomplished by fewer principles is not effected by more. But it seems that all things which appear in the world can be accomplished by other principles, on the supposition that God is not: because those things which are natural are reduced to a principle which is nature; but those which are by intention are reduced to a principle which is human reason or will. Therefore there is no necessity to posit that God exists.

But on the contrary: from the person of God, Exodus 3: "I am who am."

I answer that: The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and most manifest way is that which is taken from motion. It is certain, and evident to sense, that in the world some things are moved. Now whatever is moved, is moved by another. Nothing is moved except insofar as it is in potency (*potentia*) to that toward which it is moved; but something moves insofar as it is in act (*actus*). For to move is nothing other than to bring something forth from potency into act. But nothing can be brought from potency into act except by something which is in act, as the actually hot - namely fire - makes wood, which is hot in potency, to be actually hot; and by this it moves and alters it. But it is not possible that the same thing be at once in act and in potency in the same respect, but only in different respects; for what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be hot in potency, but at the same time it can be in potency as to being cold. It is therefore impossible that, in the same respect and in the same way, something be both mover and moved, or that it move itself. Therefore whatever is moved must be moved by another. If that by which it is moved is itself moved, this also must be moved by another; and this by another. But it is not possible to proceed to infinity, because then there would be no first mover; and consequently no other mover: for subsequent movers do not move except insofar as they are moved by a first mover; as the staff does not move except insofar as it is moved by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at some first mover, which is moved by nothing; and this everyone understands to be God. [239]

The second way is from the notion of the efficient cause (*causa efficiens*). In the sensible things we find an order of efficient causes; and yet we do not find, nor is it possible, that something be the efficient cause of itself, for then it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Neither is it possible to proceed to infinity in efficient causes: because in all ordered efficient causes, the first is the cause of the intermediate, and the intermediate is the cause of the last, whether there are many intermediates or only one; but if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. Therefore, if there is no first among efficient causes, neither will there be a last effect nor an intermediate efficient

239. Aristotle, Physics, VIII; cf. "Ex Met." in the margin.

cause. But if one were to proceed to infinity in efficient causes, there would be no first efficient cause; and thus neither would there be an ultimate effect nor intermediate efficient causes, which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to posit some first efficient cause; and this everyone names God. [240]

The third way is taken from the possible and the necessary, which runs thus. We find among things certain ones that are possible to be and not to be; for some are found to be generated and to be corrupted; and consequently they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible that all such things be, always; for what can not-be, at some time is not. If therefore everything were such that it is possible not to be, at some time nothing would have been in existence. But if this were true, even now nothing would be: because that which is does not begin to be, except through something which is. If therefore nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to begin to be, and thus nothing would now be - which is false. Therefore not all beings are merely possible; but it is necessary that there be something necessary among things. Every necessary being either has the cause of its necessity from another, or it does not. But it is not possible to proceed to infinity in necessary things which have the cause of their necessity from another, just as it is not possible in efficient causes. Therefore it is necessary to posit something which is necessary through itself, not having the cause of its necessity from another, but rather being the cause of necessity for others; and this all call God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation which is found in things. For there are found in things more and less good, true, and noble, and so on with the others of this sort. "More" and "less" are said of diverse things according as they approach in diverse ways to something which is in the highest degree; as that is hotter which more nearly approaches that which is hottest. Therefore there is something which is most true, and best, and most noble; and consequently that which is most being (*ens*): for those things that are most true are most being, as is said in the second book of the Metaphysics. [241] Now what is said to be "most such" in any genus is the cause of all things which are of that genus; as fire, which is the hottest, is the cause of all hot things, as is said in the same book. Therefore there is something which is cause of being, and goodness, and every perfection for all beings; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of things. For we see that some things which are devoid of knowledge, namely natural bodies, act for an end; which is evident from this, that they always or for the most part act in the same way in order to achieve that which is best. Hence it is plain that they attain their end not by chance but by intention. But those things which lack knowledge do not tend to an end unless they be directed by some knowing and intelligent being; as an arrow is directed by the archer. Therefore there exists some intelligent being by whom all natural things are ordered to an end; and this we call God.

240. On efficient causes and their order: see the notes "Ex Metaphysica" in the margin.
241. Aristotle, Metaphysics II (or IV), commentary noted in the margin: "2. Metaph."

Reply to the first: As St. Augustine says in the Enchiridion, God, since he is supremely good, would in no way allow anything evil to exist in his works, unless he were so omnipotent and so good as to bring good even out of evil. Therefore this pertains to the infinite goodness of God: that he permits evils to exist, and from them draws forth goods. [242]

Reply to the second: Since nature, for the sake of a determinate end, operates under the direction of some higher agent, it is necessary to reduce the things which are done by nature to God also, as to a first cause. Likewise too the things that are done by intention must be reduced to some higher cause which is not human reason and will; because these are changeable and fallible. But all things that are mobile and able to fail must be reduced to some first principle which is immobile and necessary through itself, as has been shown above.

In this article the holy Doctor proves that God exists by five means; and since in the preceding article he said that this can be demonstrated, beyond doubt in this he aims to adduce demonstrations alone.

Disputatio XX - Whether God's existence can be proved by a true demonstration

- Error of the atheists.[243]
- That it cannot be evidently shown that God exists, is maintained by Alliacensis.[244]
- That God's existence can be demonstrated is the common opinion of the theologians.[245]
- That God's existence is demonstrated by arguments.[246]

Caput I - The error of the atheists

We supposed as most well known in this question, to us, that God exists; only it had to be called back into dispute what St. Thomas set forth in these articles. But since a great crowd of atheists in our age has rushed into the Church,

Since a great crowd of atheists in our age has rushed into the Church, I judged it necessary to recount in this chapter the authors of this error. The first atheists of all, if we believe Cicero,[247] Plutarch,[248] Lactantius,[249] Eusebius,[250] and Theodoret,[251] were Protagoras - who called into doubt that God exists - and Diagoras, Melius, Theodorus the Cyrenaic, and others who expressly denied it; and therefore they were called, as it were, without God. In this same opinion, in our age, many

242. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 11 (as cited: "Enchi. c. 11").
243. "Error Atheorum, cap. 1."
244. "Non posse evidenter ostendi, Deum esse, arbitratur Alliacensis, cap. 2."
245. "Deum esse, posse demonstrari, communis est Theologorum opinio, cap. 3."
246. "Deum esse, rationibus demonstratur, cap. 4."
247. Cicero, De natura deorum, I, prologue.
248. Plutarch, De placitis philosophorum, I, c. 7.
249. Lactantius, Divinae institutiones, I, c. 2; De ira Dei, c. 9.
250. Eusebius, Demonstratio evangelica, XIV, c. 6.
251. Theodoret, Graecarum affectionum curatio, III, prologue.

heretics rest fully satisfied. For as Hedio testifies in a letter to Philip Melanchthon, and Lindanus in his Doubtantia, since the men of these times, through a most extreme inconstancy, from Catholics become Lutherans, from Lutherans Zwinglians, and from these Calvinists, and, as they try and profess the several sects, having fallen headlong into the depth of evils, they deny that God exists. These atheists are now called Politicians, because they undertake the management of no other affairs than those which pertain to the external government of the state; but about religious worship they are only so far solicitous as they judge it expedient, by human policy, for holding the peoples in civil discipline and obedience. And that false simulation of piety proceeds plainly from atheism itself.

On this matter Machiavelli, a citizen of Florence, not many years ago published a book which was immediately, and with very good right, forbidden by a public edict of the inquisitors. By his continual reading and the doctrine in which he had made no little progress, Henry III, King of the French, being moved, long tolerated most evil morals and heresies in his kingdom; and, if the pious and very many Catholics of that realm are to be believed, while on the one hand he pretended to be Catholic, and on the other hand followed the morals of the heretics with the mind that he might rule the realm with the highest peace and authority, he cruelly laid it entirely waste and divided it against itself, until he ended his life by a most unhappy death. From which civil sedition a very great part of war and hardships still remains: so that even from this the Politicians may persuade themselves how little profit - indeed how much harm - atheism brings to temporal peace and to the governance of a kingdom, which alone they deem sufficient for human happiness

That very many of this sect are in the church which they call the Italian, Lindanus gathers in the place cited: that when the Calvinists, consulting among themselves about the once-for-all abolishing of the Roman pontificate, purgatory, and other dogmas, one of their leading masters said: "Let us assert that the soul perishes together with the body; thus, with purgatory, together with the Mass, we shall abolish the Roman Pontiff at a stroke." And indeed, whoever once is brought into that error, so as to think that the soul of man is mortal, will easily decline into atheism.[252]

Caput II - Alliacensis judges that the existence of God cannot be shown evidently

I judged it superfluous to confute this error by the testimonies of Scripture, of the Fathers, of the pagan philosophers, and by the common consent of all nations: for atheists will despise all these things with ease; while for Catholics they are so well-worn that there is no need to set them out one by one in detail. It is therefore enough to recall to memory that hitherto there has been no nation so barbarous that it did not acknowledge some divinity, to which it rendered worship and invoked it; so that Epicurus rightly said, as cited in the preceding disputation, chapter 1, that there was no race of men which did not have, without teaching, a certain anticipation of the gods. In confirmation of this truth Eugubinus gathers innumerable testimonies of the heathen in books 1, 2, and 6 of the Perennial Philosophy.[253]

252. Lindanus, in the place cited; on the so-called "Italian" church and Calvinist deliberations.

Therefore we must deal only with reasons; nor must we discourse by probable and merely topical arguments, but evident demonstrations are to be brought forward. But since, among Catholics who confess that God exists, some have called into doubt whether the existence of God can be demonstrated, before the reasons are set forth, this difficulty must be examined.

There was, moreover, the opinion of certain men, which St. Thomas reports,[254] who affirmed that it cannot be demonstrated, but that only by revelation it is established that God exists. The recent writers attribute this to Rabbi Moses in book 3, chapter 6;[255] however the Ferrariense, in the place against the Gentiles, only says that that Rabbi mentions this opinion, which indeed, among the Scholastics, Alliacensis followed in question 3, article 2, letter x, with a certain moderation. For he asserts that the existence of God cannot be shown evidently, yet is naturally probable; wherefore he does not refer all knowledge of God to supernatural revelation; nor, indeed, does he deny that it is most probable and such that it appears at once to all, as was set forth in the preceding disputation; he only affirms that no knowledge of God can naturally arrive at evidence.

This opinion he chiefly supports by diluting the arguments which are wont to be advanced as, so to say, concluding. Then it can be confirmed by this argument which he, in the third place, adduces at the beginning of the question: It is not evidently known to us that God is one; therefore neither that God exists. For it comes to the same thing to demonstrate that God is, and that He is one: since by the name "God" we understand nothing other than a certain one, infinite above all beings.

Caput III - That God's existence can be demonstrated: the common opinion of the theologians

The latter opinion, which I judge the truer one, is the common one among the theologians, who teach that by natural reason it can be demonstrated that God exists. Thus St. Thomas teaches,[256] as do Cajetan and more recent authors in this article and in Contra Gentiles 1, chapters 12 and 13; likewise the Ferrariense there; Albert in 1, part, question 17, first part of the question; Richard, on 1, dist. 3, q. 1, a. 9, 3; Aegidius, q. 1, a. 3; Scotus, on 1, dist. 2, q. 2, q. Ad 1. quaest.; Marsilius, on 1, q. 5, a. 1; Henricus, in Summa a. 22, q. 4.[257] Among these, however, Aegidius does not defend it in the same manner as the others; for, since he thinks - as we saw in the preceding disputation - that that proposition "God exists" is self-evident (per se nota), he is unwilling to concede that it can be demonstrated absolutely; but he claims that all demonstrations are brought only to explain what the name "God" signifies; which being explained, it is at once self-evident that He exists. And certainly, if the reasons were to do only this, that proposition would not truly be demonstrated; for by the force of the reasons no assent would be elicited, but only by the explication of the terms.

253. Agostino Steuco (Eugubinus), De perenni philosophia, lib. 1, 2, 6.
254. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 12.
255. Rabbi Moses (Maimonides), Guide of the Perplexed, III, c. 6.
256. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles I, cc. 12 - 13.
257. Albertus Magnus, In I partem, q. 17; Richard (of Middleton), In I Sent., dist. 3, q. 1, a. 9; Aegidius (of Rome), q. 1, a. 3; Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 2, q. 2, Ad 1 quaest.; Marsilius, In I, q. 5, a. 1; Henricus, Summa, a. 22, q. 4.

The reason, moreover, on account of which he thinks that proposition not to be demonstrable in the aforesaid way, is of this sort: if God's existence (*esse Dei*) is God Himself, then about Him His existence cannot be demonstrated: for the same thing would be that which is demonstrated and that about which it is demonstrated. Then too it can be proved in this way: If that proposition, once the terms are explained, generates assent to itself of itself, any demonstration subsequently arriving will do nothing toward assent.

But in both points Aegidius is in error. First, when he says that the aforesaid proposition is self-evident, as we have refuted above. Then, when he asserts that it cannot be demonstrated; which is disproved by these reasons. First, although God and His existence are the same in reality (secundum rem), yet by us they are conceived as diverse, and therefore we compose the proposition in which we predicate "exists" of "God": since here there is question of a demonstration in the intellect of the wayfarer, the unity and simplicity of God cannot hinder our demonstrating that God exists. This is the teaching of St. Thomas in Contra Gentiles 1, chapter 12. Nor ought it to move one that he says that the said demonstration does not take the middle term from God Himself, but proceeds from effects.

Second, the arguments which are advanced do not explain what is signified by the name "God," but confirm the intellect, against every doubt, in assent to that proposition: for, even after the explication of the name, someone can doubt whether God exists, against which doubt the demonstration determines the intellect.

Third, even if we were to concede that the aforesaid proposition is self-evident, the intellect, to one who does not see it, could nonetheless be aided by a posteriori demonstration - if, namely, that proposition were self-evident not with the intuitive evidence they speak of, nor so manifest as other things which are nearer to our sense. Wherefore Albert, who conceded that that proposition is self-evident, nevertheless affirms that it can be demonstrated a posteriori.

Scotus uses a certain distinction: for he says that if the discussion is about this proposition according to itself, it can be demonstrated even by a demonstration propter quid; to us, however, who are wayfarers (*viatores*), it is known only by a demonstration a posteriori. But as to what he asserts about a demonstration propter quid, it is in no way true. For this proposition, according to itself, that is, abstracted from the intellect of the wayfarer who knows it through alien species, and posited in the intellect of one who sees it itself, is without doubt without a middle; indeed, it is not a proposition composed of subject and predicate, but a certain simple cognition; wherefore neither discourse, much less any demonstration, can be about it; from which principle, in Disputation 22, chapter 2, we shall prove that angels know nothing by discourse from those things which are known to them by simple intuition. Therefore this latter opinion is true, according to the common sense of the other authors, who speak only of a demonstration a posteriori and of the intellect of wayfarers. So truly do more recent Thomists esteem this opinion, that they rightly judge the former rash, which St. Thomas in the Contra Gentiles called an error.[258]

258. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 12.

They prove, indeed, by the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers; for to the Romans 1 it is said: "For the invisible things of him, namely of God, from the creation of the world, by those things which are made, being understood, are seen" [Rom 1:20], where they press the word "are seen," by which they think something greater than an obscure assent is signified. Paul adds: "So that they are inexcusable" [Rom 1:20]. From which they argue thus: if the knowledge of God were only obscure and probable, they would be excusable who could rightly doubt. Similar is that in Wisdom 13: "For by the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, the creator of all could be seen in a knowable way" [Wis 13:5]. For which cause Wisdom calls the nations vain who have not attained the knowledge of God from the fabric of the universe. The Doctors also note the word "to be seen," which signifies evident assent. They also adduce that of Psalm 18: "The heavens declare the glory of God," and Psalm 88: "The heavens shall confess thy wonders," and Acts 14: "And indeed he left not himself without testimony, since, doing good from heaven, he gave rains," and so forth [Ps 18:2; Ps 88:6; Acts 14:16 - 17].

But all these things, in my judgment, do not prove the proposition. For in these places of Scripture, and the like, it only contends that there has always been a sufficient testimony of God from the world's fabric, beauty, and other effects, so that he might be known by all; whether, however, by evident knowledge, or only most probable, it does not care. And that it uses the word "are seen" and the word "to be seen," matters little: for these, in a certain common and more usual signification, signify any knowledge of the intellect with determined assent; and in this common signification Scripture everywhere treats these and similar things. Moreover, what Paul says, and Wisdom insinuates, that the Gentiles who did not know God cannot be excused, does not prove that all could have had a demonstration. For to this end, that they might not be able to be excused, it is enough if they could have had some most probable and prudent knowledge. For having this knowledge, they ought to have worshiped the true God. For if someone in like manner denied Christ, he would not on that account be incapable of excuse because he could have had an evident reason of him, but because by faith and prudent knowledge he could have believed. From this, therefore, the Gentiles cannot be excused, because they did not acquiesce in probable arguments among the prudent. As to St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 34, which is the second on Theology, a little from the beginning he says: "For that God is, and that he is a certain principal cause which produced all things and preserves them, both the very eyes and the natural law teach to that man, when, fixing their gaze upon the things that fall under sight, these, through the things subjected to the eyes and set in right order, gather by a certain conjecture their author." He did not say "by evident reasoning," but that by a certain conjecture from the things seen it is gathered that God is. For it is the best argument, even if it is not evident to all, to be deduced from created things, and that which almost immediately sticks in the minds of nearly all. In Greek Nazianzen uses the participle syllogizomenos from the verb syllogizomai, which does not signify "to gather evidently" or "to demonstrate," but simply "to reason." Therefore this view will be confirmed by us only in the following chapter by adducing reasons to prove that God exists, which we judge to be demonstrations. For the present, the arguments of Alliacensis must be satisfied.

The first argument will be of no moment; from the things which we shall say in the following chapter it will be clear.

To the second argument I reply that, even if it could not be demonstrated that God is one, it could nevertheless be demonstrated that God exists, that is, that there is some divinity above all visible and created things, as we shall see in the following chapter. I add, however, that it can in fact be demonstrated that God is one, as will be clear in Question 11, no less readily than that God exists in the order of nature. As to what we have already said and what remains to be said in the following chapter, it must be noted that in these demonstrations one must not demand the kind of force and evidence found in mathematics, but only what is appropriate to natural, metaphysical, or moral science; for all the arguments we are about to adduce fall under one of those three heads.

Caput IV - That God exists is demonstrated by arguments

We must strive to demonstrate God by reasons drawn only from natural principles; for by theological arguments we should dispute against Atheists in vain. Moreover, since very many are wont to be adduced, which St. Thomas gathers in Contra Gentiles I, c. 13, and in article 3 of this question, as also Henricus and Scotus in the places cited, omitting some, we shall use only those which are more efficacious and more becoming to a Theologian. This, however, I judged should be premised, which I have received from men of great authority, namely, that in Gaul and in England, where now Atheism flourishes most greatly, most wicked men are easily recalled from Atheism, when in magical arts, in other things, or in themselves, they experience marvelous effects which surpass all human and visible power; by which they are compelled to believe that, besides those things which fall under sight, there is something spiritual and of a more powerful virtue: this once admitted, they are more easily led into that opinion, that they acknowledge some numen. For they deny this because they think there is nothing else besides these corporeal and visible things; worse indeed than the Sadducees, who, although they denied a created spirit and the immortality of the soul, nevertheless acknowledged God by sacrifices. Wherefore most grave men testify that especially in Gaul and England men are held fast by Atheism, who the more eagerly study magical arts; which, unless among these heretics God had permitted, almost all would be involved in Atheism.

The first demonstration, therefore, is as follows. Whatever is in the universe either is from itself or from another; the former cannot be said. For we see very many things not only to be made by others, but also to be preserved, and to be arranged in many ways, that they may be defended from contraries; and thus all things can depend upon another. For thus it would happen that the order of causes would be infinite; which all philosophers with Aristotle, 2 Metaphysics, c. 2, rightly thought most absurd.[259] First, because an essential order of efficient causes, of which we now speak, could not through an infinite series transfer the virtue of the higher to the lower. Then also it does not seem possible that any thing at all should need an infinite number of causes for its being and preservation; for each has a determined nature, and therefore demands also a determined cause

259. Aristotle, Metaphysics II (alpha minor), c. 2.

which is of this or that nature; wherefore it cannot depend upon a confused and infinite multitude of causes. Moreover, since nothing first is assigned in that order of causes, and each depends upon another, we are compelled to acknowledge that this whole machine of things is disposed as it were by chance and without a cause, since there is nothing firm and stable to which the rest may be referred, from whose nature or will the other things have been produced and are preserved; for if there were no cause, there would be no reason why the universe of things should be disposed in that infinite series; both because there would not be a superior will, and because there would be no nature; for nature is in each thing determined; and therefore from itself it demands a determined multitude of causes. Nor, moreover, would there be one nature of all together which would demand such an infinite order, as is manifest: there would, therefore, be as it were a Chaos and utmost confusion, since with such contrariety as we see, this beauty of things and the congruity with due order could not stand.

Nor indeed do I now contend to exclude the plurality of gods; for of this in Question 11 there must be disputation: nor whether it is a body or a spirit; of which in the following Disputation we shall speak: I only wish in general to prove that in this universe there is a divine numen, which is easily gathered by the foregoing reason. For if there is some being which is not from another, it follows necessarily that it has always existed; nor indeed can it be determined by any cause that it begin in time and at some time cease. It follows, moreover, that that being is a cause. For if we must stand in effects and causes, at length we must arrive at a first which is of this sort. But these properties belong to God alone; therefore he who admits that there is in this manner a necessary being, concedes in reality that God exists, although he does not call him by the name "God."

This argument is taken from the principles of metaphysics and of philosophy, which Aristotle taught in 2 Metaphysics, c. 2.[260] St. Thomas also touched upon it, and the other Schoolmen mentioned, and St. John Damascene, 1 De fide, c. 3.[261]

The second demonstration, drawn from moral philosophy, is of this sort. He who removes God from the middle must also remove rewards of virtues and punishments of vices after this life. For who will be a judge in this cause? especially since he who denies God ought also to deny the immortality of the soul. These being taken away, virtue, which even the most wicked men venerate in others, would remain without its due reward. For it sometimes happens most miserably that the more modest and the more studious are forced to spend this life. If, therefore, after death no one will repay the reward of true praise which virtue by its nature demands, virtue will remain without reward; but that virtue merits a reward even scoundrels confess. Happier, too, would be the one nurtured among crimes, who would take care of his skin, when no punishments at all would remain. He, therefore, who once denies God, and hence the immortality of the soul, removes also worship of God, religion, oath, and finally removes all virtue from the midst; for the best thing would be the convenience of bodily life, if, besides itself, neither God nor any other immortal reality remained.

260. Aristotle, Metaphysics II, c. 2.
261. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 3.

The third demonstration, rather subtle, which Anselm pursues in the Proslogion, chapter 2, and in the book against the Fool, is this: God is that than which nothing better can be thought; but that than which nothing better can be thought cannot be only in thought; for thus it would not be the best: that is better which is in thought and in reality; therefore God exists in the nature of things. However, in reality the case stands otherwise.

Quaestio III - On the simplicity of God

Once it has been established of a thing that it is, it remains to ask in what way it is, so that one may know what it is. But because concerning God we cannot know what He is, only what He is not, we must consider not how He is, but rather how He is not.

- First, therefore, it must be considered how he is not.
- Second, how he is known by us.
- Third, how he is named.

Now it can be shown of God how he is not, by removing from him those things which do not belong to him, as, for instance, composition, motion, and other things of this sort.

- First, therefore, inquiry is made concerning his simplicity, by which composition is removed from God. And because simple things among bodily things are imperfect and parts,
- Second, inquiry is made concerning his perfection.
- Third, concerning his infinity.
- Fourth, concerning his immutability.
- Fifth, concerning his unity.

From this question St. Thomas begins to demonstrate the divine attributes and, as it were, the properties of God, who is the subject of the whole of theology. In the preceding question he proved what otherwise would have had to be presupposed, namely that God exists, unless it had been necessary to answer the error of certain foolish men.

From this question up to Question 43, where he treats the divine nature and attributes, St. Thomas follows the common way of considering divine things commended by Pseudo-Dionysius and St. John Damascene, namely the way of knowing God by negation. What belongs to God in Himself he considers in four ways. First, the perfections of God that are not operations, from this question up to Question 11. Second, in Questions 12 and 13, the same perfections insofar as they are referred to our intellect. Third, from Question 14 to Question 16, the divine perfections considered in operations that are not productions, namely intellect and will. Fourth, from Question 27 to Question 43, the operations that are productions within God Himself. Finally, he runs through the operations outside Himself and all their effects.[262]

262. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa.

Articulus I - Whether God is a body

Objicitur primo: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has three dimensions; but Sacred Scripture attributes to God three dimensions: for it is said in Job 11, "He is higher than heaven, and what wilt thou do? deeper than hell, and how shalt thou know? The measure of him is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea": therefore God is a body.

Objicitur secundo: Further, everything that is figured is a body, since figure is a quality about quantity. But God seems to be figured, since it is written in Genesis 1, "Let us make man to our image and likeness": for image is called figure, according to that in Hebrews 1, "Who being the brightness of glory and the figure of his substance," that is, image: therefore God is a body.

Objicitur tertio: Further, whatever has bodily parts is a body. But Scripture attributes bodily parts to God: for it is said in Job 41, "Hast thou an arm like God?"; and in the Psalm, "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just"; and, "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength": therefore God is a body.

Objicitur quarto: Further, situation does not befit anything except a body; but the things that pertain to situation are said of God in the Scriptures: for it is said in Isaiah 6, "I saw the Lord sitting"; and in Isaiah 3, "The Lord stands to judge the peoples": therefore God is a body.

Objicitur quinto: Further, nothing can be a local terminus from which, or to which, unless it be a body or something corporeal. But in Scripture God is said to be a local terminus, both as that to which one goes, according to the Psalmist, and as that from which one departs, according to Jeremiah 17, "They that depart from thee shall be written in the earth": therefore God is a body.

But on the contrary: It is said in John 4, "God is spirit."

I answer that it must be said absolutely that God is not a body; which can be shown in three ways.

First, because no body moves without being moved, as is clear by induction in each case. But it was shown above that God is the first unmoved mover; whence it is manifest that God is not a body.

Second, because it is necessary that that which is the first being be in act (*actus*), and in no way in potency (*potentia*). For although in one and the same thing which proceeds from potency into act, potency is prior to act in time, simply speaking act is prior to potency, because what is in potency is not reduced into act except by a being in act. But it was shown above that God is the first being. It is therefore impossible that there be anything of potency in God. But every body is in potency, because a continuum, with respect to such quantity, is divisible to infinity. It is therefore impossible that God be a body.

Third, because God is that which is most noble among beings, as is clear from what has been said. But it is impossible that any body be the most noble among beings: because a body is either living or non-living. Now a living body is manifestly more noble than a non-living body; but a living

body does not live insofar as it is a body, for thus every body would live; it is therefore necessary that it live through something else, as our body lives through the soul. But that by which the body lives is more noble than the body: it is therefore impossible that God be a body.

Reply to the first: As was said above, Sacred Scripture hands down to us spiritual and divine things under the likenesses of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes three dimensions to God under the likeness of corporeal quantity, it signifies his virtual quantity: for example, by depth, the power to know hidden things; by height, the excellence of his power over all things; by length, the duration of his existence (*esse*); by breadth, the affection of love toward all. Or, as Pseudo-Dionysius says in the sixth chapter of On the Divine Names, by the depth of God is understood the incomprehensibility of his essence (*essentia*); by length, the advance of his power penetrating all things; but by breadth, his overextension to all things, inasmuch, namely, as all things are contained under his protection.[263]

Reply to the second: Man is said to be to the image of God not according to the body, but according to that whereby man excels other animals: whence it follows in Genesis 1, after it has been said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness," "and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea," etc. But man excels all animals as to reason and intellect: whence according to intellect and reason, which are incorporeal, man is to the image of God.

Reply to the third: Bodily parts are attributed to God in the Scriptures by reason of their acts according to a certain likeness; as the act of the eye is to see: whence "eye" said of God signifies his power for seeing in an intelligible mode, not a sensible one; and the same is to be said of other parts.

Reply to the fourth: The things also that pertain to situation are not attributed to God except according to a certain likeness: thus he is called "sitting" on account of his immobility and authority; and "standing" on account of his strength for warring down whatever opposes.

Reply to the fifth: One does not approach to God by bodily steps, since he is everywhere; but by the affections of the mind: and in like manner one recedes from him. And thus "approach" and "withdrawal," under the likeness of local motion, designate a spiritual affection.

Note on the article.

The conclusion is: God is not a body, nor does he consist of body. Which St. Thomas confirms by three reasons, which you have in the text. Concerning those, however, and the propositions which they assume, many things which pertain to the philosopher are disputed by Cajetan and more recent Thomists, which are not much accommodated to our plan. But we, as we promised at the beginning of this work, will take only those things from philosophy which can conduce to confirming this truth; and we will set forth the errors and the degree of certitude which it has in Theology and in philosophy. Concerning the title of the article it must be observed, with Cajetan in the commentary on the following article, that here there is not a question whether God is a body composed of matter and form. For although in the doctrine of St. Thomas "body" and "composite

263. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus VI.

of matter and form" are the same - for his School acknowledges no simple body - yet because some have thought that some body exists without composition, he rightly inquires in general whether he is a body; but in the following article, whether he is composed of matter and form. In the third, nevertheless, for its own reason he also indicates something concerning composition.

Articulus II - Whether God is composed of matter and form

It seems that in God there is composition of matter and form.

1. For everything that has a soul is composed of matter and form, since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for in Hebrews 10 God is introduced as saying, "The just man lives by faith; but if he draw back, my soul shall have no pleasure in him." Therefore God is composed of matter and form.
2. Further, anger, joy, and the like are passions of something composite, as is said in the first book of On the Soul. But such things are attributed to God in Scripture; for it is said in the Psalm, "The Lord was angry in fury against his people." Therefore God is composed of matter and form.
3. Further, matter is the principle of individuation. But God seems to be an individual, since he is not predicated of many. Therefore he is composed of matter and form.

But on the contrary: everything composed of matter and form is a body, for dimensive quantity first inheres in matter. But God is not a body, as was shown in the preceding article. Therefore God is not composed of matter and form.

I answer that it is impossible for there to be matter in God.

First, because matter is that which is in potency; but it was shown above that God is pure act, having nothing of potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God be composed of matter and form.

Second, because every composite of matter and form is perfect and good through its form, and therefore good by participation, insofar as matter participates in form. But that which is first and best, namely God, is not good by participation, because what is good by essence is prior to what is good by participation. Hence it is impossible that God be composed of matter and form.

Third, because every agent acts through its form; wherefore, as a thing is related to its form, so it is related to acting. Therefore whatever is first and per se agent must be first and per se form. But God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause, as was shown above. Therefore He is form through His essence, and not composed of matter and form.

The conclusion is: God is form, and not composed of matter and form.

Therefore, first it must be said that "soul" is attributed to God by a likeness of act; for that whereby we will something in us is the soul. Hence when it is said "the good pleasure of the soul of God," it is the good pleasure of his will.

Secondly, it must be said that anger and the like are attributed to God by a likeness of effect: because it is proper to one who is angry to punish; hence his act of punishing is metaphorically called his anger.

Thirdly, it must be said that forms, inasmuch as they are receivable in matter, are individuated by matter, which cannot be in another, since it is the first subject sustaining substance; but a form, inasmuch as it is of itself, unless something else impede, can be received by many. Yet that form which is not receivable in matter, but is per se subsistent, is individuated precisely by this, that it cannot be received in another; and such a form is God: whence it does not follow that he has matter.

Conclusion: There cannot be in God any such composition. It is proved by three reasons, one of which we will bring forward in the following disputation for the confirmation of Catholic doctrine. But since the subject matter of this article contains nothing especially proper to the theologian beyond what is common with the doctrine of the preceding article, we will embrace the matter of both under a single disputation.

Disputatio XXI - Whether God is a body or composed of matter and form

Various errors, cap. 1. Catholic truth established by the authority of Scripture and the Fathers, cap. 2. Reasons of the same position, cap. 3.

Caput I - Various errors

So weak is the frailty of the human mind, and so perverse the depravity of morals, that, if it be not prepared by the light of divine grace by the Lord, not only concerning those things which are known solely by supernatural revelation, but even concerning those things which are consentaneous to natural reason, it most shamefully slips. Wherefore above, disputation 1, cap. 2, I noted that sacred doctrine is necessary not only for supernatural mysteries, but also for natural truths to be understood without error. Accordingly, just as there have not failed those who, having fallen into the depth of evils, would deny God, which of all truths is the most well known, so it ought not to be a wonder that there were some so foolish heretics as to assert that God is corporeal.

Among the pagan philosophers, as St. John Damascene relates in the book on heresies, the Stoics were the first authors of this error. For they said that body is everything, and that God is this world which is perceived by sense. In this opinion Thales is said to have been, as Eusebius relates, book 4 of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 6.[264] But Epiphanius, in heresy 8, affirms that the Stoics taught that God is the soul of the world; and Damascene attributes this not to all of them, but to some. Nevertheless they could have taught that he is corporeal itself, as will be established from art. 8 of this question, as Democritus taught, whom we will report in that article.

264. St. John Damascene, De haeresibus; Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 4.6; Epiphanius, Haereses 8.

Among Christians, indeed, the master of this error was, as the Master, on the testimony of Epiphanius in heresy 70, states, in the time of Arius, Audius, or Audæus, a monk, a man formerly religious and grave, who, with Christian freedom and zeal of religion, rebuked sharply not only religious of his own order and presbyters, but also bishops, for misdeeds. Afterwards, however, on some occasion, which Epiphanius narrates, departing from the Church, he began to teach that that of Genesis 1, "Let us make man to our image and likeness," was fulfilled according to the body; in which he said that man is made like to God, and hence he attributed to God the body and members of man. This error Theodoret also ascribes to Audius, book 4, On the Fables of the Heretics, chapter 13, and book 4 of the History, chapter 19.[265] Yet he reports him under the emperors Valentinian and Valens; with which the Tripartite History, book 7, chapter 11, also agrees. Nicephorus, however, book 11, chapter 14, places him under Theodosius the Younger; but the more recent writers vary among themselves. Yet the opinion of Epiphanius in this matter has greater weight with me: following whom St. John Damascene, after the heresy of Arius, immediately puts the sect of the Audiani. The followers of this error were called Audiani, or Odiani, whom, with a corrupted word, St. Augustine calls Vadiani; and others Anthropomorphites, a Greek word composed from anthropos, that is, man, and morphê, that is, form; as it were, those who fashion God in the likeness of a man. Concerning these St. John Damascene in the book on heresies says: "The schism and division of the Audiani is not a heresy"; which St. Augustine also, book on Heresies, cap. 50, seems to gather for himself from Epiphanius. But since he understood that of Genesis 1, "Let us make man," etc., according to the body, from which it necessarily followed that God is corpulent, they are to be considered not only schismatics, but also heretics. Wherefore it is a wonder why St. John Damascene calls them only schismatics and not heretics, since he says that passage of Genesis 1 is explained most harshly by them. Epiphanius indeed, although he calls them schismatics, does not deny that they also were heretics: for they were divided from the bosom and obedience of the Church, and taught the aforesaid error.

This same error, too, Melito, bishop of Sardis, is indicated to have taught earlier, by true report of Theodoret, question 20 on Genesis, after the middle, which are to be discussed earlier, where that "to the image" is situated - in the body, or in the soul. First let me see by whom it was earlier asserted, of which number is Melito, who left writings in which he asserts that God is corporeal.

But, as Sixtus Senensis very well observes, book 5 of the Bibliotheca Sancta, annotation 18, it is hardly credible that such a man fell into so great an error. For elsewhere Eusebius, book 5 of the History, chapter 23, and likewise 24, makes a most notable mention of this man: for he reports Polycrates, who was president in a certain synod of Asia, where it was disputed on which day Easter ought to be celebrated, to have written to Pope Victor that he still wished to retain the ancient tradition of his own people, among whom, mentioning Melito, thus he says: "Why then should I recount the Blessed Papirius and Melito the Eunuch, who, inspired by the instinct of the Holy Spirit, spent all the time of their life piously and holily, and who is buried at Sardis?" Here the text of Eusebius in the ancient translation is rather corrupted: for the translator rendered not

265. Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum compendium 4.13; Historia ecclesiastica 4.19; Historia tripartita 7.11; Nicephorus, Historia 11.14.

"Blessed Papirius," but "Papirius, Macharius, and Melito for the kingdom of God, Eunuch"; where the interpreter accepted these four names as if they were proper names; whereas in truth those two, Macharius and Eunuch, are epithets of the other two; for makarios is not a substantive, but an adjective which in Latin signifies "blessed," which, since it is sometimes a proper name and substantive, was the cause of the interpreter's error.

The same also Eusebius, book 4, chapter 25, and St. Jerome in the books On Ecclesiastical Writers, marvelously praises this Melito, and among his other works lists a book peri ensomiatou theou, that is, On God Incarnate; nevertheless he does not attribute such an error to him: indeed, St. Jerome adds the testimony of Tertullian, in the books Against the Church on behalf of Montanus, who said that this Melito was considered by many a prophet.[266]

Furthermore, Theodoret himself, in the place alleged when treating of the error of the Audiani, makes no mention of Melito; and, which is the chief point, as Sixtus has most well noted, the words of Theodoret in that question 30 on Genesis in Greek exemplars corrected have it far otherwise than those in the Latin codices translated, and a little before recited: for he writes, "of whom the writings which he left are, concerning that God is embodied; he indeed wrote a book on God corporeal, as we have just related from Eusebius and Jerome." Therefore Theodoret does not say that Melito taught that, but others, whose opinion he himself left written and impugned. Wherefore the interpreter of Theodoret erred when he translated "in which he asserts God to be corporeal"; for these words seem to be referred to Melito himself, and therefore the aforesaid error is falsely ascribed to him.

In the same error Tertullian is thought to have been, by the statement of St. Augustine, book 10 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 25, although he excuses him in the book On Heresies, cap. 86, that, although he slipped into this error, he did not say that God is a body of the sort whose parts, some greater, some lesser, might avail, or ought to be thought such as all those things which we properly call bodies are; but, says St. Augustine, he could have called God a body because he is not nothing, he is not emptiness; in this way "body" could be used not for that which has extension, but for the reality which is opposed to shadow. In which sense Paul said to the Colossians 2, "in Christ dwells all the fullness of the Godhead corporally," that is, not figuratively, but really. But where Tertullian taught this St. Augustine does not report; rather in that same chapter 25 he only notes that Tertullian seemed to himself to have taught the contrary, if he thought God to be a body; for in the book On the Soul, chapter 8, at the end, he said that every corporeal thing is passible, and a little above he had said that God is body. But it is not credible, says St. Augustine, that Tertullian thought God to be passible.

I, however, could not find in that book where he says that God is corporeal, nor do St. Augustine or the more recent writers, who attribute this error here to Tertullian, allege any place. Yet this opinion in no way seems able to be excused: for, after he said that there are no members in God, although their names are said of him, he subjoins the reason in these words: "What diversity will there be of the divine body and the human, since, under the same names of members, there will be

266. Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 4.25; St. Jerome, De viris illustribus; Tertullian, Adversus Ecclesiam pro Montano.

such diversity and difference of the divine mind and the human, although under the same words the senses differ?" where, since he clearly asserted that God consists of body and soul, he only contends that the members of the human body are not to be repeated in God: because his body is altogether of another kind of proportion and nature.[267]

One might object to us the same Tertullian in the book On the Trinity, chapters 6 and 7, where he more at length shows that God is spiritual and everywhere, and that only metaphorically do members belong to him. But that book is not by Tertullian, but by Novatian, as Pamelius most well proves at the beginning; there, moreover, Novatian proves that in Scripture members are attributed to God because by these sensible things, in whatever way, we may conceive him, although we cannot express him exactly. Indeed he adds, if we say that God is Spirit, it is not enough; because every spirit is a creature, which Pamelius in annotation 33 thinks that Novatian held the Holy Spirit to be a creature. But Novatian certainly was not speaking of the third person of the Trinity, but of "spirit" for air or wind; therefore most aptly did he say, to express the subtlety of God, that it is not enough if we call him Spirit, using a name transferred from created things to divine: for no name taken from created things is able to express what God is.[268]

Caput II - Catholic truth established by the authority of Scripture and the Fathers

The Catholic doctrine, which affirms that God is altogether incorporeal and spiritual, has always been undoubted in the Church of God, approved by common sense and tradition of the faithful, so that it has no need of confirmation by some express definition of a council. Yet it is expressed in Scripture at Romans 1, where it is said: "The invisible things of God," etc.; and 1 Timothy 1: "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible," etc.; and John 4: "God is spirit." From which places some think that it is not sufficiently proved, unless the common opinion of the Fathers and the sense of the Church interpreting those places be adduced; for many of the Fathers hold that the angels are corporeal, yet they are said by them to be invisible and spiritual, because they have certain more subtle bodies which are likened to spirit, that is, wind, and do not fall under sight. Below, however, disputation 178, chapter 3, we will manifestly show that angels are incorporeal. Meanwhile, from those places it can very well be deduced that the divine nature is spiritual and invisible in a higher way than the angels; and by a much stronger reason one must judge that the same thing concerning God is to be gathered from the same Scripture.

Wherefore all the Fathers whom we have mentioned rightly held that the opinion of the Audiani was heretical. Against which, among more recent writers, Alphonsus de Castro disputes under the word "God," heresy 2; and from the immensity of God, which Scripture hands down, he proves that he is not a body: for either he would be an infinite body or a finite one. To assert an infinite body beyond this universe is without foundation and, as many think, impossible; but that he be finite is not possible either, for by his nature he would be enclosed in some place, against that which Scripture everywhere proclaims, that the majesty of God is contained neither by heaven nor by the

267. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 10.25; De haeresibus 86; Tertullian, De anima 8; Adversus Marcionem 2.16.
268. Novatian, De Trinitate 6 - 7; Pamelius, annotations ad Novatianum.

whole universe; it remains therefore that he be spirit, who is in the whole world, and in any part of it, in such a way that by his nature he is neither circumscribed nor bounded by the universe; because in other universes, if there were many, he could exist, as we shall see in disputation 29.[269]

If, however, any argument at all had weight for the Audiani, it would be that in Scripture man is said to have been made to the image and likeness of God, and that many members are attributed to God, as eyes, hands, etc. But this is ridiculous. For first, all the Fathers interpret the image and likeness of God in man according to the soul, which Epiphanius at the cited place and Theodoret in question 20 on Genesis set forth at length. Secondly, if it had any force, it would also prove that God is a lion and has wings; indeed, that he is a monster compacted from various animals, since Scripture attributes to God not only the members of a man but also of other animals. Therefore all those things are to be understood by metaphor, as Novatian in the book On the Trinity, chapters 6 and 7, very well teaches; and St. Augustine in the book On True and False Religion, cap. 50; and epistle 112, after the middle; and in the book On the Essence of the Divinity something from the beginning; St. Jerome; and St. Anselm in the little work on this matter; St. Gregory, book 14 of the Moralia, cap. 22, on that "Pray, my sons, for my womb"; St. John Damascene, book 1 On the Orthodox Faith, chapters 14 and 15; St. Isidore, book 6 of the Etymologies. There also exists in the ninth tome of St. Jerome an epistle in the order 15, which explains individually the things that are attributed to God in Scripture. The same argument was treated also by Pagninus.[270]

It may be objected to us that the same Tertullian, in the book On the Trinity, chapters 6 and 7, where he shows more at length that God is spiritual and everywhere, and that only metaphorically are members attributed to him, supports our view. But that book is not by Tertullian, but by Novatian, as Pamelius excellently proves at the beginning of Novatian. There, however, Novatian proves from Scripture that members are attributed to God, in order that by these sensible things we may conceive him in some manner, although we are not able to express him exactly. Nay more, he adds that if we call God Spirit, it is not enough, because every spirit is a creature - on which point Pamelius in annotation 33 thinks Novatian erred, as if he had thought the Holy Spirit were a creature. But Novatian certainly was not speaking of the third person of the Trinity, but of spirit as meaning air or wind; and thus he said very well, for expressing God's subtlety, that it is not enough if we call him Spirit with a name transferred from created things to the divine: for no name taken from created realities can express what God is.

The Catholic truth, confirmed by Scripture and the authority of the Fathers.

The Catholic doctrine, which affirms that God is altogether incorporeal and spiritual, has always been undoubted in the Church of God; proved by the common sense and tradition of the faithful; so much so that it does not now need the confirmation of some explicit definition of a Council. Yet it is expressed in Scripture at Romans 1, where it is said: "The invisible things of God," etc.; and 1 Timothy 1: "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible," etc.; and John 4: "God is spirit." From these

269. Alphonsus de Castro, De haeresibus, verbo Deus, haeresis 2.

270. St. Augustine, De vera et falsa religione 50; Epist. 112; De essentia divinitatis; St. Jerome, Epistolae; St. Anselm, Opusculum de hac re; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia 14.22; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 1.14 - 15; St. Isidore, Etymologiae 6; Pagninus, Epistola de nominibus Dei.

passages some think it is not sufficiently proved, unless those texts be interpreted according to the common opinion of the Fathers and the common sense of the Church. For many Fathers hold the Angels to be corporeal; yet they call them invisible and spiritual, because they have certain bodies more subtle, which are likened to spirit - that is, to wind - and do not fall under sight. Nevertheless, below at disputation 178, chapter 3, we shall clearly show that Angels are incorporeal; and this will be gathered most rightly from Scripture's way of speaking. By greater reason, therefore, the same must be judged to be collected about God from the same Scripture.

Wherefore all the Fathers, being moved, rightly thought the opinion of the Audians to be heresy; against which Alphonsus de Castro disputes among the recent writers, under the word "God," heresy 2. And from the immensity of God, which Scripture hands down, he proves that God is necessarily spiritual, or not a body. For either he would be an infinite body, or a finite one. That he is an infinite body above this universe is asserted without foundation, and is, as many more learned men think, impossible; but that he is finite is not possible: for then by his nature he would be contained in some place, against what Scripture commonly proclaims, that the majesty of God is contained neither by heaven nor by the whole universe. It remains, therefore, that he is a spirit, who is in the whole world, and in any part of it in such a way that by his nature he is neither circumscribed nor defined by the universe: because otherwise, if there were many spirits, he could be contained in others, as we shall see at disputation 29.

If, however, any argument would have any force on behalf of the Audians, it would be this: that in Scripture man is said to be made to the image and likeness of God, and many members are attributed to him, as eyes, hands, etc. Yet this is ridiculous. For first all the Fathers interpret the image and likeness of God in man as according to the soul; which is widely followed by Epiphanius in the place cited, and Theodoret in Question 20 on Genesis. But further, if it had any force, it would also prove that God is a lion, and has wings; nay, that he is a monster composed out of various animals, since the Scripture attributes various members not only of a man, but also of other animals, to him. Therefore all those things, as the Novatian in the book On the Trinity, chapters 6 and 7, St. Augustine in On True and False Religion, chapter 50, and in epistle 112 after the middle, and in the book On the Essence of the Divinity somewhat from the beginning, St. Jerome, and St. Anselm in a little opuscle on this question, St. Gregory in the Moralia, book 14, chapter 22 on "I will pray for the children of my womb," St. John Damascene, book 1, chapters 14 and 15 of On the Orthodox Faith, and Isidore, book 6 of the Etymologies, rightly teach, are to be understood metaphorically. There also exists in the ninth tome of St. Jerome an epistle, number 15 in order (in the edition of Pagninus), which explains the several things that are attributed to God in Scripture. The same argument is handled by Alphonsus de Castro under the word "God," heresy 2. [271][272]

271. Novatian, De Trinitate c. 6 - 7; St. Augustine, De vera et falsa religione c. 50; Ep. 112 (post medium); De essentia divinitatis (aliquantum a principio); St. Jerome; St. Anselm; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia XIV, 22; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, 14 - 15; Isidore, Etymologiae VI; St. Jerome, Epistola (tom. IX) in ordine 15 (ed. Pagninus).

272. Alphonsus de Castro, under the word "Deus," heresy 2.

Caput III - Reasons of the same opinion

Although the common opinion of the philosophers has always been that the true God is immaterial and incorporeal, nevertheless I have decided to prove this philosophically, and at the same time to show that God is not composite - which St. Thomas strives to prove in article 2. Many other reasons being omitted, it can be recommended by this one alone. If God is corporeal, either he is composite, or he is altogether simple; in neither way can he be: therefore he must be spiritual and incorporeal.

First, if he were composite, he would necessarily consist at least of two parts, of which one would be potency (*potentia*), the other act (*actus*), otherwise he would not be one simply, which is repugnant to God. But it cannot be that in God one part is potency, the other act; for a part in potency would not be the most perfect thing that it could be, nor would it be God, as is manifest: therefore neither would it have existence (*esse*) from itself, nor union with act, but it would have perfection from another, which either would be God, or would be something under God, having existence and union with act. Therefore, besides that part which would be potency, there would be something which would be God, on which that part would depend; and consequently it could not belong to the essence (*essentia*) of God.

But someone may say that indeed it depends on another more perfect, namely on the whole composite of which it is a part; wherefore it does not follow that, besides that, there is God, on whom its constitution and composition depend. But this objection is easily rejected. For the parts composing the whole cannot, in their very existence or in the union by which they come together to composition, depend on the whole itself: for they are by nature prior to the composite itself; but the prior does not depend on the posterior. Wherefore, if that part depends on something that is God, it cannot belong to the composition of that [whole]. By this reason Antissiodorensis, book 1, Summa, chapter 1, part 2, concludes that, if God were composite, something would be prior to him.[273] St. Gregory Nazianzen too, in Oration 34 (which is the second theological oration), witnesses to this; and Sanctes Pagninus in the Isagoge to the Sacred Letters, chapter 48, near the beginning, proves that there is no composition in God by these words: "For composition is the beginning of conflict; beauty is the conflict of disagreement; disagreement is the solution"; and dissolution by no means falls into God and the first nature. Nay, from this Nazianzen gathers that God is not a body: for he seems to feel that every body is composite and capable of corruption; which, although it cannot be demonstrated, is to me nevertheless most probable; and, if we speak of every corruption, it seems most consonant with Scripture and the doctrine of the Fathers.[274][275]

Moreover, since there are some who think there is some body altogether simple, it must be shown by another reason that God is not a body in this manner. Either he would be wholly without sense and cognition, or cognizant. The first cannot be said; for then it would be a body far more ignoble than very many things, and therefore would not be God. The latter also does not suffice for

273. Antissiodorensis (Anselm of Laon?), Summa, lib. 1, c. 1, pars 2.
274. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 34 (the second theological oration).
275. Sanctes Pagninus, Isagoge ad sacras litteras, cap. 48.

the perfection of God. For if cognition were in a body, it would not be whole in the whole and whole in any part; wherefore that body would not sense equally perfectly from every part; for it would need exterior sense, by which it would perceive sensible things, which could not be applied equally perfectly so as to be known. Hence it would fail in the governance and conservation of things. Then too, since cognition would be a power in a body, it could not fail to be fatigued, and at some time remit its operation; which is of such imperfection that it cannot befit God.

But if someone answers that such a body would be so perfect as to be without toil and weariness, this indeed, just as it is said gratuitously and without foundation, so also is to be rejected without anything further. For whatever be the kind of body, it is by no means capable of lassitude; such as the heavens are; yet a living and cognizant body of this sort cannot exist, unless, as I said, gratuitously and without foundation someone concoct some such body. Philosophical reason more rightly prescribes that fatigue belongs to a body as its own proper [passion], so that it cannot belong to another; and likewise that all that which thinks and discourses is free from matter and body.

As for the principle of individuation, about which in this article one is wont to treat regarding the solution of the third [argument], many opinions are omitted; below, at disputation 181, we shall say something touching this matter.

Articulus III - Whether God is the same as His essence or nature

To the third we proceed thus.

1. It seems that God is not the same as His essence (*essentia*) or nature (*natura*). For nothing is in itself; but the essence or nature of God, which is Deity, is said to be in God: therefore it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature.
2. Further, the effect is likened to its cause: because every agent acts to its like. But in created things the supposit (*suppositum*) is not the same as its nature: for man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore neither is God the same as His Deity.

But on the contrary, of God it is said that He is life, and not only that He is living, as is clear in John 14: "I am the way, the truth, and the life." But as life stands to the living, so Deity stands to God: therefore God is Deity itself.

I answer that God is the same as His essence or nature. For the understanding of which it must be known that in things composed of matter and form it is necessary that the nature or essence and the supposit differ. For essence or nature comprises only those things which fall into the definition of the species: as humanity comprises in itself those things which fall into the definition of man; for by these man is man; and this is what humanity signifies, namely that by which man is man. But individual matter with all the accidents individuating it does not fall into the definition of the species: for in the definition of man these fleshes and these bones, or whiteness, or blackness, or something of this sort, do not fall. Whence these fleshes and these bones and the individuating accidents are not included in humanity; and yet in that which is man they are included. Wherefore

that which is man has in itself something which humanity does not have; and on this account man and humanity are not totally the same; but humanity is signified as the formal part of man: because the defining principles are formally in respect of the individuating matter.

In those, therefore, which are not composed of matter and form, in which individuation is not through individual matter, that is, through this matter, but the forms themselves are of themselves individuated, it is necessary that those very forms be supposits and subsistences (*subsistentia*): whence in them supposit and nature do not differ. And so, since God is not composed of matter and form, as has been shown, it is necessary that God be His Deity, His life, and whatever else is predicated thus of God.

Reply to the first: We cannot speak of simple things except after the mode of composites, from which we receive our cognition: and therefore when speaking of God we use concrete names, so as to signify His subsistence; because among us there subsist only composites: and we use abstract names so as to signify His simplicity. Therefore what is said, that Deity, or life, or something of this sort is in God, is to be referred to the diversity which is in the reception of our intellect, and not to any diversity of the thing.

Reply to the second: The effects of God imitate Him not perfectly, but according as they can: and this belongs to a defect of imitation, that that which is simple and one cannot be represented except by many; and thus there occurs in them composition, from which it follows that in them the supposit is not the same as the nature.

Explication of the article.

The conclusion is: God is the same as His essence or nature. For the explication and doctrine of the whole article it must be noted that by the concrete name "God" St. Thomas understands either the supposit of the divine, or something which includes it: and from this he infers that God is His essence, that is, Deity itself, because the supposit in divine things is not distinguished from it. He thinks exactly the same regarding created spiritual things; not so in composites out of matter and form. In which doctrine there were many things worthy of disputation, some of them indeed philosophical, such as that about the distinction of nature from supposit; yet they are so necessary to the theologian, and were so unknown even to the ancients, that it would not be right to pretermit them unless they were deferred to a more convenient place. But about the concrete "God," whether it directly signifies only the nature and connotes the supposit, or whether it directly also signifies the supposit itself, will be disputed below at disputation 115. And, insofar as the rules of logic may especially aid, the theologian who wishes to understand accurately can do so; and from there also it may be seen how the doctor of the Trinity speaks. Secondly, since the supposit in the divine relations, as we shall see at disputation 159, is, as it were, consummated by the utmost complement, it will be evident whether the supposit and the nature in the divine differ in any way from those [terms] as is said later in disputation 120. Thirdly, the distinction of the created supposit from nature, and of the essence itself, as well in composites from matter as in spirituals, we have above, I hope, explained very well, for the use of the theologian. From this many points of

the doctrine of the divine Incarnation, which are to be treated, depend; and for that reason they are conveniently to be treated where the matters of that question are handled, there at question 4, article 2.

Articulus IV - Whether in God essence and existence are the same

To the fourth we proceed thus.

It seems that in God essence and existence (*esse*) are not the same. For if this were so, then to the divine being nothing would be added: rather, existence, to which no addition is made, is common being, which is predicated of all things: therefore it follows that God is common being predicable of all things; but this is false, according to Wisdom 14: "They imposed the incommunicable name upon woods and stones"; therefore the being of God is not His essence.

Further, concerning God we can know that He is, as was said above, but we cannot know what He is; therefore the being of God is not the same as His whatness or quidditative nature.

But on the contrary, Hilary says in book 6 On the Trinity, at the beginning of the book: being is not an accident in God, but subsistent truth; therefore that which subsists in God is His being.[276]

I answer that God is not only His essence, as has been shown, but also His existence; which indeed can be shown in many ways.

First, because whatever is in something else besides the essence, is either caused by the essential principles of the species, and follows consequently upon the species, as the risible follows upon man and is caused by the essential principles of the species; or [it is caused] by some exterior principle, as heat in water is caused by fire. If therefore the very being in something else is other than its essence, it must be that either it is caused by its essence - if so, that being would be caused by something exterior; or [it is caused] by the essential principles of the same essence. But it is impossible that that which is only a cause by its essential principles have from those same principles its being in such a way that it would have a caused being. It is necessary that that which is the first efficient cause be: it is impossible, therefore, that there be in God one thing which is being and another which is His essence.

Secondly, because existence (esse) is the actuality (actus) of every form or nature: for neither goodness nor humanity is signified in act unless inasmuch as we signify it to exist. It is necessary therefore that existence itself be compared to the essence (essentia), which is other than it, as act to potency (potentia). Since therefore in God there is nothing potential, as was shown above, it follows that there is not in him one thing which is essence and another his existence: therefore his essence is his existence.

276. St. Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate, lib. 6, at the beginning.

Thirdly, just as that which has fire and is not fire is enflamed by participation, so that which has existence and is not existence is a being by participation. But God is his own essence, as has been shown: if therefore he were not his own existence, he would be a being by participation and not by essence; therefore he would not be the first being, which it is absurd to say. Therefore God is his existence, and not his essence alone.

Reply to the first: Something to which no addition is made can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that it belongs to its notion that no addition be made to it, as it belongs to the notion of an irrational animal to be without reason. In another way, something is understood to which no addition is made because it does not belong to its notion that any addition be made to it: thus the common notion of animal is without reason, because it does not belong to the notion of common animal to have reason, nor yet does it belong to its notion to lack reason. In the first way, to be without addition is the divine being; in the second way, to be without addition is the common being.

Reply to the second: "To be" (esse) is said in two ways: in one way it signifies the act of existing; in another way it signifies the composition of the proposition which the soul discovers when it joins the predicate to the subject. Therefore, taking "to be" in the first way, we cannot know God's existence, just as neither his essence, but only in the second way. For we know that this proposition which we form about God, when we say "God is," is true; and we know this from his effects, as was said above.

Conclusion: God is not only his essence (essence), but his existence (esse). Two things are wont in this article to be called into question, which, although they rest in part on the principles of philosophy, are most necessary to the theologian. One is, whether the existence of God is really distinct, or distinct by nature of the thing, from his essence and from the supposit (suppositum): about this, however - just as about the distinction in general of those things which are formally in God - we shall defer to Disputation 116 and the following. The other is, whether the existence of any created thing is distinct from its essence, about which in IIIa q. 17, a. 2, and below in this Ia, Disputation 182, we shall say something; but as to the matters now to be said about God, nothing at all can be helped by it.

Articulus V - Whether God is in some genus

For the fifth, thus one proceeds.

It seems that God is in some genus. For substance is a being subsisting through itself; but this above all befits God: therefore God is in the genus of substance.

Secondly, every single thing is measured by something of its own genus: as lengths by length, and numbers by number; but God is the measure of all substances, as is clear from the Commentator on Metaphysics 10; therefore God is in the genus of substance.[277]

277. The Commentator (Averroes), In Metaphysicorum, book 10.

But on the contrary: Genus is prior, according to the intellect, to that which is contained in the genus; but nothing is prior to God, neither according to thing nor according to intellect; therefore God is not in any genus.

I answer: Something is in a genus in two ways. In one way, simply and properly, as species which are contained under a genus. In another way, by reduction, as principles and privations: for example, point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity as principles; and blindness and every privation are reduced to the genus of their habit. But in neither way is God in a genus.

That something cannot be a species of any genus can be shown in three ways.

First, because a species is constituted from genus and difference. Now, that from which the difference constituting the species is taken stands to that from which the genus is taken as act to potency. For "animal" is taken from the sensitive nature by way of concretion: for that is called "animal" which has a sensitive nature; but "rational" is taken from the intellective nature, because that is rational which has an intellective nature. Now the intellective is compared to the sensitive as act to potency; and likewise is it manifest in other cases. Hence, since in God potency is not adjoined to act, it is impossible that he be in a genus as a species.

Secondly, because since God's existence is his essence, as has been shown, if God were in some genus, his genus would have to be "being" (ens): for a genus signifies what a thing is. But the Philosopher shows in Metaphysics 3 that "being" cannot be the genus of anything: for every genus has differences which are outside the essence of the genus; but no difference can be found which is outside "being," since non-being cannot be a difference. Whence it is left that God is not in a genus.[278]

Thirdly, because all things which are in one genus communicate in the quiddity or essence of the genus, which is predicated of them in answer to "what is it?"; but they differ as to existence: for it is not the same to be a man and to be a horse, nor the same to be this man and that man. And thus it is necessary that whatever things are in a genus differ both in their existence and in their "what it is," that is, in their essence. But in God, existence and essence do not differ; whence it is manifest that God is not in a genus as a species.

From this it is clear that he has neither genus nor differences, nor is there a definition of him, nor a demonstration, except through effect: for a definition is from genus and difference; but the middle term of a demonstration is a definition.

That God is not in a genus by reduction, as a principle, is manifest from this: the principle which is reduced to some genus does not extend beyond that genus; thus the point is a principle only of continuous quantity, and unity of discrete quantity. But God is the principle of the whole of existence, as will be shown below; whence he is not contained in any genus as a principle.[279]

278. Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 3, text 10.
279. See below, q. 44.

Reply to the first: The name "substance" does not signify only "that which exists through itself"; for this, namely existence itself, cannot of itself be a genus, as has been shown; but it signifies the essence to which it belongs to exist thus, that is, to exist through itself; though that existence is not the very essence of it. And thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance.

Reply to the second: That objection proceeds about a proportionate measure; for such a measure must be homogeneous with what is measured. But God is not a proportionate measure of anything; nevertheless he is called the measure of all things from this, that each thing has so much of existence as it approaches to him.

Conclusion: God is neither directly in a predicament (praedicamentum), nor can he be reduced to a predicament.

The doctrine of this article, although it is wont to be disputed by logicians, should not seem alien to the theologian: for upon it depends no small knowledge of the divine perfections. Omitting, however, very many things which are wont to be delivered in this article about analogy, we shall briefly dispatch what concerns the theologian, drawing also upon some points from Logic.

Disputatio XXII - Whether God is in some genus with created things

- Status of the controversy. Caput I.
- The Nominalists held that God is placed in a predicament. Caput II.
- The truer opinion is proved by six reasons of others. Caput III.
- The first reason, effective, of the preceding opinion. Caput IV.
- The later reason. Caput V.
- The preceding reason is confirmed by the doctrine of the Fathers. Caput VI.
- Replies are made to the arguments of the earlier opinion. Caput VII.

Caput I - Status of the controversy

Since it is manifest that there is one only God, as in Question XI is to be proved expressly, the present controversy will not be whether God is placed in some genus common to himself and to other gods: for where a plurality cannot be, or even be imagined, the intellect cannot discover any generic notion, nor arrange a series of predicaments, as is plainly evident.

The question therefore is about a genus or predicament common to God and creatures - namely, whether God can be placed under some such thing.

It will, however, be more difficult to establish that God is outside every genus, if we suppose that which I judge to be most true, and which we shall set forth more openly below in Disputation 118, chapter 4: namely, that none of the predicaments are things, nor forms of notions distinct by nature of the thing, but an ordering of concepts taken from this - that in the things we see, by effects and other signs we conceive some ratio common to them, greater or lesser in extent, and again another more common, up to the supreme degree of genus and of likeness; which likeness

indeed is taken by the intellect from the very nature of things, not because in things there is something really common, or distinct by nature of the thing from singulars. This being supposed, it seems easier that God be contained under some genus. For what could hinder our reason from conceiving that God agrees in some respect with created things, and in some respect differs? And if he ought to be constituted in some predicament, he must be placed not reductively, as they say, but directly: for only those are reduced to a predicament which are not entities, or forms subsisting through themselves, but parts, or as it were principles and appendices, such as a point, the soul, and matter. The present difficulty therefore is, whether God is constituted directly under some genus, as a species.

Caput II - The Nominalists held that God is placed in a predicament

There have not been lacking among the Scholastics those who asserted that God is placed directly in a predicament. The authors of this opinion are Robert Holcot in 1, q. 6; Gregory, d. 8, q. 3, especially in art. 2; Marsilius in 1, q. 12, art. 2; and Gabriel in 1, d. 8, q. 1, who even judged it the more probable, although he himself embraces the opposite opinion, thinking that in the Oxford School it was the common one.[280] In the same way the aforesaid Doctors teach that some names are predicated univocally of God and creatures; which also Scotus thinks, in the same d. 8, and in 1, d. 3, q. 3, n. 9. As to the second point, however, we shall cite him for the following opinion.[281]

But to show that this does not conflict with the divine simplicity, they suppose that which we said above: that genus and difference are distinguished not by nature of the thing, but by our consideration alone; and hence that it does not conflict with God to be in a predicament and to be composed of genus and difference; for no other repugnance would seem to prevent God from being placed in a predicament.

Augustine seems to teach that certain predicaments are said of God only by translation, namely quality, quantity, position, habit, and time, while certain others are said properly, namely substance and relation. On this foundation a good part of the doctrine of the whole book seems to rest. And in that same chapter 8, after he said that many predicaments are predicated of God by translation, he adds these words: "But as to doing, perhaps of God alone is it most truly said: for God alone acts, and he himself is not acted upon, nor does he suffer"; by which he seems to teach that the predicament of action properly befits God.[282]

In addition there is St. John Damascene, who in book 1 On the Faith, chapter 9, so attributes to God the names of sonship and paternity that they were not transferred to God from creatures, but rather, on the contrary, were communicated to us from God. He proves it from that passage to the Ephesians 3: "From whom every paternity in heaven and on earth is named." He teaches this more expressly in the book of the First Institutions, chapter 7, where, after he has said that essence, which others call substance, is the highest genus, he subjoins: "Of this highest and first genus the

280. Robert Holcot, 1, q. 6; Gregory, d. 8, q. 3, especially art. 2; Marsilius, 1, q. 12, art. 2; Gabriel, 1, d. 8, q. 1.
281. Scotus, the same d. 8; and in 1, d. 3, q. 3, n. 9.
282. St. Augustine, De Trinitate 5.8: "Solus enim Deus facit, et ipse non fit, neque patitur."

species are, first, that which is without body, and inanimate body"; and, after a few things interposed, he completes thus: "Essence without body comprises God, the angel, the soul, the demon."[283]

Caput III - The truer position, proved by six reasons of others: that God cannot be placed in a predicament

The aforesaid position is much more probable, which more and greater authorities among the theologians follow; namely, that God cannot be placed in a predicament. Thus taught St. Thomas, Cajetan, and more recent authors in this article; Henry in the Summa, article 26, question 2. The Master also is reported in 1, distinction 8, who teaches that neither the predicaments of accidents, nor substance itself properly, befit God, by which he seems to exclude God from the predicament of substance. But most clearly do Albert in the same distinction, article 32; St. Bonaventure, article 1, question 4; Richard, article 4, question 2; Thomas of Argentina, question 1, article 1; Aegidius, article 1, question 3; Scotus, question 3; Basso lis, question 4; Capreolus, question 2, article 1, conclusions 5 and 6; Durandus, in 2, distinction 3, question 1, number 12; likewise St. Thomas and the Ferrarian in Contra gentiles 1, chapter 25; finally Ockham in that distinction 8, question 1 - although he judges it difficult to prove - embrace the aforesaid position.[284]

From this doctrine Gregory in the cited question, articles 1 and 2, resolves almost all the reasons that are wont to be brought forward for the contrary opinion, as will be clear by induction. Hence the second reason is dissolved, which is as follows: Genus is a part of that which is under a genus; but God does not have parts; therefore God is not under a genus. By this reason Aegidius and Henry in the places cited, and Avicenna in Metaphysics 8, used to argue; and yet nothing is proved thereby: for it does not seem to be contrary to the simplicity of God to consist of some parts according to our intellect. Just as it is not repugnant to be composite, or constituted by reason, as will be explained below in disputation 121, chapter 2, and again in disputation 159, so only composition from the nature of the thing is repugnant to God, as also plurality and distinction, except the distinction of the persons.

The third reason is: A thing of a predicament ought to be something distinct from its existence (*esse*), at least in intention and in definition, although in reality it is not distinguished. But Henry - whose this reason is - understands only a distinction of reason, as will be evident from his doctrine below, disputation 121, chapter 1. Since therefore God is not distinguished from his own existence, but in the definition of God himself that is included even according to our reason, it follows that God is not placed in a predicament.

283. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 1.9; and "From whom every paternity in heaven and on earth is named" (Eph. 3). Also: Damascene, Lib. primarum institutionum c. 7.

284. St. Thomas; Cajetan; Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 26, q. 2; the Master (Peter Lombard), 1, dist. 8; Albert the Great, in the same distinction, art. 32; St. Bonaventure, ar. 1, q. 4; Richard of St. Victor, ar. 4, q. 2; Thomas of Argentina, q. 1, ar. 1; Aegidius (Giles of Rome), ar. 1, q. 3; Scotus, q. 3; Basso lis, q. 4; Capreolus, q. 2, ar. 1, concl. 5 - 6; Durandus, in 2, d. 3, q. 1, n. 12; St. Thomas again; the Ferrarian (Ferrariensis), Contra gentiles 1.25; Ockham, dist. 8, q. 1.

St. Thomas used almost this same reasoning in this article; and Capreolus in 1, distinction 8, question 2, article 1, conclusion 2. For he assumes it necessary that, in order for something to be placed in a predicament, the essence (*essentia*) of that thing differ from its existence not only by reason, as Henry was saying, but also from the nature of the thing. Yet this reasoning is easily solved from the same principle posited above. Both because what Henry supposes in his major proposition cannot be proved; and also because in God we can distinguish essence from existence by our concept in the manner of creatures. Moreover, we will show in 3, part, question 17, article 2, that existence and essence in created things are not distinguished from the nature of the thing. And since composition from genus (*genus*) and difference (*differentia*) is only by the intellect, such a distinction from the nature of the thing does not seem necessary.

The fourth reason of Scotus is in this way. Although a common and univocal concept can be given to God and creatures - for thus he thinks "being" is predicated of God and creatures - yet in God there is no reality which of itself is indifferent to the finite and the infinite, from which a genus might be taken: therefore God cannot be placed under a genus. But from the same principle it is clear that it is not necessary that there be something distinct from the nature of the thing, from which the genus is taken, and something from which the difference is taken, as we will show from the doctrine of St. Thomas, disputation 180, chapter 3. Wherefore this can place no obstacle to that which is most simple being able to consist of genus and difference.

The fifth reason, which St. Thomas asserts in that chapter 25, is of this sort. If God were in a predicament, he ought to be in the predicament of substance; but in that he cannot be, because "substance" is said of him abusively, according to St. Augustine, book 7 On the Trinity, chapter 5: therefore God is not in a predicament. Yet one can reply: although "substance," if we consider that from which the name was first imposed, is not properly said of God, but abusively - for it was said from "standing under" accidents - if, however, we attend to the thing itself signified, it is properly found in God, as in that same chapter Augustine indicates: for it signifies a nature, or essence, which does not need another in which it may inhere, but is through itself. Wherefore he teaches that essence properly befits God. And indeed, since "hypostasis" is properly said of God according to the phrase of the Greek Fathers and Councils, there is no reason why we should deny that "substance" too is properly predicated of God. For both hypostasis in Greek, and substance in Latin, are said from "standing under." But what St. Thomas objects on the contrary in that same chapter 25 - namely, that "per se" in substance is nothing, and signifies only a negation of existing in another, and therefore if in God there is not substance insofar as it "stands under" accidents, substance does not properly befit him - does not persuade me. For, as I will show in 3, part, question 4, article 2, against Scotus, that "per se" mode in substance is not a mere negation, but something positive explained by a negation, as also in the supposit and the person.

The sixth reason: whatever is in a predicament is enclosed and contained by it; but that which is infinite, like God, cannot be enclosed or contained by another: therefore neither is it in a predicament. This argument was used by St. Bonaventure, Thomas of Argentina, and Durandus, and was hinted at by Aegidius and Albert; yet it is of little weight. For to be contained under some genus of a predicament happens only according to our mode of understanding. And as we

understand the natures of things determined and finite essentially, so too we can consider something common and indifferent to the finite being and the infinite, unless that should be repugnant on other grounds. For to be contained and concluded under the most general predicament does not mean to be finite and limited in reality according to essence. For the common concept is abstracted from both, and thus can under itself embrace both finite and infinite according to essence. I pass over other reasons which, from the foregoing doctrine, I could easily show to be weak, and by two only, more efficacious, we will confirm the aforesaid position.

Caput IV - The first efficacious reason for the foregoing position

Two reasons are at my disposal which efficaciously prove the superior and more preferable position; of which I will set forth the former, since it seems less theological, more strictly in this chapter; the latter, which contains much doctrine of the Fathers, I will subjoin in the following chapter.

The first is of this sort. Whatever is under some genus is either an individual, or a species, either subalternate or lowest; but God in neither way can be in a predicament: therefore in no way is he placed in it. First, he is not a species; for he neither contains under himself other species as subalterns, nor individuals as the lowest species, as is manifest; for there are not many gods, differing only in number. Next, God in a predicament cannot be an individual: for every individual, in the notion of its species, essentially agrees with others; but God can in no way agree thus with anything in the world; otherwise he would be said to be of the same species with some creature and to differ from it only numerically; which is absurd, because he is more distant from any creature whatsoever than one creature is from another of a different species. Therefore God in no way is contained with any creature under a genus.

Next, it cannot be said that God is under any of the ten predicaments assigned by Aristotle; and by running through them it will easily be made clear. For if he were placed under any of those, he would be substance or relation; as Augustine seems to have taught in the places cited for the prior position: for of the other predicaments although something is properly said of God - namely, that he acts, as Augustine indicates - yet that is not something in God himself intrinsically and befitting. Now the controversy is whether God himself, according to something of himself, is placed in some predicament; not however whether something of a predicament is properly enunciated of him at least by an extrinsic denomination: as nearly all the items that are numbered in the predicament of action. Wherefore, although we should concede that the action of creation, or another by which God produces something external, is in the predicament of action, nevertheless what is said of God on that account does not make God himself to be in a predicament. It remains, then, that he must be in the predicament of substance or of relation, if he is to be placed in any. But that he cannot be constituted in these will also be easily proved.

First, indeed, concerning the predicament of relation (*relatio*), there is a particular argument to be set out next, besides the common reason that will be given a little later.

Caput V - The latter reason

The latter reason is this. Either God together with all other created things is under the univocal predicament (*praedicamentum*) of being, or he is under one of the ten predicaments assigned by Aristotle; but under none can he be: therefore he is not under any predicament. First, he cannot be under being: both because substance alone is being simply, while the rest are such only in a qualified sense; but what is predicated univocally of some things is wont to belong to them simply; and also because whenever some abstract concept univocally befits many, it ought to be common besides many things, that is, so abstracted from them that in them something remains by which they differ, different from that which is abstracted univocally from them: otherwise nothing common to them could be understood, as we will show in disputation 114, chapter 2. But "being" cannot be abstracted in this way; for in that which remains in the inferiors the very notion of being is intrinsically included; for which reason it is commonly said that being is intrinsically included in each, and hence is not a genus, nor univocal with respect to all individual beings; which reason Richard touched upon. Wherefore I do not see how those things could stand which Scotus teaches in the place cited: namely, that there is something univocally common to God and creatures, but that God is not placed under a predicament; to pursue this more extensively against him is not necessary. From what has been said one may also gather the commentary of certain more recent authors who try to recall all things into one predicament of being.

Next, it cannot be said that God is under one of the ten predicaments assigned by Aristotle; as will easily be made clear by running through some of them. For if He were placed under any of them, He would be under substance or relation, as Augustine seems to have taught in the places cited for the prior position; for from the other predicaments scarcely anything is properly said of God except "to act," as Augustine indicates; yet that is not something intrinsically and fittingly in God Himself. But the present controversy is whether God Himself, according to something in Him, is placed in some predicament; not, however, whether some predicament is properly enunciated of Him at least by an extrinsic denomination: as perhaps the predicament of action would be enunciated. Wherefore, although we should grant that the action of creation, or another by which God produces something externally, is in the predicament of action (which, however, is not yet certain), nevertheless for that reason God Himself would not be in that predicament. It remains therefore to see whether, if He is to be collocated in any, He must be in the predicament of substance or of relation. But that in these He cannot be constituted will also be easily proved.

First, indeed, concerning the predicament of relation, apart from the common reason which likewise proves the point concerning the predicament of substance - reason which we shall assert below - this can be shown in a special way. Although the series of each predicament is disposed by our intellect alone, indeed sometimes the predicaments are distinguished by our reason alone, as action and passion and relation (a point which will be made manifest below in Disputation 118, chapter 3), nevertheless the predicaments of accidents necessarily require this, that in no predicament of accident should anything be collocated unless it be a true and real accident. For just as the predicament of substance is true and real substance, so also the remaining nine are truly

accidental forms. This supposed, human reason can order the several predicaments of accident, and distinguish one from another; but the relation which is in God is not an accidental form, but true substance: therefore it cannot be placed in the predicament of relation, which is one of the nine. For the same reason we shall note in Disputation 173, chapter 2, that a relation which by the nature of the thing is the same as substance is not to be constituted in the predicament of relation.

But for what reason Boethius in book 1 of De Trinitate says that the predicament of quality and quantity in God signifies substance, that the last six predicaments are said of God after the manner of an extrinsic form, and that, finally, the predicament of relation is not predicated of God, will be explained in Disputation 114, chapter 1.[285]

Furthermore, that God is not in the predicament of substance is shown thus: no notion can be apprehended by our intellect univocally common to God and creatures - not only of wisdom, power, and the other attributes which in creatures are accidents but in God are substance, but not even of substance itself. For the substance in God is of such a nature that it ought rather to be called supersubstance than substance; because neither the name substance, nor the concept which we have of it, suits that which is in God; a point which common opinion of the Fathers bears out for the other names also which are said of God, as we shall see in the following chapter.

Caput VI - The foregoing reason is confirmed by the doctrine of the Fathers

Boethius. Boethius, about the middle of his book on the Trinity, speaking of the substance of God, writes thus: "For substance in Him, namely in God, is not truly substance, but beyond substance; and, a few words later: For when we say 'God is,' we seem indeed to signify substance, but that which is beyond substances."[285] He is elucidated by Gilbert. In his commentary on that book he says: "For what is called His substance is indeed in that of which it is predicated, but it is not there substance - that is, not with that truth of notion by which anything whatever is called substance, namely that which, subsisting, is something; it is substance in respect of that in which it is, but it is called substance by a certain proportion of reason." By which words Gilbert expressed Boethius's opinion, namely, that substance in God is not of the same notion with our own, but is called substance by a certain proportion.

However, what the author subjoins a little below does not please me: namely, that God is named essence by one notion, substance by another, so that in this way there be some agreement between God and the creature; whereas in truth the ratio of both names is the same, if it be compared with God and with creatures. For Boethius does not on that account deny substance of God because by its primary signification it signifies that which underlies accidents; but because God's substance and nature exceeds the grasp of our cognition, and therefore neither by the name substance, nor essence, nor by any other imposed by us can it be expressed, except by a certain proportion.

That this was the mind of Dionysius in book 7 of On the Divine Names, I hold myself persuaded.[286] For there, describing the mode by which we know God in this life, he says that we have knowledge of God not from His own nature (which, considered in itself, is unknown to us), but

285. Boethius, De Trinitate 1; see also Gilbert of Poitiers (Porretanus), Commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, ad loc.

from the things created by Him, in which there are images and likenesses of the divine perfections. And explaining this mode more fully he adds: "But that which surpasses all things we approach, so far as lies in us, by the way and order of the removal of all things and by the excellence and ascendings of all." Whence: "In all things God is known, and apart from all; and God is known both by knowledge and by ignorance." These words St. Thomas, in lecture 4 on that chapter, explains by distinguishing three modes by which we know God, which Dionysius seems to have expressed in the words cited.[287]

The first and chief mode is by the negation of those things which we see: hence we deny of God substance, wisdom, and all the rest. We deny, I say, in that manner in which we see those things in creatures and for this present state conceive them: for thus they are by no means found in God. Wherefore the same Dionysius in the Mystical Theology, in the chapter on God, thus speaks: "We profess that He is neither soul, nor mind, nor has imagination, opinion, discourse, or mental apprehension; that He is neither reason nor understanding."[286] And, among many other things which he denies of Him, he numbers life, essence, and eternity - not for any other reason than because nothing of that sort, such as we conceive and see, is in God.

This mode of knowing God Damascene taught with these notable words: "But in God it is impossible to say what His essence and nature is; rather it is more fitting to speak by the removal and denial of all things: for none of the things that are is His."[288] And a little later he grants that He is "beyond essence"; finally he subjoins: "There are moreover certain things which, although they are said of God by affirmation, nevertheless have the force of negation: for example, when in speaking of God we take up the word 'darkness,' we do not propose to our mind obscurity, but that He is not light as we know it, rather that He is loftier than light." Therefore this mode of knowing God denies all the things which we have said of God - not because of any imperfection in God, but because He surpasses all those things by a certain superior way.

In the same way Boethius, in that same book De Trinitate, said that God is not substance, but supersubstance. Of both modes of knowing - by affirmation and by negation - Dionysius makes mention: in that same book the Mystical Theology, chapter 3, and in book 1 of On the Divine Names; and a little after the middle he seems to have indicated both when he said that God is all the things that are, and is nothing of the things that are.[286] Elias cites these words in his commentary on Oration 24 of Nazianzen, which is "On the Coming of the Egyptians"; he says: "God indeed is the cause of the things that are, but He Himself is not, as being none of those things that are, but above all."[289] For although God is called being (ens), according to that saying, "I am who am," nevertheless He is not being in the way that the things which are are being (for otherwise the

286. Pseudo-Dionysius, De mystica theologia 3, 5; De divinis nominibus 1, 7.

285. Boethius, De Trinitate 1; see also Gilbert of Poitiers (Porretanus), Commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, ad loc.

287. St. Thomas, In De divinis nominibus, cap. 7, lect. 4, on the three ways: by negation, by excellence, and by causality.

286. Pseudo-Dionysius, De mystica theologia 3, 5; De divinis nominibus 1, 7.

288. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 1.4.

286. Pseudo-Dionysius, De mystica theologia 3, 5; De divinis nominibus 1, 7.

289. Elias of Crete, Commentary on St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 24 (In adventum Aegyptiorum); also on the Apologetic Oration.

craftsman would be of the same mode as his work), nor is He being in any determinate way, but simply and in a peculiar mode, or as in an eminent and surpassing way, as He alone knows. And on the Apologetic Oration, on those words "The high heaven," he speaks thus: "He indeed (namely, God) is, according to St. Dionysius, as mind, and as wisdom, and as life, and as lovable, celebrated by all Scripture. And likewise He both has many names and is without every name." And a little below, after he had enumerated many things which are said of God, he subjoins: "Accordingly He is said to be all these things, and yet He is above all these things: for God is, and is mind above mind, and is life above life, and, finally, is above all."

On the other hand, others, in order to show the same difference between God and other created things, and that He is above all, said that God is, and that the rest are not. Thus Augustine reports that Plato called all things except God "non - beings"; whence Augustine persuaded himself that Plato had read that text of Exodus 3 in which the Lord answered Moses: "I am who am." The same Plato in the Sophist shows that that which can simply be called being is that which contains in itself the perfections of being, and to which nothing is lacking. In this sense Augustine, Confessions 7, chapter 11, says thus: "I inspected the rest beneath Thee, and I saw that they neither altogether are nor altogether are not: they are, indeed, because they are from Thee; but they are not, because they are not what Thou art; for that is truly which remains unchangeably."

The third mode of knowing God, says St. Thomas, is according to the relation of cause and effect, since all the things found in the order of nature are considered as effects of God Himself.[287]

Caput VII - On the ways of knowing and naming God

But this third mode, which is little suited to the present disputation, ought to be included under one of the two preceding modes. For when we refer other things to God, we understand Him either by negation or by excellence: from this doctrine of the Fathers it is clearly evident that nothing can be univocally common to God and creatures in our cognition; therefore the notion of the divine essence does not pertain to the predicament of other things. Nor is this only true if the discourse be about the intellect of wayfarers, but also about the intellect of those seeing God: first, because for the same reason nothing at all common can be found between God and creatures, since God is above every mode of essence and of substance; and also, because those who see the thing are assured that in it they cannot distinguish a generic from a specific concept, as we shall see in disputation 118, chapter 4.

For this cause also the names which otherwise, according to the common sentiment of the theologians, are said properly of God, the Fathers affirm neither to belong to Him truly nor properly, because in God they signify something quite other than in created things from which they are taken. Thus Boethius in that book On the Trinity said that substance in God is not truly substance; and St. Augustine, book 5 On the Trinity, chapter 10, at the end, after having asserted that certain predicaments are said of God not metaphorically but properly, subjoins: Yet if anything can be said properly of Him by the mouth of man: as if to intimate that in every

287. St. Thomas, In De divinis nominibus, cap. 7, lect. 4, on the three ways: by negation, by excellence, and by causality.

appellation by which we name God, however proper it may seem, there is always something of the mode of translation.[294][295] In which sense Pseudo-Dionysius, chapter 5 of the Mystical Theology, among the many things which he denies of God, says that in God there is neither the notion of son nor of father; and St. Basil, book 5 against Eunomius, chapter 13, says that neither son nor generation is proper to the Deity, but thinks it has been introduced from human likeness.[296][297]

For the explanation of this it must be noted that in all the names which are attributed to God there is some impropriety, because they do not signify God and His perfections as they are in themselves, but after the manner of created things whose likeness we know, by removal or by excellence, as has been explained. But when they are transferred to God so as to signify that which is in Him unmixed with imperfection, we therefore say that the formal signification of those things is found in God truly and properly. Thus we call Him wise, not because He discourses, nor because His cognition is an operation elicited by a faculty of the intellect, but because in Him all things are manifest in a certain superior manner.

On these names St. Thomas taught most well below, q. 13, a. 2 - 3: that they are said of God improperly, if we attend to that from which they are taken and to the mode of our cognition; but if we attend to the thing itself, they belong properly to God. Which we shall show there from St. Cyril and John Cyparisiotes. On the other hand, because there are some names whose proper signification cannot at all be separated from imperfection, transferred to God they cannot in any way belong to Him properly, but metaphorically; which nevertheless are attributed to God because of some likeness of an effect. Such as we sometimes attribute even to inanimate things: so to the disturbed sea, anger and indignation; and hearing and sense also, because of some likeness on the side of an effect. Therefore when the cited Fathers teach that nothing of the things which are understood by us belongs properly to God, and hence that all the names are predicated of Him improperly, they are to be understood as speaking in the former way

In this reasoning St. Thomas and Cajetan also have used in this article; Richard and the Argentina in the place cited: for, as Richard most aptly says, every creature in respect of God is said to be a being by imitation, no otherwise than accidents in respect of substance; and therefore the Doctors cited think that there is not anything univocally common to God and creatures. With whom Cajetan teaches this very thing in this article and in I, q. 13, a. 5, and in the little work On Being and Essence, c. 2, q. 3; Ferrar likewise with the same St. Thomas in Contra Gentiles c. 32; Basthol also on I, dist. 8, q. 1, a. 5. For these reasons we reply to the arguments for the prior view.[298][299]

294. Boethius, De Trinitate 1.

295. St. Augustine, De Trinitate 5.10.

296. Pseudo-Dionysius, De mystica theologia 5; De divinis nominibus 7.

297. St. Basil, Contra Eunomium 5.13.

298. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 2 - 3; on the three ways, see also In De divinis nominibus, cap. 7, lect. 4.

299. Cajetan on Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 5; Opusculum De ente et essentia c. 2, q. 3; Richard of St. Victor; the "Argentina" (Hugh of Strassburg); Ferrar; Basthol on I, dist. 8, q. 1, a. 5; and St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles 1.32.

Foundations of the prior opinion are not difficult to overthrow. To the first argument, which is unique, namely that the authors of that opinion think that no effective argument is found for ours, I answer: although many reasons which are customarily adduced for our opinion do not have much weight, nevertheless some not ineffectual are not lacking, as was shown above. And to the testimonies of the Fathers from what has been said one can also easily reply.

Reply to the authorities. To the first, which is of St. Augustine, we concede that those two predicaments of substance and relation, that is, the names of those predicaments, belong properly to God; but not univocally: for which reason we noted above whence Augustine, book 5 On the Trinity, chapter 10, said: Yet if anything can be said properly of Him, that is, of God, by the mouth of man. But we are not concerned at present with those predicaments which are enunciated of God only extrinsically, such as the predicament of action. For although the action of God should be set in a predicament, nevertheless not for that reason would God Himself be placed in a predicament.

To the second testimony, which is of Damascene, I reply that the vocables of sonship and procession, like all the others, are truly translated from creatures to the divine, as was shown above from Pseudo-Dionysius and other Fathers, who for that reason seem to concede a certain kind of translation in divine names, because all those things have been taken from created things. Wherefore I do not see how Damascene could have said the opposite. That, indeed, which he adduces on Ephesians 3, "from whom every fatherhood," does not prove that the very names and vocables "Son" and "Father" were derived from divine to human things; nor does any of the Fathers interpret the place in that sense. Nor indeed does "fatherhood" in that place signify the ratio and dignity of a Father, but family. For in Greek there is in the margin that "patria" denotes family or tribe. Thus Psalm 21 the Vulgate translates: "All the families shall adore in His sight," and Psalm 95, where he could have said in Latin, "Bring to the Lord the families of the nations," he left the Greek name "patriae," and said, "Patriae of the nations." In Hebrew it is mishpehoth, which the Seventy have translated as patriae in the cited places and in Numbers. Therefore also in Ephesians 3 is set the name "patria," which signifies family, not "patrotês," which in Latin can be said "paternitas"; which same term Damascene uses in the subtext when he says: It is fitting that the name of paternity, that is, of family, be derived.[300]

1. Solution. Further, it must be observed that the word "is named" in that place in Paul does not signify that which is called or is vocalized, but that which is. Thus also "name" is sometimes taken for the thing itself: Philippians 2: "At the name of Jesus every knee should bow," as has been often shown by us elsewhere. A similar thing is said in that same epistle, chapter 1: "Above every name that is named whether in this age or in that to come," that is, above everything that is celebrated.

Therefore the sense of Paul in Ephesians 3 is of this sort: Hence I bend the knee to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom every "patria," and family of men as well as of angels, is derived; who is not only the Father of Christ, but also of all men and of angels; and therefore not only

300. Eph. 3; Phil. 2:10; Ps. 21(22); Ps. 95(96); see also St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 7 on Ephesians; Theophylact, Theodoret, and Oecumenius on Ephesians; St. Ambrose; St. Jerome, Commentarii in Ephesios (short and large versions).

eternal paternity, but temporal also in heavenly and earthly tribes and congregations, belongs to Him. This interpretation is followed by all the Greek Fathers - St. John Chrysostom, homily 7; Theophylact; Theodoret; and Oecumenius on that place: among the Latins, however, St. Ambrose does not press this particle of the text. St. Jerome in the short commentaries which are had in tome 8 simply explains it thus: From whom every "paternitas" has received its name, that is, from whom every thing that is father is named father: not that he thought that by translation from the divine to the human the name "Father" was derived, but that every thing which is father has from God the form, dignity, and hence also the very name, of father. But the same Jerome in the large commentaries, which are had in tome 6, excellently explains this place according to the mind of the Greek Fathers, demonstrating that the name patria signifies family, although he himself translates "paternitas": and certainly the Vulgate translator, because of a paronomasia, that is, a likeness of names, rendered "paternitas" in Latin what in Greek is patria. Yet the sense comes to the same both ways, if by the name "paternitas" we understand not only the notion which arises by generation, but also a principality in any family and congregation: otherwise, if paternity there were signified only from generation, it could by no reason be true that every paternity which is in heaven and on earth comes from the eternal Father or is named after Him; since in heaven there is no other besides the eternal paternity of God the Father: and this is not from Him, but rather is Himself the Father. Of the celestial spirits there is indeed a principality; or at least there is a paternity proceeding not by generation. Thus, therefore, Jerome in those commentaries explains this place so as to say that not only every family and assembly, both of angels and of men, is from God the Father, but indeed also every paternity; which he thinks to be a principality in a congregation: for he says, I think the angels and the other virtues have first rank in the heavens, whom they rejoice to call fathers. Therefore it is clear that Damascene did not employ that testimony according to the mind of the Apostle.

By reason also it is proved that the aforesaid names were not derived from the divine to the human: for before the mystery of the Trinity was manifested to the world, men, according to the idioms of their languages, were called fathers and sons; and the name of generation among men is by so much more ancient as human generation was known before the divine. Likewise the name "Spirit," as Basil noted, was taken from created things, namely from the breathed air, and was in a certain manner translated to the divine. In the same way Pseudo-Dionysius is to be understood, On the Divine Names in the cited place, where as it were by allusion and accommodation he reads that testimony of Paul thus: From whom, namely from the divine Trinity, the very "Trinity" is named in heaven and on earth.

To the other testimony of Damascene from the Elementary Chapters, chapter 7, I reply that it plainly favors the former opinion: unless we say that in that place he is not so much concerned to settle whether God is in a predicament, as to propose examples of species and genera: the truth of which examples is not always found.

Articulus VI - Whether there are any accidents in God

We proceed thus to the sixth. It seems that there are in God certain accidents. For a substance is no accident to another, as it is said in Physics I: but that which cannot be in another as accident, cannot be in another as substance. Thus it is proved that heat is not the substantial form of fire: because in other things it is an accident; but wisdom, virtue, and the like, which in us are accidents, are attributed to God; therefore also in God there are accidents.

1. Further: In every genus there is one first, but many are subsequent in rank: these are accidents; therefore if the first of those genera are not in God, there will be many firsts outside God, which is incongruous.

But on the contrary: Every accident is in a subject; but God cannot be a subject: because a simple form cannot be a subject, as Boethius says in the book On the Trinity; therefore in God there cannot be an accident.[301]

I answer that, from the foregoing it plainly appears that in God an accident cannot be. First indeed, because the subject is related to the accident as potency to act: for the subject, by reason of an accident, is in a certain way in act; but in no way is potency in God, as from the foregoing is evident. Second, because God is His own existence, as Boethius says in the book On the Hebdomads: and although that which is some thing can have something adjoined, nevertheless "to be" itself can have nothing adjoined: thus that which is hot can have something other than hot, as whiteness; but heat itself has nothing besides heat. Third, because everything which is per se is prior to that which is per accidens. Hence, since God is simply the first being, in Him there cannot be anything per accidens. Nor indeed can accidents be in Him per se, as "risible" is per se an accident of man: because such accidents are caused by the principles of the subject. But in God nothing can be subject to principles.

Reply to the first: Virtue and wisdom are not predicated univocally of God and of us, as will be made clear below. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God as in us.

Reply to the second: Since substance is prior to accidents, the principles of accidents are reduced to the principles of substance as to prior things: although God is not the first content within the genus of substance, but is first outside of every genus with respect to the whole of existence.

Explanation and confirmation of the article.

The conclusion is: In God there are no accidents. St. Thomas proves this by three reasons. Omitting these, because they are easier, and also those which Cajetan notes, I have resolved to confirm the entire doctrine of the article by the judgment of the Fathers. It is held as indubitable, both by philosophers and by theologians, that all those things which in creatures are accidents, when attributed to God, pass into His substance (*substantia*). Thus teach, among the Fathers, St. Augustine in De Trinitate 5, chapters 4 and 5; and Boethius in the book On the Trinity, when he

301. Boethius, De Trinitate; De hebdomadibus.

says that the predicaments of accidents, which are transferred to God, signify substance.[302] Athanasius agrees in the Epistle to the African Bishops; Basil in Epistle 141 to the Caesarienses; Marius Victorinus in book 1 against the Arians; and Nicetas, in Oration 40 of St. Gregory Nazianzen, on the words "I desire to be dissolved," teaches the same. The same truth was defined by Leo I in epistle 93 to Turibius, chapter 5, and in the Council of Rheims against Gilbert, the acts of which we will report below, disputation 120, chapter 2 - not that Gilbert thought that there are accidents in God, but that he said God is not His own wisdom. But when in the council it is defined that God, that is, the person, is His own wisdom and His own deity, it is plainly decreed that there is no accident in God.[303]

From the philosophers indeed, by the guidance of natural reason, Plato knew this very thing in the Symposium, where, speaking of the Beautiful, which he says is of God, he says: "It always is, nor is it affected by change; it is not beautiful as a part, nor as that in which beauty is, but He Himself is by Himself Beauty, whence the beauty of the others flows forth"; and Plutarch in the book On the Instruction of Princes, where he says: "Justice does not sit beside Jove, but He Himself is justice, and the most exact law."[304]

By philosophical reason also it can be shown. Moreover, all the reasoning of St. Augustine, which, from the immutability of God, rightly proves that there is not in Him any accident which can be separated, some employ in this argument: whether an accident can be separated from God or not, if once we concede that there is an accident in God, we are forced to say that He is composed of two; for the form of a true accident in respect of something cannot be, unless it be really distinguished from that by nature before the intellect. But to assert composition in God is absurd, as is evident from article 2. Therefore whatever is in Him is of His substance and essence (*essentia*).

However, since hitherto in the conclusion it has been proved that God is not essentially composed, and yet from the fact that someone should say that in Him there is some accidental composition it would not follow that there is in Him essential composition, it is necessary by another reason to prove that accidental composition is not found in God, which is of this sort: Since by His very nature God is the highest being most perfect, needing nothing, than whom nothing better can be conceived, it follows that in His essence and substance is contained every fullness of perfection; nor does He need another extraneous nature or form, such as is accidental. Wherefore not only essentially, but neither accidentally can He be composed.

Furthermore, since there are certain appellations which are attributed to God from time, as of Creator, Lord, etc., they are said to belong to God not from any change wrought in Him in time, but through extrinsic denomination and respect from the change of creatures. This St. Augustine noted very well in book 5 On the Trinity, chapter 16, and St. Jerome on that of Amos 9: "Behold I will command," where he says: "Therefore God is not changed, who is always immutable, but we change Him by our conversion"; as if he said, there is no change in Him, but because we are

302. St. Augustine, De Trinitate 5.4 - 5; Boethius, De Trinitate.
303. St. Leo I, Ep. 93 ad Turibium, c. 5; Council of Rheims against Gilbert of Poitiers.
304. Plato, Symposium (on the Beautiful itself); Plutarch, De doctrina principum.

changed, He is said to look upon us in another way. Wherefore, to speak in the manner of logicians, although in God there is not any accident of the predicament, that is, any intrinsic form, yet there is an accidental predicable, that is, something can be predicated of Him by the predication of the fifth predicable. Nay more, if there be any predicament which, by extrinsic respect alone, is said of substance, something too can be enunciated of God by reason of mere simplicity, which does not repugn.

Articulus VII - Whether God is absolutely simple

To the seventh we proceed thus. It seems that God is not absolutely simple. For those things which are from God imitate Him: whence from the first being are all beings, and from the first good are all goods; but in the things which are from God, nothing is absolutely simple: therefore God is not absolutely simple.

1. Further, whatever is better is to be attributed to God: but among us composites are better than simples, as mixed bodies than the elements, and animals than plants: therefore it is not to be said that God is absolutely simple.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in book 6 On the Trinity that God is truly and supremely simple.[305]

I answer that God is absolutely simple can be made manifest in many ways.

First indeed by the things said above in this question. For since in God there is not composition, neither of quantitative parts - for He is not a body - nor composition of form and matter; nor in Him is one thing nature and another supposit (*suppositum*); nor one thing essence and existence (*esse*); nor in Him is the composition of genus and difference; nor of subject and accident; it is manifest that God is in no way composite, but is absolutely simple.

Second, because every composite is posterior to its components and dependent upon them; but God is the first being, as was shown above.

Third, because every composite has a cause: for things which are diverse according to themselves do not agree in something one unless by some cause uniting them; but God has no cause, as was shown above, since He is the first efficient cause.

Fourth, because in every composite there must be potency and act, which is not in God: for either one of the parts is act in respect of the other, or at least all the parts are as in potency in respect of the whole.

Fifth, because every composite is something which does not belong to any of its parts: and in wholes of dissimilar parts this is manifest: for none of the parts of a man is man; nor is any of the parts of a foot a foot. But in wholes of similar parts, although what is said of the whole is said of the part - for a part of air is air, and of water, water - yet something is said of the whole which does not belong to any part: for if the whole water be of two cubits, the part is not of two cubits. Thus

305. St. Augustine, De Trinitate 6, cap. 6 - 7.

therefore in every composite there is something which is not the thing itself. Now this, although it can be said of the one having a form, namely that it has something which is not itself - for example, in white there is something which does not pertain to the notion of white - yet in the very form there is nothing other. Whence, since God is the very form, or rather the very existence, in no way can He be composite. And this reason is touched by St. Hilary, 7 On the Trinity, saying: "God, who is power, is not contained from infirm things; nor He who is light is fitted together from dark things."[306]

Reply to the first: Those things which are from God imitate God as the caused imitates the first cause. Now this belongs to the notion of what is caused, that it be in another way composite: for at least its existence is other than what it is, as will be made clear below.

Reply to the second: Among us composites are better than simples, because the perfection of a creature's goodness is not found in one simple thing, but in many; but the perfection of the divine goodness is found in one simple thing, as will be shown below.

Confirmation of the doctrine of the article.

The conclusion is: God is absolutely simple; and this pertains not only to the dogma of faith, but is also evident by philosophical reason. It was first defined in the Council of Rheims, as we noted in the preceding article. For although Gilbert did not expressly say that God is composite, yet that followed from his opinion. And whether this can in truth be inferred from the opinion of those who say that the divine attributes differ outside the thing among themselves and from the essence, we shall see in disputation 116. He opposed, moreover, the error of him who attributed composition to God, as is ascribed to Peter Abaelard the Master, in his Elenchus of heretics; which error St. Bernard, however, in epistles 188, 190, and 192, among others, does not record as one of Abaelard's errors. Then the same truth was defined in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, and is reported in the chapter "Firmiter" on the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith. And by natural reason also it is proved by us in disputation 21, chapter 3. Furthermore, concerning the simplicity of God St. Hilary elegantly disputes in book 8 On the Trinity; St. Augustine, book 11 On the City of God, chapter 10, and book 1, chapter 17; Hilduin, book 1 On the Supreme Good, chapter 1; Boethius, book On the Trinity, chapter 3; St. Bernard, book 5 On Consideration. Aristotle also, Metaphysics 12, chapter 7, pronounces that the first substance, that is, God, is simple and indivisible.[307]

306. St. Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate 7.

307. Fourth Lateran Council (Innocent III), cap. "Firmiter"; Hilduin, De summo bono 1.1; Boethius, De Trinitate 3; St. Bernard, De consideratione 5; Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.7.

Articulus VIII - Whether God enters into the composition of other things

To the eighth we proceed thus. It seems that God enters into the composition of other things. For Dionysius says, in the Celestial Hierarchy, that the being of all things is the Deity which is above being; but the being of all enters into the composition of each thing: therefore God enters into the composition of others.[308]

1. Further, God is a form; for St. Augustine says, in the book On the Words of the Lord, that the Word of God, which is God, is a certain unformed form; but a form is a part of a composite: therefore God is a part of some composite.[309]
2. Further, whatever things are, if they differ, differ by certain differences; and thus they must be composite: but God and prime matter are both utterly simple; therefore they in no way differ, and so are altogether the same. But prime matter enters into the composition of things; therefore so does God. The proof of the middle is this: whatever things differ, differ by certain differences, and thus it is necessary that they be composite: but God and matter are most simple; therefore they in no way differ.

But on the contrary: Dionysius says in the Divine Names that God is neither as a part in anything, nor is He composed of parts: therefore He does not enter into the composition of other things.[310]

I answer: Concerning this there have been three errors. Certain ones posited that God was the soul of the world, as is clear from St. Augustine, book 7 of the City of God; and to this is also reducible the position of some who said that God is the soul of the first heaven. Others, however, said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this is said to have been the opinion of the Amalricians. But a third error was that of David of Dinant, who very foolishly posited that God is prime matter. For all these are manifest falsehoods: and it is not possible that God should in any way enter into the composition of anything, neither as a formal principle, nor as a material principle.

First, because we have said above that God is the first efficient cause (*causa efficiens*). But an efficient cause does not coincide numerically with the form of the thing made, only in the same species: thus man generates man. Matter, however, neither coincides numerically nor specifically with the efficient cause, because this is in potency, but that in act.

Second, because since God is the first efficient cause, it belongs to Him to act first and per se; whereas what comes into the composition of something is not the per se agent, but rather the composite: for the hand does not act, but man through the hand; and fire heats through heat. Hence God cannot be a part of any composite.

308. Pseudo-Dionysius, De coelesti hierarchia; cf. also De divinis nominibus.
309. St. Augustine, Sermo de Verbis Domini (on the Word as "forma quaedam non formata").
310. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus.

Third, because no part of a composite can be first simply among beings; not even matter and form, which are the first parts of composites: for matter is in potency, and potency is posterior to act, simply speaking, as is evident from what has been said; and form, which is a part of the composite, is a participated form: and as the participant is posterior to that which is by essence (*per essentiam*), so too is the participated act posterior to that which is through essence; just as fire that is in an ignited thing is posterior to that which is through essence fire. But it has been shown that God is the first being simply.

Reply to the first: The Deity is said to be the being of all things effectively and by way of exemplar, not, however, by essence.

Reply to the second: The Word is an exemplary form, not the form which is a part of a composite.

Reply to the third: Simple things do not differ by some other differences, which is a feature of composites: for man and horse differ by the rational and irrational differences, and those differences themselves do not differ further among themselves by other differences: hence, if one insists on the word "differ," prime matter and God are not properly said to differ, but to be diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 10, "diverse" is said absolutely, but every "different" differs by something: therefore, even if it be granted in speech that prime matter and God do not "differ," they are nevertheless diverse in themselves; whence it does not follow that they are the same.[311]

Confirmation of the article. The conclusion is: God cannot with another come together into the composition of anything. The conclusion of this article is no less certain in philosophy and theology than that of the preceding; yet there were not a few who dared to affirm the opposite. First among the philosophers, according to Eusebius, book 14 of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 6, Democritus taught that God is the soul of the world, and therefore to have the form of a spherical fire; though Cicero reports this man's error very differently in book 1 On the Nature of the Gods.[312] Into this opinion Epiphanius records the Stoics to have fallen, book 1 of the Panarion (Against Heresies); and John Damascene, in his book on heresies, ascribes it not to all, but to certain Stoics; and Ludovicus Vives judges it to have also been Pythagoras's view, on City of God, book 4, chapter 12.[313] Among Christians, the first of all seem to have been the Priscillianists in this error, since they asserted that the soul of man is a divine substance, or a part of it, as is clear from the First Council of Toledo in the confession of faith, and from Pope Leo I in epistle 93 to Turibius, chapter 5.[314] But Peter Abelard, as Bernard testifies in epistle 190, taught that the Holy Spirit is the soul of the world; which opinion Bernard relates him to have learned from Plato.[315] Finally, among the errors of a certain Amalric, who flourished under Innocent III, Turrecremata in book 4 of the Summa,

311. Aristotle, Metaphysics 10, on the distinction between "diverse" and "different."

312. Eusebius of Caesarea, Praeparatio evangelica 14.6; Cicero, De natura deorum 1.

313. Epiphanius, Panarion (Against Heresies), book 1; John Damascene, De haeresibus; Ludovicus Vives, commentary on Augustine's City of God 4.12, on Pythagoras.

314. First Council of Toledo, Profession of Faith; Pope Leo I, Ep. 93 to Turibius, c. 5.

315. St. Bernard of Clairvaux, Ep. 190, on Peter Abelard's teaching that the Holy Spirit is the soul of the world, learned from Plato.

chapter 35, numbers this error: for he used to say that all things are one and of the same nature, indeed that all things are God, and that God Himself is the essence of all things. This man Innocent condemns as heretical with the single word "We condemn," in the chapter Damnamus, On the Most High Trinity and the Catholic Faith.[316] From Scripture too it is clearly shown that God cannot be the soul of the whole world: for in Job 22 it is said, "He is higher than heaven," etc.; and in 2 Chronicles it is said, "Heaven, and the heaven of heavens cannot contain Thee."

Moreover, that God cannot enter into the composition of anything can be shown for this reason: everything out of which something is composed is more imperfect than the composite itself; but God is the most perfect of all things: therefore from Him no other thing can be composed. Those, however, who taught the opposite seem to have been deceived because they observed that the universe depends upon God the efficient and conserving cause in such a way that without Him it could no more be than an animal could live without a soul. On account of this, however, they ought not to have affirmed that God Himself, or the soul of the world, or the souls of other things, is a form.

As to the ancient philosophers, I do not have sufficiently clear information whether they said that God is truly the soul of the world, as the form and nature of it, or only the mover by way of an efficient and conserving cause - in the manner in which some think Aristotle called the intelligence that moves the heaven its assisting soul. As to the heretics, there is no doubt about the Priscillianists having taught that our soul, as informed, is a certain portion of God; and in this sense the Council of Toledo condemns their error, and Leo I likewise, and finally Leo concludes that there is no creature so pre-eminent that God Himself should be by nature its form - that is, "form" under the name of "nature," as Aristotle uses the name, Physics 2, chapter 1, and more clearly Metaphysics 5, chapter 4, where toward the end he says that that is first and properly called "nature" which is substance - that is, the form - of those things which in themselves, as such, have the principle of motion; matter is called "nature" metaphorically, as being the recipient of this.[317] As to Abelard and Amalric, there is no doubt that they spoke of an informing soul.

Quaestio IV - On the perfection of God

After the consideration of the divine simplicity, something must be said concerning the perfection (*perfectio*) of God. And because each thing, insofar as it is perfect, is said to be good, first we must treat of the divine perfection; second, of His goodness.

Note on the whole question. Just as in those questions to be elucidated which are more difficult and have something worthy of close attention, it is not worthy of one's honor, nor of the time and labor, to weave out a treatment exposed to censure, so also in easier questions, a treatment unworthy of censure must be composed. Therefore in this whole question, which is most easy, I

316. Juan de Torquemada (Turrecremata), Summa 4.35, on Amalric; Innocent III, cap. Damnamus, De summa Trinitate et fide Catholica (Fourth Lateran Council).

317. Aristotle, Physics 2.1; Metaphysics 5.4, on "nature" as substance, i.e., form, and matter called "nature" metaphorically.

wish to note only one thing from the foregoing doctrine, and from what we shall say in question 13, which is clearly gathered: namely, that in God certain perfections are contained eminently only and virtually (*eminenter* et *virtute*), whereas others are in Him formally and properly - or rather, the most simple nature of God virtually contains certain perfections, while others belong to Him formally. Those are said to be contained virtually which, in their intrinsic and essential concept, however abstract, include some imperfection; such are the perfections of corporeal things. But He is said to contain them eminently because He has in Himself an eminent power to produce them. Hence the perfection of a stone, which is in God eminently, has life in God Himself, but in the stone it is without life. Concerning the manner in which a thing is said to be "in God," we will say many things in disputations 51, chapter 3, and 70, chapter 2. Those perfections, however, which can be understood as purged of all imperfection are said to be in God formally and properly - not indeed as really distinct, as we shall discuss in disputation 116, but as conjoined without distinction in one most simple essence. The rest of what Cajetan and more recent authors treat on this question is easy and unnecessary for the things that must be said subsequently. In article 3, solution 4, it should have been noted why creatures are said to be assimilated to God, but God not to creatures; of this, however, we will treat in disputation 167, the last chapter.

Articulus I - Whether God is perfect

Objicitur 1. It seems that to be perfect does not befit God. For "perfect" is so called as if "wholly made"; but it does not befit God to be made; therefore neither to be perfect.

Objicitur 2. Further, God is the first principle of things; but the principles of things seem to be imperfect. For seed is the principle of animals and plants; therefore God is imperfect.

Objicitur 3. Further, it was shown above that the essence (*essentia*) of God is his very existence (*ipsum esse*); but existence itself seems to be most imperfect, since it is most common and the recipient of all additions; therefore God is imperfect.

But on the contrary: It is said in Matthew 5: "Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect."

Respondeo dicendum, that, as the Philosopher relates in Metaphysics 12, certain ancient philosophers - namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus - did not attribute what is best and most perfect to the first principle.[318] The reason of this is that the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle, which is most imperfect. For since matter, as such, is in potency (*potentia*), the first material principle must be maximally in potency, and thus maximally imperfect. But God is set down as a first principle not material, but in the genus of efficient cause (*causa efficiens*); and this must be most perfect. For as matter, as such, is in potency, so an agent, as such, is in act (*actus*). Hence the first active principle must be most in act, and consequently most perfect; for a thing is said to be perfect according as it is in act, since "perfect" is said of that to which nothing is lacking according to the mode of its perfection.

318. Aristotle, Metaphysics 12, reporting the opinions of certain ancients (Pythagoreans, Leucippus) about the first principle.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, that, as St. Gregory says, stammering as we can, we echo the lofty things of God: that which is not made cannot properly be called "perfect." But because in those things which are made we say something is perfect when it is led out from potency into act, the name "perfect" is transferred to signify whatever lacks nothing of being in act, whether it has this by way of being made or not

Ad secundum dicendum, that a material principle, which with us is found to be imperfect, cannot be simply first, but is preceded by another that is perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of an animal generated from seed, nevertheless has before itself the animal or the plant whence it falls; for it is necessary that before that which is in potency there be something in act, since a being in potency is not reduced to act except through some being in act

Ad tertium dicendum, that existence itself (*ipsum esse*) is the most perfect of all; for it is compared to all things as act: nothing indeed has actuality except insofar as it exists; whence existence itself is the actuality of all things, and even of the forms themselves. Hence it is not compared to other things as a recipient to what is received, but rather as what is received to a recipient: for when I say "the existence of a man" or "of a horse" or of anything whatsoever, the existence itself is considered as something formal and received, not as that to which existence befits

Articulus II - Whether the perfections of all things are in God

Objicitur 1. It seems that in God there are not the perfections of all things. For God is simple, as has been shown; but the perfections of things are many and diverse: therefore not all the perfections of things are in God.

Objicitur 2. Further, opposites cannot be in the same thing; but the perfections of things are opposed, for each species is perfected by its specific difference, and the differences by which a genus is divided and a species constituted are opposed. Since therefore opposites cannot be together in the same subject, it seems that not all the perfections of things are in God.

Objicitur 3. Further, a living thing is more perfect than a being, and a wise thing than a living thing. Therefore to live is more perfect than to be, and to be wise than to live. But the essence of God is his very existence; therefore he does not have in himself the perfection of life and of wisdom and other such perfections.

Sed contra is what Dionysius says, that in God the existences of all things pre-exist.[319][320]

Respondeo dicendum, that in God there are the perfections of all things; whence he is called universally perfect, because there is not lacking to him any nobility found in any genus, as the Commentator says on Metaphysics 5, text 21.[321] And this indeed can be considered from two points.

319. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 5.
320. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 2.
321. The Commentator (Averroes), In Metaphysicam 5, text 21.

First, from this, that whatever perfection is in an effect must be found in the efficient cause: either according to the same notion, if the agent is univocal, as a man generates a man; or in a more eminent mode, if the agent is equivocal, as in the sun there is the likeness of the things that are generated through the power of the sun. For it is manifest that the effect pre-exists virtually in the agent cause; but to pre-exist in the virtuality of the agent cause is not to pre-exist in a more imperfect mode, but in a more perfect mode, although to pre-exist in the potency of the material cause is to pre-exist imperfectly. Since therefore God is the first efficient cause of things, it is necessary that the perfections of all things pre-exist in God in a more eminent mode. And Dionysius touches this reason in the book On the Divine Names, saying of God that he is not indeed this or that, but is all things, as the cause of all.[319]

Secondly, from this, which was shown above, that God is existence itself subsisting of itself (*ipsum esse per se subsistens*); whence it must be that he contains in himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if something hot does not have the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is participated not according to its perfect notion; but if heat were subsistent of itself, nothing of the power of heat could be lacking to it. Hence, since God is subsistent being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be lacking to him. But the perfections of all things belong to the perfection of being; for things are called perfect according as they in some way have existence: whence it follows that no thing's perfection is lacking to God. And Dionysius also touches this reason when he says that God is not existent in some way, but simply and without circumscription, and that the whole is in himself uniformly precontained, and afterwards he adds that he is existence for things subsisting.[319]

Ad primum ergo dicendum, that just as the sun, as Dionysius says, though it is one and uniform in itself and by shining uniformly, causes in sensible things many and different substances and qualities; so, in the cause of all, much more must all things pre - exist according to a natural union. And thus those things which are diverse and opposed in themselves, pre - exist in God as one, without any detriment to his simplicity

Ad secundum patet solutio by the same consideration

Ad tertium dicendum, that in the same chapter the same Dionysius says that existence itself is more perfect than life, and life itself than wisdom itself, if they be considered according as they are distinguished by notion; yet a living thing is more perfect than a being only, because a living thing is also a being; and a wise thing is a being and living. Although therefore "being" does not include in itself "living" and "wise" (for it is not necessary that that which participates existence participate it according to every mode of existing), nevertheless the very existence of God includes in itself life and wisdom, because none of the perfections of existing can be lacking to him who is subsistent existence itself

319. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 5.
319. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 5.

Articulus III - Whether any creature can be like God

Objicitur 1. It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is said in the Psalm: "There is none among the gods like unto you, O Lord" (Ps 85[86]:8); but among all creatures the more excellent are those who are called "gods" participatively; much less therefore can other creatures be said to be like God.

Objicitur 2. Further, likeness is a comparison; but there is not comparison of things which are of different genera; therefore neither is there likeness. For we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is of the same genus with God, since God is not in a genus, as was shown above; therefore no creature is like God.

Objicitur 3. Further, things are said to be like which agree in form; but nothing agrees with God in form, for the essence of no thing is existence itself except of God alone; therefore no creature can be like God.

Objicitur 4. Further, in things alike there is mutual likeness, for like is like to like, and the like is the like of the like. If therefore some creature is like to God, God will be like to some creature; which is against that which is said, Isaiah 40: "To whom have you likened God?"

Sed contra is that which is said, Genesis 1: "Let us make man to our image and likeness"; and in the First Epistle of John, chapter 3: "When he shall appear, we shall be like to him."

Respondeo dicendum, that since likeness is attended according to agreement or communication in form (*forma*), there is a manifold likeness according to the many modes of communicating in form. Some things are called like which communicate in the same form according to the same notion and according to the same mode; and these are not only said to be like, but equal in their likeness, as two things equally white are said to be like in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way things are said to be like which communicate in form according to the same notion, but not according to the same mode, but according to more and less; as what is less white is said to be like what is more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some are said to be like which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same notion, as is manifest in non-univocal agents. For since every agent acts so as to make something like itself insofar as it is an agent, and everything acts according to its form, it is necessary that in the effect there be a likeness of the agent's form. If therefore the agent is contained within the same species with its effect, there will be likeness between the maker and the made in form according to the same specific notion, as a man generates a man. But if the agent is not contained within the same species, there will indeed be likeness, but not according to the same specific notion: for the things that are generated by the power of the sun do indeed approach to some likeness of the sun, yet they do not receive the form of the sun according to a specific likeness, but according to a generic likeness. If therefore there be some agent that is not contained in a genus, its effect will still more remotely approach to the likeness of the agent's form, yet not so as to participate the likeness of the agent's form according to the same notion either of species or of genus, but according to some analogy, just as "being" (*ens*) itself is common to all. And in this way the things that are from God are assimilated to him insofar as they are beings, as to the first universal principle of all existence.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, that, as Dionysius says, when Sacred Scripture says that something is not like to God, this is not contrary to assimilation to him. For the same things are both like and unlike to God: like indeed insofar as they imitate him, according as it befalls that he be imitable, who is not perfectly imitable; unlike, however, insofar as they fall short of their cause, not only according to intensity and remissness, as the less white falls short of the more white, but because there is not a congruence either according to species or according to genus

Ad secundum dicendum, that God does not stand to creatures as a thing of a different genus, but as that which is outside every genus and the principle of every genus

Ad tertium dicendum, that a likeness of the creature to God is not asserted on account of communication in form according to the same notion of genus and species, but only according to an analogy: namely, in that God is being through essence, and others through participation

Ad quartum dicendum, that although in some way it is conceded that a creature is like to God, in no way is it to be conceded that God is like to a creature. For, as Dionysius says in De Divinis Nominibus, chapter 9, in those things which are of one order, mutual likeness is received, but not in cause and caused. For we say that an image is like to a man, and not conversely; and similarly one can in some way say that a creature is like to God, but not that God is like to a creature

Quaestio V - On the good in general

Then inquiry is made about the good. And first, about the good in general. Secondly, about the goodness (*bonitas*) of God.

In this question St. Thomas treats of the good universally, a treatment which properly belonged to the philosopher, so that in what follows he may prove that which pertains to the theologian, namely, that God is good. But since from the things we shall say it will be evident that one can err not a little in assigning the notion of goodness in God if he is ignorant of it universally, therefore those things which will seem to conduce to this theological truth, although they are philosophical, we have judged it necessary to recall into the question.

Articulus I - Whether the good differs in reality from being

Ad primum sic proceditur. It seems that the good differs in reality from being. For Boethius says in the book On ... (text truncated)

Objicitur. It seems that the good differs in reality from being. For Boethius says in the book On the Hebdomads: I consider in things one thing which is that they are good, and another which is that they are.[324] Therefore the good and being differ in reality.

1. Moreover, nothing is informed by itself; but the good is said by the informing of being, as is had in the Commentary on the book On Causes.[325] Therefore the good differs in reality from being.
2. Moreover, the good admits of more and less; but existence does not admit of more and less. Therefore the good differs in reality from being.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in the book On Christian Doctrine: inasmuch as we are, we are good.[326]

I answer: The good and being are the same according to reality, but they differ according to reason alone; and this is clear as follows. For the ratio of the good consists in this, that something be appetible; whence the Philosopher in Ethics I says that the good is that which all things desire.[327] Now it is manifest that each thing is appetible according as it is perfect; for all things desire their perfection. But each thing is perfect inasmuch as it is in act; whence it is manifest that, inasmuch as something is being, it is good: for existence is the actuality of every thing, as is clear from the foregoing. Whence it is manifest that the good and being are the same according to reality; but the good adds the ratio of the appetible, which being as such does not express.

Reply to the first: Although the good and being are the same according to reality, nevertheless since they differ according to reason, something is not predicated simply good and simply a being in the same way. For since being properly signifies to be in act, and act of itself has an ordination to potency, according to this something is said simply to be according as it is first discerned from that which is only in potency; but this is the substantial existence of each thing. Hence by its substantial existence each thing is said to be simply; but by superadded acts something is said to be in a qualified way; as to be white signifies to be in a qualified way. For to be white does not remove to be in potency simply, since it supervenes to a thing already existing in act. But the good signifies the ratio of the perfect, which is the appetible; and consequently it signifies the ratio of the ultimate. Hence that which is ultimately perfect is called simply good; but that which does not have the ultimate perfection which it ought to have, although it has some perfection inasmuch as it is in act, nevertheless is not called simply perfect nor simply good, but good in a qualified way. Thus therefore, according to the first substantial act, something is called simply being and good in a qualified way, that is, insofar as it is being; but according to the ultimate act something is called being in a qualified way and simply good. Thus therefore what Boethius says, that in things one thing is that they are good and another that they are, is to be referred to to be simply and to be

324. Boethius, De hebdomadibus.
325. Liber de causis, in the commentary, text 21.
326. St. Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, lib. 1, c. 32.
327. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.

good simply: because according to the first act something is simply being; and according to the ultimate, simply good; and yet according to the first act it is in a certain way good, and according to the ultimate act it is in a certain way being.

Reply to the second: The good is said by informing, insofar namely as the good simply is taken according to the ultimate act.

And similarly to the third: the good is said according to more and less by reason of the supervening act, for instance, according to knowledge or virtue.

Conclusion: The good and being are the same according to reality, but the good includes the ratio of the appetible, which being does not have.

Disputatio XXIII - What is the universal formal ratio of the good, and in what way it befits God

- Sententia Durandi. cap. 1.
- Refutatio praecedentis sententiae. cap. 2.
- Duae aliae sententiae de eadem re. cap. 3.
- Prior pars verioris sententiae. cap. 4.
- Posterior pars verioris sententiae. cap. 5.
- Quaedam oppositiones contra praedicta. cap. 6.
- Corollaria praecedentis doctrinae. cap. 7.

Caput I - The teaching of Durandus

In this article the true ratio and definition of goodness are delivered to us, from which we ought to gather that God is good; we must explain it so clearly that at the same time everything that pertains to the divine goodness becomes plain. And lest we repeat the same things again while explaining the nature of the good universally, we shall at once also show by what ratio God is good. Therefore, according to our customary method, let us examine the opinions of individuals on this matter. The first opinion is that of Durandus in II Sentences, dist. 34, q. 1, n. 22,[328] where, after he has at length impugned the opinion of Hervaeus,[329] in his explanation he teaches two things.

First, that goodness, or the formal ratio of the good in any entity whatsoever, is a relation of fittingness (relatio convenientiae), not along with appetite, as some impose upon Durandus, but along with another thing; and since he asserts that goodness is a certain respective entity, he judges it to be a real relation, as he also expressly affirms in the same question, n. 11. In God, however, this relation of fittingness by which he says that he is good he thinks to be an extrinsic denomination, as is the denomination "creator." He adds finally that in created things goodness is not found in the same way. For he esteems that in some things it is intrinsic and primarily existent - namely in

328. Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In Sententias II, dist. 34, q. 1, n. 22 (and n. 11).
329. Hervaeus Natalis.

those things which are intrinsically suitable to something either according to the habit of material cause or of formal cause, or of an integrating part, or lastly even of an accidental form inhering inherently; in other things, however, it is secondary and extrinsic, namely in those which are called good because they are optimally suited to and congruent with something else, either by the mode of efficient cause, or by some extrinsic condition. In the former way health is said to be intrinsically good for man, as also the soul, matter, and his parts. In the latter way medicine is good for the sick by the mode of efficient cause; and urine by the mode of a sign.

He proves first that goodness is something real in things by that number 11 which Durandus gathers from Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, c. 2, text 8, where he says that good and evil are in things as true and false are in the intellect.[330] Secondly, that it is a relation of fittingness he proves, because the formal ratio of the good is the same as the ratio of the fitting (conveniens); but the formal ratio of the good is goodness; therefore goodness is the ratio of the fitting, which, since it is nothing else than a relation of fittingness, with good reason goodness itself is called the relation of fittingness. Thirdly, that this relation of fittingness is attributed to God and to certain created things only extrinsically he shows thus. The ratio of fittingness is in things in the same way as the things themselves are said to fit with and be congruent to others; but by an extrinsic denomination we say that God fits with created things, and created things fit with certain other created things: therefore goodness in God and in some creatures is nothing other than an extrinsic relation of fittingness, which in God he thinks to be toward creatures. Finally, by the same reasoning it is proven that to certain other created things goodness belongs intrinsically, as was proved above. This is the first part of the sentence of Durandus.

Then he asserts in that same number 22 that good and being are reciprocal, not essentially but denominatively; which is plainly deduced from the prior part. For the exposition of which it must be presupposed, from the doctrine of Hervaeus, and Durandus himself also supposes in that question, n. 9, that certain things are said to be reciprocal in a twofold way: first, essentially, whenever one is the same formally and essentially with the other, as reality and entity are; and in the universe, things which differ only in name and are synonyms, as sword and blade. Then, denominatively, whenever two things so essentially accompany one another that the one is not without the other, and yet one is not formally and essentially the same as the other; thus "rational" and "man" are reciprocal denominatively, because man includes something beyond rational, and therefore is not adequately the same as it. And this kind of conversion is called denominative because we seem to predicate one of the other in the manner of accidents in the concrete by a denomination; for we seem to say in the same way, "man is rational," and "man is white," although in the former things they are reciprocal both in the abstract and in the concrete, with mutual consequence one being inferred and predicated from the other. And thus we say, if the thing is, it is being, and conversely; likewise, if there is reality, there is entity, and conversely.

On this foundation Durandus proves in that question, n. 11, the latter part of his opinion in this way. Those things convert essentially which differ in no way either in reality or in notion; but being and the good, entity and goodness, differ in ratio; therefore they do not convert essentially.

Otherwise it would be useless tautology to say "ens is good," just as if someone said "sword is blade"; and being and good would be synonyms as sword and blade, which is absurd. Moreover entity in its ratio does not include the relation of fittingness, which is the very ratio of goodness; and therefore goodness is not predicated of entity in the abstract

Caput II - Refutation of the preceding opinion

As to the opinion of Durandus, I grant that the latter part of it, if rightly understood, is true, as will appear below; but as to the former, nothing at all is proven. Wherefore, those things in it which seem false must be impugned briefly.

First, therefore, what he asserts - that goodness is a relation of fittingness - is refuted thus. Goodness, which is a passion of being, if it were that relation of fittingness, it would follow that God is not in himself formally good from the fact that he is in himself and for himself perfect, but from the fact that he has an order toward creatures; wherefore he would not be good in himself before creatures possible were understood, to which alone he would be good; and so in the very nature of God there would not be goodness in itself, but he would have goodness dependent upon possible creatures.

Durandus replies in that question, n. 26, that indeed God is not good save through an order to creatures; nevertheless he does not have goodness dependent upon them. And as if he were to say that he does not have it communicated from creatures, but only related to them; and thus he concedes this proposition: The goodness of God depends to creatures; because in this manner of speaking only order and relation to creatures seems to be signified; yet he denies this proposition: The goodness of God depends from creatures; because by this the same seems to be denoted - some origin and derivation of the goodness of God from creatures. Nor is it absurd to concede something to God through an order to creatures, in which manner we attribute to him many perfections; but it is altogether false to assert that any perfection of God is derived from creatures.

But this doctrine of Durandus does not dissolve the difficulty of the proposed argument. For neither do we, from his opinion, infer as an absurdity that God begs goodness from creatures - for this, as he himself very well noted, is gathered by no reason - but we infer that God in himself and for himself is not good and perfect, as he is wise and infinite, before possible creatures are understood; which also we judge to be absurd, as will appear more at large from those things which we shall say in Disputation 104 on the omnipotence of God, and in Disputation 154 on that property of the gift which befits the Holy Spirit from his origin. Now, however, it can be shown by this brief reasoning. The things which follow to God with the same degree of necessity with which God himself and the Trinity exist, themselves exist; and those follow to God which are more necessary than that creatures be possible. From which also, by the intrinsic argument-place, it is deduced that God would be the same even if creatures were not possible. Therefore likewise, God is

330. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, c. 2, text 8.

by absolute necessity good and perfect in himself; and even if creatures were not possible, he nevertheless would be good and perfect. Therefore he is not good because he has an order to creatures, nor does his goodness hang upon them.

But rather, because he is in himself infinitely good and perfect, he also suits creatures, and is good.

Second, that goodness, which is a passion of being, does not belong to other things in this way, is shown thus. There is no thing which is not absolutely and simply good; or, if some are said to be evil, they are not said to be absolutely and simply [evil], but evil to certain others: as poison to living things; very few indeed, or none, suit all others and are good. Therefore created things are not said to be simply good from a respect of conveniency with others, but absolutely and according to themselves, by the notion of their entity. Moreover, by the same account by which things are suited to some and are good, to others they are evil and adverse: therefore they ought not rather to be called good than evil; and consequently good and being would not convert absolutely, but good and evil, as being and good, would depend upon a mutual consequence; which is absurd, and not a little inclines to the Manichaean error, who affirmed that certain substances are by their nature evil, as St. Augustine attests in many places, especially in book 2 of On the Morals of the Manichaeans, from chapter 1 to 8, where he elegantly shows that every substance created by God is in itself good; for, he says, just as evil is nothing other than a privation and is not a substance, which he himself calls an inconvenience hostile to substance and against nature; so also every substance, insofar as it is substance, is good, not because it suits another: just as it is not substantially evil because it is contrary to another.[331]

Third, even if the notion of goodness consisted in a relation of conveniency, nevertheless Durandus would not have rightly said that it is found intrinsically only in those things which inhere in another either after the manner of a form or after the manner of a part, but extrinsically in others. For although that which is suited to another after the manner of an efficient cause is not primarily and intrinsically good, but by reason of the effect, as the sun is good to that which is made cool by reason of the heat which it produces in it; nevertheless something which does not inhere intrinsically in a thing is yet to it good and suitable not remotely by reason of the effect, but proximally by reason of itself, namely as an object with respect to a potency; for this is to be an end, and a good proximate to a potency by reason of itself, and not by reason of an effect, against that same Durandus. We shall prove this against Durandus in I - II, q. 4, a. 1; and moreover, not all the things which are in a thing to which they are said to suit are referred to it by an intrinsic relation of conveniency: for the integral parts of some whole, and suiting the whole, are said by Durandus to be good to it; yet they are not referred to the whole by a real relation of conveniency, as is clear.

Caput III - Two other opinions on the same question

There is another opinion of certain recent writers, who agree with Durandus in this, that he asserts that goodness formally is a relation of conveniency of one thing with another: they differ, however, in that they think that relation in general to be of reason and not real. Yet this opinion ought, in the same way, to be impugned by the two prior arguments made against Durandus. Then too it can easily be shown that the relation of conveniency between some things is sometimes no less real than the relation of dissimilitude and contrariety. But these are lighter matters and do not require a longer disputation.

Another opinion was that of Capreolus in II, dist. 34, ... and 3, asserting that the goodness of a being formally consists in a relation of reason to appetite, which he himself calls the perfective notion of another: which opinion indeed is not to be embraced. For if he understands that goodness is a relation of conveniency, from which it follows that something is desired, it is to be impugned in the same way as the preceding opinions; but if he understands it to be a relation of the appetible, his opinion pleases us still less. For, as Cajetan very well noted on this question, articles 1 and 4, the notion or denomination "appetible" is posterior to the notion "good," just as the notion "visible" is [posterior] to the notion "color": for "appetible" is said by an extrinsic denomination from the very potency that desires, because it can be desired. Wherefore it is prior that one can desire a good, than that it be appetible. But before it is understood that the potency can desire, the good in the object is understood: therefore the notion of the good is prior to that of the appetible. This doctrine will be made clear from those things which we shall say in disputation 104, chapter 2. [332]

Caput IV - The prior part of the truer opinion

It remains to report only the opinion of Hervaeus, which (although it by no means pleases me) I will refer, and I will not undertake to impugn it formally. In passing, while setting forth our own opinion, we shall mark those things which in it are less true. For the sake of this, and of the things which must be said, a certain distinction of goodness, or of the good, must be premised. Therefore, in three ways something is called good, first, in itself, insofar as it is in itself good and not for another. Second, that is called good which is good for another, whose rationale seems to be placed in a relation of congruency and conveniency with another thing. Now this kind of good can still be contained in two ways. Either it is in natural things, as heat in due proportion, and health with respect to an animal; or it is in moral things, and thus a moral action, which is said to be according to right reason or suitable to a rational nature insofar as it is rational, is good. On the contrary, it happens likewise in three ways that there is evil: first, that which is opposed to the good absolutely and in itself. Second, that which is less convenient or contrary to another, and this in a twofold way, either in natural things, or also in moral matters: for warm water is said to be bad for the sick; and sin is bad for a rational nature insofar as it is rational.

331. St. Augustine, De moribus Manichaeorum, lib. 2, cc. 1 - 8.
332. Cajetan, on Summa theologiae I, q. 5, aa. 1 and 4.

With this foundation laid, our opinion on this matter consists in two points: one is about the good relatively and with respect to another; the other is about the good absolutely and in itself: we shall explain the former part in this chapter, and the latter in the following. Therefore the good relatively, and that which is good for another, is posited in a relation of conveniency; and in this I judge Durandus's opinion to be true. Whether indeed that relation is always of reason or real matters little. In moral matters, however, both goodness and malice are in general a relation of reason - I shall prove [this] in I - II, q. 71, a. 6.[333] Among those, however, which are called good in this way, some are primarily good, because they are primarily convenient to another, as are accidental forms inhering in a subject; others, however, are said to be secondarily good from an effect, because they make something good in the subject; in which way one substance is said to be good for another.

It must be observed, however, that goodness in this way is not a passion of being, as was proved against Durandus in chapter 2.

But some prove that this relation of conveniency, which we have said to be goodness, is not real, because that relation would be either good by another goodness, or not: if it were not good by another goodness, it would follow that being and good are not convertible, which is absurd; but if it were good by another goodness, there would be a process to infinity, unless we were to say that the goodness by which that prior relation and goodness is good is a relation of reason, but the prior [goodness] is real: whence it would follow that the goodness which is converted with being is not a real relation in general. But this argument, although it would convince that the goodness which follows upon the notion of being and is converted with it is not a real relation of conveniency, nevertheless does not prove that there is not some goodness which is placed in a real relation of conveniency alone. Whether indeed it altogether proves that goodness is not a real relation, we shall see in the following chapter.

By this kind of goodness God is supremely good to creatures: yet the relation of conveniency which is in him is not real but of reason, as we shall say of the relation of omnipotence below, disputation 104, chapter 6, and of others by which God is referred to creatures: nevertheless, the rationale of goodness in this way belongs to God primarily, not secondarily; that is, he is not therefore good to creatures because he effects something good in them (although this too is true), but because by reason of himself he is proximally convenient to them. First, indeed, to all things universally: even to brute and inanimate things; because he produces and preserves their whole existence, which indeed is not in those things in this way a good, since it is not distinguished from them in any way. Then to rational creatures he is especially good, as known and apprehended. For thus he is that of which we delight and which we desire: but desire and delight are of goods that are convenient.

Moreover, that God is the proximate object of desire and delight, we shall prove against Durandus on I - II, q. 4, a. 1.[334]

333. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I - II, q. 71, a. 6.
334. Durandus, on I - II, q. 4, a. 1.

But with respect to a goodness opposed in this way, it must be said otherwise; for in himself God cannot be evil to us, but only by effect, because in us he can bring about something dissonant to nature; for which cause in the same article we shall also say that God is indeed the object of delight and of desire, but not of sorrow and of fear.

Moreover, concerning this genus of goodness, whereby something is said to be suitable to another, St. Thomas does not dispute in this question, nor is it the business of the following question to prove that God is good in this way.

Next it had to be said about moral goodness, which consists in a relation of suitability (*convenientia*) with rational nature; about this, however, it will be more convenient to dispute at I-II, q. 19, a. 20.[335]

In what way, however, God is good in this kind of goodness can now be easily explained. He is good, therefore, whether his goodness be considered in operations within himself, or in operations without; for he is the author of no fault or sin: yet his goodness is of another kind than that which is in a man or in an angel; for he is not a cause by participation, as it is in a man or in an angel. Of this kind of goodness St. Thomas does not treat in this question, nor in the following; nor is goodness in this mode numbered by St. Thomas or by any other doctor among the divine attributes. For attributes are to be assigned not according to a generic notion, but according to a specific account; but the account of moral goodness is generic, and is found in many virtues, of which some we attribute to God - truthfulness, fidelity, justice, mercy, etc. Therefore the attribute of goodness, about which St. Thomas and the other Scholastics dispute, is that which answers to a passion of being, which the philosophers call entitative goodness (*bonitas entitativa*), about which it must be treated in the following chapter.

One might think, besides the goodness which corresponds to a passion of being, that there should be assigned to God a certain goodness of holiness distinct from that which is in the individual acts of virtues, by which also baptized infants are holy. I answer: in us and in the angels, besides the goodness which they call entitative, and besides the moral goodness which is in individual acts of virtues, there is a goodness of holiness, which consists in this, that we adhere to God justly; but it is not necessary to attribute to God any goodness of holiness besides his entitative goodness, and besides a moral goodness in all his works utterly perfect and without fault, because he has no one to whom he must be conformed in order that he be just and holy; rather by this very fact he is the rule of all holiness.

The latter part is the truer opinion.

335. I-II, q. 19, a. 20.

Caput V - On the good that is convertible with being, and on the opposite evil

It remains that we speak of the good which is convertible with being, and of the evil opposed. Therefore the formal notion (*ratio*) of goodness which is convertible with being, in my opinion, is the integrity and perfection of a thing in its own existence (*esse*). Wherefore in this kind of goodness, good is the same as integral or perfect; in what manner, however, it is reciprocated with being, we shall immediately say.

St. Thomas conveys this opinion in express words in this question. For in Article 1 he says that the good is that which all things desire: but each thing is desired insofar as it is perfect; and in the first solution he says: "But the good expresses the notion of the perfect"; and after a few words: "Whence that which is ultimately perfect is called simply good; but that which does not have the ultimate perfection which it ought to have, although it have some perfection insofar as it is in act, is not called simply perfect nor simply good, but qualifiedly." And when in Article 1 at the end he subjoins: "The good expresses the notion of the appetible," he does not understand a relative denomination from the appetitive power, nor a relation of suitability, but the notion of the perfect, on which chiefly it is founded, and whence it comes about that some thing is desired. In Article 3 he teaches the very same thing; and finally in Article 5 he infers that the account of the good, which is set in perfection, consists in mode, species, and order.[336]

From which, although St. Thomas seems variously to explain "mode" in this question, Article 5, and in I-II, q. 85, a. 4, and in De veritate, q. 21, yet he comes to the same thing, as Cajetan very well notes on the aforesaid Article 5.[337] In whatever way it be explained, at least from St. Thomas we have that the account of the good consists of mode, species, and order; and thus the goodness of a being and its integrity complete from all these are the same. Which doctrine he took from St. Augustine, book On the Nature of the Good, chapters 3 and 4.[338]

Reason: This opinion can also be proved by reason: for if there is lacking to any thing something of those which ought to agree to its integrity, from that defect it is said to be, and is, evil - not because it is unsuitable to another; for thus it would not be called absolutely evil, but evil for some; since there is no thing which is unsuitable to all others: therefore the absolute goodness of a thing is placed in its integrity. In this way we say that that horse is evil to which an eye is lacking, or something else: for, as Augustine witnesses in that place, chapter 4, malice is nothing else than the corruption of mode, or of species, or of order.[339]

On behalf of our opinion Herveus reports in Quodlibet 3, question 2, article 2, where he teaches that the formal account of the good is either the very perfection of the thing, or something ordered to perfection, so that in this way he may defend that being and good are convertible. For it happens that some thing is not absolute and perfect; since, however, there is none which does not have something ordered to its perfection, therefore there is none which does not have goodness

336. In this question, art. 1, and the first solution; art. 3; and art. 5.
337. Cajetan, on the said art. 5; see also I-II, q. 85, a. 4; and De veritate, q. 21.
338. St. Augustine, De natura boni, cc. 3 - 4.
339. St. Augustine, De natura boni, c. 4.

Yet there was no need to contrive this evasion, as will straightway be clear in the following chapter. Moreover, Herveus seems to have followed Augustine's phrase, who, as we said a little before, calls those three things by which a thing is perfected - namely, mode, species, and order - three goods or three goodnesses; not because each of them by itself without the others constitutes simple goodness, but because they all contribute to the account of what is simply good, although when some one be lacking, the account of some goodness can remain, as we shall note below. And in this sense Herveus said that the good or goodness is an end, or something ordered to an end: for perfect and end are reciprocal; wherefore just as the good is either the perfect or ordered to perfection, so also it is either the end, or ordered to the end.

Caput VI - Certain objections against the foregoing doctrine

It remains that we dispel certain objections against the foregoing opinion, that the greater and greater clarity may be brought to it.

The first is, that from the foregoing doctrine it seems to follow that being and good are not convertible: for not every being is integral, nor has it all things necessary to its perfection; wherefore there will also be some beings evil: in which we would seem to agree with the Manichean, who taught that some substances are evil.

In order to meet this objection, let us first note that the Manichean taught not only that some substance - but also that nature, which is the same, as we shall show at I-II, q. 71, a. 6 - is evil, yes indeed that it is substantially evil, insofar as such a nature and substance is, by reason of its own entity; as is clear from St. Augustine, book 2 On the Morals of the Manichees, from chapter 1 to 8, and in the book On the Nature of the Good, chapter 16.[341] Wherefore Augustine contends against the Manichean only in those two places, and very often elsewhere, to show that no nature, insofar as it is nature and being, is evil. He openly concedes, however, in that book, On the Nature of the Good, chapter 4, that some nature or substance is evil when it is corrupted. But he calls corrupted, not that which now is not at all, but that which suffers some diminishment of itself: whence he infers that some nature is evil, which from its own genus is more excellent, better than the good of another genus; as a thing corrupted in part and imperfect is better and more excellent than a good, perfect thing of another genus. And he subjoins in the same chapter 5 these words: "But if corruption were to take away from corruptible things every mode, every species, every order, no nature would remain."[342]

Therefore, he says, an evil nature is not entirely so, but corrupted in part.

Next it should be observed that a thing can be perfected and be good in many ways. First, essentially, as man by body and rational soul. Second, substantially, namely by the parts which regard the integrity of the substance itself, as by the members. Third, accidentally, by the powers of the soul, by which a thing is perfected for acting, by perfections also immanent in operation, and by

341. St. Augustine, De moribus Manichaeorum, lib. 2, cc. 1 - 8; and De natura boni, c. 16.
342. St. Augustine, De natura boni, c. 5.

other accidents by which the good habit or condition of the thing consists. Since, however, malice is opposed to some finality - namely privation or corruption of integrity - it is necessary that in things malice be found in just as many ways.

First, then, the malice of a thing is a complete corruption: and in this way, since the very thing and substance do not remain to which such malice or privation might belong, nothing can be evil: wherefore everything is good by that whereby it is, namely by its nature and essence; for the things which are necessary for its essential constitution can never be lacking, and the thing itself remains. And so in that place, On the Nature of the Good, ch. 16, Augustine writes thus: "... Therefore malice is not, if the nature remains; and if it is evil, it is not of any nature; but if it is not altogether, it is of a good nature; and if into the very nature the evil were to pass, there would remain no good by which that nature might be recognized."[343]

Second, evil happens in the very substance by the defect of some member or part of integrity.

Third, from the privation of some quality or operation, which pertains to the state and due constitution of the thing; and in both ways, namely the second and the third, many substances and natures become evil. And this is what Augustine wished in the book On the Nature of the Good, ch. 16, where, when he conceded that some nature, or substance, is evil when it is corrupted, it is plain, therefore, that being and good are convertible: for every being, by the very fact that it is, has essential goodness.

Then someone can object thus in the second place. If goodness is the perfection of a thing, and integrity consists of many parts, it can agree neither to God, nor to simple things. For if, indeed, many things do not concur for forming their species, if they are simple, they are perfected by themselves; for their integrity will be their very essence or nature and goodness. And in general, even if we speak of the goodness which follows and accompanies essence, whether in simple things or also in composites, goodness cannot be distinguished from entity: for goodness arises from the concord of essential parts, as of matter and form, without which neither is there an essence nor can it be considered. Therefore in this way goodness will be the same as the very essence of the thing, so that they differ only in name, and will be reciprocated not denominatively but essentially, according to what we said in the first chapter of this disputation. Wherefore goodness cannot be assigned as a passion (*passio*) of being.

I answer: first, this argument proves only that the goodness which follows upon the essence of a being is not distinguished, according to the nature of the thing, from the essence itself: yet nothing hinders our distinguishing them according to our mode of understanding. For in one way we conceive some thing under the concept of constituted being, considering whether it consist of other things and be perfected, or have all things which integrate it and complete it: in which way we conceive the thing itself alone and its essence, accidents being excluded. In another way we understand it distinctly, considering of what things it consists, and whether nothing be lacking of those things by which it is constituted; then we consider the thing not only as thing and entity, but also as integral and good. And although the intellect does not assert that any thing can essentially

343. St. Augustine, De natura boni, c. 16.

subsist without the integrity of essential parts, nevertheless it can consider it confusedly, not attending to its integrity, which consists of essential parts. Whence it is clear how, by the diversity of the concept of being and of good in our intellect, namely that the one can be known without the other.

These things, however, which we have said, are to be understood of that goodness which most nearly follows the thing or essence. For there is another goodness which consists in integral parts or in accidents, and is distinguished from the thing itself and can be separated from it: for which reason Gregory Nazianzen in Oration 38, and Nicetas, his commentator, on those words "Immemor igitur," and likewise Pictius with him, note in Nicetas on Oration 42, on those words "Immemor igitur," etc., that they said God is simply good from whose nature goodness is - just as composition is not of a nature compounded, nor is from that very composition...[344]

Caput VII - On whether the notion of goodness is absolute or relative

But Nicetas and Psellus indeed say that the nature of God is one thing, simplicity another, which is considered about the nature and, as it were, surrounds it; and in fact they said this only on account of a distinction of our reason. If, therefore, simplicity and composition are thus compared with a thing simple or composed, in like manner the integrity of a thing ought to be compared with the thing itself. Therefore the argument does not prove that, universally, being and good are in no way to be distinguished.

Then I say that in simple things the notion of good can be fitting, not as something distinct from their essence by the nature of the thing, but only by our intellect; for we can consider it in either way just now explained. Nor does their simplicity prevent our conceiving them as, as it were, perfected out of many. For just as we apprehend in them several aspects distinct by our intellect, so too we can think of them themselves as, as it were, entire out of all the things that pertain to their entity, after the likeness of those which are constituted from many things really distinct. From which it may also be gathered that being and good do not reciprocate essentially, but denominatively, according to what was noted in the first chapter. In which place also the opinion of Durandus, there reported, is disproved, whose opposite Herveus thought true, teaching that good can convert essentially with being, and then that it is something abstracted from the absolute and the relative alike.

Corollaries of the preceding doctrine.

Someone will ask whether the ratio of goodness is absolute, or relative, or abstracted from both. I answer, on the basis of the higher doctrine, that goodness is in this way a relation, not indeed of the fittingness of one thing with another, as Durandus supposed, but of the integrity that comes from many. For the assemblage of all the things without defect necessary to the constitution of some thing is signified relatively; and this relation is to the very essence as to something to which it is fitting, but it is among those things which pertain to integrity: it also in a certain manner regards

344. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 38; Nicetas, Commentator on the same, on the words "Immemor igitur"; and again in Oration 42; Pictius ad loc.

the essence itself as consummated and perfected from them. Whether, however, this relation is only of reason or real, I do not care: yet it is certain that, in simple things, it is only of reason; for the assemblage of those things which are distinguished only by reason cannot be real, as is evident. Wherefore, if this goodness were a real relation, it could be only in composite things. But the two reasons which seem to fight against this doctrine have no weight.

Third objection. Herveus argues thus: no relation has perfection, but it is indifferent to the perfect and the imperfect; therefore the goodness of a thing cannot formally be a relation, since the goodness of a thing is its perfection.

Solution. Perfection is said of something in two ways: first, the integrity of a thing; then, that which pertains to its integrity. Although, therefore, relation, as it pleases some, is not a perfection in the latter way - which, however, we shall show false in Disputation 122 - yet nothing hinders that it be a perfection in the former way formally: for the same is the perfect and the complete in all respects, which cannot be understood without some reference.

Fourth objection. The alternative reason of certain recent authors is of this sort: if goodness is a real relation, either that relation is good or it is not. If it is not good, then good does not convert with being; but if it is good, then there is another relation that is good, and so on to infinity.

Response. First, not every goodness is a real relation, as has been shown, but some is of reason; and therefore there will not be a regress to infinity. Then I say that good converts with being, even with the relative, yet in such wise that it converts with the bare being which is understood after the manner of a subject receiving perfection, not, however, with the perfection of being itself.

Moreover, to put an end to this disputation, let us infer from what has been said that which chiefly pertains to our plan: namely, that God is good, indeed supremely good, in this kind of goodness, which, as it were, is a passion of being; for he is constituted whole and perfect in his existence (*esse*), so that nothing can be lacking to him, whether of those things which pertain to essence, or to persons, or to operations and emanations. But this goodness of God surpasses the goodnesses of all things created: for their essence is always good in such wise that, although it cannot be separated from the goodness existing with it, yet it can have opposed to itself the malice, namely, of its corruption. Moreover, a created essence, remaining in its existence with its essential goodness, can otherwise be evil by defect of other things which accidentally perfect it, according to what has been said in the preceding chapter. But God is so necessarily always existent, and therefore good, that no malice at all can blot out his goodness; just as neither can his essence and existence be corrupted. Then, too, existing in the realm of things, he is so necessarily good and perfect on every side that from no defect can he be evil; from which plenitude of goodness that he has in himself, there comes that he is good to all created things.

Articulus II - Whether good, according to reason, is prior to being

Whether, according to reason, good is prior to being.

Proceeding thus to the second. It seems that, according to reason, good is prior to being. For the order of names is according to the order of the things signified by the names. But Pseudo-Dionysius, among the other names of God, puts good before being, as is clear in book 3, chapter On the Divine Names; therefore, according to reason, good is prior to being.[345]

1. Further, that is prior according to reason which extends to more: but good extends to more than being; for, as Dionysius says in the same place, good extends to existent and non-existent things, whereas being extends only to existent things: therefore good is prior according to reason to being.
2. Further, what is more universal is prior according to reason; but good seems to be more universal than being: for good has the aspect of the appetible; yet for some the very not-being is appetible: for it is said in Matthew 26 about Judas, "It were good for him if that man had not been born," etc.; therefore good is prior to being according to reason.
3. Further, not only existence is appetible, but also life and wisdom and many other things of this sort; and thus it seems that existence is something particular among appetibles, while good is universal: therefore good simply is prior according to reason to being.

But on the contrary is what is said in the book On Causes, that the first of created things is being.[346]

I answer that being, according to reason, is prior to good. For the aspect signified by a name is that which the intellect conceives of a thing and signifies by a word: therefore that is prior according to reason which first falls under the conception of the intellect. But first in the conception of the intellect falls being: because each thing is knowable insofar as it is in act, as is said in Metaphysics IX; whence being is the proper object of the intellect, and so is the first intelligible, just as sound is the first audible: therefore, according to reason, being is prior to good.

Reply to the first: Dionysius is determining in the Divine Names according as we name the things that import about God the relation of cause; for we name God, as he himself says, from creatures, as cause from effects: but good, since it has the character of the appetible, imports the relation of final cause, whose causality is first, because an agent acts only for an end, and by the agent matter is moved to form; whence it is said that the end is the cause of causes ...

... the cause of causes. And so, in causing, the good is prior to being: as the end is prior to the form. And for this reason, among the names signifying the divine causality, "good" is set before "being." And again, because according to the Platonists - who, not distinguishing matter from privation, said that matter is non-being - the participation of the good extends to more things than the participation of being: for prime matter participates the good, since it desires it; but nothing desires except what is like itself; yet it does not participate being, since it is held to be non-being. And therefore Dionysius says that the good extends to things that do not exist.[347]

345. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 3; cf. also the clustered citations as they stand in the text: In I Sent., dist. 19, q. 1, a. 2; Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 20; De veritate, q. 30, a. 3; and Dionysius, loc. cit.

346. Liber de Causis; cf. Aristotle as cited in the margin (Metaphysics IX).

347. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 3.

Whence the solution to the second is clear. Or one may say that the good extends to things that exist and to things that do not exist, not according to predication, but according to causality: so that by "things that do not exist" we understand not those which simply are not at all, but those which are in potency and not in act: because the good has the character of the end, in which not only the things that are in act come to rest, but toward which also the things that are not in act but only in potency are moved. But being does not import the notion of a cause, except of a formal cause only, whether inhering or exemplary; and the causality of such extends only to those things which are in act.

Reply to the third: Non-being, taken in itself, is not appetible, but per accidens: namely, inasmuch as the removal of some evil is appetible; and an evil is indeed taken away by non-being. Yet the removal of evil is not appetible except insofar as by evil some being is privated. Therefore that which is per se appetible is being; non-being is good only per accidens, insofar as a certain being is desired of which a man does not endure to be deprived; and thus even non-being is called good per accidens.

Reply to the fourth: Life, and knowledge, and other such things are desired as they are in act: hence in all these a certain being is desired; and thus nothing is appetible except being, and consequently nothing is good except being.

Conclusion: Being is prior according to reason to good. For the confirmation and explication of this doctrine a few things will suffice; for from the foregoing it is quite clear; yet it will become still clearer by the following doubt.

Dubitatio circa textum.

The doubt is, in what way being can be prior, in the order of reason, to all other intelligibles, as St. Thomas says. For either the discourse is of the order of reason according to itself; and thus the doctrine cannot be true: for nothing is prior to God, neither according to reality, nor according to intellect, as in Question 3, Article 1, the same St. Thomas taught; therefore the ratio of being cannot be prior to all others. But if the discourse be of things with respect to our intellect, it does not seem that the question proposed in the title of the article is satisfied, in which it is asked whether the ratio of being, according to itself, is prior to the ratio of good.

Cajetan answers this doubt in two ways. The latter solution is as follows. When it is asked whether St. Thomas understands about the order "as to us," the phrase "as to us" can be taken in two ways: either it is referred to the intelligibles, or to the order. If it be referred to the order, the sense is: whether, in the order as to us, the ratio of being is prior to the ratio of another intelligible. Wherefore the objection proposed at the beginning (says Cajetan) attains that which it strives to prove: and St. Thomas does not speak of the order "as to us," by which, namely, a thing is known by us, but of the order according to itself, by which one ratio is prior to another: wherefore, in his opinion, not the ratio of being, but God among other things is prior according to himself. But if the phrase "as to us" be referred to the intelligibles, Cajetan distinguishes between intelligibles to us and not intelligible to us; and in this way he thinks it is to be taken in the present place, so that the sense is: among the intelligibles to us, being is prior according to itself. Therefore, since here being

is compared only with the intelligibles to us, it cannot be compared with God, who absolutely, though not to us, is the first intelligible. Wherefore the doctrine of this article does not oppose the doctrine of Article 1, Question 3, where the Doctor said that nothing is prior to God, neither according to reality nor according to intellect.

Cajetan thinks moreover that this exposition squares at first sight with the letter of the text, because St. Thomas said that the ratio signified by the name is that which the intellect understands; in which fashion he seems to have spoken of the human intellect, to which names signify. Yet this does not hinder, says the same Cajetan, but that the sequel be understood of intellect absolutely, whose object is known to be being. Thus far the latter solution of Cajetan, which is far less acceptable to me than the former, as I shall presently say.

Another solution is that St. Thomas here compares the ratio of being with other ratios of things, and not with the things themselves. Now, the ratio of being is the first intelligible in this manner, because it is compared with the rest in such a way that it is not compared with the quiddity of God himself. For Cajetan understands the ratios of things to be those which in their concept do not formally include existence. Since therefore the essence or quiddity of God cannot be abstracted from existence, it must be reckoned not among the ratios of things, but among the existing things themselves. If, however, the ratio of being were compared not only with the ratios of things, but with the things themselves, among which God would be contained, the ratio of being would not be the first intelligible; for God among the rest is first, since he is intelligible not by participation, but by himself; for which reason St. Thomas, Question 3, Article 1, says that nothing is prior to God, neither according to reality, nor according to intellect. Here, however, he only asserts that the ratio of being is first intelligible, not indeed compared with God, but with the other ratios of things which we understand.

But who does not see that these subtilties of Cajetan contribute little to the illustrating of St. Thomas's doctrine, which, if it be compared with the doctrine of the preceding article, is most clear? In the explanation of it, note that those things which are not distinguished by the nature of the thing, but by the consideration of the intellect, cannot be distinguished by an intellect that sees the thing, as is the cognition, as they say, intuitive; but only by an intellect that knows the thing through species and alien concepts. Wherefore, since in the preceding article of this question the Doctor said that being and good are the same according to reality and are distinguished by reason alone, he plainly understands the human intellect, which, by reason of the imperfection of its mode of cognition, forms various concepts of the same thing, and thus distinguishes things which were altogether undivided in themselves. All this doctrine will be proved more fully below in Disputation 118.

Therefore, when in this article he asks what is prior according to reason between being and good, in respect of our intellect distinguishing the ratio of being and of good, he proposes a question: for since by Article 1 it is established that being and good are the same by nature of the thing, he could not inquire which of them by nature of the thing would be prior. For the order of prior and posterior necessarily presupposes a distinction between those things which are ordered. Wherefore such ought to be the order as is the distinction of those things which have an order. To

the question thus proposed he excellently replies, saying that the ratio of being is prior to the ratio of good: and he understands this in any thing whatsoever, even in God: and he understands not only the ratio of being in general and abstract, but also the ratio of such a being, as of man, of God, etc. And that this ratio is prior in our intellect than the ratio of good is manifest: for of any thing whatsoever we first know its entity, than that which we conceive of it under the mode of an affection and property, as is the ratio of the good and the perfect. For goodness, as compared by our intellect with the entity of the thing, is always understood under the mode of an affection and property; but the entity of the thing is conceived under the mode of substance and subject. And so we first conceive man or God, than that we understand in them the ratio of the good: and to this tends the reasoning of St. Thomas in this article.

But someone will object Dionysius, On the Divine Names, book 3, at the beginning, where, among other names of God, he first enumerates "good." Now the order of names seems to be assigned from the order of the things which they signify: therefore the ratio of the good in God is prior to any other.

St. Thomas answers in the reply, that Dionysius in that place is treating of names which in God signify some mode, or relation, of cause. Now since among causes the first place is held by the final cause, whose ratio is goodness (for this cause moves the efficient), with reason he enumerated the name "Good" in the first place.

However, the mind of Dionysius can be more easily unfolded in such a way that it in no way opposes the doctrine handed down. His words, according to the translation of Perionius, are these: "Let us first, if it seems good, consider the name of good, which is perfect, and the interpreter of all the processions of God," where he says that the name "good" is perfect and an interpreter - or, as another translation has it, manifestative - of the divine processions and emanations: for all processions are ascribed to God by reason of goodness, whose proper and per se act seems to be to communicate itself to others. From this it is not proved that the name "good" signifies the first of all the ratios in God. And by "emanations" Dionysius understands those by which God communicates himself to creatures.

Articulus III - Whether every being is good

To the third, it proceeds thus.

It seems that not every being (*ens*) is good (*bonum*).

1) For the good adds to being, as was said above: but that which adds something of its own to another is coarser than that other: thus substance, quantity, quality, and other such things contract being; therefore not every being is good.

2) Further, no evil is good; but some being, as we say, is evil: and "evil good" is said through an addition of something; therefore not every being is good.

3) Further, the good has the ratio of the appetible: but prime matter does not have the ratio of the appetible, but of the desire only; therefore prime matter does not have the ratio of the good; therefore not every being is good.

4) Further, the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 3 that in mathematics there is no good; but mathematical things are certain beings, otherwise there would not be science about them; therefore not every being is good.

But on the contrary: Every being that is not God is a creature of God; but every creature of God is good, as is said in 1 Tim. 4: God, moreover, is supremely good: therefore every being is good.

I answer: Every being, insofar as it is being, is good. For every being, insofar as it is being, is in act, and in a certain way perfect; since every act is a certain perfection. Now the perfect has the ratio of the appetible and of the good, as is clear from what has been said: whence it follows that every being, insofar as it is of this sort, is good.

Reply to the first: Substance, quantity, and quality, and the rest which are contained under them, contract being by applying being to some quidditative determination or nature: but in this way the good does not add anything upon being, but only the ratio of the appetible and of perfection, which belongs to the very act of existing in whatever nature it be: whence the good does not contract being.

Reply to the second: No being is called evil insofar as it is being, but insofar as it lacks a certain being: thus a man is called evil insofar as he lacks virtue; and an eye is called evil insofar as it lacks sharpness of sight.

Reply to the third: Prime matter is not being except in potency; thus neither is it good except in potency. And although, according to the Platonists, it could be said that prime matter is non-being by reason of the privation adjoined, nevertheless it participates something of the good, namely, an order or aptitude to the good: and therefore it does not befit it that it be appetible, but that it desire.

Reply to the fourth: Mathematical things, precisely as abstracted, do not contain in themselves the nature of the appetible, which follows upon actuality in things; and therefore, in that respect, "good" is not said of them by way of predication as of appetible things. Yet, insofar as they have being in the intellect, and exhibit order and a certain perfection of truth, they are not outside the scope of the good absolutely, since every being, under its proper mode of being, is proportioned to the ratio of the good.

Reply to the fourth: Mathematical things do not subsist separately according to existence (*esse*): because if they subsisted, there would be good in them, namely, their very existence. But mathematical things are separated according to reason (*ratio*) only, insofar as they are abstracted from motion and from matter; and thus they are abstracted from the notion of end (*finis*), which has the character of mover. Nor is it incongruous that in some being according to reason there be neither good nor the notion of the good, since the notion of being (*ens*) is prior to the notion of good, as was said above.

Explanation of the article. The conclusion affirms something whose explanation can easily be gathered from the doctrine of Article I. For, if the discussion be about moral goodness, not every being is good, as is clearly evident. But if it be about the goodness by which one thing is said to be good for another, not every being is absolutely and simply good: because no being besides God can be suitable to all other things, as has been proved. Finally, if we speak of that goodness which is the integrity and consummation of a thing, then every thing is good by that goodness which consists in the integrity of the essence (*essentia*), although from another point of view it can be evil by defect of accidental integrity, or of parts.

But St. Thomas argues in the fourth way as follows: Mathematical figures and quantities are certain beings, to which nevertheless the notion of the good does not befit: for Aristotle teaches in Metaphysics III, chapter 2, text 3, that in these there is found no good, and on that account mathematicians prove nothing by a final cause; therefore not every being attains the notion of the good.[348] The Holy Doctor replies that, if mathematical figures subsisted in reality, they would indeed be good, as any beings whatsoever; but because they are abstracted by our consideration from existence, therefore in them goodness is not found; for this is found in a thing existing in reality. Nor is it at all absurd that something in our consideration be without goodness; since the notion of being and of good are distinguished only in reason, and the notion of being is prior to the notion of good.

Cajetan, in his commentaries, in order to defend the doctrine of St. Thomas, endeavors to show that mathematical figures are abstracted from matter in such a way that no individual of theirs exists in the nature of things apart from matter; metaphysics, by contrast, abstracts from matter in such a way that some of its individuals exist separate from matter, namely, the intelligences. In this way he would prove that mathematical figures are not good, because even in their individuals abstracted from matter they do not exist; whereas metaphysical things are good, because some of their individuals exist in reality, even abstracted from matter.[349] Yet in this matter Cajetan labors in vain: for, as has been proved, in things however abstracted from matter and from existence, the notion of the good is found.

In my judgment, the mind of Aristotle in that place can more easily be explained. For when he denies that goodness inheres in mathematical figures and lines, he is not speaking of the good which formally consists in the perfection and integrity of the thing and is convertible with being; but of the good relatively taken, which is suitable to another. For this good has the character of an end (*finis*), and for the sake of which the rest is sought. Aristotle therefore teaches that the mathematical disciplines prove nothing from a final cause: for they do not consider what is fitting "for the sake of" which other things are done, since in them there is no principle of motion and operation, inasmuch as they consider figures as entirely abstract. For this reason Aristippus, as Aristotle testifies in the same place, despised these sciences, and preferred to them the leather-

348. Aristotle, Metaphysics III, c. 2, text 3.
349. Cajetan, Commentary on the Summa theologiae, ad loc.

worker's and the craftsman's arts, which consider the very "for the sake of which." Wherefore the notion of the good so follows upon the notion of being, and is convertible with it, that it also befits mathematical figures and things however much abstracted.

Articulus IV - Whether the good has the nature of a final cause

To the fourth, we proceed thus. It seems that the good does not have the nature of a final cause, but rather of other causes.

Objicitur 1. For, as Pseudo-Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, chapter 4, the good is praised as the beautiful; but the beautiful imports the notion of a formal cause; therefore the good has the nature of a formal cause.

Objicitur 2. Further, the good is diffusive of its own being, as is gathered from the words of Pseudo-Dionysius, who says that the good is that from which all things subsist and are; but a being diffusive of itself imports the notion of an efficient cause; therefore the good has the nature of an efficient cause.

Objicitur 3. Further, St. Augustine says in De doctrina Christiana that because God is good, therefore we are; but we are from God as from an efficient cause; therefore the good imports the notion of an efficient cause.

But on the contrary: The Philosopher says in Physics II that that for the sake of which a thing is, is as the end and the good of the others; therefore the good has the nature of a final cause.

I answer: Since the good is that which all desire, this manifestly has the notion of an end; therefore it is clear that the good imports the notion of a final cause. Yet the notion of the good presupposes the notion of the efficient cause and the notion of the formal cause. For we see that what is first in causing is last in the thing caused. Fire first heats before it induces the form of fire, although in fire heat follows upon the substantial form. But in causing, first there is found the good and the end, which moves the efficient cause; secondly, the action of the efficient cause moving toward the form; thirdly, the form arrives. Whence, conversely, it must be in the thing caused: what is first is the form itself, through which it is a being; secondly, in it is considered an effective power, insofar as it is perfect in being - for each thing is then perfect when it can make something like itself, as the Philosopher says in Meteorology IV; thirdly, the notion of the good follows, inasmuch as in that very perfection it is founded.

Reply to the first: The beautiful (*pulchrum*) and the good are the same in subject, because they are founded upon the same thing, namely, upon form; and for this reason the good is praised as beautiful. But they differ in notion: for the good properly regards the appetite, for the good is what all desire, and therefore it has the notion of an end, for appetite is as it were a certain motion toward a thing. The beautiful, however, regards the cognitive power: for those things are called beautiful which, when seen, please; whence the beautiful consists in due proportion, because sense

delights in things duly proportioned, as in its similars. For sense is a kind of reason, and every cognitive power is such because cognition takes place by assimilation, and likeness regards form; therefore the beautiful properly pertains to the notion of a formal cause.

Reply to the second: The good is said to be diffusive of its own being in the way in which the end is said to move.

Reply to the third: Everyone having a will is called good insofar as he has a good will: because by the will we make use of all the things that are in us. Hence a man is not called good because he has a good intellect, but because he has a good will. But the will regards the end as its proper object; and thus what is said, that God is good, is referred to the final cause.

Explanation of the article. The conclusion affirms that it is to be understood not of the good which is placed in the integrity of the thing itself, but of the good related to another, which is said to be fitting to something; of which kind of good there was speech in the preceding disputation. Moreover, as we noted there, this relative ratio of the good befits another, but arises from the goodness of the thing itself, which is its integrity and perfection, and is convertible with being. What Cajetan notes in this article concerning these three - good, end, and the appetible - we shall treat in I, q. 2, a. 4, where also in a. 1 it must be disputed whether apprehension is a condition or the notion of the end. Finally, whether the end is first in causality and last in acquisition we shall explain in a. 1 of that and other questions.

Articulus V - Whether the notion of the good consists in mode, species, and order

To the fifth, we proceed thus. It seems that the notion of the good does not consist in mode, species, and order.

Objicitur 1. For the good and being differ in notion, as was said above; but mode, species, and order pertain to the notion of being. Therefore the notion of the good does not consist in mode, species, and order.

Pulchrum, however, regards the cognitive power: for those things are called beautiful which, when seen, please; whence the beautiful consists in due proportion, because the sense takes delight in things duly proportioned, as in things like itself; for sense too is a certain reason, and every cognitive power. And because cognition takes place through assimilation, and likeness regards form, the beautiful properly pertains to the notion of the formal cause.

Reply to the second: the good is said to be diffusive of its own existence, in the way in which the end is said to move.

Reply to the third: whoever has a will is called good insofar as he has a good will; because through the will we use all the things that are in us: whence a man is not called good who has a good intellect, but one who has a good will. But the will regards the end as its proper object; and thus what is said, that God is good, is referred to the final cause.

Explanation of the article. The conclusion is not asserted of the good which is set in the thing's integrity, but of the good relative to another, which is said to be fitting to someone; about which genus of good it was said in the preceding disputation. Moreover, as we there noted, this notion of a good fitting to another arises from the goodness of the thing itself, which is its integrity and perfection, and is convertible with being. What Cajetan notes in this article concerning these three - good, end, and the appetible - we shall treat in I - II, q. 1, a. 4; where also in a. 1 it must be disputed whether apprehension is a condition or the notion of the end. Finally, whether the end is first in causality and last in acquisition we shall explain in a. 1 and a. 4 of that question.[350]

Whether the notion of the good consists in mode, species, and order

To the fifth, we proceed thus. It seems that the notion of the good does not consist in mode, species, and order.

Objicitur 1. For the good and being differ in notion, as was said above; but mode, species, and order seem to pertain to the notion of being, because, as it is said in Wisdom 11, "You have disposed all things in measure, number, and weight." To these three are reduced species, mode, and order: for, as St. Augustine says in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis IV, "Measure sets a mode for every thing; and number gives a species to every thing; and weight draws every thing to rest and stability."[351] Therefore the notion of the good does not consist in mode, species, and order.

Objicitur 2. Further, mode, species, and order are themselves certain goods; if therefore the notion of the good consists in mode, species, and order, it would also be necessary that mode have mode, species, and order; and similarly species and order: and thus there would be a process to infinity.

Objicitur 3. Further, evil is the privation of mode, and of species, and of order; but evil does not totally take away the good; therefore the notion of the good does not consist in mode, species, and order.

Objicitur 4. Further, that in which the notion of the good consists cannot be called evil; but one says a bad mode, a bad species, and a bad order; therefore the notion of the good does not consist in mode, species, and order.

Objicitur 5. Further, mode, species, and order are caused by weight, number, and measure, as is clear from the authority of St. Augustine just cited; but not all goods have weight, number, and measure: for St. Ambrose says in the first book of the Hexaemeron that "the nature of light is that it is not created in number, nor in weight, nor in measure."[352] Therefore the notion of the good does not consist in mode, species, and order.

350. Cajetan, Commentary on Summa theologiae I - II, q. 1, a. 4; cf. also a. 1 of the same question, on whether apprehension is a condition or the notion of the end, and a. 1 and a. 4 on whether the end is first in causality and last in acquisition.

351. Wisdom 11:21; St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram IV, c. 3.

352. St. Ambrose, Hexaemeron I, c. 9.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in the book On the Nature of the Good: "These three, mode, species, and order, are, as it were, general goods in things made by God; and thus these three, where they are great, are great goods; where small, small goods; where none, there is no good." Which would not be unless the notion of the good in them were set; therefore the notion of the good consists in mode, species, and order.[353]

I answer that one and the same thing is called good insofar as it is perfect: for thus it is appetible, as was said above; but that is called perfect to which nothing is lacking according to the mode of its perfection. Now since each thing is what it is by its form, but form presupposes certain things and certain things necessarily follow upon it: for something to be perfect and good it is necessary that it have form, and the things that follow upon it. Now there is pre-required for the form the determination, or commensuration, of the principles - either material or efficient - to the form itself; and this is signified by mode, wherefore it is said that measure sets the mode. But the form itself is signified by species; because through the form each thing is constituted in its species; and for this reason it is said that number gives species, because definitions signifying a species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics VIII: for as unity added or subtracted varies the species of number, so in definitions the difference added or subtracted.[354] But to the form there follows also an inclination to the end, or to action, or to something of this sort: because each thing, insofar as it is in act, acts and tends toward that which is fitting to it according to its form; and this pertains to weight and to order: whence the notion of the good, insofar as it consists in perfection, also consists in mode, species, and order.

Reply to the first: those three do not follow upon being except insofar as it is perfect; and according to this it is good.

Reply to the second: mode, species, and order are called goods in the same way as beings are called beings: not because they are, as it were, subsistences, but because by them other things are beings and goods. Whence it is not necessary that they themselves have other things by which they may be good: for they are not thus called goods as if they were formally the good of other things, but because through them, formally, other things are good. Thus whiteness is not called a being because it itself is made by something else, but because through it something is, namely white.

Reply to the third: since every sort of being is according to the form of something, whence, according to whatever being a thing has, there follows upon it mode, species, and order: thus a man has species, mode, and order insofar as he is a man; and likewise insofar as he is something else he has mode, species, and order in another way; and insofar as he is virtuous, and insofar as he is learned, and according to all the things that are said of him. But evil deprives of a certain being, as blindness deprives of the being of sight: whence it does not take away every mode, species, and order, but only the mode, species, and order that follow upon the being of sight.

353. St. Augustine, De natura boni, c. 3 - 4.
354. Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, text 10.

Reply to the fourth: as St. Augustine says in the book On the Nature of the Good, every mode, insofar as mode, is good; and likewise it can be said of species and order. But a bad mode, or bad species, or bad order, is said either because they are less than they ought to be, or because they are not accommodated to those things to which they ought to be accommodated; or they are said to be bad because they are alien and incongruous.[355]

Reply to the fifth: the nature of light is said to be without number, weight, and measure, not simply, but by comparison to corporeal things: because the power of light extends to all corporeal things, insofar as it is the active quality of the first body that alters, namely the heaven.

Conclusion: The conclusion is affirmative, about which enough has been said in the preceding disputation.

Articulus VI - Whether the good is fittingly divided into the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable

To the sixth, we proceed thus. It seems that the good is not fittingly divided into the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable.

Objicitur 1. For the good, as the Philosopher says in Ethics I, is divided by the ten predicaments; but the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable can be found in one predicament: therefore the good is not fittingly divided by these.[356]

Objicitur 2. Further, every division is made by opposites; but these three do not seem to be opposites: for honorable things are also pleasurable; and no dishonorable thing is useful; which nevertheless would be required, if the division were made by opposites, so that the honorable and the useful would be opposed, as Cicero also says in the book On Duties; therefore the aforesaid division is not fitting.[357]

Objicitur 3. Further, where one is on account of another, there there is only one; but the useful is not good except on account of the pleasurable or the honorable: therefore the useful ought not to be divided against the pleasurable and the honorable.

But on the contrary: St. Ambrose in the book On Duties uses this division of the good.[358]

I answer that this division seems properly to be that of the human good, if we consider the notion of the good more deeply and more commonly, this division is found to belong properly to the good according as it is good. For the good is something insofar as it is appetible, and the terminus of the motion of appetite: the termination of whose motion can be considered from the consideration of the motion of a natural body. For the motion of a natural body is terminated simply at the ultimate; but in a certain respect also at the medium, by which it is carried to the ultimate, which terminates the motion: and something is called the terminus of motion insofar as it terminates some part of the motion. Now that which is the ultimate terminus of motion can be

355. St. Augustine, De natura boni, c. 3 - 4.
356. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, c. 6.
357. Cicero, De officiis.
358. St. Ambrose, De officiis.

taken in two ways, either as the very thing to which it tends, as place, or form; or as the rest in that thing. Thus therefore in the motion of appetite, that which is appetible terminating the motion of appetite in a certain respect, as a medium, by which it tends to another, is called useful; but that which is desired as the ultimate terminating totally the motion of appetite, as a certain thing to which of itself the appetite tends, is called the honorable, because honorable is said of that which is desired for its own sake. But that which terminates the motion of appetite as rest in the thing desired is the pleasurable.

Reply to the first: the good, insofar as it is the same in subject with being, is divided by the ten predicaments; but according to its proper notion this division belongs to it.

Reply to the second: this division is not by opposite things, but by opposite notions. Yet those things are properly called pleasurable which have no other reason for being appetible except pleasure, although sometimes they are harmful and dishonorable. But those things are called useful which have in themselves nothing from which they are desired, but are desired only as leading to another, as the taking of bitter medicine. But those things are called honorable which have in themselves that from which they are desired.

Reply to the third: the good is not divided into these three as something univocal equally predicated of them, but as an analogous term which is predicated according to prior and posterior: for first it is predicated of the honorable, second of the pleasurable, third of the useful.

Conclusion: The conclusion is affirmative, about which there is discussion at I - II, q. 1, a. 4; for the aforesaid division is most suitable for a moral treatment.[359]

Quaestio VI - On the goodness of God

Then we inquire concerning the goodness of God. And about this four things are asked:

Articulus I - Whether to be good belongs to God

To the first, we proceed thus. It seems that to be good does not belong to God.

Objicitur 1. For the notion of the good consists in mode, species, and order; but these do not seem to belong to God, since God is immense in himself and is not ordered to another: therefore to be good does not belong to God.

Objicitur 2. Further, the good is that which all things desire; but not all desire God, because not all know Him: for nothing is desired unless it be known; therefore to be good does not belong to God.

But on the contrary: it is said in Lamentations 3: "Good is the Lord to them that hope in him, to the soul that seeks him."[360]

359. Cf. Summa theologiae I - II, q. 1, a. 4.
360. Lamentations 3:25.

I answer that to be good belongs chiefly to God. For the good is something according as it is appetible; but each thing desires its own perfection; and perfection, and the form of the effect, is a certain likeness of the agent, since every agent acts something like itself; whence the agent itself is appetible and has the notion of the good: for this is what is desired of it, that its likeness be participated. Therefore, since God is the first efficient cause of all things, it is manifest that the notion of the good and of the appetible befits Him. Whence Pseudo-Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names attributes the good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that God is called good as that from which all things subsist.[361]

Reply to the first: to have mode, species, and order pertains to the notion of created good; but the good in God is as in a cause: whence it pertains to Him to impose on others mode, species, and order; and thus these three are in God as in a cause.

Reply to the second: by desiring their proper perfections all things desire God, insofar as the perfections of all things are certain likenesses of the divine being, as is clear from what has been said. And thus of those that desire God, some know Him according to Himself, which is proper to a rational creature. But some know certain participations of His goodness, which extends even to sensible cognition. Some, however, have a natural appetite without cognition: as things inclined to their own ends by some higher knower.

Conclusion: To be good belongs chiefly to God.

Articulus II - Whether God is the highest good

Objicitur: 1. It seems that God is not the highest good. For the highest good adds something over and above good; otherwise it would belong to every good. But whatever has its being from an addition to something is composite; therefore the highest good is composite. But God is supremely simple, as was shown above; therefore God is not the highest good.[362]

1. Further, good is what all things desire, as the Philosopher says; but there is nothing else that all things desire except God alone, who is the end of all things. Therefore there is nothing else good except God. This also appears from what is said in Luke 18: "None is good save God alone." But "highest" is said in comparison to others, as "highest hot" is said in comparison to other hot things; therefore God cannot be called the highest good.
2. Further, "highest" imports a comparison; but things that are not of one genus are not comparable, as sweetness is not suitably called greater or less than a line. Since, therefore, God is not in the same genus with other goods, as is clear from the foregoing, it seems that God cannot be called the highest good with respect to them.

Sed contra: St. Augustine says in De Trinitate that the Trinity of the divine persons is the highest good, which is beheld by the most purified minds.[363]

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361. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus IV; cf. Summa theologiae I, q. 44, a. 1.

362. The reference numbers in the margin here allude to loci already treated above in the work, especially the discussion of divine simplicity.

Respondeo: I answer that God is the highest good simply, and not only in some genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God (as was said) inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from him as from the first cause; yet they do not flow from him as from an univocal agent, as is clear from the foregoing, but as from an agent that does not agree with its effects either in the notion of species or in the notion of genus. Now the likeness of the effect is found in the univocal cause uniformly; in the equivocal cause, however, it is found more excellently, as heat exists in a more excellent mode in the sun than in fire. Therefore it must be that, since good is in God as in the first cause of all things and not univocally, it is in him in the most excellent mode, and on this account he is called the highest good.

Ad primum:

To the first it must be said that the highest good adds over and above good not some absolute thing, but only a relation. But the relation according to which something is said of God relatively to creatures is not really in God but in creatures, though in God according to reason. Thus "knowable" is said relatively to knowledge, not because it itself is referred to knowledge, but because knowledge is referred to it. And thus it is not necessary that there be any composition in the highest good, but only that other things fall short of it.

Ad secundum:

To the second it must be said that, when it is said "good is what all things desire," it is not to be understood as though every good were desired by all, but because whatever is desired has the notion of good. But what is said, "None is good save God alone," is understood of the good by essence, as will be said below.

Ad tertium:

To the third it must be said that those things which are not in the same genus, if indeed they are contained in diverse genera, are in no way comparable; but it is denied of God that he is in the same genus with other goods, not because he is in some other genus, but because he is outside genus and the principle of every genus. And thus he is compared to other things by excess; and by a comparison of this sort "highest good" is imported.

Conclusio: The conclusion is that God is the highest good simply, and not only in some genus or order of things. Concerning the doctrine of each of the two foregoing articles enough has been said in the preceding disputation.

363. St. Augustine, De Trinitate I, c. 2.

Articulus III - Whether to be good by essence is proper to God

Objicitur: 1. It seems that to be good by essence is not proper to God. For as one is convertible with being, so is good, as was had above. But every being is one by its essence, as is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics IV; therefore every being is good by its essence.

1. Further, if good is what all things desire, since existence itself is desired by all, the existence of any thing is its good. But every thing is a being by its essence; therefore every thing is good by its essence.
2. Further, every thing is good by its goodness. If therefore there is some thing which is not good by its essence, it will be necessary that its goodness is not its essence. Therefore that goodness, since it is a certain being, must be good; and if indeed by another goodness, then again inquiry will be made about that goodness. Either, then, we will proceed to infinity, or we will come to some goodness which will not be good by another goodness. By the same reasoning we must stand at the first: therefore every thing whatsoever is good by its essence.

Sed contra: Boethius says in the book De hebdomadibus that all other things from God are good by participation; therefore not by essence.[364]

Respondeo: I answer that God alone is good by his essence. For each thing is called good according as it is perfect. Now the perfection of a thing is threefold. First, according as it is constituted in its existence. Second, according as some accidents are superadded, necessary for its perfect operation. Third, the perfection of a thing is by this, that it attains something else as an end. For instance, the first perfection of fire consists in the existence which it has by its substantial form; its second perfection consists in heat, lightness, and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is according as it rests in its proper place. But this threefold perfection befits no created thing according to its essence, but God alone, whose essence alone is his existence, and to whom no accidents accrue; but those things which are said of others accidentally befit him essentially - namely, to be powerful, wise, and other such things, as is clear from what has been said. He also is not ordered to anything else as to an end, but he himself is the ultimate end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every kind of perfection according to his essence; and therefore he alone is good by his essence.

Ad primum:

To the first it must be said that "one" does not import the notion of perfection, but only of indivision, which befits every thing according to its essence. Now the essences of simples are individed both as to act and potency; but the essences of composites are individed according to act alone. And therefore it must be that every thing is one by its essence, but not good, as has been shown.

364. Boethius, De hebdomadibus.

Ad secundum:

To the second it must be said that, although each thing is good insofar as it has existence, nevertheless the essence of a created thing is not its very existence; and therefore it does not follow that a created thing is good by its essence.

Ad tertium:

To the third it must be said that the goodness of a created thing is not its very essence, but something superadded - either its very existence, or some superadded perfection, or order to the end. Yet this very goodness thus superadded is called good, just as "being" is. For it is called "being" by this account, because it is something, not because it is by some other. Hence by this account it is called "good," because it is something good, not because it has some other goodness by which it is good.

Conclusio: The conclusion is: God alone is good by essence. This at first glance seems easy; yet in the way in which it is understood by St. Thomas it is difficult, as will appear in the following disputation.

Disputatio XXIV - Whether to be good by essence is proper to God

Sententia S. Thomae, et Caietani. Exponitur difficultas praedictae sententiae. Cui conveniat bonum per essentiam.

Caput I - The view of St. Thomas and of Cajetan

The controversy proposed seemed so easy that no variety of opinions could arise about it; nevertheless, concerning the manner of expounding it, not all have the same view. The prior view is that of St. Thomas, which Cajetan follows in this article - namely, that it is proper to God to be good by essence, such that no other thing can be good by essence. For the sake of this point Cajetan notes that that particle "by essence" in the proposition ought rather to be referred to the predicate than to be considered as referred to the subject, namely to God; and thus the sense is: God by his essence is so good as not to be by something added. But the particle "by essence" is referred to the predicate, namely to "good," and thus the sense will be: that God is good by a goodness not participated, but which by essence is such. He calls participated goodness that which does not have the fullness of perfection befitting the formal notion of goodness, and this is finite and dependent on another. By contrast, goodness by essence is infinite in itself and has its being from no other.

Next, Cajetan notes that in the present difficulty, by reason of the matter, these two are altogether the same: for what is good by essence in the prior mode is also good by essence in the posterior mode. Yet because these two - "to be such by essence" and "that such be by essence" - do not universally fall into the same thing, but are formally distinguished (for Socrates by his essence is a man, and yet he is not a man by essence), and also because the present question in St. Thomas

is about the good which is good by essence, not about the essence of God, whether by itself or by something else it is good - for already in question 3 he had demonstrated that God is supremely simple, and hence that nothing accidental inheres in him, and thus it stood fast that God by his essence is good, not by something added - therefore in this article the particle "by essence" is to be referred to the predicate, not to the subject. So that the sense is: that God is good by a goodness which is goodness by essence.

Nevertheless, although this doctrine of Cajetan is true, yet it is not according to the mind of St. Thomas, whom he strives to interpret. For although from the argument "But on the contrary" it may seem to be gathered that he speaks of the good by essence, which is distinguished from the good by participation, yet because in all the other arguments he plainly refers the particle "by essence" to the subject of the proposition, not to the predicate - and this is clearly gathered from the doctrine of the article, as we shall presently show - therefore what seems to be deduced from the argument "But on the contrary" ought to be reckoned of less moment. For very often this kind of argument is not set down by St. Thomas so much to confirm what he teaches in the article, as to render the proposed question, after his usual fashion, doubtful on both sides. The sense of his position is always to be drawn from the solutions of the arguments and the doctrine of the article itself.

Accordingly, in the article St. Thomas teaches that there are three belongings or perfections of goodness in each thing. The first, he says, is the integrity of the thing as existing, and thus it is already constituted out of essence and existence. The second is the accident, by which things are well disposed. The third is the end to which it is ordered.

Caput II - The difficulty is explained

It is the attainment of its proper end. In a stone he shows these three: which is, first, perfected in its existence and essence; second, by gravity and other qualities; third, by its center and the term of its motion. Therefore the Holy Doctor says that to no creature by its own essence do any of these goodnesses belong: for if any belonged in this way, it would belong primarily for the very reason on account of which it belongs; because in no creature, but in God alone, to be is His essence. Therefore no creature by its essence has any goodness, but God alone. It would seem indeed that St. Thomas teaches that the first goodness, which follows upon the thing in the notion of being before the advent of existence and of any accident, does not belong to any thing considered according to its essence and according to possible being: for if before existence it were good, he would not say that nothing is good by its essence, because no created essence is its own existence.

This very point is gathered from the doctrine of the same St. Thomas below, q. 19, a. 3, as we shall note a little further down. But in order to defend this view, he must assert that in created things essence is really distinguished from existence, as he himself taught in Contra gentiles II, c. 52, and in De ente et essentia, c. 5, and with him other Scholastics, whom we shall report at III, q. 17, a. 2.[365][366][367] For if it were distinguished only by reason, every thing would be good by itself, that

365. Summa Theologiae III, q. 17, a. 2.

is, not by something adventitious and distinct from it. It would matter little to say that the goodness of created things is distinguished by reason from the essence as a consequent passion: for even in God in this way it is distinguished by us; nonetheless we say that God is good by His essence: therefore in the same way every created thing would be called good, just as God Himself.

Set forth is the difficulty of the aforesaid position.

First, because goodness is a passion of being and is convertible with it: therefore, of whatever is truly enunciated "being," goodness can be predicated. But of any essence, before it exists, "being" is truly enunciated: therefore also "good." For the copula - the verb "is" - in that proposition does not signify existence, but a connection according to the nature of the thing between subject and predicate; and hence of things not yet existing such propositions can be enunciated.

Second, as will be proved at III, q. 17, a. 2,[365] existence is entirely the same in reality as essence: if, therefore, things are good by existence, they will also be good by essence itself, although goodness be distinguished from their essence and existence by the mode of a passion only by reason; except that, just as things, before they actually exist, are said to be possible according to that same existence under possible being, so also goodness, before existence, will belong to the thing itself under merely possible being. And since the verb "is" in that proposition, "Man is good," or "a horse is good," does not denote existence but the connection of extremes, it follows that of man and of the horse, before they exist, the aforesaid proposition can be enunciated.

Moreover, just as goodness is not of the essence of any created essence, although it be entirely the same in reality with existence, because, however, it depends on another, before it is and after it exists it can fail to exist, therefore by a special reason existence is said not to be of the essence of that thing formally: so likewise we must say that the creature is thus good by its essence as that it can perish and be corrupted, and thus that some evil is opposed to it, as will be explained more fully in the following chapter.

Third, the same view is difficult, because, as we shall say in Disputation 79,[368] God so loves creatures according to possible being with the love of simple complacency that He loves them necessarily: therefore in them, before existence - even future existence - there is some goodness toward which the act of the divine will is borne. I confess nonetheless that, in the view of St. Thomas, possible creatures are not loved by God, but only those that will sometime be future; for which reason, since below at q. 19, a. 3, he had taught that creatures are loved by God freely, yet necessarily known, immediately in the solution of the sixth he assigns the difference between knowledge and love, namely, that things are known by God inasmuch as they are in Him, but are loved inasmuch as they are in themselves: and because in God they necessarily are, but in themselves not necessarily, therefore they are necessarily known, but not necessarily loved. Which would not be true, if things were loved by God according to possible being.

366. St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles II, c. 52; De ente et essentia, c. 5.
367. See likewise the Scholastics adduced at III, q. 17, a. 2.
365. Summa Theologiae III, q. 17, a. 2.
368. Vazquez, Disputationes 79 and 144.

Possible being. For this is so necessary, and in God is necessarily represented, just as the entity and truth of things; and hence, in the same way, it would be loved as it is known. He taught the very same thing in a. 6 of this question, to the second reply; and in I Contra gentiles, c. 81, in the last reason.[369] The doctrine of this article also agrees, when he says that in the essences of things before the advent of existence there is no goodness. Ferrariensis thinks the same in that place, c. 81, and IV Contra gentiles, c. 13; and where in c. 75, 9, it is said, 2, although indeed, of the first book, it is replied that he says that creatures are loved by God in Himself, inasmuch as He also loves Himself; and he repeats the same in IV Contra gentiles, c. 13, 6. These do not stand in the way: yet in my view he is not speaking of creatures according to the proper and formal reasons objected to the divine intellect, but of creatures inasmuch as they are said to be God Himself, or to be contained virtually in Him. In which way a stone in God is said to live the life of God, as we shall see in Disputation 70.[370] In this sense too St. Thomas said below at q. 19, a. 6, ad 2, that God does not will every good except inasmuch as He wills Himself, in whom virtually is every good.[371] What, however, Caietan thinks in this matter, must be said below in Disputation 79 and Disputation 144.[368]

Yet this doctrine seems difficult. For although a thing, before it exists, does not have goodness in act, just as it does not have existence in act, nor anything else, nonetheless any thing ought to be said to be simply good, even according to possible being, because the verb "is" in that proposition does not signify the existence of the predicate in the subject, but the agreement and connection with it. And just as the essence of a thing according to possible being is understood together with existence also possible, indeed in reality is the same with it, so also it is understood as good: wherefore nothing prevents God from loving things that are only possible: rather the will of God, whereby He wills some thing to be future, does not suppose future existence as the object toward which it is borne in the mode of love, but only supposes possible being. For it is posterior that a thing be future, than that God will it to be future. When, therefore, it is understood that God wills a thing to be future, already it is understood that He loves it as possible.

Finally, against the preceding view a reason can be framed. The goodness of a thing is the same as its integrity; but every essence, before it exists, is understood to be integral, either by itself, if it is simple; or by its essential parts, as matter and form, if it is composite: therefore by itself, before existence, it is good. To this reason Caietan in this article replies, that a thing is called good in two ways. First, relatively; and in this way any essence, before it is in the nature of things, is good by itself. Then absolutely; and thus it is never perfect and good, until it be in the nature of things; wherefore the being of existence is of the integrity of nature, and pertains to the goodness of that nature in this latter way: not as a part of the essence, but as its act. And when the essence of some thing is said to be more perfect than another, it must not be so understood (says Caietan) as if the

369. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 6, a. 6, ad 2; Contra Gentiles I, c. 81 (ultima ratio).
370. Vazquez, Disputatio 70.
371. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 2.
368. Vazquez, Disputationes 79 and 144.

essence of some thing by itself is good without anything else, unless only, as he says, radically. But when St. Thomas denies that some created thing is good by its essence, he understands it absolutely and sufficiently without another.

But from the things we have said it is plainly evident that this distinction of Caietan has no weight. For the essences of things, whether by themselves, or by something else, be good, must be said absolutely and simply to be good, before they exist. Because the verb "is" in a proposition does not signify existence. Moreover, that the essences of things are simply good by themselves is proved because they are called simply beings; but "good" and "being" are convertible.

Caput III - To whom goodness by essence belongs

I answer, therefore, to the proposed question: to be good by essence in a certain manner belongs to God alone, and in a certain manner also to creatures; which I explain in this way.

First, not God alone by His essence, without anything else really distinct from Himself, is good by that goodness which follows upon essence, but by any goodness whatsoever. Creatures, however, although they be good by their essence, that is, without something added which is really distinct from themselves, by that kind of goodness which follows upon essence; nevertheless they are not good by their essence with any goodness whatsoever: for they are perfected accidentally by something distinct from their essence, as was explained above. God, however, is not perfected in this way, because whatever is in God is of His essence.

Second, any created thing, even a spiritual one, although its essence and existence are not distinguished by nature of the thing, can fail to exist and perish, not by a departure and separation of its being and essence, which before might be held together by some conjunction, but because it depends upon the efficient will of God, as we shall say below in Disputation 18.[372] Wherefore, also, that which we number among the predicates of a creature ought not to be counted by us as that which, according to our mode of understanding, cannot but be; for, in our mode, man is understood by us according to his essence, his existence not being understood; yet we can understand that the essence of man can be corrupted, perish, and not exist. But to God it belongs so necessarily to exist that, although by our mode of not understanding His existence may be distinguished from His essence, just as also the attributes and the persons are distinguished, nevertheless He Himself cannot not exist; and thus it can by no means be enunciated of His essence, "not to be": for which reason the existence of God is said to be of His essence, although even the attributes, however much they are distinguished by reason from it, are so joined to it in reality that it implies a contradiction for Him to be without them.

Third, from these things it is gathered that, by a certain peculiar reason, it belongs to God to be good, which in no way belongs to creatures, even in that kind of goodness which follows upon essence. For God is so good that, just as His essence cannot not exist, so also His goodness cannot fail to be in Him. For not only is this proposition necessary: "God is good by essence," if the particle "by" denotes mere connection (for thus it would also be necessary of any created thing, which is

372. Vazquez, Disputatio 18.

called good by its essence, if the particle "by" denote a connection), but also if it denote existence itself; in which way it belongs to no creature to be good by its essence. For if together with any creature it is possible that it not be, so also it is possible that it not have the act of goodness.

Fourth, from the same principle it is inferred that no malice at all is opposed to the goodness of God, since His essence cannot not be; whereas to created goodness malice is opposed, which is corruption, or the destruction of the substance itself: for when this is taken away, the goodness of the thing is taken away altogether. From which it is clear in what way it is proper to God to be good by His essence, which does not belong to the creature.

Articulus IV - Whether all things are good by the divine goodness

To the fourth, the proceeding is thus. It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For St. Augustine says in De Trinitate VIII: "This good, and that good: take away this and take away that, and see the good itself, if you can: thus you will see God, not good by any other good, but the good of every good." Therefore each thing is good by its own good; therefore each thing is good by that good itself, which is God.[373]

1. Further, as Boethius says in the book De hebdomadibus, all things are called good insofar as they are ordered to God: and this by reason of the divine goodness: therefore all things are good by the divine goodness.[374]

But on the contrary: all things are good insofar as they are; but not all things are said to be beings by the divine existence, but by their own existence: therefore not all things are good by the divine goodness, but by their own goodness.

I answer that, nothing prevents, in those things which import relation, something from being denominated from without: just as something is denominated "located" from place, and "measured" from a measure. But about those things which are said absolutely there was a different opinion. For Plato posited the separate species of all things; and that from them individuals are denominated, as participating in the separate species: for instance, that Socrates is called "man" according to the separate idea of man. And just as he posited a separate idea of man and of horse, which he called "man-in-himself" and "horse-in-himself," so he posited a separate idea of being and a separate idea of life, which he called "being-in-itself" and "living-in-itself"; and by its participation each thing is called a being, or living, or good, etc., as is reported in Metaphysics I by the Philosopher, texts 4 and 10.[375]

But on the contrary: This which is "per se being" and "per se one," he posited to be the highest good; and because the good is convertible with being, as also the one is, he said that the per se good is God, from whom all things are called good by way of participation. And although this opinion seems irrational as regards that point wherein he posited the species of things as separated and

373. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VIII.
374. Boethius, De hebdomadibus.
375. Aristotle, Metaphysics I, texts 4 and 10.

subsisting per se (as Aristotle impugns in many ways), nevertheless this is absolutely true: that there is something first, which by its own essence is being and good, which we call God, as is clear from the foregoing; to this judgment Aristotle also agrees.[376] Therefore from that which is first - being and good by its own essence - each thing can be called good and being, insofar as it participates in that first by a kind of assimilation, though remotely and defectively, as has been shown above. Thus then each thing is said to be good by the divine goodness, as by the first exemplary, efficient, and final principle of all goodness. Nonetheless, each thing is said to be good by the likeness of the divine goodness inhering in it, which formally is its own goodness denominating it. And thus there is one goodness of all, and also many goodnesses. And by this the reply to the objections is clear.[377]

Conclusion: Whatever thing is said to be good, is said to be good by the divine goodness as by the first efficient, exemplary, and final principle of all goodness; but formally it is said to be good by the likeness of the divine goodness inhering in it, which is the formal goodness of each single thing.

Dubitatio circa articulum. We will examine in this article a single doubt and the mind and doctrine of St. Thomas. The doubt is whether a thing is called good by an extrinsic denomination alone, from the goodness of another. I explain the view of St. Thomas in this way. No denomination of a thing can be taken from an extrinsic form alone. I say the same of the goodness of a thing, which is its perfection from its conjunction with the end: for this is not taken from the end alone, but from the nature and quality of the thing taken together with the end. Yet there is a certain acceptation of goodness whose denomination in some things can be derived from the form and goodness of another: of this sort is the goodness of the fittingness of one thing with another, which, as we have noted in Disputation 23, is not a passion of being, nor is it found in all things. For there are some that by reason of themselves are not fitting to another, but by reason of the effect which they produce, as when the sun is good for what is cooled by reason of the heat which it produces in it. And although this goodness which is a relation of fittingness would be a relation of reason, and an extrinsic denomination in the universal, nevertheless it would not be found in the same mode in all things. For some things are good and fitting to another according to themselves, not by reason of some effect produced; wherefore they are primarily called good. But others are fitting by reason of an effect, and consequently are secondarily called good: and for this reason also we shall say below, in Question 20, Article 1, that moral malice, which in the universal is a relation of reason and an extrinsic denomination, is found primarily in certain human operations and secondarily in others.

From all these things one may gather that the denomination of "holy" and "just" with God is not of the essence of nature, so that no one could be called just from the justice and sanctity of another as from a form denominating, but from some quality in the just man himself, or from a change effected in act or in habit; add also the hypostatic union, as will be more fully explained in 1 - 2, q. 113, a. 2.[378] Wherefore no one can be said to be, or be, just by the justice of Christ or of God - nor

376. Li. 3. meta. a text. 20. víque ad fin. lib.; Aristot.
377. 9. 2. art. 3; 4. 4. art. 3.

yet by His favor only, or love, or law, as will be shown there. Therefore, when Christ is said to be "made unto us wisdom, and sanctification, and redemption" (1 Cor 1), this is to be understood in the same mode in which we say that by the goodness of God we are good, as by an efficient and exemplary cause, because He brings about in us whatever there is of good; and also as by an end, for "The Lord has wrought all things for Himself" (Proverbs 16). Thus therefore Christ, because by His merit He has procured for us our sanctification and redemption, is said to be our sanctification, wisdom, and redemption.[379]

Verum sententia S. Thomæ faciliori ratione confirmari posset hoc modo, tametsi denominatio relativa possit ab aliquo extrinseco tanquam a forma desumi, et quamvis the denomination of the good be relative, nevertheless it cannot agree to things save by reason of something intrinsic; nor is every relative denomination taken from something extrinsic, but there are many relations which posit in the thing they denominate something absolute and real - such as are all those of the first genus assigned by Aristotle in the Metaphysics, chapter 15, and many others. Such is the relation of goodness, which consists in integrity and follows the nature of being. For just as a thing cannot be integrated, whether substantially or accidentally, except by things inhering, so the denomination of that cannot be taken from an extrinsic form alone. I say the same of the goodness of a thing, which is the perfection of it from conjunction with the end: for this is not taken from the end alone, but from the nature and quality of the thing taken together with the end.

Quaestio VII - On the infinity of God

Post the consideration of the divine perfection, there is to be considered His infinity, and His existence in things. For it is attributed to God that He is everywhere and in all things in such wise that He is uncircumscribable and infinite. Concerning the first there are four questions.

Articulus I - Whether God is infinite

It is objected that: It seems that God is not infinite.

1) Every infinite thing is imperfect, because it has the nature of a part and of matter, as is said in Physics III; but God is most perfect, therefore He is not infinite.[380]

2) Further, according to the Philosopher in Physics I, the finite and the infinite belong to quantity; but in God there is no quantity, since He is not a body, as was shown above; therefore infinitude does not befit Him.[381]

3) Further, what is thus here and not elsewhere is finite with respect to place; therefore what is thus this which is not another is finite with respect to substance: but God is this, and is not another, for He is not a stone nor wood; therefore God is not infinite according to substance.

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378. 1 - 2, q. 113, a. 2.
379. 1 Cor 1; Proverbs 16.
380. 3. Physic.
381. 1. Physic. text. 15.

But on the contrary: Damascene says that God is infinite, and eternal, and uncircumscribable.[382]

I answer that: All the ancient philosophers attribute the infinite to the first principle, as is said in Physics III. And this, reasonably considering that things flow from the first principle in ...[383]

...into the infinite. But because certain men erred about the nature of the first principle, it followed that they erred about its infinity: for since they posited the first principle to be matter, they consequently attributed to the first principle a material infinity, saying that some infinite body was the first principle of things. One must therefore consider that a thing is called infinite from the fact that it is not finite: but what is finite is, in a certain way, both matter by form and form by matter. Matter indeed is limited by form, inasmuch as, before it receives form, matter is in potency (*potentia*) to many forms; but when it receives one, it is terminated by that. Form, however, is limited by matter, inasmuch as form considered in itself is common to many, but by the fact that it is received in matter it becomes the determinate form of this thing. Now matter is perfected by form, by which it is limited; and therefore the infinite, in a certain respect, is attributed to matter and has the notion of the imperfect: for it is as it were matter not having form. But form is not perfected by matter; rather by it its amplitude is contracted: whence the infinite, insofar as it stands on the side of form not determined by matter, has the notion of the perfect. But that which is most formal of all is existence (*esse*) itself, as is evident from what has been said above; therefore, since the divine existence is not an existence received in something, but he himself is his own subsisting existence (*esse subsistens*), as was shown above, it is manifest that God himself is infinite and perfect. And from this the reply to the first [objection] is evident.

Reply to the second: The terminus of quantity is as it were its form: a sign of which is that figure, which consists in the termination of quantity, is a certain form about quantity. Whence the infinite which belongs to quantity is an infinite that holds itself on the side of matter; and such an infinite is not attributed to God, as has been said.

Reply to the third: From the very fact that the existence of God is per se subsistent, not received in anything, insofar as it is called infinite, he is distinguished from all others, and others are removed from him. Thus, if there were a subsisting whiteness, from this very fact, that it would not be in another, it would differ from every whiteness existing in a subject.

Conclusion: God is infinite.

Articulus II - Whether anything other than God can be infinite by essence

It is proceeded to the second as follows.

Objection 1: It seems that something other than God can be infinite by essence (*essentia*). For the power (*virtus*) of a thing is proportioned to its essence. If therefore the essence of God is infinite, it follows that his power is infinite: therefore he can produce an infinite effect, since the quantity of power is known through the effect.[384]

382. Liber de fide orthodoxa, c. 4.
383. 3. Physic.
384. Compare the common axiom that power is known by its act; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics I (or X), text 10.

Objection 2: Further, whatever has infinite power has infinite essence: but the created intellect has infinite power; for it apprehends the universal, which can extend itself to infinitely many singulars: therefore every created intellectual substance is infinite.[385]

Objection 3: Further, prime matter is other than God, as was shown above, but prime matter is infinite: therefore something other than God can be infinite.[386]

But on the contrary: The infinite cannot be from some principle, as is said in Physics III. But everything that is apart from God is from God as from the first principle: therefore nothing that is apart from God can be infinite.[387]

I answer: It must be said that something other than God can be infinite in a certain respect, but not simply. For if we speak of the infinite as it belongs to matter (*materia*), it is manifest that everything existing in act has some form, and thus its matter is determined by form. But because matter, insofar as it is under one substantial form, remains in potency to many accidental forms - which is simply finite - it can be infinite in a certain respect, as wood is finite according to its form, yet is infinite in a certain respect, insofar as it is in potency to infinite figures. If, however, we speak of the infinite as it belongs to form (*forma*), thus it is manifest that those whose forms are in matter are simply finite and in no way infinite. But if there be some created forms not received in matter but subsisting per se, as some think about the angels, they will indeed be infinite in a certain respect, insofar as forms of this kind are not terminated nor contracted by any matter; but because a created form thus subsisting has existence, and is not its existence, it is necessary that its very existence be received and contracted to a determinate nature. Whence it cannot be simply infinite.

Reply to the first: This is against the notion of an effected thing, that the essence of the thing be its existence: for subsisting existence is not created existence. Whence it is contrary to the notion of an effected thing, that it be simply infinite. Therefore, just as God, although he has infinite power, nevertheless cannot make something not made - for this would be that contradictories exist at the same time - so neither can he make something simply infinite.

Reply to the second: This very fact, that the power of the intellect extends itself in a certain way to infinities, proceeds from this, that the intellect is a form not in matter, but either totally separated, as are the substances of the angels, or at least the intellectual power, which is not the act of any organ, in the intellective soul conjoined to the body.

Reply to the third: Prime matter does not exist in the nature of things by itself, since it is not a being in act, but only potency: whence it is rather something concrete, than created. Nonetheless, prime matter even according to potency is not simply infinite, but in a certain respect: because its potency does not extend itself except to natural forms.

Explication of both articles.

385. The objection uses the scholastic doctrine of the intellect's reach to universals.
386. See above, in the discussion on prime matter's distinction from God.
387. Aristotle, Physics III, text 30.

Conclusion: Nothing other than God can be simply infinite, although something may be infinite in a certain respect. St. Thomas calls "infinite in a certain respect" that which is commonly called "infinite in potency": and since in these two articles the question is not about the infinite according to quantity (of that he treats in articles 3 and 4), but about the infinite according to existence (*esse*) or by essence, as is clear from the title of article 2 and from its first argument, that which St. Thomas calls here in article 2 "infinite in a certain respect," that is, in potency, is not what can, without term, be increased according to number or quantity; but that which thus has its being determined by some form, as to be in potency without end to other [forms]. Such, says St. Thomas in article 2, is matter, which, although it is determined by only one form to be the being of this [thing], nevertheless always remains in potency to receive another, and another, to infinity. But "infinite simply" St. Thomas understands not according to quantity, but according to existence or essence. Therefore the conclusion of article 2, explained thus, illuminates the conclusion of article 1. Wherefore the doctrine of both articles can be comprehended in one proposition: It is proper to God to be simply infinite by essence and according to existence, in such a way that it cannot belong to another thing. For although in article 1 the Doctor says "God is infinite," he undoubtedly understands it through essence, about which infinity he inquires in article 2; to wit, that it is proper to God to be infinite, since to another it does not belong. Nor, when in article 1 he says "God is infinite," does he understand it, without doubt, through quantity, for this was established from question 3, that God is not corporeal, and hence not endowed with quantity.

Disputatio XXV - In what way it is proper to God to be infinite by essence

- Some explain the reason of God's infinity from infinite attributes. Caput 1.
- "God is infinite, because his existence is in no way received in another," some have thought. Caput 2.
- Certain explain the infinity of God from this, that he is not placed under a genus. Caput 3.
- Albert the Great expounds the infinity of God in two other ways. Caput 4.
- The true account of the infinite according to essence is, not to be from another. Caput 5.

Caput I - Some explain the reason of God's infinity from infinite attributes

All the scholastics, in I Sentences, distinction 43, in conclusion 2 of the article, agree, asserting that God is so infinite by essence that this infinity can belong to no other. Indeed the Philosopher, in Physics III, chapter 4, text 30, from the mind of Anaximander and of the natural philosophers, teaches that the first principle of all things is infinite; but he does not explain what kind of infinity that is, nor do our scholastics agree in assigning it. We shall therefore enumerate the several opinions, and lastly subjoin our own.

First, some more recent authors explain the reason of infinity according to existence - which they so call - from the infinite perfections and attributes that are wont to be assigned to God. For since the perfections of God are said to be infinite, he himself also will be infinite according to essence.

This opinion, however, the more common and popular it is, by so much the less is it supported by weight of probability: for, as will be evident in Disputation 116 and the following, the essence of God is so simple according to reality that it has only one essential perfection inhering in it, although by the reason of man as wayfarer there are distinguished in him many perfections and attributes: yet no one could distinguish in God infinite perfections. By this reason alone, then, we ought not to attribute to God infinity simply according to existence or essence.

Someone will reply, as an evasion, that God is infinite according to essence, because he has in himself the foundation from which, by the intellect of the wayfarer, perfections without number are assigned to him. This reply, however, is refuted first, because it is not clear whether there can be thought out infinite possible perfections in creatures which, considered in themselves, are so simply simple that they could be attributed to God; although there are infinitely many possible creatures specifically distinct - something which is still put forth only as an opinion - nonetheless no one can affirm that there are infinite possible perfections of creatures which, considered in themselves, could also belong to God; for not every perfection of creatures, even according to analogy, is attributed to God. And it is most certain among all that God is infinite according to existence: therefore, in this way, the account of God's infinity is not sufficiently explained.

Next, either the infinity of God consists in this, that perfections in him are actually distinguished without end - and in this way he would never be actually infinite - or it consists in this, that he has the foundation whereby infinite perfections are distinguished in him; and this infinity is either not simply infinity, but only according to a certain respect, if it is to be weighed from a multitude of perfections; or certainly it is another mode of infinity which hitherto has not been sufficiently explained.

Caput II - St. Thomas, Cajetan, and recent authors; Aegidius, and Richard

St. Thomas, Cajetan, and recent authors, in these articles and in Summa contra gentiles I, chapter 43, and Ferrarensis there, doctrine 6, treat this proposition. Aegidius, in I Sentences, distinction 43, art. 1, q. 1, and Richard, II Sentences, q. 1, in another way explain the infinity of God: infinite (they say) is altogether the same as "not finite and limited"; but a thing is finite by that which is terminated and contracted by another.[388]

Among created things composed of matter and form there is found the notion of the finite according to existence (esse): for matter is limited by form, and conversely form by matter; although matter is in a certain way infinite, because once informed it still remains in potency (potentia) toward other forms without end; in which respect the holy Doctor calls it infinite

388. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles I, c. 43; Cajetan, ad loc.; Ferrarensis, ibid., doctrina 6; Aegidius, In I Sent., d. 43, a. 1, q. 1; Richard of St. Victor (or Richardus), In II Sent., q. 1.

according to what it is, that is, in potency; although in act by the form it is finite. To spiritual creatures also there belongs the notion of the finite according to existence, not because in them matter is limited by form and form by matter, but because they are composed of existence (esse) and essence (essentia), and their existence, received in their essence, is determined by it. They are therefore finite according to existence, because their existence is received and, by that in which it is received, limited. Since therefore the essence of God is his existence, and consequently his existence is not received in anything, he will be infinite and not limited. Wherefore, as was proved above in disp. 22, it is proper to God alone to be infinite according to existence, so that it belongs to no creature.

Scotus attacks this reasoning in I Sentences, dist. 2, q. 2, at the end: he shows thus. The existence (esse existentiae) of separate substances is an accident of the essence: therefore it cannot substantially limit it. Nay rather, he judges that every being is finite, whether according to quantity or according to substance, by a certain determined grade, to be first finite in itself before it is terminated by something extrinsic: just as the first heaven is finite in itself by reason of its quantity, although it is not limited by something extrinsic; and for that very reason it is terminated by something extrinsic because it is finite in itself, rather than conversely.

But this objection of Scotus is trifling. First, because the existence (esse existentiae) is not an accident of the essence according to the teaching of St. Thomas - though Scotus falsely ascribes this to him - but is its substantial act (actus); and the fact that it can be separated from it matters little: for even the substantial form can be separated from matter, and yet is not an accident of it. Secondly, St. Thomas did not say that the essence is terminated by existence, but on the contrary, that existence is by the essence, whose opposite Scotus imputes to him. Thirdly, when St. Thomas asserts that a thing is limited by that which is terminated by another, he is not speaking of bulk-quantity, to which it wholly happens to be enclosed and bounded by something extrinsic; rather, he is speaking of the substantial existence of some thing, and he says that by that very fact it is finite, namely, that it is received in another. Nor, indeed, does he suppose that the formal notion of the finite according to existence formally consists in the reception itself, but rather that that which by its nature demands to be received in another is by its very nature finite and limited, before it is received in another.

However, the foregoing reason by which the holy Doctor strives to explain and to prove the attribute of infinitude in God still seems to me difficult. For in things separated from matter I think that nothing is substantially received in another: for essence and existence are altogether the same in the nature of the thing, as will be proved in III, p. 1, q. 17, a. 2.[389] Moreover, spiritual things are not composed of matter and form, nor of some potency and substantial act according to reality, but only of genus and difference according to our reason: which composition, were nothing else to stand in the way, could be granted to God without any absurdity, as was proved in disp. 22.

389. Vázquez's own work, Part III, p. 1, q. 17, a. 2.

Therefore nothing substantial is in spiritual things that is limited and terminated by another according to reality: wherefore the reason of the infinitude of God and of the finitude of all creatures must be proved by another account.

Someone will say that even in spiritual creatures there is a composition of nature and personality, and that personality is distinguished from essence in the nature of the thing, as we shall show in III, q. 4, a. 2.[390] But this composition does not seem sufficient for essence to be so received in personality and personality in essence that by this very fact they would substantially limit one another. For personality is only a certain mode per se, which, although it terminates and contracts the nature so that it be a person, which can be communicated to no other, nevertheless does not seem to receive it in itself and substantially to terminate it so that it be finite according to existence, unless the notion of finitude befit it from elsewhere. Then too it is not sufficiently clear in what manner, because the form is received in matter or existence in essence, a thing becomes limited and finite according to existence: for although they mutually determine one another in such wise that from them there results a third substance, distinct from any other, from this it does not follow that that thing is finite, as Ferrarensis falsely thought in the place cited. For, as Alexander has most well noted, I p., q. 6, m. 1, ad 3, something is not finite by the fact that it is distinguished from another; thus God would be finite, since he is God in such a way as to be distinguished from the other things.[391]

Caput III - Some explain God's infinitude from this, that he is not placed under a genus

Some explain the infinitude of God from this, that he is not placed under a genus. For in this way he will be infinite, because he lacks both genus and definition. For definition, as Aristotle says, Metaphysics, text 22, is called a terminus, because it terminates and encloses the thing which it defines. Since therefore God is not placed under a genus, and thus has no definition from genus and difference, it follows that he is infinite. In this way St. Thomas reasons in Summa contra gentiles I, c. 43; and Ferrarensis there likewise; Capreolus, In I, dist. 43, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 1; Aegidius, a. 1, q. 1. To this also seems to look what Albert the Great teaches in the same distinction, namely, that God is infinite because he can neither be defined nor comprehended by our intellect.[392]

But in this way the aforesaid infinitude of God according to essence (essentia) is not sufficiently defended. First, that nothing hinders God's being placed under a genus from his being infinite has been shown above in disp. 22, cap. 3. Secondly, as regards definition and comprehension, this proves only that God is above every human intellect, not, however, that he is simply infinite: for that which cannot be seen, defined, or comprehended by a created intellect only proves that it cannot be finished off and terminated by the human intellect; but that in itself it is infinite, this does not sufficiently show: for one could say that God, by his own intellect and knowledge, is

390. Vázquez's own work, Part III, q. 4, a. 2.

391. Alexander of Hales, I, q. 6, m. 1, ad 3.

392. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles I, c. 43; Cajetan and Ferrariensis ad loc.; Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 43, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 1; Aegidius (Giles of Rome), a. 1, q. 1; Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 2, a. 1.

comprehended and is defined by himself, when he understands himself as he is. If you reply that the intellect of God is infinite and thus can define and comprehend his essence, this still had to be proved: for the infinitude of the divine intellect must be proved from the infinitude of the essence. Thirdly, since the created intellect can look upon God clearly and as he is, when the light of glory has been communicated to it, so that nothing of him is hidden, without doubt by that very created vision a definition can be had much better than other things in this life are defined by us. And although those seeing God as he is are not said to comprehend him, nevertheless their clear vision embraces within the latitude of its representation all the things that are in him formally. Nor are the blessed therefore said not to comprehend God because something of those things that are formally in him is outside their vision, but because they do not, by the force of the vision of the essence of God, know all the things which God will do or can do. Add that from this account there is gathered only the attribute of incomprehensibility, not, however, of infinitude according to essence, which certainly are distinct.

Caput IV - Albert the Great expounds the infinity of God in two other ways

Albert in another two ways expounds the infinitude of God in I, q. 43, a. 1: he proves that God is infinite, first because he lacks a beginning and an end of duration; then because he can be enclosed in no place adequate to him. St. Bonaventure records this view in the same distinction, a. 1, q. 2, and reports that some authors taught that God is indeed infinite to us, but according to the truth he is not: because to himself, who is Truth itself, he is not infinite. Yet he inclines in that opinion to that mode of infinitude on the side of comprehension.[393]

But as regards the two other modes, the one from place, the other from duration, this opinion can easily be attacked: for in the former way there is proved only the infinitude of God according to place, which is immensity; and this is not the present controversy. For the attribute of infinitude, which is now in question, is different from immensity, which must be treated in the following question. Nor, indeed, is the ratio of infinitude gathered from the notion of immensity, but rather the contrary. But in the latter way there is proved only that God is infinite in duration, that is, eternal: not, however, that he is infinite according to essence, of which infinitude there is now speech: for concerning eternity, which is another attribute, there will be disputation in q. 10; as also concerning incomprehensibility, which is another attribute than infinitude, to be treated below in q. 12. I pass over many other reasons by which St. Thomas in Contra gentiles, c. 43, and Scotus, in the cited q. 2, try to demonstrate the infinitude of God. From those there is gathered only in general that God is infinite according to essence, but what the account of this infinitude is, is not sufficiently explained.[394]

393. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. a. 1, q. 2.
394. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles I, c. 43; Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 2, q. 2.

Caput V - The true account of the infinite according to essence is, not to be from another

Since the infinite is altogether the same as the non-finite, and thus signifies the negation of an end, and every negation ought to be known from the opposite form which it deprives of, the account of any infinite must be explained from the end, as from its contrary. Note, however, first, that in this place "end" is not taken for the perfection and consummation of something. For thus an infinite thing would be the same as an imperfect thing; in which sense the account of infinitude would not befit God. But "end" is now the same as "terminus," beyond which a thing does not extend, but by which it is, as it were, enclosed; and as for the terminus of other things, from which they are called finite according to essence, it will also be made clear from the negation of which terminus God is said to be infinite in this way.

Secondly, note that a thing can in some measure be finished off in many ways: first, by definition or cognition; secondly, by the end of duration; thirdly, by the end of place; fourthly, by the end of the effect produced by it or that can be produced. Conversely, by the negation of an end in any of these ways a thing is called infinite. However, as is clear from what has been said in this disputation, by none of these ways is the formal notion of the infinitude of God according to essence sufficiently shown: but either only the infinitude of incomprehensibility, or of eternity, or of immensity, or finally of power, which are all distinguished from the infinitude of the essence, as is evident.

Thirdly, observe that, since every effect receives existence from its cause, and is therefore contained within the efficacy of that cause and cannot go forth beyond it, it comes about that whatever thing receives existence from another is said to be finite and limited according to essence, and to have a participated nature, and consequently to depend, to be limited, and to be ended. Wherefore every creature is finite according to essence for this reason, that it so depends upon God continually conserving it, that it cannot exist even for an instant without his influx. On the contrary, since God has existence from no one and is not conserved by any, but exists from himself, by no end or terminus can his existence and essence, in the genus of being, be limited: the proper account therefore of the infinitude of God according to essence lies in this, that he has existence from no cause. For which reason the infinitude according to essence is rightly distinguished from the other infinitudes, because it signifies a negation of end in a different way than the other infinitudes do, as from what has been said is plain. Whence it is that, although infinitude according to duration can be communicated to creatures, as we shall gather in disp. 177, yet even that belongs to God in a different way than it does to creatures. For since eternity in God, which is the infinitude of duration, has its foundation in the infinitude according to essence, it comes about that eternity belongs to God from within and from himself, but to creatures only by participation.

This mode of infinitude according to essence seems to have been handed down by Alexander, I p., q. 6, m. 1, ad 3 and 4. There he numbers three modes by which God is infinite. The first is, because he himself terminates other things and is terminated by no one - because, namely, he is in all things - which seems to insinuate the infinitude of immensity. The second mode of infinitude in God is because he is not perfected by another; he seems, however, to understand this as by an

efficient cause. To this also seems to pertain what certain Scholastics teach, whom we recalled in disp. 103, namely, that God is of infinite virtue and power, not because he moves through eternal time, but because he is from himself, not moved, nor depending upon another. This same thing Dionysius wished to teach, De divinis nominibus, c. 9, where, speaking of the greatness of God, he says: "And 'great' as said of God, both from his own greatness which, communicating itself with all the things that are great, diffuses itself through every greatness and extends itself, contains every place, surpasses every number, every infinitude, triply: both from the supreme force and magnitude of action, and from the gifts which flow from him as from a source." By these words Dionysius seems to have expressed not only the infinitude of immensity and of power, but also of the essence of God, when he said that he is himself the fount of all gifts which he communicates to all the others. For it was by that very divine greatness - which he immediately said to be infinite - not that, through some cause of his by which he would bestow finite gifts, he would be finite, but that he is the fount of all goods, in need of none, from whom the rest are derived. In the same sense St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 38, called God "a certain sea of essence, measureless and unbounded"; which words, although Nicetas, upon that same oration of his, ...[395]

Although in that oration the words, "God both was," etc., might seem to be interpreted of the infinity of eternity, immensity, and incomprehensibility, nevertheless they truly signify the infinity of his own existence and the essence (*essentia*) of God. For just before, St. Gregory Nazianzen had said that on Mount Sinai God named himself by the name "Who is," to indicate that he encloses within himself the whole of what is. But the name "Who is," as we shall say in Disputation 59, chapter 3, is said of God among the rest in the most proper way, because it signifies that he is through his essence and has existence from himself. Which opinion Nazianzen in that same place has Nicetas interpret with these words: "But God always is; and, to speak with the divine-tongued Dionysius, he encloses the whole essence in himself. For I, says Scripture, am the first, and I am after; and before me there is no other God, nor shall there be after me. For his whole essence, having neither beginning nor about to have an end, is as it were a certain vast sea of essence." Where, although Nicetas had regard to the infinity of duration, yet he also understood, in the way set forth by us, the infinity according to existence. For by those words, "Before me there is no God," he expressed not only the infinity of duration, but also of dignity and power. For to say, "Before me there is no God," is the same as to say, "I am from myself, and from no other cause do I receive essence and existence"; and this is the chief and first of all infinities, from which the rest proceed in notion.

Alexander says that the third mode of infinity in God is from this, that he is not for another as for an end, but all things are for him: for since God lacks a final cause, by this very reason he will be infinite, that is, without end. But this kind of infinity belongs not so much to essence and existence as to operation, so that in this way too God is infinite in operating, because he is not terminated by any other thing as by a final cause. Of this kind of infinity St. Thomas treats in q. 19, a. 5.[396]

395. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 9; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 38; Nicetas (commentary on Gregory Nazianzen's orations).

396. St. Thomas, q. 19, a. 5.

Therefore that infinity which in the second place was set forth according to the mind of Alexander is a proper attribute of the infinity of God according to essence, which he is handling in this question.[397]

Articulus III - Whether something can be actually infinite according to magnitude.

Tertium sic proceditur. It seems that there can be something actually infinite according to magnitude.

1. In the mathematical sciences there is found nothing false: for of abstractions there is no lying, as is said in 2 Physics. But the mathematical sciences use the infinite according to magnitude; for the Geometer in his demonstrations says, "Let there be such-and-such a line infinite"; therefore it is not impossible that something be infinite according to magnitude.
2. Further, that which is not against the notion of anything is not impossible to belong to it; but to be infinite is not against the notion of magnitude, but rather finite and infinite seem to be passions of quantity; therefore it is not impossible that some magnitude be infinite.
3. Further, magnitude is divisible to infinity: for thus is the continuum defined, that it is divisible to infinity, as is clear in 3 Physics. But contraries are naturally about the same thing: since therefore addition is opposed to division, and increase to diminution, it seems that magnitude can grow to infinity; therefore it is possible that there be an infinite magnitude.
4. Further, motion and time have quantity and continuity from magnitude, over which motion passes, as is said in 4 Physics. But it is not against the notion of time and motion that they be infinite, since each indivisible sign-marked in time and in circular motion is a beginning and an end; therefore neither will it be against the notion of magnitude that it be infinite.

But on the contrary: Every body has a surface; but every body having a surface is finite, because surface is the terminus of a finite body; therefore every body is finite. And similarly it can be said of surface and of line: therefore nothing is infinite according to magnitude.

I answer: One thing is to be infinite according to its essence, and another according to magnitude. For granted that there were some body infinite according to magnitude, say fire or air, nevertheless it would not be infinite according to essence: because by its form its essence would be terminated to some species, and by its matter to some individual. And therefore, granted from the premises that no creature is infinite according to essence, there still remains to inquire whether something created be infinite according to magnitude.

One must know therefore that "body," which is a complete magnitude, is taken in two ways, namely mathematically, according as only quantity is considered in it; and naturally, according as matter and form are considered in it. And concerning a natural body it is manifest that it cannot be

actually infinite. For every natural body has some determinate substantial form: therefore, since to a substantial form there follow accidents, it is necessary that to a determinate form there follow determinate accidents, among which is quantity. Whence every natural body has a determinate quantity, both for the greater and for the less. Hence it is impossible that any natural body be infinite. This also is clear from motion: because every natural body has some natural motion; but an infinite body could not have any natural motion: not rectilinear, because nothing is moved naturally with rectilinear motion unless it is outside its own place, which could not befall an infinite body, for it would occupy all places, and so indifferently any place would be its place. And likewise neither could it be according to circular motion: because in circular motion it is necessary that one part of the body be transferred to the place in which another part was, which in a circular body, if it be posited infinite, could not be; because two lines drawn from the center, the further they are extended from the center, so much the further do they stand apart: if therefore the body were infinite, to infinity the lines would stand apart from one another, and thus one could never arrive at the place of the other.

Concerning the mathematical body the same reason holds: because if we imagine a mathematical body existing actually, we must imagine it under some form, because nothing is in act except through its form: whence, since the form of quantity as such is figure, it will be necessary that it have some figure, and thus it will be finite. For figure is that which is comprehended by a term or terms.

Reply to the first: The geometer does not need to assume that some line is actually infinite; but he needs to assume some line actually finite from which he may subtract as much as is necessary; and this he calls an infinite line.

Reply to the second: Although the infinite is not against the notion of magnitude in common, yet it is against the notion of any species of it, namely, against the notion of a magnitude of two cubits or three cubits, or circular, or triangular, and the like: but it is not possible for something to exist in the genus which is in no species; whence it is not possible that there be some infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude is infinite.

Reply to the third: The infinite which belongs to quantity, as was said, is on the side of matter; but by division of the whole one approaches matter, for parts have the character of matter; by addition, however, one approaches the whole, which has the character of form: and therefore the infinite is not found in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.

Reply to the fourth: Motion and time are not wholly in act, but successively; whence they have potency mixed with act. But magnitude is wholly in act, and therefore the infinite, which belongs to quantity, as was said, being on the side of matter, is repugnant to the totality of magnitude, but not to the totality of time or of motion; for to be in potency belongs to matter.

Conclusion: There cannot be an infinite according to quantity, or continuous magnitude.

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397. The marginal references here include: De veritate q. 2, a. 2 and a. 9; Quodlibet q. 2 and q. 12, a. 2; and 2 Physics, text 18.

Articulus IV - Whether there can be an infinite in things according to multitude.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. It seems that it is possible that there be an actually infinite multitude

1. For it is not impossible that what is in potency be reduced to act; but number is multipliable to infinity; therefore it is not impossible that there be an actually infinite multitude.
2. Further, for any species it is possible that there be some individual in act; but the species of figure are infinite, therefore it is possible that there be infinite figures in act.
3. Further, things that are not opposed to each other do not hinder each other: but given some multitude of things, there can still come to be many other things which are not opposed to them; therefore it is not impossible that some other things again be together with them, and so on to infinity; therefore it is possible that there be things infinite in act.

But on the contrary is what is said in Wisdom 11: "Thou hast ordered all things in weight, number, and measure."

I answer: Concerning this there was a twofold opinion. Some indeed, as Avicenna and Algazel said, that it is impossible that there be an actually infinite multitude per se, but that an infinite multitude per accidens is not impossible. For a multitude is said to be infinite per se when it is required for something that the multitude be infinite; and this is impossible, because thus it would be necessary that something depend on infinites, whence its generation would never be completed, since it is not possible to pass through an infinite. But per accidens a multitude is said to be infinite when an infinity of multitude is not required for something, but it happens so to be. And this can be made manifest in the operation of a smith, for which a certain multitude is required per se, namely that there be art in the soul, and a moving hand, and a hammer; and if these were multiplied to infinity, a smith's work would never be completed, because it would depend on infinite causes. But the multitude of hammers, which happens from this, that one is broken and another is taken up, is a multitude per accidens: it happens indeed that he works with many hammers, and it makes no difference whether he works with one, or with two, or with more, or with infinite, if he were to work for infinite time. By this mode therefore they posited that it is possible that there be an actually infinite multitude per accidens. But this is impossible, because every multitude must be under some species of multitude. The species -

To the fourth, I proceed thus. It seems that it is possible that there be an infinite multitude in act.

1) For it is not impossible that what is in potency be reduced to act; but number is multiplicable to infinity; therefore it is not impossible that there be an infinite multitude in act.

2) Further, for every species it is possible that there be some individual in act; but the species of figures are infinite; therefore it is possible that there be infinite figures in act.

3) Further, things which are not opposed to one another do not impede one another; but, some multitude of things being posited, others can still be produced which are not opposed to them; and again, others not opposed to these; and thus to infinity. Therefore it is possible that there be infinite things in act.

But on the contrary: Wisdom 11:21: "You have ordered all things in measure, number, and weight."

It is answered: There was a twofold opinion. Some philosophers, as Avicenna and Algazel, held that it is impossible that there be an actually infinite multitude per se, but that an actually infinite multitude per accidens is possible.[398] They explained that for a multitude to be infinite per se it is required that something depend upon an infinite, and this is impossible; for thus generation would never be completed, since it would depend upon infinite causes. But per accidens it is said to be infinite when an infinite multitude is not required for some thing, but it happens to be so. And this can occur in an operation in which a certain multitude happens accidentally with respect to the art, as when the art is in the artisan, and the hammer is in hand. For if these instruments were lacking unto infinity, the work of the artisan would never be completed, because it would depend upon an infinite multitude of hammers; but the multitude of hammers which happens from this, that one is broken and another is taken up, is a multitude per accidens: for it happens that he works with many hammers, and it makes no difference whether he works with one, or with two, or with more, or with infinitely many, if he were to work through infinite time. By this mode, therefore, they asserted that an actually infinite multitude per accidens is possible. But this is impossible, because every multitude must fall under some species of multitude, namely a determinate number; and no species of number is infinite, since each number is a multitude measured by one. Hence it is impossible that there be an infinite multitude in act, whether per se or per accidens. Likewise, every multitude existing in the nature of things is created; and every created thing is comprehended under some definite intention of the Creator, for no agent works in vain. Whence it is necessary that all created things be comprehended under a definite number. Therefore it is impossible that there be an infinite multitude in act, even per accidens.

But that there be an infinite multitude in potency is possible: because the increase of a multitude follows upon the division of a multitude. For the more something is divided, so many more things result according to number. Hence just as an infinite is found in potency in the division of the continuous, because there is a proceeding to matter, as was shown above, by the same reason an infinite is found in potency in the addition of a multitude.

Reply to the first: Each thing which is in potency is reduced into act according to the mode of its being: for a day is not reduced into act so as to be whole at once, but successively; and likewise the infinite of a multitude is not reduced into act so as to be whole at once, but successively; because after any given multitude another multitude can be taken, to infinity.

398. Avicenna; Algazel (al-Ghazali).

Reply to the second: The species of figures have their infinitude from the infinitude of number. For there are species of figures, as trilateral, quadrilateral, and so on. Hence just as an infinite multitude enumerable cannot be reduced into act so as to be whole at once, so neither can the multitude of figures.

Reply to the third: Although, certain things being posited, others can be posited which are not opposed to them, nevertheless "infinite" as such is opposed to any species of multitude. Whence it is not possible that there be any actually infinite multitude.

Disputatio XXVI - On the infinite in created things

Caput I - Two extreme sentences on this matter

The materials of these articles belong properly to the philosophical disputation on the infinite, and are of little necessity for theological truths in various kinds. For as concerns the power of God, whether He can make such an infinite, this ought to be defined from this alone, whether an infinite involves a contradiction in itself or not. But whether by reason of magnitude or of multitude an infinite repugns, is to be examined solely from the principles of philosophy. Yet, because in Disputation 63 we have to prove that God actually knows infinite things, which some without cause deny, lest otherwise they think that God could bring about all absurdities; therefore, at present I will in a few words show whether an infinite according to magnitude, or according to multitude, can be made by God.

It should, however, be premised that this genus of infinity is of a wholly different notion from an infinity according to essence (*essentia*); and the same is to be said of an infinite in quality according to intensity. For although, when quantity or quality increases according to extension or intensity, the essence and nature of quantity and of quality likewise increase, and consequently with infinite intensity or extension the essence of quality and of quantity would be infinite; nevertheless neither is infinite essentially, or according to existence (*esse*), in that kind of infinity according to which we have thus far said that God is infinite: because both a quality according to intensity, and a quantity according to extension, would have a cause of their being, and consequently would be limited by a term on the part of the cause.

In the proposed question not a few theologians assert that an actual infinite according to magnitude, or according to multitude, cannot be made by God, because very many absurdities would follow, which we shall gather here into one. If, however, we should say otherwise, namely that an infinite can be made, in this sentence were St. Thomas, Cajetan, and other Thomists on articles 3 and 4 of this question; St. Bonaventure on 1, dist. 43, article 1, question 3; Durandus on question 2; Marsilius on 1, question 42, article 3, conclusions 6 and 7; and among philosophers not a few of our more recent age.[399] The reasons, indeed, by which they prove this we will report below;

399. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 7, a. 3 - 4; Cajetan, ad loc.; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 43, a. 1, q. 3; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 43, q. 2; Marsilius, In I Sent., q. 42, a. 3, concl. 6 - 7.

from whose solutions it becomes manifest that nothing at all absurd is evidently deduced against the opposite sentence. Therefore the opposite opinion, not without probability, affirms that an infinite in act can be made in things, both in magnitude and in multitude, in spiritual as well as in corporeal things. And this is taught by Gregory on 1, dist. 43, question 4; by Bassolis in the single question, article 2; and is held as at least probable absolutely by Gabriel on 2, dist. 1, question 3; and by Ockham, at least in the multitude of spiritual things. In any genus, however, of multitude not per se ordered, Avicenna and Algazel defend it, whom St. Thomas mentions in article 4.[400]

Before we come to the arguments, it must be supposed - what in Disputation 63 will be expressly proved - namely, that an infinite both according to magnitude and according to number is one thing in potency (*potentia*), another in act (*actus*). It is said to be in potency, from which, if that be taken which actually exists, it is indeed finite and has a term. But if those things be regarded which can still be added to it, it is infinite. Such, says Aristotle in Physics III, chapter 6, are the day and the Olympic game: for from that in which they are in act they are finite; but from that which can be added to them, infinite. Thus, therefore, a multitude of things, to which addition can always be made without end, is said to be infinite in potency, although all the unities which they have are comprehended by a finite number.

Now then let us probably show, not only that there can be an infinite in potency, which the philosophers call syncategorematically infinite, that is, infinite with addition - for this, all admit, is already in things, as is clear from what has been said - but also an infinite in act, which is called categorematically infinite, that is, simply infinite. This is to be gathered from the solutions of the arguments of the prior sentence. And whether, besides these reasons which we shall collect here into one, another can be devised, which shows it impossible that an actual infinite be made by God, we leave to the judgment of others.

The first reason by which it is wont to be proved that an infinite according to magnitude cannot be made by God is of this sort. Either a body is natural, conjoined to matter and form, or it is altogether mathematical, in pure quantity abstracted from matter: but in neither way can it be infinite; therefore in no other way will it be able to be. First, it cannot be a natural body, both because such a body ought to have a determinate and finite substantial form; and every determinate form demands determinate accidents and quantity; and also because every natural body is moved, or can be moved; but an infinite body cannot undergo any motion, as Aristotle at length explains in On the Heavens I, chapter 5; therefore an infinite body conjoined to matter and form, that is, a natural body, cannot exist. Then, neither can it be a mathematical body: because every body of this sort has a figure, for this is the form of a mathematical body; but a figure is in the extremity and term of a body; therefore such a body cannot be infinite.

This reason is employed by St. Thomas in article 3 of this question; but it does not please Richard in question 5, and it can be dissolved in this way.[401] Although a mathematical body could not be infinite in mere thought, because it would always be apprehended by us after the likeness of

400. Gregory, In I Sent., d. 43, q. 4; Bassolis, Quaestio unica, a. 2; Gabriel, In II Sent., d. 1, q. 3; Ockham, ad loc.; Avicenna; Algazel; cf. St. Thomas, article 4 of this question.

401. Aristotle, De caelo I, c. 5; cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 7, a. 3; Richard, q. 5.

other things which are finite, yet from this it is not gathered that in reality it cannot be made by God. For many things which we are not able to conceive it is not repugnant to be made by God. Then also, on the side of our thought nothing hinders: for we easily apprehend some vastness, or magnitude, beyond the heavens without any bound; therefore nothing repugnant remains why a mathematical infinite body could not be made by God. I grant indeed that such a body is not that of which the mathematicians dispute. For their demonstrations treat only of finite quantity; about the infinite, however, under the notion of the infinite, their science demonstrates nothing: yet this does not prove - what cannot be divided into two fires; but by aggregation, however, that one which can be divided into two. Ver -

They (the mathematicians) treat only of finite quantity; about the infinite, under the formal notion of the infinite, their science demonstrates nothing: yet this does not prove that such a magnitude cannot exist in reality. Wherefore, when Aristotle in Physics III, chapter 5, shows that the infinite is not, in text 39 he plainly professes that he does not dispute about mathematical and intelligible things. We shall quote his very words in what follows.[402]

If, however, we speak of a natural body, even if that body did not move, if it were infinite, as Aristotle very well proves in On the Heavens I in that chapter, nevertheless from this it is not gathered that it would not be natural, or that it would not have in itself a nature which is the principle of motion. It only follows that its nature would be impeded by the mass of that infinite quantity; for any part of it, separated and finite, could be moved without any substantial change. Wherefore, as Richard rightly teaches, nothing repugns that there be some body which cannot be moved.[403] Finally, from the fact that that natural body would have a determinate and finite form according to existence (*esse*), and consequently would require determinate accidents, and finite according to existence, it is not gathered that it would be determined according to magnitude. For these two genera of infinity - namely according to existence (*esse*) and according to quantity - are altogether distinct, as we admonished above. And if from a determinate nature according to existence it were inferred that a determinate quantity is necessary according to extension, it would follow that every natural body would also require a determinate extension; which is absurd: for fire, by addition of matter, could be increased without term, as Aristotle teaches in On the Soul II, chapter 4, text 41; and this has been verified by experience.[404]

Oppressed by this argument, Cajetan devised the following evasion: he asserts that "maximum fire" is understood in two ways: in one way, as that which is perfectly one; in another way, as that which is one by aggregation. He concedes, moreover, that there is indeed a maximum fire intrinsically determined, whose natural form of itself requires such a magnitude, but in some perfectly one individual, not in an individual by aggregation; for in this latter it could be increased to infinity. He calls an individual of fire "per se one" when it cannot be divided into two fires; and

402. Aristotle, Physics III, c. 5, text 39.
403. Richard of Mediavilla, quaestio cited in the text.
404. Aristotle, On the Soul II, c. 4, text 41.

"one by aggregation" when it can be divided into two. Therefore it is true (says Cajetan) that the natural form of fire, because it is determinate according to itself, also requires a determinate quantity and accidents.[405]

However, besides the fact that this distinction of Cajetan is fictitious - as appears at once - the argument in the same way proves what we are contending. First, that distinction is empty; this is evident from the fact that fire is altogether of the same nature in whatever quantity: it therefore always requires exactly the same accidents which pertain to the conservation of itself and to its right condition. Wherefore, if its quantity can grow, then even by aggregation it can grow to infinity; this is a sign that a determinate measure is not per se required. From which I also think it truer that neither towards a minimum nor towards a maximum is any bound of quantity necessary for the conservation of a non-living natural form; but that a termination occurs per accidens: it is corrupted by excessive diminution from the contrary; by increase, however, even to infinity, it would never perish; although Aristotle says in the passage cited that the increments of living things cannot occur to infinity, the words of which it has pleased me here incidentally to explain.

Accordingly Aristotle proves that living things are not increased by natural heat alone according to the proper nature of that heat, but inasmuch as it is a power and instrument of the soul. He gives the reason in these words: "For fire indeed advances to increase in infinitum." As if he said: if living things were increased by natural heat alone by its own power, they would grow to infinity. He then adds: "But of all those things which subsist by nature there is an end and a rule both of magnitude and of accretion." These words of Aristotle seem contrary to those which he had just said. For he had said that fire increases to infinity, and afterwards he seems to assert that natural entities have a bound of magnitude. But they admit of an easy explanation, and they cohere rightly with the preceding, if we follow the interpretation of Simplicius, who by the name "end" does not understand a limit and extremity, but the form which is said in reality to determine matter; or, as other texts have it, not "end" but "term." The text, therefore, is to be ordered in this way. "Of all natural entities, whether living or non-living, the end and term - that is, the form - is the rule, or ratio, of magnitude and of accretion; and hence in living things accretion is to be attributed to the soul, not to fire, that is, not to heat according to itself and to the account of increase itself, which we have said is the form; accretion is to be attributed, not however to the matter of nourishment": by which he rightly proves that the increase of living things, even if it occurs by means of heat, and nourishment is always added, does not proceed to infinity, because its impulse is moderated by the soul, to which increase is chiefly to be attributed as to the form.[406]

Moreover, if we admit Cajetan's distinction, at least the foregoing argument proves that nothing repugns to granting an infinite fire by aggregation, because such a fire by its nature does not require determinate accidents and quantity.

The second reason which St. Bonaventure uses to prove that an infinite body cannot be given, is as follows. Every actually infinite is pure act; otherwise, if it had something of potency, it would be finite: but nothing created can be pure act, because then it would be its own existence (*esse*), and

405. Cajetan, ad art. 3, n. 9.

consequently could not fail to be; therefore no created thing can be infinite. But from those points which I noted at the beginning of the disputation, this reason is easily dissolved: for that infinite which is according to existence (*esse*), and belongs to God alone - as we explained in the preceding disputation - is pure act, which cannot not be; but the infinite according to quantity, because it is finite according to existence and produced from nothing, is not pure act, and can fail to exist.[407][408]

A third reason: If there were a certain infinite length, and it were divided into two parts, one would be equal to the other, because each would be infinite on one side, but finite on the other: but this cannot be, both because to each of them something could be added, and so it would become greater, and also because it would follow that a part is equal to the whole. For let us assume that length infinite on one side, before anything is added to it on the other side, which is finite; it is indeed equal to itself, and then, whatever quantity is added to it, it is a part with respect to itself once the addition has been made: therefore a part would be equal to the whole. Richard brings a similar reason and replies that it proves nothing: because equal and unequal, greater and less, are passions of finite quantity; for they are relations according to measure between two quanta. But only those things which are finite can fall under measure. Therefore an infinite quantity compared to another infinite cannot be said to be equal, or unequal, greater or less. Wherefore, if to a quantity finite on one side and infinite on the other something were added - as indeed it could be added - on that account it would not be said to become greater.[409]

Furthermore, although Aristotle in Physics III, chapter 5 expressly proves that there cannot be in the nature of things any infinite body, he never used such a reasoning. Nor indeed could it stand satisfactorily with his own doctrine. For in Physics VIII, chapters 1, 2, and 3, and On the Heavens I, chapter 10, he proves that the world is ungenerated and from eternity, and consequently that its motion was without a beginning. If, therefore, the reason alleged proved that an infinite body cannot be given, it would also prove that there could not have been motion from eternity even unto this present day. For it would follow that something can be added to the infinite: for past time is perpetually being added; it would also follow that the first part of that time is equal to the whole: for time past up to yesterday seems to be a part when compared with the whole time up to today. Which if Aristotle had judged to be an absurd consequence, he would never have asserted that motion was from eternity.[410]

I for my part think that Aristotle taught above all that the infinite cannot exist, because he thought that this universe of things was constituted from eternity not by the will of God, but by necessity; whence he also proves that another universe cannot be. This being supposed, from those things which we see he rightly concludes that the infinite cannot be; which in his view comes to the same thing as proving that it is not now in act. For all the reasons which he uses in Physics III,

406. Simplicius, as an interpreter of Aristotle's Physics.
407. St. Bonaventure.
408. On pure act according to existence, see the preceding disputation.
409. Richard of Mediavilla, quaestio 5.
410. Aristotle, Physics VIII, cc. 1 - 3; On the Heavens I, c. 10.

chapter 5, and On the Heavens I, chapter 5 and the following, are taken either from generation and mixture, or from other things which are established by experience. From which it is not permissible to infer that by God's absolute power an infinite cannot be made.[411]

A fourth reason. Aristotle, On the Heavens I, chapter 5, therefore proves that an infinite body cannot be moved in a circle, because it would follow that an infinite distance is traversed in finite time. For from the center let two lines be drawn; the more they are prolonged, the more they are distant: since, therefore, they are prolonged to infinity, at length the distance will be infinite, through which it is necessary that the motion be performed at the same time as through the shorter distance between the same lines, in proportion as they are near the center. It furthermore follows that the distance between two lines is at length infinite; which seems absurd, since it is between lines, and thus bounded by lines.

I answer that by this argument it is rightly proved that the circular motion of an infinite body cannot exist, because it would follow that the infinite is passed over, in that the motion which would correspond to the space between two lines or to a small circle around the center could not be finite when compared with the whole magnitude toward the upper part; and unless we assign some highest sphere through which the motion is made, no circular motion at all can be understood. But if a sphere be assigned, the body must be finite and enclosed by the circle: nonetheless it is not concluded that there is some magnitude infinite between two lines: because wherever it be marked, it will always be finite; nor is there any supreme part in which the distance is assigned as actually infinite; but, whatever mark you set, which will be finite, another greater can be set, and so on to infinity. Wherefore, if someone says that an infinite body can be given but cannot be moved circularly, and also that there cannot be a sphere of finite magnitude which would carry out the motion, he says nothing absurd.

It is shown in the same way that an infinite multitude is not repugnant.

Caput III - On the infinite according to multitude

It remains that we prove the same about the infinite according to multitude, whether in spiritual things or also in bodily things, by setting out the reasons by which some are wont to show the opposite, and showing that they can easily be dissolved. But before all, it must be premised that Aristotle never spoke about an infinite multitude of spiritual things: rather, in Physics III, chapter 5, after he had proposed certain arguments by which some strove to persuade that the infinite is not something separated from matter, in text 39 he subjoins: "But this inquiry, perhaps, is more universal: whether there can be an infinite in mathematics and in intelligibles, and in those things which have no magnitude." "We, however," he says, "inquire and examine whether there be an infinite body as to increase in sensibles, about which we are making our doctrine." Then indeed he pursues the disputation about the infinite in things quantitative. He did not wish, therefore, to dispute about incorporeal things, because to him it was not so evident in spirituals as in corporeals that the infinite cannot be; since, indeed, in his opinion the world and the generations of men were

411. Aristotle, On the Heavens I, c. 5; Physics III, c. 5; and following.

from eternity. Whence it followed that either the rational soul is mortal, or it migrates from body to body, or there is an infinite number of souls. Next, it must be observed that this question is not about a multitude of causes per se ordered among themselves - for this is impossible, so that some effect might follow - but about a multitude of things of whatever sort. Now, then, let us see whether the opposed arguments prove anything.[412]

First argument. Every multitude must be under some species; but all the species of multitude are according to the species of number; and no species of number is infinite: therefore no infinite multitude can exist. St. Thomas uses this argument in the first place in article 4 and in the work On the Power of God. To the same purport seems the second, which Richard alleges in question 6, namely that all effects which are derived from one principle ought to have some order among themselves; but in an infinite multitude they could not: for the order of a multitude is not a relation to one first, and in an infinite multitude there is no first.[413]

But in either reasoning there is assumed what is not proved; and if it be denied, it cannot be proved. First, that every multitude must be in some species of number: whence it also follows that even the multitude of things, insofar as it is on the side of reality, does not have the formal and specific distinction of number; for it receives this from the intellect as it considers and divides. For before the intellect numbers, why will you say that this unity rather belongs to the quaternary than to the quinary, since it can be conjoined in reality just as well to the one as to the other, and in reality these numbers are not divided, but there is only one multitude of things?[414]

I answer: This argument cannot rightly be used to prove that there is circular motion of an infinite body, because it would follow that the infinite is traversed; for the motion that would correspond to the space between two lines, or to a small circle about the center, could not be finite when compared with the whole magnitude toward the upper part. Unless we assign some supreme sphere through which the motion is made, no circular motion can be understood; but if a sphere be assigned, it is necessary that that body be finite and enclosed by a circle. Nevertheless it does not follow that there is some magnitude infinite between two lines: for wherever it be marked, it will always be finite; nor is there any uppermost part in which a distance may be assigned actually infinite; but whatever distance is marked, which will be finite, a greater one can be assigned to infinity. Wherefore, if someone should say that an infinite body can be given, but that it cannot be moved circularly, he would not be saying anything absurd.

Nor does it repugn that an infinite should have order: for order in a multitude is not a relation to one first; but in an infinite multitude there is no first.

On infinity according to multitude

It remains to treat of the infinite according to multitude, whether in spiritual things or also in corporeal things; and let us prove the same in both, showing that the reasons by which some try to demonstrate the opposite can easily be dissolved. But before all, it must be premised that Aristotle

412. Aristotle, Physics III, c. 5, text 39.
413. St. Thomas, in article 4 and in De potentia Dei; Richard of Mediavilla, quaestio 6.

never spoke of an infinite multitude of spiritual things; rather, when in Physics III, c. 5, after he had proposed the reasons by which some attempted to persuade that the infinite is not separated from matter, at text 39 he subjoins: "But perhaps this is more universal: if it can be in mathematical things and in intelligibles, which have no magnitude. We, however, consider whether an infinite occurs in sensibles or not, and we pursue in particular the discussion about those things which belong to bodies, namely increase, generations and corruptions."] Therefore he did not wish to inquire about incorporeal things, in which, as I said, the question is not as perspicuous to the philosophers as in corporeal things, since for them it could not be sufficiently clear whether there were without beginning movements and generations of men from eternity. From which it followed that either the rational soul is mortal, or the soul migrates from body to body, or that there is an infinite number of souls. Next, it is fitting that we do not treat this question by a multitude of causes pursued in order, for this is impossible where no effect follows: in whatever multitude of things you please.

Let us go on to see whether the opposing arguments prove anything.

First argument. Every multitude ought to be under some species of number; but the species of multitude are according to the species of number, and no species of number is infinite; therefore an infinite multitude cannot be. St. Thomas uses this argument in article 4, first place.] The same also seems in some way to look to the teaching of Ricardus, q. 6, where he asserts that all effects deriving from one principle ought to be ordered among themselves; in an infinite multitude there could not be order, for order is a relation to one first; but in an infinite multitude there is no first.]

But in both lines of reasoning there is a fault. And if it be denied, it cannot be proved. First of all, that a multitude ought to be in some species of number, is not true in the same way on the side of the thing; whence it is clear also that multitude, insofar as it is on the side of the thing, does not have the formal and specific notion of number: for it receives this from the intellect considering and dividing. For before the intellect numbers, why will you say that this unity belongs rather to the quaternary than to the quinary, since it can be joined in reality to the one as well as to the other, and in reality these numbers are not divided, but there is only one multitude of things?

Cajetan. In this article, in order to confirm St. Thomas by this reasoning, Cajetan grants that not every multitude is in the species of number - not because he thinks there can be some infinite multitude which does not have the notion of number, but because he holds that the multitude of spiritual things does not pertain to the species of number, which he supposes to be constituted only from bodies.] He adds moreover that St. Thomas did not assume that proposition, "Every multitude ought to be under some species of number," but this: "Every multitude ought to be in some species"; then he drew his argument in this way: All the species of multitude ought to be according to the species of numbers - he did not say, "They ought to be species of numbers," but "according to the species of numbers," as if he were saying (Cajetan's words): they ought to have proportion with the species of numbers, just as the multitude of angels, although it is not in the predicament of quantity under the species of number, nevertheless has the same proportion with

414. Cajetan is being alluded to at the end of the page.

number, so as to be numbered; but an infinite multitude cannot have this; therefore such cannot be. Moreover, that every multitude has proportion with number, he proves from those things which we commonly see.

It is refuted. Against this doctrine there are some reasons. First, number according to its formal notion, which no one considers except the mathematician, is also found in angels: for mathematical demonstrations proceed in angels just as in corporeal things. Second, when the aforesaid argument assumes that every multitude ought to be in some species, either it is understood of some species which is not a species of number - and this is assumed altogether gratuitously; for if it is not a species of number under the genus of quantity, under what other genus or species will it be? Yet the preceding argument seems to suppose that that multitude ought to be in some species which is not a species of number. Or the argument assumes that that multitude ought to be in some species of number - and this too would have to be proved: for who will say that an infinite multitude is some species of number? Third, even if we grant that every multitude is in some species which is not a species of number, when then the argument subjoins that all the species of multitude ought to be according to the species of numbers - that is (as Cajetan wills) ought to have proportion with the species of numbers - and proves this gratis also by an appeal to what we see, it does not follow. For what Cajetan says seems to be clear to us from the fact that we see every multitude of things to stand thus, in equal measure: this indeed is found only in the multitude of created things; but he does not prove that there cannot be some multitude which has no proportion with number.

Second argument. Every creature is comprehended under some definite intention of the creator, since every agent, especially God, does not act indeterminately: therefore, if many are created, it is necessary that they be comprehended by a definite number; but an infinite multitude cannot be comprehended under a definite number; therefore it cannot be made. St. Thomas uses this argument also in article 4, in the second place.]

It is broken by Cajetan. But Cajetan objects three things, by which what he asserts in that second place seems to me to be weakened in this way. Although each created thing of some multitude ought to fall under the definite intention of the creator, nevertheless the universal multitude of individuals ought not to be comprehended in this way: for to each thing of this multitude there belongs its own proper and determinate creation, and hence the agent's intention is borne surely and determinately to individual things; but the whole multitude is not produced by one single creation; therefore it ought not to be comprehended by a definite intention and number.

Cajetan's solution. Cajetan replies for himself, § Ad 2, that the whole multitude which has the notion of a universe has also the notion of one created thing; therefore it ought to fall under some definite intention of the creator.

It is rejected. But this does not satisfy the reasoning which he objected to himself. For the whole universe of things cannot have the notion of one created thing, since it is produced not by one, but by many productions of individual things. And if the universe of things has some unity, it is only a certain order among the very things of which it consists; which order can be found in a finite

multitude. Moreover, since God by His most perspicacious intellect and omnipotent will, which cannot be deceived or fail, works all things, that infinite multitude of things would no less fall under the definite knowledge and will of God than if it were finite. Wherefore neither would His transitive action by which He produced individuals tend to what is indeterminate; for now He would not be able to produce individually those very things which He could before: if therefore this is not absurd, neither will that be; for just as it repugns that the power of God be exhausted, so also that it be diminished or restricted. Furthermore, since the production of things adds to God no perfection, but the whole perfection of omnipotence consists in this, that in Himself He be of such a nature as to whom it befits to produce all things that do not involve a contradiction, it follows that from His not being able to produce those things which involve a contradiction, there is no impotence in God, nor diminution or imperfection of power. Wherefore from this, that after the production of some things He cannot produce as many as He could before, or that, all possible things being produced, He cannot produce another thing, since both are impossible, there is no defect of power; and therefore on that account His power will by no means be said to be exhausted or diminished: for it is always and was with respect only to those things which for such or such a time do not involve a contradiction; nor was there or is there in God any power to produce something beyond every multitude which He Himself knows. No variation therefore can be in God, but in other things; nor any diminution. Wherefore His power in itself will by no means be said to be exhausted, diminished, or restricted.

Third argument. God cannot at once do everything which He knows to be possible to be done; therefore He cannot make an infinite. For if God produced an infinite, He would do all the things which He knows to be possible to be done: for these two seem to be reciprocal. But that God cannot at once do all the things which He knows to be possible, they prove by this reason: If God should at once produce all those things, nothing else would remain to be done; therefore the omnipotence of God would be exhausted, and thus less than before, or at least nothing. This is the reasoning of Alexander, 1 p., q. 21, m. 2, ad 3, which has seemed of great moment to many learned men of our age.]

It is weak. Yet that it is weak is easy to show from a twofold source. First, in order that that first consequence be good, it is necessary that those two which we said be reciprocal, namely, "an infinite" and "whatever God knows to be possible": but they are not convertible. Indeed it follows rightly, "He does all the things which He knew, therefore He does infinite things"; but it is not rightly gathered, "He does infinite things, therefore He does all the things which He knew." For God does not know only one infinite multitude, but many: in whatever species He knows infinities in individuals; He could therefore produce an infinite multitude in one species, if He produced at once all the individuals of that which He knows, and yet He would not at once produce all the things which He knows. Therefore those two are not reciprocal, and hence that first consequence is null.

Moreover, even if we grant that God produced at once all the things which He knew to be possible in whatever species, nothing absurd follows, as the argument intended. Wherefore also the latter consequence of that argument is not rightly inferred; and this can be proved by three

reasons. First reason: As the omnipotence of God stands to the whole multitude of possibles, so it stands to the singulars thereof; namely, if then, all things being at once produced, because another could not be produced, the power of God would be said to be exhausted, so also now, some one thing or many being produced, it would be diminished, or at least not so far-ranging as before. But now it could not then be said that the power of God was exhausted or diminished, since then it could not operate in things not yet existing, but also it would be operative in act; by the same reasoning, while He conserved the whole multitude altogether, He would be no less then than in the beginning exhausted or diminished. For now He would not be able individually to produce those very things which before He could; if therefore this is not absurd, neither will that be: for just as it repugns that the power of God be exhausted, so also that it be diminished or restricted.

Furthermore, since the production of things adds to God no perfection, but the whole perfection of omnipotence consists in this, that in Himself He be of such a nature as to whom it befits to produce all things which do not involve a contradiction, it follows that from His not being able to produce those things which involve a contradiction there is in God no impotence, nor diminution or imperfection of power. Wherefore from this, that after the production of some things He cannot produce as many as He could before, or that, all possible things being already produced, He cannot produce another thing, since both are impossible, there is no defect of power; and therefore on that account His power will by no means be said to be exhausted or diminished: for it is always and was with respect only to those things which for such or such a time do not involve a contradiction; nor was there or is there in God any power to produce something beyond every multitude which He Himself knows. No variation therefore can be in God, but in other things; nor any diminution. Wherefore His power in itself will by no means be said to be exhausted, diminished, or restricted.

Then, if the infinite multitude of all possible things had been produced, not only would the power of God not be exhausted on His part, but not even on the part of things: for something to be done would still remain in eternity. For, the multitude of all things which He knows having once been produced, He could still destroy the whole or a part and create again: therefore something to be done would remain over to the power of God.

Note. Add that that multitude would proceed from God in the same way continuously as at the beginning it had been produced: for the conservation of things is a certain continuous creation of them, by which no less continuously are things drawn out of nothing than in the beginning when they were first created, as we shall say in Disputation 34, cap. 3. Therefore, just as at the instant when that multitude would be created the power of God would by no means be said to be exhausted or diminished, since then it could not yet operate in things not yet existing, but would be operative in act, so also by the same reason, while He conserved the whole multitude altogether, it would by no means then be said to be exhausted, diminished, or restricted.

For the infinite is that outside of which there is nothing: therefore, outside infinitely many men no other thing could be produced. Then too, if something else were produced, there would be an addition made to the infinite, and consequently one infinite would be greater than another. By this

very argument some also think that it is very well demonstrated that generations of men have not been from eternity; because the number of souls would be infinite, outside of which no other thing could be created.

But the fourth argument is of no efficacy. For since the argument is drawn from another definition of the infinite which some think was handed on by Aristotle, and yet he himself nonetheless said that generations have been from eternity, it is not to be believed that it has any strength; and since the same argument can be made against the true opinion which says that actually infinite individuals under any given species are known by God, as we shall see in disputation 63, and it ought to prove nothing against that, so too in no way does it prove that an infinite multitude cannot be made.

Moreover, to satisfy the argument directly will not be difficult. For Aristotle does not hand down that definition of the infinite, but altogether rejects it in Physics III, text 62, in these words: "It happens that the infinite is in a contrary way to what others say: for the infinite is not that of which there is nothing outside, but that of which there is always something outside"; and in text 63: "Therefore the infinite, by reason of quantity, is that of which there is always something outside."[415] But that of which there is nothing outside - namely, that which is perfect, and actually so - is perfect, not infinite. For that is perfect which has all things in itself, and nothing is outside, of those things which are required for its constitution. The true definition of the infinite, according to Aristotle's mind, is that, when things are being taken from it, there always remains something to be taken. Of this sort he had said, at text 57, that what is wholly finite, that is, actually, is to be distinguished from what is infinite in potency: for the infinite in potency is like the Olympic game, which is wholly finite in act, yet can be made greater without end; but the infinite in act is that of which, when things are being taken, there is always something further to be taken from among those which are in it.

The second argument is taken from the order to the space which an infinite multitude would occupy, and it is of this sort. Let there be given an infinite multitude of stones; that will without doubt occupy an infinite place: therefore infinitely many men could not be made at once; therefore God could not produce all the things which he knows to be possible. I answer first, that by this argument it is not proved that an infinite cannot be made by God, but that all the things which God knows can be made cannot be made at once. Then too, it does not prove that several infinite multitudes cannot be made at once: for an infinite multitude does not necessarily occupy infinite space on every side, but, if it be extended into infinity from one side only, it can be innumerable.

But someone will press in this way. Let stones be placed in a straight line to infinity, which on one side have a terminus, but on the other extend into infinity. Then let this length be divided into infinite foot-length quantities, and let God separate the alternate ones from these, the others remaining and conjoined; or, if it be said that in that multitude there are not alternates - for the ratio of "every other" consists in proportion, which is not found in an infinite multitude - at least let each foot-length quantity be divided in two, and let each half be separated from the other, and let

415. Aristotle, Physics III, texts 62 - 63.

all the halves together, separated, be placed each in its own order: then without doubt there will be made two infinites according to length from one side, where previously there was but one: wherefore that same quantity will occupy a greater space than before. Or, if one prefers, let one series of those halves be extended toward Complutum to the east, and another from the same place toward the west, which God can do without motion, and now there will be made one infinite in act according to length toward both parts.

If someone should say that the halves of single quantities cannot be assigned, because that would be just the same as assigning alternates, let us suppose that God has produced infinitely many men toward the east, then let him separate the arms of each toward the west: now there will be made, as I said, one infinite in act on both sides, out of one which was infinite only toward the other side.

As for myself - omitting the many things which St. Gregory heaps up in that question, 4.2.2. ad 6, so as to dissolve this argument - I would candidly concede that from one infinite, according to multitude toward one side, there can be made another infinite from one side as well; and from both, one that is infinite from one and from the other side: from which I do not see that any contradiction can be gathered, although it seems repugnant to sense.[416] For from this it would not be licit to infer that the same infinite is made greater by itself, without anything extrinsic supervening. For "greater" and "less" can belong only to finite quantity, as was said above. Wherefore, however that quantity be disposed, it will never occupy a greater space. But if anyone should object that by the same reasoning it could be brought about that from one infinite, according to length from one side, an infinite would be made not only on both sides according to length, but also on every side in a circuit - which seems absurd - one replies that it is not rightly inferred: because only an addition could be made by a division carried out according to proportion from the single quantities; but this could not thus be done into infinity as to fill all possible space.

The last argument. If there were infinitely many men, and each had a single stone, they could throw them into one heap, and from that heap each might take ten, since the heap is infinite; and thus each would have more than he had before. I answer, that not all the men could take ten stones, but only single ones: for the fact that the stones are infinite matters little, when each has put in only a single one. You will say that, if each had put in ten, they could take ten; and the heap would be none the more infinite than if each had put in only a single one. I answer, the heap would indeed be infinite, neither greater nor less than if each had thrown in single stones; because "greater" and "less" cannot exist among infinite quantities or multitudes, as was noted above: yet if each had put in ten stones, there would be some in that infinite multitude who would not be in the other, namely, where single stones only had been thrown in; and this is enough that, in the former case, each can take ten, but in the other only single ones.

Objection. You will say that in the case in which single stones had been put in, at least as many men as can should take ten stones; then it is asked: how many will remain? If you say "infinitely many," then some from that multitude could now receive more than they put in. But if you say

416. St. Gregory, in that question, 4.2.2, ad 6.

"finitely many will remain," then already infinitely many men each have received ten stones. The reply: there is not a determinate number of men from whom each can take ten stones; but, a number of twenty men being fixed, more can also take sets of ten stones; and thus into infinity, without our being able to mark out a final limit. And if from that multitude ten men each were to take ten stones, it would be necessary that, from that infinite multitude of men, there remain also other men without the single stones which they put in. Wherefore, all things being rightly considered, I for my part up to now find that no evident contradiction has been alleged for which God could not produce an infinite in quantity.

Quaestio VIII - On the existence of God in things

Since it is agreed that the infinite is everywhere and in all things, it must be considered whether this befits God. And concerning this, four things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether God is in all things

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things; but God is above all things, according to that of the Psalm: "Exalted above all nations is the Lord, and his glory above the heavens" (Ps. 112:4). Therefore God is not in all things.

For what is above all does not remain encompassed. Therefore, as long as a thing has existence, so long it must be that God is present to it according to the mode by which he gives it existence.

Objection 1. It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things; but God is above all things, according to that of the Psalm: "Exalted above all nations is the Lord, and his glory above the heavens" (Ps. 112:4). Therefore God is not in all things.

Objection 2. Furthermore, what is in something is contained by it; but God is not contained by things, rather he contains things: therefore God is not in things, but rather things are in him. Whence St. Augustine, in the book Eighty-Three Questions, says that in him rather are all things than that he himself be anywhere.[417]

Objection 3. Furthermore, the more powerful an agent is, the more its action proceeds to what is distant; but God is the most powerful of agents: therefore his action can reach even to those things which are distant from him, and it is not necessary that he be in all things.

Objection 4. Furthermore, demons are certain things; yet God is not in demons: for there is no agreement of light with darkness, as it is said in 2 Cor. 6. Therefore God is not in all things.

But on the contrary: Wherever something operates, there it is; but God operates in all things, according to that of Isaiah 26: "All our works you have wrought in us, O Lord": therefore God is in all things.

I answer that: God is in all things; not indeed as a part of the essence (*essentia*), nor as an accident (*accidens*), but as an agent is present to that in which it acts. For it is necessary that every agent be conjoined to that in which it acts immediately, and touch it by its power; whence, in the seventh book of the Physics, it is proved that the moved and the mover must be together.[418] But since God is existence (*esse*) itself through his essence, it is necessary that created existence be his proper effect, just as to set afire is the proper effect of fire itself. Now this effect God causes in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are conserved in being: as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore, as long as a thing has existence, so long it must be that God is present to it according to the mode by which it has existence. But existence is that which is most intimate to each thing, and which is more profoundly in all things, since it is the form (*forma*) and act (*actus*) of all the things which are in the thing, as is clear from what was said above. Whence it is necessary that God be in all things, and intimately.

Reply to the first: God is above all things by the excellence of his nature; and yet he is in all things as causing the existence of all, as was said above.

Reply to the second: Although corporeal things are said to be in something as in a container, nevertheless spiritual things contain those things in which they are, as the soul contains the body; whence also God is in things as containing things. Yet by a certain likeness of corporeal things all things are said to be in God, insofar as they are contained by him.

Reply to the third: The action of no agent, however powerful, proceeds to something distant except insofar as it acts upon it through intermediates. But it pertains to the greatest power of God that he act immediately in all things. Whence nothing is distant from him as though in itself it did not have God. Nevertheless things are said to be distant from God by dissimilitude of nature or of grace; just as he is over all by the excellence of his nature.

Reply to the fourth: In demons there is understood both the nature which is from God, and the deformity of guilt which is not from him. And therefore it must not be granted absolutely that God is in demons, but with this addition: insofar as they are certain things. But in things which denote an un-deformed nature, it must be said absolutely that God is.

Disputatio XXVII - Whether it is certain that God is everywhere

The doctrine of this article we can embrace in this brief conclusion: God is everywhere.

Caput I - Errors on this matter

That he is everywhere is so well established that, as Athanasius testifies, in the Oration against Idols after the middle, both reason and reputation have obtained this among all. By what reasoning St. Thomas confirms this, we shall see in the following disputation. However, there have not been lacking those who, in a matter so well known and commonplace, have erred grievously. I pass over

417. St. Augustine, Eighty-Three Questions, in principio quaest. 20.
418. Aristotle, Physics VII, on the simultaneity of mover and moved.

the Anthropomorphites, against whom I disputed expressly above in Disputation 21, who, affirming God to be corporeal, were compelled to assert that he also is contained in some finite and determined place: although this error is not expressly reported of them. For neither could he with his body penetrate the whole mass of the things capable of body, so as to be everywhere. Wherefore most aptly St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 34, which is the second on Theology, proves that God is not a body, because according to divine Scripture he is everywhere. "Which," he says, "could not be, if he were corporeal."

But among those who said that God is spirit, there were some - first philosophers, then heretics, and finally otherwise Catholic men - who asserted that God is not in all things. In the first place, Aristotle, in the book De Mundo to Alexander, asserted that he is nowhere else than in heaven: just as the king of the Persians is wont not to be in all his cities, but in the royal city of Ecbatana or of Susa. And not only in that book, which many deny to be Aristotle's, but also in the first book De Caelo, chapter 9 near the end, he contends that God and all intelligences and spirits are not within but outside heaven. After Aristotle, in the same error seem to have been the Manichees, against whom St. Augustine disputes in the book Contra epistolam fundamenti, chapter 16, who would seem to conclude that God is enclosed in some place. Lastly, among Catholics, St. Augustine Eugubinus, on those words of Psalm 138, "If I shall ascend into heaven, you are there," asserted that God by his essence and presence is only in heaven, just as the sun is situated by its position and its body in the heaven. But just as the sun by its illumination pervades these lower places, nor is it defiled by filthy things which it enlightens, so God (says Eugubinus) is present to all things and to the lower places by his knowing, enlightens all things, and yet is not disturbed or defiled by the lower places: which [presence] he thought to take place not by his substance and presence, but by knowledge and knowing alone.[419]

Caput II - The Catholic truth

But the Catholic doctrine is also most strongly proved by philosophers, which St. Thomas hands down in this article, namely, that God by his substance (*substantia*) is in all things. We presuppose from Question 3 that he is spirit, and that he does not occupy even the most subtle body. That this was especially the opinion of the Peripatetics and of the Platonists, Tully teaches in the First Academica; Aristotle also reports it, in the last chapter of De Anima, text 86, and in De Caelo to Alexander: that Thales of Miletus said that all things are full of gods. The same, Aristotle in the last chapter of De Partibus Animalium, relates of Heraclitus, that to those who were coming for the sake of seeing him and did not wish to enter into the bakehouse, he said: "Enter, for neither in this place are the immortal gods lacking." There is also a famous testimony of Orpheus, in Clement of Alexandria, and in St. Cyril, which we shall put forward a little later. Next, this is the common opinion of the Fathers, among whom, besides Athanasius and Nazianzen already mentioned, and others more whom we shall enumerate in the following article, St. John Chrysostom, Homily 5 on

419. Athanasius, Oration against Idols; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 34; Aristotle, De Mundo ad Alexandrum; Aristotle, De Caelo I, c. 9; St. Augustine, Contra Epistolam Fundamenti, c. 16; St. Augustine Eugubinus, on Psalm 138.

chapter 2 to the Colossians, affirms that it must be firmly believed that God is everywhere. St. Augustine also expressly taught this, book VII of the City of God, chapter 30, where, among other things, about God he says: "You fill heaven and earth by a presence of power, not by a nature that is absent."[420]

Caput III - In what modes the presence of God in place is described

Moreover, in Sacred Scripture there are manifest testimonies of this truth. Jeremiah 23: "I fill heaven and earth"; and Psalm 138: "Whither shall I go from your Spirit? or whither shall I flee from your face? If I ascend into heaven, you are there; if I descend into hell, you are present," etc. Where, while he assigns the extreme places of the world, in which he says that God is, he plainly indicates that he is also in all the other parts. Nor is it lawful that these and many other testimonies of Scripture be interpreted otherwise than of presence according to substance. For unless they were to be understood in this way, Scripture would not say in that place of Jeremiah 23, "I fill heaven and earth," and in 3 Kings 8, "If heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain you"; and in Job 11: "He is higher than heaven - what will you do? deeper than hell - how will you know? longer than the earth is his measure," etc. In this sense the holy Fathers understood these and many other places of Scripture. Wherefore the scholastic Doctors, among the other attributes of God, rightly count immensity - which differs not only by reason from omnipotence and eternity, but also from the infinity of essence, as we noted in Disputation 25.

But what Eugubinus was adducing in confirmation of his opinion is plainly frivolous. For although God by his substance be intimately present to filthy things, it would be foolish for someone to suspect that he is defiled by them afterward, since he is supremely spiritual. This is very well explained by Hugh of St. Victor, book I De Sacramentis, part 3, chapter 17, and by the Master in the First Book of the Sentences, distinction 37: they are wont to show it by the example of the rational soul, which, because it is spirit, is not infected by a leprous body. The same thing, by the example of the sun, St. Augustine demonstrates, in the book De Agone Christiano, chapter 18, and in De Natura Boni, chapter 29. For God is spirit, and therefore immutable: even if his substance be present in the lower places of torments, he cannot be disturbed, just as neither can he be polluted by a body.[421]

Not only is God said in Scripture to be in a place, but by a certain peculiar way his presence in place is signified. For he is said to be in heaven as in a seat and throne, but the earth to be to him as a footstool of his feet. Various Doctors have understood this mode of speaking. Scripture uses it in Isaiah 66 and very often elsewhere. In this way of speaking, Orpheus also explained God's place and magnitude, as cited by Clement of Alexandria, Stromata V, near the end, and by Cyril, book V

420. Cicero, Academica I; Aristotle, De Anima, c. ult., and De Partibus Animalium, c. ult.; Aristotle, De Caelo ad Alexandrum; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata V; St. Cyril, Contra Julianum V; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 5 on Col 2; St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei VII, c. 30.

421. Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis I, part 3, c. 17; Peter Lombard, Sentences I, d. 37; St. Augustine, De Agone Christiano c. 18; De Natura Boni c. 29.

against Julian, after the middle. St. Cyril therefore thus explains that place of Isaiah: since God is in all things, the more precious, which are signified by the name "heavens," are said to be as his seat and throne; but the more vile, which are denoted by "earth," are said to be his footstool.

St. John Damascene explains the same in another way, book I De Fide Orthodoxa, chapter 16, namely, that the heaven is called God's seat because there are the blessed Angels who obey his will, and hence it is as it were his seat and dwelling; but the earth is called the footstool of his feet because God, made man, dwelt on earth with men. For the very flesh of Christ is called the foot of God (says Damascene), and hence the earth is the footstool of his feet.

Although these things are true, nevertheless it cannot be denied that by this way of speaking God's greatness and immensity are signified in Scripture in a human mode, namely, that he so fills the extremities of the world that, sitting in heaven, he has the earth as the footstool of his feet. But when it is said in Psalm 113, "The heaven of heavens is the Lord's, but the earth he has given to the sons of men," it was not therefore said because he is not on earth, but because heaven itself, and not earth, serves God as a royal court, since in heaven his glory appears to the blessed, whereas on earth the glory and dominion of men shine forth: and hence heaven is said to belong to God, but the earth to be given to the sons of men. For the same reason, heaven is called in Scripture the habitation of God, as in Psalm 112.[422]

Disputatio XXVIII - From God's operation in things, his presence in them is gathered

That from God's operation his presence is not proved was the opinion of Scotus. Caput 1.

What St. Thomas and others think. Caput 2.

Observation.

Caput I - The state of the question and Scotus's reasons

Although the Catholic doctrine which we set forth a little above, about the existence of God in all things, is, among all the Scholastic doctors, held without controversy, nevertheless they differ about the reason to be assigned for it. Those who think that the reason of God's existing in things is his operation (operatio) prove hence that he is everywhere, because he operates in all things. But those who affirm that God is in things by his bare essence (essentia), try to show that this does not befit him by reason of operation. We shall therefore report each party's reasons, and examine them in the usual manner.

Scotus's first reason is in I Sentences, dist. 37, the single question. There he asserts that from the presence of omnipotence one does not prove God's presence in things according to substance (substantia). And he calls "presence of omnipotence" the presence of operation, as if he were saying

422. Isaiah 66; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata V; St. Cyril, Contra Julianum V; St. John Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa I, c. 16; Ps. 113:16; Ps. 112.

that from operation it is not sufficiently inferred that the presence of God's substance is in the place where he operates. Hence, concerning the estimation that operation is not only no reason for existing where one operates, but even that, by the place (as they say) intrinsically, by the force of operation itself and of omnipotence, there is nothing repugnant in God's operating at a distance, unless from elsewhere, by reason of his immensity, he be everywhere present.

Ockham follows Scotus in I Sentences, the same dist., the single question, where he expressly impugns St. Thomas's reasoning; as do Bassolis in the single question, and Gabriel in the single question, art. 3, dub. 1. Along with these also side with them those who think that God according to his substance is present in infinite imaginary places outside the heaven, which we shall report in Disputation 16. But all of them with one voice affirm, by the same reason, that this attribute of immensity befits God not by reason of operation, but immediately by reason of his substance.

Now Scotus confirms this his opinion by three reasons. The first is that, although no bodily agent can operate unless it be in contact with a body, or by a derived power through a continuous space and conjoined to it, nevertheless to a spiritual agent, especially of infinite power, such as God is, this is not necessary. For this agrees with a bodily agent because of its own imperfect and limited power. Wherefore, if the agent be of infinite power, it will not need proximity of place or continuity of space, nor can it be limited by them: therefore it is not repugnant to understand that God operates at a distance.

The second reason: God the omnipotent operates by the mere nod of his will; but his will can be concerned with what is absent and distant; therefore so also can his operation. The third reason: that God might create the universe at the beginning of duration, it was not necessary that he had first been present by an interval and imaginary space in which the world seems to have been created; therefore for operation he does not need presence according to substance. By these three reasons Scotus not only directly proves that presence according to substance is in no way prior, in order of reason, to God's operation in things, but also by the same, especially the second, he seems to prove that not even by the force of operation is God in the things themselves present according to substance, since it can rightly be understood that he operates in what is distant from him.

Caput II - What St. Thomas and others think

The contrary reasoning, by which others try to gather the same Catholic position about God's existence in all things, is taken from the operation of God as it passes into the very things which he creates and continually conserves; and thus, from the attribute of omnipotence, by which God operates all things, they prove the attribute of immensity, by which God by his substance fills all things. This reasoning is used along with St. Thomas by Cajetan, and some more recent writers in this article, as also Albert, Bonaventure, Aegidius, Durandus, Capreolus, Richard, Thomas of Argentina, the Ferrariense, and, it seems, Henry in his Summa, and the Antissiodorensis.[423] And

later Thomists, who use this reasoning, together with Cajetan, assert that a transitive operation is for God the reason and foundation of existing in things, just as for bodies quantity is the reason for filling place.

Now the more recent writers attempt to confirm that operation is the reason and foundation of God's existing in things in a twofold manner, first from Scripture, then from the Fathers, and lastly by reason. In the first place, from Scripture: Psalm 138, "If I shall ascend into heaven, thou art there; if I shall descend into hell, thou art present. If I shall take my wings early in the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea," add "even there thou art." Then he subjoins the cause: "For there also thy hand shall lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me." Not amiss, except that, as Eugubinus says on that place, by those words the cause is not assigned, because in Greek it has "gar," and in Hebrew "gam," and the sense is, as he explains, "so far is it from my being able to flee thy presence, that even there thy hand would lead me."[424] But although we admit that interpretation, we still cannot help understanding a cause under those words. For if the right hand of God can lead me even there, then even if he himself were not present there by his substance, the Psalmist would say in vain, "So far is it from my fleeing thy presence that even there thy hand and power would lead me." The same seems to have been expressed by Paul, Acts 17, when he said of God: "He is not far from any one of us," and he subjoins the cause: "For in him we live, and move, and are," as also some of your own poets have said. Whose sentiment Paul seems to approve in such a way that he confirms his own by that most excellent reason.

In the second place, they think the same point can be gathered not obscurely from the Fathers. Philo, in the book On the Confusion of Tongues somewhat after the middle, says: "God fills all things, not as contained, but as containing." He says that God is not contained, because he is not circumscribed or bounded by place; but he says that he fills all things by containing them, because he holds together all things and fosters them by his operation. Therefore he judges that all things are filled with God's majesty because all things are conserved by him; wherefore as a foundation and reason for existing in things, God's operation is rightly assigned. This way of speaking is familiar among the holy Fathers. Thus speaks St. Hilary on that verse of Psalm 124, "The mountains are round about it," and in On the Trinity near the beginning; and so also St. Augustine in Confessions.[425] In a like manner Bernard,[426] Anselm in the Proslogion ch. 19, and Theophilus of Antioch, book 2 To Autolycus, say that God is not confined by place, because, if he had a place,

423. Cajetan on I Sentences, d. 37; Albert, I Sentences d. 37, q. 2, a. 1; St. Bonaventure, I Sentences, prolog. art. 1, q. 1; Aegidius (Giles of Rome), I Sentences d. 2, q. 1, a. 9, aa. 1 - 2; Durandus, I Sentences, q. 1; Capreolus, I Sentences, dist. 1 - 2, q. 1, conclusions 1 - 2, 3, in the solution of the argument against that position; Richard, II Sentences d. 1, q. 1; Thomas of Argentina, I Sentences q. 1, art. 1; the Ferrariense, Contra gentiles III, c. 68; Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 30, q. 5; the Antissiodorensis, Summa, I, c. 15, q. 1, ad 1.

424. St. Augustine Steuchus (Eugubinus), on Psalm 138, ad locum.

425. St. Hilary, on Psalm 124; and On the Trinity, near the beginning; St. Augustine, Confessions, book 1.

426. St. Bernard, De essentia divinitatis, near the beginning; Sermon 6 on the dedication of a church; St. Anselm, Proslogion ch. 19; Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum, book 2. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 16; St. Anselm, Monologion chs. 20 - 21.

place would be greater than God. Rather, he himself is the place of all. He says that he is in a place in such a way that by his power he contains and conserves all the things in which he is, and so he is, as it were, their place; for every thing is said to be conserved by its own natural place.

More clearly this doctrine seems to be handed down, first by Isidore in On the Supreme Good, book 1, ch. 1, in these words: "This is the immensity of the divine greatness, that we understand him to be within all things yet not enclosed, outside all things yet not excluded; and therefore by his interior power he contains all things, and by the unbounded immensity of his greatness he encloses all things as by an exterior circumference. Therefore by that which is exterior he is shown to be the creator; by that which is interior it is shown that he governs all things." Accordingly, he is within every creature according to substance, because he so governs all things that their existence (esse) depends on him. Next, St. John Damascene, defining the "place" of the whole universe, asserts that God is "where his operation is manifest"; for, he says, "without any commixture he permeates all things and imparts efficacy to all things." Finally, Anselm in the Monologion ch. 21, near the end, after many things in that chapter and the preceding which seem to confirm this opinion, concludes in these words: "But since nothing at all can be anywhere or ever without it (namely, without the essence of God), it is necessary that it be everywhere and always." In which sense he had said in ch. 20: "When it is in one place, no good and no essence is meanwhile in other places," because without it nothing at all exists; as if he had said: if we confine God to one place, all other things must needs altogether perish; which would not be true if, as Scotus contends, God's operation could be understood without his presence in things.

In the third place this opinion is proved by reason in this way. A cause is necessarily conjoined with its effect, as the Philosopher teaches, Physics VII, from text 10 to 13. But God is the cause of all things, and indeed the proper cause of existence (esse) itself, as fire is the proper cause of fire and heat of heat, not only at the beginning when things come to be, but as long as their existence remains, because he continually cherishes and conserves all: therefore he must be conjoined to all things according to his substance.

Cajetan and the Ferrariense explain this argument thus, that the major proposition is to be understood of a cause which operates (as they say) by the immediacy of power (virtus) and of the supposit (suppositum). And according to Cajetan, it is the same thing for God to be present according to the power of one who operates proximately, and to be present according to essence and substance. They assert that that agent operates by immediacy of power which acts by its own power and not one borrowed from elsewhere; but by immediacy of supposit, that which, without any other cause set under it and interposed, operates upon something. So understood, the proposition follows very well, that God is everywhere: for he is the proper cause of existence itself in all things, in such wise that he produces it and by his own power, without any other intermediate cause, continually conserves it. Therefore he operates in all things by immediacy of power and of supposit, and hence ought to be conjoined to them according to substance. And they call "the being (esse) of things" not only existence, but the whole being of them, which by a kind of continuous creation is conserved by God. Moreover, explaining this opinion more fully, Cajetan says that this presence of God in things can be taken in a twofold way: both for God's contact with them - which

indeed is nothing other than God's operation - and also for the relation of presence, which in God is something of reason, of which operation is, as it were, the foundation. From this he infers that operation is to God the reason for existing in place, just as quantity is to bodies. In this sense Aegidius said on the same dist. 37, art. 2, q. 1, that God is in place not by a quantity of bulk, as bodies are, but by a quantity of power, which is his very operation.

Furthermore, some of the more recent writers confirm the said opinion thus. It is impossible that anything be moved, even by God, from one extreme to the other without a transit through the middle: therefore it is impossible that God operate into a distant place. For just as a mobile must be moved continually through the space, so any agent, even God, must act continually through the middle, and hence be in the whole middle where he operates, as a mobile is in the whole space through which it is moved. Lastly, others prove that, since God's power is infinite, it rightly follows, from the force of his operation, that God is everywhere. For, if God's power were confined to some peculiar place, it would be finite.

Caput III - Some observations for the explanation of this controversy

Before I set down my own opinion in this difficult matter, two things, worthy of note, must be premised. One is that, although every agent must necessarily be conjoined according to substance with its effect by the very fact that it operates, nevertheless this cannot in every respect befit God and created agents in the same way. For created agents, especially if they are bodies, of which Aristotle treats in Physics VII, at that already-cited text 10, in order to operate, need proximity of place. Wherefore, as something prior and requisite for acting, proximity precedes in them. That the same is the case with created spiritual agents, we shall show below in Disputation 189, ch. 2. God, however - even in the view of the more recent Thomists whom I recalled in the chapter above - is not therefore present to things in order to operate on them; nor does he require proximity of place as something necessary for operation; otherwise he could not have made the universe out of nothing, since before that he would not have been present to the very things which he at the beginning produced from nothing. Likewise, as we shall show in Disputation 29, before God produced the world, he was not in that imaginary vacuity in which some suppose the universe to have been created; and even if God had been in that empty space before the world's creation, yet in the very things created - which he produced at the beginning - he then began to be when he called them from nothing to be. Therefore, for their production it was not necessary that he first exist in them. And indeed, on every opinion, one must grant that God's presence either in things or in imaginary place is not necessary for the creation of things, because, since God's power is infinite, it ought not to be confined by nearness of place.

Next, if God, like other agents, needed proximity in order to act, it would suffice for him, as for all other agents, to be next to, and not within, the very things in which he operates. But now we are contending, from operation, ...

It is attempted to prove from operation, or from elsewhere, that God is not only near, but innermost to all things. From the doctrine therefore of Aristotle concerning the nearness of agents, the presence of God in things is not sufficiently shown. Durandus replies that spiritual agents excel bodies in this, that whereas bodies, having the limits of their quantity, cannot penetrate other things, it is enough if they are conjoined to the things upon which they act; but spiritual beings, since they lack quantity, can most excellently penetrate corporeal things.

But this is frivolous. For although by their nature a spirit can be within the mass of a body, yet a body cannot be within another body; nevertheless, by force of operation it does not follow that a spirit must be within the thing in which it operates in order to be able to act upon it, if for a body, which is a less perfect agent, it is enough to be next to the thing in order to act upon it. For it seems to pertain to the greater perfection of an agent to need proximity of place less for acting; and accordingly, it is the more perfect to operate upon that which is more distant, even across an intervening space.

Moreover, what I said about the creation of all things, namely that proximity of place is not necessary to God for creating, is also true about conservation, which is a certain continued creation. For although God is prior in duration, at least by an indivisible moment of time, in created things than He is in conserving them, nevertheless that presence is not something prior and necessary for conservation; but just as at the beginning God, not first existing in things, created them, so also by continuing the same operation, and without proximity of place required for this, He can conserve them. Wherefore the presence of God accompanies the conservation of things in such a way that it contributes absolutely nothing to it.

This very point is manifestly confirmed by the arguments of Scotus which we reported in the place of this disputation. Therefore Durandus does not speak rightly when, in the question cited, he says that in the conservation of things God behaves like a seal imprinting a figure in water, which is necessarily present to the water as long as the figure is preserved in it. For the presence of the seal on the part of the conserving cause is something prior and necessary for the preservation of the figure. But the presence of God, although it is connected with His operation by which He preserves things, is not something necessary for the operation, but is either a necessary consequent of it, as the later opinion contends, or something that necessarily accompanies it, as Scotus and others affirm.

Another point that must be observed: from the things said it follows that, in the opinion of the more recent Thomists, the presence is so conjoined with the operation of God that the operation is, as it were, the foundation of the presence, and hence in no way necessary for acting. For this reason I said that, in their opinion, the presence is not in God something prior and required for acting; but that the whole question is whether the presence is so conjoined with the operation that it follows it as a foundation, as the Thomists contend, or whether it comes from elsewhere, namely from the essence (*essentia*) of God alone, and necessarily accompanies the operation, as Scotus affirms. For Scotus does not say anywhere that God operates where His substance (*substantia*) is not; rather he asserts that God is present according to His substance wherever He operates, yet that the presence does not come from the operation, but from the immensity of the essence as from its proper cause.

Wherefore Dionysius the Carthusian ineptly and falsely reproaches Scotus in that place, distinction 37, question 1, for asserting that it does not repugn that God be confined in a particular place and operate at a distance, as if he held that this simply does not repugn. For Scotus did not think it possible simply that God be defined in some particular place; he only taught that, by force of the operation alone, it does not necessarily follow that He be where He operates, and accordingly, that by an intrinsic place it would not repugn, if from elsewhere it could be brought about, that God, existing in a particular place, should operate upon distant matter. Indeed, these two cohere in such a way that from the force of the one the contradictory of the other does not follow. Nevertheless Scotus and those who follow his opinion simply concede that it cannot come to pass that God be circumscribed in a particular place and operate upon what is distant, not because by force of the operation this is impossible, but because it repugns the immensity of His substance to be in some place and not elsewhere.

But the ancient Schoolmen above alleged, except for Giles, do not clearly explain whether the presence of God is something prior required for acting, or whether rather the operation is the foundation for God to exist in things. From them, however, St. Thomas seems to assert that it is not a foundation, but something prior.

Caput IV - The middle opinion is proved by answering the testimonies of the later position

Since among all the Scholastics it is undoubted that God, as immense, exists in all things, the whole controversy of this matter and the variety of opinions lies solely in assigning the reason of this catholic truth. Wherefore, what seems to me regarding the arguments adduced, following out also a probable line of reasoning from the foundations already laid, I shall submit in this chapter. Two things, then, seem to me: the first is that it is established for us, not by faith and Sacred Scripture alone, that God is everywhere, but that this can also be demonstrated by the best philosophical reasoning. The second is that, although absurdities do not follow from our saying that God is in things by reason of operation - absurdities which are brought against those who assert that a spiritual creature is also placed in a place by reason of operation - nevertheless the doctors of the later position do not efficaciously prove that God is in a place by reason of operation; indeed, by that reason it can hardly be made plausible. Concerning the former part of this position, I presuppose what I noted above, namely that the immensity of God in all things is contained rather expressly in Scripture, whose testimonies we cited in disputation 27, chapter 2; indeed, although St. John Chrysostom, homily 5 on chapter 2 of the epistle to the Colossians and homily 2 on the epistle to the Hebrews, not being much concerned about the reason, says that this truth is to be believed by faith alone, even if it seems absurd to reason, yet I judge that it can be most excellently demonstrated by natural reason.[427]

427. St. John Chrysostom, Homily 5 on Colossians 2; Homily 2 on Hebrews; and Homily 38 on the Acts of the Apostles. Theophylact, on Acts 17.

If God is not in things by reason of operation, about which there is now controversy, He is either in them by reason of His substance, or by reason of His will, namely either according as He is, or according as He wills. He cannot be in them by reason of His will; otherwise He could withdraw from one place and establish Himself in another place, and thus, like a created spirit, be moved locally - which is absurd. For, as we shall show in disputation 31, whatever effect God outwardly works by His will depends on Him so freely that it can also fail to be done by Him; wherefore, if God is in some place by His will, He could withdraw from it and betake Himself to another. Still, although by His will alone, without any other exterior operation, God were in a place, it ought not to be denied that He could be everywhere, that is, be in all things. For the infinite power of His will would not be limited to a determinate place and presence. It remains, therefore, that we say God is present to things or to places by reason of His essence; and since there is no greater reason why He should be in one place rather than in another, He will be equally necessarily in all.

I said "necessarily," the existence, however, of created things being supposed; for that which arises from the very essence of God, insofar as He is, does not proceed freely but necessarily. Wherefore it will not be free to God to be in one creature rather than in another, although absolutely He can fail to be present to things, if He should will freely to destroy the things themselves which He conserves.

The latter part of this position will remain confirmed if by induction it is established that the foundations of the prior opinion are not firm; which I will set forth in a brief enumeration. In the first place there were adduced testimonies of Scripture, which, if we attend to its customary manner of speaking, do not prove much. For when the Psalmist and Paul assign the cause on account of which God is everywhere and in each one of us, namely that in Him we move and are, and that by His power we are borne whithersoever and are everywhere sustained, they show not the cause of the thing but of our cognition, and in a human way accommodate themselves to us, so that from the power of God, by which in every place we are preserved, we may understand that He is everywhere; and, as St. John Chrysostom says in homily 38 on the Acts of the Apostles, whom Theophylact follows on that place of Acts 17, they declare by a, as it were, bodily example the presence of God in us, so that, just as it is not permissible to be ignorant that the air is diffused everywhere, since we live with it, so too we may not be ignorant that God is everywhere, because we live not only through Him but also in Him. But the reason and foundation by which the air is posited in a place is not operation; indeed, in order that it operate, it is necessary that it first be near us by reason of its quantity. Therefore from that it is not sufficiently shown that God is in us by reason of His operation.

There is added that Jeremiah 23 says in these words: "Do you think that I am a God near at hand, says the Lord, and not a God afar off? If a man will hide himself in hiding-places, do not I see him? says the Lord." Which passage, in the same sense and with only a few words changed, the Seventy also express.[428]

428. Jeremiah 23:23 - 24.

But on the contrary: The Seventy translated those words thus. Therefore the Lord says that all things, whether those which are near, or those which are farther distant, are manifest to Him, and consequently that nothing can be hidden from Him in hiding-places. Then He immediately adds a cause that is more manifest to common folk, in order to demonstrate what He had said: "Do not I fill heaven and earth? says the Lord." As if He were saying: if I fill heaven and earth, no one will be able to be hidden from Me either on account of distance or of the obscurity of a place. And yet the reason why all things are manifest to God is not His immensity and presence, or the nearness of place, as it is in a bodily eye in order that we look upon something; rather Scripture, by an example and in a human manner, urges upon us a perfect knowledge of God. In the same way, therefore, when it speaks of His immensity, it does not care whether operation be the reason and foundation of presence, as the authors of the later opinion contend, but it shows the presence of God in things by an easy reasoning accommodated to the human mind. Nor do I think that the Fathers wished to teach anything else; although in the places alleged for the later opinion they seem to hand down operation as the reason for God's presence in things.

Nevertheless, indeed, we ought not to think that Scripture wished to prove only by a common way of reasoning and by the example of bodily things (accommodated to the minds of men) either God's immensity in things from His operation, or the knowledge of all things from His presence, but that it wished by the best and most efficacious reasoning to demonstrate each. For although operation is not for God the foundation of presence, nor presence the reason for knowing all things, nevertheless it is rightly inferred that God is in all things if He operates in all; and that He knows all things if He is present to all. For if God is infinite in His power (*potentia*), so as to reach all things and not be limited by them, He will be no less infinite in His presence, so as to be in all and not be bounded by them. Then also, if God is so immense as to penetrate all things by His substance, He will be no less infinite in knowledge, so that nothing can lie hidden from Him; since His essence (*essentia*) must be equally perfect and infinite with respect to all. From this, however, it does not follow that operation of power is for God Himself the foundation of existing in things, but only that from power and operation the immensity of God in things is rightly proved.

Add that in that verse of the Psalm, "Whither shall I go from your spirit, and whither shall I flee from your face?" the Prophet wished to show the immensity of God's knowledge, from which nothing can be hidden: he showed and signified it by the name of "spirit" and "face," about which he had said much in that Psalm. Therefore when he answered, "If I shall ascend into heaven, you are there," he expressed the reason why he could not flee the sight of God - namely, because God is everywhere. Jeremiah also rendered that reason; although that reason is not why God knows all things, as was shown above. But when he adds, "For there also your hand will lead me," he assigns the proper reason why he cannot flee God's face if he should arise at the first light of dawn and flee through the breezes even to the sea. For since God does all things and directs them by His knowledge, which in that same place he calls His "right hand," that same hand would also lead and hold David even if he fled to the sea.

Finally, I judge it sufficiently probable that in Acts 17 Paul was not speaking of the immensity of God by which He is everywhere present, but that he wished to show how easily the true God can be known and adored by each one of us. This sense I seem to myself to gather clearly from the context of the chapter itself. For when at Athens Paul had seen an altar whose title was: "To the Unknown God," in order to convict of foolishness those who thought God to be unknown and worshiped Him as such, he said in these words: "What therefore you worship not knowing, this I announce to you. God who made the world and all things that are in it, He being Lord of heaven and earth, does not dwell in temples made with hands, nor is He served by human hands, as if needing anything, since He Himself gives life and breath and all things." That is, since God is the author of all things, He does not need temples made by human hands in order to be worshiped, since He gives life to all living things and preserves all things. He adds: "And He made from one every race of men to dwell upon the whole face of the earth, determining set times and the limits of their dwelling, to seek God, if perhaps they might feel after Him." As if he said: since He has produced every race of men, He has prepared the whole earth for its habitation, determining and distinguishing times into days and nights, months and years, for this end, that man may seek his author God and may find Him, not by site and local presence, but by true knowledge and religious worship. For this is "to feel after," the metaphor being taken from bodily touch, by which we seize upon things we are seeking when found. But because he had said, "If perhaps," which is a particle of one doubting and making a thing more difficult, as if correcting himself he added: "Although He is not far from each one of us." As if he said, it is not difficult to feel after Him in the way I have said, since He is not far from us, not only as to place and local situation, but also as to knowledge. "For in Him we live and move and are; as some also of your own poets have said, For we are even His offspring." That is, He is not far from us so as to be known; since, as even your poets have said, we are His handiwork, by Him we are sustained and preserved. Therefore from ourselves it will not be difficult to know Him. Then he draws the inference: "Since therefore we are the offspring of God" - that is, His handiwork and creature - "we ought not to think that the divinity is like to gold or silver or stone carved by art"; that is, that God is like to these things and needs them in order to be worshiped. For if we, who are God's handiwork, are superior to these vain things and cannot in any way be compared to them, much less will God need them. Therefore since that clause, "Although He is not far from each one of us," is referred to that, "if perhaps they might feel after Him," as is clear from what has been said, and since it does not befall that God is to be felt after by hands, but by our thought and affection, it follows that Paul was speaking not of local presence, which is required for the touching of hands, but of propinquity according to knowledge, by which God must be sought and felt after. But these things do not depend on local presence.[429]

The same view is confirmed by a solution of the arguments of the later opinion.

429. Acts 17:23 - 29.

Against the claim that operation is the foundation of God's presence

We have shown thus far that it is not sufficiently proved by authority, as the later opinion contended, that operation is for God the reason and foundation of existing in things. It remains that in this chapter we show that the argument brought forward for the same opinion is not sufficiently efficacious. But it rests upon the proposition of Aristotle in Physics VII, text 10, which we reported in chapter 2, namely, that the cause is necessarily conjoined with the effect.[430] Now already in chapter 3 of this disputation we have shown that that proposition is to be understood only of a bodily agent; indeed also that all bodily agents are, by a reason far different, conjoined according to situation with the effect, than God is present to the things in which He operates; wherefore for that cause alone that reasoning has not much strength.

But let us grant that some conjunction with the effect is necessary to any agent whatsoever: this, however, is to be understood not of any agent whatsoever, even created and bodily, but of that which is commonly said to operate by immediation of power (*immediatio virtutis*) and of supposit (*immediatio suppositi*), as I have explained from Cajetan in chapter 2 of this disputation. For thus he himself infers: if an agent is immediate in this way, it ought also to be conjoined with the effect by situation and place. Yet even by this reasoning nothing is proved. For from the fact that some agent is near in both ways, it does not follow that it is conjoined with the effect by place; therefore from that proposition understood as Cajetan wishes, the presence of God according to place is not proved.[431]

Furthermore, that it does not follow that it is conjoined by place with the effect, I show by this reasoning. In the sense of that view, an immediate agent by immediation of power is that which operates by its own proper power; but immediate by immediation of supposit is that which operates without another interposed and supposit cause subordinated to it. But this can be very well maintained and understood without local propinquity; for one thing is "immediately," that is, with no distance interposed; another is, to operate with no other intermediate agent. Therefore some agent could operate by immediation of supposit, that is, with no interposed second cause, and yet be far distant from the matter in which it operates. But if the Thomists say that the same thing is "to operate immediately by immediation of supposit" and "to operate with no body and no distance interposed" - about which there is wont to be a controversy of words rather than of things, as we shall see in question 23, article 2 - then indeed that major proposition is true, "every immediate agent ought to be conjoined with its effect"; but since under that major the assumption is taken, "God is an immediate agent," it certainly supposes what had to be proved, and hence can easily be denied; and if it be granted, only this follows, as I noted in chapter 3 of this disputation, that God is near to, not, however, within the things themselves. Which is not sufficient for explaining God's presence in things.

430. Aristotle, Physics VII, text 10.
431. Cajetan, on this disputation, chapter 2.

Moreover, others urge in this way. Every agent, by the very fact that it operates immediately by immediation of supposit, cannot remove and separate the effect from itself; therefore it must itself necessarily be conjoined: indeed, from the force of the operation there follows local propinquity.

Solution: But even in this way the argument adduced is no more efficacious. For when they say that such an agent cannot remove the effect from itself, if they understand this of local distance, it can easily be denied; and again they assume what they themselves had to prove. If, however, they understand that the effect is so connected with the cause that it cannot but depend upon it, that cannot be denied; yet from that it does not follow that they must at the same time be together according to place. Wherefore, if otherwise it does not repugn, God can produce and conserve all things and set them far away from Himself; and from the effects of creation and conservation it is not repugnant that this be so.

Someone might further, in confirmation of what we have said, bring forward Aristotle's opinion, that the conjunction of agent with effect is not to be understood universally so as to include God Himself, and therefore that from Aristotle's view nothing can be proved here. For although he says that God is in some peculiar place, not in all things, as we noted in the first chapter, nevertheless he also teaches that life itself is derived from Him into other things. For he says in On the Heavens I, chapter 5, at the end, that there is a certain divine eternity in the outermost region of the heaven, where there is neither void nor time, which things always are as such; and from it life and being flow to all other things. Which he had said more clearly in Metaphysics I, chapter 2, near the end: where, speaking of God, he says that with His untiring powers He bestows so great a benefaction as may be loved from afar, and that He sits at the highest summit of the heaven. Moreover, although in the book De Mundo to Alexander he said that not all things are governed and conserved by God immediately, nor yet by many intermediate instruments and machines, as kings govern their realms, but by a single simple motion of the heaven - just as a great artisan by a single pull of the cord sets before the eyes diverse images of things - still we need not be concerned with the authority of that work in this part. I nevertheless judge that, according to his opinion, God is not in all the things which He preserves immediately. That the other great intelligences have being from God Himself is clear from Aristotle's doctrine; but that they exist in Him he nowhere taught: for he taught only that in the extreme boundary of the heaven God is.

To the argument of the recent authors brought in the fourth place, I answer first that it does not repugn to God to move something from one extreme to the other without its passing through the middle; for if Christ were in the same thing in heaven and yet were to descend to the Host, He would truly be moved and yet not through the middle, just as now He does not pass through the middle; and for this reason He is not now said to be moved, because He does not leave the place in which He previously was. Nor are Angels less able by their own power to be moved in this manner, as we shall see in question 23, article 2. But although what they assume is true, nevertheless it is not necessary for the point they contend for. For if some agent, even a created one, operates, it is not necessary that it be within the thing in which it operates: it suffices if its effect be continually diffused through the intervening space, even if its substance remain near the middle in some determinate point-like place; and this happens not only in Angels and bodies. For the sun illumines

where its substance is not, by a certain continuation of its effect; thus therefore God can remain in some particular place, and His power be continually diffused as to the effect; and His immensity does not repugn to this: wherefore from the force of operation it is not gathered that God is everywhere.

Add also the difference between the motion of a body - which cannot but be continuous through a middle - and the infinite power of God, which can operate in a divine manner. For motion is in the mobile itself and therefore must be continuous in it; but an effect is not in the agent, and hence it does not seem to have the same necessity, that it be conjoined to it by the force of operation, unless from another source that be necessary. Nay rather, the infinity of power formally is virtual, notwithstanding distance from the effect, by which infinity it extends itself to all things and comprehends all. And indeed it is always conjoined to the effect, or rather, in either respect of immensity with which it is conjoined - which, however, is not of the formal concept of the power itself.

To the argument brought in the fifth place I reply, that the infinity of God's power does not consist in this, that it be placed in all things without being bound to any particular thing; but that comes from God's immensity and from other attributes of His, of which St. Thomas has spoken in this question. The infinity of power, however, is of another notion, to wit without any order to place: for it is said to be infinite only with respect to effects.[432]

Ad the argument, however, of the more recent authors brought in the fourth place I answer, first, that it does not repugn to God to move something from one extreme to the other without its passing through the middle. For if Christ did not remain in heaven, but descended to the host, He would truly be moved, and yet not through a middle, just as now He does not pass through a middle: but He is now not said to be moved, because He does not leave the place in which He previously was; and at present the Angels can by their own power be moved in this way, as we shall see in disputation 196, chapter 2. But even if what the adversaries assume were true, it still could not be rightly inferred, what they contend. Because, in order that some agent, even a created one, may operate, it is not necessary that it be inside the thing in which it operates: it is enough that its effect be continuously diffused through the space, even if its substance remain near the middle in some peculiar place; which happens in Angels and in bodies. For the sun illumines where its substance is not, continuously indeed by a certain effect: so then God could remain in some peculiar place, and His power be diffused by a certain continuous effect, if otherwise this did not repugn to His immensity; wherefore from the power of operation it is not concluded that God is everywhere. Add also the difference between the motion of a body - so that it cannot but be continuous through a medium - and the infinite power of God - so that it can operate at a distance. For motion is in the mobile itself, and thus must be continuous in it; but the effect is not in the operator, and therefore there does not seem to be the same necessity that it be conjoined to it by force of operation, unless otherwise this were necessary. Rather, the infinity of power formally, as

432. Cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 8 (passim); q. 23, a. 2 (on angelic motion). Also Aristotle, On the Heavens I, c. 5; Metaphysics I, c. 2; Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mundo ad Alexandrum.

such, would operate notwithstanding distance, because this infinity extends itself to all things and embraces all. Yet it is always conjoined to the effect, or rather, within it by reason of the immensity with which it is conjoined - which is not of the formal concept of the power itself

To the argument brought in the fifth place I reply, that the infinity of God's power does not consist in this, that it should fill every place and be bound to none in particular; but that comes from immensity, which is another attribute, about which in this question St. Thomas treats differently. The infinity of power, however, is of another notion, namely without any order to place: for it is said to be infinite only with respect to effects.[434]

It is said to be with respect to the effect, as we shall say in disputation 105; but immensity is said to be infinite with respect to place. Moreover, infinity in respect of existence (*esse*) - unless it were conjoined to immensity formally - could of itself be understood even in a peculiar place; because this consists in something other than a respect to place, as has been set down and explained there. Therefore the adversaries wrongly confuse these ratios of infinity, so as to deduce from operation what belongs by reason of immensity.

One could further, in confirmation of what we said, assert Aristotle's opinion concerning the conjunction of a universal agent with its effect, not to be understood so that it should comprehend God Himself, and hence from his opinion nothing is proved. For although he asserts that God is in a peculiar place, not in all things, as we noted in chapter 1, nevertheless he teaches that His power is derived into other things. For he says in On the Heavens 1, chapter 9, toward the end, that a certain divine eternity is in the extreme region of heaven, where there is neither void nor time, which is so called from its always being; from which life and existence come to all the other things. Which he had said more clearly in Metaphysics 1, chapter 2, toward the end. There of God, he says, that He uses powers unwearied, to the extent of the beneficence He accomplishes, which may seem to be sent afar, and that He abides on the highest summit of heaven. However, since in the book On the World to Alexander he said that not all things are governed and conserved by God proximately, nor yet by many instrumental means and machines, as kings govern their kingdoms, but by the single simple motion of the heaven, just as great artisans by the stroke of one string set before the eyes diverse images of things - therefore not much weight is to be given to his authority in this part. I think nevertheless that, according to his opinion, God is not in all the things which He conserves proximately. For that the other intelligences have their being from God Himself is plain from Aristotle's doctrine; but that He exists in them he taught nowhere: for he asserts only that God is in the extreme part of heaven.[435][436][437]

It is therefore clear from what has been said that a real presence of God in all things is not sufficiently demonstrated from operation - that which in the preceding chapter we proposed to prove in a subsequent place. On that account, however, I do not judge that the opinion of Scotus

434. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputationes, disp. 105.
435. Aristotle, On the Heavens 1, c. 9, toward the end.
436. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1, c. 2, toward the end.
437. Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mundo ad Alexandrum.

can be proved by any efficacious reason drawn from its own principles; but only from this, that, in order to establish God as in place, without any urgent reason we ought not to have recourse to operation, but to attribute to His essence (*essentia*) in itself immensity.

A compelling reason in favor of St. Thomas's position seemed to me to underlie the matter, by which at least probably the latter opinion could be confirmed in this way. If God otherwise were not in all things by reason of His immensity, nevertheless by reason of the hypostatic union He would be in human nature: for it cannot be understood that a person is substantially united to an alien nature, if it be distant from it by place; and since for a substantial union that presence according to place is not necessary as a prior disposition, it follows that the hypostatic union is the reason and foundation of such a presence. In the same way, therefore, although God were not in things by His substance, nevertheless by reason of operation He would be conjoined to them. But in this argument the difficulty is this, that the union of an agent with its effect in its proper genus does not seem to suit things so intimately as the union of a person with a nature does; since this is a much greater and tighter conjunction than that of an agent with its effect. Wherefore it is not a wonder if the hypostatic union is a sufficient reason for presence according to place, but operation is not.

Articulus II - Whether God is everywhere.

The second proceeds thus.

Objicitur 1. It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere signifies to be in every place. But to be in every place does not befit God: to whom it does not befit to be in a place; for incorporeals, as Boethius says in the book On the Hebdomads, are not in a place. Therefore God is not everywhere.[438]

Objicitur 2. Further, as time is related to successives, so place is related to permanents. But one indivisible of action or motion cannot be in diverse times; therefore neither can one indivisible in the genus of permanent things be in all places. But the divine existence is not of succession, but permanent; therefore God is not in many places, and thus He is not everywhere.

Objicitur 3. Further, what is whole someplace, nothing of it is outside that place. But if God is in some place, He is whole there; for He does not have parts. Therefore nothing of Him is outside that place. Therefore God is not everywhere.

Sed contra is what is said in Jeremiah 23: "Heaven and earth I fill."[439]

Respondeo dicendum, that since place is a certain thing, to be something in a place can be understood in two ways. Either in the mode of other things, that is, as something is said to be in other things in whatever way, as the accidents of place are in a place; or in the proper mode of place, as things placed are in a place. In either way, however, according to something God is in every place: which is to be everywhere. First indeed He is thus in all things, as giving them

438. Boethius, De hebdomadibus; the title is "An omne quod est bonum sit" (On the Hebdomads), on its principles.
439. Jeremiah 23:24.

existence (*esse*) and power and operation: for thus He is in every place, as giving to it existence and the locative power. Likewise, things placed are in a place inasmuch as they fill a place; and God fills every place: not as a body - for a body is said to fill a place inasmuch as it does not tolerate with itself another body - but by this, that God is in some place, it is not excluded that other things be there; rather by this He fills all places: because He gives existence to all things placed, which fill all places.

Reply to the first: Incorporeals are not in a place by the contact of dimensional quantity, as bodies are, but by the contact of power.

Reply to the second: An indivisible is twofold. One kind is that which is the terminus of a continuum, as a point in permanent things and a moment in successives. And such an indivisible, in permanent things - because it has a determinate situation - cannot be in many parts of a place or in many places; and similarly an indivisible of action or motion - because it has a determinate order in motion or action - cannot be in many parts of time. Another indivisible, however, is that which is outside the whole genus of the continuous; and in this way incorporeal substances, as God, an angel, and a soul, are said to be indivisible. Such an indivisible, therefore, is not applied to a continuum as something of it, but inasmuch as it reaches that by its power; whence, according to the extent to which its power can extend itself to one or many, to small or great, according to this it is in one or in many places, and in a small place or a great.

Reply to the third: Whole is said with respect to parts. But there is a twofold part, namely a part of essence (*essentia*), as form and matter are called parts of the composite; and genus and difference parts of the species. And there is also a part of quantity, into which namely a quantity is divided. Therefore what is whole in some place by the totality of quantity cannot be outside that place, because local quantity is commensurated to the quantity of the place: whence there is no totality of quantity without the totality of the place. But the totality of essence is not commensurated to the totality of the place. Hence it is not necessary that that which is whole by the totality of essence in something be in no way outside it. As appears also in accidental forms, which have quantity according to accident: for whiteness is whole in any part of a surface, if totality be taken according to essence; because according to the perfect notion of its species it is found in any part of the surface. But if totality be taken according to the quantity which it has per accidens, in that way it is not whole in any part of the surface. In incorporeal substances, however, there is no totality either per se or per accidens, except according to the perfect notion of essence. And therefore, as the soul is whole in any part of the body, so God is whole in all and in each.

Observations for the explanation of the article:

- The doctrine of this article can be summarized in two conclusions. One is: God is in all things in the mode in which the accidents of a place are in the place; and in this way God is said to be in all things, inasmuch as He bestows on them power for operation, and consequently the locative power.

- The other is: God is in things as something placed is in a place, filling them; not as a body fills the sides of the containing surface - for thus it fills, that with it another thing cannot be; whereas with God a body can be - but for this reason God is said to fill all things, because by His inmost presence He penetrates them.

For a fuller explanation of this doctrine, first it must be observed that it is not the same thing, what St. Thomas asks in this article, and what in the preceding conclusion he had set down. In the preceding he had proposed the question, whether God is in all things, and he simply answers that He is in them. But in this article he inquires whether God is in things as in a place, as he proposed in the title, Whether God is everywhere. For the adverb "everywhere" signifies place. How, moreover, he answers that God is in a place, he sufficiently declares by setting out the twofold mode of being in a place.

Just as the power of a place is in a place, so too is that which is placed. Albert, however, in I, dist. 37, art. 2, distinguishes "God's being in things" from "His being everywhere" in this way: to be in things is to be in them conserving them; to be everywhere is to be in things by bestowing on them the power of place.[440] Yet St. Thomas spoke far better when he said that God is everywhere, and that He is in a place both as the power of place is said to be in a place and as that which is placed is in a place.[441]

Next, various modes of speaking of the holy Fathers are to be observed, which, although at first glance their locutions may seem difficult, nevertheless neither contravene the article nor the truth of doctrine. St. John Chrysostom, hom. 5 on the Epistle to the Colossians, says: "Nowhere is God, and yet He is everywhere."[442] Likewise Philo, in the book On the Confusion of Tongues, somewhat past the middle,[443] and St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 16: "God - inasmuch as He is devoid of matter and circumscription - is in no way in a place. For He is the place of Himself, and, existing above all things, He Himself encompasses all things, and yet He is said to be in a place."[444] In the same sense Theophilus of Antioch said in book 2 To Autolycus, not far from the beginning, in vol. 5 of the Bibliotheca sacra, that God is not contained by place, but is Himself the place of all things; and Athanasius, in his rescript to Liberius, that God is incomprehensible by place; and St. Augustine, serm. 8 De verbis Domini, that God is contained by no place; and in the book On the Essence of the Divinity, at the beginning, that God is "illocal"; and in 83 Questions, q. 20, that God is "not anywhere"; and St. Basil, in the homily which we shall cite in the next disputation, that God is not in any place.[445]

What the Fathers just mentioned said must be understood not as if they denied that the substance (*substantia*) of God is truly present in all things, but because God is so in things that He is circumscribed by no surface - as Augustine seems to have noted in Quaest. in Hept., q. 20 - or

440. Albert the Great, In I Sent., dist. 37, art. 2.
441. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 8, a. 2 ad 1; cf. a. 1.
442. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 5 in epist. ad Colossenses.
443. Philo of Alexandria, De confusione linguarum.
444. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 16.
445. Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum II; Athanasius, Epistola ad Liberium; St. Augustine, Serm. 8 De verbis Domini; De essentia divinitatis, init.; 83 Quaest., q. 20; St. Basil, Hom. cited in the next disputation.

because God is in no thing in such a way that He is defined by it and shut up within it, for which reason they said that He is "nowhere," and "in place incomprehensible," indeed that He is "the place of all things," inasmuch as, like a natural place, He contains and preserves all things; hence He is "His own place," because adequately He can be nowhere save in Himself. That other Fathers too followed this manner of speaking we shall see in the next disputation. Wherefore Bernard, book 5 On Consideration to Eugene, long before the middle, speaks thus: "Concerning Him, namely God, it is well known that He is 'nowhere,' because He is not shut up by place, and yet that He is 'nowhere not' [i.e., not absent anywhere], because He is not excluded by place."[446]

In the same way Augustine, in that book On the Essence of the Divinity, said that God is "illocal," because, as he says, from place to place He by no means passes, nor is He held by any place. Here he calls Him "illocal" not only because He is not circumscribed by a surface, as bodies are, but also because He is not determined to some particular place, as an angel is. Therefore Anselm spoke most fittingly of God in the Monologion, chs. 22 - 23: "If usage of speech allowed it, it would seem more fitting to say that God is 'with place' or 'with time' than 'in place' or 'in time'." Hence, in his sense one would say that God is "nowhere": for to be "somewhere" is to be in a place, not to be with place.[447]

Finally, we must note - as we shall explain more fully in the next disputation - that God's existence (*existentia*) in things is properly a certain substantial presence, which can be understood without any local presence. For "place," however it be taken, cannot be without some substance; and thus, insofar as they are not bodies, "place" can in no way be, nor can it be understood. But God is in things, even in spiritual things, in His immensity, not by local presence (because angels in themselves have no distance, as will appear in the next disputation), but by a substantial [presence]. Therefore God's existence in things can be separated from local presence. Hence it comes about that the primary existence of God in things is substantial; but because the bodies in which He is are "somewhere" by reason of their quantity, He too is said secondarily to be "in a place."

The reason why Anselm said that God is rather "with place" than "in place" is that "to be in a place," if we attend to the force of the words, seems to be said only of those things which are circumscribed or defined by place, just as "to be in time" is said of those things which time itself measures. But those which are "with place" or "with time" seem to be such as are in no way subject to place or time, but merely accompany place and time.

- That God can be outside heaven and can be in a vacuum has been taught by Maior and Cajetan.[448]
- That God is not outside heaven is the common opinion of the Scholastics and is affirmed by the Fathers.[449]
- The same common opinion is proved by reason.[450]

446. St. Bernard, De consideratione, l. 5, ad Eugenium.
447. St. Anselm, Monologion, chs. 22 - 23.
448. John Maior, In I Sent., dist. 37, q. 1; Cajetan, on John 12, "Ego lux veni in mundum."
449. See below, Caput II; cf. the Fathers cited in Caput I above.

- Replies are given to the testimonies adduced for the prior opinion.[451]
- The arguments of the same opinion are dissolved.[452]

Disputatio XXIX - Whether God could be outside heaven or in the vacuum within heaven, or whether before the creation of the world He was somewhere

Caput I - The assertion of Maior and Cajetan

The matters that are called into controversy seem to have the very same question throughout. For if God can be in a vacuum within heaven, He will also be outside heaven in that imaginary and infinite space, and before the creation of the world He would have been in the same, and in that part in which the world seems to have been created. Therefore in this single disputation we shall weigh all these things together.

In it, let the first position be that which John Maior, in I, dist. 37, q. 1, and Cajetan, on that text of John 12, "I am come a light into the world," hand down: namely, that God was in the whole imaginary space before the creation of the world, and after it remained outside the region of heaven where He had been before, and hence - if a vacuum within heaven were granted - could remain in a vacuum even if some substance were destroyed. In favor of this position Durandus, Gabriel, indeed even St. Thomas, and Hugh of St. Victor are reported, who, however, assert the very opposite. Yet to theologians in general this opinion has seemed so easy to understand that it is far more plausible than the opposite. The authors of it try to persuade us in this way.

First, by the authority of philosophers. For Aristotle, De caelo I, c. 9, toward the end, asserts that God is outside heaven; and that this was also the opinion of the Stoics, Tertullian affirms in the book Against the Gentiles, c. 40, n. 593, where he says that, like a potter, He turns this mass of the heavens.[453]

Next, it can be confirmed by the testimonies of the Fathers and of Scripture. Among whom first Augustine seems expressly to have handed it down: for, in City of God, c. 5, arguing against those who said that God created the world from eternity, he says thus: "For if they conceive an infinite expanse of times before the world, in which it does not seem to them that God could have ceased from working; similarly therefore they conceive outside the world an infinite expanse of places, in which, if anyone says that the Omnipotent cannot be idle, will they not be forced to dream up, with Epicurus, numberless worlds?" As if to say, this should not be conceded; therefore it must be held that through infinite duration and in the vastness of infinite space God was without external work.[454]

450. See below, Caput III (as signposted in the running heads).
451. See below, Caput IV.
452. See below, Caput V.
453. Aristotle, De caelo I, c. 9 (toward the end); Tertullian, Adversus Gentes, c. 40, n. 593.
454. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, V, c. 5 (arguing against those who posited an eternal world).

Secondly, Gregory Nazianzen, in Oration 34, which is the second on Theology, two leaves on, to show that God is not limited by place, says: "Is He nowhere, or is He somewhere? For if nowhere, someone of those who take special delight in the subtlety of inquiry and disputation might ask how He can also be. For if that which is not is nowhere, that also which is nowhere is perhaps nothing at all. But if you say that He is somewhere, since He certainly is, He is either in the universe, or above the universe. If in the universe, He is either in some part of it, or everywhere. If in some part, then He is circumscribed by this lesser part. If everywhere, then He will be contained by something much greater, if indeed it is to come about that God is held by the whole complex of the universe and is in no part free of circumscription. Into these absurdities one must fall who said that He is in the universe." Thus Nazianzen teaches that one must necessarily hold that He remains above and outside the universe, lest, if we say that He is only in the universe, we be forced to assert that He is circumscribed. It should also be noted, in what Nazianzen assumes in his argument, namely that what is nowhere is nothing; just as, conversely, what is nothing can be nowhere. From which it follows that before the creation of the world God was somewhere, lest - if we assert that He was nowhere - we say that He was nothing. Whence it follows that no spiritual substance, whether created or uncreated, can be nowhere, but must necessarily be somewhere; which, as will appear below, seems not a little to conflict with our opinion.[455]

Thirdly, Basil, in Homily 16 on "In the beginning was the Word," writes thus: "Whatever whole you know, and into whatever you penetrate with your spirit, is full of God; and together with the Son's hypostasis conjoined you will find [it]." Therefore God will be in that imaginary space above the heavens into which the spirit of our thought can penetrate.[456]

Fourthly, Philo, in book 1 of the Allegories, somewhat before the middle: "For God - He says - neither would even the whole world be a dwelling worthy of Him, since He is His own place, and is full of Himself, and unto Himself sufficient." He then subjoins the reason: "since God fills and contains every alien want, solitude, and emptiness." As if to say, since the whole world is not a sufficient dwelling for God, He fills with His presence the whole emptiness of infinite space above this universe.[457]

Lastly, there is added the common manner of speaking of the Fathers, who assert that God is not shut up within the world, but that He is above and outside the world. Thus Athanasius, in the letter of the Nicene Synod, not far from the beginning, says: "God is in all things according to His goodness and power, and the same is outside all things according to His own proper nature." In the same way Hilary speaks, book 12 On the Trinity, at the beginning, explaining those words of Isaiah 66, "Who holds the heaven in His palm," etc.; and Jerome on the same words of Isaiah 66; Augustine, On Genesis ad litteram, c. 36; and in On the Essence of the Divinity; Isidore, book 1 On the Supreme Good, c. 3. For they say that God is in all things, but not enclosed; outside all things, but not excluded; so that He is both containing and within; and infinite and surrounding, as

455. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio 34 (Theol. Or. II).
456. St. Basil, Hom. 16 on "In principio erat Verbum."
457. Philo, Allegoriae, l. 1.

Jerome says. Wherefore Augustine, Confessions, c. 5, teaches that, compared to this universe, God is as an infinite sea which would contain and penetrate all kingdoms within itself, and would be outside them. And, what is chief, Scripture itself sufficiently clearly attests the same.[458]

A third argument. God was outside all time; therefore He was always outside all place. But outside place there is nothing else than imaginary space; therefore God was always in it. Wherefore it is necessary that, after the creation of the world, He also remain in it.

Caput II - That God is not outside heaven; the common opinion of the Scholastics, and the Fathers affirm it

For my part I judge that not only is the opposite opinion - which is the common one - far more probable, but indeed most probable; and pious authors on spiritual things and about God, as well as philosophers about bodily things, do not disagree. The common opinion, therefore, is that God is not in that imaginary space outside the heaven: that He neither, before the creation of the universe, was anywhere other than in Himself, nor could He remain in a vacuum. Many hand down this opinion expressly among the ancients and later Scholastics, affirming along with it that God cannot exist in that wherein there is nothing.[459]

But on the contrary:

- It is proved by the authority of Scripture. For 3 Reg. 8 says: "If the heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee"; Job 11: "He is higher than heaven - what wilt thou do? deeper than hell - how wilt thou know?"; and Baruch 3 has something similar.
- First reason for this opinion. Outside the heavens there is truly an empty space, in which a body and a spirit can be set: for what forbids a body or a spirit from being produced outside the heaven, if indeed a new heaven could be created above the Empyrean, and another universe outside this world? Then too, a man stationed at the extreme edge of heaven could stretch forth his arm; finally, this whole universe could be moved at once through that empty space, and change its place. God therefore will be able to be in that space; wherefore He will there be actually also: for His immensity necessarily fills the space that can be filled by Him, as was said above in disput. 28, cap. 4.
- Second reason. If this whole universe can simultaneously be moved through that vast emptiness, and God alone were in this universe, it would follow that He would be moved along with it - which is absurd: for together with the universe He would be changing His distance from the imaginary points.

458. Athanasius, Epistola Synodi Nicaenae; St. Hilary, De Trinitate, at the opening of l. 12; St. Jerome on Isaiah 66; St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, c. 36; De essentia divinitatis; St. Isidore, De summo bono, l. 1, c. 3; cf. 3 Reg. (1 Kings) 8; Job 11.

459. Among the Scholastics who expressly defend that God is not outside heaven and cannot be in a vacuum: Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, c. 13, q. 1 (ad primam replicam); Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 37, a. 2, q. 3 (in corpore, ad 2); Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate II, c. 4; Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 37 (var. loci); Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 37 (var. loci); Dionysius Carthusianus, ad loc.; Thomas of Argentina (as reported).

- Lastly, there is added the common manner of speaking of the Fathers, who assert that God is not enclosed within the world, but is above the world, and also that He is outside the world. Thus Athanasius in the epistle of the Nicene Synod says at length against the impious: "God is in all things according to His goodness and power, and the same is outside all things according to His proper nature." In the same way Hilary, in De Trinitate 12, explaining those words of Isaiah 66, "Who holds the heaven in His palm"; and St. Jerome upon the same passage of Isaiah; St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, and De essentia divinitatis; and St. Isidore, De summo bono, say that God is in all things, but not included; outside all things, but not excluded; so that He is both outwardly and inwardly, infused and surrounding, as St. Jerome says. Wherefore Augustine, Confess. 7, c. 5, teaches that God, compared with this universe, is as an infinite sea which would contain and penetrate a sponge and be also outside it; and, what is most to the point, Scripture quite plainly bears the same witness in 3 Reg. 8; Job 11; and Baruch 3.[460]

I for my part think not only that the opposite opinion, which is the common one, is much more probable; but also that the authors of the former opinion philosophize about spiritual realities and about God as though they were bodies. Thus the common opinion is that God is not in that imaginary space outside the heaven; wherefore neither before the creation of the universe was He anywhere other than in Himself; nor can He remain in a vacuum: for in truth of these there is absolutely no reason at all.

The Scholastics have expressly transmitted this opinion: Alexander of Hales; St. Bonaventure; Richard of St. Victor; Scotus; Durandus; Capreolus; the Carthusian Dionysius; and Thomas of Argentina as reported.[461] He also recites these verses there: "Say where He then was, when besides Him there was nothing. Then, where now, in Himself; for He suffices to Himself."

To the same effect, along with the aforementioned Doctors, speak Alexander; Albert; St. Bonaventure; Aegidius; Thomas of Argentina; and Gabriel, when they assert that from eternity it by no means befits God to be everywhere, insofar as this way of speaking signifies being elsewhere than in Himself; yet that it does befit Him to be everywhere, if it be taken for this, namely, to be in Himself.

And all, taken together, agree that for God to be said to exist anywhere other than in Himself necessarily requires the existence of something other than God.

St. Thomas likewise agrees in the same place, q. 2, a. 3, saying that it does not befit God from eternity to be everywhere - not from any defect of His, but from the defect of things which did not exist from eternity, so that God might be somewhere. Nor does what Gabriel says stand in the way,

460. Athanasius, Epistola Synodi Nicaenae; St. Hilary, De Trinitate, at the opening of book 12; St. Jerome on Isaiah 66; St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, c. 36; De essentia divinitatis; St. Isidore, De summo bono, l. 1, c. 3; see also 3 Reg. (1 Kings) 8; Job 11.

461. Among the Scholastics who expressly defend that God is not outside heaven and cannot be in a vacuum: Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, c. 13, q. 1 (ad primam replicam); St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 37, a. 2, q. 3 (in corpore, ad 1); Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate II, c. 4; Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 37 (var. loci); Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 37 (var. loci); Capreolus (var. loci); Dionysius Carthusianus, ad loc.; Thomas of Argentina (as reported).

in 2, dist. 2, q. 2, a. 1, notab. 3, that God is in every place in such a way that by no place is He contained, because He is higher than heaven; for in this manner both the Fathers and the Scriptures speak; yet they do not oppose our opinion, as we shall show below. Finally, this opinion is gathered from the doctrine of St. Thomas in art. 1, where he infers that God is in a place from His operation, which cannot be in a vacuum.

To confirm this opinion by the testimonies of the Fathers and by reason, and at the same time to refute the prior opinion, will not be difficult. Among the Fathers, first it seems to be expressed by Tertullian in the book Contra Praxean, c. 5, with these words: "Before all things God was alone, and He was to Himself both place and all things." For if God had been in that imaginary interval, although He was alone, yet He would not have been "place" to Himself - inasmuch as He would have been in another, as in a place.

Secondly, Augustine, De fide contra Manichaeos, c. 37, when he argued against the Manichees attacking the Old Testament on the ground that many false and trifling things were contained in it, and suspecting the Gospel as though it were a divine Scripture, contends that one can argue in the same way against the Gospel as against the Old Testament; and hence that both must be explained in the same way. Then he subjoins: "For if someone be so foolish as to rebuke that saying of the Lord in the Gospel, 'Thou shalt not swear by heaven, for it is the throne of God; nor by the earth, for it is the footstool of His feet,' and say that you are wont to utter a marvelous thing: 'Where was God before there was heaven and earth?'" After certain other points which some might object against the Gospel, yet who seem to themselves to say something, he adds: "Do they not know where their head lies?" Finally, Augustine said that the question of the Manichees, where God was before the creation of the world, was foolish - for no other reason surely, except because He could not be anywhere other than in Himself. The same in those words of Psalm 122, "Who dwells in heaven," to show that the spiritual heavens, that is, holy men who are to remain for eternity, are indeed the habitation of God, but not the bodily heavens; thus he says: "For if we shall understand that this heaven, which we see with our eyes, is the habitation of God, the habitation of God will pass away, because heaven and earth shall pass away. Then, before God made heaven and earth, where did He dwell? But someone will say, 'Before God made the saints, where did He dwell?' He dwelt in Himself; and God is with Himself. Behold, there was no other place before the creation of the world besides Himself," Augustine grants to God. To which, likewise, Tertullian had said of God: "He was to Himself place and all things." These words Augustine seems to have taken up from the Master in 1 Sent., dist. 37, from the book 3 Contra Maximimum, although nothing of theirs is contained there.

To the same question Bernard, in the book De consideratione, long before the middle, answers in the same way. For after he shows that God Himself is in every place of the universe, thus he says: "But as to where He was before the world was made, there He is. There is no need for you to inquire further where He was: besides Himself there was nothing; therefore He was in Himself."

Finally, Theodoret is no small supporter, who, since he thinks the angels are free from any body (as we shall relate below in disput. 178), in Quaest. 3 in Genesis proves by reason that there was no corporeal world, because by their nature they are defined by place and circumscribed, that is, they

are so in one place that they cannot be everywhere, they cannot be in any body. He therefore judges that in that empty and imaginary space they could not be created: although his reason does not prove what he contends (as will be treated in its place), nevertheless as regards what we have established, we have from him the opinion that angels could not be in imaginary space; wherefore neither outside heaven: and by the same reasoning God - since He is spirit - could not be in that imaginary space, although He does not need any bodily place in order to exist, as Theodoret thought an angel needed.

The same common opinion is proved by reason.

Caput III - The same common opinion is proved by reason

However, in order to corroborate our reasoning for the first opinion, two positions must be supposed. One is, that for something to be said truly and properly to exist in another, two things are necessary. First, that there be two things really distinct, namely, that which is, and that in which it is: for in Himself nothing is said to be in reality, unless in a certain broader signification. Next, it is required that those two be real entities: for what is something real, if it be compared with that which is truly nothing, is by no manner of speaking said to be "in" it, or to be contained by it. Whence it comes about that an angel, or anything else, truly and properly cannot be in nothing or be contained by it. Nay rather, this existence and presence is so common that the thing would more truly be said to be nowhere; for nothing and nowhere are entirely the same.

The second is, that the true and real, not the imaginary and fictitious presence of God, is now the question - namely, whether it could have befit God to be outside the heaven and before the creation of the world.

With these foundations laid, it is proved in this way that God is not outside the heaven, nor in a vacuum. That vast imaginary expanse which is said now to be outside the heaven, and that emptiness which we say existed before the creation of the world, and that emptiness which we say exists within the sides of a body's vacuum, is altogether nothing: therefore, in it neither God nor an angel can truly and in reality be; or, if he is said truly to be "in it," it will not be anything but a chimera; for that emptiness is a being less feigned and nothing more than a chimera.

Someone will reply, first, that that space is not a chimera, but a certain distance of an interval; and therefore in it something can truly be. But this is manifestly false. For if that vastness is something, it must be either a substance, or quantity, or another accident. It is not a substance, as is sufficiently clear; nor an accident, because it would have to be in a substance; finally, not a quantity, both because this also must be in some substance, since it is an accident, and also because a body could be within a quantity; for two quantities cannot penetrate one another. On this ground the Philosopher, Physics 4, c. 4, refutes the opinion of those who said that place is a certain extended interval within the sides of the containing surface. He impugns it because, when the located thing arrives, two quantities would penetrate one another, or that quantity which is the interval and the place would be destroyed; wherefore the thing located would not be in a place. Therefore that emptiness is nothing other than imaginary space, as the Doctors also of the prior

opinion call it; and hence is constituted solely by our thought; wherefore in reality it will be nothing and the same entirely as "nowhere." It will be altogether the same, then, to set God or an angel in that imaginary space, and to consider the same there by mere thought, since in reality they are in nothing, that is, nowhere other than in themselves.

But someone may say, secondly, that emptiness is not entirely nothing, but a privation, which is a negation with aptness to something; so that that void is not filled, yet apt to be filled; and thus it can be filled by some created body, or even by a spirit created, or by God. In the same way, then, it will be said that God is in the imaginary space and fills it, just as a body can exist there and fill it. And to this seems to look the first reason which we adduced in cap. 1 for the prior opinion.

Refutation: Whether we speak of the imaginary space before the creation of the world, or of that which is said to be outside the heaven now, or of a vacuum within the surface of the surrounding body, this solution is futile and empty. For in order that some negation be a privation, which is with aptness, it must be in some subject; for aptness cannot exist outside a subject: wherefore no negation outside a subject can be a privation. But before the creation of the world there was no subject of that negation: therefore there was no "emptiness" which would be a privation, but altogether nothing and a pure negation. Then also the emptiness outside the heaven will not be a privation, since it can have no subject there. For which reason Aristotle, De caelo 1, c. 9, rightly said that outside the heaven there is neither place nor vacuum. But if that emptiness were a privation, it would truly be a vacuum, which is "not filled, yet apt to be filled."

Moreover, concerning a vacuum within the sides of a containing surface, we can speak in two ways: first, about the very negation which is "within" the surface and is called imaginary space; and this cannot be a privation, just as nothing can be privation within a surface; for that negation has no subject, and therefore is not a privation. Next, we can speak of that negation which is "in" the surrounding surface, and this is called a privation. For just as the surface which contains a body within itself is called filled, so also when it has no body within itself it is called deprived, that is, not filled, apt nevertheless to be filled.

From this it does not follow that God, or a spirit, can be within the surface and fill it. For a vacuum in this way is a place not filled by a body, yet apt to be filled by a body; therefore that negation is in the place or surrounding surface with the aptitude to contain a body, not a spirit: wherefore, by reason of this aptitude, a spirit cannot be within it. And if from elsewhere it could be within it, nevertheless it would remain void and with its own aptitude. And on this account I think St. Augustine said of God in book 2 On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount, chapter 9: he is present everywhere, not by the spaces of places, but by the majesty of power.[462]

But if someone should say that there is in the surface also an aptitude to contain a spirit, besides the fact that we shall show below that a spirit by its very nature does not fill space and the sides of the surrounding place, that would be said without foundation; thus also it could be refuted without any other reason.

462. St. Augustine, De sermone Domini in monte II, c. 9.

Nevertheless someone will object thirdly in this way. Not only is the surrounding surface filled by a body, but also the space or interval that is within. For if the contained body should remain where it was, with the surrounding surface destroyed, it would by its quantity fill not the surface, which would no longer exist, but that interval which it would be said to occupy: in the same way as the highest sphere is now said to fill not the surface, since it has none above itself, but that interspace equal to its quantity; and just as a body, if it were made to exist outside heaven, would be said to fill some part of that imaginary vastness.

Solution: But from the foundations laid this objection is easily confuted. For since, besides the surrounding surface, that interval is nothing except in thought alone, as has been proved, it remains that a body which would remain without a surrounding surface, or be produced without it, would in very truth by its quantity fill nothing nor occupy [anything]; and hence it would be in nothing other than in itself. And it would be said to occupy the situation of another body only in this respect, not because that situation would be distinguished from its own quantity, but because together with its own quantity another body could not be. Wherefore, if a body outside heaven is not said to be in any space, nor in anything other than in itself, by no reasoning can God or an Angel be said to be outside heaven in anything other than in himself. But if the Doctors of the opposite opinion contend that God exists in himself outside heaven as a body would exist, so that he might be said to have in himself space and situation, distance, and that the adverbs of place should befit him; we shall indeed grant that God is in himself, yet that all the rest - namely situation, distance, the adverbs of place, and "outside heaven" - can in no way be attributed to him, as will presently be evident.

However, someone will argue in a fourth place to this effect, with a rather efficacious argument for the contrary opinion. Although bodies do not by their quantity fill that interval which is imaginary only, nevertheless they are said - even if they are outside heaven, or in a vacuum - truly to be "here" and not "elsewhere": just as the whole universe is now "here" and not "elsewhere"; and thus they can be moved within a vacuum or outside heaven. Thus therefore a spirit, even if existing outside heaven, although it is not in anything other than in itself, will be said to be "here" and not "elsewhere"; and just as a body, it will be able to be moved; and hence it will be no less outside heaven than a body, as the former opinion contended.

We adduced this argument first in favor of the prior opinion, the solution of which we did not wish to relegate with the others to the latter part of the question; but in order that we might more fully unfold the whole doctrine here, we have chosen expressly to weaken it itself. Although therefore we concede that there may be a body outside heaven; nevertheless it is not allowable to affirm that a body is in some space or interval distinct from itself, as from what has been said is sufficiently proved; but only that, by reason of its quantity, which by its nature has in itself interval and distance, and hence situation, and an aptitude to be contained by, and to fill, the surrounding surface and place, the adverbs of place, "Where," "There," "Somewhere," etc., do truly and properly befit it. From which it follows that outside heaven, or even in a vacuum, it can be moved, as will expressly be proved in Disputation 195, chapter 3, namely by changing not some space distinct from itself, or the surrounding surface containing it, but the mode of situation which it has in itself

from the nature of its quantity.[463] Now this situation is varied when the distance is varied, which we measure by imaginary points. Nor is this a fiction and mere imagination, that fixed points are designated by our thought alone: just as neither is the place which is called the first and immobile surface of the surrounding body some figment, although its immobility and the distance - changed wherewith place is said to be changed - we are accustomed to measure by imaginary points as well.

And the things we have said are to be understood whether we say that through local motion one acquires a form or intrinsic mode which is called "Where," or only an extrinsic respect, about which there will be controversy for us in Disputation 195; for although only an extrinsic respect be posited, at least it will have the foundation of its nature in the quantity of the body, to which both distance and whatever else is said according to place, do belong.[463]

Thus therefore God, or another spirit, cannot be outside heaven in anything other than in himself, since outside heaven absolutely nothing exists, neither space nor interval, as has been said: wherefore neither is he to be said to be in imaginary space, for to exist in this is the same as to be in nothing. Then neither by reason of his nature or substance can he be said to be "here," or "elsewhere," or "outside heaven," as a body; and therefore neither will he be able to be moved outside it. For to a spiritual substance - of God, or even of an angel - according to itself, a situation of distance or nearness cannot belong as it does to a body; to which indeed distance or nearness belongs because, by reason of its quantity, between it and another there can be some body of such and such a quantity whereby there is filled that aptitude of two bodies, which otherwise was said to be void. Therefore one body is said to be more or less distant from another inasmuch as a greater or a lesser body can be interposed between it and another. Finally, any body whatsoever, according to fixed points, will be said to be more or less distant even if there be no other from which it stands at a distance: for inasmuch as it is a quantum, it is apt together with another to contain so much and so much body; wherefore from this or that it is said to be so much and so much distant: whence it follows that a body, by reason of its quantity, can be moved, lengthened, brought nearer, be outside heaven, and be "here" or "there." For all these things consist in distance or in the variation of that distance, which seems to be inborn in a body.

But a spirit by its very nature is such that between it and another neither a body nor another spirit can be contained: not a spirit, because it lacks quantity and extremities; whence it cannot be a measure of distance between one Angel and another, or between one and another body. Not a body, because although a body has extremities, spirits nevertheless do not have within themselves extremities such as bodies ought to be contained within, to which the extremities of a body might correspond, so that adequately a body might be contained between the spirits.

But someone will say that Angels by their substance are in an indivisible, and between two indivisibles there can be a corporeal measure by which distance is constituted. But this objection is hindered by reason: because Angels are not individuals in the way in which points are, which have position in quantity; but they are indivisible in a spiritual mode; and hence, although between two

463. Vazquez, Disputation 195, cap. 3.

463. Vazquez, Disputation 195, cap. 3.

points there can be distance, nevertheless between two spirits it cannot be, just as neither [can there be] a measure of quantity: because the individual notion of a spirit does not have position in quantity. For this same reason we shall prove in Disputation 192, chapter two, that it is not rightly inferred that an Angel can be placed at a point of quantity, because he is indivisible in himself: since the spiritually indivisible has no proportion to the indivisible of quantity so as to be equal to it.[464]

It remains therefore that spirits and God, unless they are in a body, are not said to be in anything other than in themselves; and since in themselves they have neither interval nor the vastness of space nor situation - because their spiritual substance is indivisible - they are neither "here" nor "elsewhere," nor do they fill imaginary spaces.

Wherefore it does not befit spirits to be in a place primarily, but secondarily, by reason of bodies to which they are primarily joined by substantial presence, as we explained a little above. Therefore God, before the creation of the world, was in himself, but he neither filled anything, nor did he have in himself any extension of interval, nor was he said to be "here" or "there": but, when the universe was created, he began to be in it, and to exist therein according to the ratio of "here" and "there," according to the distance of bodies.

But the adversaries reply: God filled by substantial, not by corporeal, presence that imaginary space before he created the universe. Yet this solution is vain and trifling. For if that space was nothing, it could fill nothing other than itself. And he himself was said to fill himself alone, inasmuch as his substance sufficed for himself: yet this is not enough for it to be said that he was outside heaven - which indicates situation and extension - but only that he was in himself in an indivisible and spiritual mode; which no one denies. But if it werefit him to have in himself situation or distance, or if the adverbs of place befitted him, he would be outside and divisible; but since he is spiritually indivisible, and does not exist in anything other than himself, it could not be said that he is whole in one and whole in any part: and throughout any part, except for himself, there is nothing of which it might be said that he is "in"; nor indeed would he be whole in the whole and whole in any part; for since he has no parts in himself, he exists whole in the whole in an indivisible mode. Therefore the sentence of those Doctors is to be rejected, who think that God, before the creation of the world and now outside heaven, so fills by his presence some infinite space, as if he himself were of such and such size and extended.

But now it is needful that we collect and weigh the foundations of the prior opinion. And among the testimonies adduced, the first is that of Aristotle, in whose mind interpreters vary, namely whether he said that those separate substances are within the very body of heaven, or above its outermost surface: yet his words plainly suggest that they are above the summit of heaven. Nevertheless I answer that either he said that, not because he thought that God and the intelligences were in that imaginary place somewhere or elsewhere than in themselves, but lest he confine them, like bodies, within the quantity of heaven; or, certainly, that nothing is to be cared for about his opinion, when in assigning a place to God he so shamefully erred by a peculiar

464. Vazquez, Disputation 192, cap. 2.

conclusion about places, as we noted in Disputation 17.[465] Plato also, in the Phaedrus, or On the Beautiful, asserts that all the blessed and prudent intelligences are outside heaven; but he is to be interpreted in the same way as Aristotle; or else no credence is to be had for him, since he tells many fabulously excessive things about them there.

It is answered to the testimonies adduced for the prior opinion.

On the testimonies alleged for the prior opinion

Now indeed there is need that we overthrow the foundations of the prior opinion. Of the testimonies adduced, the first was Aristotle's; and in expounding his mind the interpreters vary, namely, whether he said that those separated substances are within the mass of the very heaven, or above its outermost surface: however, his very words plainly indicate that they are above the summit of heaven. Nevertheless I answer, either that he said that, not because he thought that God and the intelligences were in that imaginary place somewhere or elsewhere than in themselves, but lest he confine them, like bodies, within the quantity of heaven; or, certainly, that nothing is to be cared for about his opinion, when in assigning a place to God he so shamefully erred by a peculiar conclusion about place itself, as we noted in Disputation 27.[466] Plato also, in the Phaedrus, or On the Beautiful, asserts that all the blessed, and therefore the intelligences, are outside heaven; but he is to be interpreted in the same way as Aristotle; or else no credence is to be had for him, since he tells many fabulously excessive things about them there.

But that the testimonies of the holy Fathers favor nothing of the prior opinion we shall easily show. First indeed St. Augustine, against those Philosophers, does not place God in imaginary spaces, but was against them; and rightly he infers in this way. If God from eternity could not be idle, so as not from eternity to create the universe, by the same reason he could not, outside this world, in infinite spaces fail to produce infinite worlds: he did not say, he could not fail to exist in imaginary spaces, but, he could not fail to produce other infinite worlds outside this world. But this is rightly inferred, if God through infinite times could not cease from work. But if Augustine were speaking of the existence of God in imaginary spaces, as the adversaries contend, by his own argument he would prove that indeed God could have not been in those, just as he could, through infinite duration, do nothing. But the Doctors of the former opinion will not concede this: for when they assert that God exists in imaginary capacity, they affirm that he is there not freely, but necessarily; since they say that that does not come from the free will (*voluntas*) of God, but from his essence (*essentia*), so far as it is immense. Therefore Augustine would favor nothing of the prior opinion.

Second, St. Gregory Nazianzen, in the place alleged, only contends that God is not circumscribed anywhere: and therefore he tries to lead to absurdities those who said that God is in this whole universe, or in a part of it, circumscribed; and since by the words that follow he plainly teaches that God is not above, or outside, the universe as in a place, he does not assert that in any

465. Vazquez, Disputation 17.
466. Vazquez, Disputation 27.

way he exists there. Moreover, that which he assumes in the argument, he proposes not as certain, but under doubt, when he says, Perhaps: yet he could easily elsewhere suppose that God is either in the whole universe, or in a part of it; which no one would deny. Therefore he only wished to infer that God is so in the universe that neither by the whole, nor by a part of it, is he circumscribed: and whether he understand this of circumscription in the manner of a body, or of a particular and adequate definition of place, it is necessary and most true, as will be explained below.

Reply to Basil's testimony: Basil only intended to teach that wherever any one's thought has reached, there God is, together with the hypostasis of his Son necessarily conjoined to himself. But about the space outside the world which we constitute by thought alone, he cared nothing. For a little before, upon those words, "And the Word was with God," he says, Where was the Word? namely, in the beginning, he answers, Not in a place: but where was it? he answers, With God. But of imaginary spaces he said nothing.

Fourth, Philo said on that account that the whole world is not worthy to be a dwelling of God, not because he would be also outside it, but because he himself receives no utility from it, since place can be for himself, that is, to be in himself no less perfectly. Nay rather, he says, for something to be filled and contained by him is to have need and emptiness, not because he fills those imaginary spaces (for it would be too crude to say this), but because all things that are would be reduced to nothing and be vain, if they were not sustained by him.

In the fifth place there were adduced many Fathers, who, following the manner of speaking of Scripture, variously assert that God is outside, and inside, and above the universe. But they, just as also Scripture, by that way of speaking only wished to signify that God is so in the universe and within it as not to be by that whole circumscribed and defined, not because he is also outside in imaginary space, but because his infinite power and immensity can be in a greater and greater and in infinite other [things]: and to this look the various modes which Scripture and the holy Fathers have used, which indeed it would be too crude and absurd to interpret of that, as it were, corporeal existence outside heaven.

Nor indeed do they only wish to teach that God is not circumscribed, as a body by some surrounding surface, but neither defined and in some way bound to this universe as to a place adequate to him, as happens to Angels. Therefore God is said to contain the orb by a palm, that the greatness of his power may be declared, who, as it were, doing nothing, by a palm, that is, not by his whole effort, sustains all things. Nor indeed is there need to run through each point which we adduced in the fifth place; for from these they are easily explained. Moreover, when the holy Fathers say that God is above every creature, they sometimes, by the particle Above, do not signify the spaces of places, even imaginary, but power and potency, as St. Augustine plainly said in the book On the Nature of the Good against the Manichean, cap. 3, in these words: God is so above every creature, above every species, above every order; nor is he above by the spaces of places, but by ineffable and singular power, from whom is every mode, every species, every order.[467] And nothing other did Hugo of St. Victor wish to teach, book 1 On the Sacraments, part 3, cap. 17,

467. St. Augustine, De natura boni contra Manicheos, cap. 3.

whom it is wont, without desert, to be referred for the opposing opinion.[468] To which also alluding, the Trismegistus, who is commonly cited, compared God to a sphere whose center would be everywhere and circumference nowhere: not because he would fill that imaginary vastness, but because by the whole universe he would not be defined, as has been said.[469]

In this sense St. Thomas said, Quodlibet 11.2.1, that the infinity of God is such that he is not only in those things which are, were, and will be; but [also] in those which we can think: not because he is actually in pasts, futures, and possibles which are not and can be thought by imagination, since in that which is not yet, he cannot now actually be; but because it befits God, by reason of his infinity, to be in all things when they are, and his operation reaches all these in their time.[470] Wherefore, without foundation, some more recent men allege this text of the holy Doctor for the opposed opinion, to prove that in imaginary space, which can be apprehended by thought, God is: otherwise he would not only prove that God is in imaginary space which they suppose now to be outside heaven, but [also] in another universe which is thought by us, and which he could create outside this world; which is absurd. Nor indeed did St. Thomas say that God is in imaginary space now outside heaven, but in those things that can be thought, understanding possible things, not yet existing.

Caput V - The arguments of the same opinion are dissolved

From this point let us dissolve singly the opposite arguments. Concerning the first of which, enough was said already in cap. 3, where we showed the difference between body and spirit in the universe, namely why a body can be moved or exist in a vacuum or outside heaven, but a spirit not so; by which difference the whole force of the argument is weakened.

To the second some more recent men answer, that the whole universe cannot at once be moved by rectilinear motion; lest they be forced to concede that God is moved in place with the universe, which they deem absurd. Yet they say that the universe can be moved, if God should create some real space through which, or to which, it would be moved. Then however (they say) that absurdity would not follow, namely, that God is moved with the whole universe: for God would have been beforehand in that real space through which, or to which, the universe would be moved, and therefore he would not acquire a place which beforehand he did not have, nor would he be moved with the universe.

Yet I for my part do not see by what reason it would be impossible that this whole universe be moved at once by rectilinear motion, even if nothing else outside it were created. First indeed, because, if outside this world there were another, as can be done by God, each could approach the other, as the adversaries also grant: for, since a real terminus is created outside this universe to which it would be moved, they confess it could be rightly moved: but they must concede that it can be moved so as to reach even to the terminus, or to stand, as it were, in the middle road. Then

468. Hugo of St. Victor, De Sacramentis 1, part 3, cap. 17.

469. Hermes Trismegistus, the common comparison of God to a sphere whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere.

470. St. Thomas, Quodlibet 11.2.1.

therefore, if the universe were being moved and did not reach the terminus created, it would follow that God is moved with it: for he would leave the prior site and would acquire another in the middle way which beforehand he did not have.

Then again, it matters little whether something real be created to which the mobile arrive, or that it be able to be moved through the emptiness of intermediates: for the terminus in motion, and as it were the last changed state, is not more necessary to motion; but the form which is continuously acquired so long as motion lasts: as in heating the whole latitude of heat; in local motion, the whole being-somewhere, which is divisible with the very motion. But without the extreme and last changed state, that which is called the first changed state in the terminus "to which," there could be excellently motion, namely when the motion would cease together with the mobile itself, at least by annihilation: for then the first not-being of the mobile is the first not-being of all the things which are in the mobile.

Lastly, although the terminus, that is, the extreme of motion, were necessary to motion, it ought not be some body, or containing surface, to which it is vulgarly said that the mobile is moved; but it ought to be the changed state existing in the mobile itself, which would be indivisible of that form and mode which the mobile acquires through motion. For the surrounding surface contributes nothing at all to motion, neither in the terminus, nor while the mobile is moved: nay, Aristotle, when he supposed that the first mobile sphere is contained by nothing else, even thought that it is moved around the place. In a vacuum too motion of a body can be, as was said in cap. 3, and will be more fully proved in Disputation 195.[471] Wherefore it is altogether accidental that space be full, that the mobile be moved.

Let us concede therefore to the second argument that which it assumes, namely, that the universe can be moved by rectilinear motion, as a body through a vacuum. But what from that was being inferred - that God, namely, is moved with the whole universe - some willingly also concede, so that only secondarily, and (as they say) per accidens, God be said to be moved, not by any intrinsic change wrought in God himself, but only by some extrinsic respect of distance varied, which secondarily befits him by reason of the body to which his substantial presence is conjoined. For as we said in cap. 3, and as we shall show in the disputation alleged, to God and to any spirit there befits secondarily the respect of distance, according to which there is motion: and indeed those who assert that God is not in imaginary spaces cannot deny that God can acquire a new extrinsic respect of presence by creating another new universe: nay even that he can acquire a new extrinsic respect in a new universe, by losing the prior respect, if he were to destroy this universe and create another outside it.

Yet the aforesaid Doctors add that God cannot be moved, neither per accidens, nor within this universe by a varied extrinsic respect alone, because he cannot be in the whole universe at once: wherefore that extrinsic respect of presence will always be the same, the same things remaining. And by this sole reason they assert that Augustine, De civitate Dei 16, c. 5, said that God is not moved by place, who is always and everywhere whole; and in the book On Essence...

471. Vazquez, Disputation 195.

I, however, do not see by what reason it would be impossible for this whole universe to be moved at once with rectilinear motion, even if nothing else were created outside it. First, indeed, because if outside this world there were another, as can be done by God, each could approach the other, as the adversaries too grant: for, a real terminus being created outside this universe to which it would be moved, they admit that it could be moved rightly; but they ought to concede that it could be moved in such a way that it should reach all the way to the terminus, or should stand, as it were, midway on the way. Therefore then, if the universe were moved and did not reach the created terminus, it would follow that God would be moved along with it; for he would leave his prior situation and acquire another midway along the way, which previously he did not have.

Secondly, it matters little that something real be created to which the mobile should arrive, rather than that through the emptiness of the intervening it should be able to be moved: for a terminus necessary to motion is not the extreme in motion and, as it were, the ultimate changed state; but the form which is continuously acquired so long as the motion lasts: such as, in heating, the whole latitude of heat; in local motion, the whole being somewhere, which is divisible along with the motion itself. And without there being an extreme and an ultimate changed state, namely what is called the first changed in the terminus to which, motion could very well exist when, to wit, the motion would cease together with the mobile itself, at least by its annihilation: for then the mobile's first not-being is the first not-being of all the things that are in the mobile.

Thirdly, although a terminus were necessary to motion, nevertheless it would not have to be some body, or a containing surface, to which it is vulgarly said to be moved; rather, it would have to be a change existing in the mobile itself, which is the divisible acquisition of that form and mode which it gains through motion. A surface contributes nothing at all, neither at the terminus, nor while it is being moved: indeed Aristotle, since he supposed that the outermost moving sphere was contained in no place, nevertheless thought that it is moved. Motion, too, can be in a void, as was said in the third chapter and was proved at greater length in Disputation 195; we demonstrated that the fullness is entirely accidental for the mobile to be moved.[472]

As to what was further inferred, that it is granted readily enough that God is moved along with the whole universe, yet only so that he is said to be moved, as they say, per accidens, no intrinsic thing being changed in God himself, but only a certain extrinsic respect of presence being varied, which belongs to him secondarily by reason of the body to whose substance his essence is conjoined; as was shown in the alleged disputation, and it belongs secondarily to any spirit according to motion: and indeed those who cannot imagine how God could acquire a new extrinsic respect by creating another new universe, likewise cannot deny that he could acquire for himself a new extrinsic respect in a new universe by destroying this universe and creating another outside it, while losing the prior respect.

Yet those aforesaid Doctors add that God cannot be moved, neither per accidens nor by a varied extrinsic respect alone within this universe, because he cannot be in the whole universe at once: wherefore that extrinsic respect of presence will always be the same, the same things remaining.

472. Vazquez, Disputation 195.

And by this sole reason they assert that St. Augustine, De civitate Dei 7, c. 30, said that God is not moved by place, who is always and everywhere whole; and in the book On the Essence of the divinity in the beginning, that God is non-local, because he is neither contained by place, nor moved from place to place.[473] The same was said by Justin in the Dialogue against Trypho, p. 95: "God neither is moved, nor is separable from a place, nor from the whole world, nor can he be comprehended."[474]

Nevertheless, it seems to me that not even by an extrinsic denomination can God be said to be changed, even if the universe were moved according to place, because, in order that something be moved according to place, that which is moved secondarily must have a new respect of distance from points, at least imaginary ones: but God can indeed have an extrinsic respect of presence, and vary it, if he becomes present substantially to various bodies: for when he begins to be substantially present to one body, he begins to have an extrinsic respect which previously he did not have; but a respect of distance also from imaginary points he cannot have, as a body has which is outside the heavens, and this whole universe outside which there is nothing in act.

The reason for the distinction is this: because a body outside which nothing is actually existent, as this universe, only in the mode which it has from its quantity is said to be at a distance, inasmuch as outside it there can be a body in which our imagination may fix points from which it can recede; and although no other body be outside, nonetheless on account of the aforesaid aptitude which it has, and which varies according to the mode of its quantity, it is said to change a respect of distance. But because outside God there can be neither a body, nor a point fixed by imagination, from which God should be at a distance - because by his very nature, wherever a point were fixed, God would be - nor could he be distant from it; therefore, even if this universe were moved according to place, God would not be moved. Furthermore, a spirit existing in a sphere cannot be moved with circular motion, since he is whole in the whole and whole in any part, as God is, because circular motion does not change the distance, but only the diverse respect of parts: wherefore, since a spirit has no parts, he remains always in the same way in the sphere, and therefore is not moved.

Reply to the third objection: I reply that God existed before all time, but not in another duration than in the eternity proper to him, in which he always is, although also in time, or (as Anselm prefers) with time, as was noted in the observations upon the article. But God was not before time in another duration than in eternity, because this was from eternity, and no other: in the same way, from eternity he was not in another than in himself, because besides himself from eternity there was nothing. But he, since he is indivisible, having neither breadth nor depth, was not said to fill a space or to have with himself a space, or site, or distance, as was demonstrated in the third chapter: whence from eternity he was nowhere except in himself, which certainly is not to be somewhere. Wherefore the argument can be turned back upon the adversaries in this way: God from eternity was not in an imaginary duration, but in eternity: therefore he was not in imaginary space, but in himself.

473. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei 7, cap. 30.
474. Justin Martyr, Dialogus cum Tryphone, p. 95.

Finally they object in this wise. Spirits are in place by an application of power before they operate: but God can apply this in the void and in imaginary space by producing something there: therefore he is first there before he produces. I answer that there are various opinions of the Doctors on this matter: however, although we concede that the Angels are in place by some kind of application of power, as will be explained in Disputation 188, nevertheless they could not be in imaginary space. For either the adversaries understand the application of power to be some external operation, and this cannot be in the void or in imaginary space; moreover, God does not by some external operation apply his power to operating before he operates: wherefore by that he cannot be in imaginary space. Or else it is an operation of the will, as Cajetan thought of the Angels in that article, which we shall there prove to be false; and for God the reason of existing in a place cannot be by a decree of his will, as was said in Disputation 28: and then, even if this were posited in things, it would not follow that in imaginary space - since there is nothing - anything could be placed in this way.[475][476][477]

Moreover, if to be in imaginary space is nothing other than to be in himself, assuredly this will befit God, not by will, but by his nature.

Articulus III - Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence, and power

But to the third we proceed thus.

Objection 1. It seems that the modes of God's existing in things are ill assigned, when it is said that God is in all things by essence (*essentia*), power (*potentia*), and presence (*praesentia*). For that is said to be in something essentially which is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things: for he is not of the essence of any thing. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by essence, presence, and power.

Objection 2. Further, to be present to some thing is this, namely, not to be lacking to it. But this is for God to be by essence in all things, namely, not to be lacking to any thing: therefore it is the same to be in all things by essence and by presence. Superfluous, therefore, was it to say that God is in things by essence, presence, and power.

Objection 3. Further, as God is the principle of all things by his power, so also by his knowledge and will. But he is not said to be in things by knowledge and will: therefore neither by power.

Objection 4. Further, just as grace (*gratia*) is a certain perfection superadded to the substance of a thing, so there are many other superadded perfections. If therefore God is said to be in some in a special mode by grace, it seems that according to any perfection whatsoever there ought to be accepted a special mode of God's being in things.

But on the contrary: St. Gregory says upon the Song of Songs, cap. 5, that God is in all things in a common manner by presence, power, and substance; yet in a familiar manner he is said to be in some by grace.[478]

475. Vazquez, Disputation 28.
476. Vazquez, Disputation 188.
477. Cajetan, on that article (as cited in the place).

I answer that it must be said that God is said to be in a thing in two ways. In one way by the mode of an efficient cause (*causa efficiens*): and thus he is in all things created by himself. In another way as the object of operation is in the operator: which is proper in the operations of the soul, according as the known is in the knower, and the desired in the desirer. In this second way, therefore, God is specially in the rational creature, which knows and loves him actually or habitually. And because the rational creature has this by grace, as will be clear below, he is said to be in this mode in the saints by grace. But in other things created by him, how he is must be considered from those things which are said to be in human affairs. For a king is said to be in his whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. By his presence, however, a thing is said to be in all the things that are in his sight, as all the things which are in a house are said to be present to someone, who nevertheless is not according to his substance in every part of the house. But according to substance or essence a thing is said to be in the place in which its substance is held. There were, therefore, some, namely the Manichaeans, who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the divine power; but visible and corporeal things were said to be subject to the power of the contrary principle. Against these, therefore, one must say that God is in all things by his power. There were others, truly, who although they believed that all things were subject to the divine power, nevertheless did not extend the divine providence down to these lower bodies: on whose person it is said (Job 22): "He walketh about the poles of heaven, and he doth not consider our things." And against these it had to be said that he is in all things by his presence. There were others, moreover, who although they said that all things pertain to God's providence, nevertheless posited that all things were not immediately created by God, but that he immediately created the first creatures, and they created others. And against these it had to be said that he is in all things by essence. Thus, therefore, he is in all things by power, inasmuch as all things are subject to his power. He is by presence in all things, inasmuch as all things are naked and open to his eyes. He is in all things by essence, inasmuch as he is present to all as the cause of their existing, as has been said.

Reply to the first: Therefore it must be said to the first, that God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things, as though he were of their essence, but by his own essence, because his substance is present to all as the cause of their existing, as has been said.

Reply to the second: To the second it must be said that something can be said to be present to another inasmuch as it is subject to its sight, which nevertheless is at a distance from it according to its own substance, as has been said. And therefore two modes had to be posited, namely by essence and by presence.

Reply to the third: To the third it must be said that it belongs to the notion of knowledge and will that the known is in the knower, and the willed in the willing. Whence according to knowledge and will things are more in God than God is in things. But it belongs to the notion of power that it be a principle of acting upon another: whence according to power the agent is compared and applied to the external thing, and thus by power the agent can be said to be in another.

478. St. Gregory, Homilia 8 in Ezechielem; and In Canticum canticorum cap. 5.

Reply to the fourth: To the fourth it must be said that no other perfection superadded to substance makes God be in something as the object of what is known and loved, except grace; and therefore grace alone makes a singular mode of God's being in things. There is moreover another singular mode of God's being in man by union: of which mode we shall treat in its place, in the third part, question two.

Explicatio articuli - Explanation of the article

From this whole article five modes are gathered by which God is said to be in something. In three modes he is in all things, namely by essence, presence, and power; in two others only in the rational creature. In order, therefore, the fourth is that by which God is in men as in a temple, by some gift of grace: the fifth, by which he is said to be in Christ by the humanity. Each will be more fully set forth in the following disputation.

What rationale the modes by which God is said to exist in things have, is to be explained in Disputation 30.

Disputatio XXX - How the modes by which God is said to exist in things are to be explained

Caput I - Various opinions concerning the first three modes

The Doctors have disagreed in explaining the three prior modes, and this is no doubt. Therefore let us set down in this chapter those opinions which are not approved, so that we may submit the truer in what follows.

The first opinion is Alexander's, 4. p. 9. q. 10. memb. a, which Aegidius deems probable.[479] Now Alexander teaches that God is in things by essence, because by his essence he attains to the universe; by presence, indeed, by reason of operation; finally, by power, by reason of support. First, he himself does not declare more fully the first and third modes; yet they could be explained in a good sense.

This opinion, besides the fact that it does not sufficiently distinguish the first and the third mode, although it seems to explain each by a real co-existence, is easily refuted with regard to the first mode for this reason. However these two modes ought at least in thought to be distinguished, in order that three be enumerated; unless in the sense in which Durandus assigned it - which we shall refute below. Moreover, as St. Bonaventure very well says, many things are said to be present where they do not operate; therefore the mode of existing by presence is not on account of operation.

The second opinion is that of St. Bonaventure in 1, dist. 37, part 1, dub. art. 3, q. 2, in the replies to the arguments, which Gabriel also judges probable, namely, that it is the same for God to exist in things by presence and by non-distance, as he speaks, as if to say: it is the same as not to be distant

from the things themselves.[480] In the other two modes he does not seem to differ from the common opinion. But in the next chapter we shall show that this mode is rather by essence (*essentia*) than by presence, since one is sometimes said to be present who nevertheless is far away in place, namely to those things which he has in his sight.

The third opinion is that of Durandus, who explains all three modes otherwise than the other Scholastics, in this way. On God's side there are three: operation, the power from which it is to operate, and essence, in which is the power of operation. By reason of the first God is said to be in things by presence; by reason of the second, by power (*potentia*), because operation issues from power; by reason of the third, He is said to be by essence, inasmuch as the essence of God (as he himself says) co-exists with things so as to conserve them, just as a seal, in order to conserve the figure in water, ought to exist together with it. But the first - which contains the greater difficulty - he explains thus. By the operation of God a thing is produced in the realm of things, and forthwith is present to God existing, and from that God to the things themselves. For he thinks that from this God is said to be present to things, because they are present to Him, not conversely. But Durandus does not explain this mode of presence any further. My own opinion, however, is that it seems to consist only in this, that things produced by the force of operation co-exist with God, that is, are at the same time in the realm of things with God. Durandus established this opinion on no other ground than that one could not say that God is present to things by reason of cognition, as St. Thomas and others teach; therefore, in the manner we have said, he thinks the presence of God is more conveniently explained.

Yet this way of speaking is to be taken also from sense-vision, which, in order to know things, must have them present to view. Whence, by a transference to spiritual things, presence also is to be derived with respect to cognition; which St. Augustine taught in epistle 112, chapter 2, at the beginning, with these words: "Plainly perhaps it is enough if we understand here by presence that by which things are at hand to the senses, whether it be a word of mind or of body, whence something is done by the senses from one who is present."[481] Scripture also uses the same manner of speaking: for in 2 Machab. 12 and at the end it is said that they were wondrously delighted by the presence of God - namely, because by some vision God appeared to them - and in 4 Reg. 5 Elisha said to Gehazi, after he had received gifts from Naaman the Syrian: "Was not my heart present when the man turned back from his chariot to meet you?" (4 Reg. 5).

Nor does it stand in the way that in the law "Praesens", ff. De procuratoribus, it is said that one is held to be present at a suit, whether he is in the gardens, or in the forum, or in the city, or in the contiguous buildings. For in these cases the law reckons someone present so far as concerns the effect of the suit and of procuration, so that the procurator also is considered a procurator of one who is present, just as a procurator who manages the business of one present enjoys his privileges.[482] For there is another kind of procurator who conducts the business of one absent. But according

479. Alexander (4. p. 9. q. 10. memb. a), as reported by Aegidius.
480. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent. dist. 37, part 1, dub. art. 3, q. 2, in solutionibus argumentorum.
481. St. Augustine, Epistula 112, cap. 2 (initium).
482. Digest, De procuratoribus, title "Praesens".

to the usual manner of speaking which we have set forth up to now, by a figure of synecdoche he can be said to be present to the city; for gardens, forum, contiguous buildings, and suburbs are called parts of the city. Therefore by reason of one part he is said to be present to the whole; not, however, without respect to cognition, nor to any except those who know: not because one who is in the gardens is always known by someone else, so that he be called present to him as to a citizen and hence to the whole city; but because he who is in the gardens or contiguous buildings is wont to be seen by the citizens of that city and actually to be known. For he is where he can easily be met by others. And since he is wont easily to be present, he is counted present, and his procurator is said to transact the business of one present.

It must also be noted what the words of the law say which not only affirm that that alone is done "in the presence" of another which is known by him, but also that the same is "before" someone and that something is done with him present, just as we assumed according to our reasoning. Therefore, those things are said, in the common manner of speaking, to be present which present themselves to the knower, not conversely. Here too this way of speaking is taken from bodily sight, which, in order to know things, must have them present to view. Hence, by transference to spiritual things, presence is also to be taken with respect to cognition. This is what Augustine taught, as just cited.

Furthermore, whatever be the condition of two things existing together in the realm of things, even if they are placed in the same location, if one of them is not a knower, neither can be said to be present to the other, as is made clear by examples. For if two stones exist together in the realm of things, and one of them is even near to the other in place, it is not said to be present to it; nor conversely in the same way; nor tree to tree; nor is any non-knowing thing said to be present to one that knows, as a man to a wall or to a tree; nay rather, to an animate thing and capable of cognition nothing is said to be present unless it actually attends and knows. For it is the same thing to be present to someone and to be "in his presence", or that something is done "before him" or "with him present". But nothing is said to be done "before" someone unless he notices and knows, even if otherwise the thing is at such a distance that he could very well know it, and in a place said to be near him, as is expressly held in the law "Coram", ff. De verborum significationibus: "One ordered to do something before Titius does not seem to have done it in his presence unless he understands it; and thus if he be insane or an infant or asleep, he does not seem to have done it before him." Therefore nothing is said to be present to another unless to one who knows or understands. Accordingly, the mere real co-existence of things is not enough, as Durandus was saying, for one to be said present to another.[483]

Caput II - The common and truer opinion

The common and truer opinion is that which St. Thomas handed down in this article, and which Cajetan and more recent authors, Albertus, Aegidius, Ricardus, Capreolus, and Gabriel follow.[484] All of them in this way explain those three modes mentioned. First, they say that God is by essence

in all things, because His substance is not distant in place, but is conjoined to things, whether by reason of Himself or by reason of operation. In this way a king is not said to be in the whole kingdom, nor under the roof of his house; in which, however, he is said to be in another way, as will be clear below: but he is said to be in that part where either he sits or stands; and even if, by a synecdoche, he be said in this way to be in the whole kingdom, God is not on that account said to be in the whole universe only by a figure, but essentially, by reason of His immensity, to be present in the whole universe and in each of its parts.

Second, He is by presence everywhere, for all things are present to Him, or are done and conserved with Him present, in that He knows and cognizes all things. Thus a king, when he is present at public spectacles, is said to be present to the things that are done in the forum, and that they are done in his presence or "before" him; in which manner he could not be present at the same time to all things that are done in the kingdom. But God, by reason of His infinite knowledge, is present to all things. This mode, broadly confirmed and explained, remains from what was said above against Durandus; and it is distinguished a priori from the former, because even if the substance of God were not innermost to all things and He did not operate upon all, yet if His knowledge were infinite, by knowledge alone He would be said to be present to all things.

Third, He is by power in the whole universe, because wherever His operation reaches, there God is; just as a king is said to be in his whole kingdom, because throughout it his operation, at least through his ministers, is diffused. Wherefore, in this mode God is more perfectly in the whole universe than a king in his kingdom, since He Himself by His own efficacy immediately produces and conserves all things. This mode differs from the two preceding, because if God were not by His substance in things, nor present by reason of knowledge, yet if He operated in all things, His power would be everywhere, because His operation would permeate all things.

Objicitur: But someone will say that the first and second mode are easily confused, since we maintain that God is everywhere by reason of operation, which is, as it were, the ratio of His immensity; thus, by the same operation, God would be said to be in things both by essence and by power.

Solutio: I answer that this argument contends only against the opinion of those who teach that God is in things by reason of operation, not by reason of the bare substance - which, as we said elsewhere, is not sufficiently demonstrated - and not against our position.

It can be persuaded. But neither has it anything of moment against those points, as we shall presently see. Now Cajetan, who in this article follows the opinion of St. Thomas, answers that between those two modes, namely, "by essence" (essence, essentia) and "by power" (potency, potentia), there is a difference: the first is with immediation of virtue, but the other with immediation of the supposit (suppositum), which is rather obscurely said.

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484. St. Thomas, in this article; Cajetan, ad loc.; Albertus, In I Sent. d. 37, art. 5; Aegidius, q. 2; Ricardus, art. 1, q. 1; Capreolus, art. 1, conclus. 3; Gabriel (Vazquez), q. unica, art. 1, notabile 3.

483. Digest, De verborum significationibus, law "Coram: Coram Titio aliquid facere iussus, non videtur praesente co fecisse, nisi is intelligat; itaque si furiosus, aut infans sit, aut dormiat, non videtur coram illo fecisse."

Yet more easily, in the opinion of St. Thomas, each mode can be explained and formally distinguished, if the operation of God's power be considered in a twofold way. First, as it is an act (actus) of God's power, even if it have not the force of joining His essence intimately to the things themselves: for by this sole reason, on account of operation, God would be said to be in things "by power." Therefore it is the same to be in things by power, and to operate in them; nor does any other thing formally need to be required for this existence: and thus this mode brings with it only the immediation of virtue, as Cajetan says, that is, it only denotes that the subject operates by its own proper virtue.

Then, the operation of God can be taken as a kind of contact of quantity, and a foundation, so that the substance (substantia) of God be intimately in things; and in this way it has something more than to be an act and an operation of God's virtue: and therefore it constitutes God in things in a new mode, namely, according to substance; which mode perhaps for this reason is said to denote immediation of the supposit in Cajetan's sentence, because it joins the substance of the cause to the effect, although to operate with the immediation of the supposit be another thing, as was explained in disputation 28, chapter 4. From these points it is clear that God is in all and each things in all three modes, and that they are distinguished for the best reason.

Now these three modes of the existence of God in things have been enumerated only by the Master and the Scholastics in I Sentences, distinction 37: for among the holy Fathers there is none who distinguishes them all in that way. St. Thomas in the argument "But on the contrary," the Master, Alexander, and St. Bonaventure in the places cited, report the testimony of St. Gregory the Great, who seems to recount all three: but I could not find that passage in another author than the Master. The author, however, of the book On the Knowledge of the True Life, chapter 28, in the ninth tome among the works of St. Augustine, distinguishes at least two modes in a certain way, one according to essence, the other according to power: there, indeed, against those who say that God is contained by His essence in some particular place, as heaven, but in the world and inferior things is only by His power, he argues in this way. If God is by His essence in heaven, and by His power on earth, His essence and power will not be the same, since the one is where the other is not found, which is absurd.

Yet this reason is easily refuted out of the doctrine handed down above. For if it were said that God is somewhere by His power, where He is not by His essence, He would not therefore be said to be there because the substance of His power were there and not the substance of His essence - for this is impossible, since essence and power are altogether the same - but because the effect of the power, that is, the operation, would reach somewhere where the substance of that [power] would not be. From this, however, it would not follow that the power itself in itself and the substance of God's essence would be locally sundered and distinct.

Some think that this threefold mode is expressed in those words of Psalm 138: "Whither shall I go from your Spirit, and whither shall I flee from your face?" and in Romans 11: "From him, and through him, and in him are all things." But no one of the Fathers, or of approved interpreters of Scripture, follows this exposition. That text, indeed, of Romans 11 the Greeks interpret thus: "From him," as from an author, are all things; "Through him," all things which have begun are preserved;

and "In him," the same are perfected and consummated. Which mode of speaking is familiar to Paul, that he may fully signify the omnipotent power of God. Let it suffice us, therefore, with the Scholastics, to have distinguished and explained with the best reason these three modes of existing in things.

Objection of Durandus. Against the mode of existing by presence, as we have explained it, Durandus argues in this way. By His knowledge God regards equally the things that are, that have been, that will be, and those that are altogether possible: but of all these God is not said to be present: therefore the knowledge of God alone is not a sufficient reason of presence.

Answer. I answer: God is not said to be present to things, nor are things said to be absolutely present to God, by reason of just any knowledge, but by reason of that cognition which terminates on things existing at that time. Wherefore the knowledge of possibles does not suffice to make God present to things; nay rather, neither does the knowledge of future or of past things suffice, even if this be called knowledge of vision: for this kind of existence in things by presence has been transferred from the presence of bodily sight. But sight is only of things existing in view; and a man, in respect of sight, is said to be present to them, so that by reason of no other sense is he said to be present. Although therefore all the things that God knows are said, in a broader signification, to be present to Him, namely objectively, nevertheless He Himself is not said absolutely to be in things by presence by reason of cognition, unless the things also exist.

Caput III - Two other modes of God's existence in things

It remains now to say something about the two other modes by which God exists in things. The fourth in order is that by which God is said to be in a rational creature as the known in the knower, and as in a temple in which He is worshipped. In this mode in general, by reason of cognition, He is said to be in any knower, and Himself to be adored; but peculiarly He is said to be by the gifts of grace, about which we shall say something in question 43, article 3. About this mode of existing there is hardly any controversy among the Doctors: and its nature is such that it would not suffice to constitute God in things by essence, if otherwise He were not in them by His immensity; for this mode joins man to God only by cognition, affection, operation, or habit.

There are, however, some more recent authors who think that, when to us these gifts of grace are conferred, not only the charismata themselves are given, but also the person of the Holy Spirit is so given to us, and that with the whole Trinity He so comes to us, that, if otherwise God were neither by reason of operation universally, nor by reason of substance immense and in all things, nevertheless by reason of these gifts He would exist in us according to essence. Whose opinion is refuted on this ground. Although it cannot be denied that the person of the Holy Spirit is said to be given to us by reason of the charismata and sent to us, and that the whole Trinity comes to us, as we shall also say in question 43, article 3, still this is not said because, by reason of the whole largess of the gifts, He would be in us according to substance, even if otherwise by His immensity He did not exist in us; but because, whereas He is otherwise in us, He deigns to appear in us by a new effect of grace; and since these gifts are appropriated to the Holy Spirit, He Himself also is said

to be given and to be sent to us, and with Him the whole Trinity to come. Moreover, that this effect is not sufficient to constitute the person of the Holy Spirit, or God according to essence, in us, if otherwise He were not by reason of operation universally, or by His substance immense, is easily proved: because these gifts, beyond the common notion of an effect of divine power, have this, that they join us to God according to affection, and as to a rule, to which we are said to be just, or as to a friend, to whom we are said to be beloved, and therefore holy and immaculate; but this effect, which is wholly in affection or by relation to Him, can be between those absent according to substance, as is manifest.

The fifth mode of God's existence in things is that by which the Word exists in the assumed humanity: and this union is such that, even if God were not otherwise by His immensity in that humanity according to essence, by reason of that union He would be in it, as we noted above in disputation 28, chapter 5. Yet this mode can be very well distinguished from the others: because it includes something peculiar, namely the sustentation of the human nature, by reason of which the divine Word is directly and perfectly the supposit of that nature; but the other two persons [are there] concomitantly by necessary connection with the Word, as we shall show in the Third Part, question 3, article 4.

Articulus IV - Whether to be everywhere is proper to God

To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that to be everywhere is not proper to God. For the universal, according to the Philosopher, is everywhere and always; so too prime matter, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as is clear from what was premised: therefore to be everywhere is not proper to God.

1. Moreover, number is in things numbered: but the whole universe is constituted in number, as is clear from Wisdom 11; therefore there is some number that is in the whole universe, and thus everywhere.
2. Moreover, the whole universe is a certain perfect whole body, as is said in the first book On the Heavens and the World. But the whole universe is everywhere, because outside it there is no place. Therefore not God alone is everywhere.
3. Moreover, if some body were infinite, there would be no place outside it: therefore it would be everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not seem to be proper to God.
4. Moreover, the soul, as St. Augustine says, in the sixth book On the Trinity, is whole in the whole body and whole in any part of it. If therefore in the world there were only one animal, its soul would be everywhere. And thus to be everywhere is not proper to God.
5. Moreover, as St. Augustine says in the Epistle to Volusianus, the soul, where it sees, there it feels; and where it feels, there it lives; and where it lives, there it is. But the soul sees, as it were, everywhere; for successively it also sees the whole heaven: therefore the soul is everywhere.

But on the contrary is what St. Ambrose says in the book On the Holy Spirit: "Who would dare to call the Holy Spirit a creature, who is in all things, and everywhere, and always? which manifestly is proper to divinity."

I answer that to be everywhere first and per se is proper to God alone. I say that to be everywhere "first" is that which, according to its whole self, is everywhere; for if something were everywhere according to diverse parts existing in diverse places, it would not be "first" everywhere: because what belongs to something by reason of a part does not belong to it first; as if a man is white because of a tooth, whiteness does not belong first to the man, but to the tooth. And to be everywhere "per se" I say of that to which it does not belong to be everywhere per accidens on account of some supposition made: as, if a grain of millet were everywhere, on the supposition that there were no other body. Therefore to be everywhere belongs per se to something when it is such that, no matter what position be made, it will follow that it is everywhere. And this properly belongs to God: because however many places be posited, even if infinite be posited beyond those that are, it would be necessary that God be in all of them; for nothing can be unless through Him. Thus, then, to be everywhere "first" and "per se" belongs to God, and is proper to Him: because, however places are posited, it is necessary that in any one there be God, not according to a part, but according to Himself.

Reply to the first: The universal and prime matter are indeed everywhere, but not according to that being by which God is; for neither the universal nor matter exist per se, but in something.

Reply to the second: Number, since it is an accident, is not per se, but per accidens, in place. Nor is it whole in any one of the things numbered, but according to a part: and thus it does not follow that it is first and per se everywhere.

Reply to the third: The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not first: because it is not whole in any place whatever, but according to its parts. Nor per se: because, if some other places were posited, it would not be in them.

Reply to the fourth: If there were an infinite body, it would be everywhere, but according to its parts.

Reply to the fifth: If there were only one animal, its soul would be everywhere, not indeed first, but per accidens.

Reply to the sixth: When it is said that the soul sees somewhere, this can be understood in two ways. In one way, as we have heard some say, it determines the act of seeing on the side of the object; and so it is true that, when it sees the heaven, it sees in the heaven, and in the same way it senses in the heaven: yet it does not follow that it is there where it sees; for acts are in the agent, not in the object, and therefore the soul is rather where it is by its essence than where it is by its act.

Reply to the sixth: When it is said that the soul sees somewhere, this can be understood in two ways. In one way, as this adverb "somewhere" determines the act of seeing on the side of the object; and so it is true that, when it sees the heaven, it sees in the heaven; and for the same reason it senses in the heaven: yet it does not follow that it either lives in heaven or is in heaven; for to live

and to be do not signify an act passing over into an external object. In another way it can be understood as the adverb determines the act on the side of the one seeing, according as the act of seeing proceeds from the one seeing. And thus it is true that where the soul senses and sees, there it is and lives, according to this mode of speaking; and so it does not follow that it is everywhere.

Explication of the article: The conclusion is: It is proper to God to be everywhere. These words St. Thomas understands in this way, namely, that it is proper to God to be everywhere, as things now are: for, the hypothesis being posited that there were nothing in the order of things except man, even man would be everywhere; and the same must be said of a grain of millet, and of any most minute thing. For, as we used to say, a body carries along with itself situation by reason of quantity, and therefore the adverbs "somewhere" and the like can befit it, and consequently even the adverb "everywhere," when outside it there is nothing else: for then there would not be another "where" than its own: it therefore would be everywhere, that is, in every place.

Furthermore, it must be observed that God differs from other things in this, that other things are not apt to be everywhere, no matter what supposition is made about the existence of things; but God can be everywhere without the places in which his effects exist being posited. Add that, in order that God be said to be everywhere, there is no need that he exist outside the heaven, where there is nothing, as we said in that disputation. Wherefore I have rightly noted here that many Scholastics said that it did not befit God from eternity actually to be everywhere, indeed not even to be anywhere, because from eternity there was nothing where he might be. Wherefore this attribute is not one of actual existence in things, but that aptitude by which God is everywhere. Nor, moreover, is it the same as the essence according to formal ratio: for immensity includes a reference at least of aptitude to created things, just as omnipotence, by reason of which it is considered by us as a passion of the essence, and hence it is placed among the attributes. In what way, moreover, it is distinguished from the attribute of infinity, we have expressly noted elsewhere. And these things are enough about this article and about the whole question.[485]

Quaestio IX - On the immutability of God

Consequently, it must be considered concerning the immutability and the eternity of the divine, of which eternity follows upon immutability. Concerning immutability two things are asked.

485. Vazquez alludes to his earlier discussions: "as we used to say" and "we have expressly noted elsewhere," with marginal pointers in the edition (e.g., disput. 29, c. 3; disput. 25).

Articulus I - Whether God is altogether immutable

Objicitur: It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as St. Augustine says in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, book 8, the Creator Spirit moves himself, neither through time nor through place: therefore God is in some way mutable.

1. Furthermore, in Wisdom 7 it is said of Wisdom that she is more mobile than all mobiles. But God is Wisdom itself: therefore God is mobile.
2. Furthermore, to draw near and to withdraw signify motion: yet such things are said of God in Scripture, James 4: "Draw near to God, and he will draw near to you": therefore God is mutable.

But on the contrary: it is said in Malachi 3: "I am God, and I do not change."

I answer that it must be said that, from the foregoing, it is shown that God is altogether immutable. First indeed, because above it has been shown that there is some first being, which we call God; and that such a first being must be pure act (*actus*) without any admixture of potency (*potentia*), since potency is simply posterior to act. But whatever in any way is changed, is in some way in potency. From which it is clear that it is impossible for God to be changed in any way.

Second, because whatever is moved, as to something it remains and as to something it passes over; just as that which is moved from whiteness to blackness remains according to substance, and so in every thing that is moved, some composition is observed. Now it has been shown above that in God there is no composition, but he is altogether simple. Whence it is manifest that God cannot be moved.

Third, because whatever is moved by its motion acquires something and reaches that to which previously it did not reach. But God, since he is infinite, comprehending in himself the whole plenitude of perfection, of all being (*esse*), cannot acquire anything, nor extend himself unto something to which previously he did not reach. Whence in no way does motion befit him. And hence it is that certain of the ancients, as if compelled by the truth itself, posited that the first principle is immobile.

Reply to the first: In the place cited Augustine speaks according to the mode in which Plato said that the first mover moves itself, calling every operation "motion"; according to which even to understand and to will and to love are called certain motions. Therefore, because God understands and loves himself, they said on this account that God moves himself, not however according to that motion and change which belongs to an existent in potency, as we now speak of change and motion.

Reply to the second: Wisdom is said to be mobile by way of likeness, inasmuch as its likeness is diffused down to the lowest things: for nothing can be which does not proceed from the divine Wisdom through some imitation, as from a first efficient and formal principle, just as even things made by art proceed from the wisdom of the artisan. Thus therefore, insofar as the likeness of the

divine Wisdom proceeds by degrees from the highest, which more participate in its likeness, down to the lowest of things, which participate less, it is called a certain procession and motion of the divine Wisdom into things; just as if we were to say that the sun proceeds as far as the earth, insofar as the ray of its light reaches all the way to the earth. And in this way Pseudo-Dionysius expounds it, in the first chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy, saying that every procession of the divine manifestation comes to us "from the Father of lights."[486]

Reply to the third: Things of this sort are said of God in the Scriptures metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house or to go out, insofar as its ray reaches to the house, so God is said to draw near to us or to withdraw from us, insofar as we perceive the influx of his goodness, or fail from it.

Articulus II - Whether to be immutable is proper to God

Objicitur: It seems that to be immutable is not proper to God. For the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 2 that matter is in everything that is moved: but certain created substances, such as angels and souls, do not have matter, as it seems to some: therefore to be immutable is not proper to God.

1. Furthermore, whatever is moved, is moved for some end: therefore that which has arrived at the ultimate end is not moved. But certain creatures have arrived at the ultimate end, as all the blessed: therefore some creatures are immobile.
2. Furthermore, whatever is mutable is variable; but forms are invariable: for it is said in the sixth book of Principles that the form is simple and invariable, and that essences are consistent: therefore it is not proper to God alone to be immutable.

But on the contrary is what St. Augustine says in the book On the Nature of the Good: "God alone is immutable; but the things which he made, because they are from nothing, are mutable."

I answer that it must be said that God alone is altogether immutable, but every creature is in some way mutable. For it must be known that something can be called mutable in a twofold manner. In one way, by a potency which is in the thing itself; in another way, by a potency which is in another. I call "potency" here passive potency (*potentia passiva*), according to which a thing can attain its perfection, either in being (*in essendo*), or in attaining the end. If, therefore, the mutability of a thing be considered according to its potency to being, thus there is not mutability in all creatures, but in those only in which that which is possible in them can stand together with non-being.

It is objected: Further, all the blessed; therefore some creatures are immobile.

1. Furthermore, whatever is mutable is variable; but forms are invariable. For it is said in the sixth book of the Metaphysics that form consists in a simple and invariable essence; therefore it is not proper to God alone to be immutable.

486. Pseudo-Dionysius, De coelesti hierarchia, cap. 1.

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Reply to the first: That objection proceeds from what is mutable according to substantial or accidental being. Of such motion the philosophers have treated.

487. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 4; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, lib. 2, cap. 4.

Reply to the second: The good angels, over and above the immutability of being, which befits them according to nature, have immutability of choice by divine power; yet in them there remains mutability according to place.

Reply to the third: Forms are called invariable because they cannot be the subject of variation; yet they are subjected to variation inasmuch as the subject is varied according to them. Whence it is clear that according as things are, thus are they varied: for they are not called "beings" as if they were a subject of "being," but because there is something to them.

Observations concerning the whole question.

There follows another attribute of the divine essence, which is called immutability, in which, besides the essence, there is also signified a certain respect, although by way of negation; on account of which respect this new attribute can most fittingly be numbered. Concerning the whole question a few things are noteworthy, yet nothing that requires a long disputation; wherefore we shall treat it briefly.

It must be observed, therefore, first, that a threefold genus of mutation can be conceived of in a rational nature. The first, according to being, namely, that a thing be such as to be able not to be; and in this way God cannot be changed - not because he is his own existence (*esse*), but because he does not depend on another; and this is the proper cause or ratio of incorruptibility, not, however, that essence is not distinguished from existence by the nature of the thing; we shall show in Disputation 183, chapter 5, where we shall demonstrate that the angelic nature can be mutable by this genus of mutation, although in reality it is its own being. Therefore the question which some here dispute concerning the incorruptibility of God and of the angel, we remit to that place.

The second genus of mutation is according to some accident: in which way every creature can be changed. Wherefore, since there is no accident in God, as was proved at q. 3, art. 6, by this genus of mutation he cannot be changed; and how he cannot be moved by place, was explained in Disputation 29, chapter 5.

The third genus of mutation is of purpose and will, or of knowledge: as when one who before thought something true, afterwards judges it false; and what he before had decided to do, afterwards he does not wish. And it will be clear from the places cited below that this genus of mutation cannot be fitting to God. The immutability indeed of the knowledge of God is deduced from the certitude of the science which he has; and this we shall more fully declare at q. 14, arts. 2 and 15. But the immutability of the decree is deduced from another source, as we shall say at q. 19, art. 7.[488]

Regarding the first genus of immutability, that is understood which is in 1 Timothy 6: "Who alone has immortality." Concerning the second can be taken the testimony of James 1: "With whom there is no change, nor shadow of turning." For for "change" the Greek has a word which denotes conversion; and Proclus uses it in his Sphere for the conversion of the sun.[489] Therefore James signifies that to God - whom he had called the Father of lights - there does not befit the alternation

488. For the immutability of divine knowledge, see q. 14, arts. 2 and 15; for the immutability of the divine decree, see q. 19, art. 7.

of light and shadow which we see in our sun; for by reciprocation and conversion from the East into the West the sun is overshadowed to us; wherefore night is said to succeed. But God, because he has in himself no change, is of right called not only light, but also the Father and source of light, into whom no conversion, or reciprocal turning, can fall. But what he subjoins, "Of his own will he begot us by the word of truth," is not to be referred to the immutability of his will - about which nothing had been said - but to that which he had said a little before: "Every best gift," etc. Concerning the third genus of mutation the other testimonies of Scripture are to be understood, which we shall set down below at q. 19, art. 7.

Then it is to be noted that, since by our mode of understanding we attribute to God various perfections after the manner of passions, in like manner one proceeds from another, not as from a cause, but as from a ratio. And concerning this attribute of immutability not a few think that it is born proximally from the ratio of immensity; and therefore St. Thomas, after he had treated of immensity, immediately disputed of immutability. But from those things which we have thus far said it is easy to gather that this is not true. For, first, the genus of immutability which befits God from the fact that he does not depend on another, in which the ratio of incorruptibility consists, is present to God by the ratio of infinity according to essence, as we proved in Disputation 25, chapter 5; therefore immutability in this mode arises rather from infinity than from immensity. The second genus is born from this, that in God there is no accident; which pertains to divine simplicity: and therefore upon that matter, which is of the simplicity of God, it has been disputed at q. 3. This immutability therefore has its origin from simplicity, in which genus there is also immutability according to place, which is attributed to God by reason of immensity. Finally, the third genus is the immutability of the knowledge and will of God, which arises from the infinity and certitude of his knowledge and will, as will clearly be evident from the places cited. Wherefore only immutability according to place comes from immensity; and hence the opinion which asserts that the attribute of immutability proceeds from immensity cannot be universally true.

489. 1 Tim. 6:16; James 1:17; on the Greek term for "change," cf. Proclus, in his work on the Sphere, where he uses it for the sun's conversion.

Quaestio X - On the eternity of God

Articulus I - Whether eternity is fittingly defined as the interminable possession, all at once, of life

First, it seems that it is not a fitting definition of eternity which Boethius posits in book 3 of the Consolation, saying that "eternity is the interminable possession, all at once and perfect, of life." For "interminable" is said negatively. But negation is not of the notion except of those things which are deficient; which does not befit eternity: therefore in the definition of eternity "interminable" ought not to be placed.

1. Furthermore, eternity signifies a certain duration; but duration regards being (*esse*) more than life; therefore life ought not to have been placed in the definition of eternity, but rather being.
2. Furthermore, whole (totum) is said of that which has parts. But this does not befit eternity, since it is simple; therefore it is unfittingly said "all at once" (tota).
3. Furthermore, many days cannot be at once, nor many times. But in eternity days and times are said in the plural; for it is said in Micah 5: "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity"; and in Romans 16: "According to the revelation of the mystery kept silent for eternal times": therefore eternity is not "all at once."

But to the first, it is answered, that simple things are wont to be defined through negation, as a point is that which has no part: which is not because the negation is of their essence (*essentia*), but because our intellect, which first apprehends composites, cannot arrive at the cognition of simples, save by the removal of composition.

Reply to the second: That which is truly eternal is not only a being, but a living thing; and living itself extends in a certain way to operation, not, however, to being. But the stretching-out of duration seems to be attended more according to operation than according to being; whence also time is the number of motion.

Reply to the third: Eternity is said to be "whole" (tota), not because it has parts, but inasmuch as nothing is lacking to it.

Reply to the fourth: Just as God, since He is incorporeal, is named in the Scriptures by the names of corporeal things metaphorically, so eternity, existing all at once (tota simul), is named by temporal names of succession.

Reply to the fifth: In time two things are to be considered, namely time itself, which is successive, and the now of time, which is imperfect. Therefore he says "all at once," to remove time; and "perfect," to exclude the now of time.

Reply to the sixth: That which is possessed is held firmly and at rest. Therefore, to designate the immutability (*immutabilitas*) and indefectibility of eternity, he used the name of "possession."

The conclusion is affirmative. The text of St. Thomas needs no explanation.

Disputatio XXXI - How eternity and immutability are distinguished, and which of them presupposes the other

Caput I - In what way eternity and immutability are distinguished

Before we examine the doctrine of this disputation, it must be premised in what way St. Thomas, and the other Scholastics, distinguish eternity from immutability as a different attribute. Now it is without controversy that these two attributes differ in notion (ratione). Thus St. Thomas hands this down in the following article, and Cajetan supposes it thus in the present. Aureolus also agrees, as Capreolus reports in I, dist. 9, the only question, art. 2, arguments of the first order.[490]

Besides these, however, and some more recent writers, no other, whom I have read, made mention of this difference: which indeed is hard to assign. First, because the Fathers seem to confuse these two: for Tertullian in the book Against Hermogenes, ch. 39, says that the laws of eternity are that it cannot suffer dispersion and alteration, wherein the proper notion of immutability seems to be placed.[491] St. Augustine, however, in the book On the Nature of the Good, ch. 39, speaks thus: "But that is true eternity, which is true immortality, that is, that highest incommutability, which God alone has."[492]

Then also, if we attend to the notion, to distinguish these two appears no less difficult: for since the eternal is that which lacks beginning and end of its being, it seems altogether the same as if you were to say that it always is in the same way; but this is immutable. For immutability, insofar as it is constituted as a divine attribute, is not only a negation of mutation which is properly called mutation, to wit, with the subject remaining, but of any change whatsoever, even that which is from being to non-being, as is gathered from the doctrine of St. Thomas, q. 9, art. 2, and as Ferrarensis teaches, Contra gentiles, ch. 15, at the beginning.[493]

These things, however, do not prevent eternity from being distinguished in notion from immutability: for immutability is a fullness of being itself signified by the negation of change; but eternity expresses something else, namely duration and perseverance in being, which is said to be, as it were, the age or aevum of God's very being; this immutability does not so expressly denote. Eternity moreover adds the negation of measure, which immutability does not formally signify. Therefore eternity is God's duration without measure; immutability, rather, is the state of a thing full in its being, capable of no change. Wherefore, whether you consider the negation or the

490. St. Thomas, in the following article; Cajetan, on the present article; Aureolus, as reported by Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 9, unica quaest., art. 2, arguments of the first order.

491. Tertullian, Adversus Hermogenem, ch. 39.

492. St. Augustine, De natura boni, ch. 39.

493. St. Thomas, q. 9, art. 2; Ferrarensis, Contra gentiles, ch. 15, at the beginning.

positive ratio, immutability is not the same in notion with eternity, but eternity so closely follows it that we easily understand the one by the other. And therefore the Fathers, not being very solicitous about the formal notion of these attributes, easily confuse the one with the other.

Caput II - The opinion of Cajetan on the proposed question

It is certain among the Scholastics that not only the formal notion (*ratio formalis*) of duration, but also the negation of measure, is contained in the concept of eternity, from which negation it is called interminable. The controversy, however, is whether, besides these two, there also belongs to it some respect of reason, by which its formal notion may be fully unfolded, or whether it is wholly real, so that it is not completed by the intellect. Now when we ask whether the whole notion of eternity is real, we do not call into question whether it is some thing distinct in reality from the Deity by nature, or not: for whatever is in God is God Himself, as we will show in disputation 116 and the following; but we ask whether by the name of eternity we signify some notion that is only real, though in our intellect distinct from the essence, or whether we also denote some respect of reason as a complement of it under that name. All also, as a certain point, suppose that by the name of eternity only a respect of reason is not denoted. But in the question thus understood the Doctors' opinions vary.

The first is Cajetan's in this article, who holds first that the formal notion of eternity - which he calls "objective" - is wholly real, nor is it completed by any respect of reason. And he says that this notion is uniformity, so that, he says, eternity is formally uniformity; and that St. Thomas taught this, when he said that eternity consists in the apprehension of the uniformity of that which is outside motion. He said "in the apprehension of uniformity," not because it would consist in some respect of reason arising from apprehension, but because that whole ratio of uniformity is apprehended - that is, the objective concept of uniformity, which is real.

Cajetan indeed proves this by no reason; yet it can be recommended in this way. The notion of uniformity is unity in form: therefore it is real, and consequently so is eternity. This ratio nevertheless supposes what is most important, namely, that in eternity there is uniformity, as St. Thomas plainly taught. Moreover, because in this article he also taught that not only uniformity pertains to the notion of eternity, but the negation also of beginning and end - although we include it in the concept of eternity, as all teach - still the same conclusion is altogether proved. For that negation is without any order to the intellect: therefore the whole notion of eternity, even if you include the negation, is completed without any respect of reason.

Secondly, amplifying his view, Cajetan says that eternity is uniformity itself formally, not materially - that is, not the unity of uniformity, as some wished; for thus it would be materially uniformity itself - but uniformity itself as such. Whence it is clear how ill some recent authors understood him, who assert that according to his mind eternity is uniformity itself abstract, not, however, concrete in the divine nature; so that uniformity would not be unity in the divine nature. Nothing could he have thought less, as is clear to one who reads him: for rather he says that unity and uniformity are the same, except that uniformity is unity contracted to form; for it is unity in

form; whereas unity is an abstract and common notion. Cajetan only contends that eternity is not the unity of uniformity, as St. Thomas should be understood to have spoken formally, when he said that eternity consists in the apprehension of uniformity, and thus it is uniformity itself formally, not the unity of uniformity, which would be materially. Then too it would be a useless repetition, which logicians are wont to call a nugation, if we were to say "the unity of uniformity." For it would be just as if we were to say "the unity of unity in form." For uniformity is unity in form.

Thirdly, Cajetan's view must be explained still more. For some recent Theologians have interpreted it in a sinister way. It must therefore be noted that he never taught that eternity is a real measure of the divine nature, as they falsely impute to him. He only said that its formal notion is real, namely the uniformity of the divine nature without beginning and without end. And what he added - that it is also a measure of God Himself - he did not subjoin because he thought it to be a real measure, since it is manifest that it is not really distinct from God Himself, and that nothing can really measure itself; nor did he think that any notion of measure is contained in the objective concept of eternity; but he only taught that eternity itself is a measure which could accidentally befit it. This is Cajetan's doctrine faithfully rehearsed, which we, setting it forth and confirming it, will refute below.

Caput III - What the more recent authors think

The second opinion is that of some recent authors, different indeed from Cajetan's view by a little, namely, that the formal notion of eternity is the uniformity of God's duration taken in recto, which they say is real; but that it connotes in obliquo the notion of measure, which they teach to be only a respect of reason: wherefore this attribute is truly something real before every operation of the intellect, in whose notion the ratio of measure is contained fundamentally (as they say), not formally; but it is completed formally by the intellect - just as many think that time is in reality the duration of motion, to which there supervenes a respect of reason, which is not of its essence.

Moreover, besides the fact that below the falsity of this opinion, as also of the preceding, will be expressly shown, to pass over that, I say that in it it is not sufficiently intelligible how in the notion of eternity there should be contained a respect of reason connoted in obliquo, and yet the notion of eternity be real before the intellect: for if that respect is denoted by it, something of order to such a respect must belong to its notion; but order and connotatum are always included in the formal notion of a connotative term. Otherwise it is absurd, and in the judgment of its own patrons, because they hold that the notion of eternity is before the intellect: now an order to a respect of reason cannot be real; nor absolutely can there be an order to a respect of reason, whether real or of reason, since there is no relation to a relation. Therefore that order to the connotatum must be of the notion of the connotative term; which is proved by this, that as often as we say that by the name of one thing something else is connoted, the connotatum is not of the essence, but some order to it belongs to the notion of the connotative, though not connatural to it. Therefore, as often as by the name of one thing something else is connoted, the connotatum cannot be a respect, but something absolute; the order, however, to that is of the notion of the connotative.

Caput IV - The third opinion: eternity as composed of real duration and of the ratio of measure

Its falsity, as also of the preceding, will be expressly shown; yet, to touch this by the way and briefly, and to say something of reason, namely that it be completed in the measure of the divine substance, and thus that the notion of eternity be essentially completed by the intellect: in this I do not sufficiently understand how, in the notion of eternity, there is contained a respect of reason obliquely connoted, and yet the notion of eternity is real before the intellect. For if that respect be denoted by the same [term], there must belong to its notion some order to such a respect: for order to the connotatum is always included in the formal notion of the connotative. But this is absurd, both in their own view - because it would then follow that the notion of eternity is not before the intellect; for an order to a respect of reason cannot be real - and also absolutely, since there cannot be an order, whether real or of reason, to a respect of reason, because there is not a relation to a relation. Moreover, that that order to the connotatum must be of the notion of the connotative is proved by this, that as often as we say that by the name of one thing something else is connoted, the connotatum is not of the essence, but some order to it [belongs to the notion]; otherwise by that very name it would not be connoted. Therefore, as often as by the name of one thing something else is connoted, the connotatum cannot be a respect, but something absolute; the order, however, to that is of the notion of the connotative.

They bring in, moreover, an example for their doctrine in this way: just as wisdom in God is a real perfection, yet it connotes the notion of an attribute, which is by the intellect; so too eternity is a real duration (*duratio*) in God, yet it connotes the notion of measure (*mensura*), which is by the intellect. But this example is not apt: for although wisdom is an attribute of God, and the notion of attribute is said by the intellect (for our intellect attributes something to God after the mode of a passion), nevertheless wisdom, and any perfection of God signified by its proper name, does not connote this notion of attribute, but denominatively alone is called an attribute; just as the name animal so signifies the substance (*substantia*) of the animal that it does not connote the notion of genus, although the animal itself is denominated a genus.

The third opinion is, that to the formal notion of eternity there pertains something real, namely a duration without beginning and without end, and also something of reason, to wit that it be completed in the measure of the divine substance; and thus that the notion (*ratio*) of eternity be essentially completed by the intellect: just as time has both the duration of motion, which is something real, and its number, which is of the reason that numbers. This sentence is handed down by Ferrarensis in Contra gentiles, ch. 15, not far from the beginning; while among the ancient scholastics, who do not mention this difficulty, some quite plainly affirm that eternity is the measure of the divine substance. Whether, however, its whole formal notion is the notion of measure, or is a complement, or something of these, they do not explain. Thus teaches St. Thomas in the present question, art. 2, reply to obj. 3; Albertus in I, dist. 9, art. 8, and in the little treatise De quatuor coaevis; and Henry in q. 3, art. 1, and Henry again in the Summa, art. 31, q. 7.[494]

St. Thomas only adds that eternity is not a real measure, but [a measure] by the intellect: whether this be true, we shall say below. Ferrarensis scarcely confirms this opinion. Behold, for it would have been enough if he had explained and defended it. Yet it can be proved by this reason. Eternity, besides duration, just as also time, formally has the notion of measure: but this belongs to it by the intellect; for since it is not distinguished from the substance of God, of which it is the measure, it cannot be a real measure.

This opinion will be easily impugned below; meanwhile, however, it must be noted that certain more recent [authors], not sufficiently consistent in their doctrine, wrongly assert that eternity is not formally a duration, but the measure of the duration of the divine substance; which by no reason can be defended. For if it is the duration itself that falls under measure, it does not seem that anything else in God could be the measure of that: for neither can uniformity measure the duration - for that is the very permanent duration, as was said above - nor immutability, because this is distinguished from eternity, as we proved in that place; therefore the notion of measure belongs to duration, if it is to belong to anything.

Caput V - Notes in favor of the truer opinion

Accordingly, in this matter my mind is that eternity in some respect is constituted essentially by something real and also by something of reason, and is so constituted essentially. The real [component] is a duration remaining and uniform, without beginning and without end; the [component] of reason is not a measure, but the negation of a measure. Wherefore eternity must be defined in this way: a duration remaining, uniform, without beginning and without end, lacking a measure. This sentence seems to agree with that which Ferrarensis handed down, when he said that the notion of eternity is completed both by something real and by something of reason. Yet it differs in this, that he thinks that that [element] of reason, which he says pertains to the notion of eternity, is the notion of measure; whereas we, on the contrary, assert that it is not a measure, but the negation of it. Why we say that this is of reason will be explained in the following chapter. From which it is also clear how far this our sentence differs from the others that we have mentioned. But in its explication and confirmation certain things must be observed.

First: if there could be some real measure of any thing, it would have to be really distinguished from the very thing of which it is the measure; for the same thing cannot measure itself by a real measure. Therefore all plainly admit that no real measure can be applied to God; but those who say that eternity is His measure affirm that it is not real, but according to reason and our mode of understanding.

Second, a definition of measure must be premised, which Aristotle clearly gathers in Metaphysics X, chs. 2 and 3. Although, moreover, the name measure among approved authors also signifies that by which something is bounded by weight, or capacity, length, height, or breadth, and by mind - what philosophers call passive measure, or mensurability - and the instrument by which

494. Ferrarensis, Contra gentiles, ch. 15, near the beginning; St. Thomas, in this question, art. 2, ad 3; Albertus, In I Sent., dist. 9, art. 8, and the tract De quatuor coaevis; Henry, Quodl., q. 3, art. 1; and Henry, Summa, art. 31, q. 7.

we measure, which is called active measure; and although Aristotle defines only the active measure; nevertheless, from that it will also easily be evident what measure is in the former way; and the explication of both will not a little illuminate our sentence.

Measure, therefore, says Aristotle (he understands the active [measure]), is said in a twofold way. First, in each genus, that which in some manner measures the rest belonging to that genus, inasmuch as those are said to be more perfect the more they are like to it. And in this way any first species is something real; yet the ratio of measure, which we attribute to it, is of reason. For the first species of the thing itself does not measure others, but our intellect uses the first species as an instrument for knowing and defining the perfection of the others. Next, measure is said properly and most of all (says the Philosopher) of quantity (*quantitas*): yet by quantity he understands whatever is signified after the mode of it, which he indicated not obscurely in ch. 3. For he said that the measure ought to be homogeneous with that which it measures, and thus that the measure of lengths is length, of voices, voice, of weights, weight. But it is clear that voice is not properly a quantity, or at least no one would concede this of weight, since it is a quality; and yet in weight, as in length, we properly speak of measure. Therefore measure is homogeneous, as weight is with weight, not with length. And in the same way the duration of any thing whatsoever, about which there is now controversy, must be measured by some duration, not by weight; to which [point] the measure of voice also, whose length and shortness has been adduced, can be reduced.

Wherefore Gabriel, on II Sent., dist. 2, q. 1, art. 1, note 1, assigns, in accord with the four modes of quantity, four modes also of measure. The first he says is of perfection, which Aristotle recounted in the first place. The second, however, which Aristotle placed in quantity or in things which are signified after the mode of quantity, Gabriel distributes into three others. The first he says is of multitude, the second of extension, the third of duration. But besides these four there is another, as is clear from what has been said, namely of weight. Wherefore it is better to reduce all these to one, which is of quantity or after the mode of it, and to distinguish only that which is of perfection.

Moreover Aristotle defines measure properly in that same ch. 2 thus: it is that by which the how-much is known. That is, upon whose quantity being inspected we understand how much another thing is, whether by length, or by weight, etc. Forthwith he subjoins these words: As the how-much, either by number, or by unity. But every number [is measured] by one. As if he said: that by which we know how much is either number or unity; and by how-much he understands the continuous, not the discrete: but the continuous is best known by number, just as the quantity of bread [is known] by the number of wines; by no other continuous quantity equal to it could it be known, because no other would be better known; but number cannot be known by another number, but by unity repeated; for if to a multitude you apply another multitude, you could not measure it unless, by unity repeated, you arrive at the ultimate limits. Therefore Aristotle added, Every number [is measured] by one, and finally concludes that the first measure is unity. He thus said that the how-much, that is, the continuous, is known either by number or by unity: for in the end number is reduced to unity as to the first measure. From which doctrine, in the following chapter, we shall easily deduce that measure is formally a respect (*respectus*) of reason.

Third, it must be noted from Durandus on II, dist. 2, q. 5, n. 11, that quantity, which extends the substance subject to it, is not the measure of that [substance]; and by the same reason duration is not the measure of the substance in which it is. For measure is that by which something is known; but a thing so far as it is quantitative is not known by its own quantity, nor is a substance that endures known by its own duration: therefore neither quantity nor duration are the measure of the substance in which they inhere. Nay rather, quantity so extends the substance, and duration in its own way also affects it, that it renders the substance subject to measure, that is, measurable. For when quantity is applied, the substance is measured as quantitative, because the substance is extended by quantity; which could not be if it lacked it. Duration also, when it is extrinsic and another's, applied by the intellect, measures another substance which has duration in itself, by reason of which it can fall under measure; but the proper duration of each thing cannot measure that [same thing], because it cannot be the cause that by it [the thing] be known as how much.

Then the same is proved from that place of Aristotle: for he teaches that the measure ought to be homogeneous, that is, of the same ratio with the thing it measures; as magnitude with magnitude, length with length, weight with weight, and in the same way duration with duration. Where he always assigns that one magnitude is the measure of another magnitude, and one length of another length, etc., but never quantity as the measure of a naked substance; for thus the measure would not be homogeneous. Wherefore as often as a substance is subjected to measure, it is by reason of its proper quantity, or of something having itself after the mode of quantity, that it is subjected. Thus, then, a substance is not subjected to its own proper duration as if to a measure, but by reason of its proper duration it falls under the measure of another duration. The property, therefore, of quantity, which is wont to be called mensurability, is not an active measure of the substance in which it is, but a passive [one], by which the substance is rendered capable of measure, that is, measurable.

But if someone should contend too strongly that there is a certain genus of active intrinsic measure, and in this way that quantity and duration are the measure of the substance in which they are; and that Aristotle defined the measure which we apply extrinsically: let him produce the definition of this intrinsic measure, and he will find it to be nothing other than passive [measure], which we gladly concede: for any thing by its quantity or duration becomes measurable not by that [quantity or duration] itself, but by another applied extrinsically.

Fourth, it must be observed that we in a certain way call sense and science a measure of things, as the same Aristotle teaches in the place cited. They are said, however, to be a measure not of their objects, as Averroes, Alexander, and St. Thomas interpret that place, but they are said to be a measure of all things which fall under measure, inasmuch as by sense and science we apply the unity by which we measure things, knowing how much they are. Wherefore they seem to pertain to active measure, just as Aristotle in Physics IV, ch. 14, text 131, and in De Anima said that [measure] is a number by the one numbering, because by cognition it divides and numbers motion; but straightway Aristotle subjoins in that same book III, ch. 3, as if correcting what he had said: But they are measured rather than that they measure; yet it happens to us as if by another measuring us we should know how much we are, because a cubital measure has been applied to us. These

words seem difficult and contrary to what he had said. They are thus to be understood. Science and sense rather fall under measure than are a measure of other things at all; for they are disposed just so when we apply a measure for knowing a quantitative thing, as if a measure were applied to us by another, so that thence we might know how much we are. Then, however, our science and sense would be as it were passive; and therefore Aristotle said that they are rather measured than that they measure. Therefore they are disposed in the same way when we ourselves apply the measure. But sense is said to fall under measure inasmuch as the known thing is comprehended under measure, and thus, as is known, the known thing becomes in a certain way also a cause of the very cognition. Nor, indeed, does Aristotle deny that cognition also pertains to active measure; but...

But he says that it rather falls under measure: for it itself has two things, both to apply or compare the measure with the thing that falls under measure - this, inasmuch as it pertains to action - and then to know how great the thing is to which the measure is applied; and this, inasmuch as it seems to pertain to passion. And since this second more properly belongs of itself to science and to the intellect than to apply a measure - which can be applied by another - the science itself ought rather to be reduced to passive measure than to active.

Finally, it must be noted that a measure is always something extrinsically applied for measuring, as Scotus most aptly taught in II, dist. 2, q. 2, § 5. For the second part: whether the unity which is applied for measuring be a thing and some distinct substance - or one and the same as the cloth to be measured, which is a part of the same thing which is to be measured (as in the motion of the heaven, one part of which we take and, repeating it over the remainder, apply it, and measuring by dividing the whole); or whether it be the mere formal ratio of unity by which, in repeated multitude, number is discerned - measure is therefore always something extrinsic to the thing which we measure, and nothing can measure itself. From all which it is plainly clear that the notion of measure and of the measurable consists only in a respect of reason.

The doctrine set out above is confirmed.

The first is that it belongs to the notion of eternity to be a duration, which is something real - in which I do not see the Doctors' opinions to be discrepant; but whether in the notion of duration there be connoted something extrinsic, among them there is some controversy. The second part of this position is that to the essence of eternity there in no way pertains the notion of measure. This is proved as follows.

If eternity in itself had the notion of measure, it would either be a real measure or one by the intellect. It cannot be real, neither referred to the substance of God, nor to anything else. The first, because eternity of itself really measures no other real duration, as is evident; then, because the substance of God cannot really be measured, since it is not really distinguished from it - as is clear - which would have been necessary in order that it be a real measure, as was said in the first notation. Finally, because every measure is formally something of reason, as we showed in the same place; and every unity is called a measure only insofar as it serves our intellect for knowing the quantity of some thing: but this is a certain respect of reason. For from the fact that some thing

is assumed by the intellect as an instrument by which the quantity of another is discerned, nothing other than a respect of reason can befit it. It is therefore clear that eternity is not a real measure either of substance or of another duration.

Nor can it be a measure of reason, as is any measure whatsoever, that is, by respect to an intellect that knows one thing from another: for then it would be the measure either of the substance of God, or of other durations. Not indeed of the substance of God; because, as we have from the third observation, no duration, just as neither quantity, measures the thing of which it is, but renders it measurable. Therefore, since the eternity of God is the duration of his substance, it will not measure it; but according to our mode of knowing - if that could be done - it would render it measurable. Why, however, even this it does not effect, will be said a little later; and by this reasoning Durandus proves in II, dist. 2, q. 5 that the same is not the measure of Angels, of which there will be fuller treatment in Disputation 33.[495]

Next, it cannot be the measure of other durations: for although it is a measure in the prior way out of those which we enumerated in the second notation from the doctrine of Aristotle, namely of perfection - because the other durations are known to be the more perfect, the more they are assimilated to eternity - yet it cannot be a measure in the posterior way, about which there is now controversy, namely a measure of quantity, or of something after the mode of quantity. For this latter, as was there explained, is unity or number, which is assumed by the intellect for knowing the quantity of some thing: but eternity cannot serve any intellect for this; therefore it cannot be the measure of other durations. And first, not for the divine intellect itself, to which all things are per se known, and not from another: that is evident. Then neither for a created intellect, even angelic, as is proved. For no one can from the eternal duration of God know how great is the duration of some other thing, whether this be finite on both sides, or on one side only, or on neither.

For if it were finite on one side, or on both, it would have no proportion with the eternity of God; therefore it could not be defined by it. But if it were infinite on both sides - as if God had created from eternity a creature which also would be going to endure forever - by the eternity of God it could not be made known how great its duration was. For although in common speech we might say that it would endure with God, yet for that reason we would not measure it by the eternity of God, because both would remain equally unknown and undefined. There is added that every measure, in order to be better known, ought to be reduced to unity, as is evident from the third notation. Wherefore whenever we measure life or other motions by time, we therefore take as measure the motion of the first movable, because it is better known to us and defined by some part of it, as by a repeated unity, by which also we distinguish hours, days, months, and years: but this in eternity we cannot do; therefore it cannot be our measure.

From these it is clear that to the notion of eternity it belongs not only not to be a measure, as the second part of our view asserts, but also that the notion of measure in no way befits eternity, which is attributed to time, to weight, and to other quanta. This is expressly taught by Durandus in I, dist. 19, q. 2, ad 1; Gabriel in II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 3, dub. 1, about the middle; and Ockham in II, q. 13,

495. Durandus, In II Sent., d. 2, q. 5; see also the fuller treatment on Angels' duration in Disputatio 33.

somewhat from the beginning.[496] I pass over the former reason by which Durandus proves this; for, if it is to have any force, it must be reduced to some one of ours. The latter reason is of this sort: just as what is first in any genus does not fall under the measure of something of the same genus, so also what is first in the universe of things, which is God, cannot be defined by any measure. Therefore eternity is not the measure of God. It is, however (says Durandus), a heterogeneous measure of all other things. Wherefore he does not deny that eternity is the measure of other things, but only of God; and Albert, in I, dist. 9, a. 8, seems to have taught the same.

If, indeed, Durandus understands by measure that of perfection, which is a measure in the prior mode, as we said in the second notation, his opinion is true; and his reason only proves that eternity is not the measure of God in this way, about which there is no controversy. But if he speaks of the measure of quantity, which is a measure in the posterior mode, eternity cannot be the measure of other things, as has been shown; nor does it follow that God does not fall under measure on this account, that what is more perfect in one genus does not fall under the measure of what is more imperfect in the same genus. For sometimes we measure what is more noble by something less noble, as by the motion of the first movable we measure the duration of an Angel, as we shall say in Disputation 33. Rather, therefore, eternity for this reason cannot be a measure, because the duration of it is without principle and end.

Someone will object, Gregory Nazianzen in the Oration on the Nativity, which is the 38th, a little before the middle, where he speaks thus: Eternity is neither time, nor any part of time (for it does not fall under measure), but what for us is divided by the motion of the sun is time; that, however, is, as it were, a certain temporal motion and interval which is extended together with the eternal things. Therefore, according to his opinion, eternity is referred to the eternal things as time is to temporal things; but time is distinguished from temporals; therefore also eternity from eternals. Then too, eternity is extended together with the eternal things, just as time with temporal things: therefore, as time measures temporal things, so also eternity eternal things. He has the same words in the third Oration on Theology, which is the 35th, a little after the beginning; and in the second on Easter, which is the 42nd, before the middle, where Prelusius in the same place, and Isellus too, seem to say the same.

I answer: I take Nazianzen not to teach that eternity is the measure of the eternal things, but rather to allege that eternity lacks measure. For if eternity cannot be defined by any measure, it follows that it is not the measure of the eternal things themselves. And if sometimes eternity is called a measure of God, it is not so called because the definition of measure fits it, but so as to show that God can be defined by no measure; we say that his measure is eternity.

It should also be observed that Nazianzen seems to have defined not only the intrinsic duration of God, which is true eternity, but also another duration as if adjacent to the eternal things, which he called an interval and a kind of temporal motion extended together with the eternal things, that is, equal to them. But this "eternity" is nothing in reality, but is fashioned by imagination only; and

496. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 19, q. 2, ad 1; Gabriel [Biel], In II Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, dub. 1 (circa medium); Ockham, In II Sent., q. 13.

he called it a "quasi-motion," as Nicetas very aptly noted on that 42nd Oration, to show that an exact description of eternity cannot be given, but that it is to be understood after the manner of a flowing motion and of a space having latitude.

Wherefore the same Nazianzen in Iambic 15, among other definitions of things, of which he thus speaks, says: Aevum, which without time flows unceasingly; and by "aevum" he calls the very eternity as the common mode of the whole, as we noted in Disputation 33, c. 1. He said, moreover, that it flows without time, and meant to signify that the thing itself has no succession, although it be conceived after the manner of a flow.

In the same sense St. John Damascene, De fide, also speaks of eternity; and Albert, in I, dist. 8, a. 8, adds a definition of eternity handed down by Isaac, framed thus: It is the universal common measure of things. Albert, however, holds that in this way there is defined only a certain extrinsic eternity, and one adjacent to the eternal things. True eternity, however, is the duration of the substance of God, or rather God himself, as says St. Gregory, Moral. XVI, c. 10; and St. Augustine on that Psalm 101, "In generatione et generationem." In what way, moreover, God himself also is said to be the author of eternity, we shall say below in Disputation 33, c. 1.[497]

The third part of our opinion remains, which from what has been said is easily gathered, namely, that to the notion of eternity - signified by this name - there belongs something of reason. Yet that is not some positive relation, nor merely the negation of something real, such as to lack beginning and end, but the negation of a certain respect of reason, namely, of measure; and this seems to be expressed by that word of the definition, "interminable." For this does not only signify the negation of beginning and of end in a duration which is real, but also the negation of being measurable: for it is called "interminable" because it cannot be determined or defined by any measure. And since measure is formally some respect of reason, as was proved in the fourth notation, the negation of it will also be the negation of some being in another way than other negations - which, although they are beings of reason, that is, have no other entity than that they exist through the intellect, are nevertheless real negations and, in respect of their being negations, have no order to the intellect.

This negation, however, insofar as it is a negation, is of some being of reason; and thus "always" seems to be signified affirmatively, although it is expressed by that negation. For "it is said to be always," that is, under whatever span of duration can even be thought; but the negation of measure, as I said, aptly expresses that formal element of eternity: by which reason time and eternity are opposed. For just as time is not only the duration of the first mobile's motion, but also - as we shall show in Disputation 33, c. 2 - a duration measured and defined by an intellectual apprehension; so, on the contrary, the formal element of eternity is a duration lacking every boundary or limit. Accordingly, Scripture says that God's years do not fail; and elsewhere, that his

497. St. John Damascene, De fide; Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 8, a. 8; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia XVI, c. 10; St. Augustine, on Ps. 101 "In generatione et generationem."

"years are without number," not because some years can be numbered, but to signify that, as regards our knowledge, number and measure have no place there, which is precisely what "interminable" conveys.[498]

Disputatio XXXII - Whether any succession belongs to eternity

Caput I - The common doctrine on this matter

There is no disagreement among the doctors on this matter. For all judge that perfect eternity, of which we have thus far spoken, is wholly simultaneous and without any succession. Hence Boethius, in defining it, said not only that it is an interminable possession of life, but a perfect and whole-at-once possession, that is, one without any succession; or, as St. Thomas explains, one uniform and without any variety. The same definition, in nearly the same words, was handed down by Anselm in the *Monologion*, ch. 24, and it is the common doctrine of the Fathers.[499]

Dionysius teaches the same near the end of *On the Divine Names*, ch. 10; likewise Prosper in the *Book of Sentences of Augustine*, sentences 3 and 183; and Augustine himself in the book of 83 questions, q. 19, with these words: "Not every immortal is, strictly speaking, called eternal; for even if something lives always, yet if it suffers mutability, it is not properly called eternal."[500]

He adds in Sermon 38 on the words of the Lord, a little before the middle, that this is the difference between eternity and time: that in time there is changeableness, in eternity stability; in eternity all things stand still; in time some things come on, others succeed. He subjoins moreover: And although, perhaps, one may be found without the other, nevertheless the meaning of the two is distinguished. When he says, "perhaps one is found without the other," he leaves it in doubt whether there now exists in reality some sempiternal thing which lacks beginning and end and yet is not truly eternal as God is. For he would not hesitate to say that nothing is created from eternity; but he said "perhaps," because it is not sufficiently clear whether a creature from eternity could be made, in which the sempiternal would be found without the eternal.

This very point was taken from St. Augustine by Isidore in Etymologies, book 7, chapter 1, and by Anselm in the Proslogion, chapters 18 - 19; and St. Gregory Nazianzen and Bede bear witness in the places soon to be cited; among the philosophers Plato taught it expressly in the Timaeus not far from the beginning: for of God he says, "Accordingly he resolved to fashion a moving image of eternity; and as he adorned the heaven, he made a certain image of eternity abiding in unity, flowing along according to number, which we call time."[501]

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498. Allusions are to scriptural expressions about God's "years," used to express the absence of measurable limit rather than any temporal succession.

499. Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae*, book 5, prose 6; St. Thomas on Boethius's definition of eternity; St. Anselm, *Monologion* 24.

500. Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* 10; Prosper, *Sententiae ex Augustino delibatae* 3 and 183; St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* 19.

501. Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae 7.1; Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion 18 - 19; St. Gregory Nazianzen, various places; the Venerable Bede, on John 16; Plato, Timaeus, near the beginning: "He made time, the moving image of eternity... an image of eternity abiding in unity, an everlasting image flowing along according to number, which we call time."

According to the doctrine of these, which is most approved among the Scholastics, in order that something may be called simply and properly eternal, it is not enough that it lack beginning and end. For this, although it would be called "eternal," or rather "from eternity," would be but a participated eternity, an imitation of that which is true: for since in it there would be some variety, it could be defined by beginning and end in some respect. Thus, if the heaven or an angel were from eternity, although not in respect of their substance, yet in respect of motion and operation there would be a beginning and an end; and so in the motion of the heaven we could mark out years and months and days; in angels, these and those operations terminated with a beginning and an end, which we could define by time. But in God, who has the true and primary eternity, neither on the part of substance nor of operation can a beginning or an end be assigned in any way. And if God himself (who is omnipotent) were to create some substance from eternity without any variation at all - even according to accidents - and with operations remaining in the same state, which should seem to have a true and proper eternity, nevertheless its eternity would be participated: for that thing would not have of itself its duration or that state of immutability; since, its nature being left to itself, it would necessarily be subject to variation and change.

From this same doctrine Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity, book 2, chapter 4, asserts that it is one thing to be sempiternal, another to be eternal. For, he says, that seems to be sempiternal which lacks a beginning and an end; but that is eternal which lacks both and every changeability.[502]

Objections against the foregoing doctrine

Against the doctrine hitherto set forth something may be objected; the first objection seems rather difficult. First, I say, according to all difference of time, Scripture truly predicates of God "was, is, and will be": Psalm 109, "Before the daystar I begot you"; Proverbs 8, "Before all the hills I was brought forth"; Apocalypse 1 and 14, "Who is, and who was, and who is to come"; Hebrews 13, "Jesus Christ yesterday, and today, the same for ever." Therefore, in God's eternity there is some succession; otherwise neither words of the future nor of past time could be ascribed to him. This difficulty Plato mentioned in the Timaeus; but he replies in these words: "As to the 'was' and 'shall be', these are species of time; we do not rightly ascribe them to the eternal substance. For of that we say 'is, was, and shall be'; but truly 'is' alone befits it." St. Gregory Nazianzen has almost the same words in Oration 42, which is the second for Pascha; and Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, book 11, chapter 7, after the middle, where they assert that it is more correct to say of God, "he is," than "he was" or "he will be." This very thing St. Augustine taught in On True and False Religion, chapter 49, and on that Psalm "In generation and generation," and in the book of 83 Questions, question 19. Nazianzen and Augustine adduce that text of Exodus 3, "He who is sent me to you," where by a verb of the present tense they say the perseverance and perfect stability of God in his being are signified. But the Hebrew text uses a verb of the future tense, "I shall be," to denote God's eternal duration without end, as we shall show below in Disputation 19

Yet, although this be so, whether we consider the thing itself, or the common phrase and mode of speaking of men according to our way of understanding, it must be weighed.

502. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate 2.4.

Note: Two points, for the understanding of Scripture, are to be noted.

- According to this familiar mode of speaking, Scripture rightly conjoins the three times together; and it ascribes all together to God, to denote perseverance in being. It uses, moreover, the imperfect of the past, erat, which signifies a thing not yet finished; not, however, the perfect preterite, fuit, which denotes a completed thing; so as to express the perseverance of eternity. And therefore it says, "who is, and who was," not, "who is, and who has been"; although, if Scripture had said "who has been," adding the two other times, it would sufficiently remove every suspicion. But the verb "begot" it uses in the perfect preterite, not in the imperfect "was begetting," to express the Son's generation as perfect and entire; for it was much more expedient to express the integrity and perfection of the generation than its perseverance. That text of Hebrews 13, "Jesus Christ yesterday, and today," many Fathers understand of him according to his humanity; but that, "the same for ever," of the same according to his divinity, as we shall see below, part 3, question 16, article 9. That the whole of it, according to the divinity itself, be understood, is to be explained in accordance with what we have said.
- Two things remain to be briefly noted for the solution of this argument. First, those who clearly behold the essence of God and the things that are in him, since they see him and the things that are in him as they are in reality, can express in like manner the mode and duration proper to his very being. The second is, that when we enunciate some external operation of God - such as justification, creation, apparition, and the like - it is best and most proper to use words of the past, and of any time whatsoever: for these truly have succession, and are terminated with a beginning and an end; they can be defined by our time. But what we have said is to be understood of God's internal operations.

The second argument: In the same individual moment of duration two contradictories cannot be true at once. But in eternity two contradictories are true, as "Peter is sick," "Peter is not sick": for eternity embraces all times, and therefore the being and not being of things are constituted at once; therefore we must assign in it succession and various instants, lest we say that in one and the same individual those two contradictories are true. Some more recent writers do not think it absurd, in the same individual moment of a higher order, ...

It is objected that, in an order of instants of a higher kind, such as that of eternity, two contradictories might be granted at once; and thus, the proposed argument would seem to be very well satisfied. But the reply is frivolous: for an instant of a higher order does not swallow up and take away the contradiction, but the propositions remain in that instant under the state of contradiction; how then could they be true at once? For if in one and the same genus of duration and of the instant they cannot be true, they will be able in none; since in whatever they remain, they remain of the same kind and opposition.

Therefore it is answered that those propositions which we mentioned, and others of that kind, are not contradictory in God's eternal cognition, or in eternity, even if in it - according to the existence of the thing - they were present, whenever they are referred to diverse instants or

durations of time. They are therefore contradictory only when not only are they present in eternity, but the very copula of them enunciates the thing for one and the same moment of time. Thus, however, never are both true in eternity. Rather, we understand the propositions to be referred to the duration of our time whenever they are enunciated absolutely with no addition: as when we say, "Peter is sick," "Peter is not sick," which are never true under the same duration of time. For since words have been imposed by us to signify, they denote things under that duration by which our actions and passions are defined; thus the word "is sick" signifies sickness under the present time, otherwise under the future, and so forth; therefore under the same [time] both cannot be true.

But in order to enunciate the matter as referred to eternity, it is necessary to express its duration, which the words, taken absolutely and of themselves, do not signify. With that addition, however, and other conditions being observed, they will be contradictory, yet not at once true: for example, "Peter's sickness is in eternity," "Peter's sickness is not in eternity," of which one is false. If, however, someone should speak thus: "Peter is sick in eternity," "Peter is not sick in eternity," there would also be a contradiction; and, the hypothesis being made that at some time he was sick, this would be false: "Peter is not sick in eternity." For the sense is: Peter's sickness is in no way present to eternity. Nor does it render this sense: "Peter's not-being-sick is present in eternity," but "Peter's being-sick is not present to eternity," which sense is false. But these would not be contradictory: "Peter's being-sick is in eternity," "not-being-sick is in eternity." For both would be affirmative, since the latter has negation only on the part of the subject, not negating, but indefinitely, as the logicians speak; and hence both can be true.

Thirdly, the argument is of this sort. The duration of eternity is greater today than yesterday: for instance, if an angel had been created from eternity and were then annihilated at the beginning of the world, it would have lasted less than if it were annihilated now. Therefore eternity has a succession of past and future; otherwise it could be neither greater nor less, since addition is not made except of the past.

I answer, first, that this is not true and proper eternity of which we now speak. For true eternity cannot have a term; but if an angel were created ab aeterno, its eternity would be participated. Yet because of that [participated eternity], just as of "wherein," there must be the judgment that no succession can be in them, it is necessary still in another way to satisfy the argument.

Thus I say, secondly, as was said about a time which would have been from eternity (Disputation 26, cap. 2): although a duration which is from eternity - whether it have succession, as time, or not, as participated eternity - can have something added to it, it is not for that reason greater or less. For "greater" and "less" are proportions of finite quantity and duration.

Thirdly, I add: if on the part of infinity it were not repugnant, nothing else would hinder that among participated eternities one should be greater than another; yet this would not be because there were any succession "in which" or in eternity. For it would not be said that one "when," or one participated eternity, is greater than another because an accession of the future is made to one; but because one "when," or one eternity, would be such in itself by nature and more perfect, as to

be apt to be delimited by a greater span of our time - or at least because our thought, with a larger interval flowing, could measure one "when," or one eternity, than another. Wherefore we can say: "it has lasted thus far, and eternity has lasted thus far"; yet the adverb "thus far" would denote no succession "in which" or in eternity. Therefore most aptly Plato in the Timaeus, in the place cited about true eternity which befits God, says: "But an eternal substance, since it is always the same and immobile, perseveres, and is never older with respect to itself, nor younger, nor was it hitherto, nor will it be hereafter."[505]

By which words he wished to teach that in eternity, as such, there is no succession. But when in Scripture God is called "the Ancient of Days," and that an old man appeared to the Prophets, it was said to signify God's ancient eternity, not a change of youth into old age.

Articulus II - Whether God is eternal

Objicitur secundum sic proceditur. It seems that God is not eternal.

1. Nothing made can be said of God; but eternity is something made. For Boethius says that the flowing now makes time, the standing now makes eternity; and Augustine says in the book of 83 Questions that God is the author of eternity: therefore God is not eternal.[506]
2. Furthermore, what is before eternity and after eternity is not measured by eternity. But God is before eternity (as is said in the Book of Causes), and after eternity; for it is said in Exod. 3 that "the Lord shall reign forever and beyond": therefore to be eternal does not befit God.[507]
3. Furthermore, eternity is a certain measure; but it does not befit God to be measured: therefore it does not befit him to be eternal.
4. Furthermore, in eternity there is not present, past, or future, since it is the whole all at once, as has been said. But in Scripture words of present, past, and future time are said of God: therefore God is not eternal.

But on the contrary: Athanasius says in his symbol: "Eternal Father, eternal Son, eternal Holy Spirit."[508]

I answer that the notion of eternity follows upon immutability, just as the notion of time follows upon motion, as is clear from what has been said. Whence, since God is most immutable, it most befits him to be eternal. Nor is he only eternal, but he is his eternity: since in created things no other thing is its own duration, because it is not its own existence (*esse*). But God is his own uniform existence. Whence, as he is his own essence, so he is his own eternity.

505. Plato, Timaeus, on true eternity befitting God: "But an eternal substance, since it is always the same and immobile, perseveres, and is never older with respect to itself, nor younger, nor was it hitherto, nor will it be hereafter."

506. Boethius, frequently reported as: "the flowing now makes time; the standing now makes eternity." St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus 23.

507. Liber de Causis (Book of Causes), prop. 2; Exod. 3.

508. The Athanasian Creed (Quicumque vult).

Reply to the first: The "standing now" is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. For just as the apprehension of time is caused in us, in that we apprehend the flux of the very now, so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us, in that we apprehend the now as standing. But what Augustine says, that God is the author of eternity, is understood of participated eternity. For in that way God communicates his eternity to certain [things], just as he communicates his immutability.

And through this the solution to the second [objection] is also evident. For God is said to be "before eternity" inasmuch as it is participated by immaterial substances. Whence, also in the same place it is said that "intelligence is made equal to eternity." But what is said in Exodus, "The Lord shall reign forever and beyond": you must know that "forever" (aeternum) is there taken for "age" (saeculum), as another translation has it. Thus, then, it is said that he will reign "beyond eternity," because he endures beyond any age, that is, beyond any given duration. For an "age" is nothing else than the period of any thing whatsoever, as is said in the first book De Coelo. Or it is said also that he will reign beyond eternity, because even if something else were to exist forever (as the motion of the heaven, according to some philosophers), nevertheless God reigns beyond, inasmuch as his reign is the whole all at once.[509]

Reply to the third: Eternity is not other than God himself. Whence God is not said to be eternal as if he were in some way measured; but there is taken there the notion of measure according to our apprehension only.

Reply to the fourth: Words of diverse times are attributed to God, inasmuch as his eternity includes all times, not that he himself is varied by present, past, and future.

The conclusion is affirmative and of faith. It is had everywhere in Scripture, in the symbol of Athanasius, and in the chapter Firmiter on the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith. But as to the manner in which God is said to be his eternity, and how he is distinguished from it, the question is common with the other attributes, of which we must treat in Disputation 116 and the following.[510]

Articulus III - Whether to be eternal is proper to God

It proceeds to the third thus. It seems that to be eternal is not proper to God alone.

1. For it is said in Dan. 12 that "they that instruct many unto justice shall be as stars unto perpetual eternities." But there would not be many eternities unless not God alone were eternal; therefore God alone is not eternal.
2. Furthermore, Matt. 25 says: "Depart, you cursed, into eternal fire." Therefore God alone is not eternal.
3. Furthermore, every necessary thing is eternal; but many things are necessary, as all the principles of demonstration and all demonstrative propositions; therefore God alone is not eternal.

509. Aristotle, De Coelo I; cf. the opinion of some philosophers about the everlasting motion of the heavens.
510. Fourth Lateran Council, cap. Firmiter credimus, on the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith.

But on the contrary is what Augustine says in the book On the Faith to Peter, chapter 6: "God is he who has no beginning; but whatever has a beginning is not eternal; therefore God alone is eternal."[511]

I answer that eternity truly and properly is in God alone: because eternity follows upon immutability, as is clear from what has been said. But God alone is wholly immutable, as has been shown above. Yet, secondly, since certain things receive immutability from him, accordingly certain things share in his eternity. Some, therefore, are strengthened by God with respect to this immutability, namely, that they never cease to be; and in this respect it is said in Ecclesiastes 1 of the earth, that "it stands forever"; and thus eternity can be attributed to the angels, according to that of Ps. 75: "Illuminating wonderfully from the eternal mountains." Some things also are called eternal in the Scriptures because of a long duration; although they are corruptible, as in the Psalms mountains are called eternal; and Deut. 33 also says "of the fruits of the eternal hills." But some participate more in the notion of eternity, inasmuch as they have intransmutability either according to being, or further according to operation, as the angels and the blessed who enjoy the Word: for, with respect to that vision of the Word, thoughts are not changeable in the saints, as St. Augustine says in On the Trinity, XV. Whence also those who see God are said to have eternal life, according to that of John 17: "This is eternal life, that they may know [thee]," etc.[512]

Reply to the first: It is to be said that many eternities are spoken of in the sense that there are many who participate in eternity from the very contemplation of God.

Reply to the second: The fire of hell is called eternal only on account of its interminability. Yet there is in their punishments a change, according to that of Job 24: "They pass from the waters of snow to excessive heat." Whence in hell there is not true eternity, but rather time, according to that of Ps. 80: "Their time shall be forever."

Reply to the third: "Necessary" signifies a certain mode of truth, ...

Reply to the third: It is answered that "necessary" signifies a certain mode of truth. But truth, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics VI, is in the intellect.[513] According to this, therefore, truths and necessities are eternal, because they are in the eternal intellect, which is the divine intellect alone. Hence it does not follow that anything outside God is eternal.

Notes concerning the doctrine of the article. The conclusion is: Perfect eternity, such as was described above, belongs to no other than God. About the matter of this article there is no controversy among the Doctors. Yet for the greater perspicacity of it two points are to be observed by us.

One is that eternity can be taken in a twofold way. First, commonly, for any duration which lacks beginning and end; and thus it can also befit creatures, if it be not repugnant that some creature be created from eternity. Then, more properly, eternity is called the duration without beginning and without end, with stability of that whose duration it is; and this can befit God alone,

511. Ascribed here to St. Augustine, De fide ad Petrum, c. 6; the sense is also found in patristic sources.
512. St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV; John 17:3.
513. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, text 8.

if we say that stability is not only the negation of some mutation, but such a disposition of nature that it can in no way be varied. This, indeed, is called an eternity of its nature, or eternity through essence (*aeternitas per essentiam*); but other things which would be without beginning and without end would be said to participate some vestige of eternity, as St. Thomas rightly noted.

The second concerns the solution of the third, namely, for what reason the essences (*essentiae*) of things are said to be eternal; in which matter the Metaphysicians have spent more than was necessary, all of which we shall touch briefly. They are called eternal, not because they are outside God, produced by some act from eternity (for thus they would also exist from eternity, which is absurd); nor for this reason, that they are in God formally (for no notion of a created essence befits God formally); nor only because they are eminently in God, as in an efficient cause, or as in an intelligence: for, as we shall show in disputation 104, by priority of reason it is the case that the essences of things are possible in themselves, before they can be produced by the power of God, or be known by God. For they are not possible from the fact that they can be produced, or from the fact that they are known; but on the contrary, from the fact that in themselves they do not imply a contradiction, they are understood by God and can be produced by God, as we shall show in that disputation. Therefore the essences of things are called eternal, because they are eternal truths, that is, because something can be enunciated of them from eternity. For the word "is" in enunciations, when something is enunciated of the essences of things, does not signify actual existence (*existentia*), but the agreement of extremes; and therefore the essences are called eternal truths, as we shall explain in disputation 78.

Articulus IV - Whether eternity differs from time

Objicitur: 1. It seems that eternity is not other than time. For it is impossible for there to be two measures of duration at once, unless one be a part of the other. For two days or two hours are not together; but a day and an hour are together, because the hour is a part of the day. But eternity and time are together; each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since, therefore, eternity is not a part of time, because eternity exceeds time and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and not other than eternity.[514]

1. Further, according to the Philosopher in Physics IV, the "now" of time remains the same throughout the whole of time.[515] But this seems to constitute the notion of eternity, that it is the same, holding itself indivisibly throughout the whole discourse of time. Therefore eternity is the now of time. But the now of time is not other according to substance than time; therefore eternity is not other according to substance than time.

514. Internal cross-references as in the margin: infra art. 5; I, dist. 10; II, q. 1, a. 1; II, q. 1, a. 2; IV, 2, 9, 1, articul. 1; and Quodlib. 5, q. 4; Quodlib. 10, 9, 2; and De potentia 9, 3, 2, 14, 18.

515. Aristotle, Physics IV, texts 121 and 104 (tom. 2).

2. Further, as the measure of the first motion is the measure of all motions, as is said in Physics IV, so it seems that the measure of the first being (*esse*) is the measure of all being. But eternity is the measure of the first being, which is the divine existence (*esse*). Therefore eternity is the measure of all being. But the existence of corruptible things is measured by time. Therefore time either is eternity, or is something of eternity.[516]

But on the contrary: Eternity is "all at once" (tota simul). But in time there is a before and after. Therefore time and eternity are not the same.

I answer that it is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. But some have assigned the reason for this diversity from the fact that eternity lacks beginning and end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. But this is a difference per accidens and not per se: because, granted that time has always been and will always be, according to the position of those who assert the motion of the heavens to be sempiternal, still there would remain a difference between eternity and time, as Boethius says in the book of the Consolation, from this, that eternity is all at once, which does not befit time: because eternity is the measure of abiding being, but time is the measure of motion.[517]

If, however, the aforesaid difference be considered so far as regards the things measured (*mensurata*), and not as regards the measures (*mensurae*), thus it has another rationale: because only that is measured by time which has a beginning and end in time, as is said in Physics IV. Wherefore, if the motion of the heavens were to last forever, time would not measure it according to its whole duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it would measure any circulation which has a beginning and end in time. Yet it can have another rationale on the part of these measures themselves, if the end and beginning be taken in potency: because, even granted that time always last, nevertheless it is possible to mark in time both beginning and end by taking some of its parts, as we say that the beginning and end of a year are said; which does not occur in eternity. Yet these differences follow upon that which is per se and first, to wit, the difference from this, that eternity is all at once, whereas time is not.

Reply to the first: That reasoning would proceed if time and eternity were measures of one and the same genus: which is plainly false from the things whose measures time and eternity are.

Reply to the second: The now of time is the same in subject throughout the whole time, but different in reason: because as time answers to motion, so the now of time answers to the movable. But the movable is the same in subject in the whole course of time, but different in reason, inasmuch as it is here and there; and this alternation is motion. Similarly, the flow of the now itself, according as it alternates in reason, is time. But eternity remains the same both in subject and in reason. Hence eternity is not the same as the now of time.

Reply to the third: As eternity is the proper measure of existence itself (*ipsius esse*), so time is the proper measure of motion. Hence, according as some existence recedes from the permanence of existing and is subjected to transmutation, according to this it recedes from eternity and is

516. Aristotle, Physics IV.
517. Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy V, prose 6.

subjected to time. Therefore the being of corruptible things, because it is transmutable, is not measured by eternity but by time. For time measures not only the things which are actually undergoing transmutation, but also the things which are transmutable. Hence it measures not only motion, but also rest, which belongs to that which is apt by nature to be moved and is not moved.

Note concerning the article. The conclusion is affirmative. About the matter of this article, and of the two following which will come below, there will be a disputation. Now it is enough to take note that the title of the article, which commonly circulates, is falsely inscribed in this way: "Whether eternity differ from aevum and time"; whereas in truth the Blessed Thomas in this article only disputes the difference of eternity and time. The title, however, as it has been prescribed by us, is gathered from the words of the same St. Thomas at the beginning of the article, where he premised the title of the article.

Articulus V - Whether aevum differs from time

Objicitur: 1. It seems that aevum does not differ from time. For Augustine says on Genesis according to the letter, that God moves the spiritual creature through time; but aevum is said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore time does not differ from aevum.[518]

1. Further, it belongs to the notion of time, that it have a before and an after; but to the notion of eternity, that it be all at once, as was said. But aevum is not eternity: for it is said in Ecclesiasticus 1 that eternal wisdom is before the aevum. Therefore it is not all at once, but has a before and after, and thus is time.
2. Further, if aevum does not have a before and after, it follows that in a being of aevum there is no difference of "it is," "it was," or "it will be." Therefore, for that to which it is impossible not to have been eternal, it follows that it is impossible for it not to be going to be; which is false, since God can reduce it to nothing.
3. Further, since the aeviternal duration is infinite on the side of the future, if the aevum were all at once, it would follow that something created is infinite in act, which is impossible. Therefore aevum does not differ from time.

But on the contrary is what Boethius says: he "bids time to go forth from the aevum."[519]

I answer that aevum differs from time and from eternity as a mean existing between them. But some assign their difference thus, saying that eternity lacks beginning and end; aevum has a beginning but not an end; time, however, has a beginning and an end. But this difference is per accidens, as was said above: because even if the aeviternal things had always been and would always be, as some posit, or even if at some time they were to fail, which would be possible to God, still aevum would be distinguished from eternity and from time.

518. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram X.
519. Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy (book and prose as cited in the margin).

Others, however, assign the difference among these three by this, that eternity does not have a before and after; time has a before and after with innovation and with becoming-old; aevum has a before and after without innovation and without becoming-old. But this position implies contradictories. This indeed is manifest if innovation and becoming-old be referred to the measure itself. For to that for which the before and after of duration cannot be together, if aevum has a before and after, it is necessary that, the prior part of the thing receding, the posterior newly come; and thus there will be innovation in the aevum itself, as in time. But if it be referred to the things measured, still an inconvenience follows. For from this it is that a temporal being is measured by time, that it has a transmutable existence, and from transmutability to be measured there is a before and after in the measure, as is clear from Physics IV. If therefore the aeviternal itself is not alterable nor mutable, this will be because its existence is intrinsically immutable. Therefore its measure will not have a before and after. It is therefore to be said that eternity is the measure of abiding existence; according as something recedes from the permanence of existing, according to this it recedes from eternity. And those things which thus recede from its permanence, in such a way that their existence is subject to tran -

Objicitur 1. It seems that the aevum does not differ from time. For St. Augustine says that God moves the spiritual creature by time, but the aevum is said to be the measure of spiritual substances.[520] Therefore time does not differ from the aevum.

Objicitur 2. Further, it belongs to the notion of time that it have a before and after; but it belongs to the notion of eternity that it be altogether at once, as has been said. But the aevum is not eternity; for it is said in Ecclesiasticus that eternal wisdom is before the aevum. Therefore it is not altogether at once, but has a before and after; and thus it is time.

Objicitur 3. Further, if in the aevum there is not a before and after, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no difference between to be, to have been, or to be going to be. Since therefore it is impossible that aeviternal things should not have been, it follows that it is impossible that they will not be; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing.

Objicitur 4. Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is infinite on the side of what is after, if the aevum be altogether at once, it follows that something created is infinite in act; which is impossible. Therefore the aevum does not differ from time.

Sed contra: What Boethius says: "You who bid time to go..."[521]

Respondeo dicendum, that certain things have an existence which either consists in change, or is established in change; and these are measured by time: thus every motion, and even the existence of all corruptible things. Others recede less from the permanence of existing, because their existence neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they have change adjoined, either in act or in potency: as is clear in the celestial bodies, whose substantial existence is immutable, yet they have an immutable existence with mutability according to place; and similarly it is clear of the angels, that they have an immutable existence with mutability

520. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram VIII, c. 10 (comm. 3).
521. Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy (as cited in the margin).

according to choice, so far as pertains to their nature; and with mutability, in their own mode, of their acts of understanding and affections, and of places. And therefore such are measured by the aevum, which is a mean between eternity and time. But the existence which eternity measures is neither mutable, nor has mutability adjoined. Thus, then, time has a before and after; but the aevum does not have a before and after in itself, although a before and after can be conjoined to it; whereas eternity neither has a before nor an after, nor is compatible with them.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, that spiritual creatures, as to the affections and intellections in which there is succession, are measured by time. Whence also St. Augustine says in the same place, that to be moved by time is to be moved by affections. But as to their natural existence, they are measured by the aevum. Yet as to the vision of glory, they participate in eternity

Ad secundum dicendum, that although it be altogether at once, yet the aevum is not eternity, because it is compatible with a before and after

Ad tertium dicendum, that in the angel's existence considered in itself there is no difference of past and future, but only according to the changes adjoined. Hence when we say that an angel is, or was, or will be, it differs according to the intellect's acceptance, which takes the angel by comparison to diverse parts of time. And when one says that an angel is, or was, he supposes something with which the opposite does not lie under the divine power. But when he says that it will be, he supposes nothing as yet. Wherefore, since to be and not to be of the angel lies under the divine power, considering absolutely, God can make that the angel's being will not be; yet He cannot make that it is not while it is, or that it was not after it has been

Ad quartum, dicendum that the duration which is infinite is such because it is not terminated by time. But that there be some created thing infinite in such a way that it is not terminated by some other measure is not incongruous

Conclusio articuli est: The aevum differs from eternity and from time.

Articulus VI - Whether there is only one aevum

Quaeritur: Whether there is only one aevum.

Objicitur 1. It seems that there is not only one aevum. For it is said in the apocryphal Esdras: "Majesty and power of the aevums is with you, O Lord."[522]

Objicitur 2. Further, different genera have different measures. But some aeviternal things are in the genus of corporeal things, namely the celestial bodies; others are spiritual substances, namely the angels. Therefore there is not one aevum only.

Objicitur 3. Further, since the aevum is a name of duration, of which there is one year, there is one duration; but not all aeviternal things have one duration, because some begin to be after others, as is most manifest in human souls. Therefore there is not one aevum only.

522. The apocryphal Esdras (as cited in the margin).

Objicitur 4. Further, things which do not depend upon each other do not seem to have one measure of duration. But aeviternal things do not depend upon each other, since one angel is not the cause of another. Therefore there is not one aevum only.

Sed contra: The aevum is more simple than time, and stands nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore, much more, the aevum.

Respondeo dicendum, that concerning this there is a twofold opinion. For some say that there is one aevum only; others, that there are many. What of these is truer must be considered from the cause of the unity of time. For by an ignorance of spiritual things we come through corporeal things. Now some say that there is one time of all temporal things on this account, that there is one number of all things numbered; since time is a number, according to the Philosopher.[523] But this does not suffice, because time is not a number as abstracted outside the numbered, but as existing in the numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous, since ten ells of cloth have their continuity not from number, but from that which is numbered. But number existing in the numbered is not the same for all, but diverse for diverse things. Hence others assign the cause of the unity of time from the unity of eternity, which is the principle of every duration. And thus all durations are one, if their principle be considered; they are many, however, if the diversity be considered of those things which receive duration from the influx of the first principle. Others again assign the cause of the unity of time on the part of prime matter, which is the first subject of motion, of which time is the measure. But neither assignment seems sufficient; because those things which are one by a principle or subject most remote are not one simply, but in a certain respect. Therefore the ratio of the unity of time is the unity of the first motion, according to which, since it is most simple, all the others are measured, as is said in the tenth book of the Metaphysics.[524] Thus time is compared to that motion not only as measure to the measured, but also as an accident to its subject, and so it receives unity from it; but it is compared to the other motions only as measure to the measured. Hence it is not multiplied according to their multitude, because one separated measure can measure many. This being laid down, it is to be known that concerning spiritual substances there was a twofold opinion. Some indeed said that all proceeded from God in a certain equality, as Origen said; or at least many of them, as some have posited. Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God according to a certain grade and order. And this seems to be favored by Pseudo-Dionysius, who says in chapter ten of the Celestial Hierarchy that among spiritual substances there are first, middle, and ultimate, even within one order of angels.[525] According to the first opinion it is necessary to say that there are many aevums, according as there are many first equal aeviternals. But according to the second opinion it must be said that there is one aevum only, because since each thing is measured by that which is most simple in its genus (as is said in the tenth of the Metaphysics), the measure of all aeviternals must be the first aeviternal, which is the more simple the more prior. And because the second opinion is truer (as will be shown below), we concede for the present that there is one aevum only.

523. Aristotle, Physics IV, text 101.
524. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, texts 3 - 4.
525. Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, c. 10.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, that "aevum" is sometimes taken for a "saeculum", that is, the period of duration of some thing; and thus many aevums are said, as many ages

Ad secundum dicendum, that although the celestial bodies and the spiritual substances differ in the genus of nature, nevertheless they agree in this, that they have an immutable existence; and thus they are measured by the aevum

Ad tertium dicendum, that not all temporal things begin at the same time, and yet there is one time of all, by reason of the first, which is measured by time. And thus all aeviternal things have one aevum by reason of the first, even if not all begin at the same time

Ad quartum dicendum, that for things to be measured by some one thing, it is not required that that one thing be the cause of them all, but that it be more simple

Conclusio articuli est: There is one aevum only, which is the measure of all, just as there is one time.

Disputatio XXXIII - On the various significations of aevum and Bonaventure's opinion

Caput I - Various acceptions

Before we examine the proposed question, it has seemed good to note the various significations of the word "aevum" (*aevum*), so that the matter about which the disputation is undertaken may be made clear. Now to the Latins "aevum" is the same as what the Greeks call *aiōn*; the Latin word seems to be derived from the Greek, with only the letter *u* inserted; and in Latin "aevum" is the same as "saeculum," for which reason what the Greeks call "the ages of ages" (*aiōnas tōn aiōnōn*) we render "saecula saeculorum." Properly, however, *aiōn* is what eternity (*aeternitas*) is; for in Greek *aiōn* is, as it were, from *to aei on*, that is, "always existing," as Nicetas notes in the place to be cited below.

Nonetheless "saeculum," or *aiōn*, has various significations. First, it signifies the lifetime of any man, which is commonly completed with seventy years, according to Psalm 89: "The days of our years in them are seventy years"; and in this way it also signifies a space or "age" of seventy years, as St. Jerome notes at the end of Ezekiel 26, and Damascene and Nicetas also teach in the places cited.[526] Second, it signifies a period of a thousand years, as Damascene and Nicetas hand down in the same places. Third, it signifies the whole heap of our time, and for that reason we have been accustomed to call the most ancient things "eternal," as Pseudo-Dionysius taught, *De divinis nominibus*.[527] Therefore in Deuteronomy and in the Psalms the hills or mountains are called "eternal," because they are most ancient; and at Titus 1 times are called "eternal": "In hope," he

526. St. Jerome, on Ezekiel 26; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, II, c. 1; Nicetas, Oration 2 on St. Gregory Nazianzen.

527. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus.

says, "of life everlasting, which God, who does not lie, promised before secular times." Augustine reads it thus, *lib. 83 Quaest.*, q. 72, and *De civitate Dei*, XII, c. 16: "eternal times." In Greek it is "before eternal times" (*pro tōn chronōn aiōniōn*). And since *aiōn* signifies both "age" and "eternity," Augustine translated *aeterna*, whereas our Vulgate said *secularia*; and he asserts that "aeterna" among us is what is in Greek *aiōnia*, nor did the Latins dare to translate *aiōnia* as "secularia," because "secular" sometimes signifies what quickly passes away, whereas *aiōnion* signifies either what has no end or what extends up to the end of this age; where Augustine also concedes that *aiōnion*, i.e., "eternal," sometimes denotes the whole mass of our time. But by "eternal times" Augustine himself, in the place alleged, and Jerome and Anselm on Titus 1, understand certain "eternal" times before the creation of the world, which, as Augustine there notes, were not coeternal with God.

For my part, I do not sufficiently understand what "eternal" times, apart from God's very eternity, could have preceded the creation of the world. If there was any time at all, it could only have been imaginary. But if before there was an eternity without beginning, as those Doctors above seem to affirm, it follows that it would have been coeternal with God, and that before it God could not have promised or determined eternal life. Therefore Paul, as I think, by "secular times," or "eternal" times - Greek *aiōniōn* - understood all time, and so he said "before secular times," as if he said, "before the age." For the whole heap of time is called "age," as we were noting a little earlier. In which sense that at the end of Romans is also taken: "according to the revelation of the mystery kept silent for eternal times." "Revelation of the mystery kept silent for eternal times" (Rom 16) means "through the whole time since the world was founded not yet hitherto made manifest," as St. Thomas interprets in his commentary on that chapter of Pseudo-Dionysius.[528]

So too Ecclesiasticus 1 says: "Wisdom is from the Lord God; and with him she was always; she is before the aevum," that is, before all time. In like manner God is said to be before the ages and to have made them, as Damascene teaches in the place cited.[529] Wherefore Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, c. 5, somewhat past the middle, calls God the author and effecter of eternity, that is, of all time. In this sense too St. Augustine, *lib. 83 Quaest.*, q. 23, said that God is eternal and wise "in another way" than the rest: for they can be such by a certain participation; but God is eternal and wise because he is the author of eternity and of wisdom, and, as if he were saying, because he has these from himself and not as communicated by another; for which reason he called him the "author of eternity." Likewise, at Titus 1, "God, before all times, promised life everlasting," not by the word of a voice - since there were not yet those to whom he would promise it in that manner - but by his predestination. Thus interpret Chrysostom, Anselm, and Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, XII, c. 16.[530]

Fourth, it can be said that "saeculum," or the space of years - *Ghola* among the Hebrews is the same as the Greeks' *aiōn*, as Jerome teaches in the great commentaries on Galatians 1 - designates different things according to how it is written. For whenever among the Hebrews that word is

528. St. Thomas, Commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, on the relevant chapter.

529. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, II, c. 1; Nicetas, Oration 2 on St. Gregory Nazianzen, on the words "Iam vero cum immensitas...".

written with a certain letter, it signifies eternity; when, however, it lacks that letter, it signifies the Jubilee year, which was the fiftieth. Thus in Exodus 21, where God prescribes that he who has bought a slave should in the seventh year grant him liberty; but if he refuses: "He shall bore his ear with an awl, and he shall be a servant forever (in *saeculum*)." And Deuteronomy 15 has the same, except that in place of "in *saeculum*" it puts "in *aeternum*." In the Hebrew the word is written without that letter and signifies the time of the Jubilee; elsewhere, however, where it is written with it, it signifies eternity, or "age," in another sense. Vives took this doctrine from Jerome, *De Civitate Dei*, XII, c. 19. Yet it is not approved by more recent Hebrew writers, among whom is Mercerus, since in Scripture it is written indifferently in both ways; and indeed, if we speak of the Hebrew codices that are now in hand, we cannot deny this. Still, it is to be believed with certainty that in Jerome's time, as he himself noted, this word was wont to be written in various ways to signify diverse things; but after the addition of the vowel-points in the assembly at Tiberias this distinction was not maintained.

Fifth, Damascene and Nicetas, in the places cited, teach that from the creation of the heavens to the end of the world seven ages are numbered, the eighth being that of the future life.[531] Sixth, Pseudo-Dionysius in that chapter, and likewise Damascene and Nicetas, say that "aevum" is used for eternity itself, of which we have hitherto spoken, which lacks end and beginning and every variety.[532]

However, the aevum of which our forthcoming disputation treats is taken for the duration of an Angel, or of a rational soul, which, although it has a beginning, lacks an end; some Fathers too seem to have made mention of this. St. Basil, *lib. 2 contra Apologeticum Eunomii*, somewhat before the middle, says thus: "For common usage subjects every interval either to times or to ages. For what time is to sensible things, that is, over and above, to mundane things 'age.'" He calls "age" aevum, which in Greek is *aiōn*. And that he speaks not only of God's aevum but also of that of spiritual creatures is gathered from this, that he opposed it to "supermundane" things, not to all created things universally, but to sensible and bodily things.[533] Augustine, *lib. 83 Quaest.*, q. 19, teaches that what is immortal is sometimes, albeit improperly, also called eternal. Since therefore according to the primary signification of the name, eternity (*aeternitas*) is the same as aevum, as was said above, if immortal things are called eternal, their duration too will be called eternity, or aevum.[534] Finally, Nicetas, in the place already cited, says about the aevum, which in Greek is called *aiōn*: "But of Angels and souls it can in no wise be said properly. For their aevum has a beginning, but will not have an end." Wherefore they are in part participants of aevum, because they are incorruptible and immortal; in part of time, because they belong to the class of created things. Therefore in a broader signification the duration of Angels and of incorruptible things is called aevum, with a stronger reason than the lifetime of any man. For in their duration there is

530. St. John Chrysostom, on Titus 1; St. Anselm, on the same; St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, XII, c. 16.

531. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, II, c. 1; Nicetas, in the place cited.

532. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, the cited chapter; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, II, c. 1; Nicetas, in the place cited.

533. St. Basil, Contra Eunomium, II (Contra Apologeticum Eunomii), near the middle.

534. St. Augustine, lib. 83 Quaest., q. 19.

something of eternity, which is properly called *aiōn*, or aevum - namely, the lack of end. Indeed this seems a less improper usurpation of the name than the others mentioned: for in the latter both beginning and end are found; in this, however, there is no end. But since in all there is a certain long duration, which is commonly expressed by the adverb "always," the name "aevum" has been, by a certain extension, accommodated to them. Now the usage of the Schoolmen has prevailed that "aevum" be said only of the duration of created and incorruptible things, about which we must presently dispute.

Caput II - What Bonaventure holds

In order that we may explain more fully the nature of the aevum (aevum) according to its ultimate mode and signification, and distinguish it from eternity (aeternitas) and time (tempus), we must first see whether in the aevum there is any succession. In this first question the opinion of St. Bonaventure, II Sent., dist. 2, art. 1, q. 3, is that the duration of a spiritual substance is not without some succession, in which a "before" and "after" can be assigned, yet without any variation.[535] This opinion Scotus, II Sent., dist. 2, q. 1, "Qui vult tenere," judges to be probable; Richard also, in the same place, a. 1, q. 3, holds it; and some attribute it to Gabriel, who, in my judgment - as we shall report a little later - follows the opposite.[536]

Bonaventure explains it thus. There is a twofold kind of succession. One kind is with variation, such as is found in time, in that when one part arrives another wholly ceases; and such succession is not in the aevum of Angels and of spiritual things: in this succession there is truly a future after a past. The other kind is without variation, which does not consist in a bare extension of duration - for this, if it could exist all at once, would in no way be succession - but is in an extension in which something is future without a past, and therefore without the variation which we said befits time. And in this way Blessed Bonaventure is to be understood when, defining this kind of succession, he says it is "a certain extension" of duration. I grant indeed that an extension cannot be found in duration which is without a future or a past. Wherefore Bonaventure speaks best when, defining this kind of succession, he says it is "by a mere extension": for if the whole were at once present, there would be no succession; therefore it is in an extension in which something is future without a past, and consequently without the variation that we said belongs to time.

This opinion, explained in this way, can be proved by the testimonies of the Fathers. First, all those whom I have noted in Disput. 32, c. 1 and 2, seem to attribute to God alone perseverance of duration without any succession, just as they also seem to attribute immutability to him alone; therefore this perseverance is not to be ascribed to the aevum even of spiritual things, so that we may conveniently constitute a difference between eternity and aevum: for otherwise no difference seems able to be assigned except this, that eternity lacks beginning and end, whereas aevum has no beginning but has an end. Yet in this way the difference cannot be explained for the universal case. For it can happen that a spiritual thing be created from eternity and to be going to endure without

535. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., dist. 2, art. 1, q. 3.

536. John Duns Scotus, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 1 ("Qui vult tenere"); Richard (of St. Victor), in the same place, a. 1, q. 3; Gabriel (commonly taken to be Gabriel Biel).

end. Then the duration of that thing will lack both end and beginning; wherefore St. Thomas, in the cited place, confesses that in no way can aevum and eternity differ except in that aevum has succession, whereas eternity does not. In particular, St. Anselm in the Proslogion, c. 20, seems to have delivered Bonaventure's view, when he says of God: "Do you in this way also transcend all eternals, because the present of your eternity is present to you with respect to them, whereas they do not yet have, of their eternity, what will come to be for them, as they already have what is past? For thus you are always beyond them, to whom you are always present there where they have not yet arrived." This mode of questioning Anselm often employs; and it is familiar also to Aristotle. Now Anselm in that place compares God with all eternal things, namely, such spiritual things as are not going to have an end; in the eternity of such, therefore, he seems to concede there is succession.[537]

Second, Bonaventure proves it from Jerome, in the Epistle to Marcella, which is 136, from which he reports these words: "But God is that Being who does not know 'to have been' and 'to be going to be.'" Since therefore these two things agree with all other things, and cannot be without succession, it follows that succession also agrees with the aevum of spiritual things. However, the words cited are not Jerome's, but those of the Gloss on Exodus 3, "Qui est misit me," which the Gloss itself added after what Jerome had cited there. It took them from Isidore, Etymologies, VII, c. 1, where he explains the ten names of God.[538]

Third, it is confirmed from Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, II, c. 1, where he asserts that a "saeculum" is a certain space, or interval, which ...

[Damascene] says that the "saeculum" is a certain space or interval that is stretched out together with eternal things. By "eternal things" he calls those that will never have an end.

Fourth, in favor of this opinion Scotus adduces certain words of Boethius, On the Trinity, book 1, who teaches that between the "now" of our things and that of divine things there is this difference, that the "now" of our things always flows, but the "now" of divine things always perseveres. He therefore thinks that only the "now" of the divine essence is without succession, but that of other things is not without it.[539]

By reason, moreover, this same opinion is proved in two ways, first on the part of the action conserving the things themselves; then on the part of the things themselves. On the part of the action, first because even spiritual things are not only created by God, but also, after they have been first produced, they straightway receive existence and are conserved. But if there be in them no extension of duration nor succession, conservation, which is a certain continued creation, cannot be distinguished from the first production itself. Next, unless this succession were posited in their duration, immediately upon being first brought forth they would receive the whole of their existence in the ultimate mode in which they could receive it; whence it would follow that they would no longer need conservation. Besides, annihilation is nothing other than the negation of the conserving action; but annihilation is after the production of the thing and after some conservation

537. St. Anselm, Proslogion, c. 20.
538. Jerome, Ep. 136 ad Marcellam; the Gloss on Exodus 3 ("Qui est misit me"); Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae, VII, c. 1.
539. Boethius, De Trinitate, lib. 1.

of it: therefore after some conservation, future annihilation is also a certain part of conservation, the negation of which part annihilation would be. For since annihilation is the privation of conservation, and future annihilation is the privation of future conservation, if there were no future conservation, future annihilation could not be understood.

Likewise this same opinion is proved on the part of the things: first, because if there were no succession in the aevum of angels, it would at once be true in it to have been, to be, and to be going to be. Wherefore, just as it is impossible that the angel himself now should not have been, so it would be impossible that he should not be going to be. For the reason why things that have been cannot now not have been is this, that once "to have been" is posited, it implies a contradiction that that thing should not have been; but the same reason will obtain about the future in spiritual creatures, if that is now present and the future does not remain: therefore by the same token it would have to be said that a created spiritual thing cannot not be going to be.

Someone will reply: "It is thus impossible that the future not be, as it is that the past not have been, as we will show in disputation 68, chapter 4; therefore there is nothing absurd if we say that 'the angel will be' cannot 'not be,' just as 'he has been' cannot 'not have been'." But the proposed reason not only proves that "the angel will be" cannot "not be" - for this is true universally - but that the angel himself cannot "not be," which is manifestly absurd. For in that disputation we will say that the difference is this: on the one side there is past and present; on the other, future; that what is true only about the future is this, that the future cannot "not be going to be": but this cannot be said about the thing itself that is future, without repeating the future; "this thing cannot 'not be'." In the past or in the present it is not only true to say, "the past cannot 'not be past' and the present cannot 'not be present'," but also, "this thing, which is now past, cannot now 'not have been', and what is present cannot now 'not be'," because, as a thing in itself, it is outside its causes to have been or to be, whereas "to be going to be" is not yet outside its causes. If therefore "to be," "to have been," and "to be going to be" are together for the angel, they will be so outside causes; wherefore, just as an angel cannot now not have been and not be, so likewise he will not be able not to be going to be, not only with the repetition insofar as he is "to be going to be," but even without any repetition.

Then, if there were no succession in the aevum, one angel could not be produced after another, because "before" and "after" are founded only in succession. Finally, because if God, by reason of His eternity - for it is "the whole at once" without succession - knows all future things, on the ground that by reason of a permanent eternity He has all things at once as present, the same would likewise befit an angel by reason of his [aeviternal] duration, which is absurd.

[Here it is that the common opinion holds there is no succession.]

Caput III - That in the aevum there is no succession, as the common opinion holds

The opinion which more Scholastics follow is to be embraced, namely, that there is no succession in the aevum: this was handed down by Alexander in I, q. 12, memb. 9; Albert in the Opuscula; St. Thomas with Cajetan on this article 5 and in Quodlibet X, a. 4, where he expressly

impugns the opinion of Bonaventure; Henricus in Quodlibet V, q. 18; Durandus, In II, dist. 2, q. 3; Capreolus, q. 2, a. 1, concl. 5; Gabriel, In II, dist. 2, q. 1, a. 1, notabilia 3 et 4; Ockham, In II, q. 10. Richard and Scotus judge it probable in the places cited above; nay, Scotus judges it more probable.[540]

In order to explain this opinion, it must be observed that we can speak of the aevum of angels in two ways. First, insofar as it is conceived by us as a certain imaginary interval of duration, which in this way is not without succession, since it cannot be thought by us except after the manner of time that succeeds. And in this way Nazianzen and Damascene seem to have spoken of the aevum in the places alleged in the preceding chapter; but the present controversy must not be understood about this. Then we can speak of the real duration of the angel, as it is in itself, which, as Gabriel and Ockham have most aptly said, is not distinguished from the very existence (*esse*) of the thing. And it is about this, understood in this way, that there is dissension among the Doctors: in which we have said that truer is the opinion of those affirming that no real succession befits the aevum in itself considered without relation to some extrinsic duration. But if the aevum be taken relatively to some extrinsic duration, Gabriel and Ockham teach that by its name not only permanent duration is signified, but there is also connoted at the same time some succession: whether this is true or not, we shall say a little later.

With this foundation laid, our opinion is proved first by the testimony of St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, book 12, near the end; where, to show that the angels could not be equal to God in eternity, he says: "But time, since it runs on by mutability, cannot be coeternal to immutability; and therefore even if the immortality of angels does not pass away in time, nor is the past as if it were now no more, nor the future as if it were not yet, nevertheless their motions, by which times are completed, pass from the past into the future, and therefore they cannot be coeternal to the Creator." These are Augustine's words. He manifestly calls the immortality of angels the duration of their substance, which cannot be corrupted by a secondary cause, as we will show elsewhere; and he admits that in it there is nothing past and nothing future.[541] And he holds that succession is only in the operations of angels. We, however, are now disputing about the aevum of angels, that is, the duration of the substance; about the duration of operations we shall speak below.

By a single reason, which Blessed Thomas touched upon on this article 5, this same thing is proved in this way. No succession can even be conceived without variation; but in angels there is no variation, as St. Bonaventure also teaches: therefore neither is there succession. Moreover, that succession cannot be without variation is proved, first on the part of duration itself considered only under the ratio of duration; then on the part of the angelic substance itself, of which duration is the duration.

540. Alexander of Hales, Summa theologiae, I, q. 12, memb. 9; Albert the Great, Opuscula; St. Thomas Aquinas, on this article 5 and Quodlibet X, a. 4 (with Cajetan ad loc.); Henricus of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. 18; Durandus, In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 3; Capreolus, q. 2, a. 1, concl. 5; Gabriel (commonly taken to be Gabriel Biel), In II Sent., dist. 2, q. 1, a. 1, notabilia 3 - 4; William of Ockham, In II Sent., q. 10; Richard of St. Victor and John Duns Scotus in the places cited above.

541. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, XII, c. 15.

On the part of duration formally: if in it there is a future, which is not yet, and which will at some time be present, then when that arrives which will be present, that which before was present will become past; for it cannot remain together with that which arrives, since only one "now" ought to be present, and that altogether indivisible. Since therefore the future cannot be unless there is also the past, and if variation only occurs in the past, as Bonaventure wishes, it follows that in the duration of the aevum there is variation of the past

Scotus, in the cited place, In II, dist. 2, q. 1, no. 6, being refuted by this reasoning, admits that wherever there is "the future," there must necessarily be "the past." Nevertheless he defends the opinion of Bonaventure in another way. He says that in some delay, as it were, of duration taken formally, there can be variation of the past, although that variation is not in the thing itself whose duration it is. And in this way, in the duration of angels there would indeed be variation of the past, but not in their substance: nor, he affirms, did Bonaventure wish to teach anything else. He adds an example: if flesh were posited under quantity, not having parts, then indeed in the extension of quantity there would be parts, not in the flesh itself, whose quantity that is; so likewise in the duration under which the angel's substance is, there would be parts of past and future, yet in the angel's substance itself they would not be.

Cajetan mentions this doctrine of Scotus on this article. Yet, omitting his refutation, by this reasoning it is easily overthrown. It cannot be that flesh have quantity inhering in it, and yet the extension itself not be in the subject, just as it cannot have whiteness and yet not be white: for "extended" is the formal effect of quantity just as "white" is of whiteness. But here the discussion is about the duration of angels, which inheres in them; indeed, it is altogether the same in reality with their substance - although there can be an extrinsic duration to the angel, such as our time, by which it may be defined as by a measure, as we shall say below - and in that extrinsic duration there can be variation of past and of future, while in the angel's substance itself there is not; nevertheless intrinsic duration to the angel cannot be with that variation, without the angel's substance itself being varied: for just as there cannot be whiteness in a body without making the body white, nor quantity without making it "quantum" and extended into parts, so also, taking the duration of angels formally, there cannot be succession of the future without variation of the past, as Bonaventure wished.

Nor can there be succession in the very substance of the angel. For if the angel's "to be" (*esse*) is future, that will at some time be present; either therefore it is the same as that which was before, and thus it was not future but present; or it is other, and then of necessity, when it arrives, that which was present will pass away, or else two things will at once remain together. Therefore, in the very entire angelic existence either there will be no succession of the future, or, if there is succession, there must be variation of the past.

Someone will say that succession of the future in the angel's substance is not of the whole substance, but of a part, because in that way succession would come from something future without that which was before being present passing away, but would remain wholly, as in the substance of a man nothing would be taken away when a new part of substance comes by nutrition; there would indeed be succession of the future, but not variation of the past. But this is frivolous.

First, because the angel's substance is altogether individual, as is now evident; nothing therefore can accrue to the substance itself - let them show us, as Augustine expressly noted in the place cited, what that is which by the succession of the future is added to the substance of the angel. Next, because even if it were so, nevertheless there is not in the substance itself succession of the whole substance's being: for that some part should arrive does not suffice for there to be succession of the whole "to be"; but rather, as to the whole true "to be," aside from succession it always remains the same. Wherefore, in the duration of the substantial "to be" of corruptible substances which by nutrition or in another way can acquire new parts, there cannot be succession of the future. For the whole of what is future is now and always was, albeit not under so great a quantity and multiplicity of matter: to speak more clearly, man is man from the beginning, and, while he lives, he does not cease to be man; nor is he who will be a different man.

St. Thomas, Henricus, and others, together with Bonaventure's opponents, contend that there is always some variation wherever there is succession of the future, inasmuch as what will be will at some time be present, and ceases from being future, and is defined as present. Now Bonaventure does not deny that there is variation in that which arrives, but he denies that, by reason of the future's arrival, the past is thereby introduced and what was present ceases. But we, for our part, have proved that such variation is necessary wherever there is the future. If that is so, it plainly follows that succession belongs to nothing save to that whose whole is not together, but consists of past, present, and future parts: such is the condition of motion and its being; not of substance and its being.

Some nevertheless defend in this way that there is succession in the duration of an angel, namely, that succession is said only with respect to duration, not of the angel's substance; because succession inheres proximately to duration, not to substance. They think that duration is really distinct from the substance of an angel, just as the duration of motion is distinguished from motion: for while the motion remains the same, its duration is varied according to swiftness and slowness; from which variety a distinction, at least modal, from the thing is argued. Thus also, they say, in other things duration is distinguished from substance.

But I think otherwise. First, if duration were thus distinguished from the thing itself of which it is the duration, it could be that there would be succession in the duration, even if there were not in the substance itself. Second, even if the duration of motion be distinguished from motion itself, it does not follow that the duration of substance ought to be distinguished from the substance itself: for although in the duration of motion there appear some varieties which would not be in the motion itself - on account of which one might say that duration is distinct from motion - yet it would follow that in the duration of substance also there would be varieties that are not in the substance itself, which neither can be separated from it nor be opposed to it. Without any foundation, therefore, do they teach that the duration of substance is distinguished from the substance itself as a mode from a thing. Third, moreover, one and the same substance cannot, according to the same part and in the same respect, be at once successive and not successive; and conversely.

... or to be swift, or to be varied in duration in some way, as experience has established. Wherefore there is no reason why, in motion itself, its duration should be distinguished from it; but universally, the duration of any thing is the same as the thing itself, of which it is. And therefore, if there is succession in the duration, it must also be in the substance itself of which it is.

Obiectio. Moreover, the aforesaid authors prove that duration is distinguished from the substance of an angel by this reason. This substance can exist without this duration, though not conversely: therefore at least duration is distinguished from the substance of an angel as a mode from the thing of which it is the mode. But that the substance of an angel can exist without this duration, they show thus. The substance of an angel, which now has this duration, can be annihilated and produced again; and when it is produced again, it is the same substance in number, not the same duration: therefore duration is distinguished from substance. The same argument can be made regarding motion.

Solutio: I answer that the same substance in number can, after being annihilated, be produced again; yet then it does not have another intrinsic duration, but the same as if it had continued without interruption. One may only say there is a different extrinsic duration with respect to other extrinsic measures with which it coexisted: just as the same angel is said now and formerly to have endured, and hereafter to be about to endure, whereas in reality he has altogether the same duration. But concerning motion I pronounce that the same motion in number cannot return, not even by the power of God; because the unity of a motion is taken from time.

Note: Further, that we may set a limit to this latter part, it must be observed that Ockham and Gabriel have followed this opinion in such a way as to concede that in the thing itself and in the substance of an angel, or even in duration, inasmuch as it is in itself, there is no succession of the future; but that it is so signified by this name, Duration, that it at the same time connotes the succession of another duration with which it can exist and endure together. Wherefore, if such a duration could not be together with that succession which belongs to an angel, it could not be signified by this name, Duration.

It is rejected: Nevertheless they are plainly mistaken. For although the name Duration seems to be derived and extended from sensible things, in which there is some succession, to spiritual things, because every duration is more conveniently conceived after the manner of a certain succession, yet it does not follow that the name duration, inasmuch as it signifies the duration of an angel, connotes any succession; just as the name Wisdom, since it is derived from created things and adapted to the divine, does not in that way signify God's perfection as simultaneously to connote what is created. For it is one thing to signify it after the fashion of what is created; another thing truly is to connote what is created at the same time.

Caput IV - On reconciling the testimonies of the Fathers and distinguishing aevum from eternity

That we may satisfy the testimonies of the Fathers and the reasons adduced for the prior opinion, it must be observed that there is a difference between the aevum (*aevum*) of created spiritual things and the eternity of God, which Blessed Thomas assigns in the article.[542] They differ, therefore, not because the aevum has a beginning while eternity does not have one; for it can happen, according to the opinion of many, that a spiritual thing is created from eternity: then the aevum would not have a beginning, nor would it differ from eternity on that score. Rather, they differ because eternity is so the permanent duration of God without succession that it has conjoined to itself no succession, neither in the very substance of God, whose duration it is, nor in operation, nor in any other thing; whereas the aevum of created things is the permanent duration of the substance, yet in the accidents and operations which are together with it there is succession. Wherefore eternity is the duration of a thing in every respect; but the aevum is only, from the side of the substance, permanent and wholly at once.

From this it is easy to understand what the holy Fathers, earlier commemorated for the prior opinion, wished to say. First of all, therefore, all those who attribute only to God the perseverance of duration without any succession, just as immutability, clearly speak of eternity, which is in every respect without succession. This they attribute to God alone, as also immutability; and these are distinguished from the aevum, as was said above. For the aevum, although it has perseverance of duration without succession on the part of the substance - of which it is the duration - nevertheless has conjoined the vicissitude of operations and of accidents...

- The notion, which by its very nature is subject to the change of accidents and operations.

In the same way Anselm, cited there, should be understood; which is most clearly deduced from his words. For he asserts of things other than God, which he also calls eternal because their duration is called the aevum, that they do not yet have of their eternity what is to come, just as they already do not have what is past. But this is not true, if it be referred to the duration of their substance: for in this there is nothing past, but the whole of its being remains. He therefore speaks of the aevum itself of things, in so far as it has conjoined with itself a variation of operations and of accidents: of these, just as they do not yet have what is future, so they now do not have what is past. Wherefore the testimony of Anselm favors in nothing the opinion of St. Bonaventure: for this author contends that in the aevum of the angels, in so far as it is the duration of the substance, there is a succession of the future without a variation of the past. But Anselm says that in the aevum of the angels and of other things besides God there is not only a succession of the future, but also a variation of the past; which cannot be understood except of the variation of accidents and operations.

542. St. Thomas, in this article.

In the same manner Isidore could be explained, if he had said that in the tenor of the words which we reported. But if his words be faithfully related, they favor nothing of the prior opinion. For he said in this way: "God alone knows being, who does not know having been, or being to be." He did not say, as Bonaventure reports: "Only God is he who does not know having been, or being to be." Wherefore Isidore's words have no difficulty, as is evident.

Of St. John Damascene it must be said that he speaks of that imaginary interval of eternity, which is conceived by us after the manner of a flowing, about which there is no present controversy.

To Boethius I say that he too spoke as Anselm and the other Fathers: wherefore he is alleged in vain for the prior opinion.

Solvuntur duae primae rationes. Now let us address the arguments adduced on the opposite side. To the first two, which are taken on the part of conservation, we say that, as the eternal generation of the Son of God is always being perfected, and the Son proceeds from the Father by generation perpetually, without any succession or variation of the future: so a spiritual creature is by a certain perpetual creation produced and conserved by God. Nor is there need, either really or even according to reason, to distinguish the first creation of a thing from its conservation otherwise than by respect to various instants and to the duration of our time; so that, in so far as it is referred to the first instant, it be called creation; but in so far as to the rest of time, with which also it simultaneously endures, it be called conservation, although it be the same act in reality and in notion. If we could not compare it with our time, we would not distinguish creation and conservation: but there would be only one single act, by which a thing is perpetually drawn out by God from nothing, which always has as its terminus from which the nothing, not because that nothing preceded the thing itself in time and duration, but because the thing which is conserved by God would fall into nothing if it were left by him; and because there is not anything else from which a thing according to the whole of its being is made by God. Wherefore even if the production of some creature were eternal, it would be from nothing, as remains explained.

In the same way, to the second argument it must be granted that to all spiritual things created, the whole of their being was communicated complete in the first instant, and that there was not anything future to be added to it; from this, however, it does not follow that they do not need conservation. For they receive that being from God in such a way that by their very nature they are always referred to him as to an author and as to one actually creating. Just as the Son of God, even if he received the whole being from the Father, nonetheless proceeds from him by perpetual generation, and regards him as actually generating.

Solutio tertii. To the third, from the same ground I answer that, although there is no succession in the conservation of a thing, nevertheless there is succession between it and annihilation, as between the being of the thing and its not-being. For since these two cannot be together, nor can any medium exist between them, it is necessary that the one succeed the other. Nor indeed is there need to say that annihilation is the negation of the conservation which would be future, as the argument contends, but that it is the negation of the conservation which has preceded it, so that

what before was conserved by God, now when it is annihilated is conserved no longer. Just as the not-being of the thing is the negation of its being, not indeed of that which was future, but of that which has preceded. Wherefore between these two there is a succession of future and past, although in conservation itself there is none.

Therefore, although annihilation is the privation of conservation, nevertheless future annihilation is not the privation of future conservation: for to annihilation there does not belong a futurity from the thing which it deprives, but it is of itself future after conservation, because it succeeds conservation: and thus from this same fact it does not have both the being of annihilation and the being of the future. And thus far concerning the arguments taken on the part of conservation.

Solvitur primum argumentum ex parte rei sumptum. But to the first, on the part of the things themselves, which was the other medium, Capreolus answers in the Second Book, distinction 2, question 2, article 3, to the second against the condemned conclusion, after ten other arguments; and Durandus in the same distinction and question to the second; and many recent authors in this article as well: therefore an angel can be annihilated, because although he has his whole being together, even the future, nevertheless that being is of a nature to exist together with the future of our duration. Wherefore, before that future arrives, he can be destroyed just as any other thing whose being is truly future; but on the contrary it cannot be that, after he has existed together with the past, he did not exist, because to the past there is no potency.[543]

Reijicitur recentiorum solutio. But this doctrine does not remove the difficulty of the argument: for it seems to matter little, if the aevum is apt to exist together with some future thereafter, in order that it may be able to be annihilated and not be; for from the very thing itself, without an order to something extrinsic, it seems to be the question whether it lies within the power of God to destroy it. From the fact therefore that it can exist together with some other future, it ought not to be inferred that it can be annihilated. For although it could not come about that there be some being having succession in its being, with which permanent things also could exist together, but every created being would be permanent, having the whole being together; nonetheless any creature by its very nature could be destroyed by God for this sole reason, that in its permanent and perpetual being it needs to be conserved by him. Therefore the force of the fact argued remains, namely, if the future of a permanent thing is already with it, as the past is, the thing itself will no longer be able not to be, just as neither not to have been.

Auctoris responsio. For my part I think an easier answer can be given, if that common proposition be rightly understood, "There is no potency to the past," which is to be taken thus, that to the same duration "to have been" and "not to have been" be referred: for thus "to have been" and "not to have been" contradict each other. Similarly it is to be understood: the present cannot not be present; and the future cannot not be future, as we shall say in Disputation 68, chapter 4. And since now in the thing there is something past and present, even of the thing itself which is past and present, without repetition of the past or the present we say "it cannot not have been," "it

543. Capreolus, In II Sent., d. 2, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2, contra conclusionem damn.; Durandus, In II Sent., d. 2, q. 3, ad 2.

cannot not be," because in reality the contradictory is supposed in the same duration. But if we refer the not-being to a different duration than the being or having been, very well can both be true at once. For a thing which was past, although it cannot not have been, can nonetheless now not be, and afterwards not be going to be; and a present thing, although it cannot now not be, can nonetheless afterwards not be going to be, and before not have been. Wherefore, in the angel, since we posit that the whole of his duration is present, and nothing of it future, so that in him there is not "to be going to be," but "to be," we must philosophize of him as of any present thing. Most truly therefore we can say: the angel who is, cannot not be, referring both to present duration; yet the angel who is can not have been, and afterwards not be going to be; and therefore be annihilated. For although in the angel there is not "to be going to be," nor "to have been," but the whole is "to be," yet there is "not to have been" and "not to be going to be." For in his being itself there is no succession; but between his being and his not-being, or conversely between not-being and being, there is succession, as has been proved in this chapter. Wherefore we do not say that the angel has being after being; but well, that he has being after not-being, and not-being after being. God alone it is who so has his whole being together that after it there cannot succeed not-being: not because the whole permanent being is without succession - for from this side it would not be impossible, as has already been shown of angels - but because, as Durandus very well noted in the said place, distinction 2, question 3, to the reply, and Capreolus likewise in that article 3, after the third solution against the condemned conclusion, he depends on no other, nor is conserved by any other as by a cause. Wherefore neither can any cause of his not-being be conceived.[544]

Ad secundum, secundum aliquos. To the second, from the same ground Capreolus answers in that article 3, to the ninth, against certain moderns, that between the creation of one angel and of another there cannot be in reality any succession: wherefore, in their opinion, it would not be said that God creates one angel after another, unless there were some time with succession, at least imaginary, with which those creations of angels might be compared. And if now we say that one soul has been created by God after another, we speak with respect to our time which is in succession, with which we compare and in a certain manner measure the creations of souls according to before and after. It would still be said that God creates one, when the other does not exist. But their whole reason is that "before" and "after" indicate succession; yet there is none of this in the being of the same angel; likewise they say that even between the creations of two angels it follows. This very thing Henry seems to have taught in Quodlibet 10, question 19, when he asserts that between the creation of one angel and of another there can only be an imaginary succession by an order to some true succession thought of

Nevertheless, although in the aevum and duration of each angel there is no succession, it does not follow that between two creations there cannot be; for in any instant there is no succession, yet one instant can succeed another. For who would deny that between the very thoughts of an angel there truly is succession, and that one after another is thought by the angel, without any comparison with our time? - of which the angel is said by St. Augustine to be moved from one to another, as we shall report in Disputation 35; yet each thought in itself is permanent and whole at

544. Durandus, In II Sent., d. 2, q. 3, ad resp.; Capreolus, In eod. art. 3, post solutionem 3, contra conclusionem damn.

once. But of the very creations the same is clearly proved. For between the not-being of an angel and his being there is no succession, as was said; and likewise between the not-being of an angel and his creation, and between his annihilation and his not-being: but the creation of Gabriel, by the very nature of the cause, could be together with the not-being of Michael, since he himself is created after his own not-being; therefore the creation of Gabriel would precede the creation of Michael. For just as, if one angel were created, and afterwards destroyed, and thereafter the same were created again, there would be succession between the former and the latter creation, as Capreolus grants in the tenth solution against the second conclusion; so in like manner between the creation of one, which is together with the not-being of the other, and that other's creation, which is after that not-being, there ought to be succession: and therefore he no less ought to concede a discrete time between the creation of one and of another, than between the creation and the re-creation of the same.[547][548]

It would not be said that God creates one after another, unless there were some time with succession, at least imaginary, with which those creations of angels might be compared. And if now we say that one soul has been created by God after another, we speak with respect to our time which is in succession, with which we compare and in a certain manner measure the creations of souls according to before and after. It would still be said that God creates one, when the other does not exist. But their whole reason is that "before" and "after" indicate succession; yet there is none of this in the being of the same angel; likewise they say that even between the creations of two angels it follows. The same thing Henry seems to have taught in Quodlibet 10, question 19, when he asserts that between the creation of one angel and of another there can only be an imaginary succession by an order to some true succession thought of.

But if we now say that one soul has been created by God after another, we speak with respect to our time which is in succession, with which we compare and in a certain manner measure the creations of souls according to before and after. It would still be said that God creates one, when the other does not exist. The whole reason of theirs, however, is that before and after indicate succession; but these are in no wise in the same angel; likewise they say they follow even between the creations of two angels. Henry himself seems to have taught this in Quodlibet 10, question 19, when he asserts that between the creation of one angel and another there can only be an imaginary succession by an order to some true succession conceived.

It follows, therefore, that there can be a discrete time between the creation of one and of another, as between the creation and re-creation of the same.

It is objected: One cannot create another unless there were some time with succession, at least imaginary, with which these creations of the angels could be compared. But if now we say that one soul after another is created by God, we speak with reference to our time, which is in succession, with which we compare, according to before and after, the creations of souls, and in some way we measure them. Yet it would be said that God creates the one, the other not existing. Their whole

547. Capreolus, loc. cit., solutio 10 contra conclusionem secundam.

548. Ibid., on the parity between the interval of different angels' creations and that between a creature's creation and re-creation.

reason is this, that "before" and "after" indicate succession: but this, just as it is not in that in which the angel himself is, so also it cannot be between the creations of two angels. Henry seems to have taught this very thing in that Quodlibet, q. 19, when he asserts that between the creation of one angel and of another there can only be an imaginary succession by an order to some true succession conceived.[549]

It is answered: Granted that in the aforesaid "where" and duration of each angel there is no succession, it does not follow that there cannot be succession between two creations; for although in any instant there is no succession, nevertheless one instant can follow upon another. For who would deny that between the angel's very thoughts there is true succession, and that one thing is thought by the angel after another, no comparison having been made with our time, as when, from one thought passing into another, there is succession among angels - whence Augustine says an angel is moved, as we will report in Disputation 35 - yet each thought remains in itself and is wholly at once? But concerning the creations themselves this is manifestly proved. For between the non-being of the angel and his being there is succession, as was said; and consequently between the angel's non-being and his creation, and likewise his annihilation. But the creation of Gabriel, for example, can be simultaneous with Michael's non-being, which truly precedes the creation of the latter, because he is created after his own non-being: therefore Gabriel's creation will then precede Michael's creation. For just as, if one angel were created and afterwards destroyed, and then subsequently the same were created anew, between the prior and the later creation there would be succession, as Capreolus admits in solution 10 against the second conclusion, so in like manner between the creation of the one, which is simultaneous with the non-being of the other, and the creation of that other, which is after that non-being, there must be succession; and hence one ought no less to concede that there is a discrete time between the creation of the one and of the other, than between the creation and the re-creation of the same.[550]

Objection. But someone will urge by this argument: If one creation can be after another without any order to an imaginary time, then one can also precede another more or less; yet more or less in that precedence cannot be assigned except in order to a greater or lesser succession of our time, since the being of each angel is altogether individual: therefore neither can precedence simply be without order to our time. But if this argument has any weight, it proves likewise that there is not succession among an angel's operations without order to our time, and that from them a discrete time is not composed. For each of those operations is individual, and therefore from them alone a more or less in precedence cannot be assigned. Yet among operations all the Schoolmen concede succession, which they call a discrete time: therefore the argument can have no weight.

Solution. I answer, therefore, that without order to our time there can be precedence among an angel's operations and creations, as was said, from this alone, that one is while the other is not, and conversely; but that a more or less in that precedence cannot be designated without order to our time, because this cannot be done unless some external measure be applied. Now, as we will say in the next disputation, no aevum (*aevum*) is the measure of that in which it is, nor can one be the

549. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet X, q. 19.
550. Capreolus, In II Sent., d. 2, q. 2, a. 3, solutio 10, contra secundam conclusionem.

measure of another; but the whole reason for measuring even spiritual things ought to flow back to our time: therefore without order to it a more or less in precedence cannot be assigned, because this consists in a measure. Nevertheless, the precedence itself can simply be, because it is without a measure. Finally, from the same ground we will say most at large in Disputation 65, where we will show that nothing future has to the eternity of God a present existence and real presence, and consequently neither can the angel's aevum have it. Yet if to God in this way future things were present, no weak argument would be derived from the angel's aevum, as we will show there.

Further they argue: Just as an angel cannot be placed in a greater and greater place unless his mode of existing in it be extended, so neither can any substance be in a greater and greater time without some extension succeeding. But this argument is frivolous. First, because nothing is under our time by reason of some mode that it has in itself, but by its duration alone; and it can itself persevere without being changed in itself, even if the time under which it is said to be should succeed: just as a place remains the same, exists, and without its own succession embraces many bodies succeeding one another; and God also, without any succession, is together with the time that succeeds. Then, that when an angel is in a greater place he is said to have a more extensive mode, ought not to be understood of the extension of quantity, but of that which is in a habit with respect to more conclusions; and this is necessary, because an angel and spirit is conjoined to a body, not proximally through his own substance, but through some other mode by which he is united to it, as we will say in its own place below. Wherefore the ratio is not the same in both cases, as the argument contended.

Disputatio XXXIV - On whether the aevum is the measure of permanent things

Caput I - Various opinions

From this controversy too we shall exactly understand the nature of the aevum (*aevum*), and by what ratio it differs from our time. Now, there is in it the opinion of certain Doctors, who judge that the aevum is the measure (*mensura*) of permanent things, just as eternity is of God Himself. In which opinion agree St. Thomas, Cajetan, and the more recent Thomists there; Alexander; Albert; Aegidius in his tract on the measure of angels; Henry in a Quodlibet; St. Bonaventure in II; Richard; Thomas of Argentina; and Capreolus.[551]

The first way of holding is that of St. Bonaventure, Aegidius, and Thomas of Argentina, who teach that, besides a certain common extrinsic measure by which all immortal things are defined, there is in each of them its own aevum, which is the intrinsic and proper measure of each. Now Thomas proves that the aevum of each thing is its measure, because not all immortal things which are contained under the aevum and live began at the same time, as is clear about souls; therefore in

551. St. Thomas; Cajetan; Alexander of Hales (Summa, I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 3, ad 2; and art. 2); Albert the Great (De quatuor coelis, q. 3, a. 1); Aegidius (De mensura Angelorum, q. 2); Henry of Ghent (Quodlibet, r., q. 11); St. Bonaventure (In II Sent.); Richard; Thomas of Argentina (Summa, I, dist. a., q. 1 - 2); Capreolus (on Thomas of Argentina, q. 1, 2, 4).

each there ought to be its own measure, which may be proper to it, and also more certain. Besides this, there is a common aevum of a superior [order]; this he recommends by the following reason. Just as in other things which are corrupted, besides the intrinsic measure of each, which is its duration, there is a certain common and extrinsic measure which measures all, namely time; so in angels it ought to be.

Of these Doctors, St. Bonaventure does not so openly concede this common measure; but Aegidius thinks this measure to be the aevum and eternity of God; Thomas, however, [thinks it to be] the aevum of a superior angel, with whom many others agree in this, as we will see in this question.

The second way is Scotus's, who says two things. One is that no thing's own duration is the measure of an angel, or of any other thing in which it is. Thus he delivers in that question 2, to the second part. He proves it because a measure always differs from that which it measures; for the same does not define nor measure itself. For although sometimes the same quantity measures itself, this is done only with some part of it assigned and then replicated over the remainder by the intellect; but in an angel there is nothing of this sort. Then too, the angel's aevum is not distinguished from the angel's substance itself: therefore it is not its measure.

The other [thesis], which Scotus teaches in q. 3, is that there is some aevum which is an extrinsic measure of angels. But this (he says) can be explained or defended in three ways. Passing over, however, the first mode, which is about a measure of perfection, not of duration - according to which a more perfect species is called the measure of the less perfect species, of which there is now no controversy - two further [modes] remain. One is that the aevum of each superior angel should be the measure of the inferior, and this in an order down to the last. He proves that the duration of a superior is the measure of an inferior angel, because a measure ought to be by nature better known than that which it measures; although sometimes to some intellect, often to a human one, because it is imperfect, the measured may by nature become better known. But the aevum of a superior angel is by its nature better known, because it is more perfect, than that of the inferior; therefore that [aevum] is the measure of the inferior. The other [mode] is that there is only one aevum, namely the duration of the highest angel, which is the measure of all the others. He proves this by the same reasoning which St. Thomas uses in confirmation of his own view, which we will presently report. But in whatever way we speak, from the foregoing doctrine it necessarily follows that the highest angel will be the measure of none: not of his own, because nothing measures itself, as we said out of Scotus's own doctrine; not of an inferior, because that is to be measured which is superior to the thing measured, as he himself also teaches; not of a superior, because he has none: therefore he is without a measure.

A third way is philosophized by St. Thomas, Cajetan, Alexander, Albert, Henry, Richard, and Capreolus, which is especially approved by the more recent authors. They affirm that all immortal things are contained under one common aevum as under a measure; yet St. Thomas, Richard, and Henry assert that that common aevum is not the proper measure of those things that are contained under it, because it is not the cause of the others: just as the motion of the heaven, which, since it is

the cause of the others, is rightly said to be their measure. But, as St. Thomas most fittingly noted at article 6, reply to 4, and Albert and others [likewise], for something to be the measure of another it is not necessary that it be the cause of it; which will be made plain in the next disputation.

However, in their view it seems one must say that that highest aevum is not only the measure of inferior things, but even of the highest angel himself in whom it is, so that thus all immortal things may be contained under whose measure they are, as all corporeal things under time; which Caietan expressly taught at article 6, although the others made no mention of this. Whether indeed the very aevum of each angel can be its own measure is not sufficiently explained by the cited Doctors. From the more recent [writers], however, some seem to teach that the intellect of each angel holds his own aevum to be the measure of himself; whence they seem to incline to the opinion of Argentina and the others. This opinion is confirmed by the same reasons with which the opinion of Argentina and Scotus is supported, which, since it agrees with this [view], there is no need to repeat.

Caput II - The easier opinion

I indeed judge this controversy not great, but of such a sort; and for that reason the Doctors fight among themselves because they do not take the notion of measure in the same way. Truly, in accordance with those things which we delivered concerning measure from Aristotle in Disputation 30, c. 5, we can gather an easier opinion about this matter; which no author will doubt, who admits the definition of measure handed down by Aristotle. The opinion is this: neither any supreme aevum, nor the aevum of any thing, is the measure either of itself, in which it is, or of another. This is taught by Durandus; Gabriel; Ockham; and, in the same sense and in those places, others.[552] For the confirmation of which, two things must be proved by us, one being presupposed: namely, this is, in whichever...

Although others have treated of the measure of perfection, not of duration (duratio), according to which a more perfect species is said to be the measure of the remaining ones - a question about which there is now no controversy - two other ways remain. One is, that the aevum (aevum) of each superior Angel is the measure of the inferior, and so in order down to the last. And they prove that the duration of the superior is the measure of the inferior Angel, because a measure ought to be, by its own nature, more known than the thing it measures: although at times, to some intellect, namely to the human, because it is imperfect, the measure is not more known by its nature; yet the nature of the superior Angel is, by its own nature, more known, because it is more perfect, than that of the inferior: therefore it is the measure of the inferior. The other is, that there is only one aevum, namely the duration of the highest Angel, which is the measure of all the others. And this as well they prove by the same reason that St. Thomas brings in confirmation of his own opinion, which we shall presently report. Yet, however we speak, from the foregoing doctrine it must necessarily be admitted that the highest Angel has the measure of no aevum: not of his own,

552. Durandus, In II Sent., d. 2, q. 3; Gabriel Biel, q. 1, a. 2, concl. 5 - 6, and art. 3, dub. 1; William of Ockham, In II Sent., q. 13.

because nothing measures itself, as we said from the doctrine of Scotus; not of the inferior, because a measure ought to be superior to the thing it measures, as he also teaches; not of a superior, because he has none: therefore he lacks a measure.

In a third way St. Thomas, Cajetan, Alexander, Albert, Henry, Richard, and Capreolus philosophize, and this is especially approved by the more recent authors. They affirm that all immortals are contained under one common aevum as under a measure. Yet Richard and Henry assert that that common aevum is not properly the measure of those which are contained under it, because it is not the cause of the others: just as the motion of the heaven, since it is the cause of other things, is most fittingly said to be their measure. But, as St. Thomas most aptly noted, a. 6, ad 4, and Albert and others, for something to be the measure of another it is not necessary that it be the cause of that other; as will be made clear in the next disputation. However, in the opinion of these authors it seems one must say that that supreme aevum is not only the measure of the lower things, but also of the very highest angel in whom it is; so that in this way all immortals are contained under one measure, just as all corporeals are contained under time: which Cajetan expressly taught.[553]

The easier opinion

I for my part judge that this controversy is one not of things, but of words; and on that account the authors are at odds with one another, because they do not conceive the notion of measure in the same way. But according to the things which, from Aristotle, we handed down about measure in Disputation 30, chapter 5, we can choose an easier opinion on this matter; which I think will be doubtful to none who has admitted the notion of measure handed down by Aristotle. The opinion is this: that neither some one supreme [aevum], nor the aevum of any immortal thing, is, in that in which it is, a measure - neither of itself, nor of another, nor of anything else. This is taught by Durandus, by Gabriel, and by Ockham.[554] For the confirmation of which, two things must be proved by us, one being presupposed. And this is: that in whatever immortal thing there is its own proper duration, which is called its aevum. For just as in whatever motion there is its own duration, which is not distinguished from the being (*esse*) of that motion (I do not say [there is thereby] a measure, nor [that this duration is] time), so also in each thing that remains, whether immortal or liable to corruption. For a thing is not said to persevere and endure in its own being by the duration of another - this is, because one thing endures - just as it is not said to be of such quantity - by the quantity of another; although by the duration of another, as also by the quantity of another, it be defined as by a measure.

This being posited, which is most certain and without controversy to all, and in which Scotus agrees with us, the first part of our opinion must be proved, namely, that each thing's proper aevum is not the measure of itself. And we speak not of a measure of perfection, but of duration,

553. Cajetan, on article 6, ad 4.

554. Durandus, In II Sent., d. 2, q. 5; Gabriel Biel, q. 1, a. 2, concl. 5 - 6, and art. 3, dub. 1; William of Ockham, In II Sent., q. 13.

which is commonly called a measure according to the definition of Aristotle in Metaphysics X, chapters 2 and 3.[555] Ockham and Gabriel prove it thus: the measure of an Angel is either its existence (*esse*), or some respect founded in it: not the first, because the same thing cannot be the measure of itself. For, since that which is defined by the measure is the Angel's existing, his existence, or existence - which is the same - it cannot be the measuring measure: nor any respect, for a measure ought to be more known than the thing it measures, but that respect cannot be more known; nor something compounded from both: therefore there is no intrinsic measure in the immortal things themselves. I pass over other arguments of these authors which do not please me: nay, even this which I set down does not altogether explain, and it proves that which we proposed.

Therefore the best reason is that of Durandus which, in my opinion, is the sole and the firmest foundation of this matter. It is taken from the definition of measure handed down by Aristotle; which indeed, since we fully explained it in Disputation 30, chapter 5, so that we might prove that the eternity of God is not the measure of himself, we shall here only touch upon. The reason is in this way: the duration of any thing, although it renders that thing subject to measure, just as the quantity makes the thing in which it is [to be] something measurable, nevertheless quantity cannot be that by which the thing itself is known and defined, as I showed at length in the same disputation, chapter 5, notation 3; but some other extrinsic duration must be applied by the intellect, to which the proper definition of measure set down there in notation 2 will agree: nor is it only the substance of the thing that is considered by measure, but also its duration is considered according to another extrinsic [standard], applied by the intellect.

Moreover, in the opinion of those [who speak of a common aevum] it seems one must say that that supreme aevum is not only the measure of lower things, but also of the very highest angel in whom it is, so that thus all immortals may be contained under one measure, just as all corporeal things are under time: which Cajetan expressly taught.[553]

The latter part of our opinion is, that no aevum, not even that of a superior angel, is the extrinsic measure of another; which from the same doctrine handed down in Disputation 30, chapter 5, Durandus, Ockham, and Gabriel easily prove. For a measure ought to be more known than the thing it measures, as was explained there: for indeed by it we are made more certain about the quantity, or position, or duration of the thing which we measure. Indeed, there is nothing else to measure some thing than to know its quantity, weight, or duration through another: every measure is a measure for some intellect, as we said in that place. But the aevum of a superior angel, or even of the highest, is not more known than the aevum of an inferior, inasmuch as duration is after the manner of an extended quantity: therefore it cannot be the measure of the inferior.

Furthermore, that the aevum of a superior angel is not more known is clear by induction: first, it is not [more known] to the divine intellect; for to it all these things which are patent and manifest are not defined through another. Second, not to the intellect of the superior angel: for although he sees that his own aevum is of a more perfect nature, and that his substance is less subject to variety

555. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, chs. 2 - 3.
553. Cajetan, on article 6, ad 4.

than that of the inferior - whence he has it as a rule and measure of perfection - yet from his own duration he is not rendered more certain about the duration of the inferior, namely, how great it has been; and in this consists the proper notion of the measure of which we are disputing. For he sees that all began and persevered together; and although some of them afterwards might have begun, as souls, nevertheless from his own duration he would not know how great was the duration of the others, nor could he measure it. Third, it is not more known to the intellect of the inferior angel than to that of the superior: for each one knows his own duration so well that he cannot define it better by another's duration; so that he does not use the aevum of another as an instrument for discerning how long he himself has endured. For that he himself says and knows that he has endured as long as the highest Angel has endured, is not to define his own duration by the aevum of the superior: for it would be the same as to refer it to that of the inferior; wherefore his own aevum would be no less a measure for himself of the superior's than the superior's aevum would be a measure of his. Fourth and finally, since the [aevum] of the superior is in no way more known to our intellect, as experience shows - for as to various durations we are not rendered more certain through anything else, but only through our time, as we shall say in the following chapter - it remains, therefore, that no aevum be the measure of another, since it can serve no intellect for this.

Some more recent authors reply that a measure ought not to be more known to the intellect that uses it, but it is enough if it is of its own nature more known: of this kind is the superior, which, because it is more perfect, is more known also by its nature; as the motion of the heaven, although to our intellect it is not more known than the motions of the lower, is nevertheless their measure, because by its own nature it is more known.

But this reply is easily refuted, first, from the very definition of measure: for, as we proved in Disputation 30, chapter 5, of the ratio of measure is an order and relation to an intellect, whose proper function it is to be made more certain about some quantity, or about something having a kind of quantity, which is to measure a quantum thing; wherefore measure is an instrument of the intellect, by which it measures and defines a thing; and so in the very intellect that defines by it the measure itself ought to be more known: for if to that intellect it were not more known, it could not serve as an instrument for measuring; therefore it matters little that something which is a measure is more known by nature: what is required is that it be more known to the intellect which uses it.

Then it is false that the motions of these lower things are more known to our intellect than the motion of the heaven: for, besides the fact that in that case it could not serve us as the measure of these lower motions, as is clear from the foregoing - which is absurd - yet insofar as it is the measure of other [motions], it is the most known of all to us. For although, if we consider causes and other properties and modes of motions, the motions of the lower are more known to us, still the motion of the heaven, insofar as it is a certain duration and has the character of a measure, is more known, because it persists in the same proportion in its succession; wherefore it is rightly established as the rule of the rest, which ought to be more known to the very intellect that uses it. This also is clear from experience: for if you ask someone how long the game was, how long the reading was, or something else of this kind among these lower things, no one will be able to explain

their duration unless he compares it with the motion of the heaven, or with some lower motion first defined through the motion of the heaven, such as the motion of a clock, or of sand, or of water. For which cause, as we shall explain a little later, the motion of the heaven is for us time, because it is an instrument by which we measure the other motions into days, months, and years, the very luminaries of the heaven being distinguished by God for this very purpose; to which we also add another artificial division, namely into hours and minutes, so that we may reduce this measure to a briefer unity which may serve us more conveniently and for measuring more things.

From which (to say this in passing) it follows that, although time is in motion, nevertheless not in any motion whatsoever, as some more recent authors judge. For time formally is not only the duration of motion, which indeed is found proper to any motion, but it is the duration of the first motion so divided and distinguished by the intellect that it may be an instrument and measure for measuring other motions, to which the others are reduced; and therefore time has been called by Aristotle the number of motion, as if he were saying, a number of motion divided by the intellect and assumed for measuring other durations. Wherefore he subjoins that, if it is impossible for there to be a numerating [subject], namely the intellect, it would also be impossible that there be number, that is, something numerated, which he said time is. Therefore time is either a being of reason, to wit the relation of measure in motion, or at least it is completed by that; wherefore it must not be placed in the predicament of real quantity.

By these things that have been said, not only is the latter part of our opinion confirmed, but also the opinion of others is refuted, inasmuch as it says that there is one aevum which is the extrinsic measure of the rest, or that any higher aevum can be the measure of a lower, as Scotus supposed.

... since he himself does not know and define it; wherefore he does not use the aevum of another as an instrument for discerning how long he himself has endured. For that he himself says and knows that he has lasted as long as the highest Angel has lasted, is not to define his own duration by that of a superior; for it would be just the same as to refer it to that of an inferior; wherefore his own aevum would be no less to himself a measure of that of the superior, than the aevum of the superior would be a measure of his own. Fourth, finally, since that of the superior is not better known to our intellect, as experience shows, because concerning the duration of one we are made certain in no wise through another, but only through our own time, as we shall say in the following chapter, it remains therefore that no aevum be the measure of another, since it can serve no intellect for this.

Some more recent authors answer that a measure need not be better known to the intellect that uses it, but that it suffices if it be by its own nature more known: of such a sort is that which is higher, which, since it is more perfect, is also by its nature more known; as the motion of the heavens is not more known to our intellect than the motions of inferior things, yet it is their measure, because by its own nature it is more known.

It is refuted. Yet this answer is easily refuted, first from the very definition of measure: for, as we proved in disputation 30, chapter 5, the formal account of measure is an order and relation to the intellect, whose proper function is to render one more certain of some quantity, or of

something that is related after the mode of quantity, which is to measure a quantifiable thing. Wherefore a measure is an instrument of the intellect, by which it measures and defines some thing; and accordingly the measure itself ought to be better known to the very intellect that defines: for if it were not better known to it, it could not serve as an instrument for measuring. Therefore it matters little, for something to be a measure, that it be more known by nature; but it must be more known to the intellect that uses it.

Then it is false that the motions of these lower things are better known to our intellect than the motion of the heavens: for besides the fact that the latter could not serve us as a measure of these inferior things, as is clear from what has been said - which is absurd - yet inasmuch as it is the measure of the others, it is to us the best known of all. For although, if we consider causes and other properties and modes of motions, the motions of lower things which we see before our eyes every day may be better known to us, nevertheless the motion of the heavens, inasmuch as it is a certain duration and has the notion of measure, is better known, because it persists with the same proportion in its succession; wherefore it is rightly constituted as a rule of the others, which ought to be better known to the very intellect that uses it. This also is clear from experience: for if you ask someone how long a game lasted, how long a lesson, or other such like among these inferior things, no one will be able to explain their duration unless he compare it with the motion of the heavens, or with some lower motion previously defined by the motion of the heavens, such as the motion of a clock, or of sand, or of water. For which reason, as we shall explain a little later, the motion of the heavens is to us time, in that it is the instrument by which we measure the other motions into days, months, and years; and the very luminaries of the heavens are set apart by God for this very purpose; to which we also add another artificial division, namely into hours and minutes, so that we may reduce this measure to a briefer unity, which may serve us more conveniently and for measuring more things.

From which (to say this in passing) it follows that although time is in motion, yet it is not in just any motion, as some recent authors judge. For formally time is not only the duration of motion, which indeed is found as its own in any motion whatsoever, but it is the duration of the first motion so divided and distinguished by the intellect that it can be an instrument and measure for measuring the other motions, to which the rest are reduced; and so time was said by Aristotle to be the number of motion, as if he were to say, motion divided by the intellect and assumed by it for measuring other durations. Wherefore he adds that, if it were impossible that there be a numerating [subject], namely the intellect, it would also be impossible that there be a number, that is, something numerated, which he said time is. Therefore time is either a being of reason, to wit, the relation of measure in motion, or at least it is completed by that; wherefore it ought not to be placed in the predicament of real quantity.

By these things that have been said, not only is the latter part of our opinion confirmed, but also the opinion of others is refuted, inasmuch as it says that there is one aevum which is the extrinsic measure of the rest, or that any higher aevum can be the measure of a lower, as Scotus supposed.

Arguments.

It will not be difficult to dissolve the opposing arguments from the foregoing doctrine. To the first, which was common to all, I answer: it is not necessary to assign some higher measure proper to spiritual things. For since a measure by its nature is not something higher than that which it measures, it is not necessary that higher substances have a more excellent measure; but since a measure is an instrument of the intellect, that will be the measure which the intellect uses for measuring. And since no one can use a higher aevum for defining that which is lower, it follows that no aevum, even if higher, is the measure of what is lower. Whether time can be the measure of spiritual things, and in what manner it cannot be applied to God, we shall say in the following disputation. Nor indeed has any of the Fathers ever taught that the aevum is the measure of the Angels; for those whom we recalled in disputation 33, chapter 1, assert that aevum is also taken for the duration and, as it were, for the age of the Angels, which we likewise concede. Whether, however, it can be subject to a measure, and what its formal ratio is, by which it differs both from eternity and from time, will be seen in the following disputation. Finally, as to the arguments of each of the singular opinions, I think from the foregoing doctrine that satisfaction also has been given.

Disputatio XXXV - Whether the aevum of the Angels can be defined by our time as by a measure

Caput I - What St. Thomas and his disciples, and Durandus, held

The first opinion is that of St. Thomas in Quodlibet 10, article 4, and of Capreolus in the places cited in the former disputation,[556] whom some more recent authors follow, who hold that time indeed is for us the measure of the Angels, because our intellect defines their duration; then, that by its nature and in itself it is not time, but the aevum of them is their measure, as in the former disputation, out of their opinion, was set forth, the reason of which we also touched upon there. For they think that a measure ought to be of some higher order and by its nature more known; but time is a certain duration inferior to the aevum of the Angels.

The second opinion is that of Durandus, who not only denies that the aevum is the measure of any Angel, as we saw in the preceding disputation, but also says that time truly and properly is the measure of each one. This opinion would altogether commend itself to us, had he not added that this kind of measure is heterogeneous and of another sort of ratio; not because the substance of the Angels is immortal, whereas time is subject to corruption - if it is true that the substance of the heavens can be corrupted, or at least that the motion of it is by its own nature not perpetual, since it proceeds from an extrinsic active principle, namely an intelligence - but because time is extended and has succession, whereas the duration of the Angels is individual and all at once. Wherefore (says Durandus) an Angel is defined only by our time, inasmuch as he exists together with it, not because the duration of each is congenerous.

556. St. Thomas, Quodlibet 10, art. 4; Capreolus, in the places cited in the preceding disputation.

Caput II - This too is a controversy of words, not of things

Now this controversy also is a disagreement about words, not about things. For St. Thomas and the authors of the first opinion seem to be speaking of the measure of perfection; but the others of measure as it is defined by Aristotle in the Metaphysics, chapters 2 and 3.[557] Concerning this, the opinion of Ockham and Gabriel [Biel] in the places cited above pleases me,[558] which no one will deny, namely, not only that the aevum is not the measure of the Angels, as has been proved, but also that our time...

Our time truly and properly is their measure. And hence, against Durandus we add that this measure by which the Angels are measured is also congenerous with them. For, according to the opinion of Aristotle in Metaphysics X, chapters 2 and 3, it is not necessary that the one be the superior of which the other is the measure; for this it is enough that each be a duration.[559] For duration does not have gravity or weight for its measure, but another duration. Nor does it matter that the Angels' duration is individual and permanent, whereas the duration of time is flowing and extended: for the Angel's duration, or aevum, is conceived by us after the manner of flowing; and this is why we most fittingly apply a flowing duration as its measure. And since measure is not something outside the soul, but only in the intellect, as was proved in disputation 34, cap. 5, it also seems enough that an individual thing be truly and properly said to be a subject of measure, if it is conceived by us after the manner of something flowing and having succession; nor is it necessary that it be really extended and flowing, like that which is assumed as its measure.

Therefore it follows, from the aforesaid definition of measure, that time is the measure of the Angels. For that is a measure by which one discerns the quantity of another, if the duration is conceived after the mode of quantity; and by time we best come to know how great the Angels' age has been, and by how much they were more ancient than the Flood, or than the creation of any soul; nor can we learn this otherwise: therefore it is truly and properly a measure of the Angels. Finally, for the confirmation of this opinion certain points must be observed.

First, a measure ought not by its nature to be more perfect than the thing it measures, nor to be its cause: for this was not expressed by Aristotle in the definition of measure, but it ought to be better known, since it is assumed as a principle or instrument for coming to know that which is obscure.

Second, it ought not to belong to a nobler substance, nor even to the same; for it accidentally belongs to a measure to lead us into the cognition of the thing we measure. Wherefore by gold we can measure the weight of iron, and length by length, and by the motion of the heaven all the other motions of these lower things. Thus, too, it is not necessary that the duration be nobler, or even of the same sort: it is enough that by our intellect it reduce the thing to knowledge.

Third, since every measure is referred to the intellect, time is a measure of the aevum of Angels to our intellect, not to the Angelic or the divine: for ours alone needs some measure and unity in order definitely to know things. But God or an Angel, since he contemplates the things themselves

557. Aristotle, Metaphysics, chs. 2 - 3.

as they are, neither needs these nor can in any way use them: yet that is enough for it to be called truly and properly a measure, since a measure is not from the nature of the thing, but is assumed only by some intellect.

Lastly, it must be noted that, when we say time is the measure of the aevum of Angels, we are to understand that we do not take it absolutely as it will be perpetually future, but, as it were, on one side. Namely, because it had a beginning, we can by time define how long an Angel, or a soul still living up to now, has lived, and by how much an Angel is more ancient than a soul; but we certainly cannot measure the Angel altogether with respect to the future: for just as that which lacks a beginning cannot fall under a measure, so also that which lacks an end cannot from that side be defined. But God, since on every side He is of infinite duration without beginning and without end, in no way has a measure, as Gabriel and Ockham very well noted, not because He is of a superior nature (for a measure need not be nobler than the thing it defines, as was said above), but because every measure is reduced to unity, so that by repetition a thing may be counted: wherefore a fixed terminus is required, whence the counting may begin again, which nonetheless God does not have in reality, nor can it be designated by our intellect in His very eternity. It would be otherwise in the motion of the heaven, if it were eternal: for since it would have a flowing succession and days, months, and years assigned in it of themselves, a beginning also could be set.

Caput III - What is the definition and nature of the aevum

It remains to gather from what has now been said the nature and definition of the aevum. Concerning which, although the authors have said nothing expressly, I judge that, by a certain proportion, they would speak as they do of eternity. For Ferrarensis says that to the notion of the aevum there pertains not only real duration, but also the relation of measure, which he says is of reason.[560] But more recent Thomists hold that both also somehow pertain to the notion of the aevum; yet that the respect of reason is not included directly, but only connoted. Each of these, however, could easily be impugned from the things said there and in this disputation. It is better, therefore, if we say, as Cajetan said of eternity (although in his opinion it did not seem proved to us), that the nature of the aevum, formally, is nothing other than a certain permanent and individual duration of the Angel and of each substance - even corporeal - in its own existence, to which, however, there can be joined a variety of operations and accidents. And in this way the whole real notion of the aevum will be constituted, nor will there formally pertain to it either the notion of active measure (for this in no way befits it, as has been proved), or the notion of passive measure: for although, as things now are, it can fall under a measure, nevertheless, if it had not a beginning, it could not; yet it would still be called an aevum of the same notion. I think, therefore, that by the name "aevum" there is neither expressly signified nor connoted a respect of passive measure, nor the negation of it, but only that permanent duration; whereas by the name "eternity"

558. Ockham and Gabriel [Biel], in the places cited above.

559. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, chs. 2 - 3.

560. Ferrarensis (Francisco de Ferrara), on the aevum: he says that to the notion of the aevum there pertains not only real duration but also the relation of measure, which is of reason.

there is signified that negation of measure, as was explained in the aforesaid disputation, cap. 6.[561] From this it is evident that it differs from eternity, both because eternity is so permanent that it has no variety joined to it, whereas the aevum has variety joined to it; and also because eternity includes the negation of measure, but the aevum does not. It differs from time, however, because time is not only the duration of motion, but also its number and the measure of other things, and thus either is something of reason, or is completed by something of reason; whereas the aevum has nothing of reason, but is only the duration of a permanent thing, as has been said.

Disputatio XXXVI - What is the measure of the operations of Angels, of the beatific vision, and of bodily things subject to corruption

On the operations of the Angels, cap. 1. On the beatific vision and grace, cap. 2. On bodily things and those subject to corruption, cap. 3

Caput I - On the operations of the Angels

Since it has pleased us in one disputation to embrace all these topics, because there is one and the same reason of them, and from the doctrine handed down one ought to philosophize in the same manner concerning each, yet, that we may proceed more clearly, we must speak of them individually.

Concerning the immanent operations of the Angels, the first opinion is that of Scotus in 2, dist. 2, q. 4, who teaches that the natural operations (about the beatific [vision] the controversy will be in the following chapter) are to be defined, like the Angel's very substance, by the aevum as their proper measure. He proves the first point, because their existence is permanent and entire at once, like that of substance: therefore the aevum will be their measure, as it is of substance. Nor does it matter that the Angel's substance will endure without end, but not the operation: for even if the Angel were not about to remain forever, the proper measure of that substance would still be the aevum, since its being is permanent and all at once.

Then, because the measure of the clear vision of God is, in everyone's judgment, the aevum; but vision includes or presupposes a natural operation, and nothing aeviternal - that is, nothing which is contained by the aevum - includes or presupposes something posterior, such as what is temporal; therefore that act, or natural operation, which is contained in, or presupposed by, the vision, is not defined by time but by the aevum, and consequently all the rest ought to have the same measure. For this reason Scotus said that, in vision, an operation or natural act is included or presupposed, because the vision is produced by the soul's very natural potency, which is indeed the cause of it together with the light of glory. But since, according to Scotus's opinion (which we reported in disputation 34, cap. 1), no aevum is the measure of that which is in it, but that aevum which is extrinsic and is in another thing is the measure of another, it must be said, consequently,

561. See the explanation given earlier in the cited disputation, cap. 6.

that the measure of the operations of an Angel is not the aevum which is the duration of those operations, but another aevum, either of the Angel's very substance, or finally the aevum of one operation being the measure of another.

The second opinion asserts that neither by eternity, nor by the aevum...

They say that neither the aevum, nor our time, is the measure (mensura) of these operations, but a certain peculiar time proper to them, which they call a discrete time. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, in the First Part, q. 14, art. 1; of Cajetan, and the recent authors there; of Henry in Quodlibet 12, q. 3; and of Capreolus on II Sentences, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, concl. 3.[562] Now they call that a discrete time which consists of different instants, separated and in no way continuous. But each instant is the duration of each operation, which, although it lasts together with our time, is wholly together and in itself individual; and because among the operations themselves there is a certain succession, they therefore say that it is a discrete time: for it is like our time, whose being consists in succession. It differs, however, because it is not continuous. Thus likewise the same St. Thomas teaches in q. 13, art. 3, that the discrete motion of Angels is defined by a discrete time as its measure, and even that continuous motion is defined by a continuous time, yet of another kind than is ours.[563]

Now this kind of discrete time seems to our Doctor to be gathered from St. Augustine, On Genesis literally, ch. 20. But concerning our thoughts, even of the intellect, some more recent authors teach that they fall under the measure of our time, because they depend on the phantasm, although in themselves they are spiritual; but the phantasm must be set under the measure of our time. And finally, St. Thomas teaches that the aevum is the measure of that natural cognition by which the Angel understands himself and God; and with him not a few more recent authors, just as also of the substance of the Angel himself, because from that operation the Angel never ceases, and in the same way perseveres without end as does his substance.[564]

But from what has been said in other disputations it is easily deduced what is to be said in this matter. For either the discussion is about the intrinsic duration of operations, not considering in it the notion of measure, or about their proper and true measure. If we speak in the former way, in which the authors alleged seem to have spoken, the question is of no great moment, since it appears to be one of words, not of things. For if we regard what is in the thing, no one can deny that any operation of the intellect of an Angel and of a man is, at its beginning and end, individual, wholly together, permanent - unless perhaps it happens to become more intense by itself, or remiss; then indeed there will be some succession in it. Secondly, it is certain that the cognition by which the Angel understands himself and God is individual and wholly together, with a beginning and without end, without any variation, if it is always elicited with full endeavor - about which there is not now room to dispute. Thirdly, without doubt there is among the Angel's operations a certain discrete succession: yet it matters little to call this or that kind of duration by this or that

562. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 14, a. 1; Cajetan, ad loc.; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 12, q. 3; John Capreolus, In II Sent., d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, concl. 3.

563. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 3.

564. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, c. 20; St. Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibet 5, a. 7.

name - namely, that it be called an aevum, not only the duration of the cognition of himself and of God, as St. Thomas holds, but also of each intellection, as Scotus contends; or certainly that the intellections succeeding one another be called a discrete time. The Scholastics alone, indeed, fight among themselves about this matter, and impose various names as each one pleases.

But none of the Fathers made mention of this matter. St. Augustine alone, in the place cited, asserts that a spiritual and a bodily creature were made by the Lord, of which the spiritual would be moved according to time, not according to places, but the bodily according to both. From this, however, it is not lawful to conclude that this time of which Augustine speaks is discrete or other than our own; and that he might prove what he had said, he subjoins thereafter: "For example, the mind is admonished by time either by remembering what it had forgotten, or by departing from what it knew." There Augustine does not speak of a discrete time, but of our own; whether the opinion of those more recent authors is true, who were saying that the thoughts of our intellect are defined not by a discrete time but by our own. Finally, since Augustine says nothing other than that the spiritual creature is moved in time, there is no reason why it should be understood rather of that discrete time than of our common time, which aptly measures angelic operations also.

But if we speak in the latter way about the measure of the Angel's operations, as measure (mensura) is defined by Aristotle in Metaphysics X, chapters 2 and 3, in which way St. Thomas and other Scholastics whom he alleges do not seem to speak, one must say precisely what we taught in the preceding disputations about the measure of essence (essentia). First, that no intrinsic duration of an angelic operation is its measure, just as the aevum of an Angel is not the measure of his substance; for the same reason is present in both. Secondly, that no duration of an operation, whether of a higher or a lower one, is the measure of another, just as the aevum of one Angel is not the measure of another. The common reason also is: because no intellect can discern how great was the duration of one's own operation by the duration of another, just as neither the duration of one's own substance by the aevum of another, as is evident from what has been said. Thirdly, finally, that our time is properly and truly the measure of the Angel's operations, just as we said it is the measure of their substance; and this by precisely the same reason, because by it we definitely know how great was the duration of the Angel's operation. Now it is a measure to our intellect alone; for neither the angelic nor the divine use any measure, as was proved in the preceding disputation. And with better reason is our time the measure of the Angel's operations than of his substance: for this has a beginning but not an end; operation, however, has both; and thus it can plainly be defined by a measure. Therefore there is no need to distinguish between the Angel's external and internal operations: but all of them are to be subjected indiscriminately to our time as to their measure.

Caput II - On the beatific vision and grace

Concerning the beatific operation St. Thomas teaches in article 5, reply to the first; Cajetan and the recent authors therewith, that its measure is neither any time nor the aevum, but an eternity inferior to the divine, which they call a participated eternity; and some think this to be the opinion

of St. Augustine in the book of 83 Questions, q. 23, where (they say) Augustine declares that our beatitude is a participated eternity.[565] They prove it by reason: because, since that operation is of a more immutable and higher nature than another operation of an Angel, or even than his substance, it comes about that it is contained under a higher measure; but this seems to be no other than a certain participated eternity. Some teach the same about habitual grace, which, although it is corrupted when sin supervenes, yet by its own nature cannot be corrupted by any created thing, unless by God alone, by whom also alone it is created, that is, infused; for they think that sin does not exclude habitual grace by its own nature.

But Scotus, in the place alleged, holds that the measure of beatitude is not any eternity, but the aevum. He taught the same in IV, distinction 49, question 6, 5. As to the second doubt, it can be proved from Fulgentius, On the Faith to Peter, ch. 28. What he says, however, we shall report below. He then confirms it by reason, because the substance of an Angel, in itself, is no less immutable than beatitude: therefore the aevum ought to be its measure, as it is the measure of the Angel's substance.[566]

For my part, by the same proportion as in the foregoing difficulty, it seems that one should say the following. First, if we speak of the intrinsic duration of the vision itself or of habitual grace, that it is wholly together and individual, of a certain supernatural order above the substance and nature of the Angel; that it has a beginning and, in the future life, no end. And if for this reason it pleases the Thomists to call this duration a participated eternity superior to the aevum; or if Scotus wishes also to name it an aevum; there is no need to contend with them about a word, provided that we know the nature of those durations. Whether grace is by its nature liable to corruption and can be destroyed by none but God alone, we shall say in I, 3, q. 71, a. 4, and q. 113, art. 2, where we shall dispute about the opposition of grace and mortal sin. About the beatific vision we shall speak in I - II, q. 5, a. 2, and q. 46, a. 10.[567]

Moreover, without foundation Augustine is cited for either opinion, one and the other. For where he is alleged for the first opinion, he only teaches that someone is chaste, good, and eternal in one of two ways: first, by the chastity, goodness, or eternity which he himself begets, and of which he is the principle and cause that it be - this is, what he has by his own nature from himself - and chaste, good, and eternal in this way cannot but be such; next, by participation of chastity, and in this way one who is chaste can be not chaste. In this manner, he says, the soul is eternal by a certain participation of eternity, but God in such a way as to be the author of eternity itself, as was explained in Disputation 33, ch. 1; nor in that chapter did Augustine adduce the example of the beatific operation - although, had he adduced it, he would not have proved that the duration of the beatific operation is more a participated eternity than the duration of the substance of the soul itself. And by the common opinion of the Scholastics, the duration of the rational soul is not a

565. St. Thomas Aquinas, ad I, a. 5; Cajetan, ad loc.; St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 23.
566. John Duns Scotus, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 6; Fulgentius of Ruspe, De fide ad Petrum, c. 28.
567. See the places indicated by the author for the treatment of grace and of the beatific vision.

participated eternity, but is called an aevum. Therefore Augustine, by the name of participated eternity, understood the aevum. For aevum can be so called; for among its other significations there is one in which it is taken for the life of each man, as from Damascene and others.[568]

Next, what Scotus reports from Augustine for his own opinion is frivolous. For there he only asserts that men who are just, who die in grace, will be equal in the state of beatitude to the Angels of God; and moreover he says that they cannot be changed therefrom; and that the eternal life of all would be vain if it could be otherwise - whence Scotus, for that reason, infers that their beatitude is contained under the aevum as its measure.

Furthermore, if the discussion is about the measure of beatitude and of grace in the way measure is defined by Aristotle, in which sense the Scholastics alleged in this chapter speak, it must be said in exactly the same way and by the same reason as about the other operations of Angels - namely, that their measure is not the intrinsic duration itself, nor any other duration besides our time; nor are these two, measure and definition, defined by any other intellect than by ours, as is clear enough from what has been said.

Caput III - On corporeal things and those liable to corruption

Finally, concerning substances that are corrupted, Durandus undertook a lengthy disputation in II, dist. 2, q. 6, which we shall dispatch briefly. First, certain persons, as Durandus reports in the same place, thought that the measure of these things is discrete time, just as the Thomists said that even the operations of the Angels have such a measure. Durandus refutes this at great length; but this discrete time can scarcely be explained. Next, Durandus and St. Thomas, in II, q. 4 of this question, ad 3, teach that their measure is our time; except that Durandus added (as he had also said of the Angels) that time is a heterogeneous measure of these things, and he proves this by the same reasoning.

However, from the foregoing doctrine the solution of the question is already evident. First, if the question be about the intrinsic duration (*duratio intrinseca*) of these very things under the aspect of corruptibility, it is certain that it is all at once, and that it is not a measure, nor an individual thing that is held by a beginning and also an end, but rather is terminated by them; which, in my judgment, is not time, since it is not the number of motion nor set in succession: yet it is not inaptly called an aevum (*aevum*). Augustine therefore, by the name of participated eternity, understood that mode of duration which is above time though not absolutely eternal.

Further, if the discussion be of the measure of beatitude and of grace, in the sense in which measure is defined by Aristotle - according to which sense the Scholastics alleged in this chapter speak - one must say precisely the same and by the same reasoning as was said about the other operations of Angels: namely, that their measure is not the intrinsic duration itself, nor any other duration besides our time, nor are these two, measure and definition, determined by any intellect other than our own, as is clear enough from what has been said.

568. St. John Damascene, and other authors, on the signification of "aevum" as the life of each man.

Concerning corporeal things and those subject to corruption: Aristotle explicitly teaches this in Physics IV, chapter 14, text 133, where he says to this effect: human affairs and the rest of the things which are subject to natural motion and to generation and corruption, I declare to be as it were circular. And this is because they are judged by the time of the universe, and they undergo both an end and a beginning, just as though there were some kind of return; for time itself seems to be a certain circle. Now time measures the duration of these things otherwise than that of Angels. For the duration of the latter it does not measure absolutely, but as it were in part, as we noted in the preceding disputation; but the things that are corrupted it measures simply and absolutely, because they are concluded by a beginning and an end. And how time is the measure of these things, and the cognate matters, in opposition to the opinion of Durandus, is also sufficiently manifest from what has been said in the same disputation; and so much for this whole question of the Holy Doctor.[569]

Quaestio XI - On the unity of God

After what has been premised, we must consider the divine unity. And on this there are four questions.

Articulus I - Whether "one" adds something over and above being

Objicitur primo sic. It seems that "one" adds something over and above being. For everything that is in some determinate genus stands in the mode of addition to being, which circles about all the genera. But "one" is in a determinate genus: for it is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore "one" adds something over and above being.

Objicitur secundo. That which divides some common notion stands to it by way of addition. But being is divided by "one" and "many." Therefore "one" adds something over and above being.

Objicitur tertio. If "one" does not add over and above being, it would be the same to say "one" and "being." But it is nugatory to say "being being." Therefore it would be nugatory to say "being one," which is false. Therefore "one" adds something over and above being.

But on the contrary: Dionysius says, in the last chapter of On the Divine Names: Nothing among existing things is multiple that does not participate in the One.[570] Which would not be the case if "one" added to being in a way that contracted it. Therefore "one" does not have its standing by addition to being.

I answer: "One" does not add any thing over and above being, but only the negation of division. For "one" signifies nothing else than being undivided. And from this very point it appears that "one" is convertible with being. For every being is either simple or composite. Now what is simple is undivided both in act (*actus*) and in potency (*potentia*). But what is composite does not have existence (*esse*) so long as its parts are divided, but after they come together and compose the

569. Aristotle, Physics IV, c. 14, text 133.
570. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. ult.

composite itself. Whence it is manifest that the existence of any thing consists in a certain undividedness. And hence it is that each thing, just as it preserves its own existence, so it preserves its own unity.

Reply to the first: Certain persons, supposing that that "one" which is convertible with being is the same as that which is the principle of number, were divided into contrary positions. For Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the "one" which is convertible with being does not add any thing over and above being, but signifies the substance (*substantia*) of being as undivided, thought that the same should be held about that "one" which is the principle of number. And because number is composed out of units, they believed that numbers were the substances of all things. Avicenna, on the contrary, considering that the "one" which is the principle of number adds some thing over and above the substance of being (otherwise a number composed of units would not be a species of quantity), believed that the "one" which is convertible with being adds some thing over and above the substance of being, like white over man. But this is manifestly false: because every thing is one by its own substance. For if each thing were one by something other, since that other again is one, if it were again one by something other, there would be a process to infinity. Wherefore one must stand in the first position. Therefore it is to be said that the "one" which is convertible with being does not add any thing over and above being; but the "one" which is the principle of number adds something over and above being, belonging to the genus of quantity.

Reply to the second: Nothing prevents that which is in one way divided from being in another way undivided: just as that which is divided numerically is undivided according to species; and thus it happens that something is in one way one, in another way many. Yet if it is undivided simply - either because it is undivided according to that which pertains to the essence (*essentia*) of the thing, although it is divided as to those things which are outside the essence of the thing (as what is one in subject and many according to accidents), or because it is undivided in act and divided in potency, as what is one whole and many according to parts - such a thing will be one simply and many in a qualified sense. If, on the contrary, something is undivided in a qualified sense and divided simply, as for instance because it is divided according to its essence and undivided according to its notion, or according to a principle or cause, it will be many simply and one in a qualified sense: as those things which are many in number and one in species, or one by a principle. Thus, therefore, being is divided by one and many, as by one simply, and many in a qualified sense.

Reply to the third: It is not nugatory when one says "being one"; because "one" adds something according to notion over and above being.

Conclusion: "One" over and above being adds only the negation of division.

Although the matter of this article belongs to the metaphysician, who ought to dispute more fully about the very "one" and the formal notion of unity, yet it will not seem alien to our purpose if we do not examine it at length, so that those things which are to be said about the unity of God in a later article may be rendered more perspicuous: for which cause, concerning the notion of the goodness of God, we treated more fully in order to explain the divine attribute of goodness; and

about truth we must speak so as to show in what way God is true. But because the whole controversy concerning the formal notion of unity is situated in this, whether formally it is something positive, or only a negation of division; and for proving that God is one and not many - which is what is chiefly in this question and most necessary for a Theologian - it matters little whether one philosophizes thus or otherwise about the formal notion of unity: for experience will show that of necessity the discussion will have to be resumed about this matter in disp. 128, where we shall say not a little about it; therefore I have resolved in the present disputation to forbear here.

Articulus II - Whether one and many are opposed

Objicitur primo sic. It seems that "one" and "many" are not opposed. No opposite is predicated of its opposite; but every multitude is in a certain way one, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore one is not opposed to multitude.

Objicitur secundo. No opposite is constituted out of its opposite; but one constitutes multitude. Therefore it is not opposed to multitude.

Objicitur tertio. "One" is opposed to "one"; but "much" is opposed to "few." Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many."

Objicitur quarto. If "one" is opposed to multitude, it is opposed to it as the undivided to the divided; and thus it will be opposed as privation to habit. But this seems incongruous, because it would follow that "one" is posterior to multitude and is defined through it, whereas nevertheless multitude is defined through one. Whence there will be a circle in the definition, which is incongruous. Therefore "one" and "many" are not opposed.

But on the contrary: Those things whose notions are opposed are themselves opposed. But the notion of the one consists in indivisibility; whereas the notion of multitude contains division. Therefore one and many are opposed.

I answer: "One" is opposed to "many," but in different ways. For the "one" which is the principle of number is opposed to the multitude which is number, as the measure to the measured. For "one" has the character of a first measure, and number is a multitude measured by one, as is clear from the tenth book of the Metaphysics. The "one," however, which is convertible with being, is opposed to multitude by way of privation, as the undivided to the divided.[571]

Reply to the first: No privation wholly removes being, because privation is a negation in a subject, according to the Philosopher. Yet every privation removes some being. And therefore, by reason of its commonness, it happens in the case of being that the privation of being is founded in being; which does not happen in the privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness, or of something of this sort. And as it is with being, so it is with one and good, which are convertible with being. For the privation of the good is founded in some good; and likewise the removal of unity is founded in some one. And hence it follows that a multitude is in a way a one, and an evil is in a way

571. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 2; cf. the discussions post Praedicamenta on opposites; see also Metaphysics, text 4.

a good; and a non-being is in a way a being. Yet the opposite is not predicated of its opposite: because one of these is said simply, and the other in a qualified sense. For what is being in a qualified sense (as in potency) is non-being simply, that is, in act; or what is being simply in the genus of substance is non-being in a qualified sense as to something that is an accident of such a sort. Likewise, therefore, what is good in a qualified sense is evil simply or conversely; and similarly what is one simply is many in a qualified sense, and conversely.

Reply to the second: A whole is twofold. One is homogeneous, which is composed of similar parts; another is heterogeneous, which is composed of dissimilar parts. In any homogeneous whole, the whole is constituted out of parts having the form of the whole, as every part of water is water: and such is the constitution of a continuum out of its parts. In any heterogeneous whole, however, every part lacks the form of the whole. For no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of a man a man. And such a whole is multitude. Therefore, inasmuch as a part of it does not have the form of multitude, a multitude is composed of units, as a house is composed of non-houses; not that the units constitute the multitude according to that which they have of the notion of indivision, in which respect they are opposed to multitude, but according to that which they have of entity; just as the parts of a house constitute a house by the fact that they are certain bodies, not by the fact that they are non-house.

Reply to the third: Multitude is taken in a twofold way. In one way absolutely, and thus it is opposed to one. In another way according as it imports a certain excess, and thus it is opposed to few. Whence, in the first way, two are many, though not in the second.

Reply to the fourth: The one is opposed privatively to the many, inasmuch as in the notion of the many there is that they be divided. Hence division is prior to unity, not simply, but according to the order of our apprehension. For we apprehend the simple before the composite. Whence we define a point as that whose part is not, or as the principle of a line. But multitude also is known according to a notion consequent upon, and related to, one: for we do not judge division to have the character of multitude except insofar as we attribute unity to each of the divided things. Hence the one is placed in the definition of multitude, but not conversely is multitude in the definition of one. But division falls within the intellect by the very negation of being, so that first being falls within the intellect; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus secondly we apprehend division; thirdly, one; fourthly, multitude.

Conclusion: The "one" which is convertible with being is opposed to "many": for it is a negation or privation - namely, the undivided opposed to the divided. Concerning the formal character of this opposition we say nothing further in this article: for its entire explanation depends upon the doctrine of the preceding article; and of both there will be further discussion in the third article that follows.

Ad decimum sic proceditur. It seems that God is not one... (the objections follow)

Ad tertium sic proceditur. It seems that God is not one. For it is said to the Corinthians, 1 Cor. 8: "For there are many that are called gods and lords." Also: The "one" which is the principle of number cannot be predicated of God, since no quantity is predicated of God. Likewise, neither can that "one" which is convertible with being be predicated of him, because it imports privation, and every privation is an imperfection, which does not befit God. Therefore it is not to be said that God is one

But on the contrary: It is said Deut. 6: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one God."

I answer that it must be said that God is one, and this is shown in three ways. First indeed from his simplicity. For it is manifest that that whereby something singular is this particular something is in no way communicable to many. That whereby Socrates is a man can be communicated to many; but that whereby he is this man cannot be communicated, save to one alone. If therefore Socrates were a man by that whereby he is this man, just as there cannot be many Socrateses, so there could not be many men. But this is the case with God: for God himself is his nature, as was shown above. Therefore, by the same thing, God and this God are the same. It is impossible, therefore, that there be many gods.

Secondly, from the infinity of his perfection. For it has been shown above that God comprehends in himself the whole perfection of existing. If therefore there were many gods, they would have to differ. Something then would belong to one which did not belong to another. If this were a perfection, it would be lacking to the other; and thus the one in whom there were privation would not be simply perfect. Therefore it is impossible that there be many gods. Hence also the ancient philosophers, as though constrained by the very truth, when positing an infinite principle, posited only one principle.

Thirdly, from the unity of the world. For all things that are, are found to be ordered to one another, insofar as certain things serve others. But things that are diverse would not agree into one order unless they were ordered by some one. For many things are better reduced into one order by one than by many: because one, per se, is the cause of one; and many are not the cause of one, except per accidens, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore that which is first is most perfect and per se, not per accidens, it must be that the first reducing all things into one order be one alone. And this is God.

Reply to the first: They are called "many gods" according to the error of certain people who worshiped many gods, thinking the planets and other stars to be gods, or even the single parts of the world. Hence he adds: "But to us there is one God," etc.

Reply to the second: "One" insofar as it is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of those things which have existence in matter. For the one which is the principle of number is of the genus of the mathematical, which has existence in matter, but according to the account is abstracted from matter. But the one which is convertible with being is a certain metaphysical (that is, beyond-physical) [notion], which according to existence does not depend on matter. And although in God there is no privation, nevertheless according to the mode of our apprehension he

is not known by us except by way of privation and remotion. And thus nothing prevents certain things said privatively from being predicated of God, as that he is incorporeal, infinite, and similarly that God is one.

Confirmation of the doctrine of the article.

The conclusion is affirmative, and is to be presupposed as a necessary principle for the theologian; it is expressed in Scripture, Deuteronomy 6; and, as St. John Damascene most aptly noted, among those who believe the sacred Scripture, it is altogether beyond controversy.[572] Moreover, besides the gentiles, who give no credence to sacred Scripture, there have been many heretics who dared to assert many gods. First indeed Manichaeus, who although he did not concede many good gods, yet posited two first principles of things, one good, the other evil - which Cerdon had done before, of whom we shall speak elsewhere. Then the Peratae, as Theodoret testifies; and Philoponus, as Suidas writes under the entry "Ioannes Grammaticus," and Nicephorus in his History, who divided the divine nature into three persons, and hence were rightly called Tritheites.[573] The same error some ascribe to Joachim the Abbot, of whom we shall speak below at q. 39, a. 6. But Bernard of Luxembourg in his Catalogue of heresies wrongly attributes it to Raymond Lull, as though he had taught that the three persons are three essences (*essentiae*), since nothing of the sort is found in his works. He only said: "Essence in God 'essentiates'," not because it produces another essence (as some falsely interpret), but because he assigns "to be" as a proper act (*actus*) of essence; or, to show intrinsic correlatives, which he everywhere endeavors to establish, about which in Disputation 134 we must say something in due place.[574]

Finally, in these calamitous times, in which heresies so prevail that those long since buried and condemned are now rekindled through Poland, Transylvania, Germany, France, and England, Valentinus Gentilis of Cosenza, a disciple of Calvin, followed the same heresy. But when he saw that this "Trinity of gods" could not be defended from Scripture, he afterward declined to Arianism. This heresy must be refuted in the same manner as the error of the gentiles, who used to say that there is a family of many gods. Against whom, omitting the innumerable testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers, we could enter here upon a lengthy disputation and, from the ancient philosophers and even the Sibyls of the gentiles, prove the unity of God, had not St. Augustine Eugubinus done this most accurately in the beginning of book 3 of his Perennial Philosophy.[575] Lactantius had undertaken such a disputation in book 1 of the Divine Institutions; likewise in the Apologetic he wrote to the Nations; Tertullian, and St. Thomas in the Contra gentiles I, chapter 42.[576]

572. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, cap. 5.

573. Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum compendium, c. 18; Suidas, s.v. "Ioannes Grammaticus"; Nicephorus, Historia, lib. 18, c. 48.

574. Bernard of Luxembourg, Catalogus haereticorum; on Raymond Lull's manner of speaking about essence and "to be."

575. St. Augustine Eugubinus (Agostino Steuco), De perenni philosophia, lib. 3 (at the beginning).

576. Lactantius, Divinae institutiones, lib. 1; Tertullian, Apologeticus; St. Thomas, Contra gentiles I, c. 42.

It will suffice for us, then, both against Manichaeus and against the gentiles, to demonstrate by one single reason, which Tertullian in the book against Marcion (c. 3 - 4), Athanasius in the Oration against Idols, and St. John Damascene in the place cited have touched upon, that there are not two or more Gods.[577] Now we must suppose what has been discussed and stands proved, namely, that by the name "God" among all nations is signified that which has no superior and is not from another; for that which depends upon another, without doubt ought to acknowledge that other as God. Indeed, no nation was ever so barbarous as to say that the true God is of (or from) another true God. For although it was customary among the gentiles to call distinguished men, such as emperors, "divi," in that they were referred to the society of the gods, nevertheless they were never called "dii." For this reason among Christians holy men are not undeservedly called "divi," because they have been admitted to God's society; although some, being overly scrupulous, execrate this appellation as proper to the pagans and sacrilegious.

Therefore in this controversy about the unity of God, by "true God" we understand him who does not depend upon another, but upon himself. Now that this is the true God, I prove by this reason. If there were two gods, it would be necessary that the one not depend on the other, as we have supposed; and thus, even the other being unwilling, the one could be and exist. Wherefore (as Athanasius says), there would be equal power and equal weakness in them both: equal power, in that the one would overcome the will of the other, by the very fact that he could exist with the other unwilling; but equal weakness, in that, they themselves being unwilling, those things which they would not wish would nonetheless come about - since one would exist contrary to the will of the other. Athanasius sets this down as absurd, to prove against Manichaeus that there are not two gods, one evil and one good; for thus the one would be contrary to the other, and would in the end destroy him. Rightly therefore does Tertullian pronounce the catholic truth (Adv. Marcion. l. 1, c. 3): "God, if he is not one, is not."

But since some gentile might assert that there are indeed two gods, and that they are good, who of necessity love each other mutually, and hence that there is in them no weakness but equal power, let us press the argument further and prove that there is by no reason a possibility of there being two in this way. If there were two, not only would they themselves be from themselves, but also all other things would have to be from them; for this belongs to the notion of God and of the first principle.

Confirmation of the doctrine of the article. The conclusion is affirmative, and as a necessary principle is to be presupposed by the theologian; it is expressed in the Scripture of Deuteronomy 6, and, as St. John Damascene most aptly noted, in De fide orthodoxa I, chapter 5.[578]

Errors about this controversy. Among those who believe the sacred Scripture there is absolutely no controversy. But besides the gentiles, who give no credence to sacred Scripture, there have been many heretics who dared to assert several gods. First indeed Manichaeus, who, although he did not concede several good gods, yet posited two first principles of things, one good, the other evil; which

577. Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem, lib. 1, cc. 3 - 4; Athanasius, Oratio contra idola; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, cap. 5.

578. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, cap. 5.

Cerdon had formulated earlier and more crudely, about whom we shall speak further elsewhere. Then the Peratae, as Theodoret, in his Book of "Compendium of Heretical Fables," chapter 18, testifies; and Philoponus, as Suidas, under the entry "John the Grammarian," and Nicephorus, History, book 18, chapter 48, write - who divided the divine nature into three persons, and hence are rightly called Tritheites. The same error some ascribe to Joachim the Abbot, of whom we shall speak below, q. 39, art. 6. Yet Bernard of Luxembourg, in his Catalog of Heretics, wrongly attributes it to Raymond Lull, as though he had taught that the three persons are three essences; whereas nothing of the sort is found in his works. He only said: "Essence 'essentializes' in God," not because it produces another essence, as some falsely interpret, but because it imparts "to be" as a proper act to essence; or, in order to set forth intrinsic correlatives, which he everywhere is eager to establish, of which we must treat somewhat in disput. 134.[579]

Finally, in these calamitous times, when heresies so prevail that those long since buried and condemned are again stirred up through Poland, Transylvania, Germany, Gaul, and England, Valentinus Gentilis of Cosenza, a disciple of Calvin, followed the same heresy. But when he saw that this "Trinity of gods" could not be defended from Scripture, he afterwards declined to Arianism. This heresy is to be impugned in the same way as the error of the gentiles, who were wont to posit a whole family of gods. Against whom, omitting the innumerable testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers, we could begin here a long disputation, and, from the ancient philosophers and from the very confession of the gentiles, prove the unity of God - were it not that Augustine of Eugubium had done this most carefully at the beginning of book 3 of De perenni philosophia. This disputation had been undertaken earlier by Lactantius in book 1 of the Divine Institutions, and by Tertullian in the Apologeticus against the Gentiles, and by St. Thomas in Contra gentiles I, chapter 42.[580][581]

It will therefore suffice for us, both against the Manichaean and against the gentiles, to demonstrate by one single reason that there are not two or more gods, but one God - namely, the reason which Tertullian touched upon in the book against Marcion, chapters 3 and 4; and Athanasius, in the Oration against idols; and St. John Damascene in the place cited.[582] Now it must be presupposed - that which remains proved above - namely, that by the name "God" among all nations is signified that which has no superior and is from no other: for whatever depends upon another, without doubt ought to be reckoned as belonging to that other rather than as God. And indeed no nation was ever so barbarous as to say that the true God is of another true God. For although among the gentiles it was customary to call outstanding men, such as emperors, "divine," so that they might be reckoned in the society of the gods, nevertheless they were never called

579. Bernard of Luxembourg, Catalogus haereticorum; on Raymond Lull's manner of speaking about essence and "to be."

580. St. Augustine Eugubinus (Agostino Steuco), De perenni philosophia, lib. 3 (at the beginning).

581. Lactantius, Divinae institutiones, lib. 1; Tertullian, Apologeticus; St. Thomas, Contra gentiles I, c. 42.

582. Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem, lib. 1, cc. 3 - 4; Athanasius, Oratio contra idola; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, cap. 5.

"gods." By this very reason among Christians holy men are not undeservedly called "divine," inasmuch as they are admitted to the society of God; although some, out of over-scrupulousness, repudiate this appellation as proper to pagans and as sacrilegious.

Therefore, in this controversy about the unity of God, by "true God" we understand Him who depends upon Himself and not upon another. In this sense we demonstrate by reason that the true God is one. If there were two gods, it would be necessary that one not depend upon the other, as has been presupposed; and, to that extent, that the one could exist and subsist even with the other unwilling. Wherefore (as Athanasius says) there would be in both equal power and equal weakness: equal power, because the one would overcome the will of the other by the very fact that he could exist with the other unwilling; equal weakness, because things would happen against their will - if indeed the one should exist contrary to the will of the other. Athanasius urges this as an absurdity, that he may prove against the Manichaean that there are not two gods, the one evil and the other good: for thus the one would be contrary to the other, and would be able to destroy even God Himself. Therefore rightly Tertullian pronounces in the said book, chapter 3: "God, if He is not one, is not."

But since some gentile might assert that there are indeed two gods, and those good, who necessarily love one another, and therefore that there is no weakness in them, but equal power - let us press the argument further, and prove that by no reason can there be two in this way. If there were two, not only would they themselves be from themselves, but also all other things would have to be from them; for this belongs to the notion of God and of the first principle. Therefore, either the rest could be conserved and produced by the one alone without the other - if so, that one would be more powerful and more perfect, and thus he alone would be God: both because "God" means the supremely perfect, to whose perfection nothing is lacking; and also because the other would either be from that one, or from himself. If he were from that one, he could not be God but the creature of that one; if from himself, like the other, he would be of exactly the same nature and equally perfect: wherefore, for the same reason that the rest would be from the one, in like manner they would be from the other; and thus, being equal in perfection and altogether equal, the other would be wholly superfluous. Hence they would be said to be two rashly and without reason: not only would one be superfluous, since without him all other things could equally well be brought about; but also because, together with the other, he would have absolutely no effect. For when the whole effect is altogether from one cause, in the same kind and equally first, it cannot be done, or helped, by another - as we shall show more fully in III, q. 3, art. 6.

But to say that any created thing is produced by each of those two together as by a partial cause, as a certain burden is carried by two - this is ridiculous. For we cannot so divide spiritual things, nay nor even bodily things according to their substance, as to assign one part to one God, another to the other; nor can we so measure the powers of the gods as to say that to produce such an effect one suffices, but for such an effect two, or more, are necessary. Furthermore, to assert that they agreed among themselves that certain things should proceed from the one, certain things from the other, by free choice, is altogether fictitious and without foundation. Therefore neither assertion is to be maintained.

Finally, for whatever reason someone would say that there are two gods of equal perfection and nature, by the same reason he would have to concede that there are infinitely many. For there is no greater reason why there should be two, or three, rather than more - since they must necessarily exist and depend on no one; and accordingly, if their number once exceeds unity, it can be determined by no one, as Tertullian clearly proves in book 1 against Marcion, chapter 4 and the following.

Objicitur quarto sic proceditur (see q. 18, art. 3; and q. 39, art. 6). It seems that God is not maximally one.

1. For "one" is said according to the privation of division; but privation does not admit of more and less. Therefore God is not said to be more one than other things which are one.
2. Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than that which is indivisible in act and in potency, of which sort are the point and unity. But a thing is said to be more one, inasmuch as it is more indivisible. Therefore God is not more one than unity and the point.
3. Further, what is by essence good is maximally good. Therefore what is by its essence one is maximally one. But every being is one by its essence, as is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics IV. Therefore every being is maximally one; therefore God is not more one than other beings.[581]

But on the contrary: Boethius says that among all things which are called one, the unity of the divine Trinity holds the highest place.[583]

I answer: Since the true one is an undivided being, in order that something be maximally one, it must be maximally being and maximally undivided. But both belong to God. For He is maximally being, inasmuch as He does not have some existence determined by a nature to which it accrues, but is existence (*esse*) itself subsisting, indeterminate as to all modes. And He is maximally undivided, inasmuch as He is divided neither in act nor in potency according to any mode of division, since He is in every way simple, as was shown above. Whence it is manifest that God is maximally one.

Reply to the first: Although privation, taken in itself, does not admit of more and less, nevertheless according as its opposite admits of more and less; and in this way something is said to be more one, inasmuch as it is more being and more undivided.

581. Lactantius, Divinae institutiones, lib. 1; Tertullian, Apologeticus; St. Thomas, Contra gentiles I, c. 42.
583. Boethius, De Trinitate (cap. 1).

Objicitur: It seems that God is not most one. For "one" is said according to the privation of division. But privation does not receive more and less. Therefore God is not said to be more one than other things which are one.

1. Furthermore, nothing seems to be more indivisible than that which is indivisible both in act and in potency, of which sort are the point and unity (as the principle of number). But something is said to be more one inasmuch as it is more indivisible. Therefore God is not more one than unity and the point.
2. Furthermore, that which is by essence (*essentia*) good is maximally good. Therefore that which is by its essence one is maximally one. But every being is one by its essence, as is clear from the Philosopher in the fourth book of the Metaphysics. Therefore every being is maximally one; therefore God is not more one than other beings.

But on the contrary: Boethius says that among all the things which are called one, the summit is held by the unity of the divine Trinity.[584]

I answer: Since the one is an undivided being, for something to be maximally one it must be both maximally being and maximally undivided. But each of these belongs to God. For he is maximally being, inasmuch as he does not have existence (*esse*) determined by some nature to which it befalls, but he is subsisting existence itself (*ipsum esse subsistens*), undetermined by every mode. And he is maximally undivided, inasmuch as he is divided neither actually nor in potency according to any mode of division, since he is in all ways simple, as was shown above. Whence it is manifest that God is most one.

Reply to the first: Although privation in itself does not receive more and less, nevertheless according as its opposite admits of more and less, even privative things are spoken of according to more and less. According, therefore, as something is more divided, or more divisible, or less, or in no way, in this way something is said to be more and less, or maximally, one.

Reply to the second: The point and unity, which is the principle of number, are not things maximally beings, since they do not have existence except in some subject. Whence neither of them is maximally one. For just as the subject is not maximally one because of the diversity of accident and subject, so neither is the accident.

Reply to the third: Although every being is one through its substance, nevertheless the substance of each is not equally ordered to causing unity, because the substance of some is composed of many things, but of others not.

Explicatio doctrinae articuli. The conclusion is affirmative. Nor does it need a long disputation; rather, the matter can be explained briefly. Therefore one must observe that, whether unity is formally the negation of division, that is, indivision, or whether it is something positive, it reciprocates with indivision and is opposed to multitude, such that wherever there is greater indivision and a lesser plurality or multitude, there is greater unity. And because where there is

584. Boethius, De Trinitate, cap. 1.

greater simplicity there is less plurality and more indivision, for that reason there is greater unity. And since the simplicity of God is according to its genus the greatest that can be thought, because his essence (*essentia*) is not distinguished from his existence (*esse*) by nature, nor indeed from the supposit (*suppositum*), nor does any accident (*accidens*) befall him, but all the same altogether are what he is, it follows that his unity is greater than can be understood in creatures. For in them, although existence and essence are the same according to reality, as we shall say below, nevertheless the unity of all of them is composed in reality from substance and accidents, from nature and supposit. And this truly derogates from the divine simplicity the opinion of Scotus, who affirms that the divine attributes are distinguished among themselves and from the essence by the nature of the thing before the operation of the intellect - a point which will also be made very clear in disputation 120. In this sense perhaps the ancient philosophers, such as Melissus and others whom Eugubinus reports, called God "the One" (to hen), that is, unity itself or the very one; just as also "the Being" (to on), that is, existence itself: because especially before all others these two belong to him.[585] Nor indeed does the plurality of persons in God hinder his unity from being maximal. For in God we do not conceive unity in the person, but in the nature; and we have said that this is maximal, as is clear from what was said above; but as for the persons there is true plurality, as will appear in the matter of the Trinity. Hence, in fine, no distinction between person and nature is to be inferred, nor any composition from the nature of the thing; this too will be made clear in disputation 120.

Quaestio XII - How God is known by us

By the ways we considered above how God is according to himself, it remains to be considered how he is in our cognition; that is, how he is known by creatures.

Among the various modes by which the Angelic Doctor considers God's substance and perfection, as we noted at the beginning of the third question, the second is inasmuch as God is referred to our intellect; of which we treat in this question 12 on the vision of God, and the following 13 on his names. For these are imposed on God by us, and they signify him to us according to the mode of cognition that we have of him. In this question, therefore, St. Thomas treats the perfection of the divine substance, inasmuch as it can be seen by us.

Articulus I - Whether some created intellect can see God through his essence

Objicitur: It seems that no created intellect can see God through his essence. For St. John says, "No one has ever seen God"; and Chrysostom, expounding that saying, says that what God is, not only have the prophets not seen, but neither the angels nor the archangels have seen. "For since it

585. "In this sense perhaps the ancient philosophers, such as Melissus and others whom Eugubinus reports, called God 'the One' (to hen), that is, unity itself, or the very one; just as also 'the Being' (to on), that is, existence itself: because especially before all others these two belong to him." See Agostino Steuco (St. Augustine Eugubinus), De perenni philosophia, lib. 3, c. 7.

is of a created nature, how will it be able to see that which is uncreated?"[586] Dionysius also, in On the Divine Names, chapter 1, speaking of God, says: "Neither is he sense, nor imagination, nor opinion, nor reason, nor science."[587]

1. Furthermore, every infinite, inasmuch as it is such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above. Therefore he is unknown in himself.
2. Furthermore, a created intellect is not cognoscitive except of things that exist. For the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the intellect is being. But God is not an existent, but is above existences, as Dionysius says. Therefore he is not intelligible, but is above every intellect.
3. Furthermore, there must be some proportion of the knower to the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But there is no proportion of a created intellect to God, because they are distanced to infinity. Therefore a created intellect cannot see the essence of God.

But on the contrary: "We shall see him as he is" (1 John 3:2).

I answer: Since each thing is knowable according as it is in act (*actus*), and God, who is pure act without any admixture of potency (*potentia*), is, as far as he is concerned, maximally knowable, nevertheless that which is maximally knowable in itself is not knowable to some intellect because of the excess of the intelligible above the intellect; as the sun, which is maximally visible, cannot be seen by the bat because of the excess of light. Noting this, some have posited that no created intellect can see the essence of God. But this is said inappropriately. For since man's ultimate beatitude (*beatitudo*) consists in his highest operation, which is the operation of the intellect, if a created intellect could never see the essence of God, then either it would never obtain beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something other than God - which is alien to the faith. For in him is the ultimate perfection of a rational creature, who is to it the principle of existing. For each thing is perfect insofar as it attains to its principle. Likewise, it is contrary to reason; for there is in man a natural desire of knowing the cause when he contemplates the effect, and from this arises wonder among men. If, therefore, the intellect of a rational creature could not reach the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain vain. Hence it must simply be conceded that the Blessed see God's essence.

Reply to the first: Both authorities speak of a vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius, immediately before the words proposed, says: "To all he is universally incomprehensible, and he is not sense," etc. And Chrysostom, a little after the aforesaid words, adds that by "vision" here he signifies the most certain consideration of the Father and a comprehension as great as the Father has of the Son.[588][589]

586. St. John Chrysostom, Homilies on John, hom. 14 (on John 1:18): "No one has ever seen God... what God is, not only have the prophets not seen, but neither the angels nor the archangels.... For since it is of a created nature, how will it be able to see that which is uncreated?"

587. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 1: "Neither is he sense, nor imagination, nor opinion, nor reason, nor science."

Reply to the second: The infinite which stands on the side of matter not perfected by form is unknown in itself, because all cognition is through form. But the infinite which stands on the side of form not limited by matter is in itself maximally known. And thus God is infinite, and not in the first mode, as appears from what was said above.

Reply to the third: God is not said to be "non-existing," as if in no way existing, but because he is above every existent, inasmuch as he is his own existence (*esse*). Whence from this it does not follow that he can in no way be known, but that he surpasses every cognition; and this is precisely to be incomprehensible.

Reply to the fourth: Proportion is said in two ways. In one way, a certain habit of one quantity to another, as double, triple, and equal are species of proportion. In another way, any relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And thus there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to him as effect to cause and as potency to act. And according to this, a created intellect can be proportioned to the knowing of God.

Explicatio Articuli. The conclusion is: It can happen that a created intellect sees God clearly, as he is. St. Thomas does not say, "by its natural power"; but that in some way this can and ought to be, as he explains below (article 4), the mode, namely, by which he can and ought to be seen. From this, indeed, he proves that God can be seen, because in us there is a natural desire of seeing him: for once effects are seen, each naturally longs to see the cause. Therefore, with creatures seen, man will naturally desire to see God, the author of all. But no natural desire is vain: therefore it must turn upon something possible; therefore it is possible to see God.

Dubitatio circa textum Articuli. Concerning this reasoning, however - leaving aside the question that is usually treated here, namely, of what sort that natural desire of seeing God is, which we shall examine more fully in the First Part of the Second [Part] - now it is only to be seen in what way the reasoning of St. Thomas proves the proposed conclusion. For this purpose, it must first be premised, as is proved in the context of this article, namely according to the sentence of St. Thomas and in accordance with ancient doctrine, that there cannot be in a rational creature a natural appetite after the manner of an innate potency to the clear vision of God; but the natural appetite of seeing God is an elicited desire, which follows upon nature and upon cognition; as from the text of this article is not obscurely gathered. That is, we do not therefore naturally desire the vision because we are capable of it - for this is not a natural potency, nor is a natural appetite after the manner of a potency, but what theologians are wont to call obediential capacity - but because we see the effects and creatures of God and know God to be their author, we naturally desire and long to see him himself. And this desire theologians call elicited appetite; while that former desire they call innate appetite. Moreover, the Holy Doctor calls that elicited desire a natural appetite, not because it is had from the powers of nature, nor because it is elicited by a natural object, but because in a certain way it is necessary, namely as to its specification. For no one, unless deceived

588. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 1: "To all he is universally incomprehensible, and he is not sense," etc.

589. St. John Chrysostom, Homilies on John, hom. 14: he adds that the "vision" there signifies the most certain consideration and a comprehension as great as the Father has of the Son.

by some error, can hate the vision of God itself, inasmuch as it is considered in itself. Therefore, since we are said naturally to desire what we necessarily desire, according to the doctrine of the same St. Thomas (I - II, q. 10, a. 1), this elicited appetite of seeing God, which is in a certain way necessary, must also be called natural.

Obiectio ad enervandam rationem S. Thomae. Yet from this there does not seem to be effectively proved what Blessed Thomas contends, namely that God can be seen. For many impossibles, once apprehended as good, man can desire naturally, that is, in a certain necessary way, if in them no note of evil appears on account of which they could be hated. For that our desire can be borne toward an impossible, we shall show below in disputation 234, chapter 2. Thus, if someone considers the subtle spirituality of an angel and should desire to be such, since he apprehends in this no note of evil, he will necessarily, as to the specification, desire it; yet this desire is certainly vain: for since it is turned toward the impossible, it can in no way be fulfilled. Therefore, from the natural elicited desire St. Thomas does not rightly infer that God can be seen; whereas from a desire and appetite after the manner of an innate potency it would be concluded most aptly. For there is no natural potency which cannot be reduced to act.

Explicatio Articuli. Conclusio est. It can happen that a created intellect see God clearly as He is. St. Thomas does not say by its natural power, but that in some way this can be; and the manner in which He can and ought to be seen, he explains in articles 4 and 5. Thence he proves that God can be seen, because in us there is a natural desire of seeing Him: for once the effects are seen, each one naturally desires to see the cause; therefore, when creatures are seen, man will naturally desire to see God the author of all things; but no natural desire is in vain: therefore it must bear upon something possible: it is therefore possible to see God.

Dubitatio circa textum Articuli. Concerning this reasoning, leaving aside that question which is usually treated here - namely, of what sort that natural desire of seeing God is, which we shall examine more fully in 1 - 2, q. 5, a. 2 and 8 - now it is only to be seen how the reasoning of St. Thomas proves the proposed conclusion. For this purpose it must be premised, what in article 3 will be proved, namely according to the mind of St. Thomas and the sounder doctrine, that there is not in a rational creature, naturally placed after the mode of a potency, a clear vision of God, but that the natural appetite of seeing God is a desire which follows cognition; as from the wording of the article one can not obscurely gather. For we do not therefore naturally desire the vision of God because we are capable of it - for there is not a natural potency, nor an appetite after the mode of a potency; what the theologians are wont to call obediential capacity - but because we naturally know the creatures of God and their author, and naturally desire to see Him. Theologians call that second desire an elicited appetite; but the first they call an innate appetite. Moreover St. Thomas calls that desire a natural appetite, not because it is had in the nature, or because it is an elicited natural appetite, but because it is necessary, namely as to the specification of beatitude (*beatitudo*); for how, unless by some error, could one be said to hate that very vision of God which we consider? what we desire, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas in 1 - 2, q. 10, a. 1, is in this way necessary, and thus natural.

Obiectio. Yet it does not seem to be effectively proved what St. Thomas contends, namely that God can be seen: because many things, apprehended as good, a man can naturally, that is necessarily, desire, if in them there appear no reason of evil on account of which they could be hated; our appetite can be borne toward them, as we shall show below in disputation 234, chapter 2. Thus, if someone were to consider the subtlety of an angelic nature, and to be such himself, since he would apprehend in this no evil, he would necessarily as to the specific character desire that state; but this desire is vain: for since it is truly impossible, it is in no way able to be fulfilled. Therefore from a natural elicited desire St. Thomas infers that God can be seen; yet from a desire and appetite of an innate potency it would be better inferred: for there is no natural potency which cannot be reduced to act.

Respondeo. I answer, although concerning an object which is impossible there can be a simple affect of complacency, and that in some way it can be desired, nevertheless that desire cannot be necessary as to specification, and therefore cannot be natural: for if it be rightly considered, it is of itself an evil to one who necessarily desires it, namely the non-being of himself. Hence in the object itself there is something evil, by reason of which it can be hated; as in the example proposed, a man's being an angel is an evil in reality, because it is the man's not being; although it can be desired, because it is apprehended under the aspect of good, as in the place cited we shall explain. But the vision of God is not of this sort, for of itself it cannot be an evil for us, nor be apprehended as such: therefore it cannot of itself be hated, just as neither can any science. For this reason Aristotle, Metaphysics I, chapter 1, said that there is a natural desire (he means an elicited one) of knowing.[590] Only on account of extrinsic impediments can someone hate it; just as he can also hate some science, because it is laborious to attain it: yet this does not prevent the desire of it from being truly natural, as has been explained. This reasoning, however, has greater force if we consider that the natural appetite of beatitude and of seeing God is in all: for as St. Augustine rightly said, book 4 against Julian, chapter 3, far from the beginning, "Nor would all men by a natural instinct wish to be immortal and blessed, unless we were able to be so."[591] Therefore St. Thomas rightly infers from the natural desire of seeing God that it is possible; for if it were impossible, it could not be naturally desired and sought.

Usually in this article it is disputed whether to a wayfarer there can be communicated an evident quidditative knowledge of God, which is not an intuitive vision of Him: but that we shall dispute more fully below in disputation 135.

590. Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, c. 1: on the natural desire to know.

591. St. Augustine, Contra Julianum, l. 4, c. 3: "Neque omnes homines naturali instinctu immortales, beati esse vellemus, nisi esse possemus."

Disputatio XXXVII - Whether the vision of God, as He is, can be communicated by God to a created intellect

Caput I - The error of the Armenians and of Abelard

It happens in several ways to see or to know any thing: first, as it were by intuiting the thing itself as it is, which is to see through its essence (*essentia*); then through some image and likeness of itself, as we know a friend absent in his image, and in some manner God in His effects, in one case more perfectly than in another. Therefore there was an error of the Armenians, reported by Armacanus in book 14 of the Questions against them, chapter 1, and of more recent Greeks, as the same author relates, who asserted that God is neither seen clearly by the blessed according to His essence, nor can be so seen, but only through a certain likeness of Him, or a light derived from Him. Alphonsus de Castro, against heresies, under the word Beatitudo, heresy 1, and Gabriel Pratcolus in his Elenchus under the word Armeni, ascribe to them the same error; although Nicephorus, book 18, chapter 53, while recounting their errors, does not number this among them.[592][593][594][595] Sander, however, in book 7 De visibili monarchia, heresy 118, thinks the sole error of the Armenians to have been that they said, before the day of judgment, God is not seen by the blessed; but I do not know whence he gathers this. For although Alphonsus says in heresy 6 that the Armenians taught that, nevertheless he does not so attribute this error to them as to say that according to their opinion God is seen after the day of judgment. Therefore I think Armacanus to be in the right, who very well knew their errors.[596]

Alphonsus ascribes the same error under that first heresy to Abelard, and gathers it from Bernard, epistle 190. Abelard, indeed, was followed by Arnold of Brescia, as the same Alphonsus attests. But neither in that epistle, nor elsewhere in Bernard, could I find such a thing: nay rather, when in epistle 189 he recounts the heads of Abelard's errors, he does not list among them this one. About Arnold, however, there is no doubt that he was of that mind, if Abelard taught it: for, as Bernard testifies in epistle 190, he followed Abelard as his master.[597][598] Finally, as the same Alphonsus writes, Almericus taught the same doctrine in the time of Innocent III, at which time also the Albigenses in Gaul began to dogmatize.[599]

But what is principal is that not a few of the graver Fathers of the Church seem to have been not far from this opinion. Chiefly St. John Chrysostom, that he might decline to the opposite extreme the error of the Anomoeans, who said that by their own power they comprehended God, homily 14 on John, before the middle, while he treats that text John 1, "God no one has ever seen," says in these words: "What God is, not only have the prophets not seen, but neither the angels nor the

592. Armacanus, lib. 14 quaestionum contra Armenos, c. 1.
593. Alphonsus de Castro, Contra haereses, s.v. Beatitudo, haeresis 1; also haeresis 6.
594. Gabriel Pratcolus, Elenchus, s.v. Armeni.
595. Nicephorus, Hist. Eccl., l. 18, c. 53.
596. Nicholas Sander, De visibili monarchia, l. 7, haeresis 118.
597. St. Bernard, Ep. 189 (capita errorum Abailardi).
598. St. Bernard, Ep. 190 (on Arnold of Brescia following Abelard).
599. On Almericus under Innocent III; cf. Sixtus Senensis, Bibliotheca sancta, l. 6, annot. 182.

archangels; but if you question them, you will hear nothing from them about the substance of God, but only their saying, 'Glory to God in the highest'." And below he not only says that it is impossible to see God, but, showing what the Son has declared to us, he says: "That to see God is impossible, because since no one knows Him except the Son." He even adds that before the Incarnation God was invisible to the angels, but through the flesh assumed He was made visible; and when that text was objected, Matthew 18, "Their angels always see the face of my Father," he replies that the same sense is to be had as in that Matthew 5, "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God": "For by thought and imagination," he says, "according to our powers, we grasp Him, which he calls a vision." He states this much more clearly in tom. 5, homilies 3 and 4 De incomprehensibili natura Dei, whose words we shall adduce a little later, that there be no need of repetition. Chrysostom was followed by Euthymius and Theophylact on that John 1, "God no one has ever seen"; Theodoret too in the dialogue which has the title "Immutabilis," after folio 3; and other Fathers whom we shall mention below.[600][601][602][603]

Caput III - How some endeavor to excuse Chrysostom

Sixtus Senensis, book 6 Bibliotheca sancta, annotation 182, and others, try to defend Chrysostom; and by the same line of reasoning Sixtus as well strives to interpret in a good sense all the other Fathers who seem to have followed him or to have taught the same.[604] They say, therefore, that a threefold explanation can be given: first, that they are speaking of a vision not intellectual, but bodily; as of St. Jerome Augustine reports in epistle 111, about the middle, that he said God is invisible to bodily eyes, even of angels; but in such a way that, as Augustine there shows, God is in every way invisible.[605]

To this interpretation, however, there is a first objection: that according to the mind of Chrysostom and Theodoret - whom the rest followed as masters - angels are not corporeal but incorporeal, as we shall report in disputation 178: therefore they do not speak of a bodily vision when they say that not even by angels can God be seen; for, in their opinion, since angels are incorporeal, they are not endowed with bodily vision. Then also, even if Chrysostom and others were to assert angels to be corporeal, endowed also with bodily eyes, they still could not be explained of bodily vision: for when Chrysostom says of the angels, "If you question them, you will hear nothing from them about the substance of God," it follows that he speaks also of the vision of the intellect: for, so that the angels might report something to us about the substance of God, it would be sufficient, nay much better, if they looked upon God with the eyes of the mind and of the intellect, even if they had not seen Him with bodily eyes. Therefore it would have been inept for Chrysostom to have said that angels can say nothing to us of the substance of God because they did not see Him with bodily eyes. Moreover, in those homilies De incomprehensibili natura Dei

600. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 14 in John 1:18 ("Deum nemo vidit unquam").
601. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 3 (and 4) De incomprehensibili natura Dei.
602. Euthymius Zigabenus and Theophylact on John 1:18.
603. Theodoret, Dialogus "Immutabilis".
604. Sixtus of Siena (Sixtus Senensis), Bibliotheca sancta, l. 6, annot. 182.
605. St. Augustine, Ep. 111, on St. Jerome's statement about God being invisible to bodily sight.

Chrysostom disputes against the Anomoeans, who said that not by the eye of the body, but by the eye of the mind, God was comprehended by them, as is clear from Chrysostom himself there. Therefore of that very thing Chrysostom asserts that neither by us, nor by the angels, is He seen.

Secondly, they interpret those Fathers as speaking only of man in this mortal life, in which he cannot, by the keenness of his mind, see God as He is. Yet this interpretation cannot fit Chrysostom, Theodoret, and others: for they speak not only of man in this mortal life, but even of the angels themselves, as is plainly clear from the words to be cited below and already cited.

Third, it seems an even less probable way of excusing them to understand them not of any clear vision of God, but of that which the School calls comprehensive (comprehensiva); for they assert that God cannot be seen by anyone, even by the blessed and endowed with the light of glory. For St. John Chrysostom, in those homilies on the incomprehensible nature of God, frequently uses the name "comprehension" when he proves that God is comprehended by no intellect, not even an angelic one; which can especially have place if we say that those Fathers were speaking of a created intellect not endowed with the light of glory, but considered only in its natural power - as some more recent men also try to interpret them. For thus not only that imperfect vision, which the Schoolmen call non-comprehensive (non comprehensiva), but not even any clear knowledge, could see God as he is.

Moreover, this interpretation too cannot be made to square with the testimonies of the Fathers, because they clearly speak of the intellect of the blessed as well. For Chrysostom, Homily 14 on John, contends that from that place Matthew 18, "Their angels always see the face of my Father," etc., it is not sufficiently gathered that God is clearly seen by angels; and so too Theodoret, in the place cited below. Since, therefore, no one doubts that those angels, namely of the little ones, are blessed, no one can doubt that Chrysostom, Theodoret, and the other Fathers were speaking not only of the wayfarer's intellect, but also of that of the blessed.[606]

Yet we can prove no less clearly that the Fathers are not to be understood as speaking of that vision which the Schoolmen call comprehensive, but of any clear and intuitive knowledge of God as he is. First: Chrysostom, in those homilies on the incomprehensible nature of God, disputes against the Anomoeans, whom it does not appear to have taught that God is so perfectly seen by the blessed that he is comprehended by them in that sense in which some of the Schoolmen speak of comprehension (comprehensio). For we shall prove in Disputation 52 that before the times of the Schoolmen the Fathers did not speak of comprehension in that mode. The Anomoeans were merely contending that by its own proper power the created intellect could clearly see the whole God as he is - which they called "comprehension."

Nor, indeed, does it matter that Theodoret, in Book 4 of the Heretical Fables, says of Eunomius, who was in the error of the Anomoeans, that he dared to affirm that he was ignorant of nothing about God, nay, that he knew the very substance (substantia) of God so exactly that he had the same knowledge about God as God himself has of himself. For Eunomius was not so mad as absolutely to equalize the knowledge which he had about God with the knowledge and cognition

606. St. John Chrysostom, Homily 14 on John 1:18 ("Deum nemo vidit unquam").

which God has of himself. He said it to be equal only on the part of the object, because there would be nothing of those things which are formally in God that would be known to God which Eunomius himself would not also see. But this, as regards the blessed, must necessarily be conceded - that of those things which are formally in God and are God himself (since all are the same with the essence), nothing can be hidden from the blessed himself, as we shall say in Disputation 53.

Then I show that those Fathers are not speaking of that cognition of comprehension in this way. If Chrysostom, against the Anomoeans in those homilies, merely wanted to prove that God is not comprehended by the blessed in that sense, he would not assert that the substance of God is seen by no angelic intellect, but only something derived from it. From this, indeed, he plainly denies not only the comprehensive vision but even the intuitive, that is, clear, vision of the divine essence. And he explicitly affirms this in different words in Homily 3 on the incomprehensible nature of God. For of those Seraphim who, beholding the majesty of God, were covering their faces (Isa. 6), because they could not bear that light of God, thus he says: "Although they were not beholding the mere light itself, not the sincere and pure substance itself; rather, what they beheld was condescension, with indulgence." By which, when Chrysostom denies a vision of the sincere and pure substance of God, he also denies the vision which we call intuitive and of God as he is. For this is the substance sincere, admixed with nothing, and pure, as it is itself. Then he explains what that condescension is in these words: "When God does not show himself as he is, but insofar as he can be seen by him who has merited such a sight, he measures and tempers the representation of himself to the strength of the one seeing; this we say is to condescend for a time, and such condescension we name indulgence." In the same way he says of the Prophets that they did not see the substance of God, but that condescension - yet more obscurely than the angels. Therefore, since he compares the angels with the prophets, and the prophets did not see God according to his essence, the same must be said of the angels in the opinion of Chrysostom.[607][608]

The words cited seem to me so manifest that there is by no means any need to weigh and examine them further.

Finally, in order that the angels might be able to recount to us something of the substance of God, it was not necessary that they should have seen him with a comprehensive (comprehensiva) knowledge; rather, it would have been enough if they clearly, as he is, saw the whole substance of God, as all the blessed behold. If, therefore, the blessed angels saw God clearly but did not comprehend him, Chrysostom would speak badly when, in that Homily 14 on John, he says: "If you question them, you will hear nothing from them about the substance of God, but only their saying, 'Glory to God in the highest,' etc." The same is no less clearly asserted by Theophylact and Euthymius on that John 1, "No one has ever seen God."[609]

Most clearly, however, Theodoret, in the Dialogue "Immutabilis," after folio 3, where Orthodoxus and Eranistes, speaking thus, introduce themselves:

607. St. John Chrysostom, Homily 3 (and 4) On the incomprehensible nature of God.
608. Isaiah 6, on the Seraphim beholding the glory of God.
609. Euthymius Zigabenus and Theophylact on John 1:18.

ERANISTES. How, then, are we to understand that the angels always see the face of your Father? ORTHODOXUS. As we are wont to understand those things that are said of men who are thought to have seen God. ERANISTES. Speak more clearly; for I do not understand. ORTHODOXUS. Can God be seen by men? ERANISTES. By no means.

Proving this, ORTHODOXUS, after he showed that the divine substance cannot be seen by any man, subjoins: "So, therefore, let us understand it of the angels when we hear 'they see the face of your Father every day': for they do not see the divine substance, which can neither be circumscribed nor comprehended nor in mind perceived, nor can the universe comprehend it; but they see a certain glory which corresponds to their powers and is accommodated to them." These are Theodoret's words. If he wished only to deny comprehension in the sense in which the Schoolmen speak, not a clear vision, he would not say that the essence of God can neither be circumscribed, nor comprehended, nor perceived, nor be seen except only in that glory which corresponds to the powers of creatures.[610]

With Chrysostom and the aforesaid, certain others also among the Latins and the Greeks seem to have felt thus.

Caput IV - Further Latin Fathers concurring

To these Fathers we seem to be able to add St. Jerome on Isaiah 1, on those words, "Hear the word of the Lord, you princes of Sodom," Primasius on that of 1 Cor. 13, "I shall know, even as I am known," and Isidore in chapter 41 of Exodus, where he thus speaks of Moses: "What is meant by 'you cannot see my face' unless this - that even when human nature after the resurrection is borne on as far as to an angelic equality and rises untiring to the contemplation of God, still it is not able fully to see his essence, which neither does the very angelic perfection attain wholly or integrally?"[611][612][613]

Someone might be able to reply - some Theologian who would wish to draw the Fathers' words into the sense of the Schoolmen - that Isidore is to be understood as speaking of comprehension (comprehensio), as they speak, not of clear vision, which all grant. But besides the fact that the words cited indicate this in no way (for he says only that God is not seen by the angels in whole, or integrally, or fully - which certainly signifies that God is not known as he is; for if he were seen in that way, he would be known as whole and entire and fully), those things also which he subjoins do not suffer this interpretation. For he says: "To the Trinity alone, indeed, is the Trinity integrally known; to the humanity assumed, which is the third person in the Trinity." Now if Isidore were speaking of comprehension as the Schoolmen speak, he ought thus to reserve it to the Trinity alone, that he would not even grant it to the humanity of Christ - as we say in III, q. 10, a. 2; and surely, if God could grant it to the assumed humanity, he could, if he willed, not deny it to any other.

610. Theodoret, Dialogue "Immutabilis."
611. St. Jerome, In Isaiam, Book 1, on Isaiah 1:10 "Audite verbum Domini, principes Sodomorum."
612. Primasius, on 1 Corinthians 13:12 "Cognoscam, sicut et cognitus sum."
613. Isidore of Seville, on Exodus 33:20 (cited as c. 41).

Incidentally, it must also be noted why the person of the Word is called by Isidore the third in the Trinity: for he is not attending to the order of origin (in which he is second), but to number, in which the Son can be counted in the third place, since this order is only by the intellect; and the same seems to be as if it were said, "one of the three."

No less clearly St. Ambrose has handed on the same thing in Book 1 on Luke, in the chapter on the apparition of the Angel, explaining that John 1, "No one has ever seen God." Augustine reports this place of Ambrose in Epistle 112, c. 5, and says nothing against it, although he himself openly teaches that God is seen by the blessed.[614][615]

Among the Greeks the following also seem to have consented to the same opinion: St. Basil, Book 1 against Eunomius, after the middle; Epiphanius, Heresy 70; St. Cyril of Alexandria, Book 1 on John, ch. 22; and the Hierosolymitan in Catechesis 6; but more clearly St. Gregory of Nyssa in the book On the Beatitudes, explaining that "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God" (Matt. 5). For after he had taught that the substance of God is invisible except through certain effects and likenesses (and he was, in fact, treating of the reward of that beatitude itself), he adds that the promise "they shall see God" is to be understood in such a way that "to see God" is the same as "to have God," according to that of Psalm 127, "And may you see the good things of Jerusalem." These Fathers, if we wish to speak sincerely, we can scarcely interpret in a good sense, as is manifest from what has been said. For all seem to speak in the same way as Chrysostom. Yet I shall show in the following chapter that the opposite opinion is to be embraced.[616][617][618][619][620]
According to our faith, God, as he is, can be seen.

Caput V - The contrary opinion must be rejected as contrary to Catholic teaching

I judge the contrary position not only truer, but, according to the Catholic faith, necessarily to be maintained: namely, that the divine essence is clearly seen by the blessed as it is in itself. Although St. Thomas speaks somewhat cautiously in this article, in *De veritate*, question 8, article 1, he calls the contrary position heretical, and in the following article erroneous. This will become very clear from what follows.

First, Evaristus in his first epistle, from that 1 John 3, "We shall see him as he is," expressly affirms that the substance of God is seen by the blessed. The same is asserted by the Council of Frankfurt in its epistle to the bishops of Spain in these words: "We preach him (namely Christ) to be true God and one, and truly God himself; and may we merit to arrive at the most blessed spectacle of him, in which is eternal beatitude." They prove this in the same epistle from that 1 John 3, "It has not yet appeared what we shall be; but when it appears, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is." To these add Eugenius IV and the Council of Florence: in the

614. St. Ambrose, On Luke, Book 1, chapter on the apparition of the Angel, explaining John 1:18.
615. St. Augustine, Epistle 112, especially c. 5; also De videndo Deum, cc. 4 and 8.
616. St. Basil, Contra Eunomium, Book 1 (post medium).
617. Epiphanius, Panarion, heresy 70.
618. St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Ioannem, Book 1, ch. 22.
619. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 6.
620. St. Gregory of Nyssa, De Beatitudinibus, on "Beati mundo corde."

letters of union, which were truly received and subscribed by the whole Synod, although afterwards, through certain frauds, some of the Greek patriarchs and the emperor of the Greeks receded; among other things they define that those who, having received baptism or having completed penance, have died in grace, are forthwith received into heaven and clearly behold the very God, triune and one, as he is. Finally, Benedict XII, in a certain Extravagant which is reported by Major on IV, the last question, and by Gabriel in the Supplement on IV, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 3, dub. 3, defines that the souls of the departed who have died in grace are truly blessed before the day of judgment by the clear vision and fruition of God.[621][622][623][624][625][626]

Second, among the Fathers also many and of great name have handed on the same to us: Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4; Martial in the Epistle to the men of Toulouse, ch. 27; Origen, Book 1 of the Principles, ch. 1, explaining that Psalm 35, "In your light we shall see light"; and St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 25, at the end, where he says as follows: "In this, therefore, common name (namely of God) believe, go forward prosperously, and reign; and from here you shall pass over to the beatitude of the other life. And further, as it seems to me, it lies in a more express knowledge and comprehension of these things." With the Fathers, however, "comprehension" (comprehensio) is taken for the clear vision of God, as we shall say in Disputation 52, about which they were disputing against the Anomoeans; yet more at length Irenaeus teaches the same, Book 18, ch. 38. Augustine agrees in Epistle 112, On seeing God, ch. 4 and 8; and what in the end of that epistle he doubts, whether God is now seen by the angels, does not stand in the way; for as to all the blessed it is a matter of doubt in Augustine whether before the day of judgment they clearly behold God; he does not, however, doubt whether God is at some time to be seen.[627][628][629][630][631][615]

Gregory the Great is added, Moral. Book 18, ch. 28, where he mentions the opposite opinion and from Scripture more fully confirms this one; Damascene in the History of Barlaam, ch. 8 near the end, where he says that the greatest punishment of the damned is to be deprived of the face of God; and in the "First, On the Faith," ch. 1, where he says that God will be seen by no one unless God willed to reveal it; and although he asserts that God is incomprehensible by nature, he does not speak as Clichtoveus and many of the Schoolmen suppose, who think that comprehension is

621. Pope Evaristus, First Epistle, on 1 John 3:2 "Videbimus eum sicut est."
622. Council of Frankfurt, Epistle to the bishops of Spain, on the vision of God.
623. Pope Eugenius IV and the Council of Florence, Decree of Union, defining the immediate clear vision of God for souls dying in grace.
624. Pope Benedict XII, constitution "Benedictus Deus," defining the beatific vision before the day of judgment.
625. Richardus Maior (Richard Middleton), IV, last question, citing Benedict XII.
626. Gabriel Biel, Supplement on IV, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 3, dub. 3, citing Benedict XII.
627. Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, ch. 4.
628. The Epistle ascribed to St. Martial, to the men of Toulouse, ch. 27.
629. Origen, De principiis, Book 1, ch. 1, on Psalm 35:10 "In lumine tuo videbimus lumen."
630. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 25, at the end.
631. Irenaeus, cited as Book 18, ch. 38 (edition and numbering vary), on seeing God.
615. St. Augustine, Epistle 112, especially c. 5; also De videndo Deum, cc. 4 and 8.

not altogether the same as clear vision; nor is he speaking in the sense of Chrysostom's sentence, but he said that God is incomprehensible by nature - that is, by his nature he cannot be clearly seen by a creature unless the Son willed to reveal it.[632][633][634][635]

Third, from Scripture this truth is proved so clearly that it is a wonder that very weighty Fathers ever taught the opposite.

- The first place is Matthew 5: "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." Augustine so understands it, Epistle 112, ch. 4; Hilary, Canon 4 on Matthew; indeed Augustine from this place seems to deduce that this is of faith. For he says: "We know that God can be seen, because it is written, 'Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God,' etc. If perhaps I ought not to have said, 'We know,' but 'we believe,' because it is written in Scripture to which we believe, it was yet most fittingly said at once, 'We know,' because when he shall appear, we shall be like him; because we shall see him as he is; with which we ought to join, 'as something that he firmly believed.'"
- The second place is Matthew 18: "Their angels always see the face of my Father who is in heaven." There "face" they interpret as the very substance (*substantia*) of God as he is - Hilary, Canon 18; and on that of Psalm 118, "I besought your face," Augustine frequently in the same epistle, particularly ch. 4; St. Gregory the Great in the place cited; and Nicetas, in Oration 44 of St. Gregory Nazianzen, on those words, "Afterwards": for a certain corporeal face, under which by likeness and the appearance of a man God might appear, cannot be understood; for although, if we speak about the bodily vision of a man, that vision is more principal in which the face of some figure is seen than another part, since that part of human figure is most noble; nevertheless the angels, who with the eye of the mind alone gaze and by that part attain beatitude, cannot see by face, rather than by another part of a bodily figure, but by the vision of the substance of God as he is they can be blessed. Therefore the Fathers cited most fittingly understand by "face" the substance of God, which metaphorically is called "face": because just as then we are glad, when we see the countenance of a friend or a prince, upon which gladness shines, so also then we are blessed when we clearly gaze upon the substance of God as he is. Therefore the Greek Fathers mentioned above interpret less well by "face" that descent, that is, the light derived from God himself, to whom God is always present by his continual presence.

Nor does that which is said in 1 Peter 1 seem to stand in the way: "Into which things the angels long to look." First, because - as both St. Gregory the Great, in the place cited, and Bede, Tom. 8, Book of Questions, q. 9, most excellently interpret - that "desire" is not said with anxiety, nor does it signify absence of the thing, but only denotes, as is commonly said, a certain tending of desire; but, as Peter shows, that the blessed shall enjoy a certain satisfaction without satiety, according to

632. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia, Book 18, ch. 28.
633. "Damascene," Historia Barlaam et Iosaphat, ch. 8, near the end.
634. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, Book 1, ch. 1.
635. Josse Clichtove, on the distinction between comprehension and clear vision.

that of Psalm 16: "I shall be satisfied when your glory shall have appeared," therefore he said that they are perpetually held by the desire of beholding the face of God: for he who desires something does not loathe it. This sense Isidore followed, Book of Sentences, sentence 22. Then, if we did not read, "Into which the angels desire to look," but, "Into whom the angels desire to look," nothing of the things we said could stand in the way. Now, however, all the Greek Fathers so read, and also some of the Vulgate codices. Then truly the sentence would be formed in this way: Peter had said before concerning that salvation which the prophets inquired and searched into, etc.; he subjoins then, "To whom it was revealed that not to themselves, but to us, they were ministering those things which now have been announced to us by the Holy Spirit sent from heaven, into whom the angels desire to look": that is, which mysteries the angels desire to look into, or with great desire long to understand the mysteries of our redemption and the manifold wisdom of God, which were foretold by the prophets, according to that of Ephesians 3: "That it may be made known to the princes of the Church," etc., because in the course of time the mysteries were revealed to the angels as they were being accomplished: now, however, the Vulgate, emended by Sixtus V, reads, "Into which."

But if the angels see the substance of God, we too shall see it, when we shall have been made equal to them, as Augustine most excellently infers, Epistle 112, ch. 8 at the end, according to that of Matthew 22: "They shall be as the angels of God." Although that place of Matthew is not understood of equality of vision - for men will see God, as also the angels see, but of the incorruption of life, which neither needs marriage nor is subject to corruption. For the Sadducees foolishly objected concerning the woman who had seven husbands, whose wife she would be in the resurrection, that thus they might attack the resurrection; but the Lord answered that then men would be like the angels of God (namely, incorruptible), and thus would not need marriage: which Luke said much more clearly, ch. 20, in these words: "Neither do they marry, nor are they given in marriage, nor can they die any more: for they are equal to the angels." Hence it follows rightly that, if men are to be immortal just as the angels are, the same clear vision of God must also be granted to them.

- The third place is 1 Corinthians 13: "We see now through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I am known." He says, "even as I am known," as Theodoret explains, that is, as one known and familiar who clearly gazes on the face of a friend. Jerome says, "Perfectly, as I shall behold God by vision"; Theophylact understands it likewise; and St. John Chrysostom says, "And he himself anticipated me, when first he knew me." Others think "I am known" is put for "I am taught." But if in the other life the divine essence itself did not appear, and instead were seen only in some light derived from it, then it would still be seen in an enigma and under an obscure veil, not face to face; nor would we know as those who are known and familiar, but only in part, though more perfectly than on the way. For the soul, as Augustine testifies, *De Trinitate* 15, chapter 9, is itself a kind of obscure likeness when through one thing we wish to signify another. Therefore, since any light or creature derived from God is far more different from God

himself than one creature is from another, it follows all the more that such a medium would be an enigma of God, rather than a direct sight of him.

- The fourth place is 1 John 3: "We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like to him, because we shall see him as he is." There indeed it is plainly a discourse about the Deity, not about the humanity of Christ, as is clear first from the context: for a little before he had spoken about the Father, that is, about God: "See what manner of charity the Father has given us, that we should be called and should be the sons of God"; and he continues about the same when he says, "Most beloved, now we are the sons of God; and it has not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like to him, because we shall see him as he is": when I say, he who gave us to be sons of God: but when he presently subjoins, "And you know that he appeared to take away our sins," he is also speaking of God who deigned to appear in the flesh.

Secondly, the Council of Frankfurt, in the epistle to the bishops of Spain; Evaristus in the first epistle; and Augustine, Epistle 112, ch. 7, treating this place, teach that it is to be understood of a spiritual, not a bodily, vision; just as also in one way we will be similar to God in spirit, not in body. Therefore indeed we shall be similar, because we shall see as he is. Therefore we shall be similar, because we shall not only be satiated as sons (for now also we are), but without sin, as he is: therefore it has not yet appeared what we shall be, because although we are now sons, we are nevertheless with some sin. About which likeness Irenaeus said most aptly in the place cited: "If, which is by the manifestation through creation of God, bestows life upon men on the earth, much more that which is by the manifestation through the Word of the Father, bestows life upon those who see God."

Thirdly, that John does not speak of the vision of the humanity of Christ, but of the Deity, is shown by Armacanus, Book 14 of Questions of the Armenians, ch. 3, for this reason, which he seems to have taken from Fulgentius, in the book of Responses to Ferrandus the Deacon, Response 3 after the middle: because even the wicked will see the humanity of Christ - Matthew 24: "They shall see the Son of man" - and yet sinners will not be like him, nor even the just from this alone, that they will see the humanity, but from the vision of the Deity. Therefore there is promised (as Augustine says in that epistle, ch. 10) a spiritual vision by which the just will see one and the same Christ with the Father in the divinity.

By reason indeed this sentence is confirmed first, because - as we said without doubt about the text - by the natural appetite, by which we desire to see God as he is, it is most excellently proved that that desire can be fulfilled. For if it were impossible, it would not be a natural desire. If therefore we grant that there is a natural appetite of seeing God as he is, to know or to see the cause, it follows rightly that it is possible to see God. But that there is a natural appetite stands, because it cannot be that the vision of God is apprehended by us as evil, just as neither is the vision of any other cause which we desire to see: therefore we naturally desire to see God. Then that a

vision of God is possible is sufficiently gathered from those things which in the following we shall say in the solution of the opposing reason, where it is shown that it does not imply a contradiction that God be seen by a created intellect.

Caput VI - The arguments for the Armenian position are proposed and answered

For the sentence of the Armenians and of St. John Chrysostom, first there seems to be that of John 1: "God no one has ever seen; the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared him." And consonant to this is that of the First to Timothy, ch. 6: "Who alone has immortality, inhabits light inaccessible, whom no man has seen nor can see."

To dissolve this difficulty Jansen, book 15 of the Concordance of the Gospels, asserts that when it is said "God no one has ever seen," this is, "no one," not only man, but even Angel, is to be understood; yet John is speaking not only of the clear vision of God as he is, but also of that which the theologians call "comprehensive," by which God alone comprehends himself.[636] However, although it is true that by that kind of knowledge God alone sees himself, nevertheless John must be understood not only of this knowledge, but of any also clear vision of God as he is. For, in order that someone might be able to declare to us the mysteries of God which we had never seen, it would have been enough if he himself had clearly seen God as he is, and his counsel had been made manifest to him.

I answer therefore that John understood man alone, when he said, "God no one has ever seen," as if he said, "no man." Thus explains St. Augustine in that epistle 112, ch. 4.[637] Those, however, who interpret it also of Angels, as St. John Chrysostom, St. Ambrose, and others, say likewise that neither by men nor by Angels can the essence of God ever be seen as it is, as we reported above in this disputation. According to the interpretation therefore of St. Augustine, John said the same in ch. 6: "Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me: not that anyone has seen the Father, except he who is from God, he has seen the Father" (John 6:45 - 46): that is, I, who am begotten of the Father; as if he were to say: he who comes to me does not come because he, as a man, has heard anything from the Father himself, since, just as no one has heard from him with a bodily ear, so neither has anyone seen him; but he who comes, has heard from the Father, who through me teaches, because I have seen the Father and I know him (cf. John 7:29; 8:38). And the same is consonant with that of the First to Timothy, ch. 6: "whom no man has seen nor can see."

For when John in ch. 1 had said, "The law was given by Moses; grace and truth came by Jesus Christ," he subjoins, "God no one has ever seen" (John 1:17 - 18). As if he were to say: neither Moses, who gave the law, nor any other man in this mortal life; but this one alone, who is the only-begotten, through whom grace and truth came, has declared the things which he saw. But John said this either to prefer Christ to Moses and the prophets, or to show that the things which he had narrated about God, saying "In the beginning was the Word," etc., he had not spoken nor learned

636. Cornelius Jansen, Concordia Evangelica, lib. 15, on John 1:18.
637. St. Augustine, Epistola 112, c. 4.

from any man, because no one had seen God who could declare those things, but that he had received them from the only-begotten Son of God, of whose glory he had said, "We have seen his glory, the glory as of the only-begotten from the Father" (John 1:14). He affirms therefore that God has never been seen by any of men, not only before Christ's advent, but neither after, not only by their own power, but not even by a divine one (that is, by an extraordinary divine communication) among those, I say, with whom we pass our life in this mortal state, and whose daily converse we use, and by whom we can be taught; and that this was granted in this mortal life to the only Son of God alone, because he was to be the teacher and redeemer of all. He therefore declared to us the things which he saw.

1. Then that saying of Exodus 33 can be adduced for the sentence of Chrysostom: "Man shall not see me and live" (Exod 33:20). About this, however, we shall speak more opportunely below in disputation 55.
2. For the same sentence there seems to be a reason. Because the divine essence no less exceeds the efficacy of our intellect than a spiritual thing exceeds the power of the visive faculty: for the divine essence is compared to our intellect as the infinite to the finite, whereas the substance of an Angel is compared to the bodily eye as the finite to the finite. But the bodily eye cannot be perfected by any spiritual gift so that it may see the substance of an Angel: therefore much less can a created intellect see God.

It is answered: although both the substance of Angels and the faculty of seeing are finite; the essence of God, however, is infinite, and the created intellect finite; nevertheless the substance of an Angel and the faculty of seeing agree less and have between themselves a less proportion than God and the created intellect. For the proportion of these latter should not be mathematical according to a measure of perfection; for thus indeed God surpasses the created intellect more than the substance of Angels surpasses the bodily eye; but according to the ratio of object and power: thus, however, God has a due proportion with any intellect; but the substance of an Angel preserves absolutely none with the bodily eye: wherefore it is more distant from it than the essence of God is from the created intellect. For the substance of God is contained under the adequate notion of intellect, which is being (ens) according to the whole latitude of its analogy, which even on the way, without a supernatural gift, we can know obscurely and in some way understand; but the substance of an Angel is not contained under the object of the faculty of seeing or sensing, and therefore in no way can it by its own power be seen.

Hence it comes about that the intellect, endowed with some supernatural gift, such as is the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*), which has the character of an intelligible species of God himself, as will be made clear in disputation 43, ch. 5,[638] can be perfected so as to behold perfectly God as he is, whom it cannot see by other natural species: for it is itself capable of any gift within the intelligible genus; but no power of sensing can be furnished with any gift so as to be able to see, or sense, the substance of an Angel, because that is by no means contained under the notion of a sensible object:

638. See Disputation 43, ch. 5.

just as also in no way can it happen that sight perceive sound, or hearing color: yet it seems able to happen that the eye be moved by some gift of God to see color indivisible without quantity; because color by its notion is within the latitude of the object of sight; about which in the Third Part of St. Thomas, q. 76, a. 7, we shall speak more fully.[639] All this doctrine was not obscurely indicated to us by the Holy Doctor in Contra Gentiles III, ch. 54, around the first argument, to which again the discussion will return in disputation 40, ch. 2, and disputation 43, ch. 6.[640]

Articulus II - Whether the essence of God is seen by a created intellect through some likeness

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the essence of God is seen by a created intellect through some likeness.

1. For it is said in 1 John 3: "We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like to him, and we shall see him as he is" (1 John 3:2).
2. Further, St. Augustine says in book 9 On the Trinity: "When we know God, there arises some likeness of God in us."[641]
3. Further, the intellect in act is the intelligible in act, just as the sense in act is the sensible in act. But this happens only inasmuch as the sense is informed by the likeness of the sensible thing, and the intellect by the likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God is seen in act by a created intellect, it is necessary that he be seen through some likeness.

But on the contrary is what St. Augustine says, book 15 On the Trinity, that when the Apostle says: "We see now through a mirror and in an enigma" (1 Cor 13:12), under the name of mirror and enigma all likenesses can be understood which are accommodated to understanding God. But to see God through his essence is not an enigmatic or specular vision, but is opposed to it. Therefore the divine essence is not seen through likenesses.[642]

I answer that to vision, both sensible and intellectual-actual, two things are required, namely a visive power and a union of the thing seen with the seeing. For there is not vision in act except by this, that the thing seen is in some way in the one seeing. And in corporeal things indeed it is manifest that the thing seen cannot be in the seer through its essence, but only through its likeness. Thus the likeness of a stone is in the eye, through which there is vision in act, but not the very substance of the stone. But if it were one and the same thing which were both the principle of the visive power and the thing seen, it would be necessary for the seer both to have from that thing the visive power, and the form by which he saw. Now it is manifest that God both is the author of the intellective power and can be seen by the intellect. And since the intellective power itself of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is some participative likeness of him who is the

639. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 76, a. 7.
640. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, III, c. 54; see also Disputation 40, ch. 2, and Disputation 43, ch. 6.
641. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 9, cap. 3 (or c. 1 as cited).
642. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 15, cap. 9.

first intellect. Whence also the intellective power of a creature is called a certain intelligible light as if derived from the first light: whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore there is required for seeing God some likeness of God on the part of the visive power, by which namely the intellect be made efficacious for seeing God. But on the part of the thing seen, which must of necessity be in some way united to the seer, by no created likeness can the essence of God be seen.

First indeed, because, as Dionysius says, through likenesses of things of a lower order higher things by no means can be known: as through the species of a body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore through any created species can the essence of God be seen.[643]

Secondly, because the essence of God is his very existence (*ipsum esse eius*), as was shown above; which can befit no created form. Therefore no created form can be a likeness representing one seeing the essence of God.[644]

Thirdly, because the divine essence is something uncircumscribable, containing in itself, supereminently, whatever can be signified or understood by a created intellect. And this can in no way be presented through any created species: because every created form is determined according to some particular notion, whether of wisdom, or of virtue, or of existence itself, or of some such thing. Whence to say that God is seen through a likeness, is to say that the divine essence is not seen. Which is erroneous.

It must be said therefore that for seeing the divine essence there is required some likeness on the part of the visive power, namely the light of divine glory strengthening the intellect for seeing God. Of which it is said in the Psalm: "In thy light we shall see light" (Ps 35[36]:10). But through no created likeness can the essence of God be seen, which would represent the divine essence itself as it is in itself.

Reply to the first: That authority speaks of the likeness which is by participation of the light of glory.

Reply to the second: St. Augustine there is speaking of the knowledge of God which is had on the way.

Reply to the third: The divine essence is existence itself. Whence, just as other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to the intellect according to some act of being by which they inform the intellect itself and make it to be in act; so the divine essence is united to the created intellect, making the intellect to be in act by itself, as by that which of itself makes the intellect to be in act.

Conclusion of the article is: For seeing the essence of God there is required some likeness on the part of the power, namely the light of glory; but through a created likeness, which would represent that very essence, it cannot be seen as it is in itself.

643. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 1: "multum procul a principiis," on the inadequacy of lower likenesses for higher things.

644. Above, q. 3, art. 4.

Some observations, worthy of note, could be brought forward for the exposition of the article and of the mind of St. Thomas; for his interpreters and disciples vary; yet more conveniently in the following disputation we shall declare what he himself thought.

Disputatio XXXVIII - Whether by God's absolute power an intelligible species of God can be given, by which He may be clearly seen

Caput I - Two opposed opinions

The present question has place only among those who assert that the beatific vision is not produced by God alone, as Richard and the Nominalists taught, against whom we shall dispute in I - II, q. 3, art. 2, but also by the created intellect. And it is to be understood of the species and intelligible likeness which, with respect to other objects, is commonly assigned as the principle of intellection, whether as disposition to the act or as principle of seeing the object, so that the object may be seen; which species is called "impressed" by the Schoolmen. The question, however, is not about the word itself which is wont to be called the "expressed species," although we shall also say something of this.

Concerning the impressed species there are two opposed opinions. The first is that an impressed species of the divine essence cannot be produced by God. Those who have handed this down are Henry in Quodlibet 3, q. 1, and Quodlibet 4, q. 7, and in the Summa art. 33, q. 2; Aegidius in the Castigatorius, art. 1, and in the little work De divina induta in Beatos, c. 1; Cajetan, and more recent theologians in this article; Durandus in IV, dist. 49, q. 2, n. 13 and following, who not only deny universally intelligible species of other things, but also with a peculiar reason teach that the species of the divine essence cannot be produced; likewise Capreolus in the same place; Sotus, q. 2, art. 3; the Ferrariense Doctor, III Contra gentiles, c. 49; note what foundation is added by Marsilius in III, q. 10, art. 2, part I, art. in dubio incidens, conclusion 2, in which, although he asserts only de facto that there is not given a species of the divine essence for a clear vision of it, yet in the second reason he seems to think that it even cannot be produced; finally Thomas of Argentina in IV, dist. 49, q. 2, art. 2; and Paludanus, q. 1, art. 2, conclusion 3 - who, even if they do not dispute whether such a species can be effected by God or not, nevertheless affirm that de facto it is not given. Lastly, St. Thomas is reported for this opinion; but what he himself thought we shall see in the following disputation; the reasons of this opinion we shall set forth and examine one by one in chapter 4. 645646647648649

645. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 3, q. 1; Quodlibet 4, q. 7; Summa, art. 33, q. 2; Aegidius, Castigatorius, art. 1; Opusculum De divina induta in Beatos, c. 1; Cajetan, in this article.

646. Durandus, In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 2, n. 13 sqq.

647. Capreolus, in the same place; Dominicus Soto, q. 2, art. 3; the Ferrariense Doctor, on III Contra gentiles, c. 49; Marsilius, In III, q. 10, art. 2, part I, ad dubium incidens, concl. 2.

648. Thomas of Argentina, In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 2, art. 2; Paludanus, q. 1, art. 2, concl. 3.

649. On St. Thomas: see II Sent., dist. 3, q. 9, where he grants a quidditative species of God for abstractive, not intuitive, cognition.

The posterior opinion, now common enough in the Schools, asserts that nothing hinders God by His power from being able to produce such a species and to infuse it into a human or angelic intellect, by which, being instructed, it could behold God Himself clearly, as He is. Whether indeed God now grants it to the blessed we shall say in Disputation 43, c. 7. This opinion was followed by Aureolus, as he is cited by Capreolus in the place cited, art. 2; and among others Richard also counts it as probable in III, dist. 14, art. 1, q. 3; for, of the four which he recounts, he himself defends only two: one, which asserts that de facto God is seen through a species eliciting the vision by the potency and the species; the other, which affirms that the vision is effected by God alone, but that the light of glory is only given for receiving the vision in the intellect. Alexander also favors it, II, part, q. 24, membr. 1, who speaks in the same way as St. Thomas; and although on the side of the object seen, namely God, he says that no species is given for seeing Him Himself, nevertheless on the side of the intellect and the potency he says that a likeness is required. Finally, Scotus in IV, dist. 49, q. 11, before the solution of the arguments - which he had promised to treat elsewhere (which place I could not find) - yet in the Response, therefore, after the middle, affirms that the reasons by which it is commonly proved that there is not given a species of the divine essence prove nothing: he understands, in truth, not only of the possible, but also of the de facto. For in II, dist. 3, q. 9, he teaches that there is given a quidditative species of God, not for the clear vision, which they call intuitive, but for the quidditative alone, only abstractive, and he concedes it.[650]

Conclusion: The opinion which affirms that a species of the divine essence can be given, by a likeness from the production of the Word, is proved.

Caput II - The opinion which affirms that a species of the divine essence can be given is proved by a likeness from the production of the Word

Indeed, this latter opinion has always seemed to me much truer, and then at length did I judge it much more probable, when I clearly perceived that it in no way contradicts St. Thomas. The reasons for this opinion, however, have to be proved to me in a twofold way and confirmed. First, by a certain argument from a likeness, which in this chapter and in the following I shall more fully pursue; then by solving one by one the arguments which are commonly adduced on the opposite side. Thus it will be shown that nothing at all repugns that such a species be able to exist, and consequently that it can be produced by God.

The argument from a likeness goes thus: In the clear vision of God there is a species and expressed likeness of Him who represents Him in act just as He is; this the theologians call the Word. Why, then, will an impressed species of God in the intellect of the blessed be repugnant to be produced, which does not expressly nor in act, but habitually (as it is wont to be said) also present Him, because, namely, it is the principle for producing with the intellect an expressed likeness, which we have said to be the Word? This reason so ill torments the authors of the prior opinion that it has divided them into various positions.

650. Scotus, In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 11; and II Sent., dist. 3, q. 9.

The first evasion is Henry, Quodlibet 3, q. 1, and Quodlibet 4, q. 8; Cajetan, and the more recent Thomists on this article, whom Ferrariense seems to follow in that place cited at the end, plainly deny not only that there is given an impressed species which is the principle of the vision of God, but they also think that by the very vision the Word is produced, or that God is seen by some word produced; for they suppose the same reason for each and say that the arguments which persuade that an impressed species cannot be produced, do in like manner altogether prove the same of the Word. Capreolus, however, in the place cited, art. 3, in the solution of arguments against the first conclusion, remains indecisive and does not dare to define anything concerning the Word; nevertheless he asserts that a response can be made to the proposed argument, if we say that intellection universally is not in itself a likeness, although it be called such by reason of the principle from which it proceeds, namely by reason of the intelligible species; and especially that this is true if we assert that intellection is not an action of the genus quality, which is only called a "grammatical action," but of the genus of true action and production; which he also taught in II, dist. 3, q. 2, art. 3, ad 2, in the confirmation of the first argument, from those things which were adduced in the second place against the fourth conclusion. Thus, therefore, concerning the vision of God we can say that it is not a likeness, neither in itself, as neither are the other intellections, nor by reason of the principle, because it does not proceed from an impressed species.[651][652]

But it can in no way be denied that any intellection, precisely insofar as it is intellection or vision, is an expressed likeness of the thing known or seen, or at least that by it an expressed likeness is produced. For either any intellection is an action of the predicament of action, which is truly a production, or it is only an action (as they say) grammatical, of the genus of quality: if it is an action of the predicament of action, it follows that something is produced by it; for production cannot be understood, unless by it something be produced: but that something will be a certain quality of the mind, which the Thomists call the Word, a certain representation and likeness more expressed of the object than is the impressed species which is the principle of intellection. But if (which I judge truer) it is an action of the genus of quality, as Scotus in Quodlibet 8, and Durandus in I, dist. 27, q. 2, and Gabriel, q. 2, teach universally, assuredly there will be an expressed likeness of the object by which formally the intellect is rendered intelligent or seeing, just as by whiteness a body is made white: nevertheless, it will not be a production of that quality and likeness, as St. Bonaventure relates in I, dist. 3, part 1, distinction ar. 1, q. 1, ad ult., Anselm, and others whom we shall report below. It is called a "grammatical" action because by it nothing is produced; yet it is signified around the object after the manner of action and operation, when we are said to see and to know the object - which is nothing else than that the object itself be presented to the intellect; otherwise the expressed quality which renders the intellect formally intelligent cannot be explained, unless it be said to be such that by it the intellect has the object present to itself, which can only be done by representation; therefore, since every intellection makes the object in some way present to itself - as experience also makes clear - it is brought about that every intellection also is an expressed likeness of the object.[651][652]

651. Scotus, Quodlibet 8; Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 27, q. 2; Gabriel (Biel), q. 2.
652. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 3, part 1, distinction, ar. 1, q. 1, ad ult.; St. Anselm, as cited below.

This Augustine taught explicitly in De Trinitate IX, c. 10 near the end, and c. 11 in the beginning, where he asserts that cognition is a likeness of the thing known; from which he infers thus in these words: "Insofar as we know God, we are similar, but not to equality similar, because we do not know Him as He is"; therefore, conversely, if we had known Him as He is - as it will be in the fatherland - we would have a likeness equal to His essence. Vain, then, is what Capreolus, Cajetan, and Ferrariense teach in the cited places, that cognition in general is called a likeness of the object, not by reason of itself, but by reason of the principle from which it proceeds, namely by reason of the intelligible species. For who does not see that that which according to itself is not such, although it be named such, is only because the principle of it is such? Add that, since in their opinion in the fatherland there is not given an impressed species of the divine essence, the vision of it will be able to be called a likeness neither according to itself, nor by reason of the principle of some other likeness; Augustine holds that we shall be most perfectly similar by the vision itself, since we shall see God as He is: therefore he thinks that the vision itself, according to itself, is a likeness.[653][654]

Nor did Augustine only teach the generation of the Word from cognition, or that the vision of God is a likeness; he also most clearly says that either in the blessed in the fatherland the most perfect Word is produced, or at least that in the intellect there is always formed a word of the thing understood from the word which we now conceive in this life about God and in the fatherland we shall conceive, speaking thus: since in our mind now there is so great an image to the likeness of God and of the Word of God (that is, of the word which we conceive about God), nevertheless of this some imperfect likeness being compared, that too is to be attended: that also when we shall be like, since we shall see Him as He is, that word which we then shall have will not be false, since we neither err nor are deceived.[655]

Most clearly indeed Anselm asserts this very thing in these words in the Monologion, c. 31: "It cannot be denied by any reason that, when the rational mind by thinking understands itself, it forms in its very thought the image of itself, and establishes in itself its own image to its own likeness, as if formed by its own impression. For whoever thinks of a thing either forms for himself from the impression of sense a likeness of the thing by the imagination of the body, or seizes by reason the likeness of the thing in his thought; and he strives to express in his thought that likeness, as much as it avails in itself; and the more truly he does this, the more truly he thinks the thing itself." From this Anselm concludes the procession of the eternal Word from the Father. This testimony of Anselm is choice indeed, which our sentence which we have proposed just now strongly favors. For not only does he call cognition expressly a likeness of the thing known, but he expressly uses the word "impression" for the image, and to that perfection to which the perfection

651. Scotus, Quodlibet 8; Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 27, q. 2; Gabriel (Biel), q. 2.
652. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 3, part 1, distinction, ar. 1, q. 1, ad ult.; St. Anselm, as cited below.
653. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, book 9, c. 10 (near the end), and c. 11 (in the beginning).
654. Cajetan and the Ferrariense Doctor, in the places cited above.
655. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, book 15, c. 16.

of likeness extends. Therefore, however clear and perfect that cognition would be, so certain it is that the thing itself is present to the eyes of the mind, as he himself says; and thus the very word which we have will be a likeness.[656]

By the same reason, in sense, the same must necessarily be conceded. Whence it follows that, in the absence of the object, a visible species must in a certain way be considered to remain in the eye in order to perfect the act; and, if by a vision which God should bring about, the presence of the object were posited by reason of the word, both as to the act of seeing and as to the known term remaining, then, as a matter of fact, albeit imperfectly, it is perceived even by the senses that from a certain brilliance some sensible form remains, by which the eye is in some manner affected and disposed - as Aristotle teaches in De Anima, book III, c. 14, text 138, and in the books On Dreams and Images; and Augustine, De Trinitate IX, c. 12, although the contrary is alleged also by Gregory in II, dist. 7, q. 4, and by the Major in II, dist. 3, q. 9. Finally, everyday experience confirms this which Augustine also notes: when one looks upon bright lights, at once, when he closes his eyes, certain little flames, as it were, are seen lingering in the darkness. They respond that...[657]

The learned men of Ferrara, in the places cited, teach that cognition of anything whatsoever is called a similitude of the object, not by reason of itself, but by reason of the principle from which it proceeds, namely the intelligible species. For who does not see that what according to itself is not such is ineptly called such merely because its principle is such? Add that, since in their opinion in the fatherland there is not given an impressed species of the divine essence, the vision of it will be able to be called a similitude neither according to itself, nor by reason of a principle; but St. Augustine contends that we shall be most perfectly similar by the very vision, because we shall see him as he is: therefore the very vision, according to itself, ought to be held to be a similitude.

Nor did St. Augustine only teach, by the generation, that the cognition or vision of God is a similitude, but he also clearly affirmed that a word is produced by the blessed in the fatherland; for, showing how in the intelligent there is always formed the word of the thing understood, of that word which we conceive of God in this life and in the fatherland, he speaks thus: "Wherefore, since there is now in this enigma so great a dissimilarity of God and the word of God (that is, of the word which we conceive of God), in which, however, some similitude has been discovered: this also must be granted, that even when we shall be similar, when we shall see him as he is, etc. Then indeed our word will not be false, because neither do we lie, nor are we deceived."[658]

But most clearly St. Anselm asserts this very thing in the Monologion, c. 31: "By no reasoning can it be denied that, when the rational mind understands itself by thinking, an image of itself is born in its thought - indeed, that the very thought of itself is an image of itself according to its likeness, as though formed from its impression. For whatever thing the mind desires truly to think - either by the body's imagination or by reason - it strives, as far as it can, to express its likeness in

656. St. Anselm, Monologion, c. 31.

657. Aristotle, De Anima, III, c. 14, text 138; On Dreams and Images; St. Augustine, De Trinitate, book 9, c. 12; St. Gregory, II Sent., dist. 7, q. 4; Peter the Lombard's Major (or the "Master" as glossed by a major commentator), II Sent., dist. 3, q. 9.

658. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, book 15, c. 16.

its own thought; and the more truly it does this, the more truly it thinks the thing itself." And from this he gathers the procession of the eternal Word from the Father.[659] Thus far St. Anselm, who in my judgment could not have more clearly asserted what we have said. For he not only says that in the knower there is expressed the similitude of the thing known, but also that the very expressed similitude is cognition, and is the more perfect, the more perfect is the cognition of the thing as it is, and in reality.

However clear and manifest be the cognition of a thing as it is, nevertheless a clearer cognition ought to be a certain more expressed and brighter similitude.

But the Thomists answer, as alleged, that an expressed similitude is therefore necessary so that it may supply for absence by representing; but when the thing is intimately present by essence, as God is present to the intellect of the blessed, the word and the similitude are posited in vain; for one can behold the thing itself more perfectly in itself without any medium: and so the word is rightly denied to the blessed; and by the same reasoning in vision and in the bodily senses an expressed species is not given, since the mere presence of the real object suffices.

But on the contrary: Against these, first and foremost, stands St. Augustine, a little above cited, who grants a word to the blessed, and St. Anselm, who says that by it the similitude of the thing known in the intellect ought to be more expressed and clearer, in proportion as the cognition itself is more perfect. Moreover, an expressed similitude in the intellect of the seeing or understanding is not posited in order that it may make the object present according to place, or the thing itself present to the intellect - for in this mode God is always present to the intellect of all, who nevertheless do not see him - nor in order that it may unite the object with the potency after the manner of a principle for eliciting a vision, but that it may be actually known. For he who knows, by that very fact has that which he knows present in a peculiar way and as it were set over against him - not indeed by presence according to place, but by very thought and intellection.

By this same reasoning, in sense the same must necessarily be conceded. Whence it follows that, if in the absence of an object according to place the visible species in the eye and the very vision were perfectly preserved - as God can do - the presence of the object, in that respect in which it was known and seen, would remain entirely the same; and in fact it does remain, though imperfectly, from departing sensibles, when some luminous body has been seen, as Aristotle testifies in On the Soul, III, c. 14, text 138, and in the book On Dreams and Images; and St. Augustine likewise, De Trinitate, book 9, c. 12; although St. Gregory in II Sent., dist. 7, q. 4, and the "Major" on the Master in II Sent., dist. 3, q. 9, think the opposite.[660]

Moreover we can verify this by experience: for he who, as St. Augustine says, has attentively gazed at latticework suffused with light, immediately shuts his eyes and sees the same latticework as it were in the dark. But the aforesaid Doctors reply that then there is not seen that object which was seen before, but the quality and the impression made in the eye.

659. St. Anselm, Monologion, c. 31.

660. Aristotle, De Anima, III, c. 14, text 138; On Dreams and Images; St. Augustine, De Trinitate, book 9, c. 12; St. Gregory, II Sent., dist. 7, q. 4; Peter the Lombard's Major, II Sent., dist. 3, q. 9.

This is plainly rejected: because then the same figure, magnitude, and distance appear; but if only an impression that was inside were seen, the figure, quantity, and distance of it would not appear, since such cannot be inside the eye. Others reply that it comes only from the apprehension of the imagination, such that something seems to appear with eyes closed or with the sight turned elsewhere; yet this solution can be manifestly refuted. For if it appeared from imagination alone, by our will such a vision could be impeded; and yet this is not in anyone's power, but for some time there remains in the eye itself a little motion until by degrees it fades away; therefore in truth some impressed species remains and the object appears, although imperfectly, which before was seen more clearly. The imperfection indeed comes from this, that by the absence of the object the species gradually vanish which were preserved by it, not from anything that the presence of the object, as regards the notion of object insofar as it is seen, contributes.

Caput III - The differences that some establish between the impressed species and the word are impugned

There are authors who uphold the former opinion, who grant that in the word produced and expressed by the blessed God is seen, and nevertheless that no impressed species of the divine essence can be produced in them, although the word proceeds from them; wherefore they strive in various ways to assign a distinction between these two. Now the word of the divine essence in the blessed is conceded by Capreolus in I, dist. 27, q. 2, ar. 3, ad 3, against the first conclusion, from the things which were adduced in the second place; Sotus, in IV, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 3, after the second conclusion; and the Doctor of Ferrara, in I Contra Gentiles, c. 53. The fifth is this. Sotus tries to prove it from that text of 1 John 3: "When he shall appear we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is"; and from St. Augustine, De Trinitate, book 14, c. 17. However, John, and even Augustine, are not speaking of similarity of cognition, but of similarity of life and morals.

The first difference between the species and the word is what the Ferrara Doctor assigns, in this way. Whenever it is denied that there is given a species of the Godhead, it ought to be understood not only of the impressed [species], but also of the expressed [species] produced from the impressed, not of the expressed [species] produced from the divine essence as taking the place of an intelligible impressed species in first act. He gives the reason only in these words: "Since the intellectual species and the word expressed from it have the ratio of one perfect and total representation of the thing understood to the intellect." This of the Ferrara Doctor, nor do we add more to his words: but the reason is exceedingly obscure, and in the sense which (as I judge) his words bear, it seems to me futile and empty. The sense of these words is this: from an impressed and expressed species - even if it were granted of the divine [essence] - there would be made one likeness so perfect and entire as to equal God himself and represent him in the most perfect mode; which cannot be done by a created species and likeness. For every creature, since it is inferior to God, cannot represent him as perfectly and equally as he himself requires. But if we concede that the word and the expressed species produced by the intellect together with the divine essence supply the place of the intelligible species, it does not follow that they are most perfect and equal in

the manner in which a created thing is such, but insofar as it is from the divine essence and contains it. Here, as far as I could conjecture, this seems to be the sense of the Ferrara Doctor, for it is somewhat obscure.

But that this distinction is frivolous, I now show in a few words. The clear vision of God, indeed any cognition, is so an expressed similitude of its object - even in the judgment of these Doctors - that it is in itself distinct from the impressed species, from which alone, as from a principle, it proceeds: therefore it does not have from the impressed species, as from a form, but only from an efficient [cause], its representation. Wherefore, if it can be produced by the divine essence as by an efficient [cause], why could it not proceed also from another created species? And since the representation belonging to cognition is much more perfect than that of the intelligible species - for the latter (as they say) is habitual, but the former actual and expressed, and is the more perfect, the clearer the cognition itself is - and in fact this takes place in the blessed.

For the blessed, the word or vision, which in the opinion of these Doctors is an expressed likeness, why cannot an impressed species (species impressa), which is only habitual and represents the object less perfectly, be given? I pass over that distinction between an expressed species (species expressa) produced by the divine essence and supplying the place of the impressed species, and [an expressed species] produced by the impressed species; for it can scarcely be explained, much less understood.

The second difference is that which Dominicus Sotus assigns in the place cited: since the species is substituted in the place of the object as a principle of cognition, it ought to be purer and more spiritual. For if it were less spiritual, it could not supply its place; but since the expressed likeness, which is the word, is not substituted in the place of the object, certainly it need not be purer than the object itself and more free from matter: wherefore, since no impressed species can be purer and more spiritual than God, none will be able to supply his place in the intellect (intellectus) of the blessed; but it is necessary that the divine essence itself, of itself, as it were as an impressed species of itself, bestow the power upon the intellect for the clear vision of itself. Yet nothing hinders that in the intellect of one seeing God the species of the divine essence be expressed, which we call the word. This distinction also seems devised without any foundation. For although an impressed species may supply the place of the object, it is not for that reason necessary that it be more spiritual than the object itself; or at least this is so freely and gratuitously assumed that it can be proved by no reason: nay rather, the opposite is plainly evident. For even in the opinion of these Doctors, there can be an intelligible species (species intelligibilis) of an angel, either in the intellect of a man, or even in the intellect of another angel. But that [species] is not more spiritual than the angel; since the species is an accident (accidens), but the angel is a spiritual substance, and pure from all matter. But in order that a species may supply the place of an object, it is only necessary that it be of such a nature as can inhere in the intellect, and render it as it were disposed and able for eliciting the cognition or vision of the object; which it can very well accomplish even if it be not more spiritual than the object. For that it is sometimes purer and more without matter, happens from this, that the object itself is a material thing: but from that which happens in one case, it is not lawful to infer that it is always required from the nature of the thing. Finally, if we consider the

nature of the species and of the vision itself, the vision itself and the word ought to be no less spiritual and without matter than the impressed species: for each alike is in the same spiritual potency, namely, in the intellect.

A third difference is established by certain more recent authors between the impressed species and the word in this way. If an impressed species of the divine essence were given, that indeed would be produced immediately by God alone, and therefore it would be infinite and without bound: but the word is produced not by God alone, but also by a created power; wherefore it comes forth finite and limited: but nothing created can be infinite and without term, otherwise it would be God himself: therefore an impressed species of the divine essence cannot be given, although the word thereof can well be produced. Furthermore, they prove that an impressed species, from the mode of its production, would proceed from God in such wise that it would be infinite and without term: because in no respect could its production be limited; first, not by the efficient cause, for that [cause] is of infinite power; next, not by another created agent of finite and limited power, because none would cooperate in its production, but it would be made by God alone, as is supposed: therefore there would be nothing by which it could be ended and limited: but the word, or expressed species, even if it be from God, yet because it is made by the cooperation of a created power which is finite, comes forth from it finite and limited.

In assigning, however, this difference, the aforesaid authors do not rely upon a firm foundation. For either the discussion is about a limit and end according to existence (esse), or according to intensity. If about an end according to existence, from this alone would that species be limited and finite according to essence, and consequently it would not be God, because it would be made by another, as by a cause: for infinity according to existence consists only in this, that something lack the cause of its existence; as has been demonstrated by us at length above in disputation 25. Therefore, since that species would proceed from God as from a cause, by him also it would be said to be limited according to essence. But if we follow the opinion of the Angelic Doctor, who in that place thought that the notion of infinity is placed only in this, that something have existence received in another, the cause of finitude and limitation would likewise be manifest in that species: for it would be received in a subject; wherefore by it, according to essence, it would be limited. In no opinion, therefore, does it follow that that species will be God and infinite according to essence. Or the discussion is about infinity according to intensity: and still it does not follow that that species will be infinite in this way; because although the intellect, which is the subject of the intelligible species, be of infinite capacity, since without any end it can receive a more and more intense species, it does not for that reason necessarily have to receive a species of infinite intensity: for the same intellect, without any terminus, can elicit a more and more perfect intellection in infinitum according to intensity: yet in fact, in any one of the blessed it is limited, although God can produce a greater and a greater [intellection], and the very faculty of the created intellect can cooperate to a greater and still greater one in infinitum. Therefore, just as the vision is limited solely by the will of God, who produces it as he wills, so also could the impressed species be limited. Nor does it matter if it be said that the vision is limited not by the will of God alone, but by the light of glory as by a second cause, whereas the impressed species can be terminated by no second

cause: for although in fact the light is posited as the proximate principle of vision, as we shall say in disputation 43, nevertheless God could wholly supply its place, and, by his will alone producing the vision itself, limit it, as we were saying.

Finally, in a fourth way a difference is wont to be assigned, namely, that an intelligible impressed species proceeds from the object according to nature, and inasmuch as it is, not voluntarily, as is established in all other things besides God: therefore that impressed species of God would proceed from him, inasmuch as he is, not inasmuch as he wills: but thus it would not be a creature, but God; which is absurd: for every creature is produced by God voluntarily. Furthermore, if that species were to proceed from God voluntarily, it would be produced through some particular idea; but in that way it could not represent God as he is, totally and altogether, but according to that ideal ratio: it is therefore necessary to assert that the impressed species is to be produced by God naturally, that it might wholly and altogether represent God; which is absurd; but the beatific vision does not proceed from God naturally, but voluntarily cooperating with our intellect; just as by his will he concurs with all other causes. Wherefore it is not repugnant that an expressed species be given through the vision itself, or which is the very vision; yet it is repugnant that an impressed species be produced.

But neither is this distinction approved by me. For although other things, whether sensible or intelligible, of themselves produce a likeness naturally, not voluntarily, it does not for that reason follow that God cannot create by his will an intelligible species of himself, which naturally he cannot produce, as the proposed argument most excellently proves. For any created thing can be, and ought to be, produced by the will of God alone. In this God differs from other agents, that others produce something outside themselves naturally, whereas God produces nothing besides the persons which are produced by procession within God. Therefore, just as God voluntarily concurs to produce the clear vision of himself and the expressed species, so also could he by his will effect an impressed species; and just as the vision, by which he represents the whole God, he produces through a peculiar idea, so also could he produce the impressed species. But when we say that each species is produced through a peculiar idea, we do not assert that there is a peculiar idea of the object which is represented by the species or the vision; for this is God himself, of whom there can be no idea; but we say that each species is produced through an idea peculiar to each. For just as in God there is an idea of the clear vision of God, and of the expressed species, but not of God clearly seen, so also there is an idea of the intelligible species itself, but not of its object, which is God.[661]

Caput IV - On solving the objections against an impressed species of the divine essence

Thus far, by that argument from likeness which in chapter 2 we adduced, it has been proved that nothing hinders an impressed species of the essence of God from being given: now indeed the same will be shown no less clearly by solving the reasons by which this is wont to be proved impossible: and first, the three reasons which St. Thomas brings in this article - if they be

661. On the talk of a "peculiar idea" in God for producing the clear vision and the species, see the common doctrine of divine ideas; compare also the internal cross-reference to disputation 43.

understood of an impressed species, which is posited as a principle (*principium*) of vision, while it itself is not seen - at once appear to be of absolutely no weight; although in another sense, which the Holy Doctor maintains, of which mention will be made in the following disputation, they seem to me indeed to be demonstrations. Since therefore the Thomists also use them here to prove that an impressed species of the divine essence cannot be given, we shall briefly relate them here and refute them.

Dionysius. The first reason, to which the other two can be reduced, is taken from Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, not far from the beginning, where he teaches that by the likenesses of things of a lower order the things of a higher order can in no way be known; for example, by the species of a body that which is incorporeal cannot be known; and that is much more true if we speak of cognition and of the clear vision by which a thing is seen as it is: therefore, likewise, by a created species that which is uncreated cannot be seen. This is the first reason. From the same principle St. Thomas rightly also infers in the second reason, that by a species, whose etc., which is not of the essence whose the created species is, God, whose is his very essence, cannot be seen. And similarly, very likely in the third reason, it rightly follows that by a species which by its nature and essence is limited, it is not possible to see God, who according to essence is infinite. To these same reasons St. Thomas also has recourse in Contra Gentiles, c. 49.[662] It also pleased [me] to add to these a fourth of Durandus in IV Sentences, dist. 49, q. 2, n. 11 and the following, which is as follows: If some species of God were posited, it would have to be of the same kind and nature as God himself; for the species of a certain nature is of the same kind with the object itself; but no created species can be of the same nature and kind with God: therefore no species of God can be produced.[663]

But, as we have said, if these reasons intend [to speak] of an impressed species, which is only the principle of vision and is not itself seen, we shall easily show that they are of no moment. And first, against Durandus we suppose that by no reason can it be proved that the species and its object must be of the same kind and nature between themselves. For a likeness representing a substance, or an angel, must not be a substance, or an angel; which is manifest with respect to cognition itself: for every cognition is an expressed representation of the object, and a certain likeness of it; yet no cognition of a substance is a substance, nor is the cognition of a man a man, and so of the others. Nor is this true only of spiritual intelligibles: for it is also true of sensibles; for the species of color is not color in reality; this is shown at length in De Anima III, c. 7. And hence also Durandus's reason is solved: he gratuitously assumes what can by no reason be proved, namely, that the species and its object must be of the same kind and nature.

Likewise false is what Cajetan asserts in this article, that for a species to represent a substance it must be substantial, and for [a species] to represent an accident it must be accidental. For every intelligible species is either a principle of intellection, or represents to the intellection itself, by the mode of a habit or by the mode of an act, the object; by its nature it ought to be an accident inhering in another in potency; which, as I think, follows in the case of every sensible species. Nor

662. St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, c. 49.
663. Durandus, In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 2, n. 11 and following.

can I sufficiently understand by what reason Cajetan tries to prove that the species and the object must be of the same order, if he understands this according to essence: for according to representation they ought to agree; that is, the object ought to be represented by the species as that object is, and yet more perfectly or more imperfectly, the more the species itself is more perfect or more imperfect. Therefore it is not necessary that the species, according to its mode, be of the same kind and nature as the object; but it suffices if it achieves its representation, as remains explained. It can also happen that a species which is an accident should represent a substance; and that a created and finite [species] according to existence (*esse*) should represent God, who is not created nor finite and whose essence is his very essence; because it suffices if they agree by representation, although according to essence the reasons be altogether diverse.

Nor is it against what we have said, that which Pseudo-Dionysius asserts, whom St. Thomas alleges on his side. For he, as will be explained in the following disputation, speaks only of that likeness by which we are led from the vision of one thing into the cognition of another; not, however, of an impressed, or of an expressed species, which either is the principle of cognition, or is the cognition itself.

Dionysius. The first argument, to which the other two can be reduced, is taken from Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, not far from the beginning, where he teaches that by likenesses of things of an inferior order the superior cannot in any way be known, as by the species of a body that which is incorporeal cannot be known; and this is much more true if we speak of cognition and a clear vision by which a thing is seen as it is. Therefore likewise by a created species that which is uncreated cannot be seen; and this is the first argument. From the same principle St. Thomas rightly infers in the second argument that by a species whose existence (*esse*) is not its essence (*essentia*), such as a created species, God, whose existence is his very essence, cannot be seen. And similarly, as he gathers in the third argument, it rightly follows that by a species which by its nature and essence is limited, God, who is infinite according to essence, cannot be seen. These same arguments are used by St. Thomas in Contra Gentiles, book 3, chapter 49.[664] It pleased me, moreover, to add a fourth argument from Durandus in IV Sentences, dist. 49, q. 2, n. 12 and following, which is as follows. If there were posited some species of God, it would have to be of the same ratio and nature as God himself; for every species is of the same nature with its object. But no created species can be of the same nature and ratio with God. Therefore no species of God can be produced.[665]

But, as we have said, if these arguments are understood of the impressed species, which is only the principle of vision and is not itself seen, we shall easily show them to be of no moment. And first, against Durandus we suppose that by no reason can it be proved that the species and its object must be of the same ratio and nature between themselves. For a likeness ought not to be substance, or an Angel, to be an Angel; which is manifest from cognition itself. For since every cognition is an expressed representation of the object, it is also a likeness of it; yet no cognition of a substance is a substance, nor is the cognition of a man a man, and so of the others. Nor is this true

664. St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, III, c. 49.
665. Durandus, In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 2, n. 12 sqq.

only of spiritual intelligibles, but also of sensibles: for the species of a color is not a faint color, as is clearly shown in On the Soul, book 2, chapter 7.[666] And hence Durandus's reason is solved: for he supposes altogether gratuitously that which by no reason can be proved, namely that the species and the object must be of the same ratio and nature.

In the same way it is false, what Cajetan in this article asserts, that it is accidental for the species to agree in being either a substance or an accident. For since every intelligible species is either the principle of intellection, or the intellection itself representing the object after the mode of a habit or after the mode of an act, by its nature it ought to be an accident inhering in a potency; and the same follows manifestly of every sensible species. Nor could I sufficiently understand by what reason Cajetan tries to prove that the species and the object must be of the same order, if he understands this according to existence (*esse*). For they ought to agree according to representation, that is, such ought the object to be represented by the species as it is, yet more or less perfectly as the species itself is more or less perfect. Therefore, if there is no need that the species, according to its own existence, be of the same ratio and nature with the object, but it is enough if it agrees with it by representation, as has been explained above, it can also happen that a species which is an accident represents a substance, and that which is created and finite according to existence, and whose existence is not its essence, represents God, who is not created nor finite, and whose existence is his very essence; because it is enough if they agree by representation, although according to existence they be altogether of diverse ratio.

Nor is it against what we have said, that which Pseudo-Dionysius asserts, whom St. Thomas alleges on his side. For he, as will be explained in the following disputation, speaks only of that likeness by which we are led from the vision of one thing into the cognition of another; not, however, of an impressed, or of an expressed species, which either is the principle of cognition, or is the cognition itself, and which, not being itself known nor seen, leads us to the thing understood or seen. Although however this kind of species ought not to be of the same nature and ratio with the object according to existence, but only ought to agree with it according to representation, as we have explained, nevertheless a thing similar which, seen or known beforehand, leads us into the cognition of another, ought to be of the same nature and order with that other according to existence; otherwise, if it be of an inferior nature and order, it cannot lead us perfectly into the cognition of that other, but imperfectly, namely by detracting and denying something of it, just as from creatures in this life we know God. Most fittingly therefore, Pseudo-Dionysius, speaking of that first kind of likeness, said that by things of an inferior order the superior cannot be known and seen.

There remain three other arguments by which some strive to prove that a species of the divine essence cannot be produced.

Marsilius. The first is that of Marsilius in the place cited: for if such a species created by God were posited, once a single one had been produced, since it would be finite, God could produce another and another more perfect (he means different according to specific ratio). But various

666. Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 7.

species cannot be produced in this way; for, since the beatific vision according to specific ratio is one and not many, it demands only one principle according to specific ratio; therefore no species of the divine essence can be produced.

Solution. I answer: from the fact that a species produced is finite, it does not follow that God can produce another and another more perfect, distinct according to species, but only that within the same specific ratio it be more or less perfect: just as from the fact that a man produced is of finite perfection according to essence, it does not follow that there can be produced another and another more perfect man of another nature; but another and another more perfect within the same specific nature.

Second objection. The second argument: between that species of the divine essence and God himself there would be a relation of likeness; but this ought to be founded in unity or equality in form, therefore it would be of the same nature with God himself, which is impossible.

Solution. I answer that the relation of likeness is twofold: one is that which is founded in unity of form; and this is between things of the same nature, as between two white things, and it is placed in the first species of relation among those enumerated by Aristotle, Metaphysics V, chapter 15.[667] The other is the likeness of representation; and this can be between things altogether of diverse natures, as we said a little before. But some press us in this fashion: the whole being (*esse*) of a species is representation, or at least this is its specific being; but a representation which would represent an infinite object, such as God, would be infinite in the ratio of representation; therefore it would be of the same nature with God. True, but on the contrary the same argument can be turned: first, if we say that vision is an expressed likeness of the object, as is well known. Then even if we do not say that, since its whole being is the being of cognition; therefore, if it is of an infinite object, it will be infinite in that genus, and hence of the same ratio with God. Wherefore I answer: from the fact that some representation or cognition is of an infinite object, it does not follow that it itself, whether in the genus of representation or of cognition - which is its proper being - be intrinsically and formally infinite in itself; but only that it is conversant about something infinite, either representing it or cognizing it. It is therefore of the infinite, but not infinite. Wherefore it does not follow that it is of the same nature with God, but of a much inferior order.

Third argument of Henry. The third argument is this. If a species of the divine nature were given, an angel could by his natural power know it; for it would be something created. And since it would be his proper and quidditative likeness of God, the angel by his own power, seeing it, could also clearly contemplate God. This argument is used by Henry in the Summa, 2.33, q. 2, ad 3 arg., and it can be confirmed by a like case: for just as by the species which we see refracted in a mirror, we behold the very thing itself from which it is derived, properly and as it is, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 14, a. 5, and Cajetan in this question, art. 8, and for the evidence of these the same Doctor in Contra Gentiles, book 3, chapter 49, in the beginning, nay rather St. Augustine, On the Trinity,

667. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, c. 15.

book 15, chapter 8; so also by that species proper to the divine essence, impressed upon the intellect of the Blessed, and as it were refracted in some mirror, one angel by his own power could contemplate God himself.[668669670671672]

Solution of the argument. This argument bears a greater appearance of probability; yet, if it be more deeply considered, it will appear no less than the preceding ones infirm and weak. First, those who contend that that impressed species can be given, consistently assert that it is of a supernatural order, like the very light of glory and habitual grace. But those things which are supernatural according to their own nature, and not only by reason of the mode of the efficient cause, cannot by the natural power of any created intellect be known, as we shall say below in disputation 14; the opposite of which Henry seems to suppose as if it were known.[673674]

But let us grant that that species can by the created intellect be known by its own power: nevertheless it does not follow that by it, first seen, the divine essence could also be clearly seen. First, because the same argument could be made of the beatific vision, especially if that be an expressed likeness of the object, as is well known. Next, even if we do not say that, since its whole being is the being of cognition, therefore if it is of an infinite object, it will be infinite in that mode; and so that which was first known would lead to the cognition of another; and since in itself it would not have the whole ratio and entity of God, nor would it be of the same ratio with him, but altogether different, it could not be that by such a medium God would be clearly seen. And indeed this is expressly noted by Gregory in I Sentences, dist. 3, and in II, dist. 9, q. 2, and by Gabriel in the same place, q. 2, a. 5, dub.[675676] For then it would be a medium of the former sort, namely, that the prior known would lead into the cognition of another; whereas in itself it would not contain the whole ratio and entity of God, nor would it be of the same ratio with him, but altogether diverse: therefore by that medium God could not be clearly seen, although after that species, whether impressed or expressed, had been seen, God would be clearly beheld by it. But by this species, once seen, there could be elicited some evident knowledge of the Trinity; we will say this in disputation 43, chapter 21.[677]

Then, as Scotus most aptly observed in a certain Quodlibet, "To other things": in a twofold way can an object be known through some cognitive medium. In one way, the medium ought first to be itself known; and in this way nothing can be the medium for cognizing another quidditatively and as it is, if it does not contain the whole ratio of that thing. For if it does not have it, by it the other cannot be seen according to the whole, which, as is my own view, can be said only of that which is in no way such, but only numerically diverse from another, if it be of the same nature according to

668. Henricus, Summa, 2.33, q. 2, ad 3 arg.
669. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, q. 14, a. 5; and Cajetan, In hanc q., art. 8.
670. St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, III, c. 49, in principio.
671. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 8.
672. On "quasi as in a mirror," see also the same loci cited by St. Thomas and Cajetan ad loc.
673. See below, disputation 14.
674. The contrary supposition is attributed to Henry in the locus just cited.
675. Gregory of Rimini, In I Sent., d. 3; and In II Sent., d. 9, q. 2.
676. Gabriel, ibid., q. 2, a. 5, dub.
677. See below, disputation 43, c. 21.

species, which can be the same medium of seeing that thing as it is, in the way we have said. Most true, however, is what Scotus says, namely that that which does not contain in itself the whole ratio and entity of another cannot be the medium of seeing that other as it is. In the other way, one and the same thing can be a medium of knowing another, not as first known, but either as the ratio of cognizing, or as the principle eliciting the vision, such as is the impressed species; or as the word in which the thing is expressed, which either is the term of the cognition produced by itself, or, what I more truly think, is the intellection itself: and this medium then is only so far a ratio of seeing, in whose intellect from which, as from the sole principle, either the principle eliciting the vision can be, or it can be the word in which the thing itself is seen.[678]

Hence it follows that even if someone by his own power sees the impressed species of the divine essence, or the word of it in another's intellect, nevertheless by it he cannot clearly see God himself; a thing expressly noted by Gregory in I Sentences, dist. 3, and in II, dist. 9, q. 2, and by Gabriel in the same place, q. 2, a. 5, dub. For then it would be a medium of the former kind, which, being first known, would lead into the cognition of another; and since in itself it would not have the whole ratio and entity of God, nor would it be of the same ratio with him, but entirely different, God could not be clearly seen by such a medium; whereas by that prior medium of cognition expressed neither, in that way, is God seen in the blessed intellect.

And for the confirmation, it must be answered with Scotus in the Quodlibet cited, that the likeness of the thing existing in a mirror is not seen by us, but by refraction in some polished body the species is conveyed into the eye, which very thing we look upon, and not that which is behind; otherwise a thing placed in another region would be seen. Wherefore it does not follow that, by the species of a thing first seen, the thing itself, as it is, is ever seen. Moreover, that the species existing in a mirror is not seen, although the contrary appears to us, is clearly proved by two experiments and by various reasons. One experiment is of this sort: if the species existing in the mirror were seen, it would appear nearer, in the same depth and at the same distance as the mirror itself, since all accidents which in some subject have the same distance are seen together with it; but the thing which is presented to the mirror appears much further within and is seen at a deeper distance than the mirror; indeed, the more the thing itself is distant from the mirror and from the region in which it is placed, the deeper within the mirror it seems to us to appear: therefore it is an evident sign that the species itself existing within the mirror is not seen, but the thing placed opposite, which, on account of the refraction of the species, is represented in that mode along with the whole distance.

Disputatio XXXIX

Conceding, once an impressed species has been seen, that that species can by the created intellect be known by its own proper power; nevertheless it does not follow that, by means of that previously seen, one can also clearly see the divine essence. First, because the same argument could

678. Scotus, Quodlibet, ad "Ad alias" (quodlibetal question indicated in the locus cited).

be made about the beatific vision - especially if that species were a likeness of the thing known; and although it is not a likeness, as Henry, cited above in ch. 2 of this disputation, thought, still the same consequence seems to follow: for the vision of the object itself can no less be a medium of knowing the object than the intelligible species; the vision of that object has greater agreement with the object than its impressed species. But from the fact that there is a clear vision of God nothing absurd follows; therefore neither does anything absurd follow from the fact that an impressed species of him is produced.

Next, as Scotus very well observed, an object can be known through a medium in a twofold manner.[679] In one manner, such that the medium must first be known; and in this way, nothing can be a medium of knowing something else quidditatively, and as it is, if it does not contain in itself the whole notion and entity of that other. For if it does not have this, the other thing cannot be seen in it according to the whole that it is. And in my judgment nothing of this sort can exist, even if it were only numerically different from another yet of the same nature according to species, that could be a suitable medium of seeing that other thing as it is, in the way we said. Yet it is most true, as Scotus says, that that which does not contain in itself the whole notion and entity of another cannot be the medium of seeing that other as it is. In the other manner, one thing can be a medium of knowing another without being first known, but because it is the ratio of knowing, either as a principle eliciting the vision - as an impressed species is - or as a word in which the thing is expressed, which either is the terminus of cognition produced by it, or, what I judge more true, is the intellection itself. And this medium is a ratio of seeing only for him in whose intellect it is; for to him alone it can either be the principle eliciting the vision, or be the word in which the thing itself is seen.

Hence it follows that, even if someone by his own power sees the impressed species of the divine essence, or the word of it in another's intellect, by means of that he cannot clearly see God himself: a point expressly noted by Gregory in I Sentences, dist. 3, and in II Sentences, dist. 9, q. 2, and by Gabriel in the same place, q. 2, a. 5, dub. r.[680] For then it would be a medium in the former manner, which, being first known, would lead to the cognition of another; and since in itself it would not have the whole notion and entity of God, nor be of the same order with him, but altogether different, it could not be that by means of such a previously known medium God would be seen; whereas nevertheless the intellect in which that impressed or expressed species is could, by means of those, clearly behold God, since they are only a medium in the latter manner - either by way of an eliciting principle, or by way of expressed cognition. Therefore nothing forbids that there be such a species in the intellect of the blessed. But whether by this seen species one could be led to some evident knowledge of the Trinity, we shall say in disputation 135, ch. 2.

But to the confirmation I answer, with Scotus in the Quodlibet cited, that we do not see any thing by means of the likeness of the thing existing in a mirror, but by refraction in any polished body a species is conveyed into the eye, by which we gaze upon the thing itself that is behind, since otherwise it could not be seen unless placed face to face; wherefore it does not follow that, by the

679. Scotus, Quodlibet.
680. Gregory of Rimini, In I Sent., d. 3; and In II Sent., d. 9, q. 2; and Gabriel, ibid., q. 2, a. 5, dub.

species of a thing previously seen, the thing itself, as it is, is ever seen.[679] Moreover, that the species existing in a mirror is not seen, although the contrary appears to us, is proved clearly by two experiments and by one evident reason.

One experiment is of this sort: if the species existing in the mirror were seen, it would undoubtedly appear within the depth and distance of the mirror itself; for an accident that is in a subject has the same distance as the subject, under which it is seen together with the subject; but that thing which appears to the mirror as object is seen much further within, and at a deeper distance, than the mirror: indeed, the more the thing itself placed opposite the mirror is distant from the mirror, the deeper it seems to us to appear within the mirror. Therefore it is an evident sign that we are not seeing the species itself which exists within the body of the mirror, but the thing placed opposite, which, on account of the refraction of the species, is represented together with its whole distance in that way.

The other experiment is this: those who are endowed with such a visual faculty that they see very well at close range, but at a distance have need of a certain special kind of spectacles - even if they have a mirror set sufficiently near opposite, and, for looking at it, they do not need spectacles to see well what is in it - nevertheless need them to see the things that are set behind and appear by refraction in the mirror, if they are placed at a long distance. It is therefore a sign that what is seen is not in the mirror, since the mirror itself and the things that are in it are set at an optimal distance so as to be seen rightly without spectacles, but the very thing set behind is seen, which, since it is not at a proper distance, cannot, even though refracted in the mirror, rightly appear to sight without spectacles.

The reason is of this sort. A visible species is not a color, even a faint one, but is different from every color and light, as is proved more at length in De Anima II, c. 7; therefore it cannot be seen; for the object of sight, as the same Aristotle testifies in that chapter, is color or light.[681]

But someone will object to us the authority of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 13, when he said: "We see now through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face."[682] There, since he compares the obscure vision of God which we have in this life to a vision in a mirror and in an enigma, it is necessary to say that in a mirror the thing itself is not seen according to itself, as it is, but after first seeing its likeness - just as the vision of something in an enigma comes about after the enigma itself is first seen; otherwise, if in a mirror the thing itself, as it is, were seen as if placed opposite, Paul would not have rightly compared the obscure vision of the way to that which is in a mirror, and the clear one which we have in the fatherland to that by which we behold a thing placed opposite.

I answer: Paul did not say that a thing is seen "in" a mirror, but "through" a mirror; for since in it the species are refracted and reach the eye, which otherwise would not happen to it, we are rightly said to see through a mirror, not something that is in it, but the thing whose species is received in it. He compares to this vision which comes about by refraction in a mirror the obscure cognition which in this life we have of God; for although through a mirror the thing itself is seen

679. Scotus, Quodlibet.
681. Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 7.
682. 1 Cor 13:12.

according to itself, nevertheless it does not appear altogether unchanged, nor so perfectly as "face to face." For both quantity is varied, and even the very disposition of colors and figure is not wont so perfectly to appear as it is. He therefore most aptly compared the vision of the fatherland to the vision of a thing which we gaze upon face to face. And because it did not seem to Paul that he had sufficiently explained the obscurity of the cognition which we have of God in this life by comparing it to the vision of a thing through a mirror, he subjoined "in an enigma," to show that it is more obscure than that which is through a mirror; for an enigma, as St. Augustine bears witness in De Trinitate XV, c. 9, is a certain obscure likeness of something, as when we wish through one thing to signify another, as in Proverbs 30: "The leech has two daughters," etc.[683] Yet we cannot deny that St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, c. 8 and 9, was of the opinion that the likeness of the thing received in the mirror is seen; still it is far more true, and more in harmony with philosophy, what we have hitherto proved; and this is enough about this question. But whether de facto in the blessed there is an impressed species, which up to now we have proved could exist, we shall say in disputation 43, ch. 7, where we shall also satisfy the argument which some use in this way against the foregoing position: "If a species can be given, therefore it must be posited de facto: why then is it commonly said that the divine essence stands in the place of a species?"

Caput I - The true interpretation of St. Thomas's view

I hold that only one opinion is true - namely, that which I followed in the preceding disputation - and that it by no means opposes the doctrine of St. Thomas, as in this disputation I shall clearly show, in which I shall also, incidentally, set forth his mind and the text of the article. It pleased me to dispute this expressly, because many, although clearly seeing from the arguments of the previous disputation that there is absolutely no repugnance in positing that a species impressed of the divine essence be produced, nevertheless, solely on account of the authority of the holy Doctor - whom they interpret in the contrary direction - do not dare to assert it. All, however, admit that he plainly speaks not only of the fact, but also of the absolute power of God; for his reasons tend to show a manifest contradiction and repugnance in supposing that the divine essence be seen in its whole beauty, as Pseudo-Dionysius says in De divinis nominibus IV, that it be seen as a species.[684]

But by many of his disciples - of whom the chief seems to have been Cajetan, cited in ch. 1 of the preceding disputation - it has been thought that St. Thomas is speaking of a species impressed of the Godhead which would be only the principle eliciting the clear vision of God; wherefore they maintain, according to the intention of the holy Doctor, that such a species in no way can be produced.[685]

Yet to me, after a more exact consideration of the words of the article, the exposition which the most learned Francisco de Vitoria was wont to apply in his commentaries on this article has been exceedingly pleasing. For he used to say that St. Thomas speaks only of a species and some likeness of the Godhead which, being first seen, leads us into the clarity of the vision itself; and that this

683. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, cc. 8 - 9; Prov 30:15.
684. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, IV.
685. Cajetan, cited above, ch. 1 of this disputation.

cannot be produced, he judged; and by the same reasoning he denied an expressed word in the intellect of the blessed, which, in his opinion, must first be seen so that in it things and objects be known, as will be explained below; but that he did not deny an impressed species, which on the part of the potency stands disposed for eliciting the vision - nay rather, that he in set terms granted it de facto, as will appear in disputation 43, ch. 7.[686]

This is, in fact, what I am persuaded of from various places of the same holy Doctor. First, from the argument Sed contra of this article, which is taken from St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, c. 9, and runs thus: since the Apostle says, "We see now through a mirror in an enigma, then face to face," by "mirror and enigma" he understands any likeness accommodated to understanding God; but to see clearly the essence of God is not an enigmatic vision, since the Apostle opposes to an enigmatic vision the clear one; therefore the divine essence, which is seen clearly in the fatherland, is not seen through a likeness. Here St. Thomas plainly speaks of a likeness which, being first seen, would be the ratio of seeing God; for this is what is called an enigma; but that which would be only a principle of eliciting the vision would be inaptly called an enigma. Since, therefore, he strives only to prove that God is not seen through an enigma, he excludes only the species and likeness through which, once first seen, God would be seen.

Second, because in art. 4 of this question, where he gives as the first argument for proving that an angel can, by his natural power, know God - namely, because he clearly intuits himself - he himself declares that the angel is as it were a pure mirror receiving species; yet he denies that the angel can clearly see God by first seeing himself as a likeness of God: but there he denies this only for this reason, that, the likeness being first seen, God, as he is, cannot be clearly seen; therefore he denies in this article in a similar way; for if in this article he were only solving that no impressed species, which is a principle eliciting the vision, is bestowed, he would have replied unsuitably to that argument, and would have said: "As has been said," namely, in this same sense in art. 4.[687]

Third, in art. 2 of this question, to prove that God cannot in this mortal life be seen, he argues thus: in this life nothing can be known except material things; through these, however, God cannot be clearly seen; for it has been shown above (he says) that a cognition through any created likeness whatsoever is not the vision of his essence; therefore in this life God cannot be seen. There he is plainly speaking of a likeness which, once first known, would cause God to be seen, so that from there he might prove that through no creature previously known can we in this life clearly behold God. Therefore, since he asserts that this has been shown above, he is not speaking here in this art. 2 of this kind of likeness about the impressed species which is the principle of vision; and this necessarily must be understood in this article.[688]

Fourth, in this art. 2 he not only grants to our intellect the light of glory by which it is made efficacious for seeing God, but he also asserts that this is a likeness of God, attributing to the faculty of the intellect the power whereby it may see God. Therefore he grants a likeness impressed

686. Francisco de Vitoria, Commentaries on this article; see also below, disp. 43, ch. 7.

687. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 16, a. 3 (on the mode in which the angel, on the way, knows God); and the present q. 12, a. 4.

688. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 2 and a. 4.

upon the potency as the principle of intellection, which, not being first understood, causes God to be seen. Some reply that St. Thomas does not concede a species impressed of God himself, but the light of glory, which, since it is some effect of God, he calls a likeness of him in a general way; and since it strengthens the intellect so that it may see, he says that it is a likeness on the part of the potency; whereas, when he denies a species on the part of the thing seen, that is, of God himself, he is speaking of a likeness which, being first known, would from itself make God to be seen.[689]

I am convinced of this by various places of the same holy Doctor. First, from the argument "But on the contrary" of this article, which is taken from St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, c. 9, and is of this sort. When the Apostle says, "We see now through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face," by "mirror" and "enigma" he understands any kind of likeness accommodated to the understanding of God: but to see clearly the divine essence is not an enigmatic vision, since the Apostle opposes clear vision to it: therefore the divine essence, which is seen clearly in the fatherland, is not seen through a likeness. Here St. Thomas is plainly speaking of a likeness which, being first seen, would be the cause of seeing God: for this is what is called an enigma; whereas that which would only be the principle of the vision would be ineptly called an enigma. Therefore, since he only strives to prove that God is not seen through an enigma, he excludes solely the species and likeness by which, being first seen, God is seen.

Second, because in article 4 of this question, when the first argument to prove by conjecture that the angel could by his natural power see God was that the angel clearly understands himself, and he himself is a pure mirror receiving, if he is such, as Dionysius says, De divinis nominibus IV, he answers in solution to the first that it is natural to the angel to know God through some likeness of him shining in himself; but to know God through a created likeness is not to see him as he is. In the same way in that article 4 he says that God cannot be seen clearly by the angel by the angel's seeing himself as a likeness of God: there he only denies by way of clarification that, with that likeness being seen, God, as he is, can be seen clearly: therefore he denies in this article likewise. And if in this article he meant only that there is not given an impressed species which is the principle of eliciting vision, he would have ineptly answered that argument, and would have added, "As was said," namely in that article.

Third, in article 11 of this question, where he contends by conjecture that God cannot be seen in this mortal life, he argues thus. In this life nothing can be known except material things; but through these God cannot be seen clearly: for it was shown above that the knowledge of God through any created likeness is not the vision of his essence. Therefore in this life God cannot be seen. Here he is plainly speaking about the likeness which, being first known, makes God to be seen, so that he may prove from this that through no creature first known can we in this life clearly behold God. Since therefore he asserts that this was shown above, it is clearly to be understood that he was speaking in article 2 about this kind of likeness of things, not about the impressed species which is the principle of vision: and thus that article is to be understood.

689. On the "light of glory" as a similitude on the part of the potency in St. Thomas, see the same q. 12, a. 5 - 6.

Fourth, in this article 2 he not only speaks about the light of glory on the part of our intellect, by which it is made effective for seeing God, but from the same he gathers and asserts that this is a likeness of God, which strengthens the power of the intellect so that it may see him: therefore he grants a likeness impressed on the potency as a principle of intellection, which, not being first understood, makes God to be seen. Some answer that St. Thomas does not grant an impressed species of God himself, but the light of glory, which, because it is some effect of God, he in a general way calls a likeness of him, inasmuch as it strengthens the intellect to see: hence he says that it is a likeness on the part of the potency, but denies a species on the part of the thing seen, which (he says) must be united in some way to the intellect that sees according to the mode in which it is seen: plainly he asserts that there is not given an intelligible species of the divine essence which would be united to the intellect that sees it. For he had said before, about bodily vision, that there is necessary both the power of the faculty for seeing and the union of the thing seen with the sight, because there is no vision in act except by this, that the thing seen is in some way in the seer: and since the thing seen cannot be there through itself, it must be there through some likeness of itself. But about the intellect seeing God he says that, besides the intellect, there must also be given the light of glory, which he calls a likeness on the part of the potency, for strengthening it: but that on the part of the thing seen, that is, of God himself, there is not given a likeness by which he is united to the potency, but that he is united through himself. Therefore he denies an intelligible species impressed of God himself, just as, on the contrary, he granted that in the eye there is given an impressed species of color, by which the potency is united, in which way other things, according to themselves, cannot be united to the cognoscitive potency, but God can most excellently.

This line of argument almost compels all Thomists to assert that in the doctrine of the holy Doctor there is not an impressed species of the divine essence. To me, however, it seems that in this article he only denies an expressed species. For when he says that in the faculty of seeing a power is necessary on the part of the faculty itself, he understands not only the native power, but also another coming from without, which constitutes that native power in first act, and thus he includes the impressed species too, which is said to be on the part of the potency because it seconding it. But when he adds that a likeness is also necessary, through which the vision is made, he does not mean the impressed species, but the expressed one, by which the vision is made in act, or rather which is itself the form by which one sees. And applying this doctrine to the clear vision of God himself, he says that for it there is necessary a power of the potency, not only native, but also of the light of glory, which is (he says) a certain likeness of God: and thus he thinks the light to be an impressed species. For this reason he asserts that that likeness, or species, is on the part of the potency, because it seconding the potency to elicit the vision, which is common to all impressed species; but he adds that this species is not on the part of the thing seen, because it is not first seen so as to make the object to be seen; and this alone he denies in the intellect that sees God as he is: that is, he thinks there is not given any expressed species which, being seen, would make God to be seen; but that God himself is united immediately and through himself to the potency actually seeing, in the place of the expressed species by which vision is wont to be wrought, as by a non-efficient form: which will be made clearer in the following chapter.

Finally, what we were saying is supported from the mind of St. Thomas, and the preceding reason is made more firm, because unless he himself were speaking of an expressed species which, being first seen, would make the object to be seen, when he denies that a species of God can be produced; but were understanding an impressed species which would be the principle of vision, so that, being first seen, it would make the object to be seen; then the reasons by which he strives to prove that it is impossible for it to be produced in the intellect of the blessed would be futile and vain, as was shown in the preceding disputation, ch. 4. But if he speaks of an expressed species which, being first seen, makes the object to be seen, they plainly, in my judgment, show that God cannot be seen through any species. For, as we there said from the opinion of Scotus, one thing cannot be seen clearly through another previously seen clearly as through a medium, if in that medium there is not the whole entity and ratio of the other. Wherefore through an expressed species previously seen, which is of an order inferior to God, and is not its own existence, nor infinite, God, who is his own existence, of a higher order and infinite, cannot be seen clearly. Therefore, lest we say that the reasons of the holy Doctor are frivolous, but rather effective, it is better to interpret his mind in the sense that we have set forth, in which he also plainly seems to have spoken, if one carefully read Contra Gentiles III, c. 49, and De veritate q. 8, a. 1.[690] Nor in IV, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 1, nor anywhere else did he teach the opposite.

Objection: Perhaps you will say that the Blessed Thomas asserts that the divine essence is in the place of an impressed species for eliciting the vision, which he would not assert if he thought that such a species could be given.

Answer: I reply, he nowhere taught this, as we shall show in disputation 43.[691]

Difficulties are resolved from the same St. Thomas against the foregoing interpretation.

Objections and replies regarding expressed and impressed species

To this exposition of St. Thomas four things seem at first to object. First is in this article 2, which we touched in the preceding chapter: namely, that he only denies a species of the divine essence, by which God is united to the intellect, as color is united to the eye through its likeness: but the species by which color is united is an impressed species: therefore he also denies in the intellect of the blessed an impressed species of the divine essence. Again, in the eye there is not any species which, being first seen, makes the object to be seen: but in the intellect of the blessed St. Thomas denies that species which has the role like that which we posit in the eye, by which color is united to it: therefore he is not speaking of an expressed species of the divine essence which, being first seen, makes the object to be seen.

It is answered: In the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, that species which he says to be on the part of the potency is only the impressed one, which, not being seen, is the principle of the vision of the object; but that which is on the part of the object is the expressed one by the power of the very potency, and, being first seen, makes the object to be seen; and he thought this to exist not only in the intellect when a thing is understood, but also in bodily vision. To this, therefore, he compares

690. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 49; De veritate, q. 8, a. 1.
691. See below, disputation 43.

the species of the divine essence which is on the part of the object, which he denies to exist: for he never said that it was necessary for eliciting the vision, or for constituting the potency in first act, but said that it is that through which vision is in act, or by which a thing is seen by someone: which indeed is to be understood thus, that either it is the terminus of the vision, or it is the vision itself. St. Thomas, then, thought that color is seen by the eye through the likeness of it expressed by the eye itself, and that any thing whatsoever is understood by us in this same way, whenever that thing does not have the power which God has, to be united according to itself to the intellect, as a thing actually understood. And for this reason he proves that God is seen in the fatherland as he is, because he is seen according to himself immediately, not after some likeness of himself first seen.

Moreover, at least St. Thomas thought that any thing, when it is understood by the intellect, is understood by a likeness of itself first: this is plainly established from Contra Gentiles I, c. 53, and more clearly from IV, c. 11, where he calls the word and the expressed species an "intended intention" of the intellect, and holds that its existing is nothing other than its being understood. He immediately subjoins: "Whence it is necessary that in a man understanding himself, the interior word conceived is not a true man, having the natural being of a man, but is a man only of the intellect; when that which is in the intellect is a likeness of the man truly existing according to natural being."[692]

But you will object from the same St. Thomas in Contra Gentiles IV, c. 11, that he says the expressed likeness is distinguished from the thing known: and he proves it thus, that it is one thing to understand the thing, but another to understand the intention itself, that is, the word produced and expressed; for this the intellect knows when it reflects upon itself: he therefore thinks that the word is not understood directly by the intellect when in the same act it knows the thing.

I answer from the mind of the holy Doctor that the word and the expressed species can be known in two ways: first, inasmuch as it is a likeness referred to the object itself: and thus it is known by the same act by which the thing itself and the object is known, indeed there is nothing else for the thing itself to be known and for the object than to "see" the likeness of it, since, as St. Thomas taught, that which is seen by the intellect is not the very thing according to its natural being, but the idol and likeness of it expressed in the intellect. About this mode of knowing the expressed species St. Thomas speaks in the places a little above cited. Then, secondly, the word and the likeness can be known inasmuch as it is a certain quality in the intellect, not as an act related to an object: and this is done by a reflex act, of which he speaks in that later place, Contra Gentiles IV, c. 11.[693]

Indeed, the explicit doctrine of Aristotle seems to agree, in the little works On Sleep and on Phantasms (at the end), and more clearly in De memoria et reminiscentia, c. 2, where he says in sum that we receive memory of a thing from a trace remaining of the thing perceived; for just as we discern colors by sense and receive sounds by hearing, so in the animate subject there remains, as it were, what is impressed in a tablet, so that there is in the animal an image; and this image, which

692. St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles I, c. 53; IV, c. 11.
693. St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles IV, c. 11.

we call phantasm, must be kept in us as a kind of disposition from sense, through which, remaining and being referred to other things, images are rendered and, by a certain motion of the soul, the past is recalled as by a picture; whence he concludes that to remember is to be affected by an image preserved within us, which both represents the thing and is itself a certain affection.[694] By which Aristotle plainly hands down to us that twofold mode of knowing the likeness inwardly expressed.

Second, against the foregoing interpretation of St. Thomas it seems to stand that he himself teaches in IV, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1, and elsewhere, that there is a triple kind of medium in corporal and intellectual vision. The first is the "medium under which," and this is either light, bodily or spiritual, which perfects the potency in general, without determining it to any particular object. The second is the "medium by which" the thing is seen, and this (he says) is the visible or intelligible form. The third is the "medium in which," namely that by inspection of which sight is led to another thing, as a mirror stands to bodily sight. He then says that in the clear vision of God only the first medium is found, namely light, not however the second and the third: therefore he holds that there is not there an impressed intelligible species, which he had called the second medium.

We reply that it is easy to reconcile this with our interpretation. For he did not there teach against what we have thus far said of the expressed species: for when he denied the second medium, by which a thing is seen, which he had said to be the intelligible form, we can interpret him of the expressed species, which also is an intelligible form, indeed making the intellect to be in act: moreover, he called that medium the "by which," not the "what," not because he thought that it is not known, but because he called it the "by which" since it is the medium that another thing be known; and for this reason alone it is a "by which." Nor therefore is this medium confused with the third, even if that be first known, because the second medium is seen in the intellect in such a way that it is as the "what," and is the ratio for seeing the object, since it perfects the potency, and of its nature is such as to be known. The third medium, however, is outside, and its nature is not to be known.

Third, against the same interpretation we can object what he himself says below, in q. 8, a. ... namely, that all things which the blessed behold they see in the Word at once, because by one intelligible species, namely the divine essence, they behold them: but that species which, when it is seen, is itself seen at the same time.

I answer that by the "intelligible species" St. Thomas understands the expressed word; and because he thought that there is nothing in the blessed besides the divine essence itself, which, according to itself, is seen by no other medium, therefore he said that it is in the place of an intelligible species, that is, of the expressed species or word: yet he nowhere said that it is an intelligible species for eliciting the vision.

I pass over what he asserts in q. 9, a. 3, even if it may seem to fight against the aforesaid exposition, unless he himself had proved what he himself feels.

694. Aristotle, De memoria et reminiscentia, c. 2; cf. the Parva naturalia on sleep and phantasms.

Nevertheless, although I think that St. Thomas holds that the word and the expressed species are first seen, so that by it we understand the object; and therefore in the beatific vision no other word is expressed than this, that the very essence of God is in the place of the expressed species; yet we shall prove, together with many Thomists, I think, the opposite, as has been said. In the preceding chapter 2 I have proved that in every beatific cognition alike the word and the expressed likeness are produced, or rather the intellection or vision itself, of which the word is nothing else than the very vision or intellection of the thing which is set forth as the object, so that it is not known first, but from it the object is at once known; and by this medium the object is understood.

... in this way of knowing an expressed species St. Thomas speaks in the places a little earlier alleged. Then too the word and that likeness can be known insofar as it is a certain quality in itself, and not as actually referred to the object: and this is done by a reflex act, of which he speaks in that latter place, Contra Gentiles IV, c. 11.[695]

But indeed the doctrine of Aristotle seems expressly to confirm this, in the book On Dreams and Images, the last chapter, and more clearly in On Memory and Recollection, c. 2, where he says: "We are therefore able to recover the memory of an absent thing; for although one cannot discern the thing with the eyes when it is absent, nor receive by the ears whether it is so, yet as in an animal painted on a tablet there is both the animal expressed by the brush and the image, so we ought to hold that the phantasm is in us: taken separately, it is like a mere apparition or phantasm; inasmuch as it is referred to another, it becomes an image and is accommodated to memory. And thus, since the nature of this moves the sensitive soul, insofar as it is taken separately, to that extent the soul is affected by that sense, and seems, as it were, to undergo a notion or phantasm. But if it issues from another, the man contemplates it as an image; and though he has not looked upon Coriscus, he looks, as it were, upon Coriscus." By which Aristotle plainly hands on to us that twofold mode of knowing the likeness inwardly expressed.[696]

Second objection. Second, against the above interpretation of St. Thomas there seems to be what he himself teaches in IV, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1: namely, that there is a threefold medium in bodily vision and in the intellect. The first is the medium under which; and this he says is light, or the bodily or spiritual organ, which perfects the potency universally, not however determining it to some particular object. The second is the medium whereby the thing is seen; and this is (he says) the visible or the intelligible form (*forma intelligibilis*). The third is the medium in which, namely by the inspection of which the sight is led to another thing, as a mirror stands related to bodily sight. He says then that in the clear vision of God only the first medium is found, namely light, but not the second and the third: therefore he holds that there is not there an impressed intelligible species (*species intelligibilis impressa*), which he had said was the second medium.[697]

Answer. We could reply, first, that in that same place St. Thomas taught the opposite; yet from the other testimonies alleged our exposition, which we have set forth, can very well be gathered. Then again it can be further defended that nothing is there taught contrary to what we have so far

695. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles IV, c. 11.

696. Aristotle, De insomniis (On Dreams), last chapter; De memoria et reminiscentia (On Memory and Recollection), c. 2.

said about the expressed species: for when he denied the second medium whereby the thing is seen, which he had called the intelligible form, we can with him interpret this of the expressed species (*species expressa*), which also is an intelligible form, indeed making the intellect to be in act. Moreover he called this the medium whereby (medium Quo), not the medium which (medium Quod), not because he thought that it is not known, but therefore he called it a medium whereby, because it is the medium by which another is known; and for this reason only is it a Quo. Nor is this medium for that reason confused with the third, even if that is first known, because the second medium, at least in the intellect, is so seen as a that-which (quod), and is the reason of seeing the object, as something within the potency, and its being is to be known. The third medium however is outside, and its being is not to-be-known.

Third objection. Third, against the same interpretation we can object what he himself says below, I, q. 58, a. 2: namely, that all the things which the Blessed gaze upon in the Word are seen simultaneously, because they behold them by one intelligible species, namely the divine science; but what is seen by one species is seen at once. I answer: by "intelligible species" St. Thomas understands the expressed word, and because he thought there is no other in the Blessed besides the divine essence itself, which in itself is seen by no other medium, therefore he said that it stands in the place of an intelligible species, that is, in the place of the expressed species, or of the word: yet he never said that it is an intelligible species to elicit the vision. I pass over what he asserts below, q. 16, a. 3, even if it seems to fight against the aforesaid exposition; for what he himself held will be explained there.[698]

Author's opinion. Nevertheless, although I think this to be St. Thomas's meaning, namely, that the word and the expressed species are first seen, so that by it we may understand the object, and that for this reason in the beatific vision no other word is expressed, but that the very essence of God is in the place of the expressed species; yet more probably, together with many Thomists, I hold the opposite, as in the preceding disputation, c. 2, I have proved: namely, that in every beatitude of the fatherland alike the word and the expressed likeness are produced, or rather that the intellection or vision itself is the very word, which is thus the vision, or intellection, of the thing that is set forth as the object, so that it itself is not known first, but without any medium first known the object is understood: a thing proved by experience. For whether in the intellect, or in the phantasy, when I think of some absent thing, and a great one, as a mountain, or a city, that which appears so great is not some likeness inhering in the very faculty of the intellect or of the phantasy: for what is in the phantasy is small; but what is in the intellect is utterly without any quantity and figure: rather, it is the thing itself, the object represented, which is thus known that it is not understood or known after the manner of some form and likeness expressed in us. And in this way nothing hinders in the clear vision of God but that there be the word of the divine essence, which, not first seen, represents that essence as it is, and causes it to be known: which it could not accomplish, if it had first to be seen, as the reasons of St. Thomas excellently demonstrate, as was said in the preceding chapter.

697. St. Thomas, In IV Sententiarum, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1.
698. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 58, a. 2.

But someone will object Anselm in the Monologion, c. 31, where he says thus: "For when I think of a man known to me who is absent, the keenness of my thought is formed into such an image of him as I have drawn into memory through the sight of the eyes, which image in thought is a word." By which words he seems to signify that the very word of the mind is known by us. I answer: in that same place Anselm says that this image is the very act of thinking, and that the thinking is not that which is thought and known, except by a reflex act; by the words cited he did not wish to signify that the image itself is seen, but only that the edge (acies), that is, the power of the intellect by eliciting that image in itself, is so formed that it becomes knowing of the thing which it represents.[699]

Articulus III - Whether the essence of God can be seen with bodily eyes

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the bodily eye. For it is said in Job 19: "In my flesh I shall see God," etc.; and in 42: "With the hearing of the ear I have heard you, but now my eye sees you."

1. Further, Augustine says, at the end of the City of God, c. 29: "Therefore the power, that is, the sharpness, of their eyes will be greater, namely of the glorified; not that it may see more keenly than some animals are said to see, serpents or eagles. For however great the acuteness of seeing in these animals may be, they can see nothing other than bodies; but [the glorified] will see even incorporeal things. Now whoever can see incorporeal things can be lifted up to see God; therefore the glorified eye can see God."[700]
2. Further, God can be seen by man in an imaginary vision. For it is said in Is. 6: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne," etc. But imaginary vision has its origin from sense; for the phantasy is a movement made by sense according to act, as is said in De Anima III: therefore God can be seen by sensible vision.

But on the contrary is what Augustine says in the book On Seeing God, to Paulinus: "God no one has ever seen; neither in this life, as He is; nor in the life of the Angels, as these visible things which are discerned by bodily vision."[701]

I answer that it must be said that it is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or by any potency of the sensitive part. For every potency of this sort is the act (*actus*) of a bodily organ, as will be said below. Now an act is proportioned to that of which it is the act. Whence no potency of this sort can extend itself beyond corporeal things. But God is incorporeal, as was shown above, q. 3, a. 1; whence He can be seen neither by sense nor by imagination, but only by the intellect.

699. St. Anselm, Monologion, c. 31.
700. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XXII, c. 29.
701. St. Augustine, De videndo Deum ad Paulinum (Epistula 112), c. 9.

Reply to the first. To the first, therefore, it must be said that when it is said, "In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour," it is not understood that he will be about to see God with the eye of flesh, but that, existing in the flesh after the resurrection, he will be about to see God. Likewise, when it is said, "Now my eye sees you," it is understood of the eye of the mind; as in Ephesians 1 the Apostle says: "May he give you the spirit ..."

This is plain from what he premised: "Therefore they will belong to another power, namely the glorified eyes, if through them that incorporeal nature will be seen." But afterwards he determines this, saying: "It is very credible that we shall then see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth in such wise that we may behold with most clear perspicuity God present everywhere, and also governing all corporeal things; not as now the invisible things of God are beheld, understood through the things that are made, but as we see the men among whom, being alive and exercising vital motions, we live: as soon as we look upon them, we do not believe that they live, but we see it." From which it is evident that he understands that the glorified eyes will see God in this manner, as now our eyes see someone's life: but life is not seen by the bodily eye as a thing visible of itself, but as a sensible by accident; which indeed is not known by sight, but at once together with sense is known by some other cognitive power. And that, immediately upon bodies being seen, the divine presence in them should be known by the intellect, happens from two things, namely, from the perspicuity of the intellect, and from the refulgence of divine brightness in the renewed bodies.[702]

Reply to the third: In imaginary vision the essence (*essentia*) of God is not seen, but some form is formed in the imagination, representing God according to some mode of likeness, as in the divine Scriptures divine things are metaphorically described by sensible things.

The conclusion is: God cannot be seen by the bodily eye. And this is understood not only of God's ordained power, but also of His absolute power, since it plainly contains a contradiction in itself that God be seen by the bodily eye. The doctrine is among the Scholastics without controversy, which we shall explain a little later in the following disputation, Whether the essence of God is seen by the eye of the body by the blessed. Disputation 40.[703]

Disputatio XL - Whether the essence of God is seen by the eye of the body by the blessed

Caput I - What St. Augustine thought on this matter

It was indeed sufficiently undoubted among the Scholastics and the other Fathers of the Church that God cannot be seen by the eye of the body. St. Augustine, however, who, as being of a keen wit, was wont happily to dispute concerning very hidden matters, seems to have taught in De civitate

702. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XXII, c. 29.

703. The transition to the following disputation is authorial; cf. the topic there stated expressly: "Whether the essence of God is seen by the eye of the body by the blessed."

Dei XXII, c. 29, that God can be seen by the bodily eye, and even now by the blessed; which place of Augustine St. Thomas reports in this article, in the second argument, and, interpreting it in a good sense, asserts that Augustine there defined nothing certain, but merely proposed it inquiringly, and as it were doubting: for after he had seemed to say that God can be seen by the bodily eye, yet one having a spiritual mode, moderating his opinion in some way at the end of the chapter, he says in these words: "Either, then, by those eyes will God be so seen that they shall have in such excellence something like to the mind, whereby even an incorporeal nature is discerned - which it is either difficult or impossible to show by any examples without the testimonies of the divine Scriptures - or, what is easier to understand, God will be so known and conspicuous to us that He will be seen in spirit by each of us." Thus far Augustine; and he thereupon admits that it is difficult or impossible, from the testimonies or examples of the Scriptures, to show that there is in the blessed's bodily eyes anything spiritual whereby God Himself is seen, as he had previously in that chapter taught: yet he does not absolutely deny that God can be seen by the bodily eye having a spiritual mode.[704][705]

Moreover, the same Augustine, in Epistle 111, excuses himself with Fortunatus, and prays God Himself to reconcile to him a certain Bishop whom he had offended by his letters, especially because he had said that God neither can be seen nor ought to be seen by bodily eyes: which he attests he taught, lest, as the Anthropomorphites said, God should be believed to be corporeal. He confirms this also by the testimonies of St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Gregory Nazianzen, and St. Athanasius, who said that God is invisible, and for this reason was never seen either by Moses or by the Prophets, unless, as Ambrose says in the commentary on Luke, chapter on the apparition of the Angel, under some form which the will of God chose, not nature formed: but at length, at the end of the epistle, he dares to define nothing; for he says: "If, however, this brother, as to what I still inquire about concerning the spiritual body, now holds it for most certain to himself, unless I shall hear a gentle teacher, so let him also gently hear me inquiring; he will have whence he may be less angry." By which words he shows that he still remains under that doubt and inquiry.[706]

Caput II - That God cannot be seen by the bodily eye

And although neither by the testimonies of Scripture, nor of the Councils, nor of the Fathers has it been expressly defined that God cannot be seen by the bodily eye; yet this is proved by so efficacious a natural reason that the opposite must be judged a manifest error: since from natural reason alone it plainly follows that God is corporeal, as the heretical Anthropomorphites falsely asserted. The reason, indeed, is of this sort.

704. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 12, a. 3, arg. 2.

705. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XXII, c. 29.

706. St. Augustine, Epistula 111, to Fortunatus; cf. also St. Ambrose, In Lucam, cap. de apparitione Angeli; St. Jerome; St. Gregory Nazianzen; St. Athanasius.

Either vision, and any cognition whatsoever, is so the act of the one seeing and knowing that it also depends upon him as upon an efficient cause, and cannot be produced by God alone - which I hold as truer, as will be shown in I-II, q. 3, a. 2 - or else it is only a grammatical act by way of a mere form affecting the subject, yet so depending upon it that it can be brought about by God alone; and in either way it is clearly proved that God cannot be seen by the bodily eye.

First part: if such bodily vision depends upon the eye in such a manner that without its concurrence it cannot be effected. For vision needs to have in itself some power productive about the object which it ought to see, even if it requires a peculiar concurrence of God, as our intellect requires for seeing God: and therefore, although we should say that God can assume as an instrument any created thing whatsoever unto any other effect whatsoever, nevertheless we do not say that any power can be elevated by God unto knowing something unless that thing be contained within the latitude of its object; because about any other thing it has no vestige of innate efficacy: for this reason the eye cannot be elevated to hear a sound. The reason of this is, that any vision whatsoever, even if supernatural, insofar as it is a vision and an operation of life, by its nature depends upon some determinate faculty of a living thing: therefore, since the object of sight, according to all its latitude, is contained within the notion of body, nothing that is spirit can be seen by it, nor can it by a peculiar and supernatural efficacy of God be elevated unto the vision of such: for it would be a like elevation to see a spirit as to see a sound: for spirit has less congruity with sight than sound has; for the latter can be naturally known by some sense, but the former by none: but God is spirit; therefore to the vision of Him no divine power can bring the bodily eye.

Second part: moreover, even if vision could be produced by God alone, nevertheless the vision of God Himself could not be effected in the bodily eye. For as the vision of color cannot be posited in a stone, because it is not a fitting subject for it, so neither could the vision of God - which ought to be spiritual - be posited in a corporeal sight; therefore neither could God be seen by it. This reason avails not only in the opinion of those who agree that a vision can indeed be produced by God alone, yet cannot be posited in any subject whatsoever; but also in the opinion of those who say that it can indeed be posited in any subject whatsoever, as in a stone, yet not under the ratio of a vision, but of a certain quality - which seems to me false, as I shall prove in the next article 2. For it is impossible that some form be in some subject and not bestow upon it its proper formal effect and according to its own species.

From what has been said there follows that which we said in Disputation 37, chapter 6, and which St. Thomas very well noted, that things spiritual and created, although they be finite, are, according to the ratio of the object, far more distant from the sentient faculty than God - who is infinite - is from our intellect: because, as we there said, although God, according to the ratio of being, infinitely exceeds any created faculty; nevertheless, according to the ratio of the object, He has a congruity with the intellect, seeing that He is contained within its latitude. But spiritual substances, on the contrary, although according to the ratio of being they less exceed the power and the sentient faculty than God exceeds our intellect; nevertheless, according to the ratio of the object, they are far more distant and have less congruity with it than God has with our intellect. For God agrees with the intellect as its proper object with its proper power, as has been explained; but

spiritual substances have no congruity with sense, because they are not contained within its latitude. Wherefore he who says that God, in Himself, can in any way be seen by the bodily eye, is driven to fall into the error of the Anthropomorphites, who said that God is corporeal. For true philosophy teaches that only a corporeal object can be seen.[707]

Objections drawn from places of Scripture

Nevertheless, by certain places of Scripture it seems to be proved that God can be seen by the bodily eye. One is Job 42: "With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee; but now my eye sees Thee." Treating this place, St. Augustine asserts in De civitate Dei XXII, that perhaps to Job was communicated a great power of beholding with bodily eyes God Himself. Yet the plain sense of that place is another, from which nothing can be gathered against the truth which we have thus far established. For when Job reproved himself, that he had seemed to murmur against God's providence, and therefore had said: "Therefore I reprehend myself, and do penance in dust and ashes," after he had by experience in himself known God's providence toward himself, he subjoined the words which we have cited, "With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee," as if he were to say: "Of Thy providence, O God, toward men I had heard many things; now, however, by experience I have learned and known, and as it were with my very eyes I have seen in myself what sort of providence Thou hast toward Thy own."[708]

Another place, by which we can argue to the same effect, is Job 19: "And in my flesh I shall see God my Saviour." Lest it seem to anyone that he speaks only of the humanity of Christ when he says "my Saviour," it must be observed that in the Hebrew - nay, in some common codices, and in the edition corrected by Sixtus V - there is not had that word "my Saviour," but "God" absolutely. Yet even if we admit this, this testimony has no force against the doctrine set forth. For if we were to follow the interpretation which Eugubinus applies to this place, we should have to say that Job does not speak of the resurrection from death in his own flesh, but of health to be recovered anew, which on the dunghill he had lost; and therefore that he said: "I believe that my Redeemer and Avenger, God - who will free me from this misery - lives and thinks of me; and on the last day of this misery and calamity which I suffer, from the earth, or dust of this dunghill on which I lie, I shall rise; and again with my skin and flesh, which I lost through leprosy and ulcers, being restored I shall be renewed; and in my flesh I shall see God," in a corporeal figure, to wit, in which He will appear to me: and this hope remains fixed in my heart. For Eugubinus thinks, on that place, that Job saw with his bodily eye God, yet in a corporeal and visible form in which He deigned to appear to him, with his pristine health now recovered; and that, foreknowing this event, he said: "And in my flesh I shall see God my Saviour": yet this does not prove the point.

But others, following the same interpretation of Eugubinus, expound the later words in this way: "My pristine health being now restored, in my very flesh thus re-established, and as it were produced anew, I shall acknowledge God as the author of my salvation, and I shall look up to His

707. See St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 54; St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., dist. 3, part 1, distinctionis, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2; Durandus, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, n. 13; Paludanus, q. art. 2, in fine.

708. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XXII, c. 29; Job 42:5.

mercy and providence toward me, which I myself to my no small advantage will diligently consider; nor shall I leave it only to others to meditate and to preach: and this hope of my health to be restored rests not lightly upon my heart."

Nor would anything stand in the way of this exposition, which some more recent writers allege, namely, that Job had already despaired of his bodily health, since in that same chapter he had said: "My bone has cleaved to my skin with my flesh consumed"; and again, "Only the sepulcher remains to me." For these words are not those of one despairing, but of one weighing and exaggerating his calamity: as if he were saying, "I am so wretched and afflicted that a greater calamity cannot befall me than death itself." Yet, lifted up into the hope of health to be recovered, he straightway added: "Who will grant me this, that my discourses be written?" and the other things which we have just explained; by which, although he acknowledged his misery to be extreme, nevertheless, not dismayed in spirit, he asked that his words - by which he desired to profess his hope - might abide written in perpetuity. So much for the former sense.

But if we follow the common and true interpretation, which some, together with St. Augustine, embrace, so that Job is speaking of the resurrection from the dead on the last day of judgment, "in the flesh and in his own body," when he says that he is going to see God living, this ought not to be understood of the bodily eye, but of the keenness of mind and of the intellect (*intellectus*), though the resurrection has been wrought in the flesh. For, as St. Augustine observed in the chapter cited, he did not say, "By my flesh," but "In my flesh," to show that it is by his intellect alone - while he is, however, existing in the flesh - and not by the eye of the body, nor by the flesh, that God is to be seen by him; and when he says, "And my eyes shall behold," he understands not the eye of the body, but of the mind. Therefore from that passage nothing can be proved against the truth which we have stated.

Articulus IV - Whether some intellect by its natural powers can see the divine essence

Objicitur 1: It seems that some created intellect by its natural powers can see the divine essence (*essentia*). For Pseudo-Dionysius says that the Angel is a pure and most bright mirror receiving the whole (if it be lawful so to speak) beauty of God; but each thing is seen when it is seen in its mirror. Therefore, since an Angel by his natural powers understands himself, it seems that by his natural powers he also understands the divine essence.[709]

Objicitur 2: Further, that which is most visible becomes less visible to us on account of a defect of our sight, whether bodily or intellectual. But the intellect of an Angel suffers no defect; since therefore God in Himself is most intelligible, it seems that He is most intelligible to an Angel. If then an Angel can understand other intelligibles by his natural powers, much more can he understand God.

709. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus IV.

Objicitur 3: Further, a bodily sense cannot be elevated to understand an incorporeal substance, because that is above its nature (*natura*). If therefore to see God by essence be above the nature of any created intellect, it seems that no created intellect can attain to see the essence of God - which is erroneous, as is clear from what has been said above. Therefore it seems that it is natural to a created intellect to see the divine essence.

But on the contrary: It is said in Rom. 6: "The grace of God, life everlasting." But life everlasting consists in the vision of the divine essence, according to John 17: "This is life everlasting, that they may know thee, the only true God," etc. Therefore to see the essence of God befits a created intellect by grace, and not by nature.

I answer that: It is impossible that any created intellect should see the essence of God by its natural powers. For knowledge comes about according as the known is in the knower. But the known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Whence the knowledge of any knower is according to the mode of its nature. If therefore the mode of being of some known thing exceeds the mode of the knower's nature, it is necessary that the knowledge of that thing be above the nature of that knower.

Now there is a manifold mode of being of things. For some are such that their nature has existence (*esse*) only in this individual matter; and of this sort are all bodily things. But others are such that their natures are per se subsisting, not in any matter, which nevertheless are not their own existence, but are beings having existence; and of this sort are incorporeal substances which we call Angels. But God alone has as His proper mode of being that He is His own subsistent existence. Therefore, to know those things which do not have existence except in individual matter is connatural to us, because our soul, by which we know, is the form of some matter. Yet it has two cognitive powers: one which is the act of a bodily organ; and to this it is connatural to know things according as they are in individual matter. Hence sense knows only singulars. The other cognitive power is the intellect, which is not the act of any bodily organ. Hence by the intellect it is connatural to us to know natures which indeed do not have existence except in individual matter, yet not according as they are in individual matter, but according as they are abstracted from it by the consideration of the intellect. Whence according to the intellect we are able to know such things in the universal; which is above the faculty of sense.

But it is connatural to the angelic intellect to know natures not existing in matter; which is above the natural faculty of the intellect of the human soul, according to the state of the present life, in which it is united to the body. It remains therefore that to know subsistent existence itself is connatural to the divine intellect alone, and that it is above the natural faculty of any created intellect, because no creature is its own existence, but has a participated existence. Therefore the created intellect cannot see God by essence, unless insofar as God by His grace joins Himself to the created intellect, as an intelligible to the same.

Reply to the first: This mode of knowing God is connatural to the Angel, namely, that he know Him by a likeness of Him shining in the Angel himself. But to know God by some created likeness is not to know the essence of God, as has been shown above. Whence it does not follow that an Angel by his natural powers can know the essence of God.

Reply to the second: The intellect of the Angel does not have a defect, if defect be taken privatively, so that he lack that which he ought to have. If however it be taken negatively, thus every creature is found deficient when compared to God, inasmuch as it does not have that excellence which is found in God.

Reply to the third: The sense of sight, because it is wholly material, can in no way be elevated to something immaterial. But our intellect, or the angelic, because according to its nature it is in a certain way raised above matter, can beyond its nature be elevated by grace to something higher. And a sign of this is that sight is in no way able to know in abstraction that which it knows in concretion; for it can in no way perceive a nature except as this nature. But our intellect can in abstraction consider what it knows in concretion. And although it knows things having form in matter, nevertheless it dissolves the composite into each of the two and considers the form itself in itself. And likewise the intellect of the Angel, although it is connatural to him to know existence as concrete in some nature, nevertheless he can discern existence itself by the intellect, while he knows that one thing is himself and another is his existence. And therefore, since a created intellect by its nature is apt to apprehend a concrete form and a concrete existence in abstraction by way of a certain resolution, it can by grace be elevated to know a separated substance subsisting, and a separated existence subsistent.

Note concerning the rationale of the article.

The conclusion is: A created intellect - neither human nor angelic - cannot by its own power see God. Cajetan and the Thomists spend much labor in this article to explain and to defend St. Thomas's reasoning whereby he proves that conclusion; for Scotus vigorously attacks it in the places cited by Cajetan. I have nevertheless resolved to pass over all this, because I judge that it is not so easy, by purely philosophical reasoning, universally to prove this of every intellect, even the angelic. For from Scripture and from the Church's definition it is manifest that God, by His own power, can be seen clearly by none, not even by an Angel. As to the human intellect joined to the body, this is best shown by the following reason. By experience it is clear that in this mortal life nothing is understood by us except by the ministry of the senses; but God, and anything spiritual whatsoever, cannot be apprehended by sense; therefore neither can He be seen by the intellect, in this state, as He is.

Articulus V - Whether a created intellect needs some created light in order to see the divine essence

Objicitur 1: It seems that a created intellect does not need some created light in order to see the essence of God. For that which is lucid of itself among sensible things does not need another light in order to be seen; therefore neither does it among intelligibles. But God is an intelligible light; therefore He is not seen through some created light.

Objicitur 2: Further, when God is seen through a medium, He is not seen by His essence. But when He is seen through some created light, He is seen through a medium. Therefore He is not seen by His essence.

Objicitur 3: Further, that which is created is not prevented from being natural to some creature. If therefore the essence of God is seen through some created light, that light could be natural to some creature; and thus that creature would not need any other light in order to see God. But this is impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature, in order to see the essence of God, require a superadded light.

But on the contrary: It is said in the Psalm: "In thy light we shall see light."

I answer that: Everything which exceeds its own nature must be disposed by some disposition which is above its nature. Thus, if air ought to receive the form of fire, it must be disposed by some disposition to such a form. But when some created intellect sees God by essence, the very essence of God becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Whence it is necessary that some supernatural disposition be superadded to it for this, that it be elevated to so great a sublimity. Since therefore the natural power of a created intellect does not suffice for seeing the essence of God, as has been shown, it must be that by divine grace there accrue to it an added power of understanding. And we call this increase of the intellectual power the illumination of the intellect, just as the intelligible itself is called a light, or brightness. And this is the light of which it is said in Apocalypse 21, that "the brightness of God shall enlighten her," namely, the society ...

...of the blessed seeing God. And according to this light they are made deiform, that is, like unto God; according to that 1 John 3: "When he shall appear, we shall be like him, and we shall see him as he is."

Reply to the first: A created light is necessary for seeing the essence of God, not that by this light the essence of God be made intelligible - which in itself is intelligible - but that the intellect be made able to understand, after the manner in which a potency is made more potent for acting by a habit. Thus too bodily light is necessary in exterior vision, insofar as it makes the medium actually transparent, so that it can be moved by color.[710]

Reply to the second: This light is not required for seeing the essence of God as a likeness in which God is beheld; but rather as a certain perfection strengthening the intellect itself for seeing God. And therefore it can be said that it is not the medium in which God is seen, but that under which he is seen. And this does not take away the immediacy of the vision of God.

710. "10.4.d.49."

Reply to the third: A disposition to the form of fire cannot be natural except in one having the form of fire. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature, unless the creature were of the divine nature - which is impossible. For by this light the rational creature is made deiform, as has been said.

Conclusion is affirmative, and it follows from the doctrine of the preceding article. For if no intellect by its natural power, and by the principles due to it by right of creation, is able to see God as he is, it follows that some supernatural gift is needed; and since it ought to be a principle of seeing, it is rightly called a light, as will be made clear in Disputation 42.

Disputatio XLI - Whether the created intellect can see God by its own power

Contra errorem Anomoeorum statuitur doctrina Catholica.[711]

Caput I - Against the error of the Anomoeans the Catholic doctrine is established

Some philosophers, as St. Gregory Nazianzen relates in Oration 42, which is the second for Easter, dared to assert that in this life God can be comprehended by our intellect by its own power - that is, be clearly seen as he is - and wholly known. He testifies that these men were of the school of Plato; Nicetas and Psellus, in commenting on the words of the same oration, add that Eunomius was their leader. The same error is also attributed to Eunomius by St. John Chrysostom in the homily De incomprehensibili natura Dei, and by Theophylact on Ephesians 3, "To evangelize the unsearchable"; St. Basil, in book 1 against Eunomius (after the middle); Theodoret, in book 4 of the Haereticarum fabularum; St. Jerome, on Matthew 11, "No one knows the Son." Chrysostom calls these men Anomœi, or Anomoi, as if "without rule"; and St. Epiphanius also calls them thus, in Heresy 76, and thinks that their leader was Aëtius, although he ascribes this error only to the Arians. Nicephorus, in book 11 of his History, chapter 11, thinks they were called Anomœi, as being "without rule and equality," because they taught that the Son of God was unequal to the Father; and he reports the same of Aëtius and his disciples. But since Eunomius taught precisely the same inequality of the Son, he too could rightly be called Anomœan; thus he got this name, not because he said that God could be clearly seen by the created intellect by its own power, but because he affirmed that the Son is unequal to the Father.[712] The same error concerning the vision of God was later taught by the Beguards and Beguines in Germany, as is reported in the Clementine constitution Ad nostrum, De haereticis, where among other errors of theirs the fourth is counted thus: "Man in this life can attain the beatitude which the saints have in another." And the fifth is reported thus: "That every intellectual nature is in itself naturally blessed, and that the soul does

711. "Contra errorem Anomoeorum statuitur doctrina Catholica. cap. 1."

712. Nazianzenus, Oration 42 (secunda in Pascha); Nicetas and Psellus ad eadem verba. St. John Chrysostom, homilia s. De incomprehensibili natura Dei; Theophylactus, ad Ephes. 3 "Ingentibus evangelizare"; St. Basil, lib. 1 Contra Eunomium (post medium); Theodoretus, lib. 4 Haereticarum fabularum; St. Jerome, in Matth. 11 "Nemo novit Filium." Nicephorus, Hist. lib. 11, c. 11. Epiphanius, Haer. 76; de Actio et discipulis.

not need the light of glory elevating it for seeing God and for enjoying him beatifically." When they say that it is naturally blessed, they do not mean, as Alphonsus de Castro explains against heresies under the word Beatitudo, heresy 4 and 3, that by some operation its substance and nature alone is most nearly blessed; wherefore Alphonsus, interpreting their error in that sense, impugns it in vain. Rather, they said "naturally" that by its own natural power the rational creature could see God as he is, and thus be blessed.

This error is condemned in the Council of Vienne, and is recounted in the Clementine constitution just mentioned, where the doctrine of faith is set forth in articles 4 and 5. Alphonsus de Castro writes against this error in heresy 4 and 3; but most amply and excellently St. John Chrysostom does so in those Homilies De incomprehensibili natura Dei, albeit he must be read with caution, as we have shown in Disputation 37, chapters 2 and 3: so much did he wish to avoid the Anomoean error that he seemed to fall into the extreme.

From Scripture, indeed, it can easily be refuted. First, in Romans 6, where it is said: "The grace of God [is] life eternal," and for justification, which is the way to eternal life and beatitude, we need a special help of God, and nature alone does not suffice; much more, then, for seeing God as he is, will a special help of God be necessary. Again, if faith, by which we hold the mysteries in an enigma, is the peculiar gift of God, as we shall prove in 1 - 2, q. 109, a. 2, by a much stronger reason the clear vision of God itself will be. Next, Chrysostom refutes the contrary error in Homily 3 De incomprehensibili natura Dei, from that text to the Philippians 3: "I do not think that I have comprehended." For if Paul had not yet comprehended the essence of God - that is, clearly seen it - it was rightly known to them that Paul had not yet comprehended, that is, clearly seen, the essence of God, and persevered in its vision. Therefore, he would say in vain: "I do not think that I have comprehended"; and he adds: "One thing, namely, forgetting what is behind, and stretching forth to the things that are before, I follow after to the goal for the prize of the supernal calling of God," and so forth; as if he were saying: this one thing I do - namely, forgetting the good deeds rightly done by me before, and, as it were, turning my back on them; to that which lies before, and still remains to be acquired, I stretch out myself, as if with my whole body and with outstretched hands, pressing on to that mark of perfection which, as it were, is set before me as a prize by my calling. By these words Paul shows that he is still striving with all his strength toward an increase of virtue and perfection. Therefore, he did not say that he had not comprehended beatitude, but perfection. A little earlier, moreover, he seems to have spoken more clearly about the comprehension of the very essence of God, when he says: "If by any means I may attain to the resurrection which is from the dead; not that I have already received, or am already perfect; but I follow after, if I may comprehend," etc. - that is, I labor for this one thing, that I may come to the glorious resurrection from the dead, because I have not yet received the prize and the palm, nor have I attained the end of virtue; where without doubt he means the prize which he says he has not yet received, which the just shall receive in the resurrection, namely, the vision of the essence of God.

Most clearly, indeed, the Anomoean error is confuted by that [text] 1 Timothy 6: "[God] dwells in light inaccessible, whom no man has seen, nor can see." For which reason God is rightly called by the Fathers invisible and incomprehensible, because by no natural intellect can he be seen by its own power.

But the Anomoeans argued, as is [reported] in Chrysostom in the homily De incomprehensibili natura Dei, after the middle of it, in this manner. "What then," say these Anomoeans, "do they infer by their preeminent wisdom from what we have said (namely, that God cannot be seen)? Therefore you are ignorant of the God whom you worship." And as it is in Nazianzen, they gathered as follows: God is of a simple nature; therefore he is either altogether comprehended, or altogether unknown. For, as Aristotle teaches in Metaphysics IX, chapter 12, it does not happen to our intellect, in regard to simple substances, to be deceived; but either altogether to attain them, or altogether to be ignorant of them; and, as Nicetas reports on that oration of Nazianzen already cited, the Anomoeans said that this could happen only in regard to composites - to know some part of them on one side, and to be ignorant of something; but that in regard to simples it is necessary either wholly to be ignorant, or to comprehend.

To this objection Chrysostom replies with these words: "If there should arise a dispute between two about the magnitude of the heaven - one denying that the eye of man can perceive it; the other contending that it is possible easily to traverse the whole mass by measuring with the palm of his hand - whom would you say knows the magnitude of the heaven: him who knows how many palms complete the circuit of the heavens, or him who confesses that he does not know? The latter, surely." Such are the words of Chrysostom. Yet it is necessary that we meet their opposition directly.

Nazianzen, however, replies thus: "What indeed that simple nature is, we inquire: neither is simplicity proper to that nature; since neither is composition solely [the notion of] composition." By these few words Nicetas and Psellus, in commenting on Oration 42 of Nazianzen, judge that Nazianzen answers the Anomoeans; yet the reply is difficult. Therefore Nicetas, explaining Nazianzen's mind, says that God is in a certain way incomprehensible, in a certain way comprehensible, in a certain way knowable as comprehensible. The first is with respect to his nature, because he cannot, as he is, be seen by us. The second, because this alone do we comprehend of God, that he is incomprehensible. The third, because the attributes which we predicate of God we ascribe to him by our intellect from effects, and we can with difficulty know and enumerate them.

From this doctrine the Anomoeans are answered in this way: although God in himself is most simple, and his essence is the very highest simplicity; yet as he is conceived by us, we attribute various predicates to him, nor do we apprehend his simplicity as if it were, to us, his very nature and substance, just as neither do we conceive composition as the nature and essence of composite things, but as something circumstancing them. Because simplicity in simples, and composition in composites, is apprehended after the manner of an affection, although in reality it is the very nature and substance of the things themselves. Therefore, since God - who in reality is of the most simple nature - is by us, from his effects and creatures, understood and named in various ways; it is

necessary that so long as he is conceived by us only in this way, we understand him, as it were, by parts. Wherefore it does not follow, even if he is in himself most simple, that he must be either wholly unknown or wholly comprehended. For this can be true only of the cognition of a thing as it is in itself. But when a thing is known by comparison of it with another - which is proper to the human intellect - a most simple thing can be understood by parts, according as it is compared in different modes with various things or effects; indeed in this way it must be known. Therefore it does not happen that simple things are either altogether known or wholly unknown, as the Anomoeans contended. Hence Paul in 1 Corinthians 13 said: "We know in part, and we prophesy in part," where he calls the science and knowledge which we have of God in this life "in part," because in truth the whole of what God is is not known.

But Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, chapter 12, when he says that concerning simple substances deception does not occur, but that they are either altogether known or altogether unknown, does not deny that spiritual and simple things can be understood after the manner of bodily and composite things, and conceived by parts in the way we have just explained, by variously enunciating many things about them; rather, he contends that by a quidditative concept they are either altogether conceived, or altogether unknown - that is, in no way known. Yet concerning simples there is no deception; for he holds that falsity and deception exist only in the composition and division of one judging, as will be at length explained in Disputation 76, chapter 2.[713] We, however, say that various things can truly be enunciated of God, not by explaining and comprehending what he is, but by knowing him in a certain way in part; since in any judgment and enunciation there can be truth or falsity.

Caput II - By natural power the intellect cannot see God; against Durandus it is proved

Durandus's position. Durandus in IV Sentences, distinction 49, question 2, number 24, after reviewing two positions on this matter and refuting them, seems to embrace a certain third view; for he strives with all his might to dissolve all the opposing reasons. He asserts, then, two things. One is that God cannot, according to the order of nature fixed as we experience it, be seen by us as he is - wherein he dissents from the error of the Beguards and Beguines. He proves this because according to this order we cannot understand anything by the intellect unless it has first been known and apprehended by sense and imagination; but God cannot be perceived by any sense; therefore he cannot be seen clearly by the intellect.

The other is that God can be seen by our intellect according to the order set by divine grace. Although at first glance this doctrine appears Catholic and far removed from the heresy of the Anomoeans, nevertheless Durandus explains it in such a way that it is not entirely free from the note of error. For he says that the order of grace does not consist in the intellect's being strengthened by the light of glory, or by a species, or by some quality, but in the sole extrinsic manifestation of the object and the removal of the impediment whence obscurity arises. Thus, once the impediment has been removed, he thinks there is in our intellect sufficient power and native

713. "disputatio 76. cap. 2."

efficacy, so that, without anything further, we may clearly behold God as an object openly set before us. He proves this on the ground that every cognitive faculty, whose power is somehow ordered to some object, once the extrinsic impediment is removed, at once clearly knows that object when it is manifestly proposed - just as is evident in vision with respect to colors. But our intellect is ordered toward the divine essence as its object, since it knows that essence, and it is contained within the latitude of the intelligible object; therefore, once the extrinsic impediment is removed, it can clearly see God present, as he is. This impediment, according to the ordained order of nature, he says to consist in this, that by the ministry of the senses we come to know God from creatures; but God could remove that impediment, if he were to make himself immediately present to our intellect.

Some think that Scotus agrees with Durandus: for he asserts that the intellect without the habit of the light can see God, if we say that vision is produced by the intellect. Thus he seems to have taught in III, distinction 14, question 1, in the first question, near the end; for there, according to the opinion which says that the vision of God is effected by the intellect, he asks whether it can be without the habit of the light of glory, and answers that one should speak in the same way as he had taught about love in distinction 13, question 4, to the third and to the fourth question; for he had said that our will can love God without the habit of charity; but whether that can be done as well without supernatural aid, by the sole natural power of intellect and will, he does not settle.[714]

This position of Durandus does not lack the note of error. For, first of all, it seems to be condemned in the Clementine constitution Ad nostrum de haereticis, where the fifth error of the Beguards and Beguines is reported in this way: that any intellectual nature in itself is naturally blessed, and that the soul has no need of the light of glory elevating it to the vision of God and to the blessed enjoyment of him; which position was condemned by the Council of Vienne. It is therefore not only an error to assert that God can be seen naturally, but even to deny that some light is necessary, or some gift by which the intellect is strengthened and rendered efficacious for seeing God. But this is plainly what Durandus denies, as is clear from what has been said.[715]

But lest the definition of the Council seem without foundation, let us show the point by the best reasons.

First reason. The assent of faith in this life not only requires the exterior proposing of the object, or preaching, but also an interior light and the help of grace, as will be proved in the Prima Secundae, question 109, article 1, and as is known to all; therefore much more does a clear knowledge of God require it. But someone will reply that, for believing the mysteries of faith, grace is necessary because, since they are obscure, they do not so easily move the intellect to assent; whereas, when the divine essence is clearly manifested to our intellect, the whole impulse of the intellect is naturally borne toward it.

714. Scotus, III Sent., dist. 14, q. 1, in prima quaest., circa finem; and dist. 13, q. 4, ad 3 et ad 4, on love and fruition.

715. Clementine constitution Ad nostrum de haereticis, reporting the fifth error of the Beguards and Beguines; condemned by the Council of Vienne. See also the definition that an infused light, added to nature, is necessary for the vision of God. See further St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, Prima Secundae, q. 109, a. 1.

Refutation. Yet, granted that it is true that, after the clear vision of God and the manifestation of the object, nothing of difficulty remains for assent, but that with full natural endeavor the intellect is borne toward the divine essence itself, and that it no longer needs any further gift of grace, since the very vision of God is a judgment and an assent - still, in order that it be manifested and be seen clearly, grace is no less required than it is for our intellect, after the preaching of the mysteries has been made, to arrive at an obscure assent to them. Therefore some light or gift must be conferred upon the intellect, that it may clearly behold God himself; for the sole manifestation of the object, that is, the exterior proposition, and the removal of the exterior impediment do not suffice; indeed, it is scarcely intelligible how these could come about, as will presently appear.

Second reason, of compelling force. In order that God be clearly seen by us - who is not now seen - there must come about some change either in the intellect, or in God himself, or the removal of some extrinsic impediment. But neither can God be changed in himself, nor can some extrinsic impediment be removed, as Durandus falsely imagines; therefore it is necessary that the intellect be changed, and accordingly be furnished with some infused gift or light, that it may be able to behold God.

Now that neither can God be changed nor can an external impediment be so removed that vision should follow at once is proved, first, with respect to God. God cannot be changed intrinsically in himself, as is known to all, nor extrinsically by becoming present to the intellect when previously he was not; for he is always intimately present to all things, and to our intellect according to his essence, nor can he be present in any other way. Wherefore, if he were naturally intelligible by us, and nothing else on the part of the intellect were necessary besides his presence - since he is intimately in the intellect - he would be seen naturally by all, unless he also had to be united to the intellect by some form by reason of which he would be present not only according to reality but also according to the formal aspect of an object. For God would not be forcing the intellect by denying it his concurrence for the vision, if by its natural power it were inclined to that end.

Next, no external impediment can be removed such that, once it is removed, God is at once present to our intellect not only by an influx and according to reality, but as an object apt and proper to it. For no other impediment seems to exist - just as Durandus himself thought - than the connection of our intellect with the senses, upon which in operation it depends, and without which it is unable to understand anything. But even once this impediment is taken away, God cannot be seen by the natural power of the intellect: for the separated soul and an Angel lack that connection, and yet they cannot naturally see God - otherwise the demons too would behold him. Therefore the fact that God cannot be seen by a created intellect does not arise solely from the impediment of the senses. It is thus clear that God cannot be fitted to our intellect as an object such that by its own proper power he would be clearly seen either by some intrinsic change in himself or by an extrinsic one. Wherefore it remains that he can only be conjoined with the intellect as an object accommodated to it through some infused quality and power, which is the principle of eliciting the vision and of producing a more expressed likeness of himself - whether you choose to call that quality a light, because it manifests the object; or a species and impressed likeness, because it

produces a more expressed [conformity]; or any other designation whatsoever. Therefore Durandus asserted falsely that our intellect, naked and by its mere creation, is so sufficient and efficacious that, without anything else than the removal of the impediment of the senses, it can behold God - since the Council of Vienne expressly defines, as was cited above, that an infused light added to nature is necessary, by which it is elevated and made more powerful for seeing.[715]

Third reason, by absurdity. From Durandus's position it follows that either all the blessed see God equally, or that he who has had fewer and lesser merits sometimes sees him better - which is heretical, as will be shown more fully in the following article. For either the intellects are of equal perfection, or unequal. If equal, as Durandus holds, and able by their natural power, once only the impediment of the senses is removed, to see God - since this impediment ought altogether to be removed and ought not to affect one more than another - it follows that he is seen equally by all; for an equal and equally unhindered power has an equal effect. Or the intellects of the blessed are of unequal power; and since it can sometimes happen that one who has fewer and lesser merits is of better power for understanding, it follows that by him God will sometimes be better seen - once the impediment is removed, which in all ought to be equal, as has been said.

Durandus's first reply is absurd. Durandus is wont, in the face of this argument, to maintain that the intellects of the blessed are equal as to the faculty of understanding, and that the removal of the impediment is likewise equal, and therefore that the vision of God, according to his essential and intrinsic predicates, will be equal in all hereafter - a consequence which ought not to be conceded, since then neither the Blessed Virgin nor the human soul of Christ would have seen God more perfectly, which is absurd; rather, an inferior Angel would behold God more perfectly than the Blessed Virgin or the soul of Christ, because he is endowed with a more perfect natural intellect. Nor is it enough that Durandus adds that the blessed will differ in the revelation of other things and mysteries which they will behold in the clarity [of glory]; for those do not pertain to the essential reward but to the accidental; whereas inequality must necessarily be posited in the essential reward itself, which must necessarily correspond to unequal merits.

Not content with this reply, Durandus adds another solution. He says, then, that the blessed will be unequal in the clear vision of God regarding his essential predicates, even if they are of equal power for understanding; for God can more efficaciously move one intellect than another to the vision of himself. Granted indeed that this cannot be denied, and all theologians admit that the intellects of the blessed can be moved unequally by God to vision, so that one who is inferior by his own power may behold God more perfectly - still, this is not sufficiently consistent with Durandus's principles and doctrine. For he denies that the power of the intellect with respect to the vision of God is perfected in any way on its own part, or elevated so as to see God, but says that by the mere removal of the exterior impediment it naturally beholds God; therefore each one will see God in accord with the measure of his own efficacy. But we, since by its own proper power the intellect

715. Clementine constitution Ad nostrum de haereticis, reporting the fifth error of the Beguards and Beguines; condemned by the Council of Vienne. See also the definition that an infused light, added to nature, is necessary for the vision of God. See further St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, Prima Secundae, q. 109, a. 1.

cannot be led to the vision of God unless it be elevated above nature by God, say in consequence as well that a more perfect intellect, or an equal one, can see God more perfectly if it be more perfectly elevated to this - whether by some infused quality, or by God's aid and cooperation.

Therefore Durandus must assert one of two things: either that the natural impulse of one intellect for seeing God more than another is restrained by God, so that it beholds him less than another - which he calls violent; or that the very difficulty of the vision proceeding from the clarity of God is from God alone, and that according to his greater or lesser will he infuses into one intellect a greater or lesser influx, or himself in the end seems to infuse it. But this, besides being false - as we show in the Prima Secundae, question 9, article 1, where we prove that no operation of life, especially of knowing or willing, can be produced by God alone - is not sufficiently consonant with Durandus's own doctrine. For he teaches that the vision of God is from our intellect, indeed that it proceeds by its natural power, once only the impediment is removed by God's grace, as has been explained; unless he were also to say that God is seen by the blessed with a twofold vision: one infused by God alone - and in this the blessed are unequal - and another elicited by the natural intellect by its own efficacy. From this, however, the same absurdity follows which we were urging above: namely, that one who is endowed with a more perfect intellect, even if he has fewer and lesser merits, would see God more clearly, and would in that respect be more blessed. Moreover, it is frivolous to assert that there are two visions in the intellect of the blessed. Therefore Durandus vainly refuses to concede that the created intellect needs some supernatural elevation whereby it may be strengthened so as to be able to see God - since this has plainly been defined, as we said, by the Church.

It is answered: If, with only the impediment of the senses removed, they are able to see God - since this impediment ought altogether to be taken away, nor can it be taken from one more than from another - it follows that He is seen equally by all: for an equal power, and one equally unobstructed, also has an equal effect. Or else the intellects of the blessed are of unequal power; and since it can sometimes happen that he who has fewer and lesser merits is of better power for understanding, it follows that by him God is seen better, although the removal of the impediment ought to be equal in all, as was said.

Durandus, convicted by this argument, admits that the intellects of the blessed are equal in capacity for understanding, and likewise that the removal of the impediment is equal, and accordingly that the vision of God, according to His essential and intrinsic predicates, will be equal in all. Wherefore he must concede, on this showing, that neither by the Blessed Virgin, nor by the humanity of Christ, is God seen more perfectly, which is absurd. Nay rather, an inferior Angel will behold God more keenly than the Blessed Virgin, or the soul of Christ, since he is endowed with a more perfect natural intellect. Nor is it sufficient that Durandus adds that the blessed will be unequal in the revelation of other things and mysteries which are beheld in the essence: for these do not pertain to the essential reward, but to the accidental; whereas inequality in the very essential reward must necessarily be assigned, which must of necessity correspond to unequal merits.

Not content, however, with this solution, Durandus applies another. He says, therefore, that the blessed will be unequal in the clear vision of God with respect to His essential predicates, because, even if they are of equal power for understanding, God can move one intellect more efficaciously than another to His vision. Yet although it cannot be denied - and all Theologians admit it - that the intellects of the blessed can be thus unequally moved by God to the vision, so that he who is inferior in his own power may behold God more perfectly, nevertheless this is not sufficiently consistent with the principles and doctrine of Durandus himself. For he denies that the power of the intellect, on its own side, can be perfected in any way, or elevated, so that it may see God, but only that by the mere removal of an exterior impediment it naturally contemplates God: accordingly, each one will see God according to the measure of his own efficacy, and no more will be taken from one than from another. We, however, who profess that by its own power the intellect cannot attain to the vision of God unless above nature it be elevated by God, consequently also say that the more perfect intellect, or the equal one, can see God more perfectly, if it be elevated to this more perfectly - whether by some infused quality, or by God's help and cooperation alone.

Therefore Durandus must assert one of two things, namely that the natural impetus of one intellect to see God more than another is restrained by God, so that one beholds Him less than another - which, just as it is violent, so also is hard to believe - or that the clear vision of God is produced by God alone and, according to His will, more or less is infused into this or that intellect, as he seems to insinuate. This, however, besides being false - as we shall show in Prima Secundae, question 3, article 2, where we shall prove that no operation of life, especially of knowing or willing, can be produced by God alone - does not sufficiently accord with Durandus's own doctrine. For he teaches that the vision of God is effected by our intellect, indeed that it proceeds from it by natural power with only the impediment removed by the grace of God, as was explained; unless he should also say that God is seen by the blessed by two visions: one infused by God alone - and in this the blessed are unequal - and another elicited by the intellect by its native efficacy. From this, however, there follows the same absurdity which we urged above, namely that he who is endowed with a more perfect intellect, even if he has fewer and lesser merits, would see God more clearly, and would in that respect be more blessed.

Moreover, it is frivolous to assert that there are two visions in the intellect of the blessed. Therefore Durandus vainly refuses to concede that the created intellect needs some supernatural elevation whereby it may be strengthened so as to be able to see God - since this has plainly been defined, as we said, by the Church.

From which definition indeed it cannot so clearly be refuted and branded as erroneous (as some of the recent writers contend) the opinion of those who say that the clear vision of God, produced by God alone, is infused into the intellect of each blessed person, as the position of Durandus can. For he, since he says that only the removal of the impediment is necessary in order to see God, and that afterwards by natural power the intellect sees God, in no way can say that the light of glory, or the elevation of the intelligent faculty, is necessary for beholding God clearly. Those others at least assert that an elevation of the intellect by the light of glory and a supernatural quality is necessary, so that it may receive the vision; and for this sole effect some Theologians have maintained that the

light of glory is necessary, although they assert that the vision is so effected by the intellect that it cannot be produced by God alone, as we shall see in the following disputation. Or certainly they could say that the very vision infused by God alone into the blessed is a supernatural light, because it is the manifestation of the object; and that by it the intellect is elevated to see God, because it receives it from God alone above its own power and efficacy. Therefore we have certain by faith only this: that some elevation is necessary for seeing God; but whether for eliciting the vision, or for receiving it, or rather that the vision itself is that elevation, is not defined. Likewise it is not certain by faith whether the light of glory, which is defined by the Council of Vienne for elevating the intellect, is some habit, or only an act, as we shall see in the following disputation.

Disputatio XLII - Whether the light of glory necessary for seeing God is a habit, or an operation

Caput I - The common opinion of the Scholastics

It is undoubted among the Scholastics that the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*), which on the part of the intellect is necessarily required for beholding God, is a certain habit and a quality, distinct from the vision itself. This is handed down, together with St. Thomas in this article, by Cajetan and the recent Thomists; by St. Bonaventure in III, dist. 14, art. 1, q. 3, ad ult., and art. 2, q. 1, ad 3; by Major; by Richard in art. 1, q. 3, and in IV, dist. 49, art. 3, q. 2; by Capreolus on that same distinction, 49, q. 4, art. 1; by Thomas of Argentina, q. 2, art. 1; by Sotus, q. 2, art. 4; by Gabriel in I, dist. 2, q. 2, art. 3; by Marsilius on III, q. 9, 10, art. 2, I part, art., conclusion 2, and on the incidental doubt, opinion 4, conclusion 1; by Henry in Quodlibet 3, q. 1; by the Ferrarian in Contra gentes III, chs. 53 and 54 - although not all grant a habitual light of glory to the same effect.[716]

There is one, Scotus, who pronounces nothing about the habit of the light of glory. For in III, dist. 14, q. 2, in the first question, he alleges that if we follow the opinion of those who assert that the vision is effected by God alone, while our intellect only receives it, such a habit is not necessary; but if the vision proceeds from the intellect as from an efficient cause, it is necessary that, together with the intellect, it be a principle of the vision, as he had taught in III, dist. 13, q. 4, on the fourth question, concerning love and fruition. This very thing he affirms in IV, dist. 49, q. 1: "I answer, therefore"; but in the end he seems more to incline to this, to think that the vision is produced by God alone, as he held in III, dist. 31, q. 5: "I answer"; and Gabriel in the same distinction, q. 1, art. 3, doubt 1, says the same. I pass over Durandus, who, since he asserts that the natural power of the

716. Cajetan, on this article; recent Thomists; St. Bonaventure, In III Sent., dist. 14, art. 1, q. 3, ad ult., and art. 2, q. 1, ad 3; Major; Richard, art. 1, q. 3, and In IV Sent., dist. 49, art. 3, q. 2; Capreolus, In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 4, art. 1; Thomas of Argentina, q. 2, art. 1; Sotus, q. 2, art. 4; Gabriel, In I Sent., dist. 2, q. 2, art. 3; Marsilius, In III Sent., q. 9 - 10, art. 2, I pars, art., conclus. 2, and in the incidental doubt, opin. 4, conclus. 1; Henry of Ghent, Quodlib. 3, q. 1; the Ferrarian, Contra Gentiles III, chs. 53 - 54.

intellect suffices for seeing God with an extrinsic impediment removed, therefore judges that for no reason is any habit of light necessary, nor even any illustration which they call "actual." But we have said in the preceding disputation that this opinion is false and worthy of the mark of error.

Accordingly, not only is the opinion false which asserts that the vision is produced by God alone - as we shall demonstrate in I-II, q. 3, art. 2 - but also that which is necessarily gathered therefrom, namely that no habit of light is given to our intellect for seeing God, since it clashes even with a false foundation.

Caput II - What in this matter has been defined by the Church

Some Scholastics assert not only that the intellects of the blessed are endowed with a habit and quality of the light of glory distinct from the vision itself, but indeed that this is certain by faith and defined in that Clementine constitution; they affirm this consistently. Thus thought Capreolus on IV, dist. 49, q. 4, art. 3, in the solution of the arguments of Scotus which were brought in fifth place against the second conclusion; Cajetan on this article, to the fourth argument of Scotus; the Ferrarian in Contra gentes IV, ch. 54; Thomas of Argentina on IV, dist. 49, q. 2, art. 1, conclusion 2; the Supplement of Gabriel, q. 2, art. 3, doubt 2 - although he thinks this habit of light is not distinct from the habit of charity, as the same Gabriel already alleged elsewhere holds.[717] They prove this position by the foundation laid by Cajetan, the Ferrarian, and Sotus, namely that the Council of Vienne in the aforesaid Clementine seems to have sent away the controversy which previously was being debated among the Scholastics; but this was about the habit of the light of glory: therefore the definition of the Council ought to be understood of it. Likewise, in the same Council it seems to have been defined (says Sotus) that to little children in baptism grace and the habits of the virtues are infused - about which also then there were various opinions of Theologians.

I, however, judge more true the common opinion of more recent Theologians, who teach that in that Clementine nothing is defined about the habit of the light of glory, which some think that Dominicus Sotus thought; but in truth he asserts nothing else than that this opinion is more approved by more recent Theologians. From the authors cited in the preceding chapter, moreover, there is no other who makes mention of this matter: they only teach that this habit of the light of glory is infused into the minds of the blessed; whether indeed it is thus defined in the Church, they neither affirm nor deny. Scotus alone, who, since he deems it probable - nay much more true - that the light of glory is not necessary if the vision is produced by God alone, ought likewise to assert that it is not certain by faith that such a habit is infused.

Furthermore, nothing is proved to have been defined by the Council, because it intended only to condemn, and to define the opposite of, what the Beguards and Beguines were saying. But they erred only in this, that they asserted that God can be seen by the power of the human intellect alone without any other help and aid. Therefore it intended to define nothing else except that the

717. Capreolus, In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 4, art. 3, in the solution of Scotus's arguments; Cajetan, on this article, ad 4 argumentum Scoti; the Ferrarian, Contra Gentiles IV, ch. 54; Thomas of Argentina, In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 2, art. 1, conclus. 2; Supplementum Gabrielis, q. 2, art. 3, dub. 2.

created intellect by its own power is not able for this, and accordingly needs a special help of God by which it is elevated to such an office. Whether, however, this can be done through a habit, or rather through God's special concurrence alone supplying the place of that habit, the Council does not concern itself with. Moreover, that the intellect can quite well be elevated by God without a habit, by His special concurrence and aid alone, we shall demonstrate in Disputation 42.

Disputatio XLIII - On the effect of the light of glory in the minds of the blessed

Caput I - The opinion of Richard and others

Almost all the Scholastics cited in the preceding disputation steadily affirm that the intellect of the blessed is endowed with the habit of the light of glory; nevertheless they vary in assigning the reason or cause on account of which such a habit is necessary; it has seemed good to relate their opinions with their foundations in detail, that from them we may easily gather the more probable.

First, then, there seems to be the opinion of those who teach that such a habit is necessary not for eliciting the vision, but to dispose the intellect and render it apt for receiving it. Thus Richard, cited in the preceding disputation, cap. 1, teaches, if we follow the opinion that strongly inclines to assert that the vision is produced by God alone. The same is very plainly affirmed by Marsilius in III, quaest. 10, art. 2, part 1, conclusion 1, who absolutely defends that the vision is effected by God alone. The same thing ought to be said by all who think that the vision is not from the intellect as an efficient cause; although Gabriel, also cited there, who felt this very thing about the vision, says nothing about the effect for which the light of glory is posited. Finally, Major, in III, dist. 14, q. 2, dub. 2, and in IV, dist. 49, q. 4, teaches that the vision is not produced by God alone but also by the intellect; nevertheless he places the habit of the light of glory solely for disposing and fitting the intellect so that it may receive the vision; that it is necessary, he asserts.

The common foundation of this opinion is that which St. Thomas seems to have insinuated in article 5: because, just as natural forms need some disposition of the same order in order to be received in a subject suitably disposed, so too a supernatural form, such as is the vision of God, requires a supernatural disposition, that it may be able aptly to be present; but what this is other than the habit of the light of glory does not appear; therefore for this end alone such a habit is necessary.

A mention of this opinion is made by Scotus in III, dist. 14, q. 2, in the first question; and by Durandus in IV, dist. 49, q. 2, n. 22; and they both very well impugn it and prove that the habit of light is in no way required for receiving the vision. Laying aside other reasons, it is shown thus: for a subject in order to receive some supernatural form and to be apt for it, no other form is necessary, but by itself it is able immediately to receive it; otherwise the process would be to infinity without a terminus. For either the subject must be disposed for the supernatural form by other supernatural things, or by other natural things: by the natural it could not be made more apt

for the supernatural than it already was according to itself; but if another supernatural thing were necessary, it would follow that another also would be required to receive that, and thus to infinity; therefore there would be a process without terminus.

Someone will reply from the doctrine of Cajetan on article 5, reply to the first, that although he does not approve this opinion of Richard and the Nominalists, yet he embraces another of the Thomists, against which the argument is made in almost the same way; and thus he will reply to that proposition: "Everything that receives a supernatural form must be disposed by another supernatural form"; that it is true only of that supernatural form which is the terminus of supernatural generation, not of that which is the way to the terminus. Thus grace, which is as it were the terminus of supernatural generation, is received with dispositions of the same order in the subject. In the same way those who follow this opinion concerning the habit of light could say in the proposed difficulty that it is necessary to render the subject apt so that it may receive the vision, because the vision is as it were the terminus of supernatural generation; but for receiving the very light, no other disposition is required, because the light itself is, by its nature, a disposition; and a disposition does not need another disposition.

This doctrine does not have a firm foundation: because, although among substantial and accidental forms we find this order, namely, that the accidental disposition is ordered to the substantial, because substance is preserved by accidents lest it be able on the contrary to be corrupted; yet in accidental forms, whether natural or supernatural, to constitute this order by their own nature is not necessary; but the subject is of itself apt, and receives any accidental form, unless when one accident is in the substance by means of another accident. For then that, by which by a mean another is received in the substance, is as it were a disposition to that other. In this way quantity is compared to color, and to other bodily qualities; and a power or cognitive faculty to an operative habit. But a vision, in order to be received in the soul in the mode of intellection, does not need any habit; therefore the light of glory is posited in vain as its disposition. Wherefore, without any foundation, the adversaries answer that vision is as it were the terminus of generation, and therefore, that it may be received in the subject, it needs the habit of light.

Nor indeed does the example of habitual grace, which is received in the soul by means of dispositions, prove anything: first, because it is dissimilar; of that light of glory we ought to say rather that we must assert that the very light of glory is received by the medium of the vision, as habitual grace is received by the medium of contrition, than the contrary. For in general habit is not posited for receiving an operation, but rather an operation for a habit, as Scotus very clearly noted in III, dist. 14, q. 4, in the first question. Nay more, he adds that a habit should be posited solely on account of an act and operation that passes over; not on account of an act that remains, such as is the vision; in which, however, he is mistaken: for he too posits charity in the will, although he says that its operation remains perpetually in the fatherland.

Next, dispositions to grace are not required by the nature of the thing, but by God's ordinance. Wherefore grace is infused into little children even if, in whatever way, another's dispositions are had; but that with respect to the light of glory God has so ordained does not at all appear; and whether a moral disposition is required for receiving the vision is doubtful; indeed it does not seem

by what reason it could be established in the mode of a moral disposition, although penitential acts are established: for these God has rightly posited, that he might infuse habitual grace. For it is just that he who sinned by his own will should also by his own will, stirred by God's help, ask pardon from him and obtain habitual grace. And from what has been said there remains only this foundation of that opinion.

Caput II - What Capreolus and other Thomists thought

By the common and received opinion of the Thomists two other effects are ascribed to the light of glory. One is to dispose the intellect, that it may receive the divine essence in place of an impressed intelligible species, which may be the proximate principle for eliciting the vision. The other is to strengthen and instruct the intellect for seeing God; and that the vision concurs as the efficient principle. This is the expressed opinion of Capreolus, in IV, dist. 49, q. 4, art. 3, conclusion 2, article 3, and to Scotus he objects in the same: against cap. 54; Sotting in IV, dist. 49, q. 4, article 4; and the Ferrarian in IV Contra Gentiles, ch. 54; and Cajetan on this article; and elsewhere to these questions, and wherever he treats of this matter he establishes the same.[718]

This opinion is so well known and established in St. Thomas's doctrine that St. Thomas almost places it as a principle, when he sets down the divine essence in place of an impressed species to be the very principle of the blessed's act of intellection, and hence he provides that the intellect concur, as the general cause of eliciting the vision, not only as to general and remote causes and effects, but proximally and precisely as to the species impressed in the cognoscitive faculty. And this we truly gather from what the holy Doctor often reckons, that the divine essence is for us as a cognizable form.

Hence, supposing this, it is proved that the light of glory is necessary for those two effects: first, for receiving the divine essence in the place of a species; for since, as often as something is elevated above something according to a higher nature, it owes a peculiar disposition -

The second part of the position is proved first. Then it is necessary that there be a light, to render the intellect efficacious for eliciting the vision, they prove in a twofold way. First, because, as Soto says, two things are necessary for vision. One is the power's virtue; the other is the union of the object with the power either per se, or by its likeness. But the virtue or efficacy of the cognitive faculty is prior to the union of the object with it; indeed, the latter requires the former, so that the object can be united with it. Wherefore, since the faculty of sense does not have the virtue of knowing spiritual things, it cannot receive their species for understanding: so then, since our intellect of itself does not have the virtue and efficacy of seeing God as He is, it cannot receive the species of the divine essence, or God Himself in the place of a species, so as to see Him clearly. Therefore it must first be fitted by the light of glory, and, by means of it, be brought to a second act, so that it may be able to receive the essence of God in first act for understanding.

718. Capreolus, In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 4, art. 3, in the solution of Scotus's arguments; Cajetan, on this article, reply to Scotus's fourth argument; the Ferrarian, Contra Gentiles IV, ch. 54; Thomas of Argentina, In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 2, art. 1, concl. 2; Supplementum Gabrielis, q. 2, art. 3, dub. 2.

Secondly, the same is proved, because although God could by His help alone elevate the intellect so that it might see God; nevertheless, in order that the intellect may have in itself an inhering principle by which it may be able connaturally to gaze upon God as a second and proper cause, and not only be elevated by God by way of an instrument with a peculiar concurrence, the habit (*habitus*) of the light of glory is required, which may be the principle of cognition.

This position teaches two things which least cohere with one another: both that the divine essence by itself supplies the whole place of a species (*species intelligibilis*), and also that there is given a habit of the light of glory so as to render the intellect efficacious; for one of these seems superfluous. For either the divine essence is the proper and proximate principle efficiently causing the vision, or it does not itself, as a proper cause together with the intellect, produce the vision, as certain men philosophize universally about species impressed in any faculty for knowing, asserting that they are only a condition required on the part of the object, conferring, however, no efficacy upon the intellect. I said, as a proper cause, for the divine essence cannot but produce the vision by a certain general account and efficacy, as all other things depend on it as on an efficient cause.

If the divine essence produces the vision only in this general way, not as the object and proper cause of it, although it can rightly be said that the essence is united to our intellect by the light of glory, as we shall show in the following chapter, nevertheless it follows that it cannot take the place of an impressed species, but only be the object known. For either the reception of the species is the vision itself - and this, besides being false in all other species of created things, both because the vision is distinguished from the impressed species itself, and also because the intellect produces and effects the vision, whereas it only receives the impressed species - therefore in this way the divine essence could not supply the place of a species. For since a species is received into the intellect, it could formally render it intelligent and seeing; but the divine essence, since it does not inhere but only assists the intellect, cannot afford such an effect unless it produce and effect something else, namely the vision.

Or an impressed species is only a condition determining the intellect so that a thing be seen, yet in such a way that the vision is distinguished from it: and this also is false. First, because we could assert the same of habits, namely, that they are only a condition sine qua non of operations; and, universally, of any thing, upon the positing of which something else follows and upon its removal is taken away - which is to confound every kind of efficient cause with a condition. Then also because if an impressed species were a condition, it would be so for this sole reason, as some assert, that in it, as in a mirror, the object would shine forth, and in it would be seen: but this is fictitious; for a thing is not seen in the impressed species, but in the expressed, which we say is the vision itself; otherwise an impressed species would always move and stir up to cognition, which is false.

Moreover, even if an impressed species were a condition sine qua non, still in this way the divine essence could not supply its place. For impressed species of other things inhere in a power: wherefore by their inherence they could determine the intellect by way of a condition; but the divine essence, since it only assists, even if it be a condition sine qua non of the vision itself, cannot be so by way of a species, but only as the object is universally the cause or condition of its own cognition: therefore the divine essence is said in vain to be united to the intellect by way of a

species, and it has no peculiar efficacy in the vision itself such as a species has, but only determines as an object that is understood, and thus will rather be the thing known and the object, as indeed it is in reality, than supply the place of a species.

Finally, if the intelligible species impressed be said to be the principle of intellection in the manner in which Cajetan thought, in article 3 of this question, around the solution of the third, namely, by way of a form giving being, so that to understand be, as it were, a substantial species; still it cannot be defended that the divine essence is in the place of a species, if it is not itself the proper and proximate efficient principle of the vision. For just as esse does not follow save from an informing form, so neither will understanding follow from a species unless it be an informing, formal species. Nor does it make any difference if it be said to be an effect in the genus of the intelligible, not in the genus of a thing: for in order that it be the effect of a species, and not, as it were, of an inhering, giving form, it remains that it be derived from it as from an efficient. Therefore it remains proved that the divine essence does not supply the place of an intelligible species, if it does not by a peculiar account, as a proximate and proper principle, effect the vision.

For if the divine essence supplies the place of a species, it does not seem what effect the light of glory has in the intellect of the blessed. First, it does not serve to render the intellect apt to receive the essence itself as a supernatural form: both because, as was proved in the preceding chapter, a supernatural form by its very nature does not need any disposition; and also, if the divine essence needed a disposition on the part of our intellect, the divine essence itself ought to be an inhering form: since therefore it cannot inhere, but only assist the intellect, in vain would the intellect have to be fitted by some disposition, unless at least by reason of the effect it were necessary; but the effect, which is the vision itself, does not need the light of glory in order to be received in the intellect, as was shown already in chapter 1: therefore no disposition is necessary, such that understanding be, as it were, an esse for which the divine essence would have to assist. And from these points the first argument of the opposing position remains solved.

Next, the habit of light is not necessary in order to bestow efficacy upon the intellect so that it may be able to receive the divine essence in the place of an impressed species, as Soto was saying in his second reason. For although in a cognitive faculty there is necessarily a virtue and efficacy, of its own genus, with respect to some object, so that it can receive its species - on account of which hearing cannot receive the species of color, nor sense the intelligible species - yet for this it is enough if the faculty itself have from itself a virtue with respect to that object, not a determined one, but in general with respect to an object universally, even if it need to be completed by something coming from without with respect to this or that particular object; just as the sense of sight, before it receives the species of whiteness, has an efficacy from itself, not indeed complete and determined with respect to whiteness so that it could see it, but in general with respect to color.

- Therefore, just as sight, before it receives the species of whiteness, has an efficacy from itself, not indeed complete and determined with respect to whiteness so that it could see it, but in general with respect to color in universal, so that it must be completed by this or that

species in order that it may be able to see this or that object; so, in order that our intellect may receive the essence of God after the manner of a species (*species*), or the species of that [essence], there is no need that it have from itself a determinate and complete productive power with respect to God himself, so as to be able to see God as God; but it is enough that in general it have that power, namely, that from itself it have the power of understanding whatever is intelligible, yet in such a way that its efficacy is completed by a peculiar species with respect to this or that object. But if the whole force and efficacy for seeing God were to come to our intellect from something extrinsic, then any other faculty whatsoever, namely the sensing faculty, could receive a power from something extrinsic so as to see God, and would receive the divine essence in the place of a species - which is absurd. And if by no means can this be done, the reason is that the sensing faculty from itself has absolutely no power or efficacy, even in general, under which the vision of God could be contained; therefore it can be completed neither by any species nor by the divine essence itself in the place of a species, so that it might contemplate God himself clearly.

- From these points it is also plainly evident how frivolous is the second argument of the opposing view, employed by Dominicus Soto, who says that a habit of light is necessary to confer on our intellect an efficacy and power by which it may be able to receive the divine essence in the place of a species.
- Accordingly, the opinion also of certain more recent authors is to be rejected as false in the same way, who say that the intellective faculty has from itself no efficacy, not even that which they call partial, for seeing God and for supernatural acts, but has it all from a light, or from a supernatural form infused into it; for from this it follows first that the act of charity on the way would in no way proceed as from an efficient principle, namely the native virtue of the will, but wholly under every respect would be from a supernatural principle infused from without. Therefore the operation could be neither vital (*vitalis*), nor free (*libera*), nor meritorious (*meritoria*): for all these, under this ratio, require by their very nature to be produced by a native principle of life in such wise that they cannot be done by God alone.
- Next, since the beatific vision is a certain intellection (*intellectio*), it cannot fail to have this formal character from the native virtue of the intellect as intellect, nor can it beg the whole power of understanding from an extrinsic principle. Wherefore this opinion is no less improbable than that which asserts universally that the intellect has no power at all for understanding, not even inchoate, but receives its whole efficacy from a species. For it is impossible that for such a kind of operation the whole principle should be external; rather, some vital principle is required, whose efficacy at least is such that, once something external is added, it is completed. But if the adversaries grant in the intellect some, even the least, innate efficacy for seeing God, then it can most fittingly be completed and assisted by the light of glory alone or by the divine essence alone in the place of a species.
- They further prove their position. First, because it is impossible to assign one first cause to the generic ratio of intellection and another to the specific ratio: for each is one undivided reality in the effect; therefore each cause ought to concur to such an effect according to every

ratio, and thus the intellect will bring about the vision according to every ratio of it. Add that, since the vision also according to the specific ratio is vital, it ought also under that ratio to be from the intellect.

- I answer: when we say that in the vision there is a generic ratio and a specific ratio, and that the intellect is the principle of it according to the generic, not according to the specific, we do not mean that there are two distinct things, one of which is assigned to one cause and the other to another; but that one and the same effect has from one cause, namely from the intellect, that it is intellection - which ratio it could not have without the intellect; whereas from the light or the species it has that it is such [an intellection], which it would not have from the other. The vital ratio does not belong to intellection because it is of such an object, but because it is intellection - indeed, according to a more common ratio. Likewise the supernatural ratio it does not have from the fact that it is intellection, but from the fact that it is such; for insofar as it is intellection, it is not supernatural, but has a certain common ratio.

Obiectio secunda: - Then they prove [thus]: since, if the intellect from itself had some partial power for supernatural acts and were completed by a light or species as it is completed for natural acts, it would follow that it must be compared in the same way with natural and with supernatural acts.

Solutio: - I answer that the ratio is different for this reason alone, that for supernatural [acts] it is completed by a supernatural form (*forma*), whereas for natural [acts] by a natural [form] coming from without. You will say: whence then is the supernatural form recognized, if not from the fact that it bestows on the intellect the whole power of acting, since the same is true of the natural [form]? I say they are alike in this: they differ, however, in that a natural form can be given in a natural order and from natural causes; a supernatural [form], however, cannot, nor does any nature naturally require it for itself: and that form, in its own constitution, is supernatural, not by an order to an efficient cause, as we shall say in the following disputation.

Alius modus explicandae praedicta differentia: - But again, some, in order to defend the foregoing view which we just now impugned, philosophize in another way. They say, then, that the whole principal efficacy comes to the intellect from the light in such manner that by the light itself, as by an instrument, it is wholly elevated, itself supplying no native efficacy, and thus it operates as an instrument; and by this reasoning they think the vital character and cognition in act are best defended.

Impugnatur: - I for my part judge that all the absurdities which we were inferring in the former way against that opinion also follow in this way. First, if the intellect contributes nothing of its own proper and native efficacy, it follows that it contributes only that which it has as it were derived from the principal agent; therefore, since the principal agent is an extrinsic infused habit, there will be no efficacy proceeding from life and from the intellect as intellect; and consequently the action

can be neither vital nor cognitive: for these require to proceed from life as from their first root. Wherefore the act of vision is vital and cognition for this reason, that it is from the intellect, not because it is from the light.

- Next, no act of this sort could be free, nor even the very act of charity on the way: for if the will begs its efficacy from an extrinsic infused principle, and itself contributes nothing of its own, but only what it has from the habit, it will not be in its power to use the habit when it wishes and as much as it wishes; therefore its act will not be free, unless you reduce all liberty to the will from this alone, that it can set an opposite impediment. But this is not enough for us to say that an act is free as to both specification and exercise together, and as to such and such intensity, as is well known.
- Wherefore I for my part do not see by what probable reason in the acts of the will of this life, which are meritorious, this view can be defended; since from it all liberty, and therefore the ratio of merit, is removed. For if the will from itself contributes nothing of native efficacy in supernatural acts, it follows that it does not perform these works from itself, and consequently is not determined by itself; for since to determine oneself is to act, and it does not act from itself, but by a begged virtue from another, it will in no way be determined by itself, but wholly by another, from whom it receives the power of acting; and so no trace of liberty will remain in it: for this is the indifference of a faculty from itself.
- Others finally concede that our intellect from itself has an inchoate power of a sort for seeing God, as they also assert that in any created nature there is this power for any effect whatsoever, which they call an active obediential potency (*potentia obedientialis activa*). But they say that it is an instrumental power, because it must be completed only by a concurrence not due to it naturally, but supernatural, in order to effect. Yet that this power is in no creature, and that every native power, even inchoate, has the character of a principal cause, we shall show below in disputation 176, cap. 4; and concerning the virtue of the intellect for seeing God, by a peculiar argument we shall prove it; nor does it have anything in common with the error of Pelagius, as some object, as we shall convict them.[719] And if once we concede some native inchoate power in our intellect for seeing God, the light of glory will not be necessary for eliciting the vision, if the divine essence supplies the place of a species, as we shall show in the following chapter.

Caput V - Finally, the opinion of Capreolus is impugned

- Lastly, in this chapter against Capreolus we have still to show that the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*) is not necessary, if the divine essence is in the place of a species. And first, such a habit is not necessary in order that our intellect be strengthened to receive the divine essence so that it might be able to receive it as a species: on the ground that the divine

719. Infra disputatione 176. cap. 4. & de virtute intellectus ad videndum Deum.

essence is a certain excellent object; and therefore, unless the faculty of the intellect were strengthened, it could not sustain it; just as sight cannot receive the species of some vehement sensible unless in some way it is made more powerful.

- Accordingly, in this way the habit of light is not necessary, and the example adduced proves nothing. First, because no sense needs to be strengthened in order to receive the species of some vehement sensible. For since the species has no physical action which it exerts in order to cause cognition, it cannot in any way, physically speaking, harm the faculty; and so, without any further disposition or strengthening, sense can receive it. A clear sign of this is that no internal sense is harmed by the species of some vehement sensible, although cognition may be harmed by reason of some affect consequent upon a terrible object. But an external sense is harmed by some vehement sensible, and so needs to be strengthened in order to perceive it without lesion, by reason of the physical operation by which it touches the very sensing faculty - yet not by the mere inpouring of the sensible species. In this way vision is harmed by a vehement light, which sends its rays as far as the pupil - not by the species of that light; hearing is harmed by sound, not by the species of sound, but by the vehement percussion of the air, which dulls the ears themselves; and so with the others.
- The a priori reason is that no species of any vehement object is opposed to the temperament of the sensing faculty; therefore it cannot be harmed by it - indeed, it ought rather to be perfected by it. Physical sensible qualities, however, can have some physical action contrary to the temperament; therefore, since this reason has no place in the intellect with respect to receiving the very essence of God in the place of a species, there is no ground to say that such a habit is necessary in order to strengthen the intellect for receiving the essence, since by it, as by an excellent object, it cannot be harmed.
- Next, even if the sensing faculty were harmed by the species of a vehement object, nevertheless the intellect is harmed only by a species that inheres, not by one that merely assists. And indeed harm cannot occur except from an inhaerent effect; but the divine essence assists the intellect alone, if it holds the place of a species; therefore by that very fact it cannot harm the intellect: for even now it assists all our intellects, yet harms none. Nor does it matter that some say in common that the divine essence does not assist all as a form intelligible, but as a first cause; and that therefore it is necessary for the intellect to be strengthened so that it may assist it after the manner of an intelligible form. This matters nothing: for for the divine essence to assist the intellect as a species is nothing other than to cooperate of itself to the vision - which it can effect without any change of its own. Therefore, although it does not assist all by its actual operation to produce vision, nevertheless it assists in that very way by which it could, if it willed, produce it; from this assistance, whether it cooperates to the vision or does not operate, no lesion at all can arise in the intellect.
- Moreover, it is not necessary that the habit of the light of glory, as though a principal [cause], concur efficiently in the intellect to the vision, so that from both together - namely, the intellection and the light - there be made one integral principle and efficient cause of the

vision. Therefore in this way the habit is not necessary, if we say that the divine essence supplies the place of a species and, as the proper principle of the vision, also concurs to it together with the light and the intellect: which is proved by this reason.

- To one and the same effect several causes that are proximate and proper, even if mutually ordered, cannot concur so as to be univocal in the effect; for to one and the same effect the ratio of cause answers in some peculiar way. I said proper and proximate causes: for the first cause of all, namely God, in a universal manner of principle concurs with all particulars.[719]

In the operations of cognition there is a manifest example of this. For a vision of white has that it is a vision, not an audition; and this it has from the faculty of seeing, not from the species; for it is a vision because it proceeds from sight, not from hearing. It has also that it is of white; but this it does not receive from sight as such (for sight regards white as well as black), but from the species of white. And hence neither would it be a vision if it were not from sight, nor would it be of white if it were not from the species; therefore by both together there is completed one proximate and proper cause of the vision of white. Therefore, if to one effect several causes concur according to its various ratios such that the efficient principle is complete and no new ratio remain in the effect to which a proper cause must be assigned, it is superfluous to add several other causes for the complement of that principle; and accordingly, if they be added, they will produce no effect. We will confirm this principle again,[720] and we will dissolve certain objections of recent authors of little moment.

This being supposed, it is proved either that the divine essence does not bear the office of a species as the proper principle of vision, or that the habit of the light of glory is superfluous. For if the essence hold the place of the species, it will not only be a principle of the vision as it is of other things, but it will be a proximate and proper principle as the very species would be, in whose place the divine essence is substituted. Therefore, according to every ratio that we can devise in the species itself, the vision would proceed from the created intellect and the divine essence as from a sufficient, integral, and proper principle; in vain, therefore, do we add the habit of light for eliciting the vision. And that it is not to be posited for any other effect is manifest from the things said in this chapter. Moreover, that the vision proceeds sufficiently in every respect from the intellect and from the divine essence in the place of a species is shown by the following induction.

The clear vision of God has a threefold ratio under which it falls: the first is of cognition or intellection; the second is of its being a cognition of such an object; the third is of clarity, by reason of which the Scholastics call it intuitive and quiditative. Now all these are sufficiently assigned, as integral causes, to the intellect and to the divine essence in the place of a species. The first ratio, namely cognition or intellection, is from the intellect, not from the essence; for if it were not from the intellect, there would be no vision nor intellection, since the intellection essentially depends on the intellect according to the ratio of intellection. The second ratio, namely that it be of such an

719. Infra disputatione 176. cap. 4. & de virtute intellectus ad videndum Deum.

720. We will confirm this principle again at I-II, q.9, a.1, and we will dissolve certain objections of recent authors of little moment.

object, is from the divine essence in the place of a species; for a species makes that the intellection or cognition be of such an object and not of another; for the species modifies and determines the intellect so that it understand this rather than that.

But the third ratio, namely clarity, which seemed most fitly to be ascribed to the light of glory, is also sufficiently from the divine essence in the place of a species: because the divine essence is not posited in the place of just any species, but of a proper and quiditative species which by its very nature would make one see God as he is. Therefore, since it holds the place of such a species, it must also supply the efficacy and proper power of that species; and that power is, that, being added, it move the intellect to a clear and, as they say, intuitive knowledge of the object. Therefore to this the divine essence in the place of a species moves as the proper and proximate cause - otherwise than if it supplied the place of a species not proper nor quiditative, such as, namely, are derived in the intellect through the senses. For these cannot generate a manifest and quiditative knowledge of the object truly, not only by themselves, but not even when any infused light is added; for no light will make that species more sufficient and effective, so that, together with the intellect, it produce an express similitude of the object, quiditative and intuitive, to whose order it does not itself belong. Now this is what some assign to the light of glory as a cause; and therefore it will be altogether superfluous. For that the vision is a supernatural operation is not a special ratio for adding some new cause; for from the foregoing it follows of itself. For by that very fact that it is the clear vision of God - which is sufficiently from the intellect together with the divine essence in the place of a species - it is also supernatural; and therefore a new cause cannot be added for this, that it be supernatural.

Objicitur: But one could say that, besides the divine essence which is in the place of a species, a habit of the light of glory is also required in the way in which the theologians concede that, besides intelligible species, a habit of faith is infused in wayfarers.

Respondeo: The case is far different. For in the act of faith, which is supernatural, one thing answers to the species and another to the light. The species answer to the act of simple apprehension; for by them we apprehend that formal object to which faith is ordered - namely the First Truth - either by the help of supernatural light in the vision of God, or by apprehension of the signs, in which the same principle is found; and that the cause of simple apprehension is the same as that cause, according to which the divine essence in the place of a species is a sufficient cause of seeing and of intuitive apprehension; but another is the judgment of assent. (For although by acquired species the intellect may at some time arrive at apprehensions clear, and a judgment of assent be posited in the same act, nonetheless the habit of faith is placed as distinct from the species, because they are the proper and quiditative principle of apprehensions, and the habit alone is of assent, and of that assent in the act of faith; whence the habit of faith is inserted, as it were, into the rational powers, not as derived from species; nor is there any habit of faith because some mode constitutes the intellect in the first act by a species, but alone as it is the first act from a species, but not the entire act, which is the principle of the actual representation in words of the mysteries to be believed; and that it be not of a material thing produced by species in the intelligible, but a habit alone is assent, this connection is extreme.)

But, not to delay, it is clear that a habit of the light of glory is not to be posited for this effect; for the reason is easily demonstrated. In order that something act by a form inhering to it after the mode of a secondary and proper cause, and that it act after the mode of an instrument by the mere motion of the principal agent applying it to such an effect, it is required that some ratio in the effect produced correspond to those forms. For if nothing be assigned in the effect, it is in vain that we posit it; and to say that it is posited for some other effect is contrary to what must naturally be determined about any form that is set down: namely, that it be necessary for operating something in the effect. For either the effect proceeds connaturally from that cause - then it will suffice without it; or, if it does not, it will be able to effect nothing in it. And this also becomes clear from the solution of the third argument which Capreolus brings forward in the second chapter, as we have set forth above.

Finally, someone will reply that the light of glory is nevertheless necessary for that effect which the second opinion in the third argument was saying: namely, that the vision of God proceed from our intellect as from a second cause connaturally. For in this respect a second cause differs from an instrument elevated to act, that the second cause has in itself an inherent form by which its power is completed so that it may act; but the instrument does not have this, but only the motion of the principal agent to such an effect. Wherefore, since the divine essence, as in the place of a species, does not inhere but assists the intellect, it seems to elevate the intellect alone as an instrument for seeing; which, however, if it had in itself the habit of the light of glory, would then operate by the mode of a second cause by a power inhering in it.

But that the light of glory ought not to be posited even for this effect can easily be shown: because, for some agent to act by a form inhering in it after the mode of a second and proper cause, and not as an instrument, it is necessary that to that form there correspond some rationale in the effect produced. For if nothing be assigned in the effect, it is in vain that it is posited, as has been said; and therefore a form ought not to be established for connaturally operating which is not even necessary for effecting something in the effect. For how will it connaturally produce the effect, if it can effect nothing in it? From which there becomes clear also the solution of the third reason which, especially from Capreolus in the second chapter, we have set forth above.[721]

Objection. But you may object that an acquired habit is given to us, and is not superfluous to the potency, even if it effects nothing in the operation; therefore the light of glory likewise could be so.

Solution. I answer: if a habit effected nothing in the operation, it would not be posited as a principle for connaturally operating that; but only for making the potency ready or facile, as Durandus thought, by removing only the impediment and rendering the potency more expeditious; or, if it is posited for connaturally operating, it is necessary that it effect something in the effect, besides the connaturality. For this is the mode of operating of a cause, as we have said, which does not befit an effect unless that cause which is given for connaturally operating effect something further. Wherefore the same argument will tell also against the acquired habit, if we say that even here an effect is given. And certainly there is no one who asserts that an acquired habit is given for

721. John Capreolus, In IV Sent., d. 49, cap. 2 (as cited above).

connaturally operating; because bare potency is a second cause sufficient for operation: but all say that it is given for facility and for a delectable mode, which is either a mode of expedition of the cause, influencing nothing in the effect (as Durandus supposed), or is a certain mode of operation added to the substance of that [operation]. Whence it is not posited for connaturally operating the substance of the operation, but for a peculiar mode of it. I except Cajetan and others who affirm that an acquired habit is given to the substance of a singular operation; for these, even if they say it is given for connaturally operating, nevertheless concede that something is produced by the habit in the substance of the operation: whether this is true, we shall say in its proper place; but we contend that a habit is not posited for connaturally operating unless it effect something in the effect; nor have I hitherto read anyone who says that an acquired habit is given for connaturally operating.

Moreover, I have heard some Theologians asserting that the light of glory neither disposes the subject to receive the essence in the place of a species, nor to receive the vision, as a principle of that effect; but only as a condition on the part of the potency. And so they ascribe the whole efficacy to the intellect together with the divine essence as in the place of a species. They explain, however, this mode of "condition" by this reasoning: just as the faculty of seeing sometimes needs to be inwardly strengthened against bleariedness, and yet that strengthening is only a condition, not a principle, of vision; so the intellect for seeing God is strengthened by the light of glory.

It is rejected: But this evasion is frivolous; and, first, on this account: in this way we could no longer posit a form inhering on the part of the intellect, such that it itself, by the mode of a second cause and not as a bare instrument, elicit the vision. Then, secondly, it is not sufficiently understood what this "condition" is: for thus we could call whatever is required on the part of the agent "conditions," not efficient principles. Lastly, whenever on the part of some agent there is a necessary quality which, being posited, the effect is posited, and being removed, the effect is taken away, there is no reason why we should deny that it is a principle of that effect. The example, moreover, of the bodily eye is inept. For the eye sometimes needs to be inwardly strengthened; and that strengthening, or disposition, is not a principle of seeing, but a condition, because the power of seeing is in the bodily organ and needs its right disposition, which being removed the faculty itself is either diminished or altogether extinguished. But this cannot happen to the eye of the mind, nor anything similar, on account of which we should say that the light is only a condition, not a principle, of vision.

Caput VI - That the intellect together with the light of glory alone is the complete principle of the vision, is proved by authority

This opinion seems to surpass the others by the Author's judgment, and it is to me highly approved: namely, that which asserts that the divine essence is not conjoined to the intellect in the place of an intelligible species, but concurs with the intellect toward the vision by a certain general rationale, as the first mover, and that it is only the object of that [vision]; and that the intellect itself, furnished with the habit of light, is the sufficient and complete principle of it. This seems to

be the view of Richard, in IV, dist. 49, art. 3, q. 2. For he teaches that, if we follow the opinion which asserts that the vision is elicited by the blessed themselves - which he deems probable - the light of glory is necessary in order to second the intellect for eliciting the vision; but nowhere does he assert that, besides this, the divine essence is in the place of an impressed species, as the principle for eliciting the vision. Nay rather, in III, dist. 14, art. 1, q. 3, he defends as probable the opinion of those asserting that now God is seen by the blessed through a species which is the principle of the vision; but he impugns the opinion of those who teach that the divine essence is substituted into the place of a species.[722]

With Richard Scotus agrees, in the places cited in Disputation 42, chapter 1. For he judges that, if the vision is elicited by the intellect of the blessed, the habit of the light of glory is necessary for this, so as to impart power to the intellect for seeing; whence he thinks that both are the principle of the vision. But nowhere does he assert that the divine essence is in the place of a species as the principle of vision; nay rather, in IV, dist. 49, q. 11, he says that the light of glory without a species suffices for eliciting the vision, because the object is present - yet he does not say that the object itself supplies the place of a species. Moreover, that the object does not supply the place of a species Thomas of Argentina had expressly asserted in IV, dist. 49, question 2, art. 3; and yet in that article he had said that the habit of light is required for vision. And the same Scotus, on IV, dist. 49, question 11, in the section "Respondeo dicitur," judges that the reasons by which it is wont to be proved that God is not seen through a species prove nothing; and he understands this also de facto.[723]

Furthermore - and this is the chief point - this opinion not only is not opposed by St. Thomas, but even from him it can not obscurely be gathered. First, indeed, wherever he treats of the habit of the light of glory, he either indicates or also openly teaches that it is given for strengthening the intellect so that it may elicit the vision - that is, that it confer power upon it and complete its efficacy for producing the vision. Thus he taught in this article, a.5, ad 1 and ad 2; and in Contra Gentiles III, ch. 54 and 55, in the first argument; and most clearly in ch. 53.[724] But he nowhere taught that which his disciples defend - namely, that it is in the intellect of the blessed in the place of an impressed species for eliciting the vision; for to this effect he only asserts that the light of glory serves.

There are, however, certain places in which the Holy Doctor seems to teach that the divine essence is in the place of a species, by which his disciples seem to have been drawn into that opinion; yet they have an easier exposition.

722. Ricard., in IV Sent., d. 49, art. 3, q. 2; and in III Sent., d. 14, art. 1, q. 3.

723. Scotus, at the places cited above in Disputatio 42, cap. 1; and in IV Sent., d. 49, q. 11. Thomas de Argentina, in IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, art. 3.

724. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 12, a. 5, ad 1 and ad 3; Contra Gentiles III, chs. 53 - 55.

The principal one is the reply to the third objection of this question in this article, where he says thus: "Just as other intelligible forms which are not per se species are united to the intellect according to a certain being, whereby they inform the intellect itself and make it to be in act; so the divine essence is united to the intellect, so that it makes the intellect itself to be in act through itself."]

But from this testimony our opinion rather than that of the adversaries is confirmed. For although he compares the divine essence to forms - that is, to intelligible species - which inform the intellect, and, being inherent in it, are united to it, and he asserts that it is united to the intellect according to its own being (and he understands this from the fact that it inheres), nevertheless he does not affirm that it is united to the intellect as a form and an impressed intelligible species for eliciting the vision; rather he says that it is united to the intellect as the intellect in act - that is, as a thing actually understood, which makes the intellect itself to be in act, namely intelligent. He does not say "in first act," but "in act"; and he understands "second act": for thus a thing actually understood is referred to the intellect. He therefore compares the divine essence not to the impressed species, but to the expressed species, and to the word, which he himself also calls the intelligible form in De Veritate, q. 3, a. 2; and he teaches that the divine essence has the place of the Word in the vision itself. For, as we said above in Disputation 39, St. Thomas everywhere plainly holds that the essence of God is seen by the blessed according to itself without any Word; whereas other natures are known by the intellect not according to themselves, but by their Word; indeed the Word itself is seen first.[725]

Then, in four other places - namely, in this article, a.5, ad 1 and ad 3; in Contra Gentiles III, ch. 54 and ch. 53; and in De Veritate q. 8, a. 1 - he teaches that the divine essence is not made intelligible by the light of glory, but is of itself such; while the light is infused so that the intellect may be able to elicit the vision. But if the light had the place of an impressed species as the principle of vision, God would be made intelligible in first act by it, just as other things are by their impressed species. Therefore, since the essence itself is of itself intelligible according to the mind of St. Thomas, it would follow that it is in the place of an impressed species, and that it is united to the intellect of the blessed in this mode.

From these places, however, and from their doctrine, if rightly weighed, our opinion can be confirmed. For this reason the Holy Doctor said that God is not made intelligible by the light - even if that light constitutes the intellect potent in first act for seeing - because the divine essence, through itself, without any Word is seen, and terminates the vision itself; otherwise than other things which are understood through the Word as a medium, and by it become intelligible and visible. In which sense the Blessed Thomas himself, in IV, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 1, said that, in the same way, there comes to be one thing from the intellect of the blessed and from God himself, when he is seen according to himself, as there comes to be one thing from the intellect and the species or intelligible form when the intellect understands. He did not say, "when the intellect is constituted in first act by an impressed species," but, "when it actually understands by the Word." For that

725. St. Thomas, De Veritate q. 3, a. 2; see also Disputatio 39 above.

much-repeated and common axiom, "From the intellect and the intelligible there is made one," is much better understood of the intellect actually knowing than of the intellect constituted in act by an impressed species. This, surely, I take to be the mind of the Holy Doctor; nor did he teach the opposite anywhere, as his disciples commonly feign. Only that seems to oppose us which he delivered in Contra Gentiles III, ch. 51; and in De Veritate q. 8, a. 1; and in IV, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3 - namely, that the divine essence in beatitude is both that by which it is seen and that which is seen: which would in no way be true unless the divine essence were in the place of an impressed species, by which rationale it is that which is seen; for inasmuch as it is the object of vision, it is that which is seen, the thing seen. I answer, however, from the same doctrine which up to this point...[726]

So far we have said that, according to St. Thomas, by the medium by which God is seen, he does not understand the principle for eliciting the vision, such as an impressed species, although even this too can be called that by which he is seen; rather, he understands the Word, by which also things are seen. For, since St. Thomas holds, as I have often noted, that in the vision of God there is no expressed word given, but that God himself is seen of himself, this peculiar prerogative God has among other intelligible things, that the others are only that which is seen, because they do not have the place of the Word and are not seen of themselves, but are seen in the Word; whereas for God both are true, because, since he holds the place of the Word, he is both that by which and that which is seen. It remains, therefore, that, according to the mind of St. Thomas, it is sufficient for eliciting the vision that the intellect of the blessed be furnished and be made according to the light of glory, and that nothing else be in the place of an impressed species; whether, however, the very light can be called an impressed species, we shall explain briefly in the following chapter.

Caput VII - The same opinion is confirmed by reason and is further explained

Now indeed, from the things said above it will not be difficult to confirm this opinion by reason. For among the Scholastics it is indubitable that the habit of the light of glory is infused into the intellects of the blessed, and that together with the light of glory the divine essence cannot supply the place of an impressed species, as was proved in chapter 3; it remains, then, to say that the intellect, instructed by the habit of light alone, is the principle of the vision, but that God himself alone is its object. Indeed, as we shall say in Disputation 46, God could, without the habit of light, move the intellect to elicit the vision; then he himself would be in the place of the light, whose efficacy he would supply, and consequently he would occupy the place of the impressed species which is wont to be the principle of vision. But since all the Scholastics hold, as we saw in the preceding disputation and proved, that there is a habit of light, and that it is the principle of the vision, it follows that the divine essence is not to be subrogated in the place of an impressed species; nor does this need any greater confirmation than the refutation of the other opinions, from which indeed our opinion is gathered.

726. St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles III, ch. 51; De Veritate q. 8, a. 1; IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3.

It remains to explain why that quality is called the light of glory and whether it can be said to be an impressed species of the divine essence in the mind, or not. First, it is called the light of glory because it manifests God himself, who is our glory and beatitude; yet not all sufficiently explain how it manifests. This must be understood as follows. Since that quality is a principle, together with the intellect, for eliciting the vision of God, and vision is a certain manifestation and representation of God himself, in that respect the light of glory is said to manifest God, not formally, but efficiently, namely by producing the vision itself, which is the manifestation of God. Wherefore we ought not to suppose that the light of glory illuminates and manifests our object in such a way that the illumination and manifestation by the light precede the vision of the object, as corporeal light illuminates colors before they are seen, that is, illuminates the medium through which sensible species may be conveyed to the organ, by which we behold colors. For that cannot even be conceived, much less explained, in our case. Rather, the illumination and manifestation by the light of glory is the very vision of God itself, in the manner we have explained.

Next, I would not hesitate to call the light of glory itself an impressed species of the divine essence, by which the vision of him is elicited. First, because among the ancient Scholastics - even among those who say that God is seen through a species, whom we reported in chapter 4 - there is no one who distinguishes the light of glory from the species of the divine essence. Then, St. Thomas in article 2 of this question and in the Contra Gentiles, book 3, chapter 4, around the third argument, more than once calls the light of glory a similitude of God, which he takes on the side of the potency; not, indeed, as certain recent disciples of St. Thomas explain it, in a merely general sense in which any creature can be called a similitude of God - for to assert that of the light of glory would be frivolous and wholly beside the point - but because, just as an impressed species seconds the intellect or the cognitive faculty so that it may know the object, so too the light of glory seconds the intellect. He did not wish, however, to call it a species on the side of the object, not because it is not a species of that object - for if it is its similitude, it will also be a species - but because by "species on the side of the object," as we explained at length in Disputation 39, he understands only that which, being first seen, makes the object be seen. But since, as we showed in Disputation 38, chapter 2, nothing prevents an impressed species of the divine essence from being produced, why should it be denied that de facto it is given?

Finally, the same St. Thomas in the Prima Secundae, question 50, article 6, concedes that there are intellectual habits in the angels, and, explaining what sort of habits these are, he says that they are intelligible species; and all Thomists in that place call the intelligible species of the angels "habits," nor do they concede any other habit of the intellect to the angels.[727] Wherefore, what St. Thomas said in this place, question 12, article 5, ad 1, namely that the intellect is made, for understanding, by the light of glory, just as a faculty is rendered more powerful for acting by a

727. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 50, a. 6; see also his language about angelic intelligible species as "habits." Also compare the present place: I, q. 12, a. 5, ad 1. Further, St. Thomas calls the light of glory a "similitude of God" more than once: Contra Gentiles III, c. 4 (around the third argument).

habit, ought not to hinder in any way that the light of glory be called a species. For although he expressly called that light a habit, nevertheless it could be called a species, since, as we were just saying, St. Thomas himself calls intelligible species "habits."

Some object that this is against St. Thomas and all the theologians who say that God is not seen through a species. But neither St. Thomas nor the rest of the Scholastics said that in another sense than the one we have proved in Disputation 39. And among the other Scholastics, Scotus and Richard, cited above in chapter 4, defend that de facto God is seen through an impressed species by the blessed; many others say nothing about this matter. Only some Thomists, adduced in chapter 2 of this disputation, on the basis of certain words of St. Thomas, affirm that God is in the place of a species and that no other species of him is given; but concerning these places enough, and more than enough, was said in the preceding chapter, for which reason about that Thomist opinion there is no need to be concerned. Whether, however, beyond the infused species of things which were given to Christ, there was in him some light distinct from those species, we shall speak of in the Third Part, question 11, articles 2 and 5.

Add also that, since we are assigning the entire and sufficient principle of vision, if, together with the light, we conjoin to our intellect the habit of light, then, if we also add the divine essence in the place of an impressed species, the light of glory will be superfluous, as was shown in chapter 3; wherefore there is no reason for us to refuse to call the light itself an impressed species. For if the light completes the efficacy of the intellect so that it may elicit vision, it follows that God himself in the clear vision of himself holds the place of an expressed species; whereas the other things cannot in this way be brought to the intellect unless all are seen through the Word, and by an expressed likeness.

But I do not admit this difference. For, as I noted in Disputation 38, chapter 2, in every cognition there is a word, or rather the known thing itself is an expressed likeness of the object; wherefore not only other things, but God himself is not, of himself, intelligible in second act, nor is he, of himself, the intellect; rather, all things that are understood are seen by a medium of an expressed similitude. Yet this similitude, or word, does not precede in such a way that, by it, the intellect is led to the object, nor is it itself that which is seen, nor, as we have there shown, does it make the object be seen as though it were the viewed thing, in which respect we proved in that same second chapter that nothing absurd is entailed if we say that not only can God be seen through an impressed species, as is set forth in Disputation 38, but that de facto he is so seen.

They respond: that God does not only concur, after the manner of a first cause by will, to the vision of himself, but also by nature, inasmuch as he is, as object; and thus the vision of God proceeds from him alone freely, inasmuch as he freely applies himself to the intellect and is united to it for operating; but naturally, inasmuch as, as object, he cooperates with it.

I answer: We must reply that God does not so concur only as first cause, by will, to the vision of himself, but that this doctrine contains a manifest absurdity. For, as St. Thomas excellently teaches in the Prima Pars, question 19, article 4, God cannot act by necessity of nature outside himself; otherwise there would be an aggregation to infinity in a produced essence. For this reason, apart

from productions within God, no theologian concedes that anything is produced by God by a necessity of nature and inasmuch as he is; but all things are produced inasmuch as he wills, and by a most free motion; and he not only freely applies himself to the intellects, but also, by will, freely flows into the very effect. Besides, it is scarcely intelligible that in God there should be some union with an intellect which would be free and would precede his very cooperation with another; for to be united to the intellect is to cooperate with another. Therefore, since in all other cases God concurs with all causes, and yet he does not possess, in the operation, that mode proper to an object, but as first cause only he operates, it follows that, since a species can be given which, in the place of the object, naturally operates together with the intellect, that will be the connatural mode of operating.

Moreover, what some contend they prove from that text: "We walk by faith and not by sight" (2 Cor 5), where the cognition of the present life which Paul calls "by faith" is opposed to another cognition which he calls "by sight," cannot be admitted. For there Paul does not call "species" the similitude representing the object, but rather he designates by "sight" that open, face-to-face vision itself of God, adopting a metaphor from bodily vision, which is most perfect when it is not through a sign or image, but face to face; and thus by "sight" he means that manifest cognition which the blessed have, as he himself elsewhere says: "We shall see him face to face" (1 Cor 13). Therefore, that Pauline text lends no support to the view at hand against us.

Finally, Durandus adds a reason, namely that a species is posited in the place of the object because the object, according to itself, cannot be united to the potency, nor can it move it. And for this reason we attribute to the angel the species of himself so that he may see himself, because he is most intimately united to his own intellect; thus the species is, as it were, a supplement. Wherefore, since God can of himself be united to the intellect and move it, the species will be superfluous, if we attend to the natural mode of operating.

I reply: As we shall show below in Disputation 204, it is not sufficiently certain, as that opinion asserts, that the essence of an angel, so that he may understand himself, concurs as the proximate and proper principle of vision. But even if we concede, as our adversaries contend, what concerns the essence of the angel, nevertheless that same thing does not seem to be conceded concerning the divine essence. For, if the essence of the angel concurs to vision as the proximate cause and the next principle, it ought to concur according to its substance, naturally, inasmuch as it is, not inasmuch as it wills. But God cannot concur to the vision unless inasmuch as he wills; and thus, whereas he concurs with all other causes, he does not have in operation that mode proper to an object; but as first cause only he operates. Therefore, since there can be given a species which, in the place of that [object], naturally operates together with the intellect inasmuch as it is, with the intellect, that will be the connatural mode of operating.

Nor should anyone suppose that therefore we would remove what St. Thomas so often and so well teaches, namely, that other things are understood through a word and an impressed likeness, whereas God is seen by his very essence. For, as we have already explained, to say that God is seen by his essence does not exclude that there be in the intellect an impressed likeness habitualiter (as they say), or in first act, by which he is represented; for on that account some quality is said to

represent the object in this way, because it is a principle for eliciting a vision which, as we showed in Disputation 38, chapter 2, is an actual and expressed representation of the object. Therefore, since the light helps the intellect to express such a similitude of God himself, it can fittingly and suitably be called an impressed species, which habitually represents God.

And certainly, if an impressed species of the divine essence can be given - as remains proved in that Disputation 38 - it is rather to be said that that is communicated to the intellect for seeing God than that the divine essence is in the place of a species; because this more accords with the order of things and the common mode of operating, namely, that since God can effect things by some form, he should not do it by himself immediately, but that he should assume it as a secondary cause. Therefore, if he can in this way produce the vision of himself, just as the visions of other things, let it be that, with the natural order of operating preserved, the vision be produced not by himself proximately, but through his species.

They reply, rather, that it is more connatural a mode of operating that the vision of himself be produced without an impressed species than that it be produced with it; because a species is posited in the place of the object, since the object according to itself cannot be united to the potency, nor can it move it. And for this reason we attributed to the angel the species of himself, that he might see himself, because he is most intimately united to his own intellect; thus therefore the species is, as it were, a supplement. Wherefore, since God can of himself be united to the intellect and move it, the species will be superfluous, if we attend to the natural mode of operating.

I answer: We shall show below in Disputation 204 that it is not sufficiently certain what this opinion asserts concerning the essence of the angel, namely, that it concurs, as proximate and proper principle, in order that it may understand itself. But even if we concede, as the adversaries contend, this about the essence of the angel, it does not seem that the same thing should be conceded about the divine essence; for, if the essence of the angel concurs to vision as the proximate cause and the next principle, it must concur according to its substance naturally, insofar as it is, not insofar as it wills. But God cannot concur to vision unless insofar as he wills; and thus, whereas he concurs with all other causes, he does not have in operation that mode proper to an object, but, as first cause, he alone operates. Therefore, since a species can be given which, in the place of the object, naturally operates, inasmuch as it is, together with the intellect, that will be the connatural mode of operating.

What some moreover contend, they confirm from that text: "We walk by faith, not by sight" (2 Cor 5), where Paul opposes to the cognition of this life, which he calls "by faith," another cognition which he calls "by sight." By "sight," however, Paul does not call the similitude representing the object, but he calls that very open vision, for which reason he adds, "face to face" (1 Cor 13). He takes the metaphor from bodily vision, which is most perfect when it is had, not by a mirror or an enigma, but when each thing is recognized face to face. Therefore that text, rightly understood, is far from our question, and by no means excludes that there be in the intellect some impressed likeness by which the intellect is seconded to elicit the vision, while God himself is that which is seen.

But the very God himself in the clear vision of himself is in the place of a species, which, as it were, naturally operates in place of that, inasmuch as he is, with the intellect; that will be a mode connatural for operating. They answer: They answer that God not only concurs, after the mode of a first cause, by the will unto the vision of himself, but also by nature, inasmuch as he is as object, so that the vision of God proceeds from him alone freely, inasmuch as he freely applies himself to the intellect and is united to it, to operate; but naturally, inasmuch as, as object, he co-operates with it. Yet this doctrine contains a manifest absurdity. For St. Thomas excellently teaches, in the First Part, q. 19, a. 4, that God cannot act outside the necessity of nature inasmuch as he is, but inasmuch as he wills: for if outside himself, inasmuch as he is, he were to act, he would produce another infinite in essence; for which reason, besides the productions within God, no Theologian grants anything to be produced by God by necessity of nature and inasmuch as he is, but all things inasmuch as he wills, and freely; not only by reason of a free application, but also by a will freely influencing into the effect itself. Moreover, it can scarcely be understood in God that there should be some union with the intellect which is made freely and precedes the very co-operation with it: for to be united to the intellect is to co-operate with it; for that union which is of presence according to essence contributes little to the vision, as we said against Durandus, Disputation 41, cap. 2: therefore it is much better to concede a species for seeing God, which is the very light of glory.

Wherefore it can be said most rightly that God is seen by a species as he is, not indeed by a species previously seen (for in that case he, as he is, could not be seen), but by that which is the principle for eliciting the vision; just as also the other intelligibles are understood and seen and move the intellect, not by themselves, but by their likeness and impressed species. There is, however, this difference: that the other intelligible things in this way move the intellect toward their vision, since they cannot by themselves move it; but the divine essence can: wherefore it alone can be said to be per se intelligible in act first. In another way also St. Thomas in the preceding chapter of this treatise said that God is a most perfect intelligible form; other things are not so, because God alone cannot be seen by a previously expressed species.

But the very God himself in the clear vision of himself is in the place of an expressed species: the other things, however, are not to be referred to the intellect in this mode, but all are seen through the Word and an impressed likeness. Yet I would not admit this difference; for, as I noted in Disputation 38, cap. 2, in every cognition there is a word, or rather the cognition itself is an expressed likeness of the object: wherefore not only other things, but even God himself, is not per se intelligible in second act, or per se the intellect; but all the things that are understood are seen or known by a medium expressed likeness: yet that likeness, or word, intervenes in such a way that it itself is not seen, nor does it make the object to be seen first, as was proved in cap. 2 of this chapter; nothing, therefore, is absurd if we say not only that God can be seen through an impressed species, as was said above in Disputation 38, but also that in fact he is thus seen.

But what some contend to prove by that text, 2 Cor 5: "For we walk by faith, not by species [speciem]," where he opposes the knowledge of this life, which Paul calls "by faith," to another knowledge, which he calls "by species," is of no weight. For in that place Paul by "species" does not

call a similitude representing the object, but the very face itself; wherefore the vision of God was fitly named "facial," the metaphor being taken from bodily vision, which then is most perfect when it is not from behind, but face to face, whereby, when each thing is recognized, we gaze upon the thing itself. For Paul says in Greek: di' eidous, that is, "by form"; for eidos signifies not only the likeness and idea of a thing, but also the form or face - whence Porphyry, in the Isagoge, in the chapter on species, says that species is sometimes taken for form; according to which signification we are wont to say "the first form (species) is worthy of rule," and for this reason someone is called "fair" (speciosus) from his form. Therefore the sense of Paul is: we now know God by faith; we do not yet, however, behold his face and form, that is, his essence and nature, as he had also said in the First to the Corinthians 13: "But then, face to face"; and although there he does not employ the Greek name eidos, but prosopon, nevertheless the sense is altogether the same. Thus St. Augustine seems to have spoken on Psalm 21 at the beginning, when he says: "Believing in him whom we do not see, we shall be able, when we shall have seen, and to our faith there will succeed the species of his light," understanding by "species," according to the Apostle's phrase, the very face, or form, that is, the essence of God, not any likeness.

Caput VIII - The arguments by which it is proved that the light of glory is superfluous are dissolved

Nothing else seems to remain in this question than that we dissolve two arguments, by which it can be proved that the habit of the light is superfluous. One is in Durandus, IV, d. 49, q. 2, n. 21 and 22, in this way: If the light of glory is necessary, so that it render the intellect efficacious, it ought to effect this in one of two ways: either by intensifying the natural power of the intellect, or by concurring with it and aiding it after the mode of a partial agent, as two who draw a ship help one another. But it can be done in neither way; therefore the light is superfluous. In the first way it cannot be done, both because our intellect does not admit of more and less according to intensity and remission - especially since it is a proper passion of the soul - and also because, if the light were to intensify the intellect, either it would intensify it of itself formally, as one degree of heat intensifies another previously produced, as the Sun, producing some degree of heat, intensifies the preceding degree; but it cannot intensify itself formally, because light is of another kind than intellect; or it would do so by some effect produced by itself; but the light in the intellect does not produce another degree of the intellect: therefore the light of glory does not bestow power upon the intellect in that first way. Nor in the second: for if the habit of light and the intellect were to have the place of a single agent, each by itself would suffice to elicit the vision, although not so perfect as both together; for two, drawing a ship, thus constitute one principle, that each by himself could do something to the ship - at least impress an impetus. In this way, then, the intellect by itself could have some vision of God, although remiss and less perfect than with the light - which seems absurd.

But if someone were to say that in neither way ought the light to be compared with the intellect, but that it is necessary, as light in the eye of the body is necessary for seeing color, the reason stands in the way. For corporeal light is not necessary on the part of the object, nor on the part of

sight; for in darkness things are seen by the species of the thing being transmitted to vision; but on the part of the medium, in order that through it the species of visible things be transmitted to the sight: in this way, however, the light of glory does not seem necessary in the intellect.

I answer that light is not required in that former way, nor as corporeal light is required for bodily vision, but in the latter way: for from the light and the intellect there is made one integral principle of vision; wherefore by the light itself the power and efficacy of the intellect for seeing God is completed. But light and intellect are not related to vision as two drawing a ship are related to drawing. For in two ways two agents can concur to the same effect: in one way, according to altogether the same ratio in the effect itself, in which way two drawing a ship and two fires burning concur; to each agent, in the effect produced, there corresponds the same generic and specific ratio; that is, the effect proceeds from each according to the same ratio. And in this way intellect and light are not related: for these agents are of such a nature that each by itself can produce the same effect according to altogether the same generic and specific ratio, although within the same ratio more or less perfectly; hence any fire can burn; likewise anyone drawing a ship can by himself draw the ship, or at least impress some impetus toward it; but the intellect by itself, or the light by itself, can effect nothing at all in the clear vision of God.

In another way, two agents meeting to the same effect are united as ordered to one another, so that in the effect the same ratio does not correspond to them; not that one entity of being be attributed to one and another to the other; but because the effect proceeds of such a nature that, if it were from such an agent, it would not be of such a nature, ratio, and kind. And in this way intellect and light are referred to vision, as intellect and the species of such an object are referred to the cognition of that object: for thus from two there is born a vision, or cognition, of such an object, such that it would not be an intellection unless it were from the intellect, nor would it be of such an object unless it were from the light, or the species of that object; by this the power of the intellect is determined and completed, so that it elicits the vision of this object rather than of another, as was proved in cap. 3. Wherefore neither cause can operate, because neither completely corresponds to the effect according to every generic and specific ratio. Of this we have a very apt example in the intellect and the species, which necessarily compare themselves to one another for any intellection whatsoever. But because Durandus universally denies intelligible species in our intellect, let another example serve against him, of the habit of charity, which he does not deny in the will: for together with it there is the principle of the love of God, so that neither the will by itself, nor the habit, can effect anything of that love; because, inasmuch as it is love, it proceeds from the will; but inasmuch as it is of God, it proceeds from the habit of charity determining it to this object rather than to another.

The second objection is of this sort. Between the knowing faculty and the object there ought to be a congruity; which, if the faculty according to itself is not sufficiently accommodated to the object, but needs some quality in order to operate about it, it is necessary that, at least with that quality added, it should have congruity with it; otherwise that quality would be added in vain. But, the light of glory being posited in the intellect, there is still no proportion and congruity of it with God for eliciting the vision of God; therefore the light is posited in vain. Now that there is not

proportion between the intellect and God, even with the light of glory added, is clear: because the intellect remains within the limits of a finite being, but God is infinite; and there is no proportion of the finite to the infinite. In the same way Durandus argues this argument: if the light of glory were necessary in the intellect, it would be so in order that it proportion the intellect to the object; but this by no reason can light effect; for the intellect remains finite along with the light, but God is infinite; therefore light is posited in vain.

To this argument it is answered, from the doctrine handed down in Disputation 37, cap. 3, and Disputation 40, cap. 2, that between the object and the knowing (or appetitive) faculty there ought to be proportion and a certain equality, not arithmetical and of quantity, nor after the mode of quantity (for this cannot be between the finite and the infinite according to essence), but there ought to be equality and proportion in the ratio of the object and of the potency, so that the object be contained within the latitude of the object adequate to that potency, and the efficacy of the potency about that be complete. And thus does God stand with the created intellect: for he is contained under the ratio of being; he is the adequate object of the intellect; then the efficacy of the intellect is completed by the virtue of the light of glory infused, as has hitherto been proved in this disputation and the preceding ones.

This doctrine is taught by St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles III, c. 54, ad the fifth argument, and by Ferrariensis at the same place, and in the present article, ad 4; by Capreolus; by Scotus in IV, d. 49, quaest. 1, in the Respondeo in medio; by Capreolus, quaest. 4, art. 3, ad 3; by Scotus against the first conclusion; and it seems to be that of Cajetan in this article, ad primum of Durandus, when he asserts that the light of glory must be posited, not that the potency be equated to the object by augmenting it according to perfection, but lest the excellence of the object impede the efficacy of the potency - that is, that it render the intellect efficacious for seeing God, which is to establish the intellect in the due proportion of the potency with its object.[728]

Disputatio XLIV - Whether the light of glory can be made natural to some creature

That this cannot at all be done. Cap. 1. That the very vision of God is connatural to the intellect endowed with the light of glory. Cap. 2.

Caput I - That this cannot at all be done

The Scholastics commonly call the light of glory a supernatural form; that is, above the perfection of created nature, properly speaking. But since something is called "supernatural" in a twofold way, as we shall show in Disputation 44, cap. 3: one supernatural according to its

728. St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles III, c. 54, ad 5; Ferrariensis at the same place; and in the present article, ad 4. Capreolus; Scotus, IV, d. 49, quaest. 1, Respondeo in medio; Capreolus, quaest. 4, art. 3, ad 3; Scotus against the first conclusion; Cajetan on this article, ad primum Durandi, asserting that the light of glory is to be posited not to make the potency equal to the object by augmenting its perfection, but lest the object's excellence impede the potency's efficacy, that is, to render the intellect efficacious for seeing God, establishing it in the due proportion to its object.

substance, which by its own nature is above the perfection of any created nature and fits none by its own proper principles; the other supernatural only on the side of the efficient cause, because it is brought about outside the natural and common order of things, as when sight is restored to a blind man. Here we need not dispute in what way the light of glory is supernatural; from what we shall say in that disputation it will easily be clear what ought to be held on this matter. Here, therefore, it must only be explained whether the light of glory, which we here suppose to be of a supernatural order according to its substance and its own nature, can become natural to some created intellect.

St. Thomas, in article 3, reply to the third, plainly teaches that this form cannot become natural to any created intellect; which is as much as to say that no created intellect, from the principles of its own nature alone or from the perfection naturally due to it, can see God, but for this needs some perfection added above its nature, such as the light of glory. This is evident with regard to intellects already created, whether human or angelic. For if any creature could by nature see God, it could by nature be blessed; but this cannot be. By the very fact that something is a created nature, it cannot but be peccable, as will be proved below in Disputation 231; and therefore it needs the grace of God, that it may be freed from sin, be adopted as a daughter of God, and be made an heir of beatitude. Hence no creature is blessed by its own nature; indeed, we shall show there that there is no true natural beatitude of a rational creature.

Moreover, although in the Clementine *Ad nostrum* concerning heretics it is defined only of the human intellect that it needs the light of glory in order to see God, the same reasoning seems to me to hold for the angels. Hence Maior wrongly asserts, in IV, dist. 49, q. 4, at the end, that it is not certain whether there is, or could be produced by God, some angel who by his own nature could see God without some higher light. Maior is mistaken. First, because if angels could by their nature see God, they could also by their nature be blessed, and so would not need the grace of God for the attainment of beatitude. Next, because there does not seem to be greater reason for the intellect of a created angel, or of any other intellect that could be created, to prevail by its own power to see God than for the intellect of man; for the intellect always remains within the limits of a finite creature, whereas God is infinite in essence.

Moreover, certain theologians, prying too curiously into such matters, ask whether at least some rational nature could be created that would itself be of a supernatural order, and for which the light of glory would therefore be natural. I do not see on what ground this is asked. If the notion of the supernatural is rightly considered, it can belong only to an accidental form, not to a created substance. For a created substance would be called "supernatural" either because it is higher than another substance, and thus there would be innumerable supernatural substances; or because it is produced by God alone through creation, and thus all souls and angels would be of a supernatural order, which no one will dare to say. It remains, therefore, that the notion of the supernatural belongs only to a created accidental form. Since such a form is the perfection of a created substance, which is called a natural thing, it is then called supernatural when it perfects that substance above what the substance itself, or any other created substance, demands from its own principles and natural constitution. This will be explained more fully below in Disputation 21, cap.

2; there too we shall show from Cajetan's doctrine on this article, in the third reply against Scotus in the prologue question and in IV, dist. 49, q. 8, that in our forms the natural and the supernatural are to be taken not only from their order to a cause operating in this or that manner, but from the forms considered in themselves. Some forms are called natural because they perfect some substance from its principles and its proper constitution; others are called supernatural because they perfect no substance in that way.

Some say that a supernatural substance could therefore be produced, because there could be something of the same order as God. But they can in no way explain how it could be of the same order as God, and an argument can readily be brought against them. However spiritual such a substance might be, if it is to be of the same order as God it must be rational; yet no creature can be produced that cannot sin, and therefore none can be produced that is supernatural in this sense. For if a creature can sin and be damned, how will it be of the same order as God? That no nature can be created which cannot sin will be proved from the doctrine of the Fathers and from reason below in Disputation 231.

Caput II - Whether the very vision of God is connatural to the intellect endowed with the light of glory

Dominic de Soto, in IV, dist. 49, q. 2, art. 4, asks whether the vision itself is connatural to the intellect of the blessed. He answers that not only is the vision supernatural to the intellect according to itself, but also to the intellect furnished with the light of glory. He proves this: because since that very light is supernatural to the intellect, the vision too, which is elicited by virtue of the light, will be [supernatural]. But for an action to be natural, it is necessary that the potency, which is the principle of that action according to its nature, be natural, even if it has been restored above nature on the side of the efficient cause, as is the eye of a blind man: for the faculty of seeing is so natural to man in itself that the vision elicited by it is also natural.

Cajetan. Scotus. Ferrariensis. Contrariwise, the way of speaking of Cajetan in this article, reply to the second argument of Scotus and of Ferrariensis, ad 3, cap. 54, around the fourth objection, is proven to me, who say that the clear vision of God, if the vision be referred to the bare intellect and considered according to itself, is supernatural to it, as is abundantly established; but referred to the intellect endowed with the supernatural light, it is natural to it. And the reason is manifest: for that which is supernatural to something exceeds its powers and natural perfection; but that which does not exceed it is not supernatural to it. Now the blessed vision exceeds the powers of the intellect according to itself, but not the powers which it has from the light of glory: therefore, although it is supernatural to the intellect according to itself, yet to the intellect having the light it will be natural; otherwise indeed than the bodily vision is compared to the restored eye and to the man himself. For, as Ferrariensis well notes, although the restitution of the eye is supernatural on the part of the manner of the efficient cause, nevertheless the restored eye is a natural form to the man himself, and is naturally conserved in him; whence it comes about that the vision elicited by it is natural not

only to the man having the eye, but also to man according to himself, since the eye is a natural perfection of man. To the intellect, however, having the light, the vision of God is natural in another way.

We must observe, when we say that the vision is natural to the intellect endowed with the light of glory, that it is not to be understood in such a way that it is natural to it as to the subject receiving it: for since it is both proximately received in the naked intellect according to itself, and not through the medium of the light of glory or another supernatural disposition, as was set down in the preceding disputation, cap. 1, it follows that for the intellect receiving the vision it is a supernatural perfection, because it is above the nature of that in which it is received. Yet the vision is said to be natural to the intellect having the light of glory, as to an agent, because the intellect equipped with such a light, by its own virtue, naturally elicits the vision; and thus the vision is natural to the principle eliciting it, not to the subject in which it is received.

Disputatio XLV - Whether, besides the light of glory, the light of the agent intellect is necessary for seeing God

Caput I - The two scholastic opinions

Prima sententia. Apart from Capreolus and Ricardus, I find no other among the Scholastics who treated this question; and since it seems to be of slight moment, I will dispatch it briefly; yet I will first say what the two cited authors hold. Thus Capreolus, in IV, dist. 49, q. 4, art. 3, ad argumentum 3, in the place adduced from Aureolus against the second conclusion, teaches that the light of glory is not infused into the blessed in order to give power and efficacy to the agent intellect, since no species is abstracted for seeing God - which seems to be the proper office of the agent intellect - but in order to strengthen the possible intellect, as remains explained in Disputation 43, cap. 2, according to his opinion.[729]

Secunda sententia. By contrast, Ricardus, in IV, dist. 49, art. 3, q. 2, affirms that both lights, namely of the agent intellect and of glory, are necessary for seeing God, whether we say that the vision is produced by God alone - for thus both are required as a disposition for receiving the vision, the light of glory principally, but the light of the agent intellect in second place - or even if we assert that the vision is produced by the intellect: for to this effect it is necessary that the intellect be helped by both lights; but he proves neither by any reason.[730]

Caput II - What the light of the agent intellect is, and whether it contributes anything to the clear vision of God

We shall easily reply to the difficulty if first it be explained what the light of the agent intellect is; for from this it will be plain whether it contributes anything to the clear vision of God or not. Certain philosophers said that the agent intellect is really distinct from the possible, and serves to

illumine the phantasms and from them to abstract intelligible species. But if that were true, in no way would it be necessary, either for receiving or eliciting the vision of God, as is evident: for the vision is not received save in the possible intellect, nor is it produced by any other than by it.

For what some assert, that the light of the agent intellect not only abstracts species but also illumines first principles so that they be seen, is fictitious; for it can hardly be understood, much less explained, what that "illumination" of the agent intellect about principles might be.

Besides Capreolus and Richard I have found no other among the Scholastics who treated this question; and since it seems to be of slight moment, I will dispatch it briefly; yet I will first say what the two authors thought. Capreolus, then, in IV, distinction 49, question 4, article 3, to argument 3 adduced from Aureolus against the second conclusion, teaches that the light of glory is not infused into the blessed so as to give force and efficacy to the agent intellect - since no species is abstracted for seeing God, which seems to be the agent intellect's proper office - but rather to strengthen the possible intellect, as remains explained, according to his opinion, in Disputation 43, chapter 2.[731] Richard, on the other hand, in IV, dist. 49, art. 3, q. 2, affirms that both lights, namely that of the agent intellect and that of glory, are necessary for seeing God: whether we say that the vision is produced by God alone - for thus both are required as dispositions for receiving the vision, principally the light of glory, in the second place the agent intellect's light - or whether we assert that the vision is produced by the intellect; for to this effect the intellect must needs be helped by both lights. But neither point does he prove by any reason.[732]

The true opinion, however, is that the name "light" is rightly given to the agent intellect precisely inasmuch as, by means of the species it produces from the phantasm, it produces the act of seeing or knowing the object, which is its manifestation; the object's "illumination" can also very well be so called. From this doctrine, which seems quite consonant with philosophical principles, the solutions to the present difficulty are gathered plainly. First, since for eliciting the vision of God no species is abstracted by the power of the agent intellect, it follows that by no reason is its light necessary for that vision, or conducive to it. Next, since the vision, according to what is truer, is elicited by the possible intellect and by the light of glory, it follows that the light of the possible intellect is conducive to the vision, but not the light of the agent; without the latter it is sufficient for eliciting the vision and manifesting God himself.

Disputatio XLVI - Whether our intellect can be moved to the vision of God without the habit of the light of glory

Prior opinion of Capreolus and others. Cap. I. Truer opinion. Cap. II.

729. Capreolus, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 49, q. 4, art. 3, ad 3, drawing on Aureolus against the second conclusion.
730. Ricardus, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 49, art. 3, q. 2.
731. Capreolus, IV, dist. 49, q. 4, a. 3, ad arg. 3 (citing Aureolus) against the second conclusion; cf. Disp. 43, cap. 2.
732. Richard, IV, dist. 49, art. 3, q. 2.

Caput I - The prior opinion of Capreolus and of others

The present controversy is not whether a created intellect, by its native power and by God's common concurrence owed to it, can see God clearly; for that cannot be done, as was sufficiently proved against the Anomoeans and Durandus in Disputation 41. Rather, it is whether, without the habit of the light of glory, by a special divine concurrence and efficacy our intellect can be sufficiently helped so that it sees God clearly, as it could do with the habit. Whether, moreover, it be contrary to the Clementine "Ad nostrum" De haereticis to assert that de facto the habit of the light of glory is not given, but that by special aid alone our intellect is helped, has already been said in Disputation 42.

On the question thus understood, the first opinion is that God cannot by any special concurrence supply the force and efficacy of the light; and therefore, without it, He cannot move our intellect to a clear vision of Himself. Thus thought Capreolus in IV, disputation 49, question 4, article 3, to the doubts adduced from Scotus, 4th place, against the second conclusion, to the 3rd and 4th; and at the end of the article Dominicus de Soto, on the same distinction, question 2, article 4; but most fully is this handed down by Ferrariensis, Contra gentiles, cap. 54, n. 9, "Ad quartum dicitur," and by some more recent Thomists, who indeed do not say that without the habit of light and a permanent quality the thing cannot be done, but at least that it cannot be done without some light which is a quality distinct from the vision itself and received in the intellect - even if it remains after the manner of a passion - of the sort they think was in Paul when he is said to have seen God; Cajetan also indicates their opinion briefly in this article, solution to the objections; likewise a second part of Scotus, and Durandus to the second

Further, they grant that the vision itself, under the notion of a certain quality, can be produced by God without any light, which is a quality distinct from the vision itself; by that, however, the intellect cannot see the object. Whether indeed it can thus be produced by God alone, or also at the same time with the intellect, they do not define. Rather, they say that the vision, which makes the intellect to be seeing, cannot, as has been explained, be produced by the intellect without some light, even with some special concurrence of God aiding.

Their opinion is proved first thus. It belongs to the notion of a vital operation to be produced by an intrinsic principle of that operation, in which it remains, so that in no way can this be supplied by God; if He were to supply it, that operation would not have the character of a vital act, but of a certain quality. But the light, which is the principle of vision, is the internal principle of it; therefore the efficacy of that light cannot be supplied by God; or if it be supplied, that vision will remain only under the notion of a certain quality, not of a vital operation.

Next: if God were to supply the force of that quality and light, the intellect would be referred to God not as a second cause, whose proper part it is to operate by a form inhering in it, which is the proper principle of the operation and effect, but as an instrument for eliciting the vision: wherefore God would be the principal cause; therefore He rather than the intellect would be said to see by

that vision - which is absurd; for an action more properly denominates the cause than the instrument. For this reason some more recent men think that our intellect can in no way be helped by God to the vision by way of an instrument.[733]

Caput II - The truer opinion

I, for my part, see nothing repugnant to God's being able, by His power and special concurrence with the created intellect, to supply all the efficacy of the quality, and with the intellect alone to produce the vision of Himself. This is the opinion of Paludanus in IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, concl. 2; of Thomas of Argentina, q. 2, art. 1, concl. 1; and of Maior, q. 4, cap. verum: they confirm the first point by this reason. Among theologians and physicists it is indubitable that all the efficacy of a form which acts can be supplied by the concurrence of God, and that the effect which otherwise required to be brought about by a secondary cause can be brought about immediately by God alone; they except only the principle of a vital operation precisely as vital, for this ought to be so innate to the living thing that without it a vital operation cannot be performed by God alone, according to the more common opinion of theologians, which we shall treat in I - II, q. 3, art. 2; although there are not lacking those who assert that even this kind of principle can be supplied by God.

Be that as it may, although, as I said, this cannot be done, no one, however, doubts that God's mere concurrence and aid can be substituted in the place of a non-vital principle, and that, without an intrinsic principle from which the operation has the notion of being vital, an operation can be produced by God alone. Now the light of glory, whether as a habit or as that quality distinct from the vision, is not the principle of vision as it is a vital operation, for in this respect the vision has it from the intellect; but that it be clear and of such an object, it has from the light: therefore God can by Himself supply the force of that. For not every form inhering in the intellect or in the cognitive faculty - such as a habit or a species - is the principle of cognition as it is a vital operation: for these qualities come from without and are not native to the living thing itself, as the cognitive or appetitive faculty is; wherefore from these faculties comes the ratio of the vital in the operation, not from other qualities.

Then it is proved that God can supply the power of the intelligible species; indeed, according to Capreolus and others consenting to his opinion, de facto the divine essence is substituted in the place of the impressed species, which otherwise inheres in the intellect for eliciting the vision; likewise, God can move the will without the habit of charity and without any other quality distinct from love: therefore He can also supply the power of the light for eliciting the vision.

By these reasons it is proved not only that the vision of the divine essence can be produced by God alone with our intellect, inasmuch as it is a certain quality which does not render a man seeing - this the Doctors of the prior opinion concede - but also inasmuch as it is a vision and renders the intellect seeing. Moreover, as we shall show at length in I - II, q. 3, art. 2, those things which the

733. Capreolus as above; Dominicus de Soto, IV, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 4; Ferrariensis, *Contra gentiles*, cap. 54, n. 9, ad 4; recentiores Thomistae; hints in Cajetan, in this article, ad sol. Scotus and Durandus referenced in the same loci.

Doctors of the prior opinion teach do not rightly cohere among themselves, namely that the vision can be produced by God alone with the intellect, yet so that it does not render the intellect seeing; for if it is a vision, it cannot fail to impart its formal effect to the subject, namely to the intellect; but the effect is to be seeing. If it does not impart this effect, that is a sign that that quality is not a vision, but something else.

From what has been said the first argument of the prior opinion is solved. To the second I reply: although God were to supply the efficacy of the light and were the principal agent of the vision, while the intellect were only instrumental, nevertheless the vision would not denominate God either principally or at all, but the intellect. Indeed, God would in no way be rendered seeing or be denominated as such; for in this way God is not called "seeing," although He is the cause of the vision; nor is it inferred from the fact that He is the principal cause that He should be denominated chiefly from the vision. It is altogether accidental that some agent be denominated from an action, whether it be the principal or only the instrumental agent - although sometimes the principal is more chiefly denominated. In an immanent operation, this is what must be peculiarly observed: that only that agent is denominated by the operation in which the operation itself is received - whether the immanent operation is formally a production, or is a quality and the action only (as they say) grammatical. Therefore this kind of action denominates only the having subject, not the producer; and hence, in that case, even if God were the principal agent of the vision, He would not be denominated by it, but only the intellect, which would nonetheless be the instrumental agent, because it would be the subject of that vision.

In transitive actions, however, it happens otherwise: for those actions are wont to denominate the agents in which they do not remain, although sometimes not all of them, but the proximate and proper ones: as generation, by which one man generates another, which is an origin of a living being from a living being, from a conjoined principle in the likeness of nature, does not denominate God, although He is the chief author of it, yet not the proper and proximate [author]; but it denominates only the man. This happens whenever an action connotes a peculiar respect and mode of operating of one cause rather than of another, as is manifest in the example adduced.

...it is manifest: whence it comes about that a man produced by a man and by God is not said to be begotten of God, nor is he called His son; rather, he is properly named the son of the man.

Articulus VI - Whether among those seeing the essence of God one sees more perfectly than another

It is proceeded to the sixth thus. It is objected that, among those who see the essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than another. For it is said in 1 John 3: "We shall see him as he is"; but he himself is in one way. Therefore he will be seen in one way by all. Therefore it will not be the case that some see more perfectly and others less perfectly.[734]

1. Further, St. Augustine says in the book 83 Questions that one man cannot understand one and the same thing more than another.[735] But all who see God through His essence understand the essence of God; for God is seen by the intellect, not by the senses, as was said above.[736] Therefore, among those seeing the divine essence one is not more clearly seeing than another.
2. Further, that something be seen more perfectly than something else can arise from two sources: either on the part of the visible object, or on the part of the power of sight in the seer. On the part of the object: by the fact that the object is received more perfectly in the seer, namely according to a more perfect likeness; which does not obtain in the present case. For God is not present to the intellect of the one seeing through some likeness, but is present through His essence. Therefore, if one sees more perfectly than another, this is due to a difference of intellectual power. And thus it follows that he whose intellectual power is naturally higher will see more clearly. But this is unfitting, since to men there is promised in beatitude an equality with the angels.

But on the contrary: Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according to that of John 17: "This is eternal life," etc. Therefore, if all see the essence of God equally in eternal life, all will be equal; the contrary of which the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 15: "One star differs from another star in brightness."

I answer that, among those seeing God through His essence, one will see Him more perfectly than another. And this certainly will not be by reason of some more perfect likeness of God in one than in another, since that vision is not going to be through any likeness, as has been shown; but it will be by reason of this, that the intellect of one will have a greater power or faculty for seeing God than that of another. Now the faculty of seeing God does not befit the created intellect according to its own nature, but through the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*), which establishes the intellect in a certain deiformity, as is clear from the foregoing. Whence the intellect that participates more in the light of glory will see God more perfectly. And he will participate more in the light of glory who has more of charity (*caritas*); because where there is greater charity, there there is a greater desire.

734. 1 John 3:2. The marginal references (4. dist. 49; q.2, a.4; et 3. contr. cap. 56) point to loci paralleling St. Thomas's method in this article.

735. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 32.

736. Cf. above, this question, article 3.

And desire in a certain way makes the one desiring apt and prepared for the reception of what is desired. Whence he who will have more of charity will see God more perfectly and will be more blessed.

Reply to the first: When it is said, "We shall see him as he is," the adverb "as" determines the mode of vision on the part of the thing seen; so that the sense is: we shall see that He is as He is, because we shall see His very "to be," which is His essence. It does not determine the mode of vision on the part of the seer, so that the sense would be that the mode of seeing will be as perfect as it is in God the perfect mode of existing. And from this the reply to the second is also evident.

Further reply (to the second): When it is said that one man does not understand one and the same thing better than another, this is true if it is referred to the mode of the thing understood; because whoever understands that a thing is otherwise than it is, does not truly understand. But it is not true if it is referred to the mode of understanding; because the understanding of one is more perfect than the understanding of another.

Reply to the third: The diversity of seeing will not be on the part of the object, because the same object will be presented to all, namely the essence of God; nor through a diverse participation of the object by different likenesses, but it will be through a diverse faculty of the intellect - not indeed natural, but glorious, as has been said.

Note concerning the text of the article.

Conclusion. According to the measure of charity - that is, of merits and of sanctification in this life - one will see God more than another. This is quite certain among the theologians, although there are some difficulties about it which must be examined in the following disputation. But before we approach that, it is here briefly to be explained from the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor what he means, when he asserts that the inequality of the visions of God in the blessed does not arise from a diversity of species through which God is seen, but from the light which is not communicated to the blessed in the same way. He therefore does not deny an impressed species on the part of the intellect for seeing, which we shall prove to be the very light itself; but he denies a species by which God, once seen, is seen again, as we explained in Disputation 39; and for this reason he rightly denies that God is seen unequally by the blessed because unequal species of God Himself, which, once seen, would make God to be seen, are formed: for by these He is not seen, as we have also shown at length there.[737] Therefore the whole reason for inequality proceeds on the part of the light by which the intellect is equipped to elicit the vision: for according as one is strengthened by this very light in varying degrees, so too it elicits the vision in varying degrees, as we shall show more fully in the following disputation.

Disputatio XLVII - Whether God is seen equally by the blessed

- Caput I - The Catholic truth is established against the heretics.

737. See Disputation 39, where Vazquez argues at length that God is not seen by an impressed species distinct from the light of glory; rather, the light itself equips the intellect for the intuitive vision.

- Caput II - Three other places of Scripture are examined, by which this same truth is wont to be proved.
- Caput III - What the Fathers think concerning the parable of the laborers (Matthew 20).
- Caput IV - The parable is explained according to its proper sense, and an answer is given to Jovinian's argument.
- Caput V - The first argument against the Catholic doctrine is solved.
- Caput VI - Another argument against the same doctrine is refuted.

Caput I - The Catholic truth is established against the heretics

The heresy of Jovinian, as St. Jerome writes in book 2 against him, asserted that all the rewards of the blessed are equal and the same; and that therefore God is not seen more perfectly by one than by another.[738] Thus he taught in the time of Pope Siricius, as Alphonsus de Castro testifies against the heresies under the word "Beatitude," heresy 7, and Sanders in book 7 De visibili monarchia, heresy 87; for, as Alphonsus also says, under Damasus he was a monk, under Siricius he cast off the monastic life and taught the aforesaid error. Whether moreover he held the same opinion regarding the equality of sins, we shall say in I - II, question 73, article 2.[739] This error was condemned in the Council of Thelense under Pope Siricius, in the epistle of the Council to him - which is the 81st among the epistles of St. Ambrose, who was present at that Council - and in the Council of Florence under Eugenius IV, in the last session, in the letters of union, the Catholic truth was likewise defined: namely, that, according to the distinction of merits, the very essence of God is seen by the blessed in various degrees; how moreover in the same individual vision this variety can be assigned will be more fully explained in the last chapter.[740]

Against Jovinian the Fathers wrote excellently, St. Jerome in that dialogue, and St. Augustine in the book De sancta virginitate; and of the more recent, Alphonsus de Castro in the cited place; and St. Jerome refutes his error by many testimonies of Scripture, of which we shall adduce some

The first place is 2 Corinthians 9: "He that sows sparingly shall also reap sparingly; and he that sows in blessings, shall also reap of blessings"; where an abundant recompense of reward corresponds to abundant merit, and a lesser to a lesser.

The second place is Ephesians 4: "But to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ"; where there is no doubt that the Apostle speaks of the various gifts of grace which Christ, as it pleased Him, as head, distributed to the members of His Church; nor did He bestow the same gift upon all indiscriminately, but, as Paul says, "And he gave some indeed Apostles, and some Prophets," etc.; by which words he indicates the various offices of the members

738. St. Jerome, Adversus Iovinianum, lib. 2.

739. Alphonsus de Castro, Adversus haereses, s.v. Beatitudo, haer. 7; Nicholas Sander, De visibili monarchia, lib. 7, haer. 87; cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I - II, q. 73, a. 2.

740. Council of Thelense under Pope Siricius (as reported in the epistle counted as no. 81 among the letters of St. Ambrose); Council of Florence (under Eugenius IV), last session, in the Decree of Union.

of the Church. Therefore, since the reward of this life corresponds to merit, and since in this militant Church Christ communicated various merits, it follows that He has also reserved various and unequal rewards in beatitude.

The third place is 1 Corinthians 15, which, according to the common interpretation of all the Greeks and Latins, appears to express this same truth. For there, speaking of the future resurrection of bodies - which some thought impossible - Paul says: "One is the brightness of the sun, another the brightness of the moon, and another the brightness of the stars; for star differs from star in brightness; so also is the resurrection of the dead." This place, besides St. John Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius, Primasius, and Bede, and other Latin Fathers, St. Jerome in the book against Jovinian, and St. Augustine in De sancta virginitate, chapter 26, understood in this sense, to prove that the rewards of merits will be diverse in the other life; whose exposition most pleases me.[741] For when Paul had there treated of the future resurrection of bodies, he proposed the doubt in these words: "But some man will say: How do the dead rise again?" and he answers thus: "Fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die first; and that which thou sowest, thou dost not sow the body that shall be, but bare grain, as of wheat, or of some of the rest. But God giveth it a body as he will; and to every seed its own body." By this example he showed that it is not impossible for God, after the death of our body, again to recall us to life and to give us a body and a life, as the seeds of merits will have demanded.

Then he shows the diversity of bodies as able to be produced by God, in these words: "All flesh is not the same flesh, but one indeed of men, another of beasts," etc.; and this in animals. But in other things after this manner: "And there are bodies celestial, and bodies terrestrial" - supply "there are" - "but one is the glory (that is, the beauty) of the celestial, and another of the terrestrial; one is the brightness of the sun, another the brightness of the moon, and another the brightness of the stars; for star differs from star in brightness; so also is the resurrection of the dead." To what purpose, moreover, would Paul have said that God gives to the seed a body, to each one according to its proper power, and would have shown such diversity of bodies made by God, unless he wished from there to declare the resurrection of the dead? Would he not be saying, "So also the resurrection of the dead," unless he wished to declare a diversity of merits and of the glory of brightness? Observe well then that Paul, when he applies the example which he adduced from the seed to the resurrection, observed only in that comparison that "it is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual," that is, immortal, as is clear from the subsequent words; but he never applied to the diversity of merits an example from the diversity of bodies. And thus someone could say that the whole variety of bodies was brought in by Paul only that he might show the wisdom and omnipotence of God, who knows how to create so many and such diverse bodies for diverse, nay even for the same, genera of things; that so he might persuade that God is also able to bring forth into incorruption the animal and mortal body which in this life dies and is as it were sown in death.

741. St. John Chrysostom; Theodoret; Theophylact; Oecumenius; Primasius; Bede; St. Jerome, Adversus Iovinianum; St. Augustine, De sancta virginitate, c. 26.

But the former exposition, especially strengthened and confirmed by the authority of the Fathers, pleases me more. The Catholic truth was handed down in this same way by the Fathers whom we have cited above; but the arguments which are wont to be made against it will be solved below.

Caput II - Three other places of Scripture are examined, by which this same truth is wont to be proved

Besides these testimonies of Scripture, St. Jerome in the cited dialogue adduces other passages which, if one consider rightly, will not seem so efficacious; of which it has pleased me to report only three. The first is Matthew 5: "He therefore that shall break one of these least commandments, and shall so teach men, shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven." But where there is a least, there must be a greater; therefore not all are equal in the kingdom of heaven. Yet, as we shall say in the following chapter, in that place Christ wished not to signify...

... not to signify that such a Doctor would indeed be in heavenly glory, yet in the very lowest rank; rather, he said "least," that is, "to be by no means admitted and not to be numbered among the sons." For he speaks of one who has taught, but has not kept the whole law; and such a one, undoubtedly, will not be a sharer of heavenly beatitude. Therefore from that passage nothing can be proved.

It is objected: In that place the discourse is about the least precepts, the transgression of which is only a venial sin; and of these Christ said: "Whoever shall break one of these least commandments and shall so teach men, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. 5); that is, he will have less reward in beatitude.

It is rejected: Yet this exposition cannot be true. For the greatness of the reward must be weighed by the greatness and multitude of merits and of grace; but it can happen that one who has broken one of the least commandments - namely, those obliging only under venial sin - may have greater merits and more grace than others who have not broken them. Such a one, therefore, will not be inferior in beatitude, but much greater, after he has paid the penalties in purgatory.

The second passage is Matt. 11: "There has not arisen among those born of women a greater than John the Baptist; yet he who is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he." Therefore, if in the kingdom of heaven - that is, in eternal beatitude - there is someone "less" who, compared with John, is greater than he, it follows that not all will be equal in beatitude. But in those words Christ was not speaking of John's sanctity before God, when he compares him with the others born of women; nor did he prefer him to all others in sanctity, or assert that none was to be preferred to him - so holds Jansen in book 47 of the Concordia Evangelica - although in the same chapter Christ with other words praised the sanctity of John; and this is manifest from the context of Luke 7: "I say to you, among those born of women there is no greater prophet than John the Baptist." And although some Greeks in Luke do not add the particle "prophet," yet the corrected Latin Vulgate places it, and the context seems to require it. Therefore, Christ prefers John to others in the dignity of prophet, not in merits and sanctity before God. And wishing indeed to express that very dignity, a little earlier he had called him "more than a prophet," not because he had known by the prophetic

Spirit alone that Christ was the true Messiah whom before he had not seen, but also because he had pointed to him with his finger. But what he immediately subjoins - according to St. Jerome's way of taking the passage - "Yet he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he," is not interpreted in the same way by all. Some understand it of the angels who then were in the kingdom of beatitude, so that the sense would be: the lesser who is now in beatitude is holier than John; and this sense could very well serve St. Jerome.[742]

This interpretation is put forward by St. Augustine, book 3 Contra adversarium legis, c. 5, and St. Ambrose on that place of Luke 7, and Tertullian, book 4 Contra Marcionem, c. 28 - unless, as Pamelius has noted, Tertullian in the same place, with a different punctuation, reads thus: "He who is lesser or modest" - that is, in humility in this life - "is greater in the kingdom of heaven than he," namely than John the Baptist living in this life.[743] Yet this exposition is hindered by what we have said and have clearly proved from the text of Luke, namely, that in that place John is not compared with the others born of women in sanctity, but in the excellence of prophecy. Wherefore the clause "He that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he" must be understood in the same way: namely, not of degree of sanctity, but of revelation and knowledge of the mysteries. So understood, however, it does not prove what St. Jerome contends. For since the quality of the reward of beatitude - consisting in the clear knowledge of God - could be such that one, by a peculiar revelation, would know more mysteries than another, as will be made clear in Disputation 50, nothing follows for inequality or equality of sanctity per se.

Others, however, refer the clause "He that is least in the kingdom of heaven" to Christ himself, who was speaking; and thus, whether the comparison be made in the gift of prophecy and the knowledge of mysteries, or even in sanctity, it is most true to say: "He is greater than he," that is, than John the Baptist. Tertullian and Augustine so understand it in the places cited; and the same Augustine in Tractate 13 on John; Bede on that Luke 7; St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Euthymius on that Matt. 11. Then, as Bede admonishes, and as Pamelius rightly taught in the cited place, according to Tertullian's mind, it must be read with this punctuation: "But he who is lesser - in the kingdom of heaven - is greater than he." Now, Christ is said to be lesser either in age, or also in dignity and sanctity, according to the opinion of the crowd, as the aforesaid authors have noted. On this exposition, however, the exposition of St. Jerome, from that place, can gather nothing, as is sufficiently clear.

On further testimonies of Scripture

Nor will anything be proved from that place if we follow a third interpretation, which seems to me quite consonant with the letter: that by those words Christ compared John, as to the dignity of prophesying and of explaining mysteries, with the prophets who preceded him. Thus when he says of the prophet, "There has not arisen a greater," he not only denies that anyone was greater than

742. St. Augustine, Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum, lib. 3, c. 5; St. Ambrose, on Luke 7; Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem, lib. 4, c. 28; on Tertullian's punctuation, see Pamelius, ad locum.

743. Cornelius Jansen (Jansenius), Concordia Evangelica, c. 47; Bede, on Luke 7; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. in Matth. 11; Theophylact and Euthymius, on the same passage; Augustine, Tractatus 13 in Ioannem; Pamelius, ad Tertullianum.

John, but he also seems to indicate, with respect to the prophets, that John was more excellent than the rest; for by a common way of speaking we are accustomed by "greater" to signify "more excellent." This sense is confirmed by what had preceded: "But what went you out to see? A prophet? Yea, I say to you, and more than a prophet." For John saw and, taught by the prophetic Spirit, pointed with his finger to him whom the others had foretold and desired to see, but did not see; therefore, he is rightly said to be greater than all the other prophets. Moreover, that John alone in the gift and dignity of prophecy is preferred to the rest we have already shown from the text of Luke. But when it is said, "He that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he," it is surely understood of the same gift of prophesying; and "the kingdom of heaven" denotes not the homeland of beatitude, but the future preaching of the evangelical law. Therefore, one lesser than Christ's Apostles and disciples - who was to be a prophet in the gift both of explaining and preaching the mysteries of our evangelical faith - is preferred to John, not in sanctity, but in the gift of knowing and explaining the mysteries. For by far more mysteries were to be explained to the Christian people after John's death than John expounded; and the dignity of a prophet is to be weighed not from the foretelling of future things alone, but also from the explication of mysteries; indeed, in this sense "prophecy" and "prophet" are used in 1 Cor. 14.

Finally, that by "the kingdom of heaven" the preaching of the evangelical law is signified, can be gathered not only from other places of the Gospel, but manifestly from that same chapter of Matthew 11. For in Luke 8 the "kingdom of God" is compared to a man who, while he was sowing, cast part of the seed among thorns. And after setting forth the parable, Christ said to his disciples: "To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God," namely, what lay hidden in that parable, etc. The parable, however, indicated the event of the future evangelical preaching. And in chapter 9 the same preaching is called the "kingdom of God." In Matthew 10 it is called the "kingdom of heaven" in these words, "The kingdom of heaven has drawn near," and in Luke 10, "The kingdom of God has drawn near unto you." But Matthew 11, when Christ spoke of that same John, says: "From the days of John the Baptist the kingdom of heaven suffers violence, and the violent seize it." For Christ did not signify that those who were to obtain the kingdom of heaven - that is, beatitude - must do violence to their own inordinate affections; that would be an improper way of speaking: for it is one thing to do violence to oneself, another to do violence to the kingdom of heaven. The sense, therefore, is this: from the preaching of John the Baptist - who prepared the way for the evangelical preaching, and therefore is called "more than a prophet," and the "angel" whom the Lord sent before the face of Christ, than whom there has not arisen a greater - many strive with all their might to hear the evangelical preaching, and, persevering and brave (whom Matthew calls "violent"), to embrace it. This sense Luke clearly expresses to us in chapter 16 in these words: "The Law and the Prophets were until John" (supply: they foretold the evangelical preaching), for thus Matthew 11 says of John: "All the Prophets and the Law prophesied until John"; for he with his very finger pointed out the author of the Gospel. Wherefore in him every prediction of Christ ceased. "From that time (namely, John) the kingdom of God is gospelled," that is, it is no longer foretold, but announced, "and everyone does violence into it." Matthew, indeed, had said, "Suffers violence."

The third passage, which St. Jerome also adduces against Jovinian, is 1 Corinthians 15: "And as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive; but each in his own order." Now Paul, as we saw a little earlier, was treating of the resurrection; therefore, when he says "each in his own order," it follows that not all will be equal. For "order" is the relation of many to one first; and consequently some diversity must be among them. Yet the other Fathers interpret this passage thus: St. John Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Theophylact refer that "order" to the good and the wicked, who are to be set in a different order: the wicked at the left, but the good at the right. But the exposition of Oecumenius and Primasius seems to fit the text better: they say that that order is to be established between Christ, who raises, and the others who are raised in him. For when he has distinguished all who are to be made alive in Christ, he immediately adds: "Each in his own order: the firstfruits indeed, Jesus Christ; then those who are of Christ, who have believed at his coming; then the end." In this order, then, he assigns that Christ should rise first, both in time and in dignity, as Primasius says; then the just should rise again, and finally should follow the destruction of the wicked. No one, however, so far as I have read, among the Fathers refers that "in his own order" to a diversity of rewards paid out for their merits, except St. Jerome. Wherefore from that place I myself can prove nothing; and as to other testimonies of lesser moment (for to pursue them one by one would be troublesome), I pass over them.

Caput III - What the Fathers hold about the parable of the laborers, Matt. 20

Against this Catholic doctrine Jovinian argued - as is gathered from St. Jerome, book 2 Contra Iovinianum, and St. Augustine, De sancta virginitate, c. 26 - from that parable which Matthew 20 adds, which seems to signify the reward of eternal beatitude from the laborers, to whom the householder paid an equal wage for their toil, namely of one denarius, although not all had toiled equally in the vineyard. From this, not only is it proved that the remuneration of eternal life is equal, but also that the merits of this life are equal, insofar as one might seem to have toiled more than another, since rewards correspond to merits. This parable is indeed difficult for many to explain, and becomes especially more difficult for those who think that the reward of eternal life is signified by it. For whereas many difficulties are contained in it, first of all it is very obscure who the husbandman is and what end Christ proposed in it - about which the Doctors vary in their opinions

The common opinion of the Fathers is that, if the parable signifies the reward of eternal beatitude - something which they take to be signified by that diverse denarius - St. Gregory Nazianzen in Oration 40 (on holy Baptism), and in the same place his commentator Nicetas on the

words "He drew up a fish"; St. John Chrysostom, homily 63 on Matthew; St. Jerome elsewhere against Jovinian; the Venerable Anselm on that passage of Matthew 20; St. Thomas; Scotus; and the more recent theologians: yet they do not all interpret the parable in the same way.[744]

- First, therefore, St. Thomas, Scotus, and the other recent Doctors teach that by the denarius is signified one and the same eternal life, the same as to its formal essence - namely, the operation by which, laying hold of God himself, the blessed are made blessed - which is common to all the blessed; but that the diversity of labors will have a diverse fruit as to degrees of glory. Thus equality is kept as to the kind of reward signified by the denarius, while inequality remains as to the measure or degree of glory according to merits.[745]
- However, this interpretation seems to be opposed by the murmuring introduced in the same parable of those who, since they had labored more in the vineyard, thought they would receive a greater wage for their work than the others. For in the remuneration of eternal life there can be no just murmuring; and although in parables not everything that is asserted must be spiritually applied, yet that which the parable chiefly aims at ought not to be neglected in the application. Now it seems to aim at this: that in the eternal remuneration those who have labored less will receive an equal pay with the others; which, if understood of the formal beatitude itself, would not sufficiently square with the doctrine, established above, of the diversity to be kept, according to the proportion of merits, even in the very vision which is the summit of the blessed life.

Therefore St. John Chrysostom, St. Gregory Nazianzen, and Nicetas affirm that by the "last" who labored in the vineyard are signified those who, as far as human judgment goes, appear to have labored less in this life, and yet - because of the divine goodness which distributes without injustice and beyond all human comparison - are made equal as to the possession of eternal life, while nevertheless the precedence of those who truly labored more in fervor, diligence, and constancy is kept in the degrees of glory.[746]

But the exposition of Oecumenius and Primasius seems to fit the text better, who say that that order is to be set between Christ who rose and the others who are to be raised in him. For when he had said that all are to be made alive in Christ, he immediately adds: "Each in his own order"; and very next he subjoins: "The firstfruits, Christ; then, those who are Christ's, who have believed at his coming; then, the end." In this order, therefore, he assigns that Christ rose first, both in time and in dignity, as Primasius says; then the just are to rise; and at length the consummation of the world is to follow. Yet no one of the Fathers, so far as I have read, except St. Jerome, refers that phrase "in

744. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 40, In sanctum baptisma, with Nicetas's scholia; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 63 in Matthaeum; St. Jerome, Contra Iovinianum; St. Anselm, on Matt. 20; St. Thomas; Scotus; and later scholastic authors.

745. See especially St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I - II and III, where he treats of merit and beatitude; Scotus, in the Sentences, on the diversity of glory according to merit.

746. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 63 in Matthaeum; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 40; Nicetas, Commentarius in Orationem 40.

his own order" to a diversity of rewards which are destined to the just on account of their own merits; wherefore from that place he himself can prove nothing. I pass over other testimonies indeed of less moment, for to pursue each in detail would be burdensome.

What the Fathers hold concerning the parable of the laborers (Matt. 20)

But on the contrary: Against this Catholic doctrine Jovinian argued, as is gathered from St. Jerome in that second book against him, and from St. Augustine, in the book On Holy Virginity, chapter 26, from that parable which in Matthew 20 seems to be adduced to signify the reward of eternal beatitude concerning the laborers in the vineyard, to whom the householder paid an equal wage for their work, namely of one denarius, although not all had labored in the vineyard alike. From which is proved not only that the remuneration of eternal life is equal, but also that the merits of this life appear to be equal, although one may seem to have labored more than another; since rewards correspond to merits. This parable has seemed to many difficult to explain, and it becomes more difficult especially for those who think that the prize of eternal life is signified by it. In which, although there are many difficult points, first of all it is very obscure what was the scope and end which Christ proposed in it; about which even the Doctors think variously.

The common opinion of the Fathers is that the end of the parable is the prize of eternal beatitude, which is signified by that diurnal denarius. Thus St. Gregory Nazianzen in Oration 40 on holy baptism, and there also his commentator Nicetas on those words, "Fathers." And one may add St. John Chrysostom, hom. 65 on Matthew; St. Jerome, Against Jovinian, near the end; St. Augustine, Sermon 69 on the words of the Lord; St. Anselm on that place of Matthew; St. Thomas, I - II, q. 4, a. 2, ad 1; Soto on IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 3, a. 2; and more recent Thomists; yet the interpreters of the parable do not all interpret it in the same way.[747]

First interpretation on the object of beatitude. - First then, St. Thomas and Soto and other recent authors say that by the single denarius is denoted one and the same essence (*essentia*) of God, which is precisely the same object of beatitude in all; not, however, beatitude itself, which the Scholastics call formal, namely the operation by which, attaining God himself, we are made blessed: for this will be diverse according to the diversity of merits and of labors.

Refutation. - Yet this interpretation is blocked by the murmuring that is introduced in the same parable of those who, since they had labored more in the vineyard, thought they would receive a greater wage for their work than others. For in the remuneration of eternal life there will be no murmuring; and although it is not necessary to apply spiritually everything that is brought forward in parables, nevertheless that to which the parable chiefly looks ought not to be left without application. Now it seems to be this, that in the eternal retribution those who labored less received an equal wage with the others, so that thus the last became equal to the first; which assuredly seems unusual. Wherefore, although in the eternal judgment of God there will not be a future

747. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 40, In sanctum baptisma, with Nicetas's scholia; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 65 (63) in Matthaeum; St. Jerome, Contra Iovinianum; St. Augustine, Sermo 69 De verbis Domini; St. Anselm, on Matt. 20; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I - II, q. 4, a. 2, ad 1; Domingo de Soto, In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 3, a. 2; and later Thomist authors.

murmuring of the good against the distribution of rewards; yet Christ in that parable seems to have signified something unusual and beyond expectation. But nothing unusual and beyond expectation would happen if, in the very vision by which we are to be blessed, there were a disparity to be observed according to the due proportion of merits, even if the same divine essence were to be the object.

Second interpretation in Chrysostom, Nazianzen, Nicetas. - Therefore St. John Chrysostom, St. Gregory Nazianzen, and Nicetas assert that by the last who labored in the vineyard are signified those who in this life seem to have labored less because they were called and converted to God at the last period of life; although in reality, more than the former, sometimes someone compensates for the lateness of the time by solicitude and diligence, and merits with God more than others who from the first time of their life applied themselves to virtue; and this too has something unusual, and therefore fits the end of the parable very well.

Against this interpretation an argument is brought from the parable itself. - However, against this interpretation we can argue from the parable itself. First, if it were to be understood thus, the murmuring of the laborers who had been called first would be introduced in vain; for they could easily be convinced that those who began at the last hour had worked more, or equally; which in reality could not have been hidden from them. Why then are they made to say: "These last worked one hour," etc.?

Chrysostom's reply. - Chrysostom replies that not everything that is said in parables is to be explained spiritually; wherefore neither by that murmuring of the vineyard laborers is any contention of the good in God's judgment to be signified.

Refutation of the first point. - Against this reply there are manifest reasons. First, although murmuring, as evil and unjust, such as occurred in the vineyard laborers, will not take place in the distribution of eternal beatitude, nor ought the parable for that reason to be applied; yet it clearly indicates that in God's judgment there will be something that happens beyond everyone's expectation. For the whole parable seems to look to this, that someone by the gift of God may receive more than was owed to him by right; which, although it is not a cause of future murmuring in the blessed, will yet be a cause of admiration, to which the best reason will be given, as the householder satisfied the querulous laborers. But this would not be true if the last had in reality labored more, although by reason of the brevity of time they might seem to have labored less; for what wonder is it if he who labored more in a shorter time also receives a greater reward? And if the admiration proceeded only from ignorance, because the last were thought to have labored less in this life than he who began to labor first, the householder would not have replied: "Did you not agree with me for a denarius? Take what is yours and go; but I will give to this last as well as to you. Or is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" but rather would have shown that the last had overcome the tardiness of time by solicitude and labor. Therefore, since he convinces the first that he wills to make the last equal to them gratuitously, it follows that he did not attend to the greatness of the labor and of the merit; and consequently the last did not labor on an equal footing with the first, so as to receive an equal reward with them.

Secondly that interpretation is refuted. - Next, even if we were to follow the explanation of Nazianzen and Chrysostom, that sentence which the Lord gathers from the parable as its conclusion, "So shall the last be first, and the first last," that is, the elect, and the first the last, that is, the reprobate, could not cohere with the parable itself. For that which some interpret in this way - "the last as it were first, and the first as it were last, because they will be equal" - in no way squares with the reason which the Lord subjoins in these words: "Many are called, but few are chosen."

And as to what Chrysostom asserts, that this sentence is not the conclusion of the parable, because it is placed after the parable under a causal particle, this does not stand. For the particle "So," which is placed at the end of the parable, denotes the conclusion and application of it; then the causal is added for a fuller explication of it, as if he said: the last will be first, and the first last, since in truth it is so, that many are called by God, but few are chosen.

Third interpretation in Augustine. - Lastly, Anselm only says that by the diurnal denarius eternal beatitude is signified, and that it will be diverse; but he does not examine the difficulty of the parable. Augustine, however, interprets in this way: that we are all equal in that reward, as the last the first and the first the last; because for them the denarius is eternal life. For although by the diversity of merits one will shine more, another less; nevertheless, as regards eternity, it will be equal for all; where he teaches that there will be equality in duration, and compares it to the diurnal denarius. But as to the degrees of the vision itself, he neither asserts that it will be equal, nor denies it; he only says that the blessed are to be distinguished by a diversity of merits. And unfolding that distinction in the reward as well, he subjoins: "But chastity in marriage will be there in one way; integrity in virginity there in another; the fruit of good work there in another; the crown of passion there in another." By which words he seems to assign diversity in the accidental reward; for from the fact that there is the merit of conjugal chastity or of virginity it does not follow that what pertains to the essential reward is diverse. But besides the fact that it is not enough to assign a diversity of the accidental reward, since plainly in the Council of Florence, in the last session, in the letters of union, the very vision of God is constituted as that which, as a perfect reward, corresponds to merits, the difficulty of the parable which we set against the others still remains: namely, how the last are first and the first last. For whether we speak of the essential reward or of the accidental, since according to each one's labor and merit the reward is given, it does not appear how the last are first and the first last. And if we say that all the blessed will be equal in the vision, we must needs fall into the opinion of Jovinian. And to the same it returns when the same Augustine, in the book On Holy Virginity, chapter 26, says that by the single diurnal denarius this alone is signified: that we shall all be in eternal life and the kingdom of heaven; that we shall all rise in incorruption. Yet just as in the same heaven there are many stars and, while they have a common firmament, one nevertheless shines more than another; so also will the blessed be. The diversity, however, of rewards by which the merits of the Saints will variously shine forth he himself does not explain; wherefore the same difficulty always remains.

Caput IV - The parable is explained according to its own sense, and Jovinian's argument is answered

A far easier and more contextually consonant interpretation seems to me that which Jansenius employs in the Concord of the Gospels, chapter 101. For he thinks that in that parable there is not signified the prize of eternal life and its distribution according to the quality of merits; but rather the donation of grace and its distribution as it pleases God, whereby the last become first, and the severity of the divine judgment whereby the first become last. From which it comes to pass that in the judgment which will be after this life, in which alone it is allowed to work, those who were thought to be last for reigning with Christ will be chosen; but those who were considered first will be cast out from the kingdom.

I am clearly persuaded of this opinion for a twofold reason. First, because from the context, namely from the antecedents and sequents of the parable, this is manifestly gathered to be its end. Then, because, when all the things narrated in the parable can most fittingly be made to agree and to be applied, that point especially in which the whole force of the parable seems to consist - the murmuring, namely, of the laborers - cannot be explained spiritually according to the exposition of others. And although Jansenius omits some things, and does not apply them to the spiritual sense, yet all can be excellently accommodated, as will appear in the course. Three things, moreover, must be explained by us, by which the whole parable and its signification will become clear: first, its end; second, the murmuring of the laborers; third, the reply of the householder.

First, therefore, the parable looks to this, that the Lord might show that those who seemed last and reprobate by the Lord are to be chosen; but, on the contrary, those who seemed first are to be altogether rejected from the kingdom of God, and not to receive the diurnal denarius of eternal life. For after, in Matthew 19, the Lord had said to the Apostles, "You shall sit upon twelve seats, judging the twelve tribes of Israel," he soon subjoins, "Many, moreover, shall be last who are first, and first who are last"; and then, in chapter 20, for the same purpose the Lord brought forward the parable in question, from which again he concludes the same sentence, saying: "So shall the last be first, and the first last." And by adding to these words, "For many are called, but few are chosen," he plainly indicates that those few chosen will be the first; but the others, called and not chosen, will be the last. Now those who are called and not chosen are not to receive the denarius of beatitude, but are to be cast out of the kingdom of God; therefore those first who in reality are to be last will not be partakers of eternal life; they are therefore called "last" on the day of judgment, who are to be altogether reprobate. A like sentence is had in Luke 13 and Mark 10. Therefore Christ did not adduce the parable to show that those first who labored in the Lord's vineyard would be lesser in the remuneration of eternal life; but that those who here seemed first and to have labored more in the vineyard of God - when in reality it was not so - are to be altogether cast out of the kingdom of heaven. On the contrary, those who appeared last are to be first and chosen for the kingdom of heaven, and in this manner to be preferred to others; as is clearly gathered from Christ's sentence in Luke 13, where, after he had said, "There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth, when you shall see Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and all the Prophets in the kingdom of God, and you yourselves

cast out," he subjoins: "And they shall come from the East and the West and the North and the South, and shall recline in the kingdom of God; and behold there are last who shall be first, and first who shall be last" (Luke 13). There he calls the very Pharisees "last," who seemed first: not that they were to be at all partakers in beatitude, but because they were altogether to be excluded...

They were to be excluded; but he calls the Gentiles "first," who seemed last: not that they were to receive more reward, but that they were simply to be admitted into the kingdom while others were rejected. In the same sense Christ said to the Pharisees in Matt. 21, "Publicans and harlots go before you into the kingdom of God": what is "go before"? Not indeed that the Pharisees themselves had made less progress in the kingdom of God than the publicans, but that they had in no way admitted the faith of the preaching, which the harlots and publicans had embraced. For he immediately subjoins: "For John came to you in the way of justice, and you did not believe him; but the publicans and the harlots believed him." So also it is said in Matthew, "He shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven, who shall break one of the commandments," not because he is to receive a small reward, but because he will be wholly without it, as we noted in chapter 2.

It is objected: Nor does it stand in the way that in the parable there are brought forward first and last, who really labored in the vineyard, and merited the reward of their labor and received it; so that from this we might infer that the first, who are to be last in the kingdom of heaven and are signified by that parable, will also receive the reward of beatitude. For this manifestly conflicts with the conclusion of the parable, as has been sufficiently shown. But the parable is adduced for this sole purpose: that just as among the laborers who worked in the vineyard the first truly labored more than the last, because they bore the burden of the day and the heat, yet beyond the expectation of all the last were made first in the payment, and the last were made first, because both in place, and for a small labor, they received an equal wage with the others - and this without any injustice, from the mere liberality of the one paying - so also in the kingdom of God it will come about beyond expectation, that those who were thought first, and to have labored more in the vineyard of the Lord, such as the Scribes and Pharisees, will on the day of judgment be wholly excluded from the kingdom; because by the just judgment of God they were permitted to fall, and truly did not labor; and thus they will be last, who in truth were not first but only seemed so. On the other hand, those who here were judged last and abject will be first and chosen to reign with Christ - something that must finally be referred to the grace and liberality of the one paying. For although he duly remunerates the merits of works, nevertheless, because he gave the grace by which they might merit, the whole must be ascribed to his grace. Thus the Apostles, on whose occasion the parable was introduced, beyond all expectation will appear seated on twelve thrones, to judge the twelve tribes of Israel.

In the second place, the murmuring of the laborers is to be explained. This is to be applied spiritually, not to those who will truly receive together with others the reward of eternal life. For since in that distribution equality must be maintained, there will be no cause for murmuring or astonishment. Rather, the murmuring must be applied to those who in this life seemed to be first, but in reality were not, and afterwards in the kingdom of heaven appeared as last, such as the Scribes and Pharisees. These, therefore, will speak against the Lord, that when they themselves

were reprobated, God by his grace chose and preferred publicans and sinners, whom they held in contempt and placed in the lowest place - not that they received an equal reward with them for a lesser labor. For just as, at the beginning of the nascent Church, the Jews envied the Gentiles because the grace of the Gospel also benefited them, so on the last day of judgment the Scribes and Pharisees will envy the publicans, and complain against God that he chose them by his grace in that manner.

An objection: Someone objects that this application does not agree with the very narrative of the parable. For the laborers did not murmur because the householder had preferred the last before them in the labor, but because he had made them equal in payment; therefore the spiritual murmuring must also be understood to have been made on account of the equality of the payment and of the wage.

It is answered: Although in the narration of the parable the first laborers seem to complain of the householder because he had made the last equal to them in the payment - and thus the letter sounds - yet in reality the complaint was that he had preferred the last before them. For to have made them equal in the distribution of the wage was the same as in reality to have preferred them: for an equal wage was given for a lesser labor, which in proportion was much greater; and, besides, because the last received the reward of labor in the first place. Therefore the cause of the murmuring was that the last were in reality preferred to the first, to which the whole parable seems to tend, as has been said. Therefore in the same way, on the day of judgment, the Scribes and Pharisees, when they are cast out of the kingdom of heaven and are not allowed to recline in the bosom of Abraham their father, but the Gentiles coming from the East and the West are admitted, will murmur against the Lord that he has set them before them in the kingdom of heaven.

In the third place, from what has been said, the answer of the householder can be easily explained and accommodated: "Friend, I do thee no wrong: didst thou not agree with me for a denarius? Take what is thine and go," for this, according to the aforesaid interpretation, is not to be understood thus, as if to the Pharisees - who were thought the first laborers and were made the last - some reward of beatitude had been previously promised and paid, and so it had been said to them, "Take what is thine and go." For it is clear from the foregoing that they were wholly cast out of the kingdom of heaven. But just as the householder, defending what he had done in giving to the last, out of liberality, what was not owed to them, answered one of the first laborers, "Friend, I do thee no wrong," that is, that I prefer the last to thee in the payment; for thou didst agree with me for a denarius; and so what is thine is nothing else: therefore take what is thine and go. But I wish also to grant this favor to this last man, that for the least labor he may receive an equal wage: which truly it is lawful for me to do by my own substance - so also the Lord, on the day of judgment, to the Pharisees complaining that they were cast out of the kingdom, but the Gentiles admitted, will answer: "Take what is thine and go," namely thy sin: is it not lawful for me to choose these Gentiles, who were thought the last, not by their merits, but by my grace, which I had justly denied to thee? Therefore, "Take what is thine and go." But that other statement, "Didst thou not agree

with me for a denarius?" is brought in for this sole purpose, that the Lord may show no wrong had been done to the Pharisees who were cast out, because nothing had been taken away from what was theirs.

Finally, what is added at the end, "But I will also give to this last, as to thee," is to be understood, as we were just saying, not in this sense, that the last were only made equal to the first - for thus the lot of all would have been the same - but that they were preferred. Therefore "To give to this man as to thee" amounts to this, that I prefer this last man to thee: for the payment which seemed equal to all was richer to the last laborers. In the same way the Lord would say to the Pharisee, "Take what is thine and go: but I will, by my grace, prefer this last Gentile to thee in my kingdom": for this is the spiritual sense of that saying, "To give to this man as to thee." From all these things it is clear how vain is the argument of Io. Jovinian, who from this parable drew, contrary to Catholic truth, the denial of diversity of reward and of vision.

But John Major, in IV Sentences, dist. 49, q. 1, objects that it is in no way possible that an Angel and a man, who have had equal merits in the way, should also obtain, as reward, an equal vision of God. Since the intellect of the Angel, which is its proper passion, and the intellect of the man differ in species, it is necessary that their operations differ in species. For things which demand to be produced by diverse principles according to species differ in species; but, on the contrary, things which are of the same species and nature demand to be produced by a principle of the same species. If, then, the operations of the angelic and human intellect are different in species, it follows that the visions also, by which they see God, are different in species; and if the visions differ in species, it comes about that one is more perfect in perfection than the other; and hence, however much one becomes more intense, it can never arrive at the perfection of the other.[748]

Major answers that indeed the intellect of the Angel and of the man differ in species; and hence the intellections and even the visions which they have of God, as the proposed argument proves, differ in species; nevertheless, on account of the diversity of merits, God can be seen more perfectly by the human intellect than by the Angel, if the very vision which the man has is perfected in intensity within the latitude of its own species and nature: just as gold, which by its nature, according to species, is more perfect than silver, yet, if an addition be made to silver according to quantity, can in value surpass gold.

For "species" are not said to differ among themselves by an infinite distance because one is infinitely more perfect than another (for all are of finite perfection), but because the lower, however much it be perfected from elsewhere, can never attain to the nature and perfection of the higher: wherefore they seem to be separated by an infinite interval, which cannot be passed across. The example too is different: for however much silver be multiplied, although in the estimation of men, so far as contracts and the usefulness of the present life are concerned, it may be able to be more precious than gold itself, yet it cannot arrive at the natural nature and perfection of gold. Thus, therefore, the vision of God which is from the human intellect, if it is of a lower nature

748. John Major, In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 1.

according to species, will not be able, in natural perfection, to be equated to the vision which is produced by the angelic intellect; and consequently the Angel will be blessed in a more perfect manner, even if the vision which he has of God be remisser.

I answer, therefore, to the argument with Durandus in III Sentences, dist. 14, q. 1, n. 8, and Domingo de Soto in IV Sentences, dist. 49, q. 3, art. 2, that the vision of God in an Angel and in a man is of the same nature according to species. Wherefore the absurdity which he was contending for does not follow. Durandus proves this because grace and merits in man and in Angel are of the same species; therefore the vision of God, which corresponds as the reward, will be of the same species. Others prove it from that Matt. 22 and Luke 20, "They shall be as the Angels of God"; but there is no one among the Fathers, nor among recent interpreters of Scripture, who understands that place thus: for there it is not of the vision, but of the incorruption of the future life that it is treated, as I noted in article 1 of this question, disputation 37, chapter 2.[749]

Far better is it proved thus: for although the intellect of the Angel and of the man is distinguished in species, and the effect which their nature can of itself produce proceeds diversely according to species, it does not follow that the vision of God produced by the angelic intellect and that produced by the human differ specifically. For here we must say that a specific cause is not the diversity of the generic principle, but of the specific and particular principle. Now, as to the effect - namely, the vision of God - whether it is produced by an Angel or by a man, the very principle that determines the universal efficacy of the intellect to the species of the vision of God is the same: the light of glory (lumen gloriae), which in place of a specific form and as a particular principle is one and the same in the angelic and in the human intellect; and it determines the universal efficacy of the intellect to the species of the vision of God. And the same reasoning holds of the love of charity (caritas) in the will of the Angel and of the man: for the same is the particular and specific principle, namely charity. This reasoning is indicated by Soto in the place cited.[750]

Diluted is the second argument against the same doctrine.

There is, in fact, another very difficult argument, which divided many of the Scholastics into various opinions, and it is of this sort. It can happen that two men have in this life equal merits, of whom one is endowed with a better intellect: then, however, according to the quality of the merits, they will obtain an equal light of glory (lumen gloriae); but with an equal light, he who is more perfect will operate more perfectly: therefore he will see God more perfectly. Conquered by this argument, many Nominalists - whom we will cite at I - II, q. 3, a. 2, disp. 2 - said that the beatific vision and the love of charity in the homeland are not operations elicited by the soul, but are infused in the blessed by God alone; and by this reasoning they escape the force of the argument, and show how, with an equal light, the less perfect intellect can see God equally with the more perfect.[751]

749. Durandus, In III Sent., dist. 14, q. 1, n. 8; Domingo de Soto, In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 3, a. 2. On Matt. 22 and Luke 20, see above, article 1 of this question, disputation 37, chapter 2.

750. Domingo de Soto, In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 3, a. 2.

751. On the Nominalist position, see the discussion promised at I - II, q. 3, a. 2, disp. 2.

But since I think it impossible that the operations of life, such as cognition and appetite, be produced by God alone without the faculty of the living subject, it must be answered otherwise. And truly, as far as the present question is concerned, the argument could be easily dissolved: for if the more perfect intellect, with an equal light, were to see more perfectly, God could, with due proportion of merits observed, bestow upon the perfection of the intellect which, while having equal merits with a lesser intellect, is the more perfect, so much the less of the light of glory as is in reality necessary, that each may see God equally; and thus equal rewards of the prize would follow.

On the occasion of this argument, however, it also pleases me to examine something further, and to see whence indeed the measure of vision is to be taken

It is asked from where the measure of the vision is to be taken; whether from the perfection of the natural intellect, or from the quantity of the light. In this matter the Doctors who affirm that the vision is produced by the intellect itself think variously.

Prior opinion. Richard, in IV Sent., dist. 49, art. 2, q. 8; Major, q. 10, ad 7, argum.; Scotus, in IV, dist. 50, q. 6; Durandus, in III, dist. 14, q. 1, ad ult.; Robert Holcot, in his Determinations, q. 8, art. 1, ad 4, assert that, an intellect more perfect, being furnished with an equal light of glory, sees God more perfectly.[752]

Argument one. This opinion is proved, first, because a more perfect cause with an equal instrument not only works more perfectly, but also an equal cause with a more perfect instrument - a thing manifest to all: therefore, whether we say that the intellect is the principal cause and the light its instrument, or conversely; we must always assert that, from a more perfect intellect with an equal light, God is seen more perfectly. And the same follows if we say that neither the intellect is the instrument of the light nor conversely, but that they are two subordinated causes concurring, as it were, by the mode of one, to the same effect. For from this it also follows that the vision will be more perfect from a more perfect intellect: for the more perfect is the cause which to the same effect aids another, the more perfect also is the effect.

Second argument. Then, just as a more perfect intellect with an equal species works more perfectly, so in like manner, with a greater light of glory, it will better see God. Nor does this happen only in natural matters, but also in supernatural ones: for a more perfect intellect, with the same habit of faith, penetrates many mysteries far better than a less perfect intellect.

The latter opinion is true. For my part, however, I approve the opinion of Soto in IV, dist. 49, q. 3, art. 2, and of recent authors, who say that the measure of the vision must altogether be taken from the quantity and perfection of the light, and in no way from the native efficacy of the intellect.[753]

First explanation of that opinion. Soto gives this reason first: since the act is above the nature of man, the measure ought to follow the light, which is the supernatural principle; just as, when water is heated by heat communicated to it above its nature, the whole measure of the heating

752. Richard of St. Victor, In IV Sent., dist. 49, art. 2, q. 8; John Major, q. 10, ad 7, argum.; Scotus, In IV, dist. 50, q. 6; Durandus, In III, dist. 14, q. 1, ad ult.; Robert Holcot, Determinationes, q. 8, art. 1, ad 4.

corresponds to the heat which is in the water, and answers to it. This example has the greatest force against Cajetan, and certain philosophers, who think that the intellect of itself has no efficacy for understanding, but that the whole is communicated to it by the species, as heat to water - inasmuch as the latter becomes more one with it than matter and form are one.[754] For if in us the whole power for acting is the species itself, the light of glory also in the blessed will be the whole power for seeing God, since it stands in the place of the species, or is the very species of the divine essence itself.

But in the opinion of those who say that the intellect of itself is second toward understanding, whatever efficacy it has, because it is common and generic, ought to be completed by some peculiar form for producing this effect rather than another: the aforesaid example has no weight. For water heats by heat conjoined to it in such a way that it contributes nothing of power with it, but the whole efficacy is that of the heat; water, however, is only the subject to which the heat adheres, that it may exist and operate; wherefore by the philosophers it is wont to be called the vehicle of heat. The intellect, however, contributes something by its own efficacy to the vision, so that the vision depends by essential connection upon it, and God cannot make up its concurrence with the light, as we shall say at I-II, q. 3, art. 2, disputation 2.[755] Therefore the difficulty of the arguments for the first opinion remains.

Second explanation. Others distinguish two things in the vision of God, namely its substance and its mode. They say that the substance is of the natural order, and that it is produced by the intellect by its natural power; wherefore the measure of it is in this way to be taken from the natural power of the intellect. But the mode is supernatural, and is conferred by the light alone as proper cause; and from this the measure of its perfection proceeds. Beatitude, however, is not the mere vision according to its natural being which it has, but according to the supernatural mode of it: and hence with equal light there is always equal beatitude.

This is a contrivance. Indeed, if this doctrine and distinction were true, it would entirely remove the difficulty for the first opinion; yet since it is plainly fictitious, the latter opinion cannot be defended or explained in this way. The figment of this doctrine is shown thus. That in the clear vision of God we may distinguish those two, we must first establish some cognition produced in species, to which a supernatural mode should come as, so to speak, an accident supervening; and yet we are not able to assign any operation of this sort there which by its nature is natural, nor to understand a mode added to it: therefore that distinction is contrived. Now that there is no operation in the vision which by its nature is natural is evident: for that operation, according to its substance, must be a cognition of some object - not other than God Himself: therefore it is either clear and intuitive, or obscure and not intuitive. Not, indeed, obscure: for thus it would be of faith, or such as we have of Him on the way: wherefore afterwards clearness could not supervene to it, that it might become intuitive; for thus it would be altogether changed: not clear and intuitive; for this is altogether above nature, and by his natural strength man cannot attain to it. Therefore no

753. Domingo de Soto, In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 3, art. 2.
754. Cajetan; and certain philosophers who hold that the intellect's efficacy is wholly from the intelligible species.
755. See above at I-II, q. 3, art. 2, disp. 2.

natural cognition can even be conceived according to substance, to which a supernatural mode should be added, that it might become the clear vision of God as He is: nor, moreover, can that mode be conceived, much less explained - what its nature is, in what it consists, and in what way it should supervene to the operation of the intellect. Therefore this seems rather an evasion devised without foundation, than true.

Third explanation. Certain others, coming nearer to the very matter, confirm the latter opinion, and answer the argument of the former in this way: since the light of glory is the principal cause of the vision, and the intellect is an instrument, the vision ought to follow the perfection and measure of the light, not of the intellect. However, although this is true in material subject-matter, yet it does not happen so universally: for, as we were saying for the former opinion, an equal cause with a more perfect instrument works better; just as the carpenter with a better adze or saw makes a better bench or chair. Wherefore, in like manner, the difficulty proposed still remains for the former opinion, to which, that it may be fully satisfied, we must say something else and examine this matter more deeply.

First foundation. Therefore, for the sake of this matter, it must be premised first, that the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*) is, as it were, the principal cause of the vision, but the intellect is, as it were, an instrument subject to the power and efficacy of the light: because the vision is a supernatural operation and of an order higher than our intellect, by reason of which the intellect is said to be elevated by the light to such an operation beyond its natural order. Therefore the light of glory is compared otherwise to our intellect than the intelligible species impressed and acquired from things: for these do not elevate the intellect, nor act upon it, nor imprint a power upon it; rather the intellect gives a second act to the species, and moves it to the vision, and elevates it, and has it as, so to speak, an instrument subjected to itself - although the universal, as it were generic, efficacy of the intellect is determined and completed by the species to this intellection rather than that to be elicited.

Second foundation. Then it should be noted that our intellect is compared with the light of glory by way of instrument otherwise than an adze or saw is compared with an artisan. For these instruments of the craftsman have an action of their own, namely cutting, to which, as to a subject, the effect of art accrues, that is, the mode by which the very cutting is rendered (as it is wont to be said) artful. Hence it happens that it can be perfected in the notion of cutting even if it is not perfected in the notion of artfulness: wherefore an equal artisan with a better adze makes a better work of art, inasmuch as the work of art consists of two things - of the cutting, which with a better instrument is better; and of the mode of art, which proceeds equally perfect from an equal art. Conversely, however, because the mode of art supposes that action of cutting, by so much the less perfect is the work from an equal art, by how much the instrument is less apt; for the mode of art has its foundation in the cutting, and from there too it can be impeded. But the intellect and the light concur to the same vision as two causes ordained between themselves: one is universal, according to the generic notion of the operation, namely the intellect to intellection, inasmuch as intellection is; the other is particular, according to the specific notion, namely the light of glory to intellection, inasmuch as it is clear or intuitive of God Himself.

Therefore the proposed difficulty is easily answered, and the latter opinion is proved. For since some effect cannot be perfected according to the generic notion unless it be perfected according to the specific notion - because it is the same individual according to reality - it follows that the vision cannot be perfected on the part by which it is from a more perfect intellect, namely in the notion of intellection, unless it also be perfected inasmuch as it proceeds from the light; therefore the perfection and measure of the vision are to be set according to the perfection of the light.

It proceeds, namely, according to the notion of such an intellection. But if the light in two intellects is equal, even if one be more perfect, it follows that the future vision will be equal: for, insofar as it is such, it ought to be equally perfect, since it is from an equal light; and otherwise it cannot be perfected, unless, insofar as it is such, it be perfected: therefore in each it will remain in the same way. Wherefore the intellect will stand in relation to the vision as universal causes to particular effects. For just as the universal power of such causes is such that it can produce a better and better effect, nevertheless it is limited and determined according to that which the second cause, with which it is conjoined, demands, nor does it produce a better effect than the power of the second cause calls for, which is modified universally; so our intellect, which of itself has a universal power and could produce a better and better vision, is determined by the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*) to this vision, so that with the same light it cannot produce a more perfect one. In the same way something must be said of the will with the habit of charity.

But as to the craftsman and the instrument there is another account: since they do not concur to the same effect according to species, but in the effect there are two things altogether different in species, namely, the cutting and the artificed mode, the effect can be perfected in that part in which there is cutting, even if it be not perfected according to the artificed mode; and thus, with a better instrument, an equal art produces a better effect. Then also, since the cutting itself, according to the notion of cutting, greatly conduces to the artificed mode, as has been explained, it also happens that the same craftsman with a better instrument effects a better mode also of the artificed work.

But concerning the intellect with a species acquired from things, the account is not the same as concerning the very light of glory. For the species is as it were a particular agent modifying the universal power of the intellect, just as we said of the light, so that it lies under the intellect as an instrument and is made to act by it; wherefore it too is moved by it according to the greater or lesser effort which it applies, to produce a lesser or greater effect: but the light of glory, since it is of a supernatural order, raises up the intellect, renders it able for seeing, and moves it itself; indeed, by its power it draws it after itself as far as it can. Whence it comes about that it always sees God in the same way, nor can it in the least remit the vision: therefore we rightly said that the measure of the vision must be taken from the very light.

From these things that have been said, not only does our opinion remain sufficiently explained and confirmed, but also the two arguments of the former [objection] are altogether solved.

It remains that we say something to that which was brought forward in confirmation of the second argument, about a more perfect intellect for knowing the mysteries of faith. In the act of faith two things can be distinguished: one is, as it were, material - namely, the cognition and

apprehension, or the explication of the mysteries; and since this is not done through infused species, but acquired ones, and a more perfect intellect uses the acquired ones more perfectly, as we were just now saying, it follows that it is more perfect in the better intellect: and thus a Doctor of Theology apprehends and expounds the mysteries of our faith much better than one who is ignorant and rustic. The other is the assent to the proposition, which is from the habit of faith: and this is not more perfect the more perfect the intellect is, but the more perfect the habit is and the greater is the excitation of divine grace. For we do not always use the habit of faith or another infused [habit] according to the whole power and efficacy which it has, but insofar as the grace that excites moves to consent and assent.

But someone will object in this way: our intellect can use the habit of faith more and less, and the will can do so with the habit of charity: therefore the perfection of their acts is not to be taken from the habit, but entirely from the effort of our will and intellect. It is answered that we cannot have an act more perfect than the habit itself and its power demands, unless God supply by His aid the efficacy of it: whence the measure of a supernatural operation is to be taken from the habit in this sense, that at least its efficacy not be exceeded; although a man can sometimes act more remissly with these habits, because in this life we do not use them necessarily, but they are subject to our liberty: but the light of glory so necessarily impels the intellect to see God as He is, that he can neither see Him less nor more clearly than the power of the light demands.

Finally, it is to be briefly explained in what way in the blessed the vision of God can be clearer without anything in God appearing which did not appear by a less clear vision: for in bodily vision it never happens that something is seen more clearly without something new appearing in the thing seen. It must therefore be said that in God, since He is most simple, nothing can newly appear, no matter how much the vision be rendered clearer: since, being most simple, either the whole that is in Him is seen, or nothing. But in a visible bodily thing, either according to intension or according to extension, something new always appears, the more the vision is perfected. Moreover, just as in a bodily thing, when it is seen more clearly, not only does something new appear, but that which did appear is seen more clearly, so in the vision of God it must be said that the very same thing that was seen by a less clear vision appears by a clearer [vision] more perfectly and more clearly; and this perfection is in the vision itself, which, just as it has degrees of intension, so also has [degrees] of clarity. Nor do I think we must dwell any longer on this matter, in which certain recent authors invent many things and toil without fruit.

Articulus VII - Whether those who see God through His essence comprehend Him

To the seventh, the proceeding is thus.

It is objected that those who see God through His essence do comprehend Him. For the Apostle says, Phil. 3: "I follow after, if by any means I may comprehend."[756] But he did not follow in vain. For he himself says, 1 Cor. 9: "So I run, not as uncertainly."[757] Therefore he himself comprehended; and by the same reason others, whom he invites to this, saying: "So run that you may comprehend."[757]

Further, St. Augustine says in the book On Seeing God to Paulina: that is comprehended which is so wholly seen that nothing of it is hidden from the seer; but if God is seen through His essence, He is wholly seen, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is simple: therefore by whomever He is seen through His essence, He is comprehended.[758]

But on the contrary: it is said in Jeremiah 32: "Strong, great, mighty art Thou; Lord of hosts is Thy name: great in counsel, and incomprehensible in thought." Therefore He cannot be comprehended.[759]

I answer that to comprehend God is impossible for any created intellect to attain; yet to see God in any way whatsoever is great beatitude, as Augustine says.[758] For the evidence of which, it must be known that that is comprehended which is known perfectly; but that is known perfectly which is known as much as it is knowable. Whence, if that which is knowable by demonstrative science be held by opinion conceived from some probable reason, it is not comprehended; for example, if someone knows by demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that. But if someone should accept its opinion probably, on this account that by the wise or by many it is said thus, he does not comprehend it: because he will not reach that perfect mode of cognition by which it is knowable. But no created intellect can reach that perfect mode of cognition of the divine essence by which it is knowable, which is clear thus. Each thing is knowable according as it is being in act (*ens actu*). Therefore God, whose existence (*esse*) is infinite, as has been shown above, is infinitely knowable. But no created intellect can know God infinitely. For a created intellect knows the divine essence more perfectly or less perfectly inasmuch as it is flooded with a greater or lesser light of glory (*lumen gloriae*). Since therefore a created light of glory, received in any created intellect, cannot be infinite, it is impossible that any created intellect know God infinitely. Whence it is impossible that he comprehend God.

Reply to the first: Comprehension is said in a twofold way. In one way strictly and properly, according as something is included in that which comprehends. And thus in no way is God comprehended, neither by an intellect nor by anything else: because, since He is infinite, He can be included by no finite [thing], so that something finite contain the infinite; just as He Himself is infinite. And of comprehension thus understood is the present question. In another way comprehension is taken more broadly, according as comprehension is opposed to pursuit. For he

756. Phil. 3:12: "Sequor autem si quo modo comprehendam."
757. 1 Cor. 9:26; cf. Phil. 3:12 - 14.
757. 1 Cor. 9:26; cf. Phil. 3:12 - 14.
758. St. Augustine, Epistula 112, De videndo Deum ad Paulinam, cap. 9, circa principium.
759. Jer. 32:19: "Fortissime, magne, potens, Dominus exercituum nomen tibi: magnus consilio, et incomprehensibilis cogitatu."
758. St. Augustine, Epistula 112, De videndo Deum ad Paulinam, cap. 9, circa principium.

who attains someone, when now he holds him, is said to comprehend him. And thus God is comprehended by the blessed, according to that of Canticles 3: "I held him, nor will I let him go."[760] And in this way are understood the authorities of the Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way comprehension is one of the three endowments (*dotes*) of the soul, which corresponds to hope, as vision to faith and fruition to charity. For with us not everything that is seen is already held or had, because sometimes things at a distance are seen, or things that are not in our power. Nor again do we enjoy all the things that we have, either because we are not delighted in them, or because they are not the ultimate end of desire, so that they fill and quiet our desire. But the blessed have these three in God: for they both see Him, and by seeing hold Him present to themselves, having it in their power always to see Him; and holding, they enjoy [Him], as the ultimate end filling desire.

Reply to the second: God is not on this account called incomprehensible as if there were something of Him that is not seen, but because He is not seen so perfectly as He is visible: just as when some demonstrable proposition is known by some probable reasoning, there is not something of it that is not known, neither the subject, nor the predicate, nor the composition; but the whole is not known so perfectly as it is knowable. Whence Augustine, defining comprehension, says that "the whole is comprehended by seeing which is so seen that nothing of it is hidden from the seer," or "whose bounds can be surveyed or circumscribed"; for then the bounds of something are surveyed when one comes, in the mode of knowing that thing, to its limit.[758]

Reply to the third: "Totally" says the mode of the object; not indeed so that the whole mode of the object fall not under cognition, but because the mode of the object is not the mode of the knower. Therefore he who sees God through His essence sees this in Him, that He exists infinitely and is infinitely knowable. But this infinite mode does not befit him, namely, that he himself know infinitely. Just as someone can know probably that a certain proposition is demonstrable, although he himself does not know it by demonstration.

Conclusion of the article: Those who see God clearly do not comprehend Him; concerning the explication of which and the exposition of the mind of St. Thomas, in disputation 52 and the following we shall say more.

Articulus VIII - Whether those who see God through His essence see all things in God

Objicitur: It seems that those who see God through His essence see all things in God. For St. Gregory says: "What is there that he does not see, who sees him who sees all things?" But God is the one who sees all things; therefore those who see God see all things.[761]

760. Cant. 3:4: "Tenui eum, nec dimittam."
758. St. Augustine, Epistula 112, De videndo Deum ad Paulinam, cap. 9, circa principium.
761. St. Gregory the Great, Dialogi, book 4, chapter 33: "Quid est quod non videat, qui videntem omnia videt?"

Again, whoever sees a mirror, sees the things that shine in the mirror. But all things whatsoever that come to be, or can come to be, shine in God as in a certain mirror: for He Himself knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees God, sees all things that are and that can be.

1. Moreover, he who understands what is greater can understand things that are least, as is said in On the Soul III. But all the things that God does or can do are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God can understand all the things that God does or can do.
2. Moreover, a rational creature naturally desires to know all things. If, therefore, by seeing God he does not know all things, his natural desire is not at rest. And thus by seeing God he will not be blessed - which is unfitting. Therefore by seeing God one knows all things.

Sed contra: The Angels see God through His essence, and yet they do not know all things. For the lower Angels are purged by the higher from ignorance, as Dionysius says in the Celestial Hierarchy VII. They themselves also do not know future contingents and the thoughts of hearts. This belongs to God alone. Therefore not everyone who sees the essence of God sees all things.[762]

Respondeo: I answer that a created intellect, by seeing the divine essence, does not see in it all the things that God does or can do. For it is manifest that things are thus seen in God, according as they are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are virtually in their cause. Therefore all things are seen in God as effects in their cause. But it is manifest that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen in it. For one who has an elevated intellect, as soon as one demonstrative principle is set forth, from it receives the knowledge of many conclusions. This does not befit one who is of a weaker intellect; rather, each item must be explained to him. Therefore that intellect can know in the cause all the cause's effects and all the reasons of the effects, which totally comprehends the cause. But no created intellect can totally comprehend God, as has been shown. Therefore no created intellect, by seeing God, can know all the things that God does or can do. For this would be to comprehend His power. Yet of those things that God does or can do, the more perfectly someone sees God, the more of them does his intellect know.

Reply to the first: Gregory speaks with respect to the sufficiency of the object, namely of God, who, as far as lies in Himself, sufficiently contains and manifests all things. Yet it does not follow that each and every one who sees God knows all things, because he does not perfectly comprehend Him.

Reply to the second: One who sees a mirror does not of necessity see all the things in the mirror, unless he comprehends the mirror by his sight.

Reply to the third: Although it is greater to see God than to see all other things, nevertheless it is greater to see God in such a way that all things are known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all, but fewer or more things, are known in Him. For it has already been shown that the multitude of things known in God follows the mode of seeing Him, whether more perfect or less perfect.

762. Pseudo-Dionysius, De coelesti hierarchia, cap. 7.

Reply to the fourth: The natural desire of a rational creature is to know all those things that pertain to the perfection of the intellect, and these are the species and genera of things, and their reasons, which everyone seeing the divine essence will see in God. But to know other singulars, and the thoughts and deeds of persons, is not of the perfection of a created intellect; nor does its natural desire tend to this; nor again to know those things which are not yet, but can be made by God. Yet if God alone were seen - who is the fount and principle of all existence (*esse*) and of truth - He would so fill the natural desire of knowing that nothing else would be sought, and one would be blessed. Whence St. Augustine says: "Unhappy is the man who knows all these things, namely creatures, but does not know You. But blessed is he who knows You, even if he does not know those things. And he who knows You and them is not more blessed because of them, but because of You alone he is blessed."[763]

Conclusion: The blessed do not know all things possible in the divine essence; nevertheless they see some, and each sees the more, the more perfectly he sees the essence of God. The common opinion holds that, for the nature of comprehension, it is necessary that nothing of that which one comprehends by his vision lies hidden from the one seeing, as we shall see in disputation 52. Of the things, moreover, which comprehension ought to embrace and which pertain to the thing comprehended, some are intrinsic to it and in it formally (as proper predicates), others are extrinsic (as effects); and in this way possible creatures are referred to God. It will therefore be worth the effort, before we treat of comprehension in disputation 52, to examine whether the blessed, besides those things which are formally in God, can know all His effects; and because St. Thomas disputes this in article 8, it has pleased us to explain these two articles together, and to set our disputations in the following order.

- Whether one seeing God as He is necessarily sees the things that are in Him formally. Disputation 48.
- What Scotus and others with him think. Chapter 1.
- The common and truer opinion. Chapter 2.
- The passage of John 14 ("He who sees me, sees also my Father") is explained. Chapter 3.
- Scotus's arguments are answered. Chapter 4.

Disputatio XLVIII - Whether one who sees God as He is necessarily sees the things that are in Him formally

Caput I - What Scotus and others with him hold

In this disputation it must be discussed concerning the attributes and the persons, whether, according to all their perfection, they are necessarily seen by the blessed together with the essence; and on this point there are various opinions of the Scholastics. Let the first be that of Scotus in I, distinction 1, question 2, who asserts two things: first concerning the intellect, namely, that a

763. St. Augustine, Confessiones, book 5.

creature cannot by its own power and faculty see the essence without seeing the persons; and concerning the will, that the created will cannot enjoy the essence without enjoying the persons.[764] He proves the point about the intellect because it is not a free faculty, but, the object having been manifested, it is carried toward it naturally and necessarily, for the reason that it is manifest: but God shows Himself in three persons; therefore it is not in the power of the intellect not to be carried toward Him precisely as He is in the three. As to the will he proves the same, since although it is a free faculty, and enjoyment and love of God even in the fatherland are within its power (as he too had taught in the same distinction, question 4, article 1), nevertheless the negative of this article is not free to it, namely, to enjoy in this or that way; but, the object being posited, if it wills to enjoy that object, it ought to enjoy and love it in the mode in which it is objected. Wherefore, if He is objected in three persons, it must necessarily enjoy the very persons, if it wishes to go forth into act. For although it is within someone's power as to an operation - such as the act of sinning - to do it or not do it; yet it is not free that malice not follow upon his operation, if he operates. Hence he gathers that not only de facto is God seen in three persons, but also that He cannot be seen in any other way without a miracle; indeed, it would be a miracle if God were to show His essence without manifesting the persons.

Scotus teaches another thing in that question 2, 9, with respect to this article, namely, that by His absolute power, and aside from the common course and law, God can bring it about that the essence alone is seen, with the persons not seen, and that one is seen without another - there being nonetheless perfect beatitude. And that by this vision alone someone can be made blessed, Scotus proves, because the eternal Father, in the priority of origin, before He is understood to have a Son, by His very own essence is understood as blessed, the persons not yet being understood; therefore a man seeing the essence alone without the persons would in the same way be perfectly blessed. But that the divine essence can be seen with the persons not seen, we can prove from his doctrine. For since the essence is distinguished from the persons by a distinction of the nature of the thing, as from his view we shall report below in disputation 120, it follows that the essence can be seen without the three persons, or without any one of them; which is confirmed also on this ground and is further explained as follows. Just as the essence is communicated to the Son, paternity not being communicated, and filiation terminates the human nature in Christ, without the nature and essence of the Son terminating it, why will it not be able that the essence be seen while the person is not seen, or even conversely, so that one terminates the clear vision and another does not terminate it? And although Scotus in that question 2, 5 (Ista quaestio) proposes only that the question be examined concerning essence and persons, and not yet about essence and attributes - because (he says) it has not yet been shown how they are distinguished among themselves and from the essence - nevertheless from his doctrine the very same entirely follows, namely, that the essence can be seen without the attributes, and one attribute without another; for in I, distinction 8, question 4 he affirms that they are distinguished from the essence and among themselves by a distinction of the nature of the thing.

764. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 1, q. 2; and the same, d. 4, q. 1.

In favor of this view, insofar as it speaks of the vision of one attribute without another, some are cited - Capreolus on I, distinction 27, question 2, article 3, to the 8th; Durandus against the first conclusion; Ferrarien. against the Gentiles, chapter 53; and Cajetan in this, the first part of question 27, article 1, to the third doubt - who, in my judgment, teach nothing of the sort.[765]

Capreolus, then, asserts that the blessed form one single word of the divine essence and of the persons and of all the attributes, yet habitually several words concerning the attributes and concerning creatures seen in God; whence sometimes more, sometimes fewer are expressed by him. This opinion is reported by Ferrarien., yet he neither approves it nor gives any judgment on this matter. From this, however, Capreolus does not affirm that one attribute can be seen without the essence, or the essence without the persons; but he is speaking either of words expressed by a non-intuitive cognition of God Himself, such as we have of Him on the way; or, if he speaks of intuitive cognition, he understands those multiple words to be formed in order to distinguish according to reason one attribute from another - yet in such wise that, without the word by which the whole divine essence is seen together with the attributes, these distinct words could not be formed.

Cajetan, for his part, teaches only that the blessed cannot express a word adequate to the cognition which they have of God, because they know more than they are able by the word of their mind to say of Him; whence he proves that those who see God as He is express no word proportioned to their vision - so far is he from either following Capreolus's view or favoring Scotus.

Into that same opinion concerning the attributes there are wont to be alleged Richard in the third book, distinction 14, article 1, question 4, to the last, and St. Bonaventure in article 1, question 2, as if they asserted that something of the profundity of God Himself is hidden from the blessed. But they assert nothing of the sort: they only teach that God is not known by the blessed altogether according to that which is demanded for being known - something which they understand on the side of the mode of knowing, not on the side of the thing known. Yet Ferrarien. seems to favor that opinion in Contra Gentiles III, chapter 56, paragraph "Pro solutione," toward the end of that chapter, when he asserts that the infinity of God is seen by the blessed according to every degree of intensity, "as to a certain extent" (he says), "not distinctly distinguishing in Him every degree of being, and every relation to the effects which He is able to produce." He then adds that the blessed are not able in God to distinguish all the things that can be distinguished in Him, according to the mode which we have reported from Capreolus. Whether, however, one thing can be seen in God without another, as Scotus contends, from among the things which we say to be formally in God - so that one should appear and another lie hidden - he does not determine.

Caput II - On the common and truer opinion

And enough has been said about the opinion of Scotus, and of those who follow it.

Common and truer opinion.

765. Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 3, ad 8; Durandus, ad primam conclusionem; Ferrariensis (Franciscus de Ferrara), Contra gentiles, cap. 53; Cajetan, In Iam, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3.

To behold anything formally of God, all things are necessarily opened.

PVT II.

Granted the opinion which in the schools is indeed common, it not only commends itself to me, but I also think it can be demonstrated by evident reason. The opinion is this: that by the clear vision the blessed see all the things that are formally in God, in such wise that the Blessed cannot behold one without the other; nor can they behold the essence (*essentia*) without the persons, or conversely; nor one person without another; nor the essence without the attributes, or conversely; nor one attribute without another. Thus teach Henricus, quodlib. 13, q. 1; Cajetan, II - II, q. 2, a. 8; Dominicus Soto, In IV, d. 49, q. 3, a. 3, concl. 2, in the exposition of that point; and the more recent Thomists commonly.[766] Moreover, Soto in that conclusion affirms that the divine essence cannot be seen without the persons by an apprehensive knowledge (which he calls intuitive), yet it can be by a judicative knowledge; and he explains it thus, that that judicative knowledge is not the vision itself, but a certain cognition which the blessed possess together with the clear vision of God Himself, as they also have on the way (in via). For concerning the clear vision, whether it be taken as an apprehension or as a certain judgment about God, he thinks one ought to say the same, namely, that the essence cannot be seen without the persons, nor conversely. And this, in my judgment, everyone ought to admit; for that same vision of God has the character both of simple apprehension and of judgment at once.

This opinion, by a single reason, and that in my judgment an evident one, is established, on the supposition of a certain principle - which we shall prove no less clearly, both from the principles of faith and from natural philosophy, below in disputation 120 - namely, that in God, on account of His supreme simplicity, the essence is altogether the same as the persons and the attributes, and the very attributes among themselves; so that, from the nature of the thing, there is no diversity at all, not even the least distinction. Wherefore, from the nature of the thing, there are not in God a plurality of perfections which we name attributes, nor does the same attribute have any latitude of intensification; but all those things which, by reason of our defective cognition on the way, are distinguished by us, are in God like a point altogether undivided - which will be proved in that disputation.

With this supposed, I prove our opinion in the present question thus: the vision whereby the blessed behold God is the vision of God Himself as He is, so that He does not appear in the blessed's mind otherwise than He is in Himself. But in Himself He is altogether simple, and nothing in Him is distinguished from another, except the three persons, who are really distinct from one another. Therefore it is necessary that the other things which are here by us named as many should there appear altogether undivided. For if by that very vision the intellect of the blessed were to see one thing without another, assuredly that which is in God would not be clearly

766. Henricus of Ghent, Quodlibet 13, q. 1; Cajetan (Tommaso de Vio), Summa theologiae II - II, q. 2, a. 8; Dominicus Soto, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 3, concl. 2.

represented within the compass of that vision, but in a far different manner; for he who distinguishes does not conceive a thing by a proper, quidditative, and intuitive concept - as will be proved in disputation 138.

Wherefore what Ferrariensis and Capreolus were saying - that the blessed, besides the clear vision of God by which they see all things together, can form several concepts of God, as it were partial and inadequate, so as to distinguish by that single vision the things which they see together - seems absurd also, unless one says that those concepts, as it were partial, are such as a wayfarer has of God through alien species. For thus nothing hinders the blessed from distinguishing many perfections in God. But some clear knowledge of God, which they call intuitive, certainly cannot be such as to distinguish those things which in God are undivided. Wherefore several concepts of God cannot be multiplied. Thus, although the blessed, nay God Himself, knows in Himself many attributes distinguished for wayfarers, nevertheless neither God of Himself, nor the blessed of God Himself, has any kind of cognition by which distinct attributes are represented - as we shall show more fully in disputation 116.

The argument made thus far further proves that not even by divine power can it be brought about that He be clearly seen, the persons and the attributes not being seen; nor that any attribute be seen without another; nor that in the same attribute something be seen while another [aspect] is not seen; but that the whole must of necessity be known, which is altogether individual and simple. Whether, however, the blessed know every respect which we attribute to God toward creatures under a possible or future existence, we shall see in the following disputation.

Dubium. Further, if in God the attributes were distinguished by the nature of the thing among themselves and from the essence, and the essence also from the persons, there would be a difficulty whether, without a miracle, according to the natural order prescribed to things, one could be seen without another. Scotus, with that principle supposed, nevertheless taught that it could not be; and we have already reported his reason also, namely, that once the object has been manifested clearly as it is, the blessed cannot restrain the intellect from being borne wholly and entirely toward it. But if one understands Him so that some clear manifestation of God Himself precedes the vision in act, this is altogether false: for the whole manifestation of God is the vision itself. Granted, however, the vision, the intellect cannot but see the whole which it represents; yet it could elicit the vision in such a way as to behold what is represented as one thing without another, if the principle of that vision were subjected to the will. Wherefore we must have recourse to the nature of the principle, namely the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*), to see whether one thing could naturally be seen without another, even if they were distinguished, as Scotus supposed.

I say, then: if the light of glory is of such a nature (as all suppose) that it naturally carries the intellect with it to see, and is not like other habits which we use when we will, even if they are intellectual, then it cannot, according to the order prescribed to it, be that one thing in God is seen without another; because it would naturally move the intellect equally to one and to the other. Yet God, by His omnipotence, could concur with it to elicit the vision of one and not of the other. But if such were the habit that the intellect used it as the blessed might will, then indeed it could apply it to the vision of one and not of the other. When, however, we say that the essence could be seen

without the persons, if they were distinguished by the nature of the thing, and that we would use the light of glory at will, we do not say that the same vision would exist which, as it were varied, would now be of the essence and the persons, then of the essence alone; but that there would be diverse cognitions, numerically different, evident and clear, and (as they say) intuitive of the thing as it is, any one of which the light of glory could elicit of itself.

Explanation of the passage John 14: "He who sees me, sees also my Father."

Caput III - That one divine person cannot be seen without the others

From what has been said it is gathered that one person cannot be seen while another is not seen; because, although they are really distinguished among themselves, nevertheless they are the same as the very essence; whence it comes about that one person is said to be in another by circumincession (as the theologians speak), and consequently, one being seen, the other is seen in it. Nay, some think this is expressed in John 14, where, when Philip had asked for the clear vision of the Father, and [the Lord] had said that this would suffice them as a consolation for the sorrow which the disciples were going to suffer from Christ's departure, Christ answered: "Have I been so long a time with you, and have you not known me, Philip? He that sees me, sees my Father also." Concerning this clear vision according to the divinity, Hilary seems to have understood this place, in De Trinitate 7; Athanasius, in the confession of faith to Epictetus; Nazianzen, oration 36, no. 82, where he says that the Son of God is therefore deservedly called Logos, because He is, as it were, the definition of the Father, by the knowledge of which the Father Himself is known; and oration 49: "He who sees me, sees the Father," not without reason, because by unity of substance, or unity of divinity, they are one; and Augustine seems to have understood it in the same way, De Trinitate, cap. 8, and on Psalms 84 and 85.[767]

Some Thomists, however, press Scotus with this passage of John, because to Philip asking for the clear vision of the Father, Christ the Lord replied: "He who sees me, sees also my Father: how sayest thou, Show us the Father? Do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father in me?" - as if He were to say: since we are of wholly the same nature, it cannot be that he who has seen me should not see the Father; where He infers from the unity of nature that one cannot be known without the other, not from the mutual relation of the persons: so that by this reasoning we should also understand that the essence cannot be seen without the persons.

But this exposition agrees neither with the interpretation of the Fathers, who expressly elucidate that passage, nor with the context of John. First, Tertullian treats this place carefully in Against Praxeas, chapter 24; Cyril, book 9 on John, chapter 37; Chrysostom, homily 73 on John; Augustine, tractate 70 on John: yet none of these says that Philip asked of Christ the clear vision of the Father, as it is, namely the vision in which the intellect is spiritual; for if he had asked that, how would Christ by His reply...[768]

767. St. Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate, book 7; St. Athanasius, Epistula ad Epictetum (confession of faith); St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 36, no. 82, and Oration 49; St. Augustine, De Trinitate, book 1, cap. 8; Enarrationes in Psalmos 84 and 85.

It is further made clear from these things that, if Philip had asked of Christ the clear vision of the Father as He is, namely the vision in which the intellect is spiritual, if He had granted him that clear vision, He would have satisfied him by saying: "He who sees me, sees also my Father." For then Philip could have replied: "With the acumen of mind we have not yet seen your divinity, but only with bodily eyes have we known your humanity. It is therefore no wonder if, after so long a time of conversing with you, we have not yet clearly seen you yourself according to divinity, nor the Father: therefore show Him to us clearly, and it suffices for us."

Second exposition. That Philip desired to see God the Father with bodily eyes, and asked for this, Tertullian, St. John Chrysostom, and St. Cyril teach. Tertullian says: "And therefore he is rebuked, for desiring to see the Father as if visible: he is taught that the Father becomes visible in the Son by the power of His works, not by personal representation; that is, not because the person itself, as such, is shown." Therefore he interprets: "He who sees me, sees also the Father;" that is: "If someone sees me, he also sees Him," that is to say, neither I nor He can be seen [by bodily sight]. For Philip was seeking a cognition of sight.

St. John Chrysostom explains what is added, "And you have not known me": "Although I have done so many works, which are proper to God, you have not yet known me, because I am encompassed with flesh."

Third exposition. Finally St. Cyril refers Philip's petition to a corporeal vision, not as though he were asking to behold the divine substance with bodily eyes, but as desiring to see God the Father in some corporeal figure - of fire, or of some other thing - just as He appeared to the prophets. Thus Cyril subjoins these words: "Do you then, Philip," he says, "when you can see the Father far better in me than the ancients saw Him in the fire, desire some other mode of seeing the Father?" And again: "But you ask to see the Father, because you have not yet fully believed that I am in the Father, and the Father in me."

Fourth and fuller exposition. St. Augustine, in the tractate cited, and in Epistle 112, chapter 6, refers Philip's petition not to a bodily vision, as the Fathers cited take it, but to a cognitive act of the mind. He does not say that Philip asked for a clear vision of the essence of the Father, but for simple cognition - namely, who the Father might be, to whom Christ Himself said He was going; and I take this to be the genuine and native sense of the text. That we may explain this better, let us set forth the text of John. Christ had said: "Because I go to prepare a place for you; and if I shall have gone and prepared a place for you, again I am coming and will take you to myself, that where I am, you also may be; and you know where I am going, and you know the way." Thomas says to Him: "Lord, we do not know where you are going, and how can we know the way?" Jesus says to him: "I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father except through me. If you had known me, you would indeed have known my Father also; and from now on you shall know Him, and you have seen Him." Then Philip spoke up: "Lord, show us the Father, and it suffices for us," etc. By these words He was not speaking of the clear vision of God which is for the

768. Tertullian, Adversus Praxean, cap. 24; St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Ioannem, book 9, cap. 37; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 73 in Ioannem; St. Augustine, Tract. 70 in Ioannem.

intellect in the homeland, but He was speaking of the true knowledge of the Father, as will soon appear from the context itself. For when Christ was near to death, so as to go over, according to the flesh, to immortal life with His own Father God, that He might console the hearts of His disciples, He said: "And even if I shall have gone off and prepared a place for you, I am coming again, I will take you to myself." By which words He signified that He would go before, so as also to prepare a place for them, and that He would return, so as to transfer them together with Himself to that same vision. Then He subjoins: "And you know where I am going, and you know the way;" that is: You know very well the place to which I am going, and the way by which I am going, so that you may be able to follow me. But Thomas, not understanding what Christ was saying, said: "We do not know where you are going, and how can we know the way by which it is reached?" Christ, however, replied: "I am the way, the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father except through me;" that is, I am the true way by which one goes to immortal life with the Father: for no one can come to the Father except by my merits. "If you had known me, you would indeed have known my Father also; and from now on you shall know Him, and you have seen Him." As if He were saying: If you had known me, who am the way, fully, you would most excellently also have known the Father, to whom I am going; but a little later, namely when the Paraclete shall have come, you will know Him; and certainly, if you had wished to attend to my works and doctrine, you have already known Him enough. Then Philip - still ignorant who the Father might be, to whom He was saying that He would go - said: "Show us the Father, and it suffices for us;" that is: Tell us who this your Father is, to whom you are going, and we shall be content with this alone. For that Philip was ignorant what Christ was saying that His Father was, Augustine attests in the place alleged. But the Lord then most fittingly replied: "So long a time I have been with you, and you have not known me;" that is, after so long a time during which I have conversed with you, you have not yet known that I am God? "He who sees me, sees also my Father;" that is, he who perfectly knows me from my works and doctrine, will plainly understand me to be God of the same nature (*natura*) with the Father, and hence will know my Father, to whom I said that I am going, to be God. "Do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? The words that I speak to you, I do not speak from myself; but the Father abiding in me, He Himself does the works. Do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? Otherwise, believe because of the works themselves." In this way Tertullian expounds it, when he says that from the works and powers of Christ the Father becomes visible, that is, known.[769]

Objection from the context. Against this exposition that whole context can be objected: since Christ had first said, "You know where I am going, and you know the way," later Thomas said: "Lord, we do not know where you are going, and how can we know the way?" From which Philip's ignorance of who His Father was, to whom He said He was going, followed; and he added: "Show us the Father," etc. How then had Christ said, "You know where I am going, and you know the way"?

769. Tertullian, Adversus Praxean, cap. 24; St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Ioannem, book 9, cap. 37; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 73 in Ioannem; St. Augustine, Tract. 70 in Ioannem.

Reply, first. Augustine answers this difficulty with these words: "The question is easily solved, if we say that some of them knew, some did not know; and among those who did not know was Philip, and perhaps we can number Thomas," and Augustine speaks only of Philip.

Reply, second. Others explain those words "You know where I am going, and you know the way," in this manner: that the Apostles excellently knew God, and to Him Christ was going, and the kingdom of heaven to which He was going; but they did not know that Christ Himself would go there; and also, in order to know that Christ Himself was the spiritual way, whose merit would lead to eternal life, they did not yet know Him to be the way. Therefore they knew in one manner, and in another they were ignorant, as in John 9 Christ said to the man born blind whom He had healed: "Do you believe in the Son of God?" and he answered: "Who is He, that I may believe in Him?" To whom Christ said again: "You have seen Him, and He is the one who speaks with you." For he had seen Him when He healed him, who was the Son of God, but he did not yet know Him to be the Son of God.

A third reconciliation. Or we can reconcile these things in another way, namely that the disciples already quite well knew that Christ was to die, as is clear from John 12, and that by His death He would draw all things to Himself; they knew also that He would rise to immortal life; but Thomas and others did not know whether that very thing which He was saying in John 14 would happen then. Forgetful, therefore, altogether that Christ, by the imminent death, was to pass over into immortal life, and supposing, after the supper, that He wished to retire into some hidden place, they said: "We do not know where you are going, and how can we know the way?" But He, showing them the way of which He was then speaking, said: "I am the way," and at the same time He also showed that He was to go to the Father when He said: "No one comes to the Father, except through me." Moreover, since they had not sufficiently understood that His Father was God, He subjoined: "If you had known me," and the rest, to which Philip added his request.

It remains to reply to the arguments of Scotus as they are taken up by Cajetan. Concerning the first argument there are many things. Cajetan, in II - II, q. 2, a. 8, asserts this, in order to prove that to the formal ratio of beatitude there pertains not only the vision as terminated at the essence, but also as it regards the persons; the opposite Scotus had taught. But this is not our present controversy; for now we only doubt whether the essence (*essentia*) could be seen without the persons, whether the persons per se pertain to the object of beatitude or not: of this we shall treat in I - II, q. 3. Still, let us say in passing, that although, according to our mode of understanding, which we have of God in this life, we most well conceive the essence of God without the persons, and that by the sole vision of that [essence] the eternal Father in the priority of origin is Blessed - because when so we understand God to be, we understand the highest good, which formally is the object of beatitude - yet, if we consider that very clear vision of God, as on the part of the thing it is terminated at God, it does not of itself regard the divine essence separated from the persons, in such wise that if the persons were varied, this vision would remain; rather, since the persons themselves are contained within the object of beatitude, therefore not only this proposition "The divine essence makes us blessed," but also this, "The three persons make us blessed," is per se in the fourth mode of saying "per se." For thus most perfectly the divine essence agrees with the

Trinity of persons, so that if the Trinity were taken away, the essence of God could not subsist; and this follows by an intrinsic locus from the nature of the thing. Therefore, if the persons are said per se of the essence, and the essence is said per se to be blessed by the vision of itself, it will also per se agree with the persons, in the fourth mode of saying "per se."[770]

But laying aside this difficulty, let us come to the latter argument, which has place for the present. We say, therefore, that for this reason the essence cannot, even by absolute power, be seen without the persons: because from the nature of the thing it is not distinguished from them. But it is impossible - which Scotus too would gladly concede - that that which from the nature of the thing is most simple, and has in itself no distinction, if it be seen as it is, by a clear and intuitive cognition, be divided into several, or that some part of it be seen without another, when it is not one thing and another. But that the essence is not distinguished from the persons we shall prove below in Disputation 130. Now, however, we deny what is assumed in the argument, namely that the essence is distinguished from the persons, or the attributes either from the persons or among themselves by the nature of the thing, as Scotus thought; this will be proved in the place cited. This foundation being removed, the argument proves nothing, as we said: namely, that if it were distinguished by the nature of the thing, one could be seen without the other; and this was explained in the second chapter.

To what is brought forward in confirmation, namely that the essence is communicated, the persons are not communicated; that a person terminates a human nature, the divine nature does not terminate a human nature; I reply that such propositions and the like - of the kind that some among us commonly propose - do not suffice to prove a distinction by the nature of the thing between the essence and the persons, as Scotus contends; and to show this sufficiently against us the disputation cited will suffice. The true solution lies in the close of the reasoning: according to our mode of understanding, we enunciate some things about a person which cannot be said about our [essence]; but from the examples posited it is not proved that a clear and intuitive cognition can see one thing without another; for to this truth all of us who hold that no vision without another [object] is valid agree that a distinction from the nature of the thing is necessary. Whether, however, the difference required for the aforesaid propositions, which we said are truly enunciated, be from the nature of the thing, not all concede; Scotus contends that from it a distinction from the nature of the thing is rightly proved; but we shall show the opposite; and if this be once shown, that a distinction from the nature of the thing is not gathered from those, it follows, as we have already noted, that neither can one be seen without the other.

770. Cajetan (Tommaso de Vio), Summa theologiae II - II, q. 2, a. 8; for the broader controversy see also Henricus of Ghent, Quodlibet 13, q. 1; Dominicus Soto, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 3, concl. 2.

Disputatio XLIX - Not all futures and not all possibles are seen by the blessed

Caput I - Not all future things are seen by the Blessed

The question proposed is about future things, not about Christ; for about this we shall dispute in the Third Part, q. 10, a. 2. Nor is it about the mode by which the Blessed are said to see other things besides God - whether by the same vision, and whether from the force of that very vision by which they see the divine essence they also see what is connected to it - for this the following disputation will concern; but about the number of things which, besides God, they see: whether they know all things other than Him - both future and possible.

And although, as to Christ, some Doctors have different statements, as we shall see in the place cited, nevertheless, with regard to other Blessed, there is no one who lays down as a law that each of the Blessed sees all things created, both as to essence and existence. Yet Durandus, in IV, dist. 49, q. 3, and St. Thomas, in I, q. 12, a. 9, say expressly that all things in God are not seen by the Blessed.[771]

On the contrary, the opposite opinion is followed by the same St. Thomas in this article, and elsewhere in the place alleged, and certain others in the passages that will be cited in the following disputation: which opinion is understood of possibilities and futures, and the like, so that without limit they be denied to be seen. And to prove this, they bring forward St. Dionysius, when he teaches that the lower angels are purged, illuminated, and perfected by the superiors; and they add that text: "Who is this that comes from Edom?" By which the angels are understood, according to Dionysius, to have examined, inquired about, and learned from the higher mysteries of the Incarnation, what was to be done and suffered by the inferior One, which they could not have been ignorant of if all future things had been open to them. They add also that of Ephesians 3: "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the principalities and powers by the Church;" where Paul speaks of the mystery of the Gospel law, which he himself preached, that by it what had been hidden from the beginning in God might be made known to the principalities; in which words it is openly indicated that, as to that mystery, the supernal powers learned from the apostles; therefore they did not have beforehand the cognition of this mystery in all its parts

ad Rom. 11: "How incomprehensible are his judgments and untraceable his ways; who has known the mind of the Lord?" There is added that of Mark 13 and Matthew 24: "But of that day or hour no one knows, neither the angels in heaven." It is clear, however, that they were then blessed; therefore the blessed do not know all future things. As to the reason why it is there said: "Nor the Son of Man," this will be more fully explained in III, q. 10, art. 2. Finally, as will be proved in Disputation 29, angels do not know the thoughts of the heart; therefore the blessed do not know all future things

771. Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 9.

Caput II - Not all possibles are known by the blessed

Further, as to the things that are possible, it cannot so easily be proved that not all are known by the blessed. St. Thomas and more recent Thomists prove that they are not known, because, if a blessed person knew all things, he would without doubt comprehend the essence of God; but this is most impossible and contrary to faith: therefore the blessed cannot know all possible things. They think this so true that they affirm that not even by absolute power could God communicate to the blessed the knowledge of all those things in the Word and in his essence, because the absurdity which we stated would follow therefrom. Yet, as I shall show in Disputation 53, this argument proves only that not all things can be seen in God by force of the vision of the essence, but it does not show that, in fact, the blessed do not behold all possibles by a special revelation; as some also assert, and we shall say in the following disputation, that the things which, besides God, a blessed person knows are seen in him only in such a way that, if by that mode a blessed person knew all possibles, he would not comprehend God himself; as we shall see in the cited disputation.

Moreover, even if someone were to say that all things can be seen by force of the vision, nonetheless - according to the doctrine of St. Thomas and of others - one could assert that God is not comprehended; for, as the Doctor asserts in article 7, and with him the others who use this line of reasoning: for knowledge to be the comprehension of some object, it is necessary that it be of the same measure of perfection and entity as is the thing itself which is said to be comprehended, so that God might be comprehended, it would be necessary for the vision of God to be infinite according to nature, just as God himself is; because knowledge must be proportioned to God in order to comprehend him. But it would not follow that the vision is infinite, if the essence of God were seen as it is, and by the force of that vision all other things which are said to be in it; for it is not necessary that knowledge be infinite, even if the objects known are infinite, as I shall say below in Disputation 50. And although, in the same proportion, the vision would necessarily increase, nevertheless the increase would take place only in accidental perfection, so that the vision would be infinite according to intensity, not, however, according to its nature; whence it would not follow, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas which we have reported, that such knowledge is a comprehension of the divine essence. For, in order that it be comprehension, it would have to be infinite in the same manner and of as great perfection as is the divine essence itself; but the essence is infinite by its nature and in itself, not by accidental perfection or intensity; therefore even then that vision would not be comprehension. Lastly, I do not think it is a manifestly condemned error to assert that God is in some way comprehended by the blessed - though that be false, as we shall see in Disputation 52 - therefore it is not of faith, as some Thomists thought and related, to say that not all possibles are known in the Word or the divine essence, even by force of the vision. Yet I am sufficiently persuaded that not only do the blessed not see all future things, as was said above, but neither do they see all possibles (although, about possibles, it is not so certain); for it would be in vain and without foundation for us to say that God has revealed to the blessed an innumerable

multitude of things which he will never make. Moreover, that those things are not known by the blessed by force of the vision of the essence of God will be made manifest in the following disputation.

An the blessed see anything in the Word. Disputation 50. - The opinion of Durandus. Cap. 1. - What Henry thinks. Cap. 2. - The position of the Thomists. Cap. 3. - It is shown a priori that, by force of the vision of God, nothing created is seen. Cap. 4. - It is proved from an absurdity that, by force of the vision of God, no creature is seen in him. Cap. 5. - That no creature is seen by force of the vision of God, but by a special revelation, is the truer position. Cap. 6. - Creatures are seen in the Word by a different knowledge than God himself is seen. Cap. 7.

Disputatio L - Whether the blessed see anything in the Word

Caput I - The opinion of Durandus

We understand entirely the same thing when we say that certain things are seen in God or that the essence of God is seen, and that they are seen in the divine Word: for they are not said to be seen in the Word because they are not seen in the Father and the Holy Spirit, but because, when it proceeds through the intellect, the work of cognition is, by appropriation, attributed to him, just as the work of justification is attributed to the Holy Spirit. But when we inquire whether the blessed see anything in God, we understand other things besides God, that is, creatures according to their own proper rationes (*rationes propriae*), not insofar as they are said to be in God; for a stone, insofar as it is in God, is said to have the life of God - thus, in that sense, it is entirely the same thing to see God and to see creatures in him, in which way St. Augustine frequently speaks, as will appear in the following disputation.

With these things briefly premised, in the present controversy the first opinion to be examined is that of Durandus in IV, dist. 49, q. 3, and in IV, dist. 49, q. 6, a.; as Capreolus reports in III, dist. 14, q. 2; which opinion, in the beginning, was that of Godfrey in Quodlibet 6, q. 3; and Bassolis followed him in Question 4 of the Prologue, article 3. These two teach. One is that not only Christ, but also any of the blessed, by force of the vision, behold in the Word the essences of all the things that can be made. The other is that nothing future is known in the Word, insofar as it is future - which they call the thing as to existence - but that future things, which they see by a peculiar revelation, are known by them.[772]

They prove both by a single argument, which appears very plausible in this matter. When the intellect clearly sees some thing, by that very fact it sees all the things which are naturally represented in it and necessarily appear; but what are represented freely, by force of that vision, it cannot see unless a new revelation be made to it. Now, all possibles, as to essence, are naturally

772. Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 3; dist. 49, q. 6, a.; Capreolus (Jean Capreolus), In III Sent., dist. 14, q. 2; Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet 6, q. 3; Bassolis, Quaestiones in Prologum, q. 4, art. 3.

represented in the divine essence; but future things, as to the existence which they will have, are represented only freely. Therefore, by force of that vision, possibles are seen, not futures, unless by a peculiar revelation.

But certain things must be proved by us in confirmation of this reasoning.

First, that those things which are naturally represented in the essence of God are truly seen by force of the vision of that essence; this indeed is easy to grant, for if certain things are naturally represented in it, they necessarily also appear in it; but what necessarily appears cannot fail to be seen: therefore, if in the divine essence all possibles are necessarily represented, they cannot fail to be seen by force of the vision - especially since nothing else hinders; for on the part of the divine essence, which represents, nothing can hinder, since in it these things shine forth clearly and necessarily; nor on the part of the intellect of the blessed. For if anything hindered, the chief thing would be that the finite intellect cannot see infinites; but it is far less repugnant to know the infinite essences of possible creatures - each of which, according to its essence, is finite - than to see the very infinite nature of God according to being (*esse*). Therefore, since the blessed, endowed with the light of glory, see the essence of God, nothing prevents them from beholding in it also the infinite essences of possible things.

Second, that in the divine essence the possible essences of things are necessarily represented. This is gathered both because God necessarily knows in himself all possible things, nor was it in his power not to know them, just as neither was it in his power to make them not be possible; therefore, in his essence, as in the Word and as in the cognition of them, they are naturally represented. Then also because, since God by his very nature can make all those things and is their cause by his omnipotence, in a higher way he is said necessarily to contain them in himself.

Third, that future things are not represented in God naturally and necessarily. For just as he willed from eternity to produce certain things in their times, so he could have willed others, and he could have willed to do nothing; therefore what he is going to do is known by God as free, just as they are freely future, and consequently they are freely represented in him; but what is represented freely in God cannot be seen, by force of the vision of the divine essence, in him. For from the fact that from eternity that essence represents those things, it has nothing new which otherwise it would not have, even if it did not represent them; otherwise there would be in God something eternal and free which could not be, and thus something contingent would be in God - which is impossible.

But then there would be in God something free, which could not be, and thus God would be free with respect to something that could not be God - which is absurd. For all things which exist in God are God himself; therefore in God there is nothing, by reason of which the Blessed could behold and clearly know those things which are said to be represented in him freely.

Godfrey confirms this opinion with other arguments, by which below we shall prove that no creature can be known in God: for either none or all ought to be seen.

Refutation of Durandus's opinion. Yet to me this opinion of Durandus is not approved; for besides the fact that it is not true, neither is it sufficiently proved by Durandus himself that certain possibles - much less all - are seen by the Blessed by force of the vision of the divine essence, as, against other opinions, we shall show below; the distinction which he posits between possible and future things, insofar as they are referred to the divine essence and are represented therein, is futile and empty: this, then, is what I intend now to show against Durandus alone. Therefore I set forth that all have the same reason, so that in the same way they are either known in God, or not known in God.

First, both possibles and futures, according to their own formal reasons, are not formally in God; therefore on this score they are equal. Next: either possibles are known in God by force of the vision of that essence, because they are in him as in the knower, and hence they are in him as in a mirror; but not only possibles are in God in this manner, but also futures, insofar as they are future; for as future they are known by God as possibles. Or possibles are known in God by force of the vision of God himself, because they are in God as in a cause; but when the cause is known, the effect is known, and consequently, when omnipotence is known, those things are known which can be made by it: yet futures too are in God as in a cause which is going to operate; therefore, when God himself, who is going to operate, is seen, that which will be future will be clearly known in him; just as, once omnipotence is known, that which can be done by God is straightway known.

And this argument has its force especially from this, that God is the cause of things by reason of the knowledge which he has of them; wherefore one who sees in God the dictate by which he judges it good to do some thing, and the will by which he wills to effect it, can very well know future things, if possibles are seen in the way we have said.

But the distinction which Durandus establishes between possibles and futures - namely, that the latter are represented in God freely, the former necessarily and naturally - has no weight. For from this there follows only that those things which are represented naturally cannot in any case fail to be seen, because they cannot fail to be represented; whereas those things which are represented freely, since they could fail to be represented, could also fail to be seen: but indeed, once the representation is supposed, the things appear, and cannot fail to be seen. Just as an image in a mirror is not represented naturally and necessarily, but freely - just as freely the mirror itself is placed opposite us, in which the images are refracted - yet once, by our liberty, the object is placed opposite, and thus the image of it is freely also refracted, the eye, applied to the mirror, cannot fail to see the thing. In the same way, therefore, after things exist by God's will, they cannot fail to be represented in the divine essence as set over against it, even insofar as they are future; therefore, once the divine essence is seen, by this same reasoning they cannot fail to be known - especially because, once futures have been represented in the divine essence, they can no longer fail to be represented.

Someone will reply on behalf of Durandus's opinion, that to God there accrues only a respect of reason, from the fact that futures are represented or known in his essence, and from the fact that he is going to produce them in time; wherefore it is no wonder if the vision of the divine essence, which of itself is absolute with respect to future things, does not make the futures themselves to be

seen. I certainly cannot deny that in this way one very well satisfies the argument, so that it may not prove absolutely that future things are seen in the divine essence, even if they are said to be represented in it and to be known by it - which I shall show more clearly in chapter 4 of this disputation. For the present, however, I contend only against Durandus that possibles and futures have the same reason; and therefore, if futures are not known (as we shall concede there), the same must be said of possibles. Moreover, it is clear that there is no difference: for possibles are so represented in the divine essence naturally, and are so necessarily known by it, that there is in God no real relation to them, just as neither to futures - as will be shown more fully in Disputation 104, chapter 6; nevertheless they are said to be known by God and to be represented in the divine essence; therefore, since futures no less are said to be known by God himself and to be represented in his essence, even if there is no real relation to them, by force of the vision of the divine essence they can be seen no less than possibles; or, if futures cannot be, neither will possibles be able to be known. Therefore the distinction assigned by Durandus is empty; and from what has been said the solution to his arguments is evident.

Caput II - What Henry (of Ghent) holds

Henry is usually cited on behalf of the opinion of those who teach that nothing at all created is seen in the essence of God by force of that vision by the Blessed. But he handed down his own view to us otherwise, in Quodlibet 7, questions 4 and 5, where he teaches three points.[773]

First part of the view. First, that the divine essence, seen by the Blessed insofar as it is with respect to itself, not as an idea of creatures, is not for the Blessed a reason of seeing anything created, whether future or possible. This can be proved, since the divine essence, considered in this way, regards no creature; therefore, by the vision of itself, it cannot lead the intellect into the cognition of any creature.

Second part. Second, that the essence of God seen under the concept of idea is for the Blessed the reason of knowing only the species of possible things, not individuals; and he establishes the difference between species and individuals thus: that there are not in God ideas of individuals, but only of species; therefore the essence, seen under the aspect of idea, does not lead into the cognition of individuals, but only of species. Henry, however, indicates that individuals too are seen by the same vision together with the divine essence, not by force of that vision, but by a special revelation, or at least by some other, different vision. He proves, moreover, that the species of possible things are seen by force of the vision of the essence in God; because the divine essence, inasmuch as it is an idea, has a bearing and relation to creatures; therefore it can of itself lead into the cognition of creatures.

Third part. Third, that God can manifest himself to the Blessed as he is with respect to himself, without any order to creatures, that is, by manifesting the essence insofar as it is essence, not under the aspect of idea. Wherefore he says that God can be seen in himself, with no creature at all seen, by force of such a vision; just as a science, which is a certain quality with a relation to its object, can

773. Henricus (Henry of Ghent), Quodlibet 7, qq. 4 - 5.

be seen as a quality, with the relation not being known; and then it is not necessary to see or to know the object. He proves this on two grounds: first, from a real limitation of the intellect, which is by nature suited to know one thing without another; then from the fact that God is a voluntary mirror, and therefore can manifest himself to the Blessed in one way and not in another.

From these Henry infers that Christ did not see in the Word all possibles; and he ought to say the same concerning the others who are Blessed; but this he proves by no reason. Yet it can be urged from this, that God would be comprehended, if in him every notion of idea were known, and by force of it every possible specific nature - which is absurd. Wherefore Henry is driven to say that not every notion of idea which is in God can be communicated to the Blessed, but that something of God must necessarily be hidden from them.

Passing over, however, the first part of this opinion - in which I agree with Henry, and will confirm against some disciples of St. Thomas in chapter 4 - what he asserts in the second and third place is by no reason proved to me. What he asserts in the second place I refute on this ground: either the respect and relation of the divine essence, inasmuch as it is an idea of creatures, is real, or it is of reason. That it is real cannot be, as we shall show below in Disputation 104, chapter 6; but if in God there were such a relation, it would be not only a reason of knowing and seeing natures as specific in general, but also of knowing and seeing the individuals and singulars of them one by one: both because an intellect seeing a thing quiditatively and by a proper concept does not distinguish the generic and specific notion (as we shall prove in Disputation 118, chapter 3 - for this arises from imperfection of cognition), and also because the divine essence is not only the idea of species, but also of any individual whatsoever, one by one, as we shall say in Disputation 74, chapter 2. Nay more, since God's idea is his knowledge, and he himself does not distinguish in things the generic from the specific notion (as we shall show there), things will be seen rather as singulars than as specific natures in general; at least it cannot be denied that all singulars which can come to be are most perfectly known by God by that very reason by which they can come to be; by this reason, then, the divine idea will be determined to them one by one: therefore, whether there be one common idea of the whole species, or we assign to each individual its own, by that very reason by which a specific nature is known through the idea, by that same reason the individuals too must be seen.

Or if the relation which the divine idea has to creatures is a relation of reason, and belongs to God only according to our way of understanding - which indeed is what must truly be said - then in this way it cannot be a clear reason for seeing creatures in God himself. For if God is seen in himself, he will be seen as something altogether absolute with respect to creatures; and although respects of reason are conceived as long as a thing is conceived under the notion of relation, and while under that relative name it is termed, nevertheless such a notion is attributed to God only by the intellect of wayfarers, who do not see him himself as he is, but, after the manner of other things, conceive him as related. But the Blessed, who clearly see God, and have him present to their intellect in the very way in which he truly is, cannot in him conceive a respect of reason toward creatures, nor can they esteem such a notion to consist in the clear vision of God himself; nay rather, even if such a relation by name would be conceived in God by wayfarers, this would not

suffice that from it they should clearly see creatures all, or those to which it is terminated; for we apprehend in some object a respect of reason toward something else, but this is not for that reason a sufficient cause of our seeing clearly that thing to which it is terminated.

From what has been said it follows that what Henry taught in the third place is false - namely, that the vision of God can be communicated to the Blessed in two ways: as he is in himself absolutely, and then as he is referred to creatures under the aspect of idea. This position is to be rejected; for if the divine essence is clearly seen as it is, it must necessarily be seen by the intellect in one manner only; for with respect to that idea there is either a real relation or one of reason. If it is real, then by the same necessity it will be the same as the essence itself, as are the personal relations; and it will not be possible to show that the essence is seen without it, as will be proved in Disputation 48 on the divine essence and the personal relations. But if it is a respect of reason, it will always be known indeed by the Blessed as absolute; for such a respect belongs only according to the intellect of wayfarers, as was said above; hence the same thing cannot be seen in a twofold manner - namely, as referred to creatures and as absolute - but only in one and the same way, according as it truly is.

The foundations of Henry are moreover easily overturned. First, that claim whereby the divine essence - even insofar as it is an idea - could not be a reason of knowing or of seeing creatures, has already been sufficiently shown to be false. Then, as to his saying that the intellect is of its nature able to know one thing without another: from this it is not gathered that, when it beholds the thing itself as it is, it can fail to see in it the whole that it is. For although, when the thing is not itself presented, our intellect, by a certain mode of our own, can understand one thing without another, nevertheless when it beholds the thing as it is, it cannot fail to see in it the whole of what it is; and the natures in it do not distinguish themselves; wherefore, if in it there is some respect to creatures, it cannot fail to be known at the same time with the thing itself by the same vision; but if there is not, then the essence cannot be seen in that twofold way. Lastly, when God is called a voluntary mirror, this is not to be so understood as if he could cause that, of those things which are in him, one be manifested without the other; for these are manifested by God to the intellect, and are seen by him and from him, not by any defect or option extrinsic to him; rather he is called a voluntary mirror because, from created things, he can, as he wills, clearly set forth and reveal this object or that; but whether he can reveal them in himself in this way will be said more seriously below.[774]

Caput III - The Thomists' position

A third opinion is that of those who assert that, by force of the vision by which the divine essence is seen, certain creatures too are seen, and the more of them the more perfectly one beholds God's essence; yet never that in this way all possibles can be seen in the divine essence. This opinion is embraced by Cajetan, by Capreolus, by Soto, by the Ferrarian, and by more recent

774. On God as a "voluntary mirror" and the question whether he can reveal creatures "in himself," see below in this Disputation.

Thomists in this article; and it is also set down by Richard.[775] They say that St. Thomas seems to speak to this effect, as does Ferrarius; and although St. Thomas may appear to incline otherwise in article 8, nevertheless from the things that follow, when expounded, his opinion is gathered not obscurely. This opinion the Thomists prove first from that text of 1 Corinthians 13: "We see now through a glass, in an enigma."[776]

"But now through a glass, in an enigma; but then face to face": which the Fathers thus explain, that the things which we now believe by faith, in the other life, seeing the essence (*essentia*) of God, we shall contemplate face to face.

Then they strive to strengthen it by testimonies of the Fathers. First, there are very many testimonies of St. Augustine, by which he seems to have expressed this, as in book 4 on Genesis to the Letter, chapter 23, where he says: "There is, to be sure, a great difference between the knowledge of any thing whatsoever in the Word of God, and the knowledge in its nature, so that the former pertains to the day, the latter to the evening." The same he hands down in the book of 65 Questions, question 26. More testimonies to this point could be produced from St. Augustine, but I omit them; for in the following disputation we must treat more fully of his mind.[777]

Second, they adduce the well-known saying of St. Gregory, Dialogues 4, chapter 33, at the end, where, showing how the Blessed in the other life know not only those whom they knew in this life, but whomever else of the good, he says: "Because there all, in a common clarity, behold God: what is there that they do not know there, where, knowing him who knows all things, they know?" The same words are had of the blessed Angels in book 2 of the Moralia, chapter 2.[778]

The third testimony is of St. Bernard, book 5 of On Consideration to Eugenius, at the beginning, where, explaining that of Romans 1, "The invisible things of God," etc., thus he says: "Surely this ladder (that is, of creatures) citizens do not need, but exiles; as the author of this knowledge saw, who, when he said that the invisible things are conceived through the visible, significantly added, 'by the things that are made.' And truly, what need is there that he mendically seek a knowledge of the Maker by the lens of this world? He has one far more sublime, by which rather he beholds these: he sees the Word, and in the Word the things made through the Word; nor has he need, from the things that have been made, to beg a knowledge of the Maker. For neither, that he may know them themselves, does he descend to them themselves, who sees them there where they are far better than in themselves." Thus far Bernard, who seems clearly and expressly to teach this opinion.[779]

Fourth, the Council of Sens, in the decrees of faith, when it condemns the error of those who say that the Saints are not to be invoked, subjoins these words: "But how much this is discordant, not only with the truth, but also with the Scriptures, he will easily understand who does not ignore that

775. Cajetanus; Capreolus in IV, dist. 49, qq. 6, art. 1 et 3; Soto, q. 3, art. 1; Ferrariensis; contra Gentiles, c. 66; and Richard, in III, dist. 14, art. 2, q. 3; and in IV, dist. 49, art. 3, q. 5.

776. 1 Cor 13: "Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate."

777. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, IV, c. 23; and Liber LXV Quaestionum, q. 26.

778. St. Gregory the Great, Dialogi, IV, c. 33 (in fine); and Moralia in Iob, II, c. 2.

779. St. Bernard of Clairvaux, De consideratione ad Eugenium, V (initium); citing Rom 1:20 "Invisibilia Dei...".

to the Blessed there is open that manifold mirror of divinity, in which whatever pertains to them shines forth." Therefore it holds that the prayers which we pour out to them, because they pertain to them, are seen by them in the divinity, as in a mirror.[780]

Finally, it is proved by reason, since, if from a known cause effects are known, when God is known, creatures also will be able to be known from him; and just as, the more perfectly the cause is known, so the more of its effects are seen; but if it be thoroughly understood and comprehended, it is necessary that all its effects be known and seen: so also, the more clearly the Blessed see the essence of God, who is the cause of all creatures, and the more deeply they penetrate his omnipotence, the more also they will know creatures in him. This reason, moreover, proves not only that creatures are seen by the same vision with God, as Angels by a single species and known species are able to know many things at once; but truly that they are known in God himself, as in a cause, by the vision by which God himself is seen. For it cannot happen that one sees God without, in him, contemplating the notion of omnipotence; but this cannot be known, nor be clearly seen, unless the things which can be done by it are known. And since no repugnance can be assigned in this, on account of the doctrine of the Fathers and the Scholastics, this opinion seems to be preferred to the others.

Moreover, for this reason they teach that not all creatures can be known in God in this way, because otherwise the divine essence would not only be seen clearly, but would be comprehended by the Blessed, which the recent authors think to be against the faith.

Then certain more recent authors, who follow this third opinion, teach that God can be seen clearly, such that by the force of the vision of God no creature is seen. In none, however, of the ancient Scholastics could I find this, except Henry, who in his own way, as we saw in the preceding chapter, teaches this. They prove it, first, by the testimony of Augustine, Confessions, chapter 4, where he says: "Blessed is he who knows thee, even if he knows other things not." Then by this reason: it can happen that some cognition is borne to the primary object and does not pass over to the secondary; but the divine essence is the primary, and the creature the secondary: therefore there can be a vision of the essence which does not regard creatures.

A reason a priori is set forth, that by the force of the vision of God nothing created is seen.

Caput IV - Refutation of the Thomists' opinion; first argument

This opinion, which we have just set forth, among the others hitherto enumerated is the principal one which in this chapter and the next I have determined expressly to impugn; for by its refutation the truer opinion, altogether contrary to it, which we shall afterwards follow, will be confirmed.

Now this can be confuted by four reasons, of which the first we shall propose in this chapter, but the other three in the next. But first, against it, one must note that which the more recent Thomists were saying in the second place, to wit, that it manifestly clashes with the former part of their

780. Council of Sens, in the decrees (on the invocation of the saints).

opinion. For if God is seen as he is, from the fact that he is the cause of things, he leads the one seeing into the knowledge of them, there will be possible no vision of the Godhead so slight that, if it is clear and quidditative, it does not make some creature to be seen in it. For if, from the fact that some cause is known - even if it is not seen by a quidditative and proper concept - some effect of it is wont to be deduced, as experience shows; much more, from a clear and quidditative and proper vision of the cause, however remiss, some effect will be seen. But the vision of the divine essence is clear, quidditative, and proper: therefore from it some created effect is necessarily known, if the divine essence, seen of itself as the cause of creatures, leads into their knowledge.

Henry, indeed, when he concedes that the essence can be seen in such a way that by the force of such a vision no creature is seen, does not teach this of a remiss and slight vision alone, but of any even most perfect one, in which the divine essence alone is seen as it is, absolute and unto itself: for he thinks that by such a vision no creature can be seen unless the essence appears under the relative notion of idea; he judges that from the force of that vision no creature is known, so that it cannot fail that some be seen: and hence indeed it must be distinguished whether by the force of the vision some creature be seen, or not. For if once we concede that the essence, thus seen, that is, under such a notion - namely, absolute - is a cause, by the force of that vision a creature is not seen, not only must this be said of a remiss and slight vision, but of a very great and most perfect one, provided, however, that the object seen - namely, the divine essence - always be seen under the same notion; but if it appears under a relative, ideal notion, then, according to their doctrine, thus it will come about that by the force of the vision some creature be seen.

Now let us attack that opinion with our own proper reasons. The first reason a priori, which we touched upon against Henry in chapter 2, is of this sort: the divine essence in itself is absolute from every created thing, nor is it referred to any by a relation of the nature of the thing: therefore it cannot be a medium whereby any creature is known; much less, that in it a creature be clearly seen. For if it were a medium of knowing some creature, either it would be so because creatures are in the divine essence formally, and, when something is seen, those things are seen which are in it formally; or because they are in it virtually...[781]

By power only, and by efficacy, as in a cause; or certainly as in a knower: yet in none of these ways can any creature be seen in God. Therefore the essence of God, clearly seen, does not lead the viewer into a clear knowledge of any creature. That what we have said holds in each single way will appear by induction.

As to the first: no creature is in God formally according to its own proper nature and ratio; wherefore inanimate things are thus said to be in God that they are also said to have life in him, as in the following disputation we shall show from the mind of St. Augustine: for a creature in the first way in God is nothing other than God himself. Now, however, we are speaking of the cognition of creatures according to their proper created rationes, inasmuch as they are something distinct from God himself; in which respect they are not formally in God.

781. On the Thomists who favor this third opinion, see Cajetan, on this article 8 and the following; Capreolus, IV, dist. 49, q. 6, a. 1 and 3; Soto, q. 3, a. 3; Ferrariensis on Contra Gentiles III, cc. 56, 59, 60; and Richard of St. Victor, III, dist. 14, a. 2, q. 3; and IV, dist. 49, a. 3, q. 3.

As to the second and third the same is proved: for although things are said to be in God as in a cause (which the Scholastics call to be eminently), and to be in him by the mediation of the knowledge of simple intelligence, by which, as by an art and a principle, he can produce them; this is not enough for one who clearly sees God as he is to know a creature in him in any way, much less to behold it clearly. The same likewise holds in the way in which creatures are said to be in God by the knowledge of vision, which is not their cause, but in a certain order is posterior to them, as we shall say in disputation 68, chapter 7.[782] For in either way the divine essence - which is of itself the cognition of creatures, whether of possibles or of futures - is really absolute and referred to itself: therefore, seen in itself, it cannot carry us into the cognition of those things to which it is not referred, as, against Henry, was more fully proved in chapter 2.[783]

Nor is it enough if we say that the divine essence, at least by a relation of reason, is referred to creatures, inasmuch as it is their idea or cognition, so that, seen in itself, it might be the ratio for seeing some creature: for, against that same Henry, we showed there that no relation of reason - which is attributed to God only by the intellect of a wayfarer - can be a cause for the intellect that clearly sees God, such that, God being seen, it beholds some creature in him.

Moreover, about the knowledge of vision, which the Fathers call the foreknowledge of future things, and about the relation of reason by which it is referred to futures and is distinguished from the knowledge of simple intelligence, this can be shown far more clearly: for we understand that this knowledge, or foreknowledge, befits the eternal God by a relation to future things, in such wise that, if nothing were going to be, such a knowledge would not be in God; yet from this nothing would be lacking to God, nor would his essence be in any other way than it now is, as Hugo of St. Victor testifies, book i On the Sacraments, part 2, chapter 16, and the reason itself plainly shows: since whatever things are in God are necessarily God himself; which will be explained more fully in disputation 80, chapters 1 and 2.[784][785]

Therefore let us suppose that the divine essence were clearly seen when there were going to be no futures, nor would it itself foreknow anything of that sort: then certainly it would not appear to the intellect clearly beholding it in any other way than it now appears; nor is it now seen otherwise than it would then be seen. Let us also suppose the same grade of vision with respect to intensity to be then and now: from these it necessarily follows that, if then the essence of God seen were not a ratio for seeing some future, neither is it now. The same thing, seen in the same way both on the side of itself and on the side of the viewer's intellect, if it is once a ratio for seeing another thing, will always be such; and if it is once not such, it will never be such: for the same, as the same, is always apt to do the same. Therefore we have at least that the divine essence, clearly seen, is not the ratio for seeing future things.

A similar argument can be made about the knowledge of simple intelligence of possible things: for all possible things are so compared with God that, if nothing were possible, nevertheless God would be, as we shall show more at large in disputation 104, chapter 6: wherefore, if man were not

782. Disputatio 68, cap. 7.
783. Above, cap. 2, against Henry.
784. Hugo de Sancto Victore, De sacramentis, lib. I, pars 2, cap. 16.

possible, nor any other creature besides an angel, then in the same way God would be seen by the angel in himself as he is now seen; but then there would not be a ratio for knowing anything else possible, therefore neither is there now; and what was proved about futures remains proved.[786]

From what has been said it is inferred in what way the Blessed, by the clear vision of the divine essence, cannot behold the decree of his will by which he decreed to produce something: for since such a decree is free, and so befits God freely, although from eternity, in such wise that from eternity too it could not be in God, it cannot be some ratio or relation in reality, nor an elicited act from the essence, nor anything else than a respect of reason to future things, as we shall also say in disputation 80: wherefore the essence itself, inasmuch as it is compared with future things, is called by us, in a relative name, the free will. Since therefore it would not appear otherwise to one beholding it, if nothing else were going to be, than it now appears; it follows that now no decree is seen in it, but the bare essence; and that to see the decree of God is nothing else than to see his essence, and to know the futures which he is said to have decreed.[787]

Finally, because of the respect of reason of the divine essence to possibles or futures, neither a possible nor a future can be known from the fact that God is seen under that respect. For besides the fact that that respect is not apprehended by the Blessed, as we said above, even if it were apprehended, it would not suffice: because, since it befits the essence from the fact that things are either possible or future, a future or possible thing must be understood first, before the essence of God under that respect; wherefore rather the things themselves are the cause for knowing the divine essence under that respect, than conversely: or at least it is the same thing to know a future thing and to know the essence of God under that respect. Therefore from what has been said we have that, by the force of such a vision by which God is seen, however perfect and intense it be, there is not first seen anything in God - neither a knowledge nor a decree - by virtue of which anything either possible or future is known.

Objection. But someone will object thus. The divine essence is for God the ratio of seeing possibles and futures, although it has only a respect of reason to them: therefore it can be for the Blessed the ratio of seeing both possibles and futures; and accordingly, to the Blessed who sees it as it is, it can in the same way serve for seeing other things.

It is answered: the ratio is different. For the essence of God is for him the ratio of seeing creatures possible or future, not because it is for itself the primarily known object and from the force of such a knowledge he sees them (as we shall say more at large in disputation 60, chapters 2 and 3), but because at once it is the cognition of all of them, which it has present after the mode of an expressed species. But for the Blessed the divine essence cannot be for the cognition and vision of created things as it is for God himself; but only as the object known: whereas, as we said in disputation 38, chapter 4, intuitive vision of some thing cannot be had through another thing

785. Disputatio 80, cap. 1 - 2.
786. Disputatio 104, cap. 6.
787. Disputatio 80.

previously seen, which is wholly diverse and does not contain the entire ratio of that thing. Since therefore God is wholly diverse from creatures, he cannot, first being seen, be the cause that they be seen.[788][789]

Nor only can the divine essence not be the cause for a Blessed one to behold creatures clearly; but neither to know them in any way: since God in himself is a thing wholly absolute, and according to himself is referred by no relation to creatures: wherefore no cognition of them can be inferred from God seen. And far better, from a species seen or from the vision of some object in the mind and intellect of an angel or a man, can the object be known (though not seen, as in the same chapter 4 was proved): for these at least are really referred to the object, by reason of which they can be a way to the cognition of it - though not to a clear vision.

And from this the argument which we adduced for the foregoing opinion remains solved: for although the cognition of a created cause leads us into the cognition of the effect, as also conversely, nevertheless the former does not happen by intuitive cognition: for this cannot come about through some medium previously seen, as was said in disputation 38, chapter 4. Next, a created cause has a real order to its effect; wherefore it is no wonder if from an intuitive knowledge of such a cause the effect also be clearly seen: but the divine essence is a thing wholly absolute, even if by us it be named under the relative concept of omnipotence: therefore, seen as it is in itself, it cannot be the ratio for seeing any effect of it.

It is proved by an absurdity that by the force of the vision of God no creature is seen in him.

Proofs a posteriori and by absurdity that by the vision of God no creature is seen in Him

Now that we have sufficiently set forth the a priori reason on account of which one who contemplates the essence of God, by the force of such vision, sees in him nothing created, possible, or future; now indeed we can not less easily and effectively, a posteriori and by absurdity, prove the same. Three reasons especially occur to me, which in this chapter I shall set forth one by one.

First reason: if some creatures were seen by the force of such a vision, all the others that are possible and future would be seen, since there is no greater reason...

First reason: if some creatures were seen by the force of such a vision, all the others that are possible and future would be seen, since there is no greater reason why one should be seen rather than another; but no one grants that by the vision of God all creatures are seen, otherwise God would be said to be comprehended by a created intellect: therefore no creature can be seen. By this argument Paludanus uses against the preceding opinion, which he himself reports in second place in IV, dist. 49, q. 2, art. 2.[790] Moreover, that there is no greater reason for one creature than for another to be seen in the divine essence is clear by induction.

788. Disputatio 60, cap. 2 - 3.
789. Disputatio 38, cap. 4.
790. Paludanus (Peter of Ailly), IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 2, art. 2.

First, on the part of the divine essence, in which creatures are said to be, or to be represented, so that they may be seen, as in a knowing subject, or else not at all: therefore an equal reason seems to stand. For all are equally as it were in the knower, since He does not know one through another, but each immediately and in itself; likewise, all are equally in the cause as equals, either because God is the cause of things by intellect and will, and in this way, as if in a cause, they are produced in Him, as St. Thomas teaches below at I, q. 19, a. 4;[791] or because by His essence He operates and executes immediately, as others suppose. And in either way all are contained equally in God: for He neither knows one through another, nor produces one through another. Therefore there is not a greater reason on the part of the divine essence on account of which one should be seen rather than another.

Next, neither on the part of the light of glory: for any light is the principle of a less intense vision, another indeed of a more intense; yet all the lights are of the same species, and within the same species they can differ only according to more and less: but intensity and remission within the same species, on the part of the principle, cannot be the cause of seeing this object rather than that, but of seeing the same object more or less perfectly.

Certain men who defend the preceding opinion answer that the difference arises not from intensity and remission, but from a variety of individuation of the lights themselves, by reason of which variety one light manifests this object rather than that. But this is fabricated: for, besides the grade of intensity, there does not seem to be any variety in light from which it would follow that it produces this effect rather than another; just as neither in heat and other forms which are intensified and remitted. Or at least that assertion is made gratuitously and without foundation; which will become more evident from what follows.

From this, however, it would follow that all the species of things possible that are inferior to Angels or to men, and even infinite individuals, would be seen: for since all the blessed know in the Word the species of the things that have been made, and the highest of the Angels, or at least the human species, it follows that by them also in the Word all the other lower species that are possible are known; and if there is an infinite multitude of species beneath human or angelic nature, as some think, it follows that an infinite multitude of species is now known by a blessed one; or if those are not infinite, as we shall show below in Disputation 106, at least it follows that infinite individuals are seen by the blessed, for under each single species infinite individuals can be constituted. Nay rather, it would also follow that all the secrets of the human heart and future thoughts are seen by the blessed; for these individuations of an accident are much less perfect than those of a substance: or at least, if the blessed see some thoughts of hearts, as the prayers which we pour forth to them, it follows that they see all as well: because there is no greater reason why by the force of the vision, without a special revelation, one should be seen rather than another.

But some answer, at pleasure, that that difference, namely that one creature is seen rather than another by the force of the vision of the essence of God, proceeds not from the intensity of the vision, but from a variety of the individual grade of this and that vision. Yet, as I said about the

791. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 19, a. 4.

light, so also it seems about the vision itself, that this is without foundation. For if the individual grade does not make the divine essence, as such, to be seen in diverse modes, but the difference lies only in the intensity of the vision, it cannot be a cause of knowing diverse creatures. Furthermore, that the difference lies only in intensity is clear, because the divine essence itself appears to the blessed in the same way, namely whole as it is, and no diversity at all can appear in it: therefore the variety can only be in the intensity around the same thing. And certainly, if on the part of the thing known the divine essence, as the primary object, is seen in the same way, it will also in the same way be a cause, or not be a cause, that other things be known from the fact that it is seen: for the same, as the same, always produces the same. But if by reason of some peculiar mode of vision which would not pertain to intensity, this species rather than that should be seen, whereas the divine essence would appear in itself in the same way; assuredly the divine essence itself could not be the reason, as the primary object, of knowing this created nature rather than that, because it is a primary object and reason of knowing inasmuch as it appears as such: therefore, if it always appears the same, either it is not a reason of knowing diverse things (but those are known from elsewhere), or it is a reason of knowing all.

This argument also proves against those who posit, without foundation, a relation from the nature of the thing in God toward possible creatures. For that respect always appears in the same way to one seeing God; and if it were true (as some assert) that the essence of God can be seen under a respect toward creatures in general, and then under a respect toward creatures severally, one would have to admit that it is seen in a diverse way, and that in the prior way something of God was hidden, which is absurd. For when the respect is seen distinctly toward individuals, something appears in the object that did not appear when the respect toward all in general was seen; and consider, for illustration, as can be seen in other objects. From which it is also inferred that that is false which some say, and which we have recalled above, namely that to the blessed are given diverse lights, that they may behold more or fewer creatures in God - diverse, I say, lights, not in intensity, but in individual mode, which we may call extension. For no diversity can be devised in a light except according to intensity. For a habit which is the principle of cognition cannot be diverse in any other way than according to intensity, if it is always a principle of seeing the same object, according to the same reason. Thus, no other variety can be in the vision than that of intensity; and therefore neither in the light, which is the principle of that vision, can there be any other variety than that of intensity. Since therefore, in whatever clear vision of God, God appears the same and in the same way on His part, and thus in the vision itself there can be no other variety than that of intensity, as has been proved above: it follows that in the light which is the principle of that vision, too, no other variety can be than that of intensity.

Besides, others, crushed by this argument, answer that among the blessed there are lights of glory diverse according to species, so that the visions which they have of God also differ in species; by which reasoning it will not be difficult to understand that by one vision more, and by another fewer, species of things possible or future are seen than by another. But this is fabricated; for since the light of glory by its power primarily regards the essence of God, toward which the vision then bends the intellect; and since the essence of God, seen in itself, appears likewise the very same to

all who see, and cannot vary according to the seers; therefore both the light and the vision in this matter exclude specific diversity in any intellect; otherwise the very visions of the divine essence in the blessed would differ in species, which is ridiculous and absurd.

Second reason: If future individuals were seen in the Word, the more things someone saw, the more perfectly he would contemplate the divine essence; as St. Thomas seems to teach in I, q. 10, a. 2.[792] Therefore it could happen that someone who had equal merits with another would be more blessed than he. For sometimes it happens, as even the authors of the preceding opinion teach, that one who is equal in merit with another sees more individuals, either of the prayers which are offered to him, or of those things which pertain to his own state; as the founders of religions: which, if on the contrary all singulars are seen in the divine essence under the vision of that same essence, it follows that such persons see the divine essence itself better, and hence are more blessed; whereas nevertheless they are of equal merit. For in the vision of God no other diversity can obtain than intensity and remission, from which it is necessary that there arise for them also the difference of seeing this rather than that, more individuals rather than fewer. Moreover, that there can be no other diversity except intensity is evident: because on the part of God, since He is most simple, that which appears to one appears to another in the same way in the same essence; otherwise there would be in the essence of God certain varieties or differences by the nature of the thing, which is absurd.

Therefore I do not sufficiently understand how what St. Thomas says can be true, namely that in the divine essence certain creatures are more manifest than others, as if some were more hidden than others.[793] The adversary, however, will reply that, the vision of those singulars which one sees being granted by God, he attains the knowledge of others which are communicated in another way; thus they are equal in beatitude, provided they have been equal in merit. But this is frivolous: for if the singulars are seen by the light and by the vision of the divine essence according to the second mode; and these equally from the same

Next, this does not involve a repugnance, as if it were necessary that there be given an infinite light according to intensity, as seems to be gathered from the argument set forth above. First, because, in the opinion of those who say that lights of different species are given, we can easily say that, for seeing the divine essence together with all creatures, a greater light of glory is required than for seeing the essence alone; yet for this reason it is not required that it be infinite according to intensity, but that there be a certain light, specifically diverse from all the others. But when it is objected in this way: that for seeing the essence with ten creatures a greater light is required than for seeing it with two, and that, the more there are that must be seen, the greater light is necessary; therefore, for seeing infinitely many, an infinite light is required; I answer thus: the argument would prove something, if within the same species a greater increase of light had to be made, whereby more creatures would be cognoscible; but if there be given some light of another species, it is sufficient, if according to the aforesaid enumeration we ascend: so that, the more are seen, the more perfect a light is required; yet, for infinitely many to be seen, another light entirely diverse is

792. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 10, a. 2.
793. The reference string as printed: "S. Tho. q. 8. ad 3. 4. ad 12."

necessary. A similar argument is wont to be formed in this fashion: to see some perfection by nature a greater power is required, therefore for an infinite perfection, such as God is, an infinite power is required. It has no force, because it is sufficient if another light of a different species be given, whereby we may be able to see the essence of God. On this account I said that this line of reasoning has force in the opinion of those who say that there can be given diverse lights according to species.

However, even if we say that diverse lights are not given, but that there is only one according to species, from that enumeration there follows only this, that an infinite light is given according to intensity, and an infinite vision in the same manner; and this does not seem to repugn so expressly, as is gathered from what we have said, disput. 26, cap. 2. Add that, if to see the divine essence together with one creature a certain grade of intensity is required, and to see it together with more there is required a more intense [light], and so on to infinity, it would follow that Christ has a light infinitely intense, because he sees infinitely many future individuals, as will be said in III, q. 10, a. 2.[794]

But if they object that here a peculiar absurdity follows, namely that God is comprehended by the blessed if an infinite light be granted, I say that this absurdity is better avoided in another way than by denying that an infinite light can be given. For even if this be true, it by no means follows best that God cannot be comprehended by the blessed; but to deny an infinite light for this sole reason, lest that follow which we are striving to infer from the argument, namely, lest God be said to be comprehended, is a manifest begging of the question: for that is adduced as a reason, as if absurd, which we wish to infer from the argument.

Thus far there has been disputation against the third opinion, from which it only remained that we should respond to the testimonies of the Fathers. Of these, I now reply concerning St. Gregory, that he does not assert that creatures are seen in the Word by the force of the vision, indeed he does not even say that they are in any way known together with it, but only affirms that the blessed in beatitude know not only their relatives and others known in this life, but also all the rest of the good who were before unknown to them. He proves this a maiori: for if it be granted to them to see God, who knows all things, by greater reason will it be granted to them also to know the rest. But he does not say that they behold them in the knowledge of God; this, indeed, has already been shown sufficiently to be impossible.

As to the Council of Sens, which is provincial and not confirmed, I answer that the Fathers there merely define that our prayers are known to the saints in the fatherland, so that we may safely implore them; but what it says, that all that shines and appears in God as in a mirror, it does not define, but adduces as a reason. Nor does it say that things are seen in God by the force of that vision, but as in a mirror; which we concede: because it has the likeness of a mirror, in that it manifests other things - not by the force of the vision itself, but it does so by a special revelation, on account of which it is called by Theologians a voluntary mirror, as will be alleged in the following chapter. Indeed, in a material mirror things are not therefore said to appear or be seen because the

794. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae III, q. 10, a. 2.

mirror itself is seen (nor is anything existing within the mirror seen; we have already demonstrated this in disput. 38, cap. 4); wherefore, even if the mirror itself did not appear, if the species were refracted in it, other things would be seen. In this therefore he compares the divine essence to a mirror: just as a mirror is the cause of knowing things, because from it the species of them are derived by refraction, even if we do not behold the species themselves because the mirror is seen; so the divine essence, revealing other things to the blessed, causes them to be seen, not because it itself is beheld. As for the testimonies of St. Augustine and St. Bernard, we shall speak in the following disputation. In the same way can be understood what St. Augustine teaches: in the book On the Triple Habitation, q. 10, c. 6, where he says that in God, as it were in a mirror, are found both other things and we ourselves; nevertheless, about Augustine, and about the testimonies of the Fathers, a subsequent disputation must be instituted.[795]

Caput VI - The truer opinion is that no creature is seen by the force of the vision of God, but is seen by a special revelation

From the confutation of the aforesaid opinions one can easily gather the truer opinion, which asserts two things: first, that no creature is seen in God by the force of his vision; second, that by a special revelation other possible or future creatures are known by the blessed, not by the same vision together with the divine essence, but by a different one. The former part is followed by St. Bonaventure,[796] by Scotus,[797] by Gabriel,[798] by Almain,[799] by the Major,[800] by Marsilius,[801] by Ockham,[802] by Petrus Alliacensis;[803] in this sentence too can be reckoned the Thomist Paludanus in IV, dist. 49, q. 2, art. 2, where he impugns the preceding opinion, which he himself elsewhere numbers in the second place, and finally asserts that by the force of the vision of God creatures are not necessarily seen. Nay more, from the doctrine of St. Thomas below, q. 57, a. 1, it is efficaciously confirmed, as so many testimonies being alleged also seem to be confirmed physically; for he asserts that the mysteries of our faith are known to the blessed Angels in the Word, according to what God willed to reveal; and the more in proportion as they are higher, because the perspicacity of seeing the essence of God - he immediately subjoins concerning these mysteries - that this is how they are known by an Angel from the beginning of his beatitude, and certain others in the course of time; whence also it most manifestly follows that they are not seen in the Word by the force of the vision itself, but by a special revelation: which he indicated clearly by the previous words. For if they were seen by the force of the vision, it would be necessary that there be a change and an increase of the vision so that they begin to be seen in the course of time. For how could it be that one and the same vision, remaining unchanged, would not make something to be seen at the

795. St. Augustine, De Triplici Habitatione, q. 10, c. 6.
796. St. Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 3, d. 4, a. 1, q. 3; and at the end.
797. Scotus, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 5; and in the end.
798. Gabriel [Biel], In IV Sent., q. 1, a. 2, nota 5.
799. Almain, In IV Sent., q. 1, a. 13.
800. The Major, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 16.
801. Marsilius, In III, q. 10, a. 8, pro parte.
802. Ockham, In IV, q. 13, ar. 2.
803. Petrus Alliacensis, In I, q. 1; and in IV, q. 3, ar. 2. Also the Thomist Paludanus, In IV, d. 49, q. 2, art. 2.

beginning, and afterwards would make it to be seen? But the vision of God is neither intensified nor changed: otherwise it would follow that Angels day by day became more blessed; therefore neither are those mysteries seen by the blessed by the force of the vision of the divine essence.

Cajetan, in one article explaining the mind of St. Thomas, labored not a little; accordingly, he says that things are seen in the Word in a twofold way: in one way by the very vision by which God is seen; in another way by another vision arising from a special illumination. And in this way also are things said to be seen in the Word (as he says) causally; because the Word is the cause of that revelation, which he afterwards more at large explains. And certainly, in one way, by which St. Thomas can conveniently be understood, the Doctor also in this part seems to favor our sentence.

This opinion is thus explained and proved by certain Doctors who follow it, and by St. Augustine and St. Anselm, who seem to teach that God is a voluntary mirror. Cajetan, however, replies in article 3 that therefore God is called by Augustine a voluntary mirror, not as if, when he wills to be seen, he is seen by us, but because that which it pleases him should appear, appears in him. But the Fathers teach this for a far different reason. Augustine, aiming to show that God is invisible to the eyes of the body, says that to be invisible can result either from a thing's own nature or from the divine will; and that God, although invisible by nature, at times through his own free will manifests himself in various modes of appearance. Of this Ambrose bears witness, recounting certain visions; and Augustine often repeats in many places that God, when he chooses, presents himself under sensible appearances for the instruction of men. Likewise, in Anselm one may find in that place an explication in keeping with our opinion; and similarly the narratives of many apparitions in the Gospel make for this.[804]

He compares the divine essence (*essentia*) to a mirror, in this way: just as a mirror is the cause of knowing things, because from it their likenesses are derived by refraction, even if we do not gaze upon the likenesses themselves, from the fact that the mirror is seen; so too the divine essence, by revealing other things to the blessed, makes them to be seen, not because the essence itself is seen. About the testimonies of St. Augustine and St. Bernard we shall speak in the next disputation. In the same way one can understand that which St. Augustine teaches, in the book On the Threefold Dwelling, in the ninth question, chapter 6, where he says that in God, as in a mirror, we contemplate other things and ourselves; yet concerning the testimonies of Augustine and the Fathers a following disputation must be undertaken.

By refuting the foregoing opinions one easily gathers the truer position, which asserts two things: first, that no creature is seen in God by force of the vision (*visio*) itself; second, that by a peculiar revelation some creatures, whether possible or future, are known by the blessed, not by the same vision together with the divine essence, but by a different [vision]. The first part is followed by St. Bonaventure in III, dist. 14, art. 2, q. 3, at the end; by Scotus, q. 2; by Gabriel [Biel], in IV, q. 1, a. 2, nota 3; by Almain, in IV, q. 1, a. 13; by the Major, in IV, dist. 49, q. 16; by Marsilius, in III, q. 10, a. 8, for the most part; by Ockham, in IV, q. 13, art. 2; and by Peter of Ailly, in I, q. 12;

804. This paragraph gathers the patristic and scholastic testimonies adduced in the margin: Cajetan, In I, q. 12, a. 13; Augustine, various places; Anselm, Monologion; Ambrose, and other narratives of divine apparitions frequently cited by Augustine.

and in IV, q. 3, art. 2. To this opinion there can also be referred, among the Thomists, Paludanus, in IV, dist. 49, q. 2, art. 2, where he himself numbers it second in place, and finally asserts that by force of the vision of God creatures are not necessarily seen.

Nay rather, from the doctrine of St. Thomas below, q. 57, art. 5, this is efficaciously confirmed, although in the places alleged in chapter 3 he seems to teach the opposite; for he asserts that the mysteries of our faith are known by the blessed Angels in the Word, according as God willed to reveal them, and the higher they are, the more [they know], because they behold the essence of God more perspicaciously; yet he adds of these mysteries that some are known by an Angel in this manner. But if those mysteries were seen by force of the vision itself, manifestly it would follow that they were seen from the beginning of their beatitude, not in the course of time; whence it clearly follows that they are not seen in the Word by force of the vision itself, but by a peculiar revelation. For if they were clearly indicated by the words of the vision, and as they begin to be seen in the course of time, it was necessary that the vision be changed and made more intense. For how could it happen that one and the same vision, remaining immutable, should from the beginning not make something to be seen, and afterwards make it to be seen? But the vision of God is not intensified nor changed; for then Angels would day by day become more blessed; therefore neither are those mysteries seen by force of the vision of the divine essence by the blessed.

Cajetan, in that same article, labors not a little in explaining the mind of St. Thomas: he says, therefore, that some things are seen in the Word in a twofold manner, some by the very vision by which God is seen, others by another vision and peculiar illumination; and in this latter way also things are said to be seen in the Word (as he says) causally, because the Word is the cause of that revelation, which will be explained more broadly below. And certainly I do not see by what other way St. Thomas can conveniently be understood; and in this respect the holy Doctor also favors our opinion.

St. Augustine, in Epistle 112, chapter 4, in order to show that God is invisible to bodily eyes, said: "I answer that he is invisible by nature; to be seen, however, when he willed, as he willed; for very often he has been seen, not as he is, but as it pleased him to appear. What the will chose, not nature formed, that is, what he voluntarily assumed, nor was it natural to him." He speaks, however, of the bodily image in which he appeared in various ways to the ancients. He took almost word for word this sentence from St. Ambrose, on Luke, chapter 1, in the chapter on the apparition of the Angel; the same Augustine repeats in chapters 5, 7, and 10 of that same epistle. But in the place of Anselm alleged we could not find that same opinion; yet in the exposition upon the Gospel, chapter 17, on Matthew, "After six days," he says: "Clouds and darkness are round about him," because there lies hidden a certain obscurity of his incomprehensibility, nor can he be known by a creature unless so far as he wills to reveal. There Anselm does not treat of the clear vision of God, in which sense even with the opinion and exposition of Cajetan it would very well agree, but of the cognition even of the way, which we cannot have of God unless in the measure that he deigns to grant it by his grace; therefore, as regards the first part of this opinion, in my judgment it remains sufficiently confirmed from the refutation of the others, especially of that which we reported in chapter 3 and impugned in chapters 4 and 5.

Nothing can appear anew in the vision, unless the vision be changed; but it cannot with the greatest foundation be said that the vision which the blessed have of God is so easily changed: therefore there is no reason why we should say that with the same cognition they see God and creatures in such a way that creatures are also seen successively. Those, then, who would teach that with the same numerically one vision the divine essence and creatures are known, do not say this because the essence of God is seen, but because God by a peculiar revelation willed to manifest creatures, as Gabriel [Biel] taught on the Canon, lecture 31, letter E. To assert this, however, they must grant that there is no variation and succession in that vision itself, but that all things which the blessed are said to know in the Word - whether possible or future - they see simultaneously from the beginning. I, however, judge the opinion of Peter of Ailly, Ockham, Almain, and the Major, in the places cited at the beginning, to be more probable: namely, that any creature is known by the blessed by another cognition distinct from that by which they see God; not that it is repugnant for God and a creature to be known simultaneously by the same vision - for that can be defended probably, just as by one species many and various things are known by an Angel - but because it is easier to assign diverse cognitions to God and to creatures, and with this the common mode of speaking is most excellently preserved, according to which things are said to be seen in God or in the Word of God; there is no reason to force into the straits of one cognition God and creatures together, so as to say that they are seen by the same cognition. Then too in this way we can easily defend that which a little before we reported from St. Thomas, namely, that many mysteries and other created things are revealed to the blessed day by day, which, however, are said to be seen in the Word: thus no absurdity will follow.

Besides, it is difficult to explain, if that cognition were the same of God and of creatures, what principle it would have as regards creatures, inasmuch as it is terminated to creatures; for it cannot proceed from the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*), unless we say either that by the vision of the divine essence they are seen, or else unless we posit diverse lights according to species constituted for seeing God, with these creatures, and with those. For the same light within the same species, even if it differs according to greater and lesser intensity, cannot be for knowing various creatures according to species, and much less for knowing God and creatures together; wherefore it is much more probable to assert diverse cognitions: to see God, and to see creatures.

Caput VII - That in the Word creatures are known by a cognition different from that by which God himself is seen

It remains, for the confirmation of our opinion, to explain and confirm the latter part of it - namely, how creatures are said to be seen in the Word, even if they are not known by the same vision, but by other diverse cognitions. On this matter the Doctors alleged in the preceding chapter do not speak in the same way. St. Bonaventure, Marsilius, and Scotus merely say that created things are seen by the blessed in the Word by a peculiar revelation and will, as we said in the preceding chapter; they add also that in act they can be seen in the Word successively, but simultaneously in habit: that is, as St. Bonaventure and Marsilius say, that there is one habit by which things can be seen and read in the Word; but what that habit is, they do not explain. Scotus

speaks in the same way, but he says that this habit by which the blessed are able to see and read all creatures in the Word is the very vision of the divine essence, not because by force of it there follows the knowledge of other things, but for another reason, which he does not explain.

But if the aforesaid authors mean that creatures are seen together with the Word, and in it, by the same vision, and nevertheless can be understood successively - now one, now another - still their opinion does not please me; for as Peter of Ailly, in I, q. 12, letter X, and Ockham, Gabriel [Biel], Almain, and the Major teach in the cited places, it cannot happen that, with the same vision altogether immutable, something begins to be seen which previously was not known; therefore by the vision of God nothing other than God can be seen successively, unless the vision itself vary. Nor can it be said on any very great foundation that the vision which the blessed have of God is so easily changed; therefore there is no reason why we should say that by the same cognition they see God and creatures in such a way that creatures are also seen successively. Those, then, who would teach that with the same numerically one vision the divine essence and creatures are known, not from the fact that the essence of God is seen, but because God by a peculiar revelation has willed to manifest creatures - as Gabriel taught on the Canon, lecture 31, letter E - must assert this in such a way that they grant no variation and succession in that vision itself, but that all things which the blessed are said to know in the Word, whether possible or future, they see simultaneously from the beginning.

I, however, judge the opinion of Peter of Ailly, Ockham, Almain, and the Major, in the places cited at the beginning, to be more probable: namely, that any creature is known by the blessed by another cognition distinct from that by which they see God; not that it is repugnant for God and a creature to be known simultaneously by the same vision, for that indeed can probably be defended, just as by one species many and various things are known by an Angel; but because it is easier to assign diverse cognitions to God and to creatures, and with this the common mode of speaking, according to which things are said to be seen in God or in the Word of God, is most excellently preserved, there is no reason to force into the straits of one cognition God and creatures together, so as to say that they are seen by the same cognition. Then too in this way we can easily defend that which a little before we reported from St. Thomas, namely, that many mysteries and other created things are revealed to the blessed day by day, which are nevertheless said to be seen in the Word: thus no absurdity will follow. Moreover, it is difficult to explain, if that cognition were the same of God and of creatures, what principle it would have as regards creatures, inasmuch as it is terminated to creatures; for it cannot proceed from the light of glory unless we say either that by the vision of the divine essence they are seen, or else unless we posit diverse lights according to species constituted for seeing God, with these creatures, and with those; for the same light within the same species, even if it differs according to greater and lesser intensity, cannot be for knowing various creatures according to species, and much less for knowing God and creatures together; wherefore it is much more probable to assert diverse cognitions: to see God, and to see creatures. But by what reason the blessed is said to see these created things in the Word, if neither from the fact that he sees the Word, nor by the same vision with it he knows them, must be explained. The Doctors most recently cited say that to see something in the Word is nothing else than that God

should cause the cognition of those things in the intellect of him who sees him; and Cajetan also grants this mode of speaking below, q. 57, art. 5, in the place cited, namely, that things are said to be seen in the Word because by it revealing, and as by the cause of cognition, they are seen, not only because, as a known object, it is the cause of their cognition. But by what reason the blessed is said to see these created things in the Word, if neither from the fact that he sees the Word, nor by the same vision with it he knows them, must be explained. The Doctors most recently cited say that to see something in the Word is nothing else than that God should cause the cognition of those things in the intellect of him who sees him; and Cajetan also grants this mode of speaking below, q. 57, art. 5, in the place cited, namely, that things are said to be seen in the Word because by it revealing, and as by the cause of cognition, they are seen, not only because, as a known object, it is the cause of their cognition.

But we on our part say in only this sense that created things are seen in the Word by the blessed: that God himself is the efficient cause (*causa efficiens*) of that peculiar revelation and cognition of them, not as the object first known. Moreover, that God is the cause of this peculiar revelation while the intellect sees God himself, as the aforesaid Doctors were saying, has little bearing on this, that those things be said to be seen in the Word of God. Wherefore not only the blessed, but also wayfarers are truly said to see some things in the Word of God, or in God, or even in his foreknowledge, because, God's foreknowledge revealing, they know. They are said, however, rather to see in the Word than in the Holy Spirit, or in the Father, as we noted at the beginning of the disputation, because since the Word proceeds by the intellect, works of revelation are appropriated to him, just as works of grace are to the Holy Spirit.

This is further established by authority. St. Thomas below, q. 62, art. 1, ad 3, teaches that an Angel contemplates created things in the Word with a twofold cognition: first, with the cognition which he has of God according to his nature, as it were on the way, and he calls this imperfect; then by the clear vision of the divine essence, and he says this is perfect; where plainly he speaks not of the Word of God that is by voice, but of the second person of the Trinity. St. Thomas also favors this below, q. 57, art. 5, who asserts that the mysteries are known by Angels in the Word with the succession of time, when they come to be; which cannot be true if he called vision in the Word that by which the Word itself also is seen. Wherefore Cajetan, in the same place, 2.2, q. 83, art. 4, solution 2, teaches that not only are those things said to be seen in the Word which are seen by the same vision with the Word, but also those which are known by a peculiar revelation made by the Word.

Therefore, following only this latter mode and rejecting the former, we do not improperly say that some created things are seen in the Word. With this phrase I think also Bernard spoke, in Sermon 17 on the Canticles, when, speaking about Lucifer, he says: "It could have happened (if, however, it be not thought incredible) that men, more fully instructed and more perfectly in heart, could have foreknown that they would be future, even that they would advance to equal glory; but if he foreknew, in the Word of God, without doubt he saw." And yet it was sufficiently clear to Bernard that Lucifer had not yet clearly seen God. Some reply that Bernard spoke not of the substantial Word of God, but of an external word; in which sense it is said in Scripture that the

word was made to such-and-such a Prophet. But this evasion seems contrived; for you will scarcely find this phrase "external word" either in the Fathers or in Scripture; on the contrary, of the very substantial Word of God you will find it in Augustine; wherefore I do not doubt that Bernard made use of the phrase of Augustine - whose doctrine he also knew most excellently - and that, as also in that book V to Eugenius he followed Augustine's doctrine and spoke in the same sense, as will be evident in the following disputation.

There is added that the ordinary Gloss, on Isaiah 38, "Set thy house in order," teaches that the Prophets read in the book of God's foreknowledge the things which they foretell. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 173, a. 1, ad 1, explains this when he says that for this reason the Prophets are said to read in the foreknowledge of God, because from it future things are revealed to them; therefore by the same reason the blessed and the wayfarers will be said to read, or to know, in the Word of God those things which are revealed to them. And in this way one can understand St. Bonaventure and Scotus, who teach that the blessed, in the Word which they clearly contemplate, read future things and created things, in so far as the Word itself has willed to manifest them to them. They took this way of speaking from Augustine, Confessions, book 13, chapter 15, who says of the blessed: "They have no need to look up at this firmament, to learn by reading your Word. For they see your face always, and there they read, without syllables of times, what your eternal will wills: they read, they choose, and they love always: they read, and what they read never passes away. For by choosing and loving they read the very unchangeableness of your counsel." But when Augustine says that the book of the blessed is not this firmament - namely, the heaven adorned with stars - which also announces the praise of God, and in which, as in a book, God himself can be read and known, but [that their book is] the very clearly seen Word of God, he does not think that in it, by force of the vision -

Caput VIII - Which species of things the blessed know in the Word

But he does not think that, by force of the vision, the will of God is manifested to the blessed; rather, that they read it there clearly, because He Himself manifests His counsel to them. They are said to read by choice and by love, because, since they love and are friends of God, He, as to friends, reveals; not because they formally read by love itself, since reading happens only by the intellect. Moreover, when St. Augustine says that the blessed read God's will not by the syllables of times, he does not say this because no new revelations are made to the blessed - for St. Thomas also taught that, as we saw a little above - but because they clearly behold Him Himself, and from Him, who is eternal and whose will cannot be changed, they immediately know the counsel of His will, not through the heaven or other creatures that pass in time. In the same way must be taken that which the same Augustine, City of God, book 9, chapter 22, teaches, when he assigns a difference between the blessed Angels and the demons: that the former know future things in the eternal and unchangeable laws of God; but the demons understand temporal things by temporal and mutable things.

To these testimonies of Augustine, and to the doctrine set down above, there also agrees that of Isidore in book 1 of the Sentences, or On the Supreme Good, chapter 12, sentence 17: "The Angels know all things in the Word of God before they are; and those things which are still future among men, the Angels have already learned by revelation from God." There Isidore takes as equivalent "in the Word" and "to be known by revelation from God," namely, that future things are seen by the Angels in the Word before they come to be, and that by God Himself revealing they are known. The other testimonies of Augustine which seem to prove that, by force of the vision, creatures are seen in the Word - which have been alleged for the opposite opinion - we will examine in the following disputation, as we also promised; and there we shall say what St. Gregory, St. Ambrose, and the Fathers of the Council of Sens, cited in the same place, held.

Which species of things the blessed know in the Word.

It is much more difficult, in the opinion of those who teach that certain creatures are seen in the Word by force of the vision, to discern which things either possible or future or already existing in reality are seen in it; whereas in our opinion, which affirms that nothing is known from the vision, but some things are known by a special revelation, the matter is easy.

Opinions. - St. Thomas in that place, and along with him more recent Thomists, and the third book Against the Gentiles, chapter 59, and Ferrariense in the same place, Sotus in the Fourth Book, distinction 49, question 3, article 3, conclusion 6, and other Thomists of our time, assert that all the species of things are seen by any blessed one, but not individuals.[805] They prove this because that alone pertains to the perfection of the natural desire of knowing which ought to be satisfied in the beatitude of any human being; but this perfection consists in knowing all the species of things, not individuals: therefore the knowledge of the species will satisfy the natural desire of knowing; and since man's desire in beatitude ought to be satisfied, it follows that the knowledge of species, not of individuals, should be communicated to him. From this reasoning Sotus gathers that St. Thomas spoke only of natural species, because for knowing supernatural species the natural desire is not sufficient.

Refuted. - But I, first, judge that, without reason, the mind of St. Thomas is restricted to natural species alone; for nothing in his reason indicates that at all. For from what he says, that the natural desire of knowing, or appetite, ought to be fulfilled in beatitude, there does not follow that he speaks of the species only of natural things: because from his own teaching it follows not only that there is a natural desire of knowing the things that are natural, but also of seeing God, which is supernatural, as he clearly teaches in article 1 of this question, as we noted there, and we shall say more fully in First of Second, question 5, last article.

Second, I do not see by what reason it is proved that, in fact, the species are seen by any blessed one, but not individuals. For, if the natural desire of knowing ought altogether to be fulfilled, not only the knowledge of species, but also of individuals ought to be communicated: for these too we naturally desire to know, if the natural desire is taken as St. Thomas takes it and as we explained

805. Cajetan, Secunda Secundae, q. 83, a. 4, around solution 2; the third book Against the Gentiles, c. 59; Ferrariense there; Sotus, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 3, concl. 6.

above in article 1 of this question; it would then be necessary that all possible species be known - which, however, cannot be so affirmed. Nor does any one of the Doctors cited assert that all possible species of things are seen by the blessed; nor should that easily be affirmed: for there is no firm reason that persuades all that; and likewise in the opinion of those who say that, for beholding the divine essence together with created things, a greater light is required than for beholding that alone, and that the more numerous the creatures are with which it is beheld, the greater light is necessary, it follows that, if infinite species were known in the Word by force of that vision, an infinite light would also in fact be given. Moreover, since the blessed knows things as they are, by a proper concept, and does not abstract a universal from singulars, as we shall say in disputation 118, we ought not to say that only species in general are known by them, and not individuals.

Finally, as to future species, I do not see why we ought to deny that all of them are seen by the blessed; and of these I would also understand the Doctors cited, although there is no effective reason or authority beyond that of the Scholastic Doctors that compels one to assert it. For what was brought forward about the natural desire of knowing proves too much, as I was saying a little before; and the state of beatitude, by the vision of God alone, is so sufficient and fulfills the appetite, that it leaves no anxiety of desire for knowing remaining for other things besides God. For the rest, besides Him, the blessed who behold His essence reckon as nothing. But when we say that all future species are in fact seen by the blessed, we understand this of some individual and only of natural [species], not of all supernatural ones, nor of all thoughts of hearts, but of those which wayfarers direct to the blessed. And all these things that we have said must be understood according to the doctrine delivered by us above in chapter 7, namely, that these species or individuals are so known by the blessed in the Word that neither from force of the vision, nor by the same act as by which they behold the Word itself, but by a special revelation they are known.

Caput IX - Which future things the blessed see in the Word

Finally, in the last place, let us say a little about future singulars, about which the Doctors also speak in various ways. First, the Angelic Doctor, in the Third Part, question [blank], article [blank], teaches that the blessed see in the Word all the singulars that pertain to themselves, and the prayers that are made, and those that pertain to the state of a congregation of which he himself was the head. Cajetan agrees in Secunda Secundae, question 83, article 4, around the second solution; Sotus in the Fourth Book, distinction 49, question 3, article 3, conclusion 10; and other Thomists of our time.[806] Sotus adds that all these things are known by a blessed one at once in the Word from the beginning of his beatitude; but others, about prayers, say they are not seen from the beginning, but are known by a succession of time; but other singulars which happen and seem to pertain to the state of the blessed, such as those that occur in some religious order of which he is the founder, are seen in the Word from the beginning.

806. Cajetan, Secunda Secundae, q. 83, a. 4, around solution 2; Sotus, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 3, concl. 10; cf. also St. Thomas, Tertia Pars, q. [unspecified], a. [unspecified], as cited by the author.

Finally, Cajetan in the place alleged asserts that only those singulars are seen at that time when someone begins to be blessed and pertain to the state of that person, and from the beginning of his beatitude are seen at once in the Word by force of that vision; but the rest, which afterward occur, are not known from the beginning, but at the time when they occur; nevertheless, as Cajetan says, they are said to be seen in the Word causally, that is, because the Word, by a special revelation made to them, is the cause that they know them; and with this agrees the doctrine of the same, First Part, question 57, article 5, which we reported in chapter 7. Wherefore some more recent men wrongly assail Cajetan. First, because he seems to establish some variation in the vision of God, when he says that some future things are seen by the blessed in the Word by a succession. For these do not attend to the fact that Cajetan never said that the same things are seen by the same vision as the Word, but different things are seen by a different cognition. Then they argue frivolously: because if the blessed saw future things successively, Christ would see them successively, which is absurd. But this reasoning is of small moment: for although Cajetan thinks thus of other blessed men, nevertheless it is not necessary to affirm the same of Christ.

We, however, always leaning upon the principles of our opinion, affirm universally that all the future things which the blessed know, as they are and of whatever sort they are, which in some way pertain to their own state, and the prayers which are made to them, they know by a cognition distinct from that by which they behold the Word; and therefore it is not necessary that all at once from the beginning of beatitude be known by them. For if those things were seen by the same vision as the Word, they could not be known in the course of time unless some change were made in the vision itself, as we proved above in chapter 7. Nay rather, as we said there, it could happen that one who had more merits would sometimes see fewer secrets, if fewer singulars belonged to the state of that one, as could happen in some anchorite. For, in order to see more individuals by force of the vision of God, that very vision would have to be more perfect: for perfections of that sort could not be in different [blessed] from a diverse cause of knowing; and thus it follows also against Cajetan, who says that those things which at the beginning of beatitude are present are known by a blessed one in the Word from force of that vision; but those which are future are comprehended successively in the Word by some peculiar revelation. For it can happen that to the state of someone who has greater merits, more individuated things pertain at the time when he begins to be blessed; therefore then he will see more by force of the vision than another would see the Word, and hence he would gaze more perfectly upon the Word itself.

It is answered by certain Thomists that it is not necessary that, the more things are seen in the Word, the more perfectly the Word is seen, unless the things that are seen differ in species; because the apprehension of singulars does not pertain to the perfection of the intellect, but only those things which St. Thomas is thought to have said pertain to it, namely, in 3 p., q. [blank], art. [blank]: that more things are known in the Word, namely, that the blessed person should see the Word more perfectly. This is ridiculous. First, because the Doctors in that article are not speaking only of the species, but also of individuals, thoughts, and prayers that pertain to the state of the blessed; for he said that many things are seen by the blessed because he sees the Word more perfectly on account of the abundance of intelligible lights, which is a mark of a more copious act.

For it is, indeed, a "natural desire," and the perfection of the intellect consists not only in knowing the species, but also in knowing individuals; chapter 7 proved this. And besides, it is the same to say that, in order that individuals be seen in the Word, it is necessary that more things be known by that vision, as it is to say that the Word itself must be seen more perfectly. For if in two equally perfect visions one could see in one more because of one cause of seeing more, and in another another [could see more] because of another cause; we therefore choose to flee all these inconveniences and to hold by far the better and safer course: to say that nothing at all is seen in the Word by force of that vision which Thomists consider to be the sole vision, and that by revelation peculiar [things] are known.

The rest object: that if the blessed, from the very principle of beatitude, and so from the moment they know themselves, ought to pray to God to reveal our prayers to the blessed - yet the Church is not wont to do this; therefore it is a sign...

...he would see God the less, if fewer singulars belonged to his state, as could happen in the case of some anchorite. For, in order to see more individuals by force of the vision of God, that same vision would have to be more perfect; for if it were of the same perfection, it could not, in different persons, be the cause of knowing different things. But this also follows against Cajetan, who says that the things present at the beginning of beatitude are known by the Blessed in the Word by force of that vision, while those that are future are seen by some special revelation in the course of time. For it can happen that to the state of someone who has fewer merits more individuals pertain at that time when he begins to be blessed: therefore then he will see more by force of the vision by which he sees the Word, and consequently he will gaze more perfectly upon the Word itself.

Some Thomists reply that it is not necessary that, the more are seen in the Word, by that very fact the Word be seen more perfectly, unless the things that are seen differ in species; for knowledge of singulars does not pertain to the perfection of the intellect. And they think that St. Thomas said only of those things in IIIa, q. 10, a. 2, that the more are known in the Word, the more perfectly the Word itself is also seen.[807]

It is refuted. This, however, is ridiculous. First, because the holy Doctor in that article was speaking not only of species, but also of individuals pertaining to the state of the blessed - future thoughts and prayers - and he said that the more are seen by the blessed, the more perfectly he sees the Word, undoubtedly understanding those things which he adduced as examples. Then also, because it pertains to the natural desire and to the perfection of the intellect not only to know species, but even individuals, as was proved in chapter 7. Moreover, if individuals are seen in the Word by the same vision and by virtue of it, it is necessary that, the more are known, the more perfectly the Word itself be seen. For if in two persons the vision is equally perfect, it cannot be in one the cause of seeing more, or different, things than the other knows. Therefore, in order to flee all these inconveniences, it is much better to assert that nothing - neither what is future nor what is possible - is seen in the Word by force of that vision (as the Thomists contend), but is known by another vision and by a special revelation.

807. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, IIIa, q. 10, a. 2.

But some object that, unless the blessed from the very beginning of their beatitude, and at once, knew all these things, we would have to ask God to have our prayers revealed to the blessed - which pertains to their state, as could happen in the case of some anchorite - yet this the Church is not accustomed to do; therefore it is a sign that the Church holds as certain for herself that all these things are seen by the blessed from the beginning of beatitude.

It is answered: I answer that for this reason the Church does not ask it of God, because she already has it certainly persuaded for herself that these things are known to the blessed by this or by that most certain way, and that they in no way depend upon our prayers; wherefore it is not necessary to say that all these things are known to the blessed from the beginning of beatitude.

Furthermore, that all these things are seen by the blessed, besides the scholastics already cited, is taught by St. Augustine in the book On Care to Be Taken for the Dead, by St. Jerome in the book Against Vigilantius, and by St. Gregory in book 12 of the Moralia, chapter 12, on that verse of Job 12, "Thou hast strengthened him a little."[808] Yet they vary as to the mode: Augustine seems to indicate the mode, namely, that the souls of the blessed learn these things from the report of angels; Jerome, that the souls themselves by a certain marvelous swiftness of nature are present everywhere. But since presence according to place contributes little to spiritual knowledge, which is not made through the senses, they assign this cause in vain; Gregory does not define the mode by which those things are known. Finally, the scholastics also, as we have related, vary; from all of whom we have chosen that special mode which we mentioned a little above, namely, that future thoughts and prayers are known by a peculiar revelation.

Disputatio LI

Caput I - The various opinions of the scholastics on interpreting Augustine's mind

On the occasion of that division which Augustine often repeats in his books - namely of morning and evening cognition - there was introduced among the scholastics this manner of speaking, whereby we commonly assert that creatures are known in God or in the Word by the blessed. But neither do all teach in the same way that creatures are seen in the Word (as we saw in the foregoing disputation), nor do they interpret the mind of Augustine in the same sense. How the scholastics think that creatures are seen by the blessed in the Word has now been said by us enough; it remains that we say in this disputation something about the mode in which he himself interprets Augustine; from which too we can gather that the opinion of Augustine and of Bernard is in no way

808. St. Augustine, De cura pro mortuis agenda, cap. 15; St. Jerome, Contra Vigilantium; St. Gregory, Moralia in Iob, XII, c. 12, on Job 12.

opposed to our opinion, which we set forth in the preceding disputation. Therefore in this chapter we shall enumerate the various modes of interpreting Augustine; but in those that follow we shall deduce his genuine interpretation from his very words

- First mode: By Albert in part 2 of the Summa, tractate 4, q. 14, memb. 3, art. 2, part 2, in the body, and in the incidental question; and by Aegidius in II Sent., d. 13, q. 1, art. 3, dub. 3. They say that the morning cognition is not the clear vision of God, but a natural cognition of God, by which angels and men know him as the author and principle of all things. Then, using a metaphor taken from the root, they add two other cognitions, namely evening, by which creatures are known, and meridian, which they call supernatural; nor do they sufficiently explain whether this is a vision of the divine essence, or also of creatures.[809] But if we speak only of explaining Augustine's mind, this opinion can have no foundation at all in him. For we shall show in the following, that in Augustine the morning is the clear vision of God, not the natural knowledge which we can have of him as he is the author of all things. Nor in Augustine should meridian cognition be distinguished from morning and evening.
- Second mode: By St. Bonaventure in II Sent., d. 4, a. 2, q. 1 and 2, and by Richard in II Sent., d. 4, q. 1 and 2. They hold that morning cognition can be said in a twofold way: first, the clear vision of God, in which God himself is seen and creatures in him; then the very clear cognition of creatures through infused species, by which the mind is lifted up to the consideration and praise of God. Richard adds a third, which he himself, properly, calls morning: namely, of the things themselves in themselves through innate species, without the mind's rising to the praise of the Creator; but he calls evening the cognition of the creatures in their proper genus.[810] However, besides the fact that in this way, according to Richard, evening cannot well be distinguished from morning in angels, unless we say that the morning which is improperly so called is properly evening, in the following chapter we shall plainly show that this is not the mind of blessed Augustine. But what they assert about the vision of creatures in the Word must be taken in the same manner as we reported their sentences in the preceding disputation - namely, in what way they are seen in the Word either by force of the vision, or only by the will of God.
- Third mode: By Scotus in II Sent., d. 3, q. 9, at the verse "Tertio persuadetur," asserting that "vision" or "morning cognition" is also used by Augustine in two ways: first, for the very vision of the divine essence; and further for the quidditative and proper cognition of God, which is indeed lower than the intuitive, and higher than knowledge through alien species which wayfarers have of God.[811] But, as we shall show in the following chapter, Augustine called only the clear and intuitive vision of God "morning." Whether he understands the vision even of creatures in God, and in what way, must be explained there. It is added that, as will be proved in disputation 135, chapter 3, that intuitive vision of God which Scotus

809. Albertus Magnus, Summa, part 2, tract. 4, q. 14, memb. 3, art. 2, part 2, in corpus, and in the incidental question; Aegidius (Giles of Rome), In II Sent., d. 13, q. 1, art. 3, dub. 3.

810. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 4, a. 2, q. 1 - 2; Richard (of St. Victor), In II Sent., d. 4, q. 1 - 2.

811. Scotus, In II Sent., d. 3, q. 9, at the verse "Tertio persuadetur."

contrives is a fiction, nor can it be given, even according to the absolute power of God - this will be made manifest.[812] But Scotus proves his opinion from that sentence of Augustine which is commonly circulated, namely, that the angels had morning before evening cognition, so that those days in Genesis 1 may be suitably distinguished into morning and evening according to that subtlety of Augustine; but not all had the clear and intuitive vision: therefore another vision must be called "morning"; and none is more suitably called morning than that middle cognition which we mentioned: rightly, then...

It is solved: therefore that too is called morning. Still, as we shall see in the following chapter, when Augustine himself calls the intuitive vision of God morning, and says it is prior to evening, Scotus does not rightly infer what he contends; rather he too ought, as we do, to interpret Augustine. Add that Augustine so clearly explains himself as to leave no place at all for doubt.

- Fourth mode: St. Thomas in IV Sent., d. 58, a. 6 and 7, and Cajetan in the Commentaries, call "evening cognition" that which the blessed have of creatures in their proper genus, that is, through their proper species; but "morning" that of the same in the essence of God, not according to their own proper formal reasons, but according to that whereby in God they are the very life of God.[813] Now this cognition of creatures in the Word clearly seen seems to be gathered from Alexander, part 2, q. 23, especially memb. 6, by which he teaches that the demons did not have morning cognition.[814] This indeed is the doctrine of St. Thomas in that place, although here in I, q. 62, a. 1, ad 3 he also concedes morning cognition in wayfaring angels, by which they knew things in the Word by a natural cognition, inasmuch as from themselves - so to speak, as from some effect and species - they knew God himself, and in him the other creatures; and he thinks this to be the mind of Augustine, book 4 of the Literal Meaning of Genesis, chapters 34 and 22, and book 5, chapter 5, when he distinguishes the six days from the beginning of the world by the morning and evening of angelic understanding.[815]

- Fifth mode: Lastly, more recent Thomists interpret the mind of Augustine and of St. Thomas otherwise; for they assert that morning cognition is the cognition of creatures in the Word, by which they are known by force of the vision of the Word according to their proper formal reasons - not insofar as in God they are called the very God according to the notion of God, by which reason all things in him are said to have life. But evening cognition, they say, is that by which the creatures are known according to their own proper formal reasons, not by the vision by which the divine essence is seen, but by their own species, whether infused or acquired. About this opinion of the Thomists, so far as it asserts that, by the vision of the

812. See the author's Disputatio 135, cap. 3.
813. St. Thomas, In IV Sent., d. 58, a. 6 - 7; Cajetan, Commentaria ad loc.
814. Alexander of Hales, Summa, part 2, q. 23, especially memb. 6.
815. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 62, a. 1, ad 3; cf. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, IV, cc. 22, 34; V, c. 5.

essence of God, creatures are seen in him according to their own proper formal reasons, enough was said in the preceding disputation. What he asserts, however, in interpreting the mind of Augustine, must be explained.

Caput II - The true interpretation of Augustine's view

This opinion in expounding Augustine's mind is indeed quite different from what is plainly deduced from his own express places. And it consists of two points. One is that the morning and evening cognition are distinguished only in the blessed angels, and never in wayfaring men nor in angels while wayfarers; in which I agree with Alexander and many disciples of St. Thomas.[816] The other is that "morning cognition" is not called by Augustine that cognition of creatures which the blessed have according to their own proper created formal reasons, whether those be seen in their proper genus and through their proper species, or in the divine essence by force of that vision, or in some other way; but that it is the cognition of creatures according to what they are in God - the very life of God - and is itself immutable; whereas evening is the creatures' own knowledge according to their proper formal reasons. Our whole opinion is contained in these two propositions, of which the former must be proved for us in this chapter; and if anything from the same Augustine seems to be opposed to the same, it must be explained.

The former part is gathered from these places of Augustine himself. In De civitate Dei XI, c. 7, he plainly assigns to the blessed angels "morning" to the vision of God, but "evening" to the cognition of creatures; and in c. 9, when he had said that the angels do not learn by sounding words what God is, but by his very presence - which he plainly understands of the clear vision of him - there he subjoins: "There therefore, as in a daytime cognition; in themselves, as in an evening," as we said above (namely, that they know themselves). And in the book of Questions, book 65, q. 26, when he asserts that a creature known in God is morning and in itself evening, by which two a day is constituted, I do not see how this can be understood unless of the blessed. This indeed Scotus readily admits. And he very clearly hands this down in book 4 of the Literal Meaning of Genesis, from chapter 21 even to 32, as Scotus freely confesses.

... In chapter 19 he says: "Will anyone then say, or if he should say it, ought he to be listened to, that that heavenly city among the thousands of Angels either does not contemplate the eternity of the Creator, or is ignorant of the mutability of the creature, or from some lower kind of knowledge does not praise the Creator? They can indeed at once do this whole thing; they at once do this whole thing: therefore at once they have day and evening and morning." Read chapter 24, where he also most clearly taught the same.[817]

But on the contrary: against this interpretation Augustine himself seems to stand, who in many places asserts that morning knowledge is prior to evening knowledge. First, in book 6 of the Questions, question 26, he says that morning is the knowledge of the creature in the Word, but evening, the knowledge of the creature in itself.[818] He renders the reason in these words: "Because

816. Cf. Alexander of Hales and many disciples of St. Thomas, as cited in the preceding caput.
817. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, IV, c. 19, 24.

the creature is first seen in the Word than in itself." Then in book 4 of the Literal Meaning of Genesis, chapters 24, 31, and 32, he teaches the same. In that chapter 32 he says: "The angelic mind, cleaving by pure charity to the Word of God, after it had been created according to that order so as to precede the rest, saw beforehand in the Word of God the things that were to be made, than when they were made; and thus they were first in his knowledge, when God said that they should be made."[819] By which places he plainly teaches that in the Angel morning knowledge was prior to evening knowledge. But Angels were not created in beatitude, but as wayfarers, as all the scholastics admit, and we shall explain more at length below in Disputation 226; therefore Augustine understood morning knowledge not to be the clear vision of God. Scotus uses these testimonies in order to prove that morning knowledge is that quidditative knowledge of God inferior to intuitive.

I answer: that "prior" in Augustine is not of time, but of order and dignity; this I clearly gather from Augustine himself. First, from chapter 30 of book 4 of the Literal Meaning of Genesis, where he affirms that this is the difference between our day, temporal by the visible sun, and the intellectual day according to the light of angelic cognition, and the evening: that to us the day, morning, and evening are not present at the same time temporally; but to Angels in their fatherland all these are always present. Nor does evening arrive upon the withdrawal of morning and of the day; but it is together with them. He understands indeed not a succession of duration; therefore, when he says in other places that morning knowledge is prior, it must be understood not of duration or causality, but of dignity and order.

He teaches this most clearly in chapter 32 of that book, where he says: "And thus also, although there are no intervals of temporal delays, the rationale of establishing the creature in the Word of God, when he said, 'Let there be light,' preceded." And in chapter 34 about the same cognitions, namely evening and morning, thus he says: "But in these matters what is first and what is later, intervals of times do not demonstrate." He explains by the example of the bodily eye, which at the same time sees the rising sun and the intervening space; yet in order it first sees the space. But it must be observed, when we say morning knowledge is prior in a certain order, not of time, it is not to be understood of the order of causality: for although some Theologians, as we saw in the preceding disputation, say that the vision of God is the cause of seeing creatures in him according to their proper formal reasons, no one has said that morning knowledge is the cause of evening. Therefore the doctrine of Augustine must be understood of a certain order of dignity and excellence: for what is more noble is also called "prior," as Aristotle testifies in the Predicaments, in the chapter on the modes of the prior. And although in the example of the eye, which Augustine adduces, the space is not seen as prior in order of dignity to the sun, but only in order of position (which is reckoned according to another genus of prior and posterior, as is clear from Aristotle in the same chapter), nevertheless there cannot be between morning and evening knowledge any difference of temporal priority; for this he set forth the example so that we may understand that

818. St. Augustine, Quaestiones in Heptateuchum, VI, q. 26.
819. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, IV, cc. 24, 31 - 32.

between them there is no priority of duration, but only of order: just as the vision of the space is not prior in time to the vision of the sun, although that order of prior and posterior is altogether diverse in one case than in the other.

This order of dignity and perfection the same Augustine most fittingly indicated in the same book 6 of the Questions, question 26, in these words: "Because the creature is first seen in God than in itself, therefore the creature is seen more in the art by which it was made than in itself, in which it was made." Where he thinks the same thing, that to be seen first and to be seen more, that is, more perfectly, are the same. The same is gathered from his doctrine, which he hands down in book 4 of the Literal Meaning of Genesis, chapter 32, when he asserts that the angel was created in that order so as to precede the rest, although it is clear from our opinion, which we shall set forth in Disputation 224, that at the same moment the corporeal creature was founded; especially since he himself thinks that in one day and moment of time all things were produced by God, and that those days of Genesis 1 are enumerated as understood spiritually. Therefore, when he says that the Angel in his creation preceded the rest, he understands precedence in dignity, just as in Job 40 Behemoth is called "the beginning of the ways of God," not in time, but in dignity; as we shall explain below in Disputation 224, chapter 2.[820]

Secondly, against the same interpretation one is wont to object by this reason. If the days distinguished in Genesis, according to the sentence of Augustine, are according to knowledge, and each day is said to consist of those two cognitions, namely morning and evening, it is necessary in the state of angels on the way, before they were blessed, to assign both: for since they were created, together with all other things, not yet blessed, and in their knowledge those seven days ought to be assigned, it follows that before they were blessed they must have had both morning and evening knowledge. With this argument the reply of St. Thomas yields, who in I, q. 62, a. 1, ad 3, concedes that there was in Angels before beatitude a certain morning knowledge and an evening knowledge, by which also, as wayfarers, Angels were said to know things in the Word, so that in this way a day may be distinguished according to the mind of Augustine; but he calls "morning" improperly what properly is the knowledge which is in the Word clearly seen.[821]

It is answered: I for my part think that Augustine nowhere ever called "morning" that knowledge which is the clear vision of God, as is sufficiently evident from the places cited. Wherefore I answer to the argument, that in Augustine's meaning the days are to be understood metaphorically, and that by those six days it is signified that the universe, and the kinds of things which God is said to have created, were known by the Angel by morning and evening knowledge does not hinder at all that they be assigned according to the knowledge of the fatherland, which in Angels was later in time than the creation of the world.

Moreover, the number of the days according to this metaphor of Augustine, from the doctrine of the same in the places cited - especially in question 26 and in book 11 of the City of God, chapter 7 - is numbered thus. The first day, on which light is said to have been created, is the knowledge of the

820. Job 40:14 (Vulg. 19): "Principium viarum Dei"; cf. the author's Disputation 224, cap. 2.
821. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 62, a. 1, ad 3.

angelic nature, which is compared to light, and is prior in dignity to the rest. This day, however, is constituted out of morning and evening knowledge, because the Angel knew himself in those two modes. The second day is the knowledge of the firmament, likewise consisting of those two cognitions, and so with the rest.

Caput III - The latter part of the aforesaid opinion is proved

The latter part of our opinion can be proved no less clearly from Augustine himself. It is this: that morning knowledge of creatures is the very vision of the divine essence (*essentia*), and that of those things only which formally are in God, and thus of creatures themselves, insofar as they are said in God to have being (*esse*) and the life of God, not according to their proper created and corruptible formal reasons. In this sense he himself explains that saying of John 1: "What was made, in him was life," in the Tractates on John, tract. 1; and St. Thomas below in q. 18, a. 4. But evening is another knowledge distinct from the very vision of God, by which creatures are known through their proper species, and according to their proper formal reasons. Now that morning is not of creatures according to their formal reasons, St. Thomas clearly taught, whom I follow in this part; and it is evident from some testimonies of Augustine.

The first is book 11 of the City of God, chapter 7, where he says thus: "Yet there is made the evening of this day, and also the morning otherwise, in this sense: forasmuch as, when created knowledge is compared with the Creator, in a certain manner it declines to evening." By which words Augustine does not distinguish morning and evening by a diverse mode of knowing, as our Theologians commonly do after St. Thomas, namely, morning because the creature is seen in the Word (that is, together with the very vision), evening because they are seen in their proper genus (that is, through their proper species). Rather Augustine distinguishes them on the side of the thing known. For he calls the knowledge of God "morning," and the knowledge of creatures "evening." He did not say "the knowledge of creatures in the Word," but that the knowledge of God is morning; and what he subjoins forthwith, that "the knowledge of the creature dawns and there is made morning," since it is referred to the praise and love of the Creator, chapter 4, must be explained.[822]

The second testimony is in the same book, chapter 29, where, in order to show that things are seen in the Word in another way than in themselves - which is what the adversaries gather for those two cognitions of creatures, namely morning and evening - he says thus: "As rectitude of lines, or the truth of figures, is known one way when it is beheld with the intellect, another way when it is written in dust: as if he were to say, in the intellect each thing is perfect; but when it is written in reality, in dust, it cannot be without some defect. Thus, therefore, things are incorruptible in the intellect of God, whereas in themselves they are subject to corruption." He then adds: "And there is one manner in which they are described by the truth unchangeable, another in the soul"; that is to say, Augustine says this for no other reason than because justice as an idea, and the thing which is in God, is God himself unchangeable; in itself, however, by sin it can be

822. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, XI, c. 7; c. 4.

corrupted. So when Augustine speaks of things as they are in God as objectively existing according to their proper formal reasons, he would not say that they are in God in one way, and in themselves in another: for they are known by God as they are on the part of the thing subject to change and corruption. He therefore speaks about them insofar as in God they are God himself, namely, the ideas; and among others, that which is justice, is God himself.[823]

The third is book 6 of the Questions, question 26, where he evidently teaches that by morning knowledge the creature is seen far better in God and in its art than in itself, adducing John 1: "What was made, in him was life." He subjoins these words: "Altogether, therefore, because they were made in him, they have not life in themselves; in the life of God they are; but in themselves they are not." Whence he immediately infers: "And more perfectly are they seen by the holy Angels in the Word of God, where they are life, than in themselves." From Augustine's tenor in that place it would follow that things would be seen in the Word according to their proper reasons, which cannot be; for then they would live, as the stone would seem to live; and the corruptible would be incorruptible. Therefore it is a sign that Augustine speaks of the divine essence itself, insofar as it is called the idea and thing of creatures, which is God himself; and when God is seen, that is seen; and what is not present to us is not denied: and for this reason creatures are seen better in God than in themselves, not because their own nature is better known, but because in that mode they have a better and more perfect being than in themselves. This the same Augustine at length pursues in tractate 1 on John, on those words "What was made, in him was life," where, against the Manichaeans, he proves that the stone does not live, as that man said, deceived by the words of John; but that one sees the idea of the stone, which is God himself. In this sense he says, that things are better in God, that is, that their idea, which is the very divine essence, is better.[824]

The fourth testimony is in book 83 of the Questions, question 46, where, disputing of the ideas in the divine mind, he thus defines them in these words: "They are indeed the principal ideas, certain forms or stable and unchangeable reasons of things, which themselves are not formed, and therefore are always in the same manner, inasmuch as they consist in the divine intelligence." He says that these are seen by the blessed. But these in God are not created and are incorruptible; they are God himself, not creatures; it is wholly according to the objective being which they have in the divine mind. For the creatures, even as objectively existing in the divine mind, are corruptible in themselves, that is, when disjoined from God, just as they are in reality; therefore, if corruptible in reality, God knows them in that way.[825]

Wherefore we cannot but marvel at the Thomists, who from all these places, or from some of them, gather - against Scotus, Gabriel, and others - that the ideas in God of created things are not the very things objectively existing in the intellect according to their proper formal reasons, but are the very essence of God, insofar as it represents them, and insofar as it is theirs: whether this be true or not, we shall say in Disputation 72, chapter 3. And yet from these same places, not

823. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, XI, c. 29.
824. St. Augustine, Tractatus in Ioannem, tract. 1, on John 1:3 - 4.
825. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 46.

remembering, as they ought, they prove that creatures are seen in God by the power of the vision, not only according to that by which they have in God the life of God, but also according to their own proper formal reasons.

And one of them, St. Thomas, in I, q. 18, a. 4, ad 1, according to this doctrine of Augustine, asserts that all things which are in God as in the knower live in him, because they are not other than his essence. But when he says that they are seen in God by their proper reasons, he understands "by the ideas": for about the "reasons" of the forms of each creature the ancients speak; but of man, according as he is a rational animal, he could not say that all created things have in God the life of God; since in this mode things are said to be in God only objectively, in the mind of God, whence, with the divine essence, they do not live in God. Therefore, when he says that creatures, as in God the knower, live with the life of God, he does not understand that things are only objectively in him, but according to that very form which is the very essence of God: about which, in Disputation 72, it will have to be treated more at large.

From these things someone might suspect, with St. Thomas, to say that creatures are known in ...

The third testimony is in book 6 of the Questions on the Heptateuch, question 26,[826] where, speaking of morning knowledge, in order to show that a creature is seen better in God and in its art than in itself, he adduces that passage John 1: "What was made, in him was life"; he then subjoins these words: "Therefore all things which were made are life in him, and do not have life in themselves; in the Word of God they are life, in themselves they are not life." Whence he immediately infers: "And by this they are more seen by the holy Angels in the Word of God, where they are life, than in themselves." But if, according to Augustine's mind in that place, things were seen in the Word according to their proper notions, it could not be that things not living, like a stone, should be seen to live, and things corruptible to be incorruptible: it is therefore a sign that Augustine is speaking of the very divine essence, by which there is said to be the idea and art of creatures, which is God himself, and, God being seen, is seen; about which there is for us no present controversy: and for this reason creatures are seen better in God than in themselves - not because their proper natures are better known, but because in that mode they have a better and more perfect being than in themselves. Augustine himself unfolds this very point at length in tractate 1 on John, on those words, "What was made, in him was life," where, against the Manichee, he proves that a stone does not live, as the Manichee said, deceived by John's words, but that the idea of the stone lives, which is God himself. Therefore in this way he says that things are much better in God.

But to speak of creatures in the Word "by force of the vision," in this way, namely, inasmuch as they are in God as the life of God himself - this cannot stand with what he himself says, namely, that by so much the more creatures are seen in the Word by how much the essence itself is better seen: which cannot be true unless it be of creatures existing only objectively in God: for as to the things themselves as they are the divine essence and the life of God himself, one does not see more

826. St. Augustine, Quaestiones in Heptateuchum, VI, q. 26.

of them than another, since in the essence the one contemplates the very same thing as the other. Augustine, however, never taught that more creatures are seen in the Word of God the better the essence itself is seen.

The fifth and best testimony of Augustine is book 4 of the Literal Meaning of Genesis, chapter 32,[827] where he plainly assigns the difference between evening and morning knowledge in the way we assigned at the beginning of this chapter. Augustine's words are: "There was made evening, because it was necessary, and thus a cognition by which the creature should be distinguished from the Creator, otherwise known in itself than in him." From which it is clearly gathered that, according to Augustine's mind, by morning knowledge alone the Creator could not be sufficiently distinguished from the creature. But if by morning knowledge the creatures were known in the Word according to their proper created formal notions - as that man is a rational animal, and so of the others - then evening knowledge was not necessary to this, that the intellect of the blessed should distinguish creatures from the Creator. If, however, morning knowledge was nothing else than a cognition of the divine essence itself, which is the art of all creatures, there was need without doubt of the evening for that effect: for by morning knowledge a stone was not distinguished from God, since the creature, inasmuch as it was in God, was known to have the life of God - which is nothing else than to know the divine essence itself in itself, which is the art and idea of all things. There had therefore to be another cognition, by which the stone should be known in itself according to its formal notion, as not having life.

To this also pertains what Augustine says in book 5 of the Literal Meaning of Genesis, chapter 34,[828] about the Angel knowing creatures by morning and by evening knowledge: for he says: "When at once he contemplated the whole universe, as it was made all at once, and in the first and incommutable reasons by which it was created, then on account of the day; and when it was known in its own nature on account of the evening; and when even from that lower cognition he praised the Creator on account of the morning, lest he should praise on account of the morning." By which words Augustine distinguishes the evening and the morning about the creatures themselves, known in different ways. For he calls morning that which the Angel has of creatures, inasmuch as they are in the very eternal reasons of God: thus, however, they are God himself; evening, on the other hand, inasmuch as he knows them according to their proper natures. But if the creatures known in God were seen according to their proper formal notions, then already they would be known in their proper nature, and the evening cognition posited by Augustine about creatures known in their proper nature would be posited in vain.

Caput IV - Oppositions against the latter part

Against this latter part of our opinion the very same Augustine seems to be on the other side in some places; especially in book 9 of the City of God, chapter 22, and book 13 of the Confessions, chapter 15, where he teaches that these temporal and mutable things are known by the blessed

827. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, IV, c. 32.
828. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, V, c. 34.

Angels in the Word of God; and that therefore they are known by them more certainly than by the demons, because (as Augustine says there) "They behold in the Word of God their principal causes, through which the world was made; by which causes some things are approved, some reproved, all are ordered. But the demons do not contemplate the eternal causes of times, which are, as it were, the cardinal ones in the wisdom of God." In which place Augustine plainly speaks of the cognition of creatures in the Word according to their proper created notions, according to which they are known by the demons. So also Isidore, in the book On the Supreme Good or the Sentences, chapter 12, sentence 17, says of the Angels that in the Word of God they know all things before they come to be in reality, etc

I answer first: neither Augustine nor Isidore in those places called that cognition "morning" by which created things are said to be seen in the Word according to their proper notions; and how, in those places, Augustine and Isidore do not mean that creatures are known by the same vision with which the Word is seen and by force of that vision, has already been explained by us above, chapter 7 of the preceding question. Therefore, wherever Augustine calls the vision of creatures in the Word "morning," and the vision of the essence of God, and distinguishes it from the cognition of those in themselves, which he calls "evening," we say it must be explained as we noted above.

Secondly, someone could object the same Augustine, who not only posits those two cognitions, morning and evening, but also adds a third, which he calls the day: and this, he says, is of the very divine essence; therefore the morning ought to be of creatures. Thus he has it in book 4 of the Literal Meaning of Genesis, chapter 30.[831] I answer: It is true that those three are there enumerated by Augustine; and he says that "day" is taken for the contemplation of the divine essence; and "day" and "morning" - or rather that "morning" of the day which is before the evening - are used in this sense. Besides "day" and "evening" he again takes "morning," and shows how, for the following day after the evening, the light returns, by which the following day begins and after the first the second is numbered. He assigns the order thus: first he puts the day, then the evening, lastly the morning, inasmuch as the mind, by angelic cognition of creatures, which was the evening of the day, rises up unto the praise of God, and is interiorly turned to him for that work, namely to the very art and idea of God, and thence begins to be said the morning of the following day. To this pertains what he says in book 11 of the City of God, chapter 7:[832] after he has said that the knowledge about the creature, in comparison to the knowledge which the Angels have of God, is in a certain way the evening, he subjoins: and that knowledge is the morning inasmuch as the creature itself is referred to the praise and love of the Creator. He understands, indeed, that the morning of the following day is made: and this has been explained by us. Thus he does not divide one and the same day into those three: for the morning which he places after the day and the evening he numbers not for the preceding, but for the following day: otherwise he ought first to put the morning, then the day, lastly the evening.

Wherefore in that same book 4, chapter 23, he says that the knowledge of creatures in the Word, which throughout that book he commonly calls "morning," pertains to the day; but of creatures in themselves, to the evening. These things have been said to explain the mind of Augustine - not only

that we may understand him, but also that it may appear how, since among the Scholastics that doctrine of the cognition of creatures in the Word was introduced, from it a weak argument could be drawn against the opinion which we confuted in the preceding disputation, from Augustine's words.

It remains that we say something about Bernard, whom, in chapter 3, we brought forward disputing for the opinion opposed to that of the Thomists. And in my judgment he speaks in the same way as Augustine - since he was very much versed in his doctrine - namely, about the creatures themselves not according to their proper formal notions, but inasmuch as they exist in God and are said to be God, or the life of God, as has been explained by us. And in this sense Bernard said, concerning the blessed, that "they see the Word, and in the Word the things that were made through the Word": which we can gather even better from Bernard himself; let us subjoin what he writes. Explaining that of Romans, "The invisible things of God," etc., he says thus: Surely this ladder (namely, of creatures) is not needed by them, but by exiles; as the sense knows not an anchor who, when he said that the invisible things are seen through the visible, would have piled up superfluous ascents; for they are the creatures of God. And truly, what is needed is at hand for one who holds the ladder with his hand. For there you have, because of those things which are made, the reason why we see the Word, and in the Word the things made through the Word; they bear the traces of the Maker; the rest of the world - if you descend to them as though dead - you will see that there they are scarcely much better than in themselves.

Thus far the words of Bernard. From which words it is to be observed, first, that when he says that creatures are better in the Word than in themselves - whence he seems to collect that the Word and the things themselves are seen in it by the same vision - he is alluding to Augustine's manner of philosophizing, of which enough was said in the preceding chapter: according to which created things are said to be better in God than in themselves, because in God they are not subject to corruption, and all live by the life of God, whereas in themselves it is otherwise. From which it is plain that Bernard, as also Augustine, understands by "creatures in God" not the things themselves objectively existing in the divine mind according to their proper formal notions - for thus they too would be subject to corruption, nor would they live the life of God, since, although they are set before the divine intellect as its object, in themselves they are corruptible, and some even inanimate - but he understands the very art and ideas of creatures, which are God himself; and on this account creatures are said to be better in God than in themselves, in the sense in which Augustine speaks, as we said in the preceding chapter.

Then, when Bernard says that, for the blessed to know created things, they do not descend to the things themselves, because they behold them in God, where they are better, he clearly indicates that they are not known according to their own created formal notions, but according to that whereby they are in God, that is, the art and idea of God. For if he had understood about the things themselves, that their own proper notions are understood in God, he ought to have said that the blessed, from the cognition of the essence of God - according to their proper notions understood -

831. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, IV, c. 30.
832. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, XI, c. 7.

proceed to the things themselves; whereas he says that they do not descend to the things themselves, but contemplate according to that whereby they are in God, and the idea of God. For in God indeed the proper notions are understood as ideas and as the art; but he ought to have said that the blessed, from the cognition of the essence of God, according to the proper notions of the things understood, proceed to the things themselves; rather than that they should "descend" to the things as to steps: he ought, instead, to have said that the blessed, from the cognition of the essence of God, understand the proper notions as ideas.

Secondly, one could object on the authority of St. Augustine, who not only posits those two cognitions, the morning and the evening, but also adds a third, which he calls the day: and he says that this is of the divine essence; therefore the morning ought to be of creatures. So he has it in On Genesis literally, IV, c. 30.[833]

It is answered: It is true that these three are taken for the contemplation of the divine essence; but I say that day and morning, or a part of that which is before the evening, are taken by way of use. Besides the day and evening, he again resumes the morning, so as to show how, for the following day, after the evening the light returns, by which also the following day begins; and thus after the first, the second is numbered. He assigns indeed this order: first he puts the day, then the evening, finally the morning, inasmuch as the angelic mind, from the cognition of creatures, which was an evening, rises up into the praise of God, and therein sees the art of God and the idea, and from there the morning of the following day begins to be said. Wherefore the same Augustine, City of God XI, c. 7, after he had said that the science of the creature, in comparison with the science which the Angels have of God, in a certain manner becomes evening, adds that that science grows light and becomes morning, when the creature itself is referred to the praise and love of the Creator: he truly understands it to become the morning of the following day, as has been explained by us. Therefore he does not divide one day into those three: for the morning which he puts after the day and evening, he numbers not for the preceding but for the following day; otherwise he ought to have put the morning first, then the day, and lastly the evening. Wherefore in that same book IV, c. 23, he says that the cognition of creatures in the Word, which he commonly in that book calls the morning, pertains to the day; but of creatures in themselves, to the evening.[834]

These things have been said in order to explain the mind of Augustine, not only that we may understand him, but also that it may appear on what foundation among the Scholastics this doctrine was introduced concerning the cognition of creatures in the Word, and how weak an argument against the opinion which we followed in the preceding disputation can be taken from the words of Augustine.

It remains that, about Bernard - whom also in the foregoing disputation, cap. 3, we adduced for the opinion opposed to the Thomists - I should say something. Explaining that passage to the Romans 1, "The invisible things of God," etc., thus he says: "Truly, of this ladder (namely of creatures) citizens have no need, but exiles; as the author of this opinion saw, who, when he said

833. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, IV, c. 30.
834. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, IV, c. 23.

that the invisible things are beheld through visible things, significantly added, 'by the creature of the world.' And in truth, what need is there of ladders for one already holding the throne? That creature of heaven is present; he has that by which he rather looks upon these things: he sees the Word, and in the Word the things made by the Word; nor has he need to beg the knowledge of the Maker from these things which are below. For neither, that he himself may know, does he descend to the things themselves, since there he sees them, where they are far better than in themselves." So far Bernard.[835]

In whose words it must first be observed, when he says that creatures are better in the Word than in themselves, whence it seems he gathers that by the same vision the Word is seen and they themselves are seen in it, that he alludes to the manner of philosophizing of Augustine, of which enough has been said in the preceding chapter, whereby created things are said to be better in God than in themselves: because in God they are not subject to corruption, and all live the life of God; otherwise in themselves. Hence Bernard understands creatures in God, as also Augustine, not as themselves existing objectively in the mind of God according to their own proper formal notions; for thus they also are subject to corruption, nor do they live the life of God, since they are objected to the divine intellect as they are in themselves corruptible, and some even inanimate; but he understands the very art and the ideas of creatures, which are God himself, by reason of which the creature is said to be better in God than in itself: in which way Augustine speaks, as we said in the preceding chapter.

Then, when Bernard says that, for the Blessed to know created things, they do not descend to the things themselves, because they behold them in God, where they are better, he clearly indicates that they are not known according to their own created formal notions, but according to the fact that they are the very art and idea of God. For if he understood them according to their own created notions, he ought to have said that the Blessed descend from the cognition of the essence of God to the cognition of creatures, just as in turn the wayfarer ascends from the cognition of those things to the cognition of God, from the higher cognition, namely of the essence of God, to the notion of creatures, which is lower, to pass over - there is a certain descent; therefore, when he says that there is no descent there, he understands that it is not so, because while the blessed sees creatures in God, he sees God himself; and while he sees him, he holds the throne and abides in it, because he knows creatures in God, as they are God himself, not according to their own proper and formal notions.

835. St. Bernard, De Beatis: "vident verbum, et in verbo facta per verbum" (as cited by Vázquez).

Disputatio LII - Whether it is a dogma of faith that God cannot be comprehended by any creature, even the blessed

Caput I - What is called "comprehension" in St. Augustine and the other Fathers

Since from the common manner of speaking of Scripture, the Fathers, and the Councils, we ought to gather what in this matter is certain of faith; it has seemed good, leaving to the following disputation various definitions of comprehension which the Scholastics hand down, to bring forward here only that which is approved by the holy Fathers. Which Augustine, with his accustomed clarity of mind, explains to us in Epistle 112, c. 8, distinguishing between "to see a thing" and "to comprehend it" itself, with these words: "One thing it is to see, another to comprehend the whole by seeing: for that is seen which is present and in some wise is perceived; but the whole is comprehended by seeing, which is thus seen that nothing of it is hidden from the seer; or whose limits can be surveyed: just as the present will of yours is hidden from me; but you can survey the limits of your ring. By way of example, I have set two things, of which one pertains to the glance of the mind, the other to the bodily eyes."[836]

Therefore comprehension is a vision of a thing, of which nothing is hidden from the one seeing; or which includes not only the entity but also the bounds and extremes of the thing; finally, whereby the whole thing itself is known, and there is nothing of it which is not seen. This definition is followed by Bede upon that 1 John 3, "We shall see him as he is"; it is also gathered from Nazianzen, Oration 36, which is the fourth on Theology, n. 66; from Nicetas and Psellus in the same place; and from Chrysostom, Homily 5 On the Incomprehensible Nature of God.[837][838] Hence Augustine, Sermon 38 On the Words of the Lord, teaches that with the bodily eye no body can be comprehended by us by sight, because we cannot at once see it through every part of itself and its extremes. For if we see it from the anterior part, the posterior is hidden: which must of necessity occur in every body. Which also must be said of a ring, which nevertheless the same Augustine, Epistle 112, c. 8, brought forward to us as an example of comprehension, because its ends can very well be seen at once. But according to his doctrine the example does not exactly explain the matter to us: for if the anterior part is seen, the posterior cannot be seen.

From the same definition Augustine also infers, City of God XII, c. 18, that the infinite multitude of things which he asserts to be known by God cannot be infinite with respect to the science of God, by which it is comprehended. He had given a little above the reason with these words: "Because whatever is comprehended by one who knows is limited by the knower's comprehension." As if he were to say: a thing which is comprehended by someone is enclosed by the comprehension itself; and therefore it ought to be finite: because nothing of it can be outside the comprehension. Thus, if some multitude is comprehended by cognition, since it ought to be wholly within that, it also must

836. St. Augustine, Epistola 112, c. 8.
837. St. Bede, on 1 John 3: "Videbimus eum sicuti est."
838. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 36 (the fourth on Theology), n. 66; Nicetas; Psellus; St. John Chrysostom, Homily 5 De incomprehensibili natura Dei.

be terminated, enclosed, and limited: which is best explained by a corporeal example, whence the metaphor seems to be taken. For if some sphere is comprehended by a hand or by another thing, it must be wholly within the limits of that hand, and be limited by its capacity.[839]

Caput II - What Scripture teaches about the comprehension of God

Although all the Scholastics, whom we shall mention in the following disputation, plainly teach that the essence of God is comprehended by no intellect, even a blessed one, however clearly it may behold it, yet no one except Soto, in IV, dist. 49, q. 3, art. 1, and certain more recent theologians, openly says that this is certain of faith, although some strive to prove that doctrine from Scripture itself. Therefore Soto and others more recent think it is a dogma of faith, which cannot be denied without manifest error against the faith; and they attempt to establish this by the testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers, which we shall examine a little later.[840]

I, however, judge it to be of faith that God cannot be comprehended by the blessed, if comprehension is taken, as it is defined by some, for a knowledge equally perfect with the object itself: for no created vision can be in this way equal with God himself. But because it is not sufficiently certain whether this belongs to the notion of comprehension, and the theologians vary in assigning its notion, and some Scholastics say that the very vision by which whatever is in God formally is seen is also comprehension, in which manner some Fathers, indeed even Scripture itself, speak, as we shall show below; therefore there does not seem to be a firm foundation from this side to say that it is of faith that God, according to every mode of speaking, is incomprehensible, even to the blessed - although that he cannot be comprehended by wayfarers is of faith. Wherefore, leaving this matter to be defined by the judgment of others, I shall attempt to examine whether Scripture and the Fathers assert that the substance (essence) of God is incomprehensible to the blessed endowed with the light of glory, or only to creatures considered in their own proper power; meanwhile pronouncing that it is not licit, but plainly rash, to teach absolutely that God can be comprehended by the blessed, since the common school of the Scholastics teaches the opposite, although in the manner of explaining it the Scholastics themselves think variously.

The first place of Scripture which is wont to be adduced to prove as of faith that God is incomprehensible, even if he be clearly seen, is Jeremiah 32: "Great in counsel, and incomprehensible in thought"; upon which place St. Jerome says: "Whom thought does not comprehend, how can speech comprehend?" - which words the author of the Interlinear and the Ordinary Gloss took from him; Nicholas also on that place, and certain Scholastics, so interpret it.[841][842][843] I, however, think that Jeremiah was not speaking of the comprehensibility of the essence and substance of God, but of his counsels, of which he had said, "Great in counsel": which counsels

839. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, XII, c. 18.
840. Soto, In IV Sententiarum, dist. 49, q. 3, art. 1.
841. St. Jerome, on Jeremiah 32: "Quem non comprehendit cogitatio, quomodo potest sermo comprehendere?"
842. Glossa interlinearis and Glossa ordinaria on Jeremiah 32.
843. Nicholas (of Lyra), Postilla on Jeremiah 32.

the same prophet forthwith explained with these words: "Whose eyes are open upon all the ways of the sons of Adam, that thou mayest render to each according to his ways, and according to the fruit of his inventions; who hast set signs and wonders in the land of Egypt," etc. Therefore he is said to be "great in counsel" because he so attentively beholds the way of all, that he may render to each according to his merits. But when he had said, "Great in counsel," explaining the greatness of the counsel he added, "And incomprehensible in thought": that is, so great that he cannot be known by any created intellect: this is what "incomprehensible" signifies in that place: for not the angelic intellect, much less the human, with its own cleverness and industry can know what God has decreed: indeed, it cannot even by any reasoning suspect it, since more often it turns out not as man thought, but the contrary. Yet who would deny that by a special revelation, if God willed, the counsels of his will could be comprehended by Angels and men? I do not speak of counsels insofar as they are the very divine essence, whose being is to understand and to know; about this neither does the Prophet speak - for to what end would he have mixed this metaphysical consideration in his discourse? - but about the things which he decreed to do, which the Prophet calls the counsels of God. Just as when one asks what counsel the king has taken, he does not ask about the quality of the intellect by which he deliberated, but about the thing itself: wherefore another answers, the king's counsel was to go to Toledo, to take this city, and the like. In the same phrase we say that the counsels of a certain prince are inscrutable, not for any absolute reason than because that which he deliberates is hidden: for about the quality of the mind itself we assert nothing of that sort.

Therefore God is said to be incomprehensible in thought, of himself, because unless he himself openly reveal, those things which he has thought to do cannot be known. For both in Scripture and among the Fathers "to comprehend" signifies the same as to hold something thus by thought and to know it on every side, that nothing of it be unknown. Thus, then, I do not think it impossible that the counsels of God be comprehended in the sense explained, if God should will to reveal them. For this reason also in Scripture he is called ...

But I for my part think that even the blessed Jeremiah was not speaking of the comprehensibility of the essence and substance of God, but of His counsels, of which he had said, "Great in counsel"; and he forthwith explained His counsels in these words of the same prophet: "Whose eyes are open upon all the ways of the sons of Adam, that Thou mayest render to every one according to his ways, and according to the fruit of his devices, who hast set signs and wonders in the land of Egypt," etc. Therefore He is called great in counsel, because He so attentively and exactly looks upon the way of all, that He renders to each according to his merits. But when he had said, "Great in counsel," explaining the magnitude of the counsel he added, "and incomprehensible in thought": that is, so great that He cannot be known by any created intellect. For "incomprehensible" signifies only this; since neither the angelic intellect, much less the human, by its own cleverness and industry can know what God has decreed; indeed, it cannot even in any way conjecture it, since frequently, rather than what man supposed, the opposite occurs. Yet who will deny that by a special revelation, if God willed, the counsels of His will could be grasped by angels and men? I do not speak of counsels insofar as they are the very divine mind and essence, whose being (*esse*) is to understand and to know; for of this neither does the Prophet speak - for to what

end would he have mingled such a metaphysical consideration with his prayer? - but of the things which He has decreed to do, which the Prophet calls the counsels of God. Thus too, when one asks what counsel a king has taken, one does not ask about the quality of the intellect by which he deliberated, but about the thing itself: wherefore another answers, "The counsel of the king was to go to Toledo, to take this city," and the like. In the same phrase we say that the counsels of some prince are unsearchable, for no other reason than that what he had deliberated is hidden: for of the very quality of mind we assert nothing of the sort.

Therefore God is said to be incomprehensible in thought in Himself, because unless He Himself openly reveal them, the things which He has thought to do cannot be known: for both in Scripture and among the Fathers "to comprehend" signifies the same as "to hold something in thought in such a way and to know it on every side that nothing of it is unknown." Thus then I do not think it impossible that the counsels of God be comprehended in the sense explained, if God should will to reveal them. For this reason they are called in Scripture "incomprehensible," because no creature can attain to them by its own intelligence: nor did St. Jerome, the author of the Ordinary Gloss, and Nicholas [of Lyra] wish to teach anything else, if one follow the sense of the Scholastics.[844]

In the same sense does Scripture speak in Psalm 91: "Thy thoughts are become exceeding deep"; and then it is added, "the senseless man shall not know, nor will the fool understand these things": as if to say, he who has not been enlightened by Thy divine wisdom and revelation will not understand nor comprehend; otherwise he who is endowed with them. And to the Romans 11: "How incomprehensible are His judgments, and unsearchable His ways! For who has known the mind of the Lord," etc. In which words it is plain that he speaks not of the essence itself in itself, but of the things which He is said to have decreed by His counsel: namely, why the Jews were rejected, but the gentiles chosen, etc. The same was expressed by Zophar the Naamathite, Job 11: "Wilt thou by searching find out God? wilt thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?" - who truly said excellently in this: yet he was speaking not of the essence of God clearly seen by the blessed, but of the ways, that is, the counsels of the Lord, as has been explained, which according to themselves it is repugnant to comprehend unless they be revealed; just as also Job 9 says of God: "Who does great things and incomprehensible, marvelous things," which is the same as that these cannot altogether be known.

The second place, which seems to be understood of the substance of God, not of His counsels, is Ecclesiasticus 43: "Do not labor, for you will not comprehend," which some Scholastics bring forward in confirmation of the opinion which asserts that God, by those who see Him, is not comprehended. Yet from it I seem to gather the contrary: wherefore, if the word "I comprehend" were taken in the Scholastic sense in that place, their opinion would easily be impugned. First, for Ecclesiasticus there speaks with men of the present age, and exhorts them to the praises of God, that, as far as it is lawful, they should commend and proclaim Him; but that they should not so labor as to suppose that they can proclaim His praises as they are in act: therefore he said, "Do not labor, for you will not comprehend": he renders the reason in these words, "Who shall see Him,

844. St. Jerome; the Glossa ordinaria; Nicholas of Lyra, on Jeremiah 32 ("Magnus consilio et incomprehensibilis cogitatu").

and narrate? And who shall magnify Him as He is from the beginning?" - as if he were saying: since no one has seen Him as He is, no one can set forth His praises for us; but if anyone had seen, then he could narrate; just as John 1 says: "No one has ever seen God: the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He has told [Him]" - that is, no one has seen God so as to be able to preach these mysteries, except the Only-begotten who is in the bosom of the Father; about which place many things were said in disputation 37, chapter 6, where we said that that place is to be understood not of angels but of men.[845] Therefore, just as Ecclesiasticus said, "Do not labor, for you will not comprehend," so also afterward he seems to say that he can "comprehend" God with praise who sees Him; as, on the contrary, he who has not seen cannot. For this reason I said that, if the word "I comprehend" be taken there in the Scholastic sense, rather the opposite would be deduced from that testimony. True exposition of the place: I for my part think that there "to comprehend" is used for exposition, knowledge, and praise of the thing as it is; as elsewhere too in Scripture with Paul, as the Scholastics admit. Wherefore I do not doubt that Ecclesiasticus is not speaking with angels who see Him, restraining their endeavor lest they think they praise God as He is. For indeed, just as they see Him with the word expressed by their mind as He is, so also they praise Him and declare the substance and excellence of God as He is. Why, however, according to the sense of Scholastic discipline the angels are not said to "comprehend" God, will be made clear in the following disputation.

The third place is 1 Timothy 6, where it is said of God, "Who inhabits light inaccessible, whom no man has seen nor can see" - that is, "light incomprehensible." But that place, just as also in the same epistle, chapter 1, where God is also said to be "invisible," is to be understood as that one of John of which we spoke in disputation 37, chapter 6; namely, that God can be seen by no human intellect, nor even by the angelic, by its own proper power. Wherefore if there be anything in those places that signifies incomprehensibility - such as the word "inaccessible" - it signifies the very same as the word "invisible"; whence it does not follow that by the blessed, who, endowed with divine light, see God, He is not comprehended. In the same sense Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistle 1 to Gaius, and On the Divine Names, book 7 at the beginning, said that God is "above every mind and understanding": because, as he says in that epistle, "perfect ignorance" of Him is true knowledge, in that, as wayfarers, through negations we know Him, understanding rather what He is not, than what He is; as we explained above in disputation 22, chapter 6.[846]

Caput III - What the Latin Fathers think on this matter

Further, let us show whether the Church and the Latin Fathers, when they say that God is incomprehensible, speak of His incomprehensibility with respect to the blessed, or with respect to the creature considered according to its own proper power. And indeed, with such diligence as I could, in the year of the Lord 1585, when I publicly taught theology in our College, I adduced many testimonies of the holy Fathers, both Latin and Greek, by which it seemed to be proved that God is

845. John 1:18; cf. Vázquez, Disputation 37, cap. 6 (on whether "no one has seen God" is to be understood of angels or of men).

846. Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistola 1 ad Gaium; De divinis nominibus, c. 7 init.; cf. Vázquez, Disputation 22, cap. 6.

not comprehended even by the blessed; which I examined one by one and showed that this is not demonstrated by them; testimonies which afterwards certain more recent authors have used, to show that it is of faith that God is in no way comprehended by the blessed. These I have resolved to examine in this and the following chapter.

And first of all, from the Councils only the Lateran under Innocent III can be brought forward, whose decree is reported in the chapter Firmiter, On the most high Trinity and the Catholic faith, where it says: "We firmly believe that there is one only God, eternal, immense, incomprehensible."[847] Yet since in the same chapter it is said "ineffable," and nevertheless that the blessed by the light of glory, as they see clearly, so also with the tongue of the mind can utter and express Him as He is, nor is He said to be ineffable to them; so neither will He be said to be incomprehensible to them. Therefore God is said to be ineffable, incomprehensible, and invisible to wayfarers, or to rational creatures considered according to their nature; but whether He be said to be comprehended by the blessed themselves, the council does not at all treat.

Objicitur: But some urge in this fashion. In the same place it is defined in the same manner that God is immutable and incomprehensible; but He is immutable by absolute power, therefore also incomprehensible.

Respondetur: I answer that the account is different. For He is called immutable absolutely, not only because He can be changed by no contrary, but because He cannot be changed even by Himself; and, just as He is not called "incomprehensible" by Himself but by the creature, so it is also denied that He can be comprehended by a creature - unless He Himself should will to reveal Himself.

But from the Fathers we shall first adduce the Latins, who can be alleged for the opposite opinion, and we shall explain them; afterwards we shall bring forward the testimonies of the Greek Fathers, from all of which we shall prove that the Fathers never spoke of "comprehension" as the Scholastics speak, whenever they deny that God can be comprehended by a creature; but that by the name "comprehension" they meant only the clear vision of God.

The first testimony is of St. Gregory, in the Moralia, book 7 (elsewhere 10), in these words: "On the summit of retribution the Almighty can indeed be found by a kind of contemplation, yet not perfectly; because, even if we sometimes behold Him in His brightness, nevertheless we do not fully gaze upon His essence." In "the summit of retribution" he seems to signify eternal beatitude: if therefore there the blessed do not fully behold the essence of God, then either we must say that Gregory, with St. John Chrysostom, thought that God is not seen clearly by the blessed - the opposite of which is established from disputation 37, chapter 2 - or [we must say] that [they do not behold Him] so perfectly that it may be said "to be comprehended," as the Scholastics teach. Which the following words confirm, by which he gives the reason for what he had said: "For the angelic or human mind, when it longs for unbounded light, by that very fact as a creature it narrows itself, and though it strives to go beyond itself by advancement, nevertheless, even enlarged, it does not suffice to 'comprehend' its splendor."

847. Lateran Council under Innocent III (1215), cap. Firmiter, De summa Trinitate et fide catholica.

Exponitur: But I think that Gregory is speaking, not of the blessed who see God as He is, but both of men and of angels, yet as wayfarers and without the light of glory, endowed only with the grace of contemplation: of these indeed he says "on the summit of retribution," that is, in a higher grade of contemplation, which in this life is as it were the reward of good works, although the creature itself, indeed by its nature narrow, enlarge itself as it may, cannot see within itself the splendor of the divine essence. But when he says that God is beheld by us "in His brightness," he is not speaking of clear vision, but of the contemplation of this life, by which we look upon the essence and brightness of God, yet not fully, that is, not clearly and as He is, we gaze; as also a little below he said that His splendor - that is, of God - is not "comprehended" by us.

The second testimony is of the same Gregory, Moralia 18, chapter 28, at the end, where he openly says of the blessed: "... we shall not see as He sees Himself; for by far otherwise does the Creator see Himself than the creature [sees] the Creator: for, as regards the immensity of God indeed, a measure is set for us ..." and shortly after: "... as He is: for thus those words seem to limit [the matter]; and the sense will be: we shall see Him as He is."[848]

Vera loci expositio: I answer that in that place Gregory is speaking of wayfarers, and that his intention is indeed to mark out the difference between God and the created intellect: not that God "comprehends" Himself (as the Scholastics say), whereas the created intellect does not "comprehend" God; but because God, seeing Himself, rests in Himself and does not pass over to another, whereas we, so that by resting we may truly see God, tend toward Him by a kind of way of vision, so as to rest in Him; and thus nearly is his speech to be taken, that it is not "as He is" in this life that we see Him, but that "as He is" we shall see Him then; for thus those words seem to limit [the matter], and the sense will be: "we shall see Him as He is."

Germani sensus expositio: I for my part think those words are to be understood of wayfarers and to be referred rather to the immediately preceding [context]. For after he had said that we are enlightened to that which Moses sought - namely, His essence and His nature - while He appeared in a bodily figure, and he had seemed to say that this had been granted to him, or to someone else, in this mortal life, he added: "Not that God's plenitude ...," by which he denies to wayfarers the clear vision of the divine nature in itself, which he calls the plenitude of God, and grants only that by which they looked upon Him in a bodily figure; and thus he marks a difference between this vision and "comprehension," but not between the clear vision of the nature of God in itself and the "comprehension" thereof.

The third testimony is from Bede on 1 John 3, "We shall see Him as He is," which, under their wording, some allege thus: "It is promised to us to see God, not by comprehending, but by beholding..." But these words must be weighed from the sense into which Bede himself interprets them when his words are compared; for his very words are these: "We know that when He shall appear we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is": not as men see men when they wish, not in the guise in which He willed to appear to the fathers, but in the nature in which He is in Himself; for that which Moses asked was to see Him "as He is" when he said, "Show me Thyself";

848. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, XVIII, c. 28 (in fine).

not that anyone can "comprehend" the plenitude of God - not by the eyes of flesh, nor sometimes even by the mind itself - but that we may see something of Him according to the mode of that vision.[849]

This moreover is chiefly confirmed from the fact that the same Bede - whom we have referred to in disputation 54, chapter 3 - plainly affirms that God in His substance was not seen by Moses, nor by any other Prophet, but only in the figure in which He willed to appear. Wherefore Bede would not doubt to grant that the essence had been seen by Moses if a clear vision had been granted; if it had been granted, there would have been a clear vision, which carries with it "comprehension": so far is he from asserting that "comprehension" is something other than clear vision.

Augustine too is cited for this opinion, Epistle 112, chapters 8 and 9, where he distinguishes the vision of a certain thing from its "comprehension." But how far this is true in a bodily vision of some thing, as we explained in chapter 1; yet, in the clear vision of the divine essence, the distinction assigned by Augustine will not remain.

The fourth testimony is Augustine, On the Knowledge of True Life, chapter 21, at the beginning ...[850]

In sermon 38, On the Words of the Lord, on that passage John 1: "In the beginning was the Word," after he had said that bodies indeed can be seen by us, but cannot be comprehended, because they cannot be seen according to every part of themselves, he subjoins: "Behold, let us speak of bodies subject to our eyes: we are not able to comprehend them by sight. Who then has with the eyes of the heart comprehended God? It is enough that he touch Him, if his eye is pure. But if he does touch, by a touch he touches what he loves, an incorporeal and spiritual [touch]; yet he does not comprehend: and this if he is pure; and the man becomes blessed by touching with the heart that which remains always blessed; and that is perpetual beatitude," etc.[851]

It is explained. Augustine clearly speaks about one on the way, when he says that God cannot be comprehended, although He can in some manner be touched. But what he says, "And this if he is pure; and the man becomes blessed," he does not understand of perfect beatitude, but of this life; "perpetual beatitude," however, he there calls God Himself, who is the object of our beatitude, whatever that may be: just as he calls Him the everlasting light, by which man is illumined, not only in the other life, but even in this one; he also calls Him everlasting life, "whence" (says he) "man is alive"; he understands, however, any life whatsoever.

Further, that Augustine is speaking only of those on the way when he says that God is not comprehended by them, is clear, first, because when he speaks of the eye of their mind he says, "It is enough that he touch"; but with respect to the blessed it would not be rightly said that God is only touched by them, since they see within Him whatever He is; for to touch is to touch a thing lightly.

849. St. Bede, In primam Epistolam S. Ioannis, on 1 John 3:2, "Videbimus eum, sicuti est"; cf. Exodus 33:18 - 23 ("Ostende mihi te ipsum").

850. St. Augustine, Epistola 112, cc. 8 - 9; De cognitione verae vitae, c. 21.

851. St. Augustine, Sermo 38 de verbis Domini, on John 1:1 ("In principio erat Verbum").

Then it is clear from the words of the same author a little above: for after he had said that that which had been read in the Gospel about the Word of God is incomprehensible, he adds: "And yet it was read, not that it might be comprehended by man, but that man might be grieved because he does not comprehend, might find whence he is impeded from comprehension, remove those things, and gape after the perception of the unchangeable Word, himself changed from worse to better." Therefore he does not judge the comprehension of God to be simply impossible, even as he himself a little below defines it, whose definition we adduced in the first chapter of this disputation, but only that it is impossible to those on the way, insofar as they are wayfarers. For if he thought it to be impossible even for those who see God as He is, he would not exhort to the removal of those things which impede it; therefore, when he says that we can only touch God, not comprehend, he understands it of the state of the way. Likewise, when he says that "to touch God a little" is great beatitude, but to comprehend is impossible, necessarily he must be understood of wayfarers; otherwise the entire discourse would not cohere, as is clear from what has been said. Wherefore, from this passage of Augustine it is not only not proved that God cannot be comprehended by the blessed while beholding Him, but rather from it the opposite seems to be gathered, as is quite clear, even if one take the definition of comprehension in strictness, as Augustine himself defines there and in other places.

There are other testimonies of Augustine which the adversaries could allege for their opinion with a greater appearance of probability; but even from them nothing can be proved. First, in the fourth book On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 6, at the end, concerning those who see God, he says: "Although even if we were to bear most pure hearts and most simple minds, and were already equal to the holy Angels, nevertheless the divine substance would not be known to us as it is to itself."[852] But Fulgentius, both an excellent interpreter of Augustine's mind and himself a theologian nourished on Augustine, seems to have interpreted this best, in the book of Responses to Deacon Ferrandus, to the third question, where, after he has said that Christ had full knowledge of the divinity, yet did not know it as it knows itself, he gives the reason: "Because the divinity knows itself in such a way that it finds itself to be that which it knows; but the soul knows the deity in such a way that the deity is not [i.e., is not the soul]. For," as he himself says, "the deity by its nature is its own knowledge."[853]

Then in the book of Meditations, chapter 29, at the end, he says that God is not seen as He is by the Angels, and that the whole Trinity is known completely to none but Himself; and in the book of Soliloquies, chapter 31, he says that the whole Trinity is known completely only to Himself. But it is more certain that the first of these books is not by Augustine; and, moreover, the author of those books speaks plainly either in this sense, that the whole Trinity cannot clearly be seen naturally by anyone except by Himself, or, as he said in the Genesis to the Letter, that by others it cannot be seen so perfectly as by Himself; the difference we have already assigned. But from this Augustine

852. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram IV, c. 6 (in fine).
853. St. Fulgentius, Responsio ad Ferrandum diaconum, quaestio 3.

does not infer that therefore God is not comprehended by the blessed, nor did he say anything about comprehension. On the part of the thing known, however, it is most certain from Disputation 47, chapter 2, that absolutely nothing at all of the divine essence fails to be seen by the blessed.[854]

I pass over the testimony of St. Hilary in the book On the Unity of Father and Son, straightway at the beginning, where he calls God invisible; and of Cyprian, or of the author of that book if it is another, in the prologue on the principal works of Christ, who likewise call God incomprehensible. For if the words that follow were considered, these Fathers clearly speak of men on the way, or also of Angels considered only in their own nature.

Caput IV - What can be gathered concerning the comprehension of God from the Greek Fathers

Lastly some adduce very many testimonies of the Greek Fathers, long since alleged by us, who at first glance seem to have taught that God is not comprehended by the blessed. In the first place they allege St. John Chrysostom, who in many places says that God indeed is seen by the blessed, but not exactly, nor perfectly, nor is He comprehended: so he has it in many places cited by us in Disputation 37, chapter 2. They allege also Theodoret on that Psalm 103, "Thou coverest Thyself with light"; Epiphanius, heresy 70; St. Cyril of Alexandria, book 11 of the Thesaurus, chapter 1, at the beginning; and finally St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 6, where he speaks thus: "Therefore our Lord admonishes us of our weakness, saying, 'No one has seen God at any time.' What then, will someone say, is it not written that the Angels of the little ones always see the face of the Father who is in heaven? The Angels indeed see, but not as He is, but according to what is proportioned and as they themselves grasp. For He Himself elsewhere says that no one has seen the Father except he who is from heaven; this one sees the Father. The Angels see as they can; and the Archangels as they are able; the Thrones and Dominations indeed more than those, but less than according to the benignity of God; but the Holy Spirit alone sees as He ought."[855]

But all these things are not so manifest that from them a theologian may assert that it is a dogma of faith handed down by the holy Fathers that God cannot in any way be comprehended by the blessed themselves with the clear vision. For, as we showed in Disputation 37, chapter 2, Chrysostom and Theodoret were of the opinion to deny that God, as He is, can be seen by the blessed, as we have demonstrated with clear arguments. In the same opinion we said that Epiphanius was in that place, and Cyril of Alexandria on John, chapter 22, and Euthymius, Theophylact, St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nyssa, and among the Latins St. Jerome, Primasius, Isidore, and St. Ambrose; wherefore their opinion contributes nothing at all to proving what the adversaries contend. Moreover, in the place now alleged, Cyril contends for nothing else than to refute the Anomoeans, who said that God is comprehended by them by His own proper power; therefore he asserts nothing [against us]. Concerning Cyril of Jerusalem I think the same reasoning

854. Vázquez, Disputation 47, cap. 2.

855. St. John Chrysostom; Theodoret on Psalm 103; Epiphanius, Panarion (haer. 70); St. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus, XI, c. 1 (init.), and In Ioannem, c. 22; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 6; Euthymius Zigabenus; Theophylact; St. Basil; St. Gregory of Nyssa; St. Jerome; Primasius; Isidore; St. Ambrose.

holds as concerning Chrysostom, who, to the Anomoeans objecting in this way, "If the divine substance is incomprehensible, why do you discourse at such length?" himself replies with these words: "Is it then because I cannot drink a whole river dry that I shall not draw from it according to what is fitting for me?" etc. To which objection Chrysostom replies in homily 5 On the incomprehensible nature of God, in almost the same way as we reported in Disputation 40, chapter 1. Wherefore on the same occasion I think Cyril and Chrysostom were of the same opinion.[856]

In the second place they adduce Gregory Nazianzen, oration 1, page 119, and Elias on those words of the same oration, "This my inferior [part]"; where Nazianzen says of God, "And however much He is grasped, He always just so much withdraws, and He snatches His lovers from what they are, and, as it were, when caught, He springs away to things above illicit to us": the same he had said a little above. It can also be cited from oration 34, which is the second On Theology, numbers 9 and 19; and oration 36, which is the fourth, number 66; and oration 49, which is On Faith after the middle, where he teaches that God cannot be comprehended. But plainly each author speaks of those on the way, which is clearly gathered from that oration 34, number 19, where, asking why God did not grant us the comprehension of His essence, Nazianzen answers with three causes, of which the third is: "That something so illustrious might be reserved for us as the reward of the toil of this life." Which would not be true, if even in the other life there were granted for merits only such a vision as is not comprehension. From which rather, according to the phrase of Nazianzen, it should be said that God is comprehended by us; so far is it from being the case that from it the opposite should be deduced.[857]

But in that same Oration 34, n. 9, there are these difficult words: "But the whole matter (that is, God) to comprehend with the mind is altogether impossible, not only for the slothful and faint-hearted, sinking downwards, but also for great and lofty men, endowed with love of God, and for mortals, equally for all upon whom, with respect to the knowledge of truth, this dimness and the gross darkness of the flesh pour forth shadow. And I do not know whether this, too, has not been denied even to those more sublime and intelligent natures; for since they are more closely joined to God and shine with all that splendor, they can surely, perhaps, behold, if not utterly, at least more fully than we; more solidly, and some things to some rather than to others, according to each one's rank, either more abundantly or more sparingly; but let this be the end here" - so Nazianzen.

However, since a little below, concerning the same comprehension (*comprehensio*), he openly admits that it is reserved as a reward for man, as we have just noted, it is not to be believed that here he wished to deny it to the blessed Angels; therefore he must be understood as having spoken under doubt, as the words indicate: when he says of the Angels that they can behold God more fully than we, yet not comprehend. Because he seems to hesitate whether He is also seen clearly by them or not, although he asserts nothing, but immediately leaves the disputation. That he himself elsewhere thought that God is clearly seen by the blessed, we have shown in Disputation 37, cap. 2. Moreover, from that very Oration n. 19 this is plainly gathered, when he says that comprehension is

856. St. John Chrysostom, Homilia V de incomprehensibili Dei natura; cf. Vázquez, Disputation 40, cap. 1.

857. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 1 (p. 119); Oration 34 (secunda de Theologia), nn. 9, 19; Oration 36 (quarta), n. 66; Oration 49 (De fide, post medium); Elias (the commentator) ad loc.

reserved for us in another life: therefore, in order to show in that n. 9 the great difficulty on the part of our intellect in this life for comprehending God, he also in some way doubted even about Angels who see Him.

Secondly, Irenaeus is wont to be cited, book 4, cap. 36, in the beginning, where he teaches that God is incomprehensible; but since there he himself speaks against those who said that by our own proper power God is comprehended by us, as is manifest from the text, nothing can be proved therefrom. This is gathered especially from the things he says in cap. 37; for he says: "And they who see God are in God, perceiving His brightness"; and below: "And for this cause He, who is incapable [by nature], renders Himself visible and comprehensible and attainable to men." Therefore, since that which in cap. 36 he had denied, he seems so plainly to concede in cap. 37 - namely, that God is incomprehensible - it is manifest that he is not speaking of the same intellect and in the same way, but of wayfarers in cap. 36 against the Anomoeans, and of the blessed indeed in cap. 37, everywhere understanding by "comprehension" the clear vision (*visio clara*) of God as He is.

Thirdly, Damascene is finally cited, book 1 De fide, caps. 1 and 4, where he says that God is incomprehensible, nor can He be explained by any reason; and since he says the same even of Him if He be compared with the intellect of the Seraphim and Cherubim, he seems already to speak of those who see God as He is, and hence to distinguish comprehension from the clear vision of God; and in this sense Clichtoveus there takes his words, following the reasoning of the Scholastics in explaining the nature of comprehension.[858]

Nevertheless, I think that Damascene spoke no otherwise than the other Fathers; so that by the name "comprehension" he understands the clear vision of God; and therefore he calls God incomprehensible in every way, not only to men, but also to Angels: because Angels by their nature, by whatever way, cannot see Him. For he adds that by none of them can God be comprehended, unless He shall have willed to reveal Himself: but according to the Scholastics' opinion, by His will God cannot reveal Himself to the blessed as comprehended; He can, however, show Himself to be seen: therefore by the name "comprehension" Damascene understood clear vision, as the other Fathers understood it.

From all of which it is plainly evident that not only from the Fathers is it not certain what the adversary asserts - namely, that God is not comprehended by the blessed - but even from some of them, according to their own phrase, the opposite can be gathered. And therefore, lest for the sake of defending the common opinion of the Scholastics, who deny that God is comprehended by the blessed, we should be forced to interpret the Fathers in such a way that by the name "comprehension" they understood clear knowledge of God; since God is seen wholly in Himself, nor does anything of Him lie hidden, not inaptly by the Fathers the clear vision of God is called "comprehension." Therefore, now let us, with the Scholastics, take up the question about the thing

858. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, cc. 1, 4; Jodocus Clichtoveus, ad loc.

itself, and explain why God, even to the blessed endowed with the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*), is deservedly called incomprehensible, Whether, as God is clearly seen, so too He can be comprehended by a creature. Disputation 53.

Disputatio LIII - Whether, as God is clearly seen, He can also be comprehended by a creature

Caput I - By what reasoning Francisco de Vitoria and other recent authors assert the incomprehensibility of God

By what reasoning Francisco de Vitoria and other recent authors establish the incomprehensibility of God. cap. 1. In what manner St. Thomas and other Scholastics explain the incomprehensibility of God. cap. 2. The opinion of Ockham and the Nominalists on the same. cap. 3. An easier explanation of incomprehensibility. cap. 4.

All the Scholastics with one voice affirm that God is so incomprehensible (*incomprehensibilis*) that by no clear vision of Him can He be comprehended by any creature, however much elevated by supernatural light. Thus teach Alexander,[859] St. Thomas in this article 7, and in III, q. 10, arts. 1 and 2, and Cajetan and the more recent Thomists there, St. Bonaventure in III, dist. 14, art. 1, q. 2, Richard, art. 1, q. 4, Durandus, q. 1, n. 10, Paludanus, q. 1, in the end to a certain argument, Gabriel, quaest. unica, art. 3, dub. 2, Almain, quaest. unica not far from the end; Scotus in IV, dist. 49, q. 1, ad primum argument, in the second solution of the proof of argument 2; Major there, q. 15; Sotus, q. 3, art. 1; and I know of no one who teaches the opposite, unless the Nominalists alleged, if they accept comprehension in the first of the five senses which they assign, as we shall see in cap. 3; for if they accept comprehension in one of the other modes, they plainly say that God is not comprehended. And since among the Scholastics there is no settled agreement about what belongs to the notion of comprehension (*comprehensio*), no one ought to think that the mode of comprehension which he himself defends is most certain and that in this sense Scripture and the Fathers wished to teach that God is incomprehensible to the blessed; for each one explains God's incomprehensibility in his own way; indeed Scripture and the Fathers sometimes call the clear vision of God "comprehension."

Therefore a common difficulty presses upon all the Scholastics, if those things are true which, from St. Augustine and other Fathers, we set down concerning the definition of comprehension in the preceding disputation, namely, that to comprehend something by cognition (*cognitio*) is nothing else than that nothing of it be hidden, but that the whole of what it is be known and seen.

859. Alexander of Hales, Summa theologiae, I, q. 7, memb. 1; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 7; III, q. 10, aa. 1 - 2; Thomas de Vio (Cajetan), ad loc.; St. Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 14, a. 1, q. 2; Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, art. 1, q. 4; Durandus of St. Pourçain, In III Sent., d. 14, q. 1, n. 10; Peter of Palude (Paludanus), In I Sent., q. 1, in fine ad quoddam argumentum; Gabriel Biel, Quaest. unica, art. 3, dub. 2; John Almain, Quaest. unica, near the end; John Duns Scotus, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1 (ad primum arg., in secunda solutione probationis argumenti 2); John Major, In IV Sent., q. 15; Dominicus de Soto, In I Sent., q. 3, a. 1; William of Ockham, In IV Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 1.

For since those who clearly see God behold all that is in Him, as was proved in disp. 1 of this article, it seems to follow that either God is comprehended by the blessed, or else the nature of comprehension ought to be defined in some other way. Pressed, then, by this difficulty, the Scholastics variously defend God's incomprehensibility, and in its defense they teach not a few difficult things, whence it may be conjectured that the matter is not so open as to have been defined by the Church de fide. Therefore we shall report various ways of defending and explaining the common opinion, and lastly we shall subjoin our own.

The first way is that of certain theologians of our time (whom some also attest to have been the opinion of Francisco de Vitoria), who assert that for this reason God is not comprehended by the blessed, although He be clearly seen in His essence and the persons and all His attributes, because they do not see these according to every grade of intensity; wherefore something of God lies hidden to them, nor can they enumerate every grade of His perfection; but if they knew all this, without doubt (they say) they would comprehend God. From this they insert two other points: one is that, the more a blessed person penetrates by seeing the divine essence and the grades of perfection, the more creatures he sees in God; the other is that no created vision of God can be infinite, nor can anyone assign an infinite intensity of attributes, nor see infinite creatures in God.

This opinion, in the judgment of all, has no probability. For two absurdities follow from it. One is not only wondrous, but by the ordinary and common way, that the essence of God could be seen without the persons; indeed that one attribute could be seen without another. For if in the same attribute something is hidden and something is seen, much more, with the essence seen, a person could lie hidden; and with one attribute seen, another might not be seen. Nor does one attribute differ less from another, or the person from the essence, than one degree of the same attribute differs from another, if indeed it be lawful to devise degrees of intensity in the divine attributes. And yet even Scotus concedes that the essence can by a miracle be seen without the persons, as we saw in Disputation 40; therefore no one grants that without a miracle one grade of an attribute could be seen without another. Wherefore we must say that, as a matter of fact, the attributes according to every intensity are fully seen by the blessed: for it would be idle to say that a miracle is done lest God be comprehended by the blessed; since otherwise by the natural force of the light of glory He would be comprehended. Moreover, just as in that Disputation 40 it was proved that neither even by God's absolute power can the essence be seen without the persons, on account of Their supreme identity with Them and with any one of Them; by the same reason neither can one attribute be seen without another: for the same reason, therefore, it must be said that nothing of one attribute can lie hidden if something of it be seen.

The second consequence is this: that God is not seen if something of Him lies hidden. For God is the whole wisdom, not something of it; and where there is not the whole wisdom, there is not God: therefore, if He is not wholly seen, God is not seen. But, in our opinion, there is no difficulty in why he who sees more of God also sees more creatures in God; for since we say that, by the force of the vision of the essence, nothing created is known, but that by a peculiar revelation even in this very way it must be said that more creatures are known in God. But if, by the force of the vision of the essence, they were seen, at least by this way this opinion could not be defended, although other

ways are not without difficulty; yet from them there does not follow that manifest absurdity against the faith, as from this one: wherefore this reason for explaining God's incomprehensibility ought to be rejected and not defended.

The second consequence - which follows - is that God is not seen if something of Him lies hidden: for God is the whole wisdom, not something of it, and where there is not the whole wisdom, there is not God; therefore if He is not wholly seen, He is not seen. Wherefore why he who sees more of God also sees more creatures in God, in our opinion has no difficulty: since when we say that, by the force of the vision of the essence, nothing created is known, in this way also it must be said that more creatures are known in God. But if by the force of the vision of the essence they were seen, at least by this way this opinion could not be defended. Although the other ways are not without their own difficulty, nevertheless from them that conclusion does not follow which is manifestly absurd against the faith, as from this one: wherefore this account of incomprehensibility ought to be explained and defended otherwise.

The true account of the Thomists. They do not say that a thing is to be known in the better way in which it can be: for thus an ant would not be comprehended by an inferior Angel, since it could be known in a better way by God and by some superior Angel; but that it is necessary for a thing to be known with as perfect a cognition as it of itself demands; that is, that the cognition be in itself of as great perfection in the genus of cognition as the object is in the genus of the knowable. Wherefore, since God is from Himself infinite, and therefore demands to be known infinitely, no cognition will be adequate to Him unless it be infinite, such as is that by which God has of Himself; therefore by this alone will He be comprehended.

This reason (as I said) is St. Thomas's in this article 7, and of almost all the Thomists: Bonaventure seems to have followed it in III, dist. 14, art. 1, q.; but Richard expressly, art. 1, q. 4; Scotus, q. 1, ad primum argument, in the second solution of the proof of argument 1; Durandus, q. 1, n. 10; Major, in IV, q. 15; Sotus, quaest. 3, art. 1. Wherefore, in the opinion of these Doctors, in order that God, seen by a created intellect, be comprehended, an infinite vision according to intensity would not suffice; for this would still not be adequate to God's infinity; and hence only that cognition of God which is infinite according to existence (*esse*), as the essence itself is, will be called comprehension of Him. This reason they gather first from the words of St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XII, where he says in substance: "Whatever is comprehended by knowledge, by the knowledge that comprehends it is limited"; therefore, since God cannot be limited by any created cognition, it follows that by no created vision can He be comprehended. Then it could be proved by the testimony of St. Gregory, Moral. XVIII, c. 18, near the end, whose words we cited above in the preceding disputation, cap. 3.[860]

Other Scholastics to be adduced below, together with St. Thomas in art. 7 of this question, try to explain this difficulty by another account.

860. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XII (esp. cc. 7 - 8); St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob XVIII, c. 18 (toward the end).

They say therefore in this way, that for a thing to be comprehended (*comprehensio*), it is not enough to see whatever is in it, but also in every manner in which it is required to be known: for by this account alone can the cognition be adequate to the known object, and consequently contain it within itself, and, as it were, embrace it in its own bosom; for otherwise there is always something truly hidden, and so what is as it is, is not seen. For as often as a thing is not known by its proper and (as they say) intuitive concept, something of it always lies hidden: indeed, what it is, is not seen.

Now this definition is very well proved from bodily comprehension, whence the name Comprehension was transferred to spiritual things: for among bodies one is comprehended by another when the convex sides of the surface of the one are contained within the concave sides of the other; and on this account the contained is bounded by the containing, and both are mutually equalled. Wherefore, whenever one sphere is so contained within a hand, or within another [sphere], that nothing of it is not contained, it is said to be comprehended by it. In like manner, in a spiritual way, the representation (*repraesentatio*) of cognition is compared with the thing known as the concave surface of the containing body with the convex [surface] of the contained: therefore, just as the containing surface according to extension (*extensio*) is equalled to the surface of the contained whenever the whole of it is corporally contained within that [other surface], so too the cognition is said to be made adequate to the thing known, and to contain it within its bosom and, as it were, its own concavity, whenever the whole thing is represented and known. For the bosom and capacity of cognition, whereby the object is said to be contained, is the very representation: then therefore the thing known is bounded by cognition when nothing of it is not represented by that cognition; for no other spiritual quantity or extension in cognition can be conceived, by reason of which cognition may be said to limit or embrace the object, than representation itself: nor in the thing known is there anything else than the entity which is known; and in this alone is the adequation of the two to be considered, that the thing itself may be said to be comprehended, and not in the essential perfection of each. For just as, that one body may comprehend another by bodily comprehension, it matters little that it be of the same nature and perfection (for a sphere of gold can very well be comprehended by one of iron), but all that is required is that the convex quantity be adapted to the concave quantity so that the whole of it may be said to be within: so too, that an intelligible object may be comprehended by intellection, it is not required that the intellection itself be of the same perfection according to existence (*esse*) as that of which the intelligible itself is; but it is required, and it is enough, if the representation of it be so wide as to contain within itself, distinctly and as it is, whatever in the thing itself can be represented: then even if the object be infinite according to existence, and the cognition according to existence be finite, nevertheless the representation, as to extension, will be said to be infinite; and within it even the infinite object will be bounded. And this alone St. Augustine wished to teach in De civitate Dei XII, c. 18, when he says: "That which is comprehended by knowledge is bounded by the knower's comprehension," that is, the whole is contained in that cognition; as we shall explain more at large below in Disputation 63, cap. 2.[861][862]

861. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XII, c. 18.

Next, that a cognition may be said even to comprehend the object, it is not necessary that it be of equal perfection according to intension (*intensio*) with it; for just as perfection according to existence does not answer to perfection according to existence, so as to be adequate and that the one should comprehend the other, but quantity and latitude to latitude: so likewise neither does intension answer to intension. Therefore intellectual comprehension is attended to according to the latitude of its representation and of that which is represented: and thus the definition handed down by the Fathers stands very well. Hence it is altogether accidental and extrinsic to the thing, that something be comprehended, namely, that it be known in every manner in which it can and ought [to be known], if that manner ought to be on the side of cognition itself, whether according to existence or according to intension. Wherefore, that the infinite be comprehended, it is not necessary that there be a cognition infinitely perfect according to existence, or according to intension; but it is required that the thing itself appear in every way in which it can be known: that is, that in it whatever is, and as it is, be seen: but this manner is on the side of the thing known, not on the side of cognition: and in this way the blessed see the substance of God in every way in which it can be seen, that is, the whole of what is in him, and as it is in him. This doctrine and explanation of comprehension is all the more approved by me, the more it approaches the definition handed down by St. Augustine - nay, it is altogether the same with it - namely, that comprehension is a cognition of a thing so perfect that in every way the whole thing, as it is, is seen.

Thus far, a priori, the difficulty of the aforesaid opinion remains explained. Moreover, from conceded points we can refute some authors of this opinion: for many, together with St. Thomas in art. 8 of this question, refuse to concede that such a vision of the divine essence can be communicated to the blessed, that in it all creatures, which are infinite, be seen: because, to wit, it would follow that the divine essence be comprehended by some created intellect, which is absurd: for he who in some cause sees all its effects, comprehends the cause itself. But this absurdity does not seem to follow in their opinion, even if they grant that in the divine essence all creatures can be seen by the blessed. For although from this it be inferred that that vision would be infinite according to intension, if it is true that the more things are seen the more intense that vision is; nevertheless it is not gathered that it will be comprehension, if for the notion of comprehension it be required that there be as great perfection in the cognition according to existence as the object itself has: for thus, since the object - God always - is infinite according to existence, the cognition in like manner would have to be infinite, and not only according to intension.[863]

862. Below, Disputation 63, cap. 2.
863. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 8.

Caput III - The opinion of Ockham and the Nominalists on the same matter

It is familiar to the Nominalists, when pressed by the difficulty of some thing, to devise various acceptions of it, so that they may be able to escape the difficulty; and hence it is free for them to coin various definitions of things, as is common: which in this controversy has in fact happened to them. Therefore, to satisfy the proposed difficulty, they assert that comprehension is employed in various ways.

First, something is said to be comprehended by vision whenever it is so seen that nothing of it lies hidden from the seer; and in this way they say that God is comprehended by the blessed, because nothing of him is hidden from them.

Secondly, to comprehend something is to see it and to distinguish among its parts; and in this way God is by no means comprehended: for he has no parts, among which he who sees him may distinguish.

Thirdly, to comprehend is to see a thing in the best way in which it can be seen: thus not only is God not comprehended by the blessed; but no creature is comprehended by another than by God, who alone knows himself and the rest in the better way in which they can be known.

Fourthly, to comprehend is to know a thing under all the predicates which can befit it; and thus God alone comprehends himself, because he alone knows all the predicates which can be ascribed to himself and that befit him.

Finally, in a fifth way, to comprehend something happens whenever the cognition has the same proportion with respect to other cognitions that the thing known has with respect to other things. Wherefore, since no cognition by which the blessed see God so exceeds other visions and cognitions as God surpasses them all, it follows that in this fashion God is perfectly comprehended by himself alone. And this follows in this opinion not only if we say that although the beatific vision is not infinite according to intension, yet also in this way it is infinite; because even so it will not have the same proportion with other cognitions that God has with all things, and it will have to have some [proportion]. In this fifth mode of comprehension these Doctors agree with the authors of the preceding opinion.

Many indeed seem to have contrived these various significations and acceptions of the name Comprehension without foundation; and, as we noted above, the signification of this name and of the verb "to comprehend," translated from bodily things to spiritual, ought to be used with that signification which is approved among Latin authors for both bodily and spiritual [uses], with proportion preserved. Therefore the signification transferred and the metaphor in spiritual matters ought to be taken variously just as in bodily matters it is said in proper speech that someone "comprehends" a thing when in a new way he has grasped or has enclosed some thing; and even if something remains outside in part, he is said to have comprehended it, even if the whole of its quantity is not within the latitude of what contains; as when we hold something from one side. To this bodily comprehension there corresponds, by transference, the spiritual [comprehension], which pertains to cognitive use; whence the Apostle speaks: "that you may be able to comprehend

with all the saints what is the breadth," etc. (Eph. 3). And in this sense the Fathers in the disputation cited above speak when they say that God is not comprehended by wayfarers, and is in a certain manner comprehended by the blessed, especially St. Augustine in that sermon on the words of the Lord, where he expressly distinguishes comprehension from every other kind of cognition, and even of vision.[864]

- Fourth: In the fourth way, to comprehend (comprehensio) is to know a thing under all the predicates that can be attributed to it and befit it; and in this way God alone comprehends himself, for he alone knows all the predicates that can be attributed to him and that befit him.
- Fifth: Finally, in a fifth way, to comprehend something happens whenever the cognition has the same proportion to other cognitions as the thing known itself has to other things. Therefore, since no cognition by which the blessed see God so exceeds other visions and cognitions as God surpasses all things, it follows that in this way God is perfectly comprehended by himself alone. And this, on this opinion, follows not only if we say that any beatific vision is not infinite in intensity, but even if in this way it were infinite; for even so it would not have the same proportion to other cognitions as God has to all things, if he is to be said to have any proportion at all. In this fifth mode of comprehension these Doctors agree with the authors of the preceding opinion. To me, however, these various significations and acceptions of this name "comprehension" seem devised without foundation; and, as I noted above, the signification of this name and of the verb "to comprehend," when transferred from bodily to spiritual things, ought to be employed with the same transferred signification that has been received among approved authors of the Latin tongue both about bodily and about spiritual matters. Therefore, with the proportion of the transferred and metaphorical signification preserved, in spiritual things it is to be taken in a variety corresponding to bodily things; but in the latter there are two ways in which someone is said to comprehend a thing. In one way it is the same as to apprehend or attain to some thing: thus, even if we hold a thing from one side, we are said to "comprehend" it, even if the whole of its quantity is not within the latitude of what contains; as when we hold something in the hand from one side. To this bodily comprehension there corresponds, by transference, the spiritual one, which is any cognition at all; thus Paul to the Ephesians 3: "that you may be able to comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth," etc.[865] And in this sense the Fathers cited in the preceding disputation, cap. 3 and 4, do not speak, when they say that God is not comprehended by wayfarers, and when they insinuate that he is in a certain way comprehended by those who see him; especially St. Augustine in that Sermon 38 on the words of the Lord: for there he expressly distinguishes comprehension from every other kind of cognition, and even of vision; and he says that it is reserved to men as a reward, as from his words in that cap. 3 we have deduced.[866]

864. Eph. 3:18.
865. Eph. 3:18.
866. St. Augustine, Sermon 38 De verbis Domini.

In another way one is said to comprehend some bodily thing when he not only holds it by some part, but also embraces within himself, and encloses, its entire intrinsic quantity; as when we hold a certain sphere in the hand in such a way that it is wholly within the hand. In the same way in spiritual things, that cognition is called comprehension by which we so see a thing that nothing of it is hidden from us, but we see it as it is. In this sense Augustine takes "comprehension," insofar as it is referred to the intellect, in the places cited in the preceding disputation, cap. 1 and 3, where he distinguishes it from vision and from cognition in general. Therefore, beyond these two modes of comprehension, both in bodily and in spiritual matters, the Nominalists fabricate others without foundation. Wherefore, since they concede that God is comprehended by the blessed, if to comprehend a thing is to see it in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, they ought simply and absolutely to concede this; for this is the more proper mode of comprehension. Yet I do not see that this is contrary to the doctrine of the Fathers; indeed, some of them taught thus: for so Augustine in that Sermon 38 on the words of the Lord, and St. Gregory Nazianzen in Oration 34, as in my judgment we noted in Sermon 38 of Augustine on the words of the Lord and that Oration 34 of Nazianzen in cap. 3 and 4 of the preceding disputation; nevertheless, it is against the common sense of the Schoolmen.[867]

But let us show in detail that some acceptions of comprehension which the Nominalists assign are frivolous. First, the second acceptation vainly requires a distinction of parts for something to be called comprehension: for comprehension, even in bodily things, is not said from the fact that the parts are distinguished, but from the fact that they are all enclosed and contained; therefore, much less will that be necessary in spiritual things. The third acceptation too is posited without foundation; it is not required that someone, in order to comprehend a body, should embrace it in the best manner he can; it is enough if he encloses the whole within himself. Therefore, that we be said likewise to comprehend a thing by the intellect, it is not necessary to know it in the best mode we can; but it is enough if we adequately, that is, as to whatever is of it, understand and see it. About the fifth mode enough has been said by us in the preceding chapter. About the fourth, which I judge truer, and which must be said in the first chapter, it will be treated in the following chapter.

Caput IV - An easier explanation of incomprehensibility

Indeed, that opinion allows the incomprehensibility of God to be explained more easily, even if we suppose the definition of comprehension handed down from Augustine and other Fathers in the first chapter of the preceding disputation: namely, that to comprehend is to see a thing as it is, so that nothing of it is hidden from the seer; for whatever beyond this we shall say to belong to the notion of comprehension will not be without some difficulty, if we attend to the force of the very

867. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 34.

name - something which clearly appears from that from which the metaphor was taken, as was said above. Moreover, there are two ways in which it happens that we know of some thing what it is, namely, to see it so that nothing of it is hidden.

- In one way, by knowing only that which is in it formally and intrinsically pertains to its essence, or even to its intrinsic properties; and in this way Augustine in Sermon 38 on the words of the Lord, and Nazianzen in that Oration 34, seem to have taken it, when they teach that comprehension of God is reserved to us as a reward in the other life. For it is clear that they speak, not of any sort of cognition, but of that by which there is seen whatever is in the object: for Augustine openly distinguishes this from cognition in general, when he says that it is one thing to see some thing, but another to comprehend the thing itself by seeing it. And Nazianzen speaks of a comprehension which no mortal man can attain in this life: by the name therefore of "comprehension" he understands something more than cognition taken commonly.[866]
- In another way, a thing is said to be comprehended when we not only know whatever is in it formally, but also whatever can follow upon it or depend upon it; for all that pertains to it in some way. And in this way we judge that God cannot be comprehended by us; and thus also the common opinion of the Schoolmen can be rightly explained. For although the blessed man sees in God whatever is in him formally, nevertheless he does not see all the things that can follow upon him and depend on him: for the Blessed does not know all possibles, nor the future things that depend on the counsel of God. Wherefore it is rightly said that God himself is not comprehended by the blessed. For the same reason we are said not yet to comprehend some man whose counsel and will we do not know; and likewise not to comprehend some principle until we so penetrate it that from it we see all the conclusions that can be deduced. Therefore, since the blessed man who sees God does not see all the possibles that God can do, nor the future things that he will bring about, he will not be said to comprehend him.

This mode of incomprehensibility is indicated by St. Thomas in article 8 of this question, although in article 7 he handed down another, about which it was said in cap. 2 of this disputation: the same is followed by Alexander, I, q. 7, member 1; and the Nominalists cited in the preceding chapter, in the fourth mode of comprehension, seem to number this, when they said that God is therefore not comprehended because he cannot, according to all the predicates that befit him, be seen by the Blessed. They undoubtedly understand this not of the intrinsic predicates of God himself (for thus there is nothing in him that is not seen, as is clearly proved from the foregoing), but of predicates that befit God by relation to extrinsic things which are his effects, namely to creatures; as that he can do this or that, and that he will do this or that.[868][869]

866. St. Augustine, Sermon 38 De verbis Domini.
868. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 8; and a. 7.
869. Alexander of Hales, I, q. 7, memb. 1.

Objicitur primo: But someone will object first: for some body to be said to be comprehended, it is enough if its entire intrinsic quantity is enclosed within another body; therefore, for some thing to be said to be spiritually comprehended by the intellect, it is enough if the whole of it, as it is, is seen in itself, even if its extrinsic predicates are not known.

Respondeo: I answer that the reason is different: for things that are beyond some bodily quantity are not said to pertain to it corporally; wherefore, in order that it be corporally comprehended, it is enough that the whole that is in it intrinsically be enclosed and contained. But as for an intelligible thing, insofar as it is referred to the intellect, not only are those things said to pertain to it which are intrinsic to it, but also those that can be made from it or deduced from it, as something belonging to it; for thus we understand what it itself further is. Wherefore, in order that it also be comprehended by intellectual cognition, it is necessary that not only the whole that is in it intrinsically be known and seen, but also those things that can arise and be deduced from it.

Objicitur secundo: Again someone will argue thus: it can happen that God even reveal to the Blessed all possibles and all future things; for we showed in Disputation 49 that this is not repugnant: therefore, although in fact no one comprehends God, nevertheless he could be comprehended by them; therefore he will not be incomprehensible by his nature.

Respondeo: I answer that something can be known together with something else in two ways: first, from the power of the cognition by which the other is seen; next, only concomitantly and without necessary connection with it. I say, therefore, that in order that something be comprehended by the intellect, not only must whatever is in it be known, but also whatever can be done by it or derived from it, from the power of the same vision by which that thing is seen; that is, the vision of the primary object ought to be so perfect that it shows of itself even those things that are derived from it. For if it did not show that of itself from the fact that it is cognition of the primary object, it would not of itself be comprehension of the object, but would be as it were helped from elsewhere in order to comprehend and altogether to know the object. But in this way no creature can be known or seen in God, as we proved in Disputation 49 and in Disputation 4; rather only by a special revelation, or only concomitantly. And therefore, although in this way the Blessed might know all possibles and all future things, he would not comprehend the very essence (essentia) of God. God, however, in his own wisdom, knows himself in such a way that his very cognition is also, from the power of his own cognition, cognition of creatures, as will be explained in Disputation 60, cap. 4, toward the end: and therefore God alone can comprehend himself. And this suffices about the incomprehensibility of God, and about the seventh and eighth articles of St. Thomas.

From all these things it is clear that the whole disputation about the incomprehensibility of God is placed almost not in a controversy of things, but of words; and that all the Schoolmen, except Victoria, think exactly the same in reality, and differ only in word: because "comprehension" is variously employed by them.[870]

870. See Disputation 49; also Disputation 4; and Disputation 60, cap. 4.

Articulus IX - Whether the things that are seen in God are seen through certain similitudes

Ad nonum

Objicitur: To the ninth it proceeds thus. It seems that the things which are seen in God by those who see the divine essence (*essentia*) are seen through certain likenesses (*similitudines*). For every cognition is through an assimilation of the knower to the known: thus the intellect (*intellectus*) in act is the intellect in act, and sight in act is the visible in act, insofar as it is informed by its likeness, as the pupil is by the likeness of color. Therefore, if the intellect of the one seeing God through the essence understands in God certain creatures, it must be informed by their likenesses.

1. Moreover, we keep in memory the things which we have previously seen; but Paul, seeing in rapture even the very essence of God (as St. Augustine says in On Genesis, Book 12, to the letter), after he ceased to see the essence of God, remembered many things which he had seen in that rapture; whence he himself says that he heard secret words which it is not permitted for a man to speak (2 Cor. 12). Therefore it must be said that certain likenesses of those things which he remembered remained in his intellect; and for the same reason, when he was presently seeing the essence of God, he had certain likenesses or species (*species*) of the things which he was seeing in it.[871]

Sed contra: On the contrary, by one species a mirror is seen and the things which appear in the mirror; but all things are thus seen in God as in a certain intelligible mirror. Therefore, if God himself is not seen through some likeness, but through his essence, neither are the things which are seen in him seen through certain likenesses or species.

Respondeo: I answer that those who see God through his own essence do not see the things which they see in the very essence of God through any species, but through the very divine essence united to their intellect. For thus is each thing known, according as its likeness is in the knower. But this happens in a twofold manner. For, since whatever are similar to one and the same are mutually similar, the cognitive power can be assimilated in a twofold way to some knowable. In one way, according to itself, when it is directly informed by its likeness; and then that thing is known according to itself. In another way, according as it is informed by the species of something which is similar to it; and then the thing is not said to be known in itself, but in its likeness. And there is one cognition by which a man is known in himself, and another by which he is known in his image. Thus therefore to know things through their likenesses existing in the knower is to know them in themselves, that is, in their proper natures; but to know them according as their likenesses pre-exist in God is to see them in God. And these two cognitions differ. Whence, according to that cognition by which things are known by those who see God through the essence, they are not seen through some other likenesses, but through the sole divine essence present to the intellect, through which also God is seen.

871. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram XII, cap. 3 and cap. 28; 2 Corinthians 12.

Ad primum: To the first, therefore, it is to be said that the created intellect of one seeing God is assimilated to the things which are seen in God, insofar as it is united to the divine essence, in which the likenesses of all things pre - exist

Ad secundum: To the second it is to be said that there are some cognitive powers which from species first conceived can form other species. Thus imagination, from pre - conceived species of a mountain and of gold, forms the species of a golden mountain; and the intellect, from pre - conceived species of genus and difference, forms the account of species. And in like manner, from the likeness of an image we can form in ourselves the likeness of that of which it is an image. And thus Paul, or whoever else was seeing God, from the very vision of the divine essence can form in himself likenesses of the things which are seen in the divine essence, which remained in Paul even after he ceased to see the essence of God. Yet this vision, by which things are seen through likenesses of this sort conceived thus, is another than the vision by which things are seen in God

Observationes circa articulum. The conclusion of the article is: The things which the blessed see in the essence of God are not seen through any likenesses, but through the very essence of God united to their intellect. For greater perspicuity two things must be observed.

First is that the conclusion can have a twofold sense. One is that created things are seen in God through the essence of God as it were by an impressed species (*species impressa*), which is not only the principle of his own vision, but also of creatures - in which sense some disciples of St. Thomas interpret him. This sense, however, I would not approve, since I have shown sufficiently in Disputation 43, from the mind of the holy Doctor, that the divine essence is not in the place of a species for eliciting even its own vision, how much less for eliciting the cognition of creatures.[872]

The other sense is that St. Thomas speaks of the likeness, that is, of the expressed species (*species expressa*), and says that things are not seen in God by an expressed species of them, or by their own word, which in his view is always seen prior to the thing of which it is the word; indeed, to see any thing is nothing else than to know the idea and word of it. And in this way he says that things are seen in the Word, so that they are not seen by a middle expressed species of themselves; but since the divine essence, which is seen immediately and which itself is in the place of the Word, so also through itself, and not by some other word, are created things seen in God. And I judge this sense to be the ultimate and genuine one; and it agrees with the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, which we have explained in that disputation. But whether it is true we shall say below. However we speak, since it remains proved in Disputation 38, cap. 2, that in the clear vision of God a word is produced, we must also say that God himself, and whatever is seen in him, are seen through some likeness - not indeed one previously seen, but one which is the ratio of seeing and representing, or rather which is itself the vision and representation.[873]

Alterum notandum est: it must further be noted that things created can be seen in God in a twofold way. First, according as they are ideas in the mind of God, and thus they are God himself; and those things which do not have life in themselves live in God in this way, as was said in

872. See Disputation 43.
873. See Disputation 38, cap. 2.

Disputation 51, cap. 3. Then secondly, according to their proper formal reasons (*rationes formales*), existing objectively only in the intellect of God.[874] And indeed, if St. Thomas speaks of the vision of created things in the Word according to their proper formal reasons, I do not know on what ground it can be true that they are not known by some other likeness, which according to the opinion of St. Thomas ought to be previously seen, but by the sole essence of God previously known. For next to God nothing created can be seen in the likeness of God: since God differs much more from any creature than one creature from another; therefore, since one creature cannot be known quidditatively through another, neither can it be through God. Add that although a creature be known according to its proper reasons, the divine essence having been previously known as the primary object, nevertheless there would still have to be formed prior a proper concept of the creature itself distinct from the concept of God, lest the creature be confused with the Creator; then indeed an expressed species of God himself would be unnecessary.

But if St. Thomas speaks of the vision of created things in God according to that they are the very life of God, then if for seeing God no expressed species is required, as the holy Doctor thought, neither will it be necessary for seeing creatures. And indeed, if one attentively read St. Thomas, he seems to speak of the vision of creatures in God according to that they are God himself. For in this article he compares the vision of creatures in God to the vision of a thing in some likeness, which clearly is not according to the proper reason of the thing itself; consequently he ought to be speaking of the vision of them according to proper reasons, as he had discourse about them in the preceding article. For what he asserted about these - that they are seen in God according to their proper reasons - remains proved in Disputation 51, cap. 3. However we speak, since it remains proved in Disputation 38, cap. 2, that in the clear vision of God a word is produced, we must also say that God himself, and whatever is seen in him, are seen through some likeness, not indeed one previously seen, but which is the ratio of seeing and of representing; or rather is itself the vision and representation.[875]

Articulus X - Whether those who see God through the essence at the same time see all the things which they see in him

Objicitur: To the tenth it proceeds thus. It seems that those who see God through the essence do not at the same time see all the things which they see in him. Because, according to the Philosopher, it happens to know many things, but to understand one.[876] But the things which are seen in God are understood. For God is seen by an intellect. Therefore it does not happen that by those seeing God many things are at the same time seen in God.

1. Moreover, St. Augustine says in On Genesis, Book 8, to the letter, that God moves the spiritual creature through time, that is, according to intellect and affection. But the spiritual

874. See Disputation 51, cap. 3.
875. See again Disputation 38, cap. 2.
876. Aristotle, Topics IV, cap. 4 (in declaration of the locus).

creature is the angel, who sees God. Therefore those who see God understand and are affected successively. For time imports succession.[877]

Sed contra: On the contrary is what Augustine says in De Trinitate: "Our thoughts will not be whirling, passing from some things to others and returning, but we shall behold the whole of our knowledge at once with a single simultaneous gaze."[878]

Respondeo: I answer that the things which are seen in the Word are not seen successively, but at once. For the understanding of this, it must be considered that we are not able to understand many things at once, because we understand many things through diverse species, but the intellect cannot at the same time be actually informed by diverse species for understanding through them; just as neither can one body at the same time be formed by diverse figures. Whence it happens that when certain many things can be understood through one species, they are understood simultaneously; just as in the species of man we understand animal and rational; and in the species of house we understand the wall and the roof. But diverse parts of some whole, if each is understood by its own proper species, are understood successively and not simultaneously. If, however, all are understood by one species of the whole, they are understood simultaneously. But it has been shown that the things which are seen in God are not seen singly by their own likenesses, but all through one essence of God. Whence they are seen simultaneously and not successively.

Ad primum: To the first, therefore, it is to be said that we understand, as to natural cognition, with one species we understand one; but many understood under one species are understood simultaneously. Thus, in the species of man, we understand animal and rational; and in the species of house, the wall and the roof

Ad secundum: To the second it is to be said that angels, as to the natural cognition by which they know things through diverse species impressed in them, do not know all things simultaneously; and thus they are moved according to intelligence through time; but according to that by which they see things in God, they see them simultaneously

Conclusio: The conclusion is: All the things which are seen in the essence of God are seen simultaneously. Which conclusion, if it be understood of creatures according to that they are God himself, as we shall explain presently, there is no doubt that all things are seen simultaneously in the Word; because the whole God is seen at once, and whatever is said to be in him. But if we speak of those according to their proper formal reasons, there is difficulty among the Doctors whether at least some are seen with a succession of time; which we shall examine briefly in a disputation.

Disputatio LIV - Whether some creatures according to their proper formal reasons are seen successively in the Word

Two opposing opinions of the Thomists. Caput 1. The truer opinion. Caput 2.

877. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram VIII, cap. 22 - 23.
878. St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, c. 16.

Caput I - Two opposing Thomist opinions

Among those who teach that creatures are seen in God by the same vision by which God himself is [seen], not all teach in the same way regarding the proposed question. These are the Thomists, who are divided into two opinions: one is that of Scotus in IV, distinction 49, question 3, article 3, and of some more recent Thomists, who affirm that both the species of created things and the singulars which the blessed see in the Word are seen simultaneously from the beginning of beatitude; likewise concerning the prayers which are directed to them...

Moreover, they prove that succession cannot befit the beatific vision by a twofold testimony of St. Augustine. One is in the book 83 Questions, question 23, where (so they say) Augustine teaches that the measure of the clear vision of God is a participated eternity; but eternity is unchangeable: however, that Augustine did not wish to teach this in that place, I have shown more at length above in Disputation 36, chapter 2.[879] The other testimony is in On the Trinity, book 15, chapter 16, which St. Thomas adduces in the argument, But on the contrary, and his disciples set great store by it; although in truth the holy Doctor does not prove his conclusion from that passage, but, as is his custom, brings it in the Sed contra to set forth a doubtful question. For Augustine says there that in eternal beatitude our thoughts will not be voluble; if anything were seen by a successive vision of God, that vision would be voluble - how much more the other thoughts.

However, Augustine's mind in that chapter is different; and first, if he taught what the Thomists wish, it would follow that there will not be new revelations in the blessed - yet that is false, and against the same holy Thomas, below, question 17, article 5, who plainly grants that certain mysteries were revealed to the Angels in the course of time. For Augustine affirms there not only about the clear vision of God, but about all things as well, that there will not be voluble cogitations. But the true sense of Augustine is deduced from the preceding chapter 15. For there he had said that the word of our mind is that which we form for ourselves, not any sort of voluble and discursive thought, but that by which we come to that which we know, which is perfect; for then we, as it were, bring forth the concept, which Augustine calls a "word." He adds, moreover, that neither in God nor in the blessed is there a word first formable by an imperfect cogitation, so that later it might be formed; and therefore he denied to the blessed voluble cogitations - that is, those imperfect cogitations - although he did not assert this absolutely, but leaves it under doubt. His words, which by what has been said are easily understood, in that chapter 15 are these: "What, I ask, is this formable, and not yet formed, but something of our mind, which we toss hither and thither with a certain voluble movement of thought, whereby now this, now that, as it has been found or has occurred, is considered; and then there is a word when that which we say we were tossing with voluble thought has come to that which we know, that is, has been begotten." Therefore, by the name "voluble thought," Augustine understands a laborious thought, with discourse and consultation, which has not yet arrived at judgment, which in chapter 16 he says is not in God, and thus there is not in him a "formable" word prior to its formation.

879. St. Augustine, 83 Quaestiones q. 23; see also Disputation 36, cap. 2.

But about us in the beatitude of the blessed, after he has there shown that the word which we form of God clearly seen is true and produced at once without voluble cogitation, at the end of the same chapter 16 he concludes about other cogitations in these words: "Perhaps even our cogitations will not be voluble, going and returning from one thing to another; but we shall behold all our knowledge with one simultaneous view. Yet when even this shall have come to be - if even this shall have come to be - the creature will then have been formed, which was formable, so that nothing may be lacking to its form, to which it ought to come." These are Augustine's words, from which it very clearly appears that Augustine does not care whether we may know something with the course of time, but that he insists upon the act itself which we know, that there be not a volubility of cogitations coming and going back, as has been explained. They therefore can prove nothing from Augustine.

I also judge that it is asserted without foundation, nor can it be defended without absurdity, that the beatific vision itself is changed in the course of time; yet it would be necessary in this way, if not all things are seen from the beginning at once; how, however, that is necessary, if not all are seen at the beginning simultaneously, we shall show in chapter 2. And so much for the first opinion.

The second opinion is that of Ferrar. on Contra Gentiles III, chapter 59, at the words "Sed remanet dubium," who asserts that indeed the species of the things which the blessed see in the Word are all seen at once with the same vision by which they see the Word itself; but that the singulars of them can be seen with a succession of time even by the same vision. In this opinion, Dominicus de Soto and the Thomists report Scotus; but which opinion he followed, we shall show in the next chapter. Ferrar. proves this by one reason: for if this could not be done, it would be because in the vision itself no variation can occur, which nevertheless would necessarily have to occur, if the singulars were seen with a succession of time; but it is not necessary that the vision be changed in some way, so that they may be thus seen: therefore nothing hinders that they be known in this way. Furthermore, he asserts that after the clear knowledge of the species and the essential natures of things has been obtained, singulars ensuing can be known without any intrinsic change of cognition, by a merely extrinsic denomination, which in that cognition arises from the variation of the objects. The Thomists commonly reject this opinion, which we shall easily confute by argument in the next chapter.[880]

Caput II - How, on the foregoing foundations, the blessed can receive new revelations, and also see in the Word, with a succession of time

From the foundations laid in the preceding chapter, it is easy business to gather in what way the blessed can with a succession of time receive certain revelations, nay further, even see in the Word. Among the Scholastics, indeed, several assert that things are thus seen in the Word as they come to pass in reality, so that from the beginning they are not all seen, but with a succession they are seen. Thus teach Bonaventure in III, distinction 14, article 2, question 3; Scotus in the same distinction, question 2; and Marsilius in III, distinction 10, article 2, part 3 of the article; for about Christ they

880. Ferrar., on Contra Gentiles III, cap. 59, at the words "Sed remanet dubium"; see also below, Disputation 54, cap. 2.

hold that he knew all future things in the Word, not all at once, but habitually, in such a way that, with time going on, he read in the Word future things as it pleased him. Explicitly, however, about the other blessed they hand on the same thing - Ockham, Gabriel, Almain, Major, and Alliacen; and also St. Thomas, below, question 17, article 5, ad 2 and ad 3; and Cajetan on question 83, article 4, ad 2 and ad 3, and on question 10, article 2.[881]

However, if their opinion be understood as Ferrar., whom in chapter one we reported, followed it - that is, that by the same vision, with a succession of time, some things would be seen - I would by no reason be persuaded. For if it cannot be that the same vision, remaining in the same mode, should by the sole change of the objects newly represent something which before was not seen: for how can the same, remaining wholly the same in itself, now actually present that which previously it did not present? A change, in truth, seems necessary not only for it to represent some specific form, but also an individual; for in an individual there is not merely a specific ratio, but also an individual and singular one, and one thing is really diverse from another. How, therefore, whether by a change of vision or not, can that vision represent singular things which previously it did not represent? Moreover, that the intellect begin anew to see that which it did not see requires that it have a new formal effect, by which, from being one who does not see, it become a seer; but a new formal effect cannot be without a new form.

Wherefore, from the Doctors cited - Ockham, Gabriel, Almain, Allhacen, Major, Innocent, and Cajetan - say that those things which are seen in the Word are seen with a succession of time by a vision distinct from that by which the Word itself is seen; in what sense, with this change, they are said to be seen in the Word we have explained in Disputation 50, chapter 7.[882] Cajetan, however - besides other Doctors cited - thought that many are seen in the Word by the force of the vision by which the Word itself is seen, and by the same vision as the Word; and about these he taught that all which are seen in the Word are known from the beginning and at once, lest any variation and change be conceded in that very vision; but because he also thought that some things are seen in the Word by a vision different from that by which the Word itself is seen, about these he granted a succession of time, that they are not known from the beginning. Thus is St. Thomas to be understood in the places cited, where he affirms that the blessed see some things in the Word with a course of time. And in this sense I judge Scotus, Bonaventure, and Marsilius to be speaking universally, although, as I noted in that chapter 7, they do not explain themselves enough; with whom I too, in general, think it true that all created things which a blessed person sees in the Word are seen by a vision distinct from that by which he sees God himself; and therefore with a succession of time new things are there revealed. This opinion, thus explained, was handed down by Ockham, Gabriel, Major, Almain, and Alliacen.

881. Bonaventure, In III Sent. d. 14, a. 2, q. 3; Scotus, ibid. q. 2; Marsilius, In III Sent. d. 10, a. 2, part 3; Ockham, Quodl. 4, q. 13, a. 2; Gabriel, In III Sent. d. 14, q. (art. i, notabil. 3); Almain, q. 1, a. 1; Major, Quodl. q. 3; Alliacen; St. Thomas, infra q. 17, a. 5, ad 2 et 3; Cajetan, q. 83, a. 4, ad 2 et 3; in q. 10, a. 2.

882. See Disputation 50, cap. 7, where it is explained in what way, under this account, things are said to be seen "in the Word."

Articulus XI - Whether someone in this life can see God through his essence

To the eleventh, we proceed thus. It seems that someone in this life can see God through his essence.

1) For Jacob says in Genesis 32: "I have seen God face to face." But to see face to face is to see through the essence, as is evident from that which is said in 1 Corinthians 13: "We see now through a glass and in an enigma, but then face to face": therefore God can be seen through his essence in this life.

2) Moreover, in Numbers 12 the Lord says of Moses: "I speak to him mouth to mouth; and he sees God openly, and not by riddles and figures." But this seeing is to see God through his essence: therefore someone in the state of this life can see God through his essence.

3) Moreover, that in which we know all other things, and through which we judge about other things, is to us known of itself. But even now we know all things in God. For Augustine says in Confessions XII: "If we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true, where, I ask, do we see this? Neither I in you, nor you in me, but both of us in that unchangeable truth which is above our minds." Therefore God is seen by us now as he is in himself; and thus through his very nature's form he is seen by us.

But on the contrary, it is said in Exodus 33: "Man shall not see me and live." And likewise: "No one has ever seen God" (John 1:18). And it is said in 1 Corinthians 13: "We see now through a glass and in an enigma; but then face to face": therefore God cannot in this life be seen through his essence.

I answer that it must be said that by a man in the pure state of this life God cannot be seen through his essence, unless he be separated from this mortal life. The reason for this is that, as was said above, the mode of cognition follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, so long as we live in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it does not know anything except what has a form in matter, or what can be known by means of such. But it is manifest that the divine essence cannot be known through the natures of material things. For it has been shown above that the cognition of God by any created likeness whatsoever is not a vision of his essence; therefore it is impossible for the human soul, while living according to this life, to see the essence of God. And a sign of this is that our soul, the more it is abstracted from corporeal things, the more capable it becomes of the abstraction of intelligibles; whence divine revelations are received more by alienations from the senses of the body, and by previsions of future things. Therefore that the soul should be elevated up to the highest of intelligibles, which is the divine essence, cannot be while this mortal life is lived.

Reply to the first: It must be said that, according to Dionysius and as is gathered from the Gloss and from St. Jerome, in the Scriptures one is said to have seen God insofar as certain figures have been formed - either sensible or imaginary - representing something divine according to some likeness. Therefore what Jacob says, "I saw God face to face," is referred not to the divine essence

itself, but to the figure in which God was represented. And this very thing seems to pertain to a certain eminence of prophecy, namely that the person of God as speaking - or God speaking - be represented in a figure; although in this mortal life it is seen by certain images.

But on the contrary: It is said in Exodus 32: "Man shall not see me and live." The Gloss: So long as one lives here in a mortal way, God can be seen by certain images.

Further: It is said in 1 Corinthians 13: "We see now through a glass and in an enigma; but then face to face": therefore in this life God can be seen by essence.

1. Further, in Numbers 12 the Lord says of Moses: "I speak to him mouth to mouth." But he who speaks to God mouth to mouth sees God plainly and not by enigmas and figures; but this seeing is to see God by essence. Therefore someone in the state of this life can see God by essence.
2. Further, that in which we know all other things, and by which we judge about other things, is to us known essentially. But even now we confess that we know all things in God. For Augustine says in Confessions 12: "If both of us see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true, where, I ask, do we see this? Not I in you, nor you in me, but both in that truth itself which is above our minds, the unchangeable truth." Therefore God Himself is seen by us.
3. Further, according to Augustine, On Genesis ad litteram 12, "By intellectual vision those things are seen which are in the soul by their essence." But an intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not through certain likenesses, but through their essences, as he himself says in the same place. Therefore, since God is in our soul by His essence, He is seen by us through His essence.[883]

I answer: It must be said that by a pure man God cannot be seen unless he be separated [from this life]. The reason is that the mode of knowing follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But the soul - so long as we live in this life - is in a material body; hence it does not know anything except as it grasps form in matter, or things that can be known by the mode of abstraction from material things. But it is impossible that the divine essence be known by this mode derived from material things. It has been shown above that knowledge of God by a similitude created of His essence is impossible; and therefore by this way it is impossible in this life to see God. And thus our soul, the more it is abstracted from corporeal things, the more capable it becomes of intelligibles; whence in dreams, and in certain alienations from the senses, divine revelations and previsions of future things are more often perceived, provided, however, that the soul be raised as far as the highest of intelligibles, which is the divine essence - something that cannot be so long as it uses this mortal life.[884]

883. St. Augustine, On Genesis ad litteram 12; and the book De videndo Deum, on Moses the teacher of the Jews and Paul the teacher of the Gentiles.

884. Compare the standard Thomistic demonstrations in this question: that knowledge of God by a created likeness of His essence is impossible; hence by this way God cannot be seen.

Reply to the first: According to Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia 4, in Scripture someone is said to have seen God inasmuch as certain figures are formed, whether sensible or imaginary, which represent something divine according to a likeness. Therefore what Jacob says, "I have seen God face to face," must be referred not to the divine essence itself, but to the figure in which God was represented. And this very thing pertains to a certain eminence of prophecy, namely that the person of God as speaking - or God speaking - be seen, although by an imaginary vision, as will be made clear below when we speak of the grades of prophecy; or Jacob says this to designate a certain eminent intelligible contemplation above the common state.[885]

Reply to the second: Just as God miraculously works something supernaturally in bodily things, so also, supernaturally and beyond the common order, He raised the minds of certain persons living in this flesh, though not using the senses of the flesh, up to the vision of His essence, as Augustine says, On Genesis ad litteram 12, and in the book On Seeing God, concerning Moses, who was the teacher of the Jews, and Paul, who was the teacher of the Gentiles. And this will be treated more fully when we speak of his rapture.[883]

Reply to the third: We are said to see all things in God, and according to Him to judge about all things, inasmuch as through a participation of His light we know and discern all things. For the very natural light of reason is a certain participation of the divine light, just as we also say that we see and judge all sensible things in the sun, that is, through the sun's light. Hence Augustine says in the first book of the Soliloquies: "The spectacles of disciplines cannot be seen unless they be illumined by some sun, as it were their own, namely by God." Therefore, just as in order to see something sensibly it is not necessary that the substance of the sun be seen, so to see something intelligibly it is not necessary that the essence (*essentia*) of God be seen.[886]

Reply to the fourth: An intellectual vision is of those things which are in the soul through their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect. But thus God is in the soul of the blessed; not, however, in our soul, but by presence, essence, and power.

Explication of the article.

The conclusion is: A pure man in this mortal life cannot see God. Thomists understand this in various ways.

First, Ferrariensis, on Contra gentiles III, chap. 47, so explains it: the sense of the conclusion is that it is impossible to see God, as He is, by the use and exercise of the senses. This, first of all, is clearly proved by the arguments of St. Thomas in this article and in that chapter. And thus "mortal life" is the same as the use of those very senses; if in this way the conclusion be understood, it is true not only according to the ordained power of God, but also according to His absolute power. For it is of itself impossible that, by the ministry and exercise of the senses, God be apprehended as He is, namely, that He is spiritual and incorporeal. Wherefore neither by this way can the intellect see Him as He is. In this sense some recent Thomists understand St. Thomas; and indeed this

885. Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, cap. 4.

883. St. Augustine, On Genesis ad litteram 12; and the book De videndo Deum, on Moses the teacher of the Jews and Paul the teacher of the Gentiles.

886. St. Augustine, Soliloquia, lib. 1, cap. 8 (in principio).

exposition would be most pleasing to me, were it not that the holy Doctor added "by a pure man," which he added on account of Christ, who, even in this mortal life, clearly saw God, who nevertheless could not be seen by the ministry of the senses. Wherefore if by "mortal life" St. Thomas understood the operation of the senses, he would not have excepted Christ from the universal doctrine which he had handed down, but would have comprehended Him too; for neither according to the absolute power of God could God be seen by the senses. This interpretation certainly fits very well with the text of St. Thomas in that chap. 47 of the Third Book Against the Gentiles, which alone Ferrariensis strives to explain; yet it does not fit so well with the text of this article, for there he did not add that exception which in this article he added concerning the "pure man."[887888889]

Then others think that St. Thomas in this article spoke of the ordained power of God, not of the absolute; and by "mortal life" he did not understand the operation of the senses, as the preceding opinion said, but the very corruptible life of man. He says, therefore, that while we are in this life, God cannot be seen by us, because by His ordained power, according to His own law, that vision is communicated to no one; he excepts, however, from this rule Christ, and he understands the conclusion only of a "pure man." This exposition is attributed to Cajetan - which, however, is not sufficiently certain to me - although it very much pleases me.[888]

Yet against it there seems to be that St. Thomas uses the same reasoning in this article as in the Third Book Against the Gentiles, in that same chap. 47, namely about the ministry of the senses; and that reasoning proves, not only according to the ordained power of God, but also according to the absolute, that in this life, as was said above, God cannot be seen.

It is resolved. I answer that by that reasoning something is proved even according to the absolute power of God, namely, that by the ministry of the senses God cannot be seen; but because it supposes that a man in this mortal life does not understand in any other way than by the ministry of the senses according to the ordained power, therefore it does not follow "according to the absolute," but only "according to the ordained," that God cannot be seen. And for this reason he said that, while we are in this body, naturally nothing is known by us except what has form in matter, that is, sensibles; he added, however, "by a pure man," in order to except Christ, who, although He used the ministry of the senses, nevertheless had another superior mode of knowing, in no way depending on the senses, and therefore He most excellently knew spiritual things, and, with the light of glory communicated to Him, could see God. Moses and Paul also are excepted, in St. Thomas's mind, for he thinks that to them the divine essence was revealed clearly, as it is - something which, according to the power of God ordained by His own law, was granted to no other.[883]

887. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles III, cap. 47.

888. Cajetan, on De veritate q. 12, a. 9; and 2 - 2, q. 172, a. 1, ad 1.

889. On the comparison of this article with Contra Gentiles III, cap. 47.

888. Cajetan, on De veritate q. 12, a. 9; and 2 - 2, q. 172, a. 1, ad 1.

883. St. Augustine, On Genesis ad litteram 12; and the book De videndo Deum, on Moses the teacher of the Jews and Paul the teacher of the Gentiles.

Further, St. Thomas's doctrine must be noted and explained, namely, that in sleep and in alienation from the senses divine revelations are more aptly communicated. He gives the reason, because our soul, the more it is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is made apt to intelligibles and to spiritual things. Cajetan vigorously defends this doctrine and reason in this article against Scotus, whom he thinks taught what is contrary to the holy Doctor. For Scotus, in IV Sentences, d. 45, q. 2, s., as is held here - near the end of that place - seems to teach that in sleep man is less fit for understanding spiritual things; for if he were therefore more apt because he is abstracted from the operation of the senses, it would follow that he becomes so much the more apt the more he is abstracted, and consequently in a heavier sleep he would be made much more apt - which seems absurd. Therefore Scotus asserts that, if we consider the internal power of the soul for contemplating spiritual things, in sleep it is not rendered more apt for understanding spirituals; but if we attend to external impediments, and to the aptitude coming from their removal, the soul (says Scotus) is more apt in sleep to be moved by God to understand spirituals, because it can be less distracted by the sensible things themselves. Hence Scotus concludes that it is a greater miracle for truth to be revealed in sleep than in wakefulness, because the force of reason for judging truth is vigorous in wakefulness, but in sleep it is, as it were, bound.

On the contrary, Cajetan thinks that the sentence of St. Thomas must be explained otherwise out of St. Thomas's own mind in De veritate q. 12, a. 9, and 2 - 2, q. 172, a. 1, ad 1, namely, that in cognition there are two things, the reception of it and the judgment about the thing known. Therefore, according to Cajetan's reading, St. Thomas teaches the soul to be more apt in sleep for receiving knowledge and revelations; but for pronouncing judgment about the thing, in wakefulness - for judgment about a thing is made by a resolution as to whether the things understood are consonant to sensibles. However, if Cajetan had wished to interpret Scotus's mind benignly, he could easily have seen that Scotus is not his adversary; for when Scotus says that the soul is more apt in sleep by reason of the removal of external impediments, not, however, from an internal principle, he clearly understands that it can more aptly receive revelations from God moving it, though not more aptly render a judgment

Disputatio LV - Whether Moses in this mortal life clearly saw the divine essence

The opinion of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. Chapter 1. Moses in this life did not clearly see the essence (*essentia*) of God as it is. Chapter 2. From the Scripture of Exodus 33, not only is it not established that Moses clearly saw the essence of God, but the opposite is also not obscurely gathered. Chapter 3. What it was that Moses asked in those words of Exodus 33, "Show me your glory." Chapter 4. From Numbers 12 it is not established that the essence of God was clearly revealed to Moses. Chapter 5.[890]

890. See below, Disputation 55, chaps. 1 - 5.

Caput I - The opinion of St. Augustine and St. Thomas

The innumerable multitude of the Fathers and the pontifical authority of Pope Evaristus compel me to judge that Moses never in this mortal life saw God clearly. This opinion was taught first and foremost by Evaristus himself in his first decretal epistle, a little after the middle, who, although he does not wish to define it ex professo, yet, defining that the nature of both the Son and of the Father is a light inaccessible, against those who said that this belonged to the Father alone, adds in passing as something known, that in the other life God is to be clearly seen by any blessed one - not as Moses (he says) and the other Prophets through enigmas and figure, but the very Godhead will be truly beheld in the Son as in an image.[891]

The Fathers, moreover, who follow this opinion, are distributed into three classes.

- The first class is of those who say that God is clearly seen by the Blessed as He is; these we reported in Disputation 37, chapter 5. Yet they affirm that to Moses in this life He did not so appear. Thus affirm Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, cap. 4, in the first epistle to Caius; Irenaeus, book 4, cap. 37; Origen, Periarchon, book 2, cap. 4; St. Hilary on those words of Psalm 118, "I have sought thy face"; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 34, which is the second On Theology, a little after the beginning; St. Gregory, Moralia 18, cap. 28; Bede, in the eighth tome, in Questions on Exodus, q. 42.[892]
- In the second class are those who neither openly say nor deny that God is clearly seen by the Blessed; yet they assert that in this mortal life He was never seen by Moses in that way. Such are Tertullian, book 4 Against Marcion, cap. 22 near the end; and the book Against Praxeas, cap. 14 at the beginning; and it is gathered also from what Origen teaches, homily 7 on Numbers; from Phaebadius, book Against the Arians, rather after the middle; from Marius Victorinus, book 4 Against Arius, before the middle - of which last two St. Jerome makes mention in the book On Ecclesiastical Writers, whose works are found in the sacred Bibliotheca.[893]
- In the third class are all the Fathers who, in my judgment, as I showed in Disputation 37, chapters 1 and 2, taught that the essence (*essentia*) of God as it is is not seen by the Blessed, and they said peculiarly of Moses that he never saw it in this life. Thus held St. John Chrysostom, homily 14 on John, tome 3, and homilies 13 and 4 On the incomprehensible nature of God, tome 4; St. Cyril, book on John, cap. 22; Isidore on Exodus, cap. 41; St. Gregory of Nyssa, book XI; Epiphanius, heresy 70; Theodoret in the dialogue entitled Immutabilis; St. Ambrose, on Luke, book 1, chapter on the apparition of the Angel; I pass

891. Evaristus, Epistola decretalis I (post medium): defining the nature of the Son and of the Father to be "light inaccessible," he adds incidentally that in the other life God will be clearly seen by any blessed one, "not as Moses and the other Prophets through enigmas and figure, but the very Godhead will be truly beheld in the Son as in an image."

892. Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, cap. 4 (epist. 1 ad Caium); St. Irenaeus, Adversus haereses IV, 37; Origen, Periarchon II, 4; St. Hilary, on Ps. 118; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 34 (II de Theologia); St. Gregory the Great, Moralia XVIII, 28; Bede, In Exodum, q. 42.

893. Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem IV, 22; Adversus Praxean 14; Origen, Hom. 7 in Numeros; Phaebadius, Contra Arianos; Marius Victorinus, Contra Arrium IV; Jerome, De scriptoribus ecclesiasticis.

over Theophylact and Euthymius, whom I cited in that disputation; and St. Jerome on those words of Isaiah, cap. 1, "Hear the word of the Lord, ye princes of Sodom," who in general teaches that the essence of God is not clearly seen by the Blessed: of Moses, however, they make no peculiar mention.[894]

Among the Scholastic Doctors, Alexander of Hales taught the same about Moses, Part 1, q. 4, m. 1, art. 4; Cajetan on Numbers cap. 12; Faber Stapulensis on cap. 1, book 1 of St. John Damascene.[895]

Now since it is not doubtful - as we noted in the observations on the article - that nothing at all stands in the way whereby God could communicate to a wayfarer a clear vision of His essence, and the only controversy is whether de facto He has communicated it to someone, and this depends on the will of God alone, it must be judged solely from His revelation whether the essence of God, as it is, was revealed to Moses in that way or not. But such revelation can be established for us either by the Church's tradition and definition, or by Scripture. By the Church's tradition, which is conserved in the teaching of the Fathers, it rather stands that God never showed His essence to Moses, since almost all with one voice affirm that constantly. From the Church's definition, however, we have absolutely nothing. It remains, therefore, that we must gather it from Scripture. From this, I judge, our opinion can be proved sufficiently effectively in a twofold way: first, by some testimonies from which it is manifestly gathered; then by showing that there is no place of Scripture from which the opposite can be deduced - indeed, from some which are commonly adduced in confirmation of the opposite, ours is not obscurely proved. In this chapter, therefore, we will endeavor to confirm our opinion from Scripture in the former way; but in the following chapters we will show the same in the latter way.

Accordingly, it is first proved from John 1: "No one has ever seen God" (Deum nemo vidit vnquam): which we proved in Disputation 37, chapter 6, must be understood of men with whom we converse in this mortal life. Therefore Moses in this mortal life, as long as he lived among men, did not see God, since universally the Evangelist asserts: "No one has ever seen God." Nay rather, if we attentively weigh the context itself, it seems that this is said in particular also of Moses. For he had said before in John 1: "The Law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ," so as to show the difference between Christ and Moses, who was held the greatest among the Prophets, and to prefer Christ Himself to Moses. He shows Christ's excellence not only in this, that grace and truth came through Him, but also that He alone, who is the Only-begotten in the bosom of the Father, has seen God, so that He could unfold His mysteries to us; and therefore he subjoins: "No one has ever seen God; the Only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He has told us." Therefore, if Moses had clearly seen God as He is, he himself could have told it to us, and not Christ alone.

894. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 14 in Ioann., tom. 3; Hom. 13 and Hom. 4 De incomprehensibili natura Dei, tom. 4; St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Ioannem, cap. 22; Isidore, In Exodum, cap. 41; St. Gregory of Nyssa, lib. XI; Epiphanius, Haer. 70; Theodoret, Dialogus "Immutabilis"; St. Ambrose, In Lucam I, cap. De apparitione Angeli; Theophylact and Euthymius; St. Jerome, In Isaiam I, "Audite verbum Domini, principes Sodomorum."

895. Alexander of Hales, Summa, Part 1, q. 4, m. 1, art. 4; Cajetan, on Numbers 12; Faber Stapulensis, on lib. 1, cap. 1 of St. John Damascene.

The same truth is proved from that place John 6: "Every one who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me. Not that anyone has seen the Father, except he who is from God; he has seen the Father." Besides the rest, as we explained in Disputation 37, chapter 6, add also that of 1 Tim. 6: "Whom no man has seen, nor can see"; which place also we explained in that sixth chapter along with others.

Caput III - From the Scripture of Exodus 33 it not only does not follow that Moses clearly saw the essence (*essentia*) of God, but the opposite also is not obscurely gathered.

We too shall not lightly confirm our opinion, if we demonstrate that there is no place of Scripture from which St. Augustine, and those who follow him, could have deduced that the essence of God as it is was clearly revealed to Moses: for thus it will be proved that it was said without any foundation. For if, as we said, it can be established neither by tradition nor by the Church's definition, nor by Scripture, and would hang upon the will of God alone, by what reason could Augustine affirm it? Now there are two places of Scripture from which he tries to elicit this doctrine: one is Exodus 33; the other Numbers 12. Of the former we must speak in this chapter; of the latter we shall examine in the next.

Accordingly, in Exodus 33 there are some words from which Augustine's opinion seems to be gathered. First, when it is said: "But the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend." Yet from these words Augustine does not deduce his opinion; for all understand that place of the visible face in which the Lord appeared. Thus in Genesis 32 Jacob said: "I have seen the Lord face to face, and my soul has been saved"; for he was speaking of that visible form in which the Angel, under the name of God, appeared, with whom he wrestled until morning.

Then it seems to be proved from this, that Moses said: "Show me thy face, that I may know thee." From which words Augustine strives to gather his opinion by this reasoning: Moses then asked to see what he had not yet seen, not what he had already seen; but he had not yet seen God according to His essence, whereas he had seen Him in a bodily figure: therefore he asked to see the essence of God, not the face of a bodily figure. In this way, with Augustine, some hold that Moses asked for a clear vision of the divine essence. Thus teach Philo, On Fugitives, a little before the end; Irenaeus; Hilary; and Tertullian, in the places cited in chapter 2, §2. To this petition God assented, for He said in the same chapter: "My face shall go before thee, and I will give thee rest."

But to this reasoning Augustine himself does not give much credence, and at length he admits that nothing is proved from this place; for at the end of the same chapter, Exodus 33, when Moses asks to see the glory of God, the Lord expressly denies it, as will be said below. So too Abulensis, who felt with Augustine that Moses in this life saw the essence of God (q. 34 on Numbers 12, and q. 17 on Exodus 33), grants that in Exodus 33 a clear vision of the divine essence was not granted to Moses: the same is taught by Lyranus, who taught the same opinion as Abulensis.

And from the context itself, according to the various expositions of the Doctors, the same can be proved. For clearer explanation of which it must be observed that that colloquy of Moses with the Lord, which is described throughout that chapter 33, did not take place on Mount Horeb, but in the

tabernacle, after he had once received the law and had come down from the mount. As to that, however, which Moses then asked of the Lord, the Doctors vary; but whichever exposition we follow, from it there cannot be proved that God granted to Moses the clear vision of His essence.

We too shall not lightly confirm our own opinion, if we shall have shown that there is no passage of Scripture from which St. Augustine, and those who follow him, could have derived that the essence (essentia) of God, as it is, was clearly revealed to Moses; for thus it will be proved that the statement was made without any foundation. For if, as we said above, it neither stands by tradition nor by the definition of the Church, nor can it be established from Scripture, and depends only on the mere will of God, by what reasoning could Augustine have affirmed it? Now there are two passages of Scripture from which he tries to elicit this doctrine: one is Exodus 33, the other Numbers 12. Concerning the former we must speak in this chapter, as the task at hand requires; in the next we shall examine the latter.

Therefore in Exodus 33 there are certain words from which Augustine's opinion seems to be gathered. First, when it is said: "But the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend." From these words, however, Augustine does not deduce his position; for all understand that place concerning a visible face, in which the Lord appeared. Thus in Genesis 32 Jacob said, "I have seen the Lord face to face, and my soul has been saved" (Gen 32): for he spoke of that visible form in which the Angel, under the name of God, appeared, with whom he wrestled until morning.

Then it seems to be proved from what Moses said, "Show me your face, that I may know you." From these words Augustine endeavors to gather his very opinion, and this by the following reasoning: Moses then asked to see what he had not yet seen, not what he had already seen; but he had not yet seen God according to his essence, while he had seen him in a corporeal figure: therefore he asked to see the essence of God, not the face of a corporeal figure. By this reasoning, together with Augustine, some hold that Moses asked for the clear vision of the essence of God. Thus relate Philo, Irenaeus, Hilary, and Tertullian in the places cited; and God assented to this request, for in that same chapter he said: "My face shall go before you, and I will give you rest."

But to this argument Augustine himself does not grant much, and finally admits that nothing is proved from this passage; indeed, at the end of that same chapter, Exodus 33, the Lord expressly denies to Moses, who asked to see the glory of God, as will be said below. Thus also Abulensis agreed with Augustine that Moses in this life saw the essence of God; yet he concedes that in Exodus 33 a clear vision of the divine essence was not granted. The same is taught by Lyranus, who held the same opinion as Abulensis. And from the very context, according to various positions of the Doctors, the same can be proved.

For a clearer explanation, observe first that that colloquy of Moses with the Lord which is described in the entire chapter 33 did not take place on Mount Horeb, but in the tabernacle, after he had once come down from the mountain with the received law. Concerning what Moses asked there from the Lord, the Doctors differ; yet, no matter which exposition is followed, it cannot from

there be proved that God granted Moses a clear vision of the essence, where he says not, "I will show my face to you," but: "My face shall go before you, and I will give you rest," promising a leader and, at last, rest.

Concerning Moses's petition there is a first opinion. First: if we say that by those words, "Show me your face," Moses asked for a clear vision of God, as Philo, Tertullian, Irenaeus, and Hilary held, it does not follow that it was granted to Moses; for the Lord only replied, "My face shall go before you," by which words God did not signify that a clear vision of himself was to be communicated to Moses. For neither Augustine, nor those who follow his opinion, contend that during the entire time of the wandering the essence of God, as it is, clearly appeared to Moses, but either on Mount Horeb or in the tabernacle, when he again dealt with the Lord concerning the law; yet the face of the Lord always went before him during the whole time of the wandering.

Then, by those words, "Show me your face," Moses did not ask for a clear vision of God, as the Doctors commonly think, although they do not sufficiently agree on what he is said to have asked. Some, as Abulensis reports on Exodus 35, interpret it thus: "Show me your face," that is, show yourself to me as gracious and propitious; according to that verse of Psalm 118: "Make your face shine upon your servant." But this interpretation is not approved by Abulensis himself; for what he immediately added, "that I may know you," does not seem consonant with this petition: for, in order that he might know him well, it did not seem to matter that God show himself as propitious and gracious, but rather that he reveal his face, by which men are wont to be known. Therefore Abulensis thinks that Moses asked of the Lord a greater knowledge and understanding of himself. For previously God had spoken to him through Angels, and since a man is known from the face, therefore he asked to see his face - not a clear and intuitive vision of the essence, but such as can be communicated to one on a journey. Yet this opinion does not approve itself to me; for Moses had already known enough about God, though he had appeared to him through the ministry of angels; wherefore he rather desired the clear vision of the divine essence, nor is there any cause for saying that he sought some other knowledge of him.

I for my part judge that by those words Moses asked of the Lord that he would be the leader on the journey by which he was to lead that people. And this I first gather from the response of the Lord; for he did not reply, "I will show my face to you," but: "My face shall go before you, and I will give you rest" - that is, promising a leader for the people of Israel, and at last rest to Moses after his labors. Therefore, since the answer ought to fit the petition, it follows that he only asked of the Lord that he would go before them on the way and show it.

Secondly, in the Hebrew it does not say, "Show me your face," but "your way"; and thus it is read in some common Vulgate codices; and this reading agrees with what precedes and follows. For Moses had said: "You command that I bring out this people and you do not show me whom you will send with me, especially since you said, 'I know you by name, and you have found grace in my sight'; if therefore I have found grace in your sight, show me your face" - or, as the Hebrew and some common Vulgate codices have it, "your way": as if he were saying, "If you command that I lead this people here, why do you not show me whom you will send with me, that he may show me the way of this journey by which you will that I should lead this people?" Therefore he asked of the

Lord some guide for this journey, not to see his essence on Mount Horeb. And this sense not only pleases me if we follow the Hebrew text or a common Vulgate that has "your way", but also if we follow the corrected Vulgate which has "your face": for Moses did not ask to see the face of God, that is, his essence as it is, nor yet any face of a corporeal figure in whatever way, but his face as the leader of the journey; for by the face the way is indicated. And to this petition, thus explained, the response of the Lord fits, saying, "My face shall go before you."

Nay rather, that exposition which Abulensis does not approve, and which we mentioned before in the first place, can be adapted to this text, so that the sense may be: show yourself to me as gracious and propitious in this journey by which you command that I lead your people, that I may know you - that is, your will - in leading this people with power and portents, as you have led them hitherto. For Moses was not content, when the Lord said to him, "My Angel shall go before you"; therefore, not content with having an Angel as the leader of the journey, he asks for the presence of God himself - not because he did not know that God always appears through an Angel, but he desired striking signs, miracles, and portents, such as he had seen up to that point, that it might thereby be manifest to all, through special providence and power, that God was the leader of that people. This interpretation is gathered from Abulensis, question 4 on Exodus 33; and in this sense the translation of the Seventy can also have a place: "Show me yourself manifestly," that is, as a leader. Wherefore Augustine Eugubinus, approving only the Hebrew reading in that Exodus 33, without reason reproves the translation of the Seventy and the Vulgate, which has "your face."[896]

Thirdly, by those words "Show me your face," Moses did not ask for a clear vision of the divine essence; this is proved because at the end of that same chapter 33 of Exodus Moses added a new petition, saying, "Show me your glory"; and by these words, as some - indeed most - think, he asked for a clear vision of the essence of God: therefore by those earlier words he did not ask it. But if by these later words he demanded that vision, as Philo, Tertullian, Irenaeus, Hilary in the places cited, and Athanasius in the book of Questions to Antiochus, question 23, assert, it clearly follows that God was never seen by Moses. For the Lord replied: "You shall see my back parts, but my face you cannot see"; and a little before he had said: "You cannot see my face; for no man shall see me and live." He denied, therefore, to Moses that which he had asked. Wherefore, if to see the face is to see the essence, it follows that the vision of it was not granted to Moses, but only the vision of the posterior part, when he said, "You shall see my posteriora," namely, either the effects or the creatures of God, as Philo, Irenaeus, Hilary, and Athanasius interpret, or the humanity of Christ on Mount Tabor, as Tertullian and Irenaeus in the places cited, and St. Gregory Nazianzen in oration 34 a little after the beginning, teach. Nor did Moses desire, or ask for, the clear vision of the divine essence when he said, "Show me your glory"; in the next chapter we will show this. And therefore, neither did he ever see God as he is; from that chapter of Exodus 33 this is plainly gathered; so far is it that the sentence of Augustine and others is proved from it.

896. Philo, Irenaeus, Hilary, Tertullian; Athanasius, Quaestiones ad Antiochum, q. 23; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio 34; cf. also the Septuagint reading; Augustine Eugubinus (Agostino Steuco) on Exodus 33. Augustine's interpretations cited: Ep. 112, c. 13; on 2 Corinthians, "Raptus est." Tertullian, Contra Praxean 14; Athanasius, Sermo 3 contra Arianos. Abulensis (Alonso Tostado), various questions on Exodus 33.

Caput IV - What Moses asked in those words of Exodus 33, "Show me your glory."

Our position will be even more strongly confirmed if we show that by those words Moses did not ask for the vision of the essence of God, but for the glory of the corporeal figure in which the Lord was about to appear. This can be deduced without difficulty from the context itself. For after Moses had come down from the mountain, having once received the law, and, inflamed with anger on account of the people's idolatry, had broken the tablets and taken vengeance upon the people, the Lord again appeared to him in the tabernacle, urging him to go up into the mountain to receive the law anew; and then Moses asked of the Lord to see his glory on the mountain. By the glory of the Lord, however, he understood the majesty of that corporeal figure in which the Lord would appear. For when on the mountain he first spoke with the Lord, Exodus 19, and received the law written by the finger of God, it is not read that he saw the Lord or his glory; rather it is read that the Lord descended in a dense cloud which covered the whole mountain, that lightnings also and thunders appeared. But after these things the Lord appeared to him, Exodus 33, in the tabernacle, speaking with him familiarly as a friend is wont to speak with a friend. Therefore it is no wonder if Moses, about to go up again into the mountain, should ask of him to see the majesty and glory of the corporeal form under which he was to descend upon the mountain, namely, his face, in which the majesty and glory of someone especially shine forth. But the Lord, partly assenting to his petition, replied: "You cannot see my face; for no man shall see me and live"; and again: "Behold, there is a place by me, and you shall stand upon the rock; and when my glory shall pass by, I will set you in a cleft of the rock, and protect you with my right hand till I pass; and I will take away my hand, and you shall see my back parts; but my face you cannot see." Therefore the Lord denied the vision of his face; he granted, however, that his back might be seen. This cannot be understood except of a corporeal figure. And he denied it because the brightness of the countenance was so great that no bodily eye could bear it; and on that account he said, "No man shall see me and live." If this were not to be understood in this way, the Lord would have said in vain, "I will set you in a cleft of the rock, and protect you with my right hand." For unless there were danger of death, namely, from that excessive brightness of the countenance of a corporeal figure, there would have been no need to be protected by the hand of the Lord in the cleft of the rock until the Lord should pass by; and thus, as is shown in the next chapter, with his face, when it is said, "The Lord passed by before his face," namely, before Moses's face, "and said, Dominator, Lord, God," etc. It is possible, moreover, that Abulensis, on questions 19 and 20 concerning Exodus 33, thought that God covered him upon the cleft of the rock lest Moses should see the face and the glory of the Lord's countenance as he passed by. He concedes, moreover, that Moses saw the posterior part of that figure in which he appeared, because in it there was a lesser splendor of light, such as he could bear; and this is what the Lord said in that chapter: "I will show all my good to you"; not that the whole majesty of the countenance might be displayed, but that glory and splendor which Moses could bear; whence it may be conjectured how much greater were the rest of the brightness of that countenance which he could not bear. This exposition is given by Abulensis on questions 17 and 18 on chapter 33 of Exodus; and from all this it is clear that Moses asked not for the essence of God, as it is, to be seen clearly, but for that corporeal figure.

Therefore the interpretations of that passage, "No man shall see me and live," which Augustine and others put forward, do not seem to fit the letter exactly; some refer it to the vision of the clear essence of God, and they say that God cannot be seen by a man in the flesh without the man immediately dying; which, they say, Scripture wishes to express in Exodus 33. Thus Tertullian insinuates it, Contra Praxean, chapter 14; and Athanasius seems to suppose it, Sermon 3 against the Arians, where afterwards, when he says that not only the divinity but also the soul descended to the lower regions, he argues from this place in this way: Christ descended to the lower regions to save souls, not to destroy them; therefore the divinity alone did not descend: "No man shall see me and live," lest at the sight of the Father, together with the soul, souls should perish in the presence of the Father's countenance. Yet I do not approve this interpretation; first, because it is not evident that the clear vision of God brings death and not rather the highest spiritual delight. Then, this at most could happen only to a man living in mortal flesh, as Tertullian seems to insinuate, but not to a separated soul, which is immortal and incorruptible; how could death be brought upon it? Lastly, how could the soul of Christ, united to the divinity, despise that divinity, if it were dangerous to see it?

Augustine indeed, in Epistle 112, chapter 13, and again on that passage of 2 Corinthians, "He was caught up," thus interprets "No man shall see me and live," namely, that a man, while in this mortal life, does not see it, unless he be rapt from the operation of the senses. Many other Fathers, whom we have cited elsewhere, concede indeed that a clear vision was not granted to Moses; but they explain "No man shall see me while he is in this mortal life." None of these interpretations fits the letter. For as we said above, if the Lord had meant this, he would not have added: "I will set you in the cleft of the rock" etc.; by which it is plainly indicated that there he would defend and protect Moses, lest, by the brightness of his countenance, he should perish.

Therefore, plainly, the sense of that passage is what we have already said: namely, that a man cannot bear the brightness of the countenance of the figure in which he was about to appear, lest he should die.

But for a fuller explanation it must further be noted that elsewhere in Scripture the same sentiment is found, although in another sense. For in Judges 13: "We shall die, because we have seen the Lord": which, without doubt, was drawn from that saying, "No man shall see me and live," that is, he shall die. Yet whenever this saying is found (with the exception of that instance in Exodus 33), it must be understood in another way. For men who fear God, when they see him in some visible form, as it were by a sign, are afraid of death - not because they are hurt by any brightness of his - but in order to preserve a devout opinion of God. Hence Jacob says, as something wonderful (Gen 32): "I have seen the Lord face to face, and my soul has been saved": as if to say, even though I have seen God face to face, yet my soul, that is, my life, has been preserved unharmed. And more clearly with Manoah, Judges 13; after they had seen the Angel of God, when Manoah had learned that it was the Lord, he said: "We shall die, for we have seen the Lord." But his wife consoled him with these words: "If the Lord had willed to kill us, he would not have received holocausts and offerings from our hands," etc. Therefore the danger of death there arose

not from any actual peril, nor from the splendor of his countenance, but from a devout and pious opinion about God; whereas in the case of Exodus 33 the brightness itself of that countenance was such that no bodily eye could endure it.

He could bear it. And for that reason He said, "No man shall see me and live"; which, unless it were so understood, the Lord would have said in vain, "Place yourself in the cleft of the rock, and I will cover you with my right hand." For unless there were danger of death in beholding that excessive brightness of the countenance of the bodily figure, there was no need to be protected by the hand of the Lord in the cleft of the rock until the Lord had passed by; and that in fact it was so is shown by the following chapter, when it is said that when God had passed by him, namely by Moses, Moses said, "Sovereign Lord, God," etc. Abulensis thinks that a cloud was placed by God above the cleft of the rock, lest Moses should see the face and the glory of the Lord as He passed. But Moses was allowed to see the posterior part of that figure in which He appeared, because in it the splendor of the light was more tempered, so that his sight could endure it; and this is what the Lord said in that chapter, "I will show thee all good," not that He was going to show the whole majesty of the countenance, but that glory and splendor which Moses could bear, that from it he might conjecture how great was the glory of that countenance which he desired to see. Abulensis gives this exposition; from all of which it is clear that Moses at that time did not ask to contemplate clearly the essence (*essentia*) itself of the Lord, as it is, but that bodily figure.[897]

Therefore the interpretations of that place, "No man shall see me and live," which Augustine and others employ, do not seem to fit the letter. Some refer it to the vision of the clear essence of God, and say that God cannot be seen by a man in the flesh without the man's dying; and this the Scripture of Exodus 33 willed to express. Tertullian insinuates as much, and it seems to be presupposed by Athanasius, where, in order to show that not the divinity alone descended to the lower regions, but together with a soul, he argues from this place in this way: Christ descended to the lower regions in order to save, not to destroy, souls; therefore the divinity alone did not descend: "No man shall see me and live": therefore the divinity had to be tempered by a soul, so that souls could endure the sight of Him.[898] I wonder, however, at the exposition of these Fathers, first, because it does not seem how the vision of the clear God could bring death, and not the highest spiritual delight. Then, even if it were so, it could only befall a man living in mortal flesh; but for souls made ready, which are immortal and incorruptible, how could it bring death? Lastly, how could the soul of Christ united to the divinity temper it, so that without danger it might be beheld?

Augustine, however, in Epistle 112, c. 12, and Anselm on that passage of 2 Corinthians 12, on the words "He was caught up," thus interpret "No man shall see me": "No man shall see me while he is in this mortal life, unless he be rapt from the operation of the senses."[899] Many of the other Fathers, whom we cited in chapter 2, who say that the clear vision of God was communicated to Moses, explain it thus: "No man shall see me while he lives in this mortal life." But none of these

897. Abulensis (Alonso Tostado), Questions 17 - 20 on Exodus 33.
898. Tertullian, Contra Praxean 14; Athanasius, Sermo 3 contra Arianos.
899. St. Augustine, Epistle 112, c. 12; Anselm, on 2 Corinthians 12, "Raptus est."

interpretations fits the letter. For, as we were saying before, if the Lord had wished to say any of these things, He would not have added, "Place yourself in the cleft of the rock," etc., by which He clearly indicated that there He would be defending and protecting Moses, lest by the brightness of His countenance he should be terrified and die, by that glory and splendor.

But for greater explanation it must further be noted that in Scripture this same sentiment is found, yet in another sense; for it is said in Judges 13, "We shall die, for we have seen the Lord," which seems altogether the same as, "No man shall see me and live," that is, he shall die. Nevertheless, wherever this sentence is found, apart from Exodus 33, it must be understood otherwise. For men had commonly conceived a fear concerning God, that, if they had seen Him in some visible form, they would die; and this Scripture willed to show, not because they would be harmed by the excessive splendor of that, but because they had conceived about God this opinion: and therefore Jacob said, as something wondrous, Genesis 32, "I have seen the Lord face to face, and my soul has been saved," as if he said, "Since I have gazed upon God face to face, my soul, that is, my life, has been preserved"; and Judges 13, when the Angel appeared in the place of God, after Manoah recognized that He was the Lord, he said, "We shall die, for we have seen the Lord." But his wife consoled him with these words: "If the Lord had willed to kill us, He would not have received holocausts and libations from our hands," which in truth would have been no consolation if the danger of death had not arisen from the opinion which they had conceived concerning God, but from the splendor of that countenance and from the bodily figure.

Likewise, that fear arose in the same way from that figure and bodily form. Thus also in Judges 6, when Gideon had seen the Angel of the Lord, who was carrying out the offices of God Himself, he said, "Alas, my Lord God! for I have seen the Angel of the Lord face to face"; and the Lord said to him, "Peace be to thee; fear not; thou shalt not die." Indeed the Israelite people conceived this same fear when they heard the Lord speaking; whence, as something wondrous to that people, Moses said in Deuteronomy 5: "Behold, the Lord our God has shown us His majesty and His greatness; we have heard His voice from the midst of the fire; we have proved this day that when God speaks with man, man lives." In this sense, therefore, Scripture is understood whenever it asserts, "We shall die, for we have seen the Lord"; but that of Exodus 33, "No man shall see me and live," must be understood in another way, as remains explained. For neither did Moses, who had often spoken with the Lord and experienced His benignity, who said in Deuteronomy 5 the words cited, conceive this fear concerning God; and if he had it, he would not have asked to see God; wherefore, lest he die by excessive brightness, the Lord said to him, "No man shall see me and live."

From Numbers 12 it does not follow that the essence of God was clearly revealed to Moses.

For there the Lord established a distinction between Moses and the other Prophets, even those to arise from the Israelite people, so as thereby to demonstrate to Aaron and Mary, who had murmured against Moses, not only the dignity and not only the excellence of Moses. He therefore says: "Hear my words: If there be among you a Prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream; but it is not so with my servant Moses, who is most faithful in all my house: for I will speak to him mouth to mouth, plainly, and not by riddles; and he sees the

likeness of the Lord." From which place this argument can be formed: to some Prophets God appeared not only in an imaginary vision, or by sound, but also under a visible figure; thus He appeared to Abraham God in Genesis 17 and 18, and to Jacob in Genesis 32, to Gideon in Judges 6, to Manoah in Judges 13; but Moses is preferred to all the Prophets in seeing God: therefore more than in dreams, or by a common vision, indeed more than under a visible form, did He appear to him. For if God had appeared to Moses alone under a bodily form, there would be no reason why he should be preferred to all the other Prophets on this account, that he had seen the Lord face to face. Add that, if to Moses alone God had been seen in a corporeal figure, He would truly have been seen only through imagined forms and figures: how then would Scripture say, "Not by riddles and figures, but plainly did he see the Lord"? And this is confirmed most of all by the translation of the Seventy, which has thus: "I will speak to him mouth to mouth in vision, not by riddles; and he saw the brightness of the Lord."

- It is confirmed first by the context: for it follows that He would speak to him "mouth to mouth," not "by riddles and figures," but plainly he saw the Lord; therefore by that very context it is openly shown that the Lord was to appear to Moses not only by imagined forms and figures.[900]
- Second, it is confirmed by the reading of the Seventy, which has thus, "I will speak to him mouth to mouth in vision, not by riddles; and he saw the brightness of the Lord." By "the very brightness of the Lord," which is set over against a riddle and a figure, nothing else can be understood than the essence of God Himself; and hence it is also gathered that it was granted to Moses what he had asked in Exodus 33, saying, "Show me Thy glory," even if we understand that he had asked not the brightness of a bodily figure, but the essence itself of the Godhead.

Before I answer the argument of Augustine drawn from this place, I am persuaded that from that place nothing is proved; for if Moses had somewhere seen the essence of God, and Scripture had wished to indicate this in that place in Numbers 12, surely it would have narrated that it was done somewhere - either on Mount Sinai, or in the tabernacle of the covenant, or elsewhere; but it narrates that it was done nowhere, and chiefly not on the mount. For if it narrated that it was done somewhere, it would do so especially in Exodus 33; and if there Scripture were treating of the vision of the essence of God in itself, and not in some bodily figure, we ought rather to gather that it was denied to Moses when he asked, than granted, as was proved in the preceding chapter. Furthermore, no discourse is had there about the clear vision of the divine essence, nor do we show even obscurely that Moses had asked this: therefore Scripture does not narrate that Moses saw the essence of God on the mount. Then neither in the tabernacle: for in Exodus 33 and elsewhere, when the appearance in the tabernacle is written, Scripture only says that God descended in a bodily figure, and there spoke with Moses face to face as a friend with a friend speaks: therefore, since nowhere does Scripture report that Moses saw the essence of God, there is no reason why we should assert it.

900. Septuagint reading of Numbers 12:8; cf. Vulgate and Hebrew variants discussed below.

Moreover, to show that nothing is proved from that place Numbers 12, it must be noted first that there Moses is preferred by the Lord to all the Prophets who were to arise in the Israelite people; expressly, however, he is not preferred to those who had preceded, although by the gift of prophecy and of revelations he is to be preferred to them all. For it says in Deuteronomy 34, "There has not arisen a Prophet since in Israel like Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face": it did not say, "who knew the Lord," but "whom the Lord knew." For since God spoke with him with familiar converse, Moses was said to know face to face, in a human manner indeed, by which we are accustomed to signify the familiarity of one person with another.

Second, it must be noted from the doctrine of St. Thomas that the kinds of prophecy must be taken through intellectual contemplation and through imaginary vision; of this he assigns many differences in article 3, and finally in the body of that article he concludes that the grades of prophecy properly so called are to be designated according to the imaginary vision.[901] Noting these things, Alexander in the place cited in the second part says that the difference between Moses and the Prophets is this: to the others the mysteries were revealed by imaginary vision, to Moses, however, by intellectual. Yet this difference does not satisfy me, first, because, as St. Thomas most rightly teaches, the prophecy of David was by intellectual, not by imaginary, vision; therefore in that respect Moses could not be preferred to David; and then also because Scripture proposes Moses above the other Prophets on this account, that he saw God familiarly, and spoke with Him as a friend with a friend; and this cannot be understood of intellectual vision alone and of the gift of prophecy.

Therefore there is a much easier exposition of that place, from which it cannot be gathered that to Moses the clear vision of the divine essence was granted; which will be seen to be most true whether we follow the version of the Seventy, or the Hebrew reading, or the Vulgate. The Seventy have thus: "I will speak to him mouth to mouth in vision, not by riddles, and he saw the brightness of the Lord." Then that, "he saw the brightness of the Lord," is to be read by itself and not joined with the preceding; but the sense is this: "I will speak mouth to mouth," and "plainly without figure and riddle with Moses," and "he saw the brightness of a bodily, namely a visible, figure in which I appeared to him." The Hebrew reading renders the same sense, which says thus: "I will speak to him mouth to mouth, plainly, not in riddles; and he saw the idea, or likeness, of the Lord." Where that also, "and he saw the idea or likeness of the Lord," must not be joined with what precedes, but read by itself; and when he says, "and he saw the idea or likeness of the Lord," he plainly indicates that he did not see the essence itself of God, but some figure in which the Lord deigned to appear; which the Seventy called "the brightness of God."

The Vulgate edition reads: "Hear my words: If there is among you a Prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream; but it is not so with my servant Moses, who is most faithful in all my house. I will speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly; not by riddles and figures, he sees the Lord." According to which reading that, "he sees the Lord," is to be referred to what precedes, and does not yield any sense if taken by itself; but if it be referred to

901. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae II-II, q. 174, aa. 2 - 3.

what precedes, it has this sense: "I will speak to Moses mouth to mouth, and he sees, or will see, the Lord, not by riddles and figures, but plainly"; in which way the text of Scripture more favors the opinion of Augustine. Nonetheless, even if it be referred to what precedes, I still judge that the plain sense of that place is as I have said, nor does it favor the opinion of Augustine at all.

There, therefore, the Lord, so as to show the dignity and excellence of Moses among the other Prophets, assigns two differences between Moses and the others. The first is, that to others He would appear and speak either in a vision (namely, imaginary) or in dreams; which Oleaster expounds, that the apparition alone would be in an imaginary vision, but the locution only in dreams, a view which does not satisfy me; but I think that God promised both - that is, either in dreams or in an imaginary vision; and that in the Prophets, as in Ezekiel and John the Evangelist, both were in vision in spirit we often read. Yet in Numbers 12, for brevity's sake, Scripture said that the one was done in a vision and the other in dreams. But to Moses God both appeared and spoke under a visible form, mouth to mouth, as a friend to a friend: which we do not read to have been done with the later Prophets. For although Isaiah saw the Lord's majesty in chapter 6, and Ezekiel the glory of the Lord in chapters 1 and 2, and John in the Apocalypse, and the other Prophets, nevertheless those visions were imaginary; which is defined concerning Ezekiel in the Canon Episcopi, which is of the Council of Ancyra or Ancyritanum, saying so.[902]

Disputatio LVI

Gratian, who reports and records the same thing, and Burcardus in his decree, book 1, chapter 1, and book 1, part 1 of his decree, chapter 30, also show that the revelations of John in the Apocalypse were "in spirit," that is, in an imaginary vision, as is gathered from the first chapter and often elsewhere, where John says, "And I was in the Spirit"; and St. Thomas, II-II, q. 174, a. 3, thinks that the grades of prophecy properly so called are to be taken according to imaginary vision.[903]

Objection is met. Nor does it stand in the way that after Moses Manoah and Gideon saw the Lord in a bodily and visible form, and spoke with him, Judges 6 and 13. For these were not Prophets, nor was the Lord going to speak to them as to Prophets, so as to announce mysteries and future things to the people. Then too, it was not the Lord who appeared to them, but an Angel; that is, the Angel who appeared to them always spoke to them in his own name, not in the name of God; whereas, on the contrary, to Moses God manifestly spoke many mysteries to be revealed to the people by the prophetic spirit. And although God appeared to him by the ministry of Angels, according to the doctrine of Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy, book 4 (as we shall say more at length in Disputation 186), nevertheless the Angel always spoke with Moses in the name of God; not so with Gideon and Manoah.[904]

902. On imaginary visions in the Prophets, cf. Canon Episcopi, attributed to the Council of Ancyra (Ancyritanum); see also commentators under the name Oleaster.

903. Gratian, Decretum, dist. 1; Burcardus, Decretum, lib. 1, c. 1 and part 1, c. 30; cf. Apocalypse 1 ("I was in the Spirit"); St. Thomas, Summa theologiae II-II, q. 174, a. 3.

If God appeared to Abraham and to Jacob, Genesis 18 and 19 and 32, that matters little; first, because not so familiarly as to Moses, who spoke with him for a long time in conversation in the tabernacle. Then also because he did not appear so openly to Abraham and Jacob in the name of God as to Moses. In addition, all of them were before Moses; but Moses is not compared to those before him, but to those who were to come after him among the Prophets: and to these indeed he is rightly preferred in the point which we said. And although St. Thomas, II-II, q. 174, a. 3, ad 1, compares the Prophet David with Moses, and in certain points even sets him before Moses, nevertheless it is enough for us that Moses was more excellent in this, that he spoke with the Lord face to face under a bodily figure, under which he did not appear to David; and in this Moses is set before all the Prophets to come after him, Numbers 12.[905] And so much concerning the first difference and excellence of Moses which is promised in that chapter as to the vision of God face to face.

The latter difference is in the mode of speech and revelation: for to the other Prophets many, indeed the chief things, were revealed through riddles and obscure figures; for an "enigma" is a thing obscure and difficult, which signifies something other than it seems, or, according to the doctrine of St. Augustine, De Trinitate 15, c. 9, in this way Jeremiah saw "a rod watching," and "a seething pot," and so of the other Prophets; but to Moses the Lord revealed all things manifestly and without riddle, and, as a friend is wont to speak with his friend, thus he spoke with him. Therefore, when the Vulgate edition says of Moses, "For I will speak to him mouth to mouth, and openly, and not by riddles; and he sees the Lord's likeness," even if the clause "he sees the Lord" be referred to that "openly and not by riddles and figures," nevertheless it does not signify that the divine substance, or God himself, was seen by Moses without riddle and figure: for if he appeared in a bodily form, therefore he was seen in an enigma and figure. Rather it denotes that the divine revelations were communicated to Moses not by riddles and obscure figures, but manifestly; and this is "to see God not by riddles," namely, not indeed his substance, but the one revealing the mysteries. Since, then, there is no passage of Scripture, no tradition of the ancient Fathers, nor definition of the Church, by which it is established that God willed to reveal himself to Moses clearly, as he is, the more probable opinion seems to be the one which alleges that the divine essence was not seen by Moses.[906]

Caput I - Two opposing opinions.

St. Augustine in the same Epistle 112, and Anselm on that place, 2 Corinthians 12, "He was rapt into Paradise," and St. Thomas, II-II, q. 175, a. 5, and in this article 11, ad 2, affirm that in that ecstasy and rapture which he recounts about himself, 2 Corinthians 12, there was revealed to Paul a clear vision of the divine essence, as it is; the same is asserted by authors who in the previous

904. Judges 6; 13; Pseudo-Dionysius, De coelesti Hierarchia 4.
905. Genesis 18; 19; 32; Numbers 12; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae II-II, q. 174, a. 3, ad 1.
906. Augustine, De Trinitate 15, c. 9.

disputation, chapter 1, taught the same concerning Moses, except Abulensis, who in that place speaks only about Moses, but in chapter 1, 2 Paralipomenon, q. 18, expressly, though in passing, embraces this opinion also; we shall see the foundations of this opinion straightway.[907]

But to me, as I said concerning Moses, the opposite opinion is proved: on its side stand, first, all the Fathers of the third class whom I cited in the previous disputation, chapter 2. Of the Fathers of the second class, Pseudo-Dionysius expressly affirms this in book 4, in that chapter De caelesti Hierarchia; Tertullian, Against Praxeas, chapter 14; and of those who were in the first class, Gregory of Nazianzus also teaches it in express words, Oration 34: the rest only affirm it in general, that the divine essence has never been seen by anyone in mortal flesh, nor by Moses and the Prophets; but they make no special mention of Paul beyond those already cited. Among the more recent, Catharinus follows this opinion on that passage of Paul, 2 Corinthians 12; Clicthoveus in book 1, chapter 1 of De fide Damasceni; and Cajetan seems to indicate it on the same passage of Paul.[908]

The reason, in my judgment, is manifest. For, as we said of Moses, something is not to be asserted without a first foundation, either of the Fathers or of Scripture, since that same Paul in general says, 1 Timothy 6: "Whom no man has seen, nor can see." But that there is no such foundation is sufficiently plain, since the Fathers, with one or another exception, say the contrary. And that there is no foundation in Scripture is easily shown: for if there is any in it, chiefly it is in that 2 Corinthians, chapter 12; but that passage certainly does not force us to grant anything other concerning Paul than that he endured an ecstasy and transport of mind, so that very lofty mysteries might be revealed to him, even if he did not see the divine essence clearly: therefore from that passage it is not to be affirmed that he saw the divine essence, as it is; and very rightly Cajetan noted on that place that Paul did not say, "And I saw ineffable words," but, "I heard," in order to indicate that he did not see certain things but heard mysteries. Whether truly it happened to Paul in several raptures, and what the "third heaven" is, is not for us to dispute here.[909]

Incidentally, however, it seems to be noted that Abulensis spoke amiss when he said that therefore Paul was rapt away from the senses of the body by ecstasy, because otherwise he could not see the divine essence, as it is, if he were intent on the operation of his senses. For this is false, since our Lord Christ had both; nor could the operation of the senses be an impediment to the vision of the essence, which ought to be brought about by the light of glory, or by a special concurrence of God.

Furthermore, Augustine tries to prove his opinion from Ambrose, in the chapter on the apparition of the Angel on Luke, where he says: "Nor did all the Apostles see Christ"; for, says Augustine, he gave this testimony on purpose, "Nor all the Apostles," because he believed that the vision of which he was speaking could even then have been granted - certainly besides Paul.

907. St. Augustine, Ep. 112; Anselm, on 2 Corinthians 12, "Raptus est"; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae II-II, q. 175, a. 5, and in this article 11, ad 2; Abulensis on 2 Paralipomenon (Chronicles) q. 18.

908. Pseudo-Dionysius, De coelesti Hierarchia, cap. de eodem; Tertullian, Contra Praxean 14; St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 34; Catharinus on 2 Cor. 12; Clicthoveus, De fide Damasceni, lib. 1, c. 1; Cajetan, in 2 Cor. 12.

909. 1 Timothy 6:16; 2 Corinthians 12:2 - 4; Cajetan, on 2 Corinthians 12.

However, from Ambrose, if we pay attention to his text, nothing can be plainly proved; we shall see. For he was speaking at that time when Christ said, John 14: "So long a time have I been with you, and have you not known me?" Therefore, if at that time not all, but some, had seen Christ, let it be in the first times, that he had been seen by others than by Paul. For then neither had Paul seen God, nor was he then among the others: therefore it follows that Ambrose could not have been asserting about Paul that he had seen God at that time. Besides, Christ there was not speaking of the vision of the divine essence, but of the perfect knowledge of the way by which the Apostles ought to have known him to be God, as we showed above, Disput. 48, chapter 3. Wherefore I do not see why Augustine brings in Ambrose for his opinion, especially since he himself very vehemently indicates, as we noted in Disput. 57, chapter 4, that God, as he is, is never clearly seen by anyone.[910]

Caput II - On others to whom some think a clear vision of the divine essence was conceded.

There are other illustrious and holy men, to whom some Doctors think a clear vision of the divine essence was granted in this mortal life; but they have taught this no less without foundation and reason concerning them than they did concerning Moses. What do they assert about Adam in that sleep in which the Lord cast him down in Paradise, and suppose, on the doctrine of Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 9, last chapter, and Bernard, Sermon 2 De Septuagesima? Those Fathers merely assert that he was raised in ecstasy to a certain marvelous understanding of mysteries: but as to the vision of the divine essence itself, not even a word.

Secondly, others affirm that of the blessed Benedict, which Gregory seems to set forth, Dialogues, book 2, chapter 35. Yet St. Thomas explains Gregory, II-II, q. 180, a. 5, ad 3, and Quodlibet 1, a. 1, where he teaches the opposite, namely, that he is speaking of some eminent vision and revelation, not of the clear vision of the divine essence.

Thirdly, finally, Augustine himself, Confessions 9, chapter 10, about himself and his mother, when they were at the mouth of Tiber, says as it were the very same thing, because indeed, as the vision of mind which they had there was great, so too are these words: "Contemn these things, and let these visions be withdrawn, that perseverance may be useful, such as an intelligent mind of the good has, which sees its own wickedness; is not this to enter into the joy of my Lord?" - that is, he spoke thus either because he thought the head of the vision to be to see God; or, in order to extol the greatness of the contemplation and ecstasy which he had experienced, he compared it to the eternal joy and blessedness, of which it is said: "Enter into the joy of your Lord." And indeed thus one could easily say of all the saints whom in this disputation, and in the preceding one, we have numbered among those to whom God plainly revealed his essence; rather I believe that he did not in this life show it clearly. For who would dare to assert that, if by a special privilege it had been granted to others, it was denied to the Virgin? and that, of the rest whom we have, anything is produced which piety does not support, and which does not become discipline, to be believed about

910. Augustine, citing St. Ambrose, on Luke 1, De apparitione Angeli; John 14:9 ("So long a time have I been with you..."); see above Disput. 48, c. 3; Disput. 57, c. 4.

her? And who would dare to assert that after John the Evangelist there was granted to any the clear essential revelation of God, when that most noted and unique saying is found of Christ alone: "No one has ever seen God; the only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared him" (John 1:18). By now I could say nothing further, except that, if indeed certain others besides Christ had seen God in such a way that they could relate it to us as eye-witnesses, their testimony would remain to us; of which, above in chapter 5, we have brought forward what suits the matter.[911]

On the knowledge of God

Articulus XII - Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life

Proceeding to the twelfth article:

It is objected that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life.

1) For Boethius says in the book Of Consolation that reason does not grasp a simple form. But God is above all a simple form, as has been shown above. Therefore to his knowledge reason by a natural power cannot attain.[912]

2) Further. By natural reason the soul understands nothing without a phantasm, as is said in the third book De Anima. But of God, since he is incorporeal, there cannot be a phantasm in us. Therefore he cannot be known by us by natural cognition.[913]

3) Further. The cognition which is by natural reason is common to the good and to the wicked, as nature is common to them: but the cognition of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says in book 1 De Trinitate that the eye of the human mind is not fixed in so excellent a light unless it be purified by justice and faith. Therefore God cannot be known by natural reason.[914]

But on the contrary is what is said Romans 1: "That which is known of God is manifest in them," that is, that which is knowable of God by natural reason.[915]

I answer: It must be said that our natural knowledge takes its beginning from sense. Whence only so far can our natural knowledge extend as it can be led by the hand through sensibles. But from sensibles our intellect cannot attain to this, that it see the divine essence: because sensible creatures are effects of God not adequate to the power of the cause. Whence by knowing from sensibles the whole power of God cannot be known, and, consequently, neither can his essence be seen. But because they are effects depending on the cause, from them we can be led to this, that we know that God exists, and that we know those things which necessarily belong to him according to what he is the first cause of all things, and so that we know and recognize him through those things which necessarily suit him, according to what he is the first cause of all... (continues).

911. Augustine, Confessiones 9, c. 10; Gregory the Great, Dialogi 2, c. 35; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae II-II, q. 180, a. 5, ad 3; Quodlibet 1, a. 1; John 1:18.
912. Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae.
913. Aristotle, De anima III.
914. St. Augustine, De Trinitate I.
915. Romans 1:19.

...And to these words: "If this be continued, and other visions be withdrawn, and there be a vital life everlasting such as was this moment of intelligence for which we sighed, is not this: Enter into the joy of thy Lord?" - surely either St. Augustine, captivated by the sweetness of the vision, thought that he had seen God; or, that he might extol the greatness of the contemplation and ecstasy which he had experienced, he compared it to the eternal joy and blessedness of which it is said, "Enter into the joy of thy Lord." And indeed, if to any among all those so great ones whom in this disputation and the preceding we have enumerated God had openly revealed his essence in this life, it would be more credible that he did so to his Mother: for who would deny to the Virgin a special privilege granted to others? Yet we have nothing certain concerning her; but whatever does not oppose piety and faith may also piously be believed of her. But who would dare to affirm that after so many ages since John the Evangelist the essence of God has been clearly revealed, so that that singular encomium which he said of Christ alone - "No man hath seen God at any time; the Only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath told it" (John 1:18) - could no longer be said, if indeed there were others besides Christ who had seen God, so that they could recount to us as eye-witnesses? Concerning which testimony more things have already been said in the previous disputation, chapter 5.

Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life

To the twelfth, we proceed thus.

It seems that by natural reason we cannot in this life know God at all. For Boethius says in the book of the Consolation, near the end of the fifth prose, that reason does not grasp a simple form; but God is the most simple form, as was shown above. Therefore to his cognition reason cannot attain.[916]

Further, by natural reason the soul understands nothing without a phantasm, as is held in the third book of De anima.[917] But since God is incorporeal, he cannot have a phantasm. Therefore he cannot be known by us with a natural cognition.

Further, the cognition which is through natural reason is common to the good and the bad; but the cognition of God belongs only to the good. For St. Augustine says in book 1 On the Trinity, chapter 2 (and also chapter 3), that the keenness of the human mind is not fixed in so excellent a light unless it be cleansed by the justice of faith.[918] Therefore God cannot be known through natural reason.

But on the contrary is what is said in Romans 1: "That which is known of God is manifest to them," that is, what is knowable of God by natural reason.

I answer that, our natural cognition takes its beginning from the senses. Whence so far only can our natural cognition be extended as it can be led by means of sensibles. But from sensibles it cannot come so far as that our intellect should behold the divine essence: because sensible

916. Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, V, prose 5.
917. Aristotle, De anima III, text 30; see also De memoria et reminiscentia.
918. St. Augustine, De Trinitate I, c. 2 - 3.

creatures are effects of God not adequate to the virtue of the cause. Whence from the cognition of sensibles the whole virtue of God cannot be known, and consequently neither can his essence be seen. But because they are effects dependent upon his cause, from them we can be led so far as to know of God whether he is; and to know of him those things which must necessarily befit him, inasmuch as he is the first cause of all, a cause exceeding all its caused things. And thus we know of him his habitude to creatures, namely, that he is the cause of all; and the difference of creatures from him, namely, that he is not anything of those things which are caused by him; and that these things are not removed from him on account of his defect, but because he surpasses them.

Reply to the first: Reason cannot attain to a simple form so as to know of it what it is; yet it can attain so as to know of it that it is.

Reply to the second: God is known by natural cognition through the phantasms of his effects.

Reply to the third: The cognition of God through his essence, since it is by grace, belongs only to the good; but that cognition of him which is by natural reason can belong to both good and bad. Whence Augustine says in the book of Retractations: "I do not approve what in prayer I said, 'Thou, O God, who willedst that none but the clean should know the truth'": for one can reply that many not clean also know many truths, namely, by natural reason.[919]

Conclusion: From sensibles the whole virtue of God cannot be known, and therefore neither can his essence be seen.

Articulus XIII - Whether through grace a higher knowledge of God is had than that which is had through natural reason

To the thirteenth, we proceed thus.

It seems that through grace a higher knowledge of God is not had than that which is had through natural reason. For Dionysius in the first book of the Mystical Theology says that he who is most perfectly united to God in this life is united to him as altogether ignorant of him.[920] But to be united to God by being ignorant of what he is also happens through natural reason. Therefore through grace God is not more fully known by us than through natural reason.

Further, by natural reason we cannot arrive at the cognition of divine things except through phantasms; likewise not even, it seems, according to the cognition of grace. For Dionysius says in the first chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy, that it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us otherwise than as encircled by the truth of sacred veils.[921] Therefore through grace we do not more fully know God than by natural reason.

Further, by grace through faith our intellect adheres to God; but faith does not seem to be a cognition. For Gregory says in a homily that those things which are not seen have faith, and not recognition.[922] Therefore by grace there is not added to us any more excellent cognition of God.

919. St. Augustine, Retractationes I, c. 4, on Soliloquia I, c. 1.
920. Pseudo-Dionysius, De mystica theologia I.
921. Pseudo-Dionysius, De coelesti hierarchia, cap. 1.
922. St. Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia, hom. 26.

But on the contrary is what the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 2): "To us God has revealed, by his Spirit," namely those things "which none of the princes of this age knew," that is, the philosophers, as the Gloss expounds.[923]

I answer that, through grace a more perfect knowledge of God is had by us than through natural reason. This is clear, for the cognition which we have by natural reason requires two things: namely, phantasms received from sensibles, and the natural intelligible light, by the power of which we abstract intelligible conceptions from them. And with respect to both our human cognition is helped by the revelation of grace. For both the natural light of the intellect is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light, and sometimes also phantasms are formed divinely in the imagination of a man, more expressly representing divine things than those which we naturally receive from sensibles, as appears in the prophetic visions. And sometimes even certain sensible things are formed divinely, or even voices, to express something divine, as in the baptism the Holy Spirit was seen in the appearance of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard: "This is my beloved Son."

Reply to the first: Although by the revelation of grace in this life we do not know of God what he is, and thus we are joined to him as to one in a manner unknown; nevertheless, we more fully know him, inasmuch as more and more excellent effects of his are shown to us, and inasmuch as we attribute to him certain things from divine revelation, to which natural reason does not attain, as that God is three and one.

Reply to the second: From phantasms, whether taken from the senses according to the natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, a more excellent intellectual cognition is had, the stronger the intelligible light has been in a man. And thus by revelation from phantasms a fuller cognition is received through the infusion of divine light.

Reply to the third: Faith is a certain cognition, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this determination to the one does not proceed from the vision of him whom you believe, but from the vision of that which is believed. And thus, insofar as the vision is wanting, it falls short of the ratio of science; for science determines the intellect to the one by a vision and understanding of first principles.

Conclusion: By grace a higher knowledge is had than by natural reason. Around articles 12 and 13 I find nothing worthy of annotation. Their doctrine remains quite clear.

Quaestio XIII - On the names of God

With these things considered which pertain to the divine cognition, one must proceed to the consideration of the divine names: for each thing is named by us according as we know it.

923. The Gloss on 1 Corinthians 2; cf. St. Jerome, In epistolas Pauli, tom. 9.

Articulus I - Whether any name befits God

To the first, we proceed thus.

It seems that no name befits God. For Dionysius says in the first chapter of On the Divine Names that neither is there a name of him, nor an opinion; and in Proverbs 30 it is said: "What is his name, and what is his Son's name, if you know?"[924]

Further, every name is said either in the abstract or in the concrete; but names signifying in the concrete do not befit God, since he is simple; nor names signifying in the abstract, because they do not signify something perfect subsisting. Therefore no name can be said of God.

Further, names signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify with time; pronouns, however, with demonstration or relation. None of which befits God: because he is without quality and without every accident and without time; and he cannot be sensed so as to be pointed out, nor relatively signified, since relatives are reminiscent of some of the aforesaid - either of nouns, or of participles, or of demonstrative pronouns. Therefore God in no way can be named by us.

But on the contrary is what is said in Exodus 15: "As it were a man of war, the Omnipotent is his name."

I answer that, according to the Philosopher, words are signs of conceptions, and conceptions are likenesses of things.[925] And thus it is clear that words are referred to things to be signified through the mediation of the intellect's conception. Therefore according as something can be known by our intellect, thus can it be named by us. But it was shown above that in this life God cannot be seen by us through his essence, but is known by us from creatures, according to the relation of a principle and by way of excellence and of remotion. Thus, therefore, he can be named by us from creatures. Yet not in such a way that a name signifying him should express the divine essence according to what it is: as this name "man" expresses by its signification the essence of man according to what it is; for it signifies his definition declaring his essence. For the "notion" which a name signifies is a definition.

Reply to the first: In this sense it is said that God has no name, or is above nomination, because his essence is above that which we understand of God and signify by voice.

Reply to the second: Because we arrive at the cognition of God from creatures, and from them we name him, the names which we attribute to God signify in this way, namely, according to what befits material creatures, the cognition of which is connatural to us, as was said above. And in suchlike creatures those things which are perfect and subsistent are composite; but the form in them is not something complete subsisting, but rather that by which something is: as whiteness signifies that by which something is white. Since therefore God is simple and subsistent, we

924. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus I; Proverbs 30:4.
925. Aristotle, Peri Hermeneias I, c. 1.

attribute to him abstract names to signify his simplicity, and concrete names to signify his subsistence and perfection; although both kinds of names fall short of his mode, just as our intellect does not know him as he is, according to this life.

Reply to the third: To signify substance with quality is to signify a supposit with a determinate nature or form in which it subsists. Hence, just as certain things are said of God in the concrete to signify his subsistence and perfection, as has been said, so also names signifying substance with quality are said of God. Verbs, however, and participles, which signify time, are said of him on account of this, that eternity includes all time. For just as we cannot apprehend and signify simple subsistences except by the mode of composites, so neither can we understand or express simple eternity except by the temporal mode of things; and this because of the connaturality of our intellect to composite and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are said of God according as they make a demonstration to that which is understood, not to that which is sensed. For according as something is understood by us, according to that it falls under demonstration. And thus, according to that mode in which names and participles and demonstrative pronouns fall under demonstration, they are said of God.

... according as it is understood by us, according to that it falls under demonstration. And thus, according to that mode in which names and participles and demonstrative pronouns fall under demonstration, they are said of God.

Disputatio LVII - On whether a name can be imposed upon God that signifies His essence quiditatively

Caput I - The various opinions of the theologians

Conclusion and sum of the article is this: A name cannot be imposed upon God which expresses His essence as it is, just as the name "man" expresses the essence of man, because it signifies his definition; nevertheless a name taken from creatures can be imposed which in some manner signifies God Himself.

Whether the essence (essence, essentia) of God can be signified by some name as it is, and (as they say) quiditatively. Disputation 57.

Various opinions of the theologians.

This controversy is understood not only concerning wayfarers, but also concerning the blessed; for it is asked quite universally whether by any created intellect there can be imposed upon God a name which signifies His essence as it is, and, as they say, quiditatively. Theologians, however, differ among themselves; and the variety of opinions seems to have arisen from a different way of speaking, for in reality they are not at variance with one another. I shall therefore report what others think, and at length I will explain my own opinion.

Capreolus on I Sentences, dist. 22, art. 1, q. 1; Bassolis, q. 1, art. 2, conclusions 3 and 4; and Cajetan on this article; as also Ferrariensis, Contra gentiles, cap. 31; and some of the more recent, assert two things. One is that a name cannot be imposed by wayfarers upon God which signifies Him quiditatively and as He is. The other is that such a name can indeed be imposed by the blessed. The ancient theologians likewise seem to have taught these two points: the Autissiodorensis, in Summa, book 1, cap. 3; St. Bonaventure on I Sentences, dist. 22, art. 1, q. 1; Richard, art. 1, q. 1, in the body and to the 3rd and 4th arguments of the second order; Marsilius on I, q. 25, art. 2; Henry in the Summa, q. 73, q. 9; and St. Thomas, I Contra gentiles, c. 31, indeed the same holy Doctor in this very article; Alexander likewise in I, part ... [text truncation in margin, sense: the same position is found in Alexander].[926][927][928]

But Henry, among the Doctors just cited, in some point dissents, in Summa, art. 73, q. 9. In the first two points he seems to agree with them. For he asserts that God can impose upon Himself a name by which He signifies Himself in the mode in which He is seen by them, that is, essentially and quiditatively; and that the blessed among themselves are similarly able; yet that wayfarers cannot impose upon God a name which signifies Him essentially. But further, that God Himself cannot yet impose upon Himself some name by which He would signify Himself to the blessed according to the notion (ratio) of immensity. He proves this, however, from a different principle: for although he thinks it necessary that a thing be known quiditatively by him who imposes a name, so that some name may signify it quiditatively - for which reason he said that indeed a name can by the blessed be imposed upon God signifying Him as He is, but not by wayfarers - he nevertheless subjoins that it is also necessary that those to whom the name signifies should know the thing in that same mode in which names are said to signify. And so he judges that the signification of a name must be weighed from the mode of cognition of both, that is, both of the hearer and of the imposer of the name. Therefore, since God alone is known to Himself according to the notion of immensity, and not to creatures, even to the blessed; it follows that God cannot impose upon Himself a name signifying Himself according to the notion of immensity. Moreover, that a thing ought to be known by both in the very mode in which it ought to be signified by a name - namely, both by the one imposing the name and by the one hearing it - Henry proves, because names are certain symbols between him who speaks and him who hears: therefore, in order that they may signify in this or that mode, they must be known in this or that mode by both. Hence the signification of a name must be weighed from both.

Furthermore, it must be observed that when Henry says that God alone knows Himself according to the notion of immensity, he does not mean what Scotus imputes to him in In Sentences, d. 22, q. 1, namely, that the attribute of immensity is known to God alone - which would

926. Albert the Great, In I Sententiarum, dist. 2, art. 16; Durandus, In I Sententiarum, dist. 22, q. 1, n. 5; Thomas de Argentina, q. 1, art. ... (although not so openly, since he speaks only about wayfarers) seems to have handed down the same opinion.

927. The foundation of that view, so that they assert that the imposition of names must be weighed from the cognition of the thing which he has who imposes the name. From this principle Capreolus, Bassolis, and Cajetan prove the two points which we have retained.

clearly be false, as the same Scotus very well proves; for every blessed person seeing God sees all His attributes, as was proved above, Disputation 48, cap. 2 - but Henry understands that God alone comprehends Himself, and this is what he says: that God alone knows Himself according to the notion of immensity. And therefore, when he denies that God can impose upon Himself a name by which He signifies Himself according to the notion of immensity, he only means to teach that God cannot impose upon Himself a name whose signification is comprehensive; the opposite of which some Doctors of the former opinion taught. This indeed Henry teaches, because although he thinks the mode of signification of a name must be taken and weighed from the mode of cognition which the imposer of the name has of the thing, he nevertheless judges that this is not enough, but that the same mode of cognition is also required in the one who hears the name and to whom the speech is directed, for the reason given above. Therefore, although God comprehends Himself, since there is no intellect to which God's speech could be directed that comprehends God, there will be no name signifying God (as they say) comprehensively.

But on the contrary: Not only the blessed, but also wayfarers can impose upon God a name which signifies Him essentially and quiditatively.

Caput II - The assertion that not only the blessed but also wayfarers can signify God essentially and quiditatively

Here is proved the opinion of Scotus, although, as I noted above, this disagreement is only about words, not about things. He therefore asserts in I Sentences, dist. 22, the single question (whom Ockham follows in the same place, the single question; and Gabriel also, especially in art. 3), that wayfarers can use names already imposed to signify God distinctly and properly, that is, essentially and quiditatively.[929] For the explanation of this, certain points must first be observed. First: a thing can be signified distinctly and properly by some name in two ways. In one way, if the name signifies some concept that so belongs to the thing that it cannot belong to another; and thus God can by any name imposed to signify Him be properly and distinctly signified. Wherefore wayfarers, even among themselves, can use in this way the names signifying God properly and distinctly: for this name "Omnipotent" thus signifies God, so that it signifies nothing else. In another way one says that a thing is said to be signified distinctly and properly by some name, when the name generates the quiditative concept of the thing, not connoting another thing, nor after the manner of another; and this happens whenever a thing is understood through its proper, not through alien, species, just as it is in itself. Now the whole controversy is about this latter kind of signification, whether wayfarers can use names to signify God essentially and by a quiditative concept of Him, as He is.

928. Autissiodorensis (Summa, lib. 1, cap. 3); St. Bonaventure on I Sentences, dist. 22, art. 1, q. 1; Richard, art. 1, q. 1, in the body, and to the 3rd and 4th arguments of the second order; Marsilius, on I, q. 25, art. 2; Henry of Ghent, Summa, q. 73, q. 9; St. Thomas, Summa contra gentiles I, c. 31; likewise Alexander in I, part ...

929. Scotus, In I Sententiarum, dist. 22, the single question; Ockham, the same place, the single question; Gabriel, likewise the single question, especially art. 3.

Second, it must be noted - which Henry very well observed - that names are certain symbols between him who speaks and him who hears: wherefore a name is not said to signify the thing to the one using the name itself, or imposing it, but to the hearer. For, as Augustine teaches in book 2 of On Christian Doctrine, c. 1, and plainly all admit, a sign is a thing which, besides the appearance which it presents to the senses, makes something else come into cognition. Therefore, a sign in the voice, which is a name, besides the sound which is perceived by the ear, makes something else known, namely the thing for the signifying of which we know the name to have been imposed. But it does not cause that the one who utters or imposes the name should come to know the thing: indeed, rather the opposite; he himself first knows it, and, in order to express it to another and make it known by him, he imposes or utters the name. Therefore names do not signify the thing to the imposer or the speaker, but to the hearer.[930]

Third, it must be premised, according to the mind of Aristotle, that voices and names are signs of concepts, not of those which philosophers call formal concepts - that is, qualities which are in our intellect of the things which they call "objects of obedience" (that is, of the things which the one who uses the name knows, and which he is said to have present in his mind, as we shall show in Disputation 75, cap. 3) - but they are set in the place of formal concepts and of thoughts, even if they do not signify these themselves.[931] Hence Gabriel is deceived in the question cited, art. noted 1, when he contends that not all names signify concepts, but only those which are set to declare affections of the mind, such as an interjection, etc. For although these and not all signify a formal concept, nevertheless all signify the objective concept, that is, the thing known itself insofar as it is known by the one who speaks. For although names do not, strictly speaking, signify concepts (i.e., formal concepts), they nevertheless signify the thing, and as known, and thus they signify the objective concept or, as others say, the cognition itself, most closely; the things themselves, however, they signify more remotely, through those very concepts.[932]

With these foundations laid, by a single effective reason this opinion of Scotus and of others is proved; but first it must be explained in this way. Wayfarers can signify God by a proper and quiditative concept, or essentially as He is, not to other wayfarers, but to the blessed who see God as He is. Whether indeed they can signify God Himself in this fashion to God, and whether God and the blessed can signify to wayfarers, we shall say in the following chapter. Now, however, the opinion thus explained is proved by this reason: the measure of the signification of names is not to be taken from him who imposed the name, nor from him who uses the name, but from him who hears and understands the concept of the speaker. But when wayfarers utter the voice or name "God," and others, the blessed themselves understand quiditatively and essentially that which the wayfarers express and signify by their voice. Therefore, to the blessed they signify that essentially and quiditatively.

This reason evidently proves it, if the major proposition is true, namely, that the perfection of the signification of names is not to be weighed from him who imposed the name, or from him who uses it, but from him who hears and comes into cognition of that which is said. This proposition, by

930. St. Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, II, c. 1.
931. Aristotle, De interpretatione (Peri Hermeneias), I, c. 1.

examples and by reason, can be made clearer; and first of all Cajetan, and some more recent Thomists, do not deny that someone can signify to another more clearly and more distinctly than to himself by a voice already imposed, when the hearer can understand by that which the speaker himself cannot understand so distinctly, as experience shows every day. If some Spaniard, who has never seen Rome, nor those holy places of it, nor the marks of its antiquity, from mere report, and from the reading of books, has all the names, and might recount many things which would call them to my memory, at the same time he does not recall them better to me than to himself, if I understand; for I myself, from the name alone, will have not only the notion, but the thing known; and he too will have only the name, and perhaps through alien species will have the thing represented to him, as in a picture, rather than as proper and as through the thing itself by nature ... [the example continues].

First, according to Aristotle,[933] voices and names are signs of concepts; not of those which the philosophers call formal (that is, of the qualities that are in our intellect), but of those which they call objective, that is, of the things which are known by him who uses the name and which are said to be present in his mind; as we also showed in Disputation 75, cap. 3. Wherefore Gabriel was deceived when he maintained that not all names signify concepts, but only those which are set to denote affections of the soul, as "understanding," "knowing." For although these names, and not all, signify a formal concept, nevertheless all signify the objective concept, that is, the very things thought and known by him who speaks. Therefore, from what we say, that names signify concepts (namely, objective ones), we do not deny that they also signify the things themselves immediately.

Second, it is to be noted, as Henry very well observed, that names are certain symbols between him who speaks and him who hears; therefore a name is not said to signify the thing to the user of the name himself, or to the one who imposes it, but to the hearer. For, as St. Augustine teaches in De doctrina Christiana, book 2, chapter 1, and as all plainly acknowledge, a sign is a thing which, besides the appearance it impresses on the senses, causes something else to come into cognition; therefore a sign in voice, which is a name, besides the sound which is perceived by the ear, causes something else to be known, namely the thing for the signifying of which we know the name to have been imposed. But it does not cause that he who utters or imposes the name know the thing; indeed, rather the contrary: he first knows it, and in order to express it to another and to cause it to be known by him, he imposes or utters the name. Therefore names do not signify the thing to the imposer or to the speaker, but to the hearer.[934]

Third, it must be premised from Aristotle, De interpretatione, chapter 1, that voices and names are signs of concepts; not of those which philosophers call formal, but of those which they call objective, that is, of the things known by him who uses the name and which are said to be present in his mind. And some recent Thomists do not hesitate to concede to Scotus that someone can signify a thing much more clearly and distinctly to another by a voice already imposed to signify it than he himself understands it: which is manifest from this everyday example.

932. Gabriel (Biel), in the cited question, art. noted 1.
933. Aristotle, De interpretatione, I, c. 1.
934. St. Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, II, c. 1.

If some Spaniard who has never seen Rome, nor its holy places, nor those traces of antiquity, from report alone and the reading of books should recount them to me, who have seen all, he would recall them much better to my memory, and therefore signify them to me much better than he himself understands. For he, either has only the knowledge of the names or words, or, if he also has knowledge of the things, he has it only through alien species and after the likeness of other things, or of a picture which he has seen; but I have a proper concept born from the thing itself. From this it also happens that, if I recount those things which I saw at Rome, I should much less well signify them to him than he to me; and yet I understand them better than he. Therefore the perfection of signification must be weighed from the perfection of cognition which is in the mind of the hearer, not from the cognition of the speaker. Therefore, if he who hears me speaking knows the thing essentially and quiditatively, even if I, who speak, know it only confusedly and after the manner of other things, I shall nevertheless signify it to him essentially and quiditatively; because he who hears knows it essentially indeed, and the perfection of signification is weighed from the mode of knowing which he who hears has, not from the author who speaks, as the example proves and remains. But the blessed see God as He is; therefore wayfarers who speak to the blessed and express God by some voice, even if they themselves do not know Him essentially, but confusedly, nonetheless signify Him essentially to the blessed. Therefore at least we have, against Cajetan and others, that we, using names imposed beforehand, can signify God essentially and quiditatively to the blessed, even if we ourselves think of Him after the manner of visible things; therefore we can name God essentially and quiditatively to the blessed, in such wise that nothing more could be desired in the signification of His essence.

Moreover, that wayfarers also can impose some name first signifying God essentially and quiditatively is moreover evidently proved by examples against Cajetan and the recent authors; for they deny this, and on this ground defend their opinion, so that at least it may not be possible for a first name to be imposed on God by wayfarers signifying Him essentially and as He is. It is proved by examples. First, if someone ignorant of the Hebrew tongue and of its characters were to impose names upon the characters themselves, preserving the order among them, so that he should assign one name to the first character, another to the second, a third to the third, and so on, certainly those names would more distinctly and clearly signify the characters to those who know the Hebrew letters than the imposer himself understands the very letters.

Second, if King Philip were to send out his army and command a general to call the island or city which he first captured by his own name Philippina, would not the name of that island more clearly and evidently signify it to the general and the soldiers who saw it with their own eyes than to Philip, who imposed the name, knew it?

Third, if some blind man had imposed names on things he had never seen, would he not signify them better to hearers than the blind man himself would know them? For it is not necessary that he who imposes a name know the thing itself evidently; but it can happen that he who hears the name has an evident and, as it is, knowledge of that thing. Therefore it is clear from the examples that the signification of a name is not to be weighed from the perfection of the cognition which he has who imposed the name or who uses the imposed name, but from him who hears. It is not, then,

a wonder if the names which wayfarers have imposed on God in this life - wherein they are no otherwise situated with respect to God than blind men are to colors - should more fittingly signify God to the blessed, who see God, than He was known by the very wayfarers; which the following reason will also declare more.

Therefore the proposition assumed in the argument is proved by reason: for, as we supposed secondly, names are signs and symbols between him who speaks, that is, who imposes the name, and him who hears; nay rather, they are not said to signify to the imposer of the name or to the user of it, but to the hearer, because they only cause the thing to be understood; but to signify is to make that the thing be understood, as was proved there. But it can happen that he who hears understands the thing much better than he who imposed the name or uses it; therefore he can signify the thing better to him than the imposer understands it. Wherefore the imposition can procure only this, that, upon hearing the voice, such a thing, in the place of which the name is substituted, be at once understood from the imposition and common consent. But whether this thing is known in this or that way, better or less well, does not depend on the imposition, but on the mode of cognition of him who hears.

And if it sometimes happens that he who hears understands the thing better from one person than from another, this does not come from a better imposition of the names or from a better cognition which he has who imposed the name, but from this, that he who uses the imposed names, in order to explain the thing, uses more comparisons, or a better composition of names. If, however, the same two should use the same names, and in the same way for expressing and signifying the thing which they themselves know, even if one understand the thing better than the other, nevertheless they will signify the same thing to the same hearers. Therefore the whole difference of signification is taken from the hearers, not from the users or imposers of names. From all which the true opinion we proposed is gathered: namely, that not only by the blessed, but even by wayfarers, a name can be imposed on God signifying Him essentially and quiditatively, as He is. But because we said that the measure of signification is to be weighed from the hearers, not from those who use the names, in the following chapter we shall show in detail how men can by names signify God to others, namely, to wayfarers, to the blessed, and to God Himself.

However, the Schoolmen who follow the first opinion, taking the measure of imposition from the cognition of the imposer, rightly said that a name cannot be imposed to signify God quiditatively unless by him who himself knows Him quiditatively; as if they were saying that one cannot by a voice express quiditatively God whom he has in mind, unless he has in his mind a quiditative concept of Him.

First, from the preceding doctrine it plainly follows that neither by God Himself, nor by the blessed, much less by wayfarers, can any name be imposed by which, to wayfarers remaining in the state of wayfarers, God should be signified quiditatively and as He is - if indeed the perfection of signification is to be taken from the hearers, as we said. We presuppose, moreover, that to wayfarers remaining in the state of wayfarers - that is, to whom the clear and intuitive vision of God is not communicated - no other quiditative and proper [knowledge] can be communicated; as against Scotus and the Nominalists we shall prove in Disputation 135, cap. 3. And this very point

follows: for if this could be communicated to them, some name also could signify God quiditatively and properly as He is, whether it were imposed by God Himself, or even by the blessed, or by wayfarers, as is gathered from the same doctrine.

On this ground also Pseudo - Dionysius says in De divinis nominibus that of God there is neither sense, nor imagination, nor opinion, nor name, nor speech; he said neither name nor speech, because neither by one name nor by a discourse, which consists of many words, can He be explained; and he says that He is better than every name, because by no name can the whole that is in Him, as He is, be explained. He means this with respect to every created intellect considered in its nature, which does not see God as He is, and thus by no name whatever can God be entirely signified

In the same way Justin in the Apology for the Christians, not far from the end, says that a name cannot be imposed on God; and if anyone contend this, it is a sign of extreme impiety. And in the Paraenetic Oration to the Gentiles, in the middle, he teaches the same; finally, in the first Apology for the Christians, after fol. 2, he says that to God no name has been imposed; because with whatever name, there is something more ancient than it. He seems to allude to the opinion of Rabbi Eleazar, which Galatinus reports, in book 2 De arcanis catholicae veritatis, cap. 10: "When as yet the world was not created, God, holy and blessed, was, and His name." Which ought not to be understood of some vocal name imposed on Him, even of the tetragrammaton which was called sacred by the Jews; but either of His eternal Word which He by generation begot to Himself from eternity, or Justin takes "name" there for the very thing, as is frequent in Scripture, as in Philippians 2: "In the name of Jesus every knee should bow," and Acts 4: "There is no other name given under heaven whereby we must be saved."

St. Gregory Nazianzen likewise, in Oration 34, which is the second on Theology, reports Plato's opinion in the Timaeus, saying that it is difficult to grasp God with the intellect; but to express Him is impossible. Nazianzen then expounds his own sentiment, saying that God can be explained by no words, can be comprehended by the mind much less. Nor does he in any way contradict Plato, who taught that it is more difficult to express God than to grasp Him; for Plato spoke about the cognition of God such as is granted to wayfarers, obscure; and in this sense he said that it is difficult to perceive without falsity God and the things said about Him, but to utter Him and to explain exactly, and so to express, is impossible - which is the same as he meant in saying that to express is impossible. Nazianzen, however, says that it is impossible to explain God not only quiditatively and as He is, but even all those things which could be said of Him under a veil: for there is always something left to be added. But to see Him Himself as He is, with Nazianzen is called to comprehend; as we said in Disputation 5, cap. 4; to be sure this is the more impossible, for it is even more remote from the cognition of wayfarers than to explain God exactly under the veil and obscurity of faith.

It is treated of the knowledge of God which is granted to wayfarers, obscure, and under this veil; he said that it is difficult to perceive God without falsity, and the things said of Him; but to explain Him Himself exactly, as He is (for by "to speak" he meant to signify this), is impossible. Nazianzen, however, says that it is impossible to explain God not only quiditatively and as He is, but even all

those things which could be said of Him under a veil: for there is always something left to be added; but to see Him Himself as He is, which with Nazianzen is called to comprehend, as we said in Disputation 5, chapter 4, is surely the more impossible: for it is even more remote from the cognition of wayfarers than to explain God exactly under the veil and obscurity of faith.[936]

But on the contrary: St. Augustine speaks of another mode of cognition: "God is more truly thought when He is said than He is thought; but He is more truly than He is thought." Thus he teaches in On the Trinity VII, chapter 4. But this is understood of wayfarers, who at times conceive more by contemplation of God than they can explain; although still God is better and more truly in Himself than He is thought by us. Moreover, these things do not hinder, if we speak on the part of him who hears the names or the discourse about God, that the signification of those names or discourse be equal to the cognition which he himself has of God: for, as has often been said, the cognition of the hearer measures the signification of the name. With respect also to wayfarers hearing the names of God, the same Nazianzen, in the Oration on the Faith which is the forty-ninth, after the middle, says elegantly of God in these words: "Surely this is God, that when He is said, He cannot be said; when He is estimated, He cannot be estimated; when He is defined, He grows by the very definition." Which things he took word for word from that Augustine, Sermon 190 de tempore, which is the second on the Trinity. Now Nazianzen said that "God grows by the very definition," because although the definition says the end and the term of the thing, and the thing is enclosed, nevertheless when we strive to define and determine God, it is thus that something of Him always remains outside our grasp: because His nature cannot by the proper power of a created intellect be known; nor can it be sufficiently explained to a wayfarer and described by a definition.[937]

This very point Elias of Crete most excellently handed down in the first Apologetic on Nazianzen, explaining those words: "and a living creature visible and invisible." For he says in this way: "The divine Numen, as holy Dionysius says, if you look to the essence, by no means can be thought, nor comprehended; for there is in it neither sense, nor imagination, nor opinion, nor speech, nor science, nor any contact: but from things effected it is considered in a congruent mode (with one likeness from another, as it were, concurring to some one simulacrum of truth) before it is grasped while fleeing away, before, when it is thought, it snatches itself away: for not only is the thought not held, but it is not even perfectly thought," etc. By all of which he plainly indicates that to wayfarers God is so hidden that by no discourse can He be explained to them as He is.

Athanasius also agrees, in the Epistle to those dwelling the solitary life, and in the Epistle on the Synods of Ariminum and Seleucia; and Nyssen, in the book against Eunomius, when they assert that it is not possible to comprehend what God is; yet he says that it is possible to know what He is not: finally John Cyparissiotes in Decade 4 heaps up many testimonies of the saints which teach

936. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 34 (the second Theological Oration); cf. what was said above, Disputation 5, chapter 4.

937. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration on the Faith, 49, post medium; St. Augustine, Sermon 190 de tempore (the second on the Trinity).

this very thing, especially indeed in chapter 9, where he shows that by the name "God" is signified the divine nature "what is," not "what it is." I have cited also other testimonies of the Fathers suited to this doctrine above, Disputation 22, chapter 5.[938]

Secondly, how a name can signify God to the blessed essentially and as He is is also clearly gathered from the doctrine of the preceding chapter: since the perfection of signification is taken from the knowledge of the hearer of the discourse; and the blessed see, as He is, quiditatively and essentially; it follows that to them any name signifies God essentially and quiditatively, whether God Himself use it, or another blessed, or even a wayfarer. Nor does it matter that the name itself has been imposed from created things, such as those which wayfarers use: because, for a name to signify essentially, one must not attend either to the imposition of the name, or to the notice of the thing which the one who uses the name has, as if it were the term of the thing; but to the knowledge which of the thing the one who hears has. Nor, for a name to signify God essentially to a blessed person, is it necessary that the blessed from the very name begin to know God essentially, as before he had not known: for if, with me seeing some thing, someone should name it, without doubt he would signify it to me; because he would cause me to know that he too has it in his mind; which is a sign of the same thing being in his own mind too.

Nevertheless, no name can to the blessed denote God comprehensively. For as a name can to the blessed signify God essentially and quiditatively, even if wayfarers use it, and it has been imposed by them; so also it cannot to them denote God comprehensively, even if God were to use it, and it were imposed by Him. In which matter the sentence of Henry seems to me to be exceedingly proved against other Doctors cited in the first chapter, who said that God can impose a name upon Himself which should signify Him comprehensively. But the reason from the preceding doctrine is evident: because since a name is a symbol and sign between him who speaks and him who hears, and is said to signify the hearer inasmuch as it makes him understand the thing itself; it is brought about that such be the signification of the name as is the knowledge of the thing had by the one who hears; not such as he has who speaks: therefore although God comprehends Himself; yet because the blessed person who hears one speaking about Himself does not comprehend Him; the name does not signify God comprehensively to the blessed, but essentially only, as He is known by him.

The opinion of certain more recent Thomists. But certain more recent Thomists, whom in chapter 1 of this disputation I recalled, think that no name can be imposed by the blessed upon God which would signify Him essentially to other blessed also who see; whose opposite is followed by Cajetan with St. Thomas, and others whom I recounted there.[939] And they affirm that the measure of signification of names is the knowledge which the one who imposed the name, or uses it, has. Therefore those more recent men prove by this reason that a name cannot be imposed by the blessed: because, as we have proved, to the signification of names there is to be attended the

938. St. Athanasius, Epistle to those dwelling the solitary life; Epistle on the Synods of Ariminum and Seleucia; St. Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius; John Cyparissiotes, Decade 4, especially chapter 9. See also above, Disputation 22, chapter 5.

939. Cajetan and others with St. Thomas, as recounted in the place cited; cf. the enumeration given above. Disputation 38, article 8, is cited further below.

knowledge which of the thing itself generates the name in the minds of hearers; and from that it must be estimated: but no name can generate essential knowledge of God in the minds of hearers: because just as God cannot be seen essentially through some impressed species that should present Him, so neither can He be represented essentially by a name: therefore no name can signify God essentially.

It is answered: Yet this reason has no force. First, because God can very well be presented by an impressed species, as has been proved by us in Disputation 38, article 8; and at least by an expressed species, namely the word of the mind, that He Himself be seen, is very certain, as we showed there. Then, even if He could not be seen by the intellect through an impressed or through an expressed species, it would not on that account follow that He cannot be signified by a name: for a name makes one know the thing by a different account than a similitude which is in the intellect. For if it is impressed, it is the principle of eliciting the vision with the intellect; if it is expressed, it is the very vision and the actual representation of the object in the intellect itself, rendering him who formally sees; or at least it is the intrinsic term of that, produced by it, as others will; and each is a natural representation of the object to its knower: but a name certainly signifies by the free imposition of men, by which it has been agreed among them, that when someone utters such a voice, another immediately understand this thing, or that that be in the mind of the one uttering: and in this way a name is substituted in the place of cognition and of the formal concept of him who speaks. What, then, hinders by this imposition of a name, that the one who hears, if he sees God as He is, understand essentially and quiditatively God whom he who speaks says that he has in his own mind? which is enough that it signify Him essentially and quiditatively.

Thirdly, because since we can also speak with God about Himself, it must be seen how we can signify to Him Himself. But from the preceding doctrine it would seem it must be said that we can signify and express to God Himself not only essentially and quiditatively, but comprehensively too, because the perfection of signification is to be weighed from the hearer, as has been proved; therefore since God knows Himself essentially and comprehensively, in this mode also we could signify Him to Himself; if nothing else stood in the way. But there is that which stands in the way, namely that to God we can in no way signify anything by speaking: wherefore neither can the names which we use be said to signify to God: for the use of voices has been introduced that the conceived thing which lay hidden in the mind be expressed by the voice itself, the concept being substituted, and be made known to the hearer.

Articulus II - Whether any name is said of God substantially

...be made known to the hearer, so that from it he may know the thing; and thus voices are said to signify to hearers insofar as by them there is expressed to them in this mode that which someone has in his mind. But since God beholds the hearts of men and their thoughts, we can express nothing to Him by voices or indicate anything by manifesting our concepts which He already knew beforehand; therefore neither can we signify anything to Him by voices. Hence, when we use vocal speech, we do not properly signify to God our affections, which He best knew; rather we use speech

that our affection, expressed by word, may be more inflamed. Therefore wayfarers cannot by any name signify God essentially or comprehensively to Him; nor does God speak to Himself by any other word than by His own eternal Word produced from Himself. Therefore there is no name which can comprehensively signify God to anyone.

Thus one proceeds. It seems that no name is said of God substantially. For Damascene says: Each of the things which are said of God ought not to signify what He is according to substance, but to show what He is not, or some relation, or something of those which follow nature or operation.[940]

Again, Pseudo-Dionysius says in the first chapter of On the Divine Names: "You will find the hymn of all the holy theologians dividing the manifest and laudatory appellations of God according to the thearchic processions"; and the sense is that the names which the holy doctors assume in the praise of God are distinguished according to the processions of God. But that which signifies some procession of a thing signifies nothing pertaining to its essence. Therefore the names said of God are not said of Him substantially.[941]

Besides, on this account names signify something by us, according as it is understood. But God is not understood by us in this life according to His substance. Therefore neither is any name imposed by us said of God according to His substance.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in book 7 On the Trinity that in God "to be" is the same as to be wise - and whatever you say of that simplicity by which His substance is signified.[942] Therefore all such names signify the divine substance.

I answer that it must be said that, regarding the names which are said of God negatively, or which signify His relation to creatures, it is manifest that they in no way signify His substance, but either the removal of something from Him, or His relation to another, or rather the relation of something else to Him. But concerning the names which are said of God absolutely and affirmatively, as "good," "wise," and the like, many have held diverse opinions. Some have said that all these names, although they are said affirmatively of God, are nevertheless found more to remove something from God than to posit something in Him. Hence they say that when we say "God is living," we signify that God is not in the mode in which inanimate things are; and similarly must it be taken in other cases - and Rabbi Moses put this.[943] Others have said that these names are imposed to signify His relation to creatures, so that when we say "God is good," the sense is "God is the cause of goodness in things," and the same reason holds in others.

But both of these seem unsuitable for three reasons.

First, because according to neither of these positions could any reason be assigned why certain names would be said of God more than others. For thus He is the cause of bodies as He is the cause of goods. Hence if nothing else is signified when it is said "God is good" but that God is the cause of

940. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, book 1, chapter 4.
941. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, chapter 1, proemial argument.
942. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, book 7.
943. Moses Maimonides.

goods, it could be said similarly that God is a body, because He is the cause of bodies. Likewise, by this that one says something is a body, it is removed that it be a being only in potency, as prime matter is.

Second, because it would follow that all names said of God would be said of Him by posteriority, as "healthy" is said by posteriority of medicine, insofar as it signifies only this, that it is the cause of health in the animal, which is called "healthy" first.

Third, because this is against the intention of those speaking about God. For they intend to say something else when they say "God is living" than that He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that such names do signify the divine substance and are predicated of God substantially, but they fall short of the representation of Him; and this is clear as follows. For names signify God according as our intellect knows Him. But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, thus knows Him according as creatures represent Him. Now it has been shown above that God in Himself prepossesses all the perfections of creatures as simply and universally perfect. Hence each creature represents Him and is like to Him inasmuch as it has some perfection, yet not so as to represent Him as something of the same species or genus, but as an excellent principle from whose form the effects fall short, although the effects do follow with some likeness of that form - just as the forms of lower bodies represent the solar power. And this was explained above when we treated of the divine perfection. Thus therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, yet imperfectly, just as creatures imperfectly present it. Accordingly, when it is said "God is good," the sense is not "God is the cause of goodness" or "God is not evil," but this is the sense: that which we call goodness in creatures pre-exists in God; and indeed according to a more eminent mode. Whence it does not follow from this that it befittingly belongs to God to be good insofar as He causes goodness, but rather conversely: because He is good, He diffuses goodness in things, according to that of St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine: inasmuch as He is good, we are.[944]

Reply to the first: Damascene therefore says that these names do not signify what God is, because from none of these names is expressed what God is perfectly; but each one signifies Him imperfectly, just as creatures imperfectly present Him.

Reply to the second: In the signification of names, that from which a name is sometimes imposed to signify, and that to which the name is imposed to signify, are different. Thus the name "stone" (lapis) is imposed from "hurting the foot" (laedit pedem), yet it is not imposed to signify "hurting the foot," but to signify a certain species of bodies; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone. So therefore it must be said that such divine names are indeed imposed from the processions of the Deity. For just as, according to diverse processes of creaturely perfections, creatures represent God, albeit imperfectly, so our intellect, according to each procession, knows

944. St. Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, book 1, chapter 32.

and names God. Yet these names are not imposed to signify the very processes themselves; as when it is said "God is living," the sense is not "life proceeds from Him," but to signify the very principle of things, in which life pre-exists, though in a more eminent mode than we understand or signify.

Reply to the third: We cannot in this life know the essence (*essentia*) of God according to that which it is in itself, but we know it according as it is presented in the perfections of creatures. And thus the names imposed by us signify it.

Conclusion. Not all the names which are predicated of God, but some, are said of Him substantially.

Dubitation concerning the sense of the article. The question proposed in the title of the article they treat from the Fathers - Damascene, book 1 On the Orthodox Faith, chapters 4 and 12; and Nicetas, in the scholia upon St. Gregory Nazianzen's Oration 32, number 53, and in Oration 42 upon the words "What then of our piety?" - and from the Scholastics with St. Thomas; then Cajetan, and more recent Thomists; St. Bonaventure, in the First Book, distinction 22, article 1, question 4; Richard; Alexander; Aegidius, question 4; Durandus, question 2; Marsilius, in the First, question 25, article 3, doubt 2; and Alexander of Hales, First Part, question 48, in the fourth article, 3 and 2. Although they thought in various ways, since they did not teach things opposed to one another, but different things, and each one in his own sense asserted truths, I shall not take care to enumerate their opinions singly. Wherefore we must focus only on expounding the mind of the Blessed Thomas, which, if rightly understood, is true and contains doctrine worthy of such a man; yet his disciples have not interpreted it quite in harmony with his words, and Cajetan and the recent men, in this article, seize upon that particle "substantially" or "according to substance" in the title and in the body as signifying "not accidentally," and they think that the names which are said of God do not predicate accidentally. He himself, however, would have to concede - if he were to take the particle "substantially" or "according to substance" in the title and in the body for "not accidentally" - that the names which he said at the beginning of the article do not signify the substance in God, namely the negative names and those signifying relation to creatures, are not in dispute. He undoubtedly thought that those are not said of God according to substance; but that these are not said of Him accidentally is clear: for they are said accidentally either by an accidental predicamental mode, or by an accidental predicable mode. Not in the predicamental mode, because there is no form in God that inheres, as an accident; nor in the predicable mode, because although in this way "substance" is sometimes predicated, as when we say "The circle is wooden," nevertheless all those names which we mentioned cannot be predicated of God in this way - "incorruptible," "immortal," and the other negatives. For to be predicated accidentally by an accidental predicable is nothing else than for the predicate to be able to be affirmed of and denied from the subject, the nature and essence of the subject remaining intact; so that even of opposites...[945]

945. For the patristic and scholastic sources surveyed here: Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, book 1, chapters 4 and 12; Nicetas, Scholia on St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 32, number 53, and Oration 42 on the words "Quin pietatis nostra"; John Cyparissiotes, Decade 4, chapter 9; St. Thomas; Cajetan and more recent Thomists; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 22, art. 1, q. 4; Richard; Alexander; Aegidius, q. 4; Durandus, q. 2; Marsilius, In I, q. 25, art. 3, dub. 2; Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, q. 48, art. 4, 3, 2.

Doubt about the sense of the article. The question proposed in the title of the article is treated from the Fathers by St. John Damascene, in book 1 On the Orthodox Faith, chapters 4 and 12; by Nicetas in the Scholia on St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 32, number 53, and on Oration 42 at the words "Quin pietatis nostra"; and by John Cyparissiotes, Decade 4, chapter 9.[946] Among the Scholastics it is handled by St. Thomas in this place; by Cajetan and more recent Thomists; by St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 22, art. 1, q. 4; by Richard and Alexander; by Aegidius, q. 4; by Durandus, q. 2; by Marsilius, In I, q. 25, art. 3, dub. 2; by Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, q. 48, art. 4, 3, 2.[947] Although they thought variously, since they did not teach things opposed to one another, but diverse, and each one in his sense said something true, I shall not take pains to enumerate their opinions item by item. Therefore it is incumbent on us only to set forth the mind of the Blessed Thomas, which, if it be rightly understood, is true and contains doctrine worthy of such a man; whereas his disciples have not been sufficiently consonant in interpreting his sayings.

The mind of St. Thomas. Cajetan and the recent writers in this article take that particle "substantially" or "according to substance" to mean the same as "not accidentally," so that the sense is to be: whether names are said of God not accidentally. The recent writers, however, labor to show whether relative names are said of God substantially; which, nevertheless, is easy to explain. For if by "substance" we understand the absolute essence (*essentia*) of God, names that denote only an order to creatures to come - such as foreknowledge, predestination, creation - are said of God accidentally by the fifth predicable, since they signify an order to future creatures. For God could, if He willed to do nothing, as He could, neither foreknow what was to be, nor predestine, nor create. But those that denote a relation to possibles are not said of God accidentally, as is evident; for by the necessity of the nature of the thing they belong to Him.

Therefore the sense of St. Thomas in the title of the article is that certain names are said of God according to substance, or substantially, that is, names which signify that which is truly and really in God, whether it be substance or relation. He most fittingly answers that not all, but some, are said of God according to substance; for negative names do not say what God is, but what He is not; and names which signify only a relation to creatures as future do not denote that which is in reality in God, but how He is spoken of from creatures.

But concerning the other names which affirm something of God and do not signify solely a relation from time to creatures, as "Creator," St. Thomas reports two opinions, as is clear from the article. The first is that of Rabbi Moses in the book called Doctor dubiorum, where he asserts that those names which posit something and do not denote only a relation to creatures are said of God only for removing something from Him, not for attributing something positive to Him. The second opinion is that of those who assert that these names signify in God only a relation of cause to that form, not the form itself which they seem to announce; for example, when it is said "God is good," they think it is signified only that God is the cause of goodness, not that He Himself is in Himself

946. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, book 1, chapters 4 and 12; Nicetas, Scholia on St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 32, number 53, and Oration 42 on the words "Quin pietatis nostra"; John Cyparissiotes, Decade 4, chapter 9.

947. St. Thomas; Cajetan and more recent Thomists; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 22, art. 1, q. 4; Richard; Alexander; Aegidius, q. 4; Durandus, q. 2; Marsilius, In I, q. 25, art. 3, dub. 2; Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, q. 48, art. 4, 3, 2.

good, and so forth. He impugns both opinions with three most excellent reasons. The first reason at once fights against and establishes the true opinion, and is of this sort: If names signified only negation in God, we could use any name whatsoever and attribute it to God; hence we could call Him "bodied" and "corruptible"; one way, if we wished to signify only the negation of body and of corruption; the other way, if we denoted only the cause of these things. For it would be truly said "bodied," that is, "not having a body"; and "corruptible," that is, "not subject to corruption"; or "corporeal," that is, "cause of body"; and "corruptible," "cause of corruptibility." The two later reasons, which you have in the text of St. Thomas, most excellently attack the latter opinion.

Therefore St. Thomas concludes from the doctrine of the article that those names of the third order, that is, negative ones, and those that denote a relation from time to creatures, are not said of God according to substance; but the remaining names which are said of God signify in God substance, or are said of God substantially, that is, they signify something which truly is in God. Whether, however, that be substance or accident, St. Thomas did not treat in this article; for he supposes from q. 3, art. 6, that there is no accident in God. In this sense no Scholastic has spoken otherwise. Yet this is doctrine and a judgment worthy of the Angelic Doctor; and it seems that John Cyparissiotes taught it earlier in Decade 4, chapter 9 cited above, as our Francis Turrianus noted in the scholia on that chapter. He says that those names from Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, book 2, are called theoprepē, that is, "descending to God."[948]

These three genera of names are most excellently explained by Damascene in the places cited above, in these words: "Thus, therefore, it is to be thought that all the things which are recounted of God either signify something in the substantial notion truly to be, or explain what is not, or some affection to something of the things that are distinguished from Him, or finally declare some operation." Of the first genus, he says, are the names signifying what God is not, as "incorruptible." Of the second genus are those which denote some affection to something of the things that are distinguished from Him, that is, a relation from time to creatures. Of the third genus are those signifying something of the things that regard nature, that is, those which signify the attributes of God. These, according to our mode of understanding and naming, follow nature after the manner of passion; similar are those which signify an operation within God: for those which denote an action from time are to be placed in the second genus; whence, and so forth.

But someone will object against the things which we have said: "Omnipotence, wisdom, and knowledge in God signify a relation of reason to creatures which God can produce and which He knows; therefore these names are not said of God according to substance in the sense explained." It is answered: that names which signify some relation to creatures from eternity - whether that relation belong to God freely, as is the relation of foreknowledge and predestination, which necessarily, as a relation of omnipotence and of simple knowledge, can truly be said of God according to substance. For although they are relatives, nevertheless we wish them to signify not only a relation, but a certain affection of God which in created things corresponds to some quality, which we also signify by a relative name. Therefore, because by them we signify what the essence

948. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, book 2; and Francis Turrianus, scholia on John Cyparissiotes, Decade 4, chapter 9.

(*essentia*) of God is like, they are truly said of Him according to substance. But those which signify in God a relation from time do not denote any affection which is in God - neither after the manner of quality or substance, nor after the manner of an immanent operation - but only an order of an agent outside itself; and because this is not formally in God, but only extrinsically by denomination, therefore St. Thomas rightly said that these names do not signify in God substantially, or are not said of God according to substance, as was explained above. This, however, must be understood with respect to the formal signification of the names; for as to the material signification of those of them which are concrete, as "Creator," this is God Himself. For when this name is heard, we conceive the very God whom we call Creator. But about the mode in which we know and name God by the negation of other things, we have said enough elsewhere, Disputation 22, chapter 6.

Articulus III - Whether any name is said of God properly

We proceed thus to the third. It seems that no name is said of God properly. For all the names which we say of God are taken from creatures, as was said. But the names of creatures are said metaphorically of God, as when it is said, "God is a rock," or "a lion," or something of this sort. Therefore the names said of God are said metaphorically.

Further, no name is said properly of that of which it is more truly removed than predicated. But all such names - "good," "wise," and the like - are more truly removed from God than predicated of Him, as is evident through Dionysius, in the second chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy. Therefore none of these names is properly said of God.

Further, names of bodies are not said of God except metaphorically, since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply certain bodily conditions: for they signify along with time, and with composition, and with other things of this sort which are conditions of bodies. Therefore all such names are said of God metaphorically.

But on the contrary is what St. Ambrose says in book 2 De fide: "There are certain names which clearly show the property of the divinity, and certain which express the manifest truth of the divine majesty; but others are said of God translatively by similitude." Therefore not all names are said of God metaphorically, but some are said properly.[949]

I answer that, as was said, we know God from the perfections proceeding in creatures from Him; and indeed these perfections are in God in a more eminent mode than in creatures. But our intellect apprehends them only in the mode in which they are in creatures; and according to what it apprehends, so it signifies by names. In names, therefore, which we attribute to God, there are two things to be considered: namely, the perfections themselves signified - such as goodness, life, and the like - and the mode of signifying. Therefore, as to that which such names signify, they properly belong to God, and more properly than to the creatures themselves, and primarily are said of Him. But as to the mode of signifying, they are not properly said of God, for they have a mode of signifying which belongs to creatures.

949. St. Ambrose, De fide, book 2, to Gratian, chapter 10.

Reply to the first: Some names signify the perfections of this sort proceeding from God into creatures in such a mode that the imperfection which belongs to a created nature is included in that very signification; as "rock" signifies something material. And such names cannot be properly attributed to God, but metaphorically. But some names signify the perfections themselves absolutely, without implying any mode which is proper to a participator and falls under the signification of such names: as "being," "good," "living," and the like; and such names are properly said of God.

Reply to the second: It must be said first that, when Dionysius denies that such names are said of God, he denies it because of that which the name does not fittingly signify of Him - namely, the mode which the name signifies - rather than because of that which the name signifies according to a more excellent mode. Whence he says, On the Divine Names, that God is above all substance and life.

Reply to the third: It must be said that, although such names are said of God, they import bodily conditions, not by that which is signified by the name, but by the mode of signifying. But those which are said metaphorically of God import a bodily condition in their very signification.

Explanation of the doctrine of the article. The conclusion is: Some name is said properly of God, that is, not translatively and not metaphorically. But more amply St. Thomas explains this doctrine, noting that the names of God could be considered in a twofold way: in one way as to that which they signify - even as to the mode of signifying; in the prior way some signify God properly, not metaphorically, as "wisdom," since by its signification we will to signify that which truly is found in God and that which is the perfection of Him; in the latter way not all are said of God properly, since they all suffer some improper mode of signifying. But this very thing has been set forth above at Disputation 22, chapter 6, and what in this same Question 13 we understand concerning the perfections and the mode in which we understand them from the mode of creatures. Hence accordingly and in the same way we name them. This doctrine, thus understood, is most easy according to the doctrine of this disputation in the way of speaking concerning the signification of names with respect to the viators and the blessed; and as for Himself, if He spoke, none of the names would signify God metaphorically in any mode. And this which we have said, that the names are not said of God metaphorically with respect to that which is signified, but are said metaphorically only with respect to the mode of signifying, St. Thomas in this article most excellently unfolds in solution 3.

The doctrine which John Cyparissiotes hands down in Decade 4, chapter 9, as our Turrianus noted and most excellently expounded, is the same; and there he says: "It is plain that the divine names represent our sense and represent in some manner divine nature according to our consideration; and from these there are gathered concepts of the names when we understand creatures. For we ascribe essence, substance. Properly they signify that which is, not as we think it is, but as we can; names are drawn from that which is most known to us, whence the names taken from things, which we attribute to God, do not signify God Himself, but God as He is conceived from creatures, which is what it is called metaphorical of God inasmuch as it signifies from us, as has been explained: but that which truly is, that which is signified by the name, insofar as it is

conferred on God, signifies God properly, and according to that it is called proper concept; and (as he himself also says) it is not what it is, but it is as it is, insofar as it is conceived by us" - which agrees with what we said above about knowing through effects. And thus this doctrine is to be understood concerning the signification of names in the way of the viators, not of the blessed.

In the same sentence John Cyparissiotes cites St. Cyril, Thesaurus, book 7, where Eunomius contended that the very word "unbegotten" is not the proper word of the Son: "Moreover the word in Scripture is called 'Son'; and the production of the word signifies the good meaning; we understand, not according to our custom expressing ourselves with sounds and a few syllables." And he adds: "Whenever, therefore, something is said of God in a human manner, as if one were to say that He hears, not in a human manner is it understood, but according to the divine." And so forth.[950]

to the first: Certain names signify suchlike perfections proceeding from God into created things in this way, that the very imperfect mode by which the divine perfection is participated by the creature is included in the signification of the name itself; thus "stone" signifies something ens in a material way: and names of this sort cannot be attributed to God, except metaphorically. But certain names signify the perfections themselves absolutely, without any mode of participating being enclosed in their signification: as "being" (ens), "good" (bonum), "living" (vivens), and the like: and such are properly predicated of God. Reply to the second: Therefore Dionysius says that names of this sort are denied of God, because that which is signified by the name does not belong to Him in the mode in which the name signifies, but in a more excellent mode. Hence in the same place Dionysius says: "He is above every substance and life."[951]

Reply to the third: Those names which are said properly of God import corporeal conditions, not in the very thing signified by the name, but as to the mode of signifying. But those which are said metaphorically of God import a corporeal condition in their very signified.

Explication of the doctrine of the article.

Conclusion. Some name is said of God properly, that is, not by transference and metaphor. But in order further to explain this doctrine, the Holy Doctor notes that the names of God can be considered in a twofold way: in one way with respect to that which they signify, in another with respect to the mode of signifying. In the first way, some signify God properly and not metaphorically, as "wisdom": because by their very signification they signify that which is truly found in God and which is His perfection. In the second way, not all, nay no name, is said of God properly, but under all there lies some mode of metaphor. We have explained this exactly above in disputation 22, chapter 6, namely that in this life we understand God and His perfections after the mode of created things: and therefore we name Him after the mode of those. This too is to be understood according to the doctrine of that disputation, speaking namely of the signification of

950. John Cyparissiotes, Decade 4, chapter 9; St. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus, book 7.

951. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, book 2; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, book 1, chapters 4 and 12.

names among wayfarers: for to the blessed, who see Him as He is, no name signifies God metaphorically in any way. But which names are said of God metaphorically as to the thing signified, St. Thomas excellently explains in this article, in the reply to the third.

John Cyparissiotes hands on this doctrine in Decade 4, chapter 9, as our Turrianus there notes and very well expounds, where at the end he says as follows: "From these things it is plain that both are true, namely that names represent the divine operation, and not the divine nature, when we consider their material, and whence these have been procured and collected for us" - by "operation" he understands the creature. "And further, that they also properly signify the substance of God, which 'is,' not however what it is, when from each name we are led to the very thing subject." And he speaks thus: if we attend to that whence the names are taken which we attribute to God, they do not signify God Himself, but created things, which is to signify God in a certain metaphorical way, as we have explained; but that for signifying which they are accommodated, signifies God properly, not quidditatively and by a proper concept, and (as he himself says) not what He is, but that He is, that is, by that concept by which He is known by us in this life.[952]

In the same sense John Cyparissiotes cites St. Cyril in book 7 of the Thesaurus, chapter 2, where, when Eunomius contended that "Word" is not a proper term of the Son in Scripture, St. Cyril replies: "Moreover, 'Word' in Scripture is called 'Son'; and by the utterance of the voice a sharp-sounding man - Eunomius - thinks thus, ignorant that from our custom the word has been taken." And, with a few things interposed, he adds: "When therefore something is said of God in a human manner, as 'he hears,' it is not understood in a human manner, but let him who hears understand it spiritually and divinely," and so forth.[953]

From this doctrine also, which we explained above, disputation 22, chapter 6, it is understood what Dionysius, there cited often, explains: namely, that in God there is neither wisdom, nor substance, nor anything of those things which we say of Him; and that other Fathers sometimes teach with Dionysius that the name of "Father" and of "Son" comes to be said of God by transference: for as to the mode of signifying, and as to that whence the names are taken, some metaphor lies under these words; not as to the thing signified, of which Damascene treats many things in that chapter; and we have also noted some things against Damascene there.[951]

Articulus IV - Whether the names said of God are synonymous

To the fourth we proceed thus.

Objection 1. It seems that those names said of God are synonymous. For synonymous names are those which signify entirely the same thing: but those names said of God signify entirely the same thing in God, because the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise wisdom: therefore those names are entirely synonymous.

952. John Cyparissiotes, Decade 4, chapter 9; Francis Turrianus, scholia on John Cyparissiotes, Decade 4, chapter 9.
953. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus, book 7, chapter 2.
951. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, book 2; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, book 1, chapters 4 and 12.

Objection 2. If it be said that those names signify the same according to the thing, but according to different rationes; on the contrary, a ratio to which nothing corresponds in the thing is vain: if therefore those rationes are many and the thing is one, it seems that those rationes are vain.

Objection 3. Moreover, that is more one which is one both in thing and in ratio than that which is one in thing and multiple in ratio. But God is maximally one: therefore it seems that He is not one in thing and multiple in ratio. And thus the names said of God do not signify diverse rationes; and so they are synonymous.

But on the contrary: All synonyms joined together add a tautology, as if one were to say "garment clothing." If therefore all names said of God are synonymous, it could not suitably be said "God good," or anything of this sort; whereas it is written in Jeremiah 32: "Mighty, great, powerful, Lord of hosts is Your name..."[954]

I answer that, it must be said that names of this sort said of God are not synonymous. This indeed would be easy to see, if we were to say that names of this sort were introduced either to remove, or to designate, the relation of cause with respect to creatures. For then there would be diverse rationes of those names according to diverse respects, or according to diverse effects connoted. But according as it has been said, that names of this sort signify the divine substance, albeit imperfectly, it plainly appears, according to the foregoing, that they have diverse rationes. For the ratio which the name signifies is the conception of the intellect concerning the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, forms for understanding God conceptions proportioned to the perfections proceeding from God into creatures. Now these perfections pre-exist in God in an undivided and simple way, but in creatures they are received in a divided and multiple way. Therefore, just as to the diverse perfections of creatures there corresponds one simple principle represented through diverse perfections of creatures, variously and multiply; so too to the various and multiple concepts of our intellect there corresponds something wholly one and simple, imperfectly understood according to conceptions of this sort. And therefore the names attributed to God, although they signify one thing, nevertheless, because they signify it under many and diverse rationes, are not synonyms. And thus the reply to the first is clear: because synonymous names are said to be those which signify one thing according to one ratio. But those which signify diverse rationes of one thing do not primarily and per se signify one, for a name does not signify the thing except through the mediation of the conception of the intellect, as has been said.

Reply to the second: The many rationes of these names are not empty and vain: because to all of them there corresponds one simple thing, represented through all these in a multiple and imperfect way.

Reply to the third: This very thing pertains to the perfect unity of God, namely that those things which are multiple and divided in others, in Him are simple and one. And from this it happens that He is one in thing and many according to ratio: because our intellect so multiplies its apprehension of Him as the things variously represent Him.

954. Jeremiah 32:18 - 19.

Explication of the doctrine of the Article.

Conclusion of the article is this. Not all things said of God are synonymous. St. Thomas calls them not, as some say, equivocal. For each of them equally signifies many things under diverse rationes: but two or more names are called synonymous by the Scholastics which denote the same thing under precisely the same ratio, as "sword," "point," and "blade"; "garment," "clothing." Therefore, since of God many names are said, as "omnipotent," "good," "wise," etc., the Holy Doctor says that not all are synonymous; because although they signify the same God, nevertheless they denote Him under diverse rationes. For, as Caietan most aptly observes, a mere distinction of reason among the things signified suffices, nor is there need for some distinction among them from the nature of the thing, in order that the names not be synonymous. Wherefore, since the attributes among themselves, and from the essence, are distinguished according to our mode of understanding, as we shall show at length below in disputation 117, it follows that names which signify diverse attributes, although distinguished solely by reason among themselves and from the essence, are not synonymous among themselves, nor with the names that signify the essence.[955]

Note: Nevertheless it is to be observed that judgment concerning the synonymy of names must be sought not from the side of the imposer of them or of the user, but from the side of the hearer, for whom they are said to signify. For, as was demonstrated in the preceding disputation, chapter 2, the signification of a name must be measured by the cognition which the hearer has of the thing, not by that of him who speaks or who imposed the name. It must therefore be seen why these names are not synonyms, and whether for anyone they can be.

Caietan, in this article, notes that God in Himself does not distinguish diverse rationes of the attributes; whence it follows that, for God, all the names imposed upon Him, from this side would be synonyms, unless something else stood in the way. I said "from this side," because if by the names we were able truly and properly to signify something to God, all the names, whether of one or of another attribute, would be synonymous for Him: because each of them would signify to Him in the same way, since He understands Himself in the same way always. Of the blessed Caietan says nothing. There are, however, those who think that by the very beatific vision there are distinguished in God by them diverse attributes: which if it were true, the names of the attributes would not be synonyms for them. But because, as we shall demonstrate below in disputation 118, the blessed cannot by the very clear vision of God distinguish many rationes in Him, it follows that for them seeing God in this way the names are synonyms. And since only wayfarers, knowing God not as He is but through other species, after the likeness of created things, distinguish in Him diverse attributes: for them alone, and for those knowing God in this manner, these names of attributes will not be synonyms. Wherefore if the blessed also knew God in the same manner as wayfarers, and not solely by clear vision, for them too, knowing Him in this way, they would not be synonyms.

955. Cajetan, commentary on this article of St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 4.

In this article it is commonly disputed whether the attributes of God are distinguished among themselves and from the essence from the nature of the thing, or are distinguished solely by reason; of this, however, we shall defer treating below in disputation 116.[956]

Articulus V - Whether those things which are said of God and of creatures are said univocally of them

To the fifth we proceed thus. It seems that those things which are said of God and of creatures are said univocally of them.

Objection 1. Every equivocal is reduced to the univocal, as many to one. For if this name "dog" is said equivocally of the barking animal and of the sea-fish, it is necessary that it be said univocally of some things, namely of all barking animals. Otherwise there would be a process to infinity. But there are found some univocal agents which agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some equivocal agents, as the sun causes the hot, although it itself is not hot, save equivocally. It seems therefore that the first agent, to which all agents are reduced, is a univocal agent. And thus those things which are said of God and of creatures are predicated univocally.

Objection 2. Moreover, according to equivocal things no likeness is attended to. Since therefore to God there is some likeness in the creature, according to that of Genesis 1: "Let us make man to our image and likeness," it seems that something is said univocally of God and of creatures.

Objection 3. Moreover, a measure is homogeneous with the things measured, as is said in Metaphysics X. But God is the first measure of all beings, as is said there: therefore God is homogeneous with creatures. And thus something can be said univocally of God and of creatures.[957]

But on the contrary: Whatever is predicated of some according to the same name, and not according to the same ratio, is predicated of them equivocally. But no name belongs to God according to that ratio according to which it is said of the creature. For wisdom in creatures is a quality; not, however, in God. Now the genus is varied when the ratio is changed, since it is a part of the definition; and the same is to be said in other cases. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is said equivocally.

I answer that, it must be said that it is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and of creatures. For every effect which does not equal the virtue of the agent cause receives a likeness of the agent not according to the same ratio, but deficiently; so that what is in the effects dividedly and multiply, is in the cause simply and in the same mode. Thus the sun by one power produces multiform and various forms in these lower things. In the same way, as was said above, all the perfections of things, which in created things are divided and multiple, pre-exist in God in unity. Therefore, when some name pertaining to a perfection is said of the creature, it signifies that perfection as distinct according to ratio and definition from others; as when this name "wise" is said of a man, we signify some perfection distinct from the essence of man, and from potency, and

956. See below, disputations 116 - 118.
957. Aristotle, Metaphysics X (book 10), on measure and the homogeneous.

from his act of being, and from all things of this sort. But when we say this name of God, we do not intend to signify something distinct from His essence, or from His potency, or from His act of being. And thus, when this name "wise" is said of a man, it in a certain way describes and comprehends the thing signified; not, however, when it is said of God: rather it leaves the thing signified incomprehended in the concept, and exceeding the term of the name's signification. Whence it is plain that not according to the same ratio is this name "wise" said of God and of man; therefore not univocally.

It is objected:

1) Moreover, every equivocal is reduced to the univocal, as many to one. For if this name "dog" is said equivocally of the barking animal and of the sea-star, it must be said univocally of some things, namely of all barking animals; otherwise there would be an infinite regress. But we find some univocal agents, which agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and some equivocal agents, as the sun causes heat, although it is not itself hot, except equivocally. It seems therefore that the first agent, to which all agents are reduced, is a univocal agent. And thus the things that are said of God and creatures are predicated univocally.

2) Further, according to things said equivocally no likeness is attended to. But since the creature is in some way like to God, according to that of Genesis 1, "Let us make man to our image and likeness," it seems that something is said univocally of God and of creatures.

3) Further, measure is homogeneous with what is measured, as is said in Metaphysics X.[958][959] But God is the first measure of all beings, as is said in the same place: therefore God is homogeneous with creatures. And thus something can be said univocally of God and creatures.

But on the contrary: Whatever is predicated of several according to the same name, and not according to the same concept (ratio), is predicated of them equivocally. But no name befits God according to that concept according to which it is said of the creature. For wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God; and a genus, when varied, changes the concept, since it is a part of the definition; and the same holds for the others. Therefore whatever is said of God and creatures is said equivocally.

Further, God is at a greater distance from the creature than any creatures are from one another. But on account of the distance of certain creatures it happens that nothing can be predicated of them univocally, as of those which do not agree in any genus. Therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; but all are predicated equivocally.

I answer: It is impossible that anything be predicated of God and creatures univocally. For every effect that does not equal the power of the agent cause receives the likeness of the agent not according to the same concept, but defectively: so that what is in the effects in a divided and multiple way, is in the cause simply and in the same manner. Thus the sun by one power produces many and diverse forms in these lower things. In the same way, as was said above, all the perfections of things, which are in created things in a divided and multiple way, pre-exist in God

958. Aristotle, Physics VIII; Metaphysics XII (on demonstrations about God).
959. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, on measure and the homogeneous.

united. Therefore, when a name pertaining to a perfection is said of a creature, it signifies that perfection as distinct by reason of the definition from others: for instance, when this name "wise" is said of a man, we signify some perfection distinct from the essence (*essentia*) of man, and from potency (*potentia*), and from his existence (*esse*), and from all things of this kind. But when we say this name of God, we do not intend to signify something distinct from His essence, or potency, or existence. And so, when this name "wise" is said of man, it in a certain way describes and comprehends the thing signified; not, however, when it is said of God: rather it leaves the thing signified incomprehended, and exceeding the term of the name's signification. Whence it is plain that not according to the same concept is this name "wise" said of God and of man; and the same reason holds for the others. Therefore no name is predicated univocally of God and creatures.

But neither purely equivocally, as some have said. For according to this, from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God; rather there would always be the fallacy of equivocation. And this is as much against the Philosopher, who proves many things about God demonstratively, as also against the Apostle saying in Romans 1: "The invisible things of God, being understood by the things that are made, are clearly seen."[960] Therefore it must be said that such names are said of God and creatures according to analogy, that is, proportion. And this happens in names in two ways: either because many things have proportion to one, as "healthy" is said of medicine and urine, inasmuch as each has an order and proportion to the health of the animal, of which this indeed is a sign, that a cause; or from the fact that one has proportion to another, as "healthy" is said of medicine and of the animal, inasmuch as medicine is the cause of the health which is in the animal. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and neither purely equivocally nor univocally.

For we cannot name God except from creatures, as was said above. And thus whatever is said of God and creatures is said according as there is some order of the creature to God as to principle and cause, in whom excellently pre-exist all the perfections of things. And this mode of commonness is midway between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For neither in those things which are said analogically is there one concept, as in univocals; nor are they totally diverse, as in equivocals; but a name thus said in multiple ways signifies diverse proportions to something one. Thus "healthy" said of urine signifies a sign of the animal's health; but said of medicine signifies a cause of the same health.

Reply to the first: Although in predications equivocal terms must be reduced to univocal, nevertheless in actions a non-univocal agent of necessity precedes a univocal agent. For a non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as the sun is the cause of the generation of all men. But a univocal agent is not an agent cause universal of the whole species (otherwise it would be the cause of itself, since it is contained under the species), but is a particular cause with respect to this individual, which is constituted in the participation of the species. Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not a univocal agent. But a universal cause is prior to a particular. Now this universal agent, although it is not univocal, is not, however, wholly equivocal:

960. Romans 1:20.

for otherwise it would not make its like; but it can be called an analogical agent. Thus, in predications, all univocals are reduced to one first, not univocal but analogical, which is "being" (*ens*).

Reply to the second: The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect: because it does not represent the same even according to genus, as was said above.

Reply to the third: God is not a measure proportionate to measured things. Whence it is not necessary that God and creatures be contained under one genus.

But the things that are on the contrary conclude that such names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures, not, however, that they are predicated equivocally.

Conclusion of the article: It is impossible that anything be said univocally of God and creatures.

Articulus VI - Whether names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God

To the sixth we proceed thus.

1) It seems that names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God. For according to the mode by which we know something, according to that we name it, since, according to the Philosopher, names are signs of the concepts in the intellect. But we know the creature before God: therefore names imposed by us first suit creatures rather than God.[961]

2) Further, according to Pseudo-Dionysius, we name God from creatures; but names transferred from creatures to God are said primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the like. Therefore all names which are said of God and creatures are said primarily of creatures rather than of God.[962]

3) Further, all names that are said commonly of God and creatures are said of God as of the cause of all things, as Pseudo-Dionysius says. But what is said of something through its cause is said of it afterwards: before we say "healthy" of medicine, which is the cause of health, we say "healthy" of the animal. Therefore such names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God.[963]

But on the contrary is what is said in Ephesians 3: "I bend my knee to the Father of our Lord Jesus, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named": and the same reason seems to hold for other names which are said of God and creatures. Therefore such names are said primarily of God rather than of creatures.

I answer: In all names which are said analogically of many it is necessary that all be said with reference to one. And therefore that one must be placed in the definition of all. And because the concept which a name signifies is a definition, as is said in Metaphysics IV, it is necessary that the name be said first of that which is placed in the definition of the others, and afterwards of the others according to the order by which they approach that first, either more or less.[964] Thus

961. Aristotle, De interpretatione (Peri hermeneias), book 1: names are signs of concepts.
962. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, book 1.
963. Pseudo-Dionysius, Theologia mystica (or De divinis nominibus), book 1: names said of God as cause.
964. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 28: "the concept which a name signifies is the definition."

"healthy," which is said of the animal, falls into the definition of "healthy" which is said of medicine, which is called healthy inasmuch as it causes health in the animal, and into the definition of "healthy" which is said of urine, which is called healthy inasmuch as it is a sign of the animal's health.

So then, all names which are metaphorically said of God are said primarily of creatures rather than of God; because said of God they signify nothing else than likenesses to such creatures. For as to say that a meadow laughs signifies nothing else than that the meadow has a certain likeness to a man in beauty when it blooms, as a man when he laughs, according to a likeness of proportion: so the name "lion" said of God signifies nothing else than that God likewise is so disposed as to work strongly in His works, as a lion in his. And so it is clear that according to that which is said of God, their signification cannot be defined except through that which is said of the creature.

But of the other names, which are not said metaphorically of God, there would be the same reason if they were said of God only causally, as some have posited. For thus, when it is said, "God is good," it would be nothing else than that God is the cause of goodness of the creature. And so this name "good" said of God would include in its concept the goodness of the creature: whence good would be said primarily of the creature rather than of God.

But it was shown above that such names are said of God not only causally but also essentially. For when it is said, "God is good" or "wise," it is signified not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him more eminently. Whence, according to this, it must be said that, as to the thing signified by the name, they are said primarily of God rather than of creatures, because from God such perfections flow into creatures. But as to the imposition of names, they are imposed by us upon creatures, which we know first. Whence also they have a mode of signifying which befits creatures, as was said above.

Reply to the first: That objection proceeds as to the imposition of the name.

Reply to the second: There is not the same reason for names which are said metaphorically of God and for the others, as was said.

Reply to the third: That objection would proceed if such names were said of God only causally and not essentially, as "healthy" of medicine.

Conclusion: If you look to the thing signified, names are said primarily (that is, more principally) of God than of creatures; but if you look to that whence the names are imposed, they are said first of creatures than of God. In these two articles our theologians have for the most part busied themselves in disputing about the analogy of names. But the disputations worthy of theology have been exactly handed on by us above in Disputation 22, chapter f. Let the rest be left to the physicists and metaphysicians.

Articulus VII - Whether the names which import a relation to creatures are said of God from time

To the seventh we proceed thus.

1) It seems that the names which import a relation to creatures are not said of God from time. For all such names signify the divine substance, as is commonly said. Whence also St. Ambrose says that this name "Lord" is a name of power, which is the divine substance; and "creation" signifies God's action, which is His essence. But the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore such names are not said of God from time, but from eternity.

2) Further, of whatever something befits from time, it can be said to have been made such. For what is white from time "becomes" white. But it does not befit God to have become. Therefore nothing is predicated of God from time.

3) Further, if some names are said of God from time on account of this, that they import a relation to creatures, the same reason seems to hold for all that import a relation to creatures. But certain names importing a relation to creatures are said of God from eternity. For from eternity He knew the creature and He loved it, according to that of Jeremiah 31: "I have loved you with an everlasting love." Therefore also other names that import a relation to creatures, such as "Lord" and "Creator," are said of God from eternity.

4) Further, such names signify a relation. Therefore that relation must either be something in God, or be only in the creature. But it cannot be only in the creature: because thus God...

Objicitur quartum: Such names signify a relation (*relatio*). Therefore that relation must either be something in God, or be only in the creature. But it cannot be only in the creature: because thus God would be denominated "Lord" from the opposite relation, which is in the creature; yet nothing is denominated from its opposite. It remains, therefore, that the relation is something in God. But in God nothing can be from time, since He is above time. Therefore it seems that such names are not said of God from time.

Objicitur quintum: Further, according to a relation something is said relatively: for example, according to lordship, "lord," just as according to whiteness, "white." If therefore the relation of lordship is not in God according to the thing, but only according to reason, it follows that God is not really lord - which is plainly false.

Objicitur sextum: Further, in relatives which are not simultaneous by nature, one can exist without the other: as the knowable exists without knowledge, as is said in the Categories. But the relatives which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous by nature. Therefore something can be said relatively of God to the creature even when the creature does not exist; and thus such names, "Lord" and "Creator," are said of God from eternity, and not from time.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in On the Trinity that this relative appellation "Lord" belongs to God from time.[965]

I answer: Certain names importing a relation to the creature are said of God from time, and not from eternity. To understand this, it must be known that some have maintained that relation is not a thing of nature, but only a thing of reason. Which clearly appears to be false from this, that things themselves have a natural order and habitude to one another. Nevertheless, one must know that,

965. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, c. 16, com. 3.

since relation requires two extremes, it is in a threefold way that it is constituted as a thing of nature and of reason. Sometimes indeed it is only of reason, when namely an order or habitude cannot exist between certain things except according to apprehension by reason only: as when we say "the same is the same as the same." For according as reason apprehends something as one, it sets it down as if it were two; and thus it apprehends a certain habitude of it to itself. And similarly for all those relations that are between being and non-being, which reason forms inasmuch as it apprehends the non-being as a certain extreme. And the same holds for all relations that follow an act of reason, as genus and species and the like. Certain relations, however, are, as to both extremes, things of nature: when namely there is a habitude between two things according to something really belonging to each extreme; as is evident about all the relations that follow quantity - greater and smaller, double and half, and the like. For quantity is in both extremes. And it is similar regarding relations that follow action and passion - mover and mobile, father and son, and the like. Sometimes, however, relation is, in one extreme, a thing of nature, and in the other, a thing of reason only; and this happens whenever the two extremes are not of one and the same order: as sense and knowledge are referred to the sensible and the knowable, which, inasmuch as they are certain things existing in natural being, lie outside the order of what is sensible and intelligible. And therefore in knowledge and in sense there is a real relation, according as they are ordered to knowing or sensing things; but the things themselves, considered in themselves, lie outside the order of such things; hence in them there is no relation really to knowledge and sense, but only according to reason, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as the terms of the relations of knowledge and sense. Whence the Philosopher says in Metaphysics V that things are not called relative because they themselves are referred to others, but because other things are referred to them; and similarly "right" is not said of a column except insofar as an animal is placed to the right of it. Therefore such a relation is not really in the column, but in the animal.[966] Since, then, God is outside the whole order of creatures, and all creatures are ordered to Him and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really referred to God; but in God there is no real relation of Him to creatures, but only according to reason, insofar as creatures are referred to Him. And thus nothing prevents such names importing a relation to the creature from being predicated of God from time, not on account of any change in Him, but on account of a change of the creature; just as a column becomes right with respect to an animal when the animal is moved, no change occurring about the column itself, but the animal being translated.

Reply to the first: Certain relatives are imposed to signify the very habitudes of relation - such as lord, servant, father, and son, and the like; and these are called relatives according to being. Others, however, are imposed to signify the things which certain habitudes follow - such as mover and moved, head and headship, and other such things; and these are called relatives according to predication. Thus also around the divine names this difference must be considered in two ways. For some signify the very habitude to the creature, as "Lord"; and such do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, inasmuch as they presuppose it, just as lordship presupposes

966. Aristotle, Metaphysics V (Book 5), on relatives; cf. the example that "right" is said of a column only insofar as an animal stands to its right.

power, which is the divine substance. Others, however, signify the divine essence directly, and consequently import the habitude - just as "Savior," "Creator," and the like signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both kinds of names are said of God from time, as regards the habitude which they import, either principally or consequently, but not as regards this, that they signify the essence either directly or indirectly.

Reply to the second: Just as the relations which are said of God from time are in God only according to reason, so neither "to become" nor "to have been made" is said of God except according to reason, no change existing about Him; as is said in the Psalm: "Lord, you have been made our refuge."

Reply to the third: The operation of the intellect and of the will is in the agent; and therefore names which signify relations consequent to the action of the intellect or of the will are said of God from eternity. But those which follow actions proceeding, according to the mode of understanding, to exterior effects are said of God from time, as "Savior," "Creator," and the like.

Reply to the fourth: The relations signified by such names, which are said of God from time, are in God according to reason only; but the opposite relations are in creatures according to the thing. Nor is it unfitting that from relations really existing in the thing God be denominated; yet according to the way that opposite relations are understood by our intellect to be in God, thus God is said relatively to the creature because the creature is referred to Him; just as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics V that the "knowable" is said relatively because "knowledge" is referred to it.[967]

Reply to the fifth: Since by that same account God is referred by reason to the creature, by which the creature is referred to Him, and since the relation of subjection exists really in the creature, it follows that God is lord not according to reason only, but really. For He is called "Lord" in the very way that the creature is subjected to Him.

Reply to the sixth: To know whether relatives are simultaneous by nature or not, one must not consider the order of the things of which the relatives are said, but the significations of the relatives themselves. For if the one in its concept includes the other, and conversely, then they are simultaneous by nature, as double and half, and father and son, and the like. But if the one includes the other and not conversely, then they are not simultaneous by nature. And in this way knowledge and the knowable stand. For the knowable is said according to potency; but knowledge according to habit, or according to act. Hence the knowable, according to the mode of its signification, pre-exists knowledge. But if the knowable be taken according to act, then it is simultaneous with knowledge according to act; for nothing is known unless there be the knowledge of it. Therefore, although God is prior to creatures, nevertheless in the signification of "Lord" there is included that He have a servant, and conversely; and thus the two relatives "lord" and "servant" are simultaneous by nature. Hence God was not Lord before He had a creature subject to Him.

Explicatio doctrinae articuli.

967. Aristotle, Metaphysics V: the "knowable" is said relatively because "knowledge" is referred to it.

Conclusion is: Some of these are said of God from time. St. Thomas explains this in the solution to the third: what names are those which are said of God from time. And he says that they are those which follow transient actions - such as "Creator," "Lord," "Redeemer," and so forth; for the foundation by which it can be said that God is creator begins in time, so that from eternity He cannot be said "creating": because a transient action, which begins in time, is signified by that name. Other names, however, signifying a relation which follows an immanent action, although they are not attributed to God from eternity because there was not one who would use them, nevertheless could have belonged to God from eternity, because the foundation of that relation is eternal, namely the immanent action about possibles or futures, which are from eternity possible and, if future, future.

Around these names indeed, which by reason of immanent action are said of God, it must be noted that not all signify a necessary order in God. For some denote an order to future creatures, which does not belong to God necessarily: He could, remaining the same, have brought it about that nothing would ever be future; whence He would not be "predestining," "prescient," or "providing." Others, however, signify an order to possible creatures, which necessarily belongs to God, although it be not real, but of reason, because creatures are necessarily possible, and hence the foundation of this relation is necessary. Nevertheless, all these names belong to God from eternity, nor can they belong to Him from time only: because both the possible creature and the future - if it is to be future - are from eternity possible or future. Whence also we shall prove in question 14, article 15, the immutability of God's foreknowledge; and in question 19, article 7, the immutability of His will.[968]

Around the reply to the third, there is commonly disputed here, by some Nominalists, whether the relations of "Creator" and "Lord," which are attributed to God from time, just as the names of them, are real or are of reason; and indeed, about the relation in God I see that there can be controversy among Catholics. For no one can assert, nor has anyone hitherto said, that those relations are real, that is, really and intrinsically in God, either arriving to Him from time, or adhering to Him from eternity not necessarily but freely - as we shall show by evident reason in Disputation 80, chapter 2. That they belong to Him freely cannot be doubtful: for they are with respect to creatures future or present, which are not necessarily future or present. Wherefore, since Ockham and Gabriel in I, dist. 30, q. 5; Durandus, q. 3; Marsilius in I, q. 32, art. 1; and Gregory in I, dist. 28, q. 3, art. 1, call these relations "real," although they do not err in the thing itself, yet they are to be noted for impropriety of speech: for they themselves do not say that these are...

Articulus VIII - Whether this name, God, is a name of the nature

It is objected to the eighth as follows.

968. Vazquez's cross-references: q. 14, art. 15 on the immutability of God's foreknowledge; and q. 19, art. 7 on the immutability of God's will.

1) It seems that this name "God" is not a name of the nature. For St. John Damascene says in I De fide orthodoxa, cap. 12, that "God" (Theos) is said from theasthai, which is to care for and foster all things, or from aithein, that is, to burn - for our God is a consuming fire - or from theasthe, which is to consider all things. But all these pertain to operation: therefore this name "God" signifies an operation, and not the nature.[969]

2) Further, something is named by us according to the way in which it is known. But the divine nature is unknown to us: therefore this name "God" does not signify the divine nature.

But on the contrary: St. Ambrose, in the book On the Faith, says that "God" is a name of the nature.[970]

I answer: It must be said that it is not always the case that that, from which the name is imposed in order to signify, and that, to which the name is imposed to signify, are the same. For just as we know the substance (*substantia*) of a thing from its properties or operations, so also do we name the substance of a thing, whenever from some operation or property of it we denominate it. Thus we denominate the substance of a stone from some action of it, because it hurts the foot; yet this name is not imposed to signify that action, but the substance of the stone. But those things which in themselves are known to us, like heat, cold, whiteness, and the like, are not denominated from other things. Hence in such cases that which the name signifies and that from which the name is imposed to signify are the same. Because therefore God is not known to us in his nature, but becomes known to us from his operations or effects, from these we are able to name him, as was said above. Hence this name "God" is a name of an operation as regards that, from which it is imposed to signify; for this name is imposed from the universal providence of things. For all who speak of God intend by this to name that which has universal providence over things. Thus also Pseudo-Dionysius says in On the Divine Names XII, a little before the middle, that Deity is that which sees all things with providence and with perfect goodness. From this operation, accordingly, the name "God" is taken and is imposed to signify the divine nature.

Reply to the first: All the things Damascene has set down pertain to providence, from which this name "God" is imposed to signify.

Reply to the second: Although we are able to know the nature of some thing from its properties and effects, and in this way to signify it by a name; whence, because we are able to know the substance of a stone from its property by knowing in itself what a stone is, this name "stone" signifies the nature of stone, according as it is in itself. For it signifies the definition of stone, by which we know what a stone is. For the account which a name signifies is a definition, as is said in Metaphysics IV. But from divine effects we are not able to know the divine nature according as it is in itself, so as to know of it what it is; rather we know it according to the mode of eminence, causality, and negation, as was said above. And thus this name "God" signifies the divine nature. For the name has been imposed to signify one who stands over all things, which is the principle of all and removed from all. This in fact those who name "God" intend to signify.

969. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, cap. 12; cf. Heb 12:29 ("our God is a consuming fire").

970. St. Ambrose, De fide, prologue near the beginning; cf. also Comm. in Gal. cap. 3, post medium; and De fide ad Graecos (as cited in the margins of the edition).

Conclusion of the article: The name "God," as to that whence it has been imposed, signifies an action; but as to that for the signifying of which it has been imposed, it signifies the substance and the very nature of God.

- Concerning the doctrine of the article.

Disputatio LVIII - Concerning the doctrine of the article

Caput I - What the Fathers thought about this name, God

No one among the Scholastics, besides Cajetan and other Thomists, disputed this matter; but among the Fathers St. John Damascene in De fide orthodoxa, cap. 12, handled it diligently, whose opinion St. Thomas set forth this article to explain.[971] Damascene teaches that the name Theos - whence the Latin name "Deus," with a few letters changed, seems to be taken - is derived from theasthai, that is, from the verb that signifies "to look over, to behold," because God looks over all things; or from the verb that means "to run" (theein), because, as it were, running through all created things he cherishes and preserves each one; or from aithein, which is "to burn," since God is said to be a fire consuming vices. This etymology of the word was also handed down by Athanasius in the book On Definitions not far from the beginning, and in part approved by St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 16, n. 70.[972]

Then Damascene teaches that this name "God" and that one of Exodus 3, "He who is" (Qui est), are principal; but that the rest do not so perfectly signify God; and among these two he assigns the prior place to the name "He who is." The same had been taught by Nazianzen in the place cited, by Nicetas in Oration 42 of Nazianzen, on the words "God always was," and by Elias of Crete on Oration 23 of Nazianzen, on the words "Grant, O Piety," etc. From these, however, Nazianzen and Nicetas assert, for this reason, that among the other names these two are the chief: because that name "He who is" signifies being itself; but "God" signifies his most perfect operation, namely, to look over all things. In which they seem to be opposed to the doctrine of this article: for in it the Holy Doctor maintains that the name "God" also signifies the substance. But how St. Thomas and Damascene did not teach contraries, we shall soon demonstrate. Elias, for his part, thinks these two names are the most principal among the others because they more aptly signify the substance of God than the others: wherefore he seems to support St. Thomas's opinion.[973]

The same also was taught by Athanasius in a certain Epistle On the Decrees of the Nicene Synod, which begins "Refute what has been done," after the middle, where he says: "When we say 'God' and name 'Father,' we signify none of the things which are around him, but his very substance." Nor is that a counterargument which Damascene says, De fide orthodoxa I, cap. 12 - namely, that among God's names the first is "Good," as is also gathered from that same book, caps.

971. Cajetan and other Thomists on this article; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 8.

972. Athanasius, De definitionibus (near the beginning); St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 16, n. 70.

973. Nicetas, Oration 42 on St. Gregory Nazianzen, on the words "Deus semper erat"; Elias of Crete, Oration 23 on St. Gregory Nazianzen, on the words "Quin pietatis...".

2, 3, and 4 - because, as Clichtove has very well noted on that same cap. 12, among the names which show forth the substance of God through effects, "Good" holds the first place; but the name "He who is" is chief and first for signifying the substance and nature of God as it is in itself, most hiddenly lying concealed.[974]

Caput II - The opinion of St. Thomas on the same matter

This opinion of the Fathers St. Thomas explains. He first proposes this notation: If you look to that whence the name "God" has been taken, it signifies an action - namely, either of foreseeing, or of running through, or of burning; but if you look to that for the signifying of which it has been imposed, it denotes the very substance of God, as in the conclusion of the article we have set down.

For a fuller explanation of this matter a few points must first be observed.

First notable. The name "God" is sometimes accommodated, in a figurative way, to men, as in Psalm 81: "God stood in the synagogue of gods": but we are not now treating of its signification in this mode; in the common and proper way it signifies first of all the being that is the cause and principle of all things.

Second notable. It must be noted that there are three kinds of names which are ascribed to God on the ground of action: some are adjectives signifying an action, such as "omnipotent," "wise," and the like; others are substantives likewise signifying an action, as "creator," "judge," "ruler," and the like; others, however, which from the derivation or application of the appellation were taken from an action, no longer formally signify the action, but denote the very substance; and of this sort St. Thomas judges the name "God" to be. Now between these there is a manifest difference: for the names of the first and second genus, although on the part of the subject, because they supposit for the material signified, denote the substance of God, nevertheless on the part of the predicate they always signify and formally express the action; wherefore, when we say "The Father is God," we do not signify that the Father looks over all things, or runs through, or burns; but that the Father is that first substance which we call by this name. But on the contrary, when we say "The Father is omnipotent" and "creator," we denote that he can do all things and create the universe, which is to signify an action formally.

What has been said about the name "God" agrees also with other names of created things: for the name "stone" (lapis), derived from "hurting the foot" (laedendo pedem), and also many household names taken from some action or effect, by usage itself are now adapted to signify the substance itself. A sign of this is that those who use these names to denote that thing altogether ignore the derivation: therefore they are not assumed to signify that whence they have been taken. Moreover, although the name "God" denotes the substance of God and not his operation, nevertheless it does not signify what he is, but that he is, as we noted above in article 3 on the authority of Cyparisthoto.

974. Athanasius, Epistle On the Decrees of the Nicene Synod ("Redarguite factum"), after the middle; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, caps. 2 - 4, 12; Clichtove on the same cap. 12.

Caput III - In what sense the name "God" can be said to be connotative

Some assert that the name "God" is connotative of creatures, that is, that it signifies God himself in such a way that at the same time it somehow denotes creatures. But Gabriel, in I, dist. 22,

- Prior to this article there was to be noted, in what pertains to the relations which are between God and creatures, that certain authors call those relations "real," yet do not wish to call them relations of reason, because with no intellect operating God really creates and is that which is called "creating"; Gregory, however, speaks much more obscurely than the rest. Those authors differ from others only in this, that they are unwilling to call those relations relations of reason. It must be said, however, that the foundation from which the relation is taken, and from which a relative name is attributed to God, is real - either present, or future, or possible; wherefore by some an extrinsic real relation is wont to be named. But in God himself without doubt only a relation of reason is to be posited. Therefore, when an extrinsic real denomination is spoken of, the operation of our intellect is not entirely excluded, because denomination is a work of reason; but it is signified that there is something real from which our intellect took that denomination. Wherefore, if we speak of that relation whose denomination is derived from that extrinsic foundation, insofar as it is said to be in God or to befit him, it is to be called a relation of reason - thus St. Thomas calls it in this article, and Cajetan too "as to the fourth"; and the same St. Thomas in Contra gentiles II, cap. 12, and there the Ferrariensis.[975] On this proposition, and on what follows, see St. Bonaventure in I, dist. 30, q. 3; Richard, q. 4; Scotus ad q. 2; Capreolus, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 3, and art. 2, concl. 2 and 3; Deza Hispanus, art. 1; Henry, Quodlibet 9, q. ...[976] Moreover, whether there is in God an eternal real relation to creatures, we shall say below in Disputation 104, last chapter; and whether rather there is in God a relation of reason formed by the very divine intellect, and how by the human intellect, we shall treat below in Disputation 118, cap. 2; finally, how these denominations befit God from eternity, since they are relations of reason, will be explained in q. 14, art. 15. Concerning the same solution Cajetan disputes, whether relatives of the third genus are referred really to an absolute term or to a term in some way relative, and likewise about other relatives. Nevertheless, about this matter we shall say a little incidentally below in Disputation 160, cap. 6, lest we overstep the bounds of Theology.[977]

Some hold that many names derived from action do indeed formally signify and express the action, under which God himself is signified. But names of the third genus, such as "God" (Deus), although they were derived from action, by usage now do not signify the action, but the substance; and therefore, even if the name "God" be placed on the side of the predicate - where, according to

975. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 7 - 8; Contra gentiles II, cap. 12; Ferrarensis (commentary ad loc.).
976. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 30, q. 3; Richard; Scotus ad q. 2; Capreolus, In I Sent., q. 1, art. 1, concl. 3; art. 2, concl. 2 - 3; Deza Hispanus, art. 1; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 9, q. ...
977. Cajetan, on relatives of the third genus; see also Vazquez, Disputationes 104 (cap. ult.), 118 (cap. 2), and 160 (cap. 6); and q. 14, a. 15 on the immutability of God's foreknowledge.

the opinion of some, names stand only for the formal signified - it never denotes action, but the substance and nature of the first cause itself. By contrast, names such as "omnipotent" and "creator," and the like, of the first and second genus, although on the side of the subject, because they stand for the material signified, they denote the substance of God; yet on the side of the predicate they always signify action, and formally they express it. Hence, when we say, "The Father is God," we do not signify that the Father sees all things, or reasons, or burns; but that the Father is that first substance which we designate by this name. By contrast, when we say, "The Father is omnipotent and creator," we denote that he can effect all things and create the universe, which is to signify action formally.

What has been said about the name "God" holds also for other names of created things. For the name "stone" (lapis) is derived from "hurting the foot," and many names of families are also taken from some action or effect; and yet by usage they are now accommodated to signify the very substance. A sign of this is that those who are entirely ignorant of the derivation use these names to denote that very thing; therefore they are not taken to signify that whence they are derived. Nevertheless, although the name "God" denotes the substance of God and not his operation, yet it does not signify what he is, but that he is, as we noted above in art. 3.

By this reason the name "God" can be said in a certain way to be more connotative.

Second opinion. Some assert that the name "God" is connotative of creatures, that is, that it signifies God in such a way that at the same time it somehow denotes creatures. Gabriel, however, in I, dist. 22, q. 1, art. 2, and other more recent theologians teach that some divine names are not connotative; and they judge that the name "God" is such.[978] Perhaps among them there is not a difference of things, but of words. For if we understand as "connotative" that which so signifies one thing as to denote it under some respect to another - as is commonly said of a connotative name - then the name "God" will not be connotative, because it does not signify God under any relation to creatures. Other names, however, such as "creator," "omnipotent," "wise," are connotative in this way. For although the name "God" has been derived from an action, by reason of which in this way it ought to be connotative, nevertheless by usage it has already been accommodated to signify the substance of God itself, not an action. And that Nazianzen counted the name "God" among relatives matters little; for he was attending more to the etymon of the name than to the very signified which it now has by usage. Hence neither Nicetas, in that Oration 42 on Nazianzen, nor Damascene in the places cited, place this name "God" among relative names of God. The other names, however, which denote the relation of God to creatures, can in this way be called connotative.[979][980]

But if a connotative name is that on hearing which we are also compelled to conceive something other than the thing signified itself, there is no doubt that all the names of God are connotative. For since we conceive God after the likeness (*instar*) of visible things, we cannot, on hearing the word "God," so understand him as not to apprehend something else whose likeness God himself is

978. Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., dist. 22, q. 1, a. 2; and others among recent theologians.
979. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 36, n. 71.
980. Nicetas, Oration 42 on St. Gregory Nazianzen; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, in the loci cited.

known by us to be - which no Scholastic can deny. Yet this does not seem to be a proper connotation. For connotation properly belongs to a name whenever, on hearing it, by force of the very imposition and usage of it, we conceive something other than the precise signified; and this is for it, by its own force, to express and connote something else. But upon hearing any name which by imposition is absolute, to conceive something else, besides the direct signified, by whose likeness we come to know that which is signified by the name, does not suffice for the name itself to be connotative. This doctrine is gathered from St. Thomas in this question, art. II, ad 3.[981]

Articulus IX - Whether this name "God" is incommunicable

Objicitur. 1. It seems that this name, "God," is communicable. For whatever is communicated according to the thing signified by a name, the name itself is communicated. But this name "God" (as was said) signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to that 2 Peter 1: "He has given us great and precious promises, that by these we may be made partakers of the divine nature." Therefore this name "God" is communicable.

1. Further, only proper names are not communicable. But this name "God" is not a proper name, but an appellative; which is clear from this, that it has a plural, according to Psalm 81: "I have said, You are gods." Therefore this name "God" is communicable.
2. Further, this name "God" is imposed from operation, as was said. But other names which are imposed on God from operations or effects are communicable, as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "God" is communicable.

Sed contra: It is said, Wisdom 14: "They imposed on wood and stones a name that cannot be communicated"; and he is speaking of the name of deity. Therefore this name "God" is an incommunicable name.

Respondeo. It must be said that a name can be communicable in two ways: one way, properly; the other, by likeness. Properly, that is communicable which, according to the whole signification of the name, is communicable to many. By likeness, however, that is communicable which is communicable according to something of what is included in the name's signification. For example, the name "lion" is properly communicated to all those in whom the nature signified by this name "lion" is found. But by likeness it is communicable to those who participate in something leonine, as boldness or strength; such men are called "lions" metaphorically.

Now to know which names are properly communicable, one must consider that every form existing in a singular supposit, by which it is individuated, is common to many, either according to the thing, or at least according to the notion. Thus human nature is common to many both according to the thing and according to the notion. The nature of the sun, however, is not common to many according to the thing, but only according to the notion; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in several supposits. And this is because the intellect is of the nature to

981. St. Thomas, in this question, art. II, ad 3.

understand the form of any species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular supposit or in several is besides the notion of the species' nature. Therefore, the notion of the species' nature remaining, it can be understood as existing in several. But a singular, because it is singular, is divided from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify some singular is incommunicable both in reality and in notion. For the plurality of this individual cannot fall under apprehension. Whence no name signifying some individual is communicable to many properly, but only according to likeness: as someone can metaphorically be called "Achilles," insofar as he has something of Achilles' properties, namely, fortitude.

But forms which are not individuated by another supposit, but by themselves - namely, because they are simple subsisting forms - if they were understood according to what they are in themselves, could be communicated neither in reality nor in notion; but perhaps by likeness, as is said of individuals. But because we cannot understand simple subsisting forms according to what they are, but we understand them in the mode of composite things having forms in matter, therefore, as has been said, we impose on them concrete names that signify the nature as in some supposit. Hence, as regards the rationale of names, the same rationale holds both for names imposed by us to signify the natures of composite things and for names imposed by us to signify simple subsisting natures. Accordingly, since this name "God" is imposed to signify the divine nature, as has been said; and since the divine nature is not multipliable, as has been shown above; it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable indeed according to the reality, but communicable indeed according to opinion: just as the name "sun" would be incommunicable according to the opinion of those positing many suns. And according to this it is said, Galatians 4: "You served those who by nature are not gods"; the Gloss: "not gods by nature, but by the opinion of men." Yet this name "God" is nevertheless communicable, not according to its whole signification, but according to something of it, by a certain likeness, so that those are called "gods" who participate in something divine by likeness, according to that: "I have said, You are gods." But if there were any name imposed to signify God, not on the side of the nature, but on the side of the supposit as it is considered "this something," that name would be in every way incommunicable: as perhaps is the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrews. And it would be similar if someone imposed a name on the sun designating this individual.

Ad primum: Therefore it must be said that the divine nature is not communicable except according to a participation of likeness

Ad secundum: This name "God" is an appellative and not a proper name, because it signifies the divine nature as in a bearer, although God himself is neither universal nor particular according to the reality. For names do not follow the mode of being which is in things, but the mode of being which is in our cognition. And yet, according to the truth of the matter, it is incommunicable, as was said with respect to the name "sun."

Ad tertium: These names "good," "wise," and the like are indeed imposed from perfections proceeding from God into creatures; yet they are not imposed to signify the divine nature, but to signify those very perfections absolutely. And therefore also according to the truth of the thing they are communicable to many. But this name "God" is imposed from the operation proper to God, by which we continually experience it to be used to signify the divine nature

The conclusion of the argument is this: The name "GOD" cannot in reality be properly communicated to many; yet it can be communicated analogically and according to opinion; and further, it can truly be communicated by way of participation, as when eminent men are called "gods."

Articulus X - Whether this name "God," said of God by participation and by nature and by likeness, is equivocal

Objicitur. 1. It seems that this name "God" is said univocally of God by nature, and by participation, and by likeness. For where there is diverse signification, there is not a contradiction between one affirming and one denying: for equivocation impedes contradiction. But the Catholic, saying "The idol is not God," contradicts the pagan saying "The idol is God": therefore "God" taken in both places is said univocally.

1. Further, just as the idol is "god" according to opinion and not according to truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called "happiness" according to opinion and not according to truth. But this name "happiness" is said univocally of this imagined happiness and of this true happiness. Therefore also this name "God" is said univocally of God according to truth and of "god" according to opinion.
2. Further, those are called univocal of which there is one ratio. But the Catholic, when he says that there is one God, understands by the name "God" a thing omnipotent and most to be venerated; and the gentile understands the same when he says that the idol is God. Therefore this name is said univocally in both places.

Sed contra: What is in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing, as is said in Perihermeneias I. But "animal," said of a true animal and of a painted animal, is said equivocally. Therefore this name "God," said of the true God and of "god" according to opinion, is said equivocally.[982]

1. Further, no one can signify that which he does not know. But the gentile does not know the divine nature. Therefore, when he says "The idol is God," he does not signify the true deity; but the Catholic signifies this when he says that there is one God. Therefore this name "God" is not said univocally, but equivocally, of the true God and of "god" according to opinion.

982. Aristotle, Perihermeneias (De interpretatione) I, cap. 1.

Respondeo. It must be said that this name "God," in the three aforesaid significationes, is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically; and this is clear from the following. For of univocals the ratio is altogether the same; of equivocals the rationes are altogether diverse; but in analogicals it is required that the name, taken according to one signification, be placed in the definition of the same name taken according to the other significations. Thus "being" (ens), said of substance, is placed in the definition of "being" as said of accident; and "healthy," said of an animal, is placed in the definition of "healthy" as said of urine and of medicine - for of this "healthy" which is in the animal, the urine is a sign and the medicine a cause of health. So it happens in the present case. For this name "God," according as it is taken for the true God, is included in the account of "God" as it is said according to opinion or by participation. For when we call someone "god" by participation, we understand by the name "God" something having a likeness to the true God; similarly, when we call an idol "god," by this name "God" we understand something to be signified of which men have the opinion that it is God. And so it is manifest that there is a distinct signification of the name; but one of these significations is contained under the others. Whence it is clear that it is said analogically.

Reply to the first: Multiplicity of names is not attended according to men's predications, but according to significations. For this name "man," of whomever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is said in one way; but it would be said in many ways if, by this name "man," one intended to signify what we see to be a man, and another intended by the same name to signify a stone or something else. Whence it is plain that the Catholic, saying that the idol is not God, contradicts the pagan asserting this, because each uses this name "God" to signify the true God.

Reply to the second and to the third together: The reasons there proceed according to a diversity of predication of the name, and not according to a diversity of signification.

Reply to the fourth: The term "animal," said of a true animal and of a painted one, is not said purely equivocally. But the Philosopher in a broad sense takes "equivocal" so as also to include analogical names: and thus even "being," which is said analogically, is sometimes reckoned among the equivocal.

Reply to the fifth: As to the divine nature itself, the gentile does not know it; yet he knows it according to some rationale of causality, or of excellence, or of remotion, as was said above. And according to this he can take this name "God" in the same signification as the Catholic takes it when he says, "The idol is not God." But if there were someone who, according to no rationale, knew anything of God, neither would he name him - unless perhaps as we sometimes utter names whose significations we do not know.

Explicatio Articuli. The conclusion is that of God according to nature, and of "god" according to opinion, and by participation the name "GOD" is said according to analogy. The sense of St. Thomas in this article seems difficult. For if he is saying that those three significata of the name "GOD" cohere analogically under the same name...

The name God, in the three aforesaid significations, is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically: which is clear from this. For of univocals there is wholly the same rationale; of equivocals, a wholly diverse rationale; but in things said analogically it is required that a name, taken according to one signification, be placed in the definition of the same name taken according to other significations. Thus, being is said of substance, and is placed in the definition of being as it is said of accident; and healthy, said of an animal, is placed in the definition of healthy as it is said of urine and of medicine. For of this healthy which is in an animal, urine is a sign, and medicine a cause. So it happens in the present case. For this name God, insofar as it is taken for the true God, is taken in the notion of God according to that by which God is said according to opinion or participation. For when we name someone a god by participation, by the name God we understand something that has a likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we name an idol god, by this name God we understand something to be signified of which men have the opinion that it is a god; and thus it is manifest that the signification of the name is one thing and another; but one of those significations is included within the others. Whence it is manifest that it is said analogically.

Reply to the first: Multiplicity of names is not considered according to a man's predication, but according to signification. For this name man, of whomever it be predicated, whether truly or falsely, is said in one way. But then it would be said in many ways, if by this name man we intended to signify diverse things - suppose one intended by this name man to signify that which is truly a man, and another intended to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Whence it is clear that the Catholic, saying that an idol is not God, contradicts the pagan affirming this; because each uses this name God to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he is not using this name according to that by which it signifies a god according to opinion. For thus he would speak truly, since even Catholics sometimes use this name in such a signification, as when it is said, "all the gods of the nations are demons." And similarly is to be said to the second and the third. For those reasons proceed according to a diversity of predication of the name, and not according to a diverse signification.

Reply to the fourth: Animal, said of a real animal and of a painted one, is not said purely equivocally. But the Philosopher in a broad sense takes equivocal things as including within themselves analogical ones; because even being, which is said analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of diverse predicaments.

Reply to the fifth: The very nature of God, as it is in itself, neither the Catholic nor the pagan knows; but each knows it according to some rationale of causality, or excellence, or remotion, as was said above. And according to this, the gentile can take in the same signification this name God, when he says, "the idol is God," in which the Catholic takes it when saying, "the idol is not God." But if there were someone who, according to no rationale, knew anything of God, neither would he name him, unless perhaps as we sometimes utter names whose significations we do not know.

Explicatio Articuli. The conclusion is, that of God according to nature, and of "god" according to opinion, and by participation, the name GOD is said according to analogy. The sense of St. Thomas in this article seems difficult; yet from the body and from the reply to the first, I think I can gather it. It is therefore to be noted that the gods of the gentiles can be signified by the name God in a

twofold way, inasmuch as the signification is referred to diverse intellects: first, to the intellect of the gentile, who is persuaded that there are many gods, and for him the name God signifies univocally many - whether among them we include the true God of the Christians, or only many of the gentiles; for in the intellect of the gentile himself all are true gods, since he thinks the true nature of deity befits them, although this is only according to opinion, not in reality. But to the faithful intellect, which holds that there is one only God, and that the rest of the gentiles' [so-called gods] are false, the name God does not signify univocally many gods, although those whom the gentiles adore the faithful also call "the gods of the gentiles"; rather it signifies analogically, because the name God to the faithful properly signifies the true God, but the others, according to the opinion of the gentiles: nor does he apprehend them as true gods, but as thought-to-be gods. And with respect to this intellect St. Thomas speaks in this article, when he says that the name God is said analogically of the true God, and of "god" according to opinion. For to the gentile intellect it signifies all gods univocally, because although he supposes to be gods those who really are not, yet he thinks them to be true [gods], and not only according to opinion. Wherefore the Christian, who says, "An idol is not God," truly contradicts the gentile saying, "An idol is God"; and each takes the name God in the primary signification of the true God, which is the proper one. Therefore the name God, for the gentile, is univocal to the true and to the false gods whom he deems true; otherwise, the Catholic denying that an idol is God would not contradict him, because the Catholic uses that name in its proper signification for the true God, whereas if the gentile used it analogically, there would be no contradiction - since the term would not be the same, which is necessary for contradiction.

Articulus XI - Whether the name "Who is" is God's proper name, and more suited to the divine nature

To the eleventh, one proceeds thus. It seems that this name, "Who is," is not the most proper name of God. For this name God is an incommunicable name, as has been said. But this name "Who is" is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name "Who is" is not the most proper name of God.

1. Moreover, Pseudo-Dionysius says in book 3, chapter on the Divine Names, that the appellation "Good" is most excellently manifestative of all the processions of God. But this chiefly befits God, that he is the universal principle of things; therefore this name Good is the most proper of God, and not this name "Who is."
2. Moreover, every divine name seems to import a relation to creatures, since God is not known by us except through creatures. But this name "Who is" imports no habitude to creatures. Therefore this name "Who is" is not the most proper name of God.

But on the contrary is what is said in Exodus 3: to Moses asking, "If they shall say to me, what is his name? what shall I say to them?" the Lord answered him: "He Who Is has sent me to you." Therefore this name "Who is" is the most proper name of God.

I answer that this name "Who is" is, for a threefold reason, the most proper name of God. First, on account of its signification. For it does not signify some form, but the very existence (*esse*). Wherefore, since God's existence is his very essence, and this befits no other, as was shown above, it is manifest that among other names this most properly names God. For each thing is denominated from its form.[983]

Second, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less common, or, if they are convertible with it, nevertheless they add something over and above it according to their rationale. Hence they in some manner "inform" and "determine" the thing itself. But our intellect cannot know God's very essence in via, as it is in itself; rather, whatever mode it determines concerning that which it understands of God, it falls short of the mode in which God is in himself. And therefore, the less determinate, and the more common and absolute certain names are, by so much the more properly are they said of God by us. Whence also St. John Damascene says that "Who is" is the most principal among all the names said of God; for "comprehending wholly in itself it has the very existence, like an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." For by any other name some mode of the substance of a thing is determined; but this name "Who is" determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate as to all. And so it names the very sea of infinite substance.

Third, from its mode of signifying: for it signifies existence in the present. And this is said most properly of God, whose existence knows not a past or a future; as St. Augustine says in book 5 On the Trinity.[984]

Reply to the first: This name "Who is" is a more proper name of God than the name God, as to that from which it is imposed - namely, from existence (*esse*) - and as to the mode of signifying and consignifying, as has been said. But as to that to signify which the name is imposed, this name God is more proper, which is imposed to signify the divine nature. And yet more proper is the Tetragrammaton, which is imposed to signify God's very incommunicable and (so to speak) singular substance.

Reply to the second: The name Good is the principal name of God insofar as he is a cause, yet not simply; for existence absolutely is presupposed to "cause."

Reply to the third: It is not necessary that all divine names import a habitude to creatures; it suffices that they are imposed from certain perfections proceeding from God into creatures, among which the first is existence itself, from which this name "Who is" is taken.[985][986]

Conclusion of the article: The name WHO IS more properly, and especially among the rest, expresses the essence of God; St. Thomas most fittingly explains it in the body of the article; and among the holy Fathers, whom in the next disputation we shall mention, it is without controversy; yet in the replies St. Thomas has a more difficult doctrine, which we willingly examine in detail.

983. St. Thomas, I, q. 3, a. 4.
984. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V; also De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus q. 17.
985. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus III.
986. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 12.

Disputatio LIX - Whether "Who is" is the same as the Tetragrammaton

Caput I - Two extreme opinions; the prior opinion of St. Thomas

Whether the name QUI EST and the Tetragrammaton, which is commonly said IEHOVAH, are the same. Disp. 59.

Two extreme opinions on this matter.

The prior opinion is St. Thomas's in the first reply: that there are two distinct names of God imposed to signify him himself, the name "Who Is," and the name Tetragrammaton, or the name Iehovah, which St. Jerome had earlier handed down in the Epistle to Marcella, number 138. This is proved from the fact that in Exodus 3, when Moses was being sent by the Lord to the sons of Israel, and he asked the Lord with these words, "If they shall say to me, What is his name? what shall I say to them?" he answered, "Who Is has sent me to you." But a little later, when in the same chapter it is said, "The Lord God of your fathers," in the Hebrew there is set the name יהוה, Iehova, which is called the Tetragrammaton; therefore they are distinct names.[987]

In this opinion Burgensis is included; who, however, in the addition to chapter three of Exodus, although he deems this opinion of the holy Doctor probable, himself taught otherwise. For he asserts that when in that chapter the Lord said, "I am who am," and again, "Who Is has sent me to you," he did not wish to impose upon himself any name by which he might peculiarly denote his essence (such as some think that "Who Is" is), but he wished only to indicate that he would be leader, and would be present in all the labors of the Israelites' pilgrimage. For where the Vulgate reads, "Ego sum, qui sum," in Hebrew it stands thus, אהיה אשר אהיה, Eheh aser eheieh, that is, "I will be, who will be"; and again, where the Vulgate reads, "Who Is has sent me to you," in Hebrew it is said thus, "He-who-will-be has sent me to you." The sense, says Burgensis, is: "I will be, who will always be with you"; and again: "He-who-will-be," that is, "he who said, I will be with you," has sent me to you. And he says this is the exposition of the Hebrews. Wherefore, since later in the same chapter of Exodus it is said, "The Lord God of your fathers," where the Tetragrammaton Iehova is put, there is not set some other name; but since earlier no peculiar name of God had been set, here that name is set which is called first and ineffable.[988][989]

Caput II - The truer opinion

A more probable and common opinion is that which teaches that "Who Is," which is had in Exodus 3, and the Tetragrammaton, which is put there as well, are entirely the same. This opinion contains two points. One is that "Who Is" is a name of God, and that the Lord in Exodus 3 used it in

987. St. Jerome, Epistula ad Marcellam (no. 138).
988. Burgensis, Addition to Exodus 3.
989. The Venerable Bede, on Exodus, to the same effect.

order to impose a name on himself and to express his essence to Moses. The other is that it is entirely the same name, and imposed to signify the same thing in the same way. We shall prove the former part in this chapter, but the latter in the following.

For which purpose, first it is to be noted, as Lippomanus most aptly observed in the Catena on Exodus on that passage which we cited from chapter 3, that it matters little that the Vulgate renders in the present the future tense which is in the Hebrew - namely, "I will be who will be," and again, "I-Will-Be has sent me to you" - rendering it as "I am who am," and again, "Who Is has sent me to you." For in Hebrew very often the future is put for the present, of which the Hebrew lacks a proper form; as in Genesis 37, when Joseph, seeking his brothers in the field, said - in Hebrew, "What wilt thou seek?" or "What wilt thou be seeking?" - our Vulgate has, "What do you seek?" And in Tobit 1 the Vulgate reads, "Whence do you come?" whereas the Hebrew says, "Whence will you come?" And in our common Spanish tongue we sometimes say in a similar interrogation about the future, "So then you will be coming from such a place," as if we were saying, "you are coming." Accordingly, even if one were to say that there the future is not put for the present, nevertheless in either way the divine nature and essence are peculiarly set forth both in the present and in the future - "I am who am," and "I will be who will be" - as will be set forth more fully below.[990][991]

Caput III - The latter part of the opinion, that the name WHO IS, and the tetragrammaton, are the same

By authority this can likewise be proved, namely, that the name "Who is" and the tetragrammaton, which is commonly said "Iehoua," are altogether the same. First, among the Fathers this is attested by Clement of Alexandria, who says that Iehoua is the name of God, which we interpret "Who is" and "Who will be"; the same is expressly handed down by Theodoret, a most skilled knower of the Hebrew tongue, in the Questions on Exodus, q. 15.[992][993] Among the other Fathers cited in the preceding chapter, there is none who treats of this matter; concerning that name Nazianzen teaches this alone in that oration 36, that among the Hebrews it was ineffable and held in the highest veneration, so that with those characters no other [name] was written.[994] Among the more recent authors the same is taught by Pagninus and Mercerus in the Thesaurus, by Galatinus, by Lippomanus in the Catena on that place Exodus 3, by Eugubinus on the same place, and by Genebrard in the book On the Trinity.[995][996][997][998][999][1000]

990. Lippomanus, Catena on Exodus, ad Exod. 3.
991. Hugh of St. Victor, Annotations on Exodus, book 1.
992. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata.
993. Theodoret, Quaestiones in Exodum, q. 15.
994. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio 36 (the fourth on theology), no. 72.
995. Santes Pagninus, Thesaurus.
996. Johannes Mercerus, Thesaurus.
997. Petrus Galatinus, De arcanis catholicae veritatis, lib. 2, cap. 10.
998. Lippomanus, Catena on Exodus, on Exod. 3.
999. Eugubinus (Agostino Steuco), on the same place of Exodus.
1000. Genebrardus, De Trinitate.

Moreover Galatinus, Mercerus, and Genebrard teach especially that that name of God was ineffable for the sake of religion, just as we also reported from Nazianzen, so that in its place the name Adonai would be read - unless, as Mercerus says, the same name Adonai had immediately preceded; for then Elohim was read. This, however, was preserved outside the Temple; for as Galatinus and Genebrard hand down from the ancient Hebrews, when the priest blessed the people, he pronounced this name with its proper vowels; and in this way they understand that passage Num. 6, "So shall you bless the sons of Israel," that is to say, thus, that is, with my ineffable name. So taught Rabbi Aben Ezra in the preface to Moses, and to the same point Josephus, alluding, relates in the Jewish War, book 4, chapter 12, that Annanus the high priest boasted that he had put on the pontifical garment, and for that reason cried out the ineffable name of God. And this religious rite of not pronouncing that name the Jews observe even to this day.[10011002]

Furthermore, that the tetragrammaton Iehoua and the verb yihyeh, that is, "he will be," are the same is easily evident: in that yihyeh, which is the future of the verb hayah, it has the same consonants as the tetragrammaton, except that yod is changed into vau, as is frequent among the Hebrews. For by what reason could the tetragrammaton be ineffable, unless because it signified the nature and essence (*essentia*) of God far more perfectly than [any] other? But that cannot be better denoted by another name than "Who is," or "Who will be": for it signifies that peculiar mode of essence, either what is through itself, or what is always in the same way; therefore it is the same name, with only (as I said) one letter changed, as is familiar among the Hebrews in many other [cases].

As to the pronunciation of the name Iehoua: it is now pronounced in the common way "Iehoua," which pronunciation Mercerus testifies to have been expressed from the beginning by Greek letters; from which some think the name Iouis was derived. But it is not pronounced "Iehovah" as it ought to be uttered with its proper vowels, since it is the future of the verb "to be"; because now it has vowels not proper to that future, but to the name Adonai; and from the time when the Hebrews wrote the points and vowels under the consonants, it is always written with the vowels of the name Adonai; except that, since Adonai in the first place has a guttural letter, it requires a compound sheva with pathach, whereas in the word Iehoua a simple sheva without pathach is set, because the first letter is not guttural.

Mercerus, moreover, reports from Jerome that, if the name Iehoua were to be pronounced with its proper vowels, it would be read "Iao." Yet I myself have found in Jerome, column [edition], in epistle 142, which is to Damasus, that in the middle of it with two lambdas doubled, that ineffable name is to be set down, each of which is itself also a name of God - how this is to be understood I do not know. I pass over the many mysteries which the ancient Hebrews said were in this tetragrammaton, which Galatinus more fully explains in the cited chapter and what follows; but as to what pertains to the mystery of the Trinity and is contained in that same name, we will speak in Disputation 108, chapter 3.

1001. Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra, Preface to Moses, and to Joseph.
1002. Josephus, De bello Iudaico, lib. 4, cap. 12.

Two things only remain to be observed in this disputation. The first concerns what St. Thomas teaches, namely, that the name "God," with respect to that for the signifying of which it was imposed, is more proper to God than the name "Who is." This, indeed, I do not see how it can be defended: for although the name "God" signifies the very substance of God, as was explained above in Disputation 58, nevertheless that [substance] is also signified by the name "Who is," or by the tetragrammaton; therefore they are equal with respect to that for the signifying of which they were imposed. Furthermore, the name "God" is derived from an action, as we said there; but the name "Who is" [is derived] from the very proper act (*actus*) of the nature, namely from existence (*esse*). Besides, the name "Who is" more explicitly and distinctly denotes the nature (*natura*) of God; but the name "God" signifies it confusedly.

The second [thing] to be noted is that it is not true what Galatinus teaches, book 2 On the Secrets of Catholic Truth, chapter 10, from Rabbi Moses in the Moreh, par., chapter 60, namely that the name "Who is," or the tetragrammaton, does not signify anything common to God and creatures, as the other names of God signify, such as "wise," etc. For if you use the name "Who is" in its whole breadth, it is clear that it is common to creatures: for they also are; just as the name "wise" is common, according to the whole extension even of analogy. But if you take it for the principal signification, that is, for that which is through essence, or always without any change, without end and beginning, it signifies nothing common: yet by the same reason the name "wise," taken for its principal signification, does not denote anything common to creatures; for it signifies "wise through essence," which does not befit creatures.

Articulus XII - Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God

To the twelfth [article] thus we proceed. It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God.

1. For Pseudo-Dionysius says in Celestial Hierarchy, chapter 2, a little before the middle, that negations about God are true, but affirmations are incomplex.[1003]
2. Moreover, Boethius says in the book On the Trinity that a simple form cannot be [as] a subject. But God is especially a simple form, as was shown above. Therefore he cannot be [a] subject; but everything of which an affirmative proposition is formed is taken as [a] subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition about God cannot be formed.[1004]
3. Moreover, every intellect understanding a thing otherwise than it is, is false; but God has existence (*esse*) without any composition, as was proved above. Therefore, since every affirmative intellect understands something with composition, it seems that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be formed.

But on the contrary:

1003. Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, c. 2 (a little before the middle).
1004. Boethius, De Trinitate.

It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Pseudo-Dionysius says in the second chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy that the negations about God are true, but the affirmations are incompact.

1. Further, Boethius says in the book On the Trinity that a simple form cannot be a subject. But God is most of all a simple form, as was shown above. Therefore he cannot be a subject; but whatever it is about which an affirmative proposition is formed is taken as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.
2. Further, every intellect that understands a thing otherwise than it is, is false; but God has existence (*esse*) without any composition, as was proved above. Since therefore every affirmative intellect understands something with composition, it seems that a true affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.

But on the contrary: What is subject to faith is not false; but certain affirmative propositions are subject to faith, for instance, that God is three and one, and that he is omnipotent. Therefore affirmative propositions can truly be formed about God.

I answer: Affirmative propositions can truly be formed about God. For clarity in this, one must know that in any true affirmative proposition it is necessary that the predicate and the subject signify the same according to the thing in some way, and different according to reason. And this is evident both in propositions that are about an accidental predicate and in those that are about a substantial predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in supposit, and differ in ratio; for one ratio is that of man, and another that of white. Likewise when I say, "man is an animal": that very thing which is man is truly animal. For in the same supposit there is a sensible nature, by which it is called "animal," and a rational nature, by which it is called "man." Hence here too the predicate and the subject are the same in supposit, but diverse in ratio.

But in propositions in which the same is predicated of itself, this in a way is found in that the intellect draws what it posits on the part of the subject to the side of the supposit; but what it posits on the part of the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the supposit; according to which it is said that predicates are taken formally, and subjects materially. To this diversity, which is according to reason, there corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject; the identity however in reality the intellect signifies by the very composition.

But God, considered in himself, is altogether one and simple; yet our intellect under diverse conceptions knows him, because it cannot see him as he is in himself. Yet however it understands him under diverse conceptions, it knows that one and the same thing simply corresponds to all its conceptions. Therefore by this plurality, which is according to reason, it represents by the plurality of predicate and subject; but unity it represents by composition.

Reply to the first: Pseudo-Dionysius says that affirmations about God are incompact, or "inconvenient" according to another translation, insofar as no name befits God according to the mode of signifying, as was said above.

Reply to the second: Our intellect cannot comprehend the simple subsistent forms as they are in themselves; but it apprehends them according to the mode of composite things, in which there is something that is subjected, and there is something that inheres. And thus it apprehends a simple form under the ratio of subject, and attributes something to it.

Reply to the third: This proposition, "the intellect understanding a thing otherwise than it is," is twofold: from the fact that this adverb "otherwise" can determine this verb "understands" either on the side of the thing understood, or on the side of the one understanding. If on the side of the thing understood, thus the proposition is true, and the sense is: whoever's intellect understands a thing to be otherwise than it is, is false. But this does not have place in the present matter, because our intellect, forming a proposition about God, does not say that he is composite, but simple. If however on the side of the one understanding, thus the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in understanding is other than the mode of the thing in existing. For it is manifest that our intellect understands material things existing below it immaterially, nor does it understand them to be immaterial; but it has an immaterial mode in understanding. And likewise, when it understands simple things that are above it, it understands them according to its own mode, namely, composite; yet not in such a way that it understands them to be composite. And thus our intellect is not false in forming a composition about God.

Conclusion of the article: Affirmative propositions can be formed and enunciated about God. But since, in order that a proposition be formal and not identical (as the Logicians say), it is necessary that the subject and the predicate in some way agree, and in some way also differ, it is customary in this article to treat of the distinction of the attributes from the divine essence and among themselves. Of this we shall speak more conveniently in Disputation 116 and the following, where we must dispute universally about every distinction of reason in the things that are in God; and incidentally we shall see in what way not only some propositions about God can be truly enunciated, but also that some are false. For the present question, let what we have said suffice.

Quaestio XIV - On the knowledge of God

After the consideration of those things which pertain to the divine substance, it remains to consider those things which pertain to its operation. And because one operation is that which remains in the agent, but another which proceeds to an external effect: first we shall treat of knowledge (*scientia*) and will (for to understand is in the intelligent, and to will is in the willing), and afterwards of the power of God, which is considered as the principle of the divine operation proceeding into an external effect. And because to understand is a certain living, after the consideration of the divine knowledge, the divine life must also be considered. And because knowledge is of true things, there will also be consideration of truth and falsity. Again, since everything known is in the knower, but the rationes of things, according as they are in God knowing, are called ideas, together with the consideration of knowledge there must also be added the consideration of the ideas.

Concerning knowledge there are sixteen points of inquiry.

According to the division that we premised (above at the beginning St. Thomas begins from this question up to the twenty-sixth to dispute about the perfections of God which consist in an immanent operation; among which the first is knowledge and the operation of the intellect, about which, and about the things pertaining to it, he treats from this question up to the eighteenth):

Articulus I - Whether in God there is knowledge

First, thus it is proceeded. It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit, which does not befit God, since it is intermediate between potency (*potentia*) and act (*actus*). Therefore there is not knowledge in God.

1. Further, knowledge, since it is the conclusion of reasoning, is a certain cognition caused by another, namely, from the cognition of principles. But nothing caused is in God. Therefore there is not knowledge in God.
2. Further, every knowledge is either universal or particular. But in God there is not universal and particular, as is evident from the foregoing. Therefore in God there is not knowledge.

But on the contrary: The Apostle says: "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God" (Rom 11).

I answer: In God there is knowledge most perfectly. For evidence of this, it must be considered that knowers are distinguished from non-knowers in this, that non-knowers have nothing but their own form only; but the knower is of a nature to have also the form of another thing: for the species of the thing known is in the knower. Whence it is evident that the nature of a non-knowing thing is more narrowed and limited. But the nature of knowing things has greater breadth and extension. Wherefore the Philosopher says in the third book On the Soul that the soul is in a way all things. But the contraction of form is through matter. And so we said above that forms, insofar as they are more immaterial, to that extent more approach a certain infinity. Therefore it is evident that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive, and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of cognition. Whence in the second book On the Soul it is said that plants do not know because of their materiality. But sense is cognitive because it is receptive of species without matter; and the intellect is still more cognitive, because it is more separate from matter and unmixed, as is said in the third book On the Soul. Whence, since God is at the summit of immateriality (as is evident from the foregoing), it follows that he is at the summit of cognition.

Reply to the first: Since the perfections proceeding from God into creatures are in God in a higher mode (as was said above), it is necessary that whatever name taken from any perfection of a creature is attributed to God, there be excluded from its signification everything which pertains to the imperfect mode that befits the creature. Hence knowledge is not a quality in God, nor a habit, but substance and pure act. The conclusion is affirmative.

Reply to the second: Those things which are divided and multiple in creatures are in God simply and unitedly, as was said above. But man, according to different objects of knowledge, has different cognitions. For according as he knows principles, he is said to have understanding; but knowledge, according as he knows conclusions; wisdom, according as he knows the highest cause; counsel, or prudence, according as he knows things to be done. But God knows all these by one simple cognition, as will be made clear below. Hence the simple cognition of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that from each of them, insofar as it comes into divine predication, whatever imperfection there is is excluded, and whatever perfection there is is retained. And according to this it is said in Job: "With him is wisdom and strength, he has counsel and understanding."

Reply to the third: Knowledge is according to the mode of the knower. For the known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. And therefore, since the mode of the divine essence (*essentia*) is higher than the mode by which creatures are, the divine knowledge does not have the mode of created knowledge, that it should be universal or particular, or in habit or in potency; or disposed according to any such mode.

Articulus II - Whether God understands himself

In the second place, thus it is proceeded. It seems that God does not understand himself. For it is said in the Book of Causes that every knower who knows his essence is returning to his essence by a complete return. But God goes forth outside his essence, nor is he moved in any way; and thus it does not befit him to return to his essence. Therefore he is not one who knows his own essence, and so God does not understand himself.

1. Further, to understand is a certain being-passive and being-moved, as is said in the third book On the Soul; and knowledge is also a likening to the thing known, and it is also the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved or is passive or is perfected by itself, nor is a likeness to itself, as St. Hilary says. Therefore God is not one who knows himself.
2. Further, precisely on account of the intellect we are like to God: because according to the mind we are to the image of God, as St. Augustine says. But our intellect does not understand itself, unless as it understands other things, as is said in the third book On the Soul. Therefore God does not understand himself, unless perhaps by understanding other things.

But on the contrary: It is said, 1 Cor 2: "The things that are of God no one knows, except the Spirit of God."

I answer: God understands himself. For the evidence of which it must be known that, although in operations which pass over into an external effect the object of the operation, which is signified as the terminus, is something outside the agent, nevertheless in operations which are in the very agent the object which is signified as the terminus of the operation is in the agent itself; and according as it is in it, so the operation is in act. Whence it is said in the book On the Soul that "the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act." For from this it is that we

sense or understand something in act, that our intellect or sense is informed in act by the species of the sensible or of the intelligible. And according to this alone the sense or the intellect is other than the sensible or intelligible: because a power is in potency. Since therefore God has no potentiality, but is pure act, it is necessary that in him intellect and the intelligible be the same in every way, namely, that neither he should lack an intelligible species, as our intellect does when it understands in potency, nor that the intelligible species be other than the substance of the divine intellect, as happens in our intellect. And thus he understands himself through himself.

Reply to the first: To return to one's own essence is nothing other than for a thing to subsist in itself. For form, insofar as it perfects matter by giving existence, is poured out, as it were, into another; but insofar as it has existence in itself, it returns into itself. Therefore cognitive powers which are not subsisting, but are the acts of certain organs, do not know themselves, as is evident in the several senses. But the cognitive powers which are subsisting, know themselves. And on this account it is said in the Book of Causes that the knower of his own essence returns to his essence. But to subsist through himself (*per se*) most properly befits God. Hence, according to this mode of speaking, he is most of all returning to his essence, and knowing himself.

Reply to the second: That "to be moved" and "to be passive" are taken equivocally when it is said that to understand is a certain being-moved, or being-passive, as is said in the third book On the Soul. For to understand is not a motion, which is the act of an imperfect thing, which is from another into another; but it is the act of a perfect thing existing in the very agent. Likewise also that the intellect be perfected by the intelligible, or be likened to it, befits that intellect which is at times in potency: because by this, that it is in potency, it differs from the intelligible; and it is likened to it by the intelligible species, which is a likeness of the thing understood, and it is perfected by it, as potency by act. But in the divine intellect, which in no way is in potency, it is not perfected by the intelligible, nor does it -

Reply to the second: Therefore the divine intellect, which in no way is in potency (*potentia*), is neither perfected by the intelligible, nor is it assimilated to it; but it is its own perfection, and its own understanding.

Reply to the third: Natural being (*esse naturale*) does not belong to prime matter, which is in potency, except in so far as it is reduced into act by form (*forma*). But our possible intellect holds itself in the order of intelligibles as prime matter does in the order of natural things; in that it is in potency to intelligibles, just as prime matter is to natural things. Hence our possible intellect cannot have the operation of intelligibles, except in so far as it is perfected by the intelligible species of some thing; and thus it understands itself through an intelligible species, just as it does other things. It is also manifest that from this - that it knows the intelligible - it understands its own understanding; and through act it knows the potency of the intellect. But God is, as it were, pure act (*actus purus*), both in the order of beings and in the order of intelligibles: and therefore through himself he understands himself most perfectly.

Nota concerning these two articles.

The conclusion is affirmative. Nothing occurs in these two articles that is of such difficulty as to be worth a special note. Cajetan labors strenuously in examining St. Thomas's arguments: yet that has seemed to me quite superfluous. For the doctrine of the holy Doctor is so perspicuous as not to need confirmation. Nor has there ever yet been anyone who dared to say that God is foolish or ignorant: for this is a perfection most of all to be attributed to God. It is, however, to be observed, according to the doctrine of Pseudo-Dionysius which we reported above in Disputation 22, chapter 5, that the Fathers, when they ascribe to God wisdom, intelligence, and the other things that pertain to the intellect, mean that all these are not found in God in the same mode in which they are in us, but in a far more eminent way; yet so that they cannot be explained or understood by us except through those things which we see and experience in ourselves: for in God the science (*scientia*) of these is nothing other than his substance (*substantia*), which, receiving in itself no change according to the variation of things, is nevertheless variously named by us - namely, science of simple intelligence, or of vision - as we shall see in the course of this question.

Articulus III - Whether God comprehends himself

To the third, this is the procedure.

It seems that God does not comprehend himself. For St. Augustine says in the book On 83 Questions, that that which comprehends itself is finite to itself.[1005] But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore he does not comprehend himself. And if it be said that God is infinite with respect to us, but finite with respect to himself: on the contrary, a thing is truer according to what it is in God than according to what it is in us. If, therefore, God is finite to himself but infinite to us, it is truer that God be finite than infinite - which is against what was determined earlier. Therefore God does not comprehend himself.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in the same place, "Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself."[1006] But God understands himself. Therefore he comprehends himself.

I answer that God perfectly comprehends himself; and this is clear as follows. A thing is then said to be comprehended when one arrives at the end of knowledge of it; and this is when a thing is known as perfectly as it is knowable. Thus a demonstrable proposition is comprehended when it is known through a demonstration, and not when it is known through some probable reason. Now it is manifest that God knows himself as perfectly as he is perfectly knowable. For each thing is knowable according to the mode of its act. A thing is not known according to what it is in potency, but according to what it is in act, as is said in the ninth book of the Metaphysics.[1007] But God's power in knowing is as great as his actuality in existing: for by the very fact that he is in act, and separated from all matter and potency, God is cognoscitive, as has been shown. Hence it is manifest that he knows himself as much as he is knowable. And for this reason he comprehends himself perfectly.

1005. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 2.
1006. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, ibid.
1007. Aristotle, Metaphysics IX (Theta), text 20.

Reply to the first: To comprehend, if it be taken properly, signifies to have and include another. And so it is necessary that everything comprehended be finite, as that which is enclosed. But God is not thus said to be comprehended by himself, as if his intellect were other than himself, and seized and included himself. Rather such ways of speaking are to be construed by negation. For just as God is said to be "in himself" because he is contained by no exterior thing, so he is said to be "comprehended by himself" because nothing of himself lies hidden from himself. For St. Augustine says in the book On Seeing God addressed to Paulinus, that "that is wholly comprehended in seeing God, which is so seen that nothing of it lies hidden to the seer."[1008]

Reply to the second: When it is said, "God is finite to himself," this is to be understood according to a certain likeness of proportion, because thus does a thing behave in not exceeding its intellect, as something finite behaves in not exceeding a finite intellect. But in no way is God said to be finite to himself in such a way that he would understand himself to be something finite.

Conclusion is affirmative: although somewhat difficult, since it contains a difficulty common with that which we treated in Disputation 53; from what we said there, it can easily be gathered what we ought to say about this matter.

Articulus IV - Whether God's understanding is his substance

To the fourth, this is the procedure.

It seems that God's very act of understanding is not his substance. For to understand is a certain operation. But an operation signifies something proceeding from an operator. Yet the substance of an operator does not proceed from the one operating. Therefore God's very act of understanding is not his substance.

Further: When someone understands that he understands, this is not to understand something great or the principal object of intellect, but something secondary and accessory. If, therefore, God is his act of understanding, to understand God will be like when we understand "to understand." And thus it will not be something great to understand God.

Further: Every understanding is to understand something. Therefore, when God understands himself, if he himself is not other than his understanding, he understands himself to understand; and he understands himself to understand himself to understand; and so on to infinity. Therefore God's very act of understanding is not his substance.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in the seventh book On the Trinity: "For God, to be is the same as to be wise. But to be wise is to understand. Therefore for God to be is to understand." But God's to-be is his substance, as was shown above. Therefore God's understanding is his substance.[1009]

I answer that it is necessary to say that God's understanding is his substance. For if God's understanding were something other than his substance, it would follow, as the Philosopher says in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, that something other than God's substance would be the act

1008. St. Augustine, Epistola ad Paulinum, De videndo Deum, c. 19.

and perfection of the divine substance, to which the divine substance would be related as potency to act - which is altogether impossible.[1010] For to understand is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Now how that is so must be considered. For, as said above, to understand is not an action that proceeds to something external, but remains in the operator as an act and perfection of him, just as to be (*esse*) is the perfection of the existing thing. For as being follows upon form, so to understand follows upon the intelligible species. But in God there is no form which is other than his own to-be, as was shown above. Whence, since his very essence is the very intelligible species, it follows of necessity that his very act of understanding is his essence and his to-be. And thus it is clear from all the premises that in God the intellect (*intellectus*), the one understanding, the thing understood, the intelligible species, and the very act of understanding are altogether one and the same. Hence it is clear from this that, when God is called "understanding," no multiplicity is posited in his substance.

Reply to the first: To understand is not an operation going forth from the operator; rather it remains in him.

Reply to the second: When it is understood that one understands, that which is understood is not something subsistent; and therefore it is not something great, as when we understand our understanding. Nor is it so in the divine case: for the divine act of understanding, which is subsistent in itself, is of itself and not of something other; so that it would be necessary to proceed to infinity.

And from this the reply to the third is also clear. For the divine understanding, which is subsistent in himself, is of himself and not of something other; so that it would be necessary to proceed to infinity.

Observation: A certain question could, however, be examined here, namely whether the science of vision is the substance of God. The reason for doubting is that this (namely, the science of vision) is in God from eternity in such a way that from eternity, if God willed, it could not be; therefore it seems by its nature able of itself to be absent and to be present to God without corruption of him; and hence not to be the substance of God, which should always necessarily be in the same way. But because this is a difficulty in common with that which we shall treat concerning the will of God below in Disputation 79, we will for the present abstain from the discussion.

Articulus V - Whether God understands things other than himself

To the fifth, this is the procedure.

It seems that God does not know things other than himself. For whatever things are other than God are outside himself. But St. Augustine says in the book On 83 Questions that God looks upon nothing outside himself. Therefore he does not know things other than himself.[1005]

1009. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, c. 3.
1010. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII (Lambda).
1005. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 2.

Further: The understood is the perfection of the one understanding. If, therefore, God understands things other than himself, something other than himself will be a perfection of God, and nobler than God - which is impossible.

Further: The very act of understanding has its species from the intelligible, as every act has from its object. Whence also the act of understanding is so much the nobler as that is nobler which is understood. But God is his very act of understanding, as is clear from what has been said. If, therefore, God understands something other than himself, God will be specified by something other than himself - which is impossible. Therefore he does not understand things other than himself.

But on the contrary: It is said in Hebrews 4: "All things are naked and open to his eyes."

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod to understand is not an operation that goes forth from the agent, but one remaining in the agent

Ad secundum dicendum, quod when there is understood that "understanding" which is not subsistent, nothing great is understood, just as when we understand our own understanding. And therefore it is not similar in the case of the divine understanding, which is subsistent

Et per hoc patet responsio ad tertium. For the divine understanding, which is subsistent in itself, is of itself, and not of anything else, so that there would be need to proceed to infinity.

Conclusio est affirmans: and this is deduced by the best natural reason from what was said above, namely, that if some other thing were the act and perfection of the divine substance, the divine substance would have potency to act - which is altogether impossible. For to understand is the act and perfection of the intelligent. Now, to make this clearer, one must consider that, as was said above, understanding is not an action progressing to something outside, but remains in the operator as its act and perfection, as the perfection of what exists. Just as existence follows upon form, so understanding follows upon the intelligible species. But in God there is not a form which is other than his existence, as was said above. Hence, since his very essence is also the intelligible species, it follows of necessity that his very understanding is his essence and his existence. And thus it is clear from all the premises, that in God the intellect, the one understanding, and that which is understood, and the intelligible species, and the very act of understanding, are altogether one and the same. Whence it is plain from this, that by the fact that God is called "intelligent," no multiplicity is posited in his substance.

But on the contrary: It is said in Hebrews 4: "All things are naked and open to his eyes."

Whether God knows things other than himself

I answer that it must be said that it is necessary that God know things other than himself. For it is manifest that he perfectly understands himself; otherwise his existence would not be perfect, since his existence is his understanding. But if something is perfectly known, it is necessary that its power be perfectly known. Now the power of a thing cannot be perfectly known unless those things

to which its power extends are known. Therefore, since the divine power extends to other things, in that it is the first efficient cause of all beings (as is evident from what was said above), it is necessary that God know things other than himself. And this becomes even clearer if there be added that in the case of the first efficient cause, namely God, his existence is his understanding. Hence, whatever effects pre-exist in God as in the first cause, must be in his very understanding; and all things must be in him according to an intelligible mode. For whatever is in another is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.

But to know how he knows things other than himself, one must consider that something is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known through its own proper species adequate to the knowable thing; as when the eye sees a man through the species of the man. But something is seen in another when it is seen through the species of that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole through the species of the whole, or when a man is seen in a mirror through the species of the mirror, or in whatever other way it happens that something is seen in another. Thus, then, it must be said that God sees himself in himself, because he sees himself through his essence. But he sees things other than himself not in themselves, but in himself, insofar as his essence contains the likeness of the others that are from him.

Reply to the first: The word of St. Augustine saying that God beholds nothing outside himself is not to be understood as though he did not behold anything which is outside himself, but because that which is outside himself he does not behold except in himself, as has been said.

Reply to the second: The understood is the perfection of the intelligent, not indeed according to its substance, but according to its species, according to which it is in the intellect as its form and perfection. For a stone is not in the soul, but its species, as is said in On the Soul III.[1011] But those things which are other than God are understood by God insofar as the essence of God contains their species, as was said. Hence it does not follow that anything other than the divine essence is the perfection of the divine intellect.

Reply to the third: The very act of understanding is not specified by that which is understood in another, but by that principal thing understood, in which the other things are understood. For the act of understanding is specified by its object only insofar as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual operation. For every operation is specified by the form which is the principle of the operation, as heating is by heat. Hence by that intelligible form is specified the intellectual operation which makes the intellect to be in act. And this is the principal species of the thing understood, which in God is nothing other than his essence, in which all the species of things are contained. Hence it is not necessary that the divine understanding, or rather God himself, be specified by anything other than by the divine essence.

Conclusion: God knows all created things not in themselves, but in his own essence.

1011. Aristotle, On the Soul (De anima) III.

Articulus VI - Whether God knows things other than himself by a proper cognition

It is objected that:

1) God seems not to know things other than himself by a proper cognition. For he knows things other than himself, as has been said, according to that according to which things other than himself are in him; but things other than he are in him as in the first, common, and universal cause. Therefore, things are known by God as in the first and universal cause. But this is to know in universal, and not by a proper cognition. Therefore God knows things other than himself in universal, and not by a proper cognition.

2) Further, as far as the essence of the creature is distant from the divine essence, so far is the divine essence distant from the creature's essence. But through the essence of the creature the divine essence cannot be known, as was said above. Therefore neither through the divine essence can the essence of the creature be known. And so, since God knows nothing except through his own essence, it follows that he does not know the creature according to its essence so as to know of it what it is, which is to have a proper cognition of the thing.

3) Further, A proper cognition of a thing is not had except through its proper ratio. But since God knows all things through his essence, it does not seem that he knows each thing through its proper ratio; for that cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse things. Therefore God does not have a proper cognition of things, but a common one. For to know things not according to their proper ratio is to know things only in common.

But on the contrary: To have a proper cognition of things is to know things not only in common, but according to the way in which they are distinct from one another. But thus God knows things. Whence it is said in Hebrews 4 that he "reaches even to the dividing of soul and spirit, of the joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart; and there is no creature invisible in his sight."

I answer that, concerning this, certain people have erred, saying that God knows things other than himself only in common, namely insofar as they are beings. For just as fire, if it knew itself as a principle of heat, would know the nature of heat and all other things insofar as they are hot, so God, insofar as he knows himself as the principle of existing, knows the nature of being and all other things insofar as they are beings. But this cannot be. For to understand something in common and not in particular is to know something imperfectly. Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potency to act, arrives first at a universal and confused cognition of things than at the proper cognition of things, proceeding as from the imperfect to the perfect, as is plain in Physics I, in the preface.[1012] If therefore God's cognition of the things other than himself were only in universal and not in particular, it would follow that his understanding was not in every way perfect, and consequently neither would his existence be - which is contrary to the things shown above. It must therefore be said that he knows things other than himself by a proper cognition, not only according to that in which they are common in the notion of being, but according to that by which

1012. Aristotle, Physics I, prooemium (opening discussion).

one is distinguished from another. And for the evidence of this one must consider that some, wishing to show that God by one thing knows many, use certain examples: as, for instance, that if a center knew itself, it would know all the lines proceeding from the center, ...[1013]

But these examples, although they are in some respect similar, namely as regards universal causality, nevertheless fail in this, that multitude and diversity are not caused by that one universal principle as regards that by which it is a principle of distinction, but only as regards that in which things communicate. For the diversity of color is not caused by light alone, but by the diverse disposition of the diaphanous recipient; and similarly the diversity of lines by diverse position. And hence it is that a diversity and multitude of this sort cannot be known in their principle according to a proper cognition, but only in common.

But in God it is not so; for it was shown above that whatever perfection there is in any creature at all, the whole of it pre-exists and is contained in God according to an excellent mode. And not only that in which creatures communicate - namely, existence (*esse*), which pertains to perfection - but also those things by which creatures are mutually distinguished: as to live and to understand, and the like, by which things living beings are distinguished from non-living, and intelligent beings from non-intelligent. And every form by which any thing is constituted in its proper species is a certain perfection. And thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards that which is common to all, but also as regards those things according to which things are distinguished. And thus, since God contains in Himself all perfections, the divine essence (*essentia*) is compared to all essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity to numbers, or the center to lines, but as a perfect act (*actus*) to imperfect acts: as, if I were to say, man is to animal; or the senary, which is a perfect number, is to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known not only in common, but also by a proper cognition. Thus, one who knows man knows animal by a proper cognition; and one who knows the senary knows the ternary by a proper cognition. Therefore, since the divine essence has in itself whatever perfection the essence of any other thing has, and even more: God in Himself can know all things by a proper cognition. For the proper nature of each thing consists in this, that it participates in some mode of the divine perfection. Nor would God perfectly know Himself unless He knew in what way His perfection is in any way participable by others. Nor would He perfectly know the very nature of existing unless He knew all the modes of existing. Whence it is manifest that God knows all things by a proper cognition, according to that by which they are distinguished from others.

Reply to the first: To know something "as it is in the knower" can be understood in two ways. In one way, insofar as this adverb "so" (sic) imports a mode of cognition on the part of the thing known; and thus it is false. For the knower does not always know the known according to that being (*esse*) which it has in the knower. For the eye does not know the stone according to the being which it has in the eye, but by the species of the stone which it has in itself it knows the stone according to the being which it has outside the eye. And if a knower should know the known according to the being which it has in the knower, nevertheless it also knows it according to the

1013. The example is a standard one in the scholastic tradition; see the Commentator (Averroes) for comparisons of knowing many through one.

being which it has outside the knower. Thus the intellect knows the stone according to the intelligible being which it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that it understands; but nonetheless it knows that the stone exists in its proper nature. But if it be understood insofar as this adverb "so" imports a mode on the part of the knower, it is true that only thus does the knower know the known, namely, according as it is in the knower. For the more perfectly the known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of cognition. Therefore it must be said that God not only knows things to be in Himself, but, by that which He contains in Himself, He knows things in their proper nature - and the more perfectly, the more perfectly each thing is in Him.

Reply to the second: The essence (*essentia*) of the creature is compared to the essence of God as an imperfect act to a perfect act. And therefore the essence of the creature does not sufficiently lead to the cognition of the divine Essence, but conversely.

Reply to the third: The same cannot be taken as the formal reason (*ratio*) of diverse things by way of adequation. But the divine essence is something exceeding all creatures; hence it can be taken as the proper formal reason of each individual thing, according as it is participable or imitable in diverse ways by diverse creatures.

Notationes circa articulum.

The conclusion is affirmative. Concerning this article 6 one should observe first that the error of Avicenna and Averroes existed, as St. Thomas reports; for they asserted that God does not know the rest of things individually and distinctly, but only Himself. Thus Averroes taught this on Metaphysics XII, commentary 51, and in the little work entitled Distinctio distinctionum, which is found in the ninth tome of his works; and he defends this opinion as Avicenna's against Algazel, while Ferraris excuses him at the end against the book Contra gentiles, chapter 50.[1014]

What pertains, however, to the cognition of other things, even of singulars and of the least things: the opinion of Averroes which we reported is a most manifest error, about which there is no doubt. It was refuted above by that of Ps. 32: "Who fashions individually the hearts of them all, who understands all their works"; and Heb. 4: "All things are naked and open to his eyes, and no creature is invisible before him." Moreover, since in that disputation 86 it must be proved that God has providence of all things individually and particularly, it plainly follows that He has also a proper knowledge of them, without which providence cannot be.

Next it must be observed against Ockham in I, dist. 35, q. 2, a. 1, l. 1, and Gabriel, q. 2, art. 2, conclusion 2, that it can be proved evidently even by natural reason that all things are known by God individually and particularly - which they unjustly deny, admitting only a probable reason. Furthermore, it clings to the minds of all that God is intelligent just as that God is; so that each seems to be known almost per se, in the manner which we explained in disputation 19: for God would be in vain if He were such that He did not know certain created things. Gregory also attempts to prove this truth by natural reason in I, dist. 35, question unica.[1015]

1014. Averroes, Commentarium 51 on Aristotle, Metaphysics XII; and the opusculum Distinctio distinctionum (in the ninth tome of his works). He defends this opinion as Avicenna's against Algazel; Ferraris excuses him at the end against Contra gentiles, c. 50.

But St. Jerome, on that passage of Habakkuk 1: "Thy eyes are pure, that thou mayest not see evil," has words that are overly difficult: "Moreover it is absurd to bring down the majesty of God to this - that at each single moment He should consider how many gnats are born and how many die, what is the multitude of bedbugs and fleas and flies upon the earth, how many fishes swim in the waters, and which of the lesser must yield as prey to the greater. Let us not be such foolish flatterers of God that, while we even drag down His power to the lowest things, we are most injurious to ourselves, saying that there is the same providence of rational beings as of irrational." Whence that apocryphal book is to be condemned for foolishness, in which it is written that a certain angel named Tyre is set over reptiles.[1016] But the Master benignly interprets Jerome in the First Book of the Sentences, dist. 36, cap. 4, and the Bishop of Lucca in the book of Admonitions on the sixth tome of Jerome, question 5: first, that Jerome does not deny that God has at each single moment knowledge anew of these things (such as flies, etc.), but rather says that by a single eternal intuition He has seen all things. And about this, and about Cicero on the cognition of future things, we shall speak in disputation 64, chapter 1.[1017]

As to men and other things of greater moment, he ought to have said the same; but Jerome thinks that these are to be known in a different way than those which are the least. Then also of those things of which he denies in God a distinct knowledge, as is clear from the cited words, he concedes a certain general knowledge and providence in these words: "In other animals, indeed, we can understand the general disposition and order and course of things from God: for example, how a multitude of fishes is born and lives in the waters; how reptiles and quadrupeds live on land, and with what foods they are fed; but it is absurd to bring down the majesty of God to this," etc., which we have reported. By which, although he denies to God a peculiar knowledge of things, nevertheless he grants a certain general cognition of them - in which he seems to have followed Aristotle, a doctrine of which we shall speak in disputation 86. Then the same Master and the Bishop of Lucca interpret Jerome as denying that God exercises care for the least things in the same way - namely, by appointing to them an angel, by imposing also precepts and assigning rewards - as He has care for men; in this way Hugo of St. Victor also explains Jerome in the Summa, tractate 1, chapter 12, where he also mentions the preceding exposition. Yet this exposition does not much commend itself to me, since Jerome's words plainly indicate something else, as can be evident to a reader; and he grants only a general knowledge and providence of those least things. But for this reason Jerome's view in this place ought not to undermine Catholic truth. We have also in his favor a manifest testimony of his own in Matthew, chapter 10, where, explaining that "Are not two sparrows sold for a penny?" he says: "If small animals do not fall

1015. Ockham, In I Sent., d. 35, q. 2, a. 1, l. 1; Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., q. 2, art. 2, concl. 2; Gregory of Rimini, In I Sent., d. 35, q. unica.

1016. St. Jerome, on Habakkuk 1: "Mundi sunt oculi tui, ne videas malum."

1017. The Master (Peter Lombard), In I Sent., d. 36, c. 4; the Bishop of Lucca, in the Book of Admonitions on the sixth tome of Jerome, question 5; Cicero, On the cognition of future things (De divinatione), to be discussed in disputation 64, c. 1.

without God as their author, and there is always providence in all things - which I shall seek in these matters - if they do not perish without God; you, who are eternal, ought not to fear, since you live by God's providence."[1018]

Disputatio LX - Whether God knows all things in Himself

Caput I - Two opposing opinions

By this single disputation we shall endeavor to clear up both of the preceding articles; for from the mode by which God knows created things it will be easy to infer whether He knows all individually according to their proper formal reasons.

Now concerning the mode by which God knows other things, about which article 5 treats, there are various opinions of theologians. The first is that of Gabriel in I, dist. 35, art. 2, conclusion 2, and of Ockham on the same distinction, question 3, and of Aureolus as he is cited by Capreolus on the same I, dist. 35, q. 2, art. 1, in the arguments against the first conclusion: they affirm that creatures are seen by God so immediately in themselves that He does not see them in His own essence as in a primary object previously seen. This opinion seems to be gathered from Scotus in I, dist. 3, q. 1, 5, ad ista, in the middle of that passage, where first he teaches that the divine intellect by its own essence is constituted in first act to understand not only its own essence, but also all creatures. He then asserts that God in act, as it were in second act, understands Himself and other things; and although in his doctrine the primary object of the divine intellect is His essence - as we shall report below in disputation 143 - yet he nowhere teaches that the divine essence is known first in such a way that in it, as in a primary object first known, creatures are seen; rather, just as the intellect of God is constituted by His essence in first act for the cognition of Himself and of other things, so he teaches that in second act He knows Himself and all other things, and not one before another.[1019]

It is proved first: Creatures are not in God according to their own proper formal reasons, therefore neither can they be seen in Him according to those reasons; for here we are treating of the cognition of creatures according to their proper reasons, not insofar as in God they are said to be God Himself, as was explained in disputation 51. Moreover, if creatures were seen as they are in God, they would not be seen distinctly; for when something is seen in another, it cannot be known distinctly. But God knows them distinctly and individually according to their proper reasons; therefore He does not see them in Himself, but in themselves.

1018. St. Jerome, Commentary on Matthew 10:29: "Nonne duo passeres asse veneunt...?"

1019. Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., d. 35, art. 2, concl. 2; Ockham, In I Sent., d. 35, q. 3; Aureolus as cited by Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 35, q. 2, art. 1; Scotus, In I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, ad ista; see also disputation 143.

Caput II - Secunda sententia

The second opinion is that of Durandus, in I Sentences, dist. 35, q. 2, in the body to the second; Thomas of Argentina, q. 1, and most expressly in concl. 4; Capreolus, q. 2, art. 1, concl. 1 and 2; Cajetan, and some more recent authors on this article, who assert that God in Himself, as in the primary object previously known, knows all creatures distinctly and by a proper concept according to the proper formal reasons of the same. When they say "as in the object previously known," they mean that the divine essence is not only as it were a species for eliciting the vision of creatures, but is also the primary object in the knowledge of which first the creatures are seen. Then, when they add that in this way creatures are known by God according to their own proper reasons, they clearly understand that they are not only known inasmuch as, existing in God Himself, they are said to be God Himself, as we said above, but also that they are known according to created reasons by which they are distinguished from God.[1020]

Durandus and Cajetan then explain this opinion more at length as follows: creatures are said to be known in God, because they are in His essence as in a higher cause and are united to it in a certain way; yet in such a way as if they were contained in it distinctly, so that in it they are distinctly and perfectly known. Hence they say that they are not known in God as in a mere mirror or by a species, but also as in the object previously known. To this opinion St. Thomas in this article, and in Contra gentiles, c. 53, is commonly referred; likewise Aegidius in I, dist. 35, q. 3; Alexander, I p., q. 23, m. 2, art. 1; Henry, quodlib. 9, q. 2, who affirm that God knows creatures in Himself, not in themselves.[1021]

This opinion is proved, first, from Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 7, after the middle, where he not only teaches that God knows creatures in Himself, but also that He understands them in Himself as in a cause and through a cause. Second, because St. Augustine, in the book of 83 Questions, q. 46, says that God contemplates nothing outside Himself. Third, it is proved by reason: for if God knows the rest of things not from the fact that He knows Himself as the primary object, it follows that He does not comprehend Himself; for by this sole reason we said in disputation 53, c. 4, that God is not comprehended by the Blessed, namely because they cannot so see God that, by force of the vision by which they see Him, they are able to behold the other created things which in some manner pertain to Him. Wherefore, even if a Blessed should see God Himself and all created things from some other source than from God Himself previously known, in our opinion he would not be said to comprehend God. Therefore, in order that God may comprehend Himself, it is necessary that God should see Himself and, by virtue of this vision, all the rest; otherwise we must fall into one of those positions which, in that disputation, we expressly impugned. Fourth, there is nothing to prevent God from knowing Himself and creatures in Himself

1020. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 35, q. 2, in corpore ad secundum; Thomas of Argentina, q. 1, concl. 4; Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 35, q. 2, art. 1, concl. 1 - 2; Cajetan, on this article.

1021. St. Thomas, on this article; Contra gentiles, c. 53; Aegidius, In I Sent., d. 35, q. 3; Alexander of Hales, I p., q. 23, m. 2, art. 1; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 9, q. 2.

in this manner; we ought not to deny this to Him, since it seems the most perfect mode of knowing, namely, the effect in the most perfect cause, in which it exists in a much more perfect way than in itself.[1022]

But on the contrary: That God does not see all creatures in Himself as in a cause is the more probable opinion.

I, for my part, judge that God in His own essence beholds all created things, yet in a different way than Cajetan supposed - namely, that God knows them in Himself, not because He first understands Himself as cause and as the primary object, but in Himself as in the Word and express species. In order, however, to explain and prove this opinion, two things must be observed.

Observatio prima. One is that all the things which God knows, even if compared with His essence, are known together among themselves and together with it, not only together in time or duration, but also by nature: because the knowledge which God has of Himself and of other things is one and most simple. In that one and the same knowledge no before and after by nature can be assigned; yet a certain priority of reason can be constituted, inasmuch as on the part of the objects which are known one is conceived by us as the reason whereby God knows another, because one is more closely conjoined to God the knower than another. Therefore it must now be seen whether the essence of God stands related to God Himself, the intelligent knower, in such a way that it may be called the primary object, by knowing which first all the rest are known by Him.

Observatio secunda. Another thing to be observed is that in God there is an essential knowledge, which is common to the three persons, and a notional knowledge, which is proper to the Father. The former knowledge is plainly the essence of God absolutely, according to the thing, which, in our manner of understanding, is said to have both the character of an impressed species and of act in the first sense, and the character of an express species (that is, of a word) and of act in the second sense; the latter knowledge has the relation of the real production of the Word, who is the second person of the Trinity. Now there is this difference between our cognition and the divine - whether it be essential or notional - that by our cognition and intellection the Word itself is not known, which is a real action, nor the Word itself, which, so far as it is only by way of action, is (as they say) understood in a merely grammatical manner, as we shall explain in disputation 141, c. 4. But in God the Word is produced really, who is the second person; and this very divine essence - which is, as it were, the word of those things which God by essential intellection understands - is directly known by the same intellection, either essential or also notional, by which it is really produced. Hence the Word in both ways is that in which things are known and is itself known.[1023]

From the two points which our opinion contains, the first to be proved by us in this chapter is that God does not see creatures in Himself as in a cause and as in the primary object previously seen. The second will follow, and we shall confirm it in the following chapter. The first is shown as follows.

1022. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 7; St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 46.
1023. See Vazquez, disp. 141, c. 4.

Primo. If the divine attributes be considered by us according to the proper formal reasons which we conceive of them, not all of them have such a character that, according to our manner of understanding, they appear connected among themselves - namely, that one depends by reason upon another. For if we speak of God's knowledge, it does not, according to its formal notion, presuppose omnipotence; for God is not said to know all things because He is omnipotent. Nay rather, on the contrary, that is seen to be omnipotent which knows all things, as we shall say below in disputation 102. For by His infinite knowledge, and by His will, He is said to be able to do all things, or at least to be the proximate and directive principle for carrying things into effect, according to the opinion of those who ascribe to the divine essence, as it is, the power for executing, and to the intellect and will the direction. Therefore, even if God were not understood to be omnipotent by a principle taken from within (as they say, "per locum intrinsecum"), it would not follow that He is not understanding of all things. He would, then, know all things by some source other than by His essence known as omnipotent. For if by this sole medium, namely by the intrinsic principle, He understands, it follows most fittingly that, omnipotence being taken away - by the knowledge of which He knows creatures - the knowledge also which He has concerning creatures is taken away. Therefore, since according to our manner of philosophizing the science which God has of creatures does not presuppose omnipotence, neither does it presuppose His essence as known as their cause, and consequently neither as the primary object by knowing which first He understands creatures. All of this rightly follows, if we philosophize according to our mode of understanding; and that we must philosophize thus we presuppose from the previous notation.

Secundo. It is proved because, as we have shown elsewhere,[1024] an object previously known cannot be a medium for knowing something else quidditatively and by a proper concept, if it does not contain in itself the whole notion of that other and is not altogether of the same formal order with it; for if it is different, how could something else be known quidditatively after the manner of it? But God does not contain in Himself formally the notion of creatures; rather, He is in Himself altogether dissimilar to them. Therefore, known first, He cannot be the medium of knowing creatures.

Tertio. As we said in those disputations,[1025] since God in Himself is altogether absolute from every relation and order to creatures, He cannot be for any intellect, even the divine, a medium for knowing any creatures as the primary object previously known; for one thing previously known does not lead into the cognition of another unless of that to which it is referred.

Obiectio. You will say that God is referred to creatures by a relation at least of reason, though not really, and that this suffices to lead to a clear cognition of creatures.

1024. See Vazquez, disp. 38, c. 4; disp. 50, c. 4 - 5.
1025. See Vazquez, disp. 50, c. 4 - 5.

Diluitur. But this is frivolous; for, as we said in that place, such relations of reason are conceived only by wayfarers, not by the Blessed who see the thing as it is, and accordingly they do not feign relations in God which are not in Him, since they conceive Him as He is. How much less will God conceive Himself under that respect of our reason, He who so intimately understands Himself as He is that by His knowledge He changes nothing at all in Himself. And so much for the first part.

Deum in se tanquam in speculo creaturas videre.

For the divine essence is so related to God that it is not only the essence by which God is, but it is also to Him His own cognition of Himself; thus it not only constitutes God in the nature of God, but also makes Him intelligent of Himself. Hence it is to Him as it were an express species and the word of Himself, and it is the object known. Moreover, it actually represents creatures and is their cognition; wherefore it is related to them as their word. For this reason, therefore, God knows creatures in Himself first known: not indeed first known merely as the primary object and cause, but as the Word, which is also the word of creatures, representing them. And although the essence does not lead God into the cognition of creatures so far as it is known by God alone; nevertheless, from the fact that first it constitutes God intelligent of Himself, it then constitutes Him intelligent of creatures; and this latter so depends upon the former that, by an intrinsic principle, it rightly follows that, if the divine essence did not make God intelligent of Himself, it would not make Him intelligent of creatures - yet not conversely, that if it did not make Him intelligent of creatures, it would not make Him intelligent of Himself.

In the same way it must be said of the notional Word of God really produced: for it so primarily terminates the notional intellection of God that at the same time the Father is seen, and it represents the divine essence; and from this it represents creatures - which nevertheless it would not represent, nor would they be known in it - unless in that first the divine essence were seen. In this sense the Doctor (St. Thomas), and the others whom we said were alleged for the second opinion, could be explained when they assert that God knows creatures in Himself. Nor would the authors of the first opinion deny what we have said. Wherefore I think only Durandus, Capreolus, Thomas of Argentina, Cajetan, and some recent Thomists oppose this our opinion. And when he says that God sees creatures in Himself, not in themselves, it must be understood thus: namely, that God does not know creatures except by the medium of His own essence as species. But in the doctrine of St. Thomas, to know something "in itself" is to behold it without any medium species; thus he judges that God is seen by the Blessed "in Himself," because He is seen without any express medium species, as we said in disputation 35. Otherwise, God would know creatures in themselves and not in another, that is, not confusedly from the cognition of some other object, but by a proper concept by which they are known by God in themselves and not through another.[1026]

The meaning of St. Thomas, and of the authors adduced for the second opinion, is thus explained; and as to what St. Thomas says in art. 6, that creatures are known by God through His own essence, we grant it; but it is to be understood that they are known through that same essence

1026. See Vazquez, disp. 35.

as an express species - that is, as the Word - by which creatures are represented and made present to the divine intellect, not, however, through the essence as absolutely considered being the prior and primary object by the cognition of which other things are known.

Soluuntur argumenta primae, et secundae sententiae.

Wherefore, when Gabriel and Ockham and others of the first opinion affirm that creatures are not known by God in Himself, they do not deny that the very essence of God is in the place of an express species, by which creatures are represented - and this secondarily; for primarily it is that very essence which makes God understand Himself, as has been explained. And Scotus, as we reported above, concedes that the essence of God is the primary object of the divine intellect, first indeed known, but secondarily the creatures are known.[1027]

Argumenta quoque secundae sententiae nihil habent difficultatis. Primum quidem locus ex Pseudo-Dionysius eo loco solum contendit, God does not receive knowledge from things, as we do, but has from Himself the knowledge of all things from eternity. The words of Pseudo-Dionysius are these: "For the divine mind does not, learning from the things that are, know from the things that are, but from itself and in itself, through the cause, it has beforehand and previously comprehended the knowledge, science, and the anticipated essence of all things; not because it should consider each thing through a species, but because with one complex of the cause it knows all; just as also light, through its cause, has within itself an anticipated and informed knowledge of darkness, because it knows darkness from nothing else than from light. Therefore divine Wisdom, knowing itself, knows all things without matter that which consists of matter without division, that which is divided many things together, while Itself with one [intuitive] act knows and produces all things."[1028] When he says that God has "anticipated knowledge not through a species," he signifies that it comes from Himself, not from things, and on that account he called it "anticipated," that is, knowledge which is had concerning things before the things themselves exist. When he says that He does not consider singulars "through a species, but with one complex of the cause," he means that He does not have singular cognitions of singular things and consider them one by one, but with one intuition, as it were in Himself, as in a cause, they exist together; and this is what he said, "with one complex of the cause." But since God is the cause of things through intellection and His knowledge, we must understand that in this way all things are in God as in a cause, encompassed by one cognition and knowledge; and this is what he meant by "one complex of the cause."

In the same way must be understood what a little later he says in these words: "For the very [knowledge of God], knowing itself to be the cause of all things, will by no means be ignorant of those which have proceeded from itself; by this, therefore, God knows those things which are, not by a knowledge of things, but by a knowledge of Himself," that is, not by a knowledge received from things, but from Himself; nor by the same knowledge, in so far as it is terminated only to the essence, does He know them as though they formally existed in Him, but indeed by the same knowledge, which however is referred to the things themselves existing outside, or possible.

1027. On Scotus's concession, see above, cap. 1 (as cited in the discussion).
1028. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 7.

But the likeness which he adduces of light and darkness tends to this - not that God knows creatures because He first knows Himself as the primary object, according to the likeness of which He understands them, but to show that the knowledge of God is not received from the things themselves, as if light understood darkness and from itself knew it.

To the testimony of St. Augustine I answer that the sense of his words is very different. For he says, "He did not look upon anything placed outside Himself, so as to determine, according to that, what He determined; for to imagine this is sacrilege." And immediately he teaches that the reasons of all things to be created are in God. St. Augustine therefore wishes to teach that God did not create this universe of things by looking at something outside Himself, in the likeness of which He would create it - as painters who have some picture placed before them so that they may imitate it - but that within Himself He conceived what He was about to do; not that He only looked at His own essence, in the likeness of which He would make all the rest (for we shall show this is not true in disputation 72), but because within Himself He had a distinct and proper knowledge of each of the singular things which He was going to make, about which more at length in that disputation.[1029]

But to the reason for the second opinion I reply that it is indeed necessary for the notion of perfect and true comprehension by the intellect that he who comprehends should understand the object in such a way that, from the complex of living intellection, he can also embrace whatever can be attributed to the object, even if it be something extrinsic and its effects, as we said in disputation 55, chapter 4. Now this can be done in two ways. First, so that from that which is first known - namely the object itself - and by penetrating with an intimate cognition, there are known thence all the other things which can be attributed to it; and the object, inasmuch as it is something known first, leads to the knowledge of others, either by discourse or without it. And in this way God does not comprehend Himself; for He does not, because He knows Himself, understand other things, as has been shown. Then there can be a comprehension such as befits God - because His essence, which is His knowledge of Himself, so renders Him one who knows Himself that thence He has the power also to make creatures to be known, nor could He represent them from any other source unless it were the knowledge of God Himself; and this mode of comprehension is by far more perfect, since of so great perfection is the knowledge by which God understands Himself, that thence He has the knowledge of all other things. And this is enough concerning the doctrine of articles 5 and 6; for the rest which Cajetan notes are easy.

Articulus VII - Whether the knowledge of God is discursive

To the seventh, we proceed thus.

1029. See Vazquez, disp. 72.

It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not according to knowing in habit. But, according to the Philosopher in the Topics, to know in habit it happens to know many things at once, but to understand in act only one at a time. Therefore, since God knows many things (for He knows both Himself and other things, as has been shown), it seems that He does not understand all things at once, but runs from one to another.

1. Further, to know an effect through its cause is to know as one who discourses. But God knows other things through Himself, as an effect through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.
2. Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it. But we, in created causes, know their effects, and thus we discourse from causes to caused things. Therefore it seems to be likewise in God.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in book 15 On the Trinity, that God does not see all things by parts or one by one, as if with alternating concept now here, now there; but He sees all things at once.[1030]

I answer: In divine knowledge there is no discourse at all; which is clear thus. In our knowledge there is a twofold discourse. One according to succession only. For after we have understood something in act, we turn to understanding another thing. Another discourse is according to causality, as when by principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first discourse cannot befit God. For many things which we understand successively, if each of them be considered in itself, we understand them all together if we understand them in some one thing; for example, if we understand the parts in the whole, or if we see diverse things in a mirror. But God sees all things in the One which is Himself, as has been said. Whence He sees all things at once and not by succession. Likewise, the second discourse also cannot befit God. First, because the second discourse presupposes the first: for those proceeding from principles to conclusions do not consider both at once. Then, because such discourse is of one proceeding from the known to the unknown. Whence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is not known in the first, but from the first. But the terminus of discourse is when the second is seen in the first, by resolving effects into causes; and then the discourse ceases. Whence, since God sees His own effects in Himself as in a cause, His knowledge is not discursive.

Reply to the first: Although it is only one thing to understand in itself, nevertheless it happens that many things are understood in some one thing, as has been said.

Reply to the second: God does not know through a cause as if, the effect being unknown, the cause were first known; but He knows the effects in the cause. Hence His knowledge is without discourse, as has been said.

1030. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV.

Reply to the third: God indeed sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves much more [perfectly] than we; yet not in such a way that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him from the knowledge of created causes, as it is in us. Whence His knowledge is not discursive. From which it follows that His knowledge is not discursive.

The conclusion is negative, which St. Thomas most aptly explains, and which Pseudo-Dionysius had previously delivered in De divinis nominibus, chapter 7. Why the knowledge of God is not accompanied by discourse is very evident, and can be easily gathered from the things we shall say in disputation 222.[1028][1031]

Articulus VIII - Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things

To the eighth, we proceed thus.

It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on the Epistle to the Romans: "Not for this reason will something be, because God knows it will be; but because it will be, for that reason it is known by God before it happens."[1032]

1. Further, the cause being posited, the effect is posited; but the knowledge of God is eternal. If therefore the knowledge of God is the cause of created things, it seems that creatures are from eternity.
2. Further, the knowable is prior to knowledge and its measure, as is said in Metaphysics, book 10. But that which is posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things.[1033]

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says, book 15 On the Trinity, that all creatures, both spiritual and bodily, God does not know because they are, but they are because He knows them.[1034]

I answer: The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God stands to all created things as the knowledge of an artificer stands to things made by art. But the knowledge of an artificer is the cause of the things made by art, because the craftsman operates through his intellect. Whence it is necessary that the form of the intellect be the principle of operation, just as heat is the principle of heating. But it must be considered that a natural form, inasmuch as it is a form abiding in that to which it gives existence, does not name the principle of action, but according as it has an inclination to an effect. And in like manner an intelligible form does not name the principle of action according as it is only in the knower, unless there be joined to it an inclination to an effect, which is through the will. For since the intelligible form is related to opposites (since the same knowledge is of opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one by appetite, as is said in Metaphysics, book 9.[1035] But it is manifest

1028. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 7.
1031. See Vazquez, disp. 55, c. 4; disp. 222.
1032. Origen, Commentary on Romans.
1033. Aristotle, Metaphysics, X, on the knowable as measure of knowledge.
1034. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV.
1035. Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX (on the same science being of opposites).

that God causes things by His intellect, since His existence is His understanding. Whence it is necessary that His knowledge be the cause of things according to the mode in which it has the will conjoined. Whence the knowledge of God, in so far as it is the cause of things, is wont to be named "knowledge of approval."

Reply to the first: Origen spoke attending to the aspect of knowledge, to which the notion of causality does not belong unless the will be adjoined, as has been said. But what he says, that "for that reason God foreknows some things, because they are future," is to be understood according to a cause of consequence, not according to a cause of effecting. For it follows: if some things are future, that God has foreknown them; yet future things are not the cause that God knows.

Reply to the second: The knowledge of God is the cause of things in so far as things are in the knowledge. But it was not in the knowledge of God that things should be from eternity. Whence, although the knowledge of God is eternal, nevertheless it does not follow that creatures are from eternity.

Reply to the third: Natural things are in the middle between the knowledge of God and our knowledge. For we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God, by His own knowledge, is the cause.

It is objected that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen, on the Epistle to the Romans, says: Not therefore will something be because God knows it will be future, but because by His own will He has ordained it; therefore it is known by God before it happens.[1036]

Further, once a cause is posited, the effect is posited; but the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore, if the knowledge of God is the cause of created things, it seems that creatures are from eternity.

Further, the knowable is prior to knowledge and its measure, as is said in Metaphysics X. But that which is posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things.[1037]

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in De Trinitate XV: God does not know all creatures, spiritual and corporeal, because they are; rather, they are because He knows.[1038]

I answer: The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God stands to all created things as the knowledge of an artisan stands to his artifacts. But the artisan's knowledge is the cause of the things made by art, because the artisan operates through his intellect. Hence it is necessary that the form (*forma*) of the intellect be a principle of operation, just as heat is a principle of heating. Yet it must be considered that a natural form, in so far as it remains in that in which it exists, names a principle of action, inasmuch as it has an inclination to an effect. In like manner, the intelligible form does not name a principle of producing an effect inasmuch as it is only in the one who understands, unless there be joined to it an inclination to an effect, which is through the will (*voluntas*). For since the intelligible form is of opposites, it does not of itself

1036. Origen, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.
1037. Aristotle, Metaphysics, X, on the knowable as the measure of knowledge.
1038. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV.

produce a determinate effect, unless it be determined to one by appetite, as is clear in Metaphysics IX. Now it is manifest that God produces things by His intellect, since His very existence (*esse*) is His act (*actus*) of understanding. Hence it is necessary that His knowledge be the cause of things according to will conjoined. Wherefore the knowledge of God, in so far as it is a cause, is wont to be named knowledge of approval (scientia approbationis).

Therefore it must be said that Origen spoke while attending to knowledge under a ratio to which the ratio of cause does not belong unless added to the will, as when he says that therefore God foreknows because they are going to be future; this is to be understood according to a cause of consequence, not according to a cause of effecting. It follows, if certain things are going to be future, that God has foreknown; not, however, that things are future because God knows.

Reply to the first: It must be said that the knowledge of God is the cause of things in so far as things are in the knowledge. But it was not in the knowledge of God that things should be from eternity. Whence, although the knowledge of God is eternal, nevertheless it does not follow that creatures are from eternity.

Reply to the third: Natural things are in the middle between the knowledge of God and our knowledge. For we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God, by His own knowledge, is the cause. Whether, however, the knowledge of God is practical or rather speculative, and what is practical and what only speculative, we shall say in article 16 of this question.[1039]

Explication of the Article. The conclusion is affirmative, yet to be understood thus: that the knowledge of God, together with the will, each in its own order, as also happens in us, is the cause of things. Whether, however, besides knowledge and will there are in God, at least by our reason, such distinct powers as would be the proximate principle of executing and of operating what the intellect has ordered and the will has chosen, we shall say below in disputation 101; and whether knowledge stands more proximately than the will toward the production of things, we shall show in disputation 87.[1040]

Articulus IX - Whether the knowledge of God is of non - beings

Explication of the Article. The conclusion is affirmative, yet to be understood in this way: there is in God a twofold knowledge for us to distinguish, not because in Him there is a twofold operation of knowing, but on account of diverse objects to which it is referred. For certain things God knows as possible before they are future from eternity; and this is commonly called knowledge of simple intelligence (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*). Others He knows as already future from eternity; and this is called knowledge of vision (*scientia visionis*), because, just as sight is always terminated to existing things and never abstracts them from existence, so that knowledge is terminated to things under some existence: which, although it is about things future or past in time, since God knows past just as He knows future in the same way and has no need of the presence of the thing,

1039. See Vazquez, disp. 68, c. 6; and art. 16 of this question.
1040. See Vazquez, disp. 101, on the order of knowledge and will in God with respect to the production of things.

both these are commonly called knowledge of vision - although some are unwilling to call knowledge of vision anything except that which is conversant about things present in time; but this question is of little moment and is about a word alone.

Further, when it is said that the knowledge of God is the cause of things, this must be understood of the knowledge of simple intelligence, which precedes the futurition of all things; for the knowledge of vision of future things is the cause of their effect inasmuch as it presupposes that they are to be, which cannot be, because it already supposes things to be future, as is explained in disputation 68, chapter 6.[1039] Whether, moreover, the knowledge of God is practical, or rather speculative, and which is practical and which is only speculative, we shall say in article 16 of this question.[1041]

It is objected, on the contrary, thus: It seems that God does not have knowledge except of beings. For the knowledge of God is only of truths. But the true and being are convertible. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of non-beings.

Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the known. But those things which are not cannot have any likeness to God, who is existence itself (*ipsum esse*). Therefore those things which are not cannot be known by God.

Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of the things known by Him. But it is not the cause of non-beings, because non-being has no cause. Therefore God does not have knowledge of non-beings.

But on the contrary is what the Apostle says to the Romans 4: "Who calls the things that are not, as the things that are."

I answer: God knows all things whatsoever that are in any way. Now nothing prevents those things which are not simply from being in some way. For simply are those things which are in act. But those things which are not in act are in potency, either of God Himself or of the creature, whether in active potency or in passive, or in the potency of opining or imagining, or in any way of signifying. Whatever things, therefore, can be made by a creature, or be thought, or be spoken, and also whatever He Himself can make, God knows all, even if they are not. And for so much it can be said that He also has knowledge of non-beings. But among those which are not in act, a certain diversity must be attended to. For some, although they are not now in act, nevertheless either were or will be; and all these God is said to know by knowledge of vision. For since the understanding of God - which is His very existence - would be measured by eternity, which, existing without succession, comprehends the whole of time, the present intuition of God is borne to the whole of time and to all things which are in any time, as to things present to Him. Others, however, are such as are in the potency of God or of a creature, which nevertheless neither are, nor will be, nor were. And with respect to these He is not said to have knowledge of vision, but of simple intelligence. And it is called this for this reason: because the things which are seen among us have a being distinct outside the seer.

1039. See Vazquez, disp. 68, c. 6; and art. 16 of this question.
1041. See the discussion in art. 16 of this question on practical and speculative knowledge in God.

Reply to the first: In so far as they are in potency, so have those things truth which are not in act; for it is true that they are thus in potency; and thus they are known by God.

Reply to the second: Since God is "existence itself" in so far one, whatever is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God, is; just as anything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. Thus also those things which are in potency, even if they are not in act, are known by God.

Reply to the third: The knowledge of God is the cause of things with the will conjoined. Whence it is not necessary that whatever God knows are, or were, or will be; but only those which He wills to be, or permits to be. And again: It is not in the knowledge of God that those things are, but that they can be.

An inquiry whether the knowledge of God is of non-beings. Disputation 61.

Certain notes for the solution of the question. Chapter 1.

Certain notes for the solution of the question. Chapter 2. How non-being is referred to the intellect of God.

Disputatio LXI - On whether the knowledge of God is of non - beings

Caput I - The ground of doubting

By what way non-beings can be said - for things impossible, such as a man's being a horse, and the like, we can very well doubt - whether the knowledge of God is of these non-beings as it is of beings and of possible things. One could be bold to say that the knowledge of God is terminated to non-beings such that, by the same very concept by which God knows beings, He knows non-beings; as it is wont to be said that by the habit of privation things are known also in our mind: and that there is in the intellect of God a proper concept of non-beings, as there is of beings and of the things that are. For this seems to be expressly taught by Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, after the middle of chapter 7, where, on the way by which God knows things, he says thus: Not that He should consider singulars through a species, but that by one complex of cause He knows and contains all things, in the way in which also light, by its own cause, has beforehand the knowledge of darkness and informs us of darkness, which we know from light. Behold how Dionysius teaches that darkness is known through light, and with this he compares the mode by which God understands things: wherefore someone could say that, in the same way, being (*ens*) and non-being (*non ens*) are referred to the divine intellect, as light and darkness are compared in corporeal sense.[1042]

Caput II - How non - being is referred to the intellect of God

It follows from these things in what manner non-being is referred to the intellect of God, and is said to be understood by it.

1042. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 7, on the mode by which God knows things.

First, God gives in no way assent to non-being, that is, to a false proposition, whether it be an affirmative or whether a negative which is truly false; rather, to it He always dissents, because to the divine intellect a thing is never objected except as it is; whence that which is not is not objected as though it were; and therefore of it there is always dissent; and in this way the divine intellect is referred and terminated to non-being. Wherefore just as the will (*voluntas*) too of God is of good and evil - of evil by displeasure, of good by complacency - so also the divine intellect is of the true and the false - of the latter by dissent, of the former by assent; that is, these objects are so referred to the divine intellect that He Himself thence takes a denomination, as hearing is said of silence, sight of darkness, not because around these there might be some act of cognition (for privation is called the proper object of a sense, because the privation of its proper object's act gives rise to the proper operation: whence a man discerns, not by sight but by the intellect, that there is not light in the middle, because, with eyes open, he does not see; yet from this he does not discern silence, but from hearing, when that sense, with the object applied to it, does not hear; and so of the others). But sight does not perceive darkness, nor any interior sense; rather, by reasoning the intellect determines that, because sight has not the species of them, otherwise it would perceive the situation and quantity of the darkness, if darkness were referred to it as its proper sensible. The common sensible of quantity indeed is plainly seen, if it is conjoined with the proper; but the interior senses perceive only those things of which they have species derived through the external senses, although from the things they have received they sometimes fashion monsters never seen. Therefore, if darkness has not been in the external sight, it comes about that it cannot be in the interior either.

First note. It is to be noted first that in the divine intellect (*intellectus*) there cannot be many acts, as in ours; but the intellect of God and the intellection which He has of things are His most simple essence (*essentia*), which, in so far as it is referred to diverse objects, or diverse objects are compared with it, is called such and such intellection, namely assent or dissent.

Second note. Secondly, it must be observed that in our intellect, besides the simple apprehension of simples, there is also judgment, which in us is made by composition or division. But judgment is either assent to that which appears true - when, namely, it is known that the predicate is fitting to the subject in an affirmative proposition - or dissent from that which appears false - when, namely, it seems that the predicate does not fit the subject in a similarly affirmative proposition; and in this way is understood that of Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, book 2: "What is not is not known," that is, what appears not to be is not known by the intellect through assent; or to that which appears false the intellect does not offer assent: otherwise, if by assent and dissent we speak, the intellect is of the true and the false, as the will is of good and of evil - of the true by assent, of the false by dissent; the will of good by prosecution and complacency, of evil by flight and displeasure: otherwise than sight is said to be of light and darkness, hearing of sound and silence. For a sense is said to be of a privation of its proper object, not because it has some act of cognition around it, but because from the privation of its proper object the proper operation arises; and hence a man discerns, not by sight but by intellect, that there is not light in the middle, because, with eyes open, he does not see; yet from this he does not discern silence, but from hearing, when

with the object applied he does not hear; and so of the rest. But sight does not perceive darkness, nor any interior sense, but by the ratiocination of the intellect it is established, because sight does not have the species of them; otherwise it would perceive the situation and quantity of darkness, if darkness were referred to it as its proper sensible. The common sensible of quantity indeed is perfectly seen, if it is conjoined with the proper; but the interior senses perceive only those things of which they have species derived through the external senses, although, from those they have received, they sometimes fashion monsters never seen; therefore, if darkness has not been in the external sight, it comes about that neither can it be in the interior.

Third note. Thirdly, it must be premised that non-being, that is, that which is false and is the object of dissent in composition and division, is sometimes conceived by us after the mode of a certain simple being, and of it we enunciate many things, as if it were some being; thus we conceive and name the chimera, which is an impossibility, namely that a man be at once a horse, lion, and ox, after the mode of a certain being; and therefore it is called an ens of reason, a negation, just as also a privation, because in the same way it is apprehended by us and is named.[1043]

Assent and dissent are attributed to the divine intellect according to the mode explained in the first notation.

Second, the divine intellect of itself is referred, by way of assent (*assensus*), to being, that is, to the true proposition, whether it be affirmative or negative; by way, I say, of assent, that is, he so understands to be what is, and not to be what is not, that to each he is said to assent, and this of itself, not by knowing the negation through the affirmation. This, however, is to be understood thus: because God, by a simple intuition whereby he sees each extreme, also sees whether the one agrees with the other or not, as we shall likewise say of the Angels below in disputation 223, chapter 2.[1044] There is, however, a difference: an Angel, as we shall there explain, cannot by one species divide in his intellect, and thus not by one simple formal concept, but by two at least; for he conceives more things by more species, among which there must be division. But the divine intellect, by one simple formal concept, that is, by his own divine essence, conceives two extremes, which in reality are divided from each other and are mutually contrary; therefore, by understanding them thus, he also understands of itself that they are divided, and that the one repugns the other and that they are contraries, as indeed they are; and this is that division be conceived by the divine intellect, or a true negation - which is the same. And thus not only is God said to have a proper objective concept of being, but also of non-being. Nor, indeed, does God understand non-being after the manner of being; this happens to our intellect, which understands the one through the other. Wherefore neither is non-being, as a chimera, conceived by God after the manner of being, as by the human intellect, which philosophizes about it as about some thing, as we said in the notation; for this is a certain figment which cannot be attributed to God.

Yet with this it must be said, as will appear in the following article, that a privation (*privatio*) is not known by God unless the opposite habit (*habitus*) is also known - not, however, by the concept of the habit itself, I say by the objective concept; for since habit is one thing, negation another, and

1043. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, II, on "what is not is not known."

God understands the things which are or are not in the mode in which they are or are not, each thing can and must be of itself objected to the divine intellect; although the formal concept which is in the intellect of God be the same for both, namely the divine essence itself. It remains that we answer to the testimony of Dionysius, who seems to have taught the opposite; about which, however, we shall speak in the following disputation.[1045]

Articulus X - Whether God knows evils

It is objected:

1) It seems that God does not know evils. For the Philosopher in De Anima III says that the intellect which is not in potency does not know a privation. But the intellect of God is never in potency, but, as is clear from what has been said, is always in act. Therefore it seems that God does not know evils.[1046]

2) Further, every science is either the cause of what is known, or is caused by it. But the science of God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore the science of God is not of evils.

3) Further, everything that is known is known either by its likeness or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, he knows by his own essence, as is manifest from what has been said. But the divine essence is neither a likeness of evil, nor is anything contrary to evil; for nothing is contrary to the divine essence, as St. Augustine says in City of God XII. Therefore God does not know evils.[1047]

4) Further, what is known not through itself but through another, is known imperfectly. But evil is not known by God through itself, for then evil would be in God; for the known is in the knower. If, therefore, it is known through another, namely through the good, it is known imperfectly by him. But this is impossible, because no cognition of God is imperfect. Therefore the science of God is not of evils.

But on the contrary: it is said in Proverbs 15: "Hell and destruction are before the Lord."[1048]

I answer: Whatever knows something perfectly, must know all the things which can befall it. But there are certain goods to which it can befall that they be corrupted by evils. Hence God would not perfectly know goods unless he also knew evils. Moreover, each thing is knowable according as it is; whence, since the being of evil is that it is a privation of good, by this very fact that God knows goods, he also knows evils, just as by the light darknesses are known. Whence Pseudo-Dionysius says: "God through himself receives the vision of darkness; you do not otherwise see darknesses than from the light."[1049]

1044. See below, disp. 223, c. 2, on angelic intellection and the division of opposites in one concept.
1045. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 7.
1046. Aristotle, De Anima, III.
1047. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, XII.
1048. Prov 15:11.
1049. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 7: "non aliunde vides tenebras quam a lumine."

Reply to the first: The word of the Philosopher is to be understood thus: that the intellect which is not in potency does not know a privation as existing in itself. And this agrees with what he had said above: that a point and every indivisible is known through the privation of division. This happens because simple and indivisible forms are not in act in our intellect, but only in potency; for if they were in act in our intellect, they would not be known through privation. And thus simple things are known by the separate substances. Therefore God does not know evil through a privation existing in himself, but through the opposite good.

Reply to the second: The science of God is not the cause of evil, but it is the cause of the good through which evil is known.

Reply to the third: Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil, yet it is opposed to the effects of God, which he knows through his own essence; and by knowing them, he knows the evils opposed to them.

Reply to the fourth: To know something by another alone is imperfection of cognition, if that other is knowable per se. But evil is not knowable per se, because it belongs to the notion of evil that it be the privation of good; and thus it can neither be defined nor known except through good. Therefore the science of God is of evils.

Explication of the Article.

The conclusion is affirmative. And it must be understood not only of evils of fault (*mala culpae*), but also of evils of punishment (*mala poenae*): and not only of the positive thing which in the evil of punishment torments, but also of the privation of the good which it inflicts; likewise, it must be understood not only of the positive thing which is in sin, but also of the privation of rectitude of knowledge and will, whatever there is with respect to the very act of sin.

Moreover, since a twofold knowledge is said to be in God - one of approval, or practical, by which God is said to "not know" some, as in Matthew 25; and another, a simple knowledge of things - the conclusion is not to be understood universally of practical or approving knowledge, because God neither approves evils of fault, nor does he make them as they are evils of fault, as Alexander very well notes.[1050] Although in either way the knowledge of God is referred to evils of punishment, nevertheless with respect to simple knowledge, comprehending speculative knowledge, even of future things, the conclusion is in general true of every evil, both of fault and of punishment; and this is manifest enough in Scripture and the doctrine of the Fathers. About the mode, however, in which God knows the evil of fault, there is among the Doctors some controversy, and there will presently be for us a disputation.

1050. Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, q. 23, m. 3, a. 3, on the sense in which God is said in Matthew 25 not to know.

Disputatio LXII - Whether God knows the malice of sin through his goodness

Caput I - Whether God can, by his own goodness, know the evil which is of fault

The view of certain Thomists. God not by himself, but by the opposite virtue, understands every sin.

On this matter it was said enough in the preceding disputation concerning privation; wherefore neither do we ask whether by a concept of his own proper goodness God knows the malice of sin. But since a privation is the privation of some habit, and consequently it is impossible for it to be known unless the opposite habit be known; and since malice is by many said to be the privation of goodness; the controversy now is, whether, in order that God may know the malice of sin, which is said to consist in privation, it suffices for him to know his own goodness, or whether he must also necessarily know some created goodness. We presuppose, moreover, from the opinion of many, that malice is the privation of a due goodness in being; whether this be, universally, true of every malice, even of the malice of the commission of sin, or not, we shall say in I - II, q. 71, a. 6

This supposed, certain recent Thomists think that from this alone - that God knows his own goodness - he can most excellently know the malice of sin, just as, if the sun knew by its own light, it would most clearly understand any darknesses. Durandus makes mention of this opinion; I could find no one of the more ancient Scholastics who held it; it can, however, be approved from Pseudo-Dionysius: where, to show in what manner God has in himself the knowledge of things, he says in these words, that "just as light, by its causality, has within itself anticipatively and informatively the knowledge of darknesses, in that it knows darknesses from nothing else than from light," therefore by the same reason God, who is the supreme light of goodness, through himself will know the darknesses which are the malice of sin.[1052]

It is proved by reason, first, because God in himself is the highest goodness: therefore he contains in himself every notion of goodness, and consequently by it he will know every recession from his goodness. But sin is a certain recession from it; therefore by it he can know sin.

Second reason. Then too, every sin is a privation and aversion from God himself; therefore God, of himself, as by the opposite habit, will understand every sin.

Deum non per se, sed per oppositam virtutem, intelligere omne peccatum.

Caput II - The opposed sentence, more probable: that God does not by himself, but through the opposite virtue, understand every sin

The opposed sentence is much more probable, which teaches that God can perfectly know the malice of sin, but that he necessarily understands it through the opposite virtue. Thus asserts Durandus,[1053] whom some recent authors plainly follow; and among the more ancient, Alexander,

1052. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 7; Durandus of St. Pourçain, In I Sent., d. 36, q. 1, n. 12.

[1054] St. Thomas in this article to the second and third replies,[1055] St. Bonaventure in the First Book, distinction 36, article 3, question 1, in the body, and to the arguments of Richard, a. 1, q. 2, to the first and second,[1056] strongly favor it: for they teach that evil is known through the good opposed to it. Moreover, it is clear that they are not speaking of the goodness of God - to which sins are also in a certain manner opposed - for St. Thomas plainly speaks of a created good which is an effect of God; the others speak of the good which in God has a likeness and an idea. But the goodness of God does not have in God an idea and likeness; rather only the created good has it, as is evident. Therefore they all speak of created good, not of the uncreated goodness of God himself.

By reason this opinion is proved. First reason: because the malice of sin, even if it consist in privation, is not opposed to the goodness of God as to its proper habit, but only in a certain common ratio, as we said in the third reason above; but a privation cannot be known except through the proper habit to which it is proximately opposed; therefore it cannot be understood through the goodness of God alone. Likewise, the sin of intemperance, if it is the privation of rectitude, is indeed the privation of the virtue of temperance, which certainly is not formally in God; for it exists only in moderating the pleasures of taste and touch. Therefore not every evil of fault can be known by God through his goodness alone.

Second reason. Furthermore, sin is called, by that reason alone, a privation of God and of his goodness, inasmuch as it separates from his friendship and grace, whereby it deprives in respect of God himself, as in the thing and in the object - not as an opposite form, as charity deprives of color, not indeed as a contrary form, but as of an object; and to sight, as of an opposite habit. But a privation cannot be known only through the object which it deprives of (for this deprives remotely and secondarily), but through the opposite quality and form. Therefore neither can the malice of sin be understood through the goodness of God alone, by which, as by an object, it deprives; but it must be known through the opposite created goodness which ought to be in the soul; and because there is a twofold goodness which ought to be in the soul, of which mortal sin deprives: one common, namely grace and charity by which man is joined to God; and another, of virtue...

First reason. The malice of sin, even if it consists in privation, is not opposed to goodness as to a proper habit, but under a common notion, as was said in the third reason; but a privation cannot be known through the proper habit to which it is immediately opposed. Therefore, by the divine goodness alone it cannot be known.

Second reason. Again, if sin is a privation of rectitude, it is a privation of the virtue of temperance, which is not formally in God: for temperance is in moderating pleasures of touch. Therefore a fault cannot be known solely through the divine goodness.

Third reason. Sin is said to be referred to God and to his goodness only in this respect, that it deprives of his friendship and of the grace by which one is joined to him; but a privation cannot be known solely through the object which it deprives one of - this it does remotely and secondarily -

1053. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 36, q. 1, n. 9.
1054. Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, q. 23, m. 3, a. 3.
1055. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 14, a. 10, ad 2 - 3.
1056. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 36, a. 3, q. 1; Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, I, q. 2.

but rather through the opposite habit and form. Therefore the malice of sin cannot be understood by the divine goodness alone, which it deprives one of as of an object; rather it can be understood through the opposite created goodness which ought to have been present and which is taken away: and that goodness is twofold. One is the common goodness which ought to be in the soul and of which mortal sin deprives, namely grace and charity, by which one is conjoined to God; the other is the goodness of a particular virtue, to which sin is properly and proximately opposed, as justice, temperance, etc. Hence it does not suffice, for knowing the malice of sin, to understand only the goodness of grace; it is also necessary to know the goodness of the particular virtue.

As to the testimony of Pseudo-Dionysius adduced for the first opinion, I answer, first, that in that place Dionysius is not treating of the cognition by which God understands the malice of sin, as if he were to say that it is understood by God through his uncreated goodness; but rather of the knowledge and the mode by which God knows all created beings.[1057]

Second, I say that there is a manifest difference between the example of light compared with darkness and of the divine goodness with the malice of sin: for light is a proper form opposed to darkness; but the divine goodness is opposed to the malice of sin only in a general way, not as an opposite form, as has been explained. Wherefore Dionysius did not bring forward the example for that for which the prior opinion supposed it.

Third, I say that by the example of Dionysius he wished only to explain the mode by which God has from himself anticipated knowledge and cognition of all things, that is, before the things themselves exist, and not in any way received from the things themselves. And the example of light is thus to be explained: if light were intelligent, it would know darkness of itself, nor would it have need to beg the knowledge of them from the things themselves. We have more fully explained the text of Dionysius above, in disputation 60, chapter 4.[1058] And what must be answered to the two reasons adduced for the prior opinion is clear from what has been said.

Articulus XI - Whether God knows singulars

To the eleventh we proceed as follows. It seems that God does not know singulars. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect; but the human intellect, on account of its immateriality, does not know singulars, but, as is said in De Anima II, the intellect concerns universals, the sense particulars. Therefore God does not know singulars.

1. Further, only those powers in us are cognitive of singulars which receive species not abstracted from material conditions; but in God things are most abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singulars.

1057. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 7.
1058. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputation 60, cap. 4.

2. Further, every cognition is through some likeness; but the likeness of singulars, insofar as they are singulars, does not seem to be in God, because the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is a being only in potency, is altogether dissimilar to God, who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singulars.

But on the contrary: it is said (Prov 16:2): "All the ways of men are open to his eyes."

I answer that God knows singulars. For all the perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher mode, as is clear from what has been said. Now to know singulars pertains to our perfection; hence it is necessary that God know singulars. For the Philosopher also judges it unfitting that anything should be known by us which is not known by God, and he argues against Empedocles that it would follow that God were most unwise if he were ignorant of discord.[1059] But those perfections which in lower beings are divided, in God exist simply and in unity. Hence, although we by one power know universals and immaterial things, and by another singulars and material things, nevertheless God by his simple intellect knows both.

But as to how this can be, some, wishing to make the matter plain, have said that God knows singulars through universal causes. For there is nothing in any singular which does not arise from some universal cause; and they propose an example: just as, if some astrologer were to know all the universal motions of the heavens, he could foretell all future eclipses. But this does not suffice; because from universal causes singulars receive certain forms and powers which, however much they are conjoined among themselves, are not individuated except through individual matter. Hence one who would know Socrates through this, that he is white, or that he is Sophroniscus' son, or whatever else of the sort is said, would not know him insofar as he is this man. Therefore, according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know singulars in their singularity.

Others have said that God knows singulars by applying universal causes to particular effects. But this is nothing: for no one can apply something to another unless he first knows that other; whence such an application cannot be the reason for knowing particulars, but rather the cognition of singulars is presupposed.

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that since God is the cause of things through his knowledge, as has been said, his knowledge extends as far as his causality extends. Hence, since the active power of God extends not only to forms, from which the notion of the universal is taken, but also to matter, as will be shown below, it is necessary that the science of God extend even to singulars, which are individuated by matter. For since he knows things other than himself through his essence, insofar as it is the likeness of things, or as their active principle, it is necessary that his essence be a sufficient principle for knowing all the things that are made through him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. And it would be similar in the case of the science of an artisan, if it were productive of the whole thing and not of the form only.

Reply to the first: Our intellect abstracts an intelligible species from individuating principles; whence the intelligible species of our intellect cannot be a likeness of individual principles. And on this account our intellect does not know singulars. But the intelligible species of the divine intellect,

which is the essence of God, is not immaterial by abstraction, but is of itself the principle existing of all the principles which enter into the composition of a thing, whether they be principles of the species or principles of the individual. Hence by it God knows not only universals but also singulars.

Reply to the second: Although any species of the divine intellect, according to its being, does not have material conditions as do species received in imagination and sense, nevertheless by its virtual power it extends itself to incorporeal and to material things, as has been said.

Reply to the third: Although matter, according to its potentiality, recedes from the likeness of God, nevertheless insofar as it has being even thus, it retains a certain likeness of the divine existence.

The conclusion is affirmative. But what in this article appeared to be to be disputed concerning the conclusion has a common question with what is commonly disputed about divine providence - namely, whether God provides for singular things - which must be treated in disputation 87. But what some here treat concerning the mode by which singulars are known by us seems to be altogether beside the point.

Articulus XII - Whether God knows infinite things

To the twelfth we proceed thus. It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, insofar as it is infinite, is unknown: because of the infinite there is this, that to those who take its quantity there is always something further to take, as is said in Physics III.[1060] And St. Augustine also says in De civitate Dei XII, that whatever is comprehended by knowledge is limited by the knower's comprehension. But infinite things cannot be limited; therefore they cannot be comprehended by the science of God.

If it be said that those things which in themselves are infinite are finite for the science of God: on the contrary, the notion of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and a finiting is made through what is traversable, as is said in Physics III. But the infinite cannot be traversed either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Physics VI. Therefore the infinite cannot be made finite to the finite, nor even to the infinite; and thus infinite things are not finite to the science of God, which is infinite.

1. Further, the science of God is the measure of things known. But it is contrary to the notion of the infinite that it be measured; therefore infinite things cannot be known by God.

But on the contrary is what St. Augustine says, De civitate Dei XII, c. 18: "Although there is no number of infinite numbers, nevertheless it is not incomprehensible to him whose knowledge has no number."[1061]

1059. Aristotle, De Anima III; Metaphysics III, where he argues against Empedocles that God would be most unwise if he did not know discord.

1060. Aristotle, Physics III; VI.

1061. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, XII, c. 18.

I answer that, since God knows not only those things which are in act, but also those things which are in potency, whether of themselves or of the creature, as has been shown, and these are plainly infinite, it is necessary to say that God knows infinite things. And although the science of vision, which is only of those things which are, or will be, or have been, is not of an infinite number of things, as some say, since we do not posit that the world has existed from eternity, nor that generation and motion remain forever, so that individuals should be multiplied into infinity; nevertheless, if it be considered more carefully, it must be said that God also by the science of vision knows infinite things. For God knows also the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied without end, rational creatures remaining without end. And this is so because the cognition of any knower extends according to the mode of the form which is the principle of cognition. For the sensible species, which is in the sense, is a likeness only of one individual; whence by it only an individual can be known. But the intelligible species of our intellect is a likeness of the thing as to the nature of the species, which is participable by particulars without number. Whence our intellect, by the intelligible species of man, knows men in a certain manner, even infinite men, but not insofar as they are distinguished from one another, rather insofar as they communicate in the nature of the species, because the intelligible species of our intellect is not a likeness of man as much as to individual principles, but rather as to the principles of the species. But the divine essence, through which the divine intellect understands, is a sufficient likeness of all things which are, or can be, not only as to the common principles, but even as to the proper principles of each one, as has been shown above. Whence it follows that the science of God extends to infinite things, even insofar as they are distinguished from one another.

Reply to the first: The notion of the infinite befits quantity, according to the Philosopher in Physics I; and the notion of quantity is the order of parts. To know, therefore, the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and so in no way does it happen that the infinite be known, because however great a quantity of parts may be taken, there always remains something beyond what is taken. But God does not thus know the infinite, or infinite things, as if by numbering part after part, since he knows all things at once, not successively, as was said above; whence nothing prevents him from knowing infinite things.

Reply to the second: A traversal imports a certain succession among parts; and thence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed, neither by the finite, nor by the infinite. But to the notion of comprehension suffices adequation: for that is said to be comprehended, of which there is nothing outside the comprehender. Whence it is not contrary to the notion of the infinite that it be comprehended by the infinite. And thus that which in itself is infinite can be said to be finite to the science of God, as comprehended, though not as traversable.

Reply to the third: The science of God is a measure of things, not a quantitative one (which kind of measure lacks the infinite), but one by which he measures the essence and truth of the thing. For each thing has so much of the truth of its nature, inasmuch as it imitates the science of God, just as the thing made by art, inasmuch as it agrees with art. Granted, however, that there were some things infinite in act according to number - for instance, infinite men - or according to continuous

quantity, as if a sphere were infinite (as certain ancients said), nevertheless it is manifest that they would have a determined and finite existence: because their existence would be limited to certain determinate natures; whence they would be measurable according to the science of God.

The conclusion is: God not only knows infinite possibles, but also futures: and the doctrine of this we shall examine in the following disputation.

Disputatio LXIII - Whether God knows actually infinite things, not only possibles but also futures

Opinio Almaini & recentiorum.

Caput I - What is certain among all

Among all the Scholastics it is most certain that all possibles and futures are known by God, although among the Scholastics some judge that not all, still future - if you include future thoughts and all operations - are known by the soul of Christ: of which we shall speak in 3, q. 10, a. 3. But whether God, while he understands all possibles and futures at once, knows actually infinite things, is among Scholastics a great question. Of whom Durandus in 1, dist. 39, q. 2, and Almainus in 3, dist. 14, q. 1, after the first conclusion (whom many of the more recent follow), although he says that the soul of Christ knows not only all future substances and their individuals, but also all the thoughts and operations of men and angels unto eternity, nevertheless affirm that it does not know the infinite in act, which the Logicians call categorematically infinite, but [only] the infinite in potency, which they call syncategorematically infinite: and they must say the same of the very divinity, namely, that by it the infinite in act is not known. And although no other of the ancient writers follows this opinion, now in the schools it is very plausible to recent theologians, not only when they speak of the science of Christ's soul, but also when they speak of the science of the Godhead itself. They prove it in this way.

It is proved first: Things are known in the same mode in which they are; but futures are infinite in potency and not infinite in act: for of these we can say, there are not so many futures but that there could be more, which seems to be the definition of the infinite in potency: therefore God knows only the infinite in potency.

Second: If God knew possibles or futures actually infinite, then an actually infinite could be made by him - which seems absurd.

Third: Concerning the science of vision, both of Christ and of God, it is proved that the infinite in act cannot be known, because this science is only of future things; but there will never be futures actually infinite, but only in potency: therefore God, or the soul of Christ in this way, does not know actually infinite, but infinite in potency. And this seems to have been handed down by St. Thomas concerning the soul of Christ, in 3, q. 10, a. 2, when he asserts that the soul of Christ, by that

science which regards being in act, does not know the infinite, even if they be taken according to any time whatsoever: from which he seems to concede that by this science only infinite in potency are known by the soul of Christ.

Sententia opposita probabilior.

Caput II - The opposite sentence more probable

Among the more ancient Scholastics I do not see that there was any controversy about this matter: but as many as made mention of this question, plainly affirm that God knows infinite [things], both of possibles and of futures. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in this article 12, and of Cajetan there, and in Contra Gentiles, c. 69, and of Ferrariensis there, especially toward the end, of St. Bonaventure in 1, dist. 39, part 2, art. 1, q. 3, in the solution of the arguments, of Richard in art. 1, q. 3, of Walden as cited below.[1062]

Observation the first. It must be much observed what Aristotle teaches in Physics III, c. 6, who assigns two kinds of infinities, one of the infinite in potency, the other of the infinite in act, whose difference the authors of the former sentence seem plainly to confound. Aristotle says that the infinite in potency, which he thinks to be in the nature of things, is such that it never comes to be actually infinite, but is like the Olympic game and the day: such, I say, of a nature as is partly being made and can partly be made; for thus to a thing which is being made, and even to that which actually is, because that which is actually of it is finite, an addition can be made without a term, if we attend only to its nature: as to the Olympic game and the day, which are truly finite, there can be added something without end. Therefore Aristotle defines the infinite in potency in these words: that always another and another be taken; and that which is taken is indeed finite: but that which can be added is in potency; which he signified by those words, and something else always; that is, there always remains something to be added, but not yet taken and conjoined to the multitude. Wherefore Aristotle in that chapter plainly concedes that the infinite in potency is now in the nature of things; for to those things which are actually in a finite multitude - such as men, stones, etc. - more can be added to infinity, either by generation, or by division of the continuum, which nevertheless are not in act: for if those things which can be added to infinity were in act, and could be added with a term, there would indeed be an actually infinite multitude, as will immediately be clear. Finally, in the same chapter Aristotle adduces that definition, "of which nothing is outside," which some thought to be of the infinite, and says that it is the definition not of the infinite but of the perfect: for it is the same as if we were to say, "of which nothing is lacking"; and he subjoins the definition of the infinite in these words, "of which something is always outside," that is, to which something can always be added; and he thinks this to be the definition of the infinite in potency; for that which is outside ought to be in potency, not actually conjoined to the multitude, otherwise it would also be actually infinite. Therefore that is the infinite in act which Aristotle in that chapter distinguished from the infinite in potency, and said not to be in the nature of things - at least in

1062. St. Thomas, in this article; Cajetan there; Contra Gentiles I, c. 69; Francis of Ferrara there, especially toward the end; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 39, pars 2, art. 1, q. 3, in the solution of the arguments; Richard, art. 1, q. 3; Thomas Waldensis, in the place cited below.

corporeal things - just as he had said about the infinite in potency [that it is there], [namely] a multitude of things which exist at once, in which one cannot take and assign the first and the last. Otherwise indeed I do not see how these two infinites can be distinguished. For if the infinite in potency be said to be that to whose takings something always remains to be taken - as some assert - and if that which remains to be taken be actually in the multitude itself, so that it only remains to be taken by numbering through the intellect, surely in this way there will be no infinite in act, distinct from the infinite in potency. Wherefore, just as Aristotle concedes in the nature of things an infinite in potency, he will also concede an infinite in act. Therefore it must be said that the infinite in act is a multitude of things actually collected, in which, for those taking some part, there always remains something to be taken by enumeration: which is the same as that in that multitude a first unity and a last cannot be designated by enumeration - and this concerns the former [i.e., the infinite in act as defined].

Observation the second. There was the error of Wyclif, as Walden reports,[1063] that there is not an infinite multitude of those things which God has not made and can make. Wherefore he seems to conclude with a certain number all the things which are possible to God: which opinion Walden in the place alleged thinks manifestly erroneous. For who would say that in the possible multitude of men, out of which God daily could add more besides those whom he has created, there is a last man, so that the whole would be defined by a certain number? These points being posited, which, in my opinion, no one can deny, unless he prefers to contend about a word rather than about the thing, our opinion is proved by this reason.

A reason for the truer opinion. In that multitude which God has at once in his sight - whether it be of possible things or of future things - without any consideration of others which can be added to that multitude, we cannot assign a first and a last: therefore it is a multitude actually infinite. For we said that the multitude infinite in potency differs from that which is actually infinite in this, that the former indeed, the unities considered which it then contains in itself, is actually finite, and has a first and a last: yet because something further can be added to it, and among those things which can be added to it there is no last, it is called infinite in potency. But a multitude actually infinite is that which, considered in itself, among the things which it has in itself in the same way, without any addition of something else, has neither a first nor a last, nor can they be designated by numbering. Now the multitude of possible things or of future things, which at once is known in the sight of God, without anything coming to it from elsewhere, but with those unities alone considered which it has in the mode in which at once they are in the intellect of God, has neither first nor last: therefore it is actually infinite, not in potency. For the infinite in potency must be partly in act - and in that part finite - and partly in potency, because in potency there is something to be added; and in that part it is without term and end: wherefore it does not have all the unities in the same way, but certain ones in act, certain ones in potency. But in the multitude which God knows, all the unities are indeed in the same way: wherefore either the whole multitude ought to be said to be in act, or the whole in potency; not, however, partly in act, partly in potency.

1063. Thomas Waldensis, tom. 1, lib. 2, art. 1, cap. 14, reporting the error of Wyclif.

Effugium is shut off. But if you say that the whole multitude of those things is in potency, because each of them is in potency, and thus that the multitude is infinite in potency, by the same reasoning it would be said that the multitude of men which will be until the end of the world is finite, not in act, but in potency: but this is ridiculous. Therefore, just as a multitude is not said to be finite in act from this - that the things and the unities exist in act - but because by a certain number up to the last unity it can be numbered by some intellect, even if the things do not exist in act: so also nothing prevents it from being said to be infinite, namely, the multitude of possible or of future things, although those things do not exist actually outside the intellect, as often as all the unities are together in it in the same way as they are together in the intellect of God, and in them a first and a last cannot be assigned.

The proper sentence is confirmed and explained. Furthermore, when we say that that multitude is actually infinite, we do not say that it is of things existing in act; it is, indeed, only of possibles and futures: but we assert that, in it so accepted and known even by God himself, there is no last which can be assigned by numbering. Since also whenever all the things which God knows, possibles or futures, he were to make at once, no one would hesitate to say that the multitude is actually and simply infinite: therefore, when we inquire about that multitude as it is at once wholly in act in the intellect of God, we ought to say the same. For it is altogether the same in the notion of multitude.

It is confirmed second. And this has greater force in the opinion of those who think that in eternity all futures are together with a certain real presence. For thus the multitude of futures will be together: and if in it there is not a first and a last, to which someone could arrive by numbering, it follows that it is infinite, and, simply.

For when Aristotle called the infinite in potency and said that it is in the nature of things, he signified only the multitude of those things which exist in act and, according to themselves, as they exist in act, are finite, if there be considered what can be added to it from those things which are possible, [namely] that it is infinite in potency. But in that multitude which God knows together, that multitude is not infinite in potency which in itself in act does not have those [further things] which would make it infinite, but there can at the end be added now this unity, now that. But the multitude of things which is in the intellect of God is not thus: but it actually contains in the intellect of him whatever it can have; and from those which it has in act, a first and last unity cannot be assigned: therefore it is actually infinite.

It is confirmed finally. Lastly, if all the possibles or futures which God knows he were to make together, no one would doubt to say that the multitude is actually and simply infinite: therefore, since we inquire about that multitude as it is at once wholly in act in the intellect of God, we ought to say the same. For it is altogether the same in the notion of multitude.

The testimony of St. Augustine concerning comprehension is confirmed. And that the infinite multitude of possible things is most well known by God, not only did St. Augustine teach in City of God 18, c. 12, but also that it is, in an ineffable way, bounded by the divine intellect, because it is comprehended by him. "For whatever is comprehended by science is bounded by the

comprehension of the knower," says St. Augustine; which is to be understood for this reason: not that God sets a bound to that multitude in such a way that he would find a term to the first and last unity (for that is repugnant to an infinite multitude), but because that whole [multitude] is so contained within his science.

Caput III - Solutions to the arguments of the prior opinion

But on this account he concludes and comprehends it in such a way that nothing is outside of it: and whatever is within something else seems to be bounded and finished by it as by a terminating and enclosing limit. He said this, moreover, against certain Philosophers who falsely supposed that there are not infinite possibles which could be made by God; for, if they were infinite, they could not be known by God with certain science, and thus through an infinite eternity - in which they thought God had not been idle, but always working; some said that he had not always made new things, but had repeated the old and done them again, lest they should say that he did things by chance - therefore St. Augustine teaches that there is an infinite multitude of things, which God so comprehends and knows with certain science that it is said even to be bounded by him, in the way which we have set forth.

Furthermore, no one doubts that future thoughts are infinite who believes that souls and Angels - both the blessed and the damned - are going to endure forever: for thus the blessed will not always remain in that clear vision of God without acts; therefore there must be future cognitions without end and without a last. That these are infinite actually must be proved by the same reasonings by which we demonstrated that possibles also are actually infinite.

It is answered to the arguments of the prior view.

Solutio. From what has been said the reasons of the prior opinion can easily be dissolved.

Reply to the first: I say that that infinite multitude (about which we can say that there are not in it so many units that more and more cannot be added without end, so that what can be added is not yet understood to be actually conjoined) is indeed infinite in potency (*potentia*): because what is to be added is not yet added, but can be added. But that multitude in which, from the things that are in it - as we are speaking of it - we cannot by numbering take so many that we cannot add more from the very things which in the same way it contains in itself, and take them, is infinite in act (*actus*): because that in which there is no last unity is, in the same mode, conjoined to the rest of the multitude. Therefore, since in the multitude of possible or future things, which are known together in the sight of God, by considering only those unities which they have in the mode in which they are together in the intellect of God, there is neither first nor last, therefore it is infinite in act, not in potency. For what is infinite in potency must be in part actual, and in that part finite; and in part in potency, because something remains to be added; and in that part it is without term and without end. Wherefore it does not have all the unities in the same mode, but some actually and some potentially. But in that multitude which God knows, all the unities are in the same mode: wherefore either the whole multitude must be said to be actually, or the whole in potency - yet not partly in act and partly in potency.

But if you say that the whole multitude of those things is in potency, because each one of them is in potency, and thus that the multitude is infinite in potency, certainly by the same reasoning it would be said that the multitude of men who are to be all the way to the end of the world is finite, not actually, but in potency: but this is ridiculous. Therefore, just as a multitude is not said to be finite in act from this, that the things and unities exist actually, but because by a certain number up to the last unity it can be numbered by some intellect - even if the things do not actually exist - so also nothing hinders that the multitude of possible or future things be said to be infinite actually, although those things do not actually exist outside the intellect, whenever all the unities are together in it in the same mode, as they are together in the intellect of God; and in them neither first nor last can be assigned.

Reply to the second: I answer that nothing hinders God - if he willed - to make an infinite multitude of things, which he knows, not only of spiritual but also of corporeal things, as was shown at length above in Disputation 26, where I also demonstrated that many arguments which are wont to be used to prove that an infinite multitude cannot be made by God, clash no less against the science of God than against an infinite multitude if it be said to exist in the nature of things.[1064] And, to say it in a word, since the adversaries affirm that God knows infinities in potency and not in act, lest they be driven to say that God can make an infinite multitude, at least let them grant us that all those things which God knows can be made together by him. For who would deny that what is infinite in potency can be made? But if they say that it cannot be done that that multitude which God knows be produced in reality, because what was infinite in potency in the science of God would already be made infinite in act produced: besides that this is said without foundation - because it would be the very same multitude which God knows and which he would produce - at least the argument always remains in its force for proving that God can make an infinite multitude: because he knows it distinctly and clearly, and he is as powerful for knowing as for making, about which we said more in the place cited. Cajetan tries to establish a difference between the science of God, as he knows infinities, and the power, as he does not make infinities. For in the science of God those things are united which in themselves would be divided; in effect, however, and in production they are divided. But from this no contradiction can be inferred if on the side of the thing there be an infinite multitude of things, which does not follow from its being in the science of God, as we showed in that place: and thus the one consequence rightly follows from the other.[1065]

Reply to the third: I say that, although in no designated time future things are infinite, but up to whatever designated time there is only a finite multitude future; nevertheless in the whole heap of time future, which God has together in his science, there is an infinite multitude; and if in time all future things were present simultaneously, as they are in the science of God, together with the whole succession of time, without doubt the multitude would be infinite.

1064. Above, Disputatio 26, where Vázquez argues at length for the possibility of an actually infinite multitude made by God, and examines the standard arguments to the contrary.

1065. Cajetan's attempt to distinguish the divine science (as uniting many) from divine power (as not making infinities).

But what St. Thomas said about the science of Christ, namely, that he did not know infinities of things which are future in some difference of time, he clearly understands of substances which are generated and corrupted; for these are future finitely, because the duration of generation extends only to the end of the age - not of cognitions, which must be multiplied in eternity - , as Peter of Bergamo taught in the Concordances of the places of St. Thomas, dub. 477, and we shall speak in the Third Part, q. 10, a. 4.[1066] And although St. Thomas were truly speaking also of cognitions, that would only prove that the soul of Christ, according to St. Thomas's opinion, did not know infinite cogitations - about which there will be controversy in that place. But now we are dealing with the science of God, who without any controversy knows all things. Finally, what he asserts - that the things which are future in whatever difference of time are finite - even if we understand it of cognitions, is most true, as we have said. But the things that are future in the whole heap of time, which also lacks an end, cannot be finite; and since God at once embraces the whole by his intellect, it comes about that he also knows cogitations to be infinite.

But Durandus argues in the First Book, dist. 39, q. 1, art. 2, to prove that an infinite multitude is not known by God actually, but only in potency, in this way: In the way in which God knows infinite future cogitations, he knows the infinite division of the continuum, and hence he would see the continuum itself divided in every part; but he does not know every division of the continuum, nor the continuum itself divided in every part actually, but in potency: therefore neither does he know cogitations actually infinite, but in potency. For if God knew the continuum divided actually, or knew it divided into all the individual parts no longer divisible, this cannot be done: because a continuum cannot be divided into indivisibles, since it does not consist of them alone; or else it would be into divisible parts, and thus it would not be divided in every part. And thus the minor proposition remains proved.

Solution. I answer that, since God knows things as they are, and what cannot be in things is not known by God as if it were, it happens that, just as singular cogitations in any temporal difference at all, indeed in the whole heap of the succession of time, are without doubt certainly known by God; and because singular ones are future among themselves, distinct and mutually separate, and each one is neither conjoined with another nor can be further divided, he knows infinities divided by an ultimate division, divided one by one. But he cannot in like manner know a continuum actually divided in every part: although he can most perfectly, from a continuum, separate infinitely many parts by his intellect; because no division in every part is possible, as is gathered from the reasoning made above; and thus by God it cannot be known as having been made. For what is not, is not known. Yet an infinite multitude of parts communicating can be drawn out by God from a continuum; but in such a way that in each there remains infinite divisibility, and the multitude of parts is in potency separable, but not yet separated. Therefore there is a diverse mode of knowing infinite cogitations and the division of a continuum into its parts. Wherefore what Durandus assumes in the major proposition is false; the reason of the distinction is manifest enough from what has been said.[1067]

1066. Petrus de Bergamo, Concordantiae locorum S. Thomae, dub. 477; and cf. Third Part, q. 10, a. 4.
1067. Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In I Sent., dist. 39, q. 1, art. 2.

Articulus XIII - Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingents

It is objected to the thirteenth thus. It seems that the science of God is not of future contingents. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect; but the science of God is the cause of the knowable, as was said above. Since therefore it itself is necessary, it follows that its knowns are necessary. Therefore the science of God is not of contingents.[1068]

1. Besides, every conditional, whose antecedent is necessary absolutely, has a consequent necessary absolutely. For thus does the antecedent stand to the consequent as principles to the conclusion. But from necessary principles no conclusion follows except a necessary one, as is proved in the Posterior Analytics. But this is a certain true conditional: "If God knows this to be future, it will be," because the science of God is not fallible. But the antecedent of this conditional is necessary absolutely - both because it is eternal, and because it is signified as present. Therefore the consequent also is necessary absolutely. Therefore whatever is known by God is necessary. And thus the science of God is not of contingents.
2. Besides, everything known by God must be; for also everything known by us must be, although the science of God is more certain than our science. But no future contingent must be. Therefore no future contingent is known by God.

But on the contrary: It is said in Psalm 32: "He who fashioned their hearts one by one, who understands all their works" - namely, of men. But the works of men are contingent, as subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingents.

I answer that: Since it has been shown above that God is of all things, not only of those which are in act, but also of those which are in his potency, or in the creature's; and among these some are contingent for us as future; it follows that God knows future contingents. To see this more clearly, it must be considered that some contingent can be considered in a twofold way. In one way, in itself, namely, when already it is in act; and thus it is not considered as future, but as present; nor as undetermined to either, but as determined to one: and on this account, in this way it can be subjected to sure and infallible cognition, as to the sense of one seeing, as when I see Socrates sitting. In another way, a contingent can be considered as it is in its cause; and thus it is considered as future, and as contingent, not yet determined to one: because a contingent cause is related to opposites, and thus the contingent is not subjected with certainty to any cognition. Whence whoever knows a contingent effect only in its cause does not have of it except a conjectural cognition. But God knows all contingents, not only as they are in their causes, but also as they are in themselves. And he does not know successively contingent things as they are in their own coming-to-be - as we do - but at once: because his cognition is measured by eternity, as is his existence. But eternity, being the whole at once, encompasses the whole of time, as was said above. Whence all things which come to be in time are present to God from eternity, not only by that reason that he has the rationes of things present with him - as some say - but because his gaze from

1068. See the common loci: In I Sent., dist. 38, a. 5; dist. 39, q. 2; Contra Gentiles I, c. 67; and De veritate q. 2, a. 12; as well as I, q. 14, a. 13.

eternity bears over all things as they are in their own presence. Whence it is manifest that contingents are known by God both infallibly and unchangeably, insofar as they are subjected to the divine view according to their own presentness; and yet they are future contingents when compared to their causes.

Reply to the first: Therefore I say that although the supreme cause is necessary, nevertheless the effect can be contingent on account of the proximate cause being contingent: just as the sprouting of a plant is contingent because of the proximate cause being contingent, although the motion of the sun, which is the first cause, is necessary. And similarly the things known by God are contingent on account of proximate causes, although the science of God, which is the first cause, is necessary.

Reply to the second: It is said by some that this antecedent - "God knows this future contingent" - is not necessary, but contingent: because, although it is present in eternity, ...

[on divine knowledge]

That God knows future contingents

Reply to the second: Some say that this antecedent - "God knew this future contingent" - is not necessary, but contingent: because, although it is past, nevertheless it imports a respect to the future. But this does not take away the necessity: for that which had a respect to the future must needs have had it, even if sometimes the future does not follow. Others truly say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is composed of the necessary and the contingent, just as this statement is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this too is nothing: for when it is said, "God knew that this contingent would be," "contingent" is put there only as the material of the verb, and not as a principal part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity matters nothing to this, whether the proposition be necessary or contingent, true or false. For thus it can be true that I said a man is an ass, just as that I said Socrates runs or that God is; and the same ratio holds of the necessary and the contingent. Wherefore it must be said that the antecedent is absolutely necessary. Yet it does not follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary: because the antecedent is a remote cause of the consequent, which, on account of a proximate cause, is contingent. But this is nothing. For a conditional is false whose antecedent would be a remote necessary cause and whose consequent would be a contingent effect: as, for example, if one were to say, "If the sun moves, the herb will sprout." And therefore it must be said otherwise, that when in the antecedent something is posited pertaining to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken, not according to the being which it has in itself, but according to that which it has in the soul. For the being of a thing in itself is one thing, and the being of a thing in the soul is another. For example, if I say, "If the soul understands something, that thing is immaterial," it must be understood that that thing is immaterial according as it is in the intellect, not according as it is in itself. And similarly, if I say, "If God knew something, it will be," the consequent must be

understood as it falls under the divine knowledge, namely, as it is in its presence. And thus it is necessary, as also the antecedent is necessary. For "whatever is, when it is, must be," as is said in the first book of the Peri hermeneias, chapter 8, near the end.[1069]

Reply to the third: Things which are reduced into act temporally are known by us successively in time; but by God they are known in eternity, which is above time. Hence, for us - because we know future contingents inasmuch as they are such - it cannot be that they be certain; but to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. As he who goes along a road does not see those who come after him, but he who from some height looks upon the whole road at once sees all who pass along the road. And therefore that which is known by us must be necessary even according as it is in itself: for those things which are in themselves future contingents cannot be known by us. But those things which are known by God must be necessary according to the mode by which they are subject to the divine knowledge (as has been said), not, however, absolutely, according as they are considered in their proper causes. Whence also this proposition, "everything known by God is necessary to be," is commonly distinguished, because it can be taken de re or de dicto. If it be understood de re, it is divided and false; and the sense is: every thing which God knows is necessary. Or it can be understood de dicto; and thus it is composite and true; and the sense is: this dictum - "to be known by God" - is necessary. But some object, saying that this distinction has place in forms separable from the subject. As if I were to say, "the white is able to be black": which indeed de dicto is false and de re is true. For the thing which is white can be black, but this dictum, "the white is black," can never be true. But in forms inseparable from the subject this distinction has no place; or if I should say, "a black crow is able to be white," in either sense it is false. Now "to be known by God" is inseparable from the thing: since what is known by God cannot be not-known. This objection, however, would have place if "known" imported some disposition inhering in a subject. But since it imports the act of the knower with respect to the thing known itself, although it be always known, nevertheless something can be attributed to it according to itself which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it stands under the act of knowing. Thus "to be material" is attributed to a stone according to itself, which is not attributed to it according as it is intelligible.

The conclusion is affirmative and most true. But concerning that conclusion, and the things which St. Thomas teaches in the article, there are many points worthy of discussion, which in the following disputations must be examined by us. Status quaestionis: On the state of the present disputation and the kinds of futurities.

That the state of the present disputation be understood, it must be noted that there are, universally speaking, two genera of futures. Certain are altogether necessary, which not only come to pass from a natural cause and are determined to one, but also cannot be impeded by any natural opposition of causes, as is the rising of the sun and an eclipse and other things of that kind. And these are known with certitude not only by God, but also by angels and by men, with a certitude not subject to controversy, as is obvious.

1069. Aristotle, Peri hermeneias, book 1 (De interpretatione), c. 8, toward the end.

But other futures are simply contingent. Yet these are said in a twofold way. Certain futures proceed wholly from a natural cause, which nevertheless can be impeded by some other cause, either free or natural; but because this is accidental to that cause, the event which follows therefrom is also called "contingent": because thus it will come about as it is to come about, yet it can also not come about - such as future rain and other impressions natural in these lower parts, sicknesses, maladies, and the like. These, however, although by men they are not so certainly known that in their knowledge they cannot be deceived, are nevertheless known certainly and evidently by the angels, as we will show in Disputation 207, whenever in such events there intervenes only the concurrence and conjunction of natural causes, and no free cause in any way interposes.[1070] For if these events come about or do not come about by some free cause, either applying or impeding, their condition is the same as that of effects which proceed proximate from free choice: and neither the one nor the other can be known certainly and infallibly, even by an angel, as we will show there.

Concerning those, therefore, which depend solely upon natural causes, and in no way upon a free [cause], the proposed question is not to be taken: for it is manifest that these are known by God more certainly than by angels.

There is, moreover, another genus of contingent effects, which first and proximately, or at least remotely, depend upon free choice; and it is about these that we must dispute at present. We now suppose what we will say more briefly in Disputation 68, chapter 1: namely, that the free choice of man and of the angel can by its native faculty act and not act concerning one thing and concerning its opposite.[1071]

Disputatio LXIV - Whether God knows future contingents certainly by their real presence in eternity

According to the Catholic faith and philosophical reason, God foreknows all future things. Chapter 1.

According to the opinion of Richard and of some Thomists: future contingents are present in eternity, and hence are known by God with certitude. Chapter 2.[1072]

Things are not really present to eternity from eternity, nor is such a presence the reason of the certitude of God's knowledge - the truer opinion holds. Chapter 3.

The arguments for the former opinion are satisfied. Chapter 4.

What St. Thomas thought about this "presence." Chapter 5.

1070. See below, Disputation 207, where this is shown at length.

1071. See below, Disputation 68, cap. 1, on the liberty of the will of men and of angels to act or not act concerning the same thing and concerning its opposite.

1072. Richard of St. Victor is commonly named among those who hold this; some Thomists also attribute such a view.

Caput I - According to the Catholic faith and philosophical reason, that God foreknows all future things

Concerning the knowledge of these future contingents, St. Augustine reports the error of Cicero, in the City of God, book 5, chapter 9: in order to defend fortune, the heavens, and freedom in acting, he denied even to God the infallible knowledge of future contingents, so that, on this basis, he might declare divination and prophecies to be uncertain.[1073] But - to omit disputing against the alien wanderings of that writer, which Quintus his brother in the first book of On Divination confutes by his very words - nothing is so consonant to reason and constancy as that we grant not to fortune, nor to chance, nor to lot, the governance of future things, as though they should fall out vacantly, by chance, or at random. Therefore, we, following Aristotle's interpretation and approving his conclusions, reject as empty the contentions about a "future" that is not anything determinate, but sheerly fortuitous; for if (namely) God exists, it neither can happen that there be events that come to pass without order, nor is there any sequence of future things of which he is not provident.

By the best prior natural reasoning we will show: God, by the very fact that he is God, knows all things - each and every one - certainly, with all their singularities; and thus all future things, of every kind, are known by him with infallible certitude.

With this truth premised, which is confessed by all, there still remains, with many of the Scholastics, no small discussion in assigning the reason why, since future contingents are neither necessary nor determined to one, but indifferent, so that they can be and not be, God is nevertheless able not only to know them, but also to comprehend them with certain and infallible certitude. For all Catholics, and even the most skilled philosophers, led by most fitting reason, must maintain that God's knowledge of future things is everywhere, on his part, so certain that it cannot fail; but a certain and infallible knowing excludes every imperfection of conjecture. For conjecture is so imperfect a knowledge that it cannot fall in God, who is the highest truth and goodness, and an intellect free of every species-derived imperfection. Concerning the cause, therefore, why God certainly knows future contingents, we must now discourse; and in this disputation we will examine that present question, as it were in terminis, namely, what is the ratio proposed.

Caput II - According to the opinion of Richard and of some Thomists, future contingents are present in eternity, and thus are known certainly by God

After the difficulty posed, Richard in I, dist. 38, q. 3, and dist. 39, art. 1, q. 1, Capreolus on I, dist. 36, Cajetan at I, q. 14, art. 2, and on dist. 38, q. 1, 2, conclusion 1 and 2, Cajetan himself and more recent Thomists in this article, the Ferrariense on Contra Gentiles, c. 66, the second doubt, and Catherinus in his little work on foreknowledge and providence, not only maintain that all

1073. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, V, c. 9; he recounts and refutes Cicero's denial of divine foreknowledge of future contingents.

future contingents have always been really present in the measure of God's eternity, but also that this is the unique reason why God knows future things not by probable conjecture but certainly.[1074] Cajetan wonderfully praises this opinion and, with his usual subtlety, explains it accurately. Indeed, after long consideration he greatly boasts that he first discovered it and fitted it suitably to the mind of St. Thomas; although he added nothing new to the doctrine of Richard. Whether in truth St. Thomas also held that, we will say below, in chapter 5.

Note, then, that he himself observes that things can be said to be present by a real presence to eternity in a twofold way: first, such that they are present at any instant of time whatsoever, and that their existence falls in eternity under the measure of any time whatsoever; and he judges this doctrine to be altogether false, nor did it ever come into the mind of the Holy Doctor, nor did he ever dream it; and in this sense he says that the adversaries manifestly slander the opinion of St. Thomas. Moreover, that the doctrine thus explained is false is clear: for since the rising of the sun to be tomorrow does not fall under the measure of any time you like, but only of the future day of tomorrow, it cannot be that it has been, from eternity, present to the eternity of God for any duration of time you like and for any instant; for it would be as if it had begun from eternal time and had lasted; therefore, for any time you like, that is, as existing at any time you like, it cannot be present to eternity.

Next, this doctrine can be explained thus: in any now or instant of eternity, which is wholly simultaneous, future things are present to eternity and to the intellect of God by a real presence and (as they say) by a real co-existence. Understood in this way, the opinion is most true, and according to the mind and sense of St. Thomas. Wherefore (he says) these propositions and the like must be distinguished: "All things are present to eternity," "All things are always present," "All things are from eternity." For either the verb "are" signifies only the duration and measure of eternity, and then they are true; or it also at the same time denotes the measure and duration of time, and then they are false. From this doctrine he thinks all the arguments of Scotus and Durandus can be easily dissolved.

This opinion is proved first by the authority of the Fathers, then by reason. Among the Fathers, first is St. Augustine, who seems to have expressed it in book 2 to Simplicianus. For after he taught that in God there is so-called "foreknowledge" just as there is "repentance," not because He truly foreknows, or because He Himself repents, but improperly and metaphorically, because He is disposed after the manner of one repenting and of one foreknowing, he adds something, and proves it by these words: "For what is foreknowledge if not the knowledge of future things? But what is future to God, who surpasses all times? For if He has the very things in His own gaze, they are not future to Him but present; and on this account it can no longer be called foreknowledge, but only knowledge." From which words the following argument can be drawn: either Augustine speaks of the real presence of future things in eternity - and thus he supports Cajetan's position - or of the presence that they call objective, whereby, namely, by knowing things of any sort

1074. Richard of St. Victor, In I Sent., dist. 38, q. 3; dist. 39, art. 1, q. 1; Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 36; Cajetan, In I, q. 14, art. 2; In I Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, 2, conclus. 1 - 2; Ferrariense, In Contra Gentiles, c. 66, "Secundum dubium"; St. Ambrose Catharinus, Opusculum de praescientia et providentia.

whatsoever, whether past, or future, or merely possible, He by the very knowledge of them makes them present to Himself, because He is said to represent them to Himself. He does not speak of objective presence; for thus he would not rightly prove that in God there is not properly speaking foreknowledge: for the prophets are truly and properly said to foreknow the future, and yet by the very act of prediction and foreknowledge they have those things present to themselves objectively. Then also from this, that future things are not truly present to God, Augustine infers that the same things are known to us by God in an identical way, as we shall report below; but that does not follow if we speak only of objective presence. For if the same thing were known by God twice, first it would be when that thing was still future, and then when it was now present; but that which is known by God is always present by objective presence, which is wholly simultaneous, and is never objectively future, as is plain. Therefore Augustine is not speaking of objective, but of real presence. [1075]

Boethius teaches the same no less clearly, book 5 of the Consolation, the last prose: "He considers all things that are now coming to be in His simple cognition; nor, if you wish to weigh the foreknowledge whereby He discerns all things, will you judge it to be a foreknowledge as of something future, but a knowledge of a never-failing instant." From which he thereupon infers that in God it should not be called "pre-vision" but "pro-vidence."[1076] Gregory also adds, who in book 20 of the Moralia, chapter 23, alias 24, taught the same, when he affirms that in God foreknowledge is said in exactly the same way as repentance; and proposing a doubt, he says: "How is He 'foreknowing' (namely, God), when nothing is foreknown except things that are future; and we know that to God nothing is future, before whose eyes the past are none, the present do not pass, the future do not come? For everything that to us has been and will be is present before His sight; and whatever is present He can know rather than foreknow." But why nevertheless God is commonly said to "foreknow," a little later he subjoins: "And because those things which are future to us you see are nevertheless always at hand to Him, He is called 'foreknowing,' although by no means does He foresee as future what He sees as present."[1077]

In these words, besides the argument which we brought forward from Augustine (for the same could now also be done), it must be observed, that solely for this reason, according to the sense of Gregory, is "foreknowledge" said metaphorically in God, because the things that are future to us are not so to Him; which must necessarily be understood of real presence. For if he were speaking only of objective presence, it would be altogether false that "therefore" in God there is said to be foreknowledge of future things, because those things are future to us objectively. For even the things present at this time that we do not yet know, but afterwards will know, do not for that reason make it so that God is now said to "foreknow," even improperly and metaphorically, on the ground that they are to be known by us, and that we shall come to have their objective presence; by the same reason it would be said that God "foreknows" the past which we do not yet know but later

1075. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 2.
1076. Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, lib. 5, prosa ultima.
1077. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia, lib. 20, c. 23 (alias 24).

shall come to know. Finally, it is manifest that Anselm, in the little work On the Concord of Free Choice and Predestination, cap. 2, and Hugh of St. Victor in the Summa Sententiarum, tract. 1, c. 12, took the same opinion and the words from Augustine.[1078]

Moreover, Fathers can be adduced who teach that to God nothing is future, but that in Him only there is found "It is," not "It will be," or "It was"; of whom we brought forward many in Disputation 32, c. 2. But as it regards the knowledge of God, the same Gregory seems to have expressedly handed on this, in book 9 of the Moralia, c. 26, alias 25, in these words: that "to Him (namely, to God) neither do things past slip away, nor do things yet to come fail, as if they did not appear; because He who has being always, beholds all things as present to Himself; and since He is not stretched to look to 'after' and 'before,' the gaze undergoes no change." The same says Bede in tome 8, book of Questions, q. 13, after the middle; but most clearly Anselm, in the little work On the Concord of Free Choice and Predestination, cap. 1, after the middle, where, concerning the eternity of God, to which he asserts that "It is" alone befits, writes thus: "For just as the present time contains the whole of place, and whatever is in any place; so the eternal present simultaneously comprehends the whole of time, and whatever is in any time. Therefore, since every place is simultaneously really present to the present time, so also all time is simultaneously under eternity itself."[1079]

By reason, indeed, this opinion is proved first, because the duration of God, since it is infinite and eternal, cannot fail to embrace all time and the durations of all things, past and future; and it is wholly simultaneous: therefore at once without succession it contains all things within itself; and hence it is compared by St. Thomas, I Contra Gentiles, c. 66, to the point of a center, so that just as all the points of a circumference constantly correspond, although they are distant and separated among themselves, so also to eternity all created individuals, which in their temporal duration are mutually distant and separated, are permanently referred.[1080]

Second, it can be confirmed by the reason which Augustine uses in the place cited, so as to prove that in God there is not foreknowledge as in us, namely, as if future things were not yet with God, just as it now happens in the order of things; but God by His knowledge anticipates future things. Therefore, says Augustine, "He apprehends them in two ways, in one way according to the foreknowledge of future things, in another according to the knowledge of present things." By which words Augustine himself inserts the inconvenience, namely, that the same things are by God known twice, if future things are not present to Him. But besides his authority, it is also proved by reason that this follows in such wise: for God is said first to know a thing when it is truly future, then when it is already really present; although from this no real change in God follows, yet the mere change of the things suffices, that the knowledge of God, as referred to them, may be said in various ways and diversified: just as He is said to know things future in one way, but only possible things in another way; that is, His essence, altogether unchanged in itself, when compared to

1078. St. Anselm, De concordia liberi arbitrii cum praedestinatione, cap. 2; Hugh of St. Victor, Summa sententiarum, tract. 1, c. 12.

1079. See above, Disputation 32, c. 2; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia, lib. 9, c. 26 (alias 25); Bede, Tom. 8, Lib. Quaestionum, q. 13 (post medium); St. Anselm, De concordia liberi arbitrii cum praedestinatione, cap. 1 (post medium).

1080. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles, I, c. 66.

possibles, is called "knowledge" in one mode, but when collated with future things, it is called "knowledge" in another mode. What wonder, then, if, collated with things future and compared with things present, He is said in a different mode to know the same things, no change being made in Himself.

The third argument: unless we say that, by reason of presence in eternity, contingent things are known by God with certain and infallible knowledge, scarcely can another cause be assigned for the certainty of God's knowledge. Therefore this opinion rightly grants that, lest the patrons of it be compelled, with some Scholastics, to confess that the cause of such certainty is hidden. But whether this was the opinion of St. Thomas, to which his own disciples strive to draw him, we will say in chapter 5.

By reason, this same opinion is proved first: because the duration of God, since it is infinite and eternal, cannot fail to embrace all time and the durations of all things past and future; and it is wholly simultaneous: therefore at once without succession it contains all things within itself; and hence it is compared by St. Thomas, I Contra Gentiles, c. 66, to the point of a center, so that just as all the points of a circumference constantly correspond although they are distant and separated among themselves, so also to eternity all created individuals, which in their temporal duration are mutually distant and separated, are permanently referred.

Caput III - The truer opinion holds

Although the preceding opinion was, some years ago, fairly popular in the schools, the opposite is now more received; and in fact even among the older Scholastics it was more common and has far better foundations. That opposite opinion asserts two things. First, that future things are not present to eternity from eternity with a real presence, but only by an objective presence in the mind of God. Second, that the presence which the prior opinion posits is not the reason why God knows future things with certainty; rather, as we shall show a little below, even if they were present by reason of the eminence of eternity, still, prior by nature to their being thus present, they would be known by God.

The first part is defended by Alexander,[1081] St. Bonaventure,[1081] Scotus,[1081] Durandus,[1081] Gabriel,[1081] Gregory,[1081] Marsilius in his Castigatorium on the exposition of this article of St. Thomas, where he reports that the prior opinion was noted by many Doctors at Paris, and was falsely attributed to St. Thomas; add also other Thomists, whom we shall report in chapter 5.[1081]

It could first be proved by the authority of St. Augustine, book 12 On the City of God, chapter 25, at the end, where he says of God: "And if he were to withdraw, so to speak, his creative power from things, they would not be, just as before they were made, they were not; but I say 'before' by eternity, not by time." Therefore Augustine holds that, before things existed in their own time, not only were they not in a prior time, but neither were they in eternity; but if they had been really present to eternity from eternity, they would have been in it before time.[1082]

Then it can be confirmed by reasons. The first is Scotus's, thus. As the immensity of God is not present from eternity to all places that will be in time - or conversely, places are not filled by the immensity of God from eternity - so neither are future things contained by eternity itself from eternity.

Second, Scotus argues: if things are from eternity really present to eternity, or, as the adversaries say, really coexist with eternity, and do not merely have that diminished being, that is, objective being, which Scotus teaches, it follows that they cannot be produced in time and in their proper measure; for the same thing would be produced twice while remaining in its own being. This reason will be more clearly illustrated by the fourth reason, which we shall pursue at greater length from Durandus.

1081. Alexander, Summa, pars 1, q. 23, m. 4, a. 3; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 3; Scotus, In I Sent., q. 1, 5; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 38; Durandus, q. 1, a. 2, post primam conclusionem; Gabriel, In I Sent., d. 38; "Greg. m. 2, circa finem"; Marsilius, in his Castigatorium on this article of St. Thomas; and others, reported below in cap. 5.

1081. Alexander, Summa, pars 1, q. 23, m. 4, a. 3; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 3; Scotus, In I Sent., q. 1, 5; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 38; Durandus, q. 1, a. 2, post primam conclusionem; Gabriel, In I Sent., d. 38; "Greg. m. 2, circa finem"; Marsilius, in his Castigatorium on this article of St. Thomas; and others, reported below in cap. 5.
1081. Alexander, Summa, pars 1, q. 23, m. 4, a. 3; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 3; Scotus, In I Sent., q. 1, 5; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 38; Durandus, q. 1, a. 2, post primam conclusionem; Gabriel, In I Sent., d. 38; "Greg. m. 2, circa finem"; Marsilius, in his Castigatorium on this article of St. Thomas; and others, reported below in cap. 5.
1081. Alexander, Summa, pars 1, q. 23, m. 4, a. 3; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 3; Scotus, In I Sent., q. 1, 5; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 38; Durandus, q. 1, a. 2, post primam conclusionem; Gabriel, In I Sent., d. 38; "Greg. m. 2, circa finem"; Marsilius, in his Castigatorium on this article of St. Thomas; and others, reported below in cap. 5.
1081. Alexander, Summa, pars 1, q. 23, m. 4, a. 3; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 3; Scotus, In I Sent., q. 1, 5; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 38; Durandus, q. 1, a. 2, post primam conclusionem; Gabriel, In I Sent., d. 38; "Greg. m. 2, circa finem"; Marsilius, in his Castigatorium on this article of St. Thomas; and others, reported below in cap. 5.
1081. Alexander, Summa, pars 1, q. 23, m. 4, a. 3; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 3; Scotus, In I Sent., q. 1, 5; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 38; Durandus, q. 1, a. 2, post primam conclusionem; Gabriel, In I Sent., d. 38; "Greg. m. 2, circa finem"; Marsilius, in his Castigatorium on this article of St. Thomas; and others, reported below in cap. 5.
1081. Alexander, Summa, pars 1, q. 23, m. 4, a. 3; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 3; Scotus, In I Sent., q. 1, 5; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 38; Durandus, q. 1, a. 2, post primam conclusionem; Gabriel, In I Sent., d. 38; "Greg. m. 2, circa finem"; Marsilius, in his Castigatorium on this article of St. Thomas; and others, reported below in cap. 5.
1081. Alexander, Summa, pars 1, q. 23, m. 4, a. 3; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 3; Scotus, In I Sent., q. 1, 5; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 38; Durandus, q. 1, a. 2, post primam conclusionem; Gabriel, In I Sent., d. 38; "Greg. m. 2, circa finem"; Marsilius, in his Castigatorium on this article of St. Thomas; and others, reported below in cap. 5.
1081. Alexander, Summa, pars 1, q. 23, m. 4, a. 3; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 3; Scotus, In I Sent., q. 1, 5; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 38; Durandus, q. 1, a. 2, post primam conclusionem; Gabriel, In I Sent., d. 38; "Greg. m. 2, circa finem"; Marsilius, in his Castigatorium on this article of St. Thomas; and others, reported below in cap. 5.

1082. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, XII, c. 25.

The third reason: whenever several things exist together, or "coexist" (as the Scholastics say) together with some third thing, it is necessary that they also exist or coexist among themselves; but not all future things really coexist among themselves, for some are prior to others; therefore they do not really coexist with eternity either.

To these two later arguments Cajetan thinks one can answer sufficiently from the doctrine set down in the first chapter: because it is not rightly argued from the duration of eternity and from a real coexistence with it, to the duration of time and the proper duration of the things themselves, and to their coexistence among themselves according to that. Wherefore it is not rightly inferred (says he): the thing is really present to eternity before it comes to be; therefore it cannot really be produced. For what is under an alien measure can be newly produced in its own measure; therefore, since things are in eternity, not as in their own, but as in an alien measure, nothing hinders their being afterwards newly produced in their own. In the same way it does not follow: many things coexist to eternity, therefore they coexist among themselves; for they coexist to eternity because of its highest latitude, which embraces all, but they coexist to it in an alien measure; whereas among themselves they can coexist only by their proper duration and measure.

Yet by this solution the fourth reason - which is also Durandus's - impugns effectively: because what as yet is nothing in itself and has nothing of its own proper being and proper duration (which is not distinguished from its being) cannot coexist to an alien measure and duration. For to coexist to another seems to suppose as a first and necessary foundation the proper existence of the thing that coexists; but future things, even necessary ones, were from eternity nothing in themselves, nor did they have anything of a proper duration; therefore neither could they have coexisted to eternity.

To this reason I do not see what Cajetan, or the Thomists, reply; and I hold it evident. But I further press the adversaries thus. Lower things are not said to be in eternity in such a way that eternity is their intrinsic and proper duration; for just as they do not exist by the existence (*esse*) of God, nor are they said to be by God's very existence, so each thing, as it has its own being (*esse*) in itself, so also it has its own duration, by which it is truly and really said to endure, as was often said in Disputation 33. Created things, however, are only in eternity, or coexist to it, just as they are also under time and the motion of the first movable as under an extrinsic duration and measure. For although eternity is not the measure of other durations, as was said in Disputation 31, nevertheless for other things besides God eternity is a certain extrinsic duration, to which they also are said to coexist. Whether, however, it be called a measure now matters little; for in this way or in another, eternity does not confer being and duration upon things. How then can it come about that other things, which do not yet have true being and proper duration in themselves, be said in any way to coexist to eternity, which is for them an altogether extrinsic duration? For how can that which in itself is not yet anything be comprehended by eternity through an altogether extrinsic coexistence? Moreover, why eternity is said to be above every duration, this gives only that, whatever time things exist in, eternity embraces them, and that they all coexist to it at that time; but it cannot bring it about that those things somehow coexist to it which do not yet have proper being or existence: for by an alien duration or existence nothing can in any way exist or endure. Therefore

eternity, since it is extrinsically present to other things, will not make them be in any way; wherefore neither will it make them coexist to itself. For this consists in an extrinsic denomination, which supposes the true being of the things which it denominates.

This, however, agrees only with cognition, in so far as cognition is such as by its own power to make things objectively present to the intelligent subject even when they are not yet; for that being of presence is only to be represented; and what is merely possible also can be represented; but truly to coexist in no way can be.

The fifth reason is from an absurdity. It would follow that future contingents also could be known with certainty by an angel. For the duration of that substance which is called the aevum is wholly "at once," as we shall show in Disputation 33; therefore it embraces at once all subsequent things and all that coexist to it at once. If therefore the existence of future things in eternity is a sufficient cause for their being known by God with certainty and infallibly, the existence of future things in the aevum of angels will be a cause for their being known also with certainty by angels.

I have heard that some, convinced by this argument, concede that future things are indeed known by an angel, not, however, as future, but as present now in his aevum - which is plainly false and absurd. For from this it would follow that those things which are really future for us are known for certain by angels, even though they are present to them; and thus they would know the day of judgment most excellently, contrary to Matt. 24 and Mark 13: "Of that day no one knows, not even the angel of God." Nor, indeed, does the prior opinion attribute to God the knowledge of future things in any other way than because they are present to his eternity; therefore now they would concede to angels that which they attribute to God.

Others reply with Cajetan in this article as follows. Although the aevum measures the whole substantial being of an angel, nevertheless it does not measure his cognition, but discrete time. From this they infer that those things which are future for us are present to the knowledge of God, because this is measured by eternity no less than his substance; but they are not present to the knowledge of an angel, because that is measured by discrete time, not by the aevum; yet they are present to the substance of the angel, which is measured by an aevum wholly at once and permanent. But it matters little that future things are really present to the substance of an angel, for them to be known for certain by an angel, if they are not present to his cognition.

But this solution does not satisfy. For when the opposite opinion says that from real presence future things are known with certainty by God, it does not speak of objective presence; for thus there would be a useless repetition: that therefore God knows the future because they are objectively present - presence, as if we were saying: therefore they are known with certainty, because they are known with certainty. For to be objectively present is entirely nothing other than to be represented to the knower. If, then, from real presence in eternity objective presence is to be proved, the same in the angel is also evidently concluded; and this pertains to the first part of our opinion.

Moreover, we can press the Cajetanians further. For in the Thomist position there is some intellection of the angel which is not measured by discrete time but by the aevum, as his substance is measured by it; to this intellection, therefore, all future things could be really present, and, by reason of this presence, be known. For if not only as present to the angel according to his substance, but also by some intellection the angel has perseverance in his own being, and remains all at once for some part of our time - as is commonly held of an angel's act, that it lasts longer or shorter in permanence - therefore to that intellection the future things of that part of time could be present, and thus be known with certainty by an angel.

And if anyone were to say that future things must not only coexist to the intellection of an angel according to being by a real presence, but also by an objective presence, so that they may be known by him with certainty; but that future things cannot be objectively represented to an angel until they are present in their own proper duration and measure: this solution is manifestly nugatory and contains a useless repetition, as we noted a little before. For if from a real presence in the duration of eternity the objective presence were not to be inferred - so that things really present to God are known by him - but that from the objective presence this were to be proved; then the labor of proving a presence in eternity has been in vain: one ought rather to begin straightway from the objective representation, namely, that future things are objectively represented to God, and are therefore known. But if, for anything to be represented as future, it matters little whether it be present by a real presence, then it is in vain that the permanence of eternity, which by its duration embraces all successive things, is adduced to prove that all future things are present to God; or, if in God the objective presence is proved from the real presence, in the angel too it is evidently inferred: and this is of the prior part of our opinion.

The latter part also can easily be proved. First, from what has been said: if this presence of future things in eternity is of a kind such as we have chiefly shown, it follows that it cannot be the reason why God knows the future with certainty; the reason for that certainty is most perfect and proper, as we shall set out in the following disputations; and it is this: that God, the best and most perfect, knows creatures because he is their efficient and proper cause; and a certain and infallible knowledge of future things he has, because they are before him as determined in their causes and measures, and in time when they will be present in their own measure; whereas to be present in eternity, if that presence be something merely possible (as in Disputation 66 we shall show), it is not required before he understands future things as present in eternity, for a certain and infallible science from God to be had.

Some more recent Thomists seem to have sensed this; wherefore they maintain that this presence of future things in eternity is not necessary so that future things be known certainly and infallibly, but only so that God's science concerning future things be intuitive - that is, what they call "intuitive," a science which bears upon the same as present in act. Yet this necessity is not found in the ancient Thomists, who posited the presence of future things in eternity only so that the science of God might be certain and infallible, because, before they were understood as present in eternity, they seemed to them not to be determined so as to be known. But if once we concede that future things can be known by a proper and infallible concept, as they are in themselves

future, what need is there to grant also to God that knowledge which they call intuitive, that is, of the same future things as present in eternity? For this science has no greater perfection than that which is borne upon future things as they are in themselves future; and since the supreme perfection of knowledge seems to consist in this, that God know future things as future - namely, as they are - there is no need to ascribe to God an intuitive cognition of future things as present in eternity, before they are present in their own proper measure; and, moreover, that difficult opinion about a presence in eternity is superfluously introduced.

Satisfaction is given to the arguments of the prior opinion.

Caput IV - On testimonies of the Fathers; against naming God's knowledge of future things "foreknowledge"; and on the distinction between the science of vision and of simple intelligence

But moreover, that the science of future things, as they are future, is as certain and infallible as when they are present, will be clear from what we shall say in the following disputation. Add this also, that, as we shall show in Disputation 134, intuitive science is not to be called only that which is borne upon a presence according to place or proper time, but that which is borne, with a proper concept, upon a thing not abstracted from existence, but existing in its own time. And indeed a greater perfection, which can befit cognition, is that it be borne upon the things themselves, as they themselves are - either future, or past, or present - than to be borne upon future things as present.

In this way satisfaction is made to the arguments of the prior position.

It is necessary, however, to overturn the foundations of that prior opinion. But, in order to reply to the testimonies of the Fathers adduced before and to the reasons we drew from them, note the doctrine which we brought above from the same St. Augustine and Aristotle, in Disputation 38, chapter 2, at the end - namely, that a thing can even be seen by the bodily eye while absent, if God conserve its species; and that this can be done so perfectly that, when the object is again present in reality, absolutely nothing is added to the perfection of the vision, but it remains just as clear in the absence of the object, if the perfect species be conserved, as it would be in its presence. Hence a thing which would be seen in this manner, while the object were absent, would not be seen anew by another vision when the object became present.[1083]

Then it must be observed that foreknowledge (*praescientia*) among men is as it were a certain praesentience and pre-cognition of a future thing - so confused and obscure that, when the thing itself is present and actually present, it is seen much more clearly, and thereby that cognition of praesentience is changed into a clearer one. Wherefore with us, commonly, foreknowledge is as it were an anticipated and immature science. And this is true not only in the foreknowledge and divination of contingent things, but also of necessary things: for an astrologer knows a future eclipse in one way, but sees the present one in another. St. Augustine indicated this mode of foreknowing future things in Confessions XI, chapter 18, where he says: "When, therefore, things

1083. St. Augustine and Aristotle, cited above in Disputation 38, cap. 2, at the end.

future are said to be seen, it is not the things themselves, in that they are not yet, that is, in that they are future, but perhaps their causes are seen, which already are. Therefore they are not future but present to those who see them, from which future things are predicted. But God, with that perspicacity which is his in understanding, thus vividly beholds the things which are future for us, and judges that they will be future at one time, present at another, and past at yet another, that the variation of things in themselves add nothing to, nor detract anything from, the perfection of the science of God."[1084]

Accordingly, when Augustine, Gregory, Boethius, and Anselm say that in God there is foreknowledge, as there is repentance, they speak improperly of foreknowledge in the human mode, which is an obscure kind of praesentience of things. For this is not in God, but in men; yet God is said to foreknow because, before things befall us, he already knows them - wherein alone he agrees with foreknowledge taken more properly: just as, when God destroys what he made, he stands in the place of one who repents of an act. And therefore, in the judgment of these Fathers, God is more fittingly said to sense, and to know, and to see, than to foreknow, to praesentiate, and to foresee; for, although things be future for us, he beholds them as perfectly as they are future, just as we see things present to us - and far better.[1085]

From this same doctrine one can easily respond to the argument brought in that place on behalf of the prior position. For if in God there were foreknowledge, that is, that imperfect praesentience of future things, undoubtedly God would know the same thing twice, and the later notion would be more perfect: and this is the absurdity that Augustine intends to infer; for if God's prior cognition were obscure on account of the object's distance and absence, the later would be more perfect on account of the object's presence. But if God from eternity sees future things just as perfectly as if they were really present - because his cognition is borne upon the thing itself so distinctly and with its proper concept that, when a future thing becomes present with real presence, nothing of cognition is changed in God - then Augustine rightly said that God's science is not to be called foreknowledge, but science; nor that he foresees future things, but that he sees; and that he bears himself toward future things just as toward present things.

From which it is also inferred that certain recent authors are wrong to refuse to call the science which God has of future things, as they are future, "science of vision" (*scientia visionis*), and to call it instead "science of simple intelligence" (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*). For Boethius, in accord with that doctrine of Augustine, says that in God it is rather to be called providence than "prevision." For if these authors shrink from calling it science of vision, they will also say that God does not see future things, but foresees; not that he knows, but that he foreknows.[1086]

But whether, in our mode of conceiving, a twofold mode of science of future things can be distinguished in God - one as of future things, the other as of present things - just as we distinguish the science of possibles from the science of future things, can also be determined easily from what has been said. And first, even if a twofold science, in our mode of conceiving, be distinguished in

1084. St. Augustine, Confessions XI, c. 18.
1085. St. Gregory, Boethius, St. Anselm, and St. Augustine are here named together for this usage.
1086. Boethius is invoked according to the Augustinian line, that in God it is called providence rather than prevision.

God, and thus we should say that the same thing is known by God not only in two ways but in three - first, insofar as it is only possible; second, insofar as it is future; third, insofar as it is present - nevertheless there does not follow the absurdity which, in the place cited above, Augustine contends for; for that follows only if we were to say that a future thing is first known by God under a shadow and confusedly, then with a distinct and clear knowledge when the thing itself is present - which would be a great variation and imperfection in God.

But those who would distinguish a twofold science in God - one of future things, the other of present things - diverse solely according to our mode of conceiving, just as the science of possibles is distinguished from the science of future things, would not thereby be compelled to assert that the science of future things is obscure and imperfect, and that it is perfected or changed upon the advent of the science of present things; rather they ought to assert that the same science is equally perfect according to the thing, and is distinguished only, in our way of conceiving, by its order to diverse objects.

Then I say that, even according to our way of conceiving, God's science ought not further to be distinguished into a science of future things and a science of present things; otherwise, by exactly the same reasoning, we would all have to say that another member must be added - namely, a science of past things - which, however, none of the Scholastics has said up to now.

And if science, insofar as it is of future things, ought to be called "science of simple intelligence," as recent authors wish, then, by the same reasoning, the science of past things ought also to be called "science of simple intelligence." But why, in God, there ought not to be distinguished, even in our way of conceiving, any science except a twofold one - one, the science of simple intelligence, which is of possibles; the other, the science of vision, which embraces future, past, and present things together - the reason is sufficiently plain: because, on the part of the object, the science of future, past, and present things does not differ, in that in any of those modes the science of God is borne upon the thing according to essence (*essentia*) and existence (*esse*) in act. But that this existence be understood as past, or future, or present, does not arise from a diversity in the thing known, but from time to which the thing known is referred: for the same thing, with its existence distinctly known, as it is referred to one time, is called past; as it is referred to another, it is called future; and, finally, as it is referred to another, it is called present. But the science of simple intelligence, by which a thing is known only as possible, certainly considers the thing in itself in another way than the science of vision does; for it understands the essence of the thing alone without its existence. Since, therefore, such is the diversity on the part of the thing considered, we rightly, in our way of conceiving, distinguish a twofold science in God: one of simple intelligence, the other of vision.

The testimonies of the Fathers adduced later are answered more readily. First of all we say that the Fathers cited in Disputation 32, chapter 2 - who assert that in eternity there are not those three times, "was, is, will be," but only "is" - do not deny that created things, which fall under those three temporal differences, are successively comprehended by eternity itself and successively co-exist

with it; nor do they assert that they must exist together with it all at once; but only deny that there is in eternity itself an intrinsic succession, because no variation at all can be in it: yet nothing prevents those things which in themselves, under those three -

Those things which in themselves have succession, and mutually succeed one another, also successively co-exist with eternity: for to a permanent reality, such as eternity is, other things which succeed one another must also in turn stand by successively; and in this sense Anselm said that all time is concluded by eternity itself - not because, gathered together at once, all things co-exist with eternity, but because eternity, ever remaining, at length embraces all the things that come to be successively, and perseveres with them all, even if they themselves pass away and are succeeded by others.

Moreover, what Gregory, Bede, and Anselm say - that all things are present to the eternity of God in His sight - we do not deny: for this ought to be understood only of objective presence, and of things as they are in time; and therefore God sees all things at once by one intuition. But this does not prove the real presence which the Doctors of the former opinion devise, as is plainly clear from the words cited for that former opinion; which is further confirmed from the words of St. Gregory the Great, which he subjoins a little below. For when he had said that what is future is not foreseen by God, because He sees it as present, he adds: "For even whatever things are, they are not therefore seen from eternity because they are; but they therefore are, because they are seen." If Gregory were speaking here of a real presence in eternity, he ought to have said, in accordance with the doctrine of the former opinion, that for that reason things are known, because they are in eternity. But since he says that they therefore are, because they are known, he clearly indicates that he is speaking of objective presence - of which he rightly said that things therefore "are," that is, are present, because they are known: for since cognition is the express representation of the thing, it makes the thing present.

Now indeed the arguments of the former opinion can be dissolved much more easily. Reply to the first argument: although eternity, in itself, is wholly at once without any succession of its own, and embraces all things existing in time, nevertheless it does not comprehend them all at once, but successively, just as they themselves are; for it cannot contain them otherwise than by existing with them at once, persevering in its existence together with theirs. Wherefore, in order that it should exist together with them, and so constantly contain all, it would have been necessary that they too should persevere and be together; but since they succeed one another, it also comprehends them successively - not by a succession on its own part, but on the part of those very things which are said to be contained. And therefore, if any succession is posited in eternity from this fact, it is only an extrinsic denomination from the things contained that succeed one another among themselves; just as the same place, remaining the same without any succession in itself, contains many things successively, by reason that the things themselves succeed one another in the place. As to the second argument, enough has already been said; and as to the third, from those things which we shall say in the following disputation it will be evident what answer must be given. For there it will be clear that there is another sufficient and proper reason why the future, however contingent and

apt for either outcome, is known by God certainly and determinately. Therefore there is no need to have recourse to this "presence," and to rack the wits of men to no purpose in a matter most manifest.

Caput V - What St. Thomas thought about this presence

The view of the Thomist school in our time commonly teaches that that real presence which the former opinion asserts is from the mind of St. Thomas. They prove it first from the words of this art. 13, where he says: "All things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only in that way in which He has the reasons of things with Him as present (as some say), but because His intuition is borne from eternity upon all things, as they are in their own presentness." If he were speaking only of objective presence, then the reason by which he proves that the future is known by God with certainty - namely, because those things are present to Him - would be a nugatory begging of the question. For it would be as if he said: He therefore knows certainly, because he has things objectively present; and since to have things objectively present is nothing else than to know them, it would be the same as saying: they are therefore known, because they are known. By this reasoning, which Ferrariensis deduces from this place, Contra gentes I, c. 66, he is persuaded that that opinion is St. Thomas's.[1087] Next, there is another testimony in the same Contra gentes I, that same c. 66, in the sixth reason, where he says that nothing can co-exist with the eternal "in part," but must of necessity co-exist "with the whole"; and therefore also that the divine intellect looks upon all future things as if present. But by objective presence a thing is not said to co-exist with God; therefore there St. Thomas is not speaking of objective, but of real presence, by which things truly and really co-exist with God; since from real co-existence, by which things are present to God from eternity, he infers that they are known by God. He seems to speak in the same way In I Sentences d. 38, a. 5, and in De veritate q. 2, a. 12.[1088]

But the more ancient and no less weighty Thomists understood the mind of St. Thomas otherwise - and, in my judgment, much more truly, and in closer accord with his intention. They held that St. Thomas nowhere taught that real presence of future things in eternity. So judged the Archbishop of Seville, Deza, on I Sentences d. 38, q. 1, a. 2; Herveus on the same distinction; and Sylvester in defense of St. Thomas's doctrine; indeed Aegidius, himself once a disciple and hearer of St. Thomas, in his Castigatorium against the corruptor of Thomas, in his observations on this art. 13, strives to vindicate the Holy Doctor from this opinion, as from a calumny which certain Parisian Doctors in his time were attributing to St. Thomas, and on account of which they were accusing him of error.[1089] The Thomists cited teach that St. Thomas, wherever he speaks of presence, speaks of objective, not of real presence; and of the presence of things in God Himself,

1087. "Ferrariensis" adduces this from St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles I, c. 66.

1088. St. Thomas, In I Sententiarum d. 38, a. 5; De veritate q. 2, a. 12.

1089. Deza, In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 2; Herveus, the same distinction; Sylvester, in defense of St. Thomas; Aegidius, Castigatorium adversus corruptorem Thomae, Observations on this art. 13.

not outside Him; so that nothing outside God co-exists with Him from eternity, but only in Him are things said to be from eternity. This is to be understood of objective existence. And this will become manifest if we show that in this article there is nothing of that real presence.

Exposition of the former place of St. Thomas, and of others. Therefore he teaches three things in this art. 13. First, that God knows all future things. He proves this, not from the fact that they are present (as some falsely think), but from this, that He comprehends all things that are in His power and the creature's power. Wherefore, since all future things are in His power and the creature's power, He necessarily knows them all. Second, that future things are known by God in themselves, not in their causes. This too he does not prove from real presence, but because causes are of themselves indifferent to either outcome; and so in them there can be nothing from which future things should be known with certainty. Therefore, since God knows them certainly, He must know them not in their causes but in themselves. Third, that God beholds all these future things from eternity without succession. He proves this because His eternity is wholly at once; therefore His cognition also, whose duration is eternity itself, will be wholly at once. Hence he infers that the intellect of God is at once, from eternity, borne upon all future things as if they were present, lest there be any succession in His knowledge. From this too he gathers that all things which in time are future are present to God - not only in the eternal exemplars (as some say), that is, in His essence, as it has the notion of an intelligible species, but because His intuition and actual knowledge are borne upon all future things; wherein he speaks openly of objective presence. For they are said by St. Thomas to be present to God for this reason, that His intuition is borne upon them. But if St. Thomas were speaking of that real presence of Cajetan, he ought to have said conversely: the intuition of God is borne upon things because they are present. By these words he does not intend to give the reason why they are known by God, but to explain the mode by which God has all things present to Himself at once - which is the sense in which he also spoke above in art. 9. Then he subjoins these words: "Whence it is manifest that contingent things are known infallibly by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight according to their presentness, and yet, compared with their causes, they are future contingent." By these words he likewise does not give the reason why future things are known by God - namely, because they are subject to His sight (for of this presentness he plainly speaks); for this would be a nugatory begging of the question. Rather, he explains the mode whereby God's knowledge is infallible: namely, because it is borne upon the things themselves which He has present to His sight; and nevertheless, when compared with their causes, future things are contingent and indifferent. Let these points suffice for the exposition of the article; from them the other testimonies of the Holy Doctor can easily be explained, and an answer can be given to the argument which Ferrariensis had advanced.

Whether any account of the certainty of the knowledge by which God knows future things can be assigned. Disputation 65. - Various scholastic opinions. Caput 1. - From the decree of the divine will a sufficient, though remoter, cause of the certainty of knowledge can be assigned. Caput 2. - Solution of the objections against this opinion. Caput 3. - From the truth of future things and the infinity of the divine intellect, the certainty of His knowledge is most fittingly inferred. Caput 4.

Disputatio LXV - Whether any account of the certainty of the knowledge by which God knows future things can be assigned

Caput I - Various scholastic opinions

The same is more clearly declared and confirmed by a later reason of Scotus, which is as follows: an idea in God precedes every act of His will, as will be clear from what we shall say in disputation 72; therefore it naturally represents that of which it is the idea. Accordingly, there are also ideas of possible things, which are of necessity represented in the divine essence: therefore an idea, as an idea, does not represent future things insofar as they are future.

But if someone, on behalf of St. Bonaventure, were to answer that by the ideas, or rationes, existing in the mind of God there are not understood those which precede every act of will, as has been explained, and are the principle of producing creatures and pertain to His practical knowledge; but rather the simple representation in the essence of God, which pertains to speculative knowledge; certainly no sufficient account is thereby rendered of the certainty of knowledge, but the proposed difficulty returns in the same way. For if that representation of future things be posited in the divine essence after the manner of an impressed species (*species impressa*), and in first act (*actus primus*) for understanding, or as in an expressed species (*species expressa*) in second act (*actus secundus*), a reason is still to be given of this: namely, why future things, since they are indifferent and in an undetermined cause, should be represented in the divine essence determinately, either in second act or even in first act. Therefore the same question always remains, especially if the discourse be about representation in second act and as in an expressed species. For it is entirely the same thing to be represented in second act or in an expressed species, and to be known, as has been frequently inculcated in the whole of Question 12.

Caput II - From the decree of the divine will a sufficient, though remoter, cause of the certainty of knowledge can be assigned

Multiple, in my judgment, are the accounts that can be given of the certainty of the knowledge of God. The first is indeed sufficient, but remote, of which we shall speak in this chapter; the second is proper and proximate, and is evidently deduced from natural principles: about this we shall speak briefly in chapter 4.

Therefore the first account by which the certainty of the knowledge of God is proved and declared is taken from the decree of His will, by which He defined all future things that are to be produced in time. This reason is employed by Scotus in I, dist. 39, q. 1, 5; against this there is an argument, and a tract On Contingency, by Richard, I, dist. 38, art. ...; and Durandus thinks this to be the only one, I, dist. 39, q. 3, num. 9; for all the other things which he assigned in that question, from which the certainty of the knowledge of God might be gathered, do not sufficiently prove it, as

anyone can easily see. Among more recent Thomists too, who think that from real presence in eternity future things are known with certainty by God, there are some who also say that they are known with certainty not from that presence alone, but together with the decree.[1090]

In order to prove this position, and from the decree of the will of God to deduce by the best reasoning the certainty of His knowledge, it must be premised that, in a certain order, any given thing is first future before God understands it to be future, as we shall show in disputation 68, chapter 6. Then, that nothing is future without some particular will and definition of God concerning it: which is to me so certain that I think it can in no way be denied. There are indeed some more recent theologians who, not being able in any other way to explain how God provides all the necessary helps for acting well and meriting eternal life, say that it is necessary that God has decreed, one by one, all our works insofar as they are good; or, not being able in this way to reconcile the will of God with our freedom, they affirm that God has not defined everything individually, neither Himself alone, nor with the second cause to concur with it; but that by a certain general ratio He has established with Himself to concur with every cause and free choice, even with sufficient calling being foregiven, and to be prepared for this. Wherefore, neither by our mere consideration do there arise in God many decrees of His will concerning our works, nor one which is borne distinctly upon individual things, but one in general. And therefore they say that from the decree of God, which is universal and indifferent, future contingents and the works of our free choice cannot already be known with certainty.

However, that this is false, and that from the divine decree one can very well gather the certainty of the knowledge of God, I now show. First, either the will of God is engaged distinctly and individually with respect to our several works, no less than His knowledge is; or else there is only a decree of the will of God concerning future things in general and in a confused way; as if someone, within himself not attending to individual things in detail nor willing them one by one, were to determine in general to aid all causes that would need his help. If God decreed our works only in this latter way, it follows that He only confusedly and indistinctly willed from eternity to do the things that He was going to do in time; and when He concurs in time, then God would not will to concur determinately and individually to that work, but to act only by that constant and universal will. Wherefore we can say against these what St. Jerome says in the Dialogue against the Pelagians, who asserted that the help of the grace of God is not necessary for individual works, beyond the grace of creation and free choice: namely, that God determines in our works; we, however, could add what seems to serve our present purpose. For in that fashion one might say that He once for all decreed with Himself to concur with all causes in general, and thereafter cares nothing individually: which derogates much from the divine mode of providence; for thus one lapses into the view of Aristotle, who, in the book On the Heaven addressed to Alexander, thought that God does not provide for all things proximately and individually, but governs all things through universal causes; about which we shall speak in disputation 87.[1091]

1090. Scotus, In I Sententiarum d. 39, q. 1, 5; Richard of Middleton, In I Sent., d. 38, art. ...; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 39, q. 3, num. 9.

1091. St. Jerome, Dialogus contra Pelagianos; Aristotle, in the book On the Heaven addressed to Alexander.

But if, when in time He concurs with this cause, He wills to concur with it no less determinately and distinctly than if He alone were acting, as reason itself shows, it follows that from eternity He also had this will distinctly and individually concerning this operation and all the others; otherwise the singular will of God concerning some operation would have begun in time, which is absurd.

Let it be supposed, therefore, that we say the decree and definition of the will of God to have been from eternity distinct and individual concerning each of the things He was going to operate in time, whether operating by Himself alone or concurring with a second cause; whether, according to our manner of conceiving, we distinguish that decree into many, or say that it is one - about which we need not be much concerned. For it is certain that with God most good He willed all things, and each thing, by one most simple and eternal act of will; for the will itself and the operation of the will are the same as His essence, which is simple and individual. Whether, however, according to our way of understanding, there are many operations of will in God by which He wills individual things on the ground that His will is borne distinctly and individually upon individual things, I for my part judge that they can and ought to be distinguished, as commonly they are distinguished by diversity of objects. Yet if anyone prefers to concede that, even according to our way of understanding, there is one most simple act of will, I shall not care: for our present undertaking is sufficiently served, and it matters greatly, if you grant that there is a decree of God by which from eternity He has defined and willed to concur with all causes, even free ones, distinctly and individually, not confusedly and in general; which, moreover, shall be treated in its place, in disputation 87.

This being supposed, it is easily shown how, together with the indifference and freedom of causes, there is with respect to future things the certainty of God, and what the scholastics call infallibility.

Next we suppose that this decree of the divine will is, in a certain order of causality, prior to a thing's being future; indeed, it is from it that something is future, because God willed it. For a future thing cannot be understood as future save from its causes; but among its causes is the decree of God, as we shall explain. Therefore, before a thing is future, in a certain causal order God has willed it to be future; the decree of God accordingly precedes the future thing as future - whether we say that it also precedes the concurrence and determination of the secondary free cause, or that it only matures that concurrence, or rather that it effects it; in whatever way free choice be compared, the decree posits in the thing itself that will be future something prior upon which it follows.

From this decree, in a certain way, the certainty of the knowledge of God can be inferred, because the decree is necessary and cannot fail, nor can anything be done or occur against it; wherefore, since God knows that decree, from it He can rightly also know the future. Authors who wish in this chapter to deduce the certainty of the knowledge of God from His decree proceed in this way; but that from the decree alone this certainty can be gathered so that, without requisition of the concurrence of the secondary cause, it be inferred - I for my part judge otherwise; rather, in another way ...

But if someone were to say that the decree of the will of God concerning future things deals with our works only in a universal and confused way, as if someone, not attending within himself to the several particulars nor willing them one by one, were to determine in general that he would aid all causes which would need his help: if in this latter way God decreed our works, it would follow that He willed only in a confused and indistinct way to do those things which in time He was about to do; and, when in time He concurs, He would then not will that work determinately and one by one to concur, but only to operate with that confused and universal will. Wherefore we can say against these what St. Jerome says in the first Dialogue against the Pelagians, who asserted that no other help of the grace of God is necessary for individual works beyond the grace of creation and free will: "Therefore God sleeps in our works" once free choice having been given; and we on our side can add whatever seems conducive to our plan. And after He once decreed with Himself to concur with all causes in general, for the rest He cares for nothing one by one - this greatly derogates from divine providence; for thus we fall into the opinion of Aristotle in the book On the Heaven to Alexander, who thought that God does not provide for all things proximately and individually, but governs them through universal causes, of which I shall speak in Disputation 87.[1092] But if, in time, when He concurs with this cause, He wills to concur with it no less determinately and distinctly than if He alone were going to operate, as reason itself shows: it follows that from eternity He also had this will distinctly and one by one concerning this operation and the other individual ones; or else that the singular will of God concerning that operation began in time - which is absurd.

It remains, therefore, that we must say that the decree and definition of the will of God from eternity was distinct and particular concerning individual things which in time He was going to operate, whether by Himself alone or in concurrence with a secondary cause; whether, according to our way of conceiving, we distinguish that decree into several [operations], or say that it is one - about which there is not much need to be concerned. For it is certain among all that God willed all things and each thing by one most simple act of His will: for the operation of His will is the same as His essence, simple and individual. Whether, however, according to our way of understanding, there are in God several operations of will by which He may will individual things out of this, that His will is borne to individual things distinctly and one by one, I for my part judge that they can and should be distinguished, as commonly they are wont to be distinguished from the diversity of objects. If, however, someone were to insist too much that even according to our way of understanding there is one most simple act of will, I shall not be concerned: for in our present design it is enough, and it matters very much, if they at least concede the decree of God, by which from eternity He defined and willed to concur even with free causes distinctly and one by one, not confusedly and in a general way, with individual future things, as has been shown; of which matter there will again be treatment in Disputation 87, chapter 2. This being supposed, it is easily shown how, with the indifference and liberty of causes with respect to future things, there is the highest certainty of God and, as the Scholastics call it, infallibility.

Next we suppose that this decree of the will of God is in a certain order of cause prior to the thing's being future: indeed from it something is future, because God willed it. For a future thing cannot yet be understood as future except from its causes; but among its causes is the decree of God, as has been explained, since nothing is done without the will of God. Therefore, before the future thing exists, in a certain order of cause God willed that it be future: the decree of God therefore precedes the future thing as future - whether we also say that it precedes the concurrence and determination of the secondary free cause, or only accompanies it, or is posterior to it; in whatever way it be compared with free choice, with respect to the thing itself future it is conferred as something prior.

From this decree, then, some infer in this way the certainty of the knowledge of God: because since the decree cannot fail nor be deceived, nor can anything be done or occur against it, it comes about that God, knowing that decree, from it can rightly also know future things, since He sees the decree from which they infallibly follow. Thus the authors cited in this chapter seem to deduce the certainty of the knowledge of God from His decree; indeed, some contend that it can be gathered from the decree alone, so that, without the pre-requisition of the concurrence of the secondary cause, it be inferred.

But I for my part judge that in neither way can the certainty of His knowledge be rightly gathered from the decree of the will of God. First, it is proved that because God sees His decree in Himself He does not know future things as from a cause: for although the essence (*essentia*) of God is understood by us through the mode of decree and will as a cause of future things, nevertheless, as we said in Disputation 48, chapter 4, and will prove below in Disputation 80, the free decree of the divine will adds nothing beyond the bare essence except a respect of reason (*respectus rationis*) to future things. Wherefore, from the fact that God is said to have decreed something from eternity, there is nothing in Him except a respect of reason understood according to our way, which is toward future things and is derived extrinsically from them as from a foundation. Now then, just as we showed there that no Blessed one, from the fact that he sees such a decree, beholds in God anything future, so by the same argument it is proved that God Himself, from the fact that He knows His own decree in Himself, cannot know future things with certainty. First, because beyond His bare essence nothing else is added except a respect of reason; but this respect God cannot see: for it is only objectively in the intellect of a created wayfarer, as must be proved in Disputation 118; and hence only that created intellect can feign such a respect. Next, even if God were to see Himself under that respect, that respect could not be the reason and, as it were, the medium of seeing future things: rather He would have had to see the future things first. For that from which the respect of reason proceeds - as from an extrinsic foundation - must be known prior to the respect itself; or at least the respect cannot be the reason for knowing such a foundation, as is plain by innumerable examples. Therefore God from His decree cannot know future things for certain in the manner which we have said above.

1092. St. Jerome, Dialogus contra Pelagianos; Aristotle, De caelo ad Alexandrum.

What if you say that from this doctrine it follows that a thing is future before there is a decree in God, since from it is derived the respect of reason by which the decree of the will of God is said to be constituted? I answer: without doubt a circle cannot be avoided in this matter; for it is very difficult, but about this more at length must be said in Disputation 80.

Then too, even if in this way God were to see future things, it must in no way be said that He could know them for certain from that alone, not understanding the determination of the secondary cause. For that manifestly implies a contradiction. How could it be that He know a future thing from some cause, and not see the future determination of the cause and its cooperation? Therefore, by the topic "from the consequent" (as they say), it necessarily follows that, from the sole fact that God sees a future thing - by whatever account He knows it - He also sees the future determination of its cause and the cooperation, without which the effect cannot be intelligible.

With these matters, then, omitted, it must be said in another way how the decree is a sufficient cause, though remote, so that future things be known. Because by the decree of God any future thing is, and to one thing determined, and prior, in that a future thing is known by God, it is said to be defined and willed by Him: from this fact, that it is future, it can be best known, as we shall say in chapter 4. Therefore the decree of God can be assigned as a sufficient cause, albeit remote. Then, although future contingent things are indifferent in themselves, nevertheless there can very well be certainty and infallibility in the knowledge of God concerning them, about which there is now controversy. For there ought not to be a greater certainty of knowledge than the efficacy of the divine will which cannot be impeded. If, therefore, before God knows future things, in a certain order He is first said to will and to define them, and His decree cannot be rendered void, it follows that His knowledge is most certain, which cannot be deceived, so that the knowledge of God be made like to His decree in all things. From the decree, therefore, of God there is assigned in God a sufficient cause of knowing future things, and there is also rendered a sufficient reason of the certainty of the knowledge which God has.

Some recent authors, and certain Scholastics of earlier times, attack our position; but their objections can be dissolved without great difficulty.

First objection of the recent writers. First they argue thus: from that decree the liberty of our will is taken away, since we cannot in any way resist it.

Then also, if that decree concerning our individual works were necessary one by one, it would follow that remedies simply necessary have not been provided by God for all; for this decree of concurring with all is necessary, and yet it is not in God with respect to all; for with those with whom in time He is not going to cooperate, He never decreed from eternity to concur.

Reply. I answer first, that even if we were to concede now that from that decree, were it posited as wholly antecedent to our free determination, our liberty would be taken away; nevertheless, if that decree either follows our determination or contains it, nothing of our liberty perishes. Which of these is truer, from all these matters we shall show in Disputation 99. Moreover, whether it be posited in this way or that, an excellent argument is now taken from the decree to show the

certainty and infallibility of the knowledge of God, as has been proved above; and how God does not on that account withdraw sufficient helps even from those with whom He did not decree to concur in time, and also how their liberty and power for the good remain, will not obscurely be evident there.

Second objection of Gregory, Gabriel, and Ockham. Secondly, they argue with Gregory in the third book, distinction 38, question 2, article 2, and with Gabriel and Ockham in the places cited, as follows: if the decree of God were the cause, or the reason, of knowing future things, there would have to be in God an instance of prior and posterior; for prior would be the decree, which is the reason of knowing the future, and posterior the knowledge of the things themselves; we would also have to admit that there is in God some medium of knowing something - both of which cannot be in Him.

Solution. We reply that the reason of our defense is different: for we do not say that the decree is the medium by which future things are known; but we say that the decree is the sufficient cause on account of which they can be known by God. Certitudes are indeed to be kept as to the efficacy of the will, which cannot be impeded nor fail; and indifferentia of future things in themselves does not remove the effect of the will, which can render the cognition certain; nevertheless we do not say that the decree is the medium by which, but the sufficient cause on account of which, they are known: God, from His antecedent essence and will, sees all things at once; and the decree is posited as ordering among things according to the necessary order of causes, which is sufficiently explained above in Disputation 8. Hence we collect that the decree is a sufficient cause that the future be able to be known; we do not say that it is the medium by which, through which, and in it they are known: God, by the preceding express power of knowing, sees all things; but, as we say, that cause on account of which they are able to be known follows. Certainty, therefore, of knowledge is from the efficacy of the will, which cannot be impeded; nor, however, do we say that indifferentia of future things in themselves removes the effect of the will, which can render cognition certain.

Third objection. Thirdly they argue: from this decree God can only know the good things which He Himself is going to do in time; but not sins, since these He has never decreed to do, nor does He do them in time: therefore the reason from which the certainty of the knowledge of God is gathered cannot be in every case.

Response. I respond: almost every sin consists either in the omission of some good which ought to be done, or in the commission of some act which, with its concomitant circumstances, is necessarily accompanied by malice - whether it be of omission or of commission, albeit in a different way. In omission, nothing is posited except that which is required, and only the cause of sin is posited - for instance, the cause of not hearing Mass at the due time. But in the sin of commission, the act is positive, which is said to be against the law, and in which the malice and the formal element of sin are in its proper subject, namely the will; for the formal element of sin is a privation which is in the sinning will. Hence God in time can posit the positive acts as to their natural entity and as to the circumstances which are the material element that is in the sin; consequently, if God willed from eternity, and Himself knew, that in some case there would be

posited in time that act as the cause, or as the material subject of sin, it follows indeed that He would know that it would be posited; and yet from that it does not follow that He would know the malice which is in the will on account of the defect of order; for God does not will it, but hates it; nor does He will it from eternity. But how God at the same time does not will the material element of sin as sin, although nothing takes away liberty in the will and free choice, nor does He of Himself posit the malice which is the formal element of sin, has been discussed in Disputation 98 and in the solution to question 79 above, and it will be said below.

Third objection. They also add, if that decree about our works fixedly and of necessity were set, it would follow that there are not for all men simply necessary remedies on the part of God; for this decree of concurring with all is necessary, and yet it is not in God with respect to all; since with those with whom in time He is not going to cooperate, He never decreed from eternity to concur.

It is answered. I answer first, although we might grant now that from that decree - if it were posited altogether antecedently to our free determination - our liberty would be taken away: yet if that decree either follows upon our determination or accompanies it, it takes nothing away from our liberty; but which of these is truer, we will show in Disputation 99. Moreover, whether it be posited in this way or that, an excellent argument is now taken from the decree to show the certainty and infallibility of the knowledge of God, as was proved in the preceding chapter. Next, how God does not deny sufficient helps even to those with whom He has not decreed to concur in time, and yet in that very thing He preserves their liberty and the power for good, will appear not obscurely in the same place.

Second objection. Secondly, St. Gregory in III, dist. 38, q. 2, a. 2, Gabriel, and Ockham in the places cited, chapter 1, argue in this way: if the decree of God itself were the cause, or the ratio, of knowing future things, there would have to be conceded in God an instant of the prior and of the posterior: for the decree by which future things are to be known would be prior, but the knowledge of them posterior. We would also have to admit that there is in God some medium for knowing something - two things which cannot befall Him.[1093]

It is answered. But these things are trifles; for first, the instance of a prior and a posterior in the mind and will of God is to be conceded from the order of things among themselves of necessity, as from the doctrine of the Fathers and reason we will gather clearly enough below in Disputation 82. Next, from this, that we say the decree is a sufficient cause for knowing certain future things, we do not say that it is a medium by which, or in which, God knows them, as we noted expressly in the preceding chapter. Rather, we say it is a cause because, the decree being posited, the future things which follow upon it can be known by it. But the certainty of knowledge is inferred from the efficacy of will, which cannot be impeded, not from the indifference of future contingents; for since will cannot be without its effect, it is less indifferent to future events.

1093. St. Gregory, In III Sent., dist. 38, q. 2, a. 2; Gabriel [Biel], and Ockham, the places cited, cap. 1.

Third objection. A third argument: from this decree God can know only the goods which He Himself is going to do in time; not sins, because He never decreed to do these, just as He does not do them in time: therefore the reason from which the certainty of God's knowledge is gathered could not at least be a universal one.

Reply. It is answered: every sin, whether of commission or of omission, has conjoined to it some positive act, from which with all its circumstances there necessarily follows the malice either of omission or of commission; yet it is in one way in one, and in another way in the other. For in the sin of omission the positive that is found is only a cause of sin - for example, taking a journey is the cause of not hearing Mass at the due time. But in the sin of commission the positive is the act which is said to be against the law, and in which, as in its proper subject, there is the malice and the formal element of sin; for the act itself is called the material element which is in the sin. Therefore, since God is in time the cause of every positive act which is either the cause, or the material subject, of sin, it follows that He wills that act; and consequently that He willed it from eternity. And that being known, the malice which necessarily follows that act cannot fail to be known, even if God does not will it, but rather hates it, and in no way decreed it from eternity. But how, although God from eternity has determined the material of sin or the cause of it, nonetheless He neither takes away liberty from the will, nor is properly the cause of the malice which is the formal element of sin, will be said in Disputation 99, and in I-II, question 79, article 1, as was said above.

Fourth objection. A fourth argument: God not only knows future things absolutely, but also future things under a condition, about which there is no decree of His: therefore the decree is not a sufficient cause of knowing all future things.

Solution. I answer first, wherever there has been a decree, from that it is excellently inferred that God certainly knows all the future things which He has decreed. But if in conditional futures there is no decree, the certainty of their knowledge must be proved from another source, as will be said in the following disputation. Next, even in these conditional futures the decree of God is nonetheless included under the condition, as will be said there: without that decree nothing can be future.

Ultimate objection. Finally, Ockham, Gabriel, and St. Gregory argue against Scotus: even granted the decree of God, the created will remains free and indifferent to either part; how, then, can knowledge be determinate?

It is answered. Truly, this argument no more proves against the knowledge of God than against the decree of His will. For just as the decree of God cannot be rendered void, even if our will is of itself indifferent; what wonder, then, if the knowledge of God nonetheless remains infallible, however indeterminate our will may be? Therefore, what will be said about the decree can be said about the knowledge; and we will give the reason for each below, when we treat of the harmony of the knowledge and will of God with ours, in Disputation 68 and Disputation 99.

Note. This reason so evidently shows what we are contending that no one can deny it, if only that minor proposition be sufficiently proved, namely, that in singular propositions about the future one part of a contradiction is determinately true, the other false: but this must be proved

expressly in the following disputation. Eighteen years ago I publicly taught this line of argument in Spain; I frequently explained this matter in public lessons and disputations; afterwards at Rome in the year 1588, reading closely through the writings of Scotus, I found it, and I taught and defended it in the same way; and afterwards I heard it commonly employed by some theologians of our age; among the other Scholastics I find no mention of it; Scotus, however, briefly sets it down in I, dist. 39, q. 1, n. 9, in the discussion on contingency.[1094]

Caput IV - From the truth of futures and the infinity of the divine intellect is best inferred the certainty of His knowledge

Although from the decree of the divine will the certainty of the knowledge which God has of future things can be sufficiently gathered; yet, because that is a remote cause, as we said, one must strive to assign the proper and proximate reason of the certainty of divine knowledge; and that reason is very facile, which anyone can readily allege or understand by ratiocination taken only from the infinity of the divine intellect and the truth of future things; it is as follows. Because the divine intellect is of infinite power, whatever is intelligible it must necessarily embrace and understand; for if something could not be understood by an infinite intellect, it could be understood by another: but future things, however free and contingent by their nature, are intelligible, because they are determinate with respect to truth; but the true and the intelligible are convertible: therefore they can be understood by the divine intellect: and since they must be understood only in the mode in which they are, namely, as future or as not future, it follows that the knowledge of them in God must be most certain; for if God could be deceived, it would be because He would know some future thing as not going to be future; but thus there would already lurk in the divine intellect some intelligible falsehood, which is impossible.

Note. From this doctrine certain things can be collected, by which the very doctrine will be further elucidated, and some things must also be observed for its greater explanation. First, therefore, it is most true what St. Gregory and Gabriel affirm in the places cited in the first chapter, namely, that the virtue of the divine intellect is infinite, so that, although God by His omnipotence were not the cause of future things, still His virtue would be infinite for understanding, in such a way that now He would certainly and infallibly understand singular future things; if indeed future things existed from chance, or from other causes, or from another God. Which hypotheses, however impossible they are, nonetheless excellently declare the proper and proximate reason on account of which future things are known certainly by God. For with all these suppositions there would nonetheless be truth in enunciations about the future and infinity of virtue for understanding in God, as we suppose: therefore it follows by an intrinsic consequence, that future things will be known certainly by God in the same way as they are now known: since the cause is altogether the same in both cases. Therefore, the reason for the infallibility of the knowledge of God is not the truth alone, but the infinity of the divine intellect, which, precisely because it is infinite, cannot fail to be referred to that which is true, as to its proper object.

1094. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 39, q. 1, n. 9, in the discussion on contingency.

Next it is inferred that future things are not known by God in their cause in a confused way and as it were by discursus. For in themselves causes have nothing real by which they incline of necessity more to this part than to another; nor could any intellect infer a certain judgment from a cause unless by its own power it could reach future things directly: but God knows the future in themselves, because in themselves they have truth and are truly something future: and so, according to themselves, they fall under the power and efficacy of the divine intellect by their own concept. Nonetheless He also knows them in their cause in this sense, namely, that just as He sees that this or that will be future, so too He sees it will be future from this cause, not from another; indeed, from the fact that future things are known, it necessarily follows that they are known as future from such-and-such a cause, not because that cause, as seen according to itself, leads to an infallible cognition of the effect, but because a future cannot be understood unless as connected with this or that cause.

Second note. It must further be observed that the future is thus the object of the infallible knowledge of God, according to that very thing which will in reality be future; yet to our mode of understanding it presupposes the decree of God as its cause, before which nothing is truly understood to be future. For although every future thing is future from eternity, yet in a certain order of reason a thing is prior possible than future; and according to our mode of understanding we distinguish two instants of reason, in the first of which things are only possible from themselves, because from themselves they do not imply a contradiction, and another in which they are understood as future; and although this possibility of things supposes as prior the possibility and existence of God Himself, yet it does not suppose God as endowed with the power to produce, or as the cause producing, as will be explained at length below in Disputation 104. But because no thing is future from itself, but from the will and omnipotence of God, therefore before it be understood as future, the will of God is supposed as its cause - not, indeed, in the order of duration, but of reason: therefore, in that prior instant, in which the thing is possible, it is not yet understood as future, for it is first possible, and then future; as, indeed, the consequence of conversion has no force: just as "animal" is prior to "man."

Objection. But you may say: in that prior instant, in which the thing is considered possible, it can be said to be future in respect of the subsequent.

It is answered; the difficulty is solved. I reply, the term "future" is not said in respect of the prior and posterior in that order of reason, but in the order of duration in time. But that which is future in time, and from eternity is said to be going to be future in time, is not future in that instant of reason in which it is only possible: for if the thing is first possible, it is not yet future. Therefore, just as a creature is not yet possible until God is understood to exist, who is the first being of all; so too a creature is not yet future until the decree of will is understood to exist, from which, as from a cause, it is future: or if in that instant of reason some futurition could be conceded, it ought not to be the futurition of the things; for those are first in potency alone. Therefore, what some vainly attempt, to assign something present, at least in its cause, by the reason of which the future may be known by God, is in vain; because being, which is the universal object of the intellect, is not only the present, but also the future, the past, and the possible.

First note on the mode whereby truth and falsity are predicated of things. Further, two other points must be observed for the greater explication of this matter. One is, when we say that future things are known certainly by God, because they are determinate with respect to truth, this must not be understood as though the formal ratio of truth primarily belongs to the future things themselves; for truth is an affection primarily belonging to the intellect, as we will say below in Disputation 77, chapter 3; but future things are said to be of determinate truth because in reality the thing is such that it will be future or not future in a determinate way, so that of one part of a contradiction the judgment can be true, and the enunciation true, and of the other part, if a judgment be made or an enunciation be uttered, in such a judgment and enunciation there is also falsity. This, however, is enough for there to be in the things themselves what logicians call "fundamental truth," which suffices that things be intelligible and the object of a true judgment; therefore, since God is infinite, He could not be deceived: for then it would be because He knew some future as not future; but thus there would already lurk in the divine intellect some intelligible falsehood, which is impossible.

Second note: The object of the science of God is the very thing which of itself is future in reality, not, according to our way of understanding, something that presupposes God as cause, before anything is truly future. For although every future is from eternity, nevertheless in a certain order, first a thing is possible, which, according to our way of understanding, we distinguish in reason into two: one in which things are of themselves possible, that is, of themselves do not imply a contradiction; another, in which they are understood to be possible because of God's omnipotence to produce them, or as cause in the order in which the thing is future from a cause in reason, in which order it is said to be future, namely, because God's will is the cause of its futurition. Now, since there are two "instants" of reason, of which the first is that in which the thing is considered as possible, the second that in which it is considered as future: and since it does not follow conversely that, because it is future, it was possible, therefore, in the order of reason, the decree of God precedes the futurition of future things. Second note: The object of the science of God is the very thing which of itself is future in reality, not, according to our way of understanding, something that presupposes God as cause, before anything is truly future. For although every future is from eternity, nevertheless in a certain order, first a thing is possible, which, according to our way of understanding, we distinguish in reason into two: one in which things are of themselves possible, that is, of themselves do not imply a contradiction; another, in which they are understood to be possible because of God's omnipotence to produce them, or as cause in the order in which the thing is future from a cause in reason, in which order it is said to be future, namely, because God's will is the cause of its futurition. Now, since there are two "instants" of reason, of which the first is that in which the thing is considered as possible, the second that in which it is considered as future: and since it does not follow conversely that, because it is future, it was possible, therefore, in the order of reason, the decree of God precedes the futurition of future things.

Objection: But you will say: in that first instant, in which the thing is considered as possible, it is not yet future; yet one would have to posit a futurition of the futurition; that is, when it is possible that the thing will be, at the same time there would be a being-about-to-be of the future, or a future

futurition. But to posit "a futurity of the future" is foolish; therefore in that prior instant in which the thing is considered possible, it is not yet considered future. Wherefore what some say, that in that prior instant it is true to say "the future things will be in the next instant," amounts to the same as to say "then there will be a future future," which reflection, although in some way it can be considered in our words, yet to attribute it to God is foolish: for a "future of the future" cannot be given, as we said above.

From this it is inferred that the opinion of some moderns is false, who say that future things, as being of determinate truth, are represented in the essence of God, without any pre-intellection of His will's decree. For if this were so, it would follow that it was not in the power of God that future things not be represented in His essence, if, without His decree and liberty, they are truly understood to be future and are represented in the divine essence: but this is absurd. For God could, if He had willed, produce nothing; then nothing would be future. Surely, if things were not to be future from God, yet nonetheless the decree of God could be represented in the essence of God or otherwise, and by His infinite wisdom be certainly known by God, as was said above: nevertheless possibles would be understood before futures, and in the instant of reason in which possibles would be understood, they would not yet be future: now, however, not only in a later instant of reason are they understood to be future, but also with God's decree supposed, and not otherwise: because unless from their cause, which is the divine will, they are not understood to be future.

A question is proposed: But someone will ask, whether God in that prior instant, in which He is conceived by us as understanding possible things, at least understands His own decree as future, even if things are not yet future outside. I answer: God's own decree is not known by God as future in that prior instant, because in God, beyond His bare essence, the decree of His will truly is nothing other than a respect of reason toward future creatures, as will be proved in Disputation 80; wherefore neither according to that "instant" is there anything intrinsic to God and really future, even with respect to that instant of reason. For His essence will be in the same manner within itself, and also in the subsequent instant: it will only have a certain respect of reason: and since in that instant in which only possible things are understood, they are not yet future, there will not yet be any respect of a decree toward future things: because neither can a future respect toward future creatures be understood without the futures themselves: but nothing else can be understood as being truly future in God, or added to the essence; therefore in vain do some recent authors say that in that prior instant God not only knows possible creatures, but also His own decree as future; especially since God in Himself never knows that respect of reason, but His bare essence, as was often said.

Add also that, when we distinguish instants of reason, so that we may consider one thing in God prior to another according to our way of understanding, this order is not assigned by God Himself, and so in His intellect He does not have His decree under the aspect of future in a subsequent instant: because He, to know in this way the future, would have to distinguish instants: but we only in this way distinguish instants in God, that when God at once knows two things of Himself, both His bare essence and it under the notion of decree, in our way of understanding He first knows the

essence before the decree: yet not as if the decree were in any way future, since it is never to be future, but is from eternity present. For instants of reason with respect to various objects are divided in such a way that one is not mixed with another, even under the aspect of the future.

A singular proposition about a future contingent - whether it is true. Disputation 66.

What Aristotle and some Scholastics thought. Chapter 1. According to our faith, in contradictions of singular propositions about a future contingent, one part is distinctly true, the other false. Chapter 2. By philosophical reason the same truth is proved. Chapter 3. Solution of the reason for the prior opinion. Chapter 4.

Disputatio LXVI - Whether a singular proposition about a future contingent is true

Caput I - What Aristotle and certain Scholastics thought

We promised to prove the proposition in the last chapter of the preceding disputation; namely, that in contradictions of singular propositions about the future, one part is determinate to be true, the other determinate to be false. Whence it will also be clear that free future things are of determinate truth, so that they can be understood by God: and that we may perform this task more satisfactorily, it is our pleasure to set forth what Aristotle and certain Scholastics thought about this matter.

The opinion of Aristotle is proposed. Aristotle therefore, in On Interpretation, chapter 8, after he had taught in the preceding chapters that in universal contradictions one part is true, the other false, says concerning singulars and concerning the future contingent, that it is not the case that one part is true and the other false, but that each may be true or false. And Aristotle understands this not in the sense in which logicians say "disjunctive," but "disiunctus" (as separated), as he concludes toward the end of the chapter in these words: "It is necessary that everything either is or is not; likewise that it will be or will not be: yet it is not necessary to say distinctly the one of the two. For it is indeed necessary that there will be a naval battle tomorrow or that there will not be one; yet that there will be a naval battle tomorrow is not necessary; nor again that there will not be one." And a little further down he repeats the same sentiment.

What logicians call the "disjunctive" sense is this, when each member of the proposition is to be taken under a disjunction in such a way that of neither member separately is that to be said which is said of both under the disjunction; as in the example given, this is not necessary: "Some one of these parts, the naval battle will be, the naval battle will not be," and yet the whole, "it will be, or it will not be," taken together is necessary. But the "disiunctus" sense is this, whenever concerning one part it is truly said what we assert; as if someone says: "Peter is disputing," or "Peter is not disputing," one of those parts is true, and not only the whole complex under that disjunction. In

this latter way the truth of a proposition is discerned by "ascent and descent" (as the logicians say), that is, by resolution made into some determinate part: in the former way that complex ought not be divided, and therefore the logicians say that ascent or descent cannot be made.

In this sense, therefore, Aristotle says that in singular contradictions about the future contingent it is not the case that one is true and the other false, but it is necessary that each, taken by itself, be true or false disjunctively; yet not true or false distinctly, that is, that none of them distinctly and individually have truth, and that none have falsity, but that they have truth or falsity disjunctively.

That this is Aristotle's mind is affirmed by Catherinus in the little work On the Truth of Enunciations, and Ockham also interprets him thus (as Mair reports on I Sent., dist. 38, q. 1); likewise "Greg." on I Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1; St. Bonaventure in the same distinction, art. 2, q. 1, ad 2; and the ancient interpreters in that place.[1095] I have said this because many in our time twist Aristotle's opinion into another sense, and among the ancients some Scholastics do the same. For, first, Capreolus on I Sent., dist. 39, q. 1, art. 2, ad 3, against the sixth conclusion, says that Aristotle did not deny in these contradictions that one is true and the other false - this, he says, is false - but only taught that each part of a contradiction is disposed equally toward truth and falsity.[1096] But, as Catherinus most aptly noted against Capreolus in that little work, what else is it "to be disposed not more toward truth than toward falsity" than not to have one part distinctly true, the other false?

Second, Richard on I Sent., dist. 38, art. 1, q. 5, ad 1, and Mair in the place cited, explain Aristotle thus: that he says that neither part is determinate to be true, that is, so true that it cannot be false; nor the other part determinate to be false, that is, so false that it cannot be true: wherefore they seem to use the particle "determinately" in place of "necessarily."[1097]

This interpretation, however, can be refuted from Aristotle himself. First: if Aristotle were contending that in propositions about the future contingent there is no necessary truth, he would prove that future events do not happen by necessity, but freely: but this nowhere in that chapter does he prove; rather, he presupposes it as known. And those who assert that some proposition is distinctly true he drives to an absurdity, so that from that they may grant that nothing happens by chance and indifferently to either outcome: and also from the fact that he says that one part is distinctly true and the other false, he infers that the true is necessarily true and the false necessarily false. Wherefore John Mair falsely interprets that particle "determinately" as "necessarily," for Aristotle once uses "necessarily" in that chapter, and precisely the same is signified by him with "distinctly," which particle he often uses: and when he contends that no part is distinctly true, he means the same as "individually and not confusedly": which he very well concedes, namely, that each taken together is true or false, but not distinctly true or distinctly false.

1095. Catherinus, Opusculum de veritate enunciationum; Ockham (as reported by Mair on I Sent., dist. 38, q. 1); Greg., in I Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1; St. Bonaventure, in the same distinction, art. 2, q. 1, ad 2; and the ancient interpreters in that place.

1096. Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 39, q. 1, art. 2, ad 3, against the sixth conclusion.

1097. Richard, In I Sent., dist. 38, art. 1, q. 5, ad 1; John Mair, the place cited.

Then, if the particle "determinately" signified the same as "necessarily," and Aristotle only wished to prove that in contingent propositions about the future there is no necessary truth, he should have said the same about some propositions about the present. For there are some present-tense propositions that are not necessary, for example "Peter is disputing." Therefore, since he says only in propositions about the future that it is not the case that one is false and the other true, he contends not only that neither is one necessarily true or necessarily false, but also that neither is true distinctly nor false distinctly.

Third, there are those who explain Aristotle thus: that in propositions about the future neither part is false, the other true, determinately, in the sense that it can be signified by us. But this exposition is most vain; because even in propositions about present things many there are in which neither by men nor by angels could the truth or falsity be signified - such are those which signify an interior affection of the soul. Then also, because from the fact that one part is true and the other false, Aristotle would infer that it had been thus a year ago and a thousand years ago and forever, that is, from eternity, whether anyone had said this or not. For a proposition is true or false from this, that the thing is or is not, not from this, that it is said or not said. But Aristotle thinks that even in this way the proposition would from eternity have been true, necessarily or contingently in its assertor; he is not concerned whether it be true in such wise that it can be signified by us, but whether it is thus true that from eternity it followed from the thing itself, for example, because the thing itself was in this way going to be.

Therefore the opinion of Aristotle is manifest: that in contradictions about the future it is not the case that one part is distinctly true, the other distinctly false; but that each, as such, is qualifiedly true or false. This opinion, thus explained, Catherinus defends to the best of his ability in the place cited; and in this opinion was Aureolus on I Sent., dist. 39, q. 1, art. 1, conclusion 1, and elsewhere, as is reported by "Greg." on dist. 38, q. 2, art. 1; and Catherinus, in that same little work, as reported by "Greg.," says that Aureolus taught it to be false to assert as follows: that God determines of any future singular that it shall be, or shall not be, distinctly; but only "it will be, or it will not be," disjunctively or conjunctively. Cajetan too favors this opinion. In this chapter we shall pursue these things further, and in Chapter 2 reply to the objections.[1098]

Caput II - On the principal reasons for that interpretation

The prior of their reasons: They prove it also by reasons. First: a future free event is therefore called contingent because it is indifferent toward either part; for if it were determined toward one, it would not be contingent nor free: for what is free or contingent seems to be the same as what is indifferent, equally disposed toward being and not being, toward happening and not happening. But if one part of a contradiction is true, the thing is already determined toward that part; therefore it is not indifferent, nor free. Next, this part of the contradiction is true and that false; therefore the event will necessarily occur, and consequently consultation about future things is in

1098. Aureolus, In I Sent., dist. 39, q. 1, art. 1, conclusion 1; reported by Greg., dist. 38, q. 2, art. 1; Catherinus, the same little work, book 1 (as Greg. reports); Cajetan, in this matter, and responses to objections.

vain. Furthermore, from a truth detected to be true it necessarily follows - as Aristotle most clearly proves in that same place - that if this part "Peter will sin" is true, therefore that same proposition has always been true: for it makes little difference whether someone said it a year ago or a thousand years ago, and thus to infinity: indeed, it would have been true even if someone had said it or if no one had said it, because a proposition is not true from the fact that it is said, but from the fact that the thing is so; and there is no distinction according to time in that which is always true, it cannot not be true: for there is not a time when it can not be true; therefore it is necessarily true: and thus the event necessarily happens. But if it happens necessarily, all consultation is abolished, as is evident; for what from eternity was true, that it would be thus, what place is there for consultation, when no fruit will be had from that consultation? From which things this last follows, which "Averroes" (as some report) asserted in that place: that God knows nothing else about future things than "that they will be, or will not be" disjunctively; but He knows nothing of either part distinctly.[1099]

According to our faith, in contradictions of singular propositions about the future contingent, one part is distinctly true, the other distinctly false.

The common consensus of the Scholastics against Aristotle teaches that in these singular contradictory propositions about a future contingent, one part is distinctly true from eternity and the other false, from the fact that the thing itself either is future or is not future. Thus teach Richard, Capreolus, and Mair in the places of chapter and question cited; St. Bonaventure on the First Book, distinction 38, article 2, question 1, to the second reply; Gabriel, question 1, article 1, notable 7; Ockham, question 1, to the principal first; Gregory, question 1, article 2; Scotus on the First Book, distinction 39, question 1, Vision on contingency, and to the principal arguments; Marsilius on I, question 40, to the third principal; Holcot on II, question 2, article 7; Dominic Soto on Romans, chapter 9, epistle, part 3, near the end; and Cordubensis, book 1, question 55, doubt 2; which opinion I judge truer not only according to philosophical reason, but also, according to right faith, necessarily to be asserted - something we will show in this chapter by arguments taken from the principles of our faith.[1100]

From the Fathers, moreover, those to be cited first in disputation 68, chapter 6, taught this very same thing, who assert that therefore God foreknows future things because they are in very reality future, not conversely. For if God's knowledge, which He has of future things (as we shall immediately infer), is eternal, it is necessary that simultaneously from eternity the thing itself be future. But if that is therefore known by God because it is future, it follows that the thing from eternity, from its causes, was future, not from the knowledge of God; and hence an enunciation about the future has truth from itself. Moreover, Anselm, in the little work On the Harmony of Foreknowledge, Predestination, and Free Choice, and in On Free Choice, chapter r., in my

1099. The opinion attributed to Averroes that God knows future things only disjunctively ("it will be, or it will not be"), not either part distinctly.

1100. Richard, Capreolus, and Mair, in the places of chapter cited; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 38, art. 2, q. 1, ad 2; Gabriel, q. 1, art. 1, notab. 7; Ockham, q. 1, ad primum principale; Gregory, q. 1, art. 2; Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 39, q. 1, Vision "De contingentia" and "Ad argumenta principalia"; Marsilius, In I, q. 40, ad 3 principale; Holcot, In II, q. 2, art. 7; Dominic Soto, In c. 9, epist. ad Rom., part 3, circa finem; Cordubensis, Lib. 1, q. 55, dubit. 2.

judgment expressly disputes against Aristotle for this reason, that Aristotle would infer necessity in things from the truth of propositions about the future; and he clearly shows that God's knowledge is most certain, and that things future are future from eternity, and that from this something follows of necessity, which we shall explain in the following disputation; yet from that nothing is taken away from the liberty of our will. But Aristotle, when he inferred necessity from truth, did not know how to reconcile with it the liberty of free choice; and so, in order to assert liberty, he took truth away from propositions about the future; but once that is removed, it is necessary that knowledge about future things, even God's own, be taken away from the midst, as we shall soon infer.[1101]

Primary theological reason against the opinion of Aristotle. It is therefore proved first by a theological reason that one proposition about a future contingent is distinctly and determinately true, but the other, its contradictory, is false. For, as Aristotle himself concedes in that eighth chapter, if a proposition about the future were true, whoever enunciated it a year before, or a thousand years before, or at any time at all, would speak the truth; therefore, conversely, if someone enunciating a proposition about the future speaks the truth, it necessarily follows that the proposition itself is true, and that that future is truly future. For if it were indeterminate to be and not to be, and the proposition had to be neither distinctly true nor distinctly false, but true or false confusedly, it would follow that he who uttered that proposition would speak neither truth nor falsehood, but truth or falsehood; indeed, as we shall say in the following chapter, whoever asserted distinctly the one part would always speak falsehood. And yet propositions about a future contingent are truly foretold by the Prophets and by God, and we call such a prediction distinctly and determinately true: therefore it is a sign that the proposition itself is distinctly and determinately true. The same argument can be made about knowledge: for if some knowledge of future things is true, it follows that the very future things which are known are truly future, and that the enunciation about them is true. But the knowledge of the Prophets and of God, which He has about future things, is true: therefore the very future things are truly future, and the enunciation about them will be true.

Catherinus replies, in that little work, whom some of the more recent follow, that indeed a proposition about the future is true insofar as it is announced by God or known by Him, because God has it present in His eternity; but if it be referred to the cause from which the thing is future, the one part of the contradiction is not distinctly true, but true or false.

It is refuted, first: If from this very fact that God truly knows, or truly pronounces, that some thing will be future, it follows that it is present in eternity so that it is known by God certainly and determinately, it follows also that that thing is truly future. For how can it be determinately present to God - either by a real presence, or even by the true presence of its object - if it itself is not yet determinate and truly future?

1101. St. Anselm, Opusc. De concordia praescientiae, praedest. et lib. arbit., cap. r.

Second: It cannot be that what God knows will be in time is not future - whether its being will come about from God's knowledge or will, or from a created cause. For it follows very well: some intellect truly knows that a thing will be future; therefore that thing will be future. From whatever source, then, that future comes to be, the proposition enunciating it distinctly and determinately will be true.

Third: And since words are substituted in the place of intellections and concepts, if any knowledge of future things is true, the proposition enunciating those future things will be true; as if the Prophet or God, who knows future things, truly knows them, He also truly foretells and can simply affirm with truth. Wherefore, if Aristotle believed that there is some true knowledge about future things, whether of God Himself or revealed by Him to the Prophets, by what reasoning would he deny truth to propositions about the future?

It is therefore my persuasion that Aristotle, just as also Cicero, so that he might defend the liberty of free choice, denied truth, and consequently all knowledge of those propositions. For if truths of those things can be known, truth also must be in the things; and conversely, if truth is in them, some knowledge can exist; but if no truth is in them, neither will there be any knowledge of them, even divine. Therefore I would say that Aristotle tacitly denied to God certain knowledge of future things, since he even denied truth to future things. This is the more probable to me, because from the opinion of some of the Fathers, as we shall infer from some passages of Aristotle himself in disputation 87, he plainly also denied to God providence over all singular things; and for this reason I would judge that the opinion of Aristotle, as it has been explained by us, is adverse to the true faith, since from it knowledge of future things is removed from the midst.

Second theological reason. Secondly, we have from Aristotle himself that it makes absolutely no difference for some proposition about the future to be true whether it be enunciated by someone or not; and by the same reasoning he ought to say that it also makes no difference whether that thing be known to be future or not, provided only that the thing itself be future. And he gives the reason in these words: For not because an affirmation is uttered, or a negation, will the thing be or not be; for things, just as they are in themselves, are objected to God in that manner, nor are they such because they are objected, but rather conversely. From which there is also inferred that which Aureolus said, namely that God does not know that Antichrist will be, but [only] that he will be or will not be: which is manifestly against the faith. For, as Boethius well noted, in the Consolation of Philosophy, prose 3, if there were in God no other foreknowledge than this, what could be called foreknowledge? Or how would God's foreknowledge differ from that ridiculous oracle of Tiresias (in Horace, Book 2 of the Sermones): "Whatever I say, either it will be, or it will not be"? What also has divine providence surpassed human opinion in, if, like men, it indicates things uncertain?[1102]

Tertiary reason. Third, even if we grant to the Thomists that future things are from eternity present to eternity, and therefore are certainly known by God, nevertheless it follows that future things are determinately future, and propositions about the future are determinately true, or determinately false. For if future things are present in eternity, and determinately present so as to

1102. Boethius, De consolatione, prose 3; Horace, Sermones, book 2.

be known, it follows from this that they are future; indeed that they are future prior to being present. For it is not from their being present to eternity that they are future in time; but rather conversely, because they are in their time future, they are also present to eternity. Therefore already the thing, from its own cause, was future, so that it might be able to be present to eternity. But if, considered from its own cause, the thing was neither distinctly future nor distinctly not future, but future or not future confusedly, it would be that nothing else could be present to God in eternity, nor even be an object in His intellect, except that complex under a disjunction, "It will be, or it will not be." For things, just as they are in themselves, are objected to God in that way, nor are they such because they are objected, but rather conversely. From which there is also inferred what Aureolus said - namely, that God does not know that Antichrist will be, but [only] that he will be or will not be - to be manifestly against the faith. For, as Boethius well noted, in the Consolation of Philosophy, prose 3, if there were in God no other foreknowledge than this, what could be called foreknowledge? Or how would God's foreknowledge differ from that ridiculous oracle of Tiresias, in Horace, Book 2 of the Sermones: "Whatever I say, either it will be, or it will not be"? What also has divine providence surpassed human opinion in, if, like men, it indicates things uncertain?

Note against Aureolus. For if there were in God no other foreknowledge than this, what could be called foreknowledge? Or how would the foreknowledge of God differ from that ridiculous oracle of Tiresias (in Horace, Book 2 of the Sermones): "Whatever I say, either it will be, or it will not be"? What also has divine providence surpassed human opinion in, if, like men, it indicates things uncertain?

Caput III - The same truth is proved by a philosophical reason

Besides the reasons which we formed in the preceding chapter - although drawn from natural principles, they drive our adversaries to absurdities against the faith - there are also other reasons, easier indeed and natural, and taken from Aristotle's own doctrine, by which the same our opinion is confirmed.

The first is that which Gregory uses in the place alleged: since Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 27, teaches that whoever affirms and denies either speaks the truth, or errs (that is, speaks what is false); and reason itself clearly teaches this. For, since what is false is that which is dissonant from the thing, but what is true is that which is conformable, it cannot be that what is said is not either conformable or dissonant distinctly and determinately to the thing which it enunci -

The first reason is that used by Gregory in the place alleged, who teaches from Aristotle, 4 Metaphysics, text 27, that to affirm and to deny is to say what is true, or to say what is false; and he clearly teaches this. For, since what is false is that which is dissonant from the thing, but what is true is that which is conformable, it cannot be that what is said is not either conformable or dissonant distinctly and determinately to the thing which it enunciates: therefore it will be either false or true, even determinately, and not only true or false confusedly. As Aristotle himself says in the book On Interpretation, chapter 8: therefore, in propositions about the future, one part must be true, the other, namely the contradictory, false. In addition there is what Gregory says: it is not

seen how there could be some medium between contradictories: therefore, between "it will be" and "it will not be," there is no medium; for, if there were, one who says that the thing will be would not rightly be gainsaid by one saying that it will not be, because the whole of what he asserts would not be negated, if there is some medium outside assertion and negation.

But let us illustrate the matter by an example. If someone says, "Peter will sin tomorrow," then, according to Aristotle's sentence, he does not say what is true, nor what is false distinctly, but what is true or false; because the thing is indifferent to be or not be. Likewise, if another says, "Peter will not sin tomorrow," he does not say what is true nor what is false, but what is true or false. Therefore the one does not negate the whole of what the other affirmed, but the enunciation of each remains, as it were, suspended and ambiguous; wherefore, even if one speaks truth and the other falsehood, the one will not contradict the other; and since an enunciation of the future is always indifferent to the true and the false, it can never be the contradictory of another. Therefore the only contradiction in future matters can be of this sort: "It will be" or "it will not be"; "neither will it be, nor will it not be": of which the former is true because it is necessary, the latter false because it is impossible.

The second reason: if nothing is determinate as future, but any thing at all is poised toward being and not being, it follows that he who absolutely and without disjunction affirms something to be going to be, speaks false distinctly and determinately. For to assert that something will be, when the thing itself is indifferent to be or not be, and is no more to be future than not to be future, is false. For from that which the thing is or is not, an enunciation ought to be judged true or false; and whenever a thing is enunciated to be future otherwise than it is future, it is enunciated falsely. Therefore, if it is enunciated distinctly that it will be, when it is not distinctly future, but confusedly future or not future, it follows that it is false, and hence every affirmative proposition about the future would be distinctly and determinately false; therefore, in contradictions about the future, the affirmative is false, and consequently every negating enunciation ought to be distinctly and determinate true. But this, besides being manifestly absurd, openly opposes the doctrine of Aristotle; for in these contradictions he thinks that not one part is true and the other false, but that each is capable of being true or false.

Next, I retort the argument and I prove that each part of the contradiction is false. For if the enunciation affirming is false, because it determinately affirms something that is ambiguous, by the same reason the enunciation denying will be false: because it negates that which is poised toward either.

Third, against him I argue from his own principles: if in universal contradictions, that is, about a universal and common subject, one side is distinctly true, the other false, as Aristotle had taught in the preceding chapters of book 1 On Interpretation and in book 3 at the beginning, then in singulars the same must be said, as will be evident by an example. For this proposition, "Every man will sin mortally tomorrow," and this, "Some man will not sin mortally tomorrow," are contradictories; and, according to Aristotle's sentence, one of these is distinctly false, the other true; for it is a universal contradiction. But if one of these is distinctly false, it is manifest that that universal, "Every man will sin mortally," is false; for it is to be believed that in the whole Church of

God someone will be tomorrow free from mortal sin. Then the other, the particular, ought to be true; and since in a universal affirmative the subject, according to the rules of the logicians, is supposed distributively and, by descent (as they say), copulatively, the falsity of that universal ought to be detected from the fact that some singular is false, it follows that in the contradictory the subject is supposed determinately; and consequently its truth ought to be proved by a disjunctive descent (as they say), from the fact that some singular is distinctly true. For if it were only confusedly true or false, no singular would be true, and therefore neither would that particular be true: all of which are very well known from logic and beyond controversy, and therefore need not be confirmed at greater length. Therefore under this proposition, "Some man will sin mortally," if it is true, there must be some singular, such as "Peter will sin," which is true; and consequently, in singulars about a future contingent, some proposition is distinctly true. It is clear, therefore, that neither according to our faith, nor according to philosophical and natural reason, is Aristotle's sentence, as explained by us above, true.

But let us refute the arguments of Aristotle's sentence. To the first we say that an indifference is indeed necessary, so that things may be said to happen with liberty, and also that an indifference clashes with a determination; but not every indifference is necessary for contingency, nor does any and every indifference to liberty oppose any and every determination. There is therefore a twofold indifference toward either part of the contradiction: one which Aristotle posited and which is rightly explained by two propositions, which they call "of inherence" in this way: the thing is indifferent and suspended toward being and not being, so that in the thing itself it hangs as much toward being as toward not being; and this indeed clashes with a determinate truth of one part, since in the thing with this indifference there is no more being than not being; but in order that there be a determinate and distinct truth, one part is distinctly future. This indifference and suspension I judge not to be necessary for the liberty of free choice (arbitrium): rather I think it impossible and contrary to our faith, as was proved in the preceding chapters. For it is established from the science and prediction of God that, with our liberty preserved, one part is distinctly going to be future; yet this determination in no way injures our liberty; therefore neither does it oppose the indifference which is necessary for liberty, and this will be explained below. For, since a thing will be determinate future from our liberty and will have its origin thence, it can inflict upon liberty no force or necessity. The other indifference is that which is explained by one proposition "of inherence" and another "of possibility" in this way: free choice will sin, but it can, or will be able, not to sin - and conversely. With this indifference it can also be maintained that there is a determination of the future; that is, that one part is distinctly, as a matter of fact, going to be future. For nothing hinders that something be in reality distinctly future, and yet be able not to be: this is sufficient to establish the full liberty of free choice; for, as by the former mode such indifference is impossible, so too is liberty. Therefore nothing is taken away from liberty by our saying that future things are determinate or distinctly true. From which it also follows that God can distinctly know the future things of our free choice, although it is indifferent and free to the opposite. But it must be observed that, when we say that future things are distinct and determinate future with a potency to opposites, this determination is not only in the effect, but is also said with

respect to the cause: not that there is now in the causes something inclining necessarily and by the mode of nature to that part; but that there be something in the cause, with which the cause will in fact act thus, and yet be able to do the opposite; and because the will ought to be anticipated by such a thought from this or that cause, upon the positing of which it will in reality consent, even if it could not consent; and this repugnance is to thought, in which our entire liberty is preserved.

To Aristotle's later argument it is answered: once the truth about the future, or the knowledge of God, is posited, it follows that there is some necessity in the operation, but a consequent, not an antecedent necessity; which takes away nothing of our will's liberty. About which matter, since in Disputation 68 we shall say more things, in order to reconcile the knowledge of God and the truth of it, and of things and of propositions (which is the same), with our free choice, let what has been said so far suffice.

Disputatio LXVII - Whether future conditionals are certainly known by God

Whether future things under a condition are certainly known by God. Disputation 67.

The opinion of certain theologians of our time is as follows. Not less certainly are future things under a condition than absolutely future things known by God: this is proved by authority, in chapter 2. The same sentence is confirmed by reason, in chapter 3. The opposed arguments of the opinion are dissolved, in chapter 4.

Caput I - The opinion of certain theologians of our time

Although the ancient Scholastics made no mention of this controversy, nor did it begin to be disputed in the schools many years ago, nonetheless it is assuredly worthy to be diligently examined: both so that we may treat exactly those matters which are difficult about the knowledge of God, and also so that, with respect to those things about grace and predestination which we shall say below and in I-II, q. 109, we may lay down some firm foundations.

Among the more recent Scholastics there are some who, to the best of their ability, defend that there is in God no certain knowledge of future things under a condition; and there are not a few who also think that the knowledge which Scripture seems to attribute to God about these future things is only a certain conjecture. Especially in this opinion are as many as assert that there is for God a single reason of knowing things that are certainly future, namely, the real presence of them in eternity. For, since these future things are not at any time really going to be, even if some were going to be under a condition, they would in no way be really present to eternity. This opinion can be urged from St. Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 14,[1103] not far from the beginning, where, against certain Massilians, who asserted that to some infants baptism had not been granted, because God had foreknown that they would not act with repentance if they

1103. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, cap. 14.

had lived, he argues from Wisdom 4: "They were taken away lest wickedness should change their understanding, or lest deceitfulness should beguile their soul," thus: He says that "he was taken away" (namely, as one taken away) "according to the perils of this life, not according to the foreknowledge of God; by which He foresaw this, namely what was going to be, not what was not going to be, but what, if those immature for death had been begotten, He would bestow, so that they might be withdrawn from the uncertainty of temptation, because he would sin who would remain in temptation" etc. Therefore, since that prediction was of future things under a condition, as is manifest, Augustine says that that statement is false, not because it is foreknown by God what perils He would provide for them, which our human conjecture seemed to indicate to us; he goes on to say that he said these things, namely that such future things cannot be known by God with certainty. The same is stated plainly by Prosper, to Reginus, in a letter; and to Augustine, in the work which is before his book On the Predestination of the Saints, where, against the same Massilians, he speaks thus: "But in so far as you subject the election of God commonly to the merits of whomsoever, so that, as it were, past things which were not going to be, which are not now going to be, the manners mark out, hence you remove them from the order's kind, because they are not done from things foreknown" etc. Now when the Prophet says that they involve themselves in that absurdity of the kind, that they say "things to be done which have been foreknown are not to be done," he speaks of those future things which, absolutely speaking, are not future in reality, but only under a condition, by which the Massilians used to assign the merits of election: therefore, when he says they are not foreknown by God, he clearly teaches that those things do not have foreknowledge with God.

By reason, moreover, it is proved first that there is in God no decree about future things of this sort under a condition; but God, since by a decree He can know no future of this kind, cannot know future things under a condition. Further, that God has nowhere had a decree about those things will be plain from what has been said above, namely, that to posit in God now one counsel, and again another definition of doing something besides those things which He is absolutely going to do, is inadmissible. For if men not only set down with themselves that which they are in reality going to do, but also that which under a condition - if such and such an occasion should offer - they would do, how much does this pertain to human providence, since those things are doubtful and uncertain? On which account also each prudent man ought to foresee in advance the single occasions which can occur, and what he ought to do in each single case, has decreed for himself with respect to the matter; but since the providence of God is most certain and efficacious, so that He can neither be deceived nor impeded, we shall ascribe to God such conditional decrees in vain, which for various occasions would be otherwise ambivalent and works established by equality.

Only things that are certainly future have, namely, a real presence in eternity. For since these future things are not at any time really going to be, although otherwise under a condition they would be future, they are in no way really present to eternity.

Testimony of St. Augustine. This opinion can be encouraged from Augustine, book 1 De praedestinatione sanctorum, chapter 14, not far from the beginning, where, against certain Massilians who asserted that to certain little ones in their infant age baptism was not granted with

God's consent because God foreknew they would not actually do penance if they had lived, he argues from Wisdom 4, "He was snatched away lest wickedness should change his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul," in this way: "It was said (namely, 'he was snatched away') according to the perils of this present life, not according to the prescience of God, who foreknows what was going to be, not what was not going to be; that is, because for him an untimely death had been granted, in order that he might be withdrawn from temptations whose outcomes were uncertain, not because he was going to sin who, if he had remained, would not have fallen into temptations." Therefore, since that prediction was of futures under a condition - as is manifest - and Augustine says that that was said not because it was foreknown by God, but because the perils of the present life seemed to indicate that to us by human conjecture, it plainly follows, according to Augustine, that futures of this sort cannot be known by God with certainty.

Another testimony of Prosper. The same is clearly found in Prosper to Reginus, in the letter to Augustine set before Augustine's De praedestinatione sanctorum, where, against certain Massilians, he speaks thus: "In so far as they subject election to whatever imaginary merits, so that, besides past things which did not exist, futures which are not future are fabricated, to be foreknown and not foreknown," etc.[1104] When Prosper says that they move within that kind of absurdity as to say that things not to be done are foreknown, he speaks of those futures which in reality are not absolutely future, but only under a condition, which the Massilians were fabricating as merits of election; therefore, when he says that these are not foreknown by God, he clearly teaches that there is not, in God, foreknowledge of those things.

Primum argumentum. But by reason it is proved first: there is in God no decree concerning such future things under a condition; but without a decree of God no future thing can be known: therefore neither can these future things under a condition be known by God. Moreover, that God had no decree concerning those things is evident: for it is superfluous to posit in God one counsel and another determination of doing something, besides those which He is absolutely going to do. For if men do not merely set down with themselves what they are in reality going to do, but also that which under a condition - if such and such an occasion should offer - they would do, this pertains to human providence, because it is doubtful and uncertain: on which account also each prudent man ought to foresee in advance the single occasions which can occur, and what in each single case there is need to do, he determines for himself; but since the providence of God is most certain and most efficacious, so that He can neither be deceived nor impeded, we should ascribe to God such decrees under a condition in vain, which, for various occasions, would otherwise be in suspense and works established by a parity of alternatives.

Secundo confirmatur, quoniam if in any way future things under a condition are known, it is on account of the truth which is found in those propositions, as we have said in the preceding disputation about things absolutely future; but future things under a condition are not distinctly true: therefore they cannot be known with certitude. For if a conditional proposition were true, the

1104. Prosper of Aquitaine, to Reginus, in a letter; and "Ad Augustinum," before Augustine's De praedestinatione sanctorum.

consequence also would be good; for the truth of propositions is the same as the goodness of the consequence; but if the consequence were good, it would also be necessary; but it cannot be necessary, because liberty would be taken away: therefore neither is the proposition true.

Tertio aliqui sic arguit: the knowledge of future things under a condition is not of simple understanding, because it is not possible by a simple solution; nor of vision, because it is not of future things which are really going to be: therefore it is a certain middle knowledge (*scientia media*), which seems fabricated; since all the Scholastics grant to God only those two kinds of knowledge. And if indeed there is in God any knowledge of these future things under a condition, it is only from conjecture, as some prove from that of Matthew 11: "And you, Capharnaum, will you be exalted up to heaven? you will descend even to hell: for if in Sodom there had been done the mighty works which have been done in you, perhaps they would have remained until this day": the particle "perhaps" is of one doubting: wherefore it not obscurely indicates that this knowledge is not certain and infallible, but conjectural after a human fashion. They add, moreover, that some more recent writers say, not only that this knowledge of future things is without foundation, but also that it is altogether useless in those matters for which it seems to have been devised, namely, to reconcile our liberty with divine predestination, lest that be harmed; it conduces in no way at all, and they think that by another, far easier way all things are saved.

Non minus certo futura sub conditione, quam absolute futura, a Deo cognosci, auctoritate probatur.

Caput II - On the same

A view has always seemed preferable to me, opposed to the foregoing opinion, which teaches two things: first, that these future things under a condition are known by God no less certainly than things absolutely future; which can be shown by authority and by reason. Then (since in the matter of predestination and grace many things, which according to the doctrine of the Fathers must necessarily be said, follow upon knowledge under a condition) that it is most useful and most true; for truth always agrees with truth. We shall endeavor to perform the former in this chapter and the following ones; the latter, however, will be seen in their own places.

- Scriptural testimonies. Therefore, first, our opinion seems expressed in many places of Scripture. 1 Kings 23: David consulted the Lord, saying: "If the men of Keilah will deliver me into his hand (namely, Saul's), will Saul come down?" and the Lord replied, "He will come down." And again David: "Will the men of Keilah deliver me and my men into the hand of Saul?" And the Lord said, "They will deliver."[1105] And 3 Kings 11 it is said: "King Solomon loved foreign women from the nations concerning whom the Lord said to the sons of Israel, You shall not go in to them, nor shall they come in to you; surely they will turn away your hearts after their gods."[1106] And Luke 10: "Woe to you, Chorazin; woe to you, Bethsaida; for if

1105. 1 Sam 23:10 - 12.
1106. 1 Kgs 11:1 - 2.

in Tyre and Sidon there had been done the mighty works which have been done in you, long ago they would have repented, sitting in sackcloth and ashes."[1107]

Nor does it matter that, however, in Matthew the sentence has the particle added, "perhaps," from which some think that that prediction of Christ was from conjecture, though most certain after the human manner, which would arise from things themselves considered in every way, as if He were saying: "Thus indeed can be conjectured from the signs and wonders done by me, and from the disposition of the Sidonians and Tyrians." This interpretation, besides its manifest absurdity - since it contains the force of the particle itself according to the common doctrine of the Fathers - does not express it. For St. Jerome, on that of Jeremiah 26, "Do not withhold a word, if perhaps they will listen," says: "The ambiguous word 'perhaps' does not befit the majesty of the Lord; but He speaks according to our affection, that the free will of man may be preserved." The same he plainly taught on that of Ezekiel 2: "And you shall say to them." St. Augustine likewise, on that of Psalm 2, "Lest at any time he be angry," explains: "'Lest perhaps' is not said on account of uncertainty of the prophecy, but on account of those who are admonished, who with doubt are wont to think of God's future wrath"; and Tractate 37 on John, on those words "lest perhaps ...," interprets the same in the same way. So also St. John Chrysostom, homily 78 on Matthew, on that, "The faithful and prudent servant." St. Gregory, homily 9 on Ezekiel, on those words "If perhaps, or if by any means they will hear," says that the particle "perhaps" does not signify doubt or ignorance in God, but the fewness of those who were going to respond.[1108] In the same way therefore in Matthew 11 the particle "perhaps" will indicate the freedom of choice of those who were going to do penance; but by no means doubtfulness or uncertainty of the knowledge and prediction of Christ. For rather, to God there ought altogether to be denied the knowledge of these future things than there should be attributed to Him only a conjectural and some uncertain knowledge, which would be exposed to at least a very small measure of uncertainty and falsity, as we shall show in the following chapter. Finally, St. Ambrose, book 2 De paenitentia, chapter 5, on the aforesaid particle, says thus: "It is not pronounced out of ignorance, but in the divine Scriptures such a manner of speaking is frequently observed, because the diction is simple," which very thing many passages of Scripture confirm. Theodoret also on Jeremiah 26 and Ezekiel 2, on those cited words, and Eusebius, book 6 De praeparatione evangelica, chapter 9, teach that that particle is not a word of ignorance.

If someone should say that these futures which God and the soul of Christ under a condition predicted were not predicted from the knowledge which God Himself and the soul of Christ had concerning them, but were explained only by that manner of speaking, declaring what a prudent man by human conjecture ought to judge about those things, without any foundation would he affirm it. For when David consulted the Lord, he did not do this in order to hear the judgment and conjecture of a prudent man; he sought the most certain oracle of God who cannot be deceived. Then, since Christ rebuked the hardness of Bethsaida and Chorazin by that example of the

1107. Lk 10:13.

1108. St. Jerome, on Jer 26:6; St. Augustine, on Ps 2 and Tractate 37 on John; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 78 on Matthew; St. Gregory the Great, Hom. 9 on Ezekiel.

Sidonians and Tyrians, He convicted them from what He Himself most certainly knew. For according to human conjecture, it would be little to rebuke them and to prove against them the hardness of their heart on the day of judgment. Moreover, if we examine the force of the Greek particle, as Lansa noted in chapter 47 of the Harmony of the Gospels, it is not that of doubting, but signifies an asseveration, which is the mark of one affirming and seriously asserting something; the same was observed by the Carthusian and by Titelman on Matthew 11. *The same is also proved by the authority of the Fathers*. Of these, omitting others who could be brought forward concerning the knowledge of things absolutely future, Gregory of Nyssa expressly handed on this opinion in the book *On Those Who Are Snatched Away Prematurely*, where he says: "It is very credible that He who knows what is future as well as what is past, prevented the progress of the infant's life to perfection, lest that which evil foresight had observed in one who would live thus might be brought to perfection, and lest for him who would so live by that will and choice, wickedness and vice should become the matter of life." The same thing Porphyry also said, whose opinion Cyril relates and approves, book 3 against Julian. The same also Augustine has in express words, book 2 *De bono perseverantiae*, chapter 9, at the beginning: "Surely," he says, "God could, since He foreknew that they would fall, before that happened, remove them from this life," and a little below he repeats the Lord's sentence about Tyre and Sidon, "who, if they had seen the signs done in Bethsaida, would have done penance"; and immediately he subjoins: "But can we say that even the Tyrians and Sidonians, the mighty works having been done among them, were unwilling to believe, or would not have believed, if they had been done with them?" as if he were saying, by no means. He gives the reason in these words: "The Lord Himself attests that they would have done a penance of great humility if those divine signs of virtues had been done among them." As if he were saying: since the Lord thus predicted, who will dare to affirm the opposite about them? And in book 1 *Ad Simplicianum*, question 2, on the reprobate, he says about the middle: "If He (namely, God) were willing to have mercy even on them, He could call them in such a way as would be apt for them, so that they would be moved and understand and follow": therefore God knew how He could have mercy on them by that special mercy granted only to the predestined. But He could not know that, unless He had with Himself the note of a calling so congruent to their free choice that, if they were called thus, without doubt they would respond. And a little below: "But whomever He has mercy on, He calls him in such a way as He knows to be congruent, that he may not reject the one calling him." This doctrine is so familiar to Augustine that it is superfluous to bring forward more places of his.

Lastly, some Scholastics are wont to be alleged for this opinion; but because they do not treat this controversy expressly, it did not please me to report them; nor, from one or another of their words, to collect this opinion obscurely, since the testimonies both of Scripture and of the Fathers, as has been recited up to now, are so manifest; nor is the reason less clear demonstrating this very thing, as we shall see in the following chapter.

Eadem sententia ratione confirmatur.

Caput III - On the same

Let us confirm our opinion by reason. Before all else it must be supposed that either the knowledge of these future things under a condition is altogether to be denied to God, or a most certain one is to be attributed to Him. For those who so concede it to God as to say it is only some conjecture, in my judgment do Him not a moderate injury. For that God does not know is not a wonder, indeed is necessary, if that which He does not know is nothing. For "that which is not," as Aristotle testifies, "is not known."[1109] Therefore future things under a condition, which truly are not future, nor not future, but "future or not future" (as they say) disjunctively; God will not know to be, nor not to be, but "to be or not to be." But to attribute to God knowledge by conjectures only, and not altogether certain, is surely to assert Him capable of ignorance and error. For if God, by conjecture only, were to apprehend these futures, nothing could hinder that His knowledge should not attain to that which really is going to be, and that He should affirm that to be which would not be going to be. Wherefore nothing also would hinder that He should be deceived: for deception consists in this alone, that someone should assert or think that that will be which in reality is not going to be. Therefore, if the knowledge of God does not of necessity follow upon the things themselves as they are, but something can really lie hidden from Him, however well He should conjecture, His knowledge could be fallible; which is error in belief. Therefore rather the adversaries ought to say that God distinctly knows none of these futures, because nothing is distinctly true; but that He sometimes predicts, not according to the knowledge which He Himself has, but which men are wont to attain by conjecture. Yet from Scripture and the Fathers it already remains sufficiently proved that God, according to His own proper knowledge, not according to human conjecture only, predicted those futures. Now by reason this must be proved, which is of this sort. In the same way does some thing stand to being or not being under a condition, as to...

Confirmatur. In order that we may confirm our opinion, before all else it must be laid down that either we must deny to God altogether any knowledge of these conditional futures, or we must ascribe to Him a most certain and determinate knowledge of them. For those who say that God has only conjectural knowledge of them, in my judgment do Him an injury. That He knows, is not wondrous; rather, if there were anything He did not know, that would be wondrous, as Aristotle bears witness in Posterior Analytics I. Therefore, if futures under a condition are indeed futures - not non-futures, as they say - God will distinctly know that they will be, and not that they will not be. But to ascribe to God knowledge only by conjectures is to affirm ignorance in Him; for, if His knowledge did not attain to that which really would be future, and He were to affirm it to be future when it would not be, there would be nothing to prevent His being deceived; since to be deceived consists precisely in this, namely, to think that to be which in reality is not. Therefore, if God's knowledge does not follow the things themselves as they are, something in reality would be hidden from Him, so that He would form only a conjecture, and thus He could be in error - which is absurd. Therefore, rather must the adversaries say that God knows nothing of these futures, because nothing is distinctly true; but that He sometimes predicts, not according to the knowledge

1109. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2.

which He Himself has, but according to the knowledge which men are wont to attain by conjecture. Yet from Scripture and the Fathers it already remains sufficiently proved that God, according to His own proper knowledge, not according to human conjecture only, predicted those futures. Now by reason this must be proved, which is of this sort.

Ratio verioris assertionis. In the same way does some thing stand to being or not being under a condition, as to being or not being absolutely: so that, just as there is no middle between "it will be" and "it will not be" absolutely, but one part is distinctly true and the other distinctly false, as was shown in the preceding disputation; so also between "it will be" and "it will not be" under a condition, one is distinctly true and the other distinctly false. Only this differs: that in the former contradiction the effect is posited without a condition, and therefore the future is affirmed absolutely; in the latter, with a condition. For in the former there is posited a cause absolutely, from which the effect is brought forth and is absolutely future in this manner: Peter will be called by me by such a calling, to which he will respond. In the latter, the cause is posited not absolutely but under a condition, and in like manner the effect is asserted only under that same condition, in this manner: If Peter in such an occasion shall be called by such a calling, he will respond; but if by such-and-such, he will not respond. For the quality and condition appended to the cause is poured back upon the effect; in the rest, however, the reasoning of each sort of contradiction seems equal. Therefore, since in absolute futures one part is distinctly true and the other distinctly false, in futures under a condition it must be said in the same way; and all the reasons by which we proved this about absolute futures manifestly convince the same about futures under a condition. For, the truth being posited distinctly on one side of the contradiction, and the infinity of the divine intellect being added, it follows in the same way that God most certainly knows all things under a condition: because no truth which, for that very reason, is intelligible, can be hidden from the infinite perspicacity of the divine intellect. Therefore the knowledge of these futures must be attributed to God no less than of others.

Verum respondent aliqui that there is a difference between propositions about a future absolutely and about a future under a condition: for in contradictions about an absolute future they grant that one part is distinctly true and the other distinctly false; but in contradictions about a future under a condition they deny that one part is always distinctly true and the other distinctly false, but sometimes either part is equally indifferent to be, or not to be - and thus to be true or to be false - as philosophers likewise speak about God, namely, that it is always distinctly true to say absolutely "He will do" or "He will not do," and distinctly false to say the contrary; but not so under a condition. For example, if one were to ask: If God had willed to save Cain, would He have decreed to save Judas? and other such things which we enunciate about God under a condition. The reason of the difference, they say, is this: in absolute futures, when knowledge proposes diverse objects equally, and inclines no more to one than to the other, it cannot happen but that one part alone will be future in reality; for both cannot remain in suspense. But in futures under a condition, since nothing is going to be in reality, we can say that our judgment will remain in suspense toward either part, because there is nothing whence a determination of the future could arise. The solution indeed seems subtle; but, if it be rightly considered, it will also easily appear frivolous.

Respondetur, confutatur primo. First, it falsely says that in us the determination arises from the will alone, not more inclined toward the one part than toward the opposite by cognition. For always, when the will pursues one thing, that is proposed more efficaciously than the opposite, which it leaves aside; but when the opposites are considered equally, the will stays suspended. This is known to all by daily experience, if each man diligently attends to the things which are carried on within. Nevertheless, there is liberty in the will, both so that it need not follow that which is proposed more efficaciously, and so that it may apply the intellect to consider the opposite more efficaciously. But if de facto it follows something, without doubt the intellect considered that more efficaciously; as we shall say more at large in I-II, q. 13, a. 6, and q. 77, a. 2, where we will show that the true opinion of the theologians is that in the intellect of the sinner there always precedes some defect of consideration - which would not be true, if the will were sometimes moved of itself alone without any diversity on the part of the consideration; whence also we shall show below, disputation 98, chapters 6 and 7, that the prevenient grace is not equal in him who actually responds and him who resists.[1110]

Confutatur secundo. Second, even if we grant that the will sometimes, from two things equally proposed and equally considered, follows one, leaving the other, nevertheless it must be conceded that in contradictions of the future under a condition one part is distinctly true and the other false, no less than in absolutes. For a proposition under a condition differs from an absolute only by the condition. Therefore, that purified and completed, the proposition is rendered absolute: therefore the truth which is in the absolute will be in the conditional under the condition. Wherefore, no less in a contradiction under a condition will one part be distinctly true and the other false than in an absolute contradiction. For if now, this thought being posited, such an effect follows, which in reality would not follow from the will alone unless that, or greater, cognition were posited, we cannot deny that that thought together with the will was the cause of that effect; and hence it will be true, if someone were to say of the absolute future, that, this cognition being posited, such an effect will in fact follow. I speak of the least thought which one may choose to assign, along with which the will actually operates: of this therefore it would also be true under a condition, "if such a cognition be posited, the will will so operate," and so of all other conditionals. Therefore, just as in absolutes one part is distinctly true and the other false, so in conditionals it must be said. By this reasoning it remains proved that any thought, along with which free choice will operate absolutely, is the cause of the determination of the will along with the will itself; nor is the will determined of itself alone. But if this were true, as the adversaries contend, that the will sometimes determines itself of itself alone without any causality of the intellect, on account of which they assert that in propositions of the future under a condition there is not always one part true - because the will of itself alone is sometimes determined without any special cognition - then it would follow that, in those conditionals we are now discussing, neither part would be distinctly true.

Tertio refellitur. Third, if we concede to the adversaries that not any thought whatsoever cooperates toward the determination of the will, still, if we speak of that under a condition, one part of the contradiction will be distinctly true and the other false. For the truth of a conditional

1110. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 13, a. 6; q. 77, a. 2.

proposition consists in the goodness of the inference: for it is at once a consequence and a proposition; and the truth of it, insofar as it is a proposition, is the goodness of the same, insofar as it is a consequence; and both consist in the connection of the antecedent with the consequent - these things are most well known from the logicians. Wherefore, wherever the conditional consequence is not good but bad, neither will that, as a proposition, be true, but false. Thus it happens whenever a part of the antecedent does not cohere by any order or causality with the consequent, or contrariwise; but both happen together only concomitantly, as if someone should say, "If the chariot moves, Peter moves": this is a good consequence and a true proposition; but if someone should say, "If the Turk is dead, Peter took a wife," the proposition is false and the consequence bad, because there is no connection at all between antecedent and consequent, even if it should happen at the same time both that the Turk die and that Peter take a wife. Therefore, when we say of Peter, "if he were to be prevened by this thought, he would do this," either we assign a cause with which the effect is connected, or not. If we assign the cause of that effect which brings it about, that part is true; but if it is not a cause, it will be false, because there will not be a good consequence, since there will be no connection between such a cognition and the future work of free choice; and the contradictory will be distinctly true, which must be assigned with the negation set thus: "Not, if Peter were to be prevened by this thought, would he be about to do this." For in such conditionals, contradictories are not rightly assigned in another way: wherefore this would not be contradictory - "if Peter were to be prevened by this thought, he would be about to do it," and "if Peter were to be prevened by this thought, he would not be about to do it" - but both would be false, namely, "if Peter were to be prevened by such a calling, he would be about to do it," and "if Peter were to be prevened by such a calling, he would not be about to do it," because to do or not to do would have no connection with that calling, if that neither moved to doing nor to not doing, as we suppose from the adversaries' opinion.

Caput IV - The arguments of the opposing opinion are dissolved

First, we must overturn the foundations of the adversaries which we set down in the first chapter. As to the testimony of St. Augustine, we answer that, when he argues against the Massilians, he is only contending that there were no future merits of infants, who are taken away before their time, foreseen by God, for the sake of which God granted baptism to them or denied it. He understands merits as absolutely future, not under a condition: for, if God absolutely and de facto denied baptism, He denied it on account of absolute merits, not on account of merits future under a condition; for they are not rightly called merits for the sake of which someone obtains reward or punishment. For who would say that someone de facto merited the reward or the punishment which he has, because, if he had had this or that occasion to hand, he would have acted well or ill? Surely no one would doubt that such "merits" are not established: since, if the retribution is absolute, the merit must also be; for that which is not in very deed going to be, how can it be imputed for reward or punishment? This very point, indeed, he examines in the same place against the Massilians. But Augustine also said, upon Wisdom 4: "He was snatched away, lest..." - not "according to the prescience of God"; he understands "absolutely," that is, according to

what was in truth going to be in the boy, not what would have been under a condition. He explains shortly after what that is which was going to be in the boy, and what that is which was not going to be of him, in these words: therefore it is that, dying, the boy is removed, lest he fall into sin - "not because he would sin, if he were to remain in temptation" - which was not going to be. Therefore God knew the boy's being taken away by the swiftness of nature, which was thus absolutely going to be; but He did not know him to be going to sin - he understands this also absolutely; for he did not add, "if he were going to remain in temptation," as one would speak of conditional knowledge; but rather, "because he was not going to remain in temptation," which manifestly pertains to the absolute knowledge of futures. For therefore He did not know him to be going to sin, because he was in reality not going to remain in temptation.[1111]

The grounds of the adversaries, which we set out in the first chapter, will not be hard to overthrow. To the testimony of St. Augustine I answer that he is contending only against the Massilians, that there were no future merits of infants, who are taken away prematurely, foreseen by God on account of which God either granted or denied baptism to them: but he understands merits as absolutely future, not under a condition; because, if God absolutely and in fact denied baptism, He denied it on account of merits absolutely, not on account of merits future under a condition. For merits under a condition are not truly to be called merits on account of which someone attains either reward or punishment. For who would say that someone has de facto merited the reward or the punishment which he has, because, if he had had this or that occasion at hand, he would have done well or ill? Surely everyone would judge such merits to be fictitious; since, if the retribution is absolute, the merit also ought to be: for what in reality is not going to be - how can it be imputed to reward or punishment? This very point St. Augustine objects to the Massilians in the book On Perseverance; and for that reason he said that the statement from Wisdom 4, "He was taken away...," was said "not according to the foreknowledge of God": he means absolute foreknowledge, which could be the cause either of reward or of punishment; but rather it was said according to the dangers of the present life - not because God under a merely probable conjecture would have foreseen that under a condition - but because, in view of the dangers which would befall an infant if he lived, God surely knew that his mind would have to be guarded; nevertheless he said that that statement was not said "according to the foreknowledge of God," because, as we have explained, he understood "foreknowledge" there of the absolute kind, which alone pertains to the notion of merit, about which Augustine was disputing.[1112][1113]

He plainly expounds this meaning in what follows. He (namely God) foreknew that which was going to be, not that which was not going to be; as if he were to say, He foreknew that which absolutely and really was going to occur concerning that boy, not that which was going to occur under a condition; because the latter really was not going to be absolutely. He then explains what it is that was going to be in the boy, and what it is that was not going to be concerning him, in these words: That is, that He was going to bestow on him an untimely death, that he might be withdrawn

1111. Wis 4:11. ("He was taken away, lest wickedness change his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul.")
1112. St. Augustine, De bono perseverantiae, cap. 9 - 10.
1113. Wis 4:11.

from the uncertainty of temptations, not that he was going to sin, he who was not going to remain in temptation. God therefore knew that the boy would be taken away prematurely; this was thus absolutely future; but He did not know him to be going to sin; he understands this also absolutely: for he did not add, "If he were going to remain in temptation," for thus he would be speaking of conditional knowledge; but rather, "because he was not going to remain in temptation," which manifestly pertains to the absolute knowledge of futures; for therefore He did not know him to be going to sin, because he was in reality not going to remain in temptation. For this reason too Prosper, against those same Massilians, said that such merits "under a condition" are fictitious; and therefore he called it a new kind of absurdity to say that things which really are not going to be absolutely, but only under a condition, are foreknown; he understands this of absolute knowledge, such as is necessary to the notion of merit, as we have set forth.[1114]

Now let us come to the arguments. Concerning the first, even Doctors of our own opinion differ in various ways. Some think that God, even under a condition, also decreed with Himself to do this or that, if this or that cause were posited; indeed, from this decree they think all future conditionals are known by God, according to the infinite combinations of causes, in accordance with which He has arranged within Himself all the things which otherwise He would do. This, however, does not persuade me; for, as we have often said, and it will be expressly proved below in Disputation 80, a decree of God about a thing to be done adds nothing at all to His foreknowledge of the thing's bare essence (*essentia*), except a rational respect to the future thing; so that, if He had decreed nothing within Himself, nothing would be lacking to Him except the respect of inference; but this respect we cannot gather except from the fact that the thing itself is going to be. It is otherwise in men, who, by multiplying acts of intellect (*intellectus*) and will (*voluntas*) within themselves, provide and determine what ought to be done in this or that event, whence it comes about that that event will not occur.

Therefore, given this occasion - for example, David's staying at Keilah - even if the Keilahites were of such an affect and disposition that their free choice (*arbitrium*), on that occasion being present, would be moved, if God had not withdrawn His concurrence, to hand over David into the hands of Saul; nevertheless, because it was free to God either to cooperate with them, or, contrary to the inclination of such cognition and free choice thus tempered, to deny them His concurrence, without which they could not will - as He withdrew it from the fire, lest it burn the boys at Babylon - can we really collect, or attribute to God, rather a rational respect of concurring to that to which the calling inclined, than of not concurring, since in reality one outcome is not more future than another? As to those things which are absolutely future, we most rightly say that God decreed to concur, because in reality He is going to concur; but as to conditionally future things, since it is free to Him to do one thing or another, and He does not elicit diverse acts within Himself, but is said, by that sole respect of His essence, to have the notion of the decree of this or that thing, there is no ground on which we could say that He decreed this rather than that.

1114. Prosper of Aquitaine, against the Massilians (Semi-Pelagians).

True reply to the argument: Nevertheless it must be said that God so certainly knows futures under a condition, that even under that condition the decree of God to concur with free choice is to be understood implicitly, in this way. God knows well that, if to Peter on this occasion or that I were to give this or that calling, and I were to cooperate with it according to what that calling would require, and were not miraculously to withdraw my concurrence, such an act would be done; yet I could withdraw it, if it pleased me. But whether God would in that case be going to give or to grant concurrence - He has decreed nothing Himself about this, as was proved above.

For the explanation of which, observe that the calling which we call congruent is so tempered and so agrees with free choice that of itself it inclines it to consent; not indeed so that the will cannot resist, but so that in fact it freely obtains consent from it; which consent, if God were to deny His concurrence, on which every act of ours depends, would not follow in the will; yet there would be violence done to the calling, to which, according to its inward impulse and inclination, the concurrence which it was demanding would be denied. Therefore, when we say, "God knows well that free choice, given such a calling, would consent," and that the proposition is true, we understand: if God, in accordance with what the calling requires, concurs with it and does not deny His cooperation.

From this solution there follows also something else worthy of note: namely, that we speak most rightly concerning the divine will (*voluntas*) when we affirm that, if God had not willed this or that, He would not have decreed that other thing. For instance, we truly say: if God had decreed to preserve Adam in the state of innocence from sin, He would by no means have willed that His Word be incarnate - supposing the truer opinion, which teaches that Christ came in the flesh for no other cause than to redeem Adam together with the whole human race. For since there is a connection between the objects, namely between the Incarnation and the remedy for sin, there is also one between the wills, so that when one is removed, the other likewise is taken away. On the other hand, where there is no connection of wills, because there is likewise none of the objects, the conditional proposition must be denied; for example: "If God had willed to preserve Adam in grace, He would also have willed to make another universe"; or: "If He had decreed to save Pilate, He would also have decreed to save Judas." Surely these propositions must be denied, because there is no connection between the antecedent posited under a condition and the consequent; and where there is no connection, just as there is no good consequence, so neither is there a true proposition, as was shown in chapter 3. And although this proposition is false, it does not follow that those are true which seem to be its contradictories - for in truth they are not - namely: "If God had decreed to save Pilate, He would not save Judas"; or this: "Even if Christ were not to save Pilate, nevertheless He would save Judas." But all these are false, just as the former wholly affirmative one is, nor are they contradictories of it. For in conditionals, contradiction should be assigned by prefixing only the negation, not by denying the other part of the inference, as we also noted in chapter 3; but whenever in a conditional the antecedent is not connected to the consequent, the proposition must be denied and is false, whether the antecedent be affirming or denying, and whether the consequent be of this or of another quality. And thus much on the first argument.

Reply to the second argument: I answer that, for conditional propositions to be true and for the consequence to be good, it is not necessary that they be of necessary truth; it is only required that they be always true, and that that consequence be always good. For that which once is good is always good, as the logicians teach. And just as absolute propositions about a contingent future are from eternity and always true, so also are conditional ones; otherwise there would in God be no knowledge of them at all - for this must be eternal. How the truth of propositions about the future is eternal is gathered from the preceding discussion in chapter 2, and we shall speak further below in article 15. Nevertheless, it sometimes happens that the truth of a conditional proposition is necessary; namely, when from one thing we collect another which follows by natural inference; yet when from thoughts we infer the operations of free choice, we do not infer necessarily, but we truly assert and rightly infer.

Objicitur: But someone will press further in this way: if the consequence is not necessary, it cannot be good, because in it there can be an antecedent true and a consequent false, which is repugnant to a good consequence. For example: if from the fact that Peter is anticipated by such a thought it does not follow necessarily that he will sin; then it can happen that Peter is anticipated by such a thought and does not sin; and thus the antecedent will be true and the consequent false; therefore it will not be a good consequence.

Diluitur: I reply that there are two kinds of consequences. One kind is of those which occur in necessary matter and assume universal propositions; and in these the connection of consequent with antecedent is so necessary that, from the nature of the thing, it is repugnant that the antecedent be true and the consequent false; for it assumes propositions necessary from the nature of the thing, and indicates the consequence as following from the necessity of nature. But when the consequence is from a singular antecedent, and cannot be reduced to universal propositions, it merely indicates that in reality the consequent follows from that antecedent as from a cause, even if it could fail to follow; and, for such a consequence to be good, it is enough if in reality the consequent follows from the antecedent, even if it could fail to follow. But that axiom, "In a good consequence the antecedent cannot be true and the consequent false," is understood when we are dealing with syllogistic form, or another form of arguing, which ought to consist in a certain disposition such that, that being preserved in any matter whatsoever, it is never the case that the antecedent is true and the consequent false. But the conditional of a singular future is not any form of consequence according to a disposition of terms that could be preserved in various matters; rather, from a singular cause it alone gathers that such an effect will follow. Thus, it will be a good consequence when in fact it gathers what will follow; but when in fact that will not follow, it will not be good. Add also that then there would be some variation in the singular cause, that is, in the cognition by which free choice is anticipated, if it did not respond; for if free choice did not respond, the cognition would not be congruent; and that variation is within our power, as is discussed in Disputation 89, chapters 6 and 7, and we shall say more fully below; wherefore the same form would not be preserved entirely, because it would not be entirely the same cognition,

that is, with all its circumstances, as is clear. Accordingly, even in a singular consequence we can say that there is a determinate form such that, that being preserved, it can never be that the antecedent is true and the consequent false.

Someone will ask, finally, what sort of connection there was in that proposition which Elisha said to Joash, king of Israel: "If you had struck five or six times - nay, if you had struck seven times - then you would have struck down Syria unto complete destruction." I answer that the only connection was from promise and from the word of God, who revealed to the prophet that King Joash would strike Syria unto complete destruction, if he himself were to strike the ground with the staff six or seven times; and therefore that proposition was true, not from any other real connection of cause with effect.

Ad tertium argumentum: Concerning the third, the theologians of our time labor greatly to assign this knowledge of conditionally future things under some member of that common division of God's knowledge, namely of simple understanding or of vision. For my part, I would not place it under the knowledge of vision, but under simple understanding (*intelligentia*); for the knowledge of vision seems to be that which is likened to bodily vision, because it is terminated to the thing itself existing; but what is future under a condition is not of this sort; rather, it seems to be a certain simple understanding of these futures under a condition. Or, if it please for the sake of doctrine and clarity to constitute a third member, what harm is there? That the ancient Scholastics who have written hitherto mentioned only the simple knowledge of vision and of simple understanding matters little: both because they did not at all dispute or make mention of this knowledge under a condition; and also because they did not say that all the knowledge of God must be divided only into those two members

They [the ancients] said that knowledge is to be divided; but when they were treating of the knowledge of possibles, they called it simple intelligence; whereas when they were treating of the knowledge of future things, they called it vision on account of the reason stated. What then if we posit another [kind], of which they themselves made no mention, nor did they deny it? Finally, this disagreement is about words and not about things; and in this matter to speak in different ways does not much matter; therefore there is no great need to be anxious about it.

As to what was adduced from Matthew to prove that this knowledge in God is only conjecture, we have already said enough in chapter 2. Therefore it is clear that the opinion is true which attributes to God the knowledge of those future things under a condition. How great its usefulness is will be shown especially in the course of the matter of predestination and grace. I confess indeed that at times many theologians abuse this doctrine, when they think that with it they dissolve the knots of many difficulties, when nevertheless it contributes nothing at all to their solution. Wherefore in our solving of difficulties this doctrine must be employed with such moderation that it may seem not a contrived evasion, but a true and native explication of the difficulty.

Disputatio LXVIII - Whether the prescience of God takes away our free will

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Caput I - The Catholic doctrine is set forth against the heretics

Not only in this place, but also below in the treatise on predestination, there will be a dispute about the liberty of our free will. Therefore I judged it worth the effort in this brief chapter to enumerate the errors that have existed on this point, and to set forth and confirm the Catholic doctrine in a few words; for to display our liberty against heretics more at length would be superfluous: both because the matter is most well known and even among the barbarians sufficiently spread abroad; and because certain weighty authors have shown this truth clearly enough from Scripture and the Fathers.[1115]

First, the Stoics asserted in general that all things happen by fate; hence nothing happens freely, but all things by necessity: St. Augustine attributes this error to them in the City of God, book 5, chapter 8. Whether this necessity, in their opinion, has its origin from the very nature of the will itself, or from some extrinsic principle, Augustine does not explain. Yet the verses of the Stoic Cleanthes, reported by Seneca in book 18 of the Letters, which Augustine cites in the same place, seem to indicate that this necessity proceeds from an extrinsic principle which they called fate - either the stellar concourse, or the series of all causes, or the good pleasure of Jove. These are the lines: "To whatever it has pleased [the gods], there is no delay in obeying. I hasten to take up [the command]: do but will me not, I follow grieving, and being wicked I shall suffer to do what to the good it was permitted. The fates lead the willing, they drag the unwilling."

Second, Clement of Rome, book 3 of the Recognitions, reports that Simon Magus was in the same error; and, as the author is St. Augustine in the book On Heresies to Quodvultdeus, chapter 35, Bardesanes too ascribed the changes of men to fate. The Manichee also took away the freedom of choice with respect to sinning, as is clear in St. Jerome's proem against the Pelagians, in St. John Chrysostom, homily 45 on John, and in St. Augustine, in that book On Heresies, chapter 46, and in

1115. Thomas Waldensis, tome 1, book 1, article 1, chapters 21 and following; Alphonsus de Castro, Against the Heresies, s.v. "Fatum"; John Fisher (Roffensis), article 36 against Luther; Ruardus Tapper, article 7; Domingo de Soto, book 1 De natura et gratia, cap. 1; Juan de Vega, book 2 on the Council of Trent, cap. 12 and following; François Feuardent, Annotations on Irenaeus, book 4, cap. 71. See also the Council of Trent, session 6, canons 4 and 6. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei 5.8; Augustine, De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum 35, 46; Jerome, proemium against the Pelagians; St. John Chrysostom, hom. 45 in John; Augustine, Contra Fortunatum Manichaeum. Seneca, Epistulae Morales, book 18, citing the hymn of Cleanthes: "Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt." The Council of Constance, final session, condemns Wyclif's propositions.

the book Against Fortunatus the Manichee after the middle; for the Manichees said that our will is forced by a contrary nature to sin, namely by the appetite of the members, which they called the evil mind.

Then John Wyclif taught quite clearly that all things which happen - even those that are done through the free choice of men as well as of angels - happen by absolute necessity. This his error is listed among others in the Council of Constance, in the last session; Thomas Waldensis also mentions it, tome 1, book 1, article 1, chapter 21. And since he teaches that free choice operates by absolute necessity, he plainly indicates that this necessity does not arise from something extrinsic but from fate, from the very native faculty of free choice: indeed, he even asserted that God himself operates by this absolute necessity, as the same Waldensis writes in chapter 32. To them he granted only freedom from coercion, because they act of their own accord from an internal principle, while he altogether denied the liberty of contradiction and contrariety; he adds, nonetheless, that from another ground liberty does not remain in man, namely from the prescience of God, about which a disputation is now undertaken, as the same author reports in that chapter 22 and 25. If there were in man no other necessity than that which is from the knowledge of God, it would not seem an absolute necessity, but only from the supposition of something extrinsic; yet John Wyclif said that there is absolute necessity too.

Following John, some years ago there came Luther, Philip Melanchthon, Calvin, and other heretics of our time: but they do not so openly teach in all things a necessity absolute proceeding from the faculty of our will; for Ruardus, article 7, reports many things word for word from Melanchthon, in which he asserts that, considered in itself, the nature of man is free with respect to external operations, and that this is known by experience; but that with respect to internal affections there is no native liberty at all in the will: that no one can moderate the affection of love or of hatred. He also adds these words from Melanchthon: "If one refers human will to predestination, then neither in external nor in internal works is there any liberty." Roffensis cites like words from Luther, article 36. "These wretched men are deceived by the inconstancy, or, as they call it, contingency of human affairs; for they plunge their foolish eyes into the things themselves and the works of things, nor do they raise them in any way into the sight of God, that they may behold things above things in God; for to us looking down upon the lowest, things appear arbitrary and fortuitous, but to those looking up to the highest, all things are necessary."

There are others who teach that our liberty is hindered by the predestination of God; these we shall report in disputation 99, chapter 1.

Wherefore, in the present disputation, against the heretics we must not only defend absolute liberty, arising from the very nature of the will itself, but we must also show that from the prescience of God there follows no necessity that impedes its liberty to either side; for this heresy, in whatever way it denies liberty in us in deliberated operations, is most grave. Now, since the heretics admit that this extrinsic necessity, which altogether takes away our liberty, proceeds from a twofold source - namely, from the prescience and the will of God - we must treat of each in turn: for each has its own proper difficulty, and they are not to be dissolved in the same way, as some theologians have wrongly thought. About the prescience of God we must treat in this disputation;

but about his will, in disputation 99. But before we come to the contest, let us establish a firm foundation of Catholic truth against all the heretics whom we have so far mentioned, toward which our whole disputation and doctrine should look. Therefore it is this: man's free will, in all his operations, both internal and external which are deliberated, is so freely moved to one side that it can be moved to the contrary; which liberty is not only innate to our will (*voluntas*), but is also not injured by any extrinsic agent; I would add: indeed, it cannot be injured.

That this liberty is altogether uninjured in us is very largely proved by the Doctors at the beginning of the chapter cited, from Scripture, Councils, and the Fathers: to whom I willingly refer the reader. For us, however, the decree of the Council of Trent, session 6, canons 4 and 6, is sufficient, where the Fathers declare that in us, even after sin, there truly remained free will; and hence that we so cooperate unto our justification that we can assent, and that it is in our power to avoid our sins and to do good works. The same liberty is asserted in the same session, chapter 5. Wherefore it is a matter not only of faith that our free choice is not forced by an absolute necessity to act, in such wise that liberty would be impaired and it would not truly be in its power to incline to one side or the other. Hence Thomas Waldensis, tome 1, article 1, chapter 28 and the preceding ones, said that it is not only an error to concede an absolute necessity in the works of free choice, but also to concede any necessity in the works of free choice that takes away the liberty of free choice. He called that necessity absolute which is from the native inclination of the will itself; and that which proceeds from some extrinsic antecedent cause, he called from supposition. I add: not only is our liberty not injured by something extrinsic or by some supposition - be it, for instance, the knowledge of God or his will - but neither can it be injured. Of the knowledge we shall show this in the present disputation; of the will, in disputation 99; although even on that point there will be some discussion among our theologians in that place.

Caput II - The first argument of Wyclif against our liberty, to which Catholics reply in various ways

The first argument of Wyclif against our liberty, to which Catholics reply in various ways.

This argument is found at the end of that chapter 22 of Waldensis, and is of this sort: God foreknew, or foretold, that Peter would sin; therefore Peter will sin: consequently the consequence is good; the antecedent is necessary; therefore the consequent [is necessary]. Wyclif used to say that this argument is so efficacious that he asserted the Armaghan [Doctor] labored for twenty years over its solution, and at last divided it, saying that Christ, in that prediction, could have erred. If that were true, he said, the Armaghan ought also to have affirmed either that God did not know that future, in accordance with Cicero's view, or that, in that matter as in any matter at all in which future things are known, God could be deceived. But Thomas Waldensis vindicates the Armaghan from this calumny, saying that nothing of this sort is found in his writings, and that this imposture is manifest.

To this argument Catholics reply in various ways. Some say that the consequence "God knew, or foretold, that Peter would sin; therefore Peter is going to sin" is good: for the antecedent is always true, whereas the consequent "Peter will sin" can be false; for after Peter has sinned, this proposition "Peter will sin" will no longer be true. But this solution has no force; for when we say "God knew that Peter would sin," we do not understand it for just any time, but for that time at which the thing future is under prescience or predestination; and thus, with the consequent rightly taken, in that consequence both antecedent and consequent are true.

There is a second solution of St. Thomas, which he applies to the second argument in this article, where he says that the antecedent "God knew, or foretold, that Peter would sin" is something absolutely necessary; but the consequent, "Peter will sin," is of the future, inasmuch as it is subject to the knowledge or predestination of God which is contained in the antecedent. This solution is defended by Cajetan and Thomas of Argentina; and they explain it thus: because in the antecedent a verb is set down which signifies some act of soul - of will, or of thought - the consequent is not to be taken according to the being which the thing has in reality, but according to that which it has in the soul; and thus they are in a certain way diverse.

That free choice has remained entirely intact they who were cited at the beginning of the chapter prove at great length from Scripture, Councils, and the Fathers; to them I gladly refer the reader. For us, it is enough to have the definition of the Council of Trent, session 6, canons 4 and 6, where the Fathers declare that in us, even after sin, free will (*liberum arbitrium*) has truly remained; and therefore that we so cooperate in our justification, that we can dissent, and that it is in our power to make our ways evil; the same liberty is asserted in the same session, chapter 5. Therefore it is not only of faith that our free choice is not at work by absolute necessity, but also that we are not driven to act by a fatal necessity as by fate, so that its liberty be harmed, and it truly not be in its power to incline to one or another part. Wherefore Thomas Waldensis, tome 1, article 1, question 28, and the preceding, said that it is not only an error to concede an absolute necessity in the works of free choice, but also to concede a relative necessity which takes away the liberty of free choice; he called "relative" that which would arise from some extrinsic antecedent cause; but "absolute," that which would be from the native inclination of the will itself. He added besides that our liberty is not harmed by any extrinsic [cause], nor by any supposition; nay, not even if such a supposition be posited: for if by some supposition it were harmed, this would be either by the knowledge of God, or by His will. As to knowledge, we shall show it in this disputation; as to the will, in disputation 99; although there too there will be some future debate with our theologians.[1116]

The first argument of Wyclif against our liberty, to which Catholics variously reply, is of this sort. God foreknew, or foretold, that Peter would sin: therefore Peter will sin. The consequence is good; the antecedent is necessary; therefore the consequent is [necessary], namely, that Peter will sin. But what is necessary is not free, because it cannot not be: therefore it is not free for Peter to sin. Wyclif said this argument was so efficacious that he asserted Armacanus labored for twenty years on its solution and, at length overborne, was constrained to say that Christ could have erred

1116. Thomas Waldensis, tome 1, article 1, question 28, and the preceding.

in that prediction. But if it were true that Armacanus said this, he ought also to have affirmed either that God did not know that future, according to Cicero's opinion recalled in disputation 63, chapter 1, or that God could have been deceived in that matter and in any other [matter] of things future. But Thomas Waldensis vindicates Armacanus from this calumny, since nothing of the sort is found in his writings; and therefore he says it is manifest imposture.[1117]

To this argument Catholics variously respond. Some say that this consequence is not good: God knew, or foretold, that Peter would sin: therefore Peter is going to sin. For the antecedent is always true; but the consequent can be false: for after Peter has sinned, that proposition "Peter will sin" will no longer be true. But this solution has no force. For when we say, "God knew that Peter would sin," we do not understand it for just any time, but for a definite one: thus He knew the future sin of Peter as future to this time, as present to another, and as past to yet another; and so just as in this consequence the antecedent is always true, so also is the consequent.

Let there be a second solution, which St. Thomas applies in this article, where he says that the antecedent, "God knew, or foretold, that Peter would sin," is indeed absolutely necessary; but the consequent, "Peter will sin," is necessary insofar as it is subject to the knowledge, or to the predestination, of God which is in the antecedent. Cajetan and the Thomists commonly defend this solution; and they explain it with the holy Doctor in this way. Whenever in the antecedent there is posited some verb signifying an operation of the soul - of the will, or of thought - the consequent is not to be taken according to the being (*esse*) which the thing itself has in itself, but [according to the being it] has in the soul; and these are entirely different. For example, if it be said: the soul understands something; therefore that thing is without matter - the consequence is good, if in the consequent the thing be taken as it has being in the soul through the intellect. And the sense will be: therefore the thing in the intellect has a mode without matter - that is, to be intelligible without matter is attributed to it by the intellect, namely through a species entirely spiritual.

Therefore, in the consequence of the proposed argument, the consequent "Peter will sin" ought to be understood in this way: Peter, as he is in the sight of God, will sin; and in this manner it is as necessary as the antecedent. For everything which is, when it is, is necessary to be - that is, if once we suppose that [the thing] is in the knowledge of God, it is necessary that it be in it.

With this doctrine premised, they answer the argument thus: the antecedent "God knew that Peter would sin" is indeed absolutely necessary, but the consequent "Peter will sin" is not absolutely necessary; it is [necessary] relative to the antecedent, as has been explained. And when they say that the antecedent is absolutely necessary, they do not understand it so that its opposite is by its nature impossible: for thus it is not necessary that God know that Peter would sin, as we shall show below; and if it were necessary in that way, the consequent ought also to be necessary in the same way. They understand, therefore, that the antecedent is absolutely necessary, that is, without any other additament, because when we say, "God knew this would be," we do not refer to anything other than what the terms signify; but when we say in the consequent, "Therefore this will be," it is not necessary, if we attend only to the words themselves. However, insofar as it is subject

1117. On Wyclif's boast about Armacanus and Thomas Waldensis's reply, see Thomas Waldensis, loc. cit.

to the knowledge of God, which must be understood implicitly in the consequent, it is necessary. Thus also Ferrarensis interprets St. Thomas's mind in Contra gentiles, chapter 67, "But yet it must be noted," and notes how the holy Doctor himself also speaks in that chapter.[1118]

Gregory of Rimini impugns this solution, in I Sentences, distinction 38, question 2, article 3, in the solution of a certain argument. First, because it is in vain conceded that the antecedent "God knew that Peter would sin" is necessary; for it is contingent, and by what reason this is true, we shall say in the following chapter. Second, he argues against that solution because the rule which St. Thomas sets down cannot be true. For whenever someone understands that some thing is such, or of such a nature, or of such a property, and truly so understands, it is true, and he cannot be deceived in his knowledge; it is therefore most rightly inferred that the thing is of such a nature, not only in that person's knowledge, but according to itself. Thus, when someone affirms something about the thing, he enunciates it, not as it is in the intellect, but according to itself: for example, from the fact that God understands that man is truly composed of matter and form, it is rightly inferred that therefore in the thing itself, not only in God's intellect, he is so composed. Moreover, the example which is brought forward does not seem apt. For when the intellect understands some thing which consists of matter, it neither affirms nor understands that it is without matter and (as they say) immaterial; for if it were to assert that, the intellect would be deceived. Rather, from the fact that [the thing] is understood by a spiritual intellect, it follows that that thing has in the intellect itself a spiritual mode, which we can enunciate of the thing only insofar as it is in the intellect. Therefore, since the argument which we made at the beginning against the freedom of choice derives from the fact that God truly knows and enunciates of the thing itself according to itself, it infers that the thing is so: namely, if He enunciates, "It will be," therefore it is future; if He enunciates, "Peter will sin," therefore he is going-to-sin. The consequent, then, must be inferred not only with that additament which Thomists were saying - namely, "as it is in the knowledge of God" - but also without it absolutely and according to itself. Third, if that consequent were only inferred with that additament "as it is subject to God's knowledge," it would be a useless consequence and a trifling repetition. For it is the same to draw the inference thus: "God knows that Peter will sin; therefore Peter will sin - and in God's knowledge." But to say "Therefore Peter will sin - in God's knowledge" is entirely the same as the antecedent. Therefore, lest we say that this repetition is being made, it must be said that the consequent is inferred absolutely without any additament, as the thing is in itself future. Pressed by these reasons, some Thomists admit that that rule does not always obtain; and certainly in the proposed difficulty it seems, by the foregoing reasons, to have no place. And if the future thing itself, insofar as it is future according to itself, is inferred in the consequent, the force of the argument still remains: for if the antecedent is necessary, the consequent too ought to be so in the same way.

Cajetan, in this article 13, "As to the second," so that he may defend the rule which the holy Doctor assigned, asserts that it is to be understood formally - that is, when the consequent follows by force of the antecedent insofar as the antecedent signifies an operation of the soul. Now the

1118. See Ferrarensis, Contra gentiles, cap. 67, "Sed tamen advertendum."

proof is that these operations are immanent; therefore they posit nothing in the thing itself about which they are conversant; therefore that which befalls things from these operations does not befall them absolutely, but insofar as they are subjected to those operations.[1119]

True it is, but insufficient. For even if this doctrine of Cajetan is true, it can in no way be accommodated to the solution of the proposed argument. The reason is that it only proves that we cannot absolutely affirm of things something which befalls them solely through the operation of the soul; and so that it may be distinguished what are the things that differ only by reason from the soul's operation - namely, that some nature is universal, and the like. But this little bears on solving the proposed argument. For when Wyclif argues in this way: "God knows that Peter will sin; therefore Peter will sin," he does not infer that sin befits Peter only by the intellect, but he infers that Peter will sin in reality; which indeed most fittingly follows by the force of that consequence. Therefore in the consequent "Peter will sin" there is no need to add what Thomists maintain, namely, "as he is in the intellect of God."

Caput III - Two other solutions to the same argument

There are besides two other solutions of the same sort of scholastics, not without some renown, and even always in the schools employed; which, in my judgment, do not fully satisfy Wyclif's argument. Therefore it pleased me to recount and to impugn them, so that from there we may gather a much easier and truer reply.

First solution. Some answer that the antecedent of that consequence is indeed necessary, and the consequent similarly; but the consequent is necessary only with a necessity of consequence, not with a necessity of the consequent; as in this inference: If he runs, he is moving. The consequent "he is moving" is indeed necessary, but with a necessity only of consequence, because it is necessarily inferred under that antecedent; yet of itself - that is, from the terms - it is not necessary; which is to be necessary with a necessity of the consequent. Thus they reply to the argument.[1120]

Objection against that opinion. But this solution, unless it be explained further, is weak. For someone can very well object that in that example adduced the consequent "he is moving" is necessary by a necessity only of consequence, because it is necessarily inferred under the condition of that antecedent "if he runs"; but just as the antecedent "if he runs" is contingent, and in no way necessary, so also the consequent, if it be considered from the terms, is not necessary, although it follows necessarily under the condition from that antecedent. But in the argument at hand, not only does the consequent follow necessarily from the antecedent, but since the antecedent is necessary and cannot be changed - namely, "God knew that Peter would sin" - it follows that the consequent "Peter will sin" is also necessary in itself, and not only necessarily inferred from the antecedent.

1119. Cajetan, on this article 13, "Quod ad secundum."

1120. Albert the Great, In I Sent., dist. 38, art. 4, ad 1; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 38, art. 2, q. 1, in the solution of the arguments; Richard [of Middleton], question last, ad 2; Aegidius, question last, ad 2; Scotus, In I Sent., q. 1, 5, Ad primum pro tertia.

Response of St. Thomas to the objection. But if you reply with St. Thomas in this article, in solution 3, that the consequent is necessary from a supposition - that God has known - and (as they say in the schools) in the composite sense, yet not absolutely and of itself, not with God's knowledge not supposed, which they call the divided sense: this solution too does not please me. For we who defend, according to the Catholic faith, the liberty of free choice must assert it not only absolutely and from the nature of the will, but also that by no extrinsic cause posited is it taken away, so that liberty, which the will has from its nature, cannot be removed by God's knowledge or by His will as some extrinsic cause - something which, with those, cannot rightly be saved in the composite sense. Therefore it remains that we explain how, with the necessity which follows from the supposition of God's knowledge, the consequent is still in the free power of the will, and from that liberty nothing is harmed or diminished.

Second solution. Then others reply that in that consequence, "God knows that Peter will sin; therefore Peter will sin," the antecedent is not necessary but contingent. For God could not know that, if He had decreed to prevent Peter in such a way that he would not sin - which indeed He was most able to do. Therefore, if the antecedent is contingent, it does not follow that the consequent must be necessary. Thus do they solve the proposed argument.[1121]

reply to the argument

But it is contingent; nevertheless, if it is not in anyone's power to remove the antecedent, it is not free to him to prevent the consequent: wherefore it is necessary for him to be moved and to be heated, such that no liberty remains for the opposite.

Example of bodily vision does not remove the difficulty. If, furthermore, someone were to say that from vision no necessity can arise for the thing seen itself - for what a man sees, namely another walking, can in no way compel that man; although it follows well, He sees me walking, therefore I walk, and the antecedent is necessary by the necessity by which a thing, when it is, is said to be necessarily, and the consequent in the same way - still the difficulty does not seem to be satisfied. For if there be question of bodily vision, another so sees me walking that it is in my power to prevent his vision; for, that he may see me, he waits for me to walk. But God so knew from eternity that I would sin, that it is not now free to me either to change or to hinder His knowledge; for He does not wait, but by His knowledge anticipates my will.

But some Thomists say with Ferrarensis, in the place cited above, that this proposition, God knows, is indeed contingent, if it is considered in its terms; but necessary only with the necessity of immutability, namely because the knowledge of God about a true thing cannot be rendered fallible. [1122] To this, however, Cajetan replies, and proves, that the proposition is necessary not only in this way; but also, if the words are of the past tense, it is so necessary that the opposite is impossible, just as the past is necessarily past, so that now by no power could it not have been, nor does it any longer lie in anyone's power; and this seems enough, that the consequent also for the same reason be necessary, and in no way in our power.[1123] Nay rather, even if we say the antecedent with a verb

1121. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 38, art. 2, q. 2, in corpore; Albert the Great, loc. cit., art. 4, ad 3; Richard [of Middleton], q. 6, ad 7; Scotus, In I Sent., q. 1, "Ad argumenta 5 quaestionis"; Ockham, q. 1.

1122. Ferrarensis, Contra gentiles, cap. 67, "Sed tamen advertendum." The same solution is related by various Thomists.

of the present tense to be necessary in that way in which whatever is, when it is, it is necessary to be, it seems enough that the consequent for no reason be left now free to us. For the present also is necessarily present, when it is, so that it is no longer in our liberty, as we shall show in the following chapter. Finally, even if that antecedent, God knew that Peter would sin, be only necessary with that necessity of immutability, as Ferrarensis teaches, it follows in the same way that the consequent is no longer in our free choice, as in the subsequent argument of Wyclif we shall object. Therefore, in order that the difficulty of this argument be entirely removed, it is necessary to respond in another way.

I pass over many things which St. Augustine adduces in On free choice of the will, book 3, chapter 4, to resolve the difficulty proposed; for in my judgment they do not satisfy.[1124]

Caput IV - The true solution of Wyclif's argument

The whole difficulty of the proposed argument, and of like ones that can be made, may be explained, and the liberty of our free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) be clearly defended, if certain points, worthy of note, be premised, which will serve not only the present disputation but also many others which we shall treat concerning predestination.

First note a certain doctrine of Anselm, in On the Harmony of Foreknowledge and Predestination, chapter 1, of which Albert mentions; Richard in the same place, question last; Alexander; Holcot; and Thomas Waldensis; Boethius too has indicated it briefly, On Consolation, book 5, prose 4, as we shall report in the next chapter.[1125] Anselm says that there is a twofold necessity by which a thing is said to be, or to be going to be, necessarily: one is antecedent, or preceding; the other is subsequent, or consequent. The preceding necessity arises from a cause which precedes the effect, and makes it to be necessarily. With this necessity, says Anselm, the sun will rise tomorrow; because the cause moves to that effect necessarily. He subjoins that, when we speak of this necessity, thus we ought to speak: "The thing will be, because it must be that it will be"; that is, because the cause cannot do otherwise. But the following, or consequent, necessity is not posited on the part of the cause, nor does it make the thing to be or to be going to be; but it follows upon the thing itself, and upon the effect which we say to be necessary. When Anselm says that this necessity "follows the thing itself," he does not think that it arises from it as an effect from a cause, but only that by a most apt consequence it is inferred from the very position of the thing; and for that reason it could also be called accompanying, because it leaves aside the thing itself of which it is said, and does not precede. In this way we say: what is, when it is, is necessary to be; and the past is necessarily past; and the future is necessarily going to be. For, as Anselm has acutely noted, by this mode of speaking we signify only that it is impossible for a thing to have been and

1123. Cajetan, on this article 13, at "Quod ad secundum," where he argues that past-tense propositions of divine knowing are necessary as the past is necessary.

1124. St. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, III, c. 4.

1125. St. Anselm, De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae, c. 1; Albert the Great, In I Sent., dist. 38, art. 4; Richard of Middleton, ibid., q. last; Alexander of Hales, Summa, P. q. 24, m. 5; Holcot, In II Sent., q. 3, art. 9, toward the end; Thomas Waldensis, Doctrinale antiquitatum fidei, tome 1, book 1, caps. 25 and 28; Boethius, De consolatione, V, prose 4.

not to have been at the same time; and in this sense it must be said that the past is necessarily past. By the same reason it is impossible that something be and not be at the same time; and thus we say that what is, when it is, is necessary to be; and it is impossible that something be going to be and not be going to be at the same time; and so a future thing is said necessarily to be going to be. This doctrine Augustine has delivered briefly, Contra Faustum, book 26, at the end, where he says: "Just as the things future cannot fail to occur, so those which are past could not have failed to have occurred"; and he subjoins the reason: "Because it is not in God's will that there stand anything false that is true." The same was afterwards said by Anselm in these words: "God cannot make it to be that at once what is going to be should not be going to be." For it would follow, as Augustine said in the same place, that something be true by which it is false: for it would be said truly, when it would be said to be going to be, because it would be going to be; and the same would be said falsely, if it were said to be going to be, because it would not be going to be; therefore the same would be true and false. But by this necessity Anselm nowhere says that the sedition in the people is future tomorrow; which example Aristotle adduces in De Interpretatione, book 1, chapter 8, about the naval battle; against which, in my judgment, Anselm in that place proves, from the truth of propositions about the future, that some necessity follows which does not take away liberty - a point which Aristotle did not attain, as we shall see below.[1126] And with both necessities, the preceding and the following, Anselm says that the rising of the sun on the morrow is future: namely, by reason of the cause; and, since it is going to be future, it cannot at once not be going to be future. Hence he collects that these are diverse: a thing's being future - which is necessary; and a thing's being going to be - which is contingent and free, just as it is one thing for wood that is white to be white, and another thing for wood to be white; of which the former is necessary, the latter contingent.

Second, another doctrine of Anselm is to be noted, which Thomas Waldensis often repeats and explains, and which can be wondrously accommodated to our purpose; namely, that that preceding necessity clashes utterly with liberty. For, since this necessity comes from a preceding cause, which inclines in such wise to one part that it cannot to the other, by force of it it is thus necessary that such an effect arise that the opposite cannot be done freely. For liberty is also considered on the part of the cause, with indifference to acting; and this cannot stand with that necessity of the cause. But the consequent necessity, as the same teach, does not clash with liberty, but leaves it altogether unharmed; nay rather, it supposes it. For this necessity is after every effect and the determination of a free cause, and only in this, that what is future cannot at once not be future, and the present cannot not be present, and similarly the past. For when we suppose a thing to be past, or present, or future, we do not suppose that it was, or is, or will be, from any other cause than from a free cause, without any preceding necessity impelling to this. Therefore our liberty is preserved entire, together with the indifference of our will, by which it could have the opposite; we suppose that, in

1126. Aristotle, De interpretatione, I, c. 8 (on the "naval battle"); St. Anselm, De concordia, c. 1; cf. Thomas Waldensis, locc. citt.

fact, it was so, or will be so; which being posited, we then infer that necessity which, since it is later, or at least accompanies the effect placed in reality and is together with it, will necessarily be after the free determination, nor can it in any way harm liberty itself.

Third, let the difference be observed which Anselm continually notes there between the past, on the one hand, and the future, on the other. For the past, not only no longer remains now in potency, or liberty, so that at once the past should not be past; but it further stands thus, that the thing which is past is not present. But with respect to the present and the future, potency and liberty are certainly otherwise disposed. For although there is no potency whereby at once the present not be present, or the future at once not be future, nevertheless there is in our power that the thing which is present not be present, and the thing which is future not be future. Of this Anselm renders reasons which are quite easy. For if something is said to be present, that is because an operation is still to be done, which the agent is free either to do or not to do; and if it be not reduced to act, while the underlying cause remains such as it is, it inclines its operation where it will: therefore, because what you are doing is in operation, it is present; but what has been done is past, and no longer in any way remains dependent upon the same agent; hence it cannot be reduced by him to not having been. But that which, as present, still depends by its operation upon that agent, can, according to his will, cease; and thus it can still, by the same power, not be present; and much more that which is future - since it is something to be done by some agent - still remains dependent upon the power of that agent, so that afterwards it be not brought about; nor has that agent yet done anything of it.

Lastly, it must be premised - what in chapter 6 will be more fully proved by the doctrine of the Fathers and by reason - that the knowledge of vision by which future things are known is not the cause of the things which come after; but, according to our manner of understanding, and as it were by nature, it is posterior. For by the fact that a thing is future, it is known by God; not that by the fact that it is known, it is future. Wherefore, as Anselm well observed in the same chapter, in this manner of speaking, "God knows the sin of His Apostle," which is similar to "God knows that Peter will sin," even if "future" be not added, includes and supposes the future. For since foreknowledge is of future things only, by that very fact that God is said to foreknow something, we suppose that it is going to be. Whatever, therefore, is going to be, follows with this necessity, that, in like manner, it be foreknown to be going to be.

Now the argument of Wyclif is answered. The argument was: God knows that Peter will sin; therefore Peter will sin. The antecedent is necessary; therefore the consequent also. I say: that antecedent, "God knows that Peter will sin," is not necessary of itself and taken of itself and considered in its terms; but only by supposition, that God knows; that is, not by a preceding necessity, but by a following necessity - like that by which what is, when it is, is said to be necessary. The first part rests upon our liberty, as was said above; and the second, that the consequent, "therefore Peter will sin," is necessary by a following necessity, which follows from the very position of the antecedent - has been explained just now. And thus the force of the argument does not in the least prejudice our liberty, as was expounded above and as is defended by Alexander, Albert, Richard, and Thomas Waldensis in the places by us cited.[1127]

This is what is immutable and most certain, which cannot be deceived; and if from it one should wish to infer that the future which God knows is necessarily future in whatever kind of necessity, it must be answered almost in the same way; but this will be treated by us in the following chapter.

Objicitur: Nevertheless someone could press further in this way. Granted that antecedent "God knows," or, "God knew," imposes only that necessity by which, whatever is, when it is, must be, this nevertheless seems sufficient for the consequent in no way to remain in our power. For we said in the third notation that the present and the past, inasmuch as they are outside their causes, necessarily are, so that not only the past cannot not be past, and the present cannot not be present; but also the thing that is past, or the present thing, can no longer not be present or past; and thus it no longer remains in anyone's free power. Therefore, if God has already foreknown, or foreknows, that Peter will sin, it will not be in His power, nor yet in Peter's liberty, for it not to be foreknown. Therefore in the same way the consequent, "Peter will sin," will be necessary indeed with a consequent necessity, yet in such a way that it no longer remains in his power; for if it remains, the antecedent also must remain.

Respondetur: I answer that antecedent "God has foreknown," or, "God foreknows, that Peter will sin," is indeed necessary with a consequent necessity (necessitas sequentis), of the sort we say that whatever is, when it is, must be; but since the foreknowledge of God, in a certain order, presupposes that Peter will sin, and presupposes the thing which it foreknows to be future; for which reason it is said to be foreknowledge with respect only to a future thing; and, universally, every vision-knowledge supposes its own object; it must be said that in the same way it is not in Peter's free choice not to sin, just as it is not in God not to foreknow his sin. For when we say that it is not in Peter's power that God not foreknow his sin, this is only true on the supposition that the sin be future. For he who says that God foreknows Peter's sin supposes that sin to be future, as St. Anselm noted. But once it is supposed that there will be sin, it is not in his power not to sin; because a future, as it is future, is necessarily future; and thus, the supposition being made that God knows something, the opposite cannot occur or be brought about; because the future is

1127. Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Richard of Middleton, Thomas Waldensis, as cited in the preceding notes.

already supposed; but if we say that the opposite will in fact come to pass, then the supposition of the knowledge of God is taken away. This, however, does not take away our liberty, because it only brings in that consequent necessity expounded above.

If, moreover, the foreknowledge of God did not presuppose a future sin, and, that posited, the sin would necessarily be inferred, it would plainly follow that the future sin would no longer be under anyone's liberty, just as neither would the knowledge of God. For the knowledge of God would not be in Peter's power, because he could do nothing about that which is eternal, if the future object were not presupposed; nor would it be in God's own power, because whatever is, when it is, is so necessarily that it no longer remains under the working agent's arbitrium, unless it be only that it should not continue further, as was observed in the third notation. And since God cannot be changed from that which He has once begun, nor is it within His power not to continue His knowledge, it would no longer be free for Him not to know that Peter's sin is future; therefore, in consequence, neither would the sin in any way remain in anyone's liberty. But because the foreknowledge of God, as we were saying, presupposes the future thing, even if from foreknowledge it follows that the thing is necessarily future, nevertheless from that no necessity from a created cause arises so as to operate upon the future; since the foreknowledge of God does not forestall the order of a free cause, but in a way follows it, as we said in chapter 6. Therefore only that consequent necessity follows, by which a future, for this very reason, is necessarily future: because, if it is foreknown, "future" already presupposes "future."

Rightly therefore does Bede in the 8th tome, book of Questions, question 13, say: "What then compelled God, that we should appear evil to Him from eternity? Far be it: rather we compelled Him, that He should see us as such"; and he adduces the example which also Boethius uses in De consolatione, prose 6, with these words: "If I see someone lying down, a necessity is not inferred from my seeing for him to lie, but rather a necessity is inferred for me to see; yet this compulsion is not violent, which is said to be against the impulse of the mind; but a certain necessity which accompanies an eternal future."[11281129]

For from the fact itself that a thing is future, it necessarily follows that God foreknow it, that is, that the essence of God be referred to it; not, however, conversely, that from God's foreknowing it the thing be said to be future. Whence St. Augustine in book 3 On Free Choice, chapter 4, from this shows that God's foreknowledge does not take away our liberty, because neither would it be taken away by created foreknowledge: he thinks the account of either foreknowledge to be alike, so that neither can take away our liberty. Whichever way then, nothing else is gathered from what has been said than this, that antecedent "God foreknows that Peter will sin" is necessary with a consequent necessity, which, in a certain order, presupposes a future sin; and hence the consequent "Peter will sin" follows with the same necessity by which Peter is said to be about to sin: in which way neither is in Peter's power; yet it is in his freedom, if he will, to sin or not to sin: but how even the knowledge of God is said to be in his liberty, we shall explain in chapter 6.

1128. Bede, in 8. tom., lib. Quaestionum, q. 13.
1129. Boethius, De consolatione, V, prose 6.

Caput V - The subsequent argument of Wycliffe against the same liberty

To assail also our liberty, Wycliffe, and other heretics, uses the argument adduced to article 13 in St. Thomas, which is of this sort. The foreknowledge of God is most certain, and cannot be deceived: therefore its object cannot turn out otherwise than He has foreknown; for if it should turn out otherwise, His foreknowledge would be deceived: but God foreknows that Peter will sin: therefore Peter will not be able not to sin.

Reply of St. Thomas: In solution 3 he answers that all future things which God knows, referred indeed to the foreknowledge of God, are necessary; considered, however, from their own causes, some of them are free and contingent. Wherefore he asserts that this proposition, "What is foreknown by God is necessary," can be taken in a twofold way; first, of the thing, then of the dictum; or, as is wont to be said in the Schools, in the divided sense and in the composite sense. Taken of the thing and in the divided sense it is false; and in such a sense it means, "Everything which God foreknows is necessary." But taken of the dictum and in the composite sense it is true; and the sense is of this sort: "This whole dictum, 'that it is known by God,' is necessary." Boethius seems to have handed down this doctrine in De consolatione, prose 6, where he replies to the same argument with these words, "The same future, when it is referred to the divine knowing, is necessary; but when its own nature is considered, it appears altogether free and unconditioned."

Lest, however, we seem, on account of this composite sense and from the supposition of the knowledge of God, to impose such a necessity upon our will that at least extrinsically it be injured, and so that we by no means should concede to Melanchthon and the other heretics mentioned in chapter 1; for this reason it is necessary to untie this matter more fully. I answer, therefore, that, in order that the foreknowledge of God cannot be deceived, it is enough that the future object be necessary with a consequent necessity; nor is it required that it be necessary with an antecedent necessity. But the consequent necessity, as was said in the preceding chapter, does not harm liberty; rather, it supposes liberty itself as full and perfect. Therefore, with this necessity it is necessary that everything foreknown by God be future. For when it is said "foreknown," as St. Anselm well noted, the "future" is already presupposed, even if it be not expressed; but that the future be future is necessary, with that consequent necessity by which whatever is must be; with the same necessity, therefore, and not with another, it is necessary that whatever is foreknown by God be future. Thus answers St. Anselm in the work cited, chapter 10; and Vivaldus, and others noted above, allege the same.[1130] And in this way it can be said, in the composite sense, that what is foreknown is necessarily future; so that the composition in such a sense signifies no other necessity than the consequent one, which is on the part of the consequent, not on the part of the cause: but this by no means clashes with the liberty of the will, from which the thing is future. Since, therefore, the foreknowledge of God, as we shall see below, is not the cause of the future thing, but rather, in a certain order, as an object, presupposes the future thing; it follows that the necessity by which the foreknown thing is said to be future is not antecedent from a cause, but consequent to the thing itself, namely from this, that, in order to be foreknown by God, it is already presupposed

1130. St. Anselm, op. cit., cap. 10; Vivaldus; and others noted above.

from full liberty itself to be future. But that the foreknowledge of God should antecede the thing itself in time matters little for imposing an antecedent necessity: for to this there was also need that it be prior in the order of causality. Since, therefore, it is posterior in order, as we shall show in the next chapter, it can infer no antecedent necessity; rather, the necessity of the foreknowledge of God precedes the thing in duration, but posits the thing as present: for just as much from eternity is the thing future as is the foreknowledge of God. Therefore, if the thing is future, as it is future, foreknowledge neither precedes it in the order of causality nor in duration; whence our will can contract no necessity opposed to liberty.

But they see that the foreknowledge of God is much more ancient than the thing itself as present, and so it seems to them that it is not in their power to change that ancient foreknowledge of God. Yet, as I said, duration of time and priority of sequence do not at all hinder the thing foreknown from remaining wholly under the liberty of free choice; indeed, even the very foreknowledge of God is in a certain manner also reckoned as being under it, as will be explained in the next chapter.

This solution too I think I gather from Boethius, book 5 of the Consolation, prose 4: for he proposes in just the way we have framed it the same argument, namely: "Foreknowledge, although it is not a cause imposing necessity for future things to come to pass, is nevertheless a sign that they will necessarily come to pass." That is: although foreknowledge is not the cause of future things, it is nevertheless a sign and a certain cognition thereof, which can in no way be deceived; therefore neither can the thing come to pass otherwise. He replies to this with these words: "In this manner, even if the prior cognition had not been, the necessary outcomes of future things would still be clear: for every sign only points out what is, but does not effect what it designates." As if he were to say: if it follows merely from this, that God foreknew, that all outcomes are necessary, then even if there were no foreknowledge, they would nonetheless be necessary. For the knowledge of God is not the cause that outcomes be; rather it is only a sign showing what they are; but this cannot impose necessity upon a cause that it operate. Wherefore all things which, foreknowledge standing, operate of necessity, would operate of necessity even without it; for knowledge only indicates outcomes from their causes and in no way moves to them. Since, therefore, many effects from their proper causes are contingent and free (as even certain heretics concede), it is manifest that, with the foreknowledge of God existing, it follows that they nonetheless remain free and contingent. Boethius indeed supposes that contingent outcomes are, of themselves, prior to foreknowledge, and thus cannot from it contract any antecedent necessity, although it is rightly inferred that from foreknowledge there follows a consequent necessity, as has been explained.

Objection: But someone will press further: if a future thing remains wholly free and in the power of the agent, so that it can fail to be future, how then can the knowledge of God concerning it be certain and infallible, and not uncertain and fallible?

Note on infallibility and certainty: I answer from the doctrine of Capreolus, on I Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, art. 3, reply to the first against the second conclusion: knowledge can indeed be called either certain or uncertain, fallible or infallible. Infallible is said of that knowledge which cannot understand other than what is, and so cannot be deceived - so that, if it understands that a thing

will be, it cannot at the same time not be. And in the same way it is called certain because it always attains the truth itself. By contrast, uncertain and fallible is said of that knowledge which can sometimes understand the true as false and so be deceived. But the thing itself or the event is ineptly said to be uncertain or certain, fallible or infallible, because the thing itself is not capable of deception; rather the event is said to be necessary or free and contingent; in common parlance it is also called avoidable or unavoidable - inasmuch as it so happens indifferently that it can fail to happen, or it is so determined that it cannot fail to happen.

This supposed, which pertains to a way of speaking and to its propriety, I say to the argument that it is possible at once that the foreknowledge of God be infallible and certain about some future thing, and yet that that thing be going to be freely and avoidably - if we speak of the antecedent necessity or unavoidability which is only on the part of the cause. For if the discourse be of the consequent necessity, then of necessity and unavoidably that foreknown thing will be future. But in order that the knowledge of God be certain, it is enough that the knowledge itself by its infinity always be referred to that which truly will be, even if that will be freely. For since the knowledge of God in a certain way awaits the thing itself - whether it will be future or not - because in a certain order the knowledge of God is posterior to the very future thing, and the intellect of God has such power that no truth can lie hidden from it, but always tends to that which is true, and since every future is either determinately future or not future, it follows that God cannot be deceived or fail in his knowledge. For although the object can turn out otherwise, he, however, by the infinity of his intellect always attends to that to which in fact that cause will incline at the last, and what will come forth from it he can never not know - something which will be set forth more exactly in the next chapter. Wherefore we have reduced the certainty of the knowledge of God to the infinity of his intellect, from which no truth can be hidden, as to its proper cause, in Disputation 65, the last chapter. Therefore a future thing is certainly known by God because it will be future, not the other way round.[1131]

On the concord of divine knowledge with our liberty

Caput VI - That the foundation already laid must be strengthened; against the newer opinion that a thing is or will be because known by God, not conversely

That what we have hitherto said about the concord of the knowledge of God with our liberty may stand firm, it is necessary to confirm more amply that foundation which in the last place of chapter 4 we laid down. For there are some more recent theologians who strive to overthrow it, and who in general try to prove that a thing is, or will be, because it is known by God, not the other way round; and they try to persuade by authority and by reason.

It is proved first from St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, cap. 9, at the end, where he thus speaks about created causes: "Therefore whatever they avail, they most certainly avail; and what they themselves are going to do, they are altogether going to do - those whom he foreknew as going to

1131. Boethius, De consolatione, V, prose 4; Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, art. 3; cf. Disputatio 65, cap. ult.

avail and to do, whose foreknowledge cannot be deceived"; and in De Trinitate XV, cap. 13: "It must needs be that scandals come." And Damascene: "He knows not because things are, but therefore things are because he knows." The same is had in De Trinitate VI, cap. 10.[1132] To this add St. Gregory, Moralia, book 20, cap. 23, elsewhere 24: "For whatever things are are not therefore seen from eternity because they are, but therefore they are because they are seen."[1133]

Among the Scholastics too this sentence seems to find supporters: first St. Thomas in this question, art. 8, ad 1, where, replying to the testimony of Origen - by which he seems to assert that the future is a cause of the knowledge which God has of it - he says that this is to be understood according to a cause of consequence only; for rightly it is inferred from the fact that something is future that it is known by God, not in any other way. Thus indeed a cause can rightly be gathered from the effect; therefore it is no wonder if the knowledge of God be inferred from the fact that the thing will be future, even if knowledge be the cause of the future thing.[1134] Next Albertus, on I Sent., dist. 38, art. 3, Bonaventure, q. 1 and 2, and Gregory, q. 2, art. 3, in replying to a certain argument somewhat before the end of the article, teach that the knowledge of God is a cause so that things be future, whereas future things are not causes of the divine knowledge - according (as they say) to the mode of being - but that they are mutually causes for inferring, that is, that from the one the other is well inferred; for example: God knows that Peter will sin; therefore Peter will sin; and conversely - wherein they seem plainly to agree with St. Thomas.[1135]

By reason the same is proved. For if not only from the fact that something is future it would be inferred that it is foreknown by God, but also because it is future, therefore it is foreknown by God, we should have to concede that what is temporal is a cause of the eternal: for a future thing is bounded by time, but the knowledge of God is eternal; nay more, that what is created is a cause of the uncreated: for the knowledge of God is uncreated, but the future thing is created.

Yet, if the common doctrine of the Fathers and sound reason were well weighed, this matter would be outside controversy, if one's mind were intent rather on searching out the truth than on contention. For there are, first of all, indeed splendid testimonies of the Fathers, by which we are taught that certain things are therefore foreknown by God because they will be future, not the other way round (whether, however, on that account a future thing is to be called in some way a cause of the knowledge of God we shall explain in the next chapter). Thus expressly they hand down from the Greeks: Origen on that text Romans 8, "Whom he predestined"; Justin in the book of Questions addressed to the Christians, q. 58; St. John Chrysostom, homily 60 on Matthew, explaining that of Luke 17, "It must needs be that scandals come"; St. John Damascene, Against the Manichees, not far from the end; St. Cyril, book 9 on John, cap. 10, near the end. From the Latins: St. Jerome on Ezekiel 2, "Thus shalt thou say to them," and on Jeremiah 26, "Do not withhold the word"; Boethius, De consolatione, V, prose 3; Bede, tome 8; to which add Augustine, De civitate Dei, cap. 10, near the end, who, although he says only about sin that it is therefore foreknown by God

1132. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, V, c. 9 (in fine); De Trinitate, XV, c. 13; VI, c. 10.
1133. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia, lib. 20, c. 23 (alias 24).
1134. St. Thomas, ad 1 of this question and article (citing Origen).
1135. Albert the Great, In I Sent., dist. 38, art. 3; St. Bonaventure, q. 1 - 2 on the same; Gregory (of Rimini), q. 2, art. 3.

because it is going to be, not conversely, would hardly have thought otherwise about every future thing - namely, that it is therefore foreknown by God because it will be, not that it will be because it has been foreknown.[1136]

Moreover, we are not satisfied by the testimonies adduced, if with St. Thomas we say that the Fathers spoke only of a cause of consequence; this is manifest: for, as the logicians say, it is one thing that the one follow from the other by an illative or conditional consequence, and another to be inferred by a causal consequence. By an illative and only conditional consequence "future sin" and "the knowledge of God" are reciprocals, because they cohere with one another; hence it follows well: God knows future sin; therefore sin will be; and conversely. Likewise: God knows future sin; that will be; therefore conversely. But by a causal consequence in that manner it certainly cannot be inferred that sin is the cause of knowledge; for who would dare to say: therefore sin will be because God foreknows? And the Fathers cited - Augustine, Bede, and Chrysostom especially, who speak expressly of sin - openly deny this; the others in the same way about whatever future things of the world. And just as the Fathers deny that sin or any thing whatever is therefore going to be because it is foreknown by God, so they assert that it is therefore foreknown because it will be. If, therefore, we take away the causal force from the particle "because" in their mode of speaking, we shall overturn the very meaning which they clearly intend to convey. Wherefore, if the particle "because" signified mere illative consequence, both parties ought to concede it, just as they grant the particle "therefore" or the particle "if." Since, then, the one denies and the other grants it, as we have seen, it follows that the particle "because" is taken in its proper signification and in the mode of a cause which in a certain sense denotes priority; and thus the matter is explained.

Furthermore, among the remaining Fathers, Justin expressly affirms in these words that a thing is future before it is foreknown by God, nay more, that it is the cause of foreknowledge; for thus he says: "The foreseeing is not the cause of that which is future, but that which is future is the cause of the foreseeing." By which words he most expressly affirms that the future is the cause of the foreknowledge; and that it is first future he no less clearly subjoins at once: "For we do not follow the pre-knowledge of what will be, but the pre-knowledge follows what will be." Origen and Jerome, in the places cited, have what is quite like this. It is plain there that they deny in like manner what others affirm; therefore, if the future is not posterior in the order of cause to the pre-knowledge itself, in the same way it ought to be prior to the pre-knowledge: for if the discourse were only of the inference of consequence, pre-knowledge and the future would follow mutually upon one another.[1137]

By reason the same is proved. For it can be fairly proposed to reason that what is known is on that account not what is made, but what is known - at least in the way in which it is known precisely as true in itself. Thus Augustine asserts in De Genesi ad litteram, book 4, cap. 32: "Nor, indeed, can knowledge be the cause of the thing to be known except as it presupposes the thing

1136. Origen, on Romans 8:30; Pseudo-Justin, Quaestiones ad Orthodoxos, q. 58; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 60 on Matthew, explaining Luke 17:1; St. John Damascene, Contra Manichaeos, near the end; St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Ioan., lib. 9, cap. 10; St. Jerome, on Ezekiel 2 and Jeremiah 26; Boethius, De consolatione, V, prose 3; Bede, tom. 8; St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, V, c. 10 (prope finem).

1137. Pseudo-Justin, Quaestiones ad Orthodoxos, q. 58; Origen and Jerome locis citatis.

itself to be known." Therefore, when we are speaking about the knowledge of vision in God - which is only speculative cognition - the truth that is in the intellect is said to be true because it understands that which is, as it is; and accordingly, when we speak of the divine knowledge of vision concerning future things, the knowledge is set and determined by the thing itself as it will be. Wherefore concerning the knowledge of vision it must be said that it is a sign of the future, but does not make what it signifies; as we alleged above out of Boethius, De consolatione, prose 4. And thus the dictum is made good, that God foreknows a thing because it will be future, not conversely.

But, they will say, the known is prior to the knowledge that knows. I grant this of an object as it stands to cognition when we speak of speculative knowledge; however, if we speak of practical knowledge, which is of the work that is to be done, then the thing known - as an effect - does not precede but rather follows. Thus future things are related to the practical knowledge of God, which certain Scholastics call the knowledge of approbation; for with respect to those things which God decrees by his will to be, they depend upon his will as upon a cause, and, in a certain manner, upon his practical knowledge which dictates and determines what is to be done. But of the knowledge of vision, which presupposes the thing as it will be, whether by the created cause or by the divine will, it is true to say that the future, as future, is not posterior to the vision but rather precedes it in the order of the thing known; and thus it is rightly said that it is foreknown because it will be, not that it will be because it is foreknown.

Therefore Alexander of Hales, Albert, Bonaventure, and Gregory, in the places cited in this chapter, bear witness in this matter.[1138]

They reciprocate only in an illative and merely conditional way: future sin and the knowledge of God cohere mutually; wherefore it follows well, "God knows the future sin; therefore the sin will be," and conversely; likewise, "if God knows the future sin, it will occur," and conversely. But by a causal consequence in this mode one cannot infer sin from knowledge: for no one would dare to say, "therefore there will be a future sin, because God has foreknown it." And the Fathers cited - especially St. Augustine, Bede, and St. John Chrysostom - who speak expressly of sin, deny that a sin is therefore future, or any thing else, because it is foreknown by God; but immediately they assert that it is therefore foreknown, because it is future. They also employ the causal particle "because" in that very sense; otherwise, they would be speaking in an inordinate fashion. Wherefore, if the particle "because" were merely the mark of an illative consequence, they ought to grant both, just as if they were using the particle "therefore," or the particle "if." Since, then, they deny one and concede the other, as we have seen, it follows that the particle "because" is taken in its proper signification, and denotes a manner of cause and, in a way, of priority, as will soon be explained.

Moreover, among the rest of the Fathers, Justin expressly affirms in set words that a thing is first future before it is foreknown by God - indeed, that it is the cause of foreknowledge; thus he says: "Nor is the fore-notion the cause of that which is to be, but that which is to be is the cause of the fore-notion." By which words he plainly affirms that the future is the cause of foreknowledge;

1138. Alexander of Hales; Albert the Great; St. Bonaventure; Gregory (of Rimini), locis ad hunc caput pertinentibus.

and that it is first future he no less clearly subjoins at once: "For it is not that what is to be follows upon the fore-notion; but the fore-notion follows upon what is to be." Origen and St. Jerome have similar statements in the cited places, where it is clear that they deny one thing by the same reason by which they affirm another; and therefore, if the future is not posterior, in the order of cause, to the very fore-notion, by the same token it ought to be prior to the fore-notion. For if the discourse were only about illative consequence, fore-notion and the future would mutually follow one another.[1139]

It is proved by reason: for every knowledge supposes its own object which it knows - not that which it makes, but that which it knows - at least under that aspect under which, as the truth itself, it is known. Thus St. Augustine establishes it, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis IV, c. 32: "For cognition cannot come to be unless what is to be known precede." Although he is speaking of created cognition, he would say the same of the divine, inasmuch as it is speculative: for every intellect in one and the same way is called true, because it understands that something is what is, or that something is not what is not. Therefore the knowledge which God has of possible things supposes those very possibles, as we shall show more fully below in disputation 104; yet it does not make them be possible. By the same reasoning, of the knowledge of vision it must be said that it does not make its object, but supposes it; now future things are the object of the knowledge of vision: therefore they are not future because they are seen; rather, they are seen because they are future. Boethius has expressly taught this in De consolatione, book 5, prose 4 (which we adduced in the preceding chapter), when he says that the foreknowledge of God is a sign of the thing future, but does not effect that which it signifies.[1140]

I said, moreover, that whatever object is known is prior to the knowledge by which it ought to be known. For if we speak of the object of practical knowledge, which is its own work, then, since it is the effect of that knowledge, it does not precede it, but rather follows it. Thus future things are compared with God's practical knowledge, which some Scholastics call the knowledge of approval: for these, just as by God's will, as by a cause, are truly future, so also they depend on His knowledge, which dictates and judges that they be brought about in this or that way; and in the opinion of some it has only the character of a judgment which precedes the will; or, as it pleases others, even the character of a plan which follows the will. But in whatever way, this is not yet the knowledge of vision, by which things are seen to be future; rather, before by it things are understood to be future, it is occupied only with possibles, and, understanding that they can be brought about thus or thus, and at such a time, it judges that it is good, and proposes it to the will, or by the power of the will commands it. Wherefore they are deceived who say that the knowledge of vision, by which future things are known, is both practical and speculative; for it is entirely speculative: what it knows to be future as truly future, it does not make; since this knowledge is understood to exist after the decree of God's will, by which things have that they be future. Prior,

1139. Origen, on Romans 8:30; St. Jerome, in the cited places; Pseudo-Justin, Quaestiones ad Orthodoxos, q. 58.
1140. Boethius, De consolatione, V, prose 4.

therefore, are the knowledge of things as they are possible, and the decree of the will of God that things be future; for these two are the cause of the future, whereas the knowledge of vision is not yet, until the thing is future.[1141]

Therefore Alexander, Albert, St. Bonaventure, and Gregory, in the places pertaining to this chapter, authoritatively maintain the same.

On whether the divine prescience is the cause of future things

Resolution of the authorities and the twofold divine knowledge

Magister.

To the point at hand, those alleged together with the Master in I, dist. 38 rightly admonish that there are two knowledges in God: one of approval, which we have called practical; and they say that this is, in its kind, the cause of future things, and that therefore things are future because they are known. The other is speculative, such as is the knowledge of vision: this, as we have said, cannot be practical; and they say that this is not the cause of future things, nor therefore are things future because they are known.

We have, then, from the opinion of these men, that it is not for this reason that things are future, that they are foreknown to be future; and although Alexander neither asserts nor denies that things are therefore foreknown by God because they are future, nevertheless the Master, Albert, St. Bonaventure, and Gregory - indeed Hugo of St. Victor also - manifestly grant that causal [relation], as will appear in the solution to the contrary argument.[1142]

From these points, first a response is made to the testimonies objected to us at the beginning. To St. Augustine: I say he is not speaking there of the knowledge of vision, by which future things are foreknown, but of practical knowledge, which, as we said, is occupied with possible things as known objects; of this it is rightly said that things are therefore future because they are known by God. For elsewhere the same Augustine, also adduced by us, speaking of the speculative knowledge of vision, openly says that sin is therefore foreknown by God because it is future; and we have shown the same reason holds of a future sin and of any other thing whatsoever: so that, if sin is therefore foreknown because it is future, the same must be said of all future things.[1143]

But if we wish to understand Augustine's testimony in De civitate Dei, cap. 9, of the speculative knowledge of future things, which is properly called foreknowledge (for in that place he does not use the name "knowledge," but "foreknowledge"), we can reply that Augustine did not say simply that foreknowledge is the cause that things be future, but that, as causes most certain, they be said to avail whatever they avail, and be altogether about to be; that the cause, I say, is the

1141. Alexander of Hales, In I Sent., q. 24, m. 2; Albert the Great; St. Bonaventure; Gregory (of Rimini), in the places pertaining to this chapter.

1142. The Master (Peter Lombard), I Sent., dist. 38; Albert the Great; St. Bonaventure; Gregory (of Rimini); Hugo of St. Victor.

1143. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, V, c. 9; and on speculative knowledge: various places. On sin: compare also his treatment cited earlier.

foreknowledge of God, which cannot be deceived. By these words he only contends to assign the proper cause of the certainty and (so to speak) infallibility of things. For these, as I noted in the preceding chapter, do not befit things, but the intellect, which is properly said to be deceived or not to be deceived; therefore, when things are said to be most certainly future, or causes most certainly about to operate, or altogether about to operate, the cause is the foreknowledge of God, which, says Augustine, cannot be deceived.

And when he says "altogether about to be," he takes the particle "altogether" to mean "most certainly," and he refers the whole to the intellect, as has been explained. Add also that Augustine, in that book XV of De Trinitate, c. 13, did not deny that things are known by God to be future because they are - he understands, in present time. And that is most true: because, although from future things there comes to God from eternity, in our way of understanding, a new mode of knowledge which we call the knowledge of vision (which would not be in God if nothing were to be future, the addition being only in respect of reason), nevertheless from the actual existence and presence of things there does not come to God a new way of knowing, even in our way of understanding, nor even with a merely rational respect added. And thus Augustine contends that by the presence of things nothing is known by God which was not previously known: for from eternity He knows a thing future as related to this time, and the same thing related to another time He knows as present and past. But from the fact that things are future, He knows something from eternity which He would not have known, unless they were to be future - yet with only a respect of reason added. However, when he says that things are therefore because God has known, he is also speaking of the presence of things, of which he says that in God the cause is knowledge - not indeed of future things, which is the knowledge of vision alone and speculative, but of that which is practical and bears upon possibles, as has been explained.

Reply to Gregory: he did not deny that things are known by God to be future because they are future, but [he denied that they are known because] they are present. For he contends that the presence of things is not necessary for things to be known by God, as it is necessary for them to be known by us; nor did he say that things are therefore future because they are known by God, but that they are therefore present; for he was speaking of objective presence, as we noted above in disputation 64, cap. 3; and thus he said most well that things are therefore present in God because they are seen. For the very cognition is the formal reason of their presence.

From the Scholastics, however, whom I adduced for the opposed opinion, only St. Thomas brings a difficulty upon me. For when he treats in that place of the speculative knowledge of vision, he still refuses to concede that things are the cause of God's pre-knowledge; accordingly, that causal statement - "because things are known by God, since they are future" - which he had objected to himself from Origen, he thinks must be understood only of the cause of inferring, because it follows rightly: if some things are future, then they are known by God.[1144]

1144. St. Thomas, ad 1 of this question and article (citing Origen).

Caput VII - Corollaries of the whole Disputation

I say, therefore, perhaps the Angelic Doctor only wished to say what Bl. Bonaventure, Albert, and Gregory, cited at the beginning for the contrary opinion, wanted to say: namely, that future things are not the cause of the knowledge of God as to the mode (as they themselves say) of being, that is, that they are not a physical cause on which that knowledge itself - which is the very substance and essence of God as to existence - depends; which is most true. They add, however, that future things are the cause of God's foreknowledge as to the mode of denomination; which, although St. Thomas does not expressly assert, he would in no wise deny. For the foreknowledge of God, over and above the simple essence, is no elicited act, but the essence itself with only a respect of reason added, which necessarily arises from things future, as they are future; it is called foreknowledge which otherwise is the very substance of God; and, by a respect of reason even to things as possible, it is called knowledge, which the Scholastics call simple intelligence; whereas of future things they call the knowledge of vision, or foreknowledge. Rightly, therefore, it is affirmed that God foreknows future things, and that his substance, or knowledge, has that respect by which it is named foreknowledge, because things are future - whence nothing real accrues to God - as will be more fully demonstrated in disputation 78. Therefore Gregory, in the place cited, and Marsilius, in the first book, question 40, to the fifth argument, plainly teach that the foreknowledge of God is, in a certain order, posterior to future things - as we shall also say in the next chapter - which the holy Doctor would by no means deny; and hence, in this sense, he would concede that proposition, "Therefore future things are foreknown, because they are future." This doctrine is not obscurely indicated by Hugo of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, book 1, part 2, chapter 16, where he says: "If there were no future things, there would be no foreknowledge in God; but from this it would in no wise follow that nothing would be in God; for that which is foreknowledge would be knowledge" - as if to say, the same essence of God would remain which would be the knowledge of things possible; but since it would not have respect to future things, it would not be called foreknowledge: and only the denomination and the respect of reason would be lacking in God. Therefore future things are the cause of denomination, as Albert, Bonaventure, and Gregory said. Wherefore the Master, in that 38th distinction, did not wish to call future things simply the cause of God's foreknowledge, but only said that they are a cause sine qua non; by which mode of causality he did not posit any physical influx into God, but asserted a causality by way of object and the foundation of a relation; and when he said it is a cause sine qua non, he plainly denoted not something accompanying, but something that precedes foreknowledge, or rather that foreknowledge precedes: wherefore even that causality, qualified in this way, must be conceded in his view.[1145]

Then it is plainly clear how little the opposing argument proves. For when we say that a future thing is the cause of God's knowledge, we do not mean that it is a physical cause of something existing really in God, which acts really upon God himself or exerts any influence; but we only say that it is the cause of a respect and of a denomination, on account of which the knowledge of God is called foreknowledge. Wherefore neither is a created thing posited as the true cause of the

1145. Gregory (of Rimini), in I Sent., d. 38; Marsilius (of Inghen), in I, q. 40, ad quintam rationem.

uncreated, nor is anything temporal said to be the cause of something eternal. For although the foreknowledge of God is called eternal, because it is a sufficient foundation for God's knowledge to be called foreknowledge from eternity, and for the thing foreknown to begin to exist in time and in the same to end: nevertheless, it is from eternity future, just as the foreknowledge itself is; but when the thing is said to be the cause of foreknowledge according to denomination and respect of reason, because it is the foundation of that, it is understood to be the cause as it is future, not as it is present. Therefore no temporal thing is designated as the principal cause of anything eternal, nor a created thing of anything uncreated. Moreover, it is manifest that something can be future from eternity, nor does it begin to be future in time, as has been made clear, and has been noted more than once in this disputation.

From the testimony of Hugo of St. Victor we have an evident support for the doctrine proposed. And for this reason the Master, in that 38th distinction, did not wish to call future things simply the cause of God's foreknowledge, but only said that they are a cause sine qua non; and by that mode of causality he did not posit any real influx, but a mode by way of object and the foundation of relation, and he affirmed that it is a cause sine qua non, not denoting something concomitant, but rather something preceding foreknowledge, or foreknowledge itself; wherefore even that causality, so qualified, must be conceded in his view.[1146]

Corollaries of the whole Disputation.

- From the things said in this disputation some points worthy of note can be gathered, which will not moderately illustrate the doctrine delivered to us above. The first is what Gregory taught, in I, dist. 38, question 2, article 3, in the reply to a certain argument near the end, and Marsilius, in the first book, question 40, in the solution of the arguments, to the fifth argument: namely, that it can be in our power that God foreknow future things which from our will are future. They prove this: since the foreknowledge of God supposes that a thing is going to be, and anything is in our power to be future from us, it follows that even the foreknowledge of God, as it is foreknowledge, is in our power - namely, that it be that God foreknow something to be future, or not to be future, and that it be free to us. Yet this is not to be understood in such a way that we say we can change the foreknowledge which once we suppose to be in God from eternity, so that on account of our liberty God be changed from one thing to another; for that cannot be, even if we speak only of the mutation of a respect and of a relation of reason, on account of which we said the knowledge of God is called foreknowledge - not that from this variation alone there would follow in God any intrinsic mutation, for it is only a mutation of a respect of reason, which in its own genus does not repugn to God, as is established elsewhere; but for that reason we cannot change the foreknowledge of God, which, concerning some thing that is to be, we once suppose; because by that very fact by which we say God knows something, we also affirm that very thing to be going to be. For, as in chapter 4 we noted from Anselm, when we assert that God foreknows some thing, by that way of speaking, without any other addition, we also say that the thing

1146. The Master (Peter Lombard), I Sent., dist. 38.

will be. Therefore, since it is necessary that the thing future be future, nor is its opposite in our power, as we also proved in the same chapter, it follows that neither is it set within our liberty that that which is foreknown by God not be foreknown. For although it is also free to us to make future things not be, when they are future, nevertheless when we say "it is in our power that God from eternity foreknow something," we ought to consider the essence of God before we suppose the relation of reason of foreknowledge to future things; and therefore before we suppose that something is to be. Thus, just as in our case it is said to be in our power everything that from our free will is going to be, so that even if from eternity it be future, it is from us and not from another going to be: in the same way we understand it to be in our power that God, who, before a thing be future, does not foreknow it, foresee it from eternity. For if from our liberty we are not going to do that thing, neither would it be from eternity future, nor would God foreknow it; yet in time that respect of reason from which it is called foreknowledge cannot be changed: although the relation of creator and lord can be varied, because the infinite power of the divine intellect is not of such a sort that it await the event in time, but it anticipates it from eternity. For when a thing which is going to be in time is from eternity future, and only one part of a contradiction is distinctly going to be from our will - although the opposite also can be, by which liberty is sufficiently safeguarded, as in disputation 66, chapter 2, was set forth - and that from eternity is referred to the divine intellect as an intelligible object, it follows that that part is foreknown from eternity; and since the divine intellect cannot be deceived, but always understands that part to be future which is future, it follows also that the will in time will do nothing which God has not known from eternity. And thus, although it be in our power that God foreknow some thing, just as that very thing also be future, it is not free to us to change the foreknowledge of God, which we suppose to be of one part of a contradiction, into the other.

This doctrine was touched upon by Gab., in I, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 3, dub. r, and is taught by Boethius, De consolatione, book 5, prose 6; for he says that we cannot change the knowledge of God, "because to whatever purpose we are going to turn, that also he knew from eternity"; he subjoins the reason: "For the divine intellect anticipates all future things." More clearly Hugo of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, book 1, part 2, chapter 18, expressed the same in these words: "If the thing which is called future were not going to be, it would not have been known as future by God, but as not future." And in chapter 17 he teaches that a thing was not first foreknown than future, but was foreknown from eternity, and from eternity future; he speaks, however, of the priority according to duration, for in the order of nature it is prior that the thing be future, as we proved above. Finally, in chapter 22 he says: "It is possible that what is future not be done: and if it were not done, it would never have been future, nor foreseen." From all of which it is also manifest how falsely some of the more recent men have accused the Nominales of the error that they asserted it

to be placed in our liberty to change the knowledge of God, so that what is supposed to be foreknown from eternity then not be foreknown; for neither did they say this, nor dream it: rather, from their doctrine, as we have explained it, the opposite is plainly gathered.[1147]

- Second, there is to be observed a difference between corporeal vision and God's foreknowledge. For although, by the example of corporeal vision, which in no way removes the liberty of the thing beheld, Bede and Boethius most fittingly prove that nothing of our liberty is taken away by divine foreknowledge - because nevertheless corporeal sight only sees the thing present, nor in any way foresees the future; furthermore, what is seen even by free choice is seen as present, and even by the same free choice it is impeded lest it be seen afterward; and therefore the vision can be changed, as the man who freely proposes the object wills; although he cannot bring it about that the sight not behold the thing present, because everything that is, so long as it is, cannot not be, as we explained above; nor afterwards is it in our power that that not be which has been made to be present - yet because divine foreknowledge anticipates the very thing future, and is borne not only to the present but also to the very thing that is from eternity future; and when we suppose something to be foreknown by God, we suppose also that it is future from eternity; nor is it in our power that what is supposed to be future not be future, nor in any way can the knowledge of God, which we once suppose to be, be impeded or changed. For if something is future, it is either to be changed in time, or, if it is not future from eternity, it must be to be changed from eternity. Therefore the foreknowledge of God, which is eternal and follows things even future, and insofar as they are said to be future from eternity, could not itself be changed in time from one thing into another. For if, by a certain order of reason, or as it were of nature, already explained by us, it awaited the event in time, but in fact it anticipates it from eternity: for when a thing which is going to be in time is from eternity future, and one part only of a contradiction is distinctly going to be from our will - although the opposite also can be, by which liberty is sufficiently safeguarded, as was said in disputation 66, chapter 2 - and that is referred from eternity to the divine intellect as an intelligible object, that part is consequently foreknown from eternity; and since the divine intellect cannot be deceived, but always understands that part to be future which is future, it also follows that the will in time will do nothing which God has not known from eternity: and thus, although it is in our power that God foreknow some thing, just as it is in our power that the very thing be future, nevertheless it is not in our freedom to change the foreknowledge of God, which we suppose to be of one part of a contradiction, into the other.
- Fourth, it is gathered from these things - especially from what we noted above in chapter 4 - not only that free choice is free with respect to the future, so that it can do something and not do it, but also that a present action by which someone sins is truly and properly said to sin freely. For although not only the present, insofar as it is already present, cannot be not-

1147. Gab., in I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, dub. r; Boethius, De consolatione, V, prose 6; Hugo of St. Victor, De sacramentis, I, part 2, c. 18; likewise c. 17 and c. 22. Ockham, in I, d. 38, q. 1.

present - for a being, insofar as it is, cannot at the same time not be - but also, once a present operation has been posited, there does not remain liberty for it simply not to be (in which we said there is equal cessation for the present and the past, because in both the potency has already been reduced to act, and the operation cannot absolutely be recalled, but can only be impeded for the future), nevertheless in a present and a past operation true liberty is preserved - not because free choice was previously and up to the point of the operation indifferent to the past operation, and similarly to the present operation, but because, prior in nature to operating, the will was free so that it could operate and not operate; and thus, when someone sins, he sins freely. And hence our authors of legislation, whose opinion some Nominales more recently have opposed, teach, contrary to Ockham - who said sometimes that the will in the very instant of eliciting an operation is not able not to elicit it; and some externalists among ourselves think that, in a certain sentence, the Nominales said that, what has once been done, the will could entirely impede the operation; which we have denied above from Anselm in chapter 4 - that it is free, before the nature of the operation as present, and, the present being posited, it cannot at all operate otherwise; but only for the future can it not operate; nevertheless, nothing of liberty is removed from the fault of the one acting, because he operated freely before he acted.

- Third, from what has been said a solution is inferred to the argument on account of which Aristotle, De interpretatione, chapter 8, as some interpret, wished to prove that no singular proposition about a future contingent is true or false; where he argues thus: if any were true, it would have been true from eternity. We concede, therefore, that it would have been true from eternity; but not necessary by a necessity antecedent, rather by a consequent necessity, whereby every future is necessarily future, just as the present is necessarily present; for if something is ever true, it is necessary in some way to be necessary: thus also the proposition about the past is always true and necessary, not by an antecedent necessity but by the consequent, whereby whatever has been is necessarily having been present. And thus that ancient proposition is always true and necessary, not with an antecedent necessity, but with a consequent; for if from eternity it has been true that such a thing will be, it could not be that it not be true that such a thing will be; nevertheless, it does not follow that it could not be that it not be. On the contrary, as we have taught above from Anselm, it was possible not to be that which is future, and if it were not to be, it would never have been future nor foreseen.

It is not so, just as neither with respect to the past: which Almainus also grants; because what is, when it is, it is necessary that it be, and therefore it cannot be free that, while present, it should at the same time not be present; for in this liberty does not consist. But that the present act be free as referred to potency, and the past act similarly, Cajetan does not deny; he grants it on that aforesaid reason, namely, that prior by nature, before the will acts, it is indifferent to either. They agree with Ockham in this opinion thus explicated - Almainus himself, Gregory in the First Book, distinction 38, question 1, article 3, fairly before the middle, Gabriel, question 1, article 1, notes 6 and 8, and

article 2, conclusions 1 and 3; but more clearly in the Second Book, distinction 25, article 1, note 1, and article 3, the last doubt; finally, Maior in the Third Book, distinction 18, question 1, at the end, to the fifth argument.[1148]

Nor in truth do Hugh of St. Victor in Book 1 of De sacramentis, part 5, chapter 18, the Master in II, dist. 25, cap. 2, and Holcot in II, question 3, to the ninth, disagree, except that these three assert that liberty is referred only to the future in time: wherefore, when they say that Peter, who is now sinning, sins freely (for they cannot deny this, nor do they), they think that Peter now sins freely, or merits, because at the preceding time, which this present looked to as future, the will was indifferent: similarly they teach about the past; and thus, in the Summa of the Sentences, tractate 2, chapter 2, and Holcot in the place cited, affirm that an angel in the first instant of his being could not sin, because liberty cannot consist in a single instant only: but they do not deny that in any instant whatsoever the operation could have been free, if some time had preceded on account of which the will would have been indifferent.[1149]

We, however, with Ockham, Gabriel, Gregory, Maior, and Almainus, say that liberty of acting is saved from the first instant in which the creature exists, because the will is of itself prior by nature than it be understood to act, indifferent to either. Wherefore we concede that in the first instant, in which a creature is, it is free for sinning and for not sinning, and in that very instant also its liberty can most excellently be saved. Therefore we all assert that in any other present instant, besides the first, the operation is free, so that it can be sin or merit: except that we defend this liberty from a different head, and therefore about the first instant, in which the will is created, we also think in a different way, as has been explained.

Therefore it appears, as we said at the beginning, that there is no one who denies that he who now sins, sins freely, even if it be true that he who sins, when he sins, by that very fact necessarily sins; and let what we have said about foreknowledge suffice. For what Cajetan and others here dispute, namely whether, if God necessarily operates outwardly, the human will could nonetheless act freely, will be more conveniently examined below in Disputation 101: for this question pertains rather to the will of God than to the intellect, about which in that place it must be said.

Articulus XIV - Whether God knows enunciables

It is asked in the fourteenth place thus. It seems that God does not know enunciables.

1) For to know enunciables belongs to our intellect according as it composes and divides. But in the divine intellect there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciables.

2) Further, every cognition is through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciables, since He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciables.

1148. Almainus; Gregory, in I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3; Gabriel, q. 1, ar. 1, notae 6, 8; ar. 2, conclusiones 1, 3; more clearly II, d. 25, ar. 1, nota 1; ar. 3, dub. ult.; Maior, III, d. 18, q. 1, ad quintum.

1149. Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, I, part 5, c. 18; the Master (Peter Lombard), II Sent., dist. 25, cap. 2; Holcot, II, q. 3, ad 9.

But on the contrary: it is said in Psalm 93: "The Lord knows the thoughts of men." But enunciables are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciables.

I answer that, since the forming of enunciables is within the power of our intellect; but God knows whatever is in His power or in that of the creature, as was said above; it is necessary that God know all the enunciables which we form or can be formed. But just as He knows material things materially, and things composed simply: so He knows enunciables not after the mode of enunciables, namely that in His intellect there be composition or division of enunciables, but He knows each thing by a simple intelligence in understanding the essence of each. For if we, in this very fact that we understand what man is, understood all the things which can be predicated of man. Which indeed does not obtain in our intellect, which runs from one thing to another, because the intelligible species thus represents one thing that it does not represent another. Whence, by understanding what man is, we do not from this very fact understand other things which are in him, but in a divided way according to a certain succession. And on account of this, the things which we understand separately, we must reduce into one by way of forming an enunciation by composition or division. But the species of the divine intellect, namely His essence, suffices to show all things. Whence, by understanding His essence, He knows the essences of all things, and whatever can befall them.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that that reasoning would proceed, if God knew enunciables after the mode of enunciables.

To the second it must be said that the composition of an enunciable signifies that something is of the thing. And thus God, through His own existence, which is His essence, is the likeness of all the things which are signified by enunciables.

The conclusion is that God knows all enunciations and the compositions which the human intellect forms in itself, but without any composition, by a simple intuition alone; just as He understands, also in a spiritual mode, those things which consist of matter. Here the reason had to be assigned, on account of which, although God understands our enunciations and discourses, He Himself neither composes nor discourses; yet we shall show this together of God and of the angels in a few words below in Disputation 222.

Articulus XV - Whether the knowledge of God is variable

Ninety-fourth, it is added, one proceeds thus. It seems that the knowledge of God is variable.[1150]

1) For knowledge is said relatively to the knowable. But those things which import a relation to the creature are said of God according to time, and are varied according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable according to the variation of creatures.

1150. Cf. references adduced sub marginibus: ar. 7, contra; I, d. 38, q. 3, contra 2, art. 5; d. 39, q. 1, ar. 5, ad quintum; De veritate, q. 2, art. 3.

2) Further, whatever God can do, He can know; but God can do more things than He does. Therefore He can know more things than He knows. And thus His knowledge can be varied according to increase and diminution.

3) Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But now He does not know that Christ will be born, because "Christ to be born" is not. Therefore not everything that God knew, He knows. And thus the knowledge of God seems to be variable.

But on the contrary is what is said in James 1, that with God "there is no change nor shadow of alteration."

I answer that, since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is evident from the foregoing: just as His substance is altogether immutable, as was shown above: so it must be that His knowledge be altogether invariable.

Reply to the first: The names "Lord" and "Creator," and the like, import relations to creatures according as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God imports a relation to creatures according as they are in God: because according to this a thing is understood actually, which is in the intelligent. But created things are in God invariable, in themselves, however, variable. Or it must be said otherwise, that "Lord" and "Creator," and the like, import relations which follow upon acts which are understood to be terminated to the creatures according as they are in themselves; and therefore relations of this sort are predicated of God in a varied manner according to the variation of creatures. But knowledge and love of this sort import relations which follow upon acts that are understood to be in God. And therefore they are predicated in an invariable manner of God.

Reply to the second: God also knows those things which He can do and does not do. Whence, from the fact that He can do more things than He does, it does not follow that He can know more things than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things which are in effect according to some time. Yet from this, that He knows that some things can be which are not, or even not be which are, it does not follow that His knowledge is variable, but that He knows the variability of things. If, however, there were something which before God had not known and afterwards knew, His knowledge would then be variable: but this cannot be; because whatever is or can be according to any time whatsoever, God in His eternity knows. And therefore from this, that something is posited to be according to any time whatsoever, it must be posited that it has been known from eternity by God. And therefore it ought not to be conceded that God can know more things than He knows: because this proposition implies that previously He did not know, and afterwards knows.

Reply to the third: Some of the ancient Nominales said that the enunciable "Christ is being born" and "Christ will be born" and "Christ is born" are the same, and that the same thing is signified by these three, namely the nativity of Christ: and according to this it would follow that whatever God knew, He knows; since now He knows that Christ is born, which signifies the same as that Christ was to be born. But this opinion is false. First, because the diversity of the parts of speech produces a diversity of enunciables. Next, because it would follow that a proposition, which

once is true, would be always true, which is against the Philosopher; whence he says that this assertion, "Socrates is sitting," is true while he is sitting, the same is false when he rises. And therefore it must be conceded that this is not true, "Whatever God knew, He knows," if it be referred to enunciables: but from this it does not follow that the knowledge of God is variable. For just as, without any variation of the divine knowledge, it is the case that He knows that one and the same thing is at one time, and at another time is not; so, without any variation of the divine knowledge, it is the case that He knows that some enunciable is at one time true and at another false. But the knowledge of God would from this be variable, if He knew enunciables after the mode of enunciables, by composing and dividing, as happens in our intellect: whence our cognition is varied either according to truth and falsity - for instance, if, the thing having been changed, we retain the same opinion about that thing - or according to diverse opinions, if at one time we opine that someone is sitting and afterwards we opine that he is not sitting: of which neither can be in God.

Observations concerning the doctrine of the Article.

The conclusion of the article is, that the knowledge of God cannot be varied. But concerning the title and doctrine, first it must be observed that the question is only about the simple knowledge of the intellect, as from the whole discourse of the article is gathered. St. Thomas proves the conclusion by a twofold reason, one in the body of the article, the other in the solution of the first. The former is of this sort: the knowledge of God is His substance; but this is altogether immutable; therefore likewise His knowledge. The latter reason: God knows things as they are in themselves, but He Himself cannot be changed; therefore neither can the cognition which He has of things. Neither reason seems efficacious to prove what the holy Doctor contends absolutely. For, first, when we say that God knows or cognizes things, we ought not to understand that He is those things formally; but it is said objectively, that is, that they are represented in Him. Then, although the knowledge which God has of things is His very substance, nevertheless it adds a certain notional reference to the things themselves, which is nevertheless not any real mutation in Him.

It is necessarily connoted, insofar as it is called knowledge. Therefore, although someone might say that the knowledge of God varies, he would not thereby of necessity assert that God Himself is changed intrinsically; for the knowledge itself would be said to change only by a change of a reference of reason (respectus rationis).

Moreover, that the knowledge of God connotes a reference of reason to creatures, without which it would not be called knowledge of creatures, is clear. For if no creature were possible, it would not follow by an intrinsic inference that God would not exist, as we have shown at length in disputation 104, chapter 6.[1151] For the reason that God exists is of greater necessity than that creatures be possible; therefore the knowledge of God does not in any way depend upon the possibility of creatures. Nevertheless, on that supposition, God would have no knowledge of creatures; therefore the knowledge of creatures is not altogether the same as the essence (*essentia*) of God, but connotes, over and above the essence, a relation (*relatio*) to creatures, which, since it cannot be

1151. Disput. 104, c. 6.

real - as we shall show in that disputation - follows to be of reason; therefore even if, by the removal of that relation, the knowledge of God were to be changed and creatures were represented in God in a different way, it would not follow that there is any intrinsic change in the divine essence; and much less would any intrinsic change follow from a variation of the knowledge of vision (which is of future things). For the same essence would remain unchanged, even if God had from eternity decreed to create nothing, and yet then there would be in God no foreknowledge of future things, nor would future things be represented in His essence; therefore it is not rightly inferred from a change in some knowledge of God that there is some intrinsic change in God.

Nevertheless, it can be shown in another way, and clearly, that the knowledge which God has of possibles cannot be changed. For if in any way it could vary, the change would be that of that reference of reason: for the divine essence in itself cannot be changed; but that reference cannot vary, because its foundation - upon the positing of which it is said at once to arise - is the very essence of God itself, and the possible creatures; but this foundation cannot fail; therefore neither can that reference be changed. Wherefore, just as creatures cannot fail to be possible, so they cannot fail to be known by God. From which it is also gathered that it is more necessary that God be God, and that those things which are within Him agree with Him, than that He know possible creatures: for knowledge is not without that reference of reason to creatures, nor is it more necessary than that reference; but creatures, even under possible being, are less necessary than God Himself. From this principle indeed we shall also make clear in disputation 144, on the procession of the Word, that that procession which belongs intrinsically to God in no way depends, as on a principle, upon creatures under possible being; nor is the production of the Word per se primarily a knowledge of creatures, but it is terminated to them consequently and secondarily.[1152]

Besides, although St. Thomas does not render the reason why the foreknowledge of future things, which is called in God knowledge of vision, cannot be changed, an excellent one nevertheless is gathered from what has been said above: not that, if the foreknowledge of God were changed, some intrinsic change in God would follow; for this variation of foreknowledge could be understood from a mere change of a reference of reason. For, as we said in disputation 68, chapter 6, and it will be proved in disputation 80, the act (*actus*) of the foreknowledge of God is not some operation elicited by the divine essence itself, but is the very substance (*substantia*) of God, with the mere addition of a reference of reason to future creatures; with that lacking, there would then be no foreknowledge. Therefore, just as, if from eternity there were no future creature, there would be no foreknowledge in God, yet the substance and essence of God would be the same as now; so also, if nothing else hindered, the reference of reason could in time be changed, and hence the foreknowledge be varied, with no intrinsic change wrought in God Himself.

Therefore the reason why foreknowledge cannot be varied, even by a mere variation of a reference of reason, is this: because if that reference could be changed, the change would have to happen in time; and thus in time there would have to begin a reference to future things which would not have been from eternity; or conversely, the reference which was from eternity would in

1152. Disput. 144, on the procession of the Word; cf. also disput. 68, c. 6; disput. 80.

time have to cease. But this can by no reason be; therefore neither can the foreknowledge of God be changed in time; but if it is from eternity, it must remain without variation. This is proven thus. As is said in disputation 66, every proposition about the future is either determinately true or determinately false; and therefore every thing which is truly to be at some time is from eternity to be; and what is not to be is from eternity not to be. Wherefore it cannot happen that something begins in time to be future or not to be future. But everything which is truly future is thereby referred to the intellect (*intellectus*) of God as intelligible, and what is not future, as not intelligible; therefore from eternity the future and the not-future are referred in this manner to the intellect of God. For since the intellect of God is of infinite power, embracing every intelligible, and cannot be borne toward that which is not intelligible, it follows that there is sufficient foundation in the intellect of God and in the thing which is to be, that it be known from eternity, and in the thing which is not to be, that it not be known; which if it were otherwise to come about in time, then from eternity something would have lain hidden from the divine intellect, or would have been falsely known by it. Therefore, if the intellect of God is said to understand something, it cannot but understand it from eternity; wherefore His intellection must needs be unchangeable.

Accordingly, although some reference of reason in God can vary, as the relation of Creator and of Lord, and the relation which foreknowledge connotes, could from eternity have failed to belong to God if from eternity nothing were to be, as we noted in disputation 68, chapter 6; nevertheless, if once we suppose that something is to be, that relation of the knowledge of vision cannot begin in time or vary, because its foundation, which is the future thing, and the infinity of the intellect of God, are eternal. But the reference of Creator and of Lord is founded on an action which passes over into an effect, and begins in time; and therefore it is neither eternal nor immutable.

Nonetheless, for this reason alone can that relation of the knowledge of vision vary - according to the order to diverse enunciations - as St. Thomas teaches in the reply to the third;[1153] because it is called foreknowledge only so long as the thing is future; yet, once it is present or past, it is not called foreknowledge, but knowledge of vision. Therefore this knowledge which is called of vision is altogether immutable, which, beyond the knowledge of simple intelligence, merely adds a reference of reason to a thing with existence, whether it be future, or present, or past. And since God understands a thing according to each difference of time, as it is, He is not said to be changed in the notion of knowledge; for knowledge is then said to be changed either when what was known is not known, or when the opposite is known. But although God is not always said to foreknow, He is nevertheless always said to know that this or that thing will be at this time, and at that time will be present, and at another will be past; and thus perpetually the same knowledge in God perseveres, because there is always the same foundation in the object, and the power in the intellect.

I pass over many other things which Cajetan notes on the third reply; for the things said thus far suffice for the explanation of this difficulty.[1154]

1153. St. Thomas, in the reply to the third objection on this article.
1154. Cajetan, on the reply to the third.

Finally, it must be observed that when we say that the knowledge of vision is eternal, and omnipotence, and other attributes of this sort, connote a reference of reason from eternity, this is not to be understood in such a way that from eternity such a reference actually belongs by our intellect, nor by the divine, because - as we shall say below in disputation 118 - the divine intellect does not form these relations and references of reason. But we say that these attributes are signified by us with an extrinsic reference of reason, because when our intellect sees an eternal foundation in the thing itself, it is wont to conceive such a relation and to name these attributes. Whether, however, in God there is a relation from time to creatures, we said in question 13, article 7; but whether there is some eternal real relation to those same creatures or not, we shall treat in disputation 104, the last chapter.[1155]

Articulus XVI - Whether God has practical knowledge concerning things

To the sixteenth article we proceed thus.

It is objected that: 1) It seems that God does not have speculative knowledge concerning things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as was shown above. But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative. 2) Besides, speculative knowledge is by abstraction from things; which does not befit the divine knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.

But on the contrary: Whatever is more noble must be attributed to God; but speculative knowledge is nobler than practical, as is clear from the Philosopher at the beginning of the Metaphysics.[1156] Therefore God has speculative knowledge of things.

I answer that: Some knowledge is speculative only, some practical only, and some according to one aspect speculative, and according to another ...

Objicitur quod Deus de rebus non habeat scientiam speculative. Scientia enim Dei is the cause (*causa efficiens*) of things, as was shown above. But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.

Praeterea. Speculative knowledge is by abstraction from things; which does not befit the divine knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.

But on the contrary: Whatever is more noble must be attributed to God; but speculative knowledge is nobler than practical, as is clear from the Philosopher at the beginning of the Metaphysics.[1157] Therefore God has speculative knowledge of things.

I answer that: Some knowledge is speculative only, some practical only, and some according to one aspect speculative, and according to another practical. For the evidence of this, note that a given knowledge can be called speculative in three ways.

1155. See disput. 118; q. 13, a. 7; disput. 104, cap. ult.
1156. Aristotle, Metaphysics, lib. 6, text 2.
1157. Aristotle, Metaphysics, lib. 6, text 2.

First, on the side of the things known, which are not operable by the knower, as is a man's knowledge of natural or divine things.

Second, in regard to the mode of knowing: for instance, if a builder were to consider a house by defining and dividing and considering its universal predicates. This indeed is to consider operables in a speculative mode, and not according to that according to which they are operable. For the operable is something by the application of form (*forma*) to matter (*materia*), not by the resolution of the composite into universal formal principles.

Third, in regard to the end (*finis*). For the practical intellect differs in end from the speculative, as is said in De anima III: the practical intellect is ordered to the end of operation; but the end of the speculative intellect is the contemplation of truth.[1158] Whence, if a builder were to consider how some house could be made, not ordering it to the end of operation, but only to knowing, this would, as to the end, be a speculative consideration - yet about an operable thing. Therefore the knowledge which is speculative by reason of the very thing known is speculative only. But that which is speculative according to its mode or its end is in a certain respect speculative, and in a certain respect practical; and when it is ordered to the end of operation, it is simply practical.

Accordingly, it must be said that God has of himself speculative knowledge only, for he himself is not operable. But of all other things he has both speculative and practical knowledge. Speculative, indeed, as to the mode: for whatever in things we know speculatively by defining and dividing, all this God knows much more perfectly. But of those things which he can indeed make, and yet in no time makes, he does not have practical knowledge in that sense in which practical knowledge is denominated from the end. But he has practical knowledge of those which he makes at some time. Evils, moreover, although they are not operable by him, nonetheless fall under his practical cognition, inasmuch as he permits or impedes or orders them; just as diseases fall under the physician's practical science, inasmuch as by his art he cures them.

Reply to the first: The knowledge of God is cause, not indeed of himself, but of other things; of some actually, namely of those which at some time come to be; of others virtually, namely of those which he can make and yet never come to be.

Reply to the second: That knowledge be received from things known does not of itself befit speculative knowledge, but per accidens, inasmuch as it is human. To what is urged on the contrary one should say, that about operables perfect knowledge is not had unless they be known inasmuch as they are operable. And therefore, since the knowledge of God is perfect in every way, he must know the things that are operable inasmuch as they are such, and not only inasmuch as they are speculable. Yet this does not depart from the nobility of speculative knowledge, because he sees all other things apart from himself in himself; but himself he knows speculatively, and thus in the speculation of himself his knowledge has both speculative cognition, and the practical cognition of all other things.

1158. Aristotle, De anima, lib. 3, text 49.

The sum of the article is: God has of himself speculative knowledge, not practical; but of other things both practical and speculative; of possibles indeed which will never be, speculative; but of those which will sometime be, practical.

Disputatio LXIX - Circa doctrinam Articuli

- What Scotus held. Caput 1.
- The true opinion. Caput 2.

On the doctrine of this Article

Caput I - What Scotus held

Easy would be, according to the Philosopher's definition, the whole doctrine of this article, had not Scotus rendered it difficult for us. Therefore I shall first set forth his opinion; then, from the things I have set down above in disputation 8, I shall briefly explain what must be said in this matter.[1159]

First then, Scotus in q. 4 of the Prologue. If objection be made against this, to the fourth argument, he thinks it can probably be defended that the knowledge which God has of himself is practical - not because it is about some work to be done, but because it precedes the affection and moves it; and by the same reason some think the same of the clear vision by which God is seen by the blessed: yet afterward, in that question, if the verse be objected, "Licet haec," he thinks it more probable that the knowledge which God has of himself is not practical, although it moves the affection: because, in his view, if it were to be practical, it ought to be the rule of the divine will; but the knowledge which God has cannot be the rule of the will of God, because the will of God is of itself the rule of its operations; therefore it does not have the nature of practical knowledge.

Then Scotus teaches in that same question, in the third article, that none of the knowledge by which God has of other things is practical; and this he proves by the same reason, namely that the intellect is not the rule of the divine will in the production of other things, but the will itself is its own rule. He taught the same in I Sentences, dist. 38, q. 1, though for another reason: namely, that to the notion of practical knowledge it pertains to dictate to the will, or to propose something to be done; but no cognition proposes to God in this manner anything to be done: therefore no cognition in God is practical. Next he proves that no cognition proposes to God in this manner anything to be done. For if some cognition were thus to dictate, it would naturally precede every act of the will; and hence the will could not but will that which the intellect thus proposed: therefore God would of necessity have willed to make the things he made, which is absurd. That if the cognition naturally preceded, the will could not fail to follow it, Scotus does not prove; yet it could be urged thus. For if the intellect of God, which cannot be deceived, in its ultimate resolution were to propose, as a good, the justification of Peter - by what reason could the will resist the intellect? Add that such a

1159. See above Disputatio 8 for Vazquez's prior principles.

judgment, naturally preceding every act of the will, cannot befit God: for there does not seem to be greater reason why it should be proposed to God as good to justify Peter than not to justify him, or rather Peter than John. But it is clear that God willed one rather than the other: therefore not by a proposing judgment, but by his will alone did he thus decree.

Caput II - The true opinion

Grant that the disagreement is of words, not of things, when we deal with the practical or the speculative; yet, as I noted above in disputation 8, these names "practical" and "speculative," like all the rest which theologians and philosophers use, are not to be used by us at will, but according to the common signification among them. If then, as I said in that place, practical cognition is so called, not because it moves the affection or is the rule of its operation (for that seems to be accidental to it), but from this, that it is about some work to be done and as a principle of it: it plainly follows, first, that the knowledge which God has of himself is not practical, because it is not about a work to be done. It further follows that the knowledge which God has of other things is practical and speculative. That is speculative which he has of possible things, inasmuch as it is considered by us after the manner of mere speculation. For although it is about some work, yet on this account it is not about it as to be done, nor is it compared as a directing principle. But that which is about the very things insofar as they can be made, or will sometime be, is practical after the manner of a directing principle.

Moreover, the knowledge of future things can be considered in a twofold way. First, insofar as it is referred to things according to their possible essence, before they are future, after the manner of a certain dictamen and proposition, by which the intellect says that that thing is to be done in this or that way, and in this way it is practical. Then, insofar as it regards the things themselves now as future, and is called the knowledge of vision, and this is wholly speculative: for it presupposes the things themselves as future, and in no way is it a principle of them. Wherefore, in disputation 68, cap. 6, we said that this scientia visionis cannot be at once practical and speculative, but only speculative: which, in the present place, is how it must be taken, as we proved above from an explicit professor; and so let it suffice to have said thus much now.[1160]

But it is necessary to refute Scotus's reasons.

First, as regards the knowledge which God has of himself, we say it is not practical, even if it should move the affection, not because the reason in God proposing the object is not the rule of right action; for neither in us is reason itself the proximate rule, as we showed in I-II, q. 19, a. 3, but the rational nature itself, as it is rational; while the proposing reason is only a rule a posteriori, as we shall say there. And yet in us no one denies that there are many practical cognitions. But the knowledge which God has of himself is not practical, because it is not about a work to be done, which we noted above in disputation 8 is required for the notion of practical knowledge. That it

1160. See Disputatio 68, cap. 6, on the scientia visionis.

moves the affection matters little: for the speculative, too, when it considers a good thing, in regard to which no work is to be done, can move to the love of it; whereas the practical, as we proved in that place, is solely about a work to be done.

Ad rationem, qua probat Scotus scientiam Dei de aliis rebus non esse practicam, quia deberet praevenire naturaliter affectum, etc., Caietan replies in this article that that dictamen or proposition by which a good is proposed to the will, that it is good to do this or that, is not practical: because practical knowledge, in his view, is determined by the affection; wherefore it does not precede it: of this sort is the knowledge of art, which, after the decree of the will about doing the work, directs that the thing be done in this or that way

But Caietan's opinion is false: for who will deny that the dictamen of prudence, and the judgment elicited from deliberation and preceding the will, or the proposition of synderesis, whereby some honest end is proposed and precedes every affection, are practical? For these habits are practical; therefore their operations will be practical. Why then is practical knowledge posited only after the affection, for executing what has been decreed, and not also for moving the affection itself, so that it will something be done? Therefore, by the same token, in God the intellection which naturally precedes every determination of the will, and proposes diverse external works as good, to be done in this or that way, will without doubt be practical - unless that in God the truer solution be this: God proposes various things which he could do; yet although naturally the intellect, before every affection of the will, represents them, it necessarily moves to none of them. For in order that the will be necessarily moved by the intellect, it is not enough that there be no defect on the part of the proposer; it is also required that there be every ratio of the good in the object, by reason of which the will is necessarily moved. Wherefore, since various things are proposed to God which he could do, but in none of them is the will found to have the whole ratio of the good, even if in the divine intellect there be no defect in the proposer, the will can not will this or that; and that which it freely chooses, it does not will because it is proposed to it as the greater good, but because it so wills. For God does not choose one, leaving another, because the one is compared with the other and is preferred as the greater - otherwise than we, when we choose one means by deliberation, another being left aside: which difference we shall explain more fully in I-II, q. 13, a. 6.[1161]

Whether, after the practical judgment by which a thing to be done is proposed to the will, and after the election and affection of the will, there follows another practical act of the intellect after the manner of command (in which Caietan seems to place the operation of art), depends on what we shall say in I-II, q. 17, on the act of command with respect to the motion of other powers. And also, whether in God such an act must be conceded according to our mode of understanding, we shall say below in disputation 87, cap. 2. Be that as it may, whether we say such an act exists, which Caietan thinks is of art, or not; we cannot deny that that judgment which precedes election and the affection of the will, and proposes something to be done, is practical. And thus far concerning the knowledge of God.

1161. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I-II, q. 13, a. 6; see also I-II, q. 17 on the act of command.

Quaestio XV - De Ideis

After the consideration of the knowledge of God, it remains to consider the ideas. And about this three things are asked.

The Angelic Doctor proceeds with what pertains to the operation of the divine intellect; for it is manifest that the idea of an art is either an operation of the intellect or something of it: and since God is the supreme craftsman of all creatures, it is necessary to posit in his mind, according to our mode of understanding, both the art and the idea of them.

Articulus I - Whether ideas exist

It is objected that ideas are not. For Pseudo-Dionysius says in the seventh chapter of On the Divine Names, that God does not know ...[1162]

1. Further, God does not know things according to an idea. But ideas are not posited for anything except that by them things may be known. Therefore ideas are not.
2. Further, God in himself knows all things, as was said above; but he does not know himself through an idea. Therefore neither does he know other things through an idea.
3. Further, an idea is posited as a principle of knowing and operating; but the divine essence (*essentia*) is a sufficient principle of knowing and operating all things. Therefore it is not necessary to posit ideas.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in the book Eighty-Three Questions, question 46, a little from the beginning: "The whole force consists in the ideas, so that unless these be understood, no one can be wise."[1163]

I answer that it is necessary to posit ideas in the divine mind. For "idea" in Greek is said in Latin "form" (*forma*). Hence by ideas are understood the forms of other things existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of a thing existing apart from the thing itself can be in a twofold way: either such that it be the exemplar of that of which it is called the form; or such that it be a principle of the cognition of the thing itself, according as the forms of knowables are said to be in the knower. And with respect to both it is necessary to posit ideas, which is clear thus. In all things that are not generated by chance, it is necessary that the form be the end of the generation of anything whatsoever. But an agent would not act for the sake of a form unless inasmuch as the likeness of the form is in it. This indeed happens in two ways. In some agents there pre-exists the form of the thing to be made according to natural being (*esse naturale*), as in those which act by nature: as man generates man, and fire fire. In some, however, it pre-exists according to intelligible being (*esse intelligibile*), as in those which act by intellect: as the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder; and this can be called the idea of the house, because the craftsman intends

1162. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 7. (Only the opening of the first objection is preserved here in this extract.)

1163. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 46.

to make the house like to the form which he has conceived in his mind. Since therefore the world was not made by chance, but was made by God acting by intellect (as will be made plain below), it is necessary that in the divine mind there be a form to the likeness of which the world was made. And in this consists the ratio of an idea.

Reply to the first: God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside himself; and thus also Aristotle in Metaphysics, book 3, text 10 (and likewise toward the end of book 3), rejects the opinion of Plato concerning ideas, according as he posited them as existing per se, not in an intellect.[1164]

Reply to the second: Although God by his essence knows himself and other things, nevertheless his essence is an operative principle of other things, not, however, of himself; therefore it has the character of idea, insofar as it is compared to other things, not however insofar as it is compared to God himself.

Reply to the third: God according to his essence is the likeness of all things. Whence an idea in God is nothing other than the essence of God.

Conclusion of the article: In the mind of God are the ideas of creatures. The text of St. Thomas is clear; but for a greater illustration of the doctrine, as is our custom, certain matters must be disputed by us.

Disputatio LXX - In what way creatures are said to exist in God

Caput I - What John Wyclif held

So that the things which must be said about ideas existing in the mind of God may be better understood, it will not a little conduce first to explain the mode in which creatures are said to exist in God: in which matter, although all Catholics and heretics with common consent assert that creatures, such as a stone, a horse, a man, etc., according to their proper natures are not formally the very God, but exist in him only as in a knower, being represented by his very intellection (as will be explained below), nevertheless John Wyclif followed a peculiar error on this point. For as Walden reports, book 10, book 1, article 1, chapter 1 up to 9, he used to assert in proposition 217 and 219 that these two propositions are true: "Every creature is God" and "Whatever you please is God." Moreover these two propositions are referred in the Council of Constance, session 15, among the errors of John Hus, disciple of John Wyclif, where in a certain schedule presented there was contained this conclusion. In the same way, as the same Walden writes in chapters 1 and 2, Wyclif argued as follows: Although it sounds ill to assert that an ass is God, and that any other thing whatsoever is God, and hence many do not admit this mode of speaking unless with the determination "according to the intelligible, or ideal being which a creature has in God," nevertheless simply and without any addition it can be granted; and, as is gathered from that chapter 2, explaining his view further, he said that this proposition, taken in its propriety and

1164. Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 3, text 10; and likewise toward the end of book 3.

logical rigor, is true: "Every creature is God"; yet not conversely, "God is some creature." He rendered the reason according to principles of logic which he fabricated out of his own brain: because the name "creature" of itself signifies any created thing in itself and in its own proper genus; and so also when it is posited on the part of the predicate. But when it is posited on the part of the subject, it supposes for the creature according to intelligible being, as in that proposition, "A creature is God": because, according to the rule of the logicians, "subjects are such as they are determined by their predicates"; that is, subjects are determined and limited by the predicates themselves, which are as it were certain additaments of them. The same he says of any name of a creature in particular, as "man," "ass," etc. From this doctrine he conceded likewise this proposition, "Every creature lives in God," "is coeternal with God," and others of that sort.

This error Manichaeus seems to have taught, as Fulgentius indicates in the book of Replies to the Deacon Ferrandus, question 3, a little after the middle; and Walden openly testifies in the place cited, whom there likewise he himself at great length impugns; but we shall refute him in the following chapter. Moreover Augustine, tractate 1 on John, at those words, "What was made was life in him," strove only against the Manichaean to prove that a stone does not live - as he falsely thought on account of those words of John - but that the idea of the stone existing in God lives, which is God himself.[116511661167]

Caput II - The Catholic truth against Wyclif is proved

Therefore, that we may more clearly refute the error of John Wyclif and confirm the Catholic doctrine, it will be worthwhile to explain what mode of speaking is to be observed, and also what is to be thought concerning the thing itself.

First, as concerns the mode of speaking, I do not see how, according to the true doctrine of logic, that name "creature," or "man" and the like, whenever they are placed on the part of the subject, if the name "God" is placed on the part of the predicate, can be taken to suppose for the creature according to the intelligible and ideal being whereby a creature is said to be in God; whereas, when they are placed on the part of the predicate, and the name "God" on the part of the subject, they are not taken in this way, but for the thing itself considered in its proper genus. For that rule of the logicians, "subjects are such as they are determined by their predicates," is understood when the predicates are such as by that very fact to indicate that the subject is to be taken in a signification other than the common one in which it is used: as when we say, "Man is a name," on the part of the subject "man" is posited, not for the thing, but materially for the word itself. But if we say, "Man is an animal," that predicate does not draw the subject away from its common signification, whereby the word signifies the thing itself which is a man. Likewise, when we say, "Man is a species," the subject "man" does not signify individual men, as if we were to say, "Man is an animal," but the common nature. Predicates of this kind, which change the common signification of a name posited on the part of the subject, are names which the logicians call of second imposition, such as these

1165. Thomas Netter (of Walden), Doctrinale, lib. 10, lib. 1, art. 1, cap. 1 - 9.
1166. Council of Constance, sess. 15 (condemnations of John Hus, including Wyclif's propositions).
1167. St. Augustine, In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus 1, on John 1: "Quod factum est in ipso vita erat."

words "name," "word," "species," or "genus." When, however, on the part of the predicate there is a word of first imposition, that is, which signifies the thing itself, it does not change the common signification of the subject, which is posited for the thing itself signified: as in those propositions, "Man is an animal," "Man is not a stone." Therefore likewise in those propositions, "Man is God," "A creature is God," the predicate cannot extract the subject from its common signification, because it is a name of first imposition; or certainly the same would have to be said of these propositions, "God is a creature," "God is a stone," when the name "God" is put on the part of the subject, namely, that the predicate be understood according to that mode in which it can be predicated of God, to wit, according to intelligible being. For if a predicate of first imposition limits or varies the signification of the subject, it will likewise make the subject vary the predicate. Wherefore, if we inspect the propriety of speaking, the error is manifest in those propositions, "A stone is God," "Any creature whatsoever is God," unless that addition be expressly made: "according to intelligible or ideal being," placed on the part of the subject. But Wyclif erred in this, that he granted those propositions absolutely, not with an apposition; although he asserted that by force of those propositions that is always to be understood which we have set out above is to be added on the part of the subject. Yet he thereby thought that each creature in its proper genus is God; at least he did not expressly deny this.

Primum. The intelligible or ideal being of creatures in God is twofold. One is that which we call formal in the knower, namely, the very formal concept and expressed species by which the thing is known, which in God is nothing other than the one divine essence (*essentia*), insofar as it represents creatures; and according to this, as will be shown in the following disputation, the very divine essence is called the idea of creatures. In this way, a creature according to intelligible being is God himself; and in this sense every creature is said to live in God.

The other intelligible, or ideal, being of creatures in God is objective being, and ought to be explained in God after the same manner as in our cognition. For when I think Rome, there is in my intellect not only that quality which is called "cognition," by which the thing itself is represented, but also the very thing which I think, and which is represented by my cognition; that is, as something represented in the mind. For Rome, however great it is and corporeal, does not enter really into my small and spiritual mind; but it is only represented. Whence it is manifest that something other than the quality itself and the thought is contained within the mind or phantasy, namely, the thing thought - only in such wise that the cognition is present as a quality, while the thing represented is said to be there only objectively and by way of presence. Thus must we, so far as this mortal life permits, philosophize about the divine intellect: namely, that in it not only do we say there are the forms - which is the cognition, and the expressed species of all things, and the formal representations in the divine mind - but also that all creatures and all things known are objectively present; and that in him they have intelligible, or ideal, being.

Scotus calls this a certain diminished being in I, dist. 36, q. 1, in which being, he affirms, the very act of the divine intellect produces things from eternity; which mode of speaking later writers have censured more harshly than it deserves, perhaps not grasping his mind. For neither did he think that things have from eternity any real being outside their causes; but he therefore called that

being of theirs "diminished," because it is only objective being by the operation of the divine intellect. Nor does he deny that all things possible and future are objectively present to the eternal divine intellect.[1168]

This diminished being, together with Scotus, Walden concedes (loc. cit., c. 11), while Gabriel (Biel) variously and without success reproaches Scotus in I, dist. 3, q. 1; and many Thomists, seeking to oppose Scotus, have held that things have had from eternity that diminished being, understanding that being to be something real existing outside their causes - which Scotus never imagined - nor did he teach some act of existence midway between the non-being of the thing and its existence outside its proper causes; but only that possible being of creatures, according as from eternity they are objectively known by God.[116411691170]

Furthermore, Augustine in the same tractate on John, at those words "What was made was life in him," says that the stone, and all other things which were made by God, insofar as they are in him, have life in him; and thus, although absolutely it may be said by us, "the stone lives," nevertheless we must say with Augustine, "the stone lives in God": indeed, in that in which it lives God himself is the life by which it lives. Hence, whoever were to say "the creature, according to the ratio of the idea, is God himself," or "lives with the life of God," would not err; but if he were to say absolutely "according to ideal being it lives the life of God, or is God himself," a distinction must be applied. For "ideal being," or "intelligible being," can be taken in a twofold way, as has been said: either for the formal concept in the mind of the knower - namely, for the divine essence representing creatures, and then the sense would be sound - or for the objective being of the known thing; and then, since the objective being itself is not the thing's own formal essence, but only its representation in the knower, it will not follow that the creature is God, or that it lives the life of God, save by reason of that which is the very divine essence representing it. Therefore, it is better and safer to say with Augustine that creatures are better, and more well said, to live in God than to live God, and to be in God than to be God.

Disputatio LXXI - On ideas

Caput I - Preliminaries concerning the name "idea" and its reception; that ideas of creatures are in God

Before we address the question proposed, two things must briefly be premised. First: according to the doctrine received by all from Augustine, in the work on the Eighty-Three Questions, q. 46, the Greek ἰδέα is the same as what in Latin is "forms" (forma), not just any forms, but the prototype, after the likeness of which something is said to be made, which Augustine called the "original form," and which we commonly in created artisans call the "idea." For it is sufficiently

1168. Scotus, Ordinatio, I, dist. 36, q. 1.
1164. Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 3, text 10; and likewise toward the end of book 3.
1169. Thomas Netter (Walden), loc. cit., cap. 11.
1170. Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., dist. 3, q. 1 (criticizing Scotus).

manifest that that form by which someone conceives inwardly what he is to construct outwardly according to its likeness - so as to build a house or paint an image - is called the idea of the art. Second: without controversy all teach that the ideas of creatures are in the divine mind. Among the philosophers, thus Plato asserts this in the Timaeus; indeed, as Augustine says in that question 46, he was the first who invented the name "idea," though not the first who disputed concerning the matter. For, as Eusebius writes in book XI of the Preparation for the Gospel, Socrates was the first to discourse about ideas, from whom Plato received it - or rather, as Justin testifies in the Paraenetic Oration to the Greeks, he received it from Moses, when the Lord said in Exodus 25: "Look, and make according to the exemplar which was shown you on the mountain." Plato, however, is affirmed by Augustine in City of God XII, c. 26 to have asserted that the ideas are in the mind of God; wherefore either Aristotle did not understand Plato, or interpreted him malignly in order to attack him more freely, when he alleged that Plato posited the ideas as certain universal natures separated, by the participation of which singulars are produced; whereas from Plato's words this is not gathered. The same ideas to be in God are taught by Seneca, Epistle 66. Among the Fathers, in express words Pseudo-Dionysius, in De divinis nominibus, cap. 5, not far from the end; Augustine in the places cited; and in City of God XIV, c. 25; finally, in the Literal Commentary on Genesis, c. 15 and c. 14; and in book VI, q. 19 and q. 46; in which places that saying of John 1, "What was made was life in him," he refers to the ideas and the rationes of things existing in the divine mind. For this reason I do not see that anyone should doubt this mode of speaking.[1171]

What, however, the name "idea" signifies in something existing in God, not all the Schoolmen feel in the same way. The opinion of Scotus in I, dist. 3, q. 1, ad 1, is that, first, the ideas in the divine mind are the creatures themselves objectively existing in it, that is, that diminished being which was explained in the preceding disputation. Next, that the idea of creatures is not the very essence of God, even as it has the ratio of intellection and of a representation common in some respect to creatures. With Scotus agree Ockham in I, dist. 35, q. 5; and Gabriel, q. 5, art. 2, notab. 2, and the like. And they add that an idea is whatever of creatures according to objective being, but that it also connotes the divine essence, because in it they are represented. Their opinion Major de Richelieu judges more probable in the same distinction, q. 1, at the end; and with them sides Richard in I, dist. 36, a. 3, q. a., in this, that he teaches that among the other acceptations the idea can be taken in this way; yet he also concedes that the very divine essence admits the signification of "idea." Altogether, indeed, Durandus in I, dist. 36, q. 5, and Alliacensis in I, q. 6, a. 3, seem to have followed this sentence: for first they teach that creatures objectively existing in the divine mind are perfectly the ideas of things; and then they add that the divine essence is in some way the idea of creatures, but imperfectly: for if it be considered according to those perfections by which it is opposed to creatures as infinite and uncreated, it is in no way an idea, not even an imperfect idea - for in this respect creatures do not imitate it at all; but if according to other respects, such as wisdom, life, and the like, they say it is in some fashion an idea -

1171. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 5; St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XII, c. 26; XIV, c. 25; De Genesi ad litteram, c. 14 - 15; VI, q. 19; q. 46; Seneca, Epistula 66; Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica, XI; St. Justin Martyr, Oratio paraenetica ad Graecos; Exod. 25:40.

That the essence of God, not a thing objected to the divine intellect, is the idea, is the truer opinion.

Lastly it is urged by the testimony of St. Augustine, On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions, q. 46, where he says that a horse and a man are not constituted by the same reason, that is, not by the same idea. But if the divine essence were the idea, the idea of a man and of a horse - indeed, of all things - would be the same; therefore by the same reason a horse and a man would be constituted. [1172]

The Scholastics, indeed, whom we shall mention below - excepting certain recent authors who follow this opinion - do not so expressly affirm the former part; nevertheless they plainly teach that the idea of creatures is the very essence of God, from which it is manifestly gathered that they held that creatures existing objectively in the divine intellect are not ideas. More recent Thomists, however, not only say that the idea is the divine essence itself, but also expressly affirm that it is not possible for the creatures themselves to exist objectively in the divine mind, as Scotus asserted; and they charge the aforesaid opinion of Scotus with rashness, because it opposes without reason the common consent of the holy Fathers and Doctors. Yet they judge of it too harshly, both because not a few Scholastics, whom in the preceding chapter we reviewed, followed it, and because many testimonies of the Saints against it cannot be produced, as we shall see in this chapter; and also because the aforesaid authors handed down that opinion not without a probable foundation. For the three reasons alleged will not lack their own likelihood and force, as it will appear in the following disputation. Nor indeed, as some of the more recent authors think, does the opinion of Scotus have anything in common with the error of Wiclef, as is evident from what has been said; wherefore they wrongly confound it with his error.

Nevertheless, this opinion of Scotus and of others has always seemed to me less probable. Passing over many reasons of lesser weight that our theologians heap up, I will contend with a single argument, which not only refutes it as false and at the same time confirms our view, but even overturns its foundations as well. And although this argument directly refutes the former part of Scotus's opinion and also confirms the former part of our own, it nevertheless effectively recommends the latter part too. For if it has once been demonstrated that creatures objectively existing in the mind of God are not the ideas of things, it follows that the idea is the very divine essence; for nothing else seems to remain. The argument is as follows.

The idea is that exemplary form which, when the craftsman looks upon it, he produces something else after its likeness. When I say "something else," I indicate that the very thing produced by it must be distinct; for utterly the same thing cannot be the idea of itself, nor can it be its own principle through the intellect. For nothing is said to be made in the likeness of itself or according to its own likeness, but in the likeness of another and according to the likeness of that other. And thus we see that, in the first instance, the idea was said to be some object proposed outwardly to the eyes, which someone might imitate in his work. Wherefore, unless a created craftsman had either outwardly or in his mind some thing distinct, yet similar to the work which he

1172. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 46.

is going to make, he would not be said to have an idea or exemplar. For example, if some craftsman had a mind so keen that he saw the very thing he was going to make in precisely the way it would be in the future, and if by that cognition and concept he would make that very thing, he would not be said to have had it as the idea of that work, nor to have made it after its likeness; rather, he would have expressed in his work precisely the same thing that he had in his mind.

Now, however, every created craftsman conceives in his mind what he strives to execute in work, such that it is not the same, but different - yet similar in proportion, figure, and other such features. Just as when a craftsman builds a great house, he has either outwardly, or at least by knowledge, a certain small model of it; or even if he apprehends inwardly the great house itself, to the likeness of which he builds another, he never conceives it in the way in which he afterwards sees it produced. From this it is manifestly gathered that the thing apprehended in the mind of the created craftsman is different from the thing itself made or produced; and thus it is quite properly said that from the very fact of making he forms for himself a new and distinct "image" (idolum). Wherefore it is no wonder if that thing, confusedly conceived in the mind of the craftsman, after the likeness of which the work is to be made, is called the idea; but not so in the mind of God with respect to the very things themselves.

Obiectio. But someone will object in this way: In some respect the thing made and existing outside is distinguished from itself as objected to the divine intellect. For outside it has true real existence; in the intellect, however, it does not have this, but is only apprehended. Therefore this difference will suffice, so that a thing objectively existing in the intellect may be called the idea of itself, as it exists outwardly.

Responsio - I answer that this difference is nothing, such that a thing objected to the intellect should be called an idea.

Secunda conclusio. It remains now that we do the same concerning the latter part, proving against Scotus that the divine essence is the idea of all creatures - that which we said is the common tenet of the theologians. And this is first of all the opinion of St. Thomas, Cajetan, and the Thomists in this article; which is also followed by Alexander,[1173] Albert,[1173] St. Bonaventure,[1173] Giles, [1173] Dionysius,[1173] Capreolus,[1173] Thomas of Argentina,[1173] Ferrariensis on Contra Gentiles,[1173] and Henry of Ghent,[1173] who all agree in this one point.

1173. Alexander of Hales, I p., q. 23, m. 4, a. 1, throughout; Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 35, a. 9; St. Bonaventure, I, q. 1; Giles of Rome, d. 36, 2.2, q. 2, especially in the solutions to the arguments; Dionysius (as cited), q. 1; Capreolus, q. 1, a. 1, conclusion 1; Thomas de Argentina, q. 1, a. 1; Ferrariensis, In Contra gentiles, I, c. 54; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, lib. 9, q. 3.

1173. Alexander of Hales, I p., q. 23, m. 4, a. 1, throughout; Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 35, a. 9; St. Bonaventure, I, q. 1; Giles of Rome, d. 36, 2.2, q. 2, especially in the solutions to the arguments; Dionysius (as cited), q. 1; Capreolus, q. 1, a. 1, conclusion 1; Thomas de Argentina, q. 1, a. 1; Ferrariensis, In Contra gentiles, I, c. 54; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, lib. 9, q. 3.
1173. Alexander of Hales, I p., q. 23, m. 4, a. 1, throughout; Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 35, a. 9; St. Bonaventure, I, q. 1; Giles of Rome, d. 36, 2.2, q. 2, especially in the solutions to the arguments; Dionysius (as cited), q. 1; Capreolus, q. 1, a. 1, conclusion 1; Thomas de Argentina, q. 1, a. 1; Ferrariensis, In Contra gentiles, I, c. 54; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, lib. 9, q. 3.
1173. Alexander of Hales, I p., q. 23, m. 4, a. 1, throughout; Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 35, a. 9; St. Bonaventure, I, q. 1; Giles of Rome, d. 36, 2.2, q. 2, especially in the solutions to the arguments; Dionysius (as cited), q. 1; Capreolus, q. 1, a. 1, conclusion 1; Thomas de Argentina, q. 1, a. 1; Ferrariensis, In Contra gentiles, I, c. 54; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, lib. 9, q. 3.

...such that they teach, or at least clearly suppose, that the divine essence is itself the very idea of creatures, even if they are not sufficiently in agreement about the mode of explaining this opinion, as we shall report in the following disputation. And Richard also, in part, favors this, in I, d. 36, a. 3, q. 2, in that he asserts that the notion of idea can belong to the divine essence; but because he also teaches that it belongs to creatures objectively existing in the mind of God, he is not to be cited in favor of our position. The Major, however, in the place cited above, deems both opinions to be probable.

It is proved first by the authority of the passages of St. Augustine cited in the first chapter of this disputation: where, since he says that creatures live in God, that they are incorruptible, and exist in a much better way than in themselves, without doubt he understands the very divine essence, in so far as it is said to contain them by representation; as we openly drew from his words in the disputation above, chapter 3; but especially from book 6 of the Questions, question 26, and Tractate 1 on John, and City of God XI, chapter 29, where he teaches that the art and the idea of created things live in God with the very life of God, which, as we showed there, can be understood of nothing other than the very divine essence; and in that tractate he expressly proves, against the Manichee, that a stone does not live - as the Manichee falsely inferred from the words of John - but that its idea lives, which is God himself.[1174]

Second, it is proved from Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy III, meter 9, where he calls the idea which God has the supreme exemplar, although this also could in a certain way be explained of the very reality as represented and contained from eternity in the mind of God; for thus it seems in some respect to be the supreme exemplar.[1175]

Third, it is confirmed by Pseudo-Dionysius, who in On the Divine Names, chapter 5, says that the exemplars of things are in God, which Scripture calls predestinations and good wills and that which constitutes and makes all things. And he adds these words: "Just as God, who in his essence surpasses the things that are, both pre-established and brought into the light" - which all can be understood only of the very divine essence; for it is itself the good will, or the predestination, which

1173. Alexander of Hales, I p., q. 23, m. 4, a. 1, throughout; Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 35, a. 9; St. Bonaventure, I, q. 1; Giles of Rome, d. 36, 2.2, q. 2, especially in the solutions to the arguments; Dionysius (as cited), q. 1; Capreolus, q. 1, a. 1, conclusion 1; Thomas de Argentina, q. 1, a. 1; Ferrariensis, In Contra gentiles, I, c. 54; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, lib. 9, q. 3.

1173. Alexander of Hales, I p., q. 23, m. 4, a. 1, throughout; Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 35, a. 9; St. Bonaventure, I, q. 1; Giles of Rome, d. 36, 2.2, q. 2, especially in the solutions to the arguments; Dionysius (as cited), q. 1; Capreolus, q. 1, a. 1, conclusion 1; Thomas de Argentina, q. 1, a. 1; Ferrariensis, In Contra gentiles, I, c. 54; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, lib. 9, q. 3.

1173. Alexander of Hales, I p., q. 23, m. 4, a. 1, throughout; Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 35, a. 9; St. Bonaventure, I, q. 1; Giles of Rome, d. 36, 2.2, q. 2, especially in the solutions to the arguments; Dionysius (as cited), q. 1; Capreolus, q. 1, a. 1, conclusion 1; Thomas de Argentina, q. 1, a. 1; Ferrariensis, In Contra gentiles, I, c. 54; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, lib. 9, q. 3.

1173. Alexander of Hales, I p., q. 23, m. 4, a. 1, throughout; Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 35, a. 9; St. Bonaventure, I, q. 1; Giles of Rome, d. 36, 2.2, q. 2, especially in the solutions to the arguments; Dionysius (as cited), q. 1; Capreolus, q. 1, a. 1, conclusion 1; Thomas de Argentina, q. 1, a. 1; Ferrariensis, In Contra gentiles, I, c. 54; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, lib. 9, q. 3.

1173. Alexander of Hales, I p., q. 23, m. 4, a. 1, throughout; Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 35, a. 9; St. Bonaventure, I, q. 1; Giles of Rome, d. 36, 2.2, q. 2, especially in the solutions to the arguments; Dionysius (as cited), q. 1; Capreolus, q. 1, a. 1, conclusion 1; Thomas de Argentina, q. 1, a. 1; Ferrariensis, In Contra gentiles, I, c. 54; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, lib. 9, q. 3.

1174. St. Augustine, various loci: Disputation above, cap. 3; also Questions, book 6, q. 26; Tractates on John, tract. 1; City of God, XI, c. 29.

1175. Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, III, metrum 9.

constitutes and makes all things. However, Dionysius defines the idea through will, although formally it pertains to intellect, because even the will of God is rightly regulated by the idea itself and by intellect.[1176]

But on the contrary: to the confirmation I say that the divine essence, according to its existence (*esse*), is indeed in a certain way dissimilar to created things; nonetheless, because it represents all things, each creature is said to be made to its imitation, as we shall see in the following disputation; and this representation suffices for its truly to have the notion of idea. Finally, the testimony of St. Augustine alone proves the distinction of the notion of idea in regard to some particular thing: he distinguishes the divine essence, in so far as it is the idea of man, from itself, in so far as it is the idea of a horse, as will also be said there; and this is enough, if Augustine has said that man and horse are not conceived under the same ratio in God.

And at length Richard judges this opinion to be probable. But Cajetan says it is so true that he affirms it is not accidental to the divine essence to exist intrinsically in God so as to bear the true ratio of idea: for even on the impossible concession that it were present only objectively in the intellect of God, it would nonetheless truly have the ratio of idea; just as happens in a created artificer: for the object which the artificer proposes to himself, that by its likeness he may make another thing, is truly for him an idea and exemplary form. In God, however, although a possible creature thus apprehended of itself, as existing, cannot be idea (as was shown in the preceding disputation, because it is altogether the same as that thing; but the idea ought to differ from the work itself), nevertheless the divine essence, known as imitable, can be the idea of creatures, since it is distinguished from them; and it will be idea only for this reason, namely, in so far as it is objectively present to the divine intellect: therefore it is from elsewhere that it happens to exist intrinsically in God.[1177]

From all of which it may be gathered that what Alliacensis added, following the former opinion, is false: namely, that the notion of idea belongs to two of the Persons proceeding in the Trinity, to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, not to the Father nor to the divine essence. Indeed, he says that perhaps the notion of idea more properly belongs to those Persons than to creatures objectively existing [in the mind of God]: for he thinks that it belongs to the ratio of idea to be able to be produced; and because neither the divine essence nor the Father is produced, therefore he assigns that notion only to the Son and the Holy Spirit. He deduces this too from the same principle: for just as he said that creatures, known as producible, are the ideas of that which is to be produced; so also the Son and the Holy Spirit, known in the intellect under a possible existence, will be called the ideas of themselves, since they are to be produced. Therefore from what has been said it follows that this opinion is false, because if a creature previously apprehended is not idea of itself, as producible - as we have hitherto proved - so neither are the Son and the Holy Spirit idea of themselves: for the same reasoning obtains in both cases. Nor indeed did Alliacensis think that the Son and the Holy Spirit are the idea of any creature: for no one would say that unless he were an Arian; nor did Alliacensis dream of such a thing.

1176. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 5.
1177. Cajetan's clarification is in his commentary on Summa Theologiae I, q. 15, a. 2 (context of the ideas).

Now the foundations of the former opinion collapse easily. For to the first and the second argument of Scotus I reply: although in the mind of a created artificer the very thing objectively present is truly an idea, because it is a form in the likeness of which something is made, nevertheless in God it cannot be so. The reason for the difference is manifest, which we have set forth above in this chapter. Why, however, in the mind of the creating Artificer the Word and the Spirit, as expressed, are not the idea of the art, will also become clear in the following disputation.

Disputatio LXXII - By what reason the essence of God is the idea of creatures

Caput I - Various opinions of the Schoolmen

Since all the Doctors, in favor of the second opinion commemorated in the preceding disputation, with one voice proclaim that the idea of creatures in God is not creatures objectively present to him, but the very divine essence itself, nevertheless in unfolding this pronouncement they vary, nor do all teach things consistent with reason. It pleases me, then, to touch briefly upon the sense of each, so that we may be able to explain this matter more truly and more easily.

First opinion, that of Richard. Richard, in I, d. 36, q. 2, a. 2, among several acceptions of idea which he there reviews, affirms that the essence of God is the idea of creatures for this reason, that it is in reality distinct from them and imitable; and thus he attributes the notion of idea to the divine essence not in so far as it is understood as imitable, but without any order to the intellect. By contrast, St. Thomas, Cajetan, and other more recent Thomists, in article 2 of this question, and Giles in I, d. 36, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2, and Henry of Ghent in Quodlibet IX, q. 3, and Ferrariensis on Contra Gentiles I, chapter 54, teach much more probably that the notion of idea belongs to the divine essence in so far as God understands it as imitable by creatures: for thus it is compared to God as understanding, as a kind of word, or as a kind of intelligible species of creatures representing them, but in so far as it is some object known in a way imitable by creatures, it is the idea of them.[1178]

However, that opinion of Richard is false; this will be evident from what we shall say; both because the divine essence, as it is an object known and only the cause of creatures, is in no way imitable unless in so far as it is cause by cognition; and also because it can be the idea of creatures only for the reason that it is cognition and their word; but in this way it is not something accidental to the essence, that it be in God.

Now since we have that the essence of God is idea in that respect in which it is referred to the intellect, as imitable, it is still difficult to explain how it is imitable by creatures, which seem altogether opposed to it...[1179]

1178. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 15, a. 2; Cajetan ad loc.; Giles of Rome, In I Sent., d. 36, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IX, q. 3; Ferrariensis (Francisco de Ferrara), In Contra gentiles, I, c. 54.

1179. The continuation and fuller explanation are taken up in the next chapter of this disputation.

St. Thomas, Giles, and others. On this matter St. Thomas and St. Giles say nothing explicitly. But Henry, Cajetan, Ferrara, and other more recent Thomists cited above say that all creatures are made to the imitation of the divine essence, because in it every perfection of theirs is contained by an eminent rationale, although not formally; and they judge that this is sufficient for it to be the idea of them all: by looking upon it as eminently containing the perfections of creatures, God is said truly to produce any creature after its likeness.

Refellitur primo. Yet this position, if it rests only on the principles thus laid down, seems weak. For when it first asserts that the essence of God by power and by eminent rationale contains any perfection of a creature, it understands the perfections of creatures to be in God as in an equivocal cause, because he can produce them, not by the power of a form of the same rationale which he has in himself, but by reason of a higher nature - just as the sun can produce heat, not by heat, which is a form of the same rationale, but by light, which belongs to a higher nature - which is for the perfection of the creature to be in God eminently, not formally. But on this rationale the essence of God cannot be an idea, just as neither can the light of the sun be assumed as an exemplar form for producing heat. For as no intellect, however perspicacious, by looking at light would be said to produce heat after its likeness, and therefore to have it as the idea of heat, so neither can any intellect, by looking at the essence of God - on the ground that it eminently contains the perfections of creatures - have it as the idea and exemplar form of them. For either the intellect looks at what is formally in the divine essence - and this is altogether dissimilar to creatures; therefore to its imitation no creature can be made - or it looks at that which is in the essence of God eminently, namely the created perfection itself; and this cannot be an idea to the divine intellect: for thus the creature, objectively present to God, would be the idea of itself; therefore we should fall into the position of Scotus and of others impugned in the preceding disputation. And certainly, second, from an inconvenience: if the divine essence, insofar as it contains creatures as seed, were their idea, it would be an idea more imperfect than it could be; for the greater perfection of an idea consists in this, that it be imitable in a more perfect mode: but the essence in this way is imperfectly imitable, since it is only made like to the effect according to that which it contains by power, not according to that which is formally in it.

But if someone should say that the essence of God, insofar as it is cognition and the expressed species of creatures, is their idea in the mind of God, and that creatures are produced after its likeness, because God is their cause by his intellection, insofar as he knows them, not by his substance, insofar as it is - surely this is most true, as we shall demonstrate in the following chapter. Yet that this is not the view of Cajetan, or Henry, is manifest: for when they assert that the essence of God, known as imitable, is the idea of things, they speak of it insofar as it is the primary object of God's cognition, not insofar as it is cognition itself, or the expressed species, or the word of creatures. Then, when Cajetan says that the divine essence, insofar as it is known, for this reason alone would be an idea, even if it were not formally but only objectively in God himself, he plainly speaks of it not as it is cognition of creatures, but as it is a thing only known and the primary object. For if, insofar as it is cognition, it were not in God, it could not itself be the idea of creatures, as is sufficiently clear: therefore he speaks of the divine essence, not insofar as it is cognition, but

insofar as it is, and insofar as by its substance it is the efficient principle of creatures and the primary object of the divine intellect. But on this rationale it has been sufficiently proved that it cannot be an idea imitable by creatures.

The divine essence, insofar as it is cognition and a likeness as it were expressed of creatures, to be their idea, is the more probable opinion.

It is therefore established that the divine essence, insofar as it represents creatures - because it is their cognition, or word - is their idea. For by this rationale alone can creatures imitate it and be made after its likeness. Wherefore the likeness required between an idea and the thing of which it is the idea will not be according to the unity of the same form, as between two white things, but according to representation, as a species or word of some thing is said to be a likeness of that thing, even though at times they are far different in nature and quality.

This view is taught expressly by St. Bonaventure in I Sent., d. 35, a. 1, q. 1, in the body, and by Capreolus; and is gathered from St. Thomas in I Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, and from St. Thomas below, q. 19, a. 4, where he teaches that things are in God as in a cause, according to the mode of a cause; and because he is a cause through the intellect, therefore [they are] in God as in a knower. Therefore, if, as the Thomists admitted, the divine essence is the idea of creatures insofar as it has them eminently in itself as a cause, and is their cause as [one who] knows, it follows by this rationale that it is their idea; and in this sense that statement ought to be explained in this question, article 2, in the solution to the first objection, when he says that the essence of God is the idea of creatures, insofar as it is a likeness or rationale of this or that thing; and in the same way he is to be understood in the body of the article, where he says that the essence of God is the idea of creatures, insofar as it is participable according to some mode of likeness, that is, of representation. [1180] The Thomists, however, were deceived in that they thought that God is the proximate cause of all things by his essence, insofar as it is, not insofar as he understands and wills; which we shall show to be plainly false in disputation 81. Therefore they maintain that in his essence, insofar as it is, the perfections of creatures are contained, as in a cause, by a certain more eminent rationale, and thus [that it is] in some manner imitable by creatures. Hence they also taught above in disputation 60 that God beholds a creature in himself as in a cause, insofar as he is. But since, as we proved there, in that way God could not see creatures in himself, therefore it is necessary that he only behold them in himself as in a mirror, that is, as in the expressed species of them; and because, as we shall say below in disputation 81, God is the proximate cause of creatures through intellect and will, insofar as he understands and wills, not insofar as he is, by stronger reason we must say that his essence is only the idea of creatures, insofar as it is their cognition, and that in this way it is most perfectly imitable.

Moreover, that we may understand this better, the doctrine of St. Bonaventure in the place cited is to be noted, who says that between two things three kinds of likeness can be conceived. The first is of participation; he understands it according to a univocal rationale, whereby each thing formally

1180. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 35, a. 1, q. 1, in corp.; Capreolus; St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1; gathered also from St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 19, a. 4.

participates, and this can in no way obtain between God and a creature. The second is of imitation; and this he says is small between God and created things; he understands it according to an analogical rationale, on account of which Durandus in the preceding disputation taught that the essence of God can be the idea of creatures, yet imperfect and only according to some perfections, not according to all. The third, says Bonaventure, is likeness according to expression and representation, such as is between an intelligible or sensible species and the thing itself, or object; for although they are wholly diverse in rationale as to existence, nevertheless by representation and expression they are assimilated. Now this kind of likeness is the more perfect, the more the species itself, or intellection of the thing, is more expressive and proper; and if it be quidditative and of the thing as such, it will be most perfect in its genus of likeness. And since the divine essence in a most perfect way and to the life understands things by a proper and quidditative concept, so that its essence, because it is itself the cognition and the expressed species of creatures, most perfectly represents them, it follows that by this kind of likeness it is most perfectly imitable by them; for thus are they altogether in reality produced, as the divine essence represents them.

I judge this opinion, thus explained, to be much more probable than the others: first, because no other way seems to remain by which, according to the doctrine of the holy Fathers and of the philosophers, we may say that there are ideas of things in the mind of God, as is clear from the refutation of other opinions; second, because by this way there is excellently explained the kind of imitation and perfect likeness which can exist between God and creatures with the necessary distinction between idea and thing, so that the divine essence may be called their idea and exemplar form imitable by them.

But someone will object. If this were so, it would follow that the idea in the mind of a created artisan would not be a thing objectively present to it, as was concluded above in the disputation, but the very word or expressed species. Yet in neither case is it proved that the word itself or the expressed species can be an idea: for an idea seems to be that exemplar form which someone, by looking upon it, fashions another after its likeness. But God is not said so to look upon his own essence, insofar as it is the word of creatures, that by force of this gaze he should do anything in imitation of it; for neither because he looks at his essence, as it is the expressed species of creatures, does he make them, but insofar as he looks at the creatures themselves by his essence as by a species, he immediately produces them. And this is proved much more easily about the word existing in the mind of the artisan: for no artisan, looking at a quality which he has in the thing itself, but only looking at the thing set before him under that quality, makes some work.

I answer: there is a difference between the word itself, or the expressed species in the mind of the artisan, and the divine essence insofar as it is the species and word of creatures. For the word itself in the mind of the artisan is not such that in it the thing be seen and that the artisan operate after its likeness; but by some reflexion it can be known, yet imperfectly: whereas the essence of God is surely first seen by God, because in it, as in a word and species, creatures are seen by God, as was explained above in the disputation. Wherefore an artisan, when he is said to work by an interior idea, ought not first by a reflex operation to intend or to know his own word, but only the thing itself which he apprehends, after whose likeness he ought to exercise the work. But God, in

order to know the creatures which he is about to make, first contemplates his own essence, in which they are, as it were, expressed by a word; because the divine essence is both the primary object, and the word or the species of a secondary object, that is, of creatures. And since, from the fact that the essence of God makes God himself to be one who understands himself, it also renders him one who understands creatures, as we said at article 10, therefore that gaze by which God beholds his own essence seems to be suitable to the notion of idea, so that by looking first to it he is then said to make creatures after its likeness as to expression and representation. Then I answer that it does not belong to the notion of idea that, the artisan looking upon it, he actually perform the work; rather, it suffices that the artisan, or God, have in himself some form which is the principle of a work through the intellect, and that he express the work itself according to the imitation and likeness of that form, in this or that way, whether according to the unity of the same form univocally, or according to representation, as was said. Nevertheless, I do not say that two words are made in the artisan's mind, but that the very object which he proposes to imitate makes the idea. The reason, moreover, why the divine essence is the idea of creatures is not that it is objectively present. The reason, however, for the distinction is manifest, because to the notion of idea there is required also a work which imitates it, proximately or remotely. Now the artisan's work proximately imitates the thing objectively present to the intellect: for that is distinguished from the work, and the intellect from the intelligible; the species, or intellection, is by its nature apt to be denominated as being, as it were, assimilated to its object. Therefore the work imitates only remotely the word or the species existing in the artisan's mind, according to that representation by which it is proximately assimilated. Hence the idea of the work is the work expressly exhibited by the artisan, not the expressed species or the word of that work. But since any creature whatsoever, which is the work of the supreme artisan God, does not imitate an object present to the divine intellect - for this is the creature itself as apprehended in the very mode in which it will be - and therefore does not imitate the species, on this account the objection is removed that what is present to God is not the idea of the creature to be produced. Therefore it follows that whatever creature is to be produced by God imitates the divine essence as it is the expressed species or his word, which it principally has before it, since nothing else existing in the mind of God can be more closely imitated by a thing to be produced.

I confess indeed that the holy Doctor indicates this point somewhat obscurely, namely that the idea in the created artisan's mind is the species of the work which the intellect expresses; not so much that it is something objectively present, as that it is a quality after the manner of a form which we call the word. Yet without doubt the very word is the idea in the artisan's mind; and of this opinion is St. Thomas, as we showed in disputation 39 - to say what seems true. From this doctrine it is gathered, first, that the notion of idea properly is common to the three persons, just as the essence is common: for this is the idea of creatures, which not the Son alone is said properly to bring about, nor is the Father alone said to have made; but through, as it were, the medium of the idea. Yet the notion of idea is attributed to the Son alone according to appropriation, just as the Holy Spirit is called the principle of grace; and in the same way the production of the world is attributed to the Father alone through the Son as through an idea, because art and idea pertain

formally to the intellect, by which the Son is begotten, and the effect of grace to love, by which the Holy Spirit proceeds. Thus also you will understand what St. Thomas says below, q. 45, a. 8, where he teaches that the Son of God is fittingly appropriated as the principle of creatures, since he proceeds through the intellect; for in the reply to the second he says that to the Son alone, by appropriation, belongs the rationale of art and of idea.[1181]

I answer that there is a difference between the word itself, or the expressed species in the mind of the artisan, and the divine essence inasmuch as it is the species and word of creatures: for the word itself in the mind of the artisan is not seen, so that in it the thing may be seen and the artisan may work after its likeness, but it can be known by a certain reflex act, though imperfectly; whereas the essence of God itself is assuredly first seen by God, in which, as in a word and species, creatures are seen by God; as was explained in disputation 60. Wherefore, in order that the artisan be said to work by an interior idea, he ought not first by a reflex operation to gaze upon or know his word, but only upon the thing itself which he apprehends, after the likeness of which the external work ought to be made; but God, in order to know the creatures which he is going to make, first beholds his own essence, in which, as in a word, they are expressed, because the divine essence is at once the primary object, and the word or species of a secondary object, that is, of creatures. And since from the fact that the essence of God makes God himself intelligent of himself, it also renders him intelligent of creatures, as we said in that article 6; therefore that gaze by which God beholds his essence seems to conduce to the rationale of the idea, so that, looking first to it, he is then said to make creatures after its likeness, as to expression and representation.

Then I answer that it does not belong to the rationale of the idea that the artisan, looking to it, be said to imitate it by the work itself as proceeding from such a gaze: but it suffices if the artisan, or God, have in himself some form which is the principle of work through the intellect, and express it to the imitation and likeness of that form in this or that way, whether according to the univocal unity of the form, or according to representation, as was said above: nonetheless, I say that the word in the mind of the artisan is not the idea, but rather the very object which he sets before himself to imitate most closely, not, meanwhile, that the idea be the object; but in God his essence is the idea of creatures, not the thing itself objectively present. The reason for the difference is manifest, because to the rationale of the idea it is also required that the work made imitate it proximately, not remotely: but every work of the artisan imitates most closely the thing objectively present to the intellect; for that is distinguished from the work, and the work is assimilated to the intellect by reason of the very thing objected to it, as was said in the preceding disputation; but the work imitates only remotely the word, or the species existing in the mind of the artisan, by reason of the thing represented, to which it is proximately similar. Therefore the idea of the work is the thing apprehended by the artisan, not the expressed species, or the word of it. But because any creature whatsoever, which is the work of the highest artisan, God, does not imitate the thing objectively present to the divine intellect - for this is the creature itself apprehended in the same way as the very thing is going to be, and the same does not imitate itself - therefore that thing objectively present to God is not the idea of the creature to be produced. It comes about, then, that

1181. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 8.

any creature produced by God imitates the divine essence, inasmuch as it is an expressed species, or his word, and holds this as an idea, since nothing else existing in the mind of God can be more closely imitated by the thing produced.

I admit indeed that the holy Doctor in article 2 of this question, to the second reply, not obscurely indicates that the idea in the mind of a created artisan is the form, or species, which the intellect expresses: yet he taught this because he elsewhere also thought that that which is understood is not the thing objectively present, but the inwardly formed quality, which we call the word. Thus, without doubt, the word itself would be the idea in the mind of the artisan; and that St. Thomas held this opinion we showed in disputation 39; but whether it be true was said there. From this doctrine it is gathered, first, that the rationale of the idea is properly common to the three persons, just as the essence is common: for by this the idea of creatures is; wherefore not the Son alone is properly called the idea, nor is the Father alone said to have made this universe looking to the idea, that is, to the Son; but to the Son alone, according to appropriation, is the rationale of idea attributed, just as to the Holy Spirit it is attributed to be the principle of grace; and in the same way to the Father alone is attributed the production of the world through the Son as through an idea, because art and idea pertain formally to the intellect, by which the Son is begotten, and the effect of grace pertains to love, by which the Holy Spirit proceeds. Thus is St. Thomas to be understood below, q. 45, a. 8, where he teaches that it befits the Son of God, by the power of his generation, to be the principle of creatures, since he proceeds through the intellect: for in the reply to the second he says that to the Son alone, by appropriation, belongs the rationale of the word of the artisan's mind, and of the idea of the causes to be produced; which will be explained more fully in its place.[1182]

Secondly it follows that the ideas are in God formally, not only virtually and eminently: for although created things are in God only virtually, or objectively, not formally, these nevertheless are not ideas of the divine intellect, but the very essence of the Godhead itself, which is in God formally, is called idea.

Thirdly it is inferred that the name Idea signifies not only the essence of God, but a respect to creatures, which, according to the common doctrine, which we shall hand down in disputation 104, chapter 6, cannot be real, but of reason.

1182. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 8.

Articulus II - Whether there are many ideas

Objicitur that there are not many ideas. For the idea in God is his essence: but the essence of God is only one, therefore the idea also is one.

1. Further, as the idea is a principle of knowing and of working, so are art and wisdom; but in God there are not many arts and wisdoms: therefore neither are there many ideas. If it be said that the ideas are multiplied according to respects to diverse creatures. On the contrary, plurality of ideas is from eternity: if therefore the ideas are many, but the creatures are temporal, then the temporal will be the cause of the eternal.
2. Further, these respects are either according to the thing in creatures only, or also in God: if in creatures only, since creatures are not from eternity, there will not be from eternity a plurality of ideas, if they are multiplied only according to such respects. But if they are really in God, it follows that there is in God another real plurality than the plurality of persons: which is against Damascene saying that in divine things all are one, except ingeneration, generation, and procession.[1183] Therefore there are not many ideas.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in the book 83 Questions: "The ideas are certain principal forms, or rationes, of things, stable and unchangeable: because they themselves are not formed, and therefore are eternal, and always in the same way disposed, which are contained by the divine intelligence; yet although they neither arise nor perish, according to them, nevertheless, everything is said to be formed which can arise and perish, and everything which arises and perishes."[1184]

I answer that it is necessary to posit many ideas. For the understanding of this, one must consider that in any effect that is the ultimate end is properly intended by the principal agent: as the order of an army by the general. But that which is best among existing things is the good of the order of the universe, as is clear from the Philosopher in the twelfth of the Metaphysics.[1185] Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and does not come about per accidens according to a succession of agents, as some said, that God created only the first created thing, which created a second creature, and so on, until so great a multitude of things was produced: according to which opinion God would have had only the idea of the first creature. But if the order of the universe itself is per se created by him and intended by him, it is necessary that he have the idea of the order of the universe. Now the rationale of any whole cannot be had unless there are had the proper rationes of the things out of which the whole is constituted. Thus an architect could not conceive the form of a house unless with him there were the proper rationale of each of its parts. So, therefore, it is necessary that in the divine mind there be proper rationes of all things. Whence St. Augustine says in the same book 83 Questions that singulars were created by

1183. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, lib. 1, cap. 8; cf. cap. 10, cap. 11.

1184. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 46 (medio), tom. 4: "Ideae sunt principales quaedam formae..."

1185. Aristotle, Metaphysics, lib. 12.

God by their proper rationes: whence it follows that in the divine mind there are many ideas. How this does not conflict with the divine simplicity is easy to see, if one considers that the idea of the thing to be made is in the mind of the maker, as the thing understood, not however as the species by which it is understood, which is the form making the intellect in act. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Nor is it against the simplicity of the divine intellect that it understand many things, but it would be against its simplicity if it were formed by many species. Hence there are many ideas in the divine mind, as understood by him. This can be seen in this way. He perfectly knows his own essence: whence he knows it according to every mode by which it is knowable. But it can be known not only according as it is in itself, but according as it is participable according to some mode of likeness by creatures. And each creature has its proper species, according as it in some manner participates in the likeness of the divine essence. Thus, therefore, inasmuch as God knows his essence as thus imitable by such a creature, he knows it as the proper rationale and idea of this creature. And similarly of the others. And thus it is clear that God understands many proper rationes of many things, which are many ideas.

Reply to the first: The idea does not name the divine essence inasmuch as it is essence, but inasmuch as it is the likeness or rationale of this or that thing. Whence according as there are many rationes understood from one essence, according to this there are said to be many ideas.

Reply to the second: Wisdom and art are signified as that by which God understands; but idea, as that which God understands. But God by one intellect understands many things, and not only according as they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood: which is to understand many rationes of things. As the artisan, when he understands the form of the house in matter, is said to understand the house; but when he understands the form of the house as conceived by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he understands the idea or rationale of the house. But God not only understands many things by his essence, but also understands that he understands many things by his essence: and this to understand is that there be many rationes of things, or many ideas, in his intellect, as understood.

Reply to the third: These respects by which the ideas are multiplied are not caused by the things, but by the divine intellect comparing his essence to things.

Reply to the fourth: The respects multiplying the ideas are not in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real respects, like those by which the persons are distinguished, but respects of the intellect by God.

The conclusion of the article is affirmative, which, by a single disputation together with the whole doctrine of the article, we shall briefly explain: besides this, there is nothing in this article which needs any further explanation.

Disputatio LXXIII - How in God there are many ideas

- In God there are many ideas distinguished only by reason. Caput I.

- The ideas in God are not distinguished by the divine intellect, nor by the human intellect seeing God, but only by that of the wayfarer. Caput II.
- In God there are not said to be many arts or sciences as there are said to be many ideas. Caput III.

Caput I - In God there are many ideas distinguished only by reason

The difficulty proposed has place only in that opinion which we followed in the preceding disputation: namely, that the idea of creatures in God is the very essence of God. For if the sentence of Scotus were true, which says that the ideas are the creatures themselves existing objectively in God, without doubt they would be many.

... that he understands himself to understand; therefore he understands many things by his essence, and this - to understand that there are in his intellect, as understood, many notions or many ideas.

Reply to the third: Those respects by which the ideas are multiplied are not caused by the things, but by the divine intellect comparing its essence with creatures.

Reply to the fourth: The respects multiplying the ideas are not in the things, but in God. They are not, however, the respects by which the persons are distinguished, but respects of the intellect.

The conclusion of the article is affirmative, which we shall briefly explain in a single disputation with chapters; besides this there is nothing in this article that needs any exposition.

On divine ideas

... In what way there are many ideas in God ...

... Caput I ...

From all these authors at least let us gather as certain that in God there are many ideas not distinguished by nature, but only by reason, whether one speak in this or that mode. Moreover, without any additional refinement I do not at all doubt that one can say in God that there are many ideas no less than many ideal notions; for by either mode of speaking there is denoted some order to a distinct intellect, because the name "idea" is relative, and signifies the essence of God - but as related to creatures. And since that relation is of reason, it is said to be multiple in God in the sense in which it is signified by this name; thus there is no reason why we should shrink from the common way of speaking and rather concede that in God there are many ideas of things, than a single idea of many things, as Albert used to say; for we always speak according to our way of naming and conceiving, just as we commonly say that there are many attributes in God. And indeed St. Augustine calls them many when he says in the book of 83 Questions, q. 46: "one notion of the horse, another of the man"; and Pseudo-Dionysius, in that chapter of the Divine Names not far from the end, when he calls the ideas and exemplars of things in God "good wills" and "predestinations."[1186]

Ideas in God are not distinguished by the divine intellect, nor by the human seeing God, but by the wayfarer only.

Caput II - Ideas in God are not distinguished by the divine intellect, nor by the human seeing God, but by the wayfarer only

But among the authors who say that the ideas in God are distinguished only by the operation of the intellect, it does not sufficiently agree whether they are distinguished by the divine intellect, or only by the human. Thomas of Argentina plainly teaches that the distinction of ideas does not come from the human intellect, but only from the divine.[1187] He proves it, indeed, because that which distinguishes cannot be posterior to that which is distinguished; but the ideas are eternal, and the human intellect temporal - therefore they cannot be distinguished by it. All the other arguments are of the same stamp, which can readily be dispelled with a single solution. For they themselves, and others whom we shall enumerate, teach that the divine intellect distinguishes in its essence diverse respects by which the ideas are multiplied; and they teach that nothing prevents God from understanding himself in this way, just as he sees that he is also understood by wayfarers.

To the same view adhere, in part, other theologians not of the least name, when they assert indeed that the ideas are distinguished by the divine intellect, yet do not deny that they can also be distinguished by us. Thus teach Henry, Quodlib. 9, q. 1; Aegidius in the question cited in the preceding chapter, to the first; Capreolus on I, dist. 36, q. 1, art. 1, near the end, to the third, against the second conclusion; and even St. Thomas in this article, ad 2 and ad 3; Cajetan and other recent authors there; more clearly, Contra Gentiles I, c. 54; and Ferrar there. Others too favor this, whom we shall recall in Disputation 118, who teach that the attributes in God are distinguished not only by our reason but also by the divine intellect.[1188]

Yet, in expounding this opinion, the cited Doctors do not agree. For Cajetan - whom some recent authors follow - thinks that the divine essence is distinguished into many ideas, inasmuch as God understands it even by a direct act, yet compared with creatures, that is, as imitable by them. For thus, while by a direct act he apprehends it as imitable by creatures, in it there arises a manifold respect of reason, which is called "ideal." But St. Thomas in that solution to the first objection says that by a direct act God understands his essence, and the creatures in their cause; but when he knows that he understands many things by his essence, he also understands in his intellect many notions of things, or many ideas. By these words he seems to teach that the ideal relations in God arise by a reflex act, when God understands his essence as compared with creatures - and this seems easy to prove. For just as, when by a direct act the human nature is

1186. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 46; Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. ... (near the end).

1187. Thomas de Argentina, q. 1, art. 1 (in principio).

1188. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IX, q. 1; Aegidius, loc. cit.; Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 36, q. 1, art. 1; St. Thomas, here ad 2 and ad 3; Cajetan, and others; cf. Contra Gentiles I, c. 54; Ferrar; see also the authors recalled in Disputatio 118 who teach that the attributes in God are distinguished not only by our reason but also by the divine intellect.

understood by us as abstracted from singulars, it does not yet have a respect of reason until we understand it by a reflex act as already understood, so also the divine essence does not yet have the respect of an ideal relation until by a reflex act it is understood as understood.

When we say that a relation of reason arises through a reflex act, we mean whenever that relation arises from the fact that the thing is known as from its foundation: as when a thing is first understood and known to have been understood beforehand, it is then conceived with that respect of reason toward the intellect, by which it is said to be understood - this indeed comes to be by a reflex act. But if a relation of reason arises through the intellect comparing some thing with others which in reality are not referred to them, that relation of comparison does not arise by a reflex act, but by a direct one, by which a thing is compared with another: just as when I conceive God as Creator compared with the creature, I conceive him with a respect which is not real but of reason, having being only through the intellect: thus, therefore, if God were to understand his essence as related to creatures as imitable by them, in that same direct act he would conceive in his essence a respect which would have only such being as to be known.

In this same way - namely, by a direct yet comparative act - there arises a relation of reason in a universal nature for the sole reason that it is conceived by one concept as if one superior to many, with which, as common, it is compared; nor is there need of a reflex act that it be known as previously known, so that such a respect be said to be had in act. For if the intellect compares that nature to inferiors, by that very fact it understands it in act as related - not by a real relation, as is manifest - therefore constituted through the intellect; and since a relation of reason is said to be only in act while it is known, then it will be in act when that thing is compared by the intellect. Moreover, this cognition by which a nature is compared cannot be a simple apprehension, but is a composition; for then the intellect compares when it sees that the nature is in many and agrees with them; but then to "see that it is in many" is when by predication it is conferred and compared with others.

Yet I think that, if the opinion of those were true who assert that the divine essence is distinguished by the divine intellect into many ideas by a direct act, it would need to be said that it is distinguished by reason. For - so says Cajetan - God would understand it as imitable by creatures and, as it were, as related to them. For by the very fact that he conceives it with an order to creatures, it is objected and is known along with a relation to them; and because it is understood as imitable in diverse modes, it is understood with various relations, and hence it is distinguished into many ideas.

Furthermore, I hold that no distinction or relation of reason, which does not befit God by nature of the thing, can befit him through his intellect; this indeed will be expressly proved below in Disputation 118, c. 3. For no distinction of reason or respect is made by an intellect conceiving a thing as it is by a proper and quidditative concept. For he who conceives as distinct what are really individual, and as related what are in reality absolute, does not form a proper concept of the thing. Since, therefore, God by his knowledge so perfectly understands all things as they are, that he in no way at all alters them in his mind, it cannot be - without great imperfection - that he distinguish by reason what are not distinguished in the thing itself, and refer what in reality are not referred.

And although God most perfectly knows that his attributes are distinguished by us, and that some are to be conceived by us as related which in reality are absolute, yet by his intellect they are not presented as they are to us: just as he also himself understands that we know spiritual things by alien concepts, he nevertheless does not form for himself those imperfect concepts of things which we have. It remains, therefore, that we believe the many ideas in God to be distinguished by reason, and the many ideal respects, by our regarding God through the intellect of the wayfarer, not by the divine intellect, nor even by the intellect of one seeing God, inasmuch as he would clearly behold God; as by the same reasoning is gathered, and we shall say more at the place cited. Wherefore this name "idea," which has been imposed by us, by our mode of understanding signifies in God a respect of our reason; and hence above we said that, absolutely speaking, one can concede that there are many ideas in God.

What Thomas of Argentina asserted to prove that the ideas in God cannot be distinguished by our intellect is frivolous. For when we say that there are in God many ideas, we do not mean that they are distinguished by an eternal act, but that from eternity it can be that they be distinguished, if there stand an intellect which compares the essence of God, as imitable by many creatures, with those creatures; and thus, the logician discursively considering, there are in God many ideas from eternity fundamentally, not formally; and the same is to be said of every respect of reason which we attribute to God in time, whenever the foundation is eternal, though not when it is temporal, as we noted also at q. 14, art. 1.

Caput III - In God there are not said to be many arts, or sciences, as there are said to be many ideas

The Scholastics who made mention of this matter, without any controversy, affirm that in God there are not to be said many sciences or arts, even if many ideas are said; they differ, however, in assigning the reason.

First, Alexander, I part, question 23, m. 4, art. 1, alone delivered this reason: because art and science are on the part of the knower and the artificer; but the ideas rather on the part of the things. This reason St. Thomas seems to have further explained in this article, ad 4, namely: because art and wisdom signify as that by which God understands; but the idea signifies that which is understood. Therefore the ideas are rather on the part of the things; but science and art on the part of the knower and artificer. And since God is said by one act to know and to understand all things, therefore his science, wisdom, and art are said to be one; but because he understands many things, in his essence it has the character of an idea; and thus he is said to have many reasons of ideas. This reason is followed also by St. Bonaventure, in I, dist. 35, art. 1, q. 3; by Richard, dist. 36, art. 2; by Durandus, quaest. 4, ad 2, in the first solution; which reason he brings as an argument - yet it does not altogether please me. For one idea is not a thing known, but the very cognition of God, as also from the mind of St. Thomas we showed in Disputation 71, c. 4. Moreover, since both science and idea connote a respect of reason to known objects, therefore, just as the ideal respects

are multiplied from the things and so many ideas are said, why then is not multiplied from the things also that respect whereby there would be many sciences and arts, whereas yet science in God is said to be one?

Second, Aegidius, in I, dist. 36, art. 2, q. 4, ad 4, replies that therefore there are many ideas in God because an idea in its complete formal notion includes a respect to creatures, and thus, by the multiplication of relations, many ideas are said. But science, or art, principally signifies the divine essence, and thus it is said that the respect of reason is from the notion of that, although philosophers commonly say that created science is a quality; the respect, however, is connoted as something that is outside the notion and essence of that. But I for my part do not see this difference, for in the same way the very essence of God in itself is science as it is idea of things; and each, in our mode of naming, is signified with a relation, just as it is also conceived. Why then should the connoted respect more belong to the formal notion of the idea than to the notion of science, so that by it ideas are multiplied, whereas science and art are said to be only one? Moreover, created science, which in reality is referred to its object, is indeed a quality, but one which by its nature is referred to another; only by our reason do we distinguish it into the absolute and the relation, even if in reality these two are not distinct; and we place it in two distinct predicaments. For the distinction and plurality of the predicaments, as we shall say in Disputation 116 and 118, are not to be taken from things really or by their nature distinct, but can be multiplied by our reason alone; just as under the same predicament there are also various predicates constituted as distinct by reason alone.[1189]

Thirdly, therefore, the one, and best, reason why only one science and art are predicated of God, although many ideas are predicated, is that the plurality of ideas is to be taken from the plurality of material objects which are the works of art; but the distinction of science and of art is to be thought of not from the plurality of material objects, but from the diversity of the formal object and of the mode of knowing or proceeding. And this is so true that, although many judge that each science in us is not a simple and single quality, because it is conversant about various conclusions and material objects, nevertheless all grant that one or more qualities are only one science, if they have the same formal object and the same mode of knowing or proceeding; and all think the same of art. And since in us one and the same is called an art which produces many works, because it proceeds in the same way in all the works, nonetheless it contains under itself many exemplars and ideas: just as the same painter, because he proceeds in the same way in all things, is said to have one art; but because, while he makes each work, he beholds various forms, after the likeness of which he paints other images, he is said to have many ideas or exemplars. This, however, must be understood if one takes art for a habit: for sometimes it is taken for the very idea of the art, since it belongs to the art; as Aristotle took it in Metaphysics XII, chapter 4, text 24. Therefore, if the idea is multiplied, art too will be said to be multiplied - but as a particular art, not as the general art which is a habit.[11901191]

1189. Alexander of Hales, I p., q. 23, m. 4, art. 1; St. Thomas, here ad 4; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 35, art. 1, q. 3; Richard, dist. 36, art. 2; Durandus, quaest. 4, ad 2, in prima solutione; Aegidius, In I Sent., dist. 36, art. 2, q. 4, ad 4.

1190. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, c. 4, text 24.

Therefore, since in God there is the same mode of knowing, because all things are known to him of themselves; and the same principle, which is as it were the formal object of science, namely the divine essence, in which God knows all things; there will be in him only one science. And since there is also the same mode of operating by the intellect and will, there will be one and the same art, although he produces diverse effects; yet there will be diverse ideas. For under the same art many ideas can be contained, according to the variety of the works of that art, as has been explained.

This reason I seem to gather from Durandus, on that question 4, ad 1. Indeed, between God the supreme craftsman and other created craftsmen I find this difference: that others, from one and the same idea numerically, which they set before themselves and behold externally so as to imitate it, are wont to make various works, although the interior apprehension which moves to the work is in some way varied; but in God for each of the least things which he himself makes, according to our way of understanding, distinct ideas must be posited. And the reason is that the idea in God is the essence of God as it has the notion of cognition: this, however, is said to be multiplied according to a diverse order to diverse works. But the created craftsman has for his idea some thing set before him externally, which he proposes to himself to imitate; and the same thing serves different works, although apprehended in a different way by the interior thought which immediately directs to the work. Wherefore, if we should call an idea not a thing placed without but something apprehended within, a created craftsman too would have for each work its own idea.[1192]

Finally, it must be observed that the same account is to be given of the exemplar as we have said of the idea: whence, just as in God under one science and art many ideas are said to exist, so too it must be said that there are many exemplars. For exemplar and idea differ only in this, as we shall say in the following article, that the exemplar is the idea of a thing which at some time will be, whereas idea is also said to be of things merely possible and never to be. Although this diversity was introduced only by the Scholastics.

Wherefore I do not approve the opinion of Alexander, who said that the account of exemplar and of art is the same, so that in the same way, the idea being multiplied, art also will be said to be multiplied, but as a particular art, not a general one which is a habit; nor do I approve the opinion of Richard, when he says that there are not many exemplars, but there are indeed many ideas, because, says he, an exemplar is a certain aggregate of many ideas, as a composite seal is an aggregate also of many figures. This opinion I do not approve: for Pseudo-Dionysius, in De divinis nominibus 5, calls the ideas of which he there treats by the Greek name paradeigmata, and in Latin it is rendered Exemplaria. Finally, Richard himself admits that idea and exemplar can be used for the same thing, unless usage and authority contradict, which in my judgment do not in the least oppose what I have said.[1193][1194][1195]

1191. On the multiplication of art as particular habit when the idea is multiplied.

1192. Durandus, Quaestio 4, ad 1.

1193. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 5; the Greek paradeigmata are rendered "exemplars."

1194. Richard (on the Sentences I, dist. 36), who at length concedes that "idea" and "exemplar" can be used interchangeably.

1195. Alexander of Hales, I p., q. 23, m. 4.

Articulus III - Whether of all things God knows, there are ideas

The third proceeds thus. It seems that not of all things which God knows are there ideas in him.

1. For there is no idea of evil in God, because it would follow that evil is in God. But evils are known by God. Therefore not all things which are known by God are ideas.
2. Moreover. God knows the things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as was said above. But of these there are no ideas; because, as Pseudo-Dionysius says in De divinis nominibus, chapter 5, exemplars are the determinate and effective will of God with respect to things. Therefore not of all things which are known by God are there ideas in him.[1196]
3. Moreover. God knows prime matter, which cannot have an idea, since it has no form. Therefore as before.
4. Moreover. It is clear that God knows not only species but also genera, and singulars and accidents. But of these there are not ideas, according to the position of Plato, who first introduced ideas, as St. Augustine says. Therefore not of all things known by God are there ideas in him.[1197]

But on the contrary: Ideas are rationes existing in the divine mind, as is clear from St. Augustine. But of all things which God knows he has proper rationes. Therefore of all things which he knows he has an idea.[1198]

I answer that, since by Plato ideas were posited as the principles of the cognition of things and of their generation, an idea, as it is posited in the divine mind, bears upon both. And inasmuch as it is the principle of the making of things, it can be called an exemplar and pertains to practical cognition; but inasmuch as it is a cognoscitive principle, it is properly called a ratio, and it can also pertain to speculative science. Therefore, inasmuch as it is an exemplar, according to this it bears upon all the things which are made by God in some time. But inasmuch as it is a cognoscitive principle, it bears upon all the things that are known by God, even if they come to be at no time at all, and upon all the things which are known by God according to their proper notion, and according to the fact that they are known by him after the manner of speculation.

Reply to the first: Evil is known by God not by its proper notion, but by the notion of good. And therefore evil has no idea in God, neither inasmuch as idea is an exemplar, nor inasmuch as it is a ratio.

Reply to the second: Of those things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been, God does not have practical cognition, save only virtually. Hence, with respect to such things there is not in God an idea according as idea signifies an exemplar, but only according as it signifies a ratio.

1196. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 5.
1197. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 46, reporting Plato's position.
1198. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 46.

Reply to the third: Plato, according to some, posited matter as uncreated, and therefore he did not posit an idea of matter, but a co-cause of matter. But since we assert matter to be created by God, yet not without form, it does indeed have in God an idea - not of itself absolutely - but insofar as it is ordered to form.

It is proceeded thus to the third. It seems that not all the things which God knows are ideas in him. For the evil has no idea in God, because it would follow that evil were in God: but evils are known by God. Therefore not all the things which are known by God are ideas.

1. Moreover. God knows the things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as was said above. But of these there are no ideas; because, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names V, the exemplars are the determinations of the divine will and the efficient principles of things. Therefore not all the things which are known by God are ideas in him.[1199]
2. Moreover. God knows prime matter, which cannot have an idea, since it has no form. Therefore the same as before.
3. Moreover. It is clear that God knows not only species (*species*), but also genera, and singulars and accidents. But of these there are no ideas, according to the position of Plato, who first introduced ideas, as St. Augustine says. Therefore not of all the things known by God are there ideas in him.[1200]

But on the contrary: Ideas are reasons (*rationes*) existing in the divine mind, as is clear through St. Augustine. But of all the things which God knows he has proper reasons. Therefore of all the things he knows he has an idea.[1201]

I answer: since with Plato ideas were posited as principles of the cognition of things and of their generation, the idea - as it is posited in the divine mind - bears itself to each. And according as it is the principle of the making of things, it can be called an exemplar, and pertains to practical cognition; but according as it is a cognitive principle, it is properly called a reason (*ratio*), and can also pertain to speculative science. Therefore, according as it is an exemplar, in this respect it bears upon all the things which are made by God at some time. But according as it is a cognitive principle, it bears upon all the things which are known by God, even if they come to be at no time, and upon all the things which are known by God according to their proper reason and according as they are known by him by way of speculation.

Reply to the first: Evil is known by God not through its own proper reason, but through the reason of the good. And therefore evil has no idea in God, neither according as idea is exemplar, nor according as it is reason.

1199. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 5.

1200. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 46, reporting Plato's position.

1201. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, passim (especially q. 46), where ideas are "reasons" in the divine mind.

Reply to the second: Of those things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been, God does not have practical cognition, save virtually only. Hence, with respect to those things, there is no idea in God according as idea signifies an exemplar, but only according as it signifies a reason.

Reply to the third: Plato, according to some, held matter not to be created, and therefore he did not posit the idea of matter to be, but a co-cause of matter. But since we posit matter as created by God, yet not without form, matter does indeed have an idea in God, yet not other than the idea of the composite. For matter according to itself neither has existence (*esse*), nor is it knowable.

Reply to the fourth: Genera cannot have an idea other than the idea of the species, according as idea signifies an exemplar: because a genus is never found except in some species. Similarly also concerning accidents which inseparably accompany the subject: for these come to be together with the subject. But the accidents which supervene upon a subject have a special idea. For the artisan by the form of the house makes all the accidents which from the first accompany the house. But those which supervene upon a house already made, such as paintings or anything else, he makes by some other form. According to Plato, singulars did not have any other idea than the idea of the species. First, because singulars are individuated by matter, which he posited to be uncreated (as some say) and a co-cause of the idea. Next, because the intention of nature consists in species, nor does it produce particulars except that in them species may be preserved. But divine providence extends itself not only to species but also to singulars, as will be said below (q. 22, art. 3).

The conclusion is: Idea, insofar as it is called an exemplar, is only in God with respect to future things; idea, however, as it is a reason, is of all possible things, which will never be: the doctrine of the article and the mind of St. Thomas will be explained in the following disputation.

Disputatio LXXIV - On divine ideas

Around the doctrine of the article (Disputation 74): - Idea and exemplar pertain to practical science; but idea can also pertain to speculative. Caput 1. - Not only of species and genera, but also of individual singulars, there are ideas in God. Caput 2. - Of matter (*materia*) and accidents, which are really distinguished from substance, peculiar ideas must be posited. Caput 3.

Caput I - Idea and exemplar pertain to practical science; but idea can also pertain to speculative

Theologians cross swords over whether idea pertains to the practical science of God, or rather to the speculative: and since the disagreement is of words, not of things, nor is it of great moment, they contend beyond measure. Therefore I will briefly report what each says, and in a few words will also explain what I think in this same chapter.

St. Thomas, in the body of this article, asserts that idea is said in one way to be exemplar, in another way to be called reason. For exemplar is said primarily as it is the principle of a future work, and in this way it pertains to practical science. Then, insofar as it is merely a principle of knowing a thing - and thus (he says) it is more properly called reason - it can also pertain to

speculative science. When he adds the little word "also," he does not indicate that under that consideration, under which it is called reason, it can belong to both sciences, practical and speculative, at once; but he added "also" to denote that the idea, which is called exemplar and thus regards practical science, can likewise belong to speculative science, insofar as it is reason. And therefore in the reply to the second he plainly affirms that there is not in God actually practical science of those things which will never be, but only virtually - that is, a science which, although speculative, can also be practical.

Cajetan, although he does not expressly treat this difficulty in this article, nevertheless seems to explain it with a single remark, when he says that the foundation of this doctrine of St. Thomas consists in what was said above in Question 14, article 16. For he understands those words there in such a way that no science is properly practical unless it presupposes an affection and act of will moving toward the work; and because the science of things merely possible does not, in God, presuppose such an act of will, from his view it will not be actually practical. Yet because it could presuppose such an act if God had decreed to do other things, and then it would be practical, he says that it is now called practical only virtually, not actually.[1202]

This explanation is given by Giles of Rome, Gabriel, and St. Thomas in *De potentia*. But more recent Thomists contend that, with respect to things merely possible, the idea is actually and formally practical. For they judge that it is not necessary to the notion of practical science that an act of will be posterior in order and direct the work from an antecedent affection of producing; and we said above in Disputation 69, chapter 2, that this is the truer opinion. Hence Albert and Durandus expressly teach that every idea is to be reduced to practical science, although not every such idea presupposes such an affection.[12031204]

I embrace this latter opinion as the truer one, and it is plainly gathered from what was said in that disputation. As Gabriel very well notes in that same place, even if from eternity the science and idea of God do not operate but only in time, nevertheless from eternity they are practical; and this must be understood not merely because they will in fact operate in time, but because they could in time operate and produce those things which they are not in fact going to produce.[1205]

Moreover, one must observe what follows from the doctrine laid down above in Disputation 9: namely, that the science and idea which God has of creatures are, in our mode of understanding, at once practical and speculative. For the idea is the very essence of God insofar as it represents creatures; and since it can represent them in a twofold way, either for the sake of speculation alone or also for the sake of work, therefore the science and idea which God has of creatures can pertain both to practical and to speculative science. Hence I do not see on what foundation Ockham, in the First Book, dist. 35, q. 6, said that the idea and science of God belong properly neither to practical nor to speculative science.[1206]

1202. Giles of Rome, In I Sent., dist. 36, art. 2, q. 36; Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., dist. 35, q. 5, art. 3, dub. 4; St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 1, art. 5.

1203. Cf. Disputation 69, cap. 2.

1204. Albert the Great, In I Sent., dist. 35, art. 8; Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 36, q. 4, n. 6.

1205. Gabriel Biel, loc. cit., dub. 3.

1206. William of Ockham, In I Sent., dist. 35, q. 6.

Caput II - Not only of species and genera, but also of individuals there are singular ideas in God

Henricus teaches in Quodlibet 7, q. 5 that there are not proper ideas of singulars, but only common ones of species and genera; so that all men would stand as it were under one idea of human nature existing in God: just as some thought that Plato posited, outside of God, one common idea of a nature, from which all singulars would be made; and the same Henricus says in book 3, q. 1, that there is indeed only one idea of a specific nature, yet with diverse respects to each individual.[1207]

But it is far more probable that there are for individuals singular ideas and exemplars. This is expressly taught by St. Bonaventure on the First Book, dist. 35, art. 1, q. 4; by Richard, dist. 36, art. 2, q. 4; by Aegidius, art. 2, q. 4; and by St. Thomas in this article, to the fourth reply. For after he said that, according to Plato, individuals have not a proper idea but a common one, he subjoins: "But divine providence extends not only to species but also to singulars, as will be said below." By these words he willed to teach the contrary position, as if he were saying that proper ideas of each and every individual must be conceded, because providence refers also to singulars; and with greater reason ought they to assert this, who think that the idea is not the very divine essence, but a thing objectively present to the divine intellect. For thus, since singular individuals are present, it follows that there are ideas of singulars in God. Augustine has taught this expressly in Epistle 115 to Nebridius, near the end, where, after he had proposed this same question and said that it is difficult, he finally says that, in order that a man might be made, there was one single reason of man; but in order that a people might be made, there was not only one reason of man, but also of men. He concludes with these words: "If therefore Nebridius is a part of this universe, as he is, and the whole universe consists of parts, the Maker of the universe, God, could not fail to have the reason of the parts."[1208]

Now I judge not only that there are in God ideas of singulars and individuals, but also that there are not, over and above ideas of singulars, any ideas of species or of genera in general distinct merely by reason - a judgment which I understand not only concerning ideas that have the notion of an exemplar of future things, but also concerning ideas of things that are merely possible, even if they pertain to speculative science. And first, as to those ideas which are exemplars or are reduced to practical science, this is plain: for these are principles of things to be made; but nothing else can be produced save an individual; therefore there are no ideas except of singulars. Next, as to the ideas of possibles, even insofar as they look to speculation, the proof is this: God does not have an objective concept of genus or of species distinct from the concept of singulars; for he himself neither distinguishes nor abstracts universal predicates from singulars, but he knows singular things, individual things, as they are, as we shall show in Disputation 118, cap. 2. Therefore it is pointless to assign an idea of species and of genera in general, since the divine essence, which is cognition and thereby the idea of things, is referred to the things themselves only as they are in the

1207. Henricus of Ghent, Quodlibet VII, q. 5; and lib. 3, q. 1.
1208. St. Augustine, Epistola 115 ad Nebridius, near the end.

individual, as has been said. And indeed, just as he knows them as distinct, as in reality they are distinct among themselves, so too we, according to our mode of conceiving, distinguish in his essence and cognition many ideas by our way of understanding. And although we distinguish in things a generic, a specific, and a singular notion, nevertheless this is not sufficient for us to distinguish in God ideas of singular and of universal natures: for in him alone do we distinguish diverse ideas and cognitions from diverse objects, not from us, but as known by him. Therefore, if he does not know, as distinct objects, nature in general and nature in the singular, there ought not in him to be distinguished a twofold cognition or idea.

Caput III - Of matter and of accidents, which are really distinct from substance, peculiar ideas must be posited

St. Thomas teaches openly in this article, to the third reply, that prime matter does not have a proper idea in God, but he judges the idea of matter and of the whole to be the same; and he gives the reason, because matter according to itself does not have existence, since it is pure potency, and it has all its existence from form; wherefore it has nothing of cognoscibility from itself. By these words he insinuates that in God there is no idea of prime matter insofar as it is an exemplar, nor insofar as it is a ratio; and consequently that there is not for it an idea which pertains to speculative science, since from itself it has nothing of cognoscibility.[1209]

This opinion is followed commonly by the Thomists; and Cajetan, in this article, adds that the idea of prime matter which is only a ratio and looks to speculative science is the idea of the whole composite, not of any composite whatsoever, but of body, as body is; but that the idea of prime matter which is practical and is wont to be called exemplar is of the whole composite which matter itself composes according to the entire notion of that composite. The reason of this chapter can be assigned, because prime matter does not have existence in reality except through the whole, which simultaneously contains every generic and specific notion, for operation is terminated to all; therefore it has an idea only insofar as it is an exemplar common with the whole; for an idea in this mode is the principle of the work to which it gives existence, and must first be terminated to the whole. But because speculative cognition can be referred to the generic notion alone, and an idea, as ratio, by the sentence of St. Thomas, pertains to speculative science, prime matter will be said to have an idea or ratio common with that by which it can be known speculatively; but it can be perfectly known to be in something by the form of body in general; therefore the idea, as speculative ratio of matter, is the idea of body, as body is.[1210]

This opinion in part seems to have been followed by Aegidius in the First Book, dist. 35, that fourth question; yet he limits it thus, that there is not a proper idea of prime matter as of a distinct object or ideate, except according to reason; because by the idea which he has, God knows that form is distinguished from matter, not in act (for act does not befit matter according to itself), nor

1209. St. Thomas, in this article, ad 3.
1210. Cajetan, in this article.

as distinct in work (for it is not according to itself), but only by reason. Wherefore in the same manner he seems to concede an idea of matter distinct from the idea of individuals, and likewise of genera and species.[1211]

But assuredly either a proper idea of matter ought altogether to be conceded, or to be denied entirely. For if, as St. Thomas and many of his disciples think, it has no entity from itself, then there will in God be no proper idea of it - neither practical nor speculative. For a practical idea is posited for acting and for a proper effect or work; but in this opinion prime matter is not of this sort, since it has no proper existence. A speculative idea, on the other hand, is for proper cognition and understanding, namely of that which, from itself, has something of entity and of cognoscibility according to its own existence, which is known - not, I say, that it is cognoscible. Therefore in this way there would be no idea of prime matter at all, not only as of a distinct object or work, but not even as distinct by reason; because not even by reason would it be distinguished from form, the two being said to be inseparable. And so the idea of matter would be the idea of the whole composite, and that not only practical, but speculative also - not, as Cajetan thought, of the whole "in general" according to the notion of body, but of the whole singular; for God does not understand anything under a common generic notion abstracted from singulars, as we have said above.

However, if prime matter did have from itself some entity - as I judge it truer in philosophy - then it would have a proper idea not only as it is a ratio pertaining to speculative science, but also as it is called an exemplar and is reduced to practical science; for it needs to be produced as a distinct thing, and it can be known as such. And this Albertus expressly conceded when, on the First Book, dist. 35, art. 4, he asserted that there is in God a proper idea of prime matter.[1212]

Accidents which have a proper entity have a proper speculative idea. For since accidents from themselves have an entity distinct from the subject, it follows that, of accidents really distinct from their subject, there will also be a distinct notion of intelligible object, and consequently a distinct speculative idea - not only of those which, the subject having already been produced, newly supervene, but also of those which are produced together with the subject.

The reason of St. Thomas, namely that the artisan by the form of the house makes all the accidents which from the beginning accompany the house - and therefore that there is no distinct exemplar of those accidents - does not prove the opposite conclusion. For although one and the same exemplar of the house be attributed to the artisan as the principle of the work, nevertheless both in nature and in art the diverse entities of the effects, and their distinct operations according to which they are known, require a diversification of reasons in the exemplar proportioned to them. And God, who knows each thing by a proper light, does not, because he at once makes man together with all that is concreated with him, therefore lack proper exemplars proportioned to those effects; if they have from themselves a distinct entity, they will have also a distinct cognoscibility, and consequently a distinct speculative idea.

1211. Aegidius (Giles of Rome), In I Sent., dist. 35, q. 4.
1212. Albertus (the Great), In I Sent., dist. 35, art. 4.

I, for my part, do not see any sufficient reason why individual accidents, really distinct from their subject, should not have singular ideas even practical ones; for as to speculative ideas, almost all are agreed on this point. And I speak not only of those accidents which supervene to an already made subject, but also of those which, by the very constitution of the subject, are concreated and produced along with it. For just as the exemplar of the whole house is one as to the unity of the work, yet, because within the unity of art and of nature there are diverse entities of effects and operations which spring from the whole, it is not surprising if, while the house is one by a certain ordering of art, nevertheless it include various formalities, and accidents both physical and natural; and so, although in speech we sometimes name one house and one work of the artisan both physical and natural, which, according to the various entities of the physical and natural effects and operations, ought to be multiplied, nevertheless in the exemplar a diversity corresponding to those entities must be posited. And Aegidius, in the place cited, says likewise that those accidents which are concreated with the whole do indeed have a distinct idea so far as cognition is concerned, though not a distinct principle of operation; but those which supervene later have a distinct idea both for cognition and for operation. Wherefore, as to speculative ideas at least, no one can reasonably doubt that there are proper ideas of accidents; and, where the accidents themselves have their own proper production, there is no obstacle to positing for them proper exemplars also in the order of practice.[1213]

Ceterum, as to the question whether the ideas of merely possible things are practical or speculative, I add what pertains by way of conclusion to the foregoing disputation.

- They will not, according to the opinion of certain men, be actually practical by reason of an act of will now supervening - for in their view such an act is not posited - yet they are virtually practical, because they could presuppose such an act, if God had decreed to do otherwise; and then they would be practical in act, though now they are called practical by power, not in act. This explanation is given by Aegidius on the First Book, dist. 36, art. 2, q. 36; by Gabriel on dist. 35, q. 5, art. 3, dub. 4; and by St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 1, art. 5.[1214]
- But more recent Thomists contend that, with respect to things merely possible, the idea is in act and formally practical; for it is not necessary to the notion of practical science that there be an antecedent act of will directing from an affect of making to a work - of which we said above, in Disputation 69, cap. 2, that it is the truer opinion. Wherefore Albertus, on the First Book, dist. 35, art. 8, and Durandus, dist. 36, q. 4, n. 6, expressly teach that every idea is to be reduced to practical science, although not every such idea presupposes such an affect.[1215]
- This opinion as truer I embrace; and it is clearly gathered from what was said in that disputation. And, as Gabriel well noted in that article, dub. 3, even if from eternity the science and idea of God do not operate, but in time, nevertheless from eternity they are practical; understand this not only because in time they will in fact operate, but because they could in time operate and produce those things which they are not going to produce.

1213. Aegidius, loc. cit.
1214. Aegidius, In I Sent., dist. 36, art. 2, q. 36; Gabriel, dist. 35, q. 5, art. 3, dub. 4; St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 1, art. 5.
1215. Albertus, In I Sent., dist. 35, art. 8; Durandus, dist. 36, q. 4, n. 6.

- Finally, it is to be observed that, from the doctrine delivered above in the ninth disputation, the following is deduced: namely, that the science and idea which God has of creatures are at once practical and speculative. For since the idea is the very essence of God as it represents creatures, and since it can represent them in a twofold way, either for the sake of speculation alone or also for the sake of work (as we said there concerning any created practical science, which can consider, for the sake of speculation alone, the very work by reason of which it is called "practical"), therefore the science and idea which God has of creatures can, in our mode of understanding, pertain to practical and to speculative science. Hence I do not know upon what foundation Ockham, in the First Book, dist. 35, q. 6, said that the idea and the science of God properly pertain neither to practical nor to speculative science.[1216]

... Or else the proper idea of matter must simply be denied, inasmuch as prime matter, according to St. Thomas and several of his disciples, has no entity of its own; and thus there will be in God no proper idea of St. Thomas's sort, neither practical nor speculative. For the practical is posited with respect to a diverse and proper effect or work, which, on that opinion, prime matter is not, since it does not have a proper existence (*esse*). The speculative, however, is also posited for the sake of contemplating and understanding that which of itself has some entity and knowability according to existence; for what is known not to be is not said to be knowable. Therefore, in this way there will be no idea of prime matter, not only as of an object actually or operatively distinct, but not even distinct in reason; for neither would it be distinguished in reason from form, so that otherwise the idea of matter would be the idea of the whole composite, not only practical but speculative also - not, as Cajetan thought, of the whole in the generic notion of body, but of the whole singular; since God does not understand anything under the notion of a common genus abstracted from singulars, as was said above. But if prime matter has some entity, as I judge more truly in philosophy, it will have a proper idea not only as a ratio and pertaining to speculative science, but also as called an exemplar and reducible to practical science: for thus it could be produced and known as a distinct thing; and hence Albert expressly granted in God a proper idea of prime matter, in I Sentences, dist. 35, art. 10.[1217]

Finally, concerning accidents St. Thomas teaches, in the solution to the fourth, that those which are with the whole composite do not have a proper idea distinct from the idea of the whole; but the accidents which accrue to the subject once already produced have a proper idea; and although the holy Doctor does not explain whether he is speaking of the idea as it is the practical exemplar of a work, or as it is a speculative ratio, nevertheless his argument plainly indicates that he is speaking only of the practical idea. Thus also Aegidius, in the place cited, says that the accidents which are made together with the whole indeed have an idea actually distinct as to cognition, but not as to operation - that is, a speculative but not a practical [idea]; whereas, he says, other accidents have an idea distinct both as to cognition and as to operation - that is, speculative and practical. About the speculative, no one can doubt; for all admit this of the speculative.

1216. Ockham, In I Sent., dist. 35, q. 6.

1217. Albertus (the Great), In I Sent., dist. 35, art. 10.

But that they do not have a distinct practical idea when they are made together with the subject, St. Thomas proves, because the craftsman is said by one and the same idea to make the house and all its accidents; therefore God likewise will by the same [idea] make the man and all the accidents together with him.

I, however, do not see sufficient reason why singular accidents really distinct from the subject should not have singular ideas, even practical ones; for all admit this of the speculative. And I say this not only of the accidents which accrue to the whole once it has been produced, but also of those which are produced together with it. For the idea, as exemplar, only adds over and above the speculative idea that it is a principle of work by the will. Wherever, therefore, there is a diverse entity which comes to be, there will also be a diverse idea as exemplar. But the accidents which are produced together with the subject have a diverse entity; therefore, while they are coming to be, they will have a diverse becoming and a diverse exemplar idea. That they are produced simultaneously in time with the whole does not hinder their having their own peculiar production, just as they have their own existence; or, if they do not have a diverse existence, they will not have a diverse knowability, and consequently not a distinct speculative idea.

Nor does St. Thomas's reasoning efficaciously prove the opposite; for the idea of the house with all its parts and accidents is said to be one just as the house constructed is one, not by a physical and natural unity, but by the unity of art, which is one only in order; wherefore it is not surprising if one house with various physical and real entities and accidents is said to be made by one idea of art. But we now are speaking of the idea of a physical and natural being, which, according to the various physical entities of the effect and of the work, ought to be multiplied. And the same difference can be shown, and proved also in another way: for the craftsman is said not only by the same artistic idea to make the whole substance of the house and the accidents which accompany it once made, but also by the same idea afterwards he repairs the accidents of the house, if need be, and the accidents which are not made together with the house, but are added to it once already made, are said to be made by the same idea. And yet St. Thomas admits that the accidents which are added to the whole physical composite once produced have a different idea from the idea of the whole. Therefore the accidents of the house are nevertheless afterwards said to be made by the same idea because that [idea] is not physical, but pertains only to order and to the genus of art. Hence the same account is not to be given of the idea of a house and of the idea of a natural being and of its accidents.

Quaestio XVI - On truth

Since, however, science is of truths, after the consideration of the science of God, inquiry must be made concerning truth (*veritas*). About this there are eight questions.

In this sixteenth question the Angelic Doctor treats of truth, and in question 17 of falsity, which are affections of the intellect and of science, so as to show in what way truth is befitting to the divine science, while falsity is altogether repugnant to it; and from that doctrine the attribute of the

truth of our God is also to be explained by us. Moreover, many of the things which in this question and the following are handed down are wont to be disputed expressly by the Philosophers in Metaphysics IV or VI, as also those which were said in question 6 about the notion of goodness. But because the attribute of the truth of God cannot be rightly explained unless first the nature and definition of truth itself is well considered according to itself, it ought not to seem superfluous to anyone that we treat these matters at present. Yet, lest we be forced fruitlessly to repeat the same things, we shall take care that nearly all which the holy Doctor, scattered through several articles of this question and the following, taught, be gathered from a rightly explained definition of truth under these two prior articles into one.

Articulus I - Whether truth is only in the intellect

It is objected first in this way. It seems that truth is not only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine in the book Soliloquies reproves this notification of the true: "True is that which is seen," because according to this, stones which are in the most hidden bosom of the earth would not be true stones, because they are not seen. He also reproves this: "True is that which is as it appears to the knower, if he should will and be able to know"; because according to this it would follow that nothing would be true if no one were able to know. And thus he defines the true: "True is that which is." And so it seems that truth is in things and not in the intellect.[1218]

1. Further, whatever is true is true by truth. If, therefore, truth is in the intellect alone, nothing will be true except according as it is understood; which is the error of the ancient philosophers who said that whatever appears is true. From which it follows that contradictories are simultaneously true, since contradictories seem to be true simultaneously to diverse [people].
2. Further, that because of which each thing [is] is, and that more so, as is clear in Posterior Analytics I. But from the fact that a thing is or is not, an opinion or an utterance is true or false according to the Philosopher in the Predicaments. Therefore truth is more in things than in the intellect.[12191220]

But on the contrary: The Philosopher says in Metaphysics VI that the true and the false are not in things but in the intellect.[1221]

I answer that, just as the good names that in which the appetite tends, so the true names that in which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between appetite and intellect or any cognition whatsoever: because cognition is according as the known is in the knower; but appetite is according as the one appetiting is inclined toward the thing itself that is appetited. And thus the term of appetite, which is the good, is in the appetible thing; but the term of cognition, which is the true, is in the intellect itself. And as the good is in the thing inasmuch as it has an order toward the

1218. St. Augustine, Soliloquia, lib. 2, cap. 5 (tom. 1).
1219. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.
1220. Aristotle, Categories (Praedicamenta).
1221. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI.

appetite, and on this account the notion of goodness is derived from the appetible thing to the appetite - according as the appetite is said to be good insofar as it is of the good - so, since the true is in the intellect inasmuch as it is conformed to the thing understood, it is necessary that the notion of the true be derived from the intellect to the thing understood, so that the thing understood also be called true, according as it has some order to the intellect. Now the thing understood can have an order to the intellect either per se or per accidens. Per se indeed it has an order to the intellect upon which it depends according to its being; but per accidens to the intellect by which it is knowable. Thus, if we say that a house is compared to the intellect of the craftsman per se, per accidens however it is compared to the intellect on which it does not depend. But judgment about a thing is not taken according to that which is in it per accidens, but according to that which is in it per se. Whence each thing is said to be true absolutely according to the order to the intellect upon which it depends. And hence it is that artificial things are said to be true by their order to our intellect; for a "true house" is said to be that which attains to the likeness of the form which is in the mind of the craftsman. And an utterance is said to be true insofar as it is a sign of a true intellect. And likewise natural things are said to be true according as they attain to the likenesses of the species which are in the divine mind; for a "true stone" is said because it attains to the proper nature of a stone according to the preconception of the divine intellect. Thus, therefore, truth is principally in the intellect, but secondarily in things, according as they are compared to the intellect as to their principle. And according to this, truth is notified in diverse modes. For Augustine in the book On True Religion says that truth is that by which what is is shown; and Hilary says that the true is declarative or manifestative of being. And this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. But to the truth of the thing according to its order to the intellect pertains Augustine's definition in the same book On True Religion of this sort: "Truth is the supreme likeness of the principle which is without any dissimilitude." And a certain definition of Anselm of this sort: "Truth is a rectitude perceptible only by the mind." For "straight" is that which agrees with the principle. And a certain definition of Avicenna of this sort: "The truth of each thing is the property of its existence which stabilizes it or belongs to it." But that which is said, that truth is the adequation of thing and intellect, can pertain to both.[1222][1223][1224][1225]

Reply to the first: Augustine is speaking of the truth of the thing, and he excludes from the notion of this truth the comparison to our intellect; for what is per accidens is excluded from every definition.

Reply to the second: The ancient philosophers did not say that the species of natural things proceed from any intellect, but that they come forth by chance. And because they considered that the true imports a comparison to intellect, they were compelled to constitute the truth of things in

1222. St. Augustine, De vera religione, c. 36.
1223. St. Hilary, dictum cited.
1224. St. Anselm, Dialogus de veritate.
1225. Avicenna, definition cited.

an order to our intellect. From which inconveniences followed, which the Philosopher pursues in Metaphysics IV. These inconveniences do not occur if we posit that the truth of things consists in a comparison to the divine intellect.[1226]

Reply to the third: Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, nevertheless it is not necessary that it be in the thing prior...

I answer: The term of appetite, which is the good, is in the appetible thing; but the term of cognition, which is the true, is in the intellect itself. And just as the good is in the thing insofar as it has an order to appetite, and on this account the notion of goodness is derived from the appetible thing to the appetite - according as the appetite is called good as it is of the good - so too, since the true is in the intellect inasmuch as it is conformed to the thing understood, it is necessary that the notion of the true be derived from the intellect to the thing understood, so that the thing understood also be said to be true, insofar as it has some order to the intellect.

Now the thing understood can have an order to the intellect either per se or per accidens. Per se, indeed, it has an order to that intellect upon which it depends for its being; per accidens, to that intellect by which it is knowable. Thus, if we say that a house is compared per se to the intellect of the craftsman, it is compared per accidens to an intellect on which it does not depend. But judgment about a thing is not taken according to that which is per accidens, but according to that which is in it per se. Hence each thing is said to be true absolutely according to its order to that intellect upon which it depends. And from this it is that artificial things are said to be true by their order to our intellect; for a house is called true when it attains the likeness of the form which is in the mind of the craftsman. And discourse is called true insofar as it is the sign of a true intellect. In like manner, natural things are said to be true according as they attain to the likenesses of species which are in the divine mind. For a true stone is so called because it attains the proper nature of a stone according to the preconception of the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth is principally in the intellect, from which the notion of truth is derived secondarily into the things themselves.

Reply to the first: St. Augustine speaks of truth as it is in the thing; by which account the definition is excluded of this truth which is in our intellect.

Reply to the second: The ancient philosophers did not say that the species of natural things proceed from any intellect, but that they arise from natural causes. And because they considered that truth imports a comparison to the intellect, they were compelled to constitute the truth of things in an order to our intellect. Whence there followed inconveniences which the Philosopher pursues in Metaphysics IV. These inconveniences do not occur if we posit that the truth of things consists in a comparison to the divine intellect.

Reply to the third: Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, nevertheless it is not necessary that the notion of truth be found in the thing prior, just as neither in medicine is the notion of health found prior to that in an animal. For it is the power of medicine, not its health, that causes health, since it is not an agent univocally. And similarly the being of the thing, not its truth, causes the truth of the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that true opinion and true

1226. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV.

speech are from this, that the thing is - not from this, that the thing is true. Therefore the conclusion is that truth is primarily indeed in the intellect, from which the notion of truth is secondarily derived into things.

Articulus II - Whether truth is in the intellect composing and dividing

Objection 1. It seems that truth is not only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says in De Anima III that just as the senses concerning proper sensibles are always true, so also is the intellect concerning what a thing is.[1227] But composition and division are neither in sense nor in the intellect knowing what a thing is. Therefore truth is not only in the composition and division of the intellect.

Objection 2. Further, Isaac says in the book On Definitions that truth is the adequation of thing and intellect. But just as the intellect of complexes can be adequate to things, so also the intellect of incomplexes, and even sense which senses the thing as it is. Therefore truth is not only in the composition and division of the intellect.

But on the contrary: The Philosopher says in Metaphysics VI that concerning simples and what a thing is there is no truth, neither in the intellect nor in things.[1228]

I answer: The true (as has been said) according to its primary notion is in the intellect. Now since every thing is true according as it has its proper form of its nature, it is necessary that the intellect, insofar as it is knowing, be true insofar as it has a likeness of the known thing; which likeness is its form insofar as it is knowing. And on this account truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing. Hence to know that conformity is to know truth.

By this account sense in no way knows truth. For although sight has the likeness of the visible, nevertheless it does not know the comparison which is between the thing seen and that which it apprehends of it. But the intellect can know its own conformity to the intelligible thing: yet it does not apprehend it when it knows of something what it is; but when it judges the thing to be as is the form which it apprehends about the thing, then first it knows and says the true. And this it does by composing and dividing. For in every proposition some form signified by the predicate is either applied to some thing signified by the subject, or is removed from it. And therefore it is well said that sense is true of some thing, or the intellect is true when knowing what a thing is; but not that it either knows or says the true. And similarly it is with incomplex words.

Therefore truth can be in sense, or in the intellect knowing what a thing is, as in a certain true thing; not, however, as known in a knower - which the name "true" imports. For the perfection of the intellect is the true as known. And therefore, properly speaking, truth is in the intellect composing and dividing, not, however, in sense, nor in the intellect knowing what a thing is.

And hereby the solution to the objections is evident.

Conclusion: Truth is only in the intellect composing and dividing.

1227. Aristotle, De Anima III, c. 6 (text 26).
1228. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI.

There is a twofold difficulty in either article, both in explaining the mind of St. Thomas and also in the doctrine itself. Therefore in the two disputations which follow, as far as can be done, we shall examine both, and shall strive to define the true and proper nature of truth universally.

Disputatio LXXV - Whether the truth of the intellect is only in composition and division

Caput I - The opinion of Ferrarensis and of others

- The opinion of Ferrarensis and of others.
- The aforesaid opinion is refuted, and the opposite is proved especially by the testimony of Aristotle.
- By reasons the latter opinion is proved.
- The arguments of the former opinion are answered.

Since in general truth is thus defined, It is the adequation of intellect and thing, and as St. Thomas says at the end of this article, this definition is to be understood as pertaining both to the intellect and to the thing itself: and therefore not only the intellect, but also any thing which is said to be true per se, indeed truth is assigned by the philosophers as a kind of passion of being, in order that we may better investigate its nature and define it universally; we have judged it necessary to set forth in detail by what manner truth belongs to both the intellect and to all things. Although the controversy seems to be good and to be more on the side of words than of things, nevertheless it ought not to be judged of lesser moment; for from it, once accurately expounded, it will be clear for what cause our God is called the true God, whereas the gods of the Gentiles are rightly called false. Of the Scholastics there are few, and more of them from the school of St. Thomas, who have disputed of this matter; yet not all agree in the same opinion, although each is eager to draw the Holy Doctor into his own view. Wherefore, as far as we can, we shall pursue, not only what is proved to us, but also what is said by others, in our accustomed manner.

Observation for the understanding of the question. It is to be observed first, as Durandus, Hervaeus, and others warn, that since the controversy is about truth in the intellect, it is not to be understood of the power itself which has a certain nature of being; for thus there is a common account of intellect and of other things. Rather the difficulty is about the intellect insofar as it understands; and it is the same to ask in what way truth is in the intellect, as in the intellection itself. Nor, indeed, is the question about intellection insofar as in itself it is a certain entity, but insofar as it is a sign, and is referred to the things which it signifies. On this ground intellection is sometimes called false; although, insofar as it is some thing, it is always true, as will be clear in article 3.

This foundation being posited, the present controversy is the first opinion of Ferrarensis, against Cajetan, cap. 59, and cap. 60, who, from the definition of truth which we recalled in the beginning, infers that truth in the intellect is a conformity with the thing itself, and truth in things

is a conformity with the intellect. Further, that truth, about which there is now controversy, is found in the intellect in a twofold way: in one way, as in that in which there is the true; and in this way he thinks it to be in any simple apprehension of the intellect; indeed some Thomists who follow this opinion say that the same truth is also to be found in the impressed intelligible species, which is a kind of representation; and they think the same about the cognition of any sense, as Ferrarensis expressly taught in the last words of chapter 59.[1229] All of whom seem to have altogether the same reason.

In another way, says Ferrarensis, truth is found in the intellect as knowing truth itself: but thus it is only in composition and in judgment. For by judgment alone one knows that one's concept is conformed to the thing understood; which conformity is truth. Yet on that account he does not deem that truth, in this way, can be in every kind of composition and division; but only in that, in which someone reflexively knows his intellection to be conformed to the thing understood which exists, or can exist, outside the mind. With Ferrarensis agree Soncinas, in 6 Metaphysics, question 17; Capreolus, in the First [Book of the Sentences], distinction 19, question 3, article 1, conclusion 3; Aegidius, Quodlibet 4, question 7, in that at least which he asserts, that the truth of the intellect is found not only in simple apprehension, but also in the very intelligible species.[1230]

Now the former part of this position, in which I said the Doctors alleged above consent, is proved first by two testimonies of Aristotle. One is De Anima III, chapter 6, text 26, where he says thus: "There is speech about something as affirmation; and such speech is always either true or false. But the intellect is not always [so], but that which is of the what-it-is of a thing, accommodated to the form, is true; and it does not say something of something; but just as the vision of the proper object is true, so the intellect which conceives the what-it-is itself (that is, the essence of a thing) is always true, and never false; and on this account it differs from enunciation or speech, because this can be true or false; whereas the intellect about the what-it-is itself cannot be deceived."[1231] That Aristotle speaks of the non-composing intellect is manifest from these words: "And it does not say something of something." Moreover, that he taught the same about sense knowing the proper sensible, Ferrarensis expressly thought Aristotle taught in these words: "But just as the vision of the proper object is true," as if he were saying, just as sense in the cognition of its proper sensible is always true without composition, so also the intellect concerning the quiddity itself of the thing, without enunciation and composition, is always true. He had also taught the same about sense in De Anima II, chapter 6, where he says that the sense concerning its proper sensible is always true; though around the common sensibles it is not deceived, nor around the proper sensibles either, save per accidens it is sometimes deceived.[1232]

1229. Ferrarensis, cap. 59 - 60.

1230. Soncinas, on Metaphysics VI, q. 17; Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 19, q. 3, art. 1, concl. 3; Aegidius, Quodlibet IV, q. 7.

1231. The paraphrase reproduces the sense of Aristotle's text at De Anima III, c. 6 (text 26), contrasting enunciative truth and the truth of simple cognition.

1232. Aristotle, De Anima II, c. 6.

Another testimony is Metaphysics IX, chapter 12, where he seems to assert that very same thing; we shall cite his words below: for in explaining his mind in that place of De Anima they will be of use for our commentary; so that, to a certain extent, he seems in some way to favor this opinion.[1233]

From three reasons especially the aforesaid opinion seems to be confirmed. The first reason, as if from simple apprehension and from the impressed intelligible species and from the representation itself, it were also conformed with the thing, because it represents the thing itself as it is; therefore that very conformity should not fail to be called truth, unless something prevented it, which would be that truth could not be outside composition: but this cannot be said, since, just as any thing whatsoever, by that very fact that it is, is said to be true - because truth is constituted as a passion of being - and yet its truth is not complex and composite, but simple; so also the intelligible species and the simple apprehension of simples can be true with simple truth, because without composition they represent the thing as it is. Therefore nothing hinders simple truth from being found in them, as in things. And hence, since that definition of truth, namely, the adequation of the intellect to the thing, can fit the intellect by its order to things, and things by their order to the intellect, as St. Thomas teaches in this article at the end, it will surely be possible in this very article to perceive that truth is simple in the intellect, if it is also simple in things themselves; and by the same external reason one may consider it not only as regards the operation of sensing, but also as regards the very sensible species which are received in the faculty itself, and which constitute that power (as they say) in first act.

The second reason: In natural signs or those by institution there is truth, because they are conformed with the things which they signify; by which account smoke is a true sign of fire; gesture and outward bearing are signs of an interior affection - yet without any composition or division. Also a simple name is said to be a true or a false name of a thing. Therefore in any simple cognition of intellect or sense, and in the very impressed species, since in them there are representations which are a kind of signification, truth can be.

The third reason: The cognition by which God and the angels know things is no less true than ours, which consists in composition and division; and yet God and the angels understand by a simple intuition without any complex. Of God this is sufficiently manifest; of the angels it will be proved below in Disputation 123. Therefore in our simple cognition also there can be truth; and hence, too, in the intelligible species; and in the senses the same account seems to hold in all.

The aforesaid opinion is refuted, and the opposite is proved especially by Aristotle's testimonies.

Caput II - The opposite position

[Text begins in the next section.]

... for they say nothing about whether truth is found in composition or outside of it; indeed this opinion seems to be that of St. Thomas. The first part of this opinion, to which I said the Doctors lately cited above agree, is proved first by two testimonies of Aristotle. The one is De Anima III, c.

6, text 26, where he says thus: "Now utterance (dictio) is about something with respect to something, as affirmation; and every utterance is either true or false; but not every intellect is [so], only that which is fitting to the form of what a thing is (ipsius quid est), and it does not say something of something; but as the vision of what is proper to itself is true. But if it says that the man is white or is not, it is not always true; for it holds [of] those that have been composed or divided." These are Aristotle's words, by which he expressly affirms that the intellect which conceives the "what it is," that is, the essence of some thing, is always true and never false, and he says that it differs from enunciation or utterance in that the latter can be either true or false, whereas the intellect with respect to the very "what it is" cannot be deceived. Moreover, that Aristotle is speaking of the non-composing intellect is plainly evident from those words, "and it does not say something of something." Besides, that there is truth in sense when it knows the proper sensible, as Ferrarensis expressly judged that Aristotle taught by those words, "But as the vision of what is proper to itself is true" - as if he were saying: just as sense, in the cognition of its proper sensible, is always true, though without composition, so also the intellect, with respect to the very quidditative reality of the thing, is always true without enunciation and composition - Aristotle had also taught the same about sense in De Anima II, c. 6, text 63, where he had said that sense with respect to proper sensibles, as sight with respect to color and hearing with respect to sound, is not deceived nor mistaken, but is always true, whereas with respect to common sensibles and per accidens it is sometimes deceived. Another testimony is Metaphysics IX, c. 12, where he seems to assert this very thing; we shall cite his words below, for these will serve us, as it were, as the principal commentary for explaining his mind in De Anima III; they are so far from favoring this opinion in any way.

The aforesaid opinion can next be confirmed by three reasons.

First: in the simple apprehension itself and in the intelligible species impressed there is a representation of the thing; and thus there is also some conformity with it, because it represents it as it is: why, then, should not such conformity be called truth, unless perhaps truth were something that could not exist outside composition? But this cannot be said; for just as any thing, insofar as it is, is said to be true, if indeed truth is a passion of being, and yet it is not complex or composed, so also the intelligible species and simple apprehension can be true with a simple truth, because without composition they represent the thing as it is. Therefore truth no less can be in them as it is in things; and hence also that ratio of truth, namely an aptitude or ordination to the thing and to things through the intellect (as St. Thomas teaches at the end), will indeed belong to the intellect if it belongs also to things; and as regards the senses, the same account will be able to be considered.

Second reason: in natural signs or signs there is truth, because there is conformity with the things they signify; thus smoke is a sign of fire, and a gesture is a sign of an interior affection. Yet there is in them no composition or division; nevertheless they are also said to be simply true or false of some thing. Therefore in simple cognition, in the senses, and even in the species themselves there can be truth of representation, which is a certain signification.

1233. Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, c. 12.

Third reason: the cognition by which God and the angels know things is no less true than ours, which consists in composition and division; and yet God and the angels understand by a simple intuition without composition. About God this is sufficiently manifest; about the angels it will be proved below in Disputation 223. Therefore in our simple cognition there can also be truth, and hence also in the intelligible species; and as to the senses, the same account seems to hold in all.

The aforesaid opinion is refuted, and the opposite is proved especially by Aristotle's testimonies.

The opposite position

I judge the opposite opinion to be much truer, namely, that the truth of the intellect is properly found only in composition and division. This was handed down by Cajetan in article 2 of this question, by Hervaeus in Quodlibet III, q. 1, a. 2 and 3, and by Durandus in the first book, dist. 19, q. 5, n. 14.[1234] They speak, however, about the human intellect on the way; whether the same account holds of the angelic and of the divine we shall say in chapter 4, in the solution to the third reason. But we can by testimonies and reasons both establish this opinion and at the same time refute the former along with its foundations. And first the testimonies of Aristotle on behalf of this position are manifest.

The first testimony is in the first book De Interpretatione, c. 1, where, after having taught that words and concepts are signs of things, he immediately adds: "Just as in the soul there are sometimes concepts without truth or falsity, and sometimes of such a sort that one of the two is of necessity attached, so too in the voice it seems to be: for truth and falsity consist in composition." And several other things, by which he openly teaches that truth or falsity is not found in the simple concept nor in the simple word.[1235] The second testimony is c. 3 of the same book and De Anima III, c. 6, text 12, where he affirms the same in express words.[1236]

The third testimony is Metaphysics VI, c. 2, near the end, where he says thus: "And that which is as true is being; not-being, as false; since it is about composition and division, and altogether about the disjunction of contradiction; for truth has affirmation in composition, and negation in division; but falsehood the contradiction of this disjunction." When he says that being is as true, and not-being as false, he does not take these two simply, but as they are in composition and division, of which each seems to contain something within itself; therefore he added the clause "since it is about composition and division," as if he were saying that, because truth and falsehood are found in composition and division and universally in the opposition, or disjunction, of contradiction. He expressed the same thing more clearly a little further down; for when he had said that truth and falsehood are not in things as good and evil are, but are in the mind, he then adds: "But the things around simples and around those which are the what-it-is are not in the mind" - as if he were saying that simple apprehension, such as is of the what-it-is, is not in the mind; and by "mind" he calls not only the intellect, for in it too there is simple apprehension, but a judgment or opinion, a

1234. Cajetan, In Iam, q. 16, a. 2; Hervaeus, Quodlibet III, q. 1, a. 2 - 3; Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 19, q. 5, n. 14.
1235. Aristotle, De Interpretatione I, c. 1.
1236. Aristotle, De Interpretatione I, c. 3; De Anima III, c. 6, text 12.

certain reflex judgment by which one discriminates between opinions; sometimes this name "mind" is used in this way, as you will note, by Damascene, and we shall say the same below, and indeed Aristotle in Ethics VI, c. 9 sometimes uses this name for a judgment, so as thus to explain why truth is not in simple apprehension nor in just any composition, but in that which is with judgment, and has something of what in other places he signified when he said that truth is in the composition whereby something is said to be or not to be, as will be explained below.[1237]

But Ferrarensis replies in cap. 19, solution 5, to this doubt, that wherever Aristotle said that truth and falsehood are in composition and division alone, he did not deny that they also are in the simple intellect; rather, he wished to teach that truth, insofar as known, is only in composition and division: that is, that as an object known it is only in the composing or dividing intellection; and in the same way he expounds the words of St. Thomas in the cited article 2, where he thinks St. Thomas agrees with Aristotle.[1238] This interpretation of Ferrarensis is marvellously approved by some more recent authors; and hence they say that truth is in the intellect even simple, as in that in which the true is; but in the composing and dividing intellect only, as in that which knows the true. Cajetan also mentions this at 2-2, q. "Ad evidentiam," and asserts that at first glance the words of St. Thomas fit very well, but that they are not true; and so, they must be interpreted otherwise than the holy Doctor.[1239] But whatever may be of St. Thomas's mind - leaving aside for now Cajetan's interpretation, which does not please me, nor do I wish to dwell longer on examining it - Aristotle cannot be explained in this way from his own words in that Metaphysics VI, c. 2; and by reason it will become manifest.

First, from the context itself: First, that which Aristotle had said there, that the true and the false are in composition and division alone, he then proves by these words: "For neither falsehood nor truth is in things, as good [is], or as evil [is], but [they are] in the mind; but around simples and around those which are the what-it-is they are not in the mind"; wherein he plainly denies that the true and the false are in things, just as good and evil are. For what Bessarion translated more harshly, "As what is good," in Greek is "as good"; which others render, "Just as good," or "as that which is good"; and the words of Aristotle could be ordered more clearly thus: "For truth and falsity are not in things, as good truly [is], and as evil [is] false." Therefore, since Aristotle says that good and evil are in things, but truth and falsity are in the mind, if he were understood to speak only of the true and the false as they are in the knower, then, by the same account, he denied that truth and falsehood are in things; but about good and evil, nay about any other thing whatsoever, he would have to say entirely the same; for nothing, insofar as known, is in things, but only in the intellect. Now what some say, that by a peculiar account truth is not except in the knower, they neither explain sufficiently nor can it be true; for most properly the true is said of the judgment of

1237. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa IV, c. 9; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, c. 9; Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, c. 2.

1238. Ferrarensis, cap. 19, solutio 5; St. Thomas, In Iam, q. 16, a. 2.

1239. Cajetan, In II-II, q. 1, "Ad evidentiam."

him who by a direct act enunciates the thing to be as it is, even if he himself is not certain about that truth, nor advert to whether the judgment about it is true; and most properly the false is said when he enunciates the thing otherwise than it is, even if he should not have a reflex act.

Besides, as Cajetan very well noted against Ferrarensis, truth can not only be in the intellect as known in composition and in judgment, but also in simple apprehension; therefore, although, as judged, it cannot be outside composition and judgment, nevertheless, as known, it can be in simple apprehension; for just as any thing and quiddity can be apprehended by simple cognition, so too the quiddity of truth can be known, whether that be something real, as Ferrarensis seems to teach, or something of reason, as others think.

Finally, it would be a trifling doctrine in Aristotle, if in all those places he had only wished to teach that truth and falsehood, as judged, are only in judgment, and as known, are only in cognition: this is manifest even to the unlearned and unskilled; and, as we said above, he would have said nothing peculiar about truth and falsehood that does not fit other things.

Someone could answer, further, to all these Aristotelian testimonies - and perhaps more probably - that truth is twofold: one complex, and this he understood in the places cited; another simple, and of this he was not speaking there; but that this [simple truth] is in simple cognition, in the intelligible species, and in sense, as the prior opinion said. Nor should this distinction seem to anyone fabricated; for the same Aristotle, De Anima III, c. 6, in the cited text 26, said that in simple intellect and in sense there is truth; although in the same chapter, text 22, he had taught that truth is in composition alone; which two cannot both stand unless that twofold truth, complex and incomplex, be distinguished.

But this solution too has little weight. First, because Aristotle, in the places cited and in many others, when he said that truth is in composition alone, added no limitation or explanation: he therefore understood absolutely any truth whatsoever, when he said universally that outside composition it is not. Next, even if that truth were twofold, nevertheless each would have the common account of truth: therefore, when Aristotle said that truth is not outside composition, he understood not of some [truth], but of every [truth]; just as if someone were to say that "animal" is not in some place, he would not have said this of one species only, but of every [species] as well. Moreover, adversaries without foundation fabricate that, in that third book De Anima, c. 6, Aristotle affirmed that truth is in simple cognition and in sense, and thus posited a twofold truth; although indeed his words at first sight seem to denote that, nevertheless, since he treats the same matter in Metaphysics VI, c. 12, and teaches the opposite there, as we shall immediately see, it must be said that in that same third book De Anima he held altogether the same; whence also it will be clear that those two testimonies of Aristotle, which we adduced for the earlier opinion, are of no force against ours.

We grant, therefore, that in De Anima III, c. 6, text 26, Aristotle is speaking of simple cognition and apprehension of the thing, when he says, "That intellect which is fitted to the form of the what-it-is is true, and it does not say something of something"; but that by these words he did not signify that such an intellect is true with proper truth, but only that it is in that apprehension as something

like those [acts] which, by composing or dividing, say that something is or is not; and he understood this very thing of sense when in the same place he said, "But as the vision of what is proper to itself is true"; which interpretation, if it sprang from my own brain, would be...[1240]

It is rejected first: that there is a twofold truth, one complex; and that Aristotle understood this in the places cited; but another simple, and that he there spoke of this; and that this is in simple cognition, in the intelligible species (*species intelligibilis*), in sense, as the earlier opinion was saying: nor ought this distinction to seem to anyone a mere contrivance. For the same Aristotle, De anima III, c. 6, in the cited text 26, said that in simple intellect and in sense there is truth; while in the same chapter, text 22, he had taught that truth is in composition alone; which two cannot stand together unless that twofold truth, the complex and the incomplex, be distinguished. However, this solution too has little weight.

First, because Aristotle in the places cited, and in many others besides, when he said that truth is in composition alone, added no limitation or explanation: he therefore understood absolutely any truth whatsoever, since he said universally that outside composition there is none.

Second, even if there were a twofold truth, yet each would have the common notion of truth: therefore when Aristotle said that outside composition there is no truth, he understood it not of some, but of all. As if someone were to say that "animal is not in such a place"; he would have said it not of one species only, but of all likewise.

Third, the adversaries without foundation feign that in that third book De anima, c. 6, Aristotle affirmed that truth is in simple cognition and in sense, and therefore established a twofold truth. For although his words at first glance may seem to denote this, nevertheless, since when he treats the same matter in Metaphysics IX, that is, c. 12, he teaches the opposite, as we shall see immediately, it must be said that in the third of De anima he did not have the same sense; whence it will also be established that the two testimonies of Aristotle which we adduced for the former opinion avail nothing against our side.[1241]

We concede therefore that Aristotle, De anima III, c. 6, text 26, speaks of simple cognition and apprehension of the thing, when he says: "The intellect accommodated to the form of the what-it-is itself is true, and does not say anything about which beforehand it speaks"; but by such words he did not signify that the intellect of this sort is true with proper truth, but only that it is in that apprehension as something like that which, by composing or dividing, says that something is or is not; and he understood this very thing of sense when in the same place he said: "But as the vision of what is proper to itself is true"; which interpretation, if it were drawn out of my own brain, might be judged little suited to Aristotle's words; but because Aristotle himself has plainly explained in that sense in Metaphysics IX, c. 12, that this was his meaning, it ought not be doubted.[1242]

Accordingly in that chapter 12, text 22, he openly taught that true and false are in the composition and division of opinion; then concerning simples and non-composites he teaches that in them there is truth, yet not falsehood, but ignorance: because either the thing is apprehended by

1240. Aristotle, De Anima III, c. 6, text 26.
1241. Aristotle, De anima III, c. 6; Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, c. 12.

a simple concept, and the intellect is true; or it is not apprehended, and then the intellect is not deceived unless by composing it enunciates something; but it is ignorant, or does not touch the thing, which is merely to be vacant of intellection. Where Aristotle did not intend to signify that in the apprehension of simples there is found properly truth and not falsity; but only that there is something like truth, which in some manner could be called true, namely to touch and to apprehend: for this is to "say" something, although it is not to enunciate. But there is nothing like the false, since the false is not in not-knowing, but in some act of cognition: wherefore it is rather to be called not to touch, or not to know, than to be in any way deceived.

From this exposition Aphrodisias does not dissent, when he says on these words: "But in simples and in composites this does not occur, nor does true or false exist alike in these and in those (that is, in composites), but in another way; for if it existed alike, they themselves would in no way differ among themselves." Nor is there any interpreter of Aristotle who says that Aristotle conceded proper truth in the mere apprehension of simples.[1243]

Moreover, from Aristotle's very words I show this same genuine exposition of his mind: for he says: "But concerning incomposites, whether it is or is not, are the true and the false; which interrogation contains an affirmative sense with a negating one"; as if he said that in simples there is not found an "is" or "is not," which is composition and division, nor true and false: which sense the translation of Averroes makes manifest. Then Aristotle subjoins the reason: "For it is not composite, so that it be if it is composed, but is not if it is divided: nor, similarly, will there be true and false in those." As if to say, just as there is not composition and division, so also there is not true and false. Immediately there follows: "And just as neither is the true the same in these, so neither is the being itself" - that is, just as in simples there is not the same ratio of truth, so neither the same of being; which in turn he had said a little before. Therefore, since he had asserted that indeed there is a different ratio of falsity and of truth, he explains this diversity in these words: "Surely this is true, but that false: for to touch and to say is to be true: for affirmation and saying are not the same: but not to touch is to be ignorant: it is not, assuredly, to be deceived about what a thing is, except per accidens." That is, in simples each in a certain way is found, namely true and false: but truth is nothing else than to touch or to apprehend the thing, which is a kind of saying. However, because he seemed to concede consequently that in the apprehension of simples there is truth as there is in affirmation and negation, he added that to say, that is, to affirm and to enunciate, are not the same: wherefore although the apprehension of simples is a saying which has a certain shadow of truth, nevertheless it is not an affirmation, in which truth is properly and primarily.

And just as he said that to apprehend itself is as it were true, so then he did not say that not to touch is as it were false, but that it is ignorance: because there is nothing like the false; for it is merely the negation of cognition: but falsity, as also truth, is in some operation and cognition.

1242. Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, c. 12, text 22.
1243. Alexander of Aphrodisias, on De anima III, c. 6.

From these things not only does our opinion remain confirmed, but it has also been sufficiently shown that those two testimonies of Aristotle adduced for the prior opinion avail nothing: what remains is, that we briefly say by what reason he himself in other places said that sense regarding its proper sensible is true. Passing over other interpretations, what he said in De anima III, c. 6, text 63, namely that sense concerning the proper sensible cannot be deceived, in which he marked a difference between the proper and the common sensible, concerning which sense can err, is not to be taken as though it always necessarily so happens: for experience teaches this to be false. Moreover, what some say, that this is to be understood with this moderation, if the potency be rightly disposed and the object rightly applied, does not agree with Aristotle's mind: for by this reason sense could neither err about the proper sensible nor about the common; whereas Aristotle himself says that about the common error happens, not however about the proper. Therefore the best interpreter of that text 63 was Aristotle himself, De anima III, c. 3, text 161, where he moderates the aforesaid sentence with these words: "And therefore it happens that sense indeed of what is proper is true, yet nevertheless very much admits of falsity"; therefore he grants that it can sometimes be deceived. Then after a few words, about the common sensibles he says: "About which especially error and deception can occur by sense": by which words he establishes the difference to be this, that about the proper sensible deception happens with greater difficulty, about the common with greater ease: which is to be understood, other things being equal.[1244]

These things being premised, it remains that we show Aristotle in these places did not concede proper truth in external sense, as was asserted for the prior opinion: and I show it thus. Just as Aristotle himself says that sense concerning the proper sensible is true, so likewise he affirms that concerning the common it is deceived and is false: yet from Aristotle's doctrine falsity and deception cannot be in sense: therefore in that place he did not teach that there is truth in sense. Moreover, that falsity is not in sense is gathered from his doctrine in Metaphysics IX, c. 12, where, as I was just now reporting, he teaches that in the simple cognition and apprehension of the whatness itself the intellect cannot be deceived: and hence in it there is not falsity, but ignorance: therefore much more in sense, which by simple notice perceives its object and in no way composes, deception cannot be.

Evasion. But someone will say: when Aristotle asserts that sense is deceived concerning the common and the per accidens sensible, he calls the very ignorance, or the very not-knowing, by the name of error and deception in a certain broader signification; yet not any positive cognition of sense. But this interpretation does not square with his sentence: because by this account sense concerning the proper sensible not only rarely, as Aristotle contends, but also most frequently could be deceived: because there is always in sense a defect of some notice, since not every sensible is always felt; wherefore by this kind of error sense would always be deceived. Since therefore Aristotle says that never or rarely there is a mistake about the proper sensible, but about the common and the per accidens frequently, it is clear that he speaks of an error and deception which does not consist in a mere negation, but in something positive; and since falsity cannot properly be

1244. Aristotle, De anima III, c. 6, text 63; De anima III, c. 3, text 161.

in sense, it also follows that truth is not properly in it. He therefore calls a cognition in sense true or false, not because in it there is properly truth and falsity, but because it is the cause of a true or false judgment in the intellect.

That very thing Anselm expressly taught in the little work On Truth, c. 6, who, although he asserts that there is truth in many things, which he there takes most broadly, nevertheless denies that truth and falsity are in sense, and he refers both to opinion, which has its origin from external sense itself. Anselm therefore agrees with us, except that he seems to ascribe the judgment of opinion, in which he thinks truth and falsity to be, to the interior sense, which he calls "common," as Aristotle also does in De anima III, c. 3, in that text 161; whereas in truth neither can there be an enunciation in it, nor a judgment of opinion by reason of itself, except insofar as it is conjoined to the intellect: and hence the first root of truth and falsity is the intellect judging something about things.[1245]

Caput III - The posterior opinion is proved by arguments

Now to confirm our opinion by arguments, and at the same time to refute the contrary, is necessary. But it must be premised that the solution of this difficulty most of all depends on the common mode of speaking: for that there is some agreement between the thing apprehended or represented and simple cognition, indeed also between the species (*species intelligibilis*) and the thing represented, no one can doubt: but whether such agreement should be called truth has a question which must be defined solely by the common way of speaking: and although the controversy be about words, yet not about things, as we noted in the first chapter, nevertheless it is not to be despised. This therefore being supposed, our opinion is confirmed by two reasons.

Primary argument showing that in simple apprehension neither truth nor falsity properly exists. The first reason is: words are in the place of cognitions and concepts; therefore as often as the concept is true, the word also which is substituted for it is said to be true; and on the contrary, if the concept be false, the word also corresponding to it is said to be false. By the name "concept" I understand what they call formal, that is, the quality which is the cognition itself of the mind and an operation of the potency; nor however is this quality otherwise denoted by a word, but a word is put in the place of it: for the thing known and conceived is signified by a word; for that is said to be signified by a word, into the cognition of which the sign that signifies it makes someone to come. Now from words we come into the cognition of things, not of the thoughts of those who speak to us, unless when they also wish to indicate to us that they are thinking this or that; for then the thought itself is the signified of the word, not the thing thought. Otherwise, however, the signified is the thing thought, which is wont to be called the objective concept, of which I think Aristotle spoke when in On Interpretation I, c. 1, he said that words are signs of concepts.[1246] Therefore words do not signify things thought remotely, signified first by the very thought which is occupied about them; but they signify proximally the things objectively existing in the intellect of the speaker, as

1245. St. Anselm, De veritate c. 6.
1246. Aristotle, On Interpretation I, c. 1.

we showed above, in the preceding disputation, c. 2. Nevertheless words are substituted in the place of thoughts, that by them the one who speaks may make the hearer understand that which he himself understands, and think that which he thinks. In the same way, when someone by words explains what he himself is thinking, the thought is the thing proximally signified; yet there is another reflex thought upon that, in whose place words are substituted, by which the speaker signifies that he is thinking this or that. Therefore universally words are substituted for thoughts; and consequently, as I was just now saying, truth and falsity correspond in the same way to words and to thoughts.

No simple word, however, outside enunciation is called true or false: for if one hear this word "man," he cannot yet say "it is true" or "it is false": but when he hears an enunciation, he can say "it is true" or "it is false": therefore no simple cognition, to which a simple word answers, is true, of itself, or false.

Solution. Perhaps someone would answer that although in simple words there is not the complex truth of enunciation, by reason of which we are wont to say that the speech uttered by a word is true or false, nevertheless there is simple truth or falsity, by reason of which we are wont to say: "this is a true name of this thing, that however is false." Yet if one rightly consider the mode of speaking by which we say that some name is true or false, he will plainly understand that an enunciation of some sort, the cause of truth, is always involved. We say that a name is true of that thing whose proper name it is, or whose genus it is - by way of example, "rational corporeal creature," namely "man" - as if we were saying "it is true that these names are imposed on these things": and from this their very imposition, according to its proper signification, cannot of itself be a cause of deception and of false enunciation, but only of a true one. If it should happen otherwise at times, the falsity will come from elsewhere than from the name itself. In the same way a person's name is said to be false when someone takes to himself another name than he truly has, either because it is false that this is his name, or because such a name, once assumed, is of itself a cause of deception and of a false enunciation. And in this way names are called true or false from their effect; yet by reason of their own simple signification they are not said to have truth or falsity.[1247]

Hence, moreover, the second argument of the prior opinion is also solved: for we concede that a simple natural sign, such as smoke, a gesture, and the like, is true, not by a simple truth that primarily befits it by an order to the simple thing signified, but because to those who see it, it also signifies, after the manner of an enunciation. For the one who sees smoke not only apprehends fire, but also forthwith judges that it is there. So too from a gesture, indeed even from simple words, the same happens; and for this reason alone is there in them truth or falsity, as in a sign that signifies an enunciation to those who see and hear. But if they altogether signified simply, not by an order to being or not-being, such signs would be called neither true nor false. Wherefore every truth and falsity is referred primarily not only to the intellect, but also to the judgment of reason, so that nothing in signs or in cognition is called true, unless it is an enunciation, or something that has some order to it: and of the rest we shall speak in Disputation 77.

1247. The argument continues on the following page and is completed in the next chunk.

The second reason: in simple apprehension there cannot be falsity, which properly consists in deception, as Aristotle plainly teaches; therefore neither can there be truth: for these two, as even St. Thomas admits, are not opposed as affirmation and negation, but as contraries; but contraries have the same common subject, so that if it implies a contradiction that one of them be in any subject, it also implies that the other be there.[1248]

It is answered: Some reply with Ægidius that the truth of simple apprehension has no contrary; and therefore that falsity is opposed only to the truth of complex enunciation.[1249] Yet, to escape the force of the argument, without foundation they devise a twofold kind of truth: since every truth, even that of simple apprehension, from effect at least can be so named from the truth of enunciation. Accordingly, in this way we can call a simple cognition in some sense true, because from itself it is a cause of truth in a complex enunciation, if something else does not hinder. For he who apprehends some thing, or attains the quiddity of it, has a sufficient principle of a true enunciation and judgment; yet no simple apprehension can be called false from effect, because the apprehension of a thing, as such, is not a cause of a false opinion: wherefore whatever things are said to be false "from effect," we shall say in Disputation 77, chapter 4.

Others reply that even in simple apprehension falsity is found, namely that the apprehension of a man is a true knowledge of a man, but a false knowledge of a lion, or of some other thing. This, however, is ridiculous; for thus there would be no knowledge that would not be false, which is absurd. For although a thing at times is said to be false, this happens only when there is in it some accident, by reason of which it appears to be of another nature than it is: in which way orichalc is called false gold, because it appears to be gold when it is not; a thing which in the simple knowledge of a thing cannot occur, and therefore there is nothing on account of which it may be called false. Moreover, the simple knowledge of a man, if it be compared with an icon, or with another thing, has only the nature of negation and of ignorance; but falsity cannot be in ignorance and negation, as was proved above from Aristotle.

Response is given to the arguments of the prior opinion. Furthermore, let the adversaries concede truth and falsity in simple things: for in works of art those are false which do not agree with the idea of the artist; while those are true which conform rightly. Therefore, from their opinion, there is a falsity simply opposed to a simple truth: which being supposed, the reason set forth above gathers its conclusion well. And indeed St. Thomas, when he said that truth and falsity are contraries, and therefore have a common subject, granted that there is truth and falsity also in simple things: first, indeed, falsity in works of art when they depart from the ideas; then in natural matters, when they depart from the rule, as in works of sin: whether this be so we shall see in Disputation 77, chapter 2.[1250] But if someone should say that in things there is not falsity properly and primarily, but "from effect" and insofar as a thing is a cause of a false opinion, so that it is called false - this surely I myself judge to be truer: and for this very reason why shall we not speak likewise of the truth of things? Wherefore, if in things truth or falsity is only secondary and "from

1248. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 16, a. 4; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI; On Interpretation, ch. 14.
1249. Ægidius Romanus, Quodlibet IV, q. 7.
1250. On the "ideas" in works of art, and "rule" in natural things, see the author's Disputation 77, c. 2.

effect," so far as concerns truth, the same must be said, namely that no simple apprehension, neither primarily nor "from effect," can be called false; another reason will be given, and will be explained in Disputation 77, chapter 4.

To the third, however, I reply with St. Thomas that in the angelic and the divine intellect truth is found primarily, just as in our intellect when it composes and divides and judges of things, even if in none of them there is composition and division, but by a simple intuition it judges concerning things. For in them there is not simple apprehension as in us, who apprehend simply in such a way that that cognition does not reach to judging of the thing, namely to be or not to be, in which judgment truth or falsity is said to be found, not, however, in every composition and division, as is noted in the second chapter of this disputation from the doctrine of Aristotle in Metaphysics VI, chapter 2.[1251]

Now this operation of the intellect, in which there is truth and falsity, is called by Aristotle affirmation and negation, which consist in the part of the intellect concerned with composition and division, when the intellect asserts something or denies it: it is wont to be explained only in the indicative mood; for this does not occur without judgment and assent. For until the intellect apprehending the subject and the predicate in some way sees that they rather agree with each other than not agree, it is not yet said to judge, or to affirm one of the other; and, on the other hand, it is not yet said to deny, until it sees that they rather do not agree with each other than agree: in which assent or dissent of the intellect we shall show that it consists.[1252] Wherefore Aristotle in Ethics VI, chapter 9 distinguishes "deliberation" from opinion and dianoia, which his interpreter renders "thought": he distinguishes, namely, because opinion and dianoia are already an enunciation; but deliberation is not yet an enunciation: for this is the same as affirmation and negation. Hence Aristotle in the Categories, chapter on substance, not far from the end, takes speech and opinion for the same, which he says to be the subject of truth and falsity; and in the last chapter of On Interpretation he assigns contradiction between opinions, which he calls enunciations.[1253] Therefore when he said in Metaphysics VI that truth is in the very division of contradiction, he understood it to be in judgment, or opinion.

But if anyone objects that a composite proposition can exist in the intellect before he himself judges anything: I reply that this can be done only by apprehending mere words; but that the things themselves cannot be connected among themselves by the intellect with the conjunction that is denoted by the indicative, until it knows the predicate to agree more with the subject than its opposite, which is to assent; or knows that it does not agree, which is to dissent.

From what has been said it is inferred in what way there is truth in God by judging, just as in our intellect it is found by enunciating. And since the divine intellect is infinite, and above all intelligence, and therefore cannot but understand and judge every thing as it is, it follows that in

1251. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, c. 2.
1252. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 1, a. 2.
1253. Aristotle, Categories, ch. 5 (On Substance); On Interpretation, ch. 14.

him there is the highest truth, which cannot be deceived or fall into error: about which more was disputed through the whole Question 14. For the knowledge of God looks to this rather than to his essence in this respect.

Disputatio LXXVI - Whether the truth of enunciation is the conformity of the formal concept, or of the objective, with the thing itself

Veritas of the intellect is the conformity (*conformatio*) of the objective concept (*conceptus obiectivus*) with the thing. Caput 1. Corollaries of the foregoing doctrine. Caput 2.

Caput I - The truth of the intellect is the conformity of the objective concept with the thing

From the preceding disputation we have only that truth is the conformity of the enunciating intellect with the thing itself. Yet since in the intellect there is the very quality of cognition, which is called the formal concept (*conceptus formalis*), and the thing known, which is called the objective [concept], it is not sufficiently settled among the Doctors whose conformity, or agreement, is truth.

Therefore the earlier opinion is that of Cajetan on article 2 "ad evidentiam," in the second notation, who holds that truth is the conformity of the formal concept with the thing; whether the formal concept be an expressed species, or the cognition itself.[1254] Thus that quality which represents a thing to be as it is, is said, according to Cajetan's view, to be true because it is conform to the thing which it represents. He proves this opinion by no argument, but seems to assume it as something known; yet it could be recommended in this way. Foundation: Truth is the conformity of the intellect with the thing, in such wise that it is primarily in the intellect itself, and from there is derived to things, as will be explained in the following disputation: therefore it ought to be primarily in the very quality and formal concept, which is in the intellect, by reason of which the thing understood is also in the intellect; for if truth were the conformity of the thing understood with itself, as it is outside, it would be rather the thing understood than the intellect that would be called true: but in fact the intellect is said primarily to be true, and the thing itself secondarily: therefore truth is in the formal concept, not in the objective [concept]. Ægidius seems to have followed this opinion, in Quodlibet 4, question 7; for he teaches that truth is an assimilation of the intellect, which is formally in it.[1255]

The later opinion is more probable, which Durandus has proved, namely, that truth is primarily the agreement of the concept, not formal, but objective, with the thing itself; and this, moreover, is extrinsic, so as to be the conformity of some thing with itself under a diverse mode.[1256] The same opinion is taught quite expressly in the words of Hervaeus in Quodlibet 3, question 1, articles 2 and 3; although some recent writers, misunderstanding him outright, have thought that he was of a

1254. Cajetan, on Summa Theologiae I, q. 16, a. 2, "ad evidentiam," secunda notatio.
1255. Ægidius Romanus, Quodlibet IV, q. 7.
1256. Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5; cf. also q. 13.

different opinion from these authors - namely, that truth is the agreement of a thing, either outside the intellect with itself, or as it is in the intellect: for thus nearly do they define truth. However, since in the same article he plainly agrees that truth is not formally in the intellect itself, but in the thing understood, that is, in the objective concept, not because it is conform to the formal concept, but because it is conform to the thing itself existing outside the intellect, there will be no reason to say that he sensed anything other than Durandus.

Hervaeus's words are these: "Therefore judgment - because it is not formally [i.e., because truth is not] in the intellect unless it be in the thing representing, but in the thing understood, nor in the intellect are there relations to the representing, in such manner namely that such a thing be such as its thing represented; but in this, that such a thing is such as it is represented." Therefore, when he says that truth is the agreement of the thing, according to itself, with itself understood; it is the same as if he were to say, on that account what is conceived about the thing is true, because it is conform to the thing according to itself, that is, such as it is in itself, is objected to the intellect; or conversely, it is such according to itself as it is objected to the intellect: for these two come to the same. If Hervaeus had taught the opposite, Durandus without doubt would have refuted it, since he took from him all the things that he taught for sure. And in this sense did Soncinas understand Hervaeus, in book 6 on the Metaphysics, question 17, article 2, at the end.[1257] In the same direction, though not so openly, Henry in his Summa, article 34, question 9, inclines. And indeed Durandus confirms this opinion with two very good reasons, the first of which is as follows.

The conformity, or agreement, of representation, or cognition, with the thing itself - which is called truth - consists in this, that the cognition represent the thing, or be known to be, just as the thing itself is according to itself; for hence the intellect is said to be true, in that it knows a thing to be thus as it is: but such an agreement is primary and per se rather with the thing, or is objective in the intellect, not with the formal concept: therefore in it truth is found primarily. Moreover, that agreement primarily belongs to the thing, insofar as it is objective in the intellect, is proved thus. The intellect is not said to be conformed by its intellection to the things themselves from this, that its intellection is so disposed toward itself as it is in its subject, as the thing in the intellect is disposed toward its real being - this is manifestly false; but from this, that the thing is represented by the intellection just as it is: therefore that in which proximally the intellect and the thing according to itself are found and contained, is primarily the thing represented by the objective cognition: to that, therefore, there primarily intervenes agreement and truth.

The second reason, which Durandus takes from Hervaeus, is of this sort. That is primarily true which is signified by a true enunciation which is in the voice: for an affirmation which is in the voice is not for that reason true in another way than because it is the sign of a true understanding; but words do not signify formal concepts and the very qualities of intellections, but the things conceived, as in the preceding disputation, chapter 3, in the treatment, we have shown: therefore the things objective are primarily true, not, however, the formal concepts. Therefore all other things are said to be true from an order to the truth which primarily befalls the objective concept,

1257. Soncinas, In VI Metaphysicorum, quaest. 17, art. 2, in fine; cf. Henry of Ghent, Summa, a. 34, q. 9.

not only words, but the very qualities of the intellect as well; for these are signs of the objective concept of truth: hence the objective concept is true, because it agrees and is conformed with the thing according to itself.

But an objection is urged against the foregoing opinion in this way: The truth which is in the voice does not consist in the agreement of the thing signified with itself, but of the voice with the thing signified: therefore the truth of the intellect does not consist in the agreement of the objective concept with the thing itself, but of the formal concept with the thing itself represented. I answer: words are, as I said, true secondarily; not because they are conformed to the things signified, but because they signify objective concepts conformed to the things themselves. For truth is primarily in the intellect, and to that extent words are true, insofar as they denote a true intellect.[1248]

Corollaries of the foregoing doctrine.

Caput II - From the foregoing position Durandus and Hervaeus gather certain points worth noting.

The first is that truth is an entity of reason (*ens rationis*): first, because it is in things not according to themselves, existing outside the intellect, but only insofar as they are set before the intellect; and further, because it is an agreement of a thing with itself as standing in a different way; for things are not always conceived in the very way they are. Sometimes, moreover, there is an agreement of a thing with itself conceived in no other way than by intuitive knowledge (as they speak), especially by God Himself; then that agreement and conformity which we call truth will rather be a relation of identity of the same thing to itself than of likeness and agreement; and the intellect will then be said to be true when it has the objective concept of the very thing exactly as the thing itself is.[1258]

But since the truth of the intellect, which primarily belongs to the objective concept, is a relation of reason (*relatio rationis*), it follows also that there is a relation of reason in the formal concept itself, to which truth belongs secondarily. For if in the objective concept, to which truth belongs primarily, there is only a relation of reason, much more will this be so in that to which it belongs secondarily. If, however, falsity and truth belonged primarily to the formal concept, it could easily be defended that truth and falsity are real relations, as is representation itself. Thus Soncinas teaches on the sixth book of the Metaphysics, question 17, article 2, at the end; except that he thinks that sometimes there is a respect of reason, namely when they are toward a non-existing thing. For many Thomists judge that the relation of an existing thing to a non-existing one is only a relation of reason - which, however, is not universally true. For the relation of a productive [cause] to that which can be produced is placed by Aristotle, Metaphysics V, chapter 15, under the second species of relation, and yet it is toward a non-existing thing; about which there is no need to dispute further here.[1259]

1248. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 16, a. 4; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI; On Interpretation, ch. 14.

1258. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5; cf. also q. 13. Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet III, q. 1, a. 2 - 3.

1259. Soncinas, In VI Metaphysicorum, quaest. 17, art. 2, in fine; cf. also the remark on relations toward non-existents. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, c. 15 (on the second species of relation).

Secondly, Hervaeus (art. 3) and Durandus (n. 14) note that while certain entities of reason follow upon simple knowledge, other [entities of reason] follow upon enunciation; and yet true and false do not follow upon knowledge, as genus and species do, but upon an enunciation of composition and division. If indeed they understand this in such a way as to think that the relation of truth and falsity is attributed to a thing from the fact that it is understood, not by any and every kind of cognition, but by enunciation alone; and that the relation of genus is attributed to a nature from the fact that it is understood by a simple knowledge which abstracts it from singulars; their doctrine is most true. For the foundation of the relation of genus, from which a relation is conceived in the thing itself, is simple knowledge alone; but the foundation of the relation of truth and falsity is not any sort of knowledge, but enunciation with judgment. Indeed, before someone enunciates a thing, we can never say or understand [it to be] true or false, as was proved in the preceding disputation.[1260]

If, however, they think that a relation of reason itself - whose being consists only in being known - sometimes comes to be by composition and division (as truth and falsity), and sometimes by simple knowledge (as genus and species), they are plainly mistaken. For no entity of reason which is a relation - whether it be truth and falsity, or genus and species - can come to be, or be known (which is the same thing), unless a comparison has been made; because it is conceived after the manner of a relation. But a comparison cannot be made by the intellect without an enunciation, as is evident. I said that a relation is brought about only by enunciation, because an entity of reason which is a negation (as a chimera) and which is a privation (as blindness) can be formed by simple knowledge, since these two are conceived after the likeness of some real being, and on that account are called entities of reason.[1261]

Third, from what has been said there seems to follow what Henry teaches more fully in the Summa, article 34, question 5: namely, that truth is prior in the intellect than in the thing itself. For in things he says it is found only from this, that of themselves they are apt to be understood by the intellect; for which reason it seems that truth exists in things only in potency, not in act.[1262]

Not in act. For when a thing is understood and there is already agreement of the concept with it, then there is truth in act, as was explained above; and in this sense he interprets that statement of Anselm in the work On Truth, chapter 12: "Truth is a rectitude perceptible by the mind alone"; and likewise that common axiom: "The true, or truth, is the object of the intellect"; whence also it is commonly said that nothing is known by the intellect except under the aspect of the true. Finally, from this doctrine he concludes that the truth of God is more principally in His essence, insofar as it has the notion of intelligence, than insofar as it is essence.[1263]

But taken as a whole, unless it be further explained, this doctrine does not please me; and while we leave to be examined in article 5 what he teaches about the truth of God, let us now treat of created truth alone. First, what he says about things - that they are true for this reason alone,

1260. On the dependence of truth and falsity on enunciation with judgment, see Hervaeus, loc. cit.; Durandus, loc. cit.

1261. On entities of reason formed without enunciation (negation and privation), see the common doctrine of the schools.

1262. Henry of Ghent, Summa, a. 34, q. 5.

because they are apt to be known by the intellect - is most true, as will be explained in the following disputation. Next, what he says - that truth is chiefly in the intellect - can be understood in two ways. In one way, just as other relative entities of reason, it has actual being only through a knowing and comparing intellect; and therefore, in the best way in which it can exist, it exists when it is actually known: and in this sense it is most true that truth is chiefly in the composing intellect. But that truth, in this sense, is not in the divine intellect will be shown opportunely in article 5 against Henry himself.

Moreover, although the object of the intellect is the true, that is, that thing to which truth belongs primarily (because by the name "true" we include every composition and division of the intellect to which truth is attributed), nevertheless it cannot be said that the true is the adequate object of the intellect, as the good is said to be of the will - as Ægidius thought wrongly in Quodlibet IV, question 7, and others - but rather being (*ens*), as Scotus rightly taught in I Sentences, distinction 3, question 3, §5.[1264] But against that conclusion - passing over its arguments - this alone can prove it: everything that the intellect understands, it knows not under the aspect of the true, but under the aspect of being. For the intellect is of the false and of the true, just as the will is of the good and of the evil; for the will is of evil, not by pursuit but by flight; the intellect, however, is of the false, not by assent but by dissent. Nay more, sometimes the intellect is of neither the true nor the false, namely in simple apprehension, in which neither true nor false is found, as in the preceding disputation was shown.

Explication of Anselm's words. What Anselm said - that truth is a rectitude perceptible by the mind alone - Henry did not interpret rightly. For Anselm did not for that reason say "perceptible by the mind alone" in order to indicate that truth is brought about only by the operation of the intellect, as other entities of reason are; but to distinguish it from the rectitude of quantity, which is perceived by sense, as is manifestly gathered from Anselm himself in that chapter.

Examination of Henry's doctrine. Although the object of the intellect is the true, that is, that thing to which truth belongs primarily, nevertheless it cannot be said to be the adequate object of the intellect, as the good is of the will; as Ægidius wrongly thought; but rather being, as Scotus rightly taught. But against that conclusion, etc., as above.

Articulus III - Whether the true and being are convertible

Therefore he would judge it to be conform, and hence true: this, then, is that the judgment of assent is always engaged about the true, at least under the aspect of the apparently true.

But about dissent concerning the false, one must speak with a certain proportion as follows: for dissent is a judgment of enunciation by which someone knows the predicate not to agree with the subject. And yet when someone so judges, although in the thing itself it is not so, nevertheless in his own judgment he behaves as if it were so, just as it appears to him; and in the rest the intellect

1263. St. Anselm, De veritate, c. 12.
1264. Ægidius Romanus, Quodlibet IV, q. 7. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 3, q. 3, §5.

in dissent is disposed as was said above about assent concerning the true. But apprehension, which has not yet reached to assent or dissent, is that in which it has not yet appeared that the predicate agrees or does not agree with the subject.

I see well that St. Thomas and Cajetan, in the reply to the third objection of article 3 of this question, interpret otherwise that axiom, "The true is the object of the intellect," about which again in the following disputation, chapter 5, we shall speak. For now these things are enough about articles 1 and 2 of this question, in which we have embraced also those things which St. Thomas treats in the following question, articles 3 and 4.[1265]

Moreover, the things we have said hitherto do not suffice for us to elicit the definition of truth in general. For since truth is the conformity of the intellect with the thing, which can be considered on the part of the intellect with the thing, and on the part of things with the intellect, as St. Thomas noted in article 1, and we have disputed only about that which is the intellect with the thing, the other part of the definition remains thus far only explained. But in what way truth is in things, which pertains to other articles, we shall say in the following disputation, in which likewise it will be proved that the whole nature of truth is to be reduced primarily and properly to the intellect alone.

To the argument, indeed, which at the beginning we made for Cajetan's position, an answer can be given easily. We concede, therefore, that the intellect is primarily true, and that from it the denomination of "true" is derived to things themselves; however, the intellect is not true by some formality inhering in it, but by reason of the object, which it is said to contain in itself by a certain representation, and on this account also the representing quality itself is said to be true, as has been proved.

It is answered further in this way to what is commonly said, namely, that "everything which is known is known under the aspect of the true": so I understand it, namely, that everything to which the intellect gives assent in some way moves the intellect to assent under the aspect of the true; likewise, that the dissent of the intellect concerning the false is conversant in some way under the aspect of the false. For the intellect never assents to any enunciation until it knows the predicate to agree more to the subject than the opposite; and although it may not thus agree to the thing itself, nevertheless the intellect by its assent judges as if it were so; and although in such a direct judgment there is not actually truth, not even as esteemed - for then the intellect would judge with a reflex cognition that its objective concept is conform to the thing itself - nevertheless, as I have said, it so assents to that enunciation that, if above the direct assent it were to exercise a reflex judgment, it would judge it to be conform and hence true. This, therefore, is that the judgment of assent is always conversant about the true, at least under the aspect of the apparently true.

About dissent concerning the false, one must speak proportionally thus: dissent, namely, is a judgment of enunciation by which someone knows the predicate not to agree with the subject; and yet when someone so judges, although in the thing itself it is not so, nevertheless in his own

1265. St. Thomas, and Cajetan, on this question, article 3, reply to obj. 3; see also the discussion announced for the following disputation, cap. 5.

judgment he behaves as if it were so, just as it appears to him; and in the rest the intellect in dissent is disposed as was said above about assent concerning the true. But apprehension, which has not yet reached to assent or dissent, is that in which it has not yet appeared that the predicate agrees or does not agree with the subject.

But to the third [article] one proceeds as follows.

Objicitur 1. It seems that the true and being are not convertible. For the true is properly in the intellect (as was said above), but being is properly in things: therefore they are not convertible.

Objicitur 2. Moreover, that which extends itself to both being and non-being is not convertible with being; but the true extends itself to being and non-being, for the true is that "what is, is," and "what is not, is not": therefore the true and being are not convertible.

Objicitur 3. Moreover, those which are disposed according to prior and posterior do not seem to be convertible; but the true seems to be prior to being, for nothing is understood except under the aspect of the true: therefore they do not seem to be convertible.

But on the contrary: the Philosopher says in Metaphysics II that the disposition of things is the same in being and in truth.[1266]

I answer that, just as the good has the notion of the appetible, so the true has an ordination to cognition. But each thing, insofar as it has being, is so far cognoscible. And for this reason it is said in On the Soul III that "the soul is in a certain way all things according to sense and intellect." Therefore, just as the good is convertible with being, so also is the true. Yet just as the good adds the notion of the appetible over and above being, so also the true adds a comparison to the intellect.

Reply to the first: The true is in things and in the intellect, as has been said; but the true which is in things is convertible with being according to substance, while the true which is in the intellect is convertible with being as the manifestative with the manifested. For this belongs to the ratio of the true, as has been said. Although one could say that being too is in things and in the intellect just as the true is; yet the true is principally in the intellect, and being principally in things.

Reply to the second: Non-being does not have in itself that by which it may be known, but is known insofar as the intellect makes it knowable; hence the true is founded on being, inasmuch as non-being is a certain entity of reason apprehended, namely, by reason.

Reply to the third: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended without the aspect of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In one way, such that being is not apprehended unless the aspect of the true follows upon the apprehension of being; and thus the expression has truth. In another way, it could be understood thus, that being could not be apprehended unless the aspect of the true were apprehended; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the aspect of being is apprehended, because being falls under the ratio of the true. And it is similar if we

1266. Aristotle, Metaphysics II, text 4 (tomo 3).

compare the intelligible to being: for being cannot be understood unless it is intelligible. Yet being can be understood in such a way that its intelligibility is not understood. And similarly, being understood is true; not, however, by understanding being is the true understood.

Conclusion of the article: The true is convertible with being, just as also with the good. However, just as the good, over and above the notion of being, also contains the notion of the appetible, so the true not only includes the notion of being, but also a certain ordination to the intellect.

Articulus IV - Whether the good is prior to the true

To the fourth [article] one proceeds thus.

Objicitur 1. It seems that the good is prior to the true according to reason. For that which is more universal is prior according to reason. But the good is more universal than the true: for the true is a certain good, namely, of the intellect: therefore the good is prior according to reason than the true.[1267]

Objicitur 2. Moreover, the good is in things, but the true is in the composition and division of the intellect, as has been said in article 2 of this question. But those things which are in the thing are prior to those which are in the intellect: therefore the good is prior according to reason than the true.

Objicitur 3. Moreover, truth is a certain species of virtue, as is clear in Ethics IV. But virtue is contained under the good; for it is a good quality of the mind, as St. Augustine says against Julian: therefore the good is prior to the true.[1268]

But on the contrary: that which is in more things is prior according to reason. But the true is in some things in which the good is not, namely, in the mathematical [things]: therefore the true is prior to the good.

I answer that, although the good and the true, supposing that they are convertible with being, nevertheless differ in notion. And according to this the true, absolutely speaking, is prior to the good. This appears from two considerations. First, because the true is closer to being, which is prior, than the good is. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; but the notion of the good follows upon being insofar as it is in some way perfect: for thus it is appetible. Secondly, this appears because cognition naturally precedes appetite. Whence, since the true regards cognition, but the good appetite, the true will be prior to the good according to reason.

Reply to the first: The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills that the intellect understand. Thus, therefore, among those things which are ordered to the object of the will, there are also contained the things which are of the intellect, and conversely. Whence, in the order of the appetibles, the good is as the universal,

1267. Aristotle, Physics I, text 49; the gloss about universality; cf. also the remark "the true is a certain good of the intellect."

1268. Aristotle, Ethics IV, c. 7 (tom. 5). St. Augustine, Contra Julianum, l. 6, c. 7 (tom. 7).

and the true as the particular; but in the order of the intelligibles, conversely. From this, therefore, that the true is a certain good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of the appetibles, but not that it is prior simply.

Reply to the second: Something is prior according to reason in this way, that it falls first into the intellect. But the intellect first apprehends being itself, and secondarily apprehends that [such a being] be intelligible; and, thirdly, it apprehends itself to desire being. Whence, first is the ratio of being, second the ratio of truth, third the ratio of the good: although the good is in things.

Reply to the third: The virtue which is called "truth" is not common truth, but a certain truth according to which a man shows himself in words and deeds to be what he is; and "truth of life" is said in a particular way, according as a man, in his life, fulfills that which is ordered for him according to the divine intellect, just as they also say that truth is in other things. But "truth" as instituted in laws is that by which a man keeps what he owes to another according to the order of law. Whence from these particular "truths" one must not proceed to common truth.

Conclusion of the article: Absolutely speaking, the true is prior to the good.

Disputatio LXXVII - In what way truth is in things outside the intellect

Caput I - So that, for an exact explanation of these articles, it is necessary to understand how truth is in things

So that we may arrive at an exact explication of these articles, it is necessary to understand in what way truth is in things; which we have decided to examine under one disputation that embraces the truer doctrine, and also to take up those matters which we have left for dispute from the articles.

In the question proposed, the first opinion is very famous and common, first, that truth is really and intrinsically in things - indeed that it is a passion of being, which is reciprocated with being itself; second, that this truth is a relation of conformity and agreement of things with the divine intellect, upon which, as upon a cause, they depend; third, that in works of art truth is a conformity with the intellect and idea of the artificer. This is the opinion taught by Ferrariensis, and many of the more recent follow it, as he himself says in this chapter.[1269]

It seems, moreover, that this is the opinion of St. Thomas in article 1 of this question: for when he defines truth as the conformity of thing and intellect, he says that, on the side of the thing, there can be taken the truth and conformity of the thing with the intellect, and of the intellect with the thing. But when he explains how a thing compared to an intellect can be called true, he adds that he understands it to be compared of itself only with that intellect upon which it depends, namely, the natural thing with the divine intellect, and the artificial thing with the created intellect of the

1269. Ferrariensis, Contra gentiles, cap. 60 sqq., and passim; the same view is followed by many recent authors who think truth is in things as a conformity to intellect, divine in natural things, and the artificer's in artificial things.

artificer. In his view, therefore, a natural thing will be true because it is like the idea of the divine intellect; and an artificial thing, because it imitates the artisan's idea; and thus, according to both, truth is intrinsic and real in relation to being.

- What Ferrariensis held, cap. 1.
- The preceding opinion is refuted, cap. 2.
- The opinion of Capreolus and Soncinas, cap. 3.
- The more probable position, cap. 4.
- From the foregoing the doctrine of articles 3 and 4 of this question is elucidated, cap. 5.

Moreover, the same St. Thomas in the following question, article 4, affirms that falsity is also in things; for he proves in article 4 of that question that truth and falsity are opposed contrarily; from which he infers in another article that both must be conversant about the same kind of subject. Therefore he grants falsity not only in works of art, but also in natural things: in the former, when they fail from the idea of art - wherefore a house is false which does not have that disposition which the idea of art prescribes; but in the latter, when they fail from the ordination of the divine intellect, which only happens in evil actions, for which reason the act of sin is said to be false, Psalm 4: "Why do you love vanity, and seek a lie?" and on the contrary, the work of virtue is called the "truth of life," John 3. With St. Thomas agrees in all things Cajetan, although in this question, article 6, in response to a doubt he says that things are called true only by an extrinsic denomination, so that there is no truth in things formally, but imitatively (as he says), that is, by fulfillment with respect to the divine intellect, and causally with respect to our speculative intellect; indeed, St. Thomas seems to teach the same.[1270]

This sentence of Ferrariensis can be confirmed first by the authority of Anselm in the little work On Truth, chapters 4 and 8, where he teaches that truth is in an operation of the will, and hence it is said in John 8 of the devil, "He did not stand in the truth"; that it is also in operations not only of virtue, but also of nature, whenever the agent acts according to its nature as it ought.

Finally, a reason is brought, taken from the definition of truth: since truth is the conformity of intellect and thing, St. Thomas in article 1 of this question rightly infers that truth can be taken on the side of things and on the side of intellect. Now that truth which is on the side of things ought to be a conformity not with that intellect which things per accidens regard, but with that which they per se regard; and such is the divine intellect or the artisan's intellect, which are the causes of things: therefore things are called true, because they are conformable either to the intellect of God, or to the intellect of the artisan.[1271]

1270. Cajetan, on article 1 of this question; although in this question, article 6, ad dubium, he says that things are called true by an extrinsic denomination only, so that there is no truth in things formally, but imitatively with respect to the divine intellect, and causally with respect to our speculative intellect.

1271. St. Thomas, article 1 of this question; the argument taken from the definition of truth as conformity of intellect and thing.

Caput II - The preceding opinion is refuted

Yet this opinion does not persuade me in what it asserts in the second and third place; and although, according to the position which I judge more probable, truth ought to be assigned as a property of being in general, so that it always reciprocates with it, nevertheless it must be explained on another ground than that which this opinion assigned.

First, I do not sufficiently understand how the doctrine of St. Thomas in this article is consistent with itself, and with this sentence of Ferrariensis. For he said in article 1 of this question that truth is primarily in the intellect, and thence is derived into the things themselves; but on the contrary, that the good is primarily in things, and thence is diffused into appetite. If this is so, things will be true because they are the cause of a true intellect, not because they themselves are conformable to the intellect. But if truth is as much the conformity of things with intellect as of intellect with things, as the same Doctor says at the end of the first article, and as the Doctors of this former view teach, truth will belong equally and primarily to things and to intellect; nor will it be possible that it be derived by an analogy from the one to the other. Wherefore, although things are said to be true from the relation of suitability with the intellect, nevertheless they will not for that reason be said to be secondarily true by a truth communicated from the intellect. For the intellect is said to be true not absolutely in itself, but from the relation of conformity and suitability with things; yet for that reason it is not said to have truth secondarily communicated from things.

Furthermore, if truth is primarily in the intellect - namely, as a conformity with things - just as health is primarily in the animal itself as the due disposition of humors, and the denomination of truth is derived into the things themselves, as the denomination of health is into medicine; surely in things there will not be said to be truth because there is a suitability and conformity with the intellect, but because things are the cause of the conformity of the intellect with the things themselves, just as the denomination of health in medicine is not from some good disposition existing in medicine itself, but from this, that it is the cause of a good disposition in the animal. Wherefore truth could only be in things either as in a sign, or as in a cause of truth. This difficulty also, which arises from the very words of St. Thomas, will again be treated in article 6 of this question.[1272]

But if the authors mentioned, according to the opinion aforesaid, assert that truth is found equally and primarily in things as in intellect, from a mutual conformity and suitability of the one with the other (which, in my judgment, Ferrariensis felt), they can be impugned by a single reason, which is this. If in things there were found some truth primarily and formally, it would be simple, and without order to enunciation; therefore falsity also would in like manner be found in them, as we inferred in a similar case in Disputation 75, chapter 3; for these two are contrarily opposed, and therefore ought to be conversant about the same subject, as the same St. Thomas admits in the following question, article 4, and as we in the place cited have treated more at large. But in things there is not found primarily and formally a simple falsity; therefore neither a simple truth. And indeed, if there is primarily truth in things, no one doubts that it must be simple. For as there is in

1272. See below, article 6 of this question, where this difficulty arising from St. Thomas's own words is treated again.

those no enunciation, so neither can the truth of enunciation be in them formally and primarily; but secondarily, as in a cause - namely, because they can be the cause of a true or false enunciation; or at least as in a sign.

It remains, therefore, to show that in those [things] there cannot be a simple falsity through a defect from the rule of intellect to which they ought to be conformed, in order that they be true; whence it also will be proved that there is not in things a simple truth. This is shown first in works of art. For if a house were so to fail from the idea that it were not conformed with it, or were so to fail that it did not have all the things by which it ought essentially to be constituted - and thus it is not a false house, because it is not a house; or if it has all the things by which it is essentially constituted, yet remains less polished and perfect than a consummate art required, then it is a true house, but not a good one: for only integrity and consummation are lacking, which, as they are the goodness of a house according to what we said in Disputation 23, not its truth; so the defect of integrity will be malice, not falsity.[1273]

Objicitur. Yet someone will object first that the falsity of a house can happen from this, that its foundations were not laid deep, whence commonly the walls are said to be falsely founded.

Respondetur. I answer: a house without any foundation at all is a true house; for he who would so call it would speak truly; only that it is imperfect, and therefore bad. But it is said to be "falsely founded," and there is found in it a falsity of foundations, yet not without an order to the intellect composing and enunciating; just as when gold or some other thing is called false. It is said to be false "in its foundations," because, as it appears only outwardly, and that house seems and appears to have solid foundations which in truth it does not have; therefore, because it is the cause of a false judgment, it can be said to be falsely founded - a doctrine which will be more fully explained below, when we shall show in what manner falsity is found in certain things.

Secundo objicietur. Then someone will object secondly: if a house made of canvas were so accurately painted that the walls should seem to be constructed of square and polished stones, that will be a false house; therefore, in works of art falsity can be found.

Solutio. I answer in the same way: that would indeed be a true house, if it has the form not of a tent or tabernacle, but of a house. That it has walls of canvas matters little; from this it only follows that it is a canvas-house, which could have been constructed either of straw, or of wood, or of stones. For various matter does not change the form and species of a house. Yet there would be in that canvas-house, painted in such a way, some falsity from this, that it appears to be built of stones, of which in truth it is not; but this falsity would be in it from an order to the intellect judging falsely, as was said in the foregoing argument. It is clear, then, that in works of art neither a simple falsity, and consequently neither a simple truth, is found.

Then in natural things, that a simple falsity cannot be, is shown by this reason. If in some there were such, most of all in sins, as St. Thomas admits; but that defect which is in sins ought to be called not so much falsity as malice. For in the respect that an operation fails, or is contrary to God,

1273. See Disputation 75, chapter 3, for the parallel argument about falsity; and Disputation 23, on integrity and consummation as the goodness, not the truth, of an artifact. Also cf. Summa Theologiae I - II, q.71, a.6.

it is called evil with moral malice, either because it is against the will and precept of God, or because this very thing, which by natural law is against rational nature, is also against nature's very author, as will be explained in 1 - 2, q.71, a.6; but another defect in sins is not found. Therefore in them there is not a falsity properly so called, which is opposed to simple truth. Yet they are sometimes in Scripture called false and lies; but on the contrary, works of virtue are called true, or truth - not because there inheres in them the truth or the simple falsity about which our present controversy is, but because they are the cause of a true or false judgment: for sin so appears to a man that it promises him delight and full joy.

... but in things there is not found primarily and formally simple falsity; therefore neither [is there found] simple truth. Moreover, if in things there is primarily truth, that it must be simple no one doubts. For just as in them there is no enunciation, so neither can the truth of enunciation be in them formally and first, but only secondarily, as in a cause: namely, because they can be a cause of a true or false enunciation, or at least as in a sign.

Therefore, to show that in things there cannot be simple falsity from a defect from the rule of the intellect, with which they ought to be conformed so as to be true; whence it will also be proved that in things there is not simple truth: this is shown first in works of art. For a house, if it so lacks the idea that it is not conformed to it, or so lacks that it does not have all the things by which it ought essentially to be constituted, then it is not such a house, because it is not a house; or it has all the things by which it is essentially constituted, yet remains less polished and perfect than consummate art required, and thus it is a true house, but not a good [one]. For in this case only integrity and consummation are lacking, which, as they are the goodness of the house according to what we have said in Disputation 23, are not its truth; thus the defect of integrity will be badness, not falsity.[1274]

Objicitur. Yet someone will object first, that falsity of a house can occur from the fact that its foundations were not laid deep; whence commonly the walls are said to be falsely founded. I answer: a house without any foundation at all is a true house; for he who should so call it would speak truly; it is only imperfect, and therefore bad. It is said to be "falsely founded," and in those foundations falsity is said to be found, yet not without an order to the intellect composing and enunciating; just as when gold or some other thing is called false. Thus falsity is said to be in the foundations because, in so far as only what is outward is seen and appears, that house is judged by the mind to be such as in reality it is not; and so it is said to be "falsely founded." This will be explained below, in the higher article, in certain points.

Secondly it is objected: if a house were most accurately painted, with squared and set stones and the like, there would be a false house according to art. Solution: in such a case there is not a house, but the representation of a house; if, however, there were a structure which truly has all that essentially constitutes a house, even if its walls were of canvas or wood or stone - for the matter does not change the species of house - then it would be a true house but bad, if by defect of firmness or the like it falls short of the integrity which is the goodness of the house. Nevertheless,

1274. See Disputation 23, on integrity and consummation as the goodness, not the truth, of an artifact.

in the painting or façade there will be falsity, in so far as it appears as if made of those materials of which it really is not; and that falsity is said with an order to the intellect judging falsely, as was said.

In sins, if anywhere most closely, falsity might be shown to occur, as St. Thomas seems to hold; yet the defects in sins are not so much falsity as should rather be called malice. For a thing is said to be false either because it gainsays God, by moral wickedness, or because it is against nature's rule and the rational law, and thereby against the Author of nature; as will be more fully explained in I - II, q.71, a.6: in sins there is not simple falsity; sometimes, however, a false judgment is born in the sinner about the sin, when he thinks he can find in it that wherein his appetite may rest; which, however, does not so happen: on the contrary, in virtue this is found most fully; whence there is a true judgment which the intellect has concerning virtue. Whether, however, that place John 8, "He did not stand in the truth," is to be understood of the truth of virtue and holiness, or rather of that which is opposed to lying, we shall say below, Disputation 227, chapter 3.[1275]

As to Anselm, there is no great need to care much; for in that little work he uses truth with a very broad signification and confounds it with goodness. He says in chapter 12 that it is the rectitude of things, and in chapter 8 the rectitude of operation, not only moral but also natural; for when someone acts as he ought, he invokes truth: whereas goodness and truth are far different. Moreover, he teaches other things that do not seem at all to be much to be approved.

Next, this opinion could be impugned by the first reason which we set forth in Disputation 75, chapter 3, namely, that in simple apprehension there is not truth formally; also by the argument which, in chapter 4 of this disputation, we shall produce in confirmation of our opinion, where likewise the foundation which is usually made for this opinion is discussed. Last, it can be refuted by the testimony of Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 6, chapter 2, where Aristotle says that true and false are not in things, as good and evil are,[1276] which we have more fully explained in Disputation 75, chapter 2.

Caput III - The opinion of Capreolus and Soncinus

The second opinion is that of Capreolus in I, dist. 19, q. 3, art. 1, conclusions 1 and 2, and Soncinus in book 6 of the Metaphysics, q. 17, who teach that truth, whether in the intellect or in things, includes formally not only a relation of conformity and agreement, but also the absolute essence and the being (esse) of that thing to which it is conjoined; but what sort of relation that is, they do not explain in the same way. Capreolus, indeed, as far as I could gather from the places alleged and from art. 3 in the arguments against the second conclusion, seems to affirm that that relation by which, together with the absolute, the notion of truth is completed, is only of reason, which nevertheless has a foundation only in the thing itself; this he proves from St. Thomas in I, dist. 19, q. 5, art. 1, where St. Thomas openly teaches that truth, just as also time and certain other things, is not only something of reason nor only something real, but is to be summed from both.[1277]

1275. John 8; see below, Disputation 227, chapter 3.
1276. Aristotle, Metaphysics 6, chapter 2.

Soncinas, however, asserts that the relation in creatures is real, namely of conformity and agreeableness with the idea of the divine intellect, to which every creature is really referred; but in the divine essence there is a relation of reason, because only by our way of understanding is it referred to its intellect, since it is not really distinguished from it. He adds, moreover, that this relation does not directly pertain to the notion of truth; but by the name truth, according to our way of understanding, it is only consequently denoted, because without that we are unable to understand the absolute notion of truth - a point in which Capreolus does not clearly agree. All these things do not otherwise avail than from certain places of St. Thomas, from which they seem to themselves to be able to deduce them.

But whatever be the case with those, the opinion of St. Thomas, which in the foregoing chapter we have already unfolded, remains firm. Now, however, the opinion of Capreolus and Soncinus is by no means to be embraced. And indeed, as regards specific relation, below we shall show, in confirming our opinion, that it is only of reason, in which we shall agree with Capreolus. Whence we shall also explain there from what source that [conclusion] should be derived. Further, that there is not a real relation to the intellect of God, as Soncinus thought, was proved in the preceding chapter. It remains to be shown, as it is against both in the present, that truth does not include in its notion directly the absolute and the relative, as Capreolus seems to have taught, nor the absolute directly and the relative consequently, as Soncinus thought; which can be persuaded in this way.

Truth, speaking formally, is a certain affection of a thing, or at least an affection is so conceived and denominated; therefore it does not directly and formally include the thing itself of which it is the affection. For although by the concrete name "true," which is verum, there is directly signified the material subject, namely the thing itself which has the relation, while the relation is, as it were, consequent and oblique, nevertheless we ought not on that account to assert that, in the formal notion of truth, the thing itself, the absolute, is included. For this is common to all concrete names of accidents, as "white": to signify directly the subject, and consequently, or obliquely, the form, as whiteness, as we shall probably say below in Disputation 155, chapter 8. Yet for this reason we do not say that it belongs to the notion of the form, namely of whiteness, that the very subject, which is denominated white, be included.

This reasoning not only proves against Capreolus that the absolute thing itself together with that relation of conformity and agreement does not pertain to the notion of truth - since an affection of a thing does not formally include the thing itself of which it is an affection - but also, against Soncinus, shows that the direct signification of truth is only that relation, not the subject itself; similarly we shall say about goodness and moral badness in I - II, q. 20.[1278]

Then those two points which I said need a peculiar confirmation: for they will become clear enough if it is first shown that things are called true or false for no other reason than because they are a cause of a true or false judgment in the intellect. And that - the refutation of the other

1277. St. Thomas, In I Sent., dist. 19, q. 5, art. 1.
1278. Summa Theologiae I - II, q.20.

opinions having already established it, since no other way seems to remain - can be explained and confirmed further by this reason. Whenever some thing is called false, it is not called false taken simply, but with an implicit composition and enunciation being insinuated. For no thing is called false in relation to that which it is, even if it has an imperfect being, but in relation to that which it is not, in which a composition of enunciation is clearly insinuated, by an order to which the thing is called false. For example, we do not call any gold however imperfect "false gold," but we call that thing false gold which, although it has no being of gold at all, nevertheless outwardly appears to be gold. This we call false gold because it is a cause of deception in the intellect, either because it has nothing at all of gold beyond what outwardly appears, or because it has so little that it is rather another thing than gold; it is therefore called false gold because it is falsely judged to be gold.

Aristotle expressed this doctrine, Metaphysics, chapter 19, in these words: "False is said in one way as a false thing; and of this sort, either [false is said] of that which is not composed, or of what it is impossible to compose." There Aristotle refers the falsity of things to composition, either because one thing does not agree with another which nevertheless can agree - as that a man be sitting, if he is walking - or because it cannot agree, as that a diameter be commensurable with the side; and after a few words interposed: "So false things are said either because they are not, or because the appearance produced by them is of what is not." The same he immediately teaches about the notion; namely, that a conception is false when referred to other things than that about which it is true. Therefore one must philosophize about truth in the same way: that is, that gold be called true gold because it is the cause of the true judgment of the enunciation by which it is judged to be gold. Therefore all truth and falsity is in things secondarily, as in a cause; but primarily in the enunciative judgment.

From these it is easy to dissolve the common argument for the prior opinion, namely that truth is defined as conformity or agreement of the intellect with the thing, and the thing with the intellect: for thus indeed is the definition to be taken, not as if there were posited on the part of the thing a prior comparison to the intellect of God or of an artificer, as if to a cause per se; but rather as the comparison is constituted first in the intellect, and then in turn in things, since truth is first perceived in the intellect, as was shown in the head of this disputation; from which it is then denoted and designated as if it were primarily constituted in the intellect and only secondarily in the thing. Therefore from that definition truth is to be explained as primarily residing in the intellect, whose exact explication plainly belongs to this very question; the whole examination of the doctrine of the first article of the questions follows from this, of which alone there still remained a need. Now, then, what remains of this article is to be handled; and the fourth [article] also will be in a few points clarified.

Caput IV - The more probable opinion

Among all the rest the opinion seems to be preferable which teaches not only that truth is not in things formally, but neither primarily do they have it; and hence that they are called true only secondarily and by a denomination derived from the intellect: thus a medicine is called "healthy"

from the health of an animal, which it can effect. This opinion is delivered by Hervaeus, quodlibet 3, art. a; by Durandus, In I, dist. 19, q. 5, n. 14; and Henry seems to follow it in his own, art. 34, q. 5, letters L and M; and it must first be explained by us and then confirmed.[1279] Therefore, it must be understood first that truth in things is not only a relation of reason; for in the intellect also it is of that sort, as in the preceding disputation was said to be shown. But even in the things themselves the denomination of truth is secondarily derived from the intellect, so that only those things are called true or also false which are the cause of a true or false judgment in the intellect, as a medicine is called "healthy" because it is the cause of health. From this doctrine two [consequences] follow. The first is that things are true by an order to the intellect, not because they are conformed to the intellect of God or of the artificer, to whom as to a cause they are per se referred, but because they are a cause of a true judgment in composition or division; and the same, in the same proportion, is to be said about falsity, as will be explained below. The second is that all truth or falsity properly and primarily is in the enunciative judgment in composition and division; and all other things are secondarily called true or false by reason of the truth or falsity of the intellect, either because they are a cause of that (as things), or because they are signs (as voices and other things which naturally signify what is in the intellect), as St. Thomas seems to have taught in this question, article 1. Wherefore the truth of things will not be a relation of conformity or agreement with the intellect of God or of the artificer; but each thing will be called true or false from this, that it is a cause of a true or false judgment. And besides this mode of truth or falsity in things, which St. Thomas in that article also admits, no other must be conceded on account of a comparison of things with the intellect of God and of artificers, as those contend who follow the prior opinion.

Then those two points which I said need a peculiar confirmation: for they will be quite clear if it is first shown that things are called true or false for no other reason than because they are a cause of a true or false judgment in the intellect: a point which, besides being proved from the refutation of other opinions - since no other mode seems to remain - can be further explained and confirmed by this reason. Whenever something is called false, it is not called false taken simply, but with composition and enunciation being tacitly insinuated. No thing is called false in relation to that which it is, even if it has an imperfect being, but in relation to that which it is not, in which the composition of an enunciation is clearly insinuated, by an order to which that thing is called false. For example, we do not call any gold, however imperfect, false gold; but we call that thing false gold which, while it has no being of gold, nevertheless outwardly appears gold. We call this false gold from the fact that it is a cause of deception in the intellect, either because it has nothing at all of gold besides what outwardly appears, or because it has so little that it is rather another thing than gold. Therefore it is called false gold because it is falsely judged to be gold.

Aristotle expressed this doctrine, Metaphysics, chapter 19, in these words: "False is said in one way as a false thing; and of this sort, either [false is said] of what is not composed, or of what it is impossible to compose." There Aristotle refers the falsity of things to composition, either because

1279. Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet 3, art. a; Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 19, q. 5, n. 14; Henry of Ghent, art. 34, q. 5, letters L and M.

one thing does not agree with another which nevertheless can agree, as that a man be sitting if he is walking; or because it cannot agree, as that the diameter be commensurable with the side; and after a few words interposed: "So false things are said either because they are not, or because the appearance made by them is of what is not." He immediately teaches the same about the notion: namely, that a conception is false when it is related to other things than to that about which it is true. Therefore, in the same way one must philosophize about truth: namely, that gold be called true gold because it is the cause of the true judgment of the enunciation by which it is judged to be gold. Therefore all truth and falsity is in things secondarily, as in a cause; but primarily in the enunciative judgment.

Caput V - From the preceding the doctrine of articles 3 and 4 of this question is elucidated

What we have said can easily be set forth first, namely, in what way being (ens) and the true (verum) are reciprocal, and how truth is constituted as a passion (*passio*) of being; which matter St. Thomas treats properly in this article 3. However, it must be supposed that truth is not properly a passion of being, according to our present opinion, since we think it is a being of reason (*ens rationis*); indeed, even he who thinks it is a real being ought to assert the same. For a proper passion does not include essentially in its notion the concept of the subject of which it is the passion; but truth, if it is a real being, without doubt includes in its notion the concept of being, and therefore it will not be a passion of that [subject] inasmuch as being is taken as being...

From what has been said, it can easily be explained, first, in what manner being and the true are mutually convertible, and how truth is constituted as, so to speak, a passion (*passio*) of being, about which the Doctor [St. Thomas] properly treats in this article 3. It must be presupposed, however, that truth is not properly a passion of being, especially in our view, since we think it is a being of reason (*ens rationis*); indeed, even those who think it is a real being (*ens reale*) ought to assert the same. For a proper passion does not include essentially in its notion the concept of the subject of which it is the passion; but truth, if it is a real being, without doubt includes in its notion the concept of being, and therefore it will not be a passion of that [subject]. It matters little that it does not include the notion of determinate being, as of gold or of man; for a passion is not constituted of these in particular, but of being in general. Moreover, since it agrees with being, which also agrees with the passions of any subject, therefore it is called a passion of being. And by what reason the true or the truth, which is the same, is converted with being, is clear from the foregoing doctrine. For every thing, referred to that which it itself is, or related to itself, is always the cause of a true judgment and cannot be false; wherefore, although lead is false silver, it is nevertheless true lead; and although it is false gold, it is nevertheless a true thing; but those which are called false are always referred to something else, as we said above.

From these points an argument brought forward for the prior opinion can readily be solved. For when truth is defined as "the conformity or agreement of the intellect with the thing," the definition is not to be taken as those authors of the prior opinion thought, namely, that this conformity be on each side, to wit, of the intellect with the thing, and of the thing with the intellect.

For thus truth would be found equally first in things as in the intellect, as was shown in the first head of the disputation. Rather, the definition must be explained solely on the part of the intellect, as the words more clearly denote; and therefore truth is to be constituted primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things, not as compared with the intellect of God or of the craftsman as with causes, but with any judging intellect whatsoever, as we explained a little above. We already have, then, the definition of truth placed in the first article fully understood, whose exact explanation we remitted to this place: and the whole doctrine of the first article of the following question, which alone remained from that to be examined, has also been examined. Now we will endeavor in a few heads to elucidate the doctrine of this article the third and of the following fourth.

Next, it must be explained with respect to the solution of the third [objection], by what reason the true is said to be an object of the intellect as the good is of the will: this indeed, besides the explanation which we gave in Disputation 76, chapter 2, can also be most fittingly understood in another way, according to the mind of Cajetan in this article, namely, so that the good be constituted as the object of the will as the formal reason (*ratio formalis*) of what is willed; for nothing moves to pursuit and complacency unless it be apprehended under the notion of good. Truth, however, is not the formal reason in any known object; for this formal reason is entity itself; but [truth] is some consequent condition, that is, a denomination arising from an extrinsic reference to the intellect itself, such as is "intelligible" (*intelligibile*); yet they differ, in that "intelligible" is attributed to any thing in any way understood, whereas the notion of the true only befits things insofar as they can be the cause of a true judgment, according to what was said above in chapter 10. This difference between the good and the true is established by Cajetan in this article, although he does not sufficiently explain the mode in which he understands that the true is only a condition of the object; nevertheless he indicated it briefly when he said that truth is a general condition of the object perfecting the intellect; which could be accommodated to the handed-down doctrine: for by that object the intellect is said to be perfected which is the cause of truth of judgment; by the same reason falsity can also be assigned as a condition of the object of the intellect, yet not so broadly extending nor so perfecting of the intellect as truth, as is gathered from the foregoing doctrine. Wherefore, as Cajetan rightly warns, Scotus's arguments in the first Distinction do not conflict with this doctrine, but rather favor it: for they only prove that the true is not the formal reason of the known object, which we too concede with Cajetan in Disputation 76, chapter 3.

Finally, from the things we have said it can be easily set forth, what order the true and the good have among themselves, about which St. Thomas disputes in article 4 of this question: but first, let us report what St. Thomas asserts. He says, therefore, that the true is prior to the good according to the notion in which he asserts that both are converted with being; and he confirms this by two reasons. First, because the true comes closer to being than the good does; for the true follows the very notion of being simply, whereas the good [follows] the notion of perfect being; but it is prior to be a being than to be perfect; therefore it is prior to be true than to be good. Then he argues thus:

cognition is naturally prior to appetite; but the true is referred to cognition, the good however to appetite; therefore by the same proportion the true is prior to the good. Cajetan follows this doctrine in the same place and explains it briefly.

Yet to me it is not sufficiently proved, for two other reasons. First, because the notion of the good does not follow being insofar as it is perfect, but - as we said above in Disputation 72 - the goodness which is constituted as a passion of being is the same as the consummation and integrity of the thing, not however its convening with another. Therefore, although goodness in a certain signification, in which a thing is said to be fitting to another and is the reason of the object of appetite, follows the notion of perfect being, nevertheless the notion of goodness which is a passion of being follows the notion of being simply, just as any other [passion does]: for it is the very perfection and integrity, which cannot follow the perfect being, since it is rather the reason of perfection; and hence only the prior reason of the preceding opinion remains solved. Then, as is evident from article 1 of question 5 and from article 1 of this question, the notion of the good is in things themselves without any order to the intellect, whether it be taken for the integrity of the thing or even for its convening; truth, however, is only in the judging and enunciating intellect; in things, however, by a certain extrinsic denomination under respect to the intellect, as is proved in this disputation. Therefore rather goodness is prior to truth than the contrary; and from here also the reason of the preceding opinion can be easily dissolved. For although cognition is prior to appetite, nonetheless not for that reason is it effected that the notion of the good is prior to truth. For if we take the good for that which is integral and consummate, whatever being in itself is good, not from an order to appetite; but if it be used for that which is fitting to another, no thing is said to be good from an order to appetite, or from the fact that it can be appetited, but rather from the fact that, being good and fitting to another, it is appetited. Therefore this notion of the good is prior in things than that the things themselves be referred to appetite. Wherefore, although the true be said from an order to the intellect, and intellection be prior to appetite, not for that reason is the true prior to the good: because the good is not said from an order to appetite, as remains proved.

Nevertheless, the doctrine of St. Thomas has an excellent place between the appetible and the intelligible: for these two notions are posited in denomination and extrinsic relation, the one to the intellect, the other to the will; and therefore, just as intellection is prior to appetite, in the same proportion the intelligible, which is said from the intellect, is prior to the appetible, which is named from the appetite of the will. And let this suffice concerning the four prior articles of this question.

Articulus V - Whether God is truth

It is proceeded thus to the fifth. It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the composition and division of the intellect; but in God there is not composition and division. Therefore there is not truth there.

Besides. Truth, according to St. Augustine in the book On True Religion, is a likeness of a principle. But God has not a likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.

Moreover. Whatever is said of God is said of him as of the first cause of all. Just as the existence (*esse*) of God is the cause of all existence, and his goodness is the cause of all good. If therefore in God there is truth, then every truth will be from him. But that someone sins is true. Therefore this will be from God. Which is clearly false.

But on the contrary: it is said in John 14: "I am the way, the truth, and the life."

I answer that, just as has been said, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends the thing as it is, and in the thing according as it has an existence conformable to the intellect. But this is found in the highest degree in God. For his existence is not only conformable to his intellect, but it is his very act of understanding; and his act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other existence and of every other intellect; and he himself is his own existence and understanding. Whence it follows that not only is there truth in him, but that he himself is the supremely and primarily truth.

Reply to the first: Although in the divine intellect there is not composition and division, nevertheless according to his simple intellection he judges about all things and knows all complex [truths]. And thus in his intellect there is truth.

Reply to the second: The truth of our intellect is according as it is conformed to its principle, namely to the things from which it receives cognition; truth also of things is according as they are conformed to their principle, namely to the divine intellect. But this, properly speaking, cannot be said in the divine truth, unless perhaps according as truth is appropriated to the Son, who has a principle. But if we speak of essential truth, it cannot be understood unless the affirmative be resolved into the negative: just as when it is said that the Father is from himself, because he is not from another. And similarly one might say "likeness of a principle" about the divine truth, insofar as, as far as lies on his side, what is his is not dissimilar to his intellect.

Reply to the third: Non-being and privations do not have truth from themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. But every apprehension of the intellect is from God. Whence whatever there is of truth in this, that I say "this man fornicates" is true, is wholly from God. But if it be argued: therefore this fornication is from God, there is a fallacy of accident.

Explanation of the doctrine of the article.

The conclusion of the article is this: In God there is not only truth, but also God himself is the supreme, primary truth. The things which pertain to the truth of God do not need a new disputation, but can be easily deduced from the foregoing doctrine. In God, therefore, truth is found in two ways, or rather he is simply true and is truth itself: in one way, by the reason by which he understands; for thus he has a most certain judgment of himself and of other things, so that he cannot in any way be deceived. In a peculiar way, however, St. Thomas said that God is supremely true, or is truth itself, not as compared with other things which he knows, but with his own essence as known by himself: for the truth of the intellect is the conformity of it with the very thing which it understands; but God's act of understanding is his own essence understood: therefore there is the highest convening between his intellect and the thing understood; and hence [he is] supreme truth.

This reasoning indeed would most excellently prove [the point], if truth consisted in the convening and conformity of the formal concept with the thing known: because in God alone the act of understanding and the thing understood are the same. However, since it was proved in Disputation 76 that truth in the intellect is not the convening of the formal concept with the thing known, but [the convening] of the objective concept, or of the thing known insofar as it is known, with the thing itself according to itself; by another reason indeed I would say that God is the supreme truth in judging, not because there is the supreme unity and convening between the objective concept and the thing itself according to itself - for even in the blessed there is a greatest unity, if indeed the objective concept which they have is God himself, who is seen by them as he is; thus God too would be the supreme truth in judging things - not on account of that unity, but because his intellect, being his very essence, is the first and infallible measure of all things and of every truth of judgment, and he cannot be deceived.

Caput V - On the supreme truth of God in judging, and on the nature of divine truth

Or even concerning other things, whether possible or even future: for the objective concept which he has of them is the things themselves according to themselves. Therefore for this reason God is the supreme truth in judging himself, because it is maximally repugnant that God himself be deceived in the understanding of himself; both on the part of the intellect, which is infinite, and on the part of the thing known, which, since it is the first being, is most necessary. But the intellect of the blessed, with regard to God clearly seen, indeed cannot be deceived; yet not in the same grade of necessity: because not only the intellect, but the very light, is something created; and so the true in judging is not of the same genus of necessity as God himself. God also, in the judgment of other things possible and future, is truth of necessary, maximal necessity, not from the things known, but solely from his very intellect, arising from its infinity: wherefore that doctrine of St. Thomas brought forward above is true, namely, that God is the supreme truth in judging himself, although by another reason it is proved for us.

In a second way God is said to be true in his existence (*esse*), because he is most conformed to the intellect: for, as St. Thomas said in article 1 of this question, the truth of things is the conformity and convening of them with the intellect. However, lest any absurdity follow, this truth in God must thus be explained, that he is not said to be true because he is conformed to some intellect as cause, as the Thomists alleged in the superior disputation on the truth of other things used to say; but because he is referred to the intellect as the object of a true judgment, not only to the intellect of God himself, but also to the intellect of a rational creature. For our God, who is the true God, cannot be the cause and object of a false judgment, whenever he himself is judged in reality to be God and the prince of all. Conversely, Jupiter and Apollo and others whom the pagans worship as gods, for that reason are called such gods, because they are judged to be gods when they are not: just as in the preceding question we said brass is called false gold because by such a judgment it is thought to be gold: by which same reason we showed in that disputation that truth and falsity are found in things.

To these we can add a third mode of truth in God, which is rather called veracity than truth, and is found only in testifying and promising; and in God it is the greatest that can be conceived: since it in every way repugns him to assert what is false, as we shall prove more fully in II - II, question ..., article 3; it also repugns his word and promise that he be unfaithful.[1280] But whether the truth of God is a being of reason (*ens rationis*) or a real being (*ens reale*), is without controversy among the Doctors: for according to the doctrine handed down above it is manifest that it is a certain relation of reason, in whatever way it be taken.

First, concerning the truth of the divine intellect in judging either its own essence or other things, that is plainly evident: for the truth of God in this mode is either the conformity and convening of the divine intelligence with his own essence understood - this respect must altogether be of reason, whether it be considered on the part of the objective concept, or of the formal [concept] to the essence itself. For God's [relation] to himself is not a real respect, unless it be the personal [respect] of one person to another. Likewise, the truth of the divine intellect about other intelligibles, whether future or possible, must also be a relation of reason: because on the part of God there can be no respect to creatures, even to possibles, intrinsic to God by the nature of the thing, as we showed in Disputation 104, chapter six.[1281]

Next, concerning the truth of the divine essence according to existence (*esse*), in whatever way that be defined - whether by an order to the divine intellect alone, or also to the created [intellect], according to the diverse mode set out above - the same is proved. For the divine essence can be referred by the nature of the thing neither to the divine intellect, as we were just saying, nor to any creature, as we shall see in the disputation cited. Wherefore, although Soncinas in the sixth [book] of the Metaphysics, question 17, says that truth in created things is a relation from the nature of the thing to the divine intellect, nevertheless in the divine essence itself he says that truth thus accepted is only a relation of reason.[1282]

Finally, the same is proved regarding truth in testifying: for this is the conformity and convening of the sign with the signified: but such convening, universally, is something of reason: therefore the truth of God, in whatever way it be taken, is only a relation of reason, just as very many other [predicates] which we attribute to God, as has been distinctly noted in its places.

1280. "2.2. quest. ... ar. 3." (as cited in the text).
1281. Vazquez, Disputation 104, chapter 6 (as cited).
1282. Soncinas, on the sixth [book of the] Metaphysics, question 17 (as cited).

Articulus VI - Whether there is one only truth, according to which all things are true

It seems that there is one only truth according to which all things are true. For according to St. Augustine, nothing is greater than the human mind, except God. But truth is greater than the human mind; otherwise the mind would judge concerning truth. Now it judges all things according to truth, and not according to itself. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth than God.[1283]

Again, St. Anselm says in the book On Truth, that as time is related to temporal things, so truth to true things: but there is one time of all temporal things. Therefore there is one truth by which all things are true.[1284]

But on the contrary: In Psalm 11 it is said, "Truths are diminished from the sons of men."

I answer that, in a certain way there is one truth by which all things are true, and in a certain way not. For the evidence of which it must be known that when something is predicated univocally of many, that [thing] is found in each of them according to its proper notion, as animal in any species of animal: but when something is said analogically of many, that [thing] is found according to its proper notion in one of them only, from which the others are denominated. Thus "healthy" is said of the animal, and of urine, and of medicine: not that health is save in the animal alone: but from the health of the animal medicine is denominated healthy as being the efficient [cause] of that health; and urine, as being the signifying [sign] of that health. And although health is not in medicine nor in urine, yet in each there is something, by which this [one] produces, and that [other] signifies, health. Now it was said that truth is primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things, according as they are ordered to the divine intellect. If, therefore, we speak of truth as it exists in the intellect according to its proper notion, thus in many created intellects there are many truths; and in one and the same intellect, according to many things known. Whence the gloss says upon that, Psalm 11: "Truths are diminished from the sons of men," that as from one face of a man there results more likenesses in a mirror, so from one divine truth there result many truths.[1285] But if we speak of truth according as it is in things, thus all are true by one first truth, to which each thing is assimilated according to its entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many, yet one is the truth of the divine intellect, according to which all things are denominated true.

Reply to the first: The soul does not judge of all things according to just any truth whatsoever, but according to the first truth, inasmuch as it results in it as in a mirror, according to first intelligibles. Whence it follows that the first truth is greater than the soul. And yet even created

1283. St. Augustine, passim; cf. the marginal references cited in the text.
1284. St. Anselm, De veritate, cap. 14.
1285. Gloss on Psalm 11: "Diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum."

truth, which is in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain respect, inasmuch as it is its perfection, just as even science could be said to be greater than the soul. But it is true that nothing subsistent is greater than the rational mind, except God.

Reply to the second: What is said by St. Anselm holds the truth, inasmuch as things are said to be true by a comparison to the divine intellect.

Conclusion and sum of the whole article is: If the discourse be about truth which we said is in the intellect, in which it is found primarily, there are many truths, as there are many intellects: but if about the truth which is in things, there is one only divine truth, from which all things are denominated true.

Articulus VII - Whether created truth is eternal

To the seventh we proceed thus. It seems that created truth is eternal. For St. Augustine says in the book On Free Choice that nothing is more eternal than that the circle has a center, and that two and three are five; but the truth of these is created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.[1286]

Again, everything that is always is eternal: but universals are everywhere and always. Therefore they are eternal. Therefore also the true, which is the most universal.

Again, that which is true in the present was always true to-be-future. But as the truth of a proposition about the present is created truth, so the truth of a proposition about the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.

Again, everything which lacks beginning and end is eternal: but the truth of enunciables lacks beginning and end. For if truth begins when before it was not, it will be true that truth is not; and since by some truth it was true, thus truth was before it began. And likewise, if truth be posited to have an end, it follows that it will be [true] after it has ceased: for it will be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is eternal.

But on the contrary is that God alone is eternal, as was held above.

I answer that, the truth of enunciables is nothing other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciable is in the intellect, and is in the voice. According however as it is in the intellect, it has truth per se: but according as it is in the voice, an enunciable is said to be true insofar as it signifies some truth of the intellect; not because of some truth existing in the enunciable, although in the subject: just as urine is said to be healthy not from a health which is in it, but from the animal's health which it signifies. Likewise too it was said above that things are denominated true by the truth of the intellect. Whence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal: but because the divine intellect alone is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow on this account that anything else is eternal than God, because the truth of the divine intellect is God himself, as was shown above.

Reply to the first: The reason of the circle, and that two and three are five, have eternity in the divine mind.

1286. St. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, lib. ..., cap. 8 (as cited).

Reply to the second: That something be always and everywhere can be understood in two ways. In one way, because it has in itself that by which it extends itself to every time and to every place, as it befits God to be everywhere and always. In another way, because it has not in itself that by which it is determined to some place or time, as first matter is said to be one, not because it has a form, as man is one from the unity of one form, but by the removal of every formal distinction. And in this mode any universal is said to be everywhere and always, inasmuch as universals abstract from the "here and now"; but from this it does not follow that they are eternal, unless in the intellect of someone who is eternal.

Reply to the third: What now is, which was future before it was, was so because it was in its cause that it should be brought about. Whence, the cause being removed, that future-to-be would not have been. But the first cause alone is eternal. Whence from this it does not follow that the things which are, always were [true], to be future in themselves, unless insofar as in the eternal cause it was, or is, that they will be future. Which cause is God alone.

Reply to the fourth: Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciables which are formed by us eternal, but at some time it begins: and before a truth of this kind existed, it was true to say that truth was not - not, however, by the truth which did not yet exist, but by another truth, namely by the truth of the divine intellect, whose truth is eternal.

Reply to the fourth: Such a thing is not so, unless by the divine intellect, in which alone truth is eternal; but now it is true to say that then truth did not exist. And this is true only by the truth which now is in our intellect, not, however, by any truth on the side of the thing: because this is a truth about a non-being; but non-being does not of itself have that it be true, but only from an intellect apprehending it. Hence it is true to say "truth did not exist" only insofar as we apprehend its not-being as that which precedes it.

Conclusion: In the divine intellect alone, which alone is eternal, created truth has eternity; concerning the doctrine of this conclusion, and the reason by which he proves it, in the following disputation, cap. 2, we shall say something.

Articulus VIII - Whether truth is immutable

Objicitur: It seems that truth is immutable.

1) Augustine says that truth is not equal to the mind, because the mind is mutable; but truth is not mutable as the mind is.[1287]

2) That which remains after every mutation is immutable, as first matter is ungenerated and incorruptible because it remains after every generation and corruption. But truth remains after every mutation, because after every mutation it is true to say "it is" or "it is not." Therefore truth is immutable.

1287. St. Augustine, De libero arbitrio II, c. 12 (near the end); and De vera religione, c. 30.

3) If the truth of an enunciation is changed, it is changed especially by the change of the thing. But it is not thus changed. For, according to Anselm, truth is a certain rectitude inasmuch as something fulfills that which is of it in the divine mind.[1288] Now this proposition "Socrates sits," received in the divine mind so as to signify that Socrates is sitting, signifies the same even while he is still sitting. Therefore the truth of a proposition is in no way changed.

4) Moreover, where the cause is the same, the effect is the same. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of these three propositions: "Socrates sits," "Socrates will sit," and "Socrates sat." Therefore the truth of these is the same. But it must be that one of these is true. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutably. And by the same reasoning that of any other proposition.

But on the contrary: "Truths are diminished from among the sons of men" (Ps 11:2).

Respondeo: I answer that (as was said above) truth is properly in the intellect, while things are said to be true by the truth which is in some intellect. Therefore the mutability of truth is to be considered on the side of the intellect. And the truth of the intellect consists in this, that it have conformity to the things understood. Now this conformity can vary in a twofold way, just as any likeness can vary by a change of either extreme. Hence, in one way, truth varies on the side of the intellect, from the fact that, about a thing remaining in the same state, someone takes up a different opinion. In another way, with the opinion remaining the same, the thing is changed. And in both ways there is a change from true to false. If, therefore, there be some intellect in which there cannot be an alternation of opinions, or whose apprehension cannot be deceived by a thing's slipping away, in that intellect truth is immutable. Such, however, is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said above.[1289] Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable; but the truth of our intellect is mutable, not because it itself is the subject of mutation, but insofar as our intellect is changed from truth to falsity. For by this very reason forms can be called mutable. But the truth of the divine intellect is that truth according to which natural things are said to be true, which is altogether immutable.

Ad primum: Augustine is speaking of divine truth

Ad secundum: Truth and being are convertible. Hence, just as being is not generated nor corrupted per se, but per accidens, insofar as this or that being is corrupted or generated, as is said in the first book of the Physics, so truth is changed, not so that no truth remain, but because that truth which previously was does not remain

Ad tertium: A proposition has truth not only as other things are said to have truth, insofar as they fulfill that which is ordained about them by the divine intellect, but it is said to have truth in a certain special way, insofar as it signifies the truth of the intellect, which indeed consists in the conformity of the intellect and the thing. When this [truth of the intellect] is withdrawn, the truth of the opinion is changed, and consequently the truth of the proposition. Thus, therefore, this proposition, "Socrates sits," while he is sitting, is true; and there remains the first truth on the side

1288. St. Anselm, De veritate, c. 8 and c. 12.
1289. See above on the divine intellect: I, q. 14, a. 13.

of the thing, insofar as it is a certain significative utterance; and there remains the truth of signification, insofar as it signifies a true opinion. But when Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed

Ad quartum: The state of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of this proposition "Socrates sits," is not in the same way while Socrates is sitting, and after he has sat, and before he will sit. Hence by reason of the truth caused by this, it is otherwise disposed; and it is signified in different ways by propositions about the present, past, and future. Whence it does not follow that, although one of the three propositions is true, the same invariable truth remain

Conclusion: The truth of the divine intellect is immutable; but the truth of our intellect is mutable, not because it itself is the subject of mutation, but because our intellect is changed from truth to falsity; for by this reason forms can be called mutable. But the truth of the divine intellect, according to which natural things are said to be true, is altogether immutable.

Disputatio LXXVIII - On the doctrine of these articles

Caput I - The position of St. Thomas

Difficult indeed does the doctrine of this article 6 appear, when it is compared with that which St. Thomas set forth in article 1 of this question, and which the Thomists commonly follow; a difficulty which we touched upon in part above, disp. 76, cap. 1.[1291] For the explanation of that, there is no need to institute a long disputation, but first to report what he himself taught there, then, from what we have thus far said, to gather what seems more probable.

First, therefore, in this article he clearly teaches that a form is multiplied in various subjects when the subjects are denominated univocally by the form - of this sort is the form of animal and of heat; but that it is not multiplied, even if many things are denominated by it, when the denomination is derived analogically from one to another: as urine and medicine are called "healthy" from one health of an animal. From this most true and universal doctrine the Holy Doctor gathers the conclusion set above in the preceding article, namely, that the truth of the intellect is multiplied, because in individual created intellects a proper truth is found, inasmuch as individual intellects participate in the first truth in themselves, just as from one face many likenesses are derived into a mirror. He does not think, therefore, that this derivation is an extrinsic denomination only from one form; for thus he would not say that truth is multiplied, but rather that individual intellects are called true by one truth of God: but [he holds it] to be a real multiplication of many truths.

Nor, indeed, does it matter that of creatures and of God it is not predicated univocally but analogically, as are all the other names that are said of God and creatures: for those things which are analogically named by one name can sometimes have in themselves a real form of such denomination; and for this reason the name is predicated of them analogically, because those

1291. Vazquez, Disputatio 76, cap. 1.

forms are not of one and the same ratio in individuals, although in some way they are made like. Why, therefore, forms are really multiplied, even if all those things are not signified univocally by the same name, this is the doctrine which is handed on in the first part of the conclusion.

Then from the same doctrine he gathers the latter part of the conclusion, namely, that the truth which we say to be in things, from which they themselves are called true, is not multiplied in individuals, but that all are called true by one truth of God: in which, assuredly, he thinks the same reason of denomination holds by which a thing is called true, and by which medicine and urine are called healthy; but medicine and urine are not called healthy from a health existing in themselves and really multiplied, but from one health of the animal, by an extrinsic respect and denomination: therefore things too are not called true from a truth inhering in themselves, but from some extrinsic truth.

I understand, moreover, that in this sense Anselm's opinion is to be understood, who in the Dialogue on Truth, cap. 14, near the end, asserts that, just as there is one time under which all corruptible things are contained, so there is one eternal truth (he understands God), under which all things, insofar as they are true in accordance with it, are said [to be true]. This very thing St. Thomas teaches in arts. 7 and 8, and the doctrine in art. 1 of this question, as we noted in disp. 76, cap. 1. Anselm proves his view by saying that, if there were truth in things, when those things were changed, it would be changed and destroyed, and would destroy; but this is absurd. By the same reasoning St. Thomas in art. 7 shows truth to be eternal, because there is some eternal intellect - namely the divine - in which it always remains; and in art. 8 [he shows] that truth is immutable, because, although in our intellects it is varied, in the divine [intellect] it always remains in the same way; wherefore, if there were no divine intellect, no truth would remain.

On the other hand, in article 1 of this question, the same St. Thomas teaches that truth in things is the agreement and conformity of them with an intellect, divine or created, to which, as to a cause, they are per se referred. He does not say that the truth of things is an intellectual truth, but that, just as the intellect is said to be true by agreement with things, so also things by conformity with an intellect

Next, in article 1 of the following question, he affirms that in two ways a thing is said to be false: in one way, per accidens, when it is either a sign or a cause of falsity in the intellect; and this mode is by extrinsic denomination; and in the same way he thinks that things can also be called true by an extrinsic denomination. In another way, he says, a thing is false insofar as it falls short of the rule of the intellect of God or of the artisan, upon which it per se depends as on a cause; and the same must be said of truth. Now this latter mode - if it were only by extrinsic denomination - would not differ at all from the former; therefore in disp. 76, cap. 1, I said that the mind of St. Thomas seems to me sufficiently difficult. Certainly, whatever be the case with that, concerning the doctrine of this article and of the two following, we shall briefly subjoin what, from the things said thus far, seems to us more probable; and what Cajetan thinks about this view in his commentary on that article, we already reported in disp. 76, cap. 1.

Caput II - The more probable opinion

Since it has been established in disputations 75 and 76 that truths are primarily in the intellect, secondarily, however, in things - although in the intellect they are also said to be of the order of beings of reason - consequently it must be said, first, that there is not one [single] truth of the intellect, but that it is multiplied according to the very number of intellects; which St. Thomas himself also admits in this article, in which he speaks of individual truth, not only in what we said above about the intellect with respect to diverse enunciations, but even with respect to the same one. For in diverse intellects truth can be multiplied about the same enunciation, because in diverse intellects there are not only different formal concepts with respect to the same enunciation, but also different presentations of the object; for the same thing is not presented in the same way to diverse intellects, but according to diverse formal concepts.

Then from the same doctrine he gathers the posterior part of the conclusion, namely, that with respect to the truth which we say to be in things, from which they themselves are called true, it is not multiplied in individuals, but all are called true from the one truth of God: and in this he certainly thinks there is the same ratio of denomination by which things are called true, and a medicine and urine are called sound; for medicine and urine are not said to be sound from a soundness existing in them and really multiplied, but from the one soundness of the animal by an extrinsic relation and denomination; therefore also things are not called true from a truth inhering in them, but from some extrinsic truth.

But in the second solution he understands in this sense the opinion of Anselm, who in the dialogue De veritate, c. 14, near the end, affirms that just as there is one time under which all corruptible things are contained, so there is one subsisting truth (he means God) by which all things, insofar as they are, are said to be true according to it. This very thing St. Thomas also teaches in articles 7 and 8, and he had taught it in article 1 of this question, as I noted in Disputation 76, cap. 1.[1292]

Moreover, Anselm proves his opinion thus: if there were truth in things, with those changed it would be changed, and with those destroyed it would be destroyed; but this is absurd. By the same reasoning St. Thomas in article 7 shows that truth is eternal, because there is some eternal intellect, namely the divine, in which it always remains; and in article 8 he says that therefore truth is immutable, because although in our intellects it varies, yet in the divine it always perseveres in the same way: wherefore, if there were no divine intellect, no truth would remain.

But on the contrary: in article 1 of this question the same St. Thomas teaches that truth in things is a convenience and conformity of them with the divine intellect, or the artificer, to whom they are referred as to a cause, not that he says it to be the cause of truth in things, but as the intellect is true by agreement with things, so too are things by conformity with the intellect: in which he manifestly indicates that there is in the things themselves an intrinsic truth, and proper to them, as I noted in Disputation 76, cap. 1.

1292. St. Anselm, De veritate, c. 14 (near the end); and St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 16, a. 7 - 8; and above on a. 1; see also Vazquez, Disputatio 76, cap. 1.

Then in article 1 of the following question he affirms that a thing is said to be false in two ways: in one way per accidens, because either it is a sign or a cause of falsity in the intellect; and this mode is by extrinsic denomination: and by the same reasoning he holds that things can also be called true by extrinsic denomination. In another way, he says, a thing is such insofar as it falls short of the rule of the intellect of God or of the artificer, upon whom it depends of itself as upon a cause; and one ought to say the same of truth. But this latter mode, if it were through extrinsic denomination alone, would differ little or nothing from the former; for that reason, in Disputation 76, cap. 1, I said that the mind of St. Thomas seems to me difficult enough. However that may be, concerning the doctrine of this article and the two following, what seems to us more probable, from the things that have so far been said, we shall briefly subjoin: and what Cajetan thinks on this matter in the commentary on that article 3 we have already reported in Disputation 76, cap. ...[1293]

The more probable opinion

When it has remained proved in Disputations 75 and 76 that truth primarily is in the intellect, secondarily however in things, although in the intellect, whether divine or created, it is a being of reason, consequently it must be said, first, that truth of the intellect is not an eternal truth of the intellect, but is multiplied according to the very number of intellects; which St. Thomas himself also admits in this article: and if we speak of individual truth, not only must what we said be understood regarding diverse enunciations, but even regarding the same one. For in diverse intellects truth can be multiplied about the same enunciation, because in diverse intellects there are not only different formal concepts about the same enunciation, but also different objective concepts: for the same thing is not presented in the same way to diverse intellects, but according to diverse formal concepts, the objective concepts also are diverse, in whose agreement and conformity with the thing itself the truth of the intellect, considered in itself, consists: nevertheless truth about the same enunciation in diverse intellects also is called one truth, namely by the unity of the object and of the thing enunciated.

Second, from the multiplication of things their truth is not multiplied, not because the things themselves are true by an extrinsic truth of God, but because they are true by an extrinsic denomination, from the fact that they are a cause of truth in some intellect: and the same must be said about the falsity of things. Therefore the multiplication of truth can happen not on the part of things, but on the part of the intellect. For the multiplication of a form must be taken on the part of the subject to which it primarily belongs: but truth primarily belongs to the intellect, secondarily to things: nevertheless one thing, or one vocal enunciation, is commonly said to be one truth, namely by the unity of the object or of the sign: and these points belong to article six.

Third, concerning article seven it must be said that every truth is eternal, just as all things according to their essence were also wont to be called eternal, or of eternal truth, not only because the divine intellect is eternal and always judges truly about things, but because the intelligible object has such a connection of extremes and a nonrepugnance according to essence, and an

1293. Cajetan, on I, q. 16, a. 3 (as reported by Vazquez in Disputatio 76, cap. ...).

aptitude between the predicate and the subject, of which kind of enunciations the logicians are wont to speak; in the definition of True they do not name an act, but an aptitude, as "Man is an animal: man is rational," etc. For we only signify that the predicate befits the subject aptly: and thus it can either exist in the nature of things, or when the enunciation is of a future thing. For in this enunciation words signify not only aptitude, but also act, not present but future: but what is future is by nature apt to be understood as future by an intellect, even an eternal one: therefore it is a matter of eternal truth that a thing will be future.

The objection is met, that from our saying that every truth, even of created things, is eternal, it does not follow that something subsists from eternity outside of God: for this truth is called eternal only insofar as things do not of themselves repel being understood from eternity, if there be an eternal intellect, or when there is a connection according to essence and aptitude between the predicate and the subject, of which kind the logicians are wont to speak in enunciations; in the definition they do not say act, but aptitude, as "Man is an animal: man is rational," etc. We only signify that the predicate suitably fits the subject: and thus it can be either to exist in the nature of things, or when the enunciation is of a future thing. For in this enunciation words signify not only aptitude, but also act, not present but future: but what is future is by nature apt to be understood as future by an intellect, even an eternal one: therefore it pertains to eternal truth that a thing be future.

This doctrine, and those which we shall set forth below in Disputation 104, can mutually confirm one another: for we shall say there against Scotus that things are not for that reason possible and do not imply a contradiction because they are understood by God; but rather things are understood by God because in themselves they do not imply a contradiction. Wherefore, prior to the intellect of God, things are said to be in themselves true (as it is wont to be said) causally, insofar as they are apt to be truly understood by some intellect, if there were one.

Finally, concerning article eight it is easily gathered from what has been said that the truth of each thing is immutable, not because the truth of God cannot be changed, or because God himself cannot be changed; but because whatever truth, even a created truth, by this very fact that it is truth, is from eternity in the way we have said: whether it be in necessary enunciations, or even in contingent future ones.

Quaestio XVII - On falsity

Then there is inquiry about falsity. And concerning this four things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether falsity is in things

It is objected first in this way. It seems that falsity is not in things. For St. Augustine says in the book Soliloquies: "If the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false is nowhere," whatever be opposed.[1294]

Second. "False" is said from "deceiving": but things do not deceive, as Augustine says in the book On True Religion, because they do not present anything other than their own species. Therefore falsity is not found in things.[1295]

Third. True is said of things by comparison to the divine intellect, as was said above: but whatever thing, insofar as it is, imitates God; therefore any thing is true without falsity. And thus no thing is false.

But on the contrary is what Augustine says in the book On True Religion, that every body is a true body, and a false unity, because it imitates unity and is not unity. But any thing imitates the divine unity and falls short of it. Therefore in all things there is falsity.[1295]

I answer: Since true and false are opposed; and opposites are about the same, it is necessary that falsity be inquired into first where truth is first found, that is, in the intellect. But in things neither truth nor falsity exists except by an order to intellect. And because each thing is named simply from that which befits it per se, but according to that which befits it per accidens it is not named except in a qualified way: a thing indeed could be said to be simply false by comparison to that intellect on which it depends and to which it is compared per se, but in order to another intellect, to which it is compared per accidens, it could not be called false except in a qualified way. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, just as artificial things on the human intellect. Therefore artificial things are called false simply and in themselves insofar as they fall short of the form of art. Hence an artificer is said to make a false work when it falls short of the operation of art. But in things depending on God falsity cannot be found by comparison to the divine intellect, since whatever happens in things proceeds from the ordination of the divine intellect: unless perhaps only in voluntary agents, in whose power it is to withdraw themselves from the ordination of the divine intellect: in which the evil of fault consists, according to which sins themselves are called falsities and lies in the Scriptures, according to that of Psalm 4: "Why do you love vanity and seek after a lie?" Just as, on the contrary, virtuous operation is called the truth of life insofar as it is subject to the order of the divine intellect, as is said in John 3: "He who does the truth comes to the light." But by an order to our intellect, to which natural things are compared per accidens, they can be called false, not simply, but in a qualified way. And this in two ways. In one way, according to the notion of what is signified: so that that be called false in things which is signified or represented by a false speech or intellect: in which way any thing can be called false with respect to that which is not in it: as if we were to say that the diameter is falsely commensurable, as the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the Metaphysics; and as Augustine says in the Soliloquies, that the Tragedian is a false Hector.[12941296] Just as, conversely, each thing can be called true according to that which befits it, in another way by way of cause. And thus a thing is called false which is by nature apt to cause a false opinion of itself. And because it is innate to us to judge of things by those things which outwardly appear of them.

1294. St. Augustine, Soliloquia, lib. 2, c. 8 (toward the end).
1295. St. Augustine, De vera religione, c. 34; Psalm 4:3 (Vulg.); John 3:21.
1295. St. Augustine, De vera religione, c. 34; Psalm 4:3 (Vulg.); John 3:21.
1294. St. Augustine, Soliloquia, lib. 2, c. 8 (toward the end).
1296. Aristotle, Metaphysics V.

Articulus II - Whether there is falsehood in sense

Because our cognition has its rise from sense, which is first and per se of exterior accidents, therefore those things which in their exterior accidents have a likeness of other things are said to be false according to those things; thus gall is false honey, and tin is false silver. And according to this St. Augustine says in the book of the Soliloquies, that we call those things false which we apprehend as very like.[1297] And the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the Metaphysics that those things are called false which are naturally apt to appear either what they are not, or such as they are not.[1298] And in this way also a man is called false, inasmuch as he is a lover of false opinions or utterances, not, however, from the fact that he can feign them; for thus even wise and learned men would be called false, as is said in the fifth book of the Metaphysics.[1298]

First conclusion: Things referred to the intellect to which they are compared per se, namely to the divine intellect, or to the practical intellect of the craftsman, are called false, insofar as they fall short of the form which is the principle of those things.

Second conclusion: Things referred to the speculative intellect, to which they are compared per accidens, are said to be false secundum quid in one of two ways - either by way of a sign, or because they are the cause of a false opinion. Concerning each of these conclusions many things have been said expressly above in Disputation 77.

Place next to the one just treated.

Objicitur 1. It seems that there is no falsehood in sense. For St. Augustine says in the book On True Religion: "If all the bodily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we ought to require of them."[1299] And thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; therefore falsehood is not in sense.

Objicitur 2. Further, the Philosopher says in the fourth book of the Metaphysics that falsehood is not proper to sense, but to imagination.[1300]

Objicitur 3. Further, in what is incomplex there is neither true nor false, but only in what is complex. But to compose and to divide does not pertain to sense. Therefore falsehood is not in sense.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says in the Soliloquies: "It appears that in all the senses we are deceived, enticed by a likeness."[1301]

I answer: Falsehood is not to be sought in sense, except in the way in which truth is there. Now truth is not thus in sense that sense knows truth, but inasmuch as it has a true apprehension of sensibles, as was said above. And this indeed happens because it apprehends things as they are. Whence it happens that there is falsehood in sense from this, that it apprehends or judges things

1297. St. Augustine, Soliloquia, lib. 2, c. 6 (at the end).
1298. Aristotle, Metaphysics V (text 34).
1298. Aristotle, Metaphysics V (text 34).
1299. St. Augustine, De vera religione, c. 33 (about the middle), tom. 1.
1300. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 24.
1301. St. Augustine, Soliloquia, lib. 2, c. 6 (at the end), tom. 1.

otherwise than they are. Now it is thus disposed for knowing things, inasmuch as the likeness of things is in sense. But the likeness of a thing is in sense in three ways. In one way, first and per se, as in sight there is a likeness of colors and of the other proper sensibles. In another way per se, but not first: thus in sight there is a likeness of figure or magnitude and of the other common sensibles of all the senses. In a third way, neither first nor per se, but per accidens: thus in sight there is a likeness of a man, not insofar as he is a man, but insofar as it happens to this colored thing to be a man. And with respect to proper sensibles, sense does not have a false cognition, except per accidens and in fewer cases, namely because, on account of an indisposition of the organ, it does not receive fittingly the form of the sensible, just as other passive things by their indisposition receive deficiently the impression of agents. And hence it is that, because of a corruption of the tongue, sweet things seem bitter to the sick. But with respect to common sensibles, and per accidens, there can be a false judgment even in a sense rightly disposed: because sense is not directly referred to those things, but per accidens or consequently, inasmuch as it is referred to other things.

Reply to the first: For sense to be affected is its very sensing. Hence, from the fact that the senses report as they are affected, it follows that we are not deceived in that judgment by which we judge that we sense something; but from the fact that the sense is sometimes affected otherwise than the thing is, it follows that it sometimes reports a thing to us otherwise than it is. And from this we are deceived through sense about the thing, not about the very sensing.

Reply to the second: Falsehood is said not to be proper to sense, because it is not deceived about its proper object. Hence in another translation it is more plainly said that the sense of the proper sensible is not false. But falsehood is attributed to imagination, because it represents the likeness of a thing even when absent. Whence, when someone turns to the likeness of a thing as to the thing itself, falsehood arises from such an apprehension. And hence also the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the Metaphysics that shadows and pictures and dreams are called false, inasmuch as the things do not underlie whose likeness they bear.[1298]

Reply to the third: That argument proceeds as though falsehood were in sense in the same way as in a knower of the true and the false.

First conclusion: In the same manner in which truth is in sense, so too is falsehood - not because it knows truth, but because it has a true apprehension.

Second conclusion: With respect to proper sensibles, sense does not have a false cognition, unless per accidens, and rarely, because of the bad disposition of the organ.

Third conclusion: With respect to common sensibles, there can be a false judgment in sense even when rightly disposed. Concerning these conclusions enough and more than enough has been said above in Disputation 75.

1298. Aristotle, Metaphysics V (text 34).

Articulus III - Whether falsehood is in the intellect

Objicitur 1. It seems that falsehood is not in the intellect. For St. Augustine says in the book of the 83 Questions: "Everyone who is deceived does not understand that in which he is deceived." But a thing is said to be false in some cognition inasmuch as by it we are deceived. Therefore falsehood is not in the intellect.[1302]

Objicitur 2. Further, the Philosopher says in the third book On the Soul that the intellect is always right.[1303] Therefore falsehood is not in the intellect.

But on the contrary: It is said in the third book On the Soul that where there is composition of intellects, there are the true and the false. But composition of intellects is in the intellect. Therefore the true and the false are in the intellect.[1303]

I answer: Just as a thing has existence (*esse*) by its proper form, so a cognitive power has knowing by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, as a natural thing does not fail with respect to that which befits it according to its form - for example, a man does not fail with respect to being a man - yet can fail with respect to certain accidentals or consequents - for example, with respect to having two feet - so too a cognitive power does not fail in knowing with respect to that thing by whose likeness it is informed, but it can fail around something consequent upon it, or accidental to it; as was said, that sight is not deceived about the proper sensible, but about the common sensibles which are related to it consequently, and about the per accidens sensible. Now just as sense is informed directly by the likeness of proper sensibles, so the intellect is informed by the likeness of the quiddity (*quidditas*) of the thing. Hence concerning what a thing is (*quod quid est*) the intellect is not deceived, just as sense is not deceived about proper sensibles. But in composing or dividing it can be deceived, when it attributes to the thing, whose quiddity it understands, something that does not follow upon it, or that is opposed to it. For thus the intellect is disposed for judging about things of this sort, as sense is for judging about common or per accidens sensibles. This difference, however, being preserved which was said above concerning truth, namely that falsehood can be in the intellect not only because the cognition of the intellect is false, but also because the intellect knows falsehood as it knows truth. In sense, however, falsehood is not as a known object, as was said. But because falsehood in the operation of the intellect is per se only about the intellect's composition, per accidens even in the operation of the intellect whereby it knows what a thing is (*quid est*), falsehood can be, inasmuch as there composition of the intellect is mingled in. And this can happen in two ways. In one way, insofar as the intellect attributes the definition of one thing to another; as if it were to attribute the definition of a circle to a man: whence the definition of one thing is false of another. In another way, insofar as it composes together the parts of a definition which cannot be associated at the same time. Thus the definition is not only false with respect to some thing, but false in itself: as if it were to form such a definition,

1302. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 32 (in the beginning), tom. 4.
1303. Aristotle, De Anima III.
1303. Aristotle, De Anima III.

"a rational quadruped animal," the intellect is false in defining thus, because it is false in forming this composition, "some rational animal is quadruped"; and on this account, in knowing simple quiddities the intellect cannot be false, but either it is true, or it altogether understands nothing.

Reply to the first: Because the quiddity of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, for this reason we are then properly said to understand something when, reducing it to what it is (*quod quid est*), we so judge concerning it; as happens in demonstrations, in which there is no falsehood. And in this way Augustine's saying is understood: "Everyone who is deceived does not understand that in which he is deceived"; not, however, so that in no operation of the intellect could someone be deceived.

Reply to the second: The intellect is always right insofar as the intellect is of first principles, about which it is not deceived for the same reason for which it is not deceived about what a thing is; for self-evident principles are those which, the terms being understood, are known from the fact that the predicate is posited in the definition of the subject.

Articulus IV - Whether true and false are contraries

It is objected to the fourth as follows. It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are set in opposition as what is and what is not: for true is that which is, as St. Augustine says. But what is and what is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true and false are not contraries.

1. Further, one of contraries is not in the other. But the false is in the true. For as St. Augustine says in the book Soliloquies, the tragedian would not be a false Hector if he were not a true tragedian. Therefore true and false are not contraries.[1304]
2. Further, there is no contrariety in God; for nothing is contrary to the divine substance, as St. Augustine says in the twelfth book On the City of God. But falsity is opposed to God: for an idol in Scripture is named a lie, Jeremiah 5; "They have taken hold of a lie," gloss, that is, idols. Therefore true and false are not contraries.[1305]

But on the contrary: The Philosopher, in On Interpretation II, sets a false opinion as contrary to a true one.[1306]

I answer: True and false are opposed as contraries, and not as affirmation and negation, as some have said. To see this clearly, one must know that a negation, precisely as it posits nothing, neither determines to itself any subject; and for this reason it can be said both of being and of non-being, as "not-seeing" and "not-sitting." But privation does not posit anything, yet it does determine for itself a subject: for it is a negation in a subject; thus "blind" is said only of that which is of a nature to see. A contrary, however, both posits something and determines a subject: "black" is a certain species of color. Now the false does posit something. For "false," as the Philosopher says

1304. St. Augustine, Soliloquia, lib. 2, c. 10.
1305. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, lib. 12 (near the end); cf. Jer 5; Gloss: "idola."
1306. Aristotle, Perihermeneias (On Interpretation) II, cap. ult.

in Metaphysics IV, is when it is said or seems that something is which is not, or is not which is.[1307] For just as the true posits an acceptance adequate to the thing, so the false posits an acceptance not adequate to the thing. Whence it is manifest that true and false are contraries.

Reply to the first: What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is as apprehended is the truth of the intellect, in which truth is first. Whence also the false is that which is not as apprehended. But to apprehend being and non-being has contrariety, as the Philosopher proves in On Interpretation II: to the opinion "good is good" the contrary is "good is not good."[1306]

Reply to the second: The false is not founded upon a true contrary to itself, just as evil is not founded upon a good contrary to itself, but upon that which is its subject. And this happens in both cases for this reason, that the true and the good are contrary to the false and the evil, and they concur with being. Hence, just as every privation is founded upon a subject which is a being, so every evil is founded upon some good, and every false upon some true.

Reply to the third: Because contraries and privative opposites are naturally about the same, therefore with respect to God as He is considered in Himself, there is nothing contrary - neither by reason of His goodness nor by reason of His truth - since in His intellect no falsity can be. But in our apprehension there is something contrary: for to a true opinion about Him a false opinion is contrary. And thus idols are called "lies" as opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as a false opinion about idols stands contrary to the true opinion about the unity of God.

Conclusion: True and false are opposed, not as affirmation and negation, as some have said, but as contraries. In this article there is nothing worthy of disputation.

Quaestio XVIII - On the life of God

Since understanding is living, after the consideration of divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider God's life. And about this four points are asked.

Articulus I - Whether living belongs to all natural things

To the first, we proceed thus. It seems that living belongs to all natural things. The Philosopher says in Physics VIII that motion is, as it were, a kind of life to all things existing by nature. But all natural things share in motion. Therefore all natural things share in life.[1308]

1. Further, plants are said to live insofar as they have in themselves the principle of the motion of growth and diminution. But local motion is more perfect and prior by nature than the motion of growth and diminution, as is proved in Physics VIII. Since therefore all natural bodies have some principle of local motion, it seems that all natural bodies live.[1308]

1307. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 27.
1306. Aristotle, Perihermeneias (On Interpretation) II, cap. ult.
1308. Aristotle, Physics VIII.
1308. Aristotle, Physics VIII.

2. Further, among natural bodies the more imperfect are the elements. But life is attributed to them: for "living waters" are spoken of. Therefore, much more do other natural bodies have life.

But on the contrary is what Pseudo-Dionysius says in On the Divine Names VI (not far from the beginning), that plants, according to the last resonance of life, have living; whence it can be gathered that plants obtain the lowest grade of life. But inanimate bodies are below plants. Therefore it does not belong to them to live.[1309]

I answer: From those that manifestly live we can gather of which things living belongs, and of which not. Now living manifestly belongs to animals. For it is said in the book On Plants that life is manifest in animals. Hence, according to that, we must distinguish living things from non-living according as animals are said to live. This, however, is that in which life is first manifested and in which it lastly remains. First, indeed, we say that an animal lives when it begins to have motion from itself; and it is judged that the animal lives as long as such motion appears in it. But when already it does not have any motion from itself, but is moved only by another, then it is called a dead animal through defect of life. Whence it is clear that those properly are living which move themselves according to some species of motion - whether motion be taken properly, as motion is called the act of the imperfect, that is, of what exists in potency; or whether motion be taken in a common way, insofar as motion is called the act of the perfect, as understanding and sensing are said to be moved, as is said in On the Soul III - so that those things are called living which set themselves toward some motion or operation; but those, in whose nature it is not to set themselves toward some motion or operation, cannot be called living except by a certain likeness.[1310]

Reply to the first: The Philosopher's word can be understood either of the first motion, namely of the heavenly bodies, or of motion taken commonly. And in either way motion is called, as it were, the life of natural bodies by likeness and not properly. For the motion of the heaven is in the whole universe of corporeal natures, as the motion of the heart is in an animal, by which life is conserved. Likewise, too, every natural motion bears itself to natural things in such wise as a certain likeness of vital operation. Whence, if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that this motion were from an intrinsic mover, as some have supposed, it would follow that motion would be the life of all natural bodies.

Reply to the second: It does not befit heavy and light bodies to be moved except insofar as they are outside the disposition of their nature, for example, when they are outside their proper place. For when they are in their proper and natural place, they are at rest. But plants and other living things are moved with vital motion precisely according as they are in their natural disposition, not, however, in approaching to it or receding from it. Indeed, insofar as they recede from such motion, they recede from natural disposition. And, moreover, heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic mover, either by a generator, which gives the form, or by a remover of an impediment, as is said in Physics VIII. And thus they do not move themselves, as living bodies do.

1309. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 6 (near the beginning).
1310. Aristotle, De anima III.

Reply to the third: "Living waters" are said to be those which have a continuous flux. For standing waters, which are not continuous to a source that flows continuously, are called "dead," as the waters of cisterns and pools. And this is said by likeness. For insofar as they seem to move themselves, they have a likeness of life. Yet there is not in them the true notion of life: because they do not have this motion from themselves, but from the cause that generates them; as happens concerning the motion of other heavy and light bodies.

Articulus II - Whether life is a certain operation

To the second, we proceed thus. It seems that life is a certain operation. For nothing is divided except by things which are of its own genus. But living is divided by certain operations, as is evident from the Philosopher in On the Soul II, who distinguishes living by four: namely, to take nourishment, to sense, to move according to place, and to understand. Therefore life is a certain operation.[1311]

1. Further, the active life is said to be other than the contemplative. But the contemplative is not diversified from the active except according to certain operations. Therefore life is a certain operation.
2. Further, to know states a certain operation. But this is life eternal, as is evident from John 17: "This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God." Therefore life is an operation.

But on the contrary is what the Philosopher says in On the Soul II: "Living, for living things, is being."[1312]

I answer: As is clear from what has been said, our intellect - which properly knows the quiddity of a thing as its proper object - derives from sense, whose proper objects are external accidents. And hence it is that from those things which outwardly appear of a thing we come to know the essence (*essentia*) of the thing. And because we name something as we know it, as is clear from the foregoing, it follows that for the most part names are imposed from exterior properties to signify the essences of things. Whence names of this sort are at times taken for the proper essences of things, to the signifying of which they were principally imposed; at other times, however, they are taken for the properties from which they are imposed, and this is less proper - if they are so taken.[1313]

But first, as if a life of natural bodies by likeness and not properly so: For the motion of the heaven is, in the whole universe of corporeal natures, as the motion of the heart in an animal, by which life is preserved. Likewise, every natural motion stands thus toward natural things as a

1311. Aristotle, De anima II.
1312. Aristotle, De anima II: "Vivere viventibus est esse."
1313. On the Thomistic doctrine of names imposed from operations to signify essences, cf. Summa theologiae I, q. 13.

certain likeness of vital operation. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that this motion were from an intrinsic mover, as some have posited, it would follow that motion would be the life of all natural bodies.

Reply to the second: It does not befit heavy and light bodies to be moved, except inasmuch as they are outside the disposition of their nature, as when they are outside their proper place. For when they are in their proper and natural place, they are at rest. But plants and other living things are moved with vital motion precisely insofar as they are in their natural disposition, not, however, in approaching to it or in receding from it. Rather, insofar as they recede from such a motion, they recede from a natural disposition. Besides, heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic mover, either by the generator, which gives form, or by the remover of an impediment, as is said in Physics VIII; and so they do not move themselves as living bodies do.[1314]

Reply to the third: "Living waters" are so called which have a continuous flow. For standing waters, which are not continued to a principle that continually flows, are said to be "dead," as the waters of cisterns and pools. And this is said by a likeness: for insofar as they seem to move, they have a likeness of life. Yet there is not in them the true notion of life; because they do not have this motion from themselves, but from a generating cause, as happens about the motion of other heavy and light things.

It is objected that: 1) It seems that life is a certain operation. For nothing is divided except by things that are of its own genus. But living is divided by certain operations, as is clear from the Philosopher in De anima II, who distinguishes living by four, namely, to use food, to sense, to move according to place, and to understand. Therefore, life is a certain operation.[1315] 2) Moreover, the active life is said to be other than the contemplative. But the contemplative is not diversified from the active except according to certain operations. Therefore life is a certain operation. 3) Moreover, to know God is a certain operation. But this is life, as is clear from John 17: "Now this is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God." Therefore, life is an operation.

But on the contrary: The Philosopher says in De anima II: "To live, for living things, is to be."[1316]

I answer: As is evident from what has been said, our intellect, which is properly cognitive of the whatness (quidditas) of the thing as its proper object, derives from sense, whose proper objects are external accidents. And hence it is that from those things which outwardly appear of a thing we come to know the essence (essentia) of the thing. And because we name something as we know it, as is clear from the foregoing, it follows that for the most part names are imposed from exterior properties to signify the essences of things. Whence names of this sort are at times taken for the proper essences of things, to the signifying of which they were principally imposed; at other times, however, they are taken for the properties from which they are imposed, and this is less proper - if they are so taken.

1314. Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 32.

1315. Aristotle, De anima II; cf. his division of living by four: to use food, to sense, to move according to place, to understand.

1316. Aristotle, De anima II: "Vivere viventibus est esse."

As is clear, for example, that this name "body" is imposed to signify a certain genus of substances from this, that three dimensions are found in them. And so at times this name "body" is posited to signify the three dimensions, according as body is posited as a species of quantity. Thus, then, must it be said of "life." For the name "life" is taken from something outwardly appearing about a thing, which is "to move oneself"; yet this name was not imposed to signify this, but to signify the substance to which it belongs, by its nature, to move itself, or to act of itself in any way to operation. And according to this, to live is nothing other than to be in such a nature, and "life" signifies this very thing, but in the abstract - just as the name "course" signifies running in the abstract. Hence "living" is not a predication of accident, but of substance. Sometimes, however, "life" is taken - less properly - for the operations of life, from which the name of life is assumed; as the Philosopher says in Ethics IX, that to live principally is to sense or to understand.[1317]

Reply to the first: The Philosopher there takes "to live" for the operation of life. Or it is better to say that "to sense" and "to understand," and the like, are sometimes taken for certain operations, sometimes, however, for the very existence (*esse*) of those so operating. For it is said in Ethics IX that "to live is to sense or to understand," that is, to have the nature for sensing or understanding. And in this way the Philosopher distinguishes living by those four. For in the lower things there are four genera of living beings. Of which some have a nature only for using food, and for the consequences which are growth and generation. Others further for sensing; as is evident in animals that are immobile, like oysters. Others, with these, further for moving themselves according to place, as perfect animals, quadrupeds, winged things, and the like. Others further for understanding, as humans.

Reply to the second: The "works of life" are called those whose principles are in the agents, so as to induce them to such operations. But it happens that in some men there are at work not only natural principles, as are natural powers (potentiae), but also certain superadded things, as are habits inclining to certain genera of operations as by a mode of nature, and making those operations delightful. And from this it is said, as by a kind of likeness, that that operation which is delightful to a man, and to which he is inclined, and in which he is conversant, and he orders his life to it, is called "the life" of the man. Whence some are said to lead a luxurious life, others an honest life. And in this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active. And in this way too to know God is called eternal life. Whence the solution to the third is evident.

Articulus III - Whether life belongs to God

It is objected that: 1) It seems that life does not belong to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as has been said. But it does not befit God to be moved. Therefore neither to live.[1318] 2) Moreover, in all things that live there is to be received some principle of living, as is said in De anima II, that the soul is the cause and principle of the living

1317. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IX, c. 9.
1318. Cf. the prior determination that to live is said from self-motion.

body. But God does not have any principle. Therefore it does not befit Him to live.[1319] 3) Moreover, the principle of life in living things among us is the vegetative soul, which is only in corporeal things; therefore to live does not befit incorporeal things.

But on the contrary: It is said in Psalm 83: "My heart and my flesh have exulted in the living God."

I answer: That life is most properly in God is to be considered; for since things are said to live inasmuch as they operate from themselves and not as moved by others, the more perfectly this befits something, the more perfectly life is found in it. Now in movers and moved there are three things found in order. For first the end moves the agent; the principal agent, however, is that which acts through its form. And sometimes it acts through an instrument, which does not act from the power of its own form, but from the power of the principal agent; to which the instrument accords only the execution of the action. Therefore there are some which move themselves without having regard to the form or the end which is in them from nature, but only as to the execution of the motion; but the form by which they act and the end for which they act are determined for them by nature. And such are plants, which, according to a form given them by nature, move themselves according to increase and decrease.

Others, however, further move themselves, not only having regard to the execution of the motion, but also as to the form which is the principle of motion, which they acquire by themselves. And such are animals, whose principle of motion is a form not given by nature but received through sense. Hence, the more perfect a sense they have, the more perfectly they move themselves. For those which have only the sense of touch move themselves only with the motion of dilation and constriction; oysters, for instance, and certain others, move scarcely beyond the motion of plants. But those which have a perfect sensitive power not only for knowing things conjoined and touching, but also for knowing things distant, move themselves afar by progressive motion.

Yet although animals of this sort receive through sense the form which is the principle of motion, nevertheless they do not set for themselves by themselves the end of their operation or of their motion; rather, it is instilled in them by nature, at whose instinct they are moved to act something through the sensible form apprehended. Hence above such animals are those which move themselves even with regard to the end which they set for themselves. And this does not occur except through reason and intellect, whose office it is to know the proportion of the end and that which is to the end, and to order one thing to another. Whence the more perfect mode of living is that of those which have intellect. For these more perfectly move themselves. And this is a sign thereof, that in one and the same man the intellectual power moves the sensitive powers, and the sensitive powers by their command move the organs which execute the motion. Thus too we see in the arts, that the art to which pertains the use of the ship, namely, the steering art, commands that one which imposes the form of the ship; and this one commands that which has execution only in disposing the matter.

1319. Aristotle, De anima II: the soul is the cause and principle of the living body.

But although our intellect acts as to some things, nevertheless some things are set for it by nature, as are the first principles, about which it cannot be otherwise disposed, and the ultimate end, which it cannot not will. Whence, although as to certain things a man moves himself, nevertheless, as to certain things he must be moved by another. Therefore that whose very nature is its understanding, and that which it has naturally is not determined from another, this holds the highest degree of life. And such is God. Hence in God life is most of all. Whence the Philosopher in Metaphysics XII shows that God is intellect, and excludes that He has an understanding that is successive; for the intellectual operation is eternal, since the intellect is most perfect, and always in act.[1320]

Reply to the first: As is said in Metaphysics IX, there is a twofold action: one which passes into exterior matter, as to heat and to cut; another which remains in the agent, as to understand, to sense, and to will. Of which this is the difference: that the first action is not the perfection of the agent that moves, but of the moved thing; the second, however, is the perfection of the agent. Whence, since motion is the act of the movable, the second action, insofar as it is the act of the operator, is called its "motion" by a certain likeness: because as motion is the act of the movable, so such an action is the act of the agent; although motion is the act of the imperfect - namely, of that which is in potency - whereas such action is the act of the perfect, that is, of something existing in act, as is said in De anima III. Therefore, in the way that to understand is a "motion," that which understands is said to move itself. And in this way also Plato posited that God moves Himself - not in the way that motion is the act of the imperfect.[1321]

Reply to the second: That which is God's knowing is His very existence (*esse*) and His understanding and His living. And therefore He so lives that He does not have life from a principle.

Reply to the third: Life in these lower states is received in a corruptible nature which needs generation for the conservation of the species, and nourishment for the conservation of the individual. And on this account in these lower things life is not found without a vegetative soul. But this has no place in incorruptible things.

Articulus IV - Whether all things are life in God

It is objected that: 1) It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said: "In Him we live, and move, and are" (Acts 17:28). Therefore not all things in Him are life.[1322] 2) Moreover, all things are in God, namely, in the first exemplar; but things exemplified ought to be conformed to the exemplar. Since, then, not all things live in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God. 3) Moreover, as St. Augustine says in the book On True Religion, any living substance is better than any non-living substance. If, then, those things which do not live in themselves are life in God, it seems that they are truer as things in God than in themselves - which, however, seems false, since in themselves they are in act, but in God in potency. 4) Moreover, since, as Scripture teaches, God

1320. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII; cf. also XIII, on the perfection and eternity of intellectual operation.

1321. On the twofold action, see Aristotle, Metaphysics IX; on action remaining in the agent as perfect act, see De anima III.

1322. Acts 17:28.

knows even the things that are evil according to some time or condition; if all things are life in God, inasmuch as they are known by Him, then even the things that are evil would be life in God - which seems unfitting.

But on the contrary: It is said in John 1: "What was made, in Him was life." But all things other than God were made. Therefore all things in God are life.

I answer: As has been said, the living of God is His very understanding. But in God the intellect, that which is understood, and His very understanding are the same. Whence whatever is in God as understood is something living itself, or His life itself. And therefore, since all things which were made by God are in Him as understood, it follows that all things in Him are life - indeed, the very divine life.

Reply to the first: Creatures are said to "live, move, and be" in God as in the efficient and governing cause; not, however, in such wise that in God there is life, motion, and being as they are in creatures, but that from Him creatures receive their life, motion, and being. Yet all things are said to be "life in God" inasmuch as they are in Him as understood by His intellect.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut dicitur in the ninth book of the Metaphysics, there is a twofold action: one which passes over into external matter, as to heat and to cut; another which remains in the agent, as to understand, to sense, and to will. Of which the difference is this: the first action is not the perfection of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; but the second action is the perfection of the agent. And therefore, because motion is the act of what is mobile, the second action, insofar as it is the act of the operator, is called its motion by this likeness, that as motion is the act of something mobile, so this kind of action is the act of the agent, although motion is the act of something imperfect, that is, existing in potency; but this kind of action is the act of something perfect, that is, existing in act, as is said in On the Soul III. Therefore in the way in which to understand is a motion, that which understands itself is said to move itself. And in this way too Plato held that God moves Himself, not in the way in which motion is the act of what is imperfect

Ad secundum dicendum, quod as God is His own essence (*esse*) and His own understanding, so also He is His own living. And on this account He lives in such a way that He does not have a principle of living

Ad tertium dicendum, quod life in these lower things is received in a corruptible nature, which needs generation for the conservation of the species, and nourishment for the conservation of the individual. And for this reason in these lower things life is not found without a vegetative soul. But this does not have place in incorruptible things

Whether all things are life in God

Ad quartum sic proceditur

Objicitur 1. Videtur quod non omnia sint vita in Deo. Dicitur enim supra, quod vivere dicitur per quandam motus rationem; sed non omnia quae sunt in Deo sunt motus; ergo non omnia in ipso sunt vita.[1324]

Objicitur 2. Praeterea, omnia sunt in Deo sicut in primo exemplari. Sed exemplata debent conformari exemplari. Cum igitur non omnia vivant in seipsis, videtur quod non omnia in Deo sint vita.

Objicitur 3. Praeterea, sicut St. Augustine dicit in the book On True Religion, chapter 19, a living substance is better than any non-living substance. If, therefore, those things which in themselves do not live are life in God, it seems that they are more truly things in God than in themselves; which, however, seems false, since in themselves they are in act, but in God in potency.

Objicitur 4. Praeterea, as things are known by God - both good things, and those which are made according to some time; and also evils; and those things which God can make but will never be made - if, therefore, all things are life in God, insofar as they are known by Him, it seems that even evils, and things that never come to be, are life in God insofar as they are known by Him. Which seems unfitting.

But on the contrary: It is said in John 1:3 - 4, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things except God were made; therefore all things are life in God.

I answer that, as has been said above, the living of God is His understanding. But in God the intellect, and that which is understood, and His very act of understanding are the same. Whence whatever is in God as understood is His very living, or His life. And therefore, since all things that are made by God are in Him as understood, it follows that all things in Him are the very divine life.

Reply to the first: Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold way. In one way, insofar as they are contained and conserved by the divine power, as we say that those things which are in our power "are" in us. And thus creatures are said to be in God even insofar as they are in their proper natures; and in this way the word of the Apostle is to be understood, "In Him we live, move, and are" (Acts 17:28); because even our living, and our being, and our being moved are caused by God. In another way, things are said to be in God as in the knower. And thus they are in God by their proper rationes, which in God are not other than the divine essence. Whence, things insofar as they are thus in God, are the divine essence. And because the divine essence is life, not, however, motion, hence it is that, in this mode of speaking, in God there are not motions but life.

Reply to the second: The exemplata ought to be conformed to the exemplar according to the ratio of the form, not, however, according to the mode of being. For sometimes a form has a different mode of being in the exemplar and in the exemplified. Thus the form of a house in the

1324. Cf. the determination that "to live" is said from self-motion above; and see Aristotle, On the Soul II - III.

mind of the artisan has an immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house which is outside the soul it has a material and sensible being. And hence the rationes of things which do not live in themselves are life in the divine mind, because in the divine mind they have divine being.

Reply to the third: If matter were not of the ratio of natural things, but only form in every way, then natural things would in a truer way be in the divine mind through their proper ideas than in themselves. Wherefore Plato also posited that the separated man was the true man, but the material man is a man by participation. But because matter is of the ratio of natural things, it must be said that natural things more truly have being simply in the divine mind than in themselves, because in the divine mind they have uncreated being, but in themselves created being. But to be this - say, a man or a horse - they more truly have in their proper nature than in the divine mind; because to the truth of man there belongs material being, which they do not have in the divine mind. Thus, a house has a more noble being in the mind of the artisan than in matter; yet, nevertheless, that is more truly called a house which is in matter than that which is in the mind, because this is a house in act, but that is a house in potency.

Reply to the fourth: Although evils are in God's knowledge, insofar as they are comprehended under God's knowledge, nevertheless they are not in God as created by God or conserved by Him, nor as having a ratio in God. For they are known by God by the rationes of goods. Whence it cannot be said that evils are life in God. But those things which according to no time are, can be said to be life in God, according as "to live" names understanding only, insofar as they are understood by God; not, however, according as "to live" imports a principle of operation.

Notatio circa totam quaestionem.

Since St. Thomas is pursuing a disputation on the divine attributes, and after the treatise on the perfections of God which do not consist in operation he has most fully discussed the first operation, namely intellection, and the things that seem to pertain to it, from question 14 to 17, it would seem altogether outside the matter to institute here a question about the life of God, being about to dispute in the following on the operation of the will. For if life be taken for the substantial principle of vital operation, it ought not at this place to have been numbered; but if it be taken for the very operation of life, since in God it is not distinguished from intellection and appetition, it seems vain to treat of it in this question as of a distinct perfection of God. Nevertheless the admirable order of the holy Doctor is observed; and from the beginning of the question and article 3 of it one may gather this. For thus he says at the beginning of the question: "Since to understand is of living things, after the consideration of knowledge and the divine intellect, we must consider about His life." And in the third article he proves that the highest grade of life belongs to God from the mode of understanding which He has; he gathers it thus. Living things, especially animals, differ from non-living things in this, that living things move themselves, whereas the rest are rather moved; and those living things which more perfectly move themselves, more perfectly live. For those which act upon themselves by an apprehended form, such as sensing things, more perfectly move themselves and live than non-sensing things which move themselves only by a form implanted in them by nature. Then those which are endowed with a more perfect sense, and therefore act more perfectly upon themselves - such as animals which sense things at a distance and move themselves

toward those things, namely, perfect animals - also live more perfectly than those which, fastened to rocks and shells, move themselves only by a motion of dilation and constriction, because they sense only things present and conjoined. Finally, those which move themselves to an apprehended end with the due order of means, such as the rational creature, live more perfectly than other animals which, although they impel themselves toward what is distant, do not maintain a proportion of means to an end. Therefore it is clear that the rational creature lives more perfectly, because it more perfectly moves itself; for from a more perfect mode of moving oneself the more perfect life is most rightly inferred. But because the created intellect in certain respects seems to move and determine itself - for from principles previously known it proceeds from within to conclusions, whereas as to the very principles it is determined, after the manner of a natural being, by some extrinsic principle, as is said in the First Part of the Second Part, question 9, article 4[1325] - therefore the highest grade of life cannot belong to it. But God - whose is the excellence and loftiness - is not able to be moved or determined by any extrinsic principle, but has all intellection from Himself; therefore He has life in the most perfect mode.

When St. Thomas says that the created intellect is determined to first principles by an exterior principle, he does not so understand it that, for knowing them, it does not concur nor effect anything; but because there is not in it that whereby it would be rather from itself disposed to think this, than that it be determined thereto; and therefore it is determined by another extrinsic cause; in which it seems to be made like to non-living things, and hence it does not partake of the highest grade of life. We will explain this mode of determination unto first thought in men and angels in the fourth article.

Therefore the holy Doctor treats now of the life of God, in order to prove that it is in God in the most perfect way from the most perfect mode of understanding. Wherefore he is not proceeding out of order, but in an ordered fashion, after the tract on intellection and the knowledge of God, he disputes about His life. What he treats in the whole question is easy and does not need greater discussion, except for that which he treats in the fourth article, namely, how all things are said to live in God; but of this we have said enough and more than enough in disputation 70. Moreover, when we attribute life to God, as other perfections which we see in creatures, we understand it according to an analogical ratio, as we have taught in disputation 22 universally.

Quaestio XIX - On the will of God

In duodecim articulos divisa.

Post considerationem eorum, quae ad divinam scientiam pertinent, considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad the divine will, so that the first consideration be about God's will itself. The second, about those things which absolutely pertain to will. The third, about those things which pertain to intellect in order to will.

Concerning the will itself there are treated twelve articles.

1325. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I - II, q. 9, a. 4.

Having preserved the due order of nature, St. Thomas treats of the will of God, and of the second immanent operation of God Himself, and of the other affections which, as it were, follow it as virtues: in this question 19, of will in general; question 20, of love; question 21, of justice and mercy, in which also some other affections are touched upon incidentally. Thereafter indeed from question 22 concerning both operations of intellect and will together he treats at length - namely of providence, predestination, and the book of life, and of the beatitude of God - as we shall see there.

Articulus I - Whether in God there is will

Ad primum sic proceditur

Objicitur 1. Videtur quod in Deo non sit voluntas. Objectum enim voluntatis est finis et bonum; sed Deo non est assignare aliquem finem: ergo voluntas non est in Deo.

Objicitur 2. Praeterea, voluntas est appetitus quidam. Appetitus autem, cum sit rei non habentis perfectionem, designat quod deest perfectionem affectatam; ergo voluntas non est in Deo.

Objicitur 3. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in On the Soul III, the will is a mover that moves. But God is the first unmoved mover, as is proved in Physics VIII. Therefore in God there is no will.[1326]

Sed contra est quod dicit Apostolus, Romans 12: "Ut probetis quae sit voluntas Dei." Ergo in Deo est voluntas.

Respondeo dicendum, in Deo voluntatem esse, sicut et in eo est intellectus. Voluntas enim intellectum consequitur. Sicut enim res naturalis habet esse in actu per suam formam, ita intellectus intelligens actum per suam formam intelligibilem. Quilibet autem res ad suam formam naturalem hanc habet habitudinem, ut quando non habet ipsam, tendat in eam, et quando habet ipsam, quiescat in ea; et idem est de qualibet perfectione naturali quae est bonum naturae. Et haec habitudo ad bonum in rebus carentibus cognitione vocatur appetitus naturalis. Unde et natura intellectualis ad bonum apprehensum per formam intelligibilem similem habitudinem habet, ut scilicet cum habet ipsum quiescat in illo, cum vero non habet, quaerat ipsum; et utrumque pertinet ad voluntatem. Unde in quolibet habente intellectum est voluntas, sicut in quolibet habente sensum est appetitus animalis. Et sic oportet in Deo esse voluntatem, cum sit in eo intellectus. Et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse (*esse*), ita suum velle.

Reply to the first: Although nothing other than God is the end of God, nevertheless He Himself is the end with respect to all things that are from Him; and this through His essence, since through His essence He is good, as was shown above. For the end has the ratio of the good.

1326. Aristotle, On the Soul III; Physics VIII. Biblical citation: Romans 12:2.

Reply to the second: The will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although it is named from "appetere" (to seek), nevertheless does not have only an act whereby it seeks what it does not have, but also loves what it has, and delights in it. And in this respect the will is posited in God: because He always has the good which is its object, since He is not other than it according to essence, as was said.

Reply to the third: The will, whose principal object is the good - which, for a created will, is outside the will - must be moved by something. But the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another, but by itself alone, in that way of speaking in which to understand and to will is called a motion. And in this sense Plato said that the first mover moves itself.

Explicatio articuli.

Conclusio articuli: We affirm - and it is of faith, as the Apostle teaches in Ephesians 1 - "according to the purpose of His will," that there is in God will. In this all agree, not only Catholics but even heretics; for no one who acknowledges God denies that He has will.

St. Thomas. The reason for the conclusion, he has confirmed. St. Thomas proves this reason thus: just as a natural thing is by its own natural form, so the intellect is intelligent by its own intelligible form (*forma intelligibilis*). But a natural thing has to its form this inclination, that, when it does not have it, it should desire it, and when it does have it, it should rest in it - two things which pertain to will (*voluntas*), or to natural appetite (*appetitus naturalis*). Therefore, since God is intelligent, it follows, together with the account of the intelligible form, that He also has an elicited appetite, which is attributed to will.

Dubitatio circa rationem articuli. 13. A doubt concerning the foregoing reason is proposed by Cajetan, because from the natural appetite of things for their form when they lack it, there is not rightly inferred an elicited appetite in a nature that understands or senses for the intelligible or sensible form. For it seems to follow only that in a knowing nature there is a natural and innate appetite, not an elicited one, for having the intelligible or knowable form, when it does not have it, so that by it it may understand or know. From this, however, it does not follow that in an intelligent nature there is will, which is the principle of elicited appetite - as St. Thomas contends.

To satisfy this doubt, Cajetan notes first seven differences between natural appetite and animal appetite. Of these we shall briefly recount only four, which seem to conduce to the explanation of this doubt. The first is that natural appetite is in all things, whereas animal appetite is only in cognoscitives. The second, that natural appetite follows nature as such, but animal appetite follows cognition. The third, that the natural is not an elicited act, but a certain propensity or readiness to receive its perfection, which is called appetite while it lacks that perfection - as we shall say at 1 - 2, q. ult. - whereas animal appetite is an elicited act of the appetitive faculty. The fourth difference, that natural appetite is a particular inclination which each part of a composite shares to its own peculiar perfection; but animal appetite is a universal appetite which tends to the good befitting the

whole, whether by reason of this part or that. And therefore natural appetite is said to be in the several parts for their several perfections; but animal appetite is one, desiring for the whole whatever perfection may belong to it.

Next Cajetan notes that every knowing nature is in act through a cognoscible form, as such - that is, as it presents (the object), by reason of which the thing itself understood is also called a cognoscible form. He therefore answers the doubt that, on St. Thomas's reasoning, the conclusion is rightly proved: for if there is gathered an appetite for the intelligent form as it is intelligent, there is also proved an appetite for the very thing understood as it is understood; but this appetite is elicited, not natural - because the natural is for the form which is the thing's natural perfection, not for the apprehended thing.

But this solution plainly does not satisfy: both because it is not so certain that the apprehended thing is called the intelligible form, and also because, even if we conceded that to Cajetan, on that account alone would it be proved that in an intelligent nature, as it is intelligent, there is an appetite for the intelligible form, and again that you include the thing itself as the object of intellection; there is, I say, an inclination and appetite to understand the thing itself. But the rational appetite, which is elicited - and which alone we are striving to prove - certainly is not for understanding only, but for the thing understood insofar as it is a good, not so that we merely understand it, but also so that we have it, and obtain it as our good.

For my part, I think the Angelic Doctor, by that reasoning, wished not so much to demonstrate the conclusion as to explain, with a certain fitting proportion, the rational appetite in an intelligent nature from the natural appetite in natural things: that, just as the natural appetite - whereby in all things a natural form is followed - is a certain propensity to perfection and to a natural good, so too the rational appetite, which follows cognition, is a certain propensity and inclination to that which is judged and known as a good. Therefore, when it is called a rational or animal appetite - because it follows a perfection placed in apprehension - this is as the natural appetite is for the form which gives the thing its natural being.

And for that reason, in a knowing nature one appetite suffices: for although there are several perfections of the whole according to its various parts, there is nevertheless one faculty which judges all things - whether they be good or evil - and since animal or rational appetite follows that judgment, there will also be one appetite serving the whole composite. By contrast, the natural appetite is manifold, divided among the several parts and directed to the several perfections, because here the appetite is for the natural form insofar as it gives being and natural perfection; and since that is manifold, there must also be manifold appetite for it. Finally, since animal appetite follows the elicited act of cognition, it too is an elicited act of desire or love; whereas the natural, since it follows the form itself and natural being, with proportion preserved, is only a propensity after the manner of a potency, not an elicited act.

But if by reasoning we had to prove what is most well known - namely, that will and elicited appetite are fitting to God - it would be better proved from the rational appetite of creatures. For just as we attribute to God the perfection of an intelligent creature, which is to know and to

understand, abstracting certain imperfections which it has in the creature; so too ought we to attribute rational appetite, which follows propositional judgment and intellect; and in every way, with proportion preserved, yet without imperfection, we ought to philosophize about God and about a rational creature.

Here it was to be noted how the intellect apprehends good, and thus has it for its object, whereas it is commonly said that the object of the intellect is the true, but the good is the object of the will; but this has been explained abundantly enough above in disputation 76, c. 2 and disputation 77, c. 4.

Next is to be noted the teaching which St. Thomas has in reply to the third, where he says that God's will is moved only by His own goodness, not by other things; although He not only wills and has as willed His own goodness, but also other things are said to move the will as objects. Nevertheless the Doctor rightly taught thus, because, as we shall see in article 5, will is moved only by the thing willed which it has as an end, and it desires for its own sake; but it is not said to be moved by means. Therefore, since God regards His own goodness alone as end, His will is said to be moved by it alone. He sets forth plainly the same doctrine in the next article, on reply to the second, about which we shall speak in disputation 82.

Articulus II - Whether God wills other things besides Himself

Objicitur: 1. It seems that God does not will things other than Himself. For the divine willing is His existence (*esse*); but God is not other than Himself; therefore He does not will other than Himself.

1. Moreover, what is willed moves the one willing, as the appetible moves appetite, as is said in On the Soul III.[1327] If therefore God wills something other than Himself, His will will be moved by something other than Himself; which is impossible.
2. Moreover, for whatever will some one thing willed suffices, he seeks nothing beyond that. But God's goodness suffices Him, and His will is satisfied from it; therefore God does not will anything other than Himself.
3. Moreover, the act of will is multiplied according to the things willed. If therefore God wills Himself and other things besides Himself, it follows that the act of His will is multiple, and by consequence His existence, which is His willing. But this is impossible. Therefore He does not will other things besides Himself.

But on the contrary: the Apostle says, 1 Thessalonians 4: "This is the will of God, your sanctification."[1328]

I answer: God not only wills Himself, but also other things besides Himself. This appears from the likeness introduced before. For a natural thing has not only a natural inclination with respect to its own good, so as to acquire it when it does not have it, or to rest in it when it does have it, but

1327. Aristotle, On the Soul III, esp. on the appetible moving appetite.

also, so far as possible, to diffuse its own good into others. Hence we see that every agent, insofar as it is in act and perfect, makes something like itself. And so this too pertains to the very notion of will (*voluntas*): that someone communicate the good which he has to others, in accordance with what is possible. And this pertains especially to the divine will, from which, by a certain likeness, every perfection is derived. Hence natural things, insofar as they are perfect, communicate their good to others; much more does it pertain to the divine will to communicate its own good to others by likeness, according to what is possible. Thus, then, He wills both that He be and that there be others. But He wills Himself as end; other things, however, as ordered to the end: insofar as He grants that even other things should partake of the divine goodness.

Reply to the first: Although the divine willing is His existence according to reality, nevertheless they differ in reason, according to a diverse mode of understanding and signifying, as is clear from what has been said above. For in this expression, "God is," I do not import a relation to another thing, as I do in this expression, "God wills." And therefore, although He is not anything other than Himself, nevertheless He wills something other than Himself.

Reply to the second: In those things which we will on account of the end, the whole reason of moving is the end; from this it is that it moves the will. And this appears most clearly in those things which we will solely on account of an end. For he who wills to take a bitter potion wills nothing in it but health; and this alone is what moves his will. It is otherwise for him who takes a sweet potion, which one can will not only on account of health, but also on account of itself. Hence, since God does not will other things than Himself except on account of the end which is His goodness, as has been said, it does not follow that anything other moves His will except His own goodness. And if He understands other things besides Himself by understanding His own essence, so too He wills other things besides Himself by willing His own goodness.

Reply to the third: From the fact that God's own goodness suffices His will, it does not follow that He wills nothing else, but that He wills nothing else except by reason of His goodness. Thus also the divine intellect, although it is perfect from this very fact that it knows the divine essence, nevertheless in that essence knows other things.

Reply to the fourth: Just as the divine understanding is one, because it sees many things only in one, so the divine willing is one and simple, because it does not will many things except through one, which is His own goodness.

Explicatio articuli. The conclusion is affirmative, and without controversy among all - even heretics: it is proved from that text, 1 Thessalonians 4, "This is the will of God, your sanctification," and from Psalm 113: "He has done all things whatsoever He willed."[1328][1329] St. Thomas further confirms it here, and in Contra Gentiles VIII, chapter 75, from the analogy of a natural being: for just as any natural thing, by its natural appetite, not only desires its own perfection but also craves to communicate it to others, so likewise a rational nature, by rational appetite, desires to

1328. 1 Thessalonians 4:3.
1328. 1 Thessalonians 4:3.
1329. Psalm 135[113B]:11 in the Vulgate numbering: "Omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit."

communicate its own goodness to others. Therefore, since in God there is rational will, it follows that He wills to communicate Himself to others as far as possible, and thus to will things other than Himself.[1330]

Moreover, the clause "according as it is possible," which St. Thomas inserted, his disciples variously explain: Cajetan in this article, and Ferrari in chapter 75. First, they explain it thus: "as far as is possible by God's ordained power," for God does not de facto communicate Himself as much as is possible by His absolute power. But since, according to the mind of the same holy Doctor, God's ordained power is posterior to His will - as he hands down below at q. 5, a. 1, ad 1 - this sense, which Cajetan ascribes to St. Thomas's words, is inept. It is more fittingly said, as I find elsewhere: "It follows that God wills to communicate Himself to others as far as is possible by His ordained power," that is, as far as He Himself wills.

Therefore the second exposition, which Ferrari brings, is pleasing: namely, that the phrase "according as it is possible" is to be understood on the part of the recipients, not of the power, that is, as far as creatures, by a likeness, are capable of partaking.

Articulus III - Whether whatever God wills, He wills from necessity.

Reply to the third: that this is to be understood of a likeness participated and limited of His goodness; for although God within Himself communicates Himself in an infinite mode in the unity of nature, yet outwardly He cannot so communicate Himself, but according to a certain limitation. Wherefore, when St. Thomas says that God wills things other than Himself because He wills to communicate Himself "according as it is possible," he understands that finite mode in which He can outwardly communicate Himself, not the infinite, which is not possible save by an internal communication.

It is objected that everything eternal is necessary; but whatever God wills, He wills from eternity - otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills from necessity.

1. Further, God wills things other than Himself inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. But God wills His goodness from necessity; therefore He wills other things than Himself from necessity.
2. Further, whatever is natural to God is necessary; for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as was shown above. But it is natural to Him to will whatever He wills, because in God nothing can be besides nature, as is said in the 5th book of the Metaphysics. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills from necessity.
3. Further, "not to be necessary" and "to be able not to be" are equipollent. If, therefore, it is not necessary that God will something of the things which He wills, it is possible also that He not will it, and it is possible that He will that which He does not will. Therefore the divine will is contingent to either part; and thus imperfect, because whatever is contingent is imperfect and mutable.

1330. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 19, a. 2; Contra Gentiles III (or VIII in some printings), c. 75.

4. Further, from that which is to either part no action follows unless it be inclined to one by something else, as the Commentator says on Physics II, comment 48. If therefore the will of God in some matters is disposed to either part, it follows that it is determined to an effect by something else; and thus it has some prior cause.[1331]

5. Further, whatever God knows, He knows from necessity; but just as the divine knowledge is His essence, so too the divine will. Therefore whatever God wills, He wills from necessity.

But on the contrary: the Apostle says in Ephesians 1, "Who works all things according to the counsel of His will." Now what we do according to counsel of will, we do not will from necessity. Therefore not whatever God wills, He wills from necessity.

I answer: Something is said to be necessary in two ways, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. Something is judged absolutely necessary from the habitude of the terms, either because the predicate is in the definition of the subject (as it is necessary that a man be an animal), or because the subject is of the notion of the predicate (as it is necessary that a number be even or odd). But it is not necessary that Socrates sit. Hence it is not necessary absolutely, but it can be called necessary by supposition. For, supposing that he sits, it is necessary that he sit while he sits.

Accordingly, concerning the things willed by God, it must be considered that that God will something is absolutely necessary; nevertheless this is not true of all the things which He wills. For the divine will has a necessary habitude to His own goodness, which is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness to be from necessity, just as our will from necessity wills beatitude. And likewise any other power has a necessary habitude to its proper and principal object, as sight to color, because by its very notion it tends to that.

But God wills things other than Himself inasmuch as they are ordered to His goodness as to an end. Now the things that are for an end we do not will from necessity when we will the end, unless they be such without which the end cannot be. Thus we will food when we will the preservation of life; and a ship when we will to cross the sea. But we do not so will from necessity those things without which the end can be, as a horse for walking, because without this we can go; and the same reason holds in other cases. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can be without other things, since nothing of perfection accrues to it from other things, it follows that when He wills things other than Himself, this is not necessary absolutely; and yet it is necessary by supposition. For, supposing that He wills, He cannot not will: because His will cannot be changed.

Reply to the first: from this, that God wills from eternity what He wills, it does not follow that it is necessary for Him to will that thing, except by supposition.

Reply to the second: although God from necessity wills His own goodness, nevertheless He does not from necessity will those things which He wills on account of His goodness, because His goodness can be without others.

Reply to the third: it is not natural to God to will any particular thing among the others which He does not will from necessity; nor yet is it unnatural, or contrary to nature; but it is voluntary.

1331. The Commentator (Averroes), on Aristotle's Physics II, comment 48.

Reply to the fourth: some things have from a necessary cause a non-necessary habitude to some effect: and this is on account of a defect of the effect, and not on account of a defect of the cause. Thus the power of the sun has a non-necessary habitude to some of those things which happen here contingently, not on account of a defect of the solar power, but on account of a defect of the effect, which is not necessary, though it proceeds from a cause. And similarly, that God does not from necessity will some of the things which He wills does not arise from a defect of the divine will, but from a defect which befits the thing willed according to its own notion: namely, because it is such that without it the perfect goodness of God can be. That defect, indeed, follows upon every created good.

Reply to the fifth: a cause which is of itself contingent must be determined by something extrinsic to the effect. But the divine will, which of itself has necessity, determines itself to the thing willed, to which it has a non-necessary habitude.

Reply to the sixth: just as the divine existence in itself is necessary, so too the divine willing and the divine knowing. But the divine knowing has a necessary habitude to the things known, not however the divine willing to the things willed. And this is because knowing stands to things according as they are in the knower; whereas the will is compared to things according as they are in themselves. Since therefore all other things have necessity of being according as they are in God, and not according as they are in themselves, God therefore, of whatever things He knows, knows from necessity; but not of whatever things He wills does He will from necessity.

Notationes circa articulum. The conclusion is: The will (*voluntas*) of God necessarily loves His own goodness (*bonitas*), but the other things which He loves on account of His goodness He wills freely. And the reason of St. Thomas is this: although the will of God is referred of necessity to His own goodness itself, which it has as its end (*finis*), nevertheless, when related to creatures, it cannot be borne toward them of necessity. For He regards creatures as means to the end; but means have no necessity of order to the end, except perhaps in the case of those without which the end cannot be; such are not loved necessarily, but freely, even supposing the will to grant the end. But creatures do not have such a necessity of order to God that without them the goodness of God could not consist; therefore God does not will them by necessity. I do not say, by an absolute necessity with no supposition made; but, once a supposition is made that He wills them, He is borne toward them by that necessity by which whatever is, when it is, is necessarily; although otherwise, even willing His own goodness, He ought not on that account to will creatures of necessity.

The first note of Cajetan concerning that reason: first Cajetan notes that only this is proved, namely, that the will of God is necessarily moved to His own goodness so far as concerns specification, not so far as concerns exercise. For St. Thomas compares the goodness of God with beatitude in general, that the divine goodness stands to God's will as beatitude in general stands to the human will; but beatitude moves the human will of necessity only as to specification: therefore the divine goodness too is loved by the will of God necessarily only as to specification. And therefore Cajetan asserts expressly that what is placed in the title of the article is: Whether whatever God wills, He wills by necessity; to wit, supposing the exercise of the act of the will about

its objects. Therefore, he says, the question is about the order of the act of the will to the willed objects, not about the order of the will itself to the objects; and thus there remains only the necessity as to specification. With good reason, therefore, the goodness of God, with respect to the divine will, is compared to beatitude related in general to the will, so that by that comparison the necessity of specification, which alone seemed to remain, might be explained. With Cajetan thinks Ferrariense, Contra Gentiles, c. 81.[1332]

Refutation. I nevertheless judge that St. Thomas is also inquiring and answering about the necessity as to exercise. For he teaches that the will of God freely wills creatures, in such wise that it wills them necessarily on a supposition, namely, that He wills them, by that necessity by which whatever is, when it is, is necessarily; yet absolutely He does not love them of necessity. By these words he clearly understands a necessity as to exercise, whereby the will is said so to will that it cannot not-will. Therefore, since he denies this necessity to the divine will, he signifies that the will of God so freely wills creatures that it can not will them, which is liberty as to exercise. Wherefore, when he teaches that the will of God necessarily wills His own goodness, he is speaking of necessity even as to exercise. I admit indeed that he has not proved this, nor explained it sufficiently, by that example of beatitude, which is loved of necessity only as to specification - that is, is so loved that it cannot be hated; yet it can rightly be proved otherwise, as we shall say in the following disputation.

Second, when St. Thomas says that God necessarily wills creatures on a supposition, it must be observed what he understands by that phrase, On a supposition. Certain Thomists thus explain that supposition: on the supposition that God actually wills Himself as the end of other things, it is necessary that He love other things for Himself. But in this way it follows only that God necessarily loves these or other creatures in general, not these which in fact He loves. This interpretation, however, does not please me, because St. Thomas does not speak of creatures in general, but expressly of those which in fact have been created; and these he asserts are loved by God necessarily on a supposition. Although indeed, when He loves Himself as an end to be obtained, it follows of necessity that He love some creatures to whom He wills to propose Himself as an end to be obtained, nevertheless those need not of necessity be these which in fact have been produced. Of these, however, the Holy Doctor says that they are necessarily loved by God on a supposition; and he explains that he is speaking of that necessity by which that which is, when it is, is said necessarily to be, which is wont to be called necessity on a supposition. Therefore it is in vain that his disciples interpret otherwise that phrase, On a supposition, since he himself expressly expounds himself in the very letter of the text. But why this necessity on a supposition is such that now the will of God cannot be changed, or cease from that which once from eternity He decreed - although we can cease from our will, even if, when we will, by necessity of supposition we necessarily will - may be gathered from what we have said on q. 14, a. 11 and a. 15, and shall say in this question, art. 7.[1333]

Third Cajetan argues against what St. Thomas teaches in this article, namely, that nothing of perfection accrues to the goodness of God from the fact that He also loves other things. For he seems to have taught the contrary in Contra Gentiles I, c. 76, second reason, where he says that

that is perfectly desired or loved which is loved according to its whole virtue; but the virtue of the end is that not only it be loved for itself and in itself, but also that other things be loved for it: therefore that creatures be loved for God pertains to His virtue and perfection.[1334] The same Cajetan replies that this pertains to the perfection of God in a certain manner, not according to intention (as he says), but according to extension; that is, as Ferrariense explains in that same chapter 76, according to extrinsic perfection, not according to intrinsic. For that the end be in itself and for itself, and that other things be loved for it, is not any intrinsic perfection to the end itself; yet extrinsically it is said in a certain manner to be perfected in the notion of an end. But this perfection pertains rather to the creatures which are willed for God, than to God Himself.

Disputatio LXXIX - Whether God necessarily wills all the things which He wills

- Caput I - Opinion of Alexander, St. Thomas, and St. Bonaventure
- Caput II - It is more probable that the will (voluntas) of God is borne necessarily toward possible things, but freely toward future things
- Caput III - Notes for the elucidation of the foregoing doctrine

Caput I - Opinion of Alexander, St. Thomas, and St. Bonaventure

With a single disputation I shall briefly comprise all that the Angelic Doctor handed down in the two preceding articles; but in the proposed question it is certain, and without controversy among the Doctors, that God loves His own goodness, not freely but necessarily - a point which should be understood not only of the necessity of specification, but also of exercise. Whether, however, St. Thomas in article 3 speaks only of the necessity of specification has been noted there. Passing over the reason of that argument which, as we said there, scarcely proves anything other than necessity as to specification, others use this reason: since God is pure act (actus), He ought always actually to love Himself, and not at one time to love, at another not to love. Nevertheless, the matter must be demonstrated more effectively. For even if God is pure act, nonetheless He wills creatures freely ad extra; and from such a free volition He now cannot cease; therefore free will does not conflict with God, even though He is pure act. Wherefore, one must show why liberty does not belong to Him rather with respect to His own goodness than with respect to creatures.

This is shown in two ways. First, because in the goodness of God shines forth every notion of goodness, so that neither in God, nor in the first exercise of loving Himself, can there appear any reason for evil. Therefore, just as for this reason the Blessed, seeing God, love Him of necessity, as we shall see in I - II, q. 5, a. 4, so too God necessarily loves Himself.[1335] Then, if God had not loved Himself from eternity, there would have had to be some mutation in Him, that is, He would have

1332. Ferrarien. r. contra gen. c. 81.
1333. St. Thomas. I, q. 14, a. 11; a. 15; and in this question, art. 7.
1334. 1. contra gen. cap. 76, ratio secunda.
1335. 1 - 2, q. 5, a. 4.

had to be otherwise in Himself than He now is (for now He loves Himself); or, if God now does not love Himself, and could from eternity have loved, in the same way there would have had to be some mutation in Him in order that He love Himself from eternity. For it cannot be understood that the same God, persevering in the same manner, both loves and does not love Himself: remaining the same, He is compared to Himself in the same manner. But in God there cannot be any mutation. Therefore either He does not love Himself of necessity, or He loves Himself of necessity. The former must not be said, for it is manifestly absurd; therefore the latter must be asserted.

But if you say: the same God, remaining wholly the same in Himself, now loves creatures whom He could, remaining the same from eternity, not have loved - therefore likewise He could either love or not love Himself. I answer: at least some necessary mutation occurs in the things loved, that God may be said to love them; for those which, if He had not loved, would not exist, are not in the same way, nor in the same way are compared with the will of God, as will be explained below in this disputation in the following chapter. But in order that He could not love Himself, whom He actually loves, or conversely, that He could love what He would not love, it would not suffice that there be some mutation in other things; rather, in God Himself there would have to be one. For there is necessary a mutation either in the thing willed or in the very one willing. Since therefore in God, in the love of Himself, He is both the thing willed and the one willing, in Him there would have to be a mutation. Moreover, it must be noted that when we say that God loves Himself necessarily, not freely, by "free" is understood that which is equally indifferent to be and not to be. I say this on account of Scotus, who, although he agrees with us in the matter and says that God necessarily loves Himself, nevertheless wishes to call this love free, that is, voluntary from prin-

Caput II - The will of God is borne necessarily toward possible things, yet toward future things freely - this is more probable.

Granted this, which no one denies, that as regards other things outside of God, Alexander in I, p., q. 34, m. 4, and St. Bonaventure in I, d. 45, art. 1, q. 2, think that creatures are not loved by God except as future; in which opinion St. Thomas not slightly inclines them. From this they infer that God is not omni-willing, as He is omnipotent; for He is called omnipotent with respect to all possible things, in that He can produce all possibles; but He is called willing only with respect to future things. They prove this opinion from Psalm 113: "All things whatsoever He willed, He has done": since therefore He has not done all possible things, it follows that He did not will them; for if He had willed, He would have done them.[1336]

Moreover, that this was St. Thomas's opinion seems to be gathered from the first part of art. 3, where, speaking universally and making no distinction, he asserts that creatures are loved by God freely, yet at the same time he affirms that the same are known necessarily. He establishes, however, a difference in the solution to the sixth of the same article: because things are known by God insofar as they are in Him objectively - he speaks of them according to their proper natures - they are loved, however, as they are in themselves, that is, as they exist in some distinction of time;

1336. Alexander of Hales, In I, p., q. 34, m. 4; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 45, art. 1, q. 2.

and because those things that are necessary are also necessarily known, whereas those which are not necessary at some time are not necessarily loved. He has the same doctrine below, art. 6, ad 2; for, as we set forth at length above in disputation 24, St. Thomas esteems that to no creature, unless existing and as conjoined with existence in some distinction of time, does goodness belong; wherefore since the will, under the mode of complacency and prosecution, is only about the good, it follows that the will of God is not borne toward creatures under possible being and according to essence considered nakedly, but only toward things and creatures future. He has the same in Contra Gentiles I, cap. 81, in the last argument, which opinion we have there explained more fully. The same, in my judgment, was taught by the Ferrarian in Contra Gentiles I, cap. 81, and IV, cap. 13, n. 9; as I expressly drew out in the disputation cited.[1337]

From this opinion truly it follows that creatures are not loved by God necessarily, but only freely; and consequently that He alone necessarily loves Himself. As to creatures this is clear: for God wills future creatures; as for those that are possible, and in no way future, His will is not engaged, so that He wills them wholly freely insofar as He wills them to be future; for just as they are freely future, so also God freely wills them to be future. How, indeed, the will of God is borne toward future creatures, we shall see in chapter 3.

Consistent with this doctrine is what some Thomists assert, namely, that the Holy Spirit does not proceed through any love of creatures, although the same affirm that the Word is begotten by the intellection of them under possible being; for creatures are loved freely, since only future ones are loved, whereas the procession of the Holy Spirit is necessary; but possible creatures are known necessarily, wherefore they think that by the cognition of those the Son of God can be generated - about which, however, we shall speak expressly in disputation 144.

I, however, think with Scotus, in III, dist. 32, the single question at the beginning, that a distinction is necessary in principle: for either the discourse is about the love of simple complacency only, which is wont to be called simple affection; and with this love God wills all possible creatures not freely, but necessarily; or we are speaking of the will and efficacious love, by which He wills to give existence to creatures and to produce them; and with this love He loves possible creatures not necessarily, but freely. I can gather this opinion for myself from the ancient and more recent scholastics, and that it is more probable I will demonstrate briefly: Richard in I, d. 45, art. 1, q. 5, ad ult.; and Dionysius Carthusian, q. 1, toward the end; Scotus in the place cited; and Cajetan below q. 34, art. 6, replying to Scotus's first imagination, teach that possible creatures, insofar as they are possible, without any order to existence, are loved by God. Scotus, however, explains this opinion of the love of simple complacency, which clearly the rest also understand; and very many now from the school of St. Thomas follow it together with Cajetan. We could, moreover, interpret the holy Doctor, so that he would not be speaking of this love of simple complacency, but of efficacious love.

1337. 1 Contra Gentiles, cap. 81; and 4 Contra Gentiles, cap. 13, n. 9.

Caput III - Confirmation of the prior part; and on the necessity or liberty of God's will toward possibles and futures, with replies to difficulties

Not of simple complacency, but of efficacious love.

1. But this is easily proved. For, as we said above, q. 6, art. 3, the good which is posited as a passion of being and able to move affection follows the essences (*essentiae*) of things, not only when conjoined with existence, but even when possible; therefore the will not only can will things existing, but also possible ones, at least with the affection of simple complacency; for anything whatever can please the will according to itself, even if it is not in act future or present.

The prior part is proved. And that this will of complacency is necessary, although the authors cited do not say it expressly, is nevertheless gathered especially from Cajetan, who teaches that with this love of creatures, and of the divine essence itself, the Holy Spirit proceeds simultaneously; which love if it were free, without doubt there could not be a procession of the Holy Spirit, insofar as it is referred to creatures, because the Holy Spirit proceeds necessarily.

God necessarily loves possibles as to exercise. In reason, moreover, it is proved thus: if God were freely to love possible creatures, He could from eternity love them, and not love them, just as also future ones; wherefore, if now He were to choose not to love them, so that He could not have loved them from eternity, there could be some variation either in the essence of God, or in the things themselves: for two extremes which are disposed in the same way cannot be a foundation for contradictory denominations, such as "to love" and "not to love." But no variation can be conceived either in God - as is manifest - or in the things possible, because in the same way they are always necessarily possible; therefore either it must be said that they are necessarily always loved, or necessarily always not loved. But it cannot be said that they are not necessarily loved by God, since there comes to them, as has been said, some goodness by which they can please God; therefore the will of God is borne necessarily toward them as to the specification and the exercise: both because they cannot displease God, and also because they cannot fail to be loved. Add that, if God could both will and not will possible creatures from eternity, He could also in time begin to will anew what before He was unwilling; and this without any variation either in Himself or in the things, which would not be inconsistency, if indeed it were to be done without any variation in God - which, however, no one grants.

A difficult objection. But some object in this way. Prior to the nature by which a thing is future, God is understood as freely willing it, which, without any change either of Himself or of the creature itself, He could not will; therefore as regards possible things, with no change understood either in God or in the things, we can conceive in God both willing and not willing.

It is resolved. I answer that God is never understood to will future creatures unless our intellect conceives at least a future variation; and although it is difficult to explain why rather God is the cause of this than of that - which will be explained in the following disputation - nevertheless, since in the thing itself there is some variation as to what is to be, we can rightly say "God wills this and not that"; but in possible things there is absolutely no variation.

1. Finally, when we understand God to will a thing to be absolutely, and so name Him, we simultaneously understand in Him the order to that which is truly going to be, because we cannot name an act of willing without a respect; and since we refer the will of God to diverse things, it is not surprising if we speak of it in a different way. Therefore, when we refer it to the future, we can say "God wills it to be going to be"; but when we cannot refer it to the future, and yet the thing is truly understood as not future, we say "God does not will it." Some change therefore being posited in the objects, it is necessary that we speak of the will of God in a diverse way; and since no change can be understood about possibles, we must always speak of it in the same way.

Why possibles are loved by God necessarily as to exercise, while we love them not necessarily but freely. Again someone will ask: Why do we say that God is borne by the love of complacency into creatures necessarily as to the exercise, when yet the human will is not borne in this way necessarily, unless into God alone? For thus the human will seems more perfect than the divine. I answer that there is nothing of imperfection for the divine will in that it is borne into creatures in this mode necessarily; rather it proceeds from its greatest perfection. For the created will is therefore borne freely, because in the exercise of its act it can find the ratio of evil; but the divine will, since it has no elicited act, but God by His essence bears Himself into objects, cannot on that score leave free the exercise of willing; therefore all liberty must proceed from the object. Since in possible creatures, as they are good, no ratio of evil can appear, and their goodness according to possible being is necessary, they cannot fail to be referred to the essence (*essentia*) of God as loving; because from themselves they are referred to God by their very nature, and not by an elicited will of God: but those things which by their nature are compared with one another and are referred cannot but always be compared in the same way, unless a change be made in one of them; but in evils there cannot be variation from eternity; and so creatures are compared with God, and God with them, in the same way always: therefore He is always willing, and is necessarily willing. Hence too it comes about that God is not suspended, nor does He in any wise cease, as to possible creatures.

1. But when we say that the will of God is necessarily borne into possible creatures, it is to be understood not only of them insofar as, existing in God, they are said to be God Himself (for this alone would be the will of God being borne into God Himself), but it must be understood of creatures according to their formal being, as they are effected objectively in God. These things on the first part of our opinion are to be set down under the noted objection above in disputation 70 and by the same about the prior part of our sentence.

The latter part is proved. The latter part, however - namely, that by efficacious will creatures are loved by God freely - is also easily proved, because to love, or to will in this way, creatures is nothing other than to will to produce them in some way and to make them exist and to bestow on them what pertains to their being; and there is no necessity for this, since God need not produce creatures; indeed He could produce nothing, just as He could destroy by one single act all produced things. And with this love the will is borne freely into creatures. And there is no Catholic who would deny this, although Wyclif, as we reported above in disputation 70, cap. 1, said that God made all things by absolute necessity; and indeed some think that Aristotle felt this. For a fuller explanation of this matter certain things in the following chapter are to be noted.

Notes for the elucidation of the doctrine of the preceding chapter

1. First, a certain doubt of Cajetan in article 3, around solution 6, must be noted, where St. Thomas teaches that the knowledge (*scientia*) of God has a necessary order to the known objects, but the will to the willed things, not so; from which he infers that creatures are known by God necessarily, but not necessarily loved. If therefore we are to explain the difficulty of Cajetan in this way; let us speak thus. The holy Doctor speaks of creatures only possible, as God necessarily knows them by the knowledge of simple intelligence, and of those thus posited he also says that, as even if simple affection is elicited in respect of them, nevertheless it arises of itself. If it be of creatures future, as he puts it, as only futures are loved, they may seem not necessarily to be, since they were not to be future, nor to be known, nor to be loved.

Cajetan's reply is explained. Cajetan in order to explain the opinion of St. Thomas asserts that the entire proposition "Whatever God knows, He necessarily knows," if it be understood of the knowledge of simple intelligence, is in general true; and of this he thinks St. Thomas is speaking - which I myself also judge to be the case. Hence arises this difference between the intellect and the will, that the intellect by the knowledge of simple intelligence necessarily understands creatures possible, whereas the will does not necessarily love them. He subjoins then another difference between knowledge and will; and indeed it is doubtful: because this being posited, that the object of knowledge, as true, is supposed, whether it be possible or future, the knowledge of God is necessarily borne into it, even as future; for what is true cannot not be so: posited the object, the will of God is ordered by the intellect to the object as good, to which, however, the will does not necessarily tend in itself, whether it be future or free; and thus the mode of the will of God as to future things remains free, whereas knowledge is referred to them necessarily.

1. You object: this being supposed, that things are future, they are necessarily known, and are future; and thus under the same hypothesis it follows that creatures are necessarily loved; since as to future things there is no difference of knowledge and of will. He himself, Cajetan, replies to this: nevertheless there is still a difference, because knowledge, when the supposition is made of future things as object, tends to them simply as to the object; but the

will, as to the same future things, does not tend in the same way as to the object simply according to the good, and God wills to attribute being to them in some way; which follows, as soon as there is that future.

The difference between knowledge of the future and the will of the same is subtle and very true; and this difficult proposition is not...

It is objected that Caietan's reply does not satisfy. First, because if it is true, as Caietan admits, that the will of God also concerns possibles, he does not sufficiently show how possible creatures are not loved necessarily with a simple affect, just as they are necessarily known. Next, the solution is difficult in the opinion of St. Thomas, as we already said above in chapter 1: the Doctor seems to indicate that the will of God is not borne toward creatures under the merely possible order of being, except in order to make them be future in time, because in his view the good is not found in things under a merely possible being. Since therefore some knowledge can be about possibles, but no will, for that reason he is thought to have said that created things are necessarily known by God, but not necessarily loved. But since we said, in accordance with the common opinion even of the Thomists, that things under a merely possible being are necessarily also loved by God with an affect of simple complacency, we must likewise say that knowledge and will, with respect to things as possible, are related in entirely the same way. Yet with respect to the things themselves as future there is a manifest difference, which Cajetan assigns.

Note secondly: the will of God is so free in willing to produce this or that creature, that it could not have begun to will in time, but willed from eternity. Why, however, once the determination of the will has been posited from eternity, it cannot be changed in time, as men are wont to change their wills, we shall say below in article 7.

Moreover, we must assert His liberty in such a way that, on the part of the intellect, nothing peculiar precedes on account of which He should will this rather than that freely, as happens in us. For our will, in the choice of means, is determined only to that which is proposed to it as better, as we shall say in 1 - 2, q. 13, a. 6; and, in the proposal of diverse ends, it is always inclined to that which is proposed more efficaciously, as we shall likewise see there, and in 1 - 2, q. 77, a. 2, and below in this First Part, disputation 98, chapter 7. But the divine intellect proposes all things to God equally as they are in themselves, so that it cannot fail to show as better what is in reality better. And as regards efficacy, it proposes all things in the same way; nevertheless, out of sheer liberty, the light of the will can choose that which is less good. Why, however, when we choose one means rather than another, we ought to choose that which, in the judgment of reason, is proposed as better, but God need not do so, will be said in that question 13, article 6. In this sense true is what Henry taught in his Summa, art. 36, q. 4, and in Quodlibet 8, q. 1, namely, that the will of God is not determined by His knowledge to acting, but rather knowledge is determined by the will.[1338]

When, however, Ferrarensis says in 1 Contra gentiles, chapter 82, that the divine will is determined by the intellect, he does not understand it so that He should will this rather than that - for such a determination would utterly destroy the liberty of the will, because the intellect always

1338. Henricus de Gandavo, Summa, art. 36, q. 4; Quodlibet 8, q. 1.

proposes objects in the same way - but because the will cannot will without a preceding intellection; therefore Ferrarensis said that the will is determined by the intellect, namely, to acting, yet not to willing this rather than that.[1339]

Third, it must be added that Scotus is unjustly rebuked by Cajetan for saying, in I, distinction 39, the only question, according to what has been said, that the first contingent cause is the divine will. Cajetan notes that manner of speaking, because although the divine will is free, nevertheless it ought not to be called contingent, since contingency signifies not only indifference to being and not being, but also mutability, which cannot befit God. Yet this is not sufficiently proved by Cajetan. For when Scotus calls the will of God contingent, he does not call it so because in itself it can be and not be, but because it can will and not will freely. Whether the first root of the liberty of our operations is the divine will, we shall say in disputation 100.

Scotus adds that the divine will, prior by nature to willing to produce anything outside itself, is a potency of contradiction - a point which Cajetan likewise reprehends in article 7 of this question, on the ground that a potency of contradiction is not only indifferent, but is also subject to change, which cannot befit God. I, however, think that the potency of contradiction is sufficiently saved in this, that it is indifferent to willing and not willing; for this is the indifference to either part of a contradiction. And when Scotus considers the divine will prior by nature to willing anything, he speaks consistently within his own doctrine, for just as he posits a distinction in the divine attributes from the nature of the thing, he also posits an order of prior and posterior according to nature - which, however, for the same reason is false; for this priority is real, whereas in God only an order of reason can obtain, just as only a distinction of reason - except among the persons - can be posited.

The will of God, even the efficacious will, is related in no case in a merely negative manner; therefore with respect to nothing can it remain thus. Moreover, that it cannot so be related with respect to things that are not future is clear: for the non-being of any creature whatsoever can be referred to the divine will as to an appetible object, as will be said a little below, namely, that the will itself either supposes the thing or posits it.

If you consider a thing that is not to be future, God cannot have a purely negative bearing toward it; there must be posited some intrinsic variation either in God Himself, or in the things not future: for if both remain in the same way, they will in the same way be referred; but no change can be in God, and it is manifest that there is none in the things themselves not future, since non-future things are in the same way always non-future; therefore they ought always in the same way to be referred to the divine will, namely, either as willed, or as not willed. And the will of God must always either say that it wills them not to be, or that it does not will that they be; therefore the will of God toward non-futures is not of necessity to be merely negative.

He also posits an order of prior and posterior according to nature, which nevertheless for the same reason is false: for this priority is real; but in God there can obtain only an order of reason, just as also only a distinction of reason, except between the persons, can obtain.

1339. Ferrarensis (Franciscus a Ferrara), In Contra Gentiles, lib. 1, cap. 82.

Fourth, one must philosophize thus about the will of God (*voluntas*), that we should never say that with respect to any object it bears itself in a merely negative way; which I judge to be true, not only of the simple will, but also of the efficacious will. For if some thing is to be future that is not a sin, God wills it to be, because He is its cause; but if it is not to be future, God wills it not to be. Wherefore, if God in time confers to someone prevenient grace, He willed to prevent him; but if He does not confer it, He willed not to prevent. Concerning sin, moreover, in God there is an act (*actus*) of displeasure, because that which is against reason cannot but displease God: there is also an efficacious act of the divine will, by which God wills that certain sins not be - namely, those which in time He Himself prevents.

But some approve this position by a certain reason, from this, that God is not in potency to willing: for this manifestly clashes with His perfection, inasmuch as He is pure and utterly simple act. Yet this reason is not efficacious: for just as God could from eternity have had a positive act, by which He would will to produce Peter or an angel, so too He could from eternity not have had it, and this without any variation in God, or potency repugnant to pure act. Why then in the same way could His will not have remained suspended from eternity with respect to non-futures, so as neither to will to do them, nor to will not to do? For this diversity of act of will can befit God without any intrinsic change in Him, as we shall say in the following disputation, solely by a variation of the respect of reason.

I, however, show the same thing by another argument, which I clearly gather from what has been said in this chapter. For if the will of God bore itself negatively, it would be concerning those things which He is never going to do: for those things which He is going to do in time, He Himself decreed and willed from eternity, even specially and individually, as we shall show in disputation 87 and disputation 99; but concerning those things which are not going to be, the will of God cannot bear itself negatively; therefore with respect to none at all can it so remain. Moreover, that with respect to non-futures it cannot so bear itself is clear: for the non-being of any creature whatsoever can be referred to the divine will as to an appetible object, as will be said presently, which the will itself can will. Let us suppose, then, that God wills some thing not to be; then, in order that it be said to bear itself negatively, there is need to understand some intrinsic variation either in God Himself, or in the non-future things: for if both remain in the same way, they will be referred in the same way; but no change can be in God, as is manifest; nor in the very non-future things, because non-futures are always in the same way non-futures: therefore they ought always in the same way to be referred to the divine will, either as willed, or as not willed; and the will of God must always say either that it wills them not to be, or that it does not will that they be. But the will of God with respect to non-futures need not necessarily bear itself negatively, because that not-being, as we were saying above, is a certain appetible, and to that the will of God can will it: therefore, as must be said, the non-futures are willed by God not to be.

This doctrine is exceedingly useful, and has not a little served us in the matter of predestination and reprobation. There is not, then, liberty (*libertas*) in God, as in us, in this, that He can will to do some thing, and cease from every act concerning it; but only in this, that He can will to do, or will not to do. Nor is this doctrine impeded by the fact that God, in some sign of reason, can of Himself

be considered by us as indifferent: for this happens when, in order that He be understood as willing, some reason on the part of the creature must be presupposed: thus, with respect to willing beatitude for us, He is understood as indifferent before He foresees works, as we shall say in disputation 95, chapter two, against Scotus.

From this same doctrine it follows first, that the non-being of a thing, so far as it is a certain evil of the thing itself, does not please God: for if it pleased, the thing would displease, out of whose displeasing the being of that which is its evil would please. It therefore displeases necessarily under this respect, so that under the same it cannot be referred to the divine will as an appetible object of complacency and of love: but under another respect it can please, for in it there is not every ratio of evil. For in the not-being of some thing, in comparison to the rest of the universe, or to the justice or to the power of God, some ratio of good can appear, on account of which it can please God not only by simple complacency, but also by efficacious will, by which He decrees not to make that thing. Likewise, when God denies to someone His grace or glory, it does not please as it is a certain evil of his, because just as the person does not displease, so neither does his evil, as his, please: but it pleases under another respect, under which also it cannot but please, because namely the power of God is shown in it, and mercy also toward the elect, or for another reason, as we shall note in disputation 95, chapter 9.

Then it follows that the liberty of the will of God is not in this, that under the same ratio He can both hate and love some thing; and herein there is necessity as to the specification of simple affections, which is found in us also concerning any object whatsoever; for the same, as it is the same, cannot be the object of hatred and of love: nor is the liberty of God in this, that He can by an act of simple complacency, or of displeasure, love and not love, hate and cease from hatred by suspending the act, which is liberty as to exercise; because what He hates He cannot not hate, and what He loves with simple affection He cannot not love; for some suspension of act does not befall God, as we have shown above. There is, however, liberty in God - and that most perfect - concerning created things as to the exercise of will and of efficacious love in this manner, because God can will to produce Peter and not will to produce him; that is, to have an act of efficacious love, and not to have it, but to cease. This, indeed, we gather from the variety of objects, not from any change in God (for we denied above suspension of act whenever no variety appears either in things or in objects), but from this very fact, that things future, or not future, are referred otherwise to the will of God.

Yet a difference must be observed between our will and God's will: for in us liberty is so as to the exercise, that we can will to do some thing and not will, by ceasing from every act, so that it is not necessary by a positive act to will not to do; but God is so without an act of willing to do some thing, that by that very fact He positively wills not to do it, as was said above.

Disputatio LXXX - Whether the free willing of God is something in Him formally

Caput I - Various opinions of the Scholastics

Since every disputation about God and the divine attributes is so difficult to understand, and much more difficult to explain, that, according to Pseudo-Dionysius and the common judgment of the Fathers, cited above in disputation 22, chapter 5, we conceive by mind, and signify by words, more easily what God is not than what He is; I have always judged especially obscure and most difficult that question which I have now proposed to be examined; for although the human mind can by sure reasoning attain what something is not, nevertheless what it is - even after the manner of human things - cannot be fully known. Now the whole difficulty of the question lies in this, that whereas God so freely wills to produce creatures that He could not have willed, some act of will in Him seems to be necessary, and hence some perfection which befits Him not necessarily but freely - an absurdity that at once appears: on the other hand, if every operation of will abiding in God is necessary, there follows another no less absurd conclusion, namely, that God necessarily wills whatever He wills. In the proposed question, therefore, pressed by the very difficulty of the matter, some more recent Scholastics have judged less rightly with Cajetan; whose opinion I shall report in this chapter and impugn its falsity briefly, so that in what follows I may more easily set forth what is more in accord with reason and with the principles of faith.

Accordingly Cajetan, in article 5, clearly teaches that to will to produce creatures is a perfection intrinsically and formally in God, and free. When he says free, he takes it to be some additament that greatly diminishes the perfection of nature's notion, wherefore he does not judge it absurd to concede to God a free perfection, which so now befits Him that it could from eternity not have befitted Him; which of the necessary perfection of God Himself it is by no means lawful to concede. He gathers this opinion from the mind of St. Thomas in the second article. For St. Thomas's reason by which he proves that God wills creatures - because every perfect thing desires to communicate itself to others - supposes as a perfection in him who communicates himself, not only to be able to communicate himself to others, but also to will actually to communicate himself; therefore, since in God such a perfection cannot be necessary, because He does not communicate Himself to what is outside necessarily, it ought to be free, and consequently of such a sort as can befit God and not befit Him. This opinion some more recent authors follow who, in order to escape every difficulty and absurdity, think it enough to concede that that free will which is posited as some perfection of God is only by a distinction of reason, or at least from the nature of the thing; yet formally to be distinguished from God Himself.

But in whatever way this opinion be explained, it can in no way be defended, and its falsity is excellently shown by Ferrarensis in Contra Gentiles, chapter 71.[1340] However, it can be refuted first thus: if the adversaries concede that that will is an intrinsic perfection in God, yet free in such a

1340. Ferrarensis, In Contra Gentiles, cap. 71.

way that it could have not been in Him, they cannot save this by a distinction of reason alone; for what can be present so as to be absent from another must of necessity be distinguished from it from the nature of the thing, as we shall show in disputation 116, chapter 5. Next, moreover, to assert a distinction from the nature of the thing among those which are in God, except among the persons, is manifestly false, as we shall show in disputations 116 and 120. In addition, however that free will be distinguished from God Himself, if it is intrinsic, it cannot but be God Himself: for whatever is in God is, from the nature of the thing, God Himself, and equal to God Himself; therefore it exists as necessarily as God Himself. It is therefore absurd to say that it could have been in God and yet not be: for thus God Himself, too, would be free in such a way that He could not have been; or at least it must be conceded that there is something in God which by its own nature is not God - something which Bernard deems no less absurd, arguing in Sermon 80 on the Canticle against Gilbert, as we shall report within disputations 116 and 120. The same was condemned by Bernard with the bishops assembled in the Council of Reims, whose acts we shall mention below in disputation 170, chapter 2; for in their symbol of faith, among other things, it is said: "We believe and confess only God," etc., and let us not be said to posit in God any things at all, whether relations, or properties, or singularities or unities, or other things of this sort, to be in God from eternity which are not God. There, since the Fathers plainly define that there is nothing eternal in God which is not God Himself, they condemn Cajetan and others asserting an act of free will in God which could not have been in God from eternity, nor is, from the nature of the thing, God Himself; which definition, although not in all points confirmed by Eugene III, as we shall see in disputation 120, ought nevertheless to be of great authority. Therefore, whether that will be called a perfection simply simple, or not simply simple, if nevertheless it is something intrinsic to God, it cannot so freely befit God that it could have not been in Him.

And indeed, if in God there were some act of free will which could from eternity have not been, it would not seem to be deniable that God could love some things more intensely, others less intensely, not only on the part of the object and of the good willed, but also on the part of the act - which is contrary to the doctrine of St. Thomas below, question 20, articles 3 and 4 - and all agree that this is absurd. Moreover, that this follows is clear: for if in God there is an act which could have not been, neither is that act the very same essence of God; there could also have been various acts, and thus one more perfect and more intense than another.

Finally, just as Cajetan concedes in God a free perfection which is so in God from eternity that it could have not been in Him, by the same token he could concede in like manner a relation (*relatio*) in time from creation, which would befit God freely; because it is no less befitting to God to be from eternity necessarily in the way in which He now is, than to persevere in the same way always; and thus it is against God's simplicity, constancy, and necessity to have something from eternity freely which He could not have, just as it is to have that from time. For although to have from eternity something which He could not have does not argue in God a change from one thing into another (for this can occur only in time), yet it argues a variety which could befall God, and which is no less against His simplicity and constancy and necessity than to have it from time.

Caput II - How the divine will, by which God freely willed to create, befits Him

But a change from one thing to another is against His immutability. But if, with a mere distinction of reason, we can understand a free act which can befit God from eternity and not befit Him, with the same mere distinction we could assert that there comes to Him in time a real relation (*relatio*), without any detriment to His simplicity, and without any true real mutation.

From which it follows that there is not in God indifference and a real potency (*potentia*) toward elicited internal acts; because in truth there is nothing elicited in God which could fail to be elicited. Yet inasmuch as, with respect to producing external creatures, He can freely produce these rather than those - about which again in Disputation 102[1341] - therefore He can freely proceed outwardly to creatures.

The divine willing is the very essence (*essentia*) of God, understood and signified by us in a special way: this is the truer opinion.

It is necessary to dissipate the proposed difficulty, and at the same time to explain how the will (*voluntas*) of God, by which from eternity He freely willed to produce creatures, befits Him. And first, against Cajetan, we must firmly hold as certain that there is not any real perfection of God that is intrinsic to Him which befits Him freely; for that wholly clashes with the divine simplicity and immutability, as has been proved.

Second, this free will of God is not a pure relation and respect of reason to the things willed; for when God is said to will to produce creatures, in this way of speaking not only a respect of reason is signified, but also a vital operation, or the very essence of God after the manner of a vital operation; and accordingly something intrinsic to God is denoted: for no one is said to will by a mere respect of reason.

Third, this free will is not the bare divine essence; for this essence is present to God necessarily, so that it cannot fail to be present; wherefore, if that alone made God one-who-wills to produce creatures, He could not fail to will to produce them; for a form which is necessarily present also necessarily brings forth its effect.

Therefore the will of God, signified by us after the manner of vital acts and elicited affections, although in truth it is the very substance of God, nevertheless includes also a certain respect of reason to future things, which befits God freely, just as the things that are to be freely are future. For since this relation arises from non-necessary foundations, namely from the things themselves and future objects, the very respect likewise befits God freely, not intrinsically, but only by an extrinsic denomination which can befit God and fail to befit Him; nor is that absurd.

Therefore, since the free willing of God includes not only the essence, but also such a respect, if the free will can be present to God and absent from Him, nothing follows that is absurd or that clashes with the divine simplicity and immutability.

1341. Disputatio 102.

In the same way we spoke of prescience in the philosopher's sense in Disputation 68, chapters 3 and 6,[1342] namely that it is the very substance of God, which otherwise is the knowledge of possible creatures, with the addition of a respect of reason alone to future things, of which it is called prescience; so that, if the future things were not, prescience indeed would be lacking to God, but not knowledge. Therefore, if the future things were not, there would not be in God the free will which is signified with that free respect; yet there would be the will of complacency, namely the very divine essence with the necessary respect to possible things, as we said of the knowledge of possible things. This opinion is handed on by Ferrarensis, chapter 75.[1343]

Nor indeed did St. Gregory teach the contrary in 1 d. 47 q. unica after the seventh conclusion, when he said that neither the divine willing by which He wills to do this or that, nor the habitude to those things which He wills to do, is contingent or free, but necessary. For he understands the very essence of God, which is His willing, and the habitude which He has to the things possible in themselves; both of which are necessary, not free. He adds immediately: nevertheless, that willing itself by which He wills to do this or that is contingent willing, or the volition of doing those things; and the habitude is a contingent habitude to those things. The same he teaches concerning prescience: namely, he says that the very essence of God in itself, which is His knowing, is necessary, and that the habitude to things as such is necessary, as we were now saying of God's knowledge; but inasmuch as it is called knowledge of future things with a habitude to those, as future, it is altogether free, because it is referred to those things freely; and by this free relation the knowledge of those things is called free. Neither did Aureolus teach the contrary in 1 d. 47 q. 1 art. 1, whom St. Gregory a little above cited and attempted to refute. For he relates his very words: God produces whatever He produces without being determined by some intrinsic willing to produce what He produces; nevertheless He is said to produce voluntarily, and to produce what He produces, because He wills to produce; for He has it in His power to produce and not to produce. Just as, for example, if fire had in its power and dominion to ignite or not to ignite the straw present, while it ignited it would be said to ignite voluntarily; if one asked why it ignited, the answer would be: because it wills; for "to will" would not express some determinate act, but only the plenitude of power.[1344] Which words, in my judgment, ought neither to be rebuked nor marked as blameworthy; for although God is said to will freely to produce, nevertheless He is not thereby determined in Himself to producing rather than to not producing through some intrinsic act, as to this rather than that act we are more determined by eliciting an intrinsic act, than by another; the divine will, which is His essence, remains intrinsically unchanged in itself, and in itself is in the same mode as if from eternity He had decreed to do nothing. Therefore Aureolus rightly said that God is not determined to producing rather than not producing by some intrinsic willing, that is, by something peculiar which is intrinsic to Himself, as Cajetan falsely supposed; for that which is intrinsically in God does not of itself incline Him more to producing than to not producing. Therefore He is not said to produce freely what He produces because He is freely determined by

1342. Disputatio 68, cap. 3 et 6.
1343. Ferrarensis, cap. 75.
1344. Aureolus, in I Sent., d. 47, q. 1, art. 1.

something peculiar intrinsic to Himself to one part rather than to another, having in Himself intrinsically this rather than that; but He therefore produces freely whatever He produces, because nothing of the things which He does is referred to Himself necessarily.

But in what way God determines Himself to this rather than to that is unspeakable, unless that, in our mode of understanding, we understand the essence of God, which is His will, to have, with respect to future things, a special ratio of will with that respect of reason; and therefore at the beginning of this disputation I said that in this controversy a certain mode of reasoning allows us to understand what is not, for this, in my judgment, we have evidently proved against Cajetan; but what is, and in what way the will is determined, cannot be explained.

We have then, from all that has been said, that the free will of God, by which He wills to communicate Himself outwardly, insofar as it is free, is not some perfection in God; for as such it includes a respect of reason to future creatures. Nor indeed did St. Thomas ever teach that there is some perfection of God to will to communicate Himself to others, as Ferrarensis rightly warns in that same chapter 75;[1345] for he only said that it befits the good, insofar as it is perfect, to do this - that is, to be the proper act of the good and the perfect - to impart its goodness to others; and thus the good, considered not only in itself but as communicating itself to others. Which words, in my judgment, should not be reproved or noted; for although God is said to will freely to produce, nevertheless He is not thereby determined in Himself to producing rather than to not producing.

But someone will object in this way - a very difficult objection. Although the knowledge of God has the ratio of prescience from a relation of reason that comes from future things, from whose variation prescience is defined, nevertheless the free will of God cannot have the ratio of freedom from that relation which comes from the things themselves as future: for the difference is manifest. For prescience, as such, supposes the future thing as its object about which it must be concerned, as was proved in Disputation 68, chapter 6,[1346] because prescience is not the cause of the future, but rather the future thing is in a certain way the cause of it, as is explained there. But free will, already as free, is the cause of the future thing: therefore this rather than that will be, because God has freely decreed that this, and not that, shall be; therefore by the relation coming from future things the will is not called free, for that relation is posterior to the very future things.

Some reply that a free will in God, as free, is first understood before the thing is future, yet not without an order to the future thing as to something posterior and consequent to it. But they grant that the divine essence of itself has more to do with referring the volition of this rather than of that, and they think that from itself it rather refers to this object than to that.

However, this view either falls into the opinion of Cajetan which has been refuted, or it altogether involves a contradiction in itself. For if, of itself, the essence, without any respect of reason or from outside to future things, has more to do with the free volition of this rather than that, it follows that there is in God something which could from eternity not have been, which is absurd. But if it is not without an order to future things, that cannot be real, for the same

1345. Ferrarensis, cap. 75.
1346. Disputatio 68, cap. 6.

inconvenience would follow - namely, that from eternity it could have been that there was not in God the order which there is now: therefore there must be an order of reason, whose foundation is eternal. For just as from eternity a free will can be said, so also from eternity there must be at least the future foundation from which it can be called such. For from the essence alone it would not be said "this rather than that"; for the same thing, insofar as it is the same, must always be related in the same way. From creatures, indeed, it would not be said more a volition of this than of that, unless there were in this creature rather than in that a peculiar ratio; but this cannot be unless one creature is future and the other is not. Therefore the foundation of that relation, from which the will of God is called free, is the future creature.

Moreover, the adversaries admit that a free will is not understood without an order to future things; but what they add - that it is prior to its terminus as to something posterior - contains a manifest contradiction: for a relation cannot be prior to its terminus: therefore the future thing ought at least to be simultaneous with the very volition of God. But that the thing is future before that relation is otherwise proved; because, since it is a relation of reason and its foundation is not the essence of God alone, but the thing itself which is future, whence the denomination is taken, it is clear that the thing is future before that relation.

This knot, in my judgment, is insoluble; for we can scarcely avoid some circle in assigning a reason: because on that account we must not fall into the absurdity of Cajetan, or concede that there is in God some perfection or some absolute act, or something added to the very Godhead itself, which from eternity could be present or not present in God. But that there is not, and no most certain reason can be investigated for it, even if this cannot be easily expressed by word, is difficult to explain.

Nevertheless, he who sees God will feel very differently concerning His free will, insofar as it is the free principle of future things, and, seeing Him as He is, will express it in a single word without these relations of reason. Yet we, to whom it is not permitted to speak otherwise of God than after the manner of the things created, which we see and experience, say that He wills freely, and name Him as it were the free cause, by a certain confused concept. And since in reality the divine essence considered in itself is prior in nature and causality, without the elicited free act which can be present and be absent, than the manner of a free act and decree, nevertheless for this state we understand God as the cause of future things, as if with us He had by some act freely decreed this; because the very essence of God in itself does not have a necessary connection with creatures so that they should be, but is freely compared with them: not because there is in God a free act which can not be in God, but because the act which is necessary in God is freely compared with creatures.

In this manner, although we assign liberty in God by a comparison made with objects and created things, nevertheless we do not assign a sufficient rationale on the part of God why now He should, by an efficacious free act, be referred to these rather than to those things: since, remaining altogether the same in Himself, He could not to will the very things which He wills. Wherefore, although we strive to untie the matter more actually, we cannot escape the aforementioned difficulty.

Yet it remains certain, as I noted in the preceding Disputation, chapter 2,[1347] namely, that we cannot attribute various denominations to the divine will except by a respect to things holding themselves in diverse ways. But with things always, without any variation, it must, in our way of speaking, be compared in the same mode.

Articulus IV - Whether the will of God is the cause of things

To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Pseudo-Dionysius says in the chapter on the Divine Names.[1348]

Objicitur 1. It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Pseudo-Dionysius says that just as our sun, not reasoning or choosing beforehand, but by its very being, illumines all things to participate in the power of its light, so too the divine good, by its very essence, sends forth the rays of the divine goodness to all existing things.[1349] But whatever acts by will, acts by reasoning and by choosing beforehand. Therefore God does not act by will. Therefore the will of God is not the cause of things.

Objicitur 2. Further, that which is by essence is first in any order. Thus, in the order of things ignited, that is first which is fire by essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He is an agent by His essence, which is His nature. He therefore acts by nature and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.

Objicitur 3. Further, whatever is the cause of something by this, that it is such-and-such, is a cause by nature and not by will. Fire, indeed, is the cause of heating because it is hot; but the artisan is the cause of the house because he wills to make it. But St. Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine, that because God is good, we exist.[1350] Therefore God by His nature is the cause of things and not by will.

Objicitur 4. Further, of one thing there is one cause. But of created things there is one cause, namely the knowledge of God, as was said above.[1351] Therefore the will of God should not be posited as the cause of things.

But on the contrary: it is said in Wisdom 11, "How could anything persist unless you willed it?"

I answer that it is necessary to say that the will of God is the cause of things, and that God acts by will, not by the necessity of nature, as some have thought. This can appear in a threefold way.

First, from the very order of efficient causes. Since both intellect and nature act for the sake of an end, as is proved in the Physics,[1352] it is necessary that what acts by intellect and will be prior to what acts by nature. For, since in the order of agents the first is God, it is necessary that He act by intellect and will, and that the agent by nature be posterior.

1347. Disputatio praecedens, cap. 2.
1348. Dionysius, cap. de Divinis Nominibus.
1349. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, cap. 4.
1350. St. Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, lib. 1, cap. 32.
1351. Above, on the knowledge of God as the cause of things; cf. q. 14, a. 8.
1352. Aristotle, Physics II.

Second, from the notion of a natural agent, to which it belongs that one effect be produced, because nature operates in one and the same way unless it be impeded. And this is because a thing acts according as it is such; hence, so long as it is such, it produces only such. For every agent by nature has a determinate being. Therefore, since the divine being is not determinate, but contains in itself the whole perfection of being, it cannot be that He act by the necessity of nature unless perhaps He were to cause something indeterminate and infinite in being, which is impossible, as is clear from what has been said above.[1353] Therefore He does not act by the necessity of nature; rather, determinate effects proceed from His infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and of His intellect.

Third, from the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from an efficient cause according to the way in which they preexist in the cause, because every agent produces something like itself. But effects preexist in their cause according to the mode of the cause. Hence, since the divine being is His very understanding, His effects preexist in Him in an intelligible mode, and in an intelligible mode they proceed from Him, and thus consequently in the mode of will. For His inclination toward doing what has been conceived in the intellect pertains to will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things.

Reply to the first: By those words Dionysius does not intend to exclude election from God simply, but only in a certain respect - namely, inasmuch as He communicates His goodness not to some only but to all; for election imports a certain discrimination.[1349]

Reply to the second: Because the essence of God is His understanding and willing, from the very fact that He acts by His essence, it follows that He acts in the mode of intellect and will.

Reply to the third: The good is the object of will. In this sense, therefore, it is said "because God is good, we exist," inasmuch as His goodness is for Him the reason of willing all other things, as was said above most especially.[1354]

Reply to the fourth: Of one and the same effect, even in us, knowledge is a cause as directing, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will is a cause as commanding; because a form as it is in the intellect alone is not determined to the fact that it be or not be in the effect unless by will. Hence the speculative intellect says nothing about operating. But power is a cause as executing, because it names the proximate principle of operation. Yet all these in God are one.

Conclusion of the article: Since God acts by will and not by the necessity of nature, the will of God is the cause of things. Certain lighter points, worthy of notation for the clearer exposition of the article, we shall examine in the following Disputation together with the doctrine itself.

1353. The impossibility of an infinite, indeterminate effect as caused by natural necessity has been treated above.
1349. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, cap. 4.
1354. See the preceding Disputation, cap. 2.

Disputatio LXXXI - On God's operating ad extra by will, and on whether will is a more proximate cause than intellect

Caput I - That God operates ad extra by will, not by nature, is certain by Catholic faith

We premise in the title of this question what among Catholics is undoubted - namely, that God operates ad extra not by nature but by will; that is, that the principle of external productions is not the very nature of the deity, insofar as it is, but insofar as He wills. For since the divine essence is considered by us in two ways, first insofar as it gives to God His being, which is altogether natural and necessary; then insofar as it is referred to external things in the mode of free will, we say that it is not the principle of operation insofar as it is the form giving the being of God, as is the form of natural agents, but insofar as He wills, as man and the rational creature operates. And this is the sense of St. Thomas in this article when he said that God acts by will, not by the necessity of nature, as Cajetan here affirms, and Ferrarensis in the second book Against the Gentiles, chapter 23.[1355] From which there follows another sense which the aforesaid words are able to yield - namely, that God acts freely, not necessarily. But the former is prior, which the holy Doctor wished to express. And this was also the position of Justin Martyr in the book On the Explanation of Questions proposed to Christians. For when the gentiles asked whether God operated by His essence, insofar as He is, or insofar as He wills, they answered that God operated by His essence insofar as He is - something which Justin gravely reproves and refutes by that Psalm, "Our God is in heaven; whatever He willed, He has done" (Ps. 113), and by Ephesians 1, "Who works all things according to the counsel of His will." Therefore Justin thinks that the doctrine expressed in Scripture is Catholic, namely, that God operates by will.[1356]

Ferrarensis attributes the contrary to the error of Averroes in the eighth book of the Physics from the Commentary down to that point; but in the book entitled Distinction of Distinctions, Disputation 3, doubts 1 and 2, he seems to teach that God acts by intellect and will together. Concerning Aristotle, indeed, the matter is not certain, whether this error was in him; yet he strongly inclines to it. For although in the book On the World to Alexander, toward the end, he calls God the author of salvation and liberty, there he concedes only this, that God is the remote cause of all things, inasmuch as He governs all things and conserves them by the motion of the first movable, whose care alone he thinks God has immediately. Moreover, since in On the Heavens I and in Physics VIII he holds that the world was eternal and could not have begun in time, he seems to have removed altogether from the midst the action of the first cause - or at least action by intellect and will - in such a way that either the whole universe, as to its perpetual parts, was from itself, or, if from God, it proceeded not by will but by the necessity of nature. For if Aristotle had thought that its being was by the will of God, he would readily have seen that it could have begun in time and was not necessarily from eternity.[1357]

1355. Cajetan (Thomas de Vio), commentary on this article; Ferrarensis, In Contra Gentiles II, cap. 23.

1356. Justin Martyr, Quaestiones et Responsiones ad Orthodoxos (ascribed), quaest. 3; Psalm 113:11 (Vulg. numbering 113:3), "Deus noster in caelo; omnia quaecumque voluit fecit"; Ephesians 1:11, "Qui operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae."

But to me it seems very probable, with Gregory of Rimini in II Sentences, distinction 1, question 1, article 1, that Aristotle plainly held that the celestial intelligences and elements and whatever he said to be from eternity were not made by God. For Aristotle held that from nothing, nothing is made, Physics I, text 33; wherefore, in text 62 he proves from this that a subject is necessary from which something is made, and therefore that matter is ungenerated.[1358]

St. Thomas proves the Catholic doctrine by three reasons, of which the first is most excellent; the second is that, if God acted ad extra insofar as He is, He would produce another God. But that is impossible; therefore it is impossible that He Himself act by the necessity of nature. Yet against that Cajetan objects that this absurdity is not rightly inferred, because the immediate effect of God could be produced through secondary causes, which He would employ as helpers; and thus it would not be necessary that another God be produced. Still, the same Cajetan replies that the absurdity does follow, because since God would act insofar as He is, He would act according to His whole power and would produce another God, just as within Himself He generates an equal Son; for He produces Him by a necessity of nature, not freely, and the Holy Spirit similarly. For although the principle of the Holy Spirit is will, nevertheless it is not the principle insofar as He wills; because the Father does not therefore spirate because He wills to spirate, as we shall show below, Disputation 160, chapter 3.[1359]

The third reason of St. Thomas is of this sort: effects proceed from a cause according to the way in which they are in the cause; but every creature is in God as in one who understands; therefore it proceeds from Him as He is understanding, and consequently as He is willing. For the explication of this reason Cajetan asserts various things which are not according to the mind of the author; omitting which, the exposition of Ferrarensis pleases me: thus he says, in the second book Against the Gentiles, chapter 23, that in the third reason of St. Thomas that proposition of St. Thomas is to be understood - "An effect proceeds from a cause according to the mode in which that thing, the effect, preexists in the cause" - and that, since the being of God is His very understanding, effects preexist in Him according to an intelligible mode, and proceed thence in an intelligible mode; but this reason, unless it be otherwise strengthened, is not sufficiently efficacious, unless it be elsewhere proved that creatures are in God as in an intelligent cause. For a thing can be in another as in one who understands, which nevertheless is not the cause of that thing as it is understanding: for man is in another as he is understood by that other; yet he is not in an intelligent cause. That creatures truly are in God as in an intelligent cause is established in Question 14.[1360] And truly, if this mode of operating - rationally, that is, by intellection - be noblest, it ought not to be denied to God. Therefore, that God operates by intellect and will, and similarly that His will is the cause of things, must be held.

Voluntas Dei esse propinquiorem causam rerum, quam intellectus. [Heading for the next chapter.]

1357. Averroes, Commentaria in Aristotelis Physicorum VIII; Aristotle, De Mundo ad Alexandrum, near the end; De Caelo I; Physics VIII.

1358. Gregory of Rimini, In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 1; Aristotle, Physics I, texts 33 and 62.

1359. On the procession of the Holy Spirit: see below, Disputatio 160, cap. 3.

1360. See above on divine knowledge as exemplar cause, Question 14.

Caput XXIII - In the third argument he proves that a subject is necessary from which something be made, and therefore that matter is unbegotten; read Gregory of Rimini.

Secondly, one might object further: just as the Sun acts by a necessity of nature and does not produce another sun, but things much inferior, so God would not produce another God. It is answered: nonetheless there is no parity; for the Sun's efficacy is limited by the matter on which it acts and by which it is individuated; but God, when He acts, does not receive from a subject the mode of His action, nor is His action bounded by any matter, but imparts being according to the total amplitude of His causality. Therefore, if He acted by a necessity of nature precisely as He is, He would produce what is equal to Himself - which is impossible. And although in God there is a natural procession, this is not an external production of another God, but the generation of the Son; nor, even though the Holy Spirit proceeds, is the Father the principle of that procession inasmuch as He is will simply, so that He should will to spirate because He wills to spirate; rather, He spirates as Father, as will be shown below in its own place.[1363]

Caput II - Whether the divine will operates more proximately than the intellect

Since, without controversy among the Doctors - as we said in the preceding chapter - God is the cause of things by will (*voluntas*); nevertheless the question is posed, whether the will of God operates the things themselves more proximately than the intellect (*intellectus*), or contrariwise; and in this matter various opinions of theologians are numbered.

First opinion. The first is that which Durandus reports in II Sentences, dist. 45, q. 2, of certain authors: who said that the knowledge of God is the proximate cause of things, but the will a more remote one. They prove this foundation thus: although an exemplar, which is the cause of that which is made, does not have a power of producing and does not reach the effect before the applying cause, yet an exemplar which is efficacious attains the effect more proximately than the applying cause: as that which imprints the form of a seal is the seal itself, which more nearly reaches its very form than the hand applying it; but the knowledge of God is an efficacious exemplar, as a seal imprinting upon things its form, not such as it has in itself, but such as it represents (in this sense we said above, in Disputation 72, that the knowledge of God is the ideas of creatures); therefore knowledge concurs more proximately than will, which is, as it were, the hand applying the seal.[1364]

This opinion does not please Durandus on this one point of causality, because its rationale, if it has any moment, proves too much, namely, that the knowledge of God is a cause more proximate than omnipotence, whereas omnipotence is the most proximate cause of all, as he had taught in the First Book, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 4, ad 4.[1365] But this reason would not disapprove the opinion except on this score, that besides intellect and will in God another power is posited in vain, as an executive one - as there is in us - that would be called omnipotence. We shall show more fully in Disputation

1363. On the procession of the Holy Spirit as not reducible to the will simply as such, see below, Disputatio 160, cap. 3.
1364. See above, Disputatio 72, on divine knowledge as exemplar cause and the ideas of creatures.
1365. St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4.

102 that this is not to be set up in God. I do not say only a distinction from the nature of the thing from intellect and will (for I would never concede that distinction in God, unless among the persons), but neither a distinction merely of reason and of our mode of understanding. Nor does St. Thomas in that solution 4 concede that there is to be constituted in God a notion of omnipotence distinct from intellect and will, as we shall say in its proper place.

Nevertheless the aforesaid opinion is not approved by me, because the knowledge of God does not stand as a seal imprinting its figure, but as proposing an object to the will so that it should bring it about; therefore neither does the will stand as the hand applying the seal; for in God the intellect does not operate like a seal imprinting a figure; and there is also a manifest difference, for the seal is of itself the cause of the impressed figure, but the hand applying it is a cause per accidens, as it were accidental, as the hand applying fire to combustible material. Whence, if the seal were applied of itself, in the same manner it would imprint the figure; but the will is certainly not a per accidens cause of the work, and a mere applier, as in a created artificer; therefore the foregoing comparison is alleged in vain.

Second opinion. The second opinion is that the knowledge of God is the more proximate cause in the notion of directing, though not in the notion of moving, as others say: in regard of specification, not in regard of execution. But this mode of comparison is inept; for the intellect in the notion of directing and in regard of specification or object is first and alone, nor can any comparison be made with will in this kind, while, on the contrary, in the notion of moving, and in regard of execution, will alone is the principle. Therefore also, when we inquire here what is the more proximate cause, we understand this in the production of the very thing, in which, since the intellect alone is that which directs, and the will that which moves, that will be the more proximate cause which moves.

Third opinion. The opinion of Durandus in the places cited pleases me, who absolutely says that the proximate cause of the work is the will of God, but the intellect a remote one. And we ought, in the philosophical manner, to think thus concerning the divine intellect and will, just as concerning the intellect and will of a created artificer for the making of a work of art: now, if it is true that such is the order to the execution of the work that first the intellect propose the work and the mode of making it, then the will will that it be done in that mode, and at length execution follow at the nod of the will, with no intervening act of the intellect between the choice of the will and the executing faculty; it follows that in a created artificer the will concurs more proximately to the work than the intellect, although the executing faculty is the most proximate of all. So therefore in God, in our mode of understanding, these things must be assigned: wherefore, if in God there is distinguished the executive power from intellect and will, that will be the proximate cause; but the will will still be more proximate than the intellect.

But if, after the choice of the will, there is an act of the intellect by way of command transferring the impulse of the will to the executive faculties - as the Thomists contend - then the intellect will be a more proximate cause than the will, not indeed inasmuch as it judges something ought to be done, but inasmuch as by command it directs the impulse of the will to the executing faculty, as is manifest; and in this sense Cajetan seems to think, above on q. 14, art. 16, as we noted there, when

he asserts that the act of practical science proceeds from an affection for the work, which it supposes. But whether such acts of command in the intellect after the election of the will are necessary in us, let it be asked in Disputation 87; even if they were necessary in us, they would be posited in God in vain. It remains, therefore, that the divine will be a cause more proximate of the work than the intellect; and because in God an executive faculty distinct from intellect and will is not to be posited, as we shall demonstrate below in Disputation 102, it follows that the will is the proximate cause of all.

Articulus V - Whether it belongs to assign some cause of the divine will

To the fifth we proceed thus.

1. It seems that even of the divine will there is to be assigned some cause. For Augustine says in the book On 83 Questions: Who would dare to say that God made all things irrationally? But for a voluntary agent, that which is the reason of operating is also the cause of willing. Therefore the will of God has some cause.[1366]
2. Further, in those things which are done by one willing, who wills something on account of no cause, no other cause ought to be assigned than the will of the one willing. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been shown. If, therefore, there is no cause of His will, it will not be necessary in all natural things to seek any other cause except the divine will alone. And thus all the sciences would be superfluous, which strive to assign the causes of certain effects: which seems inconvenient.
3. Also, what is done by one willing not on account of some cause depends on his simple will. If, therefore, the will of God have no other cause, it follows that all things that come to be depend on His simple will, and have no other cause: which is inconvenient.

But on the contrary is what Augustine says in the book On 83 Questions: Every efficient cause is greater than that which it effects; but nothing is greater than the will of God. Therefore a cause of it is not to be sought.[1367]

I answer that it must be said that in no way does the will of God have a cause. For evidence of which it must be considered that, since will follows upon intellect, in the same way it happens that there be a cause of someone willing that he should will, and of someone understanding that he should understand. Now in the intellect it is thus: if it understand the principle by itself, and the conclusion by itself, the understanding of the principle is the cause of the science of the conclusion. But if the intellect, in the very principle, were to inspect the conclusion, apprehending both by one intuition, in it the science of the conclusion would not be caused by the intellect of the principles; because the same is not the cause of itself; yet still it would understand that the principles are causes of the conclusions. Similarly it is on the part of will, with respect to which the end stands to the things that are for the end as in the intellect the principles to the conclusions. Whence, if

1366. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 27.
1367. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 27.

someone by one act should will the end, and by another the things that are for the end, to will the end will be for him a cause of willing the things that are for the end; but if by one act he should will the end and the things that are for the end, this cannot be so; because the same is not the cause of itself. And yet it will be true to say that he wills to order the things that are for the end to the end.

But God, just as by one act He understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things by His goodness. Whence, just as in God to understand the cause is not the cause of understanding the effects, but He Himself understands the effects in the cause, so to will the end is not for Him the cause of willing the things that are for the end; yet He wills that the things that are for the end be ordered to the end. Therefore He wills this to be for the sake of that, but not on account of that does He will this.

Reply to the first. The will of God is rational, not because something is to God a cause of willing, but inasmuch as He wills one thing to be for the sake of another.

Reply to the second. Because God wills effects to be so, that they proceed from determinate causes, for this that they may enjoy order among things; it is not superfluous, even with the will of God posited, to seek other causes. It would, however, be superfluous if other causes were sought as first causes and not dependent on the divine will. And thus Augustine speaks in the third book On the Trinity: The vanity of the philosophers was pleased also to attribute other causes to contingent effects, since by no means could they see the cause superior to all the rest, that is, the will of God. [1368]

Reply to the third. Although God wills effects to be on account of causes, yet any effects whatsoever which presuppose some other effect do not depend on the sole will of God, but also on something else; but the first effects depend on the divine will alone. For instance, if we say that God willed man to have hands so as to serve the intellect for performing diverse works, and He also willed him to have an intellect so that man might be what He willed man to be; or again, that He willed man to exist so that he might enjoy Himself, or for the perfection of the universe - these are not reduced to other created ends, but depend upon the divine will alone; whereas subsequent effects are reduced to their created ends according to the order which the same divine will established.

Disputatio LXXXII - Whether any cause, or at least a final reason, can be assigned for the divine will

Caput I - Two opinions of the theologians

The Scholastics with one voice confess that no real cause of the divine will can be assigned, not only no efficient, material, or formal cause (for that is sufficiently made clear), but not even a final cause; which St. Thomas expressly noted in this article. They mean hereby not only that among external, created objects there is no final cause according to the thing itself, but neither can His

1368. St. Augustine, De Trinitate III.

own goodness be the real final cause moving His will from without. The Doctors have proved this well enough by the following consideration: whatever is a real final cause of an act of willing really moves the will toward that which is willed; around the means the end, as willed by a distinct act, is the cause of willing the means, since the will of the end really moves to will the means, and so the end itself, properly and really, would be said to move. But in God there is no such real motion toward an end as if by desire something extrinsic drew Him; rather, His own goodness, understood and loved by one and the same most simple act, is that for the sake of which He wills the order of things, while nothing outside Himself really moves His will. Therefore there is no real final cause of the divine will among things, nor even His own goodness as another really distinct end beyond His very act and essence; rather, as we shall explain, the ratio of end is found according to our manner of conceiving, not as a distinct cause that would move God.

Conclusion of the article is that no final cause of the divine will can be assigned; but the explication thereof, and the doctrine of the whole article, we shall gather in the following Disputation.

the responses to the objections But God, just as by one simple act of the will he wills all things by his goodness, so also, as by one act he understands all things in his essence. Hence, just as in God understanding the cause is not the cause of understanding the effects, but he himself understands the effects in the cause; so willing the end is not the cause of willing the things that are to the end. Yet he does will that the things which are to the end be ordered to the end. Therefore he wills this to be on account of that; but not on account of that does he will this.

Reply to the first: The will of God is rational, not because something is a cause for God's willing, but inasmuch as he wills one thing to be on account of another.

Reply to the second: Since God wills effects to be such that they proceed from determinate causes, in order that order be preserved in things, it is not superfluous, even together with the will of God, to seek other causes. Yet it would be superfluous if other causes were sought as first causes and not dependent on the divine will. And thus speaks St. Augustine in De Trinitate III, chapter 2: "It pleased the vanity of the philosophers to attribute even contingent effects to other causes, when they were altogether unable to see the cause superior to all the rest, that is, the will of God."[1369]

Reply to the third: Since God wills effects to exist on account of causes, any effects which presuppose some other effect do not depend on the will of God alone, but on something else. But first effects depend on the divine will alone; as, for example, if we say that God willed man to have hands so that, by performing diverse works, they might serve the intellect; and he willed him to have an intellect for this, that he might be a man; and he willed him to be a man so that he might enjoy him, or for the completeness of the universe. Which indeed is not to reduce them to other created ends.

1369. St. Augustine, De Trinitate III, c. 2.

Whether some cause, or at least a final reason, can be assigned of the divine will

Two opinions of the theologians

All the Scholastics with one voice confess that no real cause of the divine will can be assigned - not an efficient, nor a material, nor a formal cause (for that is quite established), nor yet a final cause; which St. Thomas openly noted in this article. By this they understand not only that among created objects there is no final cause according to the thing itself, but also that even the divine goodness itself cannot be a final cause according to the thing.

Now the holy Doctor proves this by the following reason. Then something is a real final cause of willing the means when, by a diverse act of willing, the will deals with that end and with the means: for in such a case the end, as willed, is a cause of willing the means, because the will is really moved by the end to the will of the means; and hence the end itself is said metaphorically, in its own way, to move, because by its desire it moves to the desire of the means. But whenever, by the same will, someone desires both the end and the means, there cannot be a real causality of the end with respect to the desire of the means, because the same will is not a real cause of itself. Thus also first principles are then only said really to move to the knowledge of conclusions when one cognition is of the principles and another of the conclusions; but if by the same cognition both are known together, the principles are not said to be a real cause of knowing the conclusion. But God, by the same act of will, wills his goodness as end and creatures as means; therefore neither his goodness nor anything else can be a real cause of his willing.

In this reasoning St. Thomas supposes that the end moves only after the mode of an end to the desire of the means, and that this is its proper causality; which is most true, as will be expressly proved below in II - II, q. 12, a. 2. But if someone contends that the end also moves to desire and love by some causality, nevertheless it is proved no less that there is no real final cause of the will of God. First, it cannot be his goodness, because the good is distinguished from love and from the act of the will concerning that same good; which distinction was necessary if it were to be a real cause; for the same thing cannot be a real cause of itself. Then neither can any creature be [a final cause], because nothing moves the will of God for the sake of itself, but is compared to it as a means; for God is said to love all created things by reason of his own goodness; therefore there is no final cause, according to the thing, of the divine will. Hence St. Thomas gathers that God wills this to be on account of that, yet he does not will this on account of that - propositions that are most true and will be explained below.

There is, however, disagreement among the Doctors whether at least, in our manner of understanding, a reason of willing after the mode of an end can be assigned, on account of which God is said to will something, and to will one thing because he wills another; and not only to will one thing to be on account of another. And the authors are divided into three opinions, two of which I shall recount in this chapter, while the third, which is more probable, in the following.

The first is that of Cajetan in this article, who, to unravel this difficulty and set forth the mind of St. Thomas, distinguishes four propositions. The first is, "This is on account of that." The second, "God wills this to be on account of that." The third, "This is willed by God because that is willed." The fourth, "God wills this because he wills that." He says that the first and second proposition are to be conceded, and, as will become clear below, both are without any controversy. He asserts that the third must also be conceded according to the mind of St. Thomas; but that the fourth is to be altogether denied. From which he infers that there is indeed a reason of the divine will taken passively, yet not actively, that is, that there is a reason among the created objects on account of which it is true to say that something is willed, but not a reason on account of which it is said that God wills something. None of this is proved by Cajetan, nor do I see how what he taught in the end can be defended: for if the third proposition is conceded and a reason of the divine will is assigned passively, then the fourth will also be conceded and a reason of the divine will will be assigned actively. For it is altogether the same to say that a thing is willed by God on account of another, and that God wills some thing on account of another: just as it is the same to say that a thing is understood by me on account of another, and that I understand that on account of another; for the passive voice renders altogether the same sense as the active.

The second opinion is that there is indeed a reason of the will of God, not only his own divine goodness, but also among created objects one [created thing] is a cause of willing another; and thus the Doctors of this position concede that God wills one created object on account of another, and not only wills one to be on account of another. Durandus seems to have taught this; likewise Antonius Cordubensis; and many recent Thomists follow them, thinking this to be the sentence of St. Thomas in Contra gentiles I, chapter 86, where he expressly proves by three reasons that a reason of the divine will is given, although not a cause; and in chapter 87 he begins by saying: "Although indeed some reason of the divine will can be, yet it does not follow that there is any cause of his will"; and not only does he teach in that chapter 86 that the reason of the divine will is his own goodness, but he also assigns a reason among created objects, saying that the good of the universe is the reason on account of which God wills the singular created good; and he also assigns some created reason of the divine will...[13701371]

Caput II - The truer opinion: that for God nothing other than his own goodness is the reason of willing

I hold not only that the third opinion is truer, but I also seem clearly to gather it from St. Thomas; which is this: God indeed wills one created thing to be on account of another, yet he does not will one [created thing] on account of another, but he wills all created things on account of his own goodness; wherefore among created objects there is no reason for God to will another, but only his own goodness is the reason, after the mode of an end, for willing the rest. Alexander handed down this opinion: "The will of God has no reason, if reason is understood to be some end

1370. Durandus, In I Sent., d. 41, q. 2, a. 5; Antonius de Corduba, 9.56, opinione s., p. 2, ad 2, dub.; and many recent Thomists.

1371. St. Thomas, Summa contra gentiles I, c. 86 - 87.

outside," where he concedes a finis, that is, a reason, within God, namely his own goodness, yet not outside; which must be understood of end, not according to the true notion of cause, but insofar as it is conceived as a reason of willing, after the mode of an end; and in this sense he denied there, not only that a cause is given, but even a reason, if "reason" is understood as some end outside.[1372] The same was taught by Henry,[1373] Gabriel,[1374] Driedo,[1375] and Ferrarensis inclines the same way.[1376]

Moreover, this is not obscurely proved from St. Thomas. First, because above, in I, q. 19, a. 3, ad 1, and a. 2, ad 2, he says that the will of God is moved only by his own goodness: certainly he does not understand it as by a final cause which is truly a cause, for this kind of cause the holy Doctor denied universally in this article; therefore he understands that it is moved by no other than by his own goodness as by a reason of willing; for if the will of God could have some other reason of willing than his own goodness, it would be said to be moved by something other than it. Then, after he taught in Contra gentiles, chapters 86 and 87, that among created objects there is some reason of the divine will, when in the present article he says that his goodness is to him the cause of willing other things, from this sentence I argue thus: Either St. Thomas is speaking about a final cause, in which case he is asking whether it itself is a cause and not only a reason after the mode of an end, in our way of understanding; and in this way, just as no created object is a final cause to God, so neither can his own goodness be; because, as he says in this article, since by the same act he wills his own goodness and all created things which are compared to it as means, the goodness of God cannot be a true final cause of willing created objects; and therefore in this article he taught universally that there cannot be to God any final cause according to the thing, although God wills one created thing to be for the sake of another. Or St. Thomas speaks in those two chapters about a cause only in our way of understanding, which is called a reason; and in this way there follows what we contend, namely, that to God there is no cause of willing other than his own goodness, yet that he also cannot speak otherwise: therefore the aforesaid opinion is clearly deduced from the same chapters from which the adversaries tried to confirm their contention.

Thus, then, we ought to speak: "God wills all other things on account of his goodness," that is, because he wills his own goodness; in which is noted not a cause but the final reason of willing. Yet it is not lawful to say, "Among created objects God willed this on account of that," that is, "he willed this because he willed that"; for the latter is not rightly said to be a reason of willing another: whereas it is rightly said, "Among created objects God willed one to be on account of another." But when St. Thomas in this article, I, q. 19, a. 2, after the third conclusion, denies that God wills this for the sake of that, in which denial he seems also to include even the divine goodness, so that things are not said to be willed for the sake of it, he speaks about a cause of willing according to the thing; and in this sense he uses the particle "for the sake of" (propter). But when, conversely, in chapters 86 and 87 Contra gentiles he openly proves that the will of God is not without a reason, and he assigns a reason among created objects, he does not speak of a reason of willing, nor does

1372. Alexander of Hales, Summa I, q. 28, m. 3, a. 3; q. 35, m. 3.
1373. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IV, q. 19, lit. O.
1374. Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, post tertiam conclusionem.
1375. John Driedo, De concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis, cap. 4, ad 4.
1376. Sylvester Ferrariensis, on Contra gentiles, cap. 86 - 87.

he anywhere admit among created objects some one reason for God to will another; rather, he speaks of the reason on account of which one object is said to be for the sake of another; whence he gathers that God does not will created things inordinately and confusedly, but with the due order by which he wills one thing to be for the sake of others, although he does not will one thing on account of another.

By reason this preceding opinion is confirmed and explained; for one must philosophize about the divine will along the lines of the human, namely, that what for the human will is a reason...

... is the reason of willing (*ratio volendi*), so also in the divine [will], in our way of understanding, it must be constituted; for otherwise, without any foundation, we would be philosophizing in another fashion. But only the end (*finis*), and that which is appetible for its own sake, namely the morally good or the pleasant, is for the human will a reason of willing; whereas the useful, and that which has only the notion of means (*medium*), inasmuch as it is a means and useful, is not a reason of willing.

Therefore, in God likewise one must philosophize that only the end is the reason of willing. Moreover, that only the end is the reason of willing is manifest: for the end is that for the sake of which the other things are desired, but a means and the useful, precisely as a means and useful, is not a reason of willing. It is clear, because if it were, especially in comparison with subsequent means, it would not be a reason of willing other means inasmuch as it is a means. First, because as a means it is only useful; but as useful, it is appetible only on account of the higher end which it regards, as a road to it. Then too, because if a means were that for the sake of which something is sought, it would be the honorable or the pleasant; for every end under this aspect is either a morally good or a pleasant good: the useful does not have the goodness of an end, as is clear from the doctrine of the holy Doctor in I, q. 6, a. 6.[1377] And to these add, that the useful, as useful, would not only regard the end, but also the subsequent means, moving the desire towards them, which is absurd. It is therefore established that in us the reason of willing is only the morally good or the pleasant, which truly has the notion of end and of what is appetible for its own sake. Moreover, that no means has the notion of an end with respect to another means must be proved more at length from Aristotle's doctrine in I - II, q. 1, a. 4.[1378] But God's goodness alone is compared to Him under the mode of end, and is appetible for its own sake, whereas all other created things are compared under the mode of means; therefore among those, one is not for God the reason of willing another.

Now when we say that every creature is compared with God as a means and not as an end, it is not to be understood as though a creature were truly a means for God to acquire some end; but because the will whereby God loves creatures presupposes, in the order of reason, God's own will concerning Himself: for He would love no creature unless first, in the order of reason, He loved Himself; and thus creatures please God inasmuch as they are, in a certain way, something of His by participation. This indeed does not prevent God from loving rational creatures with the love of friendship and, in a certain way, for their own sakes, as we shall say in disputation 84, cap. 2; yet it

1377. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 6, a. 6.
1378. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I - II, q. 1, a. 4.

does prevent saying that He loves one creature for the sake of another as for the reason of loving; rather, He loves all things for His own goodness, which is the object primarily willed by God in every act. Wherefore, if one must speak properly, it is not to be said that God wills something created for the sake of another created thing, that is, because He wills another created thing; but that God wills all things for His goodness, that is, because He wills His goodness; and, finally, that He wills one created thing to be for the sake of another. For we too, when we ordinate will the means which in a certain series conduce to the end, are not properly said to will one thing for the sake of another, for example walking for the sake of "attenuation" [slimming]; but we are said to will both for the sake of health; nevertheless, to do one thing for the sake of another, or to will one to be for the sake of another, that is, to serve the acquisition of the latter.

By the way, this doctrine about the end which we have here premised, namely that a single means, inasmuch as it is a means and useful, cannot be an end and that for the sake of which, and thus that there is no intermediate end, but that every end, inasmuch as it is an end, is ultimate in its order, we shall prove expressly in I - II, q. 1, a. 4.[1378]

Assignanda esse instantia prioris, et posterioris in decreto Dei.

Caput III - That instances of the prior and the posterior must be assigned in God's decree

Since God by His singular providence is said to will to dispose and to order all these inferior things, for the reason that He has decreed that one thing be or act for the sake of another, we are accustomed, in our way of understanding, to assign certain instances of the prior and the posterior, by which we posit that God wills or decrees one thing before another; although in reality He at once, by one act, sees and determines all things; or because men, who proceed in an ordered way by discursive deliberation and consultation, are said to determine earlier one thing than another, and in like manner we philosophize about God by the likeness of these. Or else because, even if all are at once in time, nevertheless men sometimes set things in order for themselves, and with that order one thing is said to come first into consultation as the cause, before another.

All the Scholastics, especially the more recent, receive this ordering of the prior and the posterior in our way of understanding, without controversy. I except Gabriel, in III, dist. 2, quaest. unica, art. 3, dub. 3, to Scotus's third argument, who denied these instances and the order of the prior and the posterior in the divine decree, and for that reason said that all things were determined at once; whence, from such an order of the divine decree it does not stand, whether, if Adam had not sinned, Christ would have come, and other things of this sort which are wont to be disputed under a condition cannot be known. Gabriel is followed by Ockham, in I, d. 9, q. 3, who denies these instances in God, although he himself seems to speak only of those which are wont to be assigned, in our way of understanding, concerning the divine processions.[137913801381]

1378. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I - II, q. 1, a. 4.
1379. Scotus, In III Sent., d. 7, q. 3; d. 19, q. 1.
1380. Gabriel (Biel), In III Sent., d. 2, quaest. unica, art. 3, dub. 3, ad tertiam rationem Scoti.
1381. William of Ockham, In I Sent., d. 9, q. 3.

Moreover, the Fathers have used this common Scholastic phrase, assigning in the divine prescience and predefinition one thing before another, which is to be understood not by duration but by order and a certain habitude of reason. Thus St. Augustine, in many places, especially however in the first book to Simplicianus, q. 2: explaining that word to the Romans (9): "That the purpose of God according to election might stand," he says: "Election does not precede justification, but justification precedes election"; which cannot be understood of the precedence of duration, since in duration election, which is eternal, is prior to justification, which is temporal; Augustine is speaking of election in the divine prescience, as we shall show in disputation 89, cap. 6. And so, according to his view, justification is in the divine prescience before election by an order not of duration, but of reason, and as it were of causality.[1382] Next, we shall report this mode of speaking, "God willed this from that," and, "God chose some to the kingdom of heaven from merits," from Augustine below in disputation 89, cap. 9.

But most clearly the same order of the prior and the posterior has been expressed by Prosper in the Epistle to Augustine which is placed before the books On the Predestination of the Saints, at the end, where, asking Augustine to explain how God's purpose of justifying could arise from the foreknowledge of merits, he says the contrary rather: that the foreknowledge of merits arises from the purpose of justifying. He asks whether one may say uniformly that prescience is from the purpose, although it cannot be distinguished by a temporal distinction; yet he acknowledges that one thing in order supposes another, namely that for this reason God foreknows good merits, because He had the purpose of bestowing them. When he says that the foreknowledge of merits cannot be distinguished from the purpose by a temporal distinction, he understands that no precedence of duration intervenes between them - this is a temporal distinction; for those things which are distinguished in time are also divided by duration. But when he says that in order one thing supposes another, he plainly understands that, of those things which are together in prescience, by order of consideration one precedes another; in which way he affirms that the prescience of merits had its origin from the purpose of justifying, because merits arose from the very grace of justification, as from a future cause.[1383]

In modo distinguendi, et ordinandi instantia rationis in divino decreto varie sentiunt auctores.

Caput IV - That authors differ in the way of distinguishing and ordering the instances of reason in the divine decree

Yet more recent theologians, who everywhere dispute about these instances of reason, differ in establishing the rule by which the order of the prior and the posterior is to be assigned in the divine prescience and decree.

Scotus, on the third book, dist. 7, q. 3, and dist. 19, q. 1, thinks this order should be taken in God's decree after the likeness of ordered human consultation; wherein he spoke very well in this: but he adds that then one proceeds in an ordered way in consultation whenever, after the will of

1382. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, q. 2, on Rom. 9: "Ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret."
1383. Prosper of Aquitaine, Epistola ad Augustinum, prefixed to De praedestinatione sanctorum, at the end.

the end, one decrees and wills the things which are closer to the end: he understands "closer" by dignity; and from this he would prove that God, after the love of Himself, most closely willed the Incarnation of His Son; because among other creatures it is closer to the divine goodness: and hence, if it was prior in the divine decree, Christ would have come even if Adam had not sinned.[1379]

But besides the fact that his conclusion is against the manifest testimonies of the Fathers and of Scripture, nor does it in any way commend the divine goodness, as the authors of that opinion suppose; nay rather, it greatly diminishes the charity of God toward the human race; the foundation on which Scotus relies, and from which he would seem to deduce a general rule, is not the first. For, as we shall say in III, q. 1, a. 3, the order in the consultation of means about some end ought not to be assigned by reason of dignity, by which one means is more like to and approaches the end; but according to the order of causality, by which the means conduces to the end. Otherwise, the order of intention or consultation would be one thing, and that of execution another; and what is first in intention is last in execution, as we shall dispute in 89, cap. 7, and say in II - II, q. 1, a. 3. But in execution, for example, that someone be healed, we proceed thus, that first the simples be sought, then from them the drugs be compounded, afterwards they be taken by the sick man, and finally he be cured. In consultation, therefore, one must proceed conversely: for when the will of health is set, which is the willing of the end, the physician is called into consultation, and the chief remedy is chosen, and its series is decided; then it is determined that it be compounded by such a druggist; finally, that such simples be sought, or this is left to the druggist to be sought. So in the construction of a house, and, in every business to be accomplished, the consultation begins in an orderly way from that means in which the execution ends, and it ends at that in which the execution takes its beginning. Therefore the place of what is prior is not according to the nobility of objects, but according to the proximity of causality to the end; it should be assigned in such a way that what more nearly operates toward the attainment of the end be prior in consultation and later in execution. Although therefore the Incarnation of Christ is closer to God's goodness in dignity; yet because it was not closer in causality, as will be proved in III, q. 1, a. 3, it does not follow that God, who wills in an ordered way, before all decreed the future Incarnation; indeed, if Scotus's reason had any weight, it would prove that God could not decree the Incarnation simply, and in some manner after sin, which is absurd. But what we have now said is enough against Scotus.[1384]

Cajetan, however, on III, q. 1, a. 3, sets up three orders of things in God's decree: the first of nature, the second of grace, and the third of the hypostatic union. But, as we showed in that place, this rule of Cajetan contains many contradictions. First, because many things that are natural are involved in the consultation about predestination. Second, because the sin of those crucifying Christ is put by Cajetan in the order of nature, and yet it supposes of necessity the hypostatic union. Third, because all things which are of the order of nature do not have an order with those which are of the order of grace; for that there be so many fish in the sea and beasts on the land is entirely accidental in regard to this, and bears no necessary conjunction with the order of grace;

1379. Scotus, In III Sent., d. 7, q. 3; d. 19, q. 1.
1384. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae III, q. 1, a. 3.

therefore they are not to be placed, as first in rank, in the divine consultation as necessary; rather they of themselves constitute their own order distinct from that [of grace]. But about these things more at length in that place.[1385]

Caput V - These instances are to be assigned according to the order of the objects among themselves

Accordingly, this is the position: the order ought to be assigned only on the part of the objects, so that those which among themselves have an order of causality, joined with the divine consultation, also constitute in it an order and the instances of a prior and posterior, always preserving the rule we have set forth: namely, that the order of execution ought to be contrary to that in consultation and intention; so that thus from it God is said to will one thing before another, because in reality one is for the sake of another, or toward another. But, that we may rightly constitute this order, it must be observed that among created objects one can be compared to another in three ways, according to which three ways more particular rules can be assigned.

First, a subject (*subiectum*) is compared to the form (*forma*) which it ought to receive. I do not speak of the subject which is prime matter and an essential part of a composite, but of the subject which is a certain whole composite, as of man; and of an accidental form, as of grace and glory. Thus, of necessity, in the intention of God the subject must be prior to the form; wherefore prior will be the will of producing man than of justifying him; and in execution likewise; and let this be the first rule. For it is impossible to will, or to decree to give grace to Peter, unless Peter already be understood as going to be. For since grace essentially supposes Peter, Peter cannot but be included in the decree of grace. Nor indeed do we understand that God first decreed to produce grace according to itself abstracted from a subject; for that would be a foolish conception; nor does that ever occur among men. Likewise He did not first decree the hypostatic union in intention, before producing this human nature which was to be assumed. For a union to be effected necessarily also supposes in conception and thought that to which it is to be effected: therefore the moderns are mistaken, who think that God did not first decree to produce Peter, for example, before predestining him by His grace; nor first to decree to produce the humanity of Christ, before to unite it to the Word; but rather, on the contrary, to have produced that from the fact that He decreed to unite it. Whence there would also follow that He first decreed to unite the humanity itself before producing it; and to glorify Peter, for example, and to justify him by His grace, before producing him - which manifestly involves a contradiction. For how can someone will to make a man just, or to deify him, whom he has not yet decreed to produce? It would be enough, if they were to say that God did not first decree to produce man before to glorify him and justify him, nor first to make the humanity of Christ before to unite it.

Wherefore, if it please to dispose these instances in another way, one must say that among the accidental forms of the subject itself, one is in a way the end (*finis*) of the others; as in man glory is the end, for the attainment of which man needs another form or a means; so too in the human

1385. Cajetan (Tommaso de Vio), In IIIam, q. 1, a. 3.

nature of Christ the union was as it were the end, the rest as means. One must therefore say that at least God decreed simultaneously that there be the subject with such a form, which is as it were the end of it, and then the other forms, which are as it were means around the man himself of this kind: for example, that He first willed to establish man for glory, then willed to provide the means for justification. So too He first decreed, from the end of redemption which He willed, to produce the human nature in the Word, so that He might unite it, and then to prepare the means and other forms which would be as it were the ornament of that.

Moreover, that God did not first decree the form which has the ratio of end than the subject has been proved above; and it can also be confirmed: because by the same act of love God wills glory for man; in which love glory is the object desired, but man is the one for whom it is desired. Now it is impossible to will glory without him for whom it is desired; therefore it cannot be willed without the subject. The same holds for the union and for the remaining forms which God decreed to give to some subject. But that He did not first decree the subject to be than the form which has the ratio of end is clear, because He did not will the subject to be made except for that end, and that it should obtain such an effect; therefore He never decreed it to be made prior to the will of the end, but together with it.

It is moreover very much to be observed that a subject which is said to be made for some perfection, which is as it were its end, does not have the ratio of a means with respect to it, and thus is not posterior to such a form, but is the end for whom (finis cui), whereas the form is the end for the sake of which (finis cuius gratia). Now the one who consults has at once an act concerning the end for whom and concerning the end for the sake of which, that is, concerning the perfection which he desires, which is as it were the end for the sake of which - the grace and the good desired - and concerning the subject, which is the end for whom that perfection is desired. And thus God at once wills glory for man and decrees to produce him for glory; although concerning his existence there is an efficacious will, but concerning glory only a simple one. For since He made man for this, that he might attain glory, from this end He willed him to be. And about the humanity of Christ one must philosophize similarly; except that the humanity was also united for another ulterior end, as we shall say in its place: namely, that it might redeem the human race; which end being supposed, straightway God simultaneously decreed, as a suitable means, simultaneously to produce the humanity conjoined to the Word, so that it might be able to satisfy; yet it is never to be said that glory was defined prior to man, or the union with the Word prior to the humanity.

But from that rule which we have just set down - "What is first in execution is last in intention, and conversely" - some argue thus. In execution, at least in the order of causality, the nature to be assumed is produced before it is assumed; and Peter, who is to be glorified and justified, is produced before he is justified and glorified: therefore in the intention of God the decree of glorifying, justifying, and uniting is prior, and from that the nature which is to be glorified, justified, and united is produced.

I answer: first, if the argument had any force, it would also prove that God first decreed to justify or to glorify some man, or to unite a humanity to the Word, before producing him - which is manifestly absurd. For who decrees to glorify or to justify a man before he sees that he will be, or before he wills him to be? For the production of grace essentially supposes a subject, as was said above.

Then I say that that rule holds only in the disposition of means with respect to the end, which means contribute in reality to the attainment of the end, either by way of efficient cause, or of disposition, or by way of merit, whose causality is reduced to the efficient. Therefore, in the disposition of the means to the end this order and series is preserved here: that what is first in execution be last in consultation or intention; and conversely, what is first in intention be last in execution. But the subject, with respect to accidents and to the things which God decreed to do in it - namely, with respect to glorification, justification, union, and the like - does not have the ratio of a means, neither physical, nor moral, nor efficient, nor meritorious. Therefore it is in vain that, from the fact that the subject is produced earlier in execution, the adversaries infer that in consultation and intention it ought to be posterior. Wherefore all the things which God decrees to be done concerning some subject, in the intention of God and in the disposition of the divine will, in a certain order suppose the subject itself about which they are to be done.

Second, one created thing is compared to another as a means to the attainment of it; but a means can be moral by way of merit; and in this case let this be the second rule. Although in the intention of God that be prior to which our merits are compared by way of a means, nonetheless it is not prior in a particular and efficacious intention than that merits be foreseen; but only in a certain intention of simple complacency and inefficacious, by which it pleases God that any man attain by his merits that which He proposes to all as an end. This is to be confirmed and demonstrated very broadly in Disputation 89, chapters 6, 8, and 10; therefore there is no need here for a fuller proof.[1386]

But with a determinate and efficacious will God is said to have chosen in His prescience the merits of grace unto the kingdom of heaven, as St. Augustine often says, and consequently this will supposes merits; and whenever in time something is said to be given out of merits, it is also said by the same Augustine that it was defined by God out of merits, as we shall see there. Wherefore neither did God ever decree with an efficacious will to call, justify, and glorify anyone, unless with the merits of Christ presupposed, by whose virtue in time He was going to call, to justify, and to glorify; otherwise He would have decreed to glorify Peter, to justify, and thus to have predestined Peter before He had seen the merits of Christ, and before He had predestined Christ Himself - which is absurd.

A single a priori reason will suffice: because that which is given on account of another, as on account of merit, is given in view of that, just as we also see among men; for if someone were to give absolutely from himself, not looking to merits, he would not give out of merits. Therefore, since the donation in time is made in view of merits, in eternity the will of giving cannot be

1386. Disputatio 89, cap. 6, 8, 10.

absolute of itself, but in view also of merits, as in that Disputation 89 we shall show more at length; and for that reason God is said in eternity to have chosen the merits of grace, because in view of them He prepared the crown of glory.

Third, one thing is compared to another as its physical cause, on account of which it is said to be; for every cause seems to be for its effect. But, that we may establish a rule of instances concerning these matters, a distinction must be made. Either the effect of some physical cause depends on free choice, or it is altogether natural. An example of the former: the calling of God is given, that man may respond; for this is the physical effect of the calling - not by way of merit, but depending on free choice. In these, therefore, let the third rule be established: although the effect to which the cause is ordered by way of an end ought to be prior in intention, since it is posterior in execution, nevertheless it is not prior in an efficacious and altogether determinate intention, but only in a simple affection of complacency, which is not efficacious; for example, God did not efficaciously decree first that Peter would respond to the calling and consent to grace, than to call him: for thus He would be decreeing the consent of the will without that upon which it depends. [1386]

But that which cannot at all be done without it, God nevertheless decreed from the will by which it pleases Him universally that each man respond to grace, be justified, and observe the law - that this or that grace should go before him; and the preparation of that vocation and grace being foreseen, He decreed to concur with it as He saw him inclined; so that in this way He might preserve entire the liberty of choice. But this is to be proved by us expressly in Disputation 89; therefore let what has been said now suffice.[1387]

Lastly, where the effect is altogether natural, it can be prior in intention in an efficacious will (and let this be the last rule), as when God willed there to be rain so that there might be abundance of grain; we can say that in intention the abundance of grain was prior to the rain, whereas, on the contrary, in execution the rain is prior to the store of grain. For that effect is, as it were, a medium nearer to the end which God wills than the rain itself. It is clear therefore how the instants (*instantia*) of the divine will are to be ordered in decreeing future things. But where in the thing itself there is no connection of effects, in the divine will they have no order, as will immediately be evident.

Caput VI - From the divine will alone, without a connection of things among themselves, instants ought not to be ordered.

Now there are, moreover, certain more recent writers, who, although they think it true that instants must at once be distinguished and ordered according to the connection of the objects and of things among themselves - namely, when in very fact one is referred to another - yet add that an order of instants can also be assigned from the sole order which things have to the divine will. For (so they say) God can by His freedom order one thing to another, even if in very fact it is not referred to that other; therefore, according to that ordering which things receive from the divine

1386. Disputatio 89, cap. 6, 8, 10.
1387. See Disputation 89.

will, the instants can also be ordered in the decree of God. Others add that God so wills some end through certain means that He can bind His will, as it shall have pleased Him, to some one means, even if in very fact the end does not necessarily depend upon such a means. They assert also that then God does not will the end prior to that means; wherefore, if such a means were not going to be, the end would not be going to be: because God has confined the decree concerning the end by such a means. Just as when someone resolves to go to Toledo, but only in a carriage; if that fails, he will not go. Whereas otherwise the will of the end, which is prior to the will of the means, is not taken away by the removal of the will of a given means; and when I speak of an end, I understand the same of some means for the sake of which other means are said to be.

However, it must always be said in the same way: the order of instants in the divine will must be taken from the order of things among themselves, and from that even the ordination of the divine will is to be inferred. For without a change of things among themselves, we cannot grant or infer diverse ordinations of the divine will. Let us suppose, for example, that the merit of Christ has impetrated and obtained glory for us, because in fact He offered the passion for us; and therefore, according to the second rule handed down in the preceding chapter, that God foresaw the merit of Christ and, in view of that, gave us grace; from which we assign such an order, that first the merit of Christ was foreseen, then there was the decree to give grace. Things, however, persevering in the same way - namely, if Christ were to offer Himself for us, and God were in fact to give grace - we could not say that He did not give it in view of the merits, but absolutely from His will alone. For, in order to say that the decree of God is changed or varied, or is otherwise than it now is, there would have to be a variation in Him or in things. But in Him none can occur: for now we suppose that the decree of the free will of God is not an act freely elicited by God which could be present and not present from eternity, as was proved in Disputation 79, chapter 5; therefore on the part of God no variation could have been; nor is there any in things either, as we suppose. Therefore, things remaining in the same order, they cannot be otherwise ordered by the will of God, but the will of God also will remain in the same way.[1388]

Hence, one must always attend to the connection of things among themselves, so that from it we may assign the order of the divine will. Now the connection of things consists most of all in the natural proportion of things, by which they are compared to one another, or in the intention not of God, but of men acting thus; for that a just man established in grace do good works has a proportion of worthiness to eternal life, and of itself is worthy of it; wherefore, if glory is given to him, it is said to be given on account of merits, and that God would not have willed to give otherwise. Then, that someone pray or do good by remitting injuries done to himself, or by having mercy on one in need, has a proportion of congruity with some particular grace which he obtains for himself; and therefore we say that God gave that particular grace in view of good works, not in view of condignity, because the works did not have such a proportion, but of congruity and fittingness.

1388. See Disputation 79, cap. 5.

Wherefore, if Christ were to suffer as He did suffer, and were to do other good works, and grace were given to us, then, in order that it be said not to be given in view of the merits of Christ, but from the mere benignity of God, there would have to be some variation on the part of Christ's merits; otherwise we would say in vain that grace is not given in view of them, as it now is given. Christ therefore would have to suffer and do good in such a way that by His will He would not offer His merits for men in payment of the guilt of others, but would do so absolutely for some other end; for His intention is required in order that He be said to merit for men, as we shall show in the Third Part of St. Thomas, question 19.[1389] But if He should offer them, as in truth He offered them, in payment for sins both past and future, His works cannot but of themselves, and not from the sole will of God, be actually ordered to man's salvation; and thus the will of God cannot but, in view of them, give grace and glory, if in fact He bestows it upon men notwithstanding their sin.

Likewise, in order that God be said to give glory freely and without merits, it is necessary that there be no merits in him to whom glory is given; for if he have merits, and then glory be given to him, it follows that God necessarily willed to give glory on account of merits, as is gathered from the doctrine set forth above. Therefore, it is in vain that the aforesaid Doctors, setting aside the order of things which they have among themselves either by their own nature or by the will of agents, assign various orders of the divine will from the sole nod of God.

Wherefore, although in Scripture and in the holy Fathers various causes of the divine will are sometimes assigned, and in the Incarnation of the Son of God a special cause was expressed, nevertheless all causes from the very order of things among themselves, according to the doctrine here assigned, we shall in their proper place very well deduce; for now it is not permitted to pursue everything, but it suffices to lay certain general foundations which can serve us in various places.

Moreover, even if by the sole variation of a divine act one object were ordered to another, yet those objects would have to have some proportion and causality between themselves; for if there were none, and one did not conduce to the other, we could not say that one is ordered to the other by the will of God. For God does not assume any means unless it really conduces.

It is objected: in such wise, without any change made in things, someone who had previously been bound by a vow can remain absolved, if God by His will alone should so will; therefore by the mere nod of the divine will an order can be constituted in things.

It is answered: Never is any man absolved from a vow until God reveal His will at least to someone; but once the revelation has been made, even if he who vowed be ignorant and by ignorance be bound, nevertheless in very fact he is not bound. But if God should reveal nothing, a man would always of itself be obliged to fulfill the vow; for, the revelation having been made, there would have been a sufficient change that what bound should not bind; that, however, not being made, no change has been made, and so things would remain in the same state. If you say that it suffices for God to have within Himself a free act, so that for that time the vow would not bind, I reply that no such elicited free act is in God, as I noted in that Disputation 79, chapter 2, but only the naked essence of God with an order to created objects; wherefore, if these be not changed, the

1389. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae III, q. 19.

same will will be said to remain. Moreover, even if such an act were in God, so as to have the force of a law, it would have to be intimated or revealed; otherwise it would not dissolve the vow in very fact. But this pertains little to our present purpose.

Concerning, however, the will of the end, whether it can be bound to one means when there are many, so that unless through that one God would not will some end, we shall treat expressly in Disputation 89, chapter 11. And whether the good which God elicits from sin can be in the primary intention of God, so that on account of it He be said to will to permit the sin, although He does not will the sin itself, we shall see in Disputation 93. Now this is to be known: nothing can be primary in God's intention unless the things which it essentially supposes are also in some way willed by God; from which ...

... from which it follows that no good which by its nature supposes sin can be in the primary intention of God, such as punishment, penance, etc.; for one who primarily sets his mind on these two and the like, if he is to bring his intention to effect, is compelled to will the sin which is essentially presupposed by them. For intention necessarily moves toward those things which are essentially necessary. But if any one of those things displeases, then the end itself, or the first means, must needs displease - a point on which we shall treat more at large in its place.

Finally, whether the conditional knowledge which God has about things contributes anything to establishing the order of the divine will absolutely, or whether from it the series which God willed to observe ought to be judged (for many abuse this conditional knowledge, as I said in its own place), we shall show in detail when we shall treat in particular about this or that order, as in Disputation 89, and in the Third Part, q. r. a. 3, and elsewhere as well.[1390]

But this is certain: the knowledge of God of simple intelligence is prior to any knowledge and to will, with which the knowledge of future conditionals can be reckoned; because the operation of will, in its kind, is by nature posterior to the operation of the intellect. Next, the will of God by which He wills something to be future is prior to the knowledge of that same future, as was said in Disputation 68, chapter 6.[1391] Finally, concerning the knowledge and will of diverse things, speech must be had: for example, about the foreknowledge of merits and the will of granting glory; about these matters one must speak in various ways according to the rules delivered above - and let this suffice for this article.

1390. See Disputation 89; and in the Third Part, q. r. a. 3; and elsewhere.
1391. See Disputation 68, cap. 6.

Articulus VI - Whether the will of God is always fulfilled

To the sixth, the procedure is thus. It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 2, that God "wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not so come to pass. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.[1392]

1. Further, as knowledge stands to the true, so will stands to the good. But God knows every truth. Therefore He wills every good. Yet not every good comes to be; for many goods could be done which are not done. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
2. Further, the will of God, since it is the first cause, does not exclude secondary causes, as was said. But the effect of a first cause can be impeded by the defect of a secondary cause, just as the effect of a motive power is impeded on account of the weakness of the shin-bone. Therefore the effect of the divine will can be impeded on account of the defect of secondary causes. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.

But on the contrary: it is said in Psalm 113: "All things whatsoever He willed, He has done."

I answer that it is necessary that the will of God be always fulfilled. For the evidence of which, one must consider that, since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the same ratio obtains in efficient causes as in formal causes. Now in forms it is thus: although something can fail relative to some particular form, nevertheless nothing can fail relative to a universal form. For it is possible that there be something which is not a man or not a living thing; but it is not possible that there be something which is not a being. Hence the same must be held in efficient causes. For something can be brought about outside the order of some particular agent cause; but not outside the order of a certain universal cause, under which all particular causes are contained: because if some particular cause fails as to its effect, this is on account of some other particular cause impeding it; which cause is contained under the order of the universal cause. Whence the effect can in no wise go out beyond the order of a universal cause. And this also is evident in bodily things. For it can be impeded that some star not induce its own effect; yet every effect proceeding from a corporeal cause impeded, in order to be attained in corporeal things, must be reduced through certain intermediate causes to the universal power of the first heaven. Therefore, since the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not attain its own effect. Whence that which seems to recede from the divine will according to one order relapses into it according to another. Thus the sinner, who, so far as is in him, departs from the divine will by sinning, falls into the order of the divine will in that, through His justice, he is punished.

Reply to the first: The word of the Apostle, that God "wills all men to be saved," can be understood in three ways. In one way, so that there be accommodated a distribution according to this sense: God wills to be saved all men who are saved; not because there is no man whom He does not will to be saved, but because no one is saved whom He does not will to be saved, as St.

1392. See also St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 19, a. 6, where this article is treated; and cf. various cross-references noted by the author.

Augustine says.[1393] In a second way, it can be understood so that there be a distribution over the kinds of particulars, and not over each individual of the kinds, according to this sense: God wills of every state of men that there be saved males and females, Jews and Gentiles, small and great; yet not all of each state. In a third way, according to St. John Damascene, it is understood of the antecedent will, not of the consequent will. Which distinction indeed is not taken on the part of the divine will itself, in which there is nothing prior or posterior, but on the part of the things willed. For the understanding of which, one must consider that, insofar as anything is good, thus it is willed by God. But something can be in the first consideration of itself, according to which it is considered absolutely as good or evil, which, however, when considered together with some adjunct which is a consequent consideration of it, has the contrary relation. Thus that a man live is a good; and that a man be killed is an evil, according to the absolute consideration. But if it be added concerning some man that he is a homicide, or is living to the danger of the multitude, thus it is a good that he be killed and an evil that he live. Whence it can be said that a just judge antecedently wills every man to live, but consequently wills the homicide to be hanged. Likewise God antecedently wills every man to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned according to the exigency of His justice. Nor yet do we simply will that which we antecedently will, but in a certain respect; because will is compared to things according as they are in themselves, but in themselves they are in the particular. Whence we simply will something according as we will that thing considered with all its particular circumstances - which is to will consequently. Whence it can be said that a just judge simply wills the homicide to be hanged, but in a certain respect wills him to live, namely insofar as he is a man. Whence it can more properly be called a will of choice (elective) than an absolute will. And thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills, takes place, although that which He antecedently wills does not take place.[1394]

Reply to the second: The act of the cognitive power is according to the ratio of the known as it is in the knower; but the act of the appetitive power is ordained to things according as they are in themselves. Now whatever can have the ratio of being and of true is all virtually in God, but does not all exist in created things. And therefore God knows every truth, but He does not will every good, unless insofar as He wills Himself, in whom virtually every good exists.

Reply to the third: A first cause can then be impeded from its effect by the defect of a secondary cause when it is not universally first, comprehending under itself all causes; because otherwise the effect could in no manner evade its order. And thus it is concerning the will of God, as has been said.

The conclusion of the article is: The will of God is always fulfilled; St. Thomas proves this from that Psalm 113: "All things whatsoever He willed, He has done, in heaven and on earth"; and Wisdom 12: "All things are subject to Him, when He wills, He is able." Omitting the reasoning of St. Thomas, there is another manifest one: for the will of God is omnipotent, and He operates by

1393. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum I, c. 8; Enchiridion, c. 103; and Contra Iulianum IV, c. 8.

1394. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, c. 19; and cf. St. Augustine, Ad articulos falsorum haereticorum, art. 2; De correptione et gratia, c. 15.

His will; therefore it cannot be impeded by anyone so as not to attain its effect. Concerning the text of St. Thomas there is nothing noteworthy; but the difficulties that concern his doctrine will be examined in the following disputation.

Disputatio LXXXIII - Whether there is in God some will of good pleasure which is not always fulfilled

- From the opinion of Alexander, St. Bonaventure, and others, that every will of good pleasure is fulfilled. Cap. I.
- That God has a will of good pleasure concerning the salvation and right life of all men, the truer opinion asserts. Cap. 2.
- Why this will is called antecedent. Cap. 3.
- In what manner the will which God has antecedently of the salvation of men is absolute, and how nevertheless it is not always fulfilled. Cap. 4.
- The arguments of the prior opinion are dissolved. Cap. 5.

Before we enter upon the disputation, a distinction of the divine will, which St. Thomas establishes in the article of this question, must be premised: namely, that there is a will of sign, and a will of good pleasure. It is called will of sign when God outwardly so acts concerning some thing as to indicate that He has such a will concerning that thing, when nevertheless in truth He does not have it. An example is in all the prophets which contain only a commination of punishment, by which the prophets seemed to signify that God had determined the punishment, when nevertheless in truth that will was not in God. An example is also customarily brought forward of the precept which God placed upon Abraham to immolate his son: since He only willed to furnish an occasion for obedience, not however the immolation of Isaac. In which example and the like, where something on the part of God is enjoined in the mode of a precept, and afterwards He Himself prohibits it from being done, there is indeed a certain will of simple complacency about that thing. For the immolation of Isaac, according to itself, pleased God on account of obedience, since it was a work of virtue and of precept; and from this part it is not solely a will of sign. But because that which outwardly appeared seemed to indicate to Abraham that God willed to command that sacrifice absolutely and not to revoke the precept, from this part it was a will of sign and not of good pleasure; for God had never decreed that, but rather willed the contrary. Now it is a will of good pleasure when there is not only a sign of such a will, but also the very thing of which there is said to be a will in God is pleasing to Him. Such is the will concerning the things which are done by God; for these by that very fact cannot but please God that they be done. But about this distinction more at large in that article.

In the present controversy there are two opposing opinions. The first is that of Alexander,[1395] St. Bonaventure,[1396] Scotus,[1397] the Master,[1398] Marsilius,[1399] Driedo,[1400] and Cajetan;[1401] and of certain others on that word of Paul to Timothy, "God wills all men to be saved," who assert that there is not

1395. Alexander of Hales, Summa theologiae, various places (as cited by the author).

in God a will of good pleasure which is referred proximately to the salvation of all and to the observance of the precepts in all men, so that these, according to themselves, be in very deed willed by God; but that the divine will is terminated proximately only to the means which God gives to all men by which they can be saved, and to the precepts which He delivers to the same, that they may work well. Wherefore they say that both wills referred to the observance of the precepts and to the salvation of men are only will of sign: because by furnishing the means absolutely, and the precepts which He commands them to observe, He seems to indicate ...

It is objected that God seems to have a will of good pleasure regarding the salvation of all and regarding the observance of the precepts, whereas in fact he has it not.

This opinion is favored by St. Augustine to the extent that the testimony of Paul in 1 Timothy 2, "God wills all men to be saved," he never explains of a will of good pleasure, which is truly in God regarding the salvation of all men; rather, by three different ways, by which he plainly denies that there is in God a will of good pleasure concerning the salvation of all. The first exposition is that which he gives in the Enchiridion, chapter 103,[1402] as a distribution which the logicians call "accommodated," as if Paul were saying: No one is saved whom God does not will to save; just as we are wont to say of some teacher, "He teaches all the boys of this city," even if not all are in fact taught. We mean to say, no one in this city is taught except by that teacher. So too is that of John 1 to be understood: "He enlightens every man coming into this world."[1403] Huguentius embraces this exposition in the book De incarnatione et gratia, chapter 31, and Bede and Anselm follow it on that passage of Paul;[14041405] but in the end Augustine himself does not much approve it.

Secondly, he interprets that passage as a distribution which the logicians call "according to the classes of individuals," and the sense is: Out of every class of men God wills men to be saved - of men and women, of little ones, of kings, of poor, etc.; which the letter of the text favors. For, after he had said that prayer should be made "for kings and for all that are in high station," he immediately subjoins the reason, saying: "Who [namely God] wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Both these expositions Augustine has in that chapter 103 of the Enchiridion, and Bede and Anselm follow him on that passage of Paul.[14021405]

A third exposition he himself adduces in chapter 15 of De correptione et gratia, around the middle: "God wills," that is, "he makes that they will that all be saved," according to that of Romans 8, "The Spirit asks for us, that is, the Spirit makes us ask," and of Genesis 22, "Now I know that you

1397. Scotus, Quodlibet (and allied questions), as referenced by the author.
1398. The Master (Peter Lombard), Sentences, as indicated.
1399. Marsilius (of Inghen), In I Sent., dist. 45, art. 1.
1400. Driedo, De concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis, cap. 4, ad 2.
1401. Cajetan, on 1 Timothy 2: "God wills all men to be saved," as cited.
1396. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., dist. 46, art. 1, q. 1 (and related loci).
1402. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 103.
1403. John 1:9.
1404. Fulgentius, De incarnatione et gratia, c. 31.
1405. Bede and St. Anselm, on 1 Timothy 2:4.
1402. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 103.
1405. Bede and St. Anselm, on 1 Timothy 2:4.

fear God," that is, "Now I have made that you know that you fear God." Augustine's expositions are approved by St. Gregory in I, dist. 46, q. 1; indeed he adds that therefore there is not in God a will regarding the salvation of all men, because he even denies sufficient helps to this end.[1406] But if this is so, God can have no will regarding that end - neither of good pleasure nor even of sign; which does not much differ from the mind of Augustine, who plainly grants that to some sufficient helps are not given, as we shall see below in disp. 97. Yet that foundation is most false, as we will show there; for now at least let us prove that there is only a will of sign, not of good pleasure, regarding their salvation, while still granting sufficient means to all.

This is proved by reason, first, because when someone is able to save another and does not save him, he is plainly convicted of not willing to save him. But God is able to save all, and to bring it about that they live rightly, in such wise that no impediment occur: therefore since he does not do so, it follows that he does not will all to be saved, nor to make it that they live rightly; although, by providing remedies necessary to salvation, he seems to indicate that he wills the salvation of all and their tranquil life.

Then, either that will of good pleasure regarding the salvation of all, which some attribute to God, is efficacious or it is inefficacious, which they call a "velleity." It is not efficacious, since in many it does not have its effect; nor is it inefficacious, for, being imperfect, it cannot suit God. Therefore there is no will of good pleasure in God regarding the salvation of all. From this they infer - Doctors do - that every will of good pleasure in God is efficacious and therefore always fulfilled, and that only that will sometimes lacks its effect which is merely of sign.

But on the contrary:

Caput II - The affirmative thesis: that God has a will of good pleasure regarding the salvation of all and a right life

I, however, judge not only the opposite opinion to be truer - namely, that by a will of good pleasure God wills the salvation of all and a right life - but also far more conformable to Sacred Scripture and to the doctrine of the Fathers, to such an extent that I do not see by what reason anyone would dare deny it. Wherefore, since not all men are saved, nor do all live rightly, it must be necessarily confessed that not every will of good pleasure is always fulfilled. This doctrine is taught, among the Scholastics, first by Durandus in I, dist. 47, q. 1; by the Carthusian on dist. 46, q. 1; by Bartholomaeus Camerarius in the Dialogus Catholicus, cap. 6, §1; and is indicated by St. Thomas in this article, reply to the first objection.[1407][1408][1409][1410] They teach that there is in God not only the sign of this will, but also a will of good pleasure regarding the salvation of all and a right

1406. St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, c. 15; Romans 8:26; Genesis 22:12; and cf. St. Gregory, on I Sentences, dist. 46, q. 1.

1407. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 47, q. 1.

1408. Dionysius the Carthusian, In I Sent., dist. 46, q. 1.

1409. Bartholomaeus Camerarius, Dialogus Catholicus, cap. 6, §1.

1410. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1.

life; which is what must be proved by us in this chapter alone. For what sort of will it is - whether antecedent or consequent, absolute or under a condition - and how, without any imperfection in God, it can fail of its effect, will be explained in chapters 3 and 4.

Therefore, that there is in God a will of good pleasure regarding the salvation of all and a right life is proved first from Paul in 1 Timothy 2. There, after he had said that prayer should be made for kings, etc., "that we may lead a quiet and tranquil life in all piety and chastity," he immediately added: "For this is good and acceptable before God our Savior, who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth."[1411] Therefore, in the same way Paul says that God wills all to be saved and to acknowledge the truth, and to act rightly, or to lead a tranquil life; for these are connected. But that men live rightly is a good, and therefore (as Paul says) acceptable before the Savior; therefore it is pleasing to him. Wherefore the will by which he wills all to be saved, to live rightly, and to attain the knowledge of the truth, will be also a will of good pleasure; for what else is it for God to will something by a will of good pleasure than for that thing to be pleasing to him, acceptable and gratifying? Accordingly, when in 1 Thessalonians 4 Paul said, "This is the will of God, your sanctification," he not only expressed a will of sign, but also of good pleasure; for he could have added: "For this is pleasing and acceptable to God."[1412]

Secondly, from the authority of the Fathers this sentence is supported by Prosper in book 2 De vocatione gentium, chapters 19 (alias 7) and 25 (alias 8), although, in the response to the Heads of the Gauls, he with Augustine defends the opposite.[1413] Next, St. John Damascene, book 2 De fide, chapter 29, explaining toward the end that passage 1 Timothy, says as follows: "Nor should this escape us: that God, as preeminent in goodness, primarily wills all men to be saved and to be made partakers of his kingdom (for he did not fashion us for punishment and torments, but for this, that we might be made participants of his own goodness); but, as just, he no less wills that punishment be inflicted on those who sin. And the former is called the antecedent will or good pleasure; the second, the consequent will, and permission arising from our fault. Moreover, there is a twofold kind of permission: one dispensatory and instructive, which looks to our salvation; the other proceeding from despair, which, as we have already said, leads to an extreme and most certain perdition. And concerning those things which are in no wise in our power, we must make determinations; but of those things which rest in our choice, such as are good God primarily wills and holds as pleasing and acceptable."[1414] Here Damascene calls the antecedent and primary will of God, by which he wills all men to be saved and to attain glory, "good pleasure." Then he adds that the good things which are in our power, namely a tranquil and right life, are primarily willed by God and are pleasing; and they cannot be pleasing unless they are acceptable. Therefore, the will regarding them is not only of sign, but also of good pleasure. Wherefore, according to the sentence of Damascene, God has a will of good pleasure not only concerning glory, which is not in our power as our work even though by God's will it depends upon our merits, but also concerning those things

1411. 1 Timothy 2:1 - 4.
1412. 1 Thessalonians 4:3.
1413. Prosper of Aquitaine, De vocatione gentium II, c. 19 (alias 7) and c. 25 (alias 8).
1414. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, c. 29 (near the end), on 1 Timothy.

which are in our power, as about good works and a right life; for he said that God's primary intention, which he calls good pleasure, is about both - about the things which are not in our power, and about the things which are placed within our choice.

But St. John Chrysostom speaks excellently, homily 1 on the Epistle to the Ephesians, where he distinguishes in God a primary and a secondary will in the same manner as Damascene distinguishes the antecedent and the consequent, and he expressly indicated that the will of which we now treat is a will of good pleasure by these words: "According to the purpose of his will, in which he took good pleasure; it is as when he would very much have it done: this was his desire - as if someone said, this was his will; for good pleasure (quod ipsi dicimus eudokia) is everywhere the principal will of God. For there is also another will of his; that first is the primary, according to which he does not will sinners to perish. There is also a secondary, according to which he wills those who persist stained in crimes to perish; for it is not necessity that chastises such with punishment, but will. We may see something like this in Paul; namely, when he said, 'I will that all men be as myself,' again, 'I will that younger women marry, bear children,' etc."[1415] Thus he clearly indicated that primary will and immense benevolence in God conjoined with ardent desire for us; for Chrysostom, having expressed that primary will with a double Greek term - eudokia, which signifies good will, or good pleasure, and eunoia, which among other things denotes a certain inclination or ardent affection - manifestly taught that that primary will truly is in God, is his good pleasure, and that it is vehement, as if it were some earnest striving; and hence he said that this eunoia signifies the mighty benignity of God conjoined with ardent desire. Who, then, would not see that all these things by no means can square with a mere will of sign, which is not truly in God?

But by reason also this our sentence is confirmed and more clearly set forth. For, if the salvation and eternal glory of men be considered in itself, and the observance of the precepts and a just life, it cannot but be pleasing to God. First, these things cannot be displeasing; next, regarding them God's will cannot be negatively disposed and, as it were, suspend every act - both which were demonstrated above in disp. 79. Therefore, regarding the salvation of men and a just life, there is in God not only a will of sign, but also of good pleasure; and, as we shall say in the following chapter, this will can rightly be called "desire," as Chrysostom called it. Nor are these objects pleasing to God only when considered under possible being, but also under future being. For it does not please God merely that man be able to keep the law, or be able to be glorified, but that he in fact keep it and be glorified is acceptable to God - not because any given man is de facto going to keep the law or to be glorified, but because this very thing, to keep the law and to be glorified, considered as if it were to be future, cannot but be pleasing to God. Wherefore, those who say that about these there is only a will of sign must needs say that these things are not pleasing and acceptable to God - a manifest absurdity. These points will be made more perspicuous in chapter 4.

Nor indeed is it to be inferred, from the passages of Augustine cited above, that he did not wish to concede this will of God regarding the salvation of all; but also that he did not rightly expound that passage of Paul by any one of those three modes. This is deduced by a single argument from

1415. St. John Chrysostom, Homily 1 on the Epistle to the Ephesians (on "secundum propositum voluntatis suae, in quo ipse beneplacuit").

the text itself. For the Apostle says that it is acceptable before God that all should lead a tranquil and right life, just as that all be saved; but above it was shown that God by a will of good pleasure wills that individual men live rightly; therefore, also, that they be saved. By this reasoning those three interpretations of Augustine are rejected. The third interpretation, namely, "He wills that they be saved, that is, he makes them to will," can be impugned on a special ground: because God does not make that individuals will to be saved and to lead a right life, as is well known; therefore we must fall back upon one of the two preceding senses, namely, either that he himself makes those to will to be saved whoever are saved, or that, as to the several conditions of men, he makes some to will to be saved; and so that third exposition cannot stand of itself.

Therefore the true interpretation of that passage is the one we have reported from Damascene and Chrysostom, and which the Scholastics above named follow: namely, that God wills the salvation and the just life of individual men. This is not understood by Paul - as some of the theologians alleged said - of a will of sign, because, to wit, he at least provides all with sufficient means to salvation, but, as Chrysostom, Damascene, and others whom I cited for the second opinion say, of a will of good pleasure. What the nature of that will is, and how it is not always fulfilled, will be explained in the next two chapters. And finally those two arguments by which the adversaries prove that there is not in God a will of good pleasure regarding the salvation of all will be refuted in chapter 5.

Why this will is called "antecedent."

Caput III - Why this will is called antecedent

It is a division familiar to theologians, that of will into antecedent and consequent, drawn indeed from Damascene and Chrysostom, as has been cited in the preceding chapter - a division most useful for this matter, and to be understood aright. For from the passages of the Fathers just cited, many have seemed to have slipped into some abuse...

Having first recalled their accepted accounts, it is finally worth the effort, following exactly the mind of Damascene, to disentangle the matter. First, those Scholastics listed in the preceding chapter who said that the will which God has touching the salvation of all is only a will of sign, not of good pleasure, and thus distinguish antecedent and consequent so that the former is of good pleasure, the latter of sign, are in error: besides the fact that their foundation is false, as was proved in the preceding chapter, this position also stands against the mind of Damascene and St. John Chrysostom, from whom the celebrated division was taken; and it does not rightly explain why one is called antecedent will and why the other consequent. For these terms are said relatively: antecedent with respect to something later, consequent with respect to something prior. Add that some will, indeed manifold will, which is of good pleasure, is also called antecedent, as will appear below; therefore that way of explaining the division must be rejected.

Second, the most commonly received explanation among more recent theologians is that antecedent will is the same as an inefficacious will, which is commonly called conditional, or velleity; but consequent is efficacious and absolute. Yet this explanation is commonly approved

without any foundation, on the sole ground that some antecedent will, such as is that of the salvation of men and their right life, is inefficacious, as we shall say below. For according to the mind of Damascene (who first received this division from Chrysostom and explained it for us), there is also an antecedent will which is efficacious and utterly absolute, such as is the will of prevening the man by the grace of calling. Moreover, although the will by which God of himself wills the salvation of all men is inefficacious, nevertheless it is by no means under a condition, but is truly an absolute will, although it includes something of a condition, as will be explained in the following chapter: therefore it must now be called not merely velleity but will.

Third, St. Thomas explains this division in three ways in this article, both by the example which he uses and by his doctrine, and he seems to have very well understood the mind of Damascene. He says, then, in the reply to the first objection, that antecedent will is that which is about a thing absolutely and as considered in itself; consequent, however, is that which is about a thing with some circumstance. He gives the example of a judge who, when he considers the man who has slain another or has stolen something, as such, does not will to punish him; indeed the man's punishment, as it is his evil, is most displeasing to him, especially if he be a son or a friend. Yet insofar as he considers his crime, he wills to punish him, and his punishment pleases him. Therefore that will by which the punishment of the man, considered in himself, displeases is antecedent; that, however, by which it pleases because of the crime, is consequent. It is called antecedent because it is about the state of the thing considered according to itself, which is prior; it is called consequent because it bears on the thing with a circumstance, which in this way is something posterior. According to this doctrine there will be called antecedent the will by which it displeases a merchant to throw his goods into the sea; but consequent that by which it pleases to throw them in because of danger to life. And although Damascene in De fide, chapter 29, called antecedent and consequent will of God only with respect to our will, nevertheless in the book against the Manichees he expressly has the doctrine of St. Thomas; therefore let us now set forth what the Fathers think about this matter.[141614171418]

Chrysostom indeed, who was first author of this division and set forth the example for us, did not explain why it is called antecedent, and why consequent: he only asserted a certain primary will, according to which God wills no one to perish; and a secondary, by which he wills those to perish who persist stained in sins. But Damascene, who received the division from Chrysostom and illustrated it by the same example, in a single word expressed the reason why it is called antecedent will and consequent, and since these are spoken relatively, he explained with respect to what they are said antecedent and consequent. "Antecedent," he says, "is the primary will flowing from God himself; that is, existing from God alone in such a way that it takes no occasion from our good or evil deeds. Consequent and secondary will (which he also calls permission) is that which has its rise from our fault." Where it must be observed that not only can that be called consequent which has some origin from our fault, but also that which arises from our good works - such as the efficacious

1416. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, c. 29.
1417. St. John Damascene, Contra Manichaeos (near the end).
1418. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1.

will of giving glory - which he was unwilling to bring into the example, because glory itself is in a certain way willed by God by antecedent will; therefore, that he might assign an example of that which is in no way willed by antecedent will, he brought forward punishment, the will of which takes its whole occasion from us.

Again, he teaches that the punishment which he calls permission is willed by consequent will in a twofold way. For punishment is twofold: one is dispensatory and has the power of instructing, from which indeed God dispenses our salvation and instructs us that we may be more cautious - such is that which brings us to true repentance; the other is of the last punishment; and he says that both are of consequent will, that is, take their occasion from us. For God of himself does not will repentance any more than eternal punishment, but he wills both from us, that is, with fault supposed and foreseen; and on that account repentance is not a good simply, but in a case, or occasioned (as it is said), and similarly redemption: for these suppose fault and disease. From this doctrine it will be proved below in disputation 93 that the permission of sin is not willed by God out of an intention of repentance, and therefore does not pertain to the effect of predestination.

Moreover, the same Damascene, a little before the end of the book against the Manichees, distinguishes primary and secondary will, and explains both thus: "Primary will is that which one wills from himself; but secondary is that which one wills on account of things that happen." Here he defines the two wills from the very things willed; and he thus concludes, that in God the will of goodness, which is of doing good, is primary, because it takes no occasion from us; but the will of justice is secondary, which has its origin from us and from the occasion of those things which happen, namely sins. According to which definition antecedent and consequent will can bear not only on men, but also on all things according to various states, as St. Thomas says. Yet those wills which bear on us must be noted: for they will often come up in disputation. But how, when God is ready of himself to repay punishment to the evil and eternal life to the good, nevertheless he is not said to will by antecedent will punishment, just as he also wills eternal life, we shall say in the following chapter.[1417]

His addendum is what we shall also say in disputation 99, namely, that a third member of the will of God toward us can be distinguished, namely accompanying: thus that antecedent be that by which God, with no foreseen determination of our will, of himself alone wills something concerning us - and to this pertains the simple will of glorifying, insofar as it is on his side, and the efficacious will of calling and prevening by the grace of vocation; accompanying, however, be that by which he efficaciously decrees to concur with us unto the consent which we render to the calling grace; consequent, however, be that by which he now efficaciously decrees, from the foreknowledge of our works, either punishment or even reward. I said that that accompanying will and this consequent are efficacious: for if there be speech of the simple will, by the antecedent will and of himself alone God desires for us beatitude, and that we cooperate with his grace; and therefore, if it did not depend on us, he would concur with us; and this will, in this way, takes no occasion from us: wherefore Damascene not only counts among those things which God wills by antecedent will

1417. St. John Damascene, Contra Manichaeos (near the end).

those which are not in our power, but also those which are in our power, such as our works, as is plain from the words cited. That will, however, by which he efficaciously decrees to glorify us or to concur with us, takes its occasion from us, as will be explained in the same place.

Caput IV - In what way the will by which God has an antecedent will of the salvation of men is absolute, and nevertheless is not always fulfilled

Among antecedent wills, first it must necessarily be granted that there are some altogether absolute and efficacious, if we follow the explanation of Damascene and St. Thomas. For since, according to their opinion, antecedent will with respect to us is that which is from God alone and in no way has its origin from the occasion of our works, that will also will be antecedent by which God decreed to call us by this or that calling, which is altogether absolute and efficacious. For just as he willed to call from his own goodness alone, so also, with nothing hindering, he calls in time: nor does such a will of calling ever lack its effect; although the very calling does not always move our will. For the effect of the calling will is to call in time, at the moment that God has decreed to call. So also, if the opinion is true of some who say that God, before the foreknowledge of any merits, efficaciously decreed to give the glory of predestination, and from this will called, etc., similarly, with no foreplanned determination of human will, from his own goodness alone he determined the goods of his own works; and each will is to be called antecedent, because it has its origin from the will of God alone, not from us; and each will also will be altogether absolute and without any condition, and efficacious. But whether such a will exists in God or not will be amply disputed in disputations 89 and 90.

Moreover, we refute at the same time those who assert that God wills the salvation of all under the condition "if they themselves will."

Furthermore, as we shall show more fully in q. 13, a. 5, there can be no present act of will which cannot be expressed by an indicative verb; nor can it be expressed by the optative verb "I would will"; rather, if there be any act which is present, it is one which would otherwise be if the condition were posited. In any case, there is no present act of will which, as it is such, is not set upon its object as absolutely good, if it be of complacency; or as absolutely evil, if it be of displeasure. This I now show by an easy reason. For just as sight is not moved except to that which participates in the formal ratio of color or light, so neither is the will moved to that which does not in some way participate in the nature of the good; and thus the act of will is not elicited to that which does not participate absolutely in the nature of the good. And just as we say that sight would see something if it were colored, but when it is not colored it does not see nor does it have any act, so when there does not appear something that is good and as such apprehended, the will does not tend to it nor does it have any act with respect to it. In the same way too the intellect, unless it now apprehend some truth, cannot yield assent; he would yield it, if such a truth appeared.

Objicitur: it is objected that just as the intellect is borne toward a thing under a condition and has assent regarding it, so the will could be borne.

Solutio: I respond, first, that if the will or the intellect were borne to an act of each in the same way, then one ought to philosophize thus: that a present act of the intellect is not explained by an optative verb. Understanding is expressed by an indicative, "I understand"; so too the act of the will would be explained by "I will," not by "I would will"; for although "to understand" does not signify a now-existing act, neither does "to will." Then I say that when the intellect considers a thing under a condition, even there it finds its entity and its truth, and therefore it tends to it absolutely. First, there is truth in the connection of antecedent and consequent under a condition, which pertains to the object of the intellect; moreover, when it considers future possibilities and gives conditional assent about a future condition, it apprehends the entity of those things and in like manner represents it; and thus the will can in the present be borne to a thing in suchwise as that which in truth or in fact depends on a condition in the future, insofar as that, according to itself, is good and desirable; so that when they assert that God wills the salvation of all under the condition if they will, they are not indicating a present act of will, but rather a reasoned connection.

Now therefore the controversy is about that antecedent will alone by which God, from himself, wills the salvation of all men, even of the reprobate, and a tranquil life in piety and virtue; which by the consent of all is not efficacious, since in many it is not fulfilled: nevertheless it is not for that reason to be judged as lacking all effect.

Many Scholastics, especially the more recent, consider this to be conditional and they also call it velleity, because, they say, it is referred to an object not considered absolutely, but under a condition: for God desires the salvation and just life of all, if however they themselves will it; and since that object considered under a condition alone moves the will, the act which is in it is not absolute and perfect, but also under a condition; and they call that conditional will or velleity. And they are wont to explain this by the verb of the optative mood, "I would will." Thus Sotus seems to teach on Romans, chapter 9, in the disputation on this matter; and Corduba likewise, book 1, question 5 and question 6 at the beginning, calls it conditional will or velleity; indeed St. Thomas so calls it in the cited place in the reply to the first objection; to which Ambrose, Theophylact, and Oecumenius are also assimilated on that place: "Who wills all men to be saved," 1 Timothy 2; Prosper in the second book On the Vocation of the Gentiles; and Chrysostom, homily 1 on John, in expounding "He enlightens every man"; and Theophylact there.[1419][1420][1421][1422][1423][1424]

It can please, as if it were going to be in very deed; and in this way it can move the will to an act of simple complacency, which is rightly expressed by the verb of the indicative mood, "It pleases (Placet)," not by the verb of the optative alone, "It would please (Placeret)." But this is a simple affection of complacency, which nevertheless virtually contains an efficacious will, yet under a condition, as will soon be explained.

1419. Dominicus Soto, on Romans 9, in the disputation on this matter.
1420. Corduba, lib. 1, q. 5; q. 6 (at the beginning), in the disputation on this matter.
1421. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1.
1422. St. Ambrose; Theophylact; Oecumenius, on 1 Timothy 2:4.
1423. Prosper of Aquitaine, De vocatione gentium II.
1424. St. John Chrysostom, Homily 1 on John: "Illuminat omnem hominem."

Accordingly, for the sake of explaining this matter, note first that there is a twofold affection of the will. One is that of simple complacency or displeasure, which of itself is inefficacious, as when it displeases someone to throw the merchandise into the sea, and it pleases him to keep them, which nevertheless in fact he throws; and as it displeased Christ to die, and pleased him to preserve life according to itself, although in fact he willed to offer himself to death. Similarly must complacency be spoken of. The other is an affection of efficacious complacency, which so tends to the work as to effect it: such is the will of throwing the merchandise into the sea, and the will by which Christ offered himself to death. Therefore, when we say that God has a will of beneplacitum concerning the salvation of all, glory, justification, and a just life, we do not assert that it is a will and affection of the efficacious kind, but only of simple complacency and inefficacious; not only such as is borne toward all these things insofar as they are possible, but toward them also according to themselves, as if they were going to be and as if conjoined with men. For thus, just as they would please if present, they please when apprehended according to themselves as if they were going to be; and just as with respect to present things that complacency would be called delectation, so also with respect to future things it is called desire. And on that account the Chrysostom cited in cap. 2 said that there is a flaming desire of God concerning the salvation of all. For it is not of the notion of desire that it be of a thing truly future or thought to be future; for of those things which are not going to be, and are believed not going to be, there is wont to be desire. For one condemned to death, who most certainly believes it to be future, desires that it not be; whereas there is only hope of a thing which is thought and believed to be going to be. It is enough, however, if someone apprehends to himself some thing under the mode of the future, so that he can have desire for it. Thus we philosophize concerning God, who, although he certainly knows that many men are not going to be saved nor to live well, nevertheless their salvation and right life according to themselves, and apprehended as future, are pleasing and agreeable to him, so that he may be said, in a human manner, to desire them.

Secondly, for the explanation of this matter, it must be observed that the will of simple affection, concerning some possible thing, known as possible, is in us then inefficacious when the complacency is not of the thing according to every consideration, and some complacency of the opposite concerning the same thing under another consideration prevails and is greater - even if either part lies in our power, as we shall say below. Thus in Christ, to whom death displeased under one consideration, as it was an evil of nature, and under the same consideration life pleased, this complacency and displeasure was inefficacious, because it pleased more under another consideration to die, inasmuch as it was a remedy for the human race and for the praise of God. Therefore the desire of future life was only a simple affection, but the desire of death was greater; and consequently, contrary to that former, it was efficacious. The same is clear in him who throws the merchandise into the sea: it pleases him according to itself to keep the merchandise, and it displeases him to throw them away, but on account of the danger it pleases him more to throw them away. Therefore this latter will is efficacious; the former, however, is inefficacious.

In God we must understand similarly that one will of the same thing under one consideration prevails and is efficacious; but another concerning the same thing under another consideration is inefficacious, and remains as only simple complacency - not because in God there are various acts more or less intense, stronger and weaker; for he is his own most simple essence; but from the effect we philosophize thus, or for this reason we conceive God in a human mode: because, namely, we see that thing not to be done and yet nonetheless to please God. But this proceeds neither from coercion nor from impotence, but from the free will of God; which cannot be explained by us more fully in this life.

Thus therefore, since we see that the salvation of all and a life tranquil according to virtue please God, and nonetheless not all are saved, nor do all live rightly, although God could so dispose things that all should live rightly and be saved; consequently we say that that will concerning the salvation of all and a just life is only of simple complacency, but that another efficacious will of God has prevailed, whereby he willed to leave many men with those helps with which he knew they would not live rightly, and in the end would be condemned, and thus willed to put their liberty to the test. From this indeed, that he did not will to confer greater helps, with which he knew they would act well, it is not concluded that he did not will, or that the salvation and right life of those men displeased him absolutely, as remains explained. Thirdly, for the sake of greater perspicuity it must be noted that the will of simple affection, which under the aspect of complacency is in itself absolute and is explained by indicative words, "It pleases" and "He wills," and deals with a thing without condition and good according to itself, is of such a nature that it virtually contains an efficacious will, which is not an act, yet would be if the condition were posited; and from this side it can be called conditional - not because it is actually borne to the object under a condition, but because from that [simple] will which is present another [will] would arise, if the condition were posited in the object. This is manifest in the same examples. For thus life pleased Christ, and death displeased according to itself, so that, if the precept did not stand in the way, an efficacious will would arise therefrom, or even that very [simple] will would be efficacious, to avoid death and to preserve life. On account of this efficacious will, which is virtually contained in the simple affection and would then exist, we say that Christ would will not to die and to will to live, and would pursue the means to avoid death, unless the precept of dying were imminent. And similarly, he who wills to throw the merchandise would efficaciously will to keep them, unless the peril, which moves more, were present. In the same way God thus by a simple affection wills our salvation, and it so pleases him that, unless sins stood in the way, he would efficaciously will it; and thus even now a life according to virtue and the observance of the precepts are received by simple complacency, so that, if we were willing to respond to the grace that calls, he would efficaciously will to cooperate with us. Therefore, by reason of this will implicit under a condition, we say that God has a conditional will, or (as they say) a velleity; although, considered in itself with respect to these objects taken according to themselves, it is absolute, as has been explained.

Fourthly, finally it is gathered that there is nothing absurd if we say that some absolute will of God, of only simple complacency and inefficacious, is not fulfilled. For from the fact that something pleases God, it is not at once necessary that it be done; just as, on the contrary, sins when done

supremely displease God, and nonetheless are done. But it would be absurd to concede in God a will and efficacious purpose of doing some thing which would have no effect; for that would argue impotence in God. However, that simple affections are not always fulfilled - indeed that some things are done contrary to such a will - implies no imperfection in God. Moreover, from this there is only inferred that God works thus together with the liberty of rational creatures, such that things which are pleasing to him are not of necessity to be attained. Likewise, although he desires by simple affection that the precepts be observed by men, he does not nevertheless efficaciously will to concur with them, when they are unwilling to respond to the gracious call. Hence, from the fact that they do not observe the law, there follows that which displeases God, the opposite of which pleases him.

Caput V - The arguments of the prior opinion are dissolved

Lastly, from the foregoing doctrine the two arguments adduced in the first chapter, by which the adversaries tried to prove that there is in God no will of good pleasure concerning the salvation of all and a right life, are easily dissolved. The first is framed thus: when someone can save another and does not save him, he is convicted of not willing to save him; but God can save all and does not save all; therefore He does not will to save them all.

That we gladly grant. But from this it does not follow that in God there is no will of good pleasure (beneplacitum), and that there is only a will of sign (voluntas signi) concerning the salvation of all. For it often happens that, together with some will of simple complacency (complacentia), or of displeasure, which is a will of good pleasure and not only of sign, someone does not in fact do that which he desires, nor shun that which displeases, even though he can: because he desires it only under one aspect, not under every aspect; and that will is hindered by another contrary, greater will, so that it has no effect. Thus, one who wills to throw merchandise into the sea has the will of retaining them, and desires to preserve them, and can preserve them; it also displeases him in itself to throw them away, and he can refrain from throwing them away; and yet he does not retain them, but throws them away. Similarly, life pleased Christ, and death displeased him in itself; and yet he neither fled death nor preserved life. And although, because a precept was standing, which he could not transgress, he could not flee from death; nevertheless, even if there were no precept, and he were free to do so, he would not flee: because for another reason it pleased him more to die than to live. Therefore, about God one must philosophize in the same way, as we set out above, saving, however, all imperfections, as was explained.

The second argument is this. Such an inefficacious will is imperfect; therefore it is not to be conceded. I answer that this will has no imperfection when one is not bound to have it be efficacious, and for a just cause does not have it efficacious. Wherefore there is no reason why we should not grant to God a similar affection of simple complacency and of good pleasure for a just cause.

A doubt is proposed. But someone will ask: if God denied sufficient helps (auxilia) to some - just as Gregory thinks in the First Book of the Sentences, distinction 46, the sole question, and perhaps St. Augustine also, as we shall say in disputation 97 - could we still attribute to God this will of simple complacency concerning the salvation of all men? I answer that nonetheless it would be the case that in God there would remain the will of good pleasure: for it always pleases God according to itself that men be saved, although it does not please him with a consequent will because of sin. It also pleases God according to itself that any man whatsoever, however destitute he be of the help of grace, live rightly; but whether in fact he confers to all the helps necessary for this, we shall say in the place indicated. We do not say that the salvation and the right life of men please God only insofar as he gives them aids. From the mere fact, however, that he grants helps, and that they are a cause of such an effect, we do not straightway infer that God gives the helps with the intention that man respond. For he himself makes rational nature, which he knows will sin; he also offers occasions and thoughts, from which he knows sin will be in the future; and yet we do not gather from this that he offers them with the intention of sin. We therefore say that God for this reason confers helps with the intention that men respond, because the response according to itself pleases him, and such help by its own nature is ordered to this end, which according to itself pleases God; but because sin displeases God, although he offers occasions and thoughts, it cannot be said that he offers them with the intention that sin should follow. Therefore, since the salvation of man according to itself, and a just life, always please God, even if he were not to confer the means necessary for this end, that antecedent will would remain in God, but in such a way that it would not move him to the means: which happens in us commonly, although for another reason, as is clear from the examples adduced above. For the man who throws out his merchandise does not apply any means to preserve them, although he desires them to be preserved; nor did Christ apply means to live, although it pleased him to live.

Objicitur: But you will object: Just as it pleases God to glorify the just, so also it pleases him to punish the wicked: therefore just as by an antecedent will he wills to make men saved, so also he wills to punish; or, just as that will is consequent, so also will be the will of glorifying. I answer that the difference is manifest. For glory, according to itself, as it is the good of man, pleases God, without considering anything on the part of man; but punishment, according to itself, as it is the evil of man, does not please God, but only insofar as it is the just vindication of sin: and therefore, unless guilt is foreseen, God wills punishment for no one. But before merits are foreseen, of himself alone God desires that men attain beatitude; indeed he even desires that they have merits unto this. This will, therefore, is rightly called antecedent, or primary, having its origin from God alone; whereas that other is consequent, or secondary, drawing its origin from our vice.

Finally, some Scholastics raise a common doubt whether the things which are done against the will of God - such as sins - somehow obey God and his will and providence, or not. Durandus answers that in two ways they can serve God and obey him: first, as matter, just as stones and timbers serve the craftsman for building a house; then, as a secondary agent, as the hand serves for working, and subordinate ministers who execute what the architect ordains. This being supposed, he first teaches that the things which are done against God's antecedent will can obey the

consequent will, and, as matter, serve divine providence: for sins are the matter of divine justice and of punishment, which belong to the consequent will; whereas they were against the antecedent. Secondly, he teaches that in a sin which is from its genus a sin, and is against the antecedent will, the human will does not subserve the divine will as a secondary agent: because God in no way cooperates to sin, nor does the human will do it together with God. He thinks, in fact, that God does not even cooperate to the material of sin in those things which are from their genus sins. Thirdly, he maintains that in a sin which is not from its genus a sin, but from the circumstance of the end, the human will somehow subserves, or cooperates with, the divine will with respect to the substance of the work, not with respect to the evil circumstance of the end. This is Durandus's view.[1425]

A truer reply. I, however, think that sins are not to be distinguished as from their genus or from their circumstance; but that in every sin God cooperates to the substance of the work according to the essence (*essentia*) of nature - as we shall expressly prove against this same Durandus in the Prima Secundae, question 79, article 1 - whereas to the moral malice he in no way cooperates: and thus our will does in some manner subserve the divine in producing the substance of the act - not because it has a precept from God to do that; for this cannot be - but because by its liberty it works together with God, who also concurs to it.

Articulus VII - Whether the will of God is mutable

To the seventh we proceed thus. It seems that the will of God is mutable.[1426]

1. For the Lord says in Genesis 6: "It repents me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done has a mutable will; therefore God has a mutable will.[1427]
2. Moreover, in Jeremiah 18 it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to pluck up and to pull down and to destroy it; but if that nation repents of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I thought to do to it." Therefore God has a mutable will.
3. Moreover, whatever God does, he does voluntarily; but God does not always do the same things. For at one time he commanded the legal observances to be kept, at another time he forbade them. Therefore he has a mutable will.
4. Moreover, God does not will what he wills by necessity, as was said above. Therefore he can will and not will the same thing. But whatever has potency toward opposites is mutable. Just as what can be and not be is mutable as to substance, and what can be here and not be here is mutable as to place. Therefore God is mutable as to will.

1425. Durandus, in dist. 47, q. 2.

1426. See 1, dist. 39, q. 1, a. x, cor., etc.

1427. See St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 19, a. 7, ad 3 - 4; Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 25 (end), and III, c. 98 (end); and later I, q. 30, a. 15.

But on the contrary is what is said in Numbers 23: "God is not as a man, that he should lie, nor as the son of man, that he should be changed."

I answer that the will of God is altogether immutable. But concerning this it must be considered that to change the will is one thing, and to will some change of things is another. For one may with the same will, remaining altogether unmoved, will that now this happen, and later its contrary. But then the will would be changed if someone were to begin to will what previously he did not will, or were to cease willing what he willed. And this indeed cannot occur unless a change is presupposed either on the part of the cognition, or with respect to the dispositions of the substance itself.

Now, since will is of the good, one can begin to will something anew in a twofold way. In one way thus, that he begin anew to judge that thing to be good for himself; and this is not without a change in him - just as when cold arrives, it begins to be good to sit by the fire, which before it was not. In another way thus, that he newly come to know that that is good for him, whereas before he was ignorant of this. For to this end we take counsel, that we may know what is good for us. But it has been shown above that both the substance (*substantia*) of God and His knowledge (*scientia*) are altogether immutable; whence it is necessary that His will (*voluntas*) be altogether immutable.

Reply to the first: The word of the Lord is to be understood metaphorically, according to a likeness taken from us. For when we repent, we destroy what we have done - although this can be without a change of will, since even some man, without any change of will, may will to do something while at the same time intending afterwards to destroy it. Thus, therefore, God is said to have repented according to a likeness of operation, inasmuch as He blotted out by the flood from the face of the earth the man whom He had made.

Reply to the second: The will of God, since it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes, in whose power it lies that certain effects be produced. But because all the intermediate causes do not equal the power of the first cause, many things are in the power, knowledge, and will of God which are not contained under the order of inferior causes, as is the raising of Lazarus. Hence someone, looking to the inferior causes, could say, "Lazarus will not rise"; but looking to the first divine cause, he could say, "Lazarus will rise." And God wills both of these, namely, that something sometimes be future according to the inferior cause, which nevertheless is not future according to the superior cause, and conversely. Thus it must be said that God in some manner pronounces something to be future according to what is contained in the order of inferior causes - e.g., according to the disposition of nature or of merits - which nonetheless does not come to pass, because otherwise it is in the superior, divine cause. Thus when He foretold to Hezekiah, "Set your house in order, for you shall die and not live" (Isa. 38), yet it did not so happen, because from eternity it was otherwise in the divine knowledge and will, which are immutable. On which account St. Gregory says that God changes the sentence, yet He does not change the counsel, namely, of His will. Therefore, when He says, "I will do penance," this is understood to be said metaphorically: for men, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened, seem to repent.[1428]

1428. St. Gregory, Moralia, book 20, chapter 23, in medio.

Reply to the third: From that reasoning it cannot be concluded that God has a mutable will, but only that He wills a change.

Reply to the fourth: Although for God to will something is not absolutely necessary, yet it is necessary ex suppositione, on account of the immutability of the divine will, as was said above.[1429]

Explanation and confirmation of the article.

The conclusion of the article is this: The will of God cannot be changed; and this is to be understood not only of the will by which He necessarily loves Himself and possible creatures, but also of that will by which from eternity He freely decreed to produce creatures. Now this conclusion is of faith from Scripture: Numbers 23: "God is not as man, that he should lie, nor as the son of man, that he should be changed"; Proverbs 19: "Many thoughts are in the heart of a man; but the will of the Lord abides forever."

And hence, whenever in some prophecy the sentence of God is contained which is afterwards changed, it must be understood that it was only comminatory, and that there was not some determined decree in God, nor an efficacious will of good pleasure, but only a will of sign; and about such there is not to be understood a necessary conclusion.

That doctrine is without controversy. But to prove the article's conclusion by a certain reasoning is not so easy; wherefore the Doctors do not agree in assigning it. St. Thomas thus proves it: A change of will can occur under one of two heads: either because the disposition of the one willing is changed - as when fire begins to be good for someone because he grows cold, which before was not good; or because he begins to know something in the object which he previously did not know, and thus his cognition is varied. And both these changes can be reduced to a change of cognition. But neither can God's substance be varied by any disposition, as was demonstrated in Question 9, nor can His knowledge, as we proved in Question 14, article 16. Therefore neither can His will be changed. Concerning this reasoning a doubt is raised by Cajetan in this article; but it is of slighter moment, and he himself easily solves it, and so I pass it over.

But far more efficaciously one can object against this reasoning: for in God there might be diverse wills without its being necessary that the disposition of His substance be varied, nor the knowledge He has of things. Rather, He remains in the same disposition, and knows in every way the same - cognizing creatures under possible existence - before He determined anything concerning them; just as, while He willed that sin would be, so He could have willed it not to be; and so with other things. Therefore, with no variation made either of disposition or of knowledge, solely by His liberty there could be in Him a different will from that which now is. And if from eternity there could have been such, why, without any change of disposition and knowledge, by His liberty alone could there not also in time begin another will than that which was from eternity? In us indeed, just as there could not have been from the beginning of our being some cognition different from what there was, unless from the beginning there had been another cognition in some way diverse, so also it is not surprising if in time volition cannot be changed unless in some way the cognition be changed. Therefore there is a different ratio of our will and the divine.

1429. See above, this question, art. 3.

Ferrariensis, in Contra gentes, cap. 87, proves that the will of God cannot be changed, because if it were changed there would cease to be in God some act which before was; which cannot be without an intrinsic change of Himself. But this has seemed somewhat probable to some; yet besides that Ferrariensis is not here sufficiently consistent with himself - since, as we noted in Disputation 80, cap. 2, he esteems the free act of will in God to be nothing other than the substance of God with only an added respect of reason to creatures, and therefore, in his view, by a mere change of a respect of reason the will of God would be changed - there follows also against him the same absurdity that we above inferred against Cajetan: namely, that there would be in God something formally so free that it could from eternity not have been.

Therefore, supposing the doctrine delivered by us in that disputation - which I think must necessarily be conceded - the article's conclusion can be demonstrated by another easier a posteriori reasoning, the very reasoning by which we proved the same thing above concerning the knowledge of God (q. 14, a. 16). For although the will of God, as free with respect to producing things, adds nothing over and above the essence except a respect of reason, and with this respect the essence is said to be the free will of producing creatures; and hence, if from eternity God had decreed to produce creatures, to Him there would be nothing except that respect of reason; nevertheless in time the will cannot be changed, nor that respect of reason, but if such a respect ought to be in God, from eternity it ought to be - just as we were saying about knowledge, not because any intrinsic change would follow in God, nor even in knowledge itself (which precedes the will), if the respect could be changed in time; but because, since future things are from eternity future, and nothing can in time begin to be future, it follows of necessity that the respect to things to be produced cannot in time begin; just as the thing to be produced, and to be future, cannot in time begin to be future.

A doubt is raised here by Cajetan: after God from eternity willed to produce something, does there remain in Him a potency not to produce, or not to will to produce, since His will cannot be changed? He himself replies, and Ferrariensis likewise (Contra gentes, c. 83), that there does not remain a physical potency, because there is not in act a potency which physically could will the opposite; yet there remains a logical potency, since of itself it is not repugnant that the divine will should will the opposite. Others, however, teach that there remains even a physical potency, because a physical potency is not destroyed by its own act: wherefore, just as the potency which produced something is said to remain although it cannot produce it again, so too in God there remains a physical potency of willing the opposite of what He has willed.

This indeed is true in this sense - and Cajetan did not deny it - namely, that the real power always remains; but not with the habitude to that which it has produced, so that it could produce it again. And in the same way there remains in God His essence, which is the very power of the will for willing; but not with the habitude to the opposite, so that He could now will it.

Further, someone proves thus that the will of God imposes necessity on what He wills: because this conditional is true, "If God wills something, it is"; but every true conditional is necessary. Therefore it follows that everything which God wills is absolutely necessary.

But on the contrary: All the goods that come to be, God wills to be done. If, then, His will imposes necessity on the things willed, it follows that all goods come about by necessity. And thus free choice, and counsel, and all such things perish.

I answer that the divine will imposes necessity on certain things willed, but not on all. Some have wished to assign the reason of this from intermediate causes: because those things which He produces through necessary causes are necessary; but those which He produces through contingent causes are contingent. Yet this does not seem sufficient for a twofold reason. First, because the effect of some first cause is contingent by reason of a second cause in this way: that the effect of the first cause is impeded through the defect of the second cause - thus the power of the sun is impeded on account of the defect of the plant. But no defect of a second cause can impede the divine will from producing its effect. Second, because if the distinction of contingent and necessary were referred only to second causes, it would follow that this were outside the divine intention and will, which is unfitting. And therefore it is better to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause has been efficacious for acting, the effect follows the cause not only as to that it is, but also as to the mode of its coming-to-be, or of its being. Hence it comes about that, of the things which God wills, some happen necessarily and others contingently, according as He willed them to be or to come about either necessarily or contingently.

Articulus VIII - Whether the will of God imposes necessity upon the things willed

It is asked whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.

It seems that the will of God does impose necessity on the things willed.

1. For St. Augustine says in the Enchiridion: "No one is saved unless God wills him to be saved. And therefore He is to be asked that He will it, because if He wills it, it is necessary that it be done." Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.
2. Further, every cause which cannot be impeded produces its effect of necessity: because nature and art, operating in the same way, do not fail unless something impede, as is said in Physics II. But the will of God cannot be impeded, as the Apostle says in Romans: "Who resists His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.
3. Further, that which has necessity from a prior has necessity absolutely. Thus moral necessity, since it is from something prior, is not necessary absolutely, because it is compounded of contraries. But things created are compared to the divine will as to something prior, just as something prior is that from which another has necessity. Therefore the divine will imposes necessity on the things willed.

But on the contrary: All the goods that are done, God wills to be done. If, therefore, His will imposes necessity on the things willed, it follows that all goods come about by necessity. And so free choice, and counsel, and all such things perish.

I answer that the divine will imposes necessity on certain things willed, but not on all. Some have wished to assign the reason of this from intermediate causes: because those things which He produces through necessary causes are necessary, but those which He produces through contingent causes are contingent. Yet this does not seem sufficient, for a twofold reason. First, because the effect of some first cause is contingent on account of a second cause, insofar as the effect of the first cause is impeded through the defect of the second cause - thus the power of the sun is impeded by the defect of the plant. But no defect of a second cause can impede the divine will from producing its effect. Second, because if the distinction of contingent from necessary were referred only to second causes, it would follow that this lay outside the divine intention and will, which is unfitting. And therefore it is better to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause has been efficacious for acting, the effect follows the cause not only as to that it is, but also as to the mode of coming-to-be or of being. Hence it comes about that those things which God wills occur either necessarily or contingently, according as He has willed them to be or to come about necessarily or contingently.

Others' solution. They say that, although God cannot physically will the opposite, nevertheless there would remain a logical potency; for in itself it is not repugnant that the divine will should will the opposite. Others indeed say that even a physical potency remains, since a physical potency is not destroyed by its proper act; wherefore, just as a potency which has produced something is said to remain, although it cannot produce it again, so in God there remains the physical potency of willing the opposite of what He willed. This is true for this reason, nor did Cajetan deny it, because a power indeed always remains, but not with an aptitude to that which it produced, so that it could produce it again. And in the same way in God His essence remains, which is the very power of the will to will; but not with an aptitude toward the opposite, so that He could now will it.

Thus one proceeds. It seems that the will of God imposes necessity upon the things willed. For St. Augustine says in the Enchiridion: "No one is saved unless the one whom God wills to be saved." And therefore He must be asked to will it, because it is necessary to be done, if He will have willed it."[1]

1. Further, every cause which cannot be impeded produces its effect of necessity; for nature always operates the same unless something impedes, as is said in Physics II.[2] But the will of God cannot be impeded, for the Apostle says to the Romans 9: "For who resists His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity upon the things willed.
2. Further, that which has necessity from a prior is necessary absolutely. Thus for an animal to die is necessary, because it is composed of contraries. But created things are related to the divine will as to something prior, from which they have necessity; since this conditional is true: If God wills something, it is. But every true conditional is necessary. Therefore it follows that whatever God wills is absolutely necessary.

But on the contrary: All the good things that are done, God wills to be done. If therefore His will imposes necessity on the things willed, it follows that all goods occur of necessity. And thus free choice, counsel, and all things of this sort perish.

I answer: One must say that the divine will does impose necessity upon some things willed, but not upon all. Some wished to assign the reason for this from the intermediate causes: because the things which He produces through necessary causes are necessary; but the things which He produces through contingent causes are contingent. But this does not seem to be said sufficiently for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of a second cause, from the fact that the act of the first cause is impeded by the defect of the second cause - thus the power of the sun is impeded by the defect of a plant. But no defect of a second cause can impede the divine will from producing its effect. Second, because if the distinction of contingent from necessary were referred only to second causes, it would follow that this lay outside the divine intention and will, which is unfitting. And therefore it is better to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause has been efficacious for acting, the effect follows the cause not only as to that it is, but also as to the mode of coming-to-be or of being. Hence it comes about that those things which God wills occur either necessarily or contingently, according as He has willed them to be or to come about necessarily or contingently. Hence He fitted necessary causes, which cannot fail, to certain effects, from which effects follow of necessity; but to other effects He fitted contingent, defectible causes, from which effects occur contingently. Therefore the effects willed by God occur contingently not because the proximate causes are contingent, but because God willed them to occur contingently and prepared contingent causes for them.

Reply to the first: By that word of Augustine necessity in the things willed by God is to be understood not as absolute, but as conditional. For it is necessary for this conditional to be true: If God wills this, it is necessary that this be.

Reply to the second: From this very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows not only that the things which God wills to be done are done, but also that they are done contingently or necessarily, as He wills them to be done.

Reply to the third: Posterior things have necessity from prior things according to the mode of the priors; whence also the things which are done by the divine will have such necessity as God wills them to have, namely either absolute or only conditional. And thus not all things are absolutely necessary.

Conclusion: The will of God imposes no necessity upon our free choice; and this is of faith, as is deduced from the things we have said in disputation 68, chapter 1, where we proved that we act so freely that neither by any internal nor by any external necessity is our liberty impaired. But, as we showed there, the knowledge of God fits rightly with our liberty: so here it had to be shown likewise about the will of God, which indeed fits with our liberty.[3]

Articulus IX - Whether the will of God is of evils.

Thus to the ninth one proceeds. It seems that the will of God is of evils. For every good that is done, God wills; but that evils be done is a good. St. Augustine says in the Enchiridion: "Although those things which are evils, insofar as they are evils, are not good; nevertheless that not only they be good, but also that they be evils, is a good."[4] Therefore God wills evils.

1. Further, Pseudo-Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, chapter 3: "There will be evil for all," that is, contributing to the perfection of the universe.[5] And Augustine says in the Enchiridion: "From all things is woven together the admirable beauty of the universe; in which even that which is called evil, being well ordered and set in its place, commends goods more eminently, so that they please more, and are more praiseworthy when they are compared with evils." But God wills all that pertains to the perfection and adornment of the universe, because this is what God chiefly wills in creatures. Therefore God wills evils.[6]
2. Further, "that evils be done" and "that evils not be done" are contradictorily opposed; but God does not will that evils not be done, because since some evils are done, the will of God would not always be fulfilled if He willed that evils not be done. Therefore God wills that evils be done.

But on the contrary is what St. Augustine says in the book of 83 Questions: "By no wise man as author does a man become worse." But God is more excellent than any wise man; much less therefore, with God as author, would someone become worse: yet a thing is done by an author when it is done with him willing. Therefore, if God does not will it, a man does not become worse. But it is certain that by every evil someone becomes worse. Therefore God does not will evils.[7]

I answer: Since the ratio of the good is the ratio of the appetible (as said above), but evil is opposed to the good, it is impossible that some evil, insofar as it is such, be desired either by natural appetite, or animal appetite, or the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless some evil is desired per accidens, insofar as it is conjoined to some good. And this appears in every appetite. For a natural agent does not intend privation or corruption, but the form to which is conjoined the privation of another form; and the generation of one thing, which is the corruption of another. For the lion killing the deer intends food, to which is conjoined the killing of the animal. Likewise the fornicator intends pleasure, to which is conjoined the deformity of guilt. But the evil which is conjoined to some good is the privation of another good. Therefore an evil would never be sought, not even per accidens, unless the good to which the evil is conjoined were more sought than the good which is deprived through the evil. But God wills no good more than His own goodness. He does, however, will some good more than some other good. Hence the evil of guilt, which deprives the order to the divine good, God in no way wills; but the evil of natural defect or the evil of punishment He wills, by willing some good to which such evil is conjoined. Thus, by willing justice, He wills punishment; and by willing the order of nature to be preserved, He wills that certain things be corrupted naturally.

Reply to the first: Certain persons said that, although God does not will evils, He nevertheless wills that evils be or be done, because, although evils are not good, still that there be evils or that they be done is good. But this is not rightly said, because evil is not ordered to good per se, but per accidens. For it is outside the intention of the sinner that from this there should follow some good; as it was outside the intention of tyrants that, from their persecutions, the patience of the martyrs should be made manifest. And therefore it cannot be said that such an order to good is imported by this, that it is said that it is good that evil be or be done; because nothing is denominated according to that which belongs to it per accidens, but according to that which belongs to it per se.

Reply to the second: Evil does not work to the perfection and beauty of the universe, except per accidens, as has been said. Whence also that which Pseudo-Dionysius says, that "evil contributes to the perfection of the universe," concludes by inducing, as it were, an incongruity.

Reply to the third: Although "that evils be done" and "that evils not be done" are contradictorily opposed, nevertheless "to will that evils be done" and "to will that evils not be done" are not contradictorily opposed, since both are affirmative. God therefore neither wills that evils be done, nor wills that evils not be done; but He wills to permit evils to be done. And this is good.

Exposition of the article. The conclusion of the article is: The will of God is not the fault of evils; it is, however, the punishment of evils. The conclusion is of faith, as will be more broadly proved at I-II, q.79, a.1. But for the explication of the article, Cajetan notes very well that by the name "will" St. Thomas does not understand the faculty itself of willing, nor the act of will in general: for in both ways the will of God is occupied about evils - sins are displeasing to God; and so the divine essence, conceived under the mode of an appetitive faculty, has some act about sins, namely of hatred and displeasure, nor does it comport itself merely negatively toward them. St. Thomas, therefore, understands, as Cajetan says, by "will" the act of complacency and prosecution, which they commonly call affirmative. Moreover, St. Thomas proves that God does not will the evil of guilt because the will cannot be borne toward evil as evil; therefore neither can the will of God be borne toward sin. Concerning that proposition, namely how the will cannot be borne toward evil, we shall speak at greater length at I-II, q.8. Then Cajetan here discusses St. Thomas's reason, how sin is a privation of God; of which there must be exact treatment at I-II, q.71, a.2 and a.6.[8]

Articulus X - Whether God has free choice.

Thus to the tenth one proceeds. It seems that God does not have free choice. For St. Jerome says in a Homily on the Prodigal Son: "God alone is He in whom sin does not fall, nor can fall; other things, since they are of free choice, can be bent to either part."[9]

1. Further, free choice is a faculty of reason and will, by which the good and the evil are chosen; but God does not will evil, as was said above. Therefore free choice is not in God.

But on the contrary is what St. Ambrose says in the book On the Faith: "The Holy Spirit divides to each as He wills" (1 Cor 12:11), "by the free decision of His will, not by the service of necessity."[10]

I answer: We have free choice with respect to those things which we do not will by necessity, nor by natural instinct. For it does not pertain to free choice that we will to be happy, but to natural inclination. Whence other animals also, which are moved to something by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free choice. Since therefore God wills His own goodness by necessity, but other things not by necessity (as was shown above), with respect to those things which He does not will by necessity, He has free choice.

Reply to the first: Jerome seems to exclude free choice from God not simply, but only as to this, that is, so far as to be turned aside into sin.

Reply to the second: Since the evil of guilt is said by an aversion from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things (as was shown above), it is manifest that it is impossible that He will the evil of guilt. And yet He comports Himself toward opposites, insofar as He can will that this be, or not be. Thus also we, without sinning, can will to sit, and can not will to sit.

Note concerning the article. The conclusion is affirmative, and sufficiently clear from the things which we said above in disputation 79. Concerning the faculty of free choice St. Thomas treats below at q.83, a.5, whether it pertains to the intellect, or to the will, or to both together.[11]

Regarding the reply to the first, only this is to be noted - how those things agree which St. Thomas teaches here and below at q.62, a.8: for to that he plainly consents, that there is truly liberty in this, that man can sin; the same is handed down by St. John Damascene, De fide, chapter 27. Yet in this reply the holy Doctor sets the ability to sin as a defect of liberty. Both, however, must be reconciled in this way: that to be able to sin is a certain part of liberty; and thus, as regards the extension of objects, there is, in him who can sin, a liberty that ranges more widely than in him who cannot; but the liberty of him who cannot sin is simply more perfect. And therefore that ability is called a defect, that is, an imperfection of liberty, as many holy Fathers speak. Wherefore, in him who cannot sin there is the greater liberty, that is, the more perfect - though not the greater according to extension.

The tenth is proceeded thus. It seems that God does not have free will. St. Jerome says in the Homily on the Prodigal Son: "God alone is he in whom sin does not fall, nor can it fall; whereas the rest, since they are of free will, can be bent to either part." Therefore, since in God there is no being bent to either part, free will is not in God.

1. Moreover, free will is the faculty of reason and will by which good and evil are chosen; but God does not will evil, as has been said. Therefore free will is not in God.

But on the contrary: St. Ambrose says in the book On the Faith, "The Holy Spirit divides to each as he wills," that is, by free choice of the will, not by the constraint of necessity.

I answer that free will we have with respect to those things which we do not will of necessity or by natural instinct. For it does not pertain to free will that we will to be happy, but to natural instinct. Whence also the other animals, which are moved to something by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free will. Therefore, since God wills his own goodness of necessity, but other things not of necessity, he has free will with respect to those things which he does not will of necessity.

Note: What St. Thomas teaches here and below at q.62, a.8, must be reconciled as follows. In one place he plainly concedes that liberty truly consists in that by which man can sin; the same is handed down by St. John Damascene, De fide, c.27. But in the other solution he teaches that this is rather a defect of liberty. Both should be reconciled in this way: that to be able to sin is a part of liberty; and thus, as to extension, there is greater liberty in him who can sin than in him who cannot; but that is imperfect liberty, and therefore is called a defect, that is, an imperfection of liberty, as many holy Fathers speak. Wherefore, in him who cannot sin there is the greater liberty, that is, the more perfect - though not the greater according to extension.

Articulus XI - Whether in God the will of sign ought to be distinguished

The eleventh is proceeded thus. It seems that in God a will of sign (*voluntas signi*) ought not to be distinguished. For just as the will of God is the cause of things, so also is knowledge. But no signs are assigned on the part of the divine knowledge. Therefore neither ought any signs to be assigned on the part of the divine will.

1. Moreover, every sign which does not agree with that of which it is the sign is false. If therefore the signs which are assigned concerning the divine will do not agree with the divine will, they are false; but if they do agree, they are superfluously assigned. Therefore there ought not to be any signs assigned concerning the divine will.

But on the contrary: The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God; yet sometimes it is signified in the plural, as when it is said, "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all his wills" (Ps 110[111]:2). Therefore it is necessary that sometimes a sign of will be taken for will.

I answer that in God some things are said properly, and some metaphorically, as has been made clear above.[1430] Now when certain human passions are assumed into the divine predication metaphorically, this is done according to a likeness of effect: namely, that which is a sign of such a passion in us is metaphorically signified in God by the name of that passion. Thus, since among us those who are angry are wont to punish, for this reason the punishment itself is a sign of anger. And on this account the punishment itself is signified by the name of anger when it is attributed to God. Likewise, that which is wont to be in us a sign of will is sometimes metaphorically called will

1430. See above, q.13, a.3, especially.

in God. For instance, when someone commands something, it is a sign that he wills that it be done. Whence the divine precept is sometimes metaphorically called the will of God, according to that of Matthew 6: "Thy will be done, as in heaven and on earth."

But this differs between will and anger: anger is never said properly of God, since in its principal concept it includes passion; whereas will is said properly of God. And therefore in God the will that is properly said is distinguished from that which is said metaphorically. The will properly so called is named the will of good pleasure (*voluntas beneplaciti*). The will metaphorically so called is the will of sign (*voluntas signi*), because the sign itself is called "will."

Reply to the first: Knowledge is not the cause of those things that are done, except through will. For the things we know we do not do unless we will. And therefore a sign is not attributed to knowledge as it is attributed to will.

Reply to the second: The "wills" which are called signs of will are called "divine wills" not because they are signs that God wills, but because those things which in us are wont to be signs of willing are in God called "divine wills." Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but punishment, from the very fact that in us it is a sign of anger, is called "anger" in God.

Conclusion: In God the will of sign and of good pleasure are to be distinguished.

Articulus XII - Whether the five signs are fittingly posited concerning the divine will

The twelfth is proceeded thus. It seems that the five signs are unfittingly posited concerning the divine will, namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission. For the very same things which God commands us or counsels he sometimes operates in us; and the same things which he forbids he sometimes permits. Therefore they ought not to be divided as opposites.

1. Moreover, God does nothing unless willing, as is said in Wisdom 11. But the will of sign is distinguished from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended under the will of sign.
2. Moreover, operation and permission commonly pertain to all creatures, for in all things God operates, and in all he permits something to be done. But precept, counsel, and prohibition pertain to the rational creature alone. Therefore they do not fitly come into one division, since they are not of one order.
3. Moreover, evil happens in more modes than good: for good happens in one mode, but evil in all sorts of modes, as is clear from the Philosopher in Ethics II, and from Dionysius in De divinis nominibus IV.[1431] Therefore unfittingly with respect to evils one sign only is assigned, namely prohibition; but with respect to goods two signs, namely counsel and precept.

I answer that those are called signs of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. Now one can declare that he wills something either through himself or through another. Through himself indeed, inasmuch as he does something, either directly or indirectly and

1431. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, c. 6; Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 4.

per accidens. Directly, when he operates something by himself; and as to this it is called the sign "operation." Indirectly, inasmuch as he does not impede an operation; for he who removes an impediment is said to move per accidens, as is said in Physics VIII.[1432] And as to this it is called the sign "permission."

Through another, however, one declares that he wills something inasmuch as he orders another to do something either by necessary inducement - which happens by commanding what one wills, and by prohibiting the contrary - or by persuasive inducement, which pertains to counsel. Because therefore by these modes it is declared that someone wills something, for this reason these five are sometimes named by the name of the divine will, as signs of will. That precept, counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is evident from that which is said in Matthew 6: "Thy will be done, as in heaven and on earth." But that permission or operation are called the will of God is evident from St. Augustine, who says in the Enchiridion: "Nothing is done unless the Omnipotent wills that it be done, either by permitting it to be done or by doing it."[1433] Or it can be said that permission and operation are referred to the present - permission indeed to evil, but operation to good; and to the future, with respect to necessary good, precept; but with respect to superabundant good, counsel.

Reply to the first: Nothing prevents one and the same matter from being declared in diverse modes that one wills something. Thus many names are found signifying the same thing. Whence nothing prevents the same thing from lying under precept and counsel and operation, prohibition, or permission.

Reply to the second: Just as God can be signified metaphorically to will that which he does not will by will properly taken, so can he metaphorically be signified to will that which he properly wills. Whence nothing prevents about the same thing both the will of good pleasure and the will of sign. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; not, however, precept or counsel - both because this (operation) concerns the present, that (precept or counsel) the future; and because this (operation) is per se an effect of the will, that (precept or counsel) is through another, as has been said.

Reply to the third: The rational creature is master of its act. And therefore concerning it some special signs of the divine will are assigned, inasmuch as God orders the rational creature to act voluntarily and by itself. But other creatures do not act except as moved by the divine operation. And therefore concerning the others there is place only for operation and permission.

Reply to the fourth: All evil of fault, although it happens in many ways, yet agrees in this, that it is discordant with the divine will. And therefore one sign is assigned with respect to evils, namely prohibition. But goods are related in diverse ways to the divine goodness. For some are such without which we cannot attain the fruition of the divine goodness; and with respect to these there

1432. Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 32.
1433. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 95 (at the end), in tom. 3.

is precept. But some are those by which we attain it more perfectly; and with respect to these there is counsel. Or one may say that counsel is not only about better goods to be obtained, but also about lesser evils to be avoided.

Conclusion: By five signs the will of God, which is called "of sign," is recognized; which are enumerated in the text.

Concerning both articles, let what we said above in disputation 83, chapter ..., suffice.[1434]

Quaestio XX - On the love of God

There must next be considered those things which pertain absolutely to the will of God. Now in the appetitive part there are found in us both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like, and the habits of moral virtues, as justice, fortitude, and the like. Whence first we shall consider the love of God. Secondly, the justice of God and his mercy. Concerning the first, four things are asked.

After St. Thomas in the preceding question has treated of the will of God, and in what manner it is borne to objects - whether freely or of necessity, and whether to one on account of another, etc. - he proceeds to dispute about the various affections which correspond to the passions of our appetite and will, and which by scholastic theologians and philosophers are called the passions of the soul: such as love, hatred, joy, delight, etc. Of these, however, he disputes in this question in general, just as in the First Part of the Second (I-II) q.22 he disputes about our passions before he treats of the virtues. Afterwards indeed in this First Part, q.21, he treats of the affections of the will, inasmuch as by us they are studiously and according to virtue constituted, namely of mercy and justice.

Articulus I - Whether love is in God

The first is proceeded thus. It seems that love is not in God. For there is no passion in God. But love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God.

1. Moreover, love, anger, sadness, and the like are divided against one another. But sadness and anger are not said of God except metaphorically. Therefore neither is love.
2. Moreover, Pseudo-Dionysius says in De divinis nominibus IV: Love is a unitive and concretive force. But this cannot have place in God, since he is simple. Therefore in God there is not love.[1435]

But on the contrary: It is said, "God is love" (1 John 4).

I answer that it is necessary to posit love in God. For the first movement of the will (*voluntas*), and of any appetitive power whatsoever, is love. Since the act of the will and of any appetitive power tends to good and to evil, according to their proper objects; but good is the principal, and of

1434. See above, disputation 83, chapter ... (as cited by the author).
1435. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 4.

itself is the object of will and appetite; whereas evil is secondary and on account of another, inasmuch as it is opposed to the good; it is necessary that the acts of will and appetite which regard the good be naturally prior to those which regard evil; and thus the first movement...[1436]

Concerning both articles let what we said above in Disputation 83, chapter 1, suffice.

Then we must consider those things which absolutely pertain to the will (*voluntas*) of God. Now on the appetitive side there are found in us both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude, and the like. Hence, first we shall consider the love of God. Secondly, the justice and mercy of God.

Regarding the first, four things are asked.

Whether love is in God

Objicitur 1. It seems that there is not love in God. For the cognitive power does not move unless by means of the appetitive; but in God there is no appetitive power distinct from the intellect, as was said above. Therefore in God there is not love.

Objicitur 2. Further, love, anger, and the like are passions in us; but passions do not befit God. Therefore in God there is not love.

Objicitur 3. Further, Pseudo-Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, chapter 4, that love is a unitive and concretive force.[1437] But this cannot have place in God, since he is simple. Therefore in God there is not love.

But on the contrary: It is said, "God is charity" (1 John 4).

I answer that it is necessary to posit love in God. For the first movement of the will (*voluntas*), and of any appetitive power whatsoever, is love. Since the act of the will and of any appetitive power tends to good and to evil, as to their proper objects; but good is more principal and of itself the object of will and appetite, whereas evil is secondary and on account of another, inasmuch as it is opposed to the good; it is necessary that the acts of will and appetite which regard the good be naturally prior to those which regard evil - joy than sadness, and love than hatred. For what is per se is always prior to what is per aliud. Again, what is more common is naturally prior. Hence the intellect has by priority an order to common truth rather than to certain particular truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite which regard the good under some special condition; thus joy and delight are of the present and possessed good; whereas desire and hope are of the good not yet attained. But love regards the good in common, whether it be possessed or not possessed. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite. And on this account all the other movements of appetite presuppose love as their first root. For no one desires anything except a beloved good; nor does anyone rejoice except in a beloved good. Hatred too is only of that which is contrary to the thing loved. And likewise sadness and the rest of this sort are manifestly referred

1436. The continuation is taken up in the sequel.
1437. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 4.

to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whatever there is will or appetite, there must be love; for when the first is removed, the others are removed. But it has been shown above that there is will in God. Therefore it is necessary to posit love in him.

Reply to the first: A cognitive power does not move unless by means of the appetitive; and just as in us the universal reason moves by means of particular reason, as is said in De Anima III, so the intellectual appetite, which is called will, moves in us by means of the sensitive appetite. Hence the proximate mover of the body in us is the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is always accompanied by some transmutation of the body, and especially around the heart, which is the first principle of movement in an animal. Thus then the acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have an annexed bodily transmutation, are called passions; but not the acts of the will. Therefore love, and joy, and delight - insofar as they signify acts of the sensitive appetite - are passions; but not insofar as they signify acts of the intellectual appetite. And thus they are posited in God. Hence the Philosopher says in Ethics VII that God rejoices with one simple operation, and by the same reason he loves without passion.[1438]

Reply to the second: In the passions of the sensitive appetite one must consider something quasi-material, namely the bodily transmutation; and something quasi-formal, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as is said in De Anima I, the material is an ignition of the blood around the heart, or something of this sort; but the formal is the appetite of vengeance.[1439] Yet again, on the part of that which is formal in some of these there is designated some imperfection; as in desire, which is of a good not possessed; and in sadness, which is of an evil possessed; and the same is the account of anger, which presupposes sadness. But some designate no imperfection, as love and joy. Since therefore none of these befits God according to that which is material in them, as has been said, those which import imperfection cannot befit God even formally, except metaphorically on account of a likeness of effect, as was said above. But those which do not import imperfection are said of God properly, as love and joy, yet without passion, as has been said.

Reply to the third: The act of love always tends to two things, namely to the good which one wills to someone, and to him to whom one wills the good. For to love someone is properly this, to will good to him. Hence in that whereby one loves himself, he wills good to himself; and thus he seeks to unite to himself that good insofar as he can. And for this reason love is called a unitive force even in God, but without composition: because that good which he wills to himself is not other than he himself, who is by his essence good, as has been shown above. But in that wherein one loves another, he wills good to him; and thus he uses him as himself, referring the good to him as to himself. And for this reason love is called a concretive force, because it aggregates another to itself, bearing itself towards him as towards itself. And thus also the divine love is a concretive force without composition, which is in God - insofar as he wills goods to others.

1438. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII, last chapter.
1439. Aristotle, De anima I; cf. also III, on the sensitive appetites and passions.

Conclusion: It is affirmative, and of faith: "So God loved the world," etc. (John 3:16); "I have loved you with an everlasting charity" (Jeremiah 31:3). These testimonies, and the like concerning the love of God, are to be understood according to the propriety of the expression, without metaphor, as will be made clear in the following disputation.

Articulus II - Whether God loves all things

Objicitur 1. It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Pseudo-Dionysius in On the Divine Names, chapter 4, love places the lover outside himself and in a certain way transfers him into the beloved.[1440] But it is unfitting to say that God is placed outside himself and transferred into other things. Therefore it is unfitting to say that God loves things other than himself.

Objicitur 2. Further, the love of God is eternal. But those things which are other than God are not from eternity except in God. Therefore God does not love them except in himself; but according to the fact that they are in him, they are not other than he. Therefore God does not love things other than himself.

Objicitur 3. Further, there is a twofold love, namely of concupiscence and of friendship. But God does not love irrational creatures with the love of concupiscence, because he needs nothing outside himself; nor yet with the love of friendship, because friendship cannot be had towards irrational things, as is clear from the Philosopher in Ethics VIII.[1441] Therefore God does not love all things.

Objicitur 4. Further, in the Psalm it is said: "You hate all who work iniquity" (Ps 5:6). But nothing is at once both hated and loved. Therefore God does not love all things.

But on the contrary: It is said in Wisdom 11: "You love all things that are, and you hate nothing of the things which you have made."

I answer that God loves all existing things. For all things that exist, insofar as they are, are good. For the very existence (*esse*) of any thing whatsoever is a certain good, and likewise every perfection of it. But it has been shown above that the will of God is the cause of all things. And thus it is necessary that a thing have so much existence, or any good whatsoever, insofar as it is willed by God. Therefore to every thing that exists God wills some good. Hence, since to love is nothing other than to will good to someone, it is manifest that God loves all things that are - not, however, in the same mode as we do. For our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by an object; our love, by which we will a good to someone, is not the cause of his goodness, but conversely his goodness, whether true or esteemed, provokes love, by which we will that the good which he has be preserved to him, and that what he does not have be added; and to this we set ourselves to work. But the love of God infuses and creates goodness in things.

1440. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 4.
1441. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII, cc. 2 and 11, on friendship.

Reply to the first: The lover is said to be outside himself and transferred into the beloved insofar as he wills good to the beloved and operates through his providence for him, just as for himself. Hence Pseudo-Dionysius says in the same place in On the Divine Names: One must dare to say the truth, that he also, the cause of all, by the abundance of amative goodness, goes out beyond himself to all existing things, providing for them.[1442]

Reply to the second: Although creatures were not from eternity except in God, yet by the fact that they were from eternity in God, from eternity God knew things in their proper natures. And by the same reason he loved them. Just as we by the likenesses of things which are in us know things existing in themselves.

Reply to the third: Friendship cannot be had except towards rational creatures, in whom there can be mutual love and communication in the works of life, and with whom it can turn out well or ill according to fortune and happiness; and to such properly belongs benevolence. But irrational creatures cannot pertain either to the love of friendship towards God, or to a communication of the intellectual and blessed life whereby God lives. Therefore, properly speaking, God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship, but with the love of concupiscence, insofar as he ordains them to rational creatures and also to himself - not as if he needed them, but on account of his goodness and our advantage. For we desire something both for ourselves and for others.

Reply to the fourth: Nothing prevents one and the same thing according to one aspect from being loved, and according to another from being held in hatred. Now God loves sinners insofar as they are beings; for thus they are, and are from him. But insofar as they are sinners, they are not, but fall short of being; and this in them is not from God. Hence in this respect they are held in hatred by him.

The conclusion of the article is: God loves all things that exist. And this also is of faith from Wisdom 11: "You love all things that are, and you hate nothing of the things which you have made." Why St. Thomas adds "that exist," we shall state also in the following disputation.

Disputatio LXXXIV - On the affections of the will of God in general

Caput I - Which affections do not befit God

Among the passions of the soul, or affections of the will, which are wont to be enumerated in general, some without controversy do not befit God; about others, however, there is some difficulty. Now the affections of the soul, whether looking to the concupiscible or to the irascible, are in number particularly, as is gathered from St. Thomas in the First of the Second, question 23 and the following: namely, love and hatred; desire and flight; hope, despair, and fear; joy or delight, and sadness.[1443] Of these, first, desire and flight, insofar as they are referred to one's own

1442. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 4: "Audendum est autem pro veritate dicere, quod et ipse, omnium causa, per abundantiam amativae bonitatis, extra seipsum fit ad omnia existentia providens."

1443. Cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I - II, q. 23.

proper good, are not found in God: since, because God possesses every good and for him there is no future, it follows that he can neither desire a good nor flee an evil that will be future; and in this sense St. Thomas speaks in the solution. But if desire and flight of the good and evil of others be compared (for we not only desire good for ourselves, but also for others), thus surely such an affection can be attributed to God. For us he ardently desires the good, that is, that we live justly and piously, as we said in Disputation 83, chapter 2, from St. John Chrysostom; and he flees the opposite, namely a wicked and shameful life, which he sees will be in us.[1444]

Secondly, hope and despair in no way befit God. Some indeed prove this thus: both because hope is of a certain arduous and difficult thing; but for God nothing is of this sort: and also because hope is not about that which is evidently known to be future, since when Paul says in Romans 8, "Hope that is seen is not hope; for what a man sees, why does he hope for? But if we hope for that which we do not see, we wait for it with patience" - but God evidently knows every future. Yet these reasons are not efficacious.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod licet creaturae ab aeterno non fuerint nisi in God, tamen per hoc quod ab aeterno in God fuerint, ab aeterno God knew things in their proper natures. And for the same reason He loved. Just as we too, by the likenesses of things which are in us, know things as they exist in themselves

Ad tertium dicendum, quod friendship (*amicitia*) cannot be had except toward rational creatures, in whom it is possible that there be mutual love returned, and a sharing in the works of life; and to whom it can befall to fare well or ill according to fortune and happiness; and toward them too there is properly benevolence. But irrational creatures cannot pertain either to loving God, or to a sharing of the intellectual and blessed life in which God lives. Therefore, properly speaking, God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship, but with the love of concupiscence, inasmuch as He orders them to rational creatures, and also to Himself - not as though He needed them, but on account of His own goodness and our usefulness. For we desire something both for ourselves and for others

Ad quartum dicendum, quod nothing prevents one and the same thing from being loved in one respect and held in hatred in another. Now God loves sinners inasmuch as they are certain natures; for thus they are, and are from Him. But inasmuch as they are sinners, they are not, but fall short of *esse* (existence); and this in them is not from God. Wherefore, in this respect, they are held in hatred by Him

Conclusio articuli est, that God loves all things which exist. This also is of faith from Wisdom 11: "You love all things that are, and You hate nothing of the things You have made" (Sap. 11). Why indeed St. Thomas refers God's love only to existing things, we shall also say in the following disputation.

Inter passiones animi, seu voluntatis affectus, qui generatim enumerari solent, quaedam sine controversia do not befit God; but about others there is somewhat of difficulty. Now the affections of the soul, whether they regard the concupiscible, or the irascible, are in number especially nine,

1444. See Disputatio 83, c. 2; cf. St. John Chrysostom, passim.

as is gathered by St. Thomas: for they are love and hatred, desire and flight, hope and despair, fear, joy or delight, and sadness. Of these, first desire and flight, inasmuch as they are referred to one's own good, are not found in God: because, since God has every good, and nothing is future to Him, it follows that He can neither desire a good nor flee an evil future to Himself; and in this sense St. Thomas speaks in the reply to the second. Nevertheless, if desire and flight be understood with respect to the good and evil of others (for we not only desire a future good for ourselves and flee a future evil for ourselves, but also for others), thus both affections can be attributed to God. For He ardently desires for us the good, namely, that we live justly and piously, as we said in Disputatio 83, cap. 2, from St. John Chrysostom,[1445] and He flees the contrary - namely a wicked and flagitious life - inasmuch as He sees it to be future in us.

Secundo, hope and despair in no way befit God. Certain persons try to prove this in a twofold way: first, because hope is about the arduous and difficult; but for God nothing is of that sort: then also because hope is not about that which is evidently known to be future - for, as Paul says in Romans 8, "Hope that is seen is not hope; for what a man sees, why does he hope for? But if we hope for that which we do not see, we wait for it with patience" - but God evidently knows every future. Yet these reasons are not efficacious.

Prior ratio refellitur: for hope can also be about the easy; it does not differ from desire in that hope is about what is difficult, and desire about whatever future thing; for desire too can be occupied about the difficult, for indeed the more difficult things are, the more ardently we are wont to desire; but because desire can be without believing that what is desired will be, indeed even if someone most firmly believes the opposite will be, he can still have desire; whereas hope cannot be unless what is desired is thought and believed to be future. And this is one account of the difference between these affections.

Reijicitur posterior: that God evidently knows what will be does not hinder these affections from being attributed to Him. For true despair can be of that which is evidently known not to be future. If, for instance, someone by the authority of certain mathematicians hoped that an eclipse, which indeed was going to happen, would not be going to happen, and thus despaired, afterwards when he evidently knows that it will be future, he will despair that it will not be. What Paul says does not gainsay this doctrine: for therefore he denies hope of that which "is seen," because what is now seen, and by the very vision is in a certain manner possessed, is not hoped for; for by the very vision it ought to be possessed. For when something is hoped for, after it is had, it is no longer hoped for. For hope is of a future thing and not yet had. But we contend that that can indeed be hoped for which is indeed known to be future, and that despair about the same can likewise be.

Verior ratio: therefore in God the affections of hope and despair do not obtain, because hope looks to that from which a thing is hoped, as to a superior and more powerful one who can grant what is hoped for; and in this the formal ratio of the object of this affection consists: for no one is

1445. See Disputatio 83, c. 2; cf. St. John Chrysostom, passim.

said properly to hope from himself; and perhaps in this consists the ratio of difficulty which St. Thomas says pertains to the object of hope;[1446] but God can have of none this sort of hope or despair; rather only desire and flight, as was explained above.

Tertio, fear and sadness are not found in God; for these are passions about an evil in a special way. Fear is about a future evil which in some way is believed or is doubted to be future; sadness truly is about a present evil; and although even fear and sadness can be of the evil of a friend, future or present, nevertheless they are of it as apprehended as if it were one's own; and hence our nature is such that it even stirs and moves a passion of the appetite. But although the evil of ours, future or present, displeases God, nevertheless He never apprehends it as if it were His own - which seems necessary for the ratio of fear and sadness about the good of a friend. Some think therefore that there is not in God sadness and pain, because nothing can happen against His will; however, I shall impugn this opinion below in Disputatio 141, cap. 1. Still, we said that in God there is desire of our future good and flight from evil, because for the ratio of these affections it is not necessary that the good or evil be apprehended as one's own. Between fear and flight from future evil this is the difference: that flight can be of an evil which is apprehended as future, even if it is not believed to be future; but fear must be of a future evil which is believed to be future.

Caput II - On the love of God

Now let us speak about the other affections which are attributed to God, none of which include any imperfection in their formal ratio: for those which we say befit God must be assigned so that in their formal ratio they contain no imperfection; but if they have annexed some imperfection, such as the bodily perturbation that is in human affections, that must not be granted to God; yet the nature itself and formal ratio of the affection ought not to be denied to Him. Such, according to the opinion of all, is love (*amor*), which formally is the affection by which we will some good for someone - not considering the account of future or even present, but considering the thing itself according to itself; which, although essentially in every prosecuting affection it is in some way included, as will be explained at I-II, q. 24, art. 1,[1447] nevertheless it can of itself be an act formally distinct from all the others, inasmuch as it tends toward the thing according to itself abstracted from present and future. This therefore is no less properly to be attributed to God than the ratio of will (*voluntas*) and intellect (*intellectus*). For, according to the sentence of Aristotle, Rhetoric II, c. 4, to love is to will a good to someone, and to have complacency in him; therefore, to love no less properly befits God than to will.[1448]

Porro, since in the same act of love there is a twofold respect, as St. Thomas teaches at I, q. 20, art. 4, and Cajetan in the same place, and Ferrarien. against the Gentiles, cap. 91: one respect is toward the thing for which we will a good; the other is toward the good itself which we will - by reason of the former it is called the love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*), by reason of the latter it is called the love of concupiscence; not indeed as a twofold act of love, but in the same act a twofold

1446. St. Thomas, on the object of hope, ad loc. (cf. I-II, q. 40).
1447. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 24, a. 1.
1448. Aristotle, Rhetoric II, c. 4.

respect. And since each must necessarily be found in God, if the integral ratio of love agrees to God, there is a difficulty whether the love of God, inasmuch as it is called love of friendship, can be referred to irrational creatures, or only inasmuch as it is love of concupiscence it is terminated to them.

Ratio dubitandi: because that is said to be loved with the love of friendship which is loved for its own sake to which we will a good as it is the good of it; but God wills a good to an irrational creature as its good is not its own; therefore He loves it not with the love of friendship.

I judge, however, that the love of God, inasmuch as it is love of friendship, cannot be referred to irrational things; but it is terminated to them only inasmuch as it is love of concupiscence. This sentence is expressly set down by St. Thomas in this article in the reply to the third; and in Scotus, III, dist. 32, q. 1, ad 2; Durandus, q. 1; Paludanus, q. 3, 2, 3; Gabriel, q. 1, a. 1, note 2 and art. 2, concl. 3; Capreolus, in I, dist. 45, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 11; and it is clearly proved from the doctrine of Aristotle, Ethic. VIII, c. 2, and St. Thomas, Contra gentiles, cap. 91, reason 2: they say that we do not love irrational things with the love of friendship, even if we will some good to them, as the preservation of wine; because the irrational thing and its good is loved as the good of rational beings, for whom by their nature irrational things serve; and therefore Aristotle says that all irrational things are always loved per accidens and therefore, since they are referred to the divine will, they cannot be the object of the love of friendship or of benevolence.[1449] Since love of benevolence is a certain beginning of friendship, as Aristotle says, Ethic. IX, cap. 5, and irrational things therefore cannot be the object of friendship, they cannot even be the object of benevolence; whence, in Ethic. ad Eudemum, lib. 7, cap. 8, Aristotle teaches that love of benevolence is the beginning of friendship: "for it is," he says, "a certain affection by which one desires a good for another because of his virtue, not because of one's own usefulness or pleasure. For otherwise (he says) among the upright there would not be benevolence; rather it would follow," says Aristotle, "that we love beasts with the love of benevolence" - something he rightly judges absurd, and which the manifest fact shows as well. Because sometimes we are affected by beasts fighting in the arena, and yet we do not on that account love them with the love of benevolence or friendship: for we are affected toward them because of our own usefulness or advantage. Therefore, since God loves all inanimate and irrational things not on account of themselves, but because of our usefulness or advantage, it follows that they cannot be the object of the love of friendship and of benevolence, but only of concupiscence. Therefore man alone, with whom true friendship can be entered, can be the object of the love of friendship and benevolence; which is a certain beginning of friendship. This differs from the love of friendship because love can be on the side of one alone toward that with which friendship can be contracted, whereas friendship is a mutual love on both sides of souls, and confirmed by benefits; about which more largely at II-II, q. 23, art. 1, as Aristotle delivers in Ethics IX, cap. 5. For this reason, in Book 3 On Adoration I proved that irrational things cannot be the complete terminus of adoration, just as neither of love as friendship or benevolence.[1450]

1449. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII, c. 2; St. Thomas, Contra gentiles, c. 91.
1450. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IX, c. 5; Eudemian Ethics VII, c. 8.

The same, which we have said about love, must be said about the affections of joy and delight: namely, that they must be formally attributed to God, not only about the good of another; for God also rejoices and is delighted about our good; but also about His own good: for this affection is of a present good as present, and therefore God can rejoice not only about our good but about His own good; whereas He has desire only of our good as future, since desire is of a future, but for Himself there is nothing future, as for us.

Caput III - That the affection of hatred befits God

Aliqui nonnulli among the Scholastics raise a controversy whether the affection of hatred (*odium*) can be properly assigned to God. For St. Thomas, I, Contra gentiles, cap. 99, and Ferrarien. there, and Capreolus in I, dist. 45, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 8, teach that in God there is not properly hatred. They prove this first with respect to sin itself; because hatred properly is referred to a subsisting -

They prove this, in the second place, as to the sinner's not being the object of hatred for God, because the will of God cannot be borne toward evil as evil; but to hold someone in hatred is to will him evil as it is his evil: therefore God cannot hate anyone. Wherefore, when God inflicts evil on someone, the will of God is borne toward that evil insofar as it has some notion of good, namely the manifestation of His justice toward sinners. Therefore God rather wills to show His justice than to inflict evil as it is evil. And since Scripture says more often that God hates sin itself and sinners, they think this must be understood metaphorically: because God comports Himself toward sinners like one who hates, when He inflicts evil upon them; whereas toward sin, which He hates, He desires that it not be.

But I, for my part, judge that, according to proper signification, hatred befits God, not only of sin, but also of the sinner: that is, both hatred of abomination and of enmity. And St. Thomas in article 2, to the fourth reply, plainly and without any limitation taught that God hates sinners, not insofar as they are His creatures, but insofar as by sin they fall away from rectitude.[1451] Wherefore I think that all the places of Scripture which attribute hatred to God are to be understood not metaphorically, but properly. But that we may explain and confirm this opinion, a certain division and definition of hatred must be noted, which Cajetan very accurately hands down: one, he says, is hatred of abomination; another, hatred of enmity.[1452] Hatred of abomination is a displeasure at an evil which we ourselves suffer, or others; but hatred of enmity is to will someone an evil, insofar as it is his evil, out of displeasure at the person.

Cajetan then explains the difference between love and hatred, and his observation is indeed noteworthy: for in the same act of love, which is nothing other than to will some good to someone, there are found a twofold respect after the mode of affirmation, pursuit, and complacency. One respect is toward the person, by reason of which it is called love of friendship; the other is toward the thing itself, or toward the good willed to the person, from which it is called love of

1451. St. Thomas, article 2, reply to the fourth (ad 4) on God's hatred of sinners.
1452. Cajetan, In I - II, q. 29, a. 1, on the division of hatred into that of abomination and that of enmity.

concupiscence. And never is there found any act of love, by which we will some good to someone, without these two respects. But that twofold hatred can constitute a twofold act. For hatred of enmity is in one act, by which we will someone an evil, as it is his evil, out of displeasure at the person; and in this act there is a twofold respect, otherwise than in love. There is indeed a respect toward the person, and this is after the mode of negation and flight, and it constitutes the act by reason of displeasure and of hatred of enmity. There is also a respect toward the evil we desire for the person, and that is regarded after the mode of affirmation and complacency, just as love regards the thing desired; yet it does not constitute an act of love, because the respect of complacency toward the person is lacking.

But hatred of abomination is a displeasure at the evil of some person, as when my own death displeases me, or that of a friend; and this act likewise has a twofold respect, one toward the person after the mode of affirmation and complacency, from which it is essentially love of friendship (as we shall say when treating with St. Thomas of contrition), the other toward the evil after the mode of negation and flight, or displeasure, from which it has the notion of hatred of abomination. Therefore to hate something with hatred of abomination is to will that no evil befall someone. Accordingly St. Thomas, defining love and hatred in general, says: love is the consonance of appetite with good; but hatred is the dissonance of appetite with evil, insofar as it appears hurtful and repugnant.[1453]

On these foundations it is easy for me to show that each kind of hatred befits God properly. First indeed, as to hatred of abomination, it ought to be judged indubitable: sin no less properly displeases God, and He would not have it done by man, than He desires justice and a right life for man, and the rest. But sin displeases for a twofold reason, both as contrary to Himself, and as harmful to man: therefore in each way He hates sin, both from complacency in Himself and from complacency in man; just as we hate death - our own or that of a friend - from complacency in ourselves or in our friend. Hence it also easily appears how weak was the first argument of the opposing opinion: for if hatred be of abomination, then according to the notion of hatred it is not necessarily referred to a subsistence, but to evil itself. Indeed, as is clear from the definition, hatred of abomination, when referred to a subsistent thing, bears the notion of complacency and of love, as has been said; yet since it is displeasure at evil itself, it has the true and proper notion of hatred: otherwise neither would we properly be said to hate sin when we grieve over it - which is absurd

Then, as to hatred of enmity, the same is proved: since God not only wills the sinner the punishment, but also wills to him that as it is his evil, and from displeasure at him; therefore He pursues him with hatred of enmity, as is clearly gathered from the very definition of hatred of enmity. Moreover, it is clear that from displeasure at the person God wills that evil. For although the person himself, insofar as he is a man and a creature of God, does not displease God, yet he displeases insofar as he is stained by sins: and for there to be hatred of a creature - that is, to will evil to him - it suffices if the sinner displease in some respect, and by reason of that the affection be moved to will him evil as it is his evil. Nor is it necessary for the notion of hatred of enmity that the

1453. St. Thomas, In I - II, q. 29, a. 1, definition of love and hatred.

evil willed to the person be his evil for the very reason for which the person displeases; but that it truly be his evil, and be so willed out of displeasure at him under this or that aspect. Whence a judge who, because of a crime, punishes someone because it is just, and detests him as a criminal, truly and properly has hatred of enmity - not from displeasure at the person as he is this man, or by some other private reason, but because he is a criminal: and for that reason such hatred is according to virtue.

Moreover, that by inflicting punishment for the crime God wills the sinner an evil as it is his evil is evident: for He inflicts death upon him and other evils, insofar as they have the true notion of punishment; but punishment, as punishment, is the evil of him who suffers it: therefore God wills the sinner evil as it is his evil, and from displeasure at him. This will be made more perspicuous in the solution of the latter argument which Ferrariensis adduced. For explaining that, the doctrine must be observed which we shall set out more fully in the First Part of the Second, question 8, article 4, namely, in what way that common axiom is true: The will is of good alone - "will" here meaning not the faculty, but the affection under the mode of pursuit.[1454] Now it is necessary to distinguish in the object of the will the thing willed and the reason for willing it. If we speak of the thing willed, it is not only good, but also evil as evil, not only another's but also one's own, from displeasure either at another's or at one's own person. But the reason for willing is always some goodness, whether one's own or a friend's. For such is the nature of the will, that it prefers the friend's good to one's own good, and judges that honorable, and according to right reason.

So too in vision: there is the thing that is seen, as a wall; and the reason for seeing, as color; but in a different manner than in the will. For the material which is seen is not seen distinctly and in itself, but through another, namely through color. But the will per se and expressly wills this or that thing, this or that evil; the reason for willing, however, is a goodness conjoined. In this way we can not only distinctly and expressly will evil to another, as it is evil, from displeasure at the person; but even to ourselves, from displeasure at ourselves. With this holy hatred we pursue our very selves when we consider that we have sinned against God; and from displeasure at ourselves we inflict on ourselves the evil of punishment as it is evil; yet the reason for willing this evil is the goodness which we consider in the very infliction of the punishment.

Hence the solution is evident to the later argument of Ferrariensis and of St. Thomas. For when it is commonly said that the will cannot be borne toward evil, and in a special way the divine will: it must be understood thus, that even toward the evil of punishment the will is not borne except by reason of some conjoined goodness; whereas toward the evil of fault, the human will indeed cannot be borne except in the same way; but the divine will in no way can tend thereto, not even under some notion of good. From this, however, it does not follow that God cannot pursue the sinner with hatred of enmity. For man, as a sinner, displeases God; and for that reason God judges it good to inflict punishment on him as it is his evil. Because in this He considers some good: therefore His will can sufficiently be borne toward that evil out of hatred of enmity. And the fact that in it He considers the notion of the good of justice, or something else, does not prevent His willing that evil

1454. St. Thomas, In I - II, q. 8, a. 4, on the axiom "the will is of good" and how the will regards evil of punishment.

from displeasure at the person from being truly and properly hatred of enmity. For to the notion of hatred it is not required that the evil of punishment be willed without any notion of good in it; for this is impossible even in us; and therefore, if that were required, the affection of hatred could not exist in us. It is enough, then, if the evil is expressly willed from displeasure at the person, that the affection truly have the notion of hatred of enmity.

Further, it must be observed that the goodness and benignity of God toward us is so great that we cannot displease Him for any other reason except insofar as we disfigure His image in ourselves by sins; and for this sole reason can He pursue us with hatred and will us evil as our evil. The reason is that we cannot be in any other way adverse and contrary to God than by reason of sin. But one man can in many ways hate another and will him evil from displeasure at him, because in many ways he can deem him his adversary.

Caput IV - On the wrath of God

Whether the affection of wrath properly be found in God is a disputed question; on which matter Lactantius published a special book, in which indeed, chapter 4, he says that Epicurus was in error, in holding that in God there is neither grace, that is, love, nor wrath; wherefore they fashioned God as if without sense, who would neither approve what is good nor punish what is evil: which cannot be ascribed to anything but a stupor and torpor that must be judged insensible.

If the Stoics had denied not only will and providence, but wrath in such a way that they also denied that evils are to be punished, they would have judged perversely indeed. But if they denied the affection of wrath according to proper signification, their opinion would not on that side have deserved any mark of censure: for insofar as they also took away love from God, their error was manifest.

The Stoics' error, according to the same Lactantius, chapter 5: they attributed love to God but denied wrath, lest they posit in Him any perturbation of mind. Wherefore Lactantius thinks that they so removed the vindication of evils from God as to make Him decree nothing against the wicked; which is to make God renounce vengeance upon evils - something Scripture everywhere most plainly proclaims, as Lactantius excellently shows.

Therefore Lactantius, that he might avoid their errors, in many chapters taught that there is in God indeed wrath, but proper wrath, which he held to be nothing other than the will of punishing sins. He rejected the definitions of other philosophers; and in chapter 17 he defines wrath thus: it is a movement of mind that arises to coerce sinners. Since therefore in God there is such an affection, as is plainly gathered from Scripture, he concluded that wrath befits Him according to its proper and formal notion, although, of course, fury and the vicious kind of wrath, and that which is conjoined with perturbation of mind, are not to be attributed to God. Nevertheless the testimonies of Scripture are not to be explained by trope and figure so as to attribute to God wrath and fury together with perturbation.

But far more truly it is held that the affection of wrath is not found in God, not only as to bodily commotion and perturbation, but also as to its own formal notion; and this is the common doctrine of the Theologians and of the Fathers. Among the scholastic writers I have read no other besides St. Thomas in the solution to the second objection of article 2 of this question who expressly teaches this;[1455] but there is none who asserts the opposite, and in the schools the opinion of the Holy Doctor is most received. Among the Fathers indeed there are countless ones who affirm that this affection, like feet, hands, and the other members, must be attributed to God according to a metaphor. In truth, they seem to have had regard not so much to the formal notion of the affection as to the bodily perturbation which is conjoined to it. Thus, among the Greeks: Origen, homily 2 on Judges, chapter 2, toward the end; and on that text of Romans 1, "The wrath of God is revealed"; and book 4 Against Celsus, expounding that of Deuteronomy 23, "He accommodated Himself to your manners"; Epiphanius, Heresy 38, after the middle; St. John Chrysostom, in the sermon on penance, not far from the end, in the tomes; St. Gregory Nazianzen, in the iambic poem 21; St. Basil, on that Psalm 37 "Neither in Thy wrath reprove me," well after the middle; St. Cyril, book 5 Against Julian, after the middle; St. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, book 1, chapter 14. Among the Latins: St. Cyprian, On Mortality, toward the end; St. Ambrose, on that Psalm 37 "O Lord, rebuke me not in Thy fury"; St. Jerome, on that Psalm; St. Augustine, in many places.[1456]

Some [names] contain imperfection, which cannot befit God; wherefore we said above in disputation 22 that all the things said of God, according to the sentence of certain Fathers, are said in some way by transference; yet some in a peculiar way befit God even analogically, which, in their formal notion (*ratio formalis*), however abstract, denote imperfection, as the Angelic Doctor very well observed in the solution to the second objection; for example, temperance, which formally consists in choosing a mean in food and drink and in repressing excessive delectation of taste. It must be said otherwise of wisdom, which, although in man is an accident, yet according to an analogical notion is also properly called the very substance of God wisdom.[1457]

Now then it remains to be seen whether the affection of anger, according to its formal and intrinsic notion, has some imperfection, or not: but this must be judged from the object about which it is conversant. For wisdom is conversant about the true, which can thus be the object of wisdom that is an accident, namely created wisdom, just as of wisdom that is a substance, namely uncreated. But temperance, because it has as its object and matter about which it has a mean, food and drink, cannot properly befit a spirit. Therefore, since anger is conversant about an object

1455. St. Thomas, in this question, article 2, solution to the second objection, explicitly denying wrath in God according to its formal notion.

1456. Greek Fathers: Origen, Hom. 2 on Judges c. 2 (toward the end); on Rom 1 ("Revelatur ira Dei"); Contra Celsum IV, on Deut 23; Epiphanius, Haer. 38 (after the middle); St. John Chrysostom, Sermon on Penance (near the end, in the tomes); St. Gregory Nazianzen, Carmen iambicum 21; St. Basil, on Ps 37 ("Neque in ira tua corripias me," well after the middle); St. Cyril, Contra Julianum V (after the middle); St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 14. Latin Fathers: St. Cyprian, De mortalitate (toward the end); St. Ambrose, on Ps 37 ("Domine, ne in furore tuo"); St. Jerome, on the same Psalm; St. Augustine, passim.

1457. Aristotle, De anima I, c. 1, text 16; Rhetoric II, c. 2 and c. 4.

which, being comparative and with a certain relation, of necessity includes imperfection, it ought not to be attributed to God according to propriety. This imperfection is clearly gathered from the definition which the philosophers hand down.

First, Aristotle, On the Soul I, c. 1, text 16, hands down a twofold definition of anger: one which he himself calls "by matter," which explains anger through its effect and bodily perturbation, in this way: "Anger is the heat or boiling up of the blood or of the heat about the heart"; the other, which declares the very formal notion of anger, thus: "It is an appetite of inflicting pain in turn upon the adversary."[1457] From this latter definition - itself uncontroverted - it is clear that anger, according to its formal notion, does not befit God, unless we should wish to devise another notion of it without foundation. Now, as St. Thomas well noted and as is gathered from the posterior definition handed down by Aristotle, he who is angry has first suffered sadness or pain inflicted by another, which he seeks to repay to him; but Lactantius contends that anger depends upon such sadness; yet God cannot suffer sadness from another, however much He be offended by sins; therefore, when He punishes sins, He is not properly angry, but by the very effect He so carries Himself as if He were angry. Nor indeed is the foregoing definition Aristotle's alone, although his authority by itself ought to suffice for us; but all the philosophers also embrace it. Of the ancients, indeed, Cicero, whom Lactantius reports in the same book, chapter 17, near the end, says: "Anger is the lust of vengeance." Posidonius, cited by the same Lactantius in the same chapter not far from the end, thus defines it: "A desire of punishing him by whom you think yourself to have been injured." Seneca, On Anger I, c. 2, and II, c. 3, says: "Anger is an incitement of the mind to vengeance proceeding by will and judgment"; and he says that it has its origin from an injury received. St. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith I, c. 16, as I adduced at the beginning of the chapter, set down the definition of anger on the side of the matter, whence he assigns several acceptions of it, and in all he establishes the formal notion in this: that it is an appetite of retaliation and vengeance for an injury received. Finally, St. Gregory of Nyssa, Philosophy IV, c. 13, affirms either definition which Aristotle assigned, and that this is the formal one, "an appetite of retaliation." The same was explained by Aristotle, Rhetoric II, c. 2 at the beginning, and c. 4 near the end, when he says: "He who grows angry grieves"; wherefore he says that anger is "an appetite of apparent vengeance with sorrow on account of an apparent contempt shown to oneself or one's own." And this is excellently proved by the example which St. Ambrose uses in the place cited above: for who would say that a judge who, without any - not to say bodily perturbation and commotion of blood - but even without any sadness of mind, inflicts the due punishment of sin upon the delinquent, is angry against the defendant? Therefore, without foundation does Lactantius reject all the definitions which we have enumerated; and he asserts that they define only irascibility and fury, which can befit man alone and are vicious; and he adds: thus therefore did the philosophers define those passions: "Anger is a movement of soul arising to restrain sins"; by this account he defends that in God anger is properly found. He taught this wrongly. For, as we noted at the beginning, when there is a question about some affection, whether it ought to be attributed to God, we speak of that affection according to the common signification of the name among philosophers and those skilled in the art. For we shall say

1457. Aristotle, De anima I, c. 1, text 16; Rhetoric II, c. 2 and c. 4.

in vain that that name signifies something else, in order that we may attribute its signified to God. Wherefore we do not deny that anger belongs to God as Lactantius defines it; but we say that that is not the signification of this name, unless insofar as it is the avenging of a pain inflicted, as has been explained.[1458][1459][1460][1461][1462][1463][1464][1465][1466][1461]

- Note also: the Stoics attributed love to God, but denied anger, lest they should ascribe any perturbation of mind to Him. Wherefore Lactantius thinks that they removed the vengeance of evils from God to such an extent that they said that He harms no one; but if in that way they denied anger to God, they erred plainly: for He Himself too is the avenger of evils, as Lactantius excellently demonstrates, and Scripture proclaims everywhere. Therefore Lactantius, that he might avoid their errors, through many chapters taught that there is in God properly anger, which he judged to be nothing else than a will of punishing the guilty. Rejecting the definitions of other philosophers, in chapter 17 he thus defines anger: "A movement of soul arising to restrain sins." Since therefore in God there is such an affection, as is plainly gathered from Scripture, it follows that to Him belongs anger according to the proper and formal notion, although fury, which is vicious and joined with perturbation, ought not to be attributed to God; for those testimonies of Scripture, wherein wrath and fury are attributed to God with perturbation, as in Psalm 77, "And the Lord awoke as one sleeping, and as a mighty man gorged with wine," he thinks ought to be explained by trope and figure; unless where in that art by the skilled it is wont to be defined: for if it were permitted also to fashion new definitions, I would attribute more things to God than we attribute, and indeed all the things that are found in man and the angels, not according to an equivocal notion, according to which always they contain some imperfection which cannot befit God, but also according to a formal notion; which does not befit God without perturbation, just as St. Thomas expressly asserted when he taught that, according to the formal notion of anger, there is no anger in God.[1467]

1458. Cicero, reported by Lactantius, De ira Dei c. 17 (near the end): "Ira est libido ulciscendi."

1459. Posidonius, cited in Lactantius, De ira Dei c. 17 (shortly before the end).

1460. Seneca, De ira I, c. 2; II, c. 3.

1461. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 16, and at the beginning of the chapter he adduces the definition of anger on the side of the matter, then assigns several acceptions, and in all establishes the formal notion as an appetite of retaliation and vengeance for an injury received. See also De fide orthodoxa I, c. 14 among the loci of the divine names.

1462. Greek Fathers cited on divine wrath: Origen, Hom. 2 on Judges c. 2 (toward the end); on Romans 1 ("Revelatur ira Dei"); Contra Celsum IV, on Deut 23; Epiphanius, Haer. 38 (after the middle); St. John Chrysostom, Sermon on Penance (near the end, in the tomes); St. Gregory Nazianzen, Carmen iambicum 21; St. Basil, on Ps 37 ("Neque in ira tua corripias me," well after the middle); St. Cyril, Contra Julianum V (after the middle); St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 14. Latin Fathers: St. Cyprian, De mortalitate (toward the end); St. Ambrose, on Ps 37 ("Domine, ne in furore tuo"); St. Jerome, on the same Psalm; St. Augustine, passim.

1463. St. Gregory of Nyssa, Philosophy IV, c. 13.

1464. Aristotle, Rhetoric II, c. 2 at the beginning; c. 4 near the end: "Qui irascitur, dolet..."

1465. St. Ambrose, on Ps 37 ("Domine, ne in furore tuo").

1466. Lactantius, De ira Dei, esp. c. 17; and c. 4 against the Epicureans.

1461. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 16, and at the beginning of the chapter he adduces the definition of anger on the side of the matter, then assigns several acceptions, and in all establishes the formal notion as an appetite of retaliation and vengeance for an injury received. See also De fide orthodoxa I, c. 14 among the loci of the divine names.

Articulus III - Whether God equally loves all things

Objicitur: 1. It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said in Wisdom 6 that "equal is His care of all." But God's providence about things is from love, with which He loves things: therefore He loves all equally. 2. Further, the love of God is His essence (*essentia*). But the essence of God does not admit of more and less: therefore neither does His love. Therefore He does not love some more than others. 3. Further, as the love of God extends to created things, so do knowledge and will. But God is not said to know some things more than others, nor more to will: therefore neither does He love some more than others.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says upon John: "God loves all the things which He made; and among them He loves more the rational creatures; and among these more those which are the members of His Only-begotten; and much more His Only-begotten Himself."[1468]

I answer: Since to love is to will good to someone, in a twofold way can something be more or less loved. In one way, on the part of the very act of the will (*actus voluntatis*), which is more or less intense. And thus God does not love some more than others, because He loves all with one and simple act of will, and always in the same way. In another way, on the part of the very good which is willed to someone. And thus we are said to love someone more than another, to whom we will a greater good; although not with a more intense will. And in this way it is necessary to say that God loves one more than another, inasmuch as He wills to one a greater good than to another.

Reply to the first: When it is said that God has equal care for all, it is not because He dispenses equal goods to all, but because with equal wisdom and goodness He administers all.

Reply to the second: That reasoning proceeds about the intention of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the good which God wills to a creature is not the divine essence. Hence nothing prevents it from being intensified and remitted.

Reply to the third: To understand and to will signify only acts, and they do not include in their signification certain objects, from whose diversity God could be said to know or to will more or less, as was said regarding love.

Explicatio articuli. - First conclusion: On the part of the very affection of the will, God equally loves all; that is, with one and the same, indeed the very same, actual act, unlike us, who love with more and less intense acts. - Second conclusion: On the part of the good which God wills to someone, He loves one more than another, inasmuch as He wills a greater good to one than to another.

This doctrine is most to be observed, especially for the things which we will say below in disputation 89, chapter 15, where we will show that, before foreseen merits, one is not loved or chosen more than another to eternal life; and yet one is more loved and is chosen to grace: which will be clearly proved from the doctrine of this article. The reason indeed is manifest. Since the will

1467. St. Thomas, in this question, article 2, solution to the second objection, expressly denying wrath in God according to its formal notion.

1468. St. Augustine, In Evangelium Ioannis tractatus, on John 9, "Omnia diligit Deus quae fecit..."; cf. also allied loci in his works.

(*voluntas*) of God is His essence, and insofar is said to have the notion (*ratio*) of love or of hatred, as it is referred to this or that object; yet in itself it cannot be greater or lesser; it follows that, on the part of the very act, one is not loved more than another; but the whole inequality must be weighed on the part of the good willed, to which, in the notion of volition, it is referred.

Objicitur primo: It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said in Wisdom 6 that "care for all is equal before Him." But the providence which God has over things arises from the love by which He loves them; therefore He loves all things equally.

Objicitur secundo: Further, the love of God is His essence (*essentia*). But the essence of God does not admit of more and less; therefore neither does His love. Therefore He does not love some more than others.

Objicitur tertio: Further, just as the love of God extends to created things, so too do His knowledge and will. But God is not said to know some things more than others, nor to will some things more than others. Therefore neither does He love some more than others.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says on John: "God loves all the things that He has made; and among them He loves more the rational creatures; and among these He loves more those which are the members of His Only-Begotten; and much more His Only-Begotten Himself."[1469]

Respondeo: Since to love is to will good to someone, a thing can be loved more or less in a twofold way. In one way, on the part of the very act of will, which is more or less intense. And thus God does not love some more than others, because He loves all by one simple act of will, which is always similarly disposed. In another way, on the part of the very good which one wills to the beloved. And thus we are said to love someone more than another to whom we will a greater good, even if we do not will it by a more intense act. And in this way it is necessary to say that God loves some more than others, because He wills a greater good to some than to others.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, that it is said that there is "equal care" with God for all things, not because He dispenses equal goods to all, but because by one wisdom and goodness He governs all

Ad secundum dicendum, that this reasoning proceeds as regards the intensity on the part of the act of will, which is the divine essence. But the good which He wills to the creature is not the divine essence. Hence nothing prevents this from being unequal and, so to speak, more or less as to participation

Ad tertium dicendum, that to know and to will in their proper signification denote the act formally, which, on the part of the divine act, is one and simple; yet even in our usage we are said to know something more than another, not because our act of knowing is more intense, but because the thing known is better or more known. In like manner God is said to love more on the side of the good willed to the beloved; and thus the inequality is taken on the part of the object loved, not on the part of the divine act

Explicatio articuli. The prior conclusion is: on the part of the divine will's act, God loves all equally; that is, by the same quality, indeed by the same one and simple act, always similarly disposed - unlike us, who love with more or less intensity. The posterior conclusion is: on the part

of the good willed to the beloved, God loves some more than others, inasmuch as to one He wills a greater good than to another. This doctrine is to be held constantly throughout what follows: any inequality of love in God is to be weighed wholly on the part of the good willed, to which the notion of love is ordered; not on the part of the single, most simple act, in which greater and lesser cannot be.[1470]

Articulus IV - Whether God always loves better things more

D quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non semper magis diligat meliora.

1. Manifestum est enim quod Christ is better than the whole human race, since He is God and man. But God loved the human race more than Christ, for it is said in Romans 8: "He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all." Therefore God does not always love better things more.
2. Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence in Psalm 8 it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels." But God loved man more than the angel; for it is said in Hebrews 2: "Nowhere doth He tak e hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold." Therefore God does not always love better things more.
3. Further, Peter was better than John, because he loved Christ more; wherefore the Lord, knowing this to be true, questioned Peter, saying: "Simon, son of John, do you love Me more than these?" (John 21). Yet Christ loved John more than Peter. For, as Augustine says on that passage, by this very sign John is distinguished from the other disciples, not that he alone loved Christ, but that he loved Him more than the others.[1471] Therefore God does not always love better things more.
4. Further, the innocent is better than the penitent, since penance is a second plank after shipwreck, as St. Jerome says.[1472] But God loves the penitent more than the innocent, because He rejoices more over him; for it is said in Luke 15: "I say to you, that there shall be joy in heaven upon one sinner doing penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance." Therefore God does not always love better things more.
5. Further, a just man who is foreknown (reprobate) is better than a predestined sinner. But God loves the predestined sinner more, because He wills to him a greater good, namely life eternal. Therefore God does not always love better things more.

Sed contra: Every thing loves what is like itself, as is manifest from that which is had in Ecclesiasticus 13: "Every animal loves its like." But something is the better the more it is like God. Therefore better things are loved more by God.

1469. St. Augustine, In Evangelium Ioannis tractatus, on John 9: "Omnia diligit Deus quae fecit..." Tom. 9.

1470. Compare St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 20, a. 3; and cf. the scholastic axiom that inequality in divine love is only on the side of the good willed, not on the side of the simple divine act.

1471. St. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, on John 21:15 ff.

1472. St. Jerome, on Isaiah, on that place "Sodom," where he says: "Penance is the second plank after shipwreck."

Respondeo dicendum, that it is necessary to say, in accord with the foregoing, that God loves better things more. For we said that to love more, as regards God, is nothing other than to will a greater good to someone. Now the will of God is the cause of goodness in things. And thus from this very fact certain things are better, that God wills to them a greater good. Whence it follows that He loves better things more.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, that God loves Christ not only more than the whole human race, but even more than the whole universe of creatures; for to Him He willed a greater good, because He gave Him "the name that is above every name" (Phil 2:9), in that He is true God. Nor did His excellence suffer any loss from the fact that God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; nay rather from this He was made a glorious victor. "The government was placed upon His shoulder" (Isa 9:6)

Ad secundum dicendum, that the human nature assumed by the Word of God (as was said above) God loves more than all the angels, and it is better, especially by reason of the union. But speaking of human nature in general, when compared with the angelic as to the order to grace and glory, there is found an equality; "for the measure of man and of the angel is the same" (cf. Apoc. 21:17). Yet in this respect some angels are found to surpass some men, and some men to surpass some angels. But as to the condition of nature, the angel is better than man. Nor therefore did God assume human nature because He would simply love man more, but because man was in greater need. As a good householder gives something more precious to a sick servant, which he does not give to a healthy son

Ad tertium dicendum, that this question about Peter and John is solved in many ways. Augustine refers it to a mystery, saying that the active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative life, signified by John, because it feels more the straits of the present life, and more ardently desires to be delivered from them and to go to God; but the contemplative life God loves more, because He preserves it more: for it is not ended together with the life of the body, as the active life is. Others say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and thus also was more loved by Christ; whence He entrusted to him the Church. But John loved Christ more in Himself, and thus also was more loved by Him; wherefore He entrusted to him His mother. Others say that it is uncertain which of these loved Christ more with the love of charity, and likewise whom God loved more in order to greater glory of life eternal. Yet Peter is said to have loved more as to a certain promptness or fervor; but John to have been more loved as to certain signs of familiarity which Christ showed him more, on account of his youth and purity. Others say that Christ loved Peter more as to a more excellent gift of charity, but John more as to the gift of intellect. Whence Peter simply was the better and more loved; but John in a certain respect. Nevertheless it seems presumptuous to judge this, since, as it is said in Proverbs 16, "the Lord is the Weigher of spirits," and no other

Ad quartum dicendum, that penitents and innocents stand to one another as excess and excessed. For whether they be innocents or penitents, those are better and more loved who have more of grace. Other things being equal, however, innocence is more worthy and more loved. Yet God is said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because for the most part

penitents rise again more cautious, more humble, and more fervent. Whence St. Gregory says in the same place, that a leader in battle loves more the soldier who, after flight, returning, presses the enemy bravely, than him who never fled, nor ever did anything brave; or for another reason, because an equal gift of grace is greater in comparison to a penitent, who had merited punishment, than to an innocent, who had not merited it; just as one hundred marks is a greater gift if they are given to a pauper than if they are given to a king

Ad quintum dicendum, that since the will of God is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of him who is loved by God must be weighed, at the time in question, according to what good from the divine goodness is to be given to him. Therefore with respect to that time in which, by the divine will, a greater good is to be given to the predestined sinner, he is the better; yet according to some other time he may be worse; for according to some time he is neither good nor evil, nor even existing, prior to conception

Conclusio huius articuli ex praecedenti sequitur, namely: God loves the better more; for such inequality of love in God is not to be taken on the part of the affection in itself, but from the order to the greater and lesser good: hence it follows that the better are more loved by God.

Dubitationes circa articulum.

Dubium I

For whoever loves God is loved by God, John 14: "If anyone love Me, he will keep My word, and My Father will love him"; and he who loves more is more loved. But Peter loved Christ more than the rest of the Apostles; for in John 21, when questioned by Christ whether he loved Him more, he affirmed it thrice, to whose thrice-given answer the Lord subjoined, saying, "Feed My sheep," as if to say: Since you love Me more, feed My sheep. Therefore Peter was more loved by the Lord.[1475] Gabriel, on condition granted, concedes that Peter was more loved by Christ than the other disciples, if he also loved God more. This sentence is favored by Nazianzen, in the oration to Julian the apostate (the ninth), where he calls Peter "the dearest of the Apostles to God," since for him the Lord paid the didrachma; and by St. Cyril of Alexandria, book 12 on John, chapter 64, when he says that Peter had a greater love toward the Lord than the other Apostles.[1476]

On the other hand, St. Jerome, book 1 Against Jovinian, from many titles proves that John the Evangelist was more loved by God; and thus Pseudo - Dionysius in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, and Tertullian, in the book On Prescriptions against Heretics, chapter 22, calls John "dearest" or "most beloved." As to the fact that He gave Peter the keys of the kingdom of heaven and the primacy of the Church, St. Jerome says, there is no wonder, since it was given so that the others might listen to him as to their elder. St. Augustine, however, in his last tractate on John, does not dare to decide the case and determine who excelled the other in sanctity and charity; rather, by certain mystical interpretations he tries to reconcile both opinions. Thus also St. Thomas, in this

1475. Proverbs 8:17; John 14:23; John 21:15 - 17. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. 1, q. 32, m. 4.

1476. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 9 to Julian the apostate; St. Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on John, bk. 12, c. 64.

article in the reply to the third objection, and St. Bonaventure, in 3, dist. 32, q. ult., define nothing on this matter; but they interpret the places of Scripture which seem to favor the one or the other, so that Peter loved Christ more strongly, but John more familiarly; as to whose sanctity was greater, they do not decree

Posterior dubitatio is about the solution to the fifth objection: in what sense St. Thomas says that the predestined man at some time is neither good nor evil, since in this mortal life there does not seem to be any mean between these two. Omitting two solutions employed by Cajetan, a third - together with him - answers that this is true of the time in which the predestined was not yet born nor conceived; for then he could be neither good nor evil, not even by original sin.[1479]

Quaestio XXI - On the justice and mercy of God

Post the consideration of the divine love, we must now treat of His justice (*iustitia*) and mercy. And concerning this four things are asked.

In this question the holy Doctor discusses the affections which, according to virtue, befit God, that he might hand down to us exactly whatever pertains to the faculty of the will.

Articulus I - Whether there is justice in God

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit justice. Justice is divided contrary to temperance. But temperance is not in God; therefore neither is justice

1. Further, whoever does all things according to the mere freedom of his own will does not act according to justice. But, as the Apostle says ...[1480]

After the consideration of divine love, there must now be a consideration of His justice and mercy. And concerning this it is asked as follows.

Whether there is justice in God

The first is argued as follows:

- It seems that there is not justice in God. The Apostle says to the Ephesians (1): God "works all things according to the counsel of His will"; therefore justice ought not to be attributed to Him.
- Moreover, among the moral virtues some are about passions, as temperance about concupiscences, fortitude about fears and boldnesses, meekness about anger. And such virtues cannot be attributed to God except metaphorically, because in God, as was said

1479. Cajetan, ad Summa theologiae I, q. 20, a. 4, ad 5.
1480. The text alludes to the Apostle (cf. Ephesians 1:11 or Romans 9:19) on God "working all things according to the counsel of His will."

above, there are neither passions nor a sensitive appetite, in which such virtues are as in a subject, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 3. But certain moral virtues are about operations, as justice, for example about giving and expenses are justice and liberality and magnificence, which also are not in the sensitive part but in the will. Therefore nothing prevents these sorts of virtues from being posited in God; yet not about civil actions, but about actions befitting God. For it is ridiculous to praise God according to political virtues, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 10.[1481]

- Moreover, the act of justice is to render what is due; but God is debtor to no one; therefore justice does not befit God.
- Moreover, whatever is in God is His essence; but this does not befit justice. For Boethius says in the book De hebdomadibus, that what is good is the essence, but the just is a good that results from action; therefore justice does not befit God.[1482]

But on the contrary: It is said in Psalm 10: "Just is the Lord, and He has loved justice."

I answer that it must be said that there is a twofold species of justice. One consists in mutual giving and receiving, as what consists in buying and selling and other such communications or exchanges. And this is called by the Philosopher in Ethics 5 the justice that is commutative, or directive of exchanges or communications; and this does not befit God, because, as the Apostle says to the Romans, "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to him?" Another, which consists in distributing, and is called distributive justice, according as some governor or dispenser orders to each one according to his dignity. Therefore, just as a fitting order of a family, or of any governed multitude, shows such justice in the ruler; so the order of the universe, which appears both in natural things and in voluntary things, shows God's justice. Whence Pseudo-Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, chapter 8, that "we ought to see in this the true justice of God, that He gives to all their own, according to the dignity of each of the existing things, and preserves the nature of each one in its own proper order and virtue."[1483]

Reply to the first: Among the moral virtues, some are about passions, as temperance about concupiscences, fortitude about fears and boldnesses, meekness about anger. And such virtues cannot be attributed to God except metaphorically, because in God, as was said above, there are neither passions nor a sensitive appetite, in which such virtues are as in a subject, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 3. But certain moral virtues are about operations, as justice, for example about giving and expenses are justice and liberality and magnificence, which also are not in the sensitive part but in the will. Whence nothing prevents these sorts of virtues from being posited in God; yet not about civil actions, but about actions befitting God. For it is ridiculous to praise God according to political virtues, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 10.[1481]

1481. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 3; bk. 10; cf. bk. 5, c. 4 on commutative justice.
1482. Boethius, De hebdomadibus.
1483. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 8.
1481. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 3; bk. 10; cf. bk. 5, c. 4 on commutative justice.

Reply to the second: Since the good understood is the object of the will, it is impossible that God should will anything except what the ratio of His wisdom holds. And this indeed is as the law of justice, according to which His will is right and just. Whence what He does according to His own will He does justly, just as what we do according to law we do justly. But we indeed [act] according to the law of some superior; God, however, is law to Himself.

Reply to the third: To each one it is owed that which is his own. Now a thing is said to be another's which is ordered to that other. Thus a servant is of a lord, and not conversely. For free is that which is the cause of itself. Therefore in the name of "debt" there is imported a certain order of exigency or necessity of something to that to which it is ordered. But a twofold order must be considered in things. One, by which something created is ordered to another created thing, as parts are ordered to the whole, and accidents to substances, and each thing to its own end. Another order, by which all created things are ordered to God. So therefore debt can be attended to in a twofold way in the divine operation: either according to what is owed to God, or according to what is owed to a created thing. And in both ways God renders a debt. For it is a debt to God that in things there be fulfilled what His wisdom and will holds, and what manifests His goodness; and according to this, God's justice regards the becomingness of Himself, according to which He renders to Himself what is owed to Himself. It is also a debt to some created thing that it have that which is ordered to it, as to man that he have hands, and that other animals serve him. And thus also God works justice when He gives to each what is owed to it according to the ratio of its nature and condition. But this debt depends on the first; because this is owed to each, which is ordered to it according to the order of divine wisdom. And although in this way God renders a debt to something, nevertheless He is not a debtor, because He Himself is not ordered to other things, but rather other things to Him. And therefore justice is sometimes said in God to be the becomingness of His goodness; sometimes indeed retribution for merits. And Anselm touches upon both ways when he says: "When you punish the wicked, it is just; because it befits their merits. But when you spare the wicked, it is just; because it is becoming to Your goodness."

Reply to the fourth: Although justice regards an act, nevertheless it is not by this excluded that it be the essence of God; because even that which is of the essence of a thing can be the principle of an action. But "good" does not always regard an act, because something is said to be good not only according to what it does, but also according to what it is perfect in its own essence. And on account of this it is said in the same place that "what is good is the essence," but "what is just is a good [which regards] an end through act": therefore justice is not precluded from God.

From this article a twofold conclusion is commonly elicited. The first is: In God there is no commutative justice. The second is: In God there is distributive justice. However, the mind of St. Thomas, and the truth of both, will be examined in the two following disputations.

Disputatio LXXXV - Whether in God there is commutative justice

Caput I - A recent opinion of certain theologians

- The opinion of certain recent theologians, that commutative justice according to strict propriety is not in God, is the truer view, and is proved by the consent of all the theologians. cap. 2.
- Certain points are premised in confirmation of the preceding opinion. cap. 3.
- It is proved that in God there is not commutative justice according to propriety from the ratio of giving and receiving. cap. 4.
- From the condition of God and of the creature the same is shown. cap. 5.
- That from promise no obligation of justice in the strict sense arises in God. cap. 6.
- The arguments of the prior opinion are solved. cap. 7.

Since the virtue of justice is busied in preserving equality of what is given and what is received, equality is twofold, as we will say in the next disputation: one, which they call arithmetic, which is the equality of one thing with another, as of the given with the received; another, which they call geometric, which is about equality, not of thing with thing, but of one proportion between two things, with another proportion of two other things. At the least, it follows that justice is twofold: one, called commutative, which attends to the arithmetic just between two things; another, distributive, which regards the just between two proportions - of which we will speak severally. Now we inquire concerning the commutative: Whether in God it is found according to strict propriety. This matter indeed, a few years ago, was without controversy, and would always have been so, had not certain more recent [authors] called it into doubt: for, in order to allege the ratio of merit which they call "according to the rigor of justice," both in Christ for the whole human race, and in us with respect to glory, they have not only tried to defend in God a true and proper ratio of commutative justice, but also that the whole ratio of our merits between Christ and us, or between the Father and the Son on the one side, and us on the other, is reduced to it, and that Christ's and our works equally claim that prize; for if God promises or owes the reward by justice, and by the same retribution, then all the ratio of justice ought to consist; for otherwise it would be a kind of injustice not to repay the equal for the equal. For that [he] who labors in one vineyard all day, though his toil is the more worthy in proportion to the dignity of the lord, does not on that account constitute a right of dominion to a debtor of retribution, unless the lord had promised a fixed price; likewise it is not necessary that God by justice should repay the price of the goods of merit, unless He has so taught by His word. To this the Doctors who hold this opinion adduce no distinct doctrine of the scholastic masters, nor do they allege [any].[1484]

1484. The passage alludes to the Gospel parable of the laborers in the vineyard (cf. Matthew 20), and to the thesis that God "works all things according to the counsel of His will" (Ephesians 1:11).

This matter a few years ago was without controversy, and would always have remained so, had not some of the more recent men called it into doubt. For, in order to establish the ratio of merit, which they call according to the strictness of justice, both in Christ on behalf of the whole human race and in us with respect to glory, they have not only tried to defend in God a true and proper notion of commutative justice, but furthermore (if it please God) they have even claimed this to be the very doctrine of St. Thomas and of all his disciples. How true that is will in some degree be shown in the following chapter.

They assert, then, first, that in God there is formally and properly commutative justice; and to confirm this they note that, when some virtue or operation is attributed to God, it is not necessary to assign it to Him together with all the imperfections with which it is found in men. Otherwise neither mercy, which in us is joined with a certain compassion, would properly be in God; nor liberality, because God does not abdicate His goods when He bestows them liberally; nor vindication, because He does not defend Himself or keep Himself unharmed by punishing others; nor knowledge, because He does not reason discursively - although all these in us have the defects we have enumerated. Likewise, because all the things that are predicated of God and of creatures are said analogically, it is therefore necessary to transfer them to God in such a way that they be attributed to Him without any imperfection, and only in that mode of perfection which befits Him.

This foundation laid, they prove their position, first, because Scripture in many places proclaims that God is just; and these passages, for brevity's sake and because they are very well known, I pass over; yet they can be explained in their proper sense without trope or figure, and there is no need to have recourse to a metaphor: rather, they can be understood properly of justice, and we should concede to God justice according to its formal notion, with every imperfection removed; therefore we shall interpret them without metaphor.

Second, if justice, according to its proper character, were not to be ascribed to God, the reason would be that between us and Him, or between Christ and Him, there is no giving and receiving (datum et acceptum). But this does not hinder; for the justice that is in God ought not to be engaged about a giving and a receiving - this imperfection belongs only among men; toward God, however, it is not necessary.

Third, they say that Christ's justice toward God is not of the same kind as the commutative justice that is observed among men; for divine right is of a higher order, not as though the equality of the given and received failed; and, in their view, this same justice is found in the fulfilling of the promises made to God, in the performance of which, according to their opinion, true and proper justice intervenes with equality: only so much does someone pay, and is able to pay, as he has promised. Wherefore, finally, they conclude that Christ's justice toward God is not distinct from religion; nevertheless, His satisfaction, which He offered to God for us, was out of justice according to propriety. The authors of this opinion prove this part by no stronger reason, nor do they confirm it by any Doctors' authority, except only because in the Thomistic school it is commonly said that the Lord Christ satisfied for the human race by the rigor of justice, in the way some scholastics, especially more recent ones, speak; but how Scholastics speak of the rigor of justice, and how they do not, will be shown below.

Caput II - The truer opinion: that commutative justice, according to its proper notion, is not in God; and this is supported by the consent of all the theologians

I for my part judge not only that commutative justice, according to its proper notion, does not befit God; but also that none of the Scholastics, so far as I have read, among those who before our times committed their writings to the press, taught the contrary. Rather, all who made particular mention of this question plainly affirmed that commutative justice, according to propriety, is not in God, although concerning distributive justice there is no small dissension among these very men. This must be proved for me expressly by alleging the Doctors in this chapter, before I bring forward the reasons of this position.

Accordingly, this opinion was taught by Alexander,[1485] by Richard,[1486] by Durandus,[1487] by Paludanus,[1488] by Capreolus,[1489] by St. Thomas in the Contra Gentiles,[1490] and by Ferrarien.[1490] Hostiensis also in his consilium,[1491] Rualdus,[1492] Soto,[1493] and Cajetan in this very article,[1494] and John Bunderius in his Compendium of the Conference, title 6, art. 7, who follows Rualdus. Likewise Gabriel in his Supplement on IV Sentences,[1495] where he says that with respect to good works there is no debt of justice according to propriety. Bonaventure likewise adds that in God absolutely there is no justice as to debt, but only as to the effusion of His goodness.[1496]

To these we may add St. Thomas where he teaches that, as regards our works proceeding even from grace, there is not, simply speaking, justice of ours toward God,[1497] and Conrad in the same place, and again Durandus in II Sentences, d. 17, q. 2, and Ferrarien on the Contra Gentiles.[1490] For all that, it must not be denied, as we shall show at greater length in the same place, that there is, simply speaking, merit on our part before God. But most clearly St. Thomas hands down this doctrine in this very article, and more recent men along with him, where, after he had

1485. Alexander of Hales, I p., q. 39, m. (cited as "Alex. 1 p. q.39 m.").

1486. Richard of St. Victor, I, ar. 1, q. (cited as "Ricard. ar. 1. q.").

1487. Durandus of St. Pourçain, I, q. 1; again II Sentences, d. 17, q. 2 (cited as "Duran. q.1 ... iterum in 2. d. 17. q. 2").

1488. Peter of Palude, I, q. 1, ar. 1 (cited as "Palud. q. 1. ar. 1").

1489. Capreolus, In II Sent., d. 45, q. 1, ar. 1, concl. 14; and ar. 3 ad argumenta contra eandem conclusionem (cited as "Capreol. in 2. d.45. q.1. ar.1. concl.14. & ar.3. ad argu...").

1490. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, cap. 93; with Ferrarien's commentary ad loc. (cited as "S. Tho. Contrag. cap. 93. & ibi Ferrarien.").

1490. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, cap. 93; with Ferrarien's commentary ad loc. (cited as "S. Tho. Contrag. cap. 93. & ibi Ferrarien.").

1491. Henricus Hostiensis, consilium politicum, c. 73 (cited as "Hofius in consel. polo. c.73").

1492. Rualdus, Articulus ... Tertia est differentia (cited briefly as "Ruar. art... Tertia est differentia").

1493. Domingo de Soto, De natura et gratia, l. 3, c. 7; and De iustitia, q., ar. ult., ad 1 (cited as "Sot. 3. de natura & gratia c.7. & de iustitia q. ar. vlti. ad 1").

1494. Cajetan, on I - II q. 114, a. 1; and on I q. 21, a. 1 (cited as "Caiet. in ar. 1 illius quaest. 114 ... in hunc art.").

1495. Gabriel Biel, Supplementum, IV Sent., d. 49, q. 4, a. 3, dub. 3 (cited as "supplementum Gab. in 4. d.49. q.4. art.3. dub.3").

1496. St. Bonaventure, IV Sent., d. 46, ar. 2, q. 1, ad 2; and elsewhere on q. 114, where he affirms that in God there is not justice as to debt absolutely, but only as to the outpouring of His goodness (cited as "Bonaventura ... de omni iustitia absolute affirmat, in Deo non esse quoad debitum, sed quoad effluxum tantum bonitatis suae").

1497. St. Thomas Aquinas, I - II q. 114, a. 1 (and cf. a. 5), where he teaches that, simply speaking, there is not justice of our works toward God, even when they proceed from grace (cited as "St. Thomas. 1.2. q.114. ar.1 ... negat 5").

1490. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, cap. 93; with Ferrarien's commentary ad loc. (cited as "S. Tho. Contrag. cap. 93. & ibi Ferrarien.").

distinguished commutative and distributive justice, he says thus of the commutative: "And this does not befit God." If in the solution to the first objection he seems to attribute justice to God, yet not about civil actions; which is not surprising - first, because there he seems to concede distributive justice; next, because not even this does he concede properly, as we shall note below.

But, that we may demonstrate more exactly that this opinion is that of all the Scholastics, and that no one taught the contrary, it will be worth the effort to gather some testimonies which might be alleged for the opposite view, to examine them, and to block the escape routes by which the adversaries are wont to contrive their defense - something which should be considered neither troublesome nor useless, since the opposite opinion, contrary to the common doctrine of the Doctors, has rather easily prevailed. For the matter is of greater moment than at first sight appears, and upon it many points depend which are difficult indeed and worthy of consideration, and which are daily called into question.

Thus, first for the prior opinion one might allege Bartholomaeus de Medina on the First - Second of St. Thomas, q. 114, a. 3,[1498] where he expressly asserts that there is for us before God merit de condigno and of justice, truly and properly; and in the article he affirms that, between our works, insofar as they proceed from grace, and the reward of eternal life, there is commutative justice. Therefore he judges that, properly, there is commutative justice in God. However, the same author explained himself in the same place, in a. 3, ad argumentum Durandi, where he does not dare to concede justice between us and God, but between our merit and the reward; in which he follows the doctrine of Cajetan on a. 1 of that question 114. For there he says that there is indeed, simply speaking, justice between our works and the reward of eternal life, because that is the equality of condignity; but, simply speaking, between us and God there is not justice - which Cajetan plainly said here in this article does not properly befit God: therefore Medina agrees with us, since he does not concede to God the attribute of justice according to propriety, though he says that there is justice between the work and the reward on account of the equality of condignity. Whether indeed these things can cohere, we shall say below. Nor did Francis Romanus will to teach anything else in his book on liberty and the necessity of works, truth 22,[1499] when he says that to our works, as they are from the Holy Spirit, the reward of eternal life is due de condigno according to the true equity of justice: he did not say "according to true and proper justice," but "according to the true equity of justice," which is the true equality of condignity between the works and the reward - such as can intervene between us and God.

Next one can allege Scotus in I Sentences, d. 17, q. 1, "Hic potest,"[1500] and Gabriel in I Sentences, d. 9, q. 1, a. 3, after the first conclusion,[1501] who say that to condign merit the reward is due of justice, yet on account of a promise. But neither does Gabriel nor Scotus lend support to that prior opinion. The first, indeed, because he himself teaches the opposite when disputing about the attribute of divine justice, as we adduced a little earlier: for they deny to God absolutely the

1498. Bartholomaeus de Medina, In I - II q. 114, a. 3; and ad arg. Durandi there.
1499. Franciscus Romanus, De libertate et necessitate operum, veritas 22.
1500. John Duns Scotus, I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, "Hic potest"; cf. also the note that these words are spurious in some editions.
1501. Gabriel Biel, I Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 3, post I concl.

attribute of justice according to propriety, not distinguishing between commutative and distributive; nay rather, they remove from God, properly, every kind of justice. And as for those words of Scotus (as is noted in the margin), they are spurious; they are not found in the original. And even if he were to say that all justice arises from a promise - which belongs to a certain fidelity - this is a potential part of justice; it is thereby withdrawn from proper justice, and reduced to fidelity, a certain mode of equity: therefore none of these authors is one who asserts the opposite.

As to what many scholastics say - that Christ satisfied for us by the rigor of justice - that matters little. First, the ancient authors, such as St. Thomas, Alexander, and Bonaventure, do not mean anything else by that way of speaking than what we ourselves say: they teach that the satisfaction of Christ was perfect, that is, needed no accepting grace; but they did not therefore dare to assert that it was according to proper justice, but that it was of equal condignity in the mode of merit, as we shall show in its own place. Then other scholastics, who in this way speak, do not contend that in Christ there was justice toward God properly, but that the equality which He observed in His satisfaction, in the manner and likeness of justice, was according to rigor - that is, that it did not need the liberal acceptation of God, but was of equal condignity to the Lord - which is most true, as we shall see. I except some more recent authors, who contend that even in the satisfaction there was justice according to propriety; it is this opinion that I now set myself to impugn.

But furthermore, the authors of this opinion strive to escape by another subterfuge. They say that those Doctors speak of commutative justice with that imperfection which is found in creatures, and with which it cannot be in God; not, however, without imperfection, as the other attributes that are ascribed to God. But indeed this contrivance, invented as an evasion, plainly has no firm foundation. First, because many of those same authors, when treating with St. Thomas about mercy, do not recognize it in the absolute sense, unless with the imperfection that it has annexed in us, as we shall see from what has been said. Then, because, whereas many of them deny commutative justice, yet without any addition they concede distributive justice, which with imperfection at least repugns less to God than commutative; therefore they concede it in the same way in which they deny commutative - that is, they concede it without imperfection; so too, then, they deny commutative justice without imperfection. Moreover, if on account of imperfection it were permitted to those judging of this matter absolutely to deny to God commutative justice, then by the same latitude one could deny intellect, will, and operations, and various other things - indeed, all the rest of the attributes. Besides, let it be granted, for the sake of argument, that those Doctors, without any addition, absolutely deny commutative justice; they would then be forced to posit some other sort of imperfection annexed to commutative justice, by reason of which this justice could not be in God - an imperfection such that cannot be conceived in other attributes which are ascribed to God; but this cannot be maintained, as will be clear in what follows.

Caput III - Certain preliminaries to shaping the reason for the preceding position

It is necessary, by reasons drawn from principles, briefly to confirm the opinion set forth, and, in summary fashion, to ...

Among the Scholastics, those who thus speak do not contend simply that there is justice between us and God; rather, they hold that there is not justice, which Cajetan plainly said in this article, that it does not befit God properly; therefore Medina feels with us, since he does not grant to God the attribute of justice according to its proper notion, although he says that between works and reward there is justice on account of the equality of condignity. Whether these statements can stand together, we shall say below.[1502][1503] Nor did Franciscus Romanus wish to teach anything else in the book On the Freedom and Necessity of Works, truth 22, when he says that to our works, as they are from the Holy Spirit according to the true equity of justice, the reward of eternal life is due condignly. He did not say "according to the true and proper justice," but "according to the true equity of justice," because there is a true equality of condignity between the works and the reward; yet it is from that sort of justice which can intervene between us and God.[1504]

Next, one could allege Scotus in I, dist. 17, q. 1, "Hic potest"; and Gabriel, in II, dist. 27, q. 1, a. 2, post the first conclusion, who say that to condign merit a reward is due from justice, but on account of a promise. But neither Gabriel nor Scotus lends support to the former opinion. First, because they themselves taught the opposite when they disputed about the attribute of justice in God, as we have alleged a little before: for they deny to God absolutely the attribute of justice according to its proper notion, not distinguishing between commutative and distributive; whence they removed from God every kind of justice properly so called. Then too, those words of Scotus, as is noted in the margin, are supposititious, since they are not found in the original. Moreover, when he says that the whole of justice arises from a promise, which is of a certain fidelity, and this is a potential part of justice, defective with respect to the proper ratio of justice, that obligation of fidelity also can in a certain way be called justice; therefore there is no author who affirms the opposite.[1505]

As to what many Scholastics say, that Christ satisfied for us "by the rigor of justice," that matters little. For first, the more ancient writers, such as St. Thomas, Alexander, and St. Bonaventure, do not use this mode of speaking, but only teach that the satisfaction of Christ was perfect, that is, in no way did it need the liberal acceptation of God, but was altogether of equal condignity by the mode of merit, as we shall say in its place. Then, other Scholastics who do speak in this way do not contend that in Christ there was justice toward God properly so called, but that the equality which He maintained by satisfaction, after the manner and likeness of justice, was according to rigor; that is, it did not need the liberal acceptation of God, but was altogether of equal condignity. This is most true, as we shall say. I except some more recent writers, who contend that even in satisfaction there was justice according to its proper notion, whose opinion I now mean to impugn.

1502. Cajetan, on this article.

1503. Medina, in this question, where he denies the attribute of justice to God according to its proper notion, while conceding equality of condignity between works and reward.

1504. Franciscus Romanus, De libertate et necessitate operum, veritas 22.

1505. Scotus, I Sent., d. 17, q. 1 ("Hic potest"); Gabriel, II Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, post 1 concl. The words cited from Scotus are noted by the author as spurious and not in the original.

But the adversary still tries to escape the authority of all these. For they say that those authors speak of commutative justice (iustitia commutativa) with the imperfection that is found in creatures, along with which they deny that it exists in God; yet not without imperfection, as the other things that are attributed to God. But that this escape is a fabrication and has no firm foundation is easily gathered.

It is proved, first, because many of these same authors, when disputing with St. Thomas about mercy (misericordia), do not deny it absolutely, but when the imperfection which it has annexed in us is removed, as we shall see in art. 3. Next, because many of them, when they deny the commutative, consequently grant, without any qualification, the distributive (iustitia distributiva), which, with imperfection, no less repugns to God than the commutative. Therefore they grant it in the same way in which they deny the commutative: but they grant it without imperfection; therefore they also deny the commutative without imperfection. In addition, if on account of imperfection it were permitted to disputants in this matter absolutely to deny commutative justice to God, nothing further preventing, it would also be permitted to deny intellect, will, and the operations of each, and finally all the other attributes. Moreover, those Doctors grant the other things to God without any qualification, but they absolutely deny the commutative; therefore they thought there was another kind of imperfection annexed to commutative justice, by reason of which this justice cannot befit God, a kind which the other attributes do not have, as will be explained in the next chapter.

Certain preliminaries in confirmation of the preceding opinion

Before we begin to confirm our opinion, I shall briefly repeat the foundations.

First foundation. I noted elsewhere from St. Thomas that the things which are found in creatures are to be attributed to God in such a way that they are assigned to Him without any imperfection; whereas the affections or operations which, as they are in us, contain imperfection in themselves, can be had in a twofold way: either the imperfection is conjoined to them, not pertaining to their formal notion, or it is essentially included in their notion, however abstractly conceived. In the former way an operation can be attributed to God formally and properly, the imperfection being set aside; as we shall say of mercy, which, without passion or compassion of appetite, according to its formal notion, which is to relieve misery, rightly befits God. From this side anger (ira) did not repugn, as we noted there in chap. 4: for when the imperfection is removed, the formal ratio of the operation is not thereby taken away, since the imperfection is not essentially conjoined to it. But if the imperfection is essentially included in the very formal notion, that act cannot properly befit God: because, since it must be assigned to Him without imperfection, and the formal ratio of such an operation is taken away when that is removed, it follows that it cannot be properly attributed to God.

Second foundation. Yet it must be observed, secondly, that in every created operation, insofar as it is created, some imperfection is essentially included - namely, that it is an act elicited by some faculty and therefore an accident, that it is finite and limited. This, however, does not prevent its

being attributed to God formally and properly. For every created perfection is transferred to God in such a way that it does not befit Him univocally, but analogically and in a higher manner. And in order that we may thus attribute some operation to God properly and formally, it is necessary that, according to the formal ratio abstracted at least analogically, no imperfection be in it. And this happens whenever, on the part of the formal object which the operation regards, imperfection is not essentially included. For if this is included in the object as it is regarded by the act, there results also in the operation itself an essential imperfection, on account of which such an operation cannot fall in God. By this reasoning we excluded anger from God, however much according to an abstract analogical notion: because this affect regards, as its proper object, the avenging of an injury suffered, which cannot befit God. So too it excludes the desire of one's own good and sadness over one's own evil, as St. Thomas notes; the former, as distinguished from love, is about a future good as future, and the latter is about one's own evil. This formal ratio cannot befit God, not even analogically.[1506]

But that God does not reason discursively is certainly not enough, on that account, for science (scientia) not to be attributed to Him according to its proper notion. For the name "science" is said as properly of cognition through discourse as of cognition without it, such as is found in the Angels; although, if you define human science, it is necessary to include discourse. Then too, that science in creatures is an accident and an elicited operation, whereas in God it is His substance, does not hinder His essence, as conceived by us in reference to the knowable object, from being called science most properly, albeit in a higher sense. For since we find in the object the ratio of knowable truth, and this has a relation to the essence of God without any imperfection, it comes about that we most properly call the very essence science.

Thirdly it must be noted, as we also said there, that when we inquire about these affections whether they are properly transferred to God, it must be understood according to the common doctrine of the Philosophers and of God as He is wont to be defined by them commonly. For if it were allowed to fashion new definitions, we ought to deny no affect to God, and rightly too would Lactantius have attributed anger to God. It remains then to see whether, in the object of justice (iustitia), which is commonly assigned to it by the Philosophers, some imperfection is included which is derived into the affect itself, by reason of which it does not properly befit God. Wherefore the adversaries, who, as we saw in chap. 1, assert that the justice of Christ toward God is of a higher notion than in us, and that it is the very virtue of religion (religio), indeed even that by the same reason the observance of a vow which we have made to God pertains to justice, are manifestly mistaken; and at the same time they assert that this is properly special justice. For at their pleasure, and without foundation, they confound virtues which Theologians and Philosophers have distinguished. For who ever denied the doctrine of St. Thomas, who in 2.2, q. 80, a. 1 taught that

1506. The allusion is to St. Thomas's remarks distinguishing desire of one's own good as about future good and sadness as about one's own evil, which, as such, cannot be attributed to God. The author also elsewhere treats mercy as formally be fitting God when passion is removed. St. Thomas: II - II, q. 80, a. 1 is cited below.

there are certain subjective parts of justice, and certain potential parts - he calls subjective parts those which are species of justice retaining the generic notion of it, such as the commutative and distributive - in which the entire and perfect notion of justice is preserved?

Caput IV - That in God there is not commutative justice according to its proper notion; it is proved from the ratio of giving and receiving

The potential parts of justice, indeed, which retain some likeness of justice, because they are toward another, yet do not have the true notion of justice, either because in them there is not the notion of due, or because they fall short of the notion of equality. By equality St. Thomas understands the equality of what is given and what is received; and among these he numbers religion, by which we also pay our vows to God. Therefore the aforesaid Doctors wrongly confound religion and commutative justice with one another. Wherefore, if they say that the justice of Christ toward God is religion, and that from this Christ has satisfied for us, they ought to assert that His satisfaction was not from justice properly so called - as we shall incidentally prove in the following chapter, where we shall give a universal reason why, even if in paying vows we render an equal to God, this payment is not from justice. And we shall show universally that commutative justice cannot be between us and God. Therefore one must philosophize thus about the virtues, and distinguish one from another, lest they be confused at will, but be used according to the common doctrine and acceptation. Wherefore, when justice or another virtue is attributed to God according to its propriety, it must be so attributed that we do not feign new natures and definitions of virtue, but, according to the common and received use, we attribute it to God, always preserving the analogy, as was explained above.

Fourth, when it is asked whether in God there is justice, this is not understood of any and every affection about the objects of justice; for without doubt God loves all the works and objects according to virtue which are in us. Whence He Himself loves the justice which men observe among themselves, and He both commands and exhorts it. But if on this account we should say that in God there is an affection of justice, there would equally have to be conceded in Him temperance and the other moral virtues. Therefore now we ask about justice, whether in God there is the affection of justice between Himself and creatures, so that He should will to preserve between Himself and us the equal and the just, which is the object of justice. And it remains to be proved that justice, as such, contains within itself an imperfection, so that, according to its proper notion, it repugns to be thus in God.

Fifth and finally, against Cajetan and Bartholomew Medina it must be presupposed that in God there is not properly commutative justice, such that there could be ratio between merit and reward. [1507] For these Doctors - by what reason they were able to be induced to assert that justice is properly between the things themselves and not between persons, if the discourse is of justice as a virtue, I do not know - say that it is between, as it were, things, not persons. But Aristotle in Ethics 5

1507. Cajetan, on this article; Bartholomew Medina, in this question, who denies that justice is attributed to God according to its proper notion, while conceding an equality of condignity between works and reward.

supposes that justice is that which constitutes the just and the equal between one man and another; therefore it ought to be between two rational natures and to have common matter about which it constitutes the just and the equal: consequently, the virtue of justice is not between merit and meed; for who would place justice between money and a horse considered collectively? Therefore those who say that the justice of Christ toward God is between merit and reward do not understand the virtue itself, but an equality and the just; or else they must admit that this equality is not the proper object of justice, which is a peculiar virtue, or else they must concede in God Himself the affection of the virtue of justice according to its propriety, if indeed the affection of God is conversant about this equality and observes it. Wherefore, although they concede equality simply according to condignity - which I think they teach and have wished to teach - yet they ought to say that this is not the proper object of justice; since they do not concede to God the affection of this virtue according to its propriety.

With these foundations laid, which in my judgment are most firm, and which in no way can be denied by the adversaries, I shall endeavor to demonstrate by three principal arguments the common position which I set forth in chapter 2.

The first is taken from the very nature of the object of commutative justice, whose formal ratio consists in the equality of what is given and what is received - why it is such. The formal object which is commonly assigned by Theologians and Philosophers to the virtue of commutative justice properly so called, which differs from all other virtues, is the equality of what is given and what is received; but between God and any creature there cannot be equality of what is given and what is received: therefore in God there cannot be the affection of justice properly so called, which is referred to the establishing of this equality between Himself and a creature; and consequently neither the affection of commutative justice properly so called; for this must be conversant about the equality between what is given and what is received.

And indeed the major proposition is St. Thomas in this article, and 2-2, q. 61, art. 3; and Aristotle in Ethics 5, cap. 2, where he distinguishes the special virtue of justice from the general, which he says is found in every virtue, because the special is conversant about three only goods - money, honor, and safety - and in these it establishes equality; and any inequality in these things is special injustice; and unless by this reason we distinguish the special virtue, it follows that in every virtue there is justice properly and in a special mode, or that justice is only a general virtue, since every virtue observes in its operation equality with its rule, that is, with the law and with God. Therefore, since there ought to be special justice, some special just thing must be constituted about which it operates; but this can be nothing other than in those three goods enumerated. And if to do something according to the will of a superior, which pleases him, is a work of special justice, and from such a work an equality of justice is constituted in rendering a wage for it - just as the adversaries say concerning our merits before God - it follows that in every good work there is a giving and a counterpassion, as in any person contracting with another, which demands retribution from justice; and thus every good work will be of special justice, which is to confound all the virtues.[15081509]

Then Aristotle, Ethics 5, cap. 4, assigning the commutative just, says that it is in buying and selling, in business either done voluntarily, as in contracts, or in those that are done to men involuntarily, as in robbery, theft, and the rest. And cap. 5 he teaches that in every commutation, which he says to be the matter and proper object of justice, there is a repassion. For he who receives something from another, by returning money, or some other thing, suffers just so much, by abdicating from himself the dominion, as he from whom he had received something. Nor has any Theologian or philosopher hitherto assigned otherwise the object of commutative justice.

Lastly, since justice ought to be between two who are capable of reason, as from Aristotle and St. Thomas in the places cited in the preceding chapter it has been proved, whenever it is no concern of the one what the other does, no just commutation with him can be properly observed, nor commutative justice. Therefore it is necessary that the thing given and received should be of mutual concern to both, so that special justice may have place between them: thus the truth of the major proposition is evident.[1510]

But the minor is manifest; and this St. Thomas clearly handed down, 1-2, q. 114, art. 1, ad 2; and in this article Driedo in the treatise On the Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race, cap. 2, and in art. 3 perhaps at the beginning, where the Angelic Doctor himself, the Dean of Louvain, and Hosius in the places cited prove it from that of Romans 11: "Who has first given to him, and it will be repaid to him?" To himself, however, Paul does not deny that God can receive nothing of profit from us (although that is most true); but he says that God is prior in the largess of gifts. Paul therefore says: If there is someone who first gave to God, that is, from his own powers has merited something from God, God will repay the reward; as if he said: but there is none; therefore, etc. For that interrogation wrings out a negation, to which he subjoins the cause: "For from him, and through him, and in him are all things" (Rom. 11); as if he said: He Himself is the author of all goods, He promotes and preserves all; none could give to Him first.[151115121513]

St. Thomas much better proves this minor proposition, 1-2, q. 114, art. 1, ad 2, by the testimony of Job 35: "If you act justly, what will you give him, or what will he receive from your hand?" This Job 22 also expressed: "What does it profit God if you are just? or what does it confer on him if your way is blameless?" For God is so above every creature that He needs no created thing, nor does anything outside Himself accrue to His utility, even if it be said to be done to His honor and glory. For honor is a thing in the one who honors, not in the one honored; as also always happens among men. But between the honor of a man and of God there is a great difference: because while a man is honored, even if that honor is in another and he himself is unaware, yet it is useful to him. Wherefore he who takes away honor from him is truly and properly said to inflict damage upon him. But the honor of God, which is said to be in us when we do well or worship Him religiously,

1508. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 61, a. 3.

1509. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V, c. 2.

1510. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V, cc. 4 - 5.

1511. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 114, a. 1, ad 2.

1512. Driedo, De captiuitate et redemptione generis humani, c. 2; the Dean of Louvain, and Hosius, in the places cited in chapter 2 above.

1513. Rom. 11:35 - 36.

certainly is not said to be to the utility of God Himself: therefore He can receive nothing from us which in any wise is of concern to Him; wherefore the proper matter of justice between Himself and us cannot exist.

But if you say that among men only does justice deal with giving and receiving, not, however, between us and God, but that it is of a higher nature; against this is what we noted in the preceding chapter, namely, that when from human things some affection or operation is transferred to divine things, it ought so to be transferred that it be transferred according to the mode of acceptance and the definition. For if it befits us to fashion definitions at will, one could attribute to God even the worst affections. But that we may observe the common definition, the proper ratio of the object, which is commonly assigned to such an affection, must be retained. For this is not only annexed as an accidental to the operation, but is essential and per se; and this being removed, the ratio of the propriety of the affection is taken away, even according to analogy. Besides, all Philosophers say that the object of justice is equalities in what is given and what is received; where this has not been, as between us and God, neither will there be such an object, nor the affection of commutative justice properly so called.

Finally, if from this - that we offer to God our works, which are meritorious with Him - and that He repays eternal life for them, one says that He is engaged about justice in a merely common way, and that He establishes a just equality between us and Himself in things given and received; it follows that before any promise He is bound to this: for if He accepts, He ought to repay; and consequently, if He should deny glory to good works done in grace, He would be unjust; but that He is unjust none will grant, as all admit; therefore to repay for good works done is not according to commutative justice in the ratio of what is given and what is received.[1514]

Some say that it is not enough that the works be of such condignity to the reward, so that God ought, before a promise, to repay out of justice. For if someone labors in the vineyard of another without a pact, even if the labor otherwise is condign to a wage, nevertheless the owner of the vineyard is not bound to pay it: therefore in the same way God is not bound to repay merits out of justice before He has made a pact. But this evasion can easily be cut off: for labor in the vineyard induces an obligation of justice not from a promise and the fidelity of performance, but solely from this, that the owner of the vineyard has accepted the labor into his utility; and because whenever someone labors in the vineyard of another, with the owner ignorant or not consenting, that labor is not counted to redound to the owner's utility, nor is he held to accept it; therefore if he does not pay a wage for it, he does not commit injustice. But if he sees and consents, now he accepts; and without any pact he ought to render the wage; and if he should not render it, he will sin against justice, though not against promise and fidelity. Nor can it be rightly argued from the fact that he who promised and does not fulfill acts unjustly; for if he promised, it is because he consents and has accepted the labor into his utility. Therefore similarly, even if God should not promise, it would suffice that the just man in grace perform good works, which cannot be done without God knowingly consenting and at times commanding. But if God is said to accept them because they are

1514. Margin: "God is not one who repays for merits out of commutative justice."

unto His honor according to His will, it follows that even if He does not expressly promise, by the very fact that they are done according to His will and please Him, they somehow redound to His utility in the way in which they can; wherefore before a promise He ought to repay, if a promise, once made, is thought to establish and preserve justice between works and reward; since after a promise He does not accept more from them than before.

Then on the contrary this very point is shown, and our position is established: since no creature, either by its sins or in any other way, can inflict damage on God which is truly damage of His, therefore neither can it render anything which truly redounds to His utility and compensation; for contraries must be on the same footing of reason. Wherefore, if there is no sin which is properly injustice against God, but only in a certain common way, likewise there will be no compensation made to Him which is properly from justice. But that no damage can be inflicted on God by us is evident, since even by the sins of blasphemy, sacrilege, and hatred, which are directly against Him, God suffers nothing, nor does He either will or lose some advantage. Rather, such sins are set against other virtues than justice - blasphemy against faith, sacrilege against religion, hatred against charity - which most differ from justice properly so called; for if they were set against justice, they would fall into a twofold species of sin, which is absurd. Therefore there is no special species of injustice against God; and thus neither is there commutative justice between God and us in the ratio of giving and receiving.[1515]

What we noted in the preceding chapter, namely, that when an affection or operation is transferred from human to divine matters, it ought to be transferred according to the customary acceptation and definition. For if it were permitted to fashion definitions at will, we could attribute any affection to God. But, in order to observe the common definition, the proper ratio of the object which is commonly assigned to the affection must be retained. For this is not merely an accident annexed to such an operation, but something essential and per se; and, if this be taken away, the proper ratio of such an affection is taken away, even according to analogy. Therefore, since all the philosophers say that the object of justice is an equality in what is given and received, where there has not been a giving and a receiving between us and God, there will not be such an object, nor the affection of proper commutative justice.

Finally, if, from the fact that we offer our works to God, which are meritorious before him, and he retributes for them eternal life, he is said to preserve commutative justice properly and to establish a just equality between us and him in the ratio of giving and receiving, it follows that before any promise he would be obliged to this: for if he receives, he ought to retribute; and consequently, if he were to deny glory to good works done in grace, he would be unjust. But he would not be unjust, if he were to deny it, as all admit: therefore the retribution made to good works is not according to commutative justice in the ratio of giving and receiving.

1515. Cf. Job 35:7; Job 22:2 - 3.

Some say that it is not enough that the works be of themselves condign to such a reward, so that God, before promising, should be bound out of justice to retribute. For if someone labors in another's vineyard without a pact, even if the labor be otherwise condign to a wage, the owner nevertheless does not owe to pay it out of justice: therefore, by the same reason, God does not owe to retribute merits out of justice before he contracts.

But this subterfuge can be easily cut off: for labor in the vineyard induces an obligation of justice not from promise and the fidelity of a pact, but only from this, that the owner of the vineyard has received the labor into his own utility; and because, as often as one labors in another's vineyard with him not knowing or not consenting, that labor is not judged to redound to the owner's utility, nor is he judged to have received it, therefore, if he does not pay a wage for it, he does not commit injustice. But if he sees and consents, he already receives it and, without any pact, owes to retribute a wage; such that, if he does not retribute, he will sin against justice, and not against promise and fidelity; nor can he be accused of falsehood, as one who promises and does not fulfill, but of injustice: because by that very fact that he consented, he received the labor into his own utility. Therefore, similarly, even if God were not to promise, it would suffice, if a just man in grace were to do good works, which could not fail to be done with God knowing and consenting, and sometimes commanding. And if God is said to receive them, because they are done in his honor according to his will, it follows that even if he should not expressly promise, by the very fact that they are done according to his will and are pleasing to him, they in a certain way redound to his utility; in such wise that, if a promise establishes and preserves justice between works and reward, he ought to retribute both before and after the promise, since after the promise he does not receive more from them than before. Wherefore, if a promise in God were to induce some obligation of justice, it would not be for things received; for to these he would be obliged before the works; but it would be an obligation to give what he promised, because from the promise there would arise for us a right against him. But that from a promise justice cannot arise between us and God, we have at length proved above in chapter 6.

Then, from the contrary, this very point is shown, and our opinion is established: because no creature, either by its sins or in any other way, can inflict damage on God such as would be truly a damage of his; therefore it can attribute to him nothing which truly should redound to his utility and compensation: for by a contrary reason the same ought to be the case. Wherefore, as there is no sin which is properly injustice against God, but only in a certain common way, so there will be no compensation itself which is done out of justice properly. That no damage can be inflicted on God by us is clear; because even by sins of blasphemy and sacrilege and hatred, which are directly against him, God suffers nothing, nor does he lose anything useful or advantageous; otherwise these would themselves properly be sins of injustice. But certainly they are not such; rather, they are opposed to other virtues than justice - blasphemy to faith, sacrilege to religion, hatred to charity - which most properly differ from justice; but if they were opposed to justice, they would fall into a twofold species of sin, which is false.

Accordingly, not only in all sins universally is there not found a damage inflicted on God which could be the object of injustice, nor is there a special ratio of injustice against him, but even in sins which are done in a peculiar way against God, the ratio of injustice or of damage inflicted according to propriety cannot be. Whence it is further inferred that neither we nor Christ have satisfied for our sins out of justice properly, if indeed satisfaction out of justice supposes a lesion against it: for no satisfaction takes place unless it reduce some inequality to equality: therefore, where there is no inequality against justice properly, there is no reduction to equality according to justice properly. And this holds not only in satisfaction for any mortal or venial sin, but also in satisfaction for sins which are directly against God.

Wherefore neither penance, which is posited in us for satisfaction for our sin, nor the vengeance which he takes for sins, pertains properly to the virtue of justice. St. Thomas teaches this concerning penance: in the Third Part, q. 85, a. 3, when he asserts that even if penance be a part of justice, nevertheless in it the just simply is not preserved.[1516] Wherefore the common opinion is that penance is not a subjective part, but a potestative part of justice (pars potestativa iustitiae), which fails from the true and proper ratio of justice; as also religion and many others are, as we said in the preceding chapter; and whether indeed it is distinguished from religion, we shall say in its own place. But this is most certain, whether it pertain to religion or not, that it is not justice properly: for a potestative part of justice, such as is also religion, fails from the ratio of proper justice and only retains a certain mode of it. And indeed for this reason St. Thomas judged penance to fail from the ratio of justice, because it is not conversant about the just simply, but according to something, since that which a man renders to God for sin, namely contrition, is not equal, by which reason it is true what we shall say below at 1-2, q. 113, a. 2.[1517] But even if it were altogether equal with a certain condignity, so that by its nature it would not only blot out sin, but also would supply every defect of it without any condonation, nonetheless it would not be justice properly on our part toward God: because from our satisfaction nothing of emolument would accrue to God; just as, on the contrary, from our sin no damage accrues to him, nor any diminution: therefore that our payment is not out of justice, because nothing grows or comes to God of profit from it; and on that account that work is rightly assigned by all not to proper justice, but to religion, which differs from justice.

Moreover, neither is there justice in God properly vindicative, which is reckoned as a certain part of commutative justice in making and vindicating injuries, as is clear even from what has been said, and as St. Thomas witnesses, 2-2, q. 108, a. 2, where he says that it includes two things, both the punishment of the injury done and the removal of the damage inflicted by it, that is, its compensation.[1518] Aristotle agrees in Ethics V, chapters 4 and 5, when he teaches that justice is found in requital, and that there, too, there is found excess and inequality, which he calls a gain when someone has suffered from another; which inequality and excess demand to be reduced to equality according to justice.[1519] But such a thing is not between God and man, as we have

1516. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 85, a. 3.
1517. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 113, a. 2.
1518. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 108, a. 2.
1519. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V, cc. 4 - 5.

sufficiently proved: therefore there is not in God justice properly so called in vindicating injuries done to himself. There is the further consideration that, when God retributes to us for merits, he suffers nothing; because he never abdicates dominion of anything, nor can he abdicate to his own loss; but he who pays out of justice, in a manner suffers a re-suffering of himself; for this reason Aristotle said in Ethics V, chapter 5, that in every commutation in which justice is preserved, there is a counterpassion; because each person abdicates from himself as much as he has received. Therefore, since God always remains Lord of that which he retributes, justice according to propriety will not fit.

Especially indeed this very point is proved because St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 80, a. 1, in the body, numbers vindication among the potestative parts of justice, because it falls short of the ratio of proper justice: for he who asks or takes compensation for damage inflicted on himself ought not to have asked it out of justice; and thus the debt, which is of the ratio of justice, ceases, as we shall see below in chapter 6: for justice is considered in paying debts; and therefore he who asks satisfaction does not act out of justice. Add that, when God punishes crimes committed against himself, even then he does not have actually this punitive justice which is a potestative part of justice; for vindication, as we were saying above, tends to remove some damage of those things which cannot befit God: and for this very reason we proved above, in the preceding disputation, chapter 4, that there is no anger in God, because it is not an appetite of vengeance. Then, from the same consideration, it follows that, when we pay our vows to God which we have promised, even if we render an equal thing, because we render only as much as we promised, nonetheless that payment is not out of justice, but out of religion; for nothing accrues to God from it of emolument.

Caput V - The same is shown from the condition of God and the creature

Second, a reason by which our opinion is to be proved is taken from the condition of God and the creature. For the creature is compared with God as a little son with his father, and as a servant with his lord: but between a son and a father, between a servant and a master, there cannot be justice: therefore neither between God and man. Moreover, that between son and father there is not justice is proved from Aristotle in Ethics V, the last chapter, where he teaches that the honor due to parents can never be repaid, but he who obeys as he is able seems good and equitable; he asserts the same of the honor due to God; whence also that common saying has prevailed: We cannot repay equal gratitude to the gods, to teachers, and to parents. Accordingly, whatever owed due is established toward parents, as the support of them with food, is constituted by a certain virtue, namely piety, which is a potestative part of justice, of which St. Thomas treats at 2-2, q. 101; and accordingly it falls short of the ratio of proper justice, because in it the just simply is not found; while toward God religion is established, similarly contained under justice as a potestative part.[1520]

Moreover, in this way it is only proved that, in showing honor and in the support of food, justice cannot be on the part of children toward parents; which suffices for our present purpose, so that we may say the same of God and the creature.

1520. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 101.

But Aristotle denies in addition, for another peculiar reason, in Ethics V, chapter 6, that there is justice between son and father, slave and master; which reason in the same way proves that between God and man right of justice is not found, because Aristotle gives it in these words: "There is not justice toward that which is, absolutely speaking, one's own;" adding that the son is in a certain way something of the father and not separated, as being a part of him; "wherefore there is not right of justice toward himself." If one were to say: since there is not injustice toward the things which are one's own, and the son is said to be something of the father, there will not be injustice toward him; wherefore neither will there be justice toward him: for both are toward another who is simply another; but the son, since he is a part of the father, is not other than he. This reason St. Thomas explained in almost these words, 2-2, q. 57, a. 4, and he adds that between wife and husband there is justice simply, because the wife is not a part of the husband, as the son is.[1521]

The second reason, by which our position is to be proved, is taken from the condition of God and the creature. For the creature is compared to God as a small child to a father, and as a servant to a lord; but between son and father, and between servant and lord, there cannot be justice: therefore neither can there be justice between God and man.

Further, that between son and father there is not justice is proved from Aristotle, Ethics VIII, last chapter, where he teaches that the honor owed to parents can never be fully repaid.[1522] Yet he who, as far as he can, pays them obedience, is called good and equitable. The same seems true regarding the honor owed to God and has long prevailed in the common saying that we cannot return equal gratitude to the gods, teachers, and parents. Wherefore, with respect to the worship owed to parents and to the provision of sustenance, there is constituted a certain virtue, namely piety, which is a potential part of justice, of which St. Thomas treats in II - II, q. 101;[1523] and therefore, failing to repay equal gratitude to parents, one does not sin against justice strictly so called, because in such a case religion is constituted, which likewise is contained under justice as a potential part.

But by this route there is only proved that, in the showing of honor and the provision of sustenance, justice cannot exist on the children's part toward their parents: which would be enough for our present purpose, so that we might say the same concerning God and the creature. Yet Aristotle moreover, by a special reason, denies in Ethics V, ch. 6, that there is justice between son and father, and between servant and lord;[1524] which reason in like manner proves that it is not found between God and man. And it is this, which Aristotle renders in these words: "For there is no justice toward one's own, simply speaking; but a son, so long as he is small and not separate, is a part of the father himself; now no one wishes to harm himself; hence there is no injustice toward him." As if he said: since there is no injustice toward things that are one's own, and the son is said to be something of the father, there will not be injustice toward him; wherefore neither will there be justice toward him: for both are toward another who is simply another; but the son, since he is a

1521. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 57, a. 4.
1522. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VIII, last chapter.
1523. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, II - II, q. 101.
1524. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V, ch. 6.

part of the father, is not other than he. St. Thomas explained this in nearly these words, II - II, q. 57, a. 4, and adds that between wife and husband there is justice simply, because the wife is not a part of the husband, as the son is;[1525] yet he did not set out at length the difference, nor the mode according to which the son is said to be a part of the father. Cajetan, indeed, in that place says that the son is for that reason something of the father, because he is begotten of the same seed; and since between father and son there is a perpetual habit of this kind, therefore there is not between them justice even in the castrense peculium. By the same cause he says there is not injustice if the son kills the father, but a greater sin: because if there cannot be justice between them. Soto, however, more appropriately says in 3 De iustitia, q. 1, last article, around the end, that there cannot be justice between father and son so long as the son is not emancipated: which Aristotle clearly indicated in the place cited when he said, "while he is small and not separate."[1526]

This, however, is to be understood in civil contracts of money or of things which are estimated by money; not, however, in the showing of honors and in the sustaining of life; for from these the son is never released toward his parents, which he owes them out of piety, which is a special virtue toward them. Wherefore, if he afflicts his father with ignominy or kills him, he sins against piety; in which point Cajetan's opinion is not approved by St. Thomas in II - II, q. 101.[1523] And accordingly, since we cannot return equal gratitude to our parents, there is not simply speaking justice toward them; but there is toward their honor and life.

Moreover, regarding monies, as long as the son is not emancipated, according to Aristotle there is no justice in any commutation and mancipation of the castrense peculium; for that later was introduced by the law of the Caesars; under Athenian law in Aristotle's time it was not in use, namely that a son not yet emancipated could have the dominion of any goods whatsoever; wherefore, in Aristotle's time, there was absolutely no dominion of a thing on the son's part, but all was on the father's. Indeed, by the more ancient law of the Gauls the father was lord of all the son's goods which were profectitious and adventitious, though not of the castrense goods, as is reported in the law Cum oportet in the Code, De bonis quae liberis, and in the Institutes, Per personas cuique, and in law 2, ff. De castrensi peculio.[1527] Hence the father also succeeded to the predeceased son in the castrense peculium, not by hereditary right, but by the right of peculium, as though lord of it. Later, however, in that law Cum oportet, and in the section there cited, and in our realm, Partidas 4, tit. 17, laws 5 and 6, it was established that the son should have dominion and usufruct of castrense and quasi-castrense goods, but of adventitious goods he should have dominion only, the father having the usufruct.[1528]

Accordingly, for this reason Aristotle very rightly said that between father and son there could not be justice in commutations, because all the son's goods were the father's, and no one can observe justice toward his own goods in dealing with another, but only toward the goods of

1525. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, II - II, q. 57, a. 4.

1526. Dominicus Soto, De iustitia et iure, III, q. 1, last article, at the end.

1523. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, II - II, q. 101.

1527. Codex Iustinianus, De bonis quae liberis, law Cum oportet; Institutes, De rerum divisione/Per personas cuique (as cited by Vazquez); Digest, De castrensi peculio, law 2.

1528. Las Siete Partidas (Kingdom of Castile), Partida 4, tit. 17, laws 5 - 6.

another; nor does anyone in his own goods wrong himself against justice. It follows that between father and son, in money, justice could not at that time be preserved. I pass over the goods of life and of honor, in which by another rationale it cannot be, as we saw above. The same is to be said of servant and lord, because all the servant's goods are the lord's. But between husband and wife there can be justice, since the goods of wife and husband have always been divided and each one's own. Now indeed, by the law of the Caesars, there can be justice in commutations between father and son, even not yet emancipated, in those goods in which the son has both dominion and usufruct, or at least dominion; nor would Aristotle ever have denied this according to the disposition of Caesar's law.

From this principle it is proved that between God and a rational creature there cannot be justice, since they are compared mutually as servant and lord, as son and father - which no one doubts - namely, as a son not yet emancipated, such as he was in Aristotle's time, who had no proper goods which were not the father's. For whatever good a rational creature has in good works, which she is said in a certain way to offer to God in order to receive the reward of those works, is from God as from an author and lord; therefore from those works she cannot constitute God a debtor to herself out of justice, since she gives back to him what she has received from his hand and always holds as preserved by him: no otherwise than a son and a servant cannot by justice oblige to themselves either father or lord by bestowing good things which rather belong to the father or to the lord than to themselves.

But you will say: our works are in a certain respect so ours as not to be God's, because they are, namely, free and human; they receive this condition from us alone; therefore, by that new title, since we offer them to God, we can constitute him a debtor to us out of justice. But since the value of works, for which a recompense is given, depends upon the grace of God, which he liberally gives to us and preserves, even if the ratio of their being free comes from us as from a proper cause - for liberty is only the foundation of merit, yet it does not confer value upon the work - by that title we cannot constitute God our debtor by a meritorious work, of which he himself is the principal author and cause. And by this same reason we shall prove, in III, q. r., a. 2, that Christ could not according to justice properly so called satisfy God by the works of his humanity, because the whole worth proceeded from the very deity sanctifying the humanity and making its works worthy: just as no one can properly satisfy another out of justice with coin of a baser value, if that coin increases in value solely from the creditor's estimation; for thus he would be remitting a good part of the debt. [1529] There is added what, in the preceding chapter, I was saying: from the fact that we act freely and God, together with us and our works, by his grace makes them worthy, we do not thereby make him lord of our works by some new title, nor do we truly attribute anything to him.

Then the same truth is shown from that other title by which we said that a son cannot render to his father an equal in the showing of honors, and on that account there is constituted toward parents a virtue distinct from justice. For in the same way neither can a creature render to God equal honor - whether by "honor" we understand works of any virtue whatsoever, which, in that

1529. See above, caput immediately preceding; and below, III, q. r., a. 2 (within this work), on the satisfaction of Christ.

they are done according to right reason, are said to be pleasing to God and to redound to his honor; or works of the special worship and honor owed to God. For the former do not pertain to justice but to various virtues; the latter pertain to religion, which is distinct from justice. Just as a son, when he honors his father by obeying his will, or by showing him some peculiar honor out of piety, does not thereby merit with him, constituting him a debtor out of justice, but, acting according to various virtues, earns from him a reward only by reason of the dignity of the act; so too, when we merit something from God by good works, we do not therefore hope for a reward from him because we have conferred upon him something equal that would call for compensation out of justice; but because the work is in itself equally worthy of remuneration; and worth is taken from goodness. For it is one thing to merit by good works, but another to contribute something that is an estimable price in a commutation - as we shall say more fully below.[1530]

Caput VI - That no obligation of proper justice arises in God from a promise

There are those who say that it is not contrary to the proper notion of satisfaction out of justice that a pact or promise intervene, so as to defend that Christ satisfied according to justice properly so called, even if the Eternal Father was not necessarily bound to admit that satisfaction before he had promised. They bring an example: Just as one who has a captive taken in a just war is not bound to free him by giving him liberty, even if the slave himself, or another on his behalf, offers an equal price for him, until the owner himself promises to free the slave for that price. For true justice does not require that, even when an equal price is offered, one be able to compel another to contract; but it is enough if they, by mutual will, contract and come to terms, and, the pact being supposed, each must observe justice and equality.

I indeed hold, first, that satisfaction equal for an injury accepted from another ought to be accepted by the creditor. For there is on both sides an obligation requiring it: on the part of him who must satisfy, and on the part of him to whom satisfaction is to be made - yet in a different way. On the part of him to whom satisfaction is owed, there is an obligation of admitting the satisfaction, if it is equal according to the rules of justice; for by the very fact that he does not admit it, he condones the debt - something which holds not only if the satisfaction is made by the debtor himself, but also if it is made by another in his stead. But on the part of him who offers satisfaction, there is not always an obligation of satisfying; for one can satisfy for another gratuitously; nevertheless such an obligation to satisfy must be present in some way.

It follows plainly from what has been said, against the aforesaid Doctors, that no satisfaction offered is equal out of justice, if the creditor can freely reject it; for then the thing offered would not be equal according to the rules of justice.

Therefore, if God did not have to admit Christ's satisfaction, but, it having been offered, could nonetheless justly not remit sin and could punish man himself - as indeed he could - it was not according to the equality of proper justice; yet it was according to the equality of condignity of

1530. Below, on merit and commutation (see the later question and article to which the author refers).

merit, which does not pertain to proper justice, and in that mode it was equal, indeed superabundant, but of such a nature as would not oblige God to admit it: therefore one must speak otherwise of that than of what is in the matter of proper justice.

Confirmation from an inconvenience that would follow: If it was necessary that a promise intervene in order that Christ's satisfaction be perfect and, as they say, according to the strictness of justice, it would follow that Christ could not by his first act have merited for the Fathers of the Old Testament, to whom grace was given and guilt was remitted in hope of the payment which he was to make; for then, before his advent, there was no pact; and again, before his first work in the first instant, likewise no pact could have preceded; therefore, by his first act he could not, according to that strictness, have satisfied for past things.

Moreover, I say: wherever there is some retribution out of justice properly so called, there is a debt to him to whom the retribution is made; and although in the retribution of glory for merits God is debtor to us by his word and promise, nonetheless I think that, between us and him, even his promise being supposed, there is not justice properly so called, but only fidelity, which is a part of the potential parts of justice properly so called. And that there is always a debt to him to whom retribution is made out of justice properly so called is proved first from St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 30, a. 1, who teaches that the potential parts of justice, which fall short of the proper notion of justice, are so constituted because in them either the notion of debt is not found, or they fall short of the notion of equality. Therefore, wherever some virtue orders one toward another from honesty, but not from debt, it cannot, according to St. Thomas, be properly justice. Reason also clearly shows this: for the justice which is observed in contracts and in making amends for injuries is on the part of him who makes retribution for what he has received or carried off; and unless he be bound to that which he pays, he does not, by paying, observe the just, nor reduce inequality to equality. For if he does not owe to pay, it follows that between him and the other there does not intervene any inequality, and hence there is no reduction to just equality when he makes retribution. From which it follows that in God there is no act of justice before a promise, because before that he owes to no one to make any retribution, as is manifest.

But indeed, by promise and by his word God has been constituted a debtor of the reward which he has promised to merits; and, in my judgment, he is not only a debtor truly and properly to himself, but also to us to whom he has promised, as in 1.2, q. 114, a. 1, according to the sentence of the Fathers and the Scholastics, I will show above and prove by argument. When, however, the holy Doctor in that article said that God is not constituted a debtor to us but, by his word, to himself, nonetheless, since he attends to that as to the cause and root of the obligation - if this were true, as the Thomists commonly think - that God, by his word, constituted not us but himself debtor, it would plainly follow that when God makes retribution to us for good works, he would not make retribution out of proper justice. Wherefore, in their judgment, the matter is adjudged thus: that God toward us, in the retribution of merits, does not exercise commutative justice properly so called; for, as we were just saying, he who owes nothing to another and nevertheless gives to him, does not observe justice with him, but is rather liberal.

Yet even if God is debtor to us by his word, he does not render to us by commutative justice properly so called what he has promised, but by fidelity, or truth (*veritas*), which is a potential part of justice, and by a certain decency and proportion of condignity between our merit and eternal life, which also can, in a common way, be called justice, inasmuch as some equality is preserved. And that this may be explained more clearly, the doctrine of St. Thomas is especially to be observed, 2.2, q. 80, a. 1, ad 3, who asserts that fidelity, which arises from a promise, is not a virtue distinct from truth; for fidelity is truth in keeping promises. Wherefore the true and proper notion of perjury - which cannot exist without falsity, as St. Thomas teaches in 2.2, q. 98, a. 1 - is found as much when one does not keep what he promised by oath, as when he affirms something false. And since truth is constituted by the same holy Doctor, in that same place (q. 80), a potential part of justice falling short of the proper notion of justice, fidelity must be set down in the same way. Wherefore Soto taught falsely, in his treatise De tegendo secreto, q. 1, m. 1, and 7, and in De iustitia, q. 2, a. 1, concerning the solution of the first doubt, when he said that fidelity does not pertain to the virtue of truth, but properly to commutative justice.[1531]

However, in very truth, from a promise made to some man who accepts that promise when made, there arises not only an obligation of fidelity or truth, but also of justice; for there is then in question a right to the promised thing for him to whom the promise is made. This I suppose as most certain, against Cajetan on 2.2, q. 88, a. 1, by the common sentence and I strengthen it by reason. For if it induced only an obligation of truth, it would not pass to the heirs; that is, the heirs of the promiser would not be bound to the fulfillment of the promise. For an obligation of truth, as also of a vow and of an oath, must be judged purely personal, and perishes with the promiser and the swearer; but the obligation which passes to the heirs is of justice. Hence there lies an action against the heirs of him who has promised something, according to the formula required in law: if by stipulation, then there is an action ex stipulatu; if by a mere pact, then according to the nature of the pact, as the law and courts admit. Cajetan, therefore, is mistaken when he says that from a promise there arises no obligation of justice, but only of truth and fidelity.

...of buying and selling, and of the commutation of what is given and received; for that such a thing cannot intervene between God and us was shown in chapter 4. Not even, moreover, in the paying of what was promised by way of a gift - for in the payment of this among men justice is observed in this, that there is given only as much as was promised, to him to whom the promise was made, because the thing promised by force of the promise belonged to him by right. Therefore, by this reasoning it is plain that God is not bound by proper justice to pay what He has promised: because, however much God promise us His glory, we always remain under His power, like a slave under the power of his master, who has nothing that is not his master's. If he has received something from his master that is akin to a donation, the master can take it away. Likewise, if a master has promised a garment to a slave remaining in the pristine state of perfect servitude, he ought, out of truth and fidelity, to make payment to him, especially if he has bound himself by an oath. Yet because the slave, to whom he promised, always remains in his power, the master can,

1531. Dominicus Soto, De tegendo secreto, q. 1, m. 1; q. 7; and De iustitia, q. 2, a. 1. Also critiqued against Cajetan on St. Thomas, II - II, q. 88, a. 1.

saving truth and faith, take away the garment once given, or even deny what was promised; that is, unless it would be against fidelity, it would not be against justice. For if that slave remains always in every respect a slave, he does not possess that thing by any right other than that of a slave; and therefore it is his master's.

Accordingly, since every creature, even after God's promise has been made, remains under God's power, as a slave under a lord, by a right of full servitude with respect to all and singular things that it possesses - if God were to take away the glory once bestowed, or to deny what was promised, He would be unfaithful and false, but not unjust; therefore, by fulfilling that which He promised, from the promise alone there arises no obligation of justice between Him and us. It is established, then, that in no respect can there properly be commutative justice (*iustitia*) on God's part toward us, or on our part toward God, whether before the promise or after it. By all of which things confirmed and explained, the common opinion of the Scholastics stands sufficiently firm - namely, that we must speak according to the common and customary acceptation of commutative justice: for it is not permitted to feign new definitions of things, as we premised in chapter 3. There is added, moreover, in confirmation of our opinion, that from the opinion of others, who strive to defend justice properly in God, there arise a thousand difficulties which the intellect cannot grasp: what, then, compels us - leaving the plain and well-trodden way - to enter a rough and difficult one?

Caput VII - The arguments of the prior opinion are solved

We still have left to us to resolve the arguments of the prior opinion. For anyone could easily answer those that are opposed to the doctrine above set forth; but so that their weakness may appear more clearly, we shall say something concerning each. Before all else, however, it is necessary to overthrow the common foundation. We assert, therefore, that whenever some affection or operation is transferred from creatures to God, it must be transferred without imperfection. Now imperfection is twofold: one which is annexed accidentally to the operation, as compassion in mercy; and another which is included essentially on the part of the object, however much it be considered analogically and abstracted. In the former way some affection that is in us can be attributed to God; and thus mercy is attributed to God without compassion, because the formal notion of it is to relieve another's misery. In the latter way, however, some affection which, on the part of its formal object, includes imperfection, such as anger and vengeance, cannot be transferred to God without metaphor, nor properly even according to analogy. We gave the reason for this in chapter 3; moreover, we showed how anger includes that essential imperfection in Disputation 84, chapter 4, on vengeance; and we proved the same point in this disputation, chapter 4.[1532]

By this same reasoning we cannot attribute to God the affection of proper commutative justice, nor of liberality, nor of magnificence: because commutative justice, as we demonstrated in chapter 4, establishes equality around what is given and received, which cannot exist between us and God;

1532. Vazquez, Disputatio 84, cap. 4, De vindicta; and in this Disputatio, cap. 4.

while liberality has to do with largess of money or of what is valued by money, as Aristotle testifies, and St. Thomas too; and magnificence, finally, with great expenditures, as they also teach.[1533] Hence it is foolish, says Aristotle, to ascribe political virtues to God.[1534]

Moreover, St. Thomas in this article, in solution 1, teaches that liberality and magnificence befit God, yet not with respect to civil actions, but with respect to actions proper to Him; by which words he seems to ascribe to God the affections of liberality and magnificence in the bestowal of spiritual goods, and without metaphor; for he had said that temperance and other affections, which are concerned with the moderation of bodily passions, befit God metaphorically. But he does not understand "liberality" and "magnificence" as the special virtues are posited and distinguished from others, but of their affections according to a certain common and general notion. Spiritual things are not the matter of these virtues. For if liberality and magnificence in the largition of spiritual gifts were in God special virtues, just as in us they regard expenditures of money, by the same reasoning in us too these virtues would be constituted as special around spiritual things: for a teacher who teaches great and hidden things would be called "magnificent," and he who without envy communicates his own things to others would be called "liberal" in a peculiar sense. Therefore these virtues in us would not have as their proper matter the expenditure of money.

We say, then, that even if, without metaphor, God is called liberal and magnificent, nevertheless He is not said to be so according to the proper and special notion, but according to a certain common one. And thus the proper notion of liberality and magnificence, as it is distinguished from the metaphorical but not from the common, also regards spiritual "expenditures," and it very well befits God. So too must it be said of justice: for, as Aristotle bears witness, justice in the universe is said of every virtue, since every virtue observes some equality; and thus, as a rather common proverb has it, justice in itself contains all the virtues.[1535] Therefore, wherever someone attends to and observes some equality in his operation, he is said, in a certain common notion, to have justice - not, indeed, improperly and metaphorically, but commonly.

In the same manner science (*scientia*) is ascribed to God properly and without metaphor, although in Him it is without discursus: because, commonly and without metaphor, "science" is said of any evident knowledge. When, however, we deny to God liberality, magnificence, justice, and science properly, we do not understand "properly" as opposed to "metaphorically," but as opposed to "commonly"; that is, we assert that those virtues which are said to be special and distinct from others do not befit God. Likewise, science according to that peculiar mode which includes discursus and is distinguished from the intellect of first principles - which properly befits us alone - is not to be ascribed to God; yet the general notion of knowing does befit Him, without metaphor.

Now to the first argument I reply: when Scripture can conveniently be explained without metaphor, with the nature of things preserved, it must be so expounded; but where an affection or operation repugns God, a metaphor must be admitted. And since it remains proved that the notion

1533. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IV, c. 1; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, II - II, q. 117; and on magnificence: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IV, c. 2; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, II - II, q. 134, a. 2.

1534. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X, c. 8.

of proper commutative justice cannot befit God, it remained that Scripture should be understood according to metaphor whenever it calls God "just" or ascribes justice to Him. But because there is a certain general notion of justice, which without metaphor is found in all the virtues, there is no need to flee to metaphor: rather, God will be called "just" by reason of any virtue and rectitude which befits Him; and He is said to be "just" with us either because He is faithful in His promises and pays only as much as He promises - for a promise is a certain part of justice and can be called "justice" by a common name - or He is also said to be "just" because He preserves equality between the worth of merits and the rewards, in which the common notion of justice is found. In this sense it is said at Heb. 6: "For God is not unjust, that He should forget," both by reason of fidelity, because He is not unfaithful, and by reason of equality, because He does not repay less than works deserve; but He would be called "unjust" if He repaid less, either because He did not keep faith or because He did not preserve this equality. Although this latter, of itself, would not altogether repugn God; therefore the justice of God must not be attended to - as Anselm thought in the Proslogion, chapter 10 - only according to the fittingness of His goodness, so that that is called "just" which befits His goodness; but also according to some equality of things among themselves, as has been explained.[1536]

Some, however, argue in order to prove that there is in God commutative justice properly, from that text of Romans 3: "Whom (Christ) God has set forth for the manifestation of His justice"; and from that other passage as well.

Disputatio LXXXVI - On whether distributive justice is proper to God

Caput I - The opinion of certain Theologians

But from that passage to the Romans 5: "As by one man's offense ... so also by the justice of one (namely, of Christ) ...," yet you will find none among the Fathers, nor among more recent interpreters, who by "justice" in those places understands commutative justice, which is toward another. Rather, at Romans 3 by "justice" they understand either the faithfulness of God, who promised justification through Christ, or the justice of grace, by which He justifies the ungodly. For Paul adds, "that He Himself may be just, and a justifier"; or punitive justice, which is not properly commutative in him who punishes an offense committed against himself, as we showed above. And much less at Romans 5 is "justice" understood to mean commutative justice, but sanctity, which Paul there opposes to "offense": so that just as by the offense of one all are constituted sinners, so also by the sanctity of one all are made saints.

Lest, however, our labor seem to someone superfluous in proving that the special virtue of commutative justice which is found in us is not found in God, since we already grant some common rationale of justice and seem to agree with our adversaries, who so concede commutative justice to God as to attribute it to Him without imperfection according to an equality of condignity between

1535. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics V, cc. 1 - 2.
1536. St. Anselm, Proslogion, cap. 10.

merits and reward - since they contend that there is a special rationale of commutative justice in God and, consequently, that all the conditions of that justice must be observed just as they are among men in the satisfaction of a debt, from which doctrine many conclusions follow that can scarcely stand, as was shown in cap. 4, §§ 1 and 6 - whereas we, when we say that only according to a common rationale is justice found in God, are not obliged to affirm that all the conditions of proper commutative justice are required for satisfaction to be perfect and for the payment of the reward: rather, in another, easier way, we shall philosophize in their proper places: in I - II, q. 114, a. 1, on the justice of our merits, and in III, q. 1, a. 2, on the satisfaction of Christ for our sins. There, with every perfect equality preserved that could exist between Christ and God, or even between us and God, we shall explain all things rightly, avoiding a thousand difficulties into which it would be necessary to fall if we were to follow the rules of proper commutative justice, as is clear from what has been said in the chapters noted.

It is objected, second: Someone will say that in this way we could also attribute temperance to God without metaphor according to the common rationale which is found in all the affective dispositions of virtue; yet the Holy Doctor in the reply concedes that only metaphorically.

I answer: That it belongs to God only according to metaphor, because temperance, even according to its common rationale, signifies a certain moderation of a passion that arises, which is altogether repugnant to God; and therefore it does not belong to Him without metaphor.

To the second argument I say: If "justice" be transferred to God in a way that does not concern "the given and the received," it remains necessarily only according to the common rationale of justice, because the proper and special rationale of the object is removed, as has been sufficiently proved. And although our affections are to be attributed to God without imperfection, nevertheless since the imperfection is essential - inasmuch as it arises from the formal object of the affection - it cannot properly belong to God. Such is the imperfection of "the given and the received" in commutative justice, if we follow the definition of the Philosophers and of all the Theologians; nor is it lawful to devise new definitions. And these were the reasons in the establishment of the first part of that sentence; but what the adversaries teach in the second and third place they prove by no reason, and we have sufficiently impugned them above.

An Deus conveniat iustitia distributiva. Disp. 86. - The opinion of certain Theologians. cap. 1. - That distributive justice does not properly exist in God is proved by the authority of the Scholastics and of others. cap. 2. - The foregoing sentence is proved by reason. cap. 3. - The adversaries' arguments are dissolved. cap. 4.

Now as to distributive justice, which concerns another kind of equality, I will inquire whether it can properly belong to God. And on this matter there is greater dissension among the Theologians: for not a few, nor of inferior standing, affirm that in God there is distributive justice according to propriety. Thus teach Richard in IV, d. 46, a. 1, q. 1; Capreolus on the First Book, d. 45, q. 1, a. 1, conclusion 14, and a. 3 to the arguments against the same conclusion; Cajetan on this article and II - II, q. 61, a. 4, around the replies; Ferrariensis against cap. 93; Soto, book 3 De iustitia, q. 5, last article to the first, and book 3 De natura et gratia, cap. 7; Hosius in the Confession of Poland, cap.

73, before the middle. What, however, St. Thomas taught on this matter we shall say in the following chapter; for inasmuch as all these, in the same way that they deny commutative justice to be in God, equally affirm that there is distributive justice, and since they deny commutative justice according to propriety, in that same way they concede distributive justice.[1537]

But as to what distributive justice belongs to God, they are not all of the same mind. Richard and Cajetan think that both in the retribution of rewards for good merits and in the infliction of punishments for sins distributive justice is observed by God. Soto, however, thinks that only in the bestowal of rewards; for in punishments commutative justice intervenes. The rest speak more generally, and seem to agree with Richard and Cajetan.

Cajetan proves his opinion thus. For, as to the matter at hand, it pertains to distributive justice to place each thing in its proper rank; but God places each in his own rank, by rendering rewards to good merits and punishments to sins - indeed, in the retribution of reward, because it is said in John 14: "In my Father's house there are many mansions"; but in the infliction of punishment, because in Acts 1, concerning Judas, it is said, "that he might go to his own place": therefore in this God observes distributive justice. Wherefore the affect of this virtue must be attributed to God according to propriety. And this is what Dionysius also seems to have expressed in the same sense, De divinis nominibus 8, near the end, when he says: For the divine justice disposes and determines all things; and, keeping all things not confused among themselves nor mingled, as they are, it gives to all what is fitting to each, according to the dignity which each of the things that are attains. And Cajetan thinks that the Father of the family in Matthew 20 observed this justice when he called the laborers and when he rendered to each a denarius for his labor; for it is a certain likeness of the divine judgment, in which God, according to merits, will appoint to each his reward.[1538]

Secondly, the same opinion is proved because the vice of respect of persons is opposed not to commutative justice but to distributive justice, as is gathered from St. Thomas, II - II, q. 63 throughout. But God is said on the day of judgment to render to each according to his works without respect of persons: therefore He renders out of distributive justice. Otherwise, when Paul said in Romans 2 that God will render to each man justly according to his works, he would not have assigned a relevant reason when he added, "For there is no respect of persons with God"; as if he said: therefore He renders to each justly, because He does not accept a person. Therefore he suggests that God's justice is opposed to respect of persons; wherefore, since such respect is opposed to distributive justice, it follows that in God there is distributive justice.

A third reason is that of Dominic Soto, who, in order to prove his thesis, notes in book 3 De natura et gratia that our good works are to be considered in a twofold way: first, as they proceed from free choice - and thus, he says, they are not meritorious de condigno of eternal life; then, as they are from a just man - and thus they are meritorious de condigno. For although one man may

1537. Richard of St. Victor, In IV Sent., d. 46, a. 1, q. 1; Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 45, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 14, and a. 3 ad contr.; Cajetan, In II - II, q. 61, a. 4; Silvester Ferrariensis, Contra cap. 93; Soto, De iustitia et iure, l. 3, q. 5 (art. ult. ad 1), and De natura et gratia, l. 3, c. 7; Hosius, Confessio fidei Christianae (Polonica), c. 73.

1538. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 8 (ad fin.); Matthew 20; John 14:2; Acts 1:25; Romans 2:6, 11; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, II - II, q. 63 (de acceptione personarum).

be able to merit de condigno with respect to another man, even if he be his enemy; nevertheless with respect to God, in view of the man as such and while he is God's enemy, he cannot so merit. And so one man merits with respect to another out of commutative justice, which is not measured by the dignity of the meriting person but by the equality of the work; for commutative justice establishes equality between the given and the received. But with respect to God we merit out of distributive justice; and therefore in such merit the dignity of the person is considered, whether he be a friend of Him with respect to whom he merits. But Soto proves this by no reason; he merely assumes it gratuitously.

Then he confirms his position in book 3 De iustitia by a line of reasoning along these lines. In the retribution of reward God considers both the dignity of persons and merits; but this seems to belong properly to distributive justice: therefore in the rendering of rewards God observes it. Nor does it stand in the way that in such rendering a certain commutative mode is also preserved, inasmuch as to each exactly is a reward rendered for merits, which does not usually happen in public distribution. For this arises from the fact that the reward of eternal life is most cumulative and infinite, so that from that store an exact retribution can be made to each; whereas public goods that must sometimes be distributed are not usually so abundant that they can proportionally compensate all merits equally, but, the proportion only among them being observed, are divided among them.

Caput II - That distributive justice does not properly exist in God is proved by the authority of the Scholastics and of others

But that in punishments God does not observe distributive justice, but commutative justice, Soto proves first from St. Thomas, II - II, q. 108, a. 2; and, secondly, by adding that St. Thomas says that the punishment of sins, as vindictive, pertains to public justice, which is commutative justice. Furthermore, the reason is that in punishments the dignity of the person is not considered, but only the equality between the sin and the punishment; therefore in these God does not observe distributive justice, which considers the dignity of persons, but commutative justice, which considers equality between two things - since, when He punishes, He assigns to sins a punishment that is just and correspondent.

Certain more recent Thomists add that in the retribution of rewards God observes both kinds of justice; for (so they say) He considers our works, and since they proceed from free choice, He repays with eternal life according to a proportion, which pertains to distributive justice - since in that way there is some proportioned equality between our works and eternal life. But if gratuitous things be received - grace and gifts - they say the reward pertains to commutative justice, because between those and the reward there is an equality of thing to thing, which commutative justice regards. Others, however, explain the mind of St. Thomas differently; Victoria is among them.

Now that distributive justice does not properly exist in God is proved far more by the judgment of the Scholastics, who teach that distributive justice does not properly belong to God.

Thus teach St. Bonaventure,[1539] Scotus,[1540] Durandus,[1541] Paludanus,[1542] and the Supplement to the Summa.[1543] Alexander of Hales also agrees.[1544]

What, moreover, St. Thomas's sentence is on this point we shall set forth below; but here it suffices that, in those places already cited, he expressly denies that there is between us and God a justice simply so called, from which it follows that neither commutative nor distributive justice belongs to God according to propriety in regard to us. For if there were any justice simply so called between God and us, at least distributive justice would have to be granted; but St. Thomas explicitly denies such a justice simply so called, as will be explained in its place.

But it is not the same thing to be simply just, that is, in general, and to be by way of repassion; this was the doctrine of Aristotle in Ethics, book V, chapter 5. For the just extends more widely than repassion: there is, namely, some just, to wit distributive, in which there is no repassion, as we shall say more at length in the next chapter.[1545] Yet the first argument objects in this way: the divine judgment is simply just, and in it the just by way of repassion is observed; therefore the simply just and that which is by way of repassion are the same. He replies in these words: To the first, that that form of the divine judgment is attended to according to the notion of commutative justice, namely, insofar as it recompenses rewards for merits and punishments for sins. By which he shows that in God's judgment there is not found the simply just, that is, universally, but such a just, namely commutative, or the form and likeness of such a justice, so as to show in this way that the simply just, that is, universally, is not the same as the just by way of repassion. But if in God's judgment there truly were distributive justice, he would have answered better that in it there is not the simply just, because it is such a just, namely distributive; or, if there be found there commutative at the same time, he ought to have granted that the simply just is found there, that is, universally. Add that, if in the divine judgment, according to the mind of St. Thomas, the form of commutative justice and the mode of that quality is observed, it cannot at the same time observe the mode of commutative (sc. distributive) justice; therefore, since he grants that in it the mode of commutative is observed, he plainly denies not only distributive properly so called, but also some mode and form of that justice, as we shall show in the next chapter.

Thus far we have only explained which Scholastic Doctors follow this opinion; next, however, it is proved for us by the authority of Anselm and Aristotle. First, Anselm in the Proslogion, chapter 10, speaks thus to God: "Thou art just, not because thou renderest a debt, but because thou doest what befits thee as the highest good." But justice properly cannot be without a debt, as was said in the preceding disputation, chapter 6, according to the judgment of St. Thomas also: therefore, since Anselm calls the justice of God his befittingness (decentia), he thinks that in God there is found no justice properly so called, but only in a certain common notion. Wherefore, on Anselm's

1539. St. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 46, q. 1.
1540. Scotus, In IV Sent., d. 46 (var. q.).
1541. Durandus, In IV Sent., d. 47 (dub.).
1542. Paludanus (Peter of Palude), In IV Sent., d. 46, q. 4, a. 1.
1543. Supplementum to the Summa theologiae (ad loc. de iustitia).
1544. Alexander of Hales, Glossa in IV Sent. (ad d. de iustitia).
1545. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V, c. 3 - 5.

view, distributive justice will not be in him. And although we say that God is a debtor by reason of a promise, nevertheless, since Anselm says that he is just because he does what befits, he is unwilling to concede on account of the promise any justice in God. And just as in the preceding disputation, chapter 6, we shall prove that from a promise there cannot arise in God a justice of giving and receiving, but only of giving that which is promised, so in the following chapter we shall show that from a promise there does not arise distributive justice in God, if before it there was not a distribution owed according to geometrical equality.[1546]

And in the same place Anselm says: "Only that is just which thou willest; that which thou dost not will is not just": he thinks therefore that justice in God is nothing other than his befittingness; for that befits the majesty of God which he himself wills to be done.

Next, from the doctrine of Aristotle in Ethics, book V, chapter 5, it is most clearly gathered that the judgment of God in inflicting punishment and penalty is not done according to distributive justice, as Soto alleged in the first chapter plainly grants; and since the very same proportion is altogether preserved and the same kind of equality in rendering rewards, as will be evident in the next chapter, it follows that in general the divine judgment does not preserve distributive justice.[1545][1547]

As to punishments, this is plainly gathered from the opinion of Aristotle; for in that chapter he expressly proves against the Pythagoreans that repassion and the simply just are not the same. For they judged that in every just thing there is repassion, and thus that they are wholly the same. Aristotle, however, shows that justice extends more widely than repassion: for there is some just in which there is no repassum, namely distributive. He subjoins therefore these words: "But repassion is accommodated neither to the distributive nor to the emendative (corrective)." And that it does not pertain to the distributive he leaves as known; that it does not pertain to the emendative he proves from this, that if a magistrate has first struck someone, he himself ought not to be struck in return; nevertheless he proves that he is bound to some satisfaction; and hence he proves that there ought to be some repassion there; for he shows most broadly that in all contracts there is repassion.

From this doctrine, which St. Thomas follows in II - II, q. 61, a. 4, it is established that, when God assigns punishments for sins, he does not preserve distributive justice: because the just which he regards is according to repassion; but repassion is not distributive just, nor is it found in it, according to Aristotle and St. Thomas; therefore neither does God, attending to the just according to repassion, regard the distributive just; wherefore neither does he preserve distributive justice.[1548] For this doctrine of Aristotle and St. Thomas we shall assign the best reason in the next chapter; for the present, however, let their authority suffice for us: for hitherto we have not determined to confirm our opinion by reason.

1546. St. Anselm, Proslogion, c. 10.
1545. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V, c. 3 - 5.
1547. Domingo de Soto, De iustitia et iure, l. 3, q. 5, a. 2.
1548. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, II - II, q. 61, a. 2, 4.

Caput III - The foregoing opinion is proved by reason

Durandus and Paludanus, who defend the aforesaid opinion, confirm it by this reason. Distributive justice takes its origin from commutative: for if someone who distributes public goods ought to divide them according to just proportion, the reason is that he, by commutative justice toward the commonwealth, is bound to that; but in God no commutative justice is found; therefore neither can distributive, which has its origin thence, be found.[1549][1550]

Yet this reason is weak: for in one who now owes to distribute public goods there precedes no obligation from commutative justice toward the commonwealth, or at least it is not necessary to precede, so that he be obliged by distributive to divide according to the equality of proportion. For when someone binds himself to the commonwealth to a just distribution of common goods, he is not otherwise obliged than to a just division: therefore he only agrees with the republic about the obligation that distributive justice be observed; nor does he owe any other damage, nor to make this good to others, than to those to whom he ought to distribute according to the equality of proportion; and at least the king, who is head of the commonwealth, when by the laws previously established he is obliged to divide the spoils to the soldiers, is held by no other law than that of distributive justice, by which he regards the soldiers; nor did the law established for this purpose introduce any other obligation than that of distributive: therefore it is false what Durandus' argument assumes in the major proposition, namely that the obligation of distributive always arises from the obligation of commutative justice.

Accordingly, a single reason drawn from the definition of distributive justice seems to show this opinion, which is of this sort. The equality which God keeps with us, either in the largess of natural perfections, or in the distribution of rewards or of punishments, is not that of distributive justice: therefore neither is there the distributive justice. The reason, indeed, in my judgment is rightly gathered. For the nature and quality of the habit of justice ought to be weighed from its object; therefore it rightly follows what we inferred: it only needs a proof of the antecedent; which, if it be set forth by a simple declaration, will remain sufficiently confirmed. It is declared therefore in this way.

First, according to the mind of Aristotle in Ethics, chapters 3 and 4 of book V, and of St. Thomas in II - II, q. 61, a. 2; of Cajetan in the same place; of Soto, De iustitia, book 3, q. 5, a. 2; of Paludanus, Durandus, and Richard in the cited places; whose opinion has been approved by the votes of all, since every justice regards the just and the equal as its proper object, and only a twofold kind of equality can be conceived, it follows that there is only a twofold kind of justice. [1545][1548][1547][1551][1549][1550][1552] Now one equality is between two things, and is called by Aristotle and others

1549. Durandus, In IV Sent., d. 27, q. 2.
1550. Peter of Palude, In IV Sent., d. 46, q. 1.
1545. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V, c. 3 - 5.
1548. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, II - II, q. 61, a. 2, 4.
1547. Domingo de Soto, De iustitia et iure, l. 3, q. 5, a. 2.
1551. Cajetan, In II - II, q. 61, a. 2.
1549. Durandus, In IV Sent., d. 27, q. 2.
1550. Peter of Palude, In IV Sent., d. 46, q. 1.

arithmetical equality, or of one to one: this commutative justice regards in exchanges and in the reparation of damage, when each one only renders as much as he received, or as much damage as he inflicted. The other is the equality which they call of proportions, and geometrical, because it is not of thing and thing, but of two proportions among themselves. Such is between two to six on one side, and four to twelve on the other: that is, two to six and four to twelve stand in equal proportion. And this equality distributive justice considers and preserves, when it distributes common goods; it preserves, I say, as a minimum between two persons and two things, as Aristotle excellently noted in Ethics, chapter 3; wherefore it establishes the just at a minimum between four terms: namely, between Ajax and his share on one side, and Achilles and his share on the other, so that the share of goods which is assigned to Ajax have the same proportion with the share which is assigned to Achilles as the dignity of Ajax has with the dignity of Achilles. For example, if, when the spoils are divided after a battle, there are given one hundred to the general, and he is in person twice as worthy in the army as the standard-bearer, let there be given fifty to the standard-bearer, and so with the rest: for this is just and equal, that a man's share stand to a man's share as the person to the person.

Whencesoever, moreover, the debt of keeping this equality arises - even if it has its origin from contract - it always pertains to distributive justice, as is taught in II - II, q. 61.[1548]

It is proved by reason the preceding opinion.

First, from the mind of those who defend the aforesaid opinion, namely Bradwardine and Palude, they confirm it by this reasoning. Distributive justice (*iustitia distributiva*) has its origin from commutative: for if someone, distributing public goods, ought to divide them according to just proportion, this is so because he himself by commutative justice (*iustitia commutativa*) is obligated toward the commonwealth to that task; but in God no commutative justice is found: therefore neither can distributive justice, which takes its origin thence, be found. Yet this reasoning is weak. For either in the one who now must distribute public goods there does not precede any obligation from commutative justice toward the commonwealth; or at least it is not necessary that it precede, in order that by distributive justice he be obliged to divide according to the equality of proportion. For when someone obliges himself to the commonwealth for the just distribution of common goods, he is not otherwise obliged than to a just division: therefore he agrees with the commonwealth only concerning the obligation of distributive justice to be observed; nor ought he to make good any other damage, nor to repair it to others, than to those to whom he must distribute according to the equality of proportion. And at least a king, who is the head of the commonwealth, when by the laws he is bound by precept to divide the spoils among the soldiers, is held by no other law than that of distributive justice, in virtue of which he has regard to the soldiers; nor has the law established for this purpose introduced any other obligation than that of distributive justice. Therefore false is that which the reasoning of Durandus assumed in the major proposition, namely that the obligation of distributive justice always arises from an obligation of commutative justice.[1553]

1552. Richard of St. Victor, In IV Sent., d. 46, a. 1, q. 1.
1548. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, II - II, q. 61, a. 2, 4.

The proper and unique reasoning, taken from the definition of distributive justice, seems to show this opinion. It is such: the equal is that which stands in the same ratio to many things as that which God keeps with us, either in the largition of natural perfections, or in the distribution of rewards or punishments: but this is not of distributive justice; therefore neither is the distribution that keeps merit - of which we spoke - distributive justice. The reasoning indeed collects this correctly from the nature of justice, which requires in its act an equality: yet it needs an antecedent and simple declaration, which, if it has been made, will be sufficiently confirmed. Therefore this matter will be set forth in this way.

Note that there is a double and only genus of justice, as has been proved in the cited places of Aristotle, St. Thomas, Cajetan, and Palude, whose object has been calculated, namely, of what quality it should regard as just, and what its object is; and that the equality of which the ancients thought is twofold: one indeed is the equality of one to one - this is arithmetical equality, and by this ratio, when it alone is considered, there is constituted only commutative justice, when it alone suffices, or when as far as the matter permits, it is preserved. The other is the equality of proportions and of a geometric ratio, but of two, not of one thing to another. Such equality is between two to six, and between four to two - namely, an equal proportion: and this equality distributive justice considers and preserves, when it distributes common goods; it preserves, I say, between two terms at least: namely, between Ajax on the one part and Achilles on the other, in such wise that the same part of goods is given to Ajax as the part which Achilles has in dignity. For example, when the spoils are divided, if Achilles in battle is twice as worthy as the standard-bearer, the standard-bearer should be given fifty when to the general are given one hundred, and so with the rest: for this is just and equal, that a man's share stand to a man's share as the person to the person.[1554]

And whencesoever there arises the debt of keeping this equality - even if it have its origin from contract - it always pertains to distributive justice, as is taught in II - II, q. 61.[1555] We will say more fully in II - II, q. 61, a. 2, because the equality is always the same, and therefore the just is the same (for the just is a certain equal), and the justice will be the same. Distributive justice also considers another equality, or proportion, which is not accommodated to our present purpose, when namely one undivided thing is to be conferred on someone as a benefice: since this cannot be divided, it ought to be given to the more worthy; and if there are several, the more worthy benefice to the more worthy person, and the less worthy to the less worthy: in which also that equality is preserved, not of thing to thing, but of proportion.

Then, for a fuller declaration, it must be noted that it sometimes happens that one who pays a debt under commutative justice has several creditors, and pays all of them justly; then indeed, although by the payment there follows a certain geometric equality and proportion - because as the debt of one stands to the debt of another, so the payment stands to the payment - yet because this equality is secondary, and is not considered by the debtor when he pays the debts, it does not

1553. Durandus, In IV Sent., d. 27, q. 2.
1554. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V, c. 3 - 5.
1555. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, II - II, q. 61, a. 2, 4.

constitute distributive justice. For he who renders to individuals what he owes, considers only the equality of one to one, to wit, of that which he pays to that which he owed; and this in each individual; but what proportion they have among themselves, he does not consider; and thus he would pay each one as much when he pays together with others as if he were paying to him alone by himself. Otherwise we would have to assert that, when someone who has many creditors pays in full all that he owes, he observes distributive justice - which no one has said. For the act of restitution, since it is an act of commutative justice by the sentence of all, even of Cajetan himself with St. Thomas in II - II, q. 62, a. 1, when someone does not restore integrally because he is not able, but diminishes the payment with proportion kept: then indeed he keeps both justices. For if to him to whom he owed a hundred he pays fifty; to him to whom he owed fifty he ought to pay twenty-five; in which way, in the first instance he keeps arithmetical equality: for he pays twenty-five because he owes twenty-five, and he pays fifty because he really owes fifty, even if he also owes more: therefore he keeps arithmetical equality in part, because he cannot keep it entirely. Then he keeps geometric equality, in that by the same proportion he diminishes the payment by which the debts exceed themselves: wherefore secondarily he constitutes a geometric equality in what is wanting to the payment. But distributive justice considers no other equality than that of proportion, as has been explained: nor does it attend to how much anyone merits according to himself, but what proportion he has with others. Whence it follows that, when common goods are distributed to many, less comes to each than if they were to be divided among fewer. It also follows that an infinite good cannot be divided with this proportion and equality preserved, as is sufficiently manifest: yet from that infinite some part can be taken in this manner, from which division one should never attend that each receive as much as he by himself merits, but according to the proportion which he has with another in merit.

These points being posited, which among moral philosophers and theologians who have treated of justice are outside controversy, our opinion is clearly proved. For in the divine judgment, arithmetical equality alone is considered by itself, which is between thing and thing; nor does the justice of God attend to this, that it constitute equality of proportion and geometric equality: although from his judgment it secondarily follows: therefore he does not observe the mode of distributive justice, but rather of commutative, so that, if there were no repugnance on other grounds - as was proved in the preceding disputation - God's justice would be commutative, not distributive. Wherefore St. Thomas rightly said that in the divine judgment the form of commutative justice is observed: and therefore neither the mode nor the likeness of distributive justice is in God's judgment; God's justice will not be distributive. Moreover, that God does not attend by his justice to geometric equality is clear first in the largition of natural gifts and perfections: to each thing he assigns that which is connatural and fitting to it; in order to assign which he does not attend to what must be assigned to another, but to what suits the nature of each thing according to itself. Hence he gave to man an upright form, hands and feet of that figure, and the other members, and to the rest of things their perfections: because so the nature of each demanded naturally.[1556]

Then, in the remuneration of reward and in the payment of punishment, which are set in the divine judgment, the same is shown. For whether God render a reward to good merits, he does not attend to what proportion one man has with others, but to what he himself has done, and how much his works deserve; and accordingly he pays to him by reason of the works, just as if he alone were to obtain the reward. Wherefore the blessed do not for this reason receive in the remuneration of reward an equal thing because, as Soto said, an infinite reward is distributed, and thus each one receives not only according to proportion with others, but also equal to his own merits - which does not occur in the distribution of other goods among men: therefore not on this account do the blessed receive a reward equal to their merits; because in truth that which is distributed is not infinite; and if it were infinite, the equality of proportion could not be preserved, as we noted above. Nay more, no common heap of formal beatitude is divided, but to each is given as much of the vision as his works deserve; and only that equality is attended to which is according to the mode of commutative justice, not distributive. Thus in Romans 2 God is said: "Who will render to each one according to his works." In punishments likewise God attends only to how much punishment the sins of each one deserve, according to that of the Apocalypse 18 concerning the punishment of the great harlot: "Render to her as she also hath rendered to you, and double the doubles according to her works. And again, in proportion as she glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give to her." Wherefore God thus punishes each one together with others as if he were alone: because in the distribution of rewards and punishments he attends only to what each one by himself deserves; but what proportion he has with others he does not consider. And for this reason Aristotle and St. Thomas rightly said, in the places cited, that in repayment distributive justice cannot be found, because in it the equality of proportion is not considered, but the equality of what is given and received, which is of one to one; from which merits consist.

From this doctrine the Doctor rightly gathers in II - II, q. 61, a. 4, ad secundum: if someone served the commonwealth, and for his service were to have a stipend, that retribution would not be of distributive justice, but of commutative. "For in distributive (he says) the equality is not attended to between what someone receives and what he gave, but to what another receives according to the mode of the person," as if to say, according to the proportion of the person with the person, not of the service exhibited with the wage. But that many are punished together for sins, and for good merits receive reward, and thus from the payment there result a certain equality of proportion between rewards and persons, matters little, because in the payment this proportion is not considered, but that which is between thing and thing, between merit, namely good or evil, and reward or punishment. Just as when someone pays in full the debts to many creditors, even if there results from thence the equality of proportion; yet because in the payment the debtor does not attend to it while he pays, he does not observe distributive justice, as all admit.

By what we have said it is proved not only that in God distributive justice is not before promise, but also after it: because God never observes equality of proportion, even after a promise; nor does there seem to be any way whereby he could observe it. But before the promise there is also another

common reason on account of which distributive justice cannot be in God: for, as we said in the preceding disputation, cap. 6, no justice properly can be where no obligation intervenes; but God is held by no obligation before he binds himself by his own promise: therefore before the promise no justice, not even distributive, is found in God.

Finally, by this reasoning not only does our opinion remain confirmed and explained, but also the opposite is sufficiently exploded, insofar as it affirms universally that distributive justice properly befits God: yet let us briefly refute certain things which the Doctors of the earlier opinion have said in particular.

First, it is gathered from the foregoing reasoning that Cajetan taught falsely when he said that the head of a household, who paid to each worker his denarius, observed distributive justice; for if it were so, any debtor who paid severally to many creditors the debts would be said to have made restitution according to distributive justice - which no one grants. It is conceded: since restitution is an act of commutative justice, as Cajetan himself admits. For the payment of a denarius for a day's labor pertains to restitution, not from a delict, but from a contract; and the reasoning is the same for either. Then also the head of a household, when he restores to each creditor what he owes, considers nothing but the equality of thing with thing: that is, of labor with wage; but what proportion one with another has, and of the wage of one with that of another, he in no way attends to, as has been said. He is also mistaken when he asserts that even in the payment of the punishment God observes distributive justice: for by authority of Scripture and by reason we have shown the contrary. And Cajetan speaks inconsistently, for the same reasoning holds for the remuneration of rewards and for the payment of punishment.[1557]

Wherefore, secondly, it follows that Soto's opinion does not sufficiently cohere with itself: for when he said rightly that in punishments distributive justice is not attended to, but commutative, he ought by all means to have taught the same concerning the payment of rewards; for in both cases the same equality is considered, as we have explained, and therefore the same justice is observed.[1558]

Thirdly, finally, what other Thomists have said cannot be true. For, as they say, our works, considered as proceeding from free will without gratuitous grace making, are by no means distributed with eternal life; nor, if that were granted, would that equality of proportion between persons be attended to in its retribution, as we have said: for the way in which that would follow cannot be explained; but if some equality were preserved, it would be between thing and thing, which pertains to commutative justice. But what they say - that between works considered in this manner and eternal life there is not equality but proportion - matters little, so that we should say that between them and glory distributive justice is preserved. For this does not regard the proportion of one to one, but the equality of two proportions: that is, of person and office to another person and office: which equality in no way can exist between our works without grace and

1556. On the two equalities and their application, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V, c. 3; St. Thomas, II - II, q. 61, a. 2; Cajetan, In II - II, q. 61, a. 2; Peter of Palude, In IV Sent., d. 46, q. 1.

1557. Cajetan, In II - II, q. 62, a. 1; cf. St. Thomas, II - II, q. 62, a. 1.

1558. Domingo de Soto, De iustitia et iure, l. 3.

eternal life. For if there were any proportion, it would be of some gratuitous fittingness: because it would seem congruous that to him who is also outside the grace of God, yet works rightly, God should give eternal life: but this is the equality of one to one, between which only commutative justice can obtain - or, to speak more truly, neither commutative nor distributive; such is the only equality that in this way can be assigned between our works and eternal life; wherefore that Thomist distinction is empty.

Caput IV - The adversaries' arguments are dissolved

But to meet the oppositions of the adversaries is not difficult. To the first, which turns on Cajetan's form, let us pay attention; I say, it contains an evident defect; for it proceeds, as the logicians say, from pure particulars. It is in the second figure, and in a true affirmative premise the other should be negative, so that the middle term, which is in what each is predicated, be distributed in the other. The major is: it pertains to distributive justice to place each one in his place; the minor is: God, by rendering rewards and punishments, places each one in his order; therefore. We say, then, that to place each one in his order, when considered in general, indeed befits distributive justice; but not alone: because commutative justice also effects this, when someone pays to each creditor what is owed. But if they be considered in species, these belong to each justice in its own way: for to distribution it pertains, when in the placing it considers not the equality of thing with thing - of merit with reward or with punishment - alone, but the equality of proportion between persons and rewards, as was said above. Commutative justice, however, also places each in his order, attending only to the equality of thing with thing, namely of merit with reward or with punishment. And since in this way God by his judgment disposes each one in his own place, therefore by his judgment he observes the mode of commutative, not distributive, justice. Nor does the testimony of Dionysius avail anything against our opinion. For what he says, "Divine justice disposes all things, and deter - "

Reply to the first: If we look to the form of Caietan's argument, I say it clearly contains a defect, for, as logicians say, it proceeds from pure particulars. It is in the second figure, and in each premise one affirms amiss, while the other denies what ought to have been the middle term, which in each is the predicate, and in the other should have been distributed: the major is, "It pertains to distributive justice to place each one in his own place"; the minor, "But by rendering rewards and punishments God places each one in his order," where the middle term is "to place each one in his own order." Therefore we say: if "to place each one in his own order" be considered universally, it indeed fits distributive justice, but not exclusively; for commutative justice likewise achieves this, as when someone pays each creditor what is due. If, however, it be considered in species, it befits each kind of justice in its own way: it belongs to distributive justice insofar as, in that placement, it considers not merely the equality of thing to thing, not only of merits to reward or to punishment, but the equality of proportion between persons and rewards, as was said. Commutative justice, on the other hand, also places each one in his order, attending only to the equality of thing to thing,

namely of merit with reward, or with punishment. And since in this way God by his judgment disposes each one in his own place, therefore by his judgment he observes the mode of commutative, not distributive, justice.

But the testimony of Dionysius avails nothing against our opinion. For what he says, "Divine justice disposes all things, and determines; and for 'disponit' another translation has 'distributes', does not prove that there is properly distributive justice in God, about which is the controversy, but that there is a certain distribution and a perfective disposition, which we do not deny. Nay rather, the words of Dionysius that follow clearly indicate that in this distribution God observes the equality of commutative justice, or its mode, for he says: "To the things that are, he gives to all what is accommodated to each." He did not say that, in this distribution of perfections, God attends to the proportion that things have among themselves and their perfections, so as to assign the quality of proportion among them, but to what is accommodated to each. He therefore considers only equality and fittingness, or the proportion between the thing and its perfection; wherefore, since he preserves this equality, which is of one to one and is called arithmetic, he preserves also the mode of commutative, not distributive, justice.

Concerning the doctrine of the second reason, St. Thomas says many things; to recall them will not be unprofitable. Thus he says, in II-II, q. 63, a. 4, that the vice of "acceptance of persons" (acceptio personarum), insofar as it is against distributive justice, has place in judgments. But in the reply to the first article of that question he teaches that this vice can be considered in a twofold way: first with respect to the thing judged, and thus it can have to do both with the matter of commutative and of distributive justice, and the case is common to both; for a judgment can be about a commutation as well as about a distribution to be made. Then, as to the form of the judgment: insofar as the judge, even in the very judgment of commutative justice which he ought to follow, takes from one and gives to another, and thus it is opposed to distributive justice. Therefore we have from St. Thomas that this vice, even if sometimes it is exercised about the matter of commutative justice, yet whenever it is committed in judgment, is against distributive justice.[1559]

However, this should not hinder our position, in which we say that in the divine judgment distributive justice is not observed, but the mode of commutative; in which, even if there were acceptance of persons, God would be acting not against distributive, but against commutative justice. And that nothing hinders, is proved, first, because what St. Thomas teaches - namely, that commutative justice cannot exist unless between two persons and two things of the same, yet in such a way that equality is constituted between them only as thing to thing.

Moreover, what St. Thomas teaches does not hurt our case, because he is plainly speaking of such cases as when in a judgment two persons contend with each other about some thing, yet when anything is acted before a judge, it is not against the right, but so that he himself may receive from the judge what is asked of him: only equality is sought to be constituted between him and the judge, I say, the equality of thing with thing - namely, of what is given with what is received. And thus the vice of accepting persons occurs in judgments. But in God there is no such case. Hence he

1559. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 63, a. 4.

concludes that the judge sins by the vice of accepting persons, and sins against commutative justice. For to the vice of accepting persons it is indeed common to be opposed to distributive justice, but it is not opposed only to that; because even when one judges about commutation, if the judge, because he favors one of the litigants, adjudicates the thing to him, which he ought to have adjudicated to the other, then indeed he sins by accepting persons against commutative justice.

And to make this clear by examples is indeed difficult. For if two were contending about some matter before a judge - as a servant with his master about the wage to be paid, a debtor with a creditor about the price of some thing, finally about any thing whatsoever belonging to either - and the judge were to deny the debt and adjudicate the thing to the creditor, or take away the wage from the servant and declare it to be the master's, and would do this not from ignorance but because he was well affected toward the person of the creditor and of the master, would he not be said to "accept person" against commutative justice, because out of respect for the person, against the right, he did not observe, or did not constitute, the equality between what was given and what was received which he ought to have observed? For this equality, which the judge ought to constitute, was arithmetic between thing and thing; and therefore it pertained to commutative justice. But if, while the judge was dividing common goods, looking to the person, he should assign to someone a greater share than according to the proportion of merits he ought to have had with others: this vice would be opposed to distributive justice, even though from it there would remain to him who made the distribution, to others whom he defrauded of their share, a debt arising from commutative justice, because he would be held to repair the damage. For every obligation of restitution, even when it arises from a violation of distributive justice, pertains to commutative justice, as St. Thomas and Cajetan have very well noted, II-II, q. 62, a. 1.[1560] Therefore it can scarcely be explained, what St. Thomas taught - namely, that acceptance of persons in judgment is opposed to distributive justice, when the judge, against justice, takes from one and gives to another, even when judgment is given concerning the justice of some commutation.

Objection: If you say that then the judge considers two persons, which seems proper to distributive and not to commutative justice; therefore that judgment pertains to distributive justice, and the vice of acceptance of persons is opposed to it.

Solution: I answer that distributive justice considers not only two persons, but two things as well, and between these four it establishes an equality of proportion. But the judge considers only two persons, between whom he ought to set in order commutative justice, because between them alone he must attend to the equality of what is given and what is received; and indeed commutative justice cannot consist unless between two persons and two things of the same, yet in such a way that the equality constituted between them is only as thing to thing.

Moreover, it remains to be observed that the vice of acceptance of persons, which is opposed to justice, is present only where a debt intervenes. Wherefore, even if God were to regard a person in those things which by his grace he bestows out of liberality or in those which by that same grace he condones, since by no law is he bound to the contrary, there would not be the vice of acceptance of

1560. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 62, a. 1; Cajetan, In II-II, q. 62, a. 1.

persons. For what a man gives of his own liberally, or condones, does not pertain to regard of the person, even if he should regard the person. God therefore, if he should regard the person alone and not merits, would not sin by the vice of acceptance of persons against justice; we may in a certain general way say that he "accepts person" because he has the bearing of a judge who in judgment ought not to regard merits, since at times even a judge is held to do so. But since Scripture says that our God is not an acceptor of persons, it denies to God not only the vice opposed to justice, but even any likeness of it in any way; even if he could do this freely, he does not regard persons, but repays according to merits alone, as we set forth above.

Second argument solved: I say then to the argument, that the vice of acceptance of persons is common, that is, it is opposed to both commutative and distributive justice. A judge is said to "accept person" because the equality which, according to justice, he ought to have observed among some persons, he does not observe; but because he is well affected toward some one of them, he bestows more upon him, or punishes him less than he ought. It is opposed to commutative justice when he violates it; to distributive, likewise, when he does not observe it. Concerning this vice, insofar as it is opposed to commutative justice, the Pharisees said to Jesus (Matt. 22): "Master, we know that you are true, and you do not care for anyone; for you do not regard the person of men." For they were asking whether he judged that tribute ought to be paid to Caesar or not, which pertained to commutative justice. And to the Colossians, chapter 3, where, speaking of the reward of the good and of the punishment of the evil, the Apostle says: "He who does wrong will receive what he has done unjustly; God is an acceptor of persons." For it is clear that the punishment of an offense, according to Aristotle and St. Thomas, pertains to commutative justice. And thus that passage of Romans 2, which is brought forward in the argument, ought to be understood, since there the Apostle not only speaks of the reward of the good but also of the punishment of the evil, and he adds: "For there is no acceptance of persons with God." But the passage about acceptance of persons against distributive justice is that of James 2: "Do not hold the faith of our Lord in acceptance of persons." For he is speaking of the distribution of honors and of seats according to the due proportion of persons among themselves; whence he considers the equality of the proportion between persons and things, although by reason of the Christian faith he judges that all are equal and that none is to be despised; but of this elsewhere.

Third argument solved: To the third reason, which is that of Dominic Soto, I answer that it labors under the same defect as the first. For although distributive justice attends to and considers the merits of the person, commutative justice also considers merits, though in a different mode: commutative indeed according to the equality of thing to thing only, that is, of merit and of reward; distributive, however, according to the equality of proportions between persons and merits. And because in the divine judgment the merits of persons are not considered according to the equality of proportion, as we have explained, but according to the equality of merit and retribution, therefore in the divine judgment not the form of distributive but of commutative justice is observed, even in the distribution of rewards. Wherefore the opinion of those is not to be accepted

who teach that Christ, with respect to God, was indeed subject to commutative justice, to which he satisfied for us, but that with respect to Christ God exercised distributive justice; which is mistaken.

Deinde, what the holy Doctor teaches does no harm, because he plainly speaks of cases in which, whenever in a judgment two persons contend with one another over some matter, yet when someone acts before a judge, he does not act against another, but so that he himself may have from the judge what he deserves from him; he only asks that equality be established between himself and the judge - equality, I say, of thing with thing; that is, of wage with reward. But commutative justice is between two persons, about the equality of two things, as we were saying just above.

I say therefore to the argument: the vice of acceptance of persons is common to be opposed to commutative and distributive justice. One is said to accept person when he does not keep the quality which according to justice he ought to keep between some persons; but because he is well disposed toward one of them, he assigns more to him, or he punishes less than he ought. Now it is opposed to commutative justice when one violates it; to distributive justice likewise, when one does not keep it. Of this vice, as it is opposed to commutative justice, we read in Matt. 22: The Pharisees said to Jesus: "We know that you are truthful, and that you do not care about anyone; for you do not regard the person of men." For they were asking him to judge whether tribute was owed to Caesar or not, which pertained to commutative justice. And to the Colossians, chapter 3, where, speaking of the reward of the good and of the punishment of the wicked, the Apostle says: "He who does wrong will receive what he has done unjustly; God is not an acceptor of persons." For it is clear that the punishment of a crime pertains to commutative justice, according to the opinion of Aristotle and St. Thomas, as we saw in the second chapter.[1561] Thus too I would understand that passage to the Romans, chapter 2, which is brought in the argument; for since there the Apostle speaks not only of the reward of the good, but also of the punishment of the wicked, he added: "For there is no acceptance of persons with God." But that saying of James, chapter 2, "Do not have the faith of our Lord with acceptance of persons," is understood of acceptance of persons against distributive justice; for he speaks of the distribution of honors and of seats according to whether he has regarded merits. This, I say, is not to be approved: for the justice which regards merits according to the proportion of one to one cannot be distributive, as has been more than sufficiently proved.

Dubium. But someone will ask, whether distributive justice belongs to God only according to a metaphor, since thus far we have proved that it does not belong properly. Solvitur. I answer, as I said about commutative justice in the preceding disputation, chapter 7: distributive justice belongs to God according to a certain general notion, but not according to its proper [specific] notion, and thus it is to be ascribed to God not merely metaphorically. For since the common notion of justice belongs to God, as we explained there, and God keeps this also by apportioning to each things good and perfections, there will be justice in distribution, that is, distributive justice; yet that peculiar [species], which is constituted as distinct from commutative because of the different kind of

1561. Aristotle; St. Thomas, as we saw above in chapter two.

equality which it observes, does not belong to God; nor does its mode and likeness, as from what has been said is quite clear. Wherefore, when it is asked whether distributive justice belongs to God properly, a distinction must be made. For "properly" is either opposed to "metaphorically," or it is opposed to "commonly." If in the former way, it belongs properly to God; if in the latter, it does not belong.

Articulus II - Whether the justice of God is truth

Objicitur 1. It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice is in the will; indeed, it is a rectitude of the will, as Anselm says; but truth is in the intellect according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics VI and Ethics VI. Therefore justice does not pertain to truth.[1562]

Objicitur 2. Moreover, truth according to the Philosopher in Ethics IV is a certain virtue different from justice. Therefore truth does not pertain to the notion of justice.[1563]

But on the contrary: In Psalm 84 it is said, "Mercy and truth have met one another." And there truth is put for justice.

I answer: Truth (*veritas*) consists in the adequation of the intellect and thing, as was said above. Now the intellect which is the cause of the thing is compared to it as rule and measure. Conversely it is with the intellect which receives knowledge from things. Therefore when things are the measure and rule of the intellect, truth consists in this, that the intellect is adequated to the thing, as happens in us. For from the fact that a thing is or is not, our opinion and speech are true or false. But when the intellect is the rule and measure of things, truth consists in this, that things are adequated to the intellect. Thus an artisan is said to make a true work when it accords with art. And as just works stand related to the law, so do artificial works to art; for they have truth when they accord with the art, just as they are just when they accord with the law. Therefore the justice (*iustitia*) of God, which establishes an order in things conformable to the plan of his wisdom, which is his law, is fittingly named truth. And thus also in us there is said to be the truth of justice.

Reply to the first: Justice, as to the law regulating, is in reason or intellect; but as to the command by which works are regulated according to the law, it is in the will.

Reply to the second: The truth of which the Philosopher speaks there is a certain virtue by which someone shows himself to be such in words or deeds as he is; and thus it consists in the conformity of sign to the signified, not in the conformity of effect to cause and rule, as has been said about the truth of justice.

Explicatio articuli. The conclusion of the article is this: The justice of God, which establishes order in things conformable to the plan of his wisdom, which is his law, is fittingly named truth.

Nota nomine veritatis, et quid intelligat St. Thomas. First it is to be observed that St. Thomas did not say that the justice of God, whereby he himself in himself is just, is the truth whereby he in himself is said to be true; for thus he would confound these two attributes with one another; but

1562. Anselm, De veritate, c. 13; Aristotle, Metaphysics VI; Ethics VI.
1563. Aristotle, Ethics IV.

here he took justice for the just and equal which he himself establishes in things; and truth for that by which made things are said to be true, because they are adequated to their rule, namely to God, just as works of art are said to be true because they are conformable to the ideas of the art. He said, therefore, that this just and equal which God establishes in things is rightly called the truth of the things themselves, because they are said to be adequated to their rule, namely the divine intellect.

Then note that not only are the justice and equality which God establishes considered by the adequation of things with the divine intellect, but also by the adequation of the things themselves among themselves. For God is said to keep justice in things not only because he makes them conform to his ideas and, in some way, equal; but because he so orders them among themselves, and assigns to things such perfections, or to merits such rewards, as the things themselves and the merits demanded and were fitting to them. Whether indeed the truth of things, which is called a passion of being, about which St. Thomas here speaks, is taken by conformity with the practical intellect of God as an artisan, we treated at length in disputation 77.

Articulus III - Whether mercy belongs to God

Objicitur 1. It seems that mercy does not belong to God. For mercy is a species of sadness, as Damascene says. But sadness is not in God; therefore neither is mercy.[1564]

Objicitur 2. Moreover, mercy is a relaxation of justice; but God cannot omit that which pertains to his justice. For it is said in 2 Tim. 2: "If we do not believe, he remains faithful; he cannot deny himself." But he would deny himself, as the Gloss says there, if he were to deny his word. Therefore mercy does not belong to God.[1565]

But on the contrary: It is said in Psalm 110: "The Lord is compassionate and merciful."

I answer: Mercy is most of all to be attributed to God, yet according to effect, not according to the affection of passion. For the evidence of this, it must be considered that someone is called merciful as though having a miserable heart, because he is affected by the misery of another with sadness, as if it were his own proper misery. And from this it follows that he works to drive away the misery of another as if it were his own misery, and this is the effect of mercy. Therefore to be saddened at another's misery does not befit God; but to repel another's misery - by which we understand any defect whatever - this most of all befits him. Now defects are not taken away except by the perfection of some goodness. But the first origin of goodness is God, as was shown above.[1566] Yet it is to be considered that to bestow perfections on things pertains indeed to the divine goodness, and to justice, and to liberality, and to mercy, yet according to different notions. For the communication of perfections absolutely considered pertains to goodness, as was shown above. But insofar as perfections are given to things by God according to their proportion, it pertains to

1564. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, lib. 2, c. 14.
1565. Glossa interlinearis on 2 Tim. 2.
1566. See above, q. 6, a. 4.

justice, as was said above. Insofar, however, as he does not attribute perfections to things for his own utility, but solely on account of his own goodness, it pertains to liberality. Insofar, however, as perfections given to things by God expel every defect, it pertains to mercy.

Reply to the first: That objection proceeds concerning mercy as far as the affection of passion is concerned.

Reply to the second: It must be said that God acts mercifully, not indeed by doing anything against His justice, but by doing something above justice. For example, if to someone to whom one hundred denarii are owed, a person gives two hundred out of his own, he does not act against justice, but acts liberally or mercifully. And likewise if someone remits an offense committed against himself. For he who remits something, in a certain way gives it. Hence the Apostle calls remission a gift, Ephes. 5: "Be giving to one another, as also Christ gave to you." From which it is clear that mercy does not take away justice, but is a certain plenitude of justice. Hence it is said in James 2 that "mercy exalts judgment."

- Explanation of the doctrine of the article. The conclusion of the article is that in God there is properly mercy; and this must be understood in a manner opposite to what we said of justice, namely, that there is in God mercy properly, not only without metaphor, nor only according to its common notion, but also according to the peculiar formal notion of it. I said according to its formal notion, for just as in anger two things are found, as I noted in disputation 84, chapter 4, namely the material - commotion of the blood about the heart - and the formal - an appetite for vengeance and punishment - so also in mercy there is a certain compassion of the sentient part, which is the material; and there is the formal, namely the raising up of another's misery. Therefore St. Thomas says that in God there is mercy not according to the affection of passion, but according to effect, that is, inasmuch as by His effect and in very deed He raises up another's misery. In the same way speak Alexander, 1 p., q. 39, m. 1; Richard, on IV, dist. 46, art. 2, q. 1; Scotus, IV, dist. 2; Durandus, q. 3; Paludanus, q. 1, 2, 3; from whom Richard expressly teaches that that compassion of the appetite is the material of mercy, and does not pertain to the formal notion of it, which the others also not obscurely indicate, since they assign compassion on the part of the appetite: for no Theologian up to now has thought that a passion of the appetite pertains to the formal notion of any virtue or effect of the soul. On the contrary, since the formal ratio of an affection is considered from its object, which is a part and an effect of it, when the aforesaid Doctors say that mercy in God is according to effect, not according to the affection of the appetite, it is as if they were saying that it is indeed in God according to that which is formal, not, however, according to that which is material.[1567]

Scotus, however, raises a doubt whether mercy and justice in God are at least distinct by reason; and he answers that justice in God can be considered in two ways: first, insofar as it is the becomingness of His goodness, and insofar as that is called just which befits the goodness of God;

and in this way justice and mercy are not at all distinct, but mercy is a certain part of justice, because it is becoming that God have mercy. Then, the justice of God can be taken inasmuch as He preserves among things themselves a certain mode of equality, as between merits and rewards; and in this way, he says, justice is distinguished from mercy, because mercy in the creature does not consider the notion and mode of some equality, which justice considers.

Hence Scotus in the cited place, and Richard on IV, dist. 46, art. 2, q. 2, and Alexander, 1 p., q. 39, m. 2, answer another doubt, namely whether justice is prior to mercy; they answer, I say, that if justice is taken in that first way, it is prior to mercy, for God has mercy because mercy befits His goodness; thus justice in this way stands to mercy as the universal to the particular, and this St. Anselm wished to say in the Proslogion, cap. 11, when he says: "Thus therefore is born of Thy justice, Thy mercy, because it is in Thee that Thou art good, that by sparing Thou mayest be good." But if justice is taken in the latter way, insofar as He renders rewards and punishments to merits, mercy is prior to justice. For to have mercy befits God from Himself, and is the operation of the will as primary; but to render punishment and reward takes occasion from us, and is the second and consequent act of the will, as we said in disputation 83. For this reason the Church says: "O God, to whom it is proper to have mercy always and to spare." Proper, I say, because He is moved from Himself to have mercy; but that He punish, He takes occasion from our works.

I, however, think that that becomingness is rather the object of justice than justice's affection itself, such that God with a quasi-reflex act wills to have mercy: because He judges that to be just, that is, becoming and fitting to His goodness, to have the affection of justice; yet the very act of having mercy is a just object. Wherefore even in this way the affections of justice and of mercy are distinguished, and nevertheless in this way mercy will arise from justice, as Anselm rightly said.

Articulus IV - Whether in all the works of God there are mercy and justice

It is objected that not in all the works of God are mercy and justice. For certain works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification of the ungodly. Certain others, however, to justice, as the damnation of the impious. Hence it is said in James 2: "Judgment without mercy shall be to him that hath not done mercy." Therefore not in every work of God do mercy and justice appear.

1. Further, the Apostle in Romans 15 attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, but the conversion of the Gentiles to mercy. Therefore not in any work of God is there justice and mercy.
2. Further, many just are afflicted in this world. But this is unjust. Therefore in every work of God there is not justice and mercy.

1567. Alexander of Hales, Summa, 1 p., q. 39, m. 1; Richard of St. Victor, In IV Sent., dist. 46, art. 2, q. 1; John Duns Scotus, In IV Sent., dist. 2; Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In IV Sent., q. 3; Peter of Palude, In IV Sent., q. 1, 2, 3. - Cf. Vázquez, Disputation 84, c. 4.

3. Further, it is the part of justice to render a debt, but of mercy to relieve misery. And thus both justice and mercy presuppose something in their work. But creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in creation there is neither mercy nor justice.

But on the contrary: It is said in Psalm 24: "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth."

I answer that it must be said that it is necessary that in every work of God mercy and truth be found. If, however, mercy is taken for the removal of any defect whatsoever; though not every defect can properly be called misery, but only the defect of rational nature, which can be happy. For misery is opposed to happiness. The reason for this necessity is that, since the debt which is rendered by divine justice is either a debt to God, or a debt to some creature, neither can be omitted in any work of God. For God cannot do anything which is not fitting to His wisdom and goodness, according to which mode we said that something is a debt to God. Likewise also, whatever He does in created things, He does according to a fitting order and proportion, in which the notion of justice consists. And thus in every work of God there must be justice. But the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy, and is founded upon it. For nothing is owed to the creature except on account of something preexisting in it or preconsidered. And again, if that is owed to the creature, this will be on account of something prior. And since one cannot proceed to infinity, one must come to something which depends solely on the goodness of the divine will, which is the ultimate end. For instance, if we say that to have hands is a debt to man on account of the rational soul; but to have a rational soul is for this, that he may be a man; and for man to be, is on account of the divine goodness. And thus in every work of God mercy appears with respect to its first root, whose power is preserved in all the consequences and even works more vehemently in them, just as a primary cause exerts a stronger influence than a secondary cause. And for this reason also, the things which are owed to some creature, God from the abundance of His goodness dispenses more liberally than the proportion of the thing demands. For less is that which would suffice to preserve the order of justice than that which the divine goodness confers, which exceeds all proportion of the creature.

Reply to the first: Certain works are attributed to justice and certain to mercy, because in some justice appears more vehemently, in others mercy. And yet in the damnation of the reprobate mercy appears: not indeed by a total remission, but by a certain alleviation, since He punishes short of condignity. And in the justification of the ungodly justice appears, when He remits the faults on account of love, which nevertheless He mercifully infuses. As is read of the Magdalene in Luke 7: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she loved much."

Reply to the second: Justice and mercy of God appear in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles; but a certain reason of justice appears in the conversion of the Jews which does not appear in the conversion of the Gentiles, as that they were saved on account of the promises made to the Fathers.

Reply to the third: In this also, that the just are punished in this world, justice and mercy appear, insofar as by afflictions of this kind certain lighter things are purged in them, and from attachment to earthly things they are raised more to God, according to that of St. Gregory: "The evils which press upon us in this world compel us to go to God."[1568]

Reply to the fourth: Although nothing in the order of things in nature is presupposed to creation, yet something is presupposed in the knowledge of God. And according to this even there is saved there the notion of justice, insofar as a thing is brought into existence according to what is fitting to divine wisdom and goodness. And in a certain way the notion of mercy is saved, inasmuch as a thing is changed from not-being into being.

The doctrine of St. Thomas in this article was taught in a wholly like manner by Alexander, 1 p., q. 39, m. 3, throughout; Scotus on IV, dist. 46, q. 4; Durandus, q. 3; Paludanus, q. 1, art. 3, concl. 3; and the conclusion is easy, for which reason it needs no further explanation.[1569]

Quaestio XXII - On the providence of God

With those things considered which absolutely pertain to the will, we must proceed to those which regard both the intellect and the will together. Of this sort is providence, indeed, with respect to all things; but predestination and reprobation, and the things that follow upon this, with respect specifically to men, in order to eternal salvation. For even after the moral virtues in moral science there is considered prudence, to which providence seems to pertain.

Concerning the providence of God, four things are asked.

From this question up to the twenty-sixth St. Thomas begins to dispute about those operations which in mixed fashion seem to pertain to intellect and will: namely about providence, predestination, and the beatitude of God; for these are either operations of both faculties, intellect and will together, or, if they formally and directly pertain to one, they seem in a certain manner to presuppose the other; as is wont to be said of choice, that it is a will pre-counseled, which formally is an operation of the will, but has a peculiar order to the consulting intellect.

Articulus I - Whether providence befits God

Ad primum sic proceditur

- Objicitur 1: It seems that providence does not befit God. For according to Tully, providence is a part of prudence.[1570] But prudence, since it is well counsel-taking according to the Philosopher in Ethics 6, cannot befit God, who has no doubt whence he would need to take counsel: therefore providence does not befit God.[1571]

1568. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, lib. 26, cap. 9.

1569. Alexander of Hales, Summa, 1 p., q. 39, m. 3; John Duns Scotus, In IV Sent., dist. 46, q. 4; Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In IV Sent., q. 3; Peter of Palude, In IV Sent., q. 1, art. 3, concl. 3.

1570. Cicero, De inventione, lib. 2.

- Objicitur 2: Further, whatever is in God is eternal. But providence is not something eternal: for it is about existences which are not eternal, according to St. John Damascene: therefore providence is not in God.[1572]
- Objicitur 3: Further, no composite is in God. But providence seems to be something composite, because it includes in itself will and intellect: therefore providence is not in God.

But on the contrary: Wisdom 14: "But thou, father, rulest all things by providence."[1573]

I answer that it is necessary to posit providence in God. For every good that is in things is created by God, as was shown above. Now in created things there is found a good not only as to the substance of things, but also as to the order of them to an end, and especially to the ultimate end, which is the divine goodness, as was treated above. This good, therefore, of order, existing in created things, is created by God. But since God is the cause of things through his intellect, and thus the reason of each of his effects must pre-exist in him, as is clear from what precedes, it is necessary that the reason of the order of things to an end pre-exist in the divine mind. Now the reason of things to be ordered to an end is properly providence. It is indeed the principal part of prudence, to which the other two parts are ordered, namely memory of the past and understanding of the present, inasmuch as from the past and the things remembered, and the present things understood, we conjecture what is to be provided for in the future. But it is the proper function of prudence, according to the Philosopher in Ethics 6, to order real things to an end, whether with respect to oneself - so a man is called prudent who well orders his acts to the end of his life - or with respect to others subject to him in a household, or a city, or a kingdom; according to which mode it is said in Matthew 24: "A faithful and prudent servant whom the lord has set over his family." According to this mode prudence, or providence, can befit God. For in God himself there is nothing that can be ordered to an end, since he himself is the ultimate end. Therefore it is the very ratio of the order of things to an end that is named providence in God. Whence Boethius in book 4 of the Consolation says that providence is the very divine plan, set in the supreme ruler of all things, which disposes all things.[1574] Now "disposition" can be said both of the reason of the order of things to an end, and of the reason of the order of parts in a whole.

Reply to the first: According to the Philosopher in Ethics 6, prudence is properly preceptive concerning those things about which good counsel is taken, and synesis judges rightly. Whence, although to take counsel does not befit God, insofar as counsel is an inquiry about doubtful matters, nevertheless to give precepts concerning things to be ordered to an end, of which he has the right reason, befits God; according to that of the Psalm: "He has established a precept, and it shall not pass."[1575] And according to this, the ratio of prudence and of providence befits God. Although it can also be said that the very ratio of things to be done is called "counsel" in God, not

1571. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI.
1572. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa.
1573. Wisdom 14:3.
1574. Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, IV, prose 6.
1575. Psalm 148:6 (Vulgate): "Posuit ea in aeternum, et in saeculum saeculi; praeceptum posuit, et non praeteribit."

on account of inquiry, but on account of the certitude of knowledge, to which those who take counsel arrive by inquiring. Whence it is said in Ephesians 1: "Who works all things according to the counsel of his will."[1576]

Reply to the second: To care pertain two things, namely the reason of order, which is called providence, and the disposition and execution of the order, which is called government. Of which the first is eternal, the second temporal.

Reply to the third: Providence is in the intellect, but presupposes the will of the end. For no one gives precepts about things to be done for the sake of an end, unless he wills the end. Whence also prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by which the appetite is disposed toward the good, as is said in Ethics 6. And yet, even if providence in an equal way regarded the divine will and intellect, this would be without detriment to the divine simplicity, since will and intellect in God are the same, as was said above.

Conclusion of the article: In God there is providence. And it is expressly in Scripture, Wisdom 14: "But thou, father, rulest all things by thy providence." Of it, nevertheless, in the following disputation something must be treated.

Disputatio LXXXVII - Whether the providence which God has of things is an operation of the intellect or of the will

- Errors concerning the providence of God. Caput 1.
- Some Scholastics have held that providence, or predestination, is an operation of the intellect. Caput 2.
- According to others, providence, or predestination, is an act of the will. Caput 3.
- The providence of God does not always attain the end for which it ordains and prepares the means. Caput 4.
- Predestination is not a subjective part, but an objective part of providence. Caput 5.
- And the way of providence. Caput 6.

Caput I - Errors about the providence of God

We presuppose in this disputation that in God there is providence, which among Catholics is outside controversy. We inquire, however, whether it pertains to the intellect or to the will. Nevertheless, it will be worthwhile in this chapter briefly to recount the errors that have been advanced concerning the providence of God, and to set forth the Catholic truth.

Passing over the philosophers and others who, denying that God exists, consequently denied his providence regarding created things - against whom we disputed expressly in question 2, article 2 - among those who confess that God exists, there were not lacking those who thought wrongly about his providence toward these inferior things.

1576. Ephesians 1:11.

The first was Epicurus, who altogether denied the providence of God; likewise Democritus and Heraclitus, who, saying that all things happen by the necessity of nature, thought the care and providence of God to be superfluous: thus relate Lactantius, book 1 De ira Dei, chapters 9 and 10, and St. Gregory of Nyssa, book 3 De philosophia, chapter 3.[1577]

The second error was that of Cicero, of whom St. Augustine makes mention, City of God, book 5, chapter 9; and we above recalled it, disputation 64, chapter 1. For, disputing in the second book De divinatione with his brother Quintus, he altogether denied to God the knowledge of future contingents which depend on human free choice; and so he took away providence regarding these effects and operations. For since providence is a care of future things and is concerned with their disposition, as we shall say below, it follows that it cannot be without the foreknowledge of the same. Therefore, he who says that God does not know future things with certitude, must needs admit that he does not have certain providence of those same things either: for by conjectures, such as men have, nothing would repugn that, without certain foreknowledge, he have some care - unless something else of the sort by conjecture could not befit God; as was said in disputation 67. But whether of other things, even the least, which do not arise from free choice, God has providence, Cicero determines nothing. In this error also we showed Aristotle plainly to have been, in that disputation 64, proving that he also denied certain knowledge of future contingents which depend on free choice.

Besides this, however, Aristotle further seems to have denied God's providence concerning individual other things which do not depend on free choice, but are by the concurrence of other causes; just as he also denied God's operation concerning individual things most minute: rather, he thought all things to be done and moved by the motion of the primum mobile. This error the gravest Fathers ascribe to Aristotle: Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book 5; Epiphanius on the last heresy; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 1 On Theology, which is the 33rd in order, num. 34; St. Ambrose, book 1 De officiis, chapter 13; Theodoret, book 6 De graecarum affectionum curatione; Salvianus, book 1 De providentia; St. Gregory of Nyssa, book 8 De philosophia, chapter 3; and Eusebius, book 15 of the Praeparatio Evangelica, chapter 4, where he reports Atticus the Platonist, who, in a discourse on providence, attacks Aristotle sharply because, against Plato and Moses, he excludes the lower parts of the world, which are under the moon, from God's providence. Wherefore Nazianzen in the place cited rightly calls the providence of God which Aristotle teaches scanty and confined within narrow bounds; of which also he had made mention by suppressing Aristotle's name in Oration 16, which is On the pauperization, and Nicetas too said that this was Aristotle's opinion on that oration of Nazianzen, in those words, "Nay rather," etc.

Yet it is gathered from Aristotle himself, Metaphysics 12, chapter 2, text 37, where he says that God moves the first body, but the rest are moved by it; and in the same book, chapter 9, he asserts that it is absurd that the first mind, namely God, should think about certain things, and that it is better not to see some things than to see them. But in the book De mundo to Alexander, near the end, he more clearly indicates that it most befits God to govern all things, even the least, and to

1577. Lactantius, De ira Dei, I, 9 - 10; St. Gregory of Nyssa, De philosophia, III.

provide for them, saying that he does not do this by himself, but through other causes; as the skilled craftsman by the motion of one cord brings various appearances of things before the eyes, so God, by the motion of one heaven, governs and directs all these lower things. For Aristotle thought it unbecoming that God, in person, should apply himself in particular to producing and governing each single thing; just as it is not seemly that the king of the Persians should himself govern each of the things in his empire, but that, residing in his city of Susa or Ecbatana, he should have them executed by his ministers. Also, in the Magna Moralia, chapter 8, towards the end, he says thus: "If a fortuitous chance were to be attributed to God, he would be unjust, since it frequently happens that wicked men are fortunate and all things turn out well for them; whereas, on the contrary, many adverse things befall the studious, both in goods of fortune and in life."

Nor does it stand in the way that in book 7 of the Ethics to Eudemus, chapter 18, he says that by the divine numen all things are moved, and he also gives the same name to fortune, as if he meant that the events which befall us by chance are done and governed by God and are not fortuitous to him which we say happen to us by chance. For this he could well understand, as he had taught in the book De mundo to Alexander: because all lower causes are moved by God himself remotely by the motion of the first orb, which is moved by him proximally, so that in a certain manner every cause operates as equipped by the divine numen, since it receives the power of God through the mediation of the first heaven. But that God has disposed all these things severally by will and intellect Aristotle did not teach, nor did he intimate elsewhere. Wherefore in that place to Eudemus he does not say that the things which happen to us by chance are not fortuitous to God, since he plainly indicated the opposite in book 2 of the Magna Moralia, so as to vindicate God from injustice. Add also that Aristotle in book 7 to Eudemus posits a twofold fortune, one divine, the other natural; and this latter he seems to deny to divine providence, as we shall say below in I - II, question 9, article 4.

There is another place in Aristotle where he seems to think far otherwise than we have said thus far, namely book 10 of the Ethics, chapter 8, near the end, where he says: "But he who works by mind and cultivates it is disposed best, and he is most a friend to the immortal gods. For if the gods have any care of human affairs, as is thought, it is surely reasonable that they should rejoice with us in that which is best and most akin to them; but this will be mind itself." Yet neither by this testimony can we vindicate Aristotle from every error: first, because he does not grant to God full and perfect care of human affairs, but only some sort, as if he neither cares for nor thinks about those things which are least among men; but only what are greater and most akin to himself - such as he thought the cultivation of mind to be. Next also, because when he grants a care concerning those things which are done by men, namely of those which please God, those who rightly cultivate mind, he does not therefore grant providence; for this is a care and solicitude of future things; but that which Aristotle grants in that chapter is concerned only with present things. By that testimony, therefore, we cannot altogether defend Aristotle.

A third error is attributed to Plato by Marsilius Ficino in the Argument to the Protagoras, and by St. Gregory of Nyssa in book 8 of the Philosophical work, chapters 3 and 4.[1578]

But on the other hand, the one who with his mind honors God by deeds is disposed most excellently, and is a friend of the immortal gods. For if it is thought that the gods take some care of human affairs, it will be in accordance with reason to think that they look after what is best and most their own; but that is the mind itself. Nevertheless, by that testimony we cannot wholly clear Aristotle of every error: both because he did not attribute to God a full and perfect providence with respect to human affairs, but only some certain providence about those things which are the least among men, nor that he should care for or think of them; but rather for loftier things, and those which he thought were especially conjoined to him, namely to cultivate the mind; and also, because when he grants that among those things which are done by men, those please God who worship him rightly, he does not therefore grant that God has care in particular. For this is the care and solicitude of particulars, whereas Aristotle's discourse in that chapter is concerned only with present things. By that testimony, therefore, we cannot altogether defend Aristotle.

A third error is attributed to Plato, namely that he asserted God to provide closely and of himself for universals and incorruptible things, but for the rest through certain intermediate demons. Wherefore Michael Medina thinks that there was none among the philosophers who, destitute of the light of faith, when disputing about the providence of God, did not err, either simply, or in a certain peculiar way; but Plato, in the dialogue Laws, book 10, toward the end most broadly shows that God has providence and care even of the least of things, just as the most perfect craftsman also has knowledge in the art of very small things. These errors are refuted most well, and they disputate elegantly for the providence of God, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Augustine, Salvianus; of which matter Augustine composed several books, and likewise Nyssen; and St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, from chapter 71 to 75.[1579]

It is therefore a Catholic truth that God has not only knowledge of all future things, as was proved in disputation 64, chapter 1, but also care and will of disposing all things, and of doing them in their time, sin excepted. For since all things, even the least, are made and conserved by God, as we shall say in disputation 173, it follows that he decreed and destined all these from eternity, which he also knew from eternity. But whether providence is called an operation of the intellect (*intellectus*), or of the will (*voluntas*), is to be explained in the following chapters.

This truth is defined universally in Scripture. Wisdom 14: "But thou, O Father, governest all things by providence." And again of the wisdom of God it is said: "Attingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter, disponit omnia suaviter." And in Luke 12 and Matthew 6 there are many things on this matter, which declare God's providence even concerning the least things, as that God has care of the lily which today is, and tomorrow is cast into the oven; that a sparrow does not perish without

1578. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata V; Epiphanius, Panarion (on the last heresy); St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 1 On Theology (33rd), n. 34; St. Ambrose, De officiis I, 13; Theodoret, De graecarum affectionum curatione VI; Salvianus, De providentia I; St. Gregory of Nyssa, De philosophia VIII, 3; Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica XV, 4; Nicetas on Nazianzen, Oration 16; Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, 2 and 9; De mundo ad Alexandrum; Magna Moralia II and VIII; Ethics to Eudemus VII, 18; Nicomachean Ethics X, 8.

1579. St. Ambrose, De officiis I, 13; St. John Chrysostom, Homily 9 to the people of Antioch; St. Augustine, De civitate Dei IX, X, and De libero arbitrio III; Salvianus, De providentia I; St. Gregory of Nyssa, De philosophia VIII; St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles III, cap. 71 - 75.

the providence of God, and the like. Wherefore it is an indubitable thing among Catholics, indeed even among heretics, although there is some variety in the manner of explaining, as will appear in disputation 99.

Accordingly, the opinion of certain more recent men, who say that God did not predefine by his providence individual works, because he did not predefine certain works of lesser moment, such as the number of flies and their motion toward this or that direction, and that God likewise did not predefine any of our free works, can by me be proved by absolutely no reason, in whatever way it be explained by its authors. For if they say that God had no will in particular about the number of flies and their motion, it is plainly absurd. For thus God would not provide for all the least things, except in general and remotely in their causes, which is the error of Aristotle and Plato already impugned. Then too we would have to say that neither in time does God have the will of concurring with a fly to this or that motion; a fly too would perish without our Father, and a sparrow similarly, which is against Luke 12 and Matthew 6. Or if in time God has a will about these individual works, it follows that he is changed, who in time begins to will something; or it must be said that he willed that from eternity. But if they say that God did not predefine all these things before the foreseen concurrence of the second cause, but together with it, they teach rightly; yet they ought to assert the same of all things, nor is there greater reason why they should assert this about the least things than about the greatest. I understand this, however, regarding things which were to be produced by the concurrence of a second cause; for those which God was going to do by himself, he decreed to do alone, no created cause being foreseen.

But about free human acts the same must be said. For either they assert that God from eternity only had a universal will of concurring with all men, and did not have that will about singular operations; and thus it cannot be defended: because, concurring in time with this cause, through individual works, he has in detail a will of concurring with it, and such concurrence pleases him: therefore he had it from eternity; or, beginning to have it in time, he is changed; or finally we fall into the error of Aristotle, who assigned providence only in general and in a confused way, namely in the causes, providing causes with reference to effects, and caring nothing in detail for them - all of which are absurd. Or they assert that God pre-defined nothing of human acts without the cooperation and concurrence of free choice foreseen; and this we shall show to be most true in disputation 99. Yet for that reason it ought not, nor can it, absolutely be denied that God provided for and pre-defined singulars in particular, in detail, which he was going to do in time; so that the particle "prae" does not signify a precedence of God's causality with respect to ours, but of time with respect to the existence of the effects; but on this matter again in that disputation, chapter 5.

Caput II - Providence (*providentia*), or predestination (*praedestinatio*), to be an operation of the intellect - such was the view of certain Scholastic doctors.

In the question proposed at the beginning the Scholastics vary; and some contend among themselves more than is meet, whereas it is not a great matter, but a small disagreement, namely whether the operation of the intellect, or of the will, or of both together, ought to be called

providence. Likewise, the difficulty about predestination is the same, for predestination, as it is taken by the holy Fathers and Scholastic Doctors, differs from providence only as the special from the universal: for providence regards all things in general; predestination, however, deals only with the grace of justification and with glorification. Wherefore both questions together must be examined by us, as the account is the same for each.

Accordingly, the prior opinion is that providence, or predestination, is an act of the intellect directly, but relative to an act of the will. So teach Alexander (who, although speaking of providence in part, question 26, member 2, says that it pertains to the intellect and to the will, and does not determine to which it should chiefly be reduced, yet in question 28, member 1, article 2, to the second, on predestination, plainly teaches it to be an operation of the intellect); the same Durandus in the First Book, distinction 14, question 1, number 9; St. Thomas and Cajetan, in this article 1, and below in question 23, article 1; Capreolus, in the First Book, distinction 40, question 1, article 1, conclusion 1, and article 2, conclusion 2; to whom Marsilius favors in First Question 41, article 1, in the beginning, when he asserts that providence pertains to knowledge, although afterwards, speaking of predestination in the same article, note 2, corollary 3, he says that three things pertain to predestination, namely knowledge for disposing, will besides, and power for effecting; yet he does not explain which of these is called providence directly.[1580]

This opinion in general, both about providence and about predestination, is proved first: because to provide or to predestine is to order someone to an end; but ordering is an operation of the intellect: therefore to provide and to predestine. Then too, since providence is a part of prudence - for to this pertains to provide for future things, to remember past things, and to know present things - but the operation of prudence pertains to the intellect: therefore so does providence. Hence Boethius said in book 4 On Consolation, prose 6, that providence is the very divine reason, established in the highest ruler of all, which disposes all things.[1581]

However, the authors of this opinion do not defend it in the same way. Alexander and Durandus, with whom Marsilius seems to agree, say that providence, or predestination, is an act of the intellect which precedes the will, and dictates or proposes what the will ought to decree, and is commonly called "judgment"; but others cited judge it to be an act of the intellect after the affection of the will about the means, which they call "imperium" (*imperium*), by which the power of the will and its impetus is borne toward the work, by a kind (so to speak) of insinuation or intimation to the work and to the executing powers; and they think this to be the proper act of prudence, so that to take counsel and to deliver judgment they attribute to other virtues annexed to prudence; certain Thomists do so with the Doctor, in 2-2, q.47, a.8 and 11 throughout, and q.57, a.6, in the body and to the third.

Furthermore, that providence and predestination pertain to the will is taught in the first rank by Bonaventure on the First Book, distinction 40, article 1, question 2; Scotus, question 1, in the beginning; Gregory, question 1, article 1. Thus too St. John Damascene, book 2, On the Faith,

1580. Alexander of Hales, Summa, q.26, memb.2; q.28, memb.1, art.2, ad secundum, De praedestinatione. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 14, q.1, n.9. St. Thomas and Cajetan on this article 1, and below q.23, a.1. Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 40, q.1, art. 1, concl.1; art.2, concl.2. Marsilius, In I, q.41, a.1, init.; eod. art., nota 2, coroll. 3.

chapter 29, defines providence in the beginning in a twofold way with these words: "Providence is the procuration of things, which God undertakes"; and again, "Providence is the will of God, by which all things are governed aptly and congruously." To this sentence the Doctors also assent who teach that "imperium" (*imperium*) is an operation of the will, not of the intellect; in which point, however, we shall confute their opinion at 1-2, q.17, a.1. These are Henry, Quodlibet 9, question 6; Bonaventure in 3, distinction 17, article 1, question 1, ad 3; Almain, tract. 3, Moral, chapter 2; St. Jerome ab Angelis, cap. 1, Moral, part 3, text, corollary 3; Ockham in 3, q.12, a.4, conclusion 3. 15821583

By reason they confirm this sentence. For although the name "providence" is sometimes taken for the knowledge of future things, indeed this seems to be the primary signification of the name, by which account Boethius, disputing of divine prescience in the last prose of the Consolation, said that it is better called "praevidentia," rather than "praescientia" or "praefcientia," as we reported above in disputation 64, chapter 1 (so that he is called prudent who sees things from afar, before they come), yet otherwise the more frequent usage is that "providence" is said of one who not only sees future things from afar, but also has due care and action about them, by reason of which he is said to look out for them and to consult rightly; in like manner one is called "prudent" who has taken counsel for his future affairs, nor has an excessive care of his future state. But here we are dealing with providence, not only insofar as it is mere knowledge of future things - for thus it is not a different attribute from knowledge - but insofar as it is about certain things, and about a study of future things according to right disposition. Therefore it is not a judgment by which things are proposed to the will, but rather a study and a purpose of the will. By this argument it is well enough proved against Alexander and the others of his party, that providence is not an operation of the intellect alone by which the will is presented with its object.

Moreover, it is not an operation of the intellect which follows upon the will, with the study, the will moreover, and the power to effect. For neither is such an act proved to be first; since such an operation, even in us, is superfluously posited for the motion of the executing faculty, but it is enough if judgment is followed by an affection in the will, so that the executing faculty may operate in its time, nor does it need another insinuation, indeed it is not capable of it, as I shall show more at large in 1-2, q.13, a.1; therefore neither in God, even in our manner of understanding, ought it to be posited. For in God we distinguish by reason all these operations after the manner of those which in us differ really.

Then, even if in us such an operation really existed, it would not seem to be established in God, in our manner of understanding also. For in us it seems necessary that by a certain insinuation the impetus of the will be carried over to the executing faculties; but in God no such executing faculty is to be posited as distinct from the will, as we shall say in disputation 102: therefore it would be vain in him, merely by reason, to distinguish such an operation of the intellect. Besides, even if in

1581. Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae IV, prosa 6.

1582. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IX, q.6; Bonaventure, In III Sent., dist. 17, ar. 1, q.1, ad 3; John Mair (Almain), Tractatus III Moralis, cap. 2; St. Jerome ab Angelis, Moral., pars III, text., coroll. 3; Ockham, In III Sent., q.12, a.4, conclusio 3.

1583. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, 29.

God there were posited that executing faculty diverse from the intellect and the will, yet that insinuation of the will and "imperium" are not aptly suited to God: because God is not accustomed to command either himself or his own faculty; for such a command could not be directed to himself, who constantly can of himself command creatures, which he will make, by his power: because creatures are not properly capable of such "imperium," but in a certain common manner, and metaphorically, are said to obey God, insofar as by the will of God they come to be without any resistance.

How moreover it pertains to prudence not only to prescribe what is to be done, but also to take counsel, nor are the habits of Euboulia, Synesis, and Gnome to be distinguished from prudence, we shall say in 1-2, q.47, art. ...

Furthermore, about the name "Predestination," it must be said in the same way that it evidently signifies a purpose of the will, whereby one wills to effect something, and he is said to "assign a destination" who proposes and determines to lead someone to that end by congruous means. Wherefore both predestination and providence universally signify a purpose of the will about the means with respect to some end.

And although the name Providence more expressly signifies this disposition of means than the name Predestination, nevertheless by usage the name Predestination is now accommodated to signify the eternal purpose of God, whereby He prepares grace for someone unto eternal life, according to the definition of St. Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, book 1, chapter 10, at the beginning.[1584]

To the first argument of the prior view it can be replied from the doctrine of Scotus, in the First Book, distinction 6, question 1, and Quodlibet 17, that to ordain is not the work of the intellect alone, which understands one thing to be for the sake of another, but also of the will, which decrees and proposes one thing to another. Wherefore, although providence is the ordination of things and of means to some end, it does not follow that it pertains to the intellect, but rather to the will, which also is said to "ordain," because it pursues the order prescribed by the intellect.[1585] To the second argument I reply that the providence which is said to be the foreknowledge or pre-notion of future things pertains to prudence, and this is an operation of the intellect, of which Boethius clearly seems to have spoken, as we said a little above. Now, however, the question concerns providence as it is conjoined with care and solicitude for things to be done; and this directly indeed pertains to the operation of the will - although it presupposes an act of the intellect, not in any manner whatsoever, but as ordaining and disposing those things which providence strives to carry out. Each of these opinions is probable; and since this controversy concerns not things but words, and in this respect it makes no difference to the dogmas of faith whether we speak in this way or in another, it is not necessary to dwell longer on it.[1586]

1584. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum 1, c. 10.
1585. Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 6, q. 1; Quodlibet 17.
1586. Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae IV, prosa 6.

Caput IV - Divine providence does not always achieve the end to which it ordains and for which it prepares means

Since providence (*providentia*) is the care which God has for things, and by which He prepares for them the means that they may attain their ends, and since it seems to be the greatest imperfection to apply such weak means that they do not produce their effect, and since any imperfection would be repugnant to divine providence, which is most perfect, it seemed to Cajetan in this article to concern the very honor of the divine name "providence" and its true notion, that it both prepare the means to the end and always attain that end. He proves this by the authority of St. Thomas, who in Contra Gentiles III, chapter 94, and in the following article of this question, ad primum, teaches that there is nothing in the nature of things that escapes the providence of God: but if the providence of God did not always attain the end proposed to itself, many things would escape it; and he adds, "All things that are provided by God come to pass." Wherefore Cajetan judges that the Angelic Doctor, in the places alleged, changed the opinion which earlier he had taught in the First Book, dist. 40, q. 1, a. 2; and in On Truth, q. 6, a. 1.[1587]

I, however, think that this opinion of Cajetan is neither that of St. Thomas nor can it be defended by any reason. Therefore, what pleases me is what Durandus asserts in the First Book, dist. 39, q. 3, and dist. 40, q. 1; Capreolus, dist. 40, q. 1, art. 1, conclusion 2; Marsilius, q. 41, art. 1, at the beginning; Ferrarius on Contra Gentiles III, chapter 94; and St. Thomas in the aforesaid On Truth, q. 6, and in that same dist. 40: namely, that the providence of God does not always attain the end to which it directs things. Durandus proves it thus: a physician is called "provident" who applies the necessary remedies for health, although he does not achieve it. Yet this reason does not prove the same of God's providence, because such a defect cannot occur in God. For a physician can will to effect and to attain some end, and yet not attain it, even if he applies those things which could be applied by diligent providence: but he fails of the attainment of the end either through a defect of knowledge - because, ignorant of the cause of the sickness, he did not apply the better remedies - or because, even if he knew the disease perfectly, he could not find or make the better medicines. Nevertheless, that physician is called provident and prudent, because he omitted no remedy which, according to human art and diligence, could have been applied.

But God, whose knowledge cannot be deceived nor His power impeded - when He does not attain the end to which He ordains things - fails to attain it for another reason: namely, because He has prepared the means for free causes, and, leaving them in their own liberty, He permits them to act, and has decreed to cooperate with them according to their liberty. Indeed, God could, by His providence, so forestall them in their individual acts that none would fail of its end; yet He does not will this, but He provides to individuals the means that are necessary indeed, though not efficacious, for the attainment of the end; and that these means do not have their effect proceeds from the liberty of our will. The matter is illustrated by an example. For in the case of the reprobate, whom God prevents by His grace and at times justifies, He without doubt provides all

1587. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 39, q. 3; dist. 40, q. 1. Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 2. Marsilius, In I, q. 41, a. 1, init. Ferrarius, In Contra Gentiles III, c. 94. St. Thomas, De veritate q. 6; In I Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 2.

the means of grace, that they may obtain eternal life, to which He also directs them; He likewise strives to lead them to repentance, as we shall say in Disputation 97; and yet He does not attain in them the end. Therefore, it is no derogation to providence not to attain universally the end.

For a greater explanation, observe first with Ferrarius that two things can be considered in God's providence on the part of the effect. One is the very application of the means to the end, and this God establishes by His efficacious will before our consent: for the means of the providence of God unto eternal life are those of prevenient grace, which take place in us before consent; and with respect to this effect providence is always fulfilled, and whatever God has provided as a means for someone is always actually bestowed and comes to pass. And in this sense the Holy Doctor said in this question, art. 4, ad secundum, that all things which are provided by God come to pass in the manner in which He has disposed and decreed them. For if He provides prevenient helps, they always come to pass; but if He has provided concomitant helps, they will follow in like manner. For that which God provides He always establishes and decrees with an efficacious will, which indeed is always fulfilled. The other thing in divine providence is the end, which God is not said to "provide," but rather the means to it; and this end divine providence does not always attain, because it leaves the means in the power of the secondary cause, and, according to its liberty, has decreed to cooperate with it, as we shall explain in Disputation 99. This latter, then, is what our opinion asserts, which I do not know by what reason Cajetan could deny. For neither does divine providence in the reprobate attain the end to which God orders them and for which He provides them the means; therefore we rightly say that the providence of God does not always attain the end to which it directs and for which it provides the means.

Note, secondly, that God always attains some end by His providence. For in the reprobate, whom we say to be ordered to beatitude and to be directed by the providence of God, God attains another end proper to Himself: namely, to show the riches of His grace in the vessels of mercy, as we shall show in Disputation 95, chapter nine. What we have said thus far is that divine providence so applies and bestows means to men for some end to be attained by them that sometimes they do not attain it; yet we do not say that God's providence in the application of means is ever without the attainment of some end: it always attains some end, as has been explained. And this is what St. Thomas meant in that question On Truth and in that dist. 40, when he said that providence does not always attain the end to which it ordains. But what he asserts in the second article of this question, ad primum - namely, that nothing escapes God's providence - is not contrary to what we have said; for it is one thing that all things which happen fall under divine providence, and another that every end which divine providence intends should actually come about. The former always happens; the latter can fail.

Thirdly, it should be noted that common providence differs from predestination (*praedestinatio*) in this, that predestination always attains the end to which it is ordered and for which it provides the means - not because by an efficacious will it predetermines the end before the application of the means, as will be proved in Disputation 89, but because it provides such means as it knows by its science will have their effect with respect to the attainment of that end.

Caput V - Predestination is not a subjective but an objective part of providence

Certain things about predestination are usually noted at the beginning of the question; since they are easier, and pertain to predestination insofar as it is compared with providence, it seemed good briefly to set them forth in this chapter.

First, as to the etymology of the name: the verb "to predestine" (praedestinare) is composed of "prae" and "destinare." Now "destinare" signifies, among other things, two: first, to send; then, to set, or to define. And perhaps in all the places where it signifies "to send," it can also be used for "to define." Thus, where soldiers are said to be destined for some place - that is, to be sent - it can signify "to define," in that they are sent. From the former signification St. Thomas derives the name predestination as a certain transmission, so as to denote the sending of a man into life eternal: the same is judged by Durandus in the First Book, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5. But Alexander derives the name from the latter signification, which seems the more fitting.[1588]

As for the preposition "prae," Doctors give various senses. Catherinus, in his Opuscule De praedestinatione, cap. 1, asserts that it signifies dignity. Wherefore he says that those are "predestined" who, before others to be saved, are destined in a more dignified manner to glory, whom he himself calls "eminently predestined." These, in his view, are those to whom, before foreseen merits, God decreed to give life eternal, of which we shall speak in disputation 90.[1589] Bartholomew Camerarius, in the Catholic Dialogue, cap. 1, § 2, judges that the particle "prae" also signifies dignity, but in another mode - namely, of those who are saved in relation to the damned - so that these are said to be "before others," that is, before the damned, destined to life eternal.[1590] The more common sentence of the Scholastics, however, is that this "prae" signifies antecedence of duration, so that predestination is the same as predefinition, and the eternal ordering of God before all times. The particle can also signify antecedence of cause with respect to our free choice, so that God is said to predestine or predefine something before our consent even as foreseen; in which sense Damascene seems to have spoken, De fide, the last chapter, and elsewhere; of which again in disputation 99.[1591]

Next, it must be premised, as Driedo very well noted in the tract De concordia praedestinationis et liberi arbitrii et praedestinatione, cap. 1, that the name "predestination" is sometimes employed commonly, sometimes properly: and, in a peculiar way, when commonly accepted it signifies as well the destination of the providence of man to life eternal as to punishment; and thus it also includes reprobation.[1592] Thus St. Augustine takes it in De civitate Dei, when he speaks of those two cities, one predestined to glory, the other to eternal fire; and Prosper agrees in his Responses 14 and 15 to the Capitula of the Gauls; and Fulgentius in book 1 To Monimus, cap. 14 and 30, and very often elsewhere; and the Council of Valence under the Emperor Lothair, c. 3.[1593] Properly, however,

1588. St. Thomas, In I Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5; Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5; Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, p. 4, tr. 28, m. 1, § 2.

1589. St. Ambrose Catharinus, Opusc. de praedestinatione, cap. 1.

1590. Bartholomeus Camerarius, Dialogus Catholicus, cap. 1, § 2.

1591. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, cap. ult.; see also disputation 99.

1592. Driedo, Tractatus de concordia praedestinationis et liberi arbitrii et praedestinatione, cap. 1.

"predestination" is used for the destination of someone to life eternal; thus Paul to the Romans 8, and elsewhere; and the Council of Trent, the Fathers, and the Scholastics commonly. Therefore, whenever we use the name "predestination" or "predestined" absolutely, we always understand predestination to life; reprobation, however, we never understand unless we add "to death" or "to punishment."[1594]

What, then, this peculiar predestination properly is, as regards grace and as regards the eternal cause - whether it be the will itself only of giving life eternal, or the will of preparing all the means of grace to that end - we shall say in disputation 89, chapter 3. For the present, however, that we may distinguish it from providence taken universally, and that we may show that it is not a subjective part of that [i.e., providence], it is enough to have said in general that predestination properly taken is occupied about grace and glory, or about one of those two.

Whether, indeed, it is a subjective part of providence, Doctors do not seem to feel the same way. Cajetan, below, q. 23, art. 1, teaches that it is not a subjective, but an objective, part - more precisely: for by a "subjective part" of something all understand a species with respect to a genus; therefore he says it is an objective part, because it is occupied about some special object of providence; but not subjective, because it is not a species of providence. He seems to compare predestination with philosophy, as some part of philosophy, namely that which treats about the heaven, with universal philosophy. For this is a certain common science, which contains under itself some parts, not as species, but as it were integral parts. Now this opinion can be proved from the doctrine handed down above in disputation 72, namely, that in God there is only one art, although there are many ideas, because there is a single, according to species, mode of knowing, even if there are many objects which come to be by that art, to which many ideas are assigned. For since in God there seems to be the same mode of providing necessary means to their ends, even if there are different means to different ends, the divine providence, as providence, will be of the same species; and therefore it will not contain under itself this and that providence as species, but as parts of the same providence, because they are occupied about individual objects.

Others, however, think that predestination is a subjective part of providence. Thus think St. Thomas, q. 6 De veritate, art. 1; and in the First Book, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 2; Durandus; Marsilius; Capreolus in the same distinction, concl. 2; and Bartholomew Camerarius in the Catholic Dialogue, cap. 1, § 4. But by what reason they prove this, I do not see; therefore, although it does not matter very much to speak in this or that mode, to me the sentence of Cajetan is more probable, which St. Thomas not obscurely indicates in I, q. 23, art. 1, at the end.[1595]

1593. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei; Prosper, Responsiones 14 - 15 ad capitula Gallorum; Fulgentius, Ad Monimum, l. 1, c. 14, 30; Council of Valence under Lothair, c. 3.

1594. Rom. 8; Council of Trent; the Fathers and the Scholastics commonly.

1595. Cajetan, In I, q. 23, a. 1; St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 6, a. 1; In I Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 2; Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 39, q. 3; dist. 40, q. 1; Marsilius, In I, q. 41, a. 1, init.; Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 2; Bartholomeus Camerarius, Dialogus Catholicus, cap. 1, § 4. See also disputation 72.

Articulus II - Whether all things are subject to divine providence

It is asked whether all things are subject to divine providence.

Objection 1. It seems that not all things are subject to divine providence. For nothing that is provided-for is fortuitous. If therefore all things are provided-for by God, nothing will be fortuitous. And thus chance and fortune perish. But this is against the common opinion.

Objection 2. Further, every wise provider excludes, as far as he can, defect and evil from those whose care he undertakes. But we see many evils in things. Therefore either God cannot prevent them, and so He is not omnipotent, or He does not have care of all things.

Objection 3. Further, those things which come about of necessity do not require providence or prudence. Hence according to the Philosopher in Ethics VI, prudence is right reason about contingent things, about which there is counsel and choice. Since then many things in reality come about of necessity, not all things are subject to providence.

Objection 4. Further, whoever is left to himself is not subject to the providence of any governor. But men are left to themselves by God, according to Ecclesiasticus 15: "God from the beginning made man, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." And especially the wicked, according to that: "He left them according to the desires of their heart." Therefore not all things are subject to divine providence.

Objection 5. Further, the Apostle says, 1 Cor. 9: "Doth God take care for oxen?" And by the same reason for other irrational creatures. Therefore not all things are subject to divine providence.

But on the contrary: It is said of the divine wisdom (Wisdom 8) that "she reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly."

I answer that: Some totally denied providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, positing that the world was made by chance. Others, however, held that only incorruptible things are subject to providence, but corruptible things not according to individuals, but according to species; for thus incorruptible they are. In the person of such it is said in Job 22: "Clouds are his covert, and he walketh about the hinges of the heaven, and he considereth not our things." From the generality of corruptible things Rabbi Moses excepted men, on account of the splendor of the intellect which they participate; but in other corruptible individuals he followed the opinion of others. Yet it is necessary to say that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in the universal but also in the singular, which is clear as follows. Since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects to the end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends. For this happens in the works of some agent, that something should come about not ordered to the intended end, because the effect follows from another cause besides the intention of the agent. But the causality of God, who is the first agent, extends to all beings, not only as to the principles of the species, but also as to the individual principles; not only of incorruptibles, but also of corruptibles. Whence it is necessary that all things which have being in any way be ordered by God to an end, according to the Apostle to the Romans 13: "Those things that are from God are ordered." Since therefore nothing else is the providence of God than the plan of the order of things to an end, as has been said, it is necessary

that all things, insofar as they participate in being, be so far subject to divine providence. Likewise also it was shown above that God knows all things, both universals and particulars. And since His knowledge is compared to things as the knowledge of art to the things made by art (as was said above), it is necessary that all things be subject to His order, just as all things made by art are subject to the order of art.

Reply to the first: The case is otherwise with a universal cause and with a particular cause. For from the order of a particular cause something can depart, not, however, from the order of a universal cause. For nothing is withdrawn from the order of a particular cause unless by means of some other particular cause impeding - for example, wood is hindered from being burned by the action of water. Hence, since all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it is impossible that any effect should escape the order of the universal cause. Inasmuch, therefore, as some effect escapes the order of some particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous with respect to the particular cause; but with respect to the universal cause, from whose order it cannot be withdrawn, it is said to be provided-for. Thus too the meeting of two servants, although it be casual as regards them, is nevertheless provided-for by the master, who knowingly sends them thus to one place, so that the one should be ignorant of the other.

Reply to the second: The case is otherwise with one who has care of something particular, and with the universal provider. For the particular provider excludes defect from that which is subject to his care, as far as he can; but the universal provider permits some defect to occur in something particular, lest the good of the whole be impeded. Hence corruptions and defects in natural things are said to be against a particular nature, yet they are of the intention of universal nature, inasmuch as the defect of one turns to the good of another, or even of the whole universe. For the corruption of one is the generation of another, by which the species is preserved. Since therefore God is the universal provider of the whole being, it pertains to His providence to permit certain defects to be in some particular things, lest the good of the universe be hindered. For if He were to prevent all evils, many goods would be lacking to the universe; there would not be the life of the lion, if there were not the killing of animals; nor would there be the patience of martyrs, if there were not the persecution of tyrants. Whence St. Augustine says in the Enchiridion: "The omnipotent God would in no wise permit any evil in His works, unless He were so omnipotent and good as also to bring good even out of evil."[1596]

Reply to the third: Man is not the establisher of nature, but uses natural things in the works of art and of virtue for his own use. Wherefore the providence of man is only about things contingent which are subject to counsel and choice; but the divine providence, as the institutor of nature and universal order, extends also to necessary things, no less than to contingents.

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1596. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, cap. 11 (at the beginning), in tom. 34.

since all particular causes are included under a universal cause, it is impossible that any effect escape the order of the universal cause. Therefore, insofar as some effect escapes the order of some particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous with respect to the particular cause; but with respect to the universal cause, from whose order it cannot be withdrawn, it is said to be provided-for. Likewise too, although with respect to them it is, as it were, accidental that servants meet together, nevertheless with respect to the master who knowingly sends them, so that one meet another at a given place, it is provided-for. (And so too all corruptions and defects in natural things are said to be against a particular nature, but yet, as has been set forth above, not against the intention of universal nature.) Universal nature's defect is ordered to the good of another, and thus to the good of the universe. For the corruption of one is the generation of another, by which the species is preserved. Since therefore the universal provider directly intends the good of the whole, it pertains to the universal providence that it permit certain defects in particular things, lest by such evils the goods of the universe be impeded. For if all evils were prevented, many goods would be lacking to the universe; there would not be the life of the lion if there were not the killing of animals; nor would there be the patience of martyrs if there were not the persecution of tyrants. Whence St. Augustine says in the Enchiridion: "The omnipotent God would in no wise permit any evil in His works, unless He were so omnipotent and good as also to bring good even out of evil."

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Reply to the fourth: In that which is said, that God "left man to himself," man is not excluded from divine providence; rather it is shown that operative power is not predetermined for him to one thing, as it is for natural things, which are acted upon only as by another, but do not act of themselves as directing themselves to an end, as rational creatures do by free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), by which they take counsel and choose. Whence it is significantly said: "In the hand of his counsel." But because the very act of free choice is reduced to God as to a cause, it is necessary that those things which come about from free choice be subject to divine providence. For man's providence is contained under God's providence, as a particular cause is under a universal cause. Moreover, over just men God has providence in a certain more excellent way than over the impious, inasmuch as He does not permit contrary events to befall them which would finally impede their salvation. For to those who love God, all things work together for good, as it is said in Romans 8. But from this very fact, that He does not draw the impious back from the evil of fault, He is said to "forsake" them; yet not so that they are totally excluded from His providence - otherwise they would fall into nothing, unless by His providence they were preserved. And from this reasoning it seems that Cicero was moved, who subtracted from divine providence those human affairs about which we take counsel.

Reply to the fifth: Because the rational creature has, through free choice, dominion over its own act, as has been said, it is subject in a certain special way to divine providence, to wit, so that something be imputed to it for guilt or for merit, and that something be rendered to it as

punishment or reward. And as to this point the Apostle removes God's "care" from oxen - not, however, so that individuals of irrational creatures do not pertain to God's providence, as Rabbi Moses supposed.

Observations concerning the doctrine of the article.

The conclusion is that all singular created things are subject to divine providence; however, sins are to be understood as excepted, about which we will say something presently. And this is expressed in Scripture in Wisdom 8, Luke 18, Matthew 6, and Luke 12, as we alleged in the preceding disputation, where we also said in what manner God's care and providence are exercised even about the least things. But since certain matters remain to be noted, the first is that Julius Sirenius taught falsely in book 2 De fato, chapter 25, when he claims that monsters and other continual natural defects occur not only by chance and rashly from second causes which were carried into an opposition to nature, but also by God, who inclined them to the opposite. This is therefore both false and absurd: for although God incline some second causes to some effects and begin to aid them, nevertheless He applies contrary causes by which others are impeded - whence monsters are generated and defects occur. Such monstrous events cannot be fortuitous with respect to God, since they are not outside His intention in applying opposite causes, by which He knows, and even wills, that monsters come forth. Therefore either Sirenius must concede that God does not apply opposite causes, nor concur with them with the purposed will of His own - which would be heretical - or else he cannot say that such effects are themselves fortuitous, since they are according to His intention and will.[1597]

Second, Cajetan treats many things concerning the solution to the second objection, to show in what way sins are permitted by God on account of the good of the universe; and he more perfectly proves that this universe is more perfect in the way in which it now is, sin having been permitted, than it would have been if Adam and the evil angels had persevered in grace.[1598] This, however, they understand not only because now it has Christ, but also that even without sin it would have had Him on account of other goods which have been born from sin, to wit, on account of martyrdom, penance, and the like. We shall discuss this matter somewhat below in disputation 107. Here, however, first it must be said that God did not permit sin from an intention of penance, or of martyrdom, or of other goods which followed from its occasion, because these goods are not of the primary and antecedent will of God, but of the consequent will, which is after sin was foreseen, as we have shown according to the mind of St. John Damascene above in disputation 83, chapter 3; whence also below in disputation 93, chapter 2, we shall prove that in the predestined God does not permit sin from an intention of penance, and therefore the permission of sin is not an effect of predestination.[1599] Then I say that indeed there are many fitting reasons on account of which God is rightly said to have permitted sin, as one may see in St. Thomas; nor would they be lacking, if God had not permitted it. But what in the thing itself and in the universe would be better - let that be God's judgment; although we shall say something of this in the article below.[1600]

1597. Julius Sirenius, De fato, lib. 2, cap. 25.
1598. Cajetanus (Caiet.), on this solution of the second objection.
1599. St. John Damascene, as cited supra, disputatio 83, cap. 3; and infra disputatio 93, cap. 2.

Third it is to be noted, concerning the solution to the second objection, in what way sins are subject to divine providence. Although the Schoolmen speak variously in this matter, nevertheless it seems to me that all have the same opinion. Alexander (2 p., q. 36, m. 4, a. 1) and Durandus (in I, dist. 39, q. 3, num.) say that sins fall under God's providence either because God provides something about them lest they be done, or because, once done, He orders them thus, so that they be matter for penance and instruction; and some think that St. Thomas himself said this in Contra Gentiles, book 3, chapter 71 - although there he only says that God is provident even if His providence does not prevent every evil.[1601] The same St. Thomas (Quæstio de veritate, q. 5, a. 4) and the Ferrarian (3 Contra Gentiles, cap. 7, art. 6 and 3) say that something falls under God's providence in two ways: first, as that for the sake of which God orders other things, and that very thing to something else; and this is the effect of divine providence, which is brought about by it, as the act of generating, to which a potency is ordained by God, and is itself ordained to the production of man. And this is called by St. Thomas a providence of approval, because it is the will approving that thing, or it supposes the will of that thing which is said to fall under providence. Then something is subjected to divine providence not as its effect, but because, once it has been done, God orders it to other things; and in this way sins are subject to divine providence, but not in the prior mode. Therefore, although we say that God's providence has to do with sins, or that sins are subject to providence and fall under it, nevertheless, in order that these be truly said, it is sufficient if sins be as it were the matter about which providence does something. One cannot say, however, that sins are provided-for by God, although they are foreseen and foreknown: for to be provided-for denotes effects of willing and of providence.

For this reason the Holy Doctor said above (q. 14, a. 16) that God has practical knowledge of sins, inasmuch as He permits them, or prevents them, or, once done, orders them; whence it is called practical knowledge of sins, not as of an effect, but as of the matter with respect to which He orders something to be done. On the other hand, when in this article he says that the ordination of an agent into the end extends as far as the agent's causality extends, in order thus to show that God provides all things for the end of happiness which is His, he speaks of those things which the providence of God ordains to come to be, for those are thus to be ordained by God inasmuch as they are done by Him; he does not, however, speak of those things which, once done, are ordered and conduce - such as sins. For to these extends the ordination of divine providence, but not its efficiency.

Articulus III - Whether God immediately provides for all things

It is asked:

1600. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles, III, cap. 71.
1601. St. Thomas, Quaestiones de veritate, q. 5, a. 4; "Ferrarien." on 3 Contra Gentiles, cap. 7, art. 6 and 3.

Objicitur: 1. It seems that God does not immediately provide for all things. For whatever belongs to dignity is to be attributed to God. But to the dignity of a king it pertains that he have ministers, through whose mediation he provide for his subjects. Therefore, much more does God not immediately provide for all things.[1602]

1. Further, to providence pertains to order things to an end. But the end of any thing whatever is its perfection and its good. Now it pertains to any cause whatever to lead its effect to good. Therefore any efficient cause whatever is a cause of the effect of providence. If therefore God immediately provided for all things, all second causes would be taken away.
2. Further, St. Augustine says in the Enchiridion that it is better for certain things to be not known than known, as vile things. And the same is said by the Philosopher in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics. But whatever is better is to be attributed to God. Therefore God does not have immediate providence of certain vile and very small things.[1603]

But on the contrary: It is said in Job 34: "Whom did He set over the earth? or whom did He place over the world which He made?" Upon which St. Gregory says: "He rules the world by Himself, whom He made by Himself."[1604]

I answer: It must be said that two things pertain to providence, namely, the rationale of the order of the things provided-for unto the end, and the execution of this order, which is called governance.

Therefore, as to the first of these, God immediately provides for all things, who in His intellect has the rationale of all things, even the very least; and whatsoever causes He has pre-assigned to certain effects, He gave them the power to produce those effects. Whence it is necessary that He have in His forethought the order of those effects, as pre-contained in His plan.

However, as to the second, there are certain media of divine providence: because He governs lower things through higher, not by reason of any defect of His power, but by reason of the superabundance of His goodness, so as to communicate the dignity of causality even to creatures. And according to this the opinion of Plato is excluded (which St. Gregory of Nyssa relates), asserting a threefold providence: of the highest God, who first and principally provides for spiritual things, and, consequently, for the whole world as to genera, species, and universal causes; the second providence, by which provision is made for singulars of generable and corruptible things - and this he attributes to the "gods who go around the heavens," that is, to separated substances which move the heavenly bodies circularly; the third providence, of human affairs, which he attributed to demons, whom the Platonists posited as intermediates between us and the gods, as St. Augustine relates.[1605]

1602. The marginal cluster of references is abbreviated in the edition.
1603. St. Augustine, Enchiridion; Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.
1604. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, lib. 24, cap. 26, ante med.
1605. Gregory of Nyssa, as reported; St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, lib. 9. Also cf. Wisdom 8; Luke 18; Matthew 6; Luke 12.

Reply to the first: That a king have ministers to execute his providence pertains to his dignity. But that he not have a rationale of the things which are to be done by them is from a defect of his own. For every operative knowledge is so much the more perfect, the more it considers particulars, in which is action.

Reply to the second: By the fact that God has immediate providence of all things, second causes are not excluded, which are the executors of this order, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply to the third: For us it is better not to know evils and base things, insofar as by them we are impeded from the consideration of certain better things, since we cannot at once understand many things; and insofar as the thought of evils sometimes turns the will aside into evil. But this has no place in God, who at once sees all things with one intuition, and whose will can in no wise be turned to evil.

Furthermore, it pertains to providence to order things to an end. But the end of anything is its perfection and good. Now it belongs to any cause to lead its effect to the good. Therefore any efficient cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If, then, God provides immediately for all things, all second causes are taken away.

Furthermore, St. Augustine says in the Enchiridion that it is better to be ignorant of certain things than to know them, as of base things. And the Philosopher says the same in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics. But whatever is better must be attributed to God. Therefore God does not have immediate providence of certain base and minimal things.[1606]

But on the contrary: It is said in Job 34: "Who hath set another over the earth? or whom hath he set over the world which he made?" Upon which St. Gregory says: "He governs the world which he himself made, not through a written law, but through himself."[1607]

I answer that two things belong to providence: namely, the plan of the order of things provided for to the end, and the execution of this order, which is called governance.

Accordingly, as to the first of these, God provides immediately for all things, who in his own intellect holds the plan of all things, even the least; and whenever he has set causes over certain effects, he gave to them the power to produce those effects. Hence it is necessary that he should previously have had in his reason the order of those effects.

But as to the second, there are certain means of the divine providence: for he governs lower things through higher, not because of any defect of his power, but because of the superabundance of his goodness, that he might communicate to creatures also the dignity of causality. And according to this is excluded the opinion of Plato (which Gregory of Nyssa reports), who posited a threefold providence: of which the first is, in a first and principal way, about spiritual things and about the world as to being and the universal causes; the second is the providence which is about the species of generable and corruptible things, which he attributes to the "gods," that is, to the

1606. St. Augustine, Enchiridion; Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.
1607. Job 34:13; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, lib. 24, cap. 26, ante med.

separated substances that move the heavenly bodies; the third is the providence which is about human affairs, which he attributes to the demons, whom the Platonists posited as something intermediate between us and the gods, as St. Augustine relates.[1608]

Reply to the first: To have ministers pertains to the dignity of a king. But that something not be provided for through ministers, but that the whole order be taken from the king himself, detracts not from dignity but from defect. For knowledge is so much the more perfect, the more it extends itself to particulars; and providence is an act of such consideration. Therefore, although God immediately has the plan of the order, he nevertheless executes many things through second causes as his ministers.

Reply to the second: From the fact that God has immediate providence concerning all things, second causes are not excluded, which are the executors of this order, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply to the third: For us it is better not to know evils and base things, insofar as by them we are impeded from the consideration of certain better things, since we cannot at once understand many things; and insofar as the thought of evils sometimes turns the will aside into evil. But this has no place in God, who at once sees all things with one intuition, and whose will can in no wise be turned to evil.

Dubitatio circa textum articuli. In explaining the mind of St. Thomas, Cajetan raises a doubt about both conclusions, because they do not seem to cohere. For either (as they say) St. Thomas is speaking in both of immediation of power, or of immediation of supposit. If of immediation of power, the latter proposition is false: for God, by an immediation of power, since he governs all things by his own power and not one begged from another, governs all things immediately. But if in one conclusion St. Thomas is speaking of immediation of power, and in the other of immediation of supposit, then in a few words there is a great variety; which indeed does not seem suitable.

To this doubt Cajetan responds, declaring the first conclusion to be true of immediation of power, because God provides for all things by his own power; but the latter of immediation of supposit, because God as supposit is most proximate to any effect, for to all things he is present according to essence; yet he adds that the holy Doctor does not understand it in this way: he speaks, says Cajetan, formally of his own immediation, which in its own genus answers to each of these, namely, to providence and to governance.[1609]

For which reason he notes that between the ruling plan, which is providence, and the things ruled, two sorts of middle reason can intervene. One way, as if it were to supply something which was lacking to the ruling plan: as when the ruling plan assigns to one reason of a human agent what must be done and ordains what must be executed; this is from a defect: for the science of a craftsman is the more perfect, the more he himself applies himself to those particular things in which execution consists. In this way, God is not determined by some created reason as a middle in his providence, or in the ruling plan. He himself by himself applies himself to the least things with

1608. Gregory of Nyssa, as reported; St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, lib. 9.
1609. Cajetan (Thomas de Vio), on this article.

all study and care, just as to the greatest and the universal. In another way, a reason can be middle as minister, not as reason: because, namely, the principal disposer orders all things, even the least and singular, but hands them over to an inferior reason as to a minister; just as skilled artisans hand over even the least things which are to be done to ministers. And in this way God uses a human reason with respect to the reason of his governance and providence, not as a reason, but as a minister. For if a reason intervened, and were middle as a reason, the divine providence and the ruling plan would not reach by its own power proximately to the governance of things, but there would be another power as reason intervening, which is absurd. Yet we rightly say that God has the ruling plan of certain things, namely of human affairs, through some middle, namely through a created reason, not through a reason as reason, but as through a minister; for thus he would dispose things by another power, because what intervenes as a true reason intervenes as a power; but a middle reason intervenes as minister; which is to be middle as a supposit.

Truly admirable is Cajetan's genius, who, endeavoring with his customary subtlety to expound the mind of St. Thomas, quite makes it more difficult. Therefore this interpretation of his is not according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor; this can be gathered quite evidently even from the text of the article itself, which is not very difficult. For there St. Thomas distinguishes in God two acts of will and two of intellect at once. The first, namely, is in God the providence concerning things, which in this first part, question 113, article 6, he called the reason of governance, by which namely God disposes with himself the things which are to be done. Then there is governance itself, the act of intellect and will, by which act he moves to the execution itself. These two St. Thomas seems to distinguish in this article, but most clearly in the following article, 2; for there he teaches that predestination, or providence, which is a certain plan in the intellect of the one who provides and predestines, places or effects nothing in the things provided for or predestined; but the execution of providence has its effect in the things provided for. This execution he teaches to be passive indeed in the effected things, but active in God himself. And he distinguishes in God those two acts of providence and governance after the manner of those which are really diverse in us: for first with us we deliberate what is to be done; then after some time by another act of intellect and will we execute the thing and are moved to the work; and if God by the same act according to the plan by which he provides were to execute, predestination and providence would place something in the effect and in the thing provided for.[1610]

Accordingly, in this article he teaches, as regards providence, which answers to our consultation, that God does not use any middle, because he admits no counselor to himself, but by himself deliberates what is to be done. Therefore the divine providence does not exclude the media which ought, on the side of the effect, to be present so that the thing be done; but of all these God has the plan in his own counsel. For unless he looked to these, his providence would overturn all liberty and the efficacy of created things, as we shall show more fully in Disputation 99. But he admits no one as counselor by whose providence he might be aided in the disposition and provision of things which he has established with himself: and this he wished to teach in the first conclusion of the article.

1610. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, a. 2; also I, q. 103, a. 6.

But as for the execution, because it tends to the effect and places something in the very thing, and God brings many things about and executes them not by himself alone but with the concurrence of other causes, therefore most rightly St. Thomas said in the latter conclusion that God does not execute all things by himself alone, but many with the intervention of second causes; and in the same way he does not provide for the execution of all things with himself alone, but for the things to be done by means of other second causes. Therefore he does not deny the medium on the side of the counsel, but neither does he deny it on the side of the effect.

A doubt from the doctrine of St. Thomas. But someone will ask whether God governs all things by an immediation of supposit, or by an immediation of power. For it seems that St. Thomas, in I, dist. 37, q. 1, art. 4, ad 4, teaches that God acts more immediately than any other agent. He teaches the same, dist. 2, art. 3, ad quartum; but in Quaestiones de potentia, q. 3, art. 7, at the end, he says that any natural agent is immediate to its own effect.[1611]

The response of certain men. Peter of Bergamo, in the Concordances in the place of the doubts of St. Thomas, dubium 504, responds that God operates with an immediation of power more immediately than second causes, and that second causes operate more immediately with an immediation of supposit. Ferrariense seems to agree in the book Contra gentiles, cap. 70, who thinks there is an immediation of power when an agent operates by its own power, not by the power of another upon whom it depends.[1612]

But I myself think that, if we call this the immediation of power, that an agent is immediate to its effect by an immediation of power, this belongs to God alone: for every created cause depends upon another. But if we say that the immediation of power is when an agent operates not by a power flowing from another, but by a power inborn to itself, many created agents operate by an immediation of power: because from a power conjoined to them the effect proceeds proximely. But some created agents operate mediately, because not by an inherent power, but by one produced by themselves; in this way certain things are said to operate remotely, as fire heats things which are remote by hot vapors emanating from it. God never operates in this way, because his power, which is his very essence, proximely reaches at once to every effect.

But as to the immediation of supposit, it must be said against Cajetan that God does not operate all things by an immediation of supposit, not because according to supposit he is not intimately present in all things and all effects (for those are according to effect, but are not within; but God is within): but because in the order of acting the universal action of God is modified by the concurrence of many second causes, which concur as more proximate, because they are singular and proper causes; and this St. Thomas plainly taught in the second conclusion. Falsely, therefore, did Cajetan say that God therefore acts by an immediation of supposit because he is, as to situation, within every effect, and between him and the effect as to situation and place there does

1611. St. Thomas, In I Sent., dist. 37, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4; In I Sent., dist. 2, a. 3, ad 4; Quaestiones disputatae De potentia, q. 3, a. 7.

1612. Petrus Bergomensis, Concordantiae; Ferrariense, Contra gentiles, cap. 70.

not intervene any supposit. For propinquity of place is not to be considered in the series and order of acting: this is to be considered among the causes themselves, insofar as one is under another, and one determines and modifies another, as has been explained.

Moreover, it is not necessary to distinguish in God, even according to reason, one act of providence and another of governance. For in us in reality there are not two acts, one of providence, by which counsel is taken, and what is to be done is established, and another, when the same thing falls out by chance: because what once we have established with ourselves, we cannot always keep it in mind, nor always consider it, and will. Wherefore, when upon the occasion of a thing occurring it comes back into memory, we deliberate again, and at that present moment take counsel and deliberate what ought to be done, and then we will again and at length execute, not by a multiplication of acts, but by the same established act; and we execute: therefore, since in God there is no defect, if that very act of counsel should not persevere, it would not seem necessary to distinguish a second reason of acting, but God can both provide and with the same act at his own time execute.

We proceed thus to the fourth. It seems that the divine providence imposes necessity on things provided for. For every effect which has some per se cause which already is or has been, from which it follows of necessity, comes about from necessity, as the Philosopher proves in Metaphysics VI. But the providence of God, since it is eternal, has fixed something beforehand, and the effect follows upon it of necessity. For the divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore the divine providence imposes necessity on things provided for.[1613]

Furthermore, every provider establishes his work as much as he can that it may not fail. But God is supremely powerful: therefore he attributes firmness of necessity to the things which he has provided.

Furthermore, Boethius says in the fourth book of the Consolation: that fate, proceeding from the immovable principles of providence, has bound the beginnings of the acts of fortune and of the births of men with an indissoluble chain. It seems therefore that providence imposes necessity on the things provided for.

But on the contrary is what Dionysius says, De divinis nominibus, cap. 4: that the divine providence does not corrupt nature, but preserves it. This has a certain regard to the fact that a contingent nature should remain contingent. Therefore the divine providence does not impose necessity on things contingent by excluding contingency.[1614]

I answer that the divine providence imposes necessity upon certain things, but not upon all, as some have believed. For it pertains to providence to order things to an end. Next to the divine goodness, which is the end in things separated, the principal good existing in things themselves is the perfection of the universe. But this would not be, if not all the grades of beings were found in things. Whence it pertains to the divine providence that there be produced many grades of things.

1613. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI.
1614. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. 4.

And so to certain effects he appointed necessary causes, that they might come forth necessarily; but to other things he gave causes contingent, that they might come forth contingently, according to the condition of proximate causes.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that the effects of the divine providence do not come to be only in such wise that something come about in one way or another, but that something come to be as it befits, or that something come to be contingently or necessarily. And thus the divine providence disposes that it come to be infallibly, and necessarily in necessary things; and contingently in contingent things.

Ceterum, it is not necessary to distinguish in God, even according to a rational distinction, the one act of providence from the other act of government. For if in us there are never distinguished two acts - one of providence, when long before a thing is done counsel is taken about it and it is determined what ought to be done; and another, when the thing itself is done - this happens because that which once we have determined we are not able to retain in mind, nor to consider and to will in act always. Wherefore, when the occasion of doing the thing occurs, we again call to mind that which by consultation was deliberated and provided, and we again will it. But if that first act of providence and counsel were to persevere, there would be no need of another for executing it. As when suddenly an occasion occurs, and, the occasion being present, we briefly consult and deliberate what ought to be done, and we immediately execute it, we do not multiply acts, but by the same act we determine and we execute. Therefore, since in God there is not this defect, but the very same act perseveres continually, it does not seem necessary even according to a rational distinction to distinguish so many acts; rather, by the same act God can provide for future things, and in its time execute them.

To the fourth, we proceed thus. It seems that the divine providence imposes necessity upon the things provided for. For every effect which has some per se cause, which already is or was, from which it follows by necessity, proceeds from necessity, as the Philosopher proves in the sixth book of the Metaphysics.[1615] But the providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and upon it the effect follows by necessity. For the divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore the divine providence imposes necessity upon the things provided for.

1. Further, every provider stabilizes his work as much as he can lest it fail. But God is supremely powerful. Therefore He attributes to the things provided by Himself the firmness of necessity.[1616]
2. Further, Boethius says in the fourth book of the Consolation, near the middle, that fate, proceeding from the immobile beginnings of providence, binds the acts of fortune and the births of men by an indissoluble chain of causes.[1617] Therefore it seems that providence imposes necessity upon the things provided for.

1615. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, text 7.

1616. An allusion to the manner in which a wise provider secures his work; cf. Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, IV, prose 6.

1617. Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, IV, prose 6, near the middle.

But on the contrary: Pseudo-Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names that to corrupt nature is not of divine providence.[1618] Now it belongs to the nature of certain things that they be contingent. Therefore the divine providence does not impose necessity upon things in such a way as to exclude contingency.

I answer: The divine providence does impose necessity upon some things, but not upon all, as certain persons have thought. For it belongs to providence to order things to an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an end separated from things, the principal good existing in the things themselves is the perfection of the universe. But this would not be, if all the grades of being were not found in things. Hence it pertains to the divine providence to produce all the grades of beings. And therefore, for certain effects He prepared necessary causes that they might come about necessarily; but for certain others, contingent causes that they might come about contingently, according to the condition of the proximate causes.

Reply to the first: The effect of the divine providence is not merely that something come to be in any sort of way, but that something come to be either contingently or necessarily. And therefore it comes about infallibly and with certainty that, as the divine providence disposes, some things come to be infallibly and necessarily; and it comes about contingently that, as the ratio of divine providence has it, other things come to be contingently.

Reply to the second: In this the order of the divine providence is immobile and certain, namely, that all the things which are provided by Him come about in that mode in which He Himself provides - whether necessarily or contingently.

Reply to the third: That indissolubility and immutability which Boethius touches upon pertains to the certainty of providence, which does not fail either as to its effect, or as to the mode of coming to be which it provided; it does not, however, pertain to the necessity of the effects. And it is to be considered that the necessary and the contingent properly follow upon being as being. Whence the mode of contingency and of necessity falls under the provision of God, who is the universal provider of the whole of being; but it does not fall under the provision of certain particular providers.

Conclusion: The providence of God imposes necessity upon some things, but not upon all. St. Thomas understands this as imposing necessity upon things of nature, but not upon free choice. In this article there is nothing peculiar worthy of disputation or of extended explanation; for the common difficulty about the will of God, or providence, or predestination - how it agrees with the liberty of our free choice - is to be examined by us in Disputation 29.

1618. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 4.

Quaestio XXIII - On predestination

Praefatio

We now undertake the very difficult disputation about divine predestination, which has long vexed the wit of mortals so severely that the unskilled, thinking about it imprudently, have been driven into a certain despair; while the more learned, inquiring into the cause with excessive zeal and solicitude, when they attempted to fit together human affairs with divine predestination, fell into very great absurdities. We must therefore strive to set forth the truth of divine predestination and of grace, so that neither the hope of salvation be taken away from men, nor anything be detracted from the excellence of grace or of divine predestination - a task which ought to be judged by no means difficult, much less impossible. Both because God has not so disposed human affairs as either to change the nature of men and create them in need of no aid and of no divine grace, or to take away or diminish their liberty; and also because by the diligent study of the Fathers and the Scholastics and by accurate doctrine, it has long since come to pass that, these difficulties having been overcome, the controversy with Catholics now remaining is much easier. But since many things, after the times of the Scholastics, have been called back into question, and various opinions have arisen among them, which each person, for his own part, strives to confirm out of the doctrine of the Fathers - as though those matters too had of old been controverted by them with the heretics - lest the disputation be rendered more obscure to us by less attentive reading, I earnestly beg the reader that, along with me, in turning over and weighing the writings of the Fathers, he spare not his labor. And let him especially direct his mind to this: that, the history being well considered, he carefully examine that about which at that time there was dissension in the Church with the heretics. For from this he will readily gather whether those testimonies that are produced from the Fathers are fitted to the difficulty proposed. But, on the contrary, if he be ignorant of that about which there was then a dispute, he will readily think that many things were defined by the Fathers which did not even come into their minds. Wherefore, if in this matter we should seem to someone more copious than he would wish, let him take it in good part, and set down to the usefulness of the work what another might charge as prolixity. But when there must be arguing from reasons alone, the very force of the arguments will readily show what in each question ought to be chosen as more in agreement with reason.

Of the nature of grace and its various modes. Disputation 88: - What grace through Christ is, c. 1. - How manyfold the aid of grace through Christ is, c. 2. - The opinion of Andreas de Vega and of St. Thomas on operating and cooperating grace, c. 3. - What Gregory of Rimini and other recent writers have thought on this matter, c. 4. - The opinion of Gregory of Rimini is refuted, c. 5. - The true sentence of the Fathers on operating and cooperating grace, c. 6. - The same truth is confirmed by the testimonies of St. Augustine, c. 7. - The testimonies of St. Augustine which Gregory of Rimini improperly adduced are explained, c. 8. - On the various names of operating and cooperating grace, c. 9. - On the helps of grace - efficacious and sufficient - c. 10.

For the sake of a preface, lest through ignorance of that about which the disputation to follow is undertaken we should easily go astray and not discern between Catholic and false doctrine: this material concerning predestination is in a certain way an appendix of the material concerning the grace of God; nor did St. Augustine and the other Fathers of the Church dispute about it otherwise, especially against the Pelagians, than about the very grace of God. For the controversy is common, as we shall see in Disputations 89 and 91. Therefore in this chapter let us set down a definition of the grace of God, and certain of its acceptations, which we shall explain one by one, as much as our present plan requires, in the following chapters; for we shall again treat expressly of this matter elsewhere.

Grace, therefore, is used in three ways by St. Thomas: first, for the affection by which someone is loved by another; next, for a gift given gratis; and finally, for the recompense of a benefit out of gratitude.[1619] Of these, it is according to the second mode that we have to dispute here about the grace of God. For grace in the first mode is called by St. Augustine not so much grace as a preparation for grace (On the Predestination of the Saints, c. 10); while grace in the third mode pertains to merits; how, however, to be "of merits" takes away the notion of grace, about which we have already treated at length, we shall speak in its proper place.

Among the other attributes which, besides intellect and will, are assigned to God, one is predestination, a certain part of providence, about which the holy Doctor treats in this question. But since many other matters seem to pertain closely to predestination - concerning the knowledge of God and His eternal and temporal effects, and concerning what the will of God works in us by the grace of predestination - these we shall handle in order in what follows.

Disputatio LXXXVIII - On the nature of grace and its various modes

Among the things which God bestows by creation itself are also counted art and the knowledge of truth, which God could have denied us by disposing things otherwise. Wherefore, even continual preservation, whereby we are sustained by God and live and breathe the air, the fruits of the earth, and many other things which He Himself bestows on us, could be called grace in this general signification, both because from the beginning He so liberally disposed the causes of all things that thereby things might properly redound to our benefit, and also because, whether miraculously or in some other way, He could have denied us such things without any injustice or ingratitude. When therefore He bestows them, He gives liberally, and for them we ought to give thanks.

This kind of grace, namely of creation and preservation, Pelagius acknowledged, as St. Augustine reports, and as the Fathers of the Council of Milevis with the same Augustine relate, when, retracting his heresy before the Eastern Fathers in the Council of Palestine, he said that grace is necessary for each good work: for he understood the gift of creation and preservation, as those Fathers testify.[1620] They further assert with Augustine and St. Jerome in the Dialogue against

1619. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I - II, q. 110, a. 1; cf. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 10.

1620. St. Augustine, Epistula 105, near the beginning; Council of Milevis with Augustine, Epistula 95; cf. the Palestinian Council.

the Pelagians and in the epistle to Cyprian, which is the 139th, that the gift of creation can, not without some plausible reason, be called grace, for which so great a benefit we ought to give thanks. There is, however (they say), another grace whereby the predestined are called, justified, glorified, so that we may say: "If God is for us, who is against us?" Then they subjoin: As for that grace whereby we were created men, even if we do not unjustly understand it to be so called, yet it is a wonder if we read it so called in any legitimate prophetic, evangelical, or apostolic writings.

Next, the aforesaid Scholastics, with the exception of Dominic Soto, divide grace into a natural gift and habitual grace whereby we are formally rendered just - a division which is indeed less sufficient, yet seemed adequate to their purpose; for they were treating of the grace in which angels are said to have been created, which is habitual.

But St. Thomas and other Scholastics, omitting any other gift of creation, divide grace through Christ, which by the holy Fathers is commonly called grace, into help and into habitual grace, and into "graces freely given" (gratis datae), of which we shall speak severally in their place.[1621] For us now it is only necessary to define and explain that grace concerning which St. Augustine in epistles 90, 95, and 105, and other Fathers, contended must be conceded against Pelagius. Now this is the help of God which day by day, on each occasion, is offered to us for living rightly and piously, for overcoming and conquering temptations: which is rightly called grace through Christ, or the grace of Christ. For as Augustine says, epistle 105, near the beginning: "For Christ did not die for none, that men might be created, but He died for the ungodly, that they might be justified." As if he were to say: Christ did not merit for us the gifts of creation, but the grace of living rightly. For since the whole merit of Christ's death was consummated, when Augustine asserts that Christ did not die for those who were nothing, that they might be created and come to be, he plainly says that by no other merit did He merit for them the gift of creation; otherwise this grace also could be called "through Christ."

Furthermore, the grace of living rightly, whereby temptations are overcome, Augustine in the places cited and elsewhere often, and the Council of Milevis canons 3 and 5, and Celestine, epistle 1, c. 10, and the Council of Carthage around the time of Boniface, c. 78, call the grace "in which we are justified," or "the grace of justification"; not because by it we are formally rendered just - which some Scholastics unreasonably think that canon to mean of formal and habitual justice - but because, helped by it on each occasion, we are moved and disposed unto justification, or, when justice has once been received, we grow in it. This grace Paul commends in the epistle to the Romans; Augustine and the other Fathers in the places alleged contended about this with Pelagius, whether when disputing about grace or about predestination; never, however, about habitual grace, which Augustine in that epistle 105 calls the grace of the remission of sins. For if someone were to confess that this is necessary, says Augustine, it would not be enough: for one had to confess grace without any merits (understand also impetratory), by which the remission of sins is obtained, as he there asserts; for faith impetrates it.

1621. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I - II, q. 111; on the "graces freely given," cf. below in their proper place.

Whether moreover this grace of living rightly is only the help of God which is conferred upon the works of the virtues which the Scholastics call infused; or also that which is bestowed upon us for living morally rightly and for conquering temptations; and whether faith is the beginning of every grace or not - of these we shall speak in Disputation 91, chapter 13. Yet I have read no author among those who have committed their writings to the press who thinks that the help of the grace of Christ, of which we must dispute here, is only of an order supernatural according to substance. But Driedo, book 1 On Grace and Free Choice, treatise 2, c. 2, part 1; Dominic Soto, book On Nature and Grace, chapter 2; and Stapleton, book 4 On Justification, chapter 2, by the name "help of grace" understand only the special help of God, freely bestowed upon us through Christ, for living rightly. Therefore, about the grace which also precedes all impetratory merits Augustine disputes against Pelagius. Now this is the help of the grace of God from the first calling all the way to the last. And this is used in two other ways which must be premised for us, that we may understand the way of speaking of the Fathers, especially of Augustine himself.

Caput II - How manyfold is the help of grace through Christ

Grace therefore, of which there has hitherto been speech, is of one sort operating (operans), of another cooperating (cooperans); each of which is also wont to be called by three other names. Operating is also called prevening, exciting, inspiration or infusion; cooperating, however, is also called accompanying, helping, and governance, as will be explained below. Finally, to this division a third member is also wont to be adjoined, namely subsequent grace, which by this single name alone is termed such, although its significations are various; of which in chapter 10 we shall speak.

I observe well that the holy Doctor in I - II, q. 111, a. 2, Albert in II, dist. 26, a. 7, St. Bonaventure, q. 6, Gabriel, q. 1, a. 1, note b, Marsilius in II, q. 17, a. 1, notable 2, Alexander, III, p. q. 69, memb. 3, a. 2 and 3, St. Antoninus, IV, tit. 9, c. 3, § 1, and other Scholastics have accommodated this division also to habitual grace, so that it too be operating and cooperating: yet although by right reason habitual grace can be distinguished and named thus, that division is not used by the holy Fathers. For the grace of the remission of sins (so Augustine calls in epistle 105 what we call habitual or formally justifying) the Fathers nowhere divide into operating and cooperating, as Andreas de Vega rightly noted, book 8 on the Council of Trent, c. 13; rather, the helps themselves of grace, which are conceded to us through Christ, Augustine first of all divided into operating and cooperating - or rather he said that God by His grace works some things in us without us, and some things with us; whence also the name of operating and cooperating grace has been employed. And he uses these very names, in order to show against the Pelagians and the Semi-Pelagians that the beginning of a good life is in us from God alone, as we shall explain in chapters 6 and 7.

But what some say, that habitual grace according to the mind of Augustine can be called operating grace, because it is in us without our meriting it, can easily be refuted from the same Augustine in epistle 105, where he teaches that the grace of the remission of sins is not that grace which Pelagius ought to concede "without merits," because the remission of sins is not given

without the merits of faith, as in Disputation 89, chapter 5, from the same Augustine we shall relate. Moreover, the Fathers divide only that grace into operating and cooperating about which there was controversy with Pelagius; but about habitual grace, and not even about the remission of sins, was there contention with him, as is clear from Augustine's epistles.

The Council of Orange II also makes mention of operating and cooperating grace in canon 9, which is taken from the judgment of Augustine, where it is said: "For as often as we do good, God works in us and with us." By the word "works," referred to the various parts of the period, each grace is signified. For if it be conjoined with the phrase "in us," it denotes operating grace; but if it be conjoined with the phrase "with us, that we may work," cooperating grace is indicated. And in canon 4 the grace of God is called "an infusion and an operation in us," by which it understands operating grace. And in canon 10, which is in Augustine, book 2 Against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, c. 8, it is said: "Many good things in man are done which man does not do," where operating grace is noted; "No good does man do unless God grants that man do it," where cooperating grace is signified. But in Augustine there are more places, some of which we shall adduce below, where mention is made of each grace.[1622]

Likewise the Council of Trent also makes mention of each in session 6, chapter 5, where it teaches that the beginning of justification must be taken from prevenient grace - thus it calls that which, from Augustine, we commonly call operating. Then it adds: "that is, from His calling, that through His exciting and helping grace they may be disposed, freely assenting and cooperating, to their own justification." Where the Council named operating grace "prevenient" and "exciting"; cooperating, however, it called "helping," and it indicated that this is cooperating, when it said: "assenting and cooperating with it." So too St. Bernard, in the little work On Grace and Free Choice, called them "prevenient" and "accompanying," which the Council called "prevenient" and "helping." Finally, the Church in the Sunday After Easter Collect called operating grace "inspiration," according to the phrase of the Council of Orange II; cooperating, however, it called "governance": "Bestow" (it says) "upon your suppliants, that we may think, by Thy inspiration, the things that are right, and by Thy governance [or: help] accomplish the same: through our Lord..."[1623] Unless perhaps by the name "governance" of grace one understands subsequent grace, according to that of Proverbs 16: "It is for man to prepare the heart, and for the Lord to govern the tongue"; of which in chapter 10 we shall speak.

It is clear enough from what has been said why grace is called operating and cooperating: God works some things in us without us; other things, however, He works with us. But since not a few points are here at issue, I shall set forth briefly the positions by which Andreas de Vega, St. Thomas, and others explain Augustine's phrase, when they speak of grace operating and cooperating.

Accordingly, Vega in book 6 on the Council of Trent, c. 8, says that operating grace in us is holy thoughts and the first motions of the will, whereby man is suddenly moved to the good; and that this grace is called "operating" because God works it in us without us. And that "without us," as

1622. Council of Orange II, can. 4, 9, 10; cf. St. Augustine, Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, l. 2, c. 8.

Augustine wishes it to be understood, he explains thus: namely, that in its production God alone is the physical efficient cause, while man, as far as that production is concerned, is wholly passive. By contrast, he affirms that "cooperating grace" is so called when, with us, God produces the consequent good works and virtuous actions, we now consenting and acting along with the help bestowed.

... for a man is said to move himself to willing or to acting when from one act of will he is moved into others, or into the work itself; and thus grace is said to cooperate with us, and we with grace.

But this interpretation, although in itself it contains true doctrine, nevertheless does not square with the words and meaning of St. Augustine; for in the first consent of the will the free will concurs not only with operating grace, but also with cooperating grace, as is clear from many of his testimonies. And according to his doctrine against Pelagius, which contends that in us there are certain beginnings of merit which God works without us, it is necessary that in the very first free act about the end there be assigned to operating grace the beginning, and also something to cooperating grace. For who will deny that the merits themselves are already of cooperating grace and not without us? For, as was said in that canon 9, which is the sentence of Augustine: "As often as we do good, God works in us and with us, that we may work." It is certain, moreover, that in the first free volition about the end we work a good and meritorious work; therefore God not only works in us (namely, by operating grace) but also with us (namely, by cooperating grace). Accordingly, operating grace, in Augustine's intention against Pelagius, is not located in the free consent alone, even of the first act, but before consent. But of this more at large in chapter 4.

What Gregory of Rimini and other recent men thought about this matter.

Caput IV - What Gregory of Rimini and other recent men thought about this matter

Closer to Augustine's mind seems to come Gregory of Rimini in 3, dist. 28, q. 1, art. 3, to argument 12; and, as one exceedingly versed in Augustine's doctrine, he is followed by many recent authors.[1624] He asserts, therefore, that every work of the intellect and will is done not only by God but also by us as by a second cause efficiently producing it physically. In good works, however, although our will cooperates as a second cause, nevertheless God by his power alone first applies them to free willing, not only by preventing with a previous thought on the part of the intellect and by the first non-deliberate motion of fear or hope or some other affection, but also by impelling it to free consent. Gregory thinks that this impulse and application is a middle thing between the free consent itself, to which the will cooperates, and the first non-deliberate motion of the will, or the thought which on the part of the intellect precedes; and that application he takes Augustine to call the "beginning of a good work," indeed for this reason (he says) God is said "to do" that we may will, and that we may do the good things which we do, and that we may keep the precepts - a phrase which Augustine uses frequently. He confirms this by many testimonies of the same.

1623. Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 5; St. Bernard, De gratia et libero arbitrio; Roman Missal, Collect of the Sunday after Easter (Quasimodo).

1624. Gregory of Rimini, In II Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 3, ad 12; followed by several recent authors.

The first testimony is in the book On Grace and Free Will, chapter 16, where he says: "Surely it is we who will when we will; but he makes us will what is good." And below: "It is certain that we act when we act; but he makes us act, by supplying the most efficacious powers."[1625]

The second testimony is from the same book, in these words: "He works in us without us that we may will; but when we will, and so will as to act, he works with us."[1626]

The third testimony is in the book To Simplicianus, question 2, before the middle: "God grants in one way that we may will, in another that we may have willed. For that we may will is both his and ours: his by calling, ours by following; but that we have willed, he alone grants."[1627]

By which mode of speaking Augustine plainly indicates that God alone in us, without us, makes it to be that we will and that we act. Which would by no account seem true, unless because he himself, intimately present to our will, first applies and moves it, or determines it prior in nature to the accession of that free consent to willing and acting. In this way of speaking Augustine, too, gathers from that text to the Philippians 2: "God is he who works in us both to will and to accomplish according to his good will." He did not say "cooperates," but "works," so that God alone might be understood; yet he does not alone work the free consent. Therefore we must grant that the beginning of that consent is from God alone - namely, that application and impulse to consent, as was explained. On this ground Augustine likewise thinks, in that question 2 on Romans 9: "It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy," as if Paul had said, "but of God alone that shows mercy," as Augustine himself most excellently deduces and as we shall explain in chapter 8. But the whole consent cannot be of God alone: it remains, therefore, that it be of God alone according to that prior application.

By reason, moreover, it is proved. For in our consent there are two things: the concurrence of God and of our free choice; but the concurrence of God is prior, as of the first cause, which by its operation first attains to the effect; and that concurrence is from God alone. Therefore there is some beginning of free operation from God alone, besides the holy thought and the first motion of the will.

Confutation of the opinion of Gregory of Rimini.

Caput V - The opinion of Gregory of Rimini is refuted

First argument. Yet that position has no foundation in Augustine or the Fathers, nor indeed in sound reason either a priori or a posteriori, as far as will be possible to show in what follows, against its supporters. First, the a priori reason is manifest: for our free operation of the will is, in reality, such an individual operation that it is said, according to the rationale of a vital and volitional act, to correspond to our will as to its proper cause; and, insofar as it is exercised about such an object, if it is supernatural, to be ascribed to God as author by the help of grace; yet, in whatever of these respects, the free operation itself of the will is so produced that not only can it

1625. St. Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 16.
1626. St. Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 17 (or contiguous context).
1627. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, q. 2 (circa the middle).

not exist and be produced in reality one without the others, but neither can we even understand in the very order of real causality any prior thing in its production that is generic and not specific, nor specific and not particular, rather than generic; even if, in the order of reason, we may consider in the thing produced first the generic rationale of a vital and volitional act, without considering the special aspect about this object. Now, however, we are dealing with the order of a prior and posterior cause which is real, although not of reason only: for if there is any order among the effects of a generating efficient cause, it is found not only in our consideration but in the thing itself. Therefore, since in the very action of our will no prior thing can be assigned as produced by God alone which is an application to consent and the beginning of it, besides the vocation of the intellect and the first non-deliberate motion of the will, nothing else is effected as an application of the will to consent besides a vocation and the first motion itself of the will; which is declared and shown yet more by what follows.

That application to consent is either an operation in God himself - and this cannot be said, because an operation remaining in God is not grace (for grace ought to be in us, since it is a gift which is given to us). Vainly, therefore, would we call that operation operating grace. Or again, in God there cannot be any peculiar operation of applying our free will to works of grace which is not also to works of nature, unless there be in us something about the works of grace which is not also about the works of nature, as is quite clear from what has been said; but in us there is no diversity of operating on the part of application in works of grace and of nature, as will be evident shortly; therefore neither is there in God any peculiar operation around works of grace. Or else that application is some operation in us, as the adversaries admit; but this cannot be anything other than an operation of the intellect or of the will. Moreover, an operation of the intellect other than intellection, and an operation of the will other than willing, cannot be devised. Since, therefore, either God alone applies the will to consent, or he produces in us holy thought and the first non-deliberate motion - this cannot be said, because none of these can be naturally produced without our concurrence. Or he makes the free consent itself - and this also is false, because free consent cannot exist without our free concurrence; yet with free consent there is already cooperating grace, without which we never give consent to a calling. Or, finally, some quality is produced by which the will is ultimately determined to consent; and this seems plainly an invention, since it is posited without foundation. Nay rather, if it is posited for this reason - that God as first cause applies the will to act - then not only must this quality or application be posited in works of grace, but also in all other operations and causes. Why, then, is it peculiar to the will in works of grace? Surely, for inducing Augustine's phrase and that of the other Fathers or of Scripture, it is superfluous, as we shall say below. And in order that we might defend the prior concurrence of God as first cause, it would have to be posited not only in works of grace, but in all others as well.

Second argument. Next, the a posteriori reason is no less efficacious. For, as we shall show more fully in Disputation 99, chapters 3 and 4, from this application - on which, once posited, the adversaries admit that it is not in man's power to resist - it seems to follow that our liberty is altogether impeded. For, once it has been posited, the free choice cannot will and not will; and consequently it does not remain indifferent.

Furthermore, against Gregory stand Scholastics of no mean note, who, although they make mention of this application as distinct from a vocation and from consent itself, nevertheless openly deny it; and foremost is Scotus, in 2, dist. 37, q. 1, a. 5, at the solution of those, and in 4, dist. 49, q. 6, a. 5. I say then more truly, to the point at issue, where he not only teaches that it is not in us, but also that by it our liberty is taken away.[1628] Gabriel agrees in 2, on that same dist. 37, q. 1, art. 1, noteworthy point 1; and Cajetan on q. 14, art. 13, and q. 19, art. 8, who, in order to defend against Scotus that the first cause, though operating necessarily, does not operate our free choice as necessary, teaches that God does not attain the effect before he attains the second cause.[162916301631] This application is also plainly opposed by Ruardus.

The first argument, led a priori, is manifest: because our operation of free will, in reality is so an individual operation that, as to the ratio of vital action and volition, it answers to our will as to its proper cause; and, inasmuch as it is conversant about such an object, if it be supernatural, it is to be attributed to the help of grace and to God as author. Yet, whatever of these ratios you choose, the very operation of the free will is so produced that not only can one of them not really be without the other, nor be produced without the other, but neither, in the very real order of causality, can we understand the generic ratio to be prior in production to the specific, nor the specific or particular to be prior to the generic; although in the order of reason, in the thing produced, we consider first the generic ratio of vital action and of volition, without considering the special determination regarding this object.

But now we are treating of the order of priority according to cause, which is real, although it is not only of reason. For if there is any order among effects of an efficient cause, it is found not only in our consideration but in the very thing. Therefore, since in the very action of our will no ratio can be assigned as produced first by God alone which would be an application (*applicatio*) to consent and the beginning of that [consent] besides the vocation (*vocatio*) of the intellect, the first non-deliberated motion of the will is effected; there is no other application of the will to consent besides the vocation and the first motion of the will itself. This is made yet clearer and is shown in this way.

That application to consent is either an operation in God himself; and this cannot be said, because an operation remaining in God is not grace, for grace ought to be in us, since grace is itself a gift which is made to us. In vain, therefore, would we call that operation "operating grace." Moreover, in God there cannot be some peculiar operation of applying our free choice to the works of grace which is not for the works of nature, unless in us there be something about the works of grace which is not about the works of nature - which from what has been said is sufficiently clear. But in us there is no diversity of operating on the side of application in the works of grace and of nature, as will immediately be evident; therefore neither is there in God any peculiar application to the works of grace.

1628. Scotus, In II Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 5; In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 6, a. 5.
1629. Gabriel Biel, In II Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, notab. 1.
1630. Cajetan, In Iam-IIae, q. 14, a. 13; q. 19, a. 8.
1631. See also Vazquez, Disputatio 99, c. 3 - 4.

The other member is that it is an operation in us: and this is either of the intellect or of the will. But it cannot be anything else than the holy cogitation and the first motion of the will; another cannot be produced. If it effects [something], it also effects it without our consent; it is produced without our free choice, whereby it is applied to consent. And this seems to be nothing other than a cause applying to consent - not only thus in the works of grace, but in all other works; therefore it is not peculiar. For certainly, as we shall show below, God's concurrence with a cause is not only in the works of grace but in all works; and hence it is no less necessary in all than [in the present case].

The second argument, taken a posteriori, is this. For, as I showed above in Disputation 99, chapters 3 and 4, from this application the adversaries admit that we do not resist, but seem to follow; and thus our liberty does not remain indifferent. Those scholastics therefore who are ingenious about this application are driven to say that liberty is altogether impeded, once the application is posited, so that a man, with it posited, cannot not will, and therefore is not free in the very consent; and first of all Scotus, thereafter Gabriel and Cajetan, busy themselves about the solution of these things, and so they turn themselves to the proposition that God does not first attain the effect before he attains the second cause, in order to defend, against Scotus, that the first cause, though operating necessarily, does not operate our free choice as necessary - something plainly opposed by Ruardus.[1632] [1633] [1634]

Ad argumentum. Reply to Gregory: But from what has been said it is plainly clear that the reasoning which Gregory alleges for himself has no force; for it has been shown that the first cause does not attain something first in the effect before the second attains it; which again I will show in Disputation 99, chapter 8, and Disputation 100, chapter 3

Caput VI - The true opinion of the Fathers about operating and cooperating grace

Truly marvellous was the genius of St. Augustine in proving the necessity of grace against Pelagius. Against the Semi-Pelagians, however - men otherwise distinguished and of eminent sanctity, and not so openly wandering from the truth - he acted much more marvellously. Against both, and indeed so powerfully did he do so by the inspiration of holy cogitation that we could neither believe, hope, nor love anything unless we first thought; in that very holy cogitation he recognized the grace of Christ; and from thence he proved not only against Pelagius the necessity of that grace for the whole life of man, but also against the Semi-Pelagians that the beginning of our salvation is not from any of our good works, but that it is from God, which he showed effectively.

Augustine therefore teaches, and those who afterwards followed his doctrine, the operating grace (*gratia operans*), which they say is that God works in us without us, to be this very holy cogitation, which is before consent, and likewise the sudden motion of the will without our liberty, arising from that cogitation, by which we are deterred from evil and provoked to good; and thus the

1632. Scotus, In II Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 5; In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 6, a. 5.
1633. Gabriel Biel, In II Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, notab. 1.
1634. Cajetan, In Iam-IIae, q. 14, a. 13; q. 19, a. 8.

opinion of Gregory of Rimini is excluded. But cooperating grace (*gratia cooperans*), whereby God is said to work with us, they say to be in the free consent, in which merit is already found, either condign of life eternal, or impetratory of some gift. Finally, in every consent which is said to pertain to the help of grace, he judges that the grace of God cooperating is to be found; and hence, against Driedo and others, one must say that in the first free consent about the end, cooperating grace is found.[1636] [1637]

But Bernard most elegantly expressed our reasoning set forth above, in the little book On Grace and Free Will, in a few words. Speaking indeed of grace he says: "To this end she goes before, that thereafter [free] choice may cooperate there, which, having been taken up by both, may be perfected equally by both; so that, in a mixed fashion, not separately, together, not by turns, they may operate for all advancements; not partly grace and partly free choice may perform by an individual work." By which words he teaches not only that one without the other does nothing in consent, but that from the beginning consent proceeds individually from both. How far the sentence of Gregory differs from the sense and the mind of Augustine and of the other Fathers, I will show in the following chapter.

Now from what has been said it plainly follows that the reasoning which Gregory alleges for himself is of no moment: for it has been shown that the first cause does not attain something first in the effect before the second attains it; which again I will show.[1635]

The true sentence of the Fathers about operating and cooperating grace:

It was indeed admirable, the mind of Augustine, in proving the necessity of grace against Pelagius. Against the Semi-Pelagians, moreover - men otherwise notable and of singular sanctity, and not so openly deviating from the truth - much more admirably [he argued]. Against both, and to such a degree, he fashioned this by the inspiration of holy cogitation, that we could believe, hope, or love nothing unless we first thought; in that very holy cogitation he immediately recognized the grace of Christ; and from thence he proved not only against Pelagius the necessity of grace for the whole life of man, but also against the Semi-Pelagians effectively showed that the beginning of our salvation is not from any of our good works, but is from God.

Therefore Augustine teaches, and those who afterwards followed his doctrine, that operating grace is God working in us without us - namely this very holy cogitation which is before consent - and likewise the sudden motion of the will without our liberty, arising from that cogitation, by which we are deterred from evil and called to good; and thus the opinion of Gregory of Rimini is excluded. But cooperating grace, whereby God is said to work with us, they say is in the free consent, in which merit is already found - either condign of life eternal or impetratory of some gift. Lastly, in every consent which is said to pertain to the help of grace, they expressly set cooperating grace; for which reason, against Driedo and others, it must be said that, in the first free consent about the end, cooperating grace is found.

1636. Gregory of Rimini (St. Gregory Ariminensis) is intended.
1637. Johannes Driedo is intended.
1635. See Vazquez, Disputatio 99, c. 3 - 4, 8; Disputatio 100, c. 3.

This indeed is the mind of Augustine and of the rest of the Fathers, as will be evident from the testimonies set forth below. Why they so speak will be explained in chapter 9. But because from those same testimonies of Augustine, by which we shall try to prove this sentence, we will explain those things which Gregory put forward for himself from the same Augustine, therefore in chapter 7 we will recite Augustine's testimonies; now, indeed, from his disciples this sentence is demonstrated.

First, therefore, Anselm, on that text 1 Cor. 15, "But the grace of God with me," says: "Note that the superior mercy first does something in us without us, so that, our subsequent free choice, the good which we seek, may do with us." Which words are those of St. Gregory the Great, Moralia 16, chapter 10 (or 11 by another count), by which it is signified that grace cooperates in that which follows free choice; then indeed it is said to work with us. On the other hand, operating grace is said to be, because God works in us without us before free consent arrives: which can be nothing other than the pious cogitation and the motion not yet deliberated.

Second, most clearly Bernard, in that little work On Grace and Free Will not far from the end, and he himself in this part by no means a small Augustinian, plainly teaches that by our consent we are coadjutors and cooperators of the Holy Spirit and, by merit, heirs of the kingdom; he adds, "By consent, assuredly, voluntary, we are joined to the divine will," by which words he indicates that cooperating grace is then present, when there is free consent of our will, lest we should say that even the least part of that whole pertains to operating grace; for no part of it is that by which we merit. But when we merit, we are already God's coadjutors and meritorious of the kingdom, as Bernard speaks.

Further, he distinctly enough expressed both graces by these words: "Grace itself (to wit, grace) excites free choice when it sows the thought; it heals, changes the affection, strengthens it, that it may lead to act; so that it may not feel defect. Thus before [consent] it works upon free choice, so that it may go before it (namely, when it sows the thought); in the others it accompanies; and it goes before to this very end, that thereafter it may cooperate with itself." What, I ask, could be said more clearly?

For if after the first, which is the mere cogitation which God sows, nothing else remains but the effect and the consent of free choice, and in the first it goes before, that will indeed be prevenient grace, which, according to Augustine, is "God working in us without us," which, by a fitting expression, Bernard called "prevenient," as will be explained below. Then in what remains, namely our consent, there will be accompanying grace, as Bernard calls it, and cooperating; since, as he says, "to this he goes before, that thereafter he himself may, by his accompanying, cooperate with man." But even that prevenient [grace], according to the phrase of Augustine, Bernard also called operating in us. For immediately he says: "Therefore here God works in us three things, that is, to think good, to will, to accomplish. The first indeed (namely, the cogitation) without us; the second (namely, the affection and consent) with us; the third (namely, the act, or the work itself to which he leads) through us." He says, moreover, that a work is done by God through us, because we are as

instruments moved by God interiorly by affection, just as a king is said to work through a minister whom he instructs about the things to be done. Whether truly in the work itself there be another grace which is called subsequent, we shall see in its place.

Thirdly, Prosper also comes in, himself an older disciple of Augustine, who, in De vocatione gentium, book 2, chapter 26 (or, according to another division, chapter 9), after he had said that the grace of God "pre-eminent" in justification (that is, going before) persuades, admonishes, terrifies, incites, gives understanding - which are the works of operating grace - adds: "But also the will of man is adjoined to it [grace], and is conjoined, which to this end has been stirred up by those aids, that it may cooperate with the divine work, and may begin to exercise works of merit, which it hath conceived as zeal from a heavenly seed." By which words, first of all, when he says that our will is "stirred up by aids," he calls those very aids by the name of exciting grace - the very aids by which it was stirred up, namely persuasions, admonitions, terrors, and understanding, which are holy cogitation and the first motion of the will. Afterwards, however, when he says that our will is conjoined and adjoined so as to cooperate with the divine work, namely with operating grace, he denotes that then the will cooperates with grace when it consents. Therefore the whole consent he attributes to cooperating grace, but to operating grace he attributes the other things above enumerated which precede consent.

Add also St. Jerome, Dialogue 3 against the Pelagians, about the middle, where he thus says: "Where there is mercy and grace, free choice in part ceases; which is in this only, that we should will and desire, and give assent to what pleases." He did not say that free choice altogether ceases, but in part; because the mercy of God begins by holy cogitation, when as yet there is not free consent: for he said that free choice is only in this, that we will, desire, and give assent to what pleases. Therefore Jerome concedes that before we give assent, the mercy of God is first - surely for no other reason than because, by cogitation, those things are proposed to us to which we ought to give assent.[1638]

I now pass over Augustine's testimonies; for I will report them in the following chapter. Also in confirmation of our opinion, and in the explanation of those which Gregory brought forward for himself, it will be shown plainly against Gregory that Augustine, in order to dispute against Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, had no consideration of asserting another beginning of grace in us besides holy cogitation and the first motion of the will, or, as he himself says, vocation. Nor do the testimonies cited thus far show anything else.

Moreover, that a non-deliberated motion of the will pertains to prevenient grace, both the testimonies of the Fathers and reason demonstrate. First, Augustine manifests this in Ad Simplicianum, book 1, question 2, not far from the end, when he says that our will cannot be moved to good unless something occurs that delights; but this he attributes to divine grace in such wise as to say that it is not in our power. This testimony we shall recite in the following Disputation, chapter 6; and in the second book On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 19, he calls the grace of God which so goes before us as to make us consent "a conquering delight."[1639] [1640]

1638. St. Jerome, Dialogi contra Pelagianos, lib. 3 (circa medium).

Then Prosper, in the place a little before cited, when he attributes terrors to prevenient grace and the affect of faith, plainly concedes that operating grace is some non-deliberated affect of the will.[1641]

Finally, reason itself demonstrates the same. For an illumination on the part of the intellect is wont naturally to excite an affect before deliberation, although that does not always occur: when therefore it so happens, that affect will pertain to operating and prevenient grace, because it takes place without us freely consenting.

The same truth is confirmed by Augustine's testimonies.

Caput VII - The same truth is confirmed by the testimonies of St. Augustine

Augustine's testimonies for this our sentence are far more perspicuous, especially because he himself expressly explained that mode of speaking: "God makes that we do," about which we have controversy with Gregory of Rimini. In the book therefore On the Dogmas of the Church, the first testimony of Augustine...[1636]

Admirable indeed was the genius of St. Augustine in proving the necessity of grace against Pelagius; but against the Semipelagians - men otherwise distinguished and of eminent sanctity, and not so openly straying from the truth - far more admirable. Against both alike he so magnified the inspiration of holy cogitation, that, since we can believe, hope, or love nothing unless we first think it, he straightway recognized in that very holy cogitation the grace of Christ; and from this he showed not only, against Pelagius, the necessity of that grace for the whole life of man, but also, against the Semipelagians, that the beginning of our salvation is not from any of our good works, but from God, and he proved this effectively.

Accordingly Augustine, and those who afterwards followed his doctrine, teach that operative grace (gratia operans), which they say to be God working in us without us, is that very holy cogitation which is before consent, and likewise the sudden motion of the will, arising from that pious cogitation without our liberty, by which we are deterred from evil and stirred to good; and thus the sentence of Gregory of Rimini is excluded. But they say that cooperative grace (gratia cooperans), by which God is said to work with us, is in free consent, in which there is already found either merit, or something condign to eternal life, or impetratory of some gift. Finally, Ruardus judges that in every consent which is said to pertain to the help of grace, cooperative grace is found (art. 7. 9. the tenth proposition, near the end). And Bernard most elegantly expressed in a few words the account of ours set forth above in his book On Grace and Free Choice: speaking indeed of grace he says, "To this end, namely, by prevening, that thereafter it may cooperate (to wit, with free choice); and that what is undertaken by both may likewise be perfected by both; so that they may work together for each advance, in mixture, not separately; at the same time, not by turns; and

1639. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, q. 2 (prope finem).
1640. St. Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione, c. 19.
1641. Prosper of Aquitaine, De vocatione gentium, lib. 2, c. 26 (secundum aliam divisionem, c. 9).
1636. Gregory of Rimini (St. Gregory Ariminensis) is intended.

so that they may not accomplish by an individual act partly grace and partly free choice." By which words he teaches not only that neither works anything in consent without the other, but that from the beginning consent proceeds indivisibly from both.

And he even called that prevenient grace "operative," according to Augustine's phrase. For straightway he says: "Therefore God works in us these three things, namely, to think good, to will, and to accomplish. The first indeed (to wit, cogitation) without us; the second (to wit, affection and consent) with us; the third (to wit, the act, or the very work to which he brings us) through us." He says moreover that the work is done by God through us, because we are as it were instruments moved inwardly by God through affection, just as a king is said to work through a minister whom he appoints concerning affairs to be done. Whether in the work itself there is another grace which is called subsequent, we shall see below in c. 10.

Thirdly, Prosper too comes in, himself the more ancient disciple of Augustine, who in book 2 On the Calling of the Nations, c. 26 (or, according to another division, c. 9), after he said that the grace of God is preeminent in justification (that is, prevenes) by persuading, warning, terrifying, inciting, giving understanding - which are the works of operative grace - adds: "But also the will of man is subjoined to it (namely, to grace that operates and prevenes) and is conjoined, and to this very thing previously is aroused by helps, that it may cooperate with the divine work within itself, and may begin to exercise unto merits that zeal which, conceived from a heavenly seed, tends to study." By which words, first, when he says that our will is aroused by "helps," he designates by the name of grace that excites the very "helps" by which it was aroused, namely, persuasions, warnings, terrors, and understanding, which are holy cogitation and the first motion of the will. Afterwards, when he says that our will is conjoined and subjoined, that it may cooperate with the divine work, that is, with operative grace, he denotes that then the will cooperates with grace when it consents. Therefore he assigns the whole consent to cooperative grace, but to operative grace the other things enumerated above which precede consent.

Add also St. Jerome, Dialogue 3 against the Pelagians, about the middle, where he says thus: "Where there is mercy, there is grace, free choice in part ceases, in that it is only in this, that we will, and desire, and give assent to what pleases." He did not say that free choice wholly ceases, but in part, because the mercy of God begins with holy cogitation, when as yet there is not free consent: for he said that free choice is only in this, that we will, and desire, and give assent to what pleases. Therefore Jerome concedes that, before we will, there is the mercy of God - surely for no other reason than that by cogitation those things are proposed to us to which we ought to give assent.

I pass over now the testimonies of Augustine; for I shall bring them forward in the following chapter. In confirmation also of our sentence, and in the explication of those which Gregory brought forward for himself, I shall show clearly against Gregory himself that it was of no consideration to Augustine, when disputing against the Pelagians and Semipelagians, to assert in us any other beginning of grace than holy cogitation and the first motion of the will, or, as he himself calls it, calling (vocatio). Nor do the testimonies cited thus far show anything else. Moreover that a non-deliberate motion of the will pertains to prevenient grace, both the testimonies of the Fathers and reason demonstrate. First, Augustine clearly indicates this in book 1,

To Simplicianus, q. 2, not far from the end, when he says that our will cannot be moved to the good unless something occurs which delights; and he attributes this to divine grace, so as to say that it is not in our power. We shall recite this testimony in the following disputation, c. 6; and in book 2 On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, c. 19, he calls the grace of God, which thus prevenes us as to make us consent, a conquering delectation. Then Prosper, in the place just now cited, when he attributes terrors and the affect of faith to prevenient grace, clearly concedes that there is, under operative grace, some non-deliberate affect of the will. Lastly, reason itself demonstrates this: for an illustration on the part of the intellect is wont naturally to arouse affect before deliberation, although this does not always happen; when therefore it so happens, that affect will pertain to operative and prevenient grace, because it is done without our freely consenting.

The same truth is confirmed by testimonies of Augustine.

Clearer testimonies of St. Augustine for our position

Much more perspicuous are Augustine's testimonies for this our sentence, especially because he himself expressly explained that manner of speaking, "God causes us to do," about which we have the controversy with Gregory of Rimini. In the book therefore On the Dogmas of the Church, c. 21, "There remains (he says) for seeking salvation the liberty of the will, but with God first admonishing and inviting to salvation, that it may either choose or follow; and we have the beginnings of our salvation from the mercy of God, in order that we may acquiesce in the most health-giving inspiration - this is in our power." Therefore he said that the beginning of a good work is in this only, that God invites; but God is said to invite to consent by holy cogitation and the first non-deliberate motion; therefore he holds that operative grace is there; for this everywhere he says is the beginning of a good work. But to acquiesce in the holy inspiration, which by cogitation was inviting to consent, he says is already in our power - he understands, with the grace of God. He therefore holds that the grace of God is a companion of our consent, and that we ourselves cooperate when we consent. Now this happens also in the first free motion about the end. We must therefore assert, against Driedo, that in every free consent there is cooperative grace, and not only in the second [consent] and in exterior work; and, also against Gregory, that in Augustine no other beginning of salvation and of a good work is found which he calls operative grace, besides holy calling, by which we are invited to consent. But what he straightway subjoins, "That we may obtain what by acquiescing in admonitions we desire is a divine gift; that we may not totter in the gift of salvation obtained is the care as well of our solicitude as of heavenly aid," is to be understood thus: that, as to this - that he so wills - the obtaining of what is desired is of grace alone, because he alone offers the opportunity of the work by subsequent grace, as we shall see in c. 10. But this book is not reckoned to be by Augustine; and there are some who think it is by Gennadius, who felt with the Semipelagians, as Augustine recognized; we shall speak in disp. 91, c. 11. Wherefore perhaps he meant that the attaining of that which we desire is of grace alone, which the Massilians used to confess; but of the beginning of our salvation he speaks rightly.

But against Driedo there is a second testimony of the same Augustine, more manifest, in book 2 On the Good of Perseverance, c. 13, in this way: "We therefore will; but God works in us to will. We therefore work; but God works in us to work." In which place Augustine speaks in the very same way about exterior work and about interior free consent; and of the latter he says that God causes that we will; of the former, that he causes that we do. Just as therefore from these words it is not lawful to gather that there is some exterior free work which is of operative grace alone, and that God works in us without us; so neither from these same [words] will it be lawful to gather that there is some free consent in us which is from God alone and from his operative grace, without us. Augustine, however, speaks in the same way not because in the first free consent about the end God alone is said to operate; nor because to consent and to the work he first applies us in that mode which Gregory imagines; but because by calling in us, without us, he works such [a thing] when it pleases him, so that through those [helps] he elicits from us the consent and the work. And this plainly he taught in book 1 To Simplicianus, q. 2, about the middle, in these words: "But this I know not how it can be said, that God has mercy, unless we will. For if God has mercy, we also will. To the very same mercy it pertains that we will. For it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish according to good will. Unless someone should arm himself against the man of God and deny that a good will is God's gift; which would be strange indeed if anyone should dare to deny. But, since a good will does not precede calling, but calling precedes a good will; therefore it is attributed to God calling that we will well; but it cannot be attributed to us that we are called. Therefore I would not say, 'not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that has mercy,' because without his help we cannot obtain what we will; but rather because without his calling we do not will." Therefore Augustine clearly teaches that the work of our own - whether of will, that is, that we will - is of God alone having mercy, because he alone bestows and works in us calling, by which we are drawn to will. In this, therefore, alone is operative grace, which is said to be of God alone; but not in consent itself, even the first about the end, nor in that application which Gregory contrived. Augustine knew of no other application of our will to consenting, to be attributed to God alone and by reason of which our work of salvation should be said to be of God alone having mercy, besides calling, which is nothing but cognition.

Those others who follow the opposite sentence with Gregory reply that Augustine, indeed when he was younger, although already a bishop and following that mode in the matter in hand, yet elsewhere speaks plainly of that application which is the beginning of consent, distinct from mere cogitation and the first non-deliberate motion. But this evasion can easily be cut off. For in those places cited by Gregory (and if there are any others) Augustine only asserts that God makes that we will, and that we do. Which mode of speaking he kept also in that question to Simplicianus. Nor did he there only explain that this is said because God works in us calling, by which he causes that we will; but also in other places which he wrote when older, to which the adversaries cannot in any way object; and nowhere else did he teach the opposite, nor did he even lightly insinuate that application distinct from calling - unless that...[1642]

1642. See Vazquez, Disputatio 99, c. 3 - 4, 8; Disputatio 100, c. 3.

Fourthly, taking his stand against Pelagius, who, granting only the grace of external preaching, said that God makes us will when his sayings are made known to us, he says thus: If therefore God willed, he would so prepare and would so work in the will of man, that he might make us will and might bring it about that we do what he commands. For if that free choice of his were brought in, and by that calling, if it were secret, he would so move the sense, that he would bring it about that assent be accommodated to the law and to doctrine; without doubt he would read it, or understand it while reading, or even expound it, and preach it; nor would there be need to pray, etc. Where he opposes to Pelagius, who said that by preaching alone God prepares and works in us the will, a higher and secret calling, by which God so moves the sense that he makes us give assent to the preaching.[1643]

Fifthly, on that, to the Philippians: God is he who works in us to will, which Pelagius was misunderstanding.[1644] And in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 19, about the middle, he says: Not because we believe, but that we may believe, we are called; and by that calling which is without repentance and irrevocable, this is wholly brought about, that, once moved, we may believe. And at the end: Therefore God works in the hearts of men by that calling according to his purpose, of which we have spoken much, so that they may not hear the Gospel in vain, but may come together to the faith. In the same way he teaches in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 34, when he says: Moreover God acts also by the suasion of visions, that we may will and that we may believe. And he signified nothing else when he said in the Enchiridion, chapter 32, that the will of man is prepared by God to be helped, and, when prepared, is helped: namely, prepared by that high, secret, and congruent calling. Therefore Augustine attributes to calling alone - which he calls either without repentance, or according to purpose - and to the suasion of visions that which we contend, namely, that God works in us to will, and to work.[164516461647]

But of any other application you will not find a word there, or elsewhere, in Augustine. Moreover, how greatly Augustine commends the doctrine which he delivered in that question to Simplicianus, we will see below in the following disputation, chapter 7.[1648] Add also the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5, where it says that the beginning of justification is to be taken from prevenient grace; and explaining what this prevenient grace is, it says: "This is from his calling": and he assigns nothing else to prevenient grace. Wherefore Alphonsus de Castro, Against Heresies, under the word Grace, heresy 1, somewhat before the end, says that what is said, "God draws men to himself," is nothing else than the calling and exhortation by which God moves our will.[16491650]

However, some object to us this reasoning. If God only were to prevent our wills by the grace of his calling, and not by that peculiar application prior to our consent, it would follow that divine providence is not infallible and certain; because, that calling being posited, it would still be free to

1643. St. Augustine, Epistula 107, near the beginning.
1644. Phil 2:13.
1645. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 19 (middle and end).
1646. St. Augustine, De spiritu et littera, c. 34.
1647. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 32.
1648. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, q. 2.
1649. Council of Trent, session 6, c. 5.

us to consent and not to consent; and therefore, in order that the effect of divine providence may follow infallibly, it would be necessary for there to be something depraved on the part of God, which being posited in us, the effect of divine providence would follow necessarily and infallibly.

I answer: one thing is infallible, another necessary or immutable, as I noted above in disputation 68, chapter 3. For infallible is referred to knowledge and to the intellect: and although something be contingent and free in its coming to be, nonetheless with respect to it the knowledge of God is said to be infallible; because that which in very deed will be cannot be not known by God; and this is the perfection of divine providence. Moreover, although from divine providence, by which God predefines the aid only prevening, our consent does not arise by a necessity preceding - for the providence of God does not clash with our liberty, nor does it impede it, and thus, with the providence of an aid only prevening posited, it does not repel that our free choice not consent - yet, because, as we shall show in disputation 99, God also determines in detail, by his providence, to concur with our free choice unto consent, and the providence of God cannot fail to attain that which it wills to be done, it comes about that, that providence being posited, our consent necessarily follows. But because, as we shall show, this necessity is not preceding, but consequent, or accompanying, our free choice, therefore it preserves our liberty.[16511652]

From all which it is clear that the opinion of Gregory has a weak foundation not only in the doctrine of Augustine, but also in human philosophy.

The testimonies of Augustine which Gregory of Rimini adduced for his case are explained.

Caput VIII - The testimonies of Augustine which Gregory of Rimini adduced are explained

With Augustine's mind now explained, it remains that we reply to the arguments which Gregory of Rimini cited for his own opinion.

I answer therefore to the first, taken from On Grace and Free Choice, that Augustine said, "God works that we may will, and when we will, and so will that we may do, he works with us," for this reason: because by that secret calling he prepares our will in such a way that it easily elicits consent; as up to now we have sufficiently shown from that same Augustine.[1653]

But in the second and third testimony he seems to have used contrary words, and therefore something more must be noted in their explanation. In the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 17, he says, "that we may will, he works without us; when we will, and so will that we may do, he works with us." Therefore Augustine acknowledges that when we will, God is already working with us, and hence, from the beginning of free consent, there must be cooperating grace (gratia cooperans), and not by any means is the whole part of it to be attributed only to operating grace (gratia operans). But he says that God works "that we may will, without us," because for this

1650. Alphonsus de Castro, Adversus haereses, verb. "Gratia," haeresis 1 (near the end).
1651. Vazquez, Disputatio 68, c. 3.
1652. See Vazquez, Disputatio 99, c. 3 - 4, 8; Disputatio 100, c. 3.
1653. St. Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 17.

end he prepares, fosters, and disposes the will by his secret calling; not that God alone makes the consent of the will when we already will: for Augustine openly said the opposite, namely, that when we already will, God works with us, which is cooperating grace. Wherefore the particular cause final is denoted here, as was said above.

He signified the same in the third testimony, although the words seem contrary and are a little more obscure. In whose explanation a few things which he subjoins there must be added. He says therefore: "He bestows 'that we may will' in one way, and 'what we shall have willed' in another way. For 'that we may will,' both he willed to be his and ours by calling us; but 'what we shall have willed,' he alone bestows: that is, to be able to act well, and to live always blessedly." Therefore he confesses that, when we will, God already works with us, and consequently, from the beginning of free consent, we must acknowledge cooperating grace, and by no means attribute to operating grace alone even a small part of it. But he says, "that we may will, God works without us," because for this end he prepares, fosters, disposes the will by his secret calling; not that God alone makes the consent of the will when we already will. For Augustine openly said the opposite, namely, that when we already will, God works with us.

But observe in this second testimony, that the word "we shall have willed" is not of the past tense of the subjunctive mood, namely, "we may have willed," but of the future perfect of the same mood, "we shall have willed": first, because otherwise the sense could not stand with the common doctrine of Augustine, and with those things which in that question he teaches and we have already reported. For if Augustine had said that what we may have willed before, he alone bestows, he would exclude our cooperation from the free consent in us already past, in which beyond doubt grace itself already works with us. Then also because, if "we shall have willed" were of past time, Augustine would not have said "he alone bestows," but "he alone bestowed." He speaks therefore of the present, because God always bestows that which each is about to will in the future. What therefore we are about to will in the future, he himself bestows. Add that he himself sufficiently explains that he is finally speaking of the preparation and disposition unto willing, when he said, "but what we shall have willed, he alone bestows": for he subjoins immediately, "that is, to be able to act well, and to live always blessedly," this, namely, he bestows. Since therefore he says that the power of living well is from God alone, he indicates that which we have said up to now, namely, the preparation and disposition, to wit of the will, which is made by secret calling, to be from God alone, and to be referred to operating grace alone.

Hence it is easy to understand the sense of the Apostle to the Philippians: "God is he who works in us to will and to accomplish for good will." But of that to the Romans 9, "It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs," etc., let us say a few things. This place is thus interpreted by Gregory of Nazianzus, oration 31, number 8, by Chrysostom, and the other Greek Fathers in those words of Paul, as if it were said that it is not ours, but of God alone who has mercy, that the heart of man be softened and not hardened; because will alone does not suffice, unless it be helped by the grace of God. But this exposition, with the author's name suppressed, Augustine impugns in the Enchiridion, chapter 32, and in that first book to Simplicianus, question 2, a little before cited, on the ground that if that were true, by the same reason it could be said, "it is not of God's having

mercy, but of man's running and willing"; because unless human will answer to grace, man will not be softened: wherefore divine grace alone does not suffice. Augustine therefore says that on that account it was said by Paul that "it is not of man's running and willing, but of God's having mercy," because there is something which God alone works, not with man willing, nor with him running: whence it comes about that his heart is softened and answers - namely, the high and secret calling. I have already set down Augustine's words above in this chapter; therefore there is no need to repeat them. But of what sort that calling is, by reason of which God is said to have mercy, to prepare the will, and to make that we will, we shall speak in the last chapter.

However, against that which we brought from the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 17, some object thus. Augustine did not say there, "But when we will, God works with us"; but thus, "But when we will, and so will that we may do, he works with us." Therefore not any will whatsoever, but that alone which works outwardly, pertains, according to Augustine's sententia, to cooperating grace. He had, moreover, distinguished in that place two wills: one small, that is, ineffective, by which we desire to act well, but do not yet will to carry it out; and this he had said to be also from God operating: another robust and effective, by which one proceeds to work; and this he said to be with us from God. And who (says Augustine) began to give even that small will, unless he who prepares the will, and, by cooperating, perfects what, by operating, he begins?

And in this way they still try to defend the way of philosophizing of Gregory of Rimini - namely, that that application to consent is from God alone, since to God alone working with us is attributed the consent of the will, not any whatsoever, but an effective one, and one which tends to the work.

But the manner which Gregory devised, and which not a few of the more recent follow, cannot be defended in this way. For he did not think that the application to consent is some act of will and free consent, such as is that small or ineffective will; but in the individual acts of will by which we freely consent and can merit, he thought there to be that prior application: wherefore even in that small will Gregory concedes that prior application. Then Augustine not only says that God makes that we will, but also that we do. Therefore he is said to make not only that we will by reason of a small and ineffective will, but also that we do by reason of a robust and effective will: for that ineffective and small will does not make that we do, nor does it move to effectiveness; and therefore it cannot be the application which Gregory of Rimini imagines. Augustine therefore in that place only says that that small will is also from God operating, who, by cooperating, perfects what, by operating, he begins. For that small will is from God operating through calling; just as also the effective will in this way is said to be also from God operating. On account of this, however, Augustine does not deny that in that small will, when consent is present, there is also cooperating grace; but he only said that it is from God operating, lest anyone think that it is only from us, not from God.

From what has been said it is clearly established that the opinion of Andreas de Vega must be rejected, in book 6 on the Council of Trent, chapter 7, when he says that sometimes we do many things, by which we are disposed to justification, without operating grace, by the help of cooperating grace alone. For this sentence is in the first place contrary to the Council of Orange II, canon 9, where it is said: "As often as we work good things, God works in us, and with us, that we

may work." That, "in us," denotes operating grace; that, "with us," denotes cooperating, as I noted in chapter 1. It is also contrary to Augustine, On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 17: "Without him operating that we may will, or cooperating when we will, we can do nothing for the works of piety." By which words he does not signify that the one of those suffices; but the one, that we may will; the other, when we already will. And indeed in the works of grace, whatever they may be, since they cannot be done without a pious thought which was not in our power, operating grace is as necessary as cooperating; indeed that very holy thought is in both ways called grace, as was explained by us above.

Caput IX - On the various names of operating and cooperating grace

Hitherto, from the Fathers, we have sufficiently shown what operating grace (gratia operans) and cooperating grace (gratia cooperans) are. It remains now that we say something about the various names by which each is wont to be called. Therefore first, that grace which is first of all, namely the holy thought and calling, is wont to be called operating grace, or rather, as Augustine speaks, it is called the grace which God works in us without us: for we never read that Augustine called grace "operating" and "cooperating," but [called it] that which God works in us without us, or that which ...[1654]

Objicitur Ceterum, against that which we adduced from the book On Grace and Free Will, chapter 17, some object after the manner of Gregory of Rimini, thus. St. Augustine did not say there in these words, "When, however, we will, God works with us," but thus: "When, however, we will, and so will as to do, he works with us." Therefore, not any will whatsoever, but only that which is brought forth into an outward work, according to the sentence of St. Augustine, pertains to cooperating grace. Moreover, in that place he had distinguished two wills: one small, that is, inefficacious, by which we desire to do well but do not yet will to effect; and this he had said is also from God operating: the other robust and efficacious, by which one proceeds to the work; and this he had said is from us with God. "And who (says St. Augustine) would even have begun to have a small will, unless he who prepares the will; and by cooperating he perfects what by operating he begins?" And in this way they still strive to defend Gregory of Rimini's manner of philosophizing, namely that the application to consent is from God alone, since to God alone operating they ascribe the consent of the will - not any consent whatsoever, but that efficacious one which tends to the work.

Respondetur But the manner which Gregory devised, and not a few of the more recent follow, cannot be defended in this way. For he did not suppose that the application to consent is some act of the will, and a free consent, such as that small or inefficacious will; but that in individual acts of the will, wherein we freely consent and could merit, there is thought to be that prior application - even he, Gregory, concedes that prior application in that small will. Then too, St. Augustine does not only say that God makes that we will; but also that we do. Therefore he is said to make this not only by reason of a small and inefficacious will, that we may will; but also by reason of a robust and

1654. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 31, n. 8; St. John Chrysostom and other Greek Fathers on Rom 9.

efficacious will: for that inefficacious and small will does not make that we do, nor does it move to the efficacious; and so it cannot be the application which Gregory of Rimini imagined. St. Augustine, therefore, in that place only says that even that small will is from God operating; just as also that robust will, since consent is present, is from God cooperating, but not from us alone, not from God alone. Hence it is clear that we must reject the opinion of Vega,[1655] when he says that, by that small will which begins under God operating, since we cooperate when we will, that same will is to be said to be from God cooperating. As we noted above in chapter 1, this is contrary to the Council of Orange II, can. 9, where it is said: "God works in us, and works with us." That "in us" denotes operative grace; that "with us" denotes cooperating grace.[1656] Likewise it is contrary to St. Augustine, On Grace and Free Will, c. 17: "Without him operating, when we will, we can do nothing." By which words he denotes one of those two; namely, that we may will: but denotes the other - that we may do - cannot be done without cooperating grace. And thus it was not within our power that there be operative grace, although some holy thought arise in us; but that there be cooperating grace, as we have explained above, is so called with various names.

Actenus ex Patribus satis ostendimus quid sit gratia operans et cooperans: superest nunc, ut de variis nominibus, quibus utraque gratia nuncupari consuevit, aliquid dicamus. Primum omnium prima, sancta cogitatio et vocatio, dici solet gratia, ut loquitur St. Augustine, operans; sed et cooperans, sed fine nobis, aut nobiscum: gratia, quam Deus in nobis operatur; et quam operatur nobiscum. He said, moreover, that God works without us (sine nobis), not because without us making it effective he makes it to be effective, as Vega thought, nor because without a preceding will, as Driedo taught; but because, in the common and popular way of speaking, those things are said to be done "in us without us" which are done in us without our consent, or before it. But vocation is of this sort: for, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas,[1657] there is one thing called an action "of man" (actio hominis), another an action "human" (actio humana), or "of man as he is man." Now only a free action is called human, or "of man as he is man," because in it the peculiar mode of operating of man and of reason shines forth, namely indifference; whereas in other actions there is found only a mode of operating with determination to one part, which is the mode of nature, not of reason.

In this manner of speaking the Apostle uses language to the Romans, chapter 7, where he says, with respect not only to sudden motions of the flesh, but also of the will: "Now I do not do that, but sin that dwells in me" (Rom 7). For no other reason, surely, than that such motions are stirred up in us before we offer them any consent. For in that place Paul considers in each of us two men: one exterior, the other interior. He calls the latter rational and spiritual, who operates freely and attends to eternal rules and reasons, and considers them; but he calls the former animal, who, without liberty, is carried headlong into what pleases. And because the interior and free man is the

1655. Andreas de Vega, Commentaria super Concilium Tridentinum, lib. 6, c. 7.
1656. Council of Orange II, can. 9.
1657. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

principal, therefore those things which are done in us without him are simply said to be done "without us," and we are simply said "not to do" them. Of this sort is vocation, namely holy thought and the first good movement, which are not in our power.

The second grace, however, is cooperating, which God works with us. And that this is present in any of our free consents, even of the first acts of the will about the end, has by now been sufficiently proved from the testimonies of the Fathers, who in every consent say that we are co-workers of divine grace, and that it also works with us; so that, against the manner of explaining of Driedo and others, we hold that we have not only cooperating grace in the second act of the will about the means, or in the exterior work, but also in the first interior consent about the end - a thing which from the testimonies of St. Augustine is also most clear.

Second, the first grace, namely holy thought or vocation, is called prevenient grace, because it prevents (goes before) us - not because it prevents every one of our operations (for that grace is a certain vital operation of ours by its nature and essence depending upon us, and thus cannot be without our concurrence), but because it goes before every free operation. Wherefore, just as it is said to be done "in us without us," that is, without our free consent, so also it is said to "prevent us," that is, our free consent. The second grace, however, is called accompanying (comitans), which is also wont to be called cooperating: because now it accompanies us, that is, our free consent. For neither is that without our consent, nor is our consent without it.

Third, for this same reason which we said above in chapter 2, that first grace is called infusion, or inspiration, because what is infused into us, or breathed into us, appears altogether to be from without and to be done in us without us; and because the first grace is of this sort if it be compared with our consent, without which it is said to be conferred upon us; therefore it is said to be infused or inspired into us "without us." But the second grace can be called governance (gubernatio), because when we cooperate with it, we are rightly said to be governed by it.

Fourth, finally, the first grace is called exciting, because it, as it were, performs the task of rousing someone from sleep. For our will, which is in the sleep of sloth or of sin, is roused by the cry of vocation and holy thought; and just as an awakening is done without the consent of the sleeper, so also exciting grace is done in us without our liberty. This office of grace is hinted at in that place of the Apocalypse, chapter 3: "Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if anyone opens to me, I will enter to him and will sup with him" (Apoc 3). To stand at the door and to knock - that is, by holy thought - is God's alone, and belongs to the one exciting from without. The second grace, however, is called helping (adiuvans), which already begins from that moment in which someone opens the door of his heart and, awakened from sleep, freely responds to the one calling; and it is denoted by those words: "If anyone shall have opened, I will enter, and I will sup, not alone, but with him." For the same is denoted in Ephesians 5: "Awake, you who sleep, and rise from the dead." To this grace of God, which calls and excites us that we may rise from sleep, these words pertain. Yet I am pleased briefly to interpret this place of Paul, because although at first glance it presents no difficulty, nevertheless, if we attend more closely to the context, it is difficult.

Note, therefore, first, that St. Jerome says this sentence, which Paul cites as of some ancient writer, is found in none of the Hebrew volumes; wherefore he judges it to be some popular sentence which was current on the lips of men, which Paul by his own authority made canonical. But that we may explain it, we must weigh the context. Paul had said: "All the things that are reproved are made manifest by the light; for everything that is made manifest is light" (Eph 5). Namely, the evil works of unbelievers which he had above recounted; these, therefore, he had said to be made manifest by the sons of light, that is, by the sons of the faithful whom he calls sons of light, when by their good morals they are reproved and rebuked. Then it follows: "Wherefore he says: Awake, you who sleep," that is, awaken, you who lie in the sleep of sinners; "and rise from the dead," that is, from the death of sin; "and Christ shall enlighten you," that is, he will regulate your life according to the norm and law of Christ, which is the fruit of light and of true faith; he will enlighten, and he will reveal the turpitude of your neighbor, so that it may be seen by others and reproved, which on account of the darkness of ignorance did not appear.

It must be observed, moreover, that the word "he will enlighten" in this place does not denote what it commonly signifies, namely the same as "to illuminate by light" in any way whatsoever, as happens to a body which does not have in itself a native light, nor so receives it in itself as to be able to illuminate others; but just as in the same Epistle, a little earlier, Paul took "light" for that which is illuminated and made bright, when he says, "everything that is made manifest is light" - that is, illuminated and made bright - so also, against the cited sentence, he took "to be enlightened" for that which is "to be made so luminous as also to be able to enlighten," even if it receives the light from another: as a mirror, which by reflection, or as the moon, which, having received light from the sun, can enlighten and disclose those things which were in darkness. In the Greek it is ἐπιφαύσει σοι ὁ Χριστός; and if you render it word for word, "Christ will shine upon you," or "rise upon you"; and the sense comes to the same. For when it is said "Christ will rise upon you," it is understood that, by his light communicated to you, as to the moon by the sun, you may rightly be able to enlighten others and bring to manifestation from the darkness the sins of others, having been made a mirror of the divine light. For sinners also in another way are said to be enlightened, namely when by the light of the honest life of their brothers their sins are disclosed and reproved. Moreover, another exposition does not please me, of those who refer that "he will enlighten" to the proper turpitude of those who are enlightened, so that the sense be: "He will enlighten your turpitude, that you yourself may be able to see it"; for this sense does not agree with the things which Paul had said above, namely that the shameful deeds of the sons of darkness are manifested and disclosed by the honest life of the sons of light.

We return, therefore, to our purpose. That second grace is called helping, because to rise from sleep is not of the one rising alone, but of him and of the one exciting him. To open the door also, at least in spiritual matters, is not solely of the one consenting, but of the one knocking and exciting: for to both grace is required. But that will be clear when we have shown whether one and the same thing is called operative grace and cooperative; prevenient and accompanying; exciting and helping; inspiring and governing, or not. From all of which we shall also easily understand, against the aforementioned opinions, how in any free consent, even about the end, there is in us grace that

cooperates and helps and accompanies and governs; but operative and exciting is only in holy thought, not however in that application which Gregory posited, which is neither according to the mind of the Fathers, nor, according to true philosophy, seems possible.

Observandum igitur est, eandem vocationem, et cogitationem sanctam, et primum motum voluntatis sub ratione boni, dici gratiam operantem et praevenientem, et cooperantem et comitantem - the same thing, I say - considered in a diverse mode: for insofar as it precedes our consent, it is operative and prevenient; but insofar as, remaining in us, it effects consent with us, it is cooperative and accompanying. For thus our consent is from God and from us, so that God not only immediately and physically concurs to it, but also by the same thought is said to bring it about in us in the way in which the intellect moves and allures the will. Wherefore, just as in James 2 and in the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 10, it is said that faith cooperates with good works, and therefore faith itself ought to be called "cooperating grace," so holy thought, insofar as it cooperates with us, ought to be called "cooperating grace"; yet not for that does...

...yet not for that do we affirm the cooperating grace to be altogether the same grace as the operating; but we say that it is new and different from the operating and the prevenient in the genus of grace (*gratia*), gift, and benefit, and that it has something new in the order of reality, namely, an effect. And accordingly we said that the very influx of vocation into consent pertains to the cooperating and accompanying grace, just as the act of the same belongs to it. From which there is also clearly inferred that any free consent, even with respect to the end, which can be meritorious and pertains to piety, is of grace already cooperating and accompanying us, as was said above.

Yet some more recent authors say that helping grace is not only the vocation together with the concurrence of God, but also the supernatural habit of grace. I for my part admit that by this habit we are helped to certain works; nevertheless, since helping and exciting grace are necessary for other works for which such a habit is not required, therefore those of the Augustinian school, under the name of helping grace, understood only the vocation of God, insofar as it brings it about that the will consents. But if we keep the phrase and manner of speaking of St. Augustine, who nowhere called grace "operating" and "cooperating," but only said that God works certain good things in us - without us - and certain other things with us, one ought to say that the gift or grace which God works in us without us is a thought and a non-deliberate motion of the will; whereas the grace which He works in us with us is the free consent. For our operation is called the gift of God, and therefore grace: for, as Augustine says in book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, "The grace of God is the very giving."[1658] Moreover, I find in Augustine that grace also works something in the arousing of the will, namely without us: for he reproves Pelagius in book 1 against the two letters of the Pelagians, chapter 19 at the beginning, because he had denied that. This, however, I would understand of the thought, which, insofar as it arouses in the will the first non-deliberate motion, is

1658. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione Sanctorum, lib. 1.

said to work something without us toward the arousing of the will. Yet for that reason it is not called by Augustine "operating grace," nor is it anywhere found to be called thus by him as distinct from cooperating grace.[1659]

The third member of the division which we adduced in chapter 2 is not only of the Scholastics, but also of the ancient Fathers, whom we shall cite, although the Scholastics understand it in another way than the Fathers understand it. It is therefore to be explained what is signified by the name of subsequent grace (*gratia subsequens*), not only by the Scholastics, but also by the Fathers: for it will contribute not a little to a clearer understanding of the necessity of grace, around which predestination is occupied.

The Scholastics, therefore, with St. Thomas in I-II, question 111, article 3, understanding this member especially of habitual grace (*gratia habitualis*), say that there are five effects of grace: first, to heal the soul with respect to willing the good; second, to do the good; third, to persevere in the good; fifth, to attain to glory. And they say that any later effect with respect to the preceding is fittingly called the effect of subsequent grace. For this opinion St. Thomas alleges Augustine in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 31. Another, however, is the sense of that passage, as we shall show forthwith; and universally, whenever the Fathers speak of prevenient and subsequent grace, they do not so name the one as referred to the other, but both as referred to us: namely, they call that "prevenient" which goes before us, and "subsequent" which follows us - although they do not always distinguish prevenient and subsequent grace in the same way.[16601661]

Moreover, that these Fathers do not distinguish habitual grace into prevenient and subsequent, as the Scholastics distinguish, is manifest. For, as we noted from Augustine's letter 105, they did not dispute against Pelagius about the grace of the remission of sins, but about the help of God's grace moving: and that grace, about which they contended with Pelagius, they divided into prevenient and subsequent. Therefore the aforesaid division of habitual grace into prevenient, accompanying, and subsequent grace is not according to the mind of Augustine and of his disciples, although it can be true and very customary among Scholastic theologians.[1662]

Accordingly Augustine in that place, and Fulgentius book 1 to Monimus, chapter 11, taking that third member as help only of grace, which they call actual, not as habit, which they call the grace of the remission of sins, distinguish prevenient and subsequent grace thus: that "prevenient" is said not of that which goes before consent for each good work, even in the justified, but of that which precedes justification, that we may be healed from sin; "subsequent," however, is said of any other which is given to us, even for individual works, before our consent, in order that we may persevere in justification, be quickened, and attain to glory. The words of Augustine in that chapter are: "It goes before (namely the grace of God) that we may be healed; and it follows, that, healed, we may be quickened: it goes before, that we may be called; it follows, that we may be glorified: it goes before, that we may live piously; it follows, that we may always live with Him." When he says, "it

1659. St. Augustine, Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, lib. 1, c. 19 (init.).
1660. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 111, a. 3.
1661. St. Augustine, De natura et gratia, c. 31.
1662. St. Augustine, Epistola 105.

goes before, that we may be healed," he does not understand the healing from sin itself to be the formal effect of prevenient grace, but he says that the help of grace goes before us, that we may be prepared for justification. Wherefore he did not say, "it goes before by healing," but "it goes before that we may be healed." Then grace follows healing, that in it we may be quickened, persevering in good works. Yet I do not deny that in Augustine there is sometimes found the healing of our will prior to justification by the help of grace alone, whereby we are prepared for well doing. This healing, however, he understands not from sin, but from the infirmity which we contracted through sin. In this sense he often says that free will avails nothing for works of piety unless it is first healed - because in the first parent we merited to lose every help of grace and holy thought - as Fulgentius says in the book On the Incarnation and Grace, chapters twelve and thirteen; wherefore, since through Christ it is restored to us, we are healed of infirmity. In the passage, however, just cited, by "healing" Augustine understands justification itself, and therefore he said, "It goes before, that we may be healed; it follows (namely, justification itself) that we may be quickened." Then he says, "it goes before that we may be called" (to justification, that is); "it follows that (persevering) we may be glorified." "It goes before that we may live piously" (until, namely, we are justified); "it follows" (the justified) "that we may always live with Him": that is, so that, persevering in that justice, we may obtain eternal life with Christ.[16631664]

Fulgentius distinguished more clearly in that same chapter eleven the prevenient and subsequent grace: "It goes before," he says, "the impious, that he may become just; it follows the just man, lest he become impious. It goes before one cast down, that he may rise; it follows the one lifted up, lest he fall." And hence it is evident that "subsequent grace" is not said with respect to "prevenient," nor conversely; but, as referred to us, that is called "prevenient" which goes before our justification, and "subsequent" which follows justification.

In another way, the Fathers also use "prevenient" and "subsequent" grace: so that "prevenient" is said because it goes before our consent for each work - on which account, as we said above, it is also called "operating" and "exciting"; "accompanying" is said because it is together with the consent of our will, for which reason it is also called "cooperating" and "helping," about which we have spoken sufficiently above; lastly, the third, "subsequent grace," is so called because it follows the consent of the will by supplying the opportunity and occasion of the good work which the will desired to accomplish. Whence it is also clear that these three graces are thus named with respect to our consent, and not because they are compared among themselves.

In this signification the Council of Trent uses "subsequent grace," denoting it in session 6, chapter 16, where concerning the influx of the grace of Christ into the justified it says: "Which virtue always goes before, and accompanies, and follows their good works." For it is manifest that the Council does not speak of habitual grace: first, because it says that it is derived continually from Christ into the justified, as from a head into members, and from the vine into the branches; but habitual grace is not thus continually derived into the justified, so that it would be certain that all the deeds of the just follow therefrom - for this is still among the Scholastics a matter of

1663. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, lib. 1, c. 11.
1664. Fulgentius of Ruspe, De incarnatione et gratia, cc. 12 - 13.

controversy; again, the Council says of the grace which Christ continually pours in, that it "goes before, accompanies, and follows"; whereas the increase of habitual grace, even if it were given continually, would not go before nor accompany good works, but would follow them. Therefore, since that threefold influx of power from the head Christ continually derived into His members cannot be distinguished in habitual grace, but only in actual help, because habitual grace is not given continually so as to go before and accompany good works, it follows that that threefold division of grace must be understood of the actual help of grace. Add that, since the Council there speaks of the application of Christ's merits to individual merits, which is effected by the helps of grace which are conferred upon us for individual merits - as we shall show in I-II, question 114, article 4 - by no means can it be understood of habitual grace. The remainder therefore is that it speaks of the help about which it said those three things; by which not only did it express the triple grace which we reported, but also it plainly indicated that each of them is so called with respect to our consent. In the same way Scripture speaks, Psalm 58: "And his mercy shall go before me." Psalm 22: "And his mercy shall follow me." And the Church in the Sunday Collect for the Sixteenth after Pentecost: "May thy grace, O Lord, always go before us and follow after, and make us ever intent upon good works" - where "prevenient" and "subsequent" are said with respect to our consent.[16651666]

Moreover, that subsequent grace is so called because it supplies the opportunity of a good work which someone conceived in desire, and prevenient because it precedes the desire, is gathered from Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 32: "A man's good will precedes many gifts of God, but not all: for both are read in the sacred oracles: 'His mercy shall go before me,' and 'His mercy shall follow me.' He goes before the unwilling that he may will; he follows the willing lest he will in vain": this is subsequent grace, which supplies the opportunity of the work. For what is it to will "in vain," unless to carry out by the work that which one desires? Therefore, according to Augustine, it is called "subsequent" because it follows consent and because it supplies to the will the opportunity of the work. This seems also to be indicated in book 2 against the two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 9, about the middle and near the end, when he says that "by subsequent grace our endeavor is helped, although even it cannot begin without grace." Likewise St. Gregory the Great, in Moral. book 2, chapter 10, said in the same sense that holy men, when they act well, are debtors to God for the gift received: "Who both, by going before, gave them the good will which they did not have, and, by following after, granted the good ability which they will." When he says, "he gave the good to will, which they did not will," he marks out prevenient grace as to their consent, that they might will - just as when Augustine said, "He goes before the unwilling that he may will." But when he adds, "by following after he granted the good ability," he signifies subsequent grace, insofar as it brings it about that, the opportunity of the good work having been offered, they can carry out what they desire.[166716681669]

1665. Council of Trent, session 6, c. 16.
1666. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 114, a. 4.
1667. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 32.
1668. St. Augustine, Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, lib. 2, c. 9.
1669. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, lib. 2, c. 10.

Finally, Fulgentius, the zealous disciple of Augustine himself and one well deserving concerning his doctrine, book 1 to Monimus, chapter 9, speaks thus: "For He Himself (namely God) freely bestows upon the unworthy the grace by which the impious man, having been justified, is illumined with the gift of good will and with the ability of good operation, so that by prevenient mercy he may begin to will the good, and by subsequent mercy he may be able to do the good which he wills": than which nothing could be said more clearly for our opinion. And in the same book, chapter 11, he says: "He goes before (namely God), giving to man good will; he follows, acting in him the capacity of the work."[16701663]

However, someone will ask: After the good desire of a work, if it is efficacious and robust, as Augustine says, what other new grace can there be which supplies the opportunity of the good work? For an efficacious purpose without the work, when the opportunity is not granted, is of as great merit before God as it would be with the work, as is the common opinion of the Scholastics with St. Thomas, II-II, q. 20, a. 4.

I answer first: Other things being equal, I affirm that an efficacious purpose of a work, without the work itself when it is not in our power to act, is of as great merit as it would be if it had its effect. But because, when the opportunity of acting is not present, a man easily ceases from his desire, and no longer thinks about that matter; whereas, once the opportunity is offered, he is strengthened in his purpose and perseveres more fervently in it: therefore the opportunity of acting, which God, without our own effort and diligence, sets before our very hands, is a new gift and benefit, and therefore a new grace, which is called "subsequent," because it is bestowed upon us after our desire.

Moreover, there is another effect of subsequent grace not to be despised: for a firm purpose conceived about a matter can be disturbed by many and various impediments, as much external - of other things that can occur - as internal - of diverse thoughts...

Caput XI - On the efficacious and the sufficient help of grace

Accordingly, since our desire can be hindered and delayed, it belongs to God's grace that He remove for us all these impediments, and preserve in us holy thought, and stir it up unto the work; and this ought most justly to be numbered among the graces of God.

To this doctrine St. Jerome seems to allude, Dialogus 3 contra Pelagianos, in the middle, when he says: "Where the mercy of God is, on the part of free choice there is free access; and afterwards, it is in the Lord's power that what we desire, what we labor and strive for, we may be able to accomplish by His help. In which he acknowledges a new grace, as often as we carry into execution what we desire." He proves it by the example of Assuerus the king, who, distracted by various thoughts, after a banquet - when sleep is wont to be much easier - could not sleep, thus disposed by God on account of the redemption of His people.[1671]

1670. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, lib. 1, c. 9.
1663. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, lib. 1, c. 11.
1671. St. Jerome, Dialogi contra Pelagianos, dialogus 3.

Of this grace is understood that of Psalm 16: "Perfect my steps in Thy paths, that my footsteps be not moved"; and that of Proverbs 16: "Man prepares the soul, and the Lord governs the tongue." And again: "Man's heart disposes his way; but the Lord directs his steps." In which the particles "but" and "and," which seem to divide what is ours, or in which we have a part, from those things that are of God alone, denote that the governance of the tongue after the cogitation and purpose, and the directing of the steps, is of God alone, according to the sentence of the Apostle in Romans 9, as St. Augustine explains, lib. 1 ad Simplicianum, q. 2, as we have seen above: "It is not of him that runs nor of him that wills, but of God that shows mercy"; and he signifies "but of God that shows mercy" - that is, of God alone that shows mercy.[1672]

Therefore, this is most justly called subsequent grace (*gratia subsequens*), by which man is confirmed by the very work, and is perfected in his good purpose, and, impediments having been taken away, he perseveres even unto the deed. This exposition of the aforesaid testimony of Proverbs 16 is excellently gathered from the doctrine set down by St. Augustine, which we adduced above; and thus it is approved by me, although this place seemed difficult to Augustine himself, lib. 2 contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum c. 8, and therefore he attempts to carry it over in another way, so as to interpret it himself.[1673]

Finally, it is to be noted that this grace, which is called "subsequent" when referred to our desire, is sometimes also, when conferred together with the work itself, called "companionship" (comitas), because it accompanies the work itself. Thus, in the secret prayer the Church, when it prays for those making a journey, says: "And may Thy grace, going before them, direct their way, and, following after, deign to be their companion." There, when it says "to accompany the way," it indicates that that grace is a companion of the way which, if it be compared with desire, is subsequent. And Bernard also distinguished this threefold grace in another way, in the book whose title is "The Manner of Living Well," in Sermon 3: one, which prevents consent; another, which accompanies; another, which is together with the very work. He calls the first antecedent, the second accompanying, the third co-operating, which hitherto from other Fathers we have called "subsequent." And let what has been said about the various modes and names of grace suffice, so that, understanding the phraseology of the Saints and of Scripture, we may know what is to be attributed to God and what indeed to our liberty in the works of grace, and may altogether keep it unharmed. For to which works grace is necessary will be treated more fully below, 1.2.q.109. One thing remains over, namely, that we hand on briefly another division of grace, which also in this matter of predestination is frequent, and which will be set out in the following chapter.

Of the efficacious and the sufficient help of grace

Prevenient help, by which we are called and invited unto the good, is assigned as twofold by scholastic theologians. One is efficacious (*efficax*), which has effect in us; the other, which could have effect and yet does not have it. Whether the efficacious has its effect in such wise that

1672. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, q. 2.

nevertheless free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) can resist it, we shall say below, disp. 98, c. 6. The inefficacious help is wont to be called sufficient (*sufficiens*). Of both kinds St. Augustine makes mention in De correptione et gratia, c. 11, about the middle, in these words: "This grace the first man (Adam) never had, so that, whenever he wished, he might be evil; but he assuredly had that, in which, if he wished to remain, he would never be evil; and without which neither even by free choice could he be good: yet that grace he could by free choice desert." And a little further down: "He had given an aid (namely to Adam), without which, in that (to wit, good will), he could not remain, if he should will. But that he should will, He left to his free choice: he could therefore remain, if he would, because aid was not lacking by which he could; without which he could not hold perseveringly the good which he would."[1674]

It ought, however, to be observed that what the Schoolmen call "efficacious" help is sometimes by the Fathers called "sufficient." Thus Prosper, lib. 2 De vocatione gentium c. 1 (alias 3), so calls it, when he says: "A certain supernal measure of doctrine is always applied to all men, which, although of a more sparing and more hidden grace, is nevertheless sufficient, as the Lord indicates, to some for remedy, to all for testimony: that it may plainly appear that, unless where sin abounded grace also should abound, now also the whole human race would be blinded by a like impiety." When Prosper distinguishes those to whom it is sufficient for remedy from those to whom it is sufficient for testimony, he plainly indicates that those to whom it was sufficient for testimony could, by such help, have been saved, but they were not; while others, to whom it was sufficient for remedy, by it were in fact brought to salvation.[1675]

Otherwise, St. Augustine distinguishes the twofold help of grace, lib. 1 ad Simplicianum q. 2. For he says there is a twofold vocation: one "congruous," to which free choice is so fitted as to respond. For since those who are thus called are said by Augustine to be "congruently called," we can call that a congruous vocation. And from the year 1578, in which I first publicly taught the matter of predestination, thus I have always named it; which name indeed did not displease other more learned men thereafter. But because others are so called that they do not "concur" nor fit themselves to the vocation, the other vocation of those who do not respond and do not fit themselves to the vocation can be called "not congruous." Of this he says in that Question: "To others indeed the vocation came, but it was of such a kind that they could not be moved by it," etc. Which words indeed are somewhat harsh; but about this and other testimonies of Augustine we shall speak at length, disp. 97, c. 6.[1676]

That congruous and efficacious vocation, which Augustine extols in a remarkable way as often as he disputes about the necessity of grace against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, he calls by many names and assigns to it many proper epithets. He calls it secret and high vocation, in Epist. 107, because by God's high and secret judgment it is conferred to some out of mercy; he calls it also "according to purpose," lib. 1 De praedestinatione sanctorum, cc. 3 and 19, and De correptione et

1673. St. Augustine, Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, lib. 2, c. 8.
1674. St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, c. 11.
1675. Prosper of Aquitaine, De vocatione gentium, lib. 2, c. 1 (alias 3).
1676. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, q. 2.

gratia c. 7, and in the book Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum c. 9. The "purpose" is understood of justifying, as is explained in lib. 1 ad Simplicianum, q. 1, before the middle. Because therefore by this vocation justification is effected, he called it "according to purpose." But in lib. 1 De praedestinatione sanctorum c. 19, in a certain general way he called it "vocation without repentance"; because "the gifts of God are without repentance," that is, God does not repent of that which He once decreed or granted.[167716781679]

Finally, in lib. 2 De peccatorum meritis et remissione c. 19, he calls it "certain knowledge," because God knows most perfectly that it will have its effect, or because by a certain knowledge altogether untroubled the good itself is shown to us by that vocation. He also calls it "victorious delight," because it conquers the will and draws it freely to itself by delight, all difficulties having been overcome. For he had said that sin happens either because there is ignorance in the intellect - that is, a defect of knowledge - or because the good thought, which ought to withdraw one from sin, does not delight.[1680]

By this, says Augustine, God's having mercy on those on whom He has mercy is first spoken of; nor is His not having mercy on others described as if He were not merciful, but because this grace always obtains its effect in him upon whom it is bestowed, understanding that saying in Exodus 33 and Romans 9: "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy." So he speaks in lib. 1 ad Simplicianum, q. 2. Secondly, it is said by Augustine that by this grace the will is prepared by the Lord. In this manner Augustine also speaks lib. 2 contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum c. 9 in principio, and lib. 1 De praedestinatione sanctorum c. 6; and the Council of Orange, can. 4, from that Proverbs 19 according to the translation of the Seventy: "And the will is prepared by the Lord," where the Vulgate reads, "and salvation is of the Lord." The will is said to be "prepared," that is, disposed; but because God makes in time that we should will, when He prevents us with congruous vocation, as was noted c. 8; therefore, by prearranging that congruous vocation, He prepares by His eternal decree - that is, He predestines - our will; as Fulgentius notes, lib. 1 ad Monimum c. 8, whom we shall refer frequently.[168116821683168416851685]

Thirdly, it is also said by Augustine that by this there is conferred on us the power to become the sons of God: thus lib. 2 De bono perseverantiae c. 8 and lib. 1 Retractationum c. 22.[16861687] Lastly, by reason of this grace of preventing and exciting the will, Augustine understands that saying of the Gospel of John 6: "No one comes to me unless the Father who sent me draw him"; and in lib. 1 De praedestinatione sanctorum c. 8; and concerning the same, Fulgentius lib. 1 ad Monimum cc. 8 and

1677. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1, cc. 3, 19.
1678. St. Augustine, Epistola 107.
1679. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1, c. 19.
1680. St. Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione, lib. 2, c. 19.
1681. St. Augustine, Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, lib. 2, c. 9.
1682. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1, c. 6.
1683. Council of Orange (Arausicanum), canon 4.
1684. Proverbs 19, according to the Septuagint: "And the will is prepared by the Lord."
1685. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, lib. 1, c. 8.
1686. St. Augustine, De bono perseverantiae, lib. 2, c. 8.
1687. St. Augustine, Retractationes, lib. 1, c. 22.

14 explains that of Ezekiel 36: "I will make you to walk in my statutes"; and St. Augustine, lib. De praedestinatione sanctorum c. 11. And we also can explain that of Proverbs 21 in the same way: "As divisions of waters, so is the heart of the king in the hand of the Lord." And let this suffice to have said about grace.[1688][1689][1690][1691]

Pars I - On those things that pertain to predestination

Apropos of the doctrine of the several articles, let us examine it. In the exposition of which we shall not keep the order which St. Thomas held; but first about those things we shall dispute which he treats in those articles in which he deals with predestination; then about those in which he deals with reprobation; finally about those which contain doctrine common to both. Yet around the several articles we shall pass over nothing which may be worthy of note or disputation; and thus I judged it worthwhile to divide the whole question into the three aforesaid parts.

Articulus I - Whether men are predestined by God

Proceeding thus: It seems that men are not predestined by God.

1. For Damascene says in lib. 2: "We must know that God indeed foreknows all things, but does not predetermine all things. For He foreknows those things which are in us, but He does not predetermine them: but merits and demerits are in us, inasmuch as we are masters of our acts by free choice. Therefore the things which pertain to merit or demerit are not predestined by God." And thus the predestination of men is taken away.
2. Moreover, all creatures are ordered to their ends by divine providence, as was said above. But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.
3. Moreover, angels are capable of beatitude, just as men are. But to angels, as it seems, it does not befit to be predestined, since in them there was never misery; but predestination is the purpose of having mercy, as St. Augustine says. Therefore men are not predestined.[1692]
4. Moreover, the benefits bestowed by God upon men are revealed to holy men through the Holy Spirit, according to that of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 2: "But we have not received the spirit of this world, but the Spirit which is of God, that we may know the things that are given to us from God." If therefore men were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit of God, their predestination would be known to those predestined. Which is plainly false.

But on the contrary: It is said in Romans 8: "Whom He predestined, them also He called."

I answer that it must be said that it is fitting to God to predestine men. For all things are subject to divine providence, as was shown above. Now it pertains to providence to order things to an end, as was said. But the end to which creatures are ordered by God is twofold. One is that which

1688. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1, c. 8.
1689. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, lib. 1, c. 14.
1690. Ezekiel 36:27.
1691. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1, c. 11.

exceeds the proportion of the created nature and faculty, and this end is eternal life, which consists in the divine vision; for to see God as He is surpasses by far the proportion of any created nature and likewise of any created habit. But another end is proportionate to created nature, which created things can attain by their own natural powers, according to the virtue of their nature. Now to that end which something cannot attain by the virtue of its nature, it is necessary that it be brought by another, as an arrow is sent to the target by the archer: whence, properly speaking, the rational creature, which is led into its end beyond its nature, is brought into that end as though "sent" by God. And the reason of this "sending" exists beforehand in God, just as in Him there exists the reason of the ordering of all things to the end, which we have said to be providence.

It is objected: It seems that men are not predestined by God.

1) For Damascene says in the beginning of book 2, chapter 30: One must know that indeed God foreknows all things; yet He does not predetermine all things. For He foreknows the things that are in us, but He does not predetermine them; for merits and demerits are in us, inasmuch as we are masters of our acts by free will. Therefore those things which pertain to merit or demerit are not predestined by God. And thus the predestination of men is done away with.[1693]

2) Besides, all creatures are ordered to their ends by divine providence, as was said above. But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.

3) Besides, angels are capable of beatitude, just as men are. But angels, in whom there never was misery, are not properly said to be predestined, since predestination seems to be the purpose of leading some out of misery. Therefore men are not predestined.

4) Besides, benefits bestowed upon men by the Holy Spirit are revealed, according to 1 Corinthians 2: "But we have received the Spirit that is from God: that we may know the things that are given us from God." If therefore men were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit of God, predestination would be known to the predestined, which is clearly false.

But on the contrary: It is said in Romans 8: "Whom he predestined, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also glorified."

I answer: It is fitting to God to predestine men. For all things are subject to divine providence, as was shown above. Now to providence it belongs to order things to an end, as has been said. But the end to which created things are ordered by God is twofold. One end surpasses the proportion and capacity of created nature, and this end is eternal life, which consists in the divine vision; this is above the nature of any creature, as has been said above. Another end is proportionate to created nature, namely, that which a created thing can attain by virtue of its own nature. Now for that to which a thing cannot arrive by the power of its own nature, it must be brought by another, as an arrow is sent by the archer to the mark. Hence, properly speaking, the rational creature, which is capable of eternal life, is led to it as it were by being sent from God. And the account (ratio) of this sending pre-exists in God, just as there is in Him the account of the ordering of all things to their end, which we have said to be providence.

1692. St. Augustine defines predestination as "the purpose of having mercy": cf. De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1.
1693. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, lib. 2, c. 30 (in principio).

But the account of something-to-be-made existing in the mind of the maker is a certain pre-existence of the thing-to-be-made in him. Hence the account of the aforesaid transmission of the rational creature to the end of eternal life is named predestination (*praedestinatio*). For to predestine is to send beforehand. And thus it is clear that predestination, as to the objects, is a certain part of providence.

Reply to the first: Damascene names by "predetermination" an imposition of necessity, as is the case in natural things which are predetermined to one. This is clear from what he adds: "for He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue." Hence predestination is not excluded.[1693]

Reply to the second: Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the capacity of human nature. Hence they are not properly said to be predestined; though sometimes "predestination" is abusively named with respect to any other end whatsoever.

Reply to the third: To be predestined befits the angels just as it does men; although the angels were never miserable. For movement does not take its specific character from the term whence, but from the term whither. For it makes no difference as regards the notion of being "made white," whether the one who is made white was black, or pale, or red. And similarly it makes no difference as regards the notion of predestination, whether one is predestined to eternal life from a state of misery, or not. Although it can be said that every conferral of a good beyond the due of the one upon whom it is conferred pertains to mercy, as was said above.

Reply to the fourth: Even if to some, by a special privilege, their predestination should be revealed, nevertheless it is not fitting that it be revealed to all; for thus those who are not predestined would despair, and security in the predestined would engender negligence.

The conclusion is affirmative, and of faith, on Romans 8. As to the doctrine of the article, if anything there was to be noted, we treated it above in disputation 87, chapter 3, namely, what "to predestine" signifies, whether it is an operation of the intellect or of the will, and in what way it is compared with providence universally.

Articulus II - Whether predestination posits anything in the predestined

It is objected: It seems that predestination (*praedestinatio*) posits something in the predestined.

1) For every action of itself induces a passion. If therefore predestination is an action in God, it must be that predestination is a passion in the predestined.

2) Besides, Origen says on that passage of Romans 1, "He who is predestined," etc.: "Predestination is of him who is not, but destination is of him who is." And St. Augustine says in the book On the Predestination of the Saints: "What is predestination, if not the destination of someone existing?" Therefore predestination is only of someone existing, and thus it posits something in the predestined.[16941695]

1693. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, lib. 2, c. 30 (in principio).
1694. Origen, Commentary on Romans, on Romans 1.

3) Besides, Preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of the benefits of God, as Augustine says in the book On the Predestination of the Saints. Therefore predestination is something in the predestined.[1695]

4) Besides, What is temporal is not put in the definition of what is eternal. But grace, which is something temporal, is put in the definition of predestination. For predestination is said to be the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future. Therefore predestination is not something eternal. And thus it must be that it is not in God, but in the predestined. For whatever is in God is eternal.

But on the contrary: St. Augustine says that predestination is the foreknowledge of the benefits of God. But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the one foreknowing. Therefore neither is predestination in the predestined, but in the predestiner.[1696]

I answer: Predestination is not something in the predestined, but in the predestiner alone. For it has been said that predestination is a certain part of providence. But providence is not in the things provided for, but is a certain account (ratio) in the intellect of the provider, as was said above. The execution of providence, which is called governance, is indeed passively in the governed, but actively it is in the governor. Whence it is clear that predestination is a certain account of the ordering of some persons to eternal salvation existing in the divine mind; but the execution of this order is passively indeed in the predestined, and actively in God. Now the execution of predestination is calling and glorifying, according to that of the Apostle to the Romans 8: "Whom he predestined, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also glorified."

Reply to the first: Actions that pass over into exterior matter induce of themselves a passion, as heating and cutting; but actions that remain in the agent, such as understanding and willing, do not, as was said above. And such an action is predestination. Hence predestination does not posit something in the predestined; but its execution, which passes into exterior things, posits some effect in them.

Reply to the second: "Destination" is sometimes taken for the real sending of something to some term; and thus destination is only of that which is. In another way "destination" is taken for the sending which one conceives in the mind, according as we are said to "destine" what we firmly propose in mind. And in this second way it is said in 2 Maccabees, chapter 6, that Eleazar "destined" not to admit illicit things for love of life. And thus destination can be of what is not. Nevertheless, predestination, by reason of the priority which it imports, can be of that which is not, in whatever way its "destination" be taken.[1697]

Reply to the third: Preparation is twofold. One is of the patient, that it may be acted upon; and this preparation is in the thing prepared. Another is of the agent, that it may act; and this is in the agent. And such a preparation is predestination, inasmuch as some agent is said by the intellect to

1695. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1.

1695. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1.

1696. St. Augustine, "predestination is the foreknowledge of the benefits of God"; cf. De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1.

1697. 2 Maccabees 6.

prepare itself for acting, insofar as it pre-conceives the account of the work to be done. And thus God, from eternity, prepared by predestining, conceiving the account of the order of certain persons to salvation.

Reply to the fourth: Grace is not put in the definition of predestination as something existing of the essence of it, but insofar as predestination imports a relation to grace, as cause to effect and act to object. Hence it does not follow that predestination is something temporal.

First conclusion. Predestination is nothing in the predestined, but in the predestiner.

Second conclusion. Governance is passively in the things governed, but actively in the very governor.

On both conclusions, as far as was needful, we have spoken above, q. 22, article 3

Articulus IV - Whether the predestined are chosen by God

It is objected: In the fourth place thus it is proceeded. It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God.

1) For Dionysius says, book 4, chapter on the Divine Names, that just as the corporeal sun, not by choosing, infuses light into all bodies, so too God [infuses] His goodness; but divine goodness is communicated chiefly to some, according to the participation of grace and glory. Therefore God communicates grace and glory without election; which pertains to predestination.[1698]

2) Besides, election is of things that are ...

It is objected: 2) Besides, election (*electio*) is of things that are; but predestination (*praedestinatio*) is from eternity also of things that are not. Therefore some are predestined without election. 3) Besides, election imports a certain discrimination. But God wills all men to be saved, as is said in 1 Timothy 2. Therefore predestination, which ordains men unto salvation, is without election.

But on the contrary: It is said in Ephesians 1: "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world."[1699]

I answer: Predestination, according to its formal ratio, presupposes election, and election presupposes love (*dilectio*). The reason is that predestination (as was said above) is a part of providence. Now providence, just like prudence, is a rule existing in the intellect prescribing the ordering of certain things to an end, as was said above. But nothing is prescribed to be ordered to an end unless a will of the end pre-exists. Hence predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in its formal ratio, that God wills the salvation of those persons. To this belong election and love: love, inasmuch as He wills to them this good of eternal salvation - for to love is to will good to someone, as was said above; and election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some rather than to others, with certain persons being reprobated, as was said above. Yet love and

1698. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 4.
1699. Ephesians 1:4.

election are ordered otherwise in us than in God, because in us the will, by loving, does not cause the good, but from a pre-existing good we are incited to love. And therefore we choose someone whom we love; and thus in us election precedes love. But in God it is the other way round. For His will, by which He wills a good to someone by loving, is the cause that that good be had by him rather than by others. And thus it is clear that love is presupposed to election according to its formal ratio, and election to predestination. Hence all the predestined are chosen and loved.

Reply to the first: If the communication of divine goodness be considered in general, He communicates His goodness without election, inasmuch as, namely, there is nothing that does not participate something of His goodness, as was said above. But if the communication of this or that good be considered, it is not granted without election, because He gives certain goods to some which He does not give to others. And thus, in the bestowal of grace and of glory, election is observed.

Reply to the second: When the will of one choosing is moved to choose by a good pre-existing in the thing, then it must be that election be of things that are - just as it happens in our choice. But in God it is otherwise, as has been said. And therefore, as Augustine says: "They are chosen by God who are not, nor does He err who chooses."[1700]

Reply to the third: As was said above, God wills all men to be saved antecedently; and this is not a simple will, but qualified, not however consequently - which is the simple will.

Explanation of the Article.

The conclusion is: According to its formal ratio, predestination presupposes election and love.

For the explication of this article, it must first be noted that these three are distinguished by St. Thomas - love, election, and predestination. Love is the will by which God wills a good to someone absolutely, not in comparison with another. But election is the will by which He wills a good to one rather than to another - that is, to one rather than to another; for this signifies the comparison of one with another. But because election can be to different things, according as God wills different goods to one person rather than to another - namely eternal life, or grace - therefore we must distinguish a twofold election: one to eternal life, the other to the gifts of grace; as Augustine expressly distinguished, as will be clear in the following disputation. For the present, St. Thomas seems to understand only election to eternal life, namely an efficacious will of giving to one eternal life rather than to another; and of this the conclusion of the proposed article is understood, as some are pleased to say.

Next it should be noted that in this way election is plainly distinguished from predestination: the latter is about the means of grace, but the former about the end, namely about eternal life. Thus St. Thomas clearly distinguishes them, as is gathered from this article and the following, and so do all the older Scholastics. For there are some more recent writers who, without reason, confound these two and take them as the same thing - our predestination having been made without merits, and the election to eternal life - whereas these two differ widely, as will be seen in the following

1700. St. Augustine, Sermon 11, De verbis Apostoli (tom. 10): "Eliguntur a Deo qui nondum sunt; nec tamen errat qui eligit."

disputation and in Disput. 91. Moreover, that predestination is the will of conferring the means of grace, Augustine plainly hands down, book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10 at the beginning; and so do the Fathers commonly, whom we shall recall in the places cited.[1701]

Disputatio LXXXIX - Whether the election to beatitude preceded the predestination of merits

Caput I - Sententia quorundam Scholasticorum

Electionem efficacem ad gloriam factam fuisse ex meritis gratiae praevisis, auctoritate Scholasticorum, et Scriptura probatur. Cap. 2. Quibus Patrum testimoniis eadem sententia ab aliis probetur. Cap. 3. Quid contra Pelagianos et Semipelagianos de electione nostra contendat St. Augustine. Cap. 4. Notantur aliqua, quibus magis aperta fiat sententia Semipelagianorum. Cap. 5. Electionem ad gloriam ex meritis gratiae praevisis factam putat St. Augustine. Cap. 6. Exploduntur oppositiones, quibus recentiores haec Augustini testimonia infirmare nituntur. Cap. 7. Nihil contra hanc electionem ex meritis docuisse Augustinum. Cap. 8. Electio ad gloriam post merita a priori probatur. Cap. 9. Eadem sententia ex libertate arbitrii ostenditur. Cap. 10. Eadem opinio ex virtute et efficacitate meritorum monstratur. Cap. 11. Respondetur testimoniis, quae probant electionem ad gloriam factam ante merita. Cap. 12. Diluuntur duae rationes eiusdem opinionis. Cap. 13.

The opinion of certain Scholastics

From all the things we have said in the exposition of the article, it is clearly evident that the present disputation is undertaken about this point - namely, about the absolute and efficacious will of God to give to some eternal life, which He decreed not to give to others - whether this was prior to predestination, that is, to the preparation of the means of grace, or not. Now when it is asked whether it was prior, it must be understood in the way in which above, in Disputation 8, chapter 5, we explained that "prior" and "posterior" in our manner of consideration must be taken in the works of God, namely from the order of the objects among themselves. For just as among objects one is said to be on account of another, or because of another, and consequently that one is prior to another; so too God is said to will one thing because of another, or that one thing be for the sake of another, and consequently that He will one thing prior to another. When, therefore, it is asked whether election to eternal life preceded the predestination of merits, it is the same as if it were asked whether the election is said to have been made on the basis of merits, or with no consideration of merits, but so gratuitously that merits rather followed from it. For since merits are the effects of predestination, it is the same to ask whether election was prior to predestination, and whether it was prior to foreseen merits, or not.

In a question understood in this way, the prior opinion is that of Cajetan and of not a few Thomists on this article, which teaches that election to eternal life, that is, the efficacious will of beatifying some, is indeed prior to their predestination, that is, to the will of preparing the means of grace unto this beatitude. This opinion was also taught by Scotus in I Sentences, distinction 41, question 1, number 9 ("Potest aliter"); Durandus, question 1, number 8; Giles in the same place, question 1, article 2, number 2; Major on I Sentences, distinction 40, question 2, after the first conclusion; Soto on Romans 9, in the digression on predestination; and Antonio of Cordoba, book 1, question 56, opinion 5, in the second part. On behalf of this opinion St. Thomas is wont to be alleged; but what he himself holds we shall see below in chapter 12.[1702170317041705170617071]

The more recent authors try to commend this view now by Scripture, now by the Fathers, and now by reason. It is proved, then, in the first place by Scripture: first indeed because in Ephesians 1 it is said, "He chose us in Him" (namely, in Christ) "before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy." It does not say, "because we were going to be holy," but "that we should be holy." But if He had chosen us on account of our merits, He would be said to have chosen us because we were going to be holy: therefore He chose us in order to give merits, not because He foresaw our merits. Augustine explains this passage in this way, as we shall report below. Secondly, because in Romans 9, concerning the two brothers Jacob and Esau, it is said: "Before they had done anything good or evil, that according to election the purpose of God..."[16991708]

It is proved therefore in the first place from Scripture: first indeed, because to the Ephesians it is said, "He chose us in him" (namely, in Christ) "before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy" (Eph. 1). Not "because we were going to be holy," but "that we should be holy." If, however, he chose us on account of our merits, he would be said to have chosen us on this account, that we were going to have merits; therefore he chose us that we might have merits, not because he foresaw our merits: thus St. Augustine expounds that place, as we shall cite below.

Next, because in Romans 9, concerning the two brothers Jacob and Esau, it is said, "Before they had done anything good or evil, that according to election the purpose of God might remain, not from works, but from the One calling"; and, "The greater shall serve the lesser." Therefore, since he says that "according to election the purpose of God" does not "from works" remain, but from the mere grace of the One calling, and saying, "The greater shall serve the lesser," it follows that the election was before all merits foreseen (Rom. 9:11 - 12).

Third, because Paul in Romans 3 and 4, in Galatians 4, in Ephesians 2, and in Titus 3 teaches that grace is not from works or from merits, which indeed is the same; but election to the blessed life is grace, nay, the first of all graces: therefore that election cannot be from works and merits;

1701. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1, c. 10 (in principio).
1702. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 41, q. 1, n. 9 ("Potest aliter").
1703. Durandus, In I Sent., q. 1, n. 8.
1704. Giles of Rome, ibid., q. 1, 2, 2.
1705. John Major, In I Sent., d. 40, q. 2, post I conclusionem.
1706. Domingo de Soto, on Romans 9, in the digression on predestination.
1707. Antonio of Cordoba, Lib. 1, q. 56, opin. 5, in the second part.
1699. Ephesians 1:4.
1708. Romans 9:11 - 12.

otherwise it would not be grace. Wherefore in Romans 11 he says: "So therefore in this time the remnant are saved according to the election of grace. But if by grace, now not by works; otherwise grace is now not grace. What then? What Israel sought, this it has not obtained; but the election has obtained it." That is, just as in the time of Elijah (of whom he had shortly before made mention) by gratuitous election God chose for himself seven thousand men who had not bowed the knees to Baal, so now from the people of Israel the remnant (that is, the few, in comparison with the multitude of those who are damned) have been made safe by the election of grace without merits. For if it were from merits and works, it would not be grace: and so that which the greater part of Israel attempted to attain by their own merits they did not obtain; but the election of grace without merits obtained its effect, namely, the salvation of the remnant, that is, a few from Israel (Rom. 11:5 - 7).

Fourth, in John 15 Christ said to the Apostles, and, in their person, to us all, as Augustine understands in Tractate 86 on John: "You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you" (John 15:16). Which would not be true, if Christ had chosen us from merits. For indeed, the merits of him whose merits are chosen rather choose that which is chosen. From which place Augustine, with strong arguments, contends to prove that our election was without merits, lest we be said rather to have chosen Christ than that he be said to have chosen us.

In the second place they adduce various testimonies of the Fathers, and especially of Augustine, whose opinion some theologians think to be this: in the book Soliloquies, chapter 28, for thus he says: "You make, from among us sons of men, those in whom it pleased you to dwell," and a little later he says, "those whom you had already chosen by your sole will, that you might dwell in them." Likewise, book 6 of Hypognosticon, a little after the beginning: "For we have said that, out of the damnable mass of the human race, God anticipated by mercy, not by merits, those whom by the election of grace he predestinated to life." And book 5 against Julian, chapter 3; Tractate 86 on John; and in On Predestination and Grace, chapter 7; and in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapters 17, 18, and 19, he expressly proves that election was before merits. For otherwise that saying would not be true in John 15, "You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you"; nor would that be true in Ephesians 1, "He chose us, that we might be holy." Finally, in Epistle 106, a little from the beginning, and in Epistle 107, Enchiridion, chapter 107, and book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, he refutes those who assert that from the mass of perdition men were made good on account of works, against that in 1 Corinthians 4, "Who separates you?" (1 Cor. 4:7). Therefore, since the separation seems to have been made by election to glory, it follows that this was not from works and merits.[1709]

Lastly, in this way we can argue for this opinion from the Epistles of Prosper and Hilary, which are had in tome 7 of Augustine, before the books On the Predestination of the Saints. It is well known that the doctrine of Augustine about election without merits was ill-spoken-of among the Massilians in the time of Cassian, and among many others also bishops of Gaul and of Africa; indeed, the Massilians attacked Prosper so sharply, because he defended this doctrine of

1709. Augustine, Ep. 106; Ep. 107; Enchiridion, c. 107; De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, q. 2; cf. Tract. 86 in Ioannem; De praedestinatione et gratia, c. 7; De praedestinatione sanctorum, cc. 17 - 19.

Augustine, that he was compelled to depart from Marseilles to Rome to consult Celestine, as their history narrates, and Celestine writes in his Epistle 1. But concerning this very election before merits which Augustine taught, the Massilians, in that Epistle of Prosper, thus used to say: "This, however, purpose of the calling of God, which either before the beginning of the world, or in the very condition of the human race, is said to have made a separation of those to be chosen and those to be rejected, so that, according to what pleased the Creator, some vessels might be created for honor, others for contumely, and, by this, care for rising be taken away from the fallen, and an occasion of sloth be brought to the saints, so that on either side the labor be superfluous, and that neither the rejected by any industry can enter, nor the elect by any negligence can fall away": and below he gives the reason: "For if, indeed, as to him whose merits are chosen, the intention of the One choosing ought rather to be removed, then all industry and all virtues are taken away, if by the constitution of God a certain fatal necessity be imposed on human wills, and, under the name of predestination, a fatal necessity be introduced." They also exclaimed that passage in Romans 9, cited above, which Augustine alleged for himself, that it had never been thus understood by the holy Fathers as he himself interpreted it of election before works, but that all had understood it from the foreknowledge of merits, so that God chose both good works and faith. Since, therefore, all these rightly understood the mind of Augustine - although they did not approve it - neither Prosper nor Hilary, the most zealous disciples of Augustine, nor Augustine himself in his responses, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Good of Perseverance, ever denied that he had said that, or said that the Massilians had wrongly interpreted his mind.[1710]

That they so interpreted him, there is no doubt; that Augustine taught that election was made by the gratuitous will of God, not from merits. To the same purpose, that Faustus of Riez, after some years, a great defender of the doctrine of the Massilians, in the book On Grace and Free Will, having suppressed the name of Augustine, severely censures him with these words: "It was said, 'Not from works, but from the One calling,' etc. In these words the impiety of gentile persuasion is understood, that God, without any examination of a moderator between good and evil, not by the order of one ruling, but by the right of dominion, should make this one an object of favor, that one an object of hatred, receive this one by purpose, exclude that one by command, and that, between two lost men, no consideration of labor, no proof of desert be had, but that one be taken up without reason to ceasing duties, the other be condemned without discretion; and thus, in either one, neither the account of merit exists nor of fault; all future cause of judgment is taken away." In the same chapter, he calls this election-before-works "fatal," and in the last chapter On the First Man, whom God made immortal, he says: "It was the justice of God that he should not choose before he approved." And book 1, chapter 12, he calls the election which we have quoted from Augustine, before works, "original" and "fatal": "original," because it would be before works; "fatal," because it would take away liberty. And in chapter 4 of that same book, against this election he says: "For what would one hope for, whom grace has already made its own? in whom, on the contrary, there is no despair, whom the violence of predestination drags? in this, fault; in that, grace has no place."

1710. Prosper and Hilary, Epistles (in Augustine, tom. 7, ante libros De praedestinatione sanctorum); cf. the narrative about Prosper and Pope Celestine, Ep. 1.

And at the end of the chapter: "If one is appointed to life, another to perdition, as he asserts, as certain one of the Saints said (he certainly means Augustine), then we are not born to be judged, but judged. And he adds: If thus we are destined to the kingdom of heaven by the sole will of God, without our merits, why are we judged concerning works, if indeed, without them, we are destined to the kingdom?"[1711] That they so interpreted him, there is no doubt; that Augustine taught that election was made by the gratuitous will of God, not from merits. To the same purpose, that Faustus of Riez, after some years, a great defender of the doctrine of the Massilians, in the book On Grace and Free Will, having suppressed the name of Augustine, severely censures him with these words: "It was said, 'Not from works, but from the One calling,' etc. In these words the impiety of gentile persuasion is understood, that God, without any examination of a moderator between good and evil, not by the order of one ruling, but by the right of dominion, should make this one an object of favor, that one an object of hatred, receive this one by purpose, exclude that one by command, and that, between two lost men, no consideration of labor, no proof of desert be had, but that one be taken up without reason to ceasing duties, the other be condemned without discretion; and thus, in either one, neither the account of merit exists nor of fault; all future cause of judgment is taken away." In the same chapter, he calls this election-before-works "fatal," and in the last chapter On the First Man, whom God made immortal, he says: "It was the justice of God that he should not choose before he approved." And book 1, chapter 12, he calls the election which we have quoted from Augustine, before works, "original" and "fatal": "original," because it would be before works; "fatal," because it would take away liberty. And in chapter 4 of that same book, against this election he says: "For what would one hope for, whom grace has already made its own? in whom, on the contrary, there is no despair, whom the violence of predestination drags? in this, fault; in that, grace has no place." And at the end of the chapter: "If one is appointed to life, another to perdition, as he asserts, as certain one of the Saints said (he certainly means Augustine), then we are not born to be judged, but judged. And he adds: If thus we are destined to the kingdom of heaven by the sole will of God, without our merits, why are we judged concerning works, if indeed, without them, we are destined to the kingdom?"[1711]

From the more recent authors indeed, Driedo, in the book On the Harmony of Free Will and Predestination, book 1, part, chapter 2 and 4, Ruard Tapper in 1, argument 1; Ruarus, a. 7, p. 245 toward the end; Sixtus Senensis, book 6 of the Sacred Library, annotations 251 and 252, confess that Faustus and other Fathers, the Massilians, and the Gauls, nay even the Greeks, taught against Augustine that election and merits were foreseen, and, against the Manichee, that liberty was to be defended. Augustine, on the other hand, that he might extol grace against Pelagius, said that it was before any merits.[1712]

1711. Faustus of Riez, De gratia et libero arbitrio, esp. lib. 2, c. 6; lib. 1, c. 12; and c. 4 of the same book, where he censures the doctrine of election ante opera and calls it "fatal" and "original."

1711. Faustus of Riez, De gratia et libero arbitrio, esp. lib. 2, c. 6; lib. 1, c. 12; and c. 4 of the same book, where he censures the doctrine of election ante opera and calls it "fatal" and "original."

1712. J. Driedo, De concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis, lib. 1, p., cc. 2 & 4; Ruard Tapper, a. 7, p. 245 (circa fin.); Sixtus Senensis, Bibliotheca sacra, lib. 6, annott. 251 - 252.

From which things, for this opinion it may be gathered, that this was the mind of Augustine: that he said that election was before foreseen works, since so many Fathers thus understood him and impugned him, nor did his disciples ever answer the adversaries, truly that the opinion had been falsely imputed to him. Nay, neither did Augustine himself excuse himself anywhere by this plea, but everywhere endeavored to defend that opinion to the utmost, as is evident in the book On the Predestination of the Saints. Much better, however, is it for us to think with Augustine than with others. He who, as I said, in the matter of grace and predestination among the other Fathers of the Church, shines forth as the sun among the other lesser stars.

Add that this opinion, which we said to be Augustine's, has been defined as Catholic, and opposed to be condemned as heretical in the Church. For Peter the Deacon, book On the Incarnation, chapter 5, which is had among the works of Fulgentius, thematizes, along with many other Greek deacons and monks of the whole East of the Church - whose faith he has professed at Rome - the books of Faustus of Riez, because they teach against the doctrine of Augustine, nay even of the Apostle; the same are condemned by John Maxentius in his Response to the Epistle of Hormisdas, which is had in Celestine's sacred library; nay even Celestine, Epistle 1 to the bishops of Gaul, defends Prosper and Augustine from the suspicion of evil doctrine against the Massilians, and vigorously rebukes the Massilians themselves because they dared to note the doctrine of Augustine.[1713]

In the third place, this same opinion is proved by reason. First argument: the will of the end is prior to the will of the means in the order of causality and of reason; but the will of choosing men to glory is the will of the end, because glory is the end of merits; and the will of giving merits is the will of the means: therefore the will of giving glory is prior to the will of giving merits. Therefore God decides, before he sees the future merits which he himself will give, to give eternal life as the end. Moreover, the common will, by which he wills to give eternal life to all, does not suffice antecedently to that simple will, about which has been said sufficiently in Disputation 82, to exist, it is proved. Because the will of giving the means of grace to the predestined, that they may merit, is efficacious; nay, there is a will of giving the means efficaciously by giving glory. Besides, unless the predestined are distinguished from the reprobates by that will concerning the end, they will not be able to be distinguished by divine providence concerning the means of prevenient grace, until their consent be seen. Therefore predestination, which is a peculiar providence concerning those who are saved, will not begin except at consent; and, since of this we are the cause, the very first effects of predestination, by which the predestined begin to be distinguished from the reprobates, will be caused by themselves. That therefore the predestined may be distinguished by prevenient grace from the reprobates, it is necessary that the calling of the predestined be from an efficacious will of the end.

1713. Peter the Deacon, De Incarnatione, c. 5 (inter opera Fulgentii); John Maxentius, Responsio ad Epistolam Hormisdae; Pope Celestine I, Ep. 1 ad episcopos Galliae.

Caput II - That efficacious election to glory is made from foreseen merits of grace: proved by the authority of the Scholastics and by Scripture

Although this matter down to our times has been little in dispute among the Doctors, I have thought it worth the effort to set forth in the open the opposing opinion, approved by not a few, nor unlearned, professors of theology in Germany, Gaul, and Spain in our age, and to lay its foundations in this chapter and the following, which, to speak truth, have no little weight. The opinion contains two parts: the prior is, that there was no efficacious election to glory from the sole will of God before merits were foreseen from grace, but that each person was chosen to glory from merits foreseen which God by his grace was going to bring about. The posterior is, that before the merits of grace were foreseen, God had no peculiar affection of giving glory for the predestined, but that concerning all, even the reprobate, he had a common, simple, and antecedent will, by which he proposed to all equally eternal life as a reward and a common prize, and desired it.

The former part from this chapter down to chapter 12 will be confirmed by authority and by reason for us; the latter indeed we will confirm by authority and by reason in chapter 13, and demonstrate in the following chapters.

Therefore, concerning the first the following teach: Bartholomaeus Cameracensis in Dialogus, chapter 5; Peter Auriol; Francis of Mayronis; Turrianus in the little work On Election; and William of Ockham, in 1 Sent., dist. 41, q. 1, art. 1 and art. 2; and many others, who affirm that predestination has a cause, namely merits wrought by grace, understanding by the name "predestination" the will only of giving eternal life, not the preparation of the means of grace. The same was felt by Maior in 1, dist. 40, q. 2; Ockham in 1, dist. 41, q. 1, when he asserts that predestination to the kingdom of heaven was from merits of grace foreseen; for he speaks of predestination not as the other Scholastics speak, in so far as it is the preparation of the means of grace, but of the will only of giving glory, which others call "election" to the kingdom of heaven; yet he excepts some whom he calls preeminently predestined, such as the Blessed Virgin, the Apostles, and others; for he asserts that they were chosen to eternal beatitude gratuitously, not from the foreknowledge of merits. With which distinction Gabriel follows the same opinion with the same distinction, q. 2, a. 1; and Catherinus, in the little work On the Predestination of God, book 1, last chapter, and book 3, chapters 1 and 2. Nevertheless that the same reasoning applies to all, we will expressly show in the following disputation; for now it will be enough in general to prove that this efficacious election to the kingdom of heaven was made from foreseen merits which God by his grace was going to bestow.[1714]

First, therefore, this opinion is gathered from that of Matthew 25: "Come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world." Where Christ offers the kingdom prepared from the foundation of the world, that is, from eternity - for by this phrase eternity also is designated - he gives the reason why they ought to receive a kingdom prepared and

1714. Bartholomaeus Cameracensis, Dialogus, c. 5; Peter Auriol; Francis of Mayronis; Turrianus, Opusc. de electione; William of Ockham, In I Sent., d. 41, q. 1, a. 1 & a. 2; Maior, In I Sent., d. 40, q. 2; Gabriel Biel, q. 2, a. 1; St. Ambrose Catharinus, Opusculum de praedestinatione Dei, lib. 1, c. vlt., lib. 3, cc. 1 - 2.

destined: "For I was hungry, and you gave me to eat," etc. By which words he not only renders the reason for which they are going to receive the kingdom, but also why they are going to receive it as prepared; which is to indicate the cause of the preparation. For if it were prepared by another reason, and not on account of the merits themselves, the cause he assigns would be vain; which by the reason that we shall assert for this opinion in chapters 9 and 11 will be more confirmed.

Nor indeed does St. John Chrysostom at all prejudice this, in Homily 54 on Matthew, where, explaining this place, he says: "Now, since he has established the reward of the saints not according to the recompense of men, but according to his own liberality, therefore before they had labored he prepared the kingdom of heaven for those who were to be saints in the world; on that account, for those whom he had before determined to be his, when they had accomplished their merits, he in due right bestowed the crown, when they were made fit for the kingdom of heaven." This, I say, in no way impugns our position, since when he says that he "constituted the reward of the saints not according to the recompense of men, but according to his own liberality," he understands that God did not constitute the reward of the kingdom of heaven according to merits from our own powers; for by the words immediately following he shows that, after the merits were accomplished (which clearly are wrought by grace), the crown is given in right.

But in the words immediately preceding he says thus: "For the kingdom of heaven is not a thing created such as the justice of men can merit, but such as the power of God could prepare. This, therefore, is 'not according to the recompense of men'." When, however, he says that he "constituted the reward according to his own liberality," he plainly denotes that he prepared it from merits of grace; for if it is a reward, it ought to be from merits. He says, however, "according to his liberality," because he too has bestowed, whence we merit that reward. Finally, when he adds that those whom he knows to be his "before the constitution of the world" he burdens with labors until they are made worthy of the kingdom, he does not signify that he knew them to be going to be his before he had decreed to give them grace and had foreseen their merits; but he says that those whom he knows will be such he has burdened with such labors that they may be made worthy of so great a reward - on no other account, indeed, except because the kingdom of heaven, as a reward, was set forth. For if he had decreed to give it gratis and from himself alone, he would vainly wait until he should make them worthy, as in cap. 9 and 11 will be proved not obscurely. There is added, that the same St. John Chrysostom, homily 6 on that place Matthew 20 "But for whom it is prepared by my Father," thus says: "It is not mine to give that, but for whom it has been prepared by labor and sweat." There he plainly teaches that the kingdom is prepared - he understands, however, by an eternal predefinition - on account of labor and sweat.[1715]

Secondly, Paul no less expressly hands on this same cause of the preparation of the kingdom of heaven through merits, in 1 Corinthians 2, with words taken from Isaiah 64: "Eye hath not seen, O God, what God hath prepared for those who love him." In which place that clause, "for those who love him," according to the common mode of speaking, indicates the cause of the preparation. For if one were to say that a king had destined a horse or a garment, or some other precious thing, for

1715. St. John Chrysostom, Homily 6 on Matthew 20 ("Sed quibus paratum est a Patre meo").

those ascending the walls of a city or fighting in such a way, he would indeed signify that he had decreed to give it in no other way than from merits in war. Yet that mode of speaking does not denote that, in the execution, God will act so as to confer it with a view to merits alone, but also that in his very definition and first decree, considered under any aspect, he had established it in no other way. For if he had destined to give it to someone gratis, then even if afterwards he understood that he had well deserved of him, he would not be said to have "prepared" it for the one who has deserved well or fought well, but to have willed to give it to Peter or to John - whom nevertheless he afterwards knew to be worthy of such a reward. The remaining words of Isaiah likewise not slightly confirm our sense. For, in place of what Paul has, "for those who love him," Isaiah according to the Vulgate has, "for those who wait for thee," and he subjoins, "Thou didst meet him that rejoiceth and doeth justice." But the Seventy render, "For he will meet those who do justice." In which place that expectation for which God prepares good things, and that meeting, manifestly signify the cause of merits.

It is objected from Paul to the Hebrews 5, who thus speaks of Christ: "He became to all who obey him the cause of salvation"; where the dative "to those who obey" does not signify a cause; for neither did Christ become the cause of salvation because someone obeyed Christ, but rather that he might obey. However, this matters little, for that very mode of speaking - "he became to those who obey the cause of salvation" - plainly indicates that Christ was the cause of their obedience and that they obey; for their salvation, of which Christ is said to be the cause, consists in their obedience. As if Paul were to say that, for those who obey - in which their salvation lies - Christ was the cause that they should obey, and therefore he is accounted the author of their salvation. But to say that God has promised or prepared the kingdom for those who love him is certainly a far different mode of speaking, by which it is plainly denoted that he has appointed the kingdom, not gratis, but on account of love and good works, and finally that he has defined the kingdom on account of another thing.

Thirdly, the same is proved from that of James 2: "Has not God chosen the poor in this world, rich in faith and heirs of the kingdom which God has promised to those who love him?" For although St. Augustine interprets this place otherwise (lib. 1 De praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 17), namely, that "to choose the rich in faith and heirs of the kingdom" is the same as "to make rich and to make heirs," nevertheless the context of the Apostle does not so conveniently admit that interpretation as the one which we shall immediately give. For if "to choose one rich in faith" is "to make one rich in faith," "to choose also the poor in this world" will be "to make poor in this world." But James does not signify that the Lord "made" the poor in this world (though it is true that he also "made" them by counseling them to leave all things for his sake); rather, he says that those who in this world were poor and abject - because they lacked temporal riches - but were rich in faith, he chose for himself, so as to show that the poor are not to be despised in the distribution of seats and places, since they are held in such honor by God if they are rich in faith and heirs of the kingdom. But if "the rich in faith" have been chosen, it follows that he chose their faith - not, indeed, unto grace; for unto this even those who are poor in faith and not yet heirs of the kingdom

are chosen - but unto glory. And in order to indicate that he was speaking of that eternal election, he subjoined: "which God has promised to those who love him," that is, to those rich in faith and in works.

Moreover, in the eternal prescience of God, it is vain to assign a twofold election, one before merits, another after merits; in cap. 7 and 11 this must be proved at greater length. For the present, however, let these testimonies of Scripture, alleged for this opinion, suffice.

Caput III - By what testimonies of the Fathers the same opinion is approved by others

Sixtus of Siena, in the place cited above, who thinks that the common opinion of the Greek Fathers - and even of some Latins - in this matter is opposed to St. Augustine, has gathered many testimonies of the Fathers, in order to prove that this election unto eternal life (which he himself judges to be predestination) was made from merits foreseen. First, therefore, among the Greeks is Origen, book 7 on the Epistle to the Romans, not far from the end, who about that passage of chapter 9, "Does not the potter have power, etc.," says that Jacob was chosen to be a vessel unto honor because he cleansed himself; for, seeing the purity of him from that same evil of Adam, God made him a vessel unto honor. Then St. John Chrysostom, homily 16 on the Epistle to the Romans, and Theodoret on those words, "Not only so, but also Rebecca"; likewise Theophylact and Oecumenius on that place Romans 8, "Whom he foreknew he also predestined"; and again Theophylact on that of the same chapter, "They who are called according to purpose, saints" - they plainly teach that the election was made from merits foreseen.[1716]

Yet, although the authority of these is of the greatest weight, I would not wish to confirm this opinion by it. For I think that they, as also some Latins whom we shall refer below, thought against the doctrine of St. Augustine - not, indeed, in this controversy about which we are disputing, but in another which will be treated in Disputation 90. For Augustine speaks of election not unto glory from merits of grace, but unto first grace from merits of free choice; and this Origen expressed more clearly on those words of the same chapter: "Who has resisted his will?" These Fathers, then, speak of that election unto first grace, which they thought to be given also in time from the merits of free choice; in the following chapter this will be made clear. Wherefore Driedo, Sixtus of Siena, and Ruardus - whom we cited in cap. 1 - ought not to set these Fathers in opposition to the sentence of Augustine in this question now at hand, namely, of election unto glory from merits of grace; for about this matter there never was any disagreement with Augustine, but only in the question of election unto grace, in which I shall show in the following chapter and in Disputation 91, cap. 7 and 8, that they felt differently, yet less rightly.

From the Latins, moreover, the first who is brought forward on behalf of this opinion is Ambrose on those words to the Romans 9, "Jacob I loved," where he says thus: "The prescience of God is demanded in these causes; for knowing what each of them would be, he said," etc.; and

1716. Origen, Hom. (or Comm.) in Ep. ad Romanos, lib. 7 on Rom 9; St. John Chrysostom, Homily 16 on Romans; Theodoret, Commentary on Romans 9 ("Non solum autem, sed et Rebecca"); Theophylact, Commentary on Romans 8 ("Quos praescivit, et praedestinavit"; "Qui secundum propositum vocati sunt"); Oecumenius, Commentary on Romans 8.

again: "One he chose by prescience, the other he rejected"; and below: "For he condemns no one before he sins, and he crowns no one before he conquers." And on that: "We know that to those who love God," etc., he says: "Those whom he foreknew would be devoted to himself, those he chose to receive the promised rewards." By which testimonies the aforesaid opinion can be proved much better. For in the cited words Ambrose openly speaks of election unto eternal life. Nor does it at all harm that, when he treats of election unto grace, he somewhat favors the sentence of the Greeks on those words of Paul to the Romans 8 cited, and on that of chapter 9, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy," when he asserts that the vocation of God, which is according to purpose, by which God is said to have mercy by preventing, namely by his grace, is given to those who are known to be about to be worthy, so as to answer the text. For although he felt quite with the Greeks about election unto grace, saying that it is from works of free choice, yet he never taught that election unto glory is made from these merits, but from merits proceeding from grace.

Nor indeed did the Greek Fathers anywhere say that election unto glory is from merits of free choice. For if they said something less correctly about grace, they did not altogether think with Pelagius, who openly taught that by our own powers we can be justified and merit eternal life - far from it; they only said that the help of grace (which they said to be necessary for justification and for the merits of eternal life) is given to us while our industry first labors and, in a certain way, merits it. But when they speak of the retribution of eternal life, which is made in time, they confess with full mouth that it is given to the sons of God, justified by his grace and, with the help of grace, well meriting it. But as for election to glory, from eter-

Had speech fallen upon this, that election was made not in the mind of God, they would plainly have said that from eternity God chose the just to the kingdom from the merits of grace. For, as we shall say below also in chapter 4, about this matter there was no controversy in the Church, nor could there be among the Fathers who at the same time teach that in time glory is given only from merits. Moreover, although those commentaries are by many judged not to be of Ambrose, nevertheless they must by all means be maintained.

In the second place Jerome is adduced, in the epistle to Hedibia, which is 150, question 10, where, explaining that of Malachi 1, "Jacob have I loved," etc., he says: "God does not save irrationally and without the truth of judgment; but on account of preceding causes: for whereas some did not receive the Son of God, others would not receive him of their own will." And below: "From their words it is shown that not nations are chosen, but the wills of men." Certainly Jerome either speaks of election to the remission of sins, which can be made from merits de congruo, not of bare free choice but with the help of grace - for to those who by faith received the Son of God and believed, he gave power to become the sons of God and to be justified - wherefore Augustine admits in epistle 105, long from the beginning, that remission of sins is not without the merits of faith, if faith obtains it; or Jerome speaks of election to eternal life - which to me is more probable - and of this he said with very good right that it is not made without the truth of judgment, and that in it there are not chosen naked men, that is, without works, but the wills of men, that is, men adorned with works and merits on account of the works and merits themselves.[1717]

It is also wont to be alleged, the same Jerome, on that of Galatians 1, "When it pleased him," etc. Yet nothing in this favors the aforesaid view of the Greeks. But on those words to the Romans 9, "On whom he wills he has mercy," he seems, with Chrysostom, to subjoin grace to human labor; which is the sentence of the Greeks; which below we shall see plainly to be against Augustine, nor sufficiently defended. Yet this ought to hinder nothing, why the aforesaid opinion about election to glory should not rightly be confirmed from Jerome, as we were just now saying of Ambrose.[1718] [1719]

In the third place Sedulius comes in, who on those words to the Romans 8, "To those who are called according to purpose," thus speaks: "According to what he purposed, he saves by faith alone those whom he foreknew would believe; and those whom he gratuitously called to salvation, he will much more glorify as working." And on the following words: "Those whom he foreknew would be devout to himself, these he chose to receive the promised rewards." And on that to the Romans 9, "That according to election," etc.: "For-knowing what each one of them was going to do, he said: that one will be worthy who will be the lesser; and he who will be the greater will be unworthy of salvation. This, as one foreknowing, he said, not as an accepter of persons." And on that of the same chapter, "Jacob have I loved," etc.: "What wonder, if justice loves innocence and also spits out iniquity, with whom things future are as if done?"[1720]

All these things I have reported, that we may see how this author favors the Greeks and the Massilienses; with whom he seems on the one hand to teach that God had regard to our own labor and industry, that he might give us his grace - although a little below he has certain words of Augustine from the Quaestio ad Simplicianum, by which the sentence of the Greeks is altogether refuted - and therefore the rest of this author can be explained in a good sense; and on the other hand let it be established in what way he speaks rightly about election to glory, when he says that "those whom he foreknew to be devout, he chose to receive the promised rewards"; and again: "If he gratuitously called to salvation, namely by his grace, those whom he knew would believe, much more will he glorify them as working"; that is, much more those whom he foreknew by his grace would work rightly, he chose to the kingdom of glory.

Fourthly, Faustus of Riez is also wont to be adduced, whose testimonies were recited in chapter 1 of this disputation; but that this author, in the Greek manner, held the threefold opinion and delivered it against Augustine in those places, we shall show below in the following chapter. Yet this I am persuaded of: if he speaks of election to eternal life, he would not speak otherwise than the rest, namely, that it was made from merits, because in time glory is to be given from merits, as we have just noted.[1721]

1717. St. Jerome, Epistle 150 to Hedibia, q. 10, on Malachi 1, "Jacob dilexi," etc.

1718. St. Jerome, Commentary on Galatians 1, "Cum placuit ei."

1719. St. Jerome, on Romans 9, "Cuius vult miseretur."

1720. Sedulius, on Romans 8 - 9: on Rom 8, "Iis qui secundum propositum vocati sunt"; on Rom 9, "Ut secundum electionem," "Iacob dilexi."

1721. Faustus of Riez; his testimonies were cited above in ch. 1 of this disputation.

Caput IV - What Augustine contends against the Pelagians and Semipelagians concerning our election

Although the authority of other Fathers ought to be of great weight with all men in every controversy, yet in this one which is now in hand, Augustine will always be one for many to me - not only because, in the judgment of all who think well, he stands out very much among the rest, but because, speaking more severely than others for the grace of God against free choice and our own merits, he affirms that this election is made from the merits of grace, and plainly shows that there is nothing common to our controversy with that, about which he disputes, namely, whether grace is given from merits; which two questions, however, not a few of the theologians of our time, without reason, confound.

I will therefore endeavor by Augustine's testimonies in a twofold way to confirm this sentence. First, I will show that in some places he taught these things in express words. Moreover, nowhere did he set the opposite, or even slightly insinuate it. But that the things which we shall bring from Augustine may be better understood, I judged it worth the effort, before all, to set forth in a few words the matter concerning which there arose, between himself and his disciples on the one part, and Cassian, the Massilienses, and the other Gauls on the other part, a dissension about the predestination of grace.

It is asked what errors Augustine attacked. In this controversy, then, about the predestination of grace, Augustine fought against two errors. First, against Pelagius and Celestius, who asserted these things about grace. First, that a man is able, by the powers of nature alone, without any other grace than that of creation, of preaching, and of commandment - which they said are given without merits - to keep the whole law, to be justified, to persevere in justice even unto death, and to attain glory. Thus it is gathered from letters 96 and 95 among Augustine, and letters 105, 106, and 107; from the Council of Milevis, canon 4; and from the African council around the times of Boniface, canon 79.[1722]

Secondly, that the grace of Christ indeed is given as interior, but that it is only useful for doing more easily and better and for accomplishing what we said; yet that it is not necessary that we simply do those things. Of this error Augustine makes mention in epistle 106, which he discovered in the writings of Pelagius after the crafty retractation which he made of his error in the Palestinian council; and against it is established canon 5 of the Council of Milevis, and 80 of the African, around the times of Boniface.[1723]

Thirdly, they said that this grace is given according to our merits, that is, from our own powers condignly, for the sake of doing better and more easily. This error Pelagius craftily retracted in the Palestinian council at Diospolis, as we shall say below, disputation 91, chapter 9, understanding by the grace of God which he admitted to be given without merits the gift of creation, as is clear from epistles 90 and 95 among Augustine, and from epistle 105.[1724]

1722. Augustine, Epistles 95 - 96, 105 - 107; Council of Milevis, can. 4; African council around the times of Boniface, can. 79.

1723. Augustine, Epistle 106; Council of Milevis, can. 5; African council, can. 80.

Against these Augustine contended that, in time, the interior grace of Christ is necessary for us, besides the commandment and the gift of creation and of preaching, that we may be able to keep all the law, to be justified, and to obtain glory; and that it is the beginning of every merit, and thus is given from no merits of ours. "To this end," he says, "we are not fit (he understands out of ourselves) to be justified and to merit glory, and therefore the help of God is necessary: at least, by asking and by the importunity of knocking let us make ourselves pleasing." For he understands the merits of free choice, and grace not second, but first, which is conferred on us from the beginning. Nor, indeed, does he deny that we can merit second grace and subsequent helps, if first we are moved by a prior grace to merit them. In this same way he spoke everywhere of the predestination of God, which in his opinion, book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, is the preparation of the gifts of grace, so that it was not from foreseen merits; but as God in time gives grace without merits, so in his eternal providence he has disposed to give it without merits. For, as we shall see below, between merits and that which is given from merits, according to Augustine's sentence, God establishes the same order in the eternal disposition that he is to observe in time: so that, if he is going to give from merits, he disposes to give from merits; another order would be perverse

And just as Augustine never shows against Pelagius that glory is given from merits (for this Pelagius did not deny), but that glory as to its attainment is conferred from the merits of grace, not from the merits of free choice - as Pelagius said - so also he never shows against Pelagius that election to glory, or the will of glorifying, was in God from a foresight of merits and altogether gratuitous; but that it was from merits foreseen which he by his grace was going to bestow; and as, against Pelagius, he contends that in time grace is not given from the merits of free choice, so also he proved that the predestination of grace is not made from those. Against these - namely Pelagius and Celestius - and their disciples, the Council of Milevis and the other African councils were gathered; but the Second Council of Orange was celebrated chiefly against the Semipelagians, about whom we shall presently speak.[1726]

Now, when Pelagius, disputing about grace, asserted that it is not necessary, he was not speaking of habitual grace, or only of the grace of the remission of sins, but of the help of grace, which he denied to be necessary, but said that free choice with the knowledge of the precept suffices. And when the Fathers contended with him that he should confess that the grace of God is necessary without merits, they did not only contend that he should concede the grace of the remission of sins to be necessary (for Augustine, epistle 105, says that this is not without merits, since faith obtains it), but that he should concede the help of grace, "from which," Augustine says there, "the work of our justification begins," as we will cite in its place, which help Augustine attributes to faith.[1727]

1724. The Palestinian council at Diospolis; cf. Disputation 91, ch. 9; Augustine, Epistles 90, 95, 105.

1726. Second Council of Orange (Arausicanum II), celebrated chiefly against the Semipelagians.

1727. Augustine, Epistle 105, on the remission of sins not being without the merits of faith, if faith obtains it; and on the help of grace, from which the work of our justification begins.

Then Augustine disputed against another error, namely of those who by Prosper and Hilary are reckoned among the remains of the Pelagians and are commonly called Semipelagians. These were the Massilienses, whose head and the author of the doctrine objecting against Augustine was Cassian, as is clear from the letters of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine, which are before the book On Predestination; and from the epistle of Pope Celestine the First, where the name being suppressed, mention of him is made; and from Prosper in the book Contra Collatorem, chapter 1. Their sentence was followed by many bishops throughout Gaul, to whom Celestine wrote that epistle. Among whom Vincent of Lérins is said to have been. The objections of all of these are in Prosper Against the Doctrine of Augustine, the book To the Gallic Chapters, and the book To the Objections of Vincentians, to which Prosper himself excellently replied; nay rather, as Prosper with Hilary bears witness, many bishops throughout Africa thought ill of Augustine's doctrine.[1728]

All these men - being otherwise Catholics and religious against Pelagius and Celestius - confessed the grace of Christ, not only of preaching, but interior also, of inspiration; not only useful, but also necessary for justification, perseverance, and the merits of eternal life, without which our endeavors would not only be difficult in their success, as we claim, but would be utterly ineffectual, and vain for justification and for achieving eternal life. Nevertheless they added that there are in us certain beginnings from our own proper labor without the interior grace of Christ moving; by which we begin, so that afterwards the grace of God may help us for promoting our endeavors and desires. Hence this was their proposition: Human labor goes before grace; the assistance of grace is joined to labors of this sort; our consent - namely, from our own powers - arises first; unless it be helped by the grace of God, it is not brought forward or promoted.

This doctrine is gathered from the whole thirteenth Collation of Cassian; and from Prosper's book Contra Collatorem; and from the book De incarnatione et gratia Domini nostri Iesu Christi, chapter 8, of Peter the Deacon; and from Faustus of Riez, the whole first book; and from many places reported in the letter of Pope Hormisdas to Possessor; and from John Maxentius in the response to the same epistle which is had in the Roman Library. In all these places the doctrine is manifestly this: that grace follows upon, assists, and helps the will of man beginning of itself; that desires, endeavors, and obediences first arise from ourselves, and then that divine aid is added; as will be said below.[1729]

And in the Second Council of Orange, whose canons Leo the First by the work of Prosper - then his secretary - published, both the very style and the material against the Semipelagians, and the history of Prosper himself, indicate: the Liber Sententiarum compiled by Prosper from Augustine's doctrine shows plainly that all are from Augustine's doctrine, as we shall say below, disputation 91, chapter 11. In can. 6 it is condemned, "whoever shall say that without the grace of God mercy is given to believers, willing, desiring, endeavoring, laboring, watching, studying, asking, knocking; or who joins the help of grace to human humility or obedience." For with these words those were

1728. Prosper of Aquitaine, Contra Collatorem c. 1; Ad capitula Gallorum; Ad objectiones Vincentianas; and letters of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine; Pope Celestine I's epistle.

1729. John Cassian, Collationes (esp. Coll. 13); Prosper, Contra Collatorem; Peter the Deacon, De incarnatione et gratia Domini nostri Iesu Christi, c. 8; Faustus of Riez, book 1; Pope Hormisdas, epistle to Possessor; John Maxentius, Response to the same epistle (in the Roman Library).

speaking who were of the remnants of the Pelagians. Thus Cassian, book 10 De Incarnatione, can. 14, says that "the grace of God is given to those who ask, opened to those who knock, and found by those who seek." This error, because it had not yet been detected in the Church of God, is not mentioned in the Council of Milevis and the Africans, in which it was acted against Pelagius. Moreover, as is related in the Life of Prosper, and in the epistle prefixed to his works recently published at Louvain, Cassian took up this doctrine from the Greek Fathers, especially from Chrysostom, whom he had as teacher; yet the Massilienses asserted, opposing the authority of them all, that those Fathers understood otherwise that of Romans 9, "Not of works, but of him that calls," etc., as Prosper and Hilary report in those letters, alleging many places from Chrysostom.[1730] [1731]

He assigns to us our own penitence, which, he says, will not be worthy of the pardon of sins unless it be promoted by the grace of God; and in this manner he speaks of dispositions on our part in book 5 of the Institutes of the Coenobia, chapters 13 and 14; and, as Hilary writes (whom we shall report in Disputation 91, chapter 12), some of the Massilians granted some compunction from ourselves for our past life, whence the grace of God would take an occasion in us.[1732][1733]

From these things, by the way, it is fitting to note how, without foundation, certain more recent writers, not having sufficiently understood the mind of these Fathers, use their testimonies to prove that the work of perfect contrition, formed by charity from the help of prevenient grace, does not of itself suffice for justification without some new grace and favor. For these Fathers speak of penitence brought forth from one's own powers - something which, apart from Pelagius, no one said suffices for justification. Of the other sort we shall dispute in its own place.

And the same doctrine is had in St. John Chrysostom: homily 2 on Psalm 50; homily 12 on the Epistle to the Hebrews, in the moral exposition; the homily, "No one is harmed except by himself," not much before the end, speaking of the three boys; homily 13 on John, on "Jesus turned," etc.; and sermon 1 on the words of the Lord, "Having the same spirit." With him also the Greek Fathers cited above have felt the same, for the first opinion, as from their words is clear: they all teach, therefore, that we begin by our own industry, then the help of the grace of God follows, so that at length we may be justified, and, persevering in grace, may merit the kingdom of heaven.[1734]

And likewise Faustus of Riez, in book 1 on grace and free will, and especially chapter 14, strongly proves the necessity of grace against Pelagius; nor does he teach this only in fallen nature, but even in an integral state it was necessary, so that man might persevere, as is seen in book 1; and that the Massilians themselves affirmed this, Hilary testifies in that epistle cited. He says, in De gratia Dei, chapter 17: "It invites the willing, draws the desiring, lifts up the one who strives"; and below he

1730. Second Council of Orange, can. 6: condemnation of those who make mercy given without grace to believers, willing, desiring, etc., or who subjoin grace's help to human humility/obedience.

1731. The Life of Prosper and the epistle prefixed to his works (recently published at Louvain) relate that Cassian took this doctrine from Greek Fathers, especially St. John Chrysostom.

1732. John Cassian, De institutis coenobiorum V.13 - 14; XII; and Collationes 13, passim.

1733. Hilary and Prosper to Augustine; see the epistles prefixed to Prosper's works.

1734. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 2 in Ps. 50; Hom. 12 in Hebr., in the moral exposition; Hom. "Nemo laeditur nisi a seipso" (toward the end, on the Three Boys); Hom. 13 in Ioann. on "Conversus Iesus"; Sermo 1 De verbis Domini, "Habentes eundem spiritum."

says that "the grace of God first asks from us the obedience of the precept, so that, as it were by a little handle, it may take hold of us"; and in book 2, chapter [sc. on penitential remedies], among the remedies for obtaining pardon, he assigns from our side our own penitence, which, he says, will not be condign for the pardon of sins unless it be promoted by the grace of God. In this way he speaks of the dispositions on our part.[1735]

In that place he says that we are not (of ourselves) competent to be justified and to be glorified, and therefore the help of God is necessary: "At least," he says, "let us please by the opportunity of seeking."

The opinion of this author Peter the Deacon gathers when he writes, in De incarnatione et gratia Domini nostri Iesu Christi, chapter 8: "We anathematize the books of Faustus, bishop in Gaul, who came forth from the monastery of Lérins; which books, written against the sentence of predestination, we in no way doubt. In which, not only coming into contradiction against these holy Fathers, but also against the very Apostle himself, he subjoins to human labor the help of grace," etc.[1736]

Likewise in the Council of Orange, whose canons were, by the work of Leo I and then-secretary Prosper, published - as both the very style and the matter against the Semipelagians, and the history of the time itself, indicate; and that they are all from the doctrine of Augustine, the book of Sentences collected by Prosper clearly shows, as we shall say in Disputation 91, chapter 11 - the same is condemned in canon 6: it condemns the one "who says that the mercy of God is given without the grace of God to those who believe, will, desire, attempt, labor, keep watch, study, ask, knock; or who subjoins the help of grace to human humility or obedience." For in these very words those were using themselves who were of the remnants of the Pelagians.[1737]

Thus Cassian in Collation 13, and likewise in book 12 of the Institutes of the Coenobia, chapters 13 and 14, says that grace is given to those who ask, is opened to those who knock, and is found by those who seek.[1738] This error, because it had not yet been detected in the Church of God, is not mentioned in the Councils of Milevis and of Africa in which there was action against Pelagius. Moreover, as is related in the Life of Prosper and in the epistle prefixed to his works, recently published at Louvain, Cassian took this doctrine from the Greek Fathers, especially from St. John Chrysostom, whom he had as his master. But Augustine opposed the authority of them all to the Massilians, or else that they understood that passage otherwise, Romans 9: "Not of works, but of him that calls," etc., as Prosper and Hilary report in those letters. Notable places of Chrysostom are: homily 40 on Genesis toward the end, and homily 27 on Genesis, column 8, when he speaks of penitence; for this author grants certain penitence from ourselves, and therefore love and hope, which nevertheless of themselves do not suffice to wash away sin unless the grace of God be added,

1735. Faustus of Riez, De gratia Dei c. 17; and De libero arbitrio, esp. book 1 - 2, c. 14.

1736. Peter the Deacon, De incarnatione et gratia Domini nostri Iesu Christi, c. 8 (against Faustus of Riez).

1737. Second Council of Orange (529), can. 6; commonly held to have been issued under Leo I's authority and, by the work of Prosper, then secretary; the style and matter target the Semipelagians, and Prosper's Sentences from Augustine confirm the doctrine.

1738. Cassian, Collatio 13; and De institutis coenobiorum XII, cc. 13 - 14, on grace being given to those who ask, knock, and seek.

which may move us to more perfect acts. The same was taught by Cassian in Collation 20, chapter 8, where among the remedies for obtaining pardon he assigns from our side our own penitence, which, he says, will not be worthy of the pardon of sins unless it be promoted by the grace of God; and thus he speaks of dispositions on our part.[1739][1740][1741][1742]

Caput V - Some notes by which the opinion of the Semipelagians is made clearer

First, therefore, it must be observed that - just as we said at the beginning - these authors, otherwise pious and religious, did not think of grace as Pelagius and Caelestius taught: for they openly enough professed that it is necessary, not only for external preaching but also for internal inspiration; not only useful, but also necessary for justification, perseverance, and the merits of eternal life - without which our endeavors would not only with difficulty attain what we contend, but would indeed be altogether vain and empty for justification and for meriting eternal life.

Nevertheless, they added that in us there are certain beginnings from our own proper labor without any grace of Christ moving within us, by which we begin, so that afterwards the grace of God be granted to us to promote our endeavors and desires. Therefore this was one of their propositions: To human labor grace is subjoined; and another like it: Our endeavors, that is, from our own powers, are ineffectual unless they be aided and promoted by the grace of God. This doctrine is gathered from the whole of Cassian's Collation 13, and from the book of Prosper against the Collator, and from book 12 of the Institutes of the Coenobia, chapters 13 and 14, and from Faustus of Riez throughout book 1 and 2 On Grace and Free Will, in many places; likewise from what Pope Hormisdas reports in his epistle to Possessor, and from John Maxentius in the Response to that epistle, which is had in volume 1 of the sacred Bibliotheca. But in book 1, chapter 17, and in the places cited in chapter 1, he clearly hands down this doctrine: "It invites the willing, draws the desiring, lifts up the one who strives"; and below he says that "the grace of God first asks from us the obedience of the precept, so that, as it were by a little handle, it may take hold of us"; and in the second book, chapter [sc. on remedies], among the remedies for obtaining pardon he assigns from our part our own penitence, which, he says, will not be worthy of the pardon of sins unless it be promoted by the grace of God. In this way he speaks of dispositions on our part.[1743][1735][1744][1745]

Second, note that, according to their sentiment, this beginning thus precedes from us: yet some were thinking it was not necessary always to precede, but that sometimes even the divine grace is prior. Thus plainly teaches Cassian - this sect's chief author - in Collation 13, chapter 12 near the

1739. The Life of Prosper and the epistle prefixed to his works (recently published at Louvain) relate that Cassian drew this doctrine from the Greek Fathers, especially St. John Chrysostom.

1740. Prosper of Aquitaine and Hilary, epistles to Augustine, reporting Romans 9: "Not of works, but of him that calls."

1741. Chrysostom, Hom. in Gen. (toward the end); Hom. 27 in Gen., col. 8, on penitence.

1742. Cassian, Collatio 20, c. 8, on remedies for obtaining pardon.

1743. Prosper, Contra collatorem c. 1; 13; 33 (on Cassian's variability).

1735. Faustus of Riez, De gratia Dei c. 17; and De libero arbitrio, esp. book 1 - 2, c. 14.

1744. Pope Hormisdas, Epistle to Possessor.

1745. John Maxentius, Response to the same epistle (in the Roman Library).

end, and chapter 15, and he confirms it by various testimonies of Scripture. For he asserts that Zacchaeus first knocked and asked before grace was given to him that he might knock, and thus by his solicitude anticipated Christ; but that Matthew and Paul and other Apostles were anticipated by the grace of God. Wherefore that Collation 13, chapter 15 thus begins: "And so the grace of God always cooperates with our will for the good part, and it helps it in all things, protects, and defends it, so that sometimes also it either exacts or expects certain endeavors of a good will." Where, when he had said that God always helps and promotes our efforts, he did not say "always" but "sometimes" he expects them; and in chapter 17 he says that God is the "undertaker" of some, because he helps their endeavors; but the "savior" of others, because he altogether anticipates them. This doctrine, however, Prosper eruditely and acutely refutes in his book Against the Collator, chapter 13; and from this variety in that same book, chapter 33, Prosper noted that Cassian had taught things contrary to himself. Now the Massilian orations which defended his opinion, which we shall report in Disputation 91, chapter 17, have some weight: they prove that our free choice always begins, and then the grace of God promotes its endeavors. Prosper also reports in that book the words of the Collator, Collation 13, chapter 3, by which he was attributing the beginnings of a good will to God; and against him he thus says: "And indeed we think that you are taking precautions against the calumnies of the Pelagians, if you concede to us, in part, that which is to be held concerning the universality of those who are called; but you have full agreement neither with the heretics nor with the Catholics. They maintain the beginnings of free will in all the just works of men; we always believe that the beginnings of good thoughts proceed from God; but you have weakly discovered I-know-not-what third thing, by which you neither gain the assent of our adversaries nor remain in the understanding of our own."[17461747]

Third, it must be premised that among these Massilians there were some who even confessed that the beginning of a good work is from God and from his grace through Christ, as Augustine reports, book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 1: "They have come (he says of some Massilians) even to confess that the wills of men are anticipated by the grace of God, and that for no good work, either to be begun or to be completed, is anyone sufficient to himself; therefore, with this retained, to which they have come, they differ very much from the Pelagian error. Accordingly, if they walk in it, let them rejoice in him who gives understanding; if they think otherwise concerning predestination, he himself will also reveal it to them." From which someone perhaps will think that therefore they were thinking wrongly concerning predestination, not because they were saying that grace was prepared for us from eternity to be subjoined to human labor - since they were saying that in time also it is the beginning of a good work - but because they were confessing that election unto glory had been made from the merits of grace. For what else contrary to Augustine's true sentiment could they have thought, if he already confessed that the beginning of a good work is not from us?

1746. Cassian, Collatio 13, cc. 12, 15, 17 (on prevenience and cooperation of grace).

1747. Prosper, Contra collatorem c. 13, citing the Collator's own words (Coll. 13, c. 3), and replying with the "tertium" reproach.

But this is of no moment, although at the first glance to those who have read little about this error it may appear rather difficult. It must therefore be observed that these indeed were still involved in the same error, namely, that grace was to be subjoined to industry or human labor; and for that reason, concerning the doctrine of predestination, they were deceived, asserting that God by his eternal prescience had prepared grace for those who would somehow begin from themselves. But concerning election unto eternal life from the merits of grace, they taught nothing against Augustine, as is manifest from that whole book On the Predestination of the Saints and what follows; where Augustine never refutes their opinion that eternal life is prepared from the merits of grace, but that they were confessing some beginning from ourselves to which grace is to be subjoined. He erred, therefore, but less than others - not only the Pelagians, but also such as were said to be of the remnants - for the others confessed many and various works, even external, from ourselves, on account of which grace would be given us, such as labors, vigils, observances even of precepts, as is seen in Cassian in the places cited. But indeed, the one who seemed to Augustine to think better granted to us only this beginning: namely, to be willing to be healed. For they did not reckon this will among the works whose beginning he said is from the grace of God. Of these, then, Hilary thus reports, writing to Augustine in that epistle cited, a little after the beginning: "But as to any work, either to be begun or to be completed, they hold that no one is sufficient to himself. Nor do they count among the works of healing any man's terrified will to be healed. For when it is said, 'Believe and you shall be saved,' they assert that one thing is required, another offered: so that, for that which is required, if it shall have been rendered, that which is offered may thereafter be bestowed. It is not consequent, they think, that faith be required of him whose nature has by the Creator's will been granted the capacity; and they do not think that nature so depraved or extinguished that it ought not or cannot will to be healed." So far Hilary. Where he says that they think the following thing not consequent - namely, that from what is said, "Believe and you shall be saved," one should infer that faith is to be required of each of us from our own powers - this by no reason follows.[1748]

We have also from Hilary that, among the good works by which, according to their sentence, men are justified, there is not to be reckoned either faith, or prayer, or the will by which one desires to be healed; and to this beginning from ourselves they subjoined grace, which they also affirmed to be necessary for the beginnings of the subsequent works, and not only for bringing them to completion.

Indeed, they compared the grace of God to a public fountain, from which anyone who wished could draw water; or to the sun, which illumines all, provided that they open their eyes; or to a most generous physician, who is prepared first to cure all those willing, as will appear below from Prosper's epistle. Therefore, with the remaining Semipelagians, they conspired in this one thing: that from ourselves there is some beginning, in view of which God confers his grace; and for that reason Augustine, straightway in chapter 2 of that book, begins to prove against them that both faith and the will of salvation are to be numbered among the gifts of grace, so that he may thus

1748. Hilary's epistle to Augustine (cited above), arguing that, from "Believe and you shall be saved," it does not follow that faith is to be exacted from our own powers.

correct their error concerning predestination, by which they were saying that God by his eternal predestination had prepared grace for us on account of faith or on account of that will of salvation.[17491750]

Fourth, it is most to be noted that these Semipelagians never said that that beginning from ourselves, to which they subjoined grace, was meritorious condignly, so that grace should be given back as condignly due. For who would not see that thus it would not be grace? But neither did they say, moreover, that the grace of God is most certainly promised to us when we begin; nor will you find this noted in any ancient author. Nay rather, Cassian - who was the author of this sect in the West and its most eager defender - in book 12 of the Institutes...

Cassian in the Institutes of the Coenobia, c. 11 and 13, near the end, plainly confesses that neither that beginning nor any work of ours is condign to divine mercy and grace. Wherefore in c. 14 he speaks thus: "For we say, according to the Savior's sentence, that indeed it is given to those who ask, and opened to those who knock; but that our asking, our seeking, and our knocking are not condign, unless the mercy of God gives that which we ask," etc.; "for the occasion of good will having been set before us, the highest is ready to be bestowed and to be joined to these things." He had said the same in c. 11; and in Conference 13, c. 13. Nor will you find anywhere that the Massilians assign a condign beginning on our part, or that they erred by saying that God most surely promised grace to those who, by their own powers, offer good will; they said only that His mercy is at hand for those who are willing.[17511752]

I admit indeed that Augustine, Prosper, and Fulgentius are wont to argue against them that grace would not be grace if it were given to anyone on account of some very small merit and beginning on our part, because it would by then be rendered as a debt, which they deem absurd. But they themselves do not condemn a debt arising from promise; for this does not take away the ratio of grace: if the promise was gratuitous, the gift will be as well; but they infer that it would not be grace, because it would be rendered rather to the beginning and to our merit; which rightly follows, even if our beginning and merit were not condign, as will be proved in Disputation 91, c. 15. It is not, therefore, against the ratio of grace that it be given on account of a promise, and on the score of the promise it cannot be denied; but it is against grace that it be given on account of some merit, even the least, as we will show in the same place: for in that case it is rendered; whereas if no merit at all had preceded, it would not be a rendering.[1753]

For this reason the Massilians did not hesitate to call "called gratuitously" those whom God calls by His grace, even if they supply a beginning by their own diligence: because if at the beginning there was no condignity, it seemed to them that the ratio of grace was not evacuated. And that they called such persons "gratuitously called" is gathered from Prosper in that epistle, when he reports their words, which we shall quote below. Cassian too said this most clearly in Conference 13, c. 13,

1749. Prosper's letter comparing grace to a fountain, sun, and physician.
1750. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, esp. c. 1 - 2 (faith and the will of salvation among the gifts of grace).
1751. Cassian, De institutis coenobiorum c. 11; 13; 14.
1752. Cassian, Collatio 13, c. 13.
1753. Vazquez, Disputatio 91, c. 8 - 11; 14 - 15.

with these words: "While God imparts grace under the color of a certain desire and toil, nevertheless the grace of God remains gratuitous, when He attributes with inestimable bounty to such small endeavors and slight efforts so great a glory of immortality, so great gifts of everlasting beatitude" - where he calls it grace even if it be given on the occasion of our labor, because the labor is minimal and not condign.[17541752]

Whether this error has anything in common with the opinion of certain Scholastics who, down to our own times, assert that, if one does what lies within him, God gives His grace; and whether the Greek Fathers can in any way be excused; and by what reasoning this error was condemned - we shall speak in Disputation 91, c. 9, 10, and 11. For the present, let these things suffice, that we may understand Augustine's mind in this question.[1753]

Finally it must be observed that by the name of grace these Massilians do not understand the remission of sins and habitual grace, by which we are formally justified, but all the helps of grace, by which we are promoted and disposed to justification. For they did not attempt to contend that by our free choice alone we can have the ultimate disposition whereby sins are remitted to us, but only some disposition on account of which the helps of grace are granted to us toward a greater disposition of justification; as we shall explain in that same Disputation 91, c. 8, 9, 10, and 11. Nor indeed did the Massilians teach so foolishly as to assert that prayer, faith, or the will of salvation, or the will to believe, or similar works which they said are only beginnings of justification, are the ultimate disposition to habitual grace or to the remission of sins. But, as it is clear from the things we have so far alleged from them, they conceded only certain very minimal beginnings, which God by the help of grace would promote all the way to justification: and in this sense they strive to refute Augustine and his disciples; and the reasons which Augustine and others frame against the Massilians prove that not even the least beginning, even remotely, can be on our part, as we shall see in Disputation 91, cap. 14 and 15.[1753]

Moreover, it seemed necessary to them to call this beginning, which they said precedes on our part, some kind of merit; because by that they thought other gifts are impetrated from God; for that by which something is impetrated from God ought to be called impetratory merit, which now the Scholastics name congruous. And some also assert that it cannot be called congruous merit, nor impetratory, which is in a sinner, against Augustine's doctrine in epistle 105, where, in order to prove against Pelagius that some grace must be conceded without merits, he says that this cannot be the grace of the remission of sins: he gives the reason in these words: "Nor is the remission of sins without some merit, if faith impetrates this; for faith is not no merit, by which that man was saying, 'God, be propitious to me a sinner'." Therefore Augustine concedes some merit in a sinner, but from the aid of God.[1755]

1754. Prosper, the epistle in which he reports the Massilians' words (see above).
1752. Cassian, Collatio 13, c. 13.
1753. Vazquez, Disputatio 91, c. 8 - 11; 14 - 15.
1753. Vazquez, Disputatio 91, c. 8 - 11; 14 - 15.
1755. Augustine, Epist. 105.

From all these things it is clear not only that there is a manifest difference between Pelagians and Semipelagians, but also what Augustine is arguing when he disputes about predestination against both and teaches that the election was not made from the foreknowledge of any merits. For he never disputes with them whether the election to glory was made from merits of grace foreseen, but whether grace was prepared from some good beginning, or merit foreseen, of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*). For since they said that in time grace is given from merits, or must be joined to human labor, or devotion, or faith (*fides*), or obedience, it would necessarily follow that one must speak in the same way about eternal election; namely, that God had regard to all those things in view of which He was going to give grace in time. Therefore Augustine proves that eternal election was made so gratuitously that God did not regard any beginning on our part: I mean the election about which there was controversy with the Pelagians and Semipelagians - namely, of grace; because they would join God's grace in time to human labor; and thus too they would be forced to say that in eternity it was made on account of human labor.

For there was one and the same controversy between Augustine and the Pelagians or Semipelagians about grace and about predestination (*praedestinatio*): nor did they teach any other error about predestination than about grace. For this reason Peter the Deacon, whose words we reported in the preceding chapter, said that the doctrine of Faustus against the sentence of predestination which the Fathers taught (he means Augustine and his disciples) and against the Apostle had been written. He immediately gives the reason, because he subjoined grace to human labor and obedience. On the other hand, when it was a question of glory, there was little dissension between the Semipelagians and Augustine: for all of them were bearing that it is given in time from merits of grace, and must be joined to labor by grace; therefore they themselves, which Augustine consistently did, ought to have said that election to glory was made with a view to merits; for in time it was to be conferred in consideration of those.

For, as we shall say below, if once Augustine had conceded to the Semipelagians that grace in time is conferred on account of some labor of ours or our good will (*voluntas*), he would never have denied that in eternal election also it was so determined that it should be given from labor, just as formerly he himself held, as we shall set forth in c. 7. For when he asserted that grace is given from the merits of faith, because he thought faith was not a gift of God, he also said that in eternal election God prepared grace from faith; indeed that He chose faith itself. Augustine commends this also in other places, as we shall see in c. 7 of this disputation.[1756][1757][5][1758][1759]

Further, if we are willing to attend even a little, we shall easily discover in the words of Prosper and of the Massilians that they erred in saying that the beginnings are from us and that grace is given to us from those beginnings. For, first, this error is contained openly in their words when they say that salvation is proposed to all, so that whoever wishes to approach may be saved; thereby they suppose the disposing of the will of salvation to be from ourselves, as we have shown

1756. Peter the Deacon, cited in the preceding chapter, on the doctrine of Faustus against the predestination taught by the Fathers and against the Apostle.

1757. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, esp. lib. 1; c. 4; 10.

1758. Augustine, De bono perseverantiae.

1759. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, quaest. 2.

above. Next, the same error is in what they add, that God, before the constitution of the world, foresaw those who would believe, and those who by the grace of God would thereafter remain in that faith, and predestined to His kingdom those whom, being gratuitously called, He foresaw would be worthy of the future election, to depart from this life with a good end. By these words Prosper does not seem to mark any other error of theirs than that they said those were elected to the kingdom of heaven whom, being gratuitously called, God knew would be worthy of this election.

Lastly, concerning the Semipelagians in general, Prosper gathers in the same epistle in these words: that all are found to err alike in this one sentence, namely, that they received the profession of the predestination of God according to foreknowledge, as though thus God made some vessels for honor and others for contumely, because He foresaw them by His diverse counsels. And he added the particle "almost," to temper the variety of their mode of speaking; because although all taught truly that the beginning is from us, yet some ascribed more, others less, to free choice; as we have seen above. And thus, though varying more or less about our beginning, yet all conspired in the same opinion, that the beginning is from us. Now, when they supposed predestination in general to be according to foreknowledge, by the name predestination they understood the preparation of grace (as Augustine defines it), not the will of glorifying; and by foreknowledge they understood not the merits of grace unto attaining life, but the good of free choice, as Prosper had more than once inculcated.

As to the rest, if some often used the words "election to honor" and "vessels of contumely" of one's own purpose, if they understood this of the end of the whole life, namely, that by the grace of God in the kingdom of heaven there are vessels for honor, but by sinful purpose and internal punishment there are vessels for contumely, they were not in error: for although to be made a vessel for honor in some is the work of God's grace as commanding, nevertheless it is also by this very grace that a man, sinning by contempt, makes himself to be a vessel for dishonor. Thus speaks Paul to Timothy: "If anyone shall have cleansed himself from these, he shall be a vessel unto honor, sanctified and useful." And thus, in like manner, some consent to grace and are advanced to honor; others, by resisting grace, make themselves vessels unto dishonor.

Now certain later theologians think that Prosper made mention of other Semipelagians in these words: "But some of them depart so little from Pelagian paths that they ascribe all progress, even with the grace of Christ, which is made in every good work and in all the merits of good conversation, to the beginnings of good will; and they are admonished by grace as it were from the outside, to this end that they may use the powers of their own will; so that they set down in this sense that grace confers honors, indeed, but does not cause worthy men; that it offers helps, indeed, but leaves to free choice, reasonings, and counsels of men to determine the good; and from the knowledge of God and of His gifts which are in us they suppose that we ourselves can draw the beginnings of better wills." From these words they collect that, together with the Pelagians in some sense, these men thought that such grace is given to all; but they did not concede equal assistance to all. But to be sure the very addition Prosper plainly shows, namely, that they acknowledged that those attain the grace of Christ who accept this grace and consent to it; and that they attributed to

this grace the justifying of men and the crowning with glory; yet they subjoined that the beginning is ours. Augustine and the other Fathers refute this: that grace which in Christ causes us to be born again, to persevere, through a natural faculty, namely by asking, seeking, and knocking, is not to be obtained unless it be accepted from God; and it is not obtained from ourselves: rather we are to be born anew by grace, which alone sufficiently begins salvation, imparting the initial motion, not merely preventing.

From this is clear what Augustine constantly urges against Pelagius: that in his followers among the Semipelagians it is seen that they assign some grace apart from merits, as a gift of creation; and they call it rational, so that it may be called both initial and rational; as is clear from the very words and their citations.

Finally, he gathers, concerning the Semipelagians, from Prosper in that epistle, in these words: that all in common find fault in this, with one sentence, that they received the profession of predestination according to foreknowledge: "that God in this has made some vessels for honor, others for contumely, as if by His diverse counsels He foresees." Therefore he added the particle "almost," that he might temper the variety of their expressions: because, although all equally taught that the beginning is from us, yet some attributed more, others less, to free choice; as we have said. Hence, varying more or less around our beginning, all nevertheless conspired in one opinion, that the beginning was from us. And when he says that they "received the profession of predestination according to foreknowledge," he understands that, by their own stating, predestination was said to be made according to foreknowledge of our free choice; but not, as Augustine in the book to Simplician, q. 2, teaches, according to the foreknowledge of the grace by which we attain life, or of the divine will of glorifying. For they referred predestination to the preparation of grace in time, not to the eternal purpose of glory.

As to what remains, if some frequently spoke about "election to honor" and "vessels of contumely" from one's own purpose, if they understood it about the end of the whole life, they were not at fault: for although to be made a vessel unto honor in God's kingdom is by the grace of God, nevertheless from one's own sinful purpose there is a becoming of a vessel unto contumely. Hence also Paul says to Timothy: "If anyone shall have cleansed himself from these, he shall be a vessel unto honor, sanctified and useful" - so that, as regards honor, some, consenting to grace, make themselves vessels unto honor; as regards contumely, those who resist grace make themselves vessels unto contumely.

... they erred in this, that they said the beginnings are from us, and that grace is given to us because of them. First, this error is openly contained in their words when they say that salvation is proposed to all, so that whoever wishes to approach may be saved: for they posited the will of salvation as from us, as we showed above. Next, the same error lies in what they add, that those who were going to believe (namely, from themselves), or were going to remain in faith with the help of God's grace - that is, in a faith to be advanced by God's grace which had been begun by their own powers (for this was their common opinion, that God helps our efforts, and follows up with his grace the beginnings of faith which are from us) - that these, I say, were to be advanced by the grace of God unto justification: which Augustine expressly refutes in the books cited, written in

answer to Prosper and Hilary.[1760] But what they say in the words that follow - that those who were foreseen to persevere by this grace of God were elected to the kingdom of heaven - he nowhere disapproves. Nor does it much matter that the Massilians called "freely called" those who were chosen to the kingdom, so that we might say they denied that the beginning of grace is from us. For although indeed they asserted that the beginning of grace precedes from us, nevertheless, as we saw a little above, they said that the grace of God is given entirely gratis; and therefore they called those "freely called."

Then the aforesaid theologians think Prosper remembered other Semi-Pelagians in these words: "But some of these do not so far decline from the Pelagian paths that, when they are forced to confess that grace of Christ which anticipates all human merits - since, if it is rendered to merits, in vain is it called grace - they want this condition to belong to each individual man, in which one, with no previous merits (for he did not yet exist), is established by the Creator's grace as of free choice and rational nature, so that, by the discernment of good and evil, and to the knowledge of God, and to the obedience of his commandments, they may be able to direct their will." From which they gather that these men felt altogether with Pelagius, in that they granted grace only of creation. But they are mistaken: for from the words which Prosper immediately added it is manifest that they also conceded the grace of Christ, besides this grace of creation, by which men are justified and attain to glory. For he subjoins of them: "And that to this grace, by which we are reborn in Christ, one comes through the natural faculty, namely, by asking, seeking, knocking; and therefore he receives, therefore he finds, therefore he enters, because by a good use of nature an initial grace works that he may come to the just, saving grace." They therefore admitted, against Pelagius, the grace of Christ as necessary for justification over and above the gift of creation; but in co-operators they seemed like other Semi-Pelagians: for, in order to assign some grace without any merits, in addition to the gift of creation they fled with Pelagius; and this they called "initial" and "rational," as is plain from the words cited.

Finally, concerning all the Semi-Pelagians together Prosper gathers at the end of the epistle in these words: "Plainly a like measure is found in all, and one sentence, by which they received the purpose and predestination of God according to foreknowledge: so that for this reason God has made some vessels unto honor, others vessels unto contumely, because he foresaw the end of each man." He added the particle "plainly," which moderates the universality of that expression, because although all in very truth taught that the beginning is from us, some nevertheless attributed more, others less, to free choice, as we saw above. And so, while varying more or less about our beginning, all conspired into one sentence, that the beginning is from us. Now when he says "they received the purpose according to foreknowledge," he understands that, in their opinion, justification was made from the foreknowledge of the good use of free will: for "purpose" in Augustine, as is clear from book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, is the purpose of justification.[1761] But when they also spoke of predestination according to foreknowledge, by the name "predestination"

1760. Augustine, the books cited above in which he replies to Prosper and to Hilary: namely, De praedestinatione sanctorum and De bono perseverantiae, addressed to them.

1761. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, quaest. 2.

they understood the preparation of grace, as Augustine defines it in book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, not the will of glorifying; and by "foreknowledge" they did not mean the merits of grace unto eternal life, but the good use of free will, as Prosper had often inculcated.[1762]

As to the rest: that some were made vessels unto honor, others vessels unto contumely from a foreseen end - if they understood this of the end of the whole life, namely, that with God's grace they would be vessels unto honor in the kingdom of heaven, but from their own sin, in eternal punishment, vessels unto contumely - they did not err. For although a man is said to be made a vessel unto honor by the grace of God which goes before him, he himself, aided by this grace and giving consent to it, is also said to make himself a vessel unto honor. Thus speaks Paul, 2 Timothy 2: "If, therefore, anyone shall have cleansed himself from these things, he shall be a vessel unto honor, sanctified and useful." So then each one, freely consenting and aided by it, is said to cleanse and sanctify himself; 1 John 3: "Everyone who has this hope in him sanctifies himself": thus also he is said to make himself a vessel sanctified and cleansed for honor - except that, in order that such a vessel be made, the gratuitous will of God and grace goes before him, by which he may be cleansed and sanctified, so that he may be a vessel unto honor. And therefore at Romans 9 Paul says that God could freely make from the same mass of Adam one vessel unto honor - namely, by preventing a man with his congruous grace, that he might be sanctified - and another unto contumely - often by permitting that the man himself should defile himself with sins - whence he would be appointed unto contumely and punishment; and at least as to the vessel of contumely, there is no doubt that each one becomes such by the merit of his own sin. For in the first permission, until he consents to sin, he is not called a vessel unto contumely. In this latter part of the sentence, therefore, the Semi-Pelagians judged rightly, nor were they ever noted by Augustine in that point.

Caput VI - Augustine holds that election to glory is made from foreseen merits of grace

Perhaps it will seem to someone that we have digressed more than was just up to this point. But since among the Schoolmen these matters are not yet sufficiently well-worn and public, and, through ignorance of them, anyone does not hesitate to drag Augustine into his own opinion, and since many questions daily arise about the divine election and about the predestination of grace, it was necessary to explain these points thus minutely and in detail, so that we may be able more easily to understand the ancient Fathers of the Church and to find the safer way. Meanwhile, let us, as we promised, confirm by testimonies of Augustine the election unto eternal life from the forevision of the merits of grace.

But before we bring those forward, it must be premised that, although election (as we said in the exposition of the article, from the doctrine of St. Thomas) is the love of one rather than another, nevertheless in Augustine a twofold election is found: one with a prior examination of those to be chosen and rejected; and this is according to justice, namely, that he is preferred who is found worthier, and he is rejected who is found less worthy: the other, however, with no examination premised; and this is that of grace - yet it is still of one rather than another: for this is intrinsic and

1762. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1, c. 10.

proper to any election precisely as it is election; whereas to have a prior examination is accidental. For one can also choose someone else wholly gratuitously from among many, in order to confer his gifts upon him rather than upon others. One can likewise choose one above others, who may seem more worthy to him, for a reward and a crown. Now in Augustine I manifestly show both elections, yet to different ends; and from him I also demonstrate the opinion set forth above.

First, therefore, in book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, a little before the middle, he thus interprets that place, Romans 9, "When not yet born." When those two brothers Jacob and Esau were not yet born, nor had they done any good from themselves on account of which one, rather than the other, upon a prior examination from his own good works, might be chosen unto justification - so that the purpose of justification should be from works - since, I say, it was not thus, it was done, not from works of free choice, but from grace, that the lesser was preferred to the greater: he understands this about the grace of justification. And he concludes in these words: "Therefore not according to election does the purpose of God stand, but according to purpose is there election; that is, not because God finds good works in men, by which he may choose, therefore the purpose of justification remains; but because that remains, that he justify believers, therefore he finds works which he now chooses for the kingdom of heaven: for if there were not election, there would not be the elect; nor would it be rightly said, 'Who shall accuse against the elect of God?' Yet election does not precede justification, but with election comes justification. For no one is chosen unless as set apart from him who is rejected: whence what is said, that God chose us before the foundation of the world, I do not see how it is said, unless by foreknowledge. But here where it is said to him, 'not from works, but from him who calls,' etc., he wished it to be understood not of the election of merits, which come after justification by grace, but of the liberality of God's gifts, lest anyone be puffed up about his works." Thus Augustine.[1761]

Concerning these points two things are to be noted. One is that that testimony of Romans 8, "Who shall accuse against the elect of God?" can be explained of those elected to grace without an examination of works; and especially that, Ephesians 1, "He chose us in him," must necessarily be understood of this election; as Augustine himself, book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 19, interprets; for it is added, "that we should be holy," which cannot be referred to an election unto glory made from merits. This, however, does not hinder that, in this testimony and in Augustine's doctrine, the aforesaid opinion be approved: for now we are arguing not from Scripture, but from Augustine's authority. The other thing to be observed is that here Augustine is not speaking of the election which God is going to make in time, whereby, as from a dragnet, he will choose the good into vessels, and cast the bad out, but of the eternal election of God, which, according to the foreknowledge of merits, was made from eternity. For thus he plainly bears witness when he says, "I do not see how it is said unless by the foreknowledge of merits"; and to these points he aptly tries to apply that testimony, Ephesians 1. Then also, when he speaks of election and of the elect, of whom it is rightly said, "Who shall accuse against the elect of God?" - which cannot be understood of those elected after they shall have been elected on the day of judgment - plainly it must be understood of those elected by an eternal election. Since, therefore,

1761. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, quaest. 2.

the election (arising, namely, from the purpose to justify - for this purpose the whole question understands) has sprung from the purpose, and thus men were elected by God unto eternal life, because God, after justification, found good works in men which he would choose unto glory; and since he says that in that place at Romans 9, "not from works," he is not speaking about the election of merits which is made after justification; and finally, that no one is chosen unless he be found distinct from another - he shows clearly enough that he posited in the eternal foreknowledge of God this order of prior and posterior, as we noted from this place above in Disputation 82, chapter 3; and that the election to the kingdom of heaven was made with the examination of merits premised according to reason. What Paul himself holds at Ephesians 1, "He chose us in him," we shall say in chapter 12.[1763]

Next, near the end of the same question 2 to Simplicianus, always dealing with the election which is made among certain persons with a preliminary examination - by which kind of election some were contending that men are chosen to God's grace - he says: "But if there is some election there, so that we may understand what is said (The remnant are saved according to the election of grace), not that the election of those already justified is made unto eternal life, but that those may be chosen who are to be justified; certainly this election is so hidden that, in the same intermixture, it cannot at all appear to us; or, if it appears to some, in this matter I confess my infirmity. For I do not have what I might look to in men to be chosen unto saving grace, if I am led beforehand by some consideration to an examination of this election, unless either greater talent, or fewer sins, or virtues; let us add also, if you will, uprightness and useful doctrines, etc." Therefore, since he denies that you can find any election unto grace, if an examination be premised - because before grace one cannot more differ from another in such wise that, because he has a greater talent, or fewer sins, or uprightness of discipline, he be elected unto grace - he rightly judges this absurd: nor does he deny that election of those justified unto eternal life which he had above affirmed; and there he excepts it, when he says: "Not that the election of the justified be made unto eternal life." He therefore concludes a little after, saying: "It remains, then, that wills be chosen; but will itself, unless something occur which delights or invites the mind, can in no way be moved. But that this occur is not in man's power." Where, when Augustine says - just as I cited Jerome, chapter 3 - that the wills of men are chosen by God, this means that in the election a reckoning has been had of merits: he does not understand this of the election whereby one is chosen to grace - for he had just denied that such an election be with a prior examination - but of the election of those justified unto eternal life; for this whole question, again and again, had taught as much: and, to show that no examination was premised in order that men might be chosen unto grace, he said that these wills, which are chosen unto eternal life, cannot be unless first there occur in thought something which delights. He holds, moreover, that this is granted wholly gratis, when he says that it is not in our power. Therefore, disputing most keenly for grace against the Pelagians, he openly affirms the election unto glory from merits.

Furthermore, Augustine, book 1 of the Exposition of certain propositions of the Epistle to the Romans, chapter 60, said that there cannot be election among equals, because he thought that grace is conferred from the merits of free choice; which opinion he retracted in book 1, chapter 23 of the Retractations, and in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 4.[176417651766] Afterwards, moreover, he grants everywhere that election is made wholly gratis from the same mass and intermixture among the lost; yet he asserts that this was unto grace, not unto glory. In the question at hand, however, he seems to admit only that election which is made with a prior examination; for as yet he did not seem to acknowledge another among equals. Nevertheless, he feels most rightly about grace, when he asserts that unto grace there is no such election; which, however, unto glory he grants: and thus he corrects that in which earlier, when speaking of the election of grace, he had erred. And what he teaches about the election unto glory he nowhere retracts, as we shall immediately say. It could nevertheless seem to someone that, in that question, he also recognized another election unto grace, without merits and without examination; since about its middle he calls those "elect" who have been called congruently. But he does not explain enough whether he says they are elect because to that very calling they were elected without examination, or because, being disposed by the calling, they afterwards had merits from which they would obtain eternal life, and would be chosen to it with a prior examination.

Then, in Sermon 7 on the words of the Lord according to Matthew, throughout, he now admits a twofold sense of that testimony ...[1767]

Caput VII - On recent attempts to overturn Augustine's testimonies, and their refutation

Then, in Sermon 7 on the words of the Lord according to Matthew, throughout, he now admits that twofold kind of that testimony, and with it he says thus: "But God chose, as the Apostle says, both according to his own grace and according to their justice." He says "according to his own grace," because God chose them freely without any prior examination, in order to give them the gifts of grace which he denied to others, for this sole reason, because it so pleased him. But what is "according to their justice," unless that he chose their good works, which by his grace he had prepared in them - he chose them, I say, unto eternal life - where now necessarily an examination precedes, which in an election unto grace could not have been. That this was Augustine's mind is clear from the following: expounding that place to the Romans, "The rest were saved according to the election of grace" (Rom 11), he speaks thus: "I chose them, because I saw their minds presuming on me, not on themselves, nor on Baal. They have not been changed; such are they as they were made by me. And you who speak - unless you presumed on me, where would you be?" Wherefore, even if he concedes an election of works unto eternal life, or unto a greater grace, he nevertheless asserts nothing against the dignity of grace, but attributes to grace those works which

1763. Vazquez, Disputatio 82, c. 3.
1764. St. Augustine, Expositio quarundam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos, c. 60.
1765. St. Augustine, Retractationes, lib. 1, c. 23.
1766. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 4.
1767. St. Augustine, Sermo 7 de verbis Domini secundum Matthaeum.

he says were chosen by God "according to justice," when he says, "Such are they as were made by me"; and in the same commendation of grace he straightway subjoins: "Beware, O Christian, beware of pride: though you be an imitator of the saints, always reckon the whole to be grace; for in order that there might be something remaining, God's grace, not your merit, has made it." He calls "the remaining" those good works which were to be chosen, so that it might be said that "the rest were saved by election."[1768] [1769]

Although, however, that place in Romans can be otherwise expounded - of the election, namely, of grace which prevents all examination and is unto grace itself, not unto glory - and this seems to be the native sense of Paul, which he follows in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 16; nevertheless the doctrine which he delivers in that sermon has nothing against the dignity of grace, nor is it found to have been retracted by him in the least part. Now, however, we have resolved to argue only from his authority. I pass over the testimony of Augustine, in the book On God's Predestination, chapters 2 and 3, which below, in chapter 8, we will cite.[1770]

Finally, Prosper too - himself altogether Augustinian and a most keen defender of grace - in the book On the Calling of the Gentiles, book 2, chapter 35, not less plainly establishes both elections with these words: "Therefore God gives to those whom he chooses without merits that whereby they may be adorned also with merits." Behold the prior election unto grace without examination. "And it is said in vain that the reason for working, that is, the zeal and solicitude for working, is not in the elect, when they even work to this very end, that they may be chosen." Since, therefore, he says that men are chosen unto grace without merits, and adorned with merits to this, that they may be chosen, he ingenuously concedes the latter election with a prior examination of merits - not unto anything other than unto glory and to the increase of grace. For the former, which he said to have been "without merits," he understands only of grace, that from it they might be adorned with merits. He denies, however, that these merits were the cause of the first election, because none could be other than of free choice, from which it could not be effected.[1771]

Explosions of the objections by which more recent authors strive to weaken these testimonies of Augustine:

There are no lack of machinations by recent men, by which they try to overturn such clear testimonies. First, indeed, some plainly confess that an election unto glory from merits is taught in those places, but that the contrary is taught elsewhere by Augustine; especially in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 7, where he concedes that the election unto reigning with Christ was altogether gratuitous and without merits. But in the following chapter we shall show not obscurely that Augustine nowhere, neither in that chapter 7 nor in the books to the same purpose, wished even lightly to insinuate the contrary.[1772]

1768. St. Augustine, Sermo 7 de verbis Domini secundum Matthaeum.
1769. St. Augustine, Expositio quarundam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos, c. 60.
1770. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1, c. 16.
1771. Prosper of Aquitaine, De vocatione gentium, lib. 2, c. 35.
1772. St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, c. 7.

Second, others - not a few learned in Augustine - proclaim that book to Simplicianus to have been written by him in his earlier age, though he was already a bishop, and therefore to have cared little about the grace of God, nor to have doubted to concede some election from merits, at least merits of grace; but that afterwards, when he had to dispute with the Massilians and fought more keenly for grace, so that not the least consideration of merit was conceded to election, he denied any election, even from merits of grace, as in the books On the Predestination of the Saints, On Rebuke and Grace, and others. I for my part indeed grant that book to have been published by Augustine in his first age after his episcopate, as he himself bears witness in the Retractations, book 2, chapter 1. I grant also that in that book he never acknowledged any election except with a prior examination, as I noted above. Nevertheless, since he makes mention of that book in the second book of the Retractations, chapter 1, he retracts nothing that he had taught in it; rather, he marvelously approves the doctrine about grace there delivered, and he deems the question of such weight that, disputing against the Massilians in book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 4, he even refers them to that book, if they wish to understand the true opinion about grace. And, lest anything be suspected, or be deemed to have been less rightly said there, which he had delivered that might seem to favor the sentence of the Massilians when he said that the election unto glory had been from merits - either he would have retracted that, or would have interpreted it in a good sense, or certainly would by no means have alleged that question in favor of Catholic doctrine against the Massilians.

Accordingly, in that chapter 4, at the beginning, he retracts what, as a presbyter, he had said, namely that grace is given from the merits of faith, which would be from our own powers, and that thus men are chosen unto grace from the merits of faith foreseen by God; thus he says: "You see what I then thought of faith and works, although I labored to commend God's grace, in which sentence I now perceive those brethren of ours to be; because they have not cared so to profit with me in those books of mine as to profit in them with me. For if they had cared, they would have found that question solved according to the truth of the divine Scriptures in the first book of the two which, for commemoration, I wrote to the blessed memory of Simplicianus." And in book 2 of the Retractations, chapter 1, concerning that question he says: "In the solution of which question, it was labored in favor of the free will of the human will; but the grace of God prevailed." Therefore he proves against the Massilians that whatever he said of grace in that question, he thinks indeed that their error is there sufficiently refuted: and if there were anything, even the least suspicion, that might seem to favor them, either he would have retracted it, or he would not remit them to that question. He also commends the same question to Simplicianus, and the doctrine of that book, in the work On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 20, where responding to Hilary of Arles he marvels that the Massilians said that for a long time the Church of God defended the Catholic opinion concerning predestination without this doctrine, which Augustine against them began to preach, teaching that no beginning of grace is from us going before; and he says: "I greatly wonder that they say - lest I speak of other things here - that our own books, written and published before the Pelagians began to appear, and see how in many places of them, not knowing that the Pelagian heresy would arise, we had to preach grace, by which God frees us from evil errors and our morals,

not from preceding good merits of ours, doing this according to his gratuitous mercy; which I began for the most part to taste in that disputation which I wrote to the blessed memory Simplicianus, bishop of the Church of Milan, in the very beginning of my episcopate, when I also learned that the gift of faith is God's." And in chapter 21 of that same book, of that question he thus writes: "Let them see, however" (namely, the Massilians) "whether in the latter parts of the first book of those two which I wrote to the blessed memory of Simplicianus, bishop of Milan, at the beginning of my episcopate, before the Pelagian heresy appeared, there remains anything whereby it may be called into doubt that the grace of God is given according to our merits; and whether I have there sufficiently treated that even the beginning of faith is the gift of God; and whether, from the things which are said there, it does not consequently shine forth - though it be not expressed - that even perseverance unto the end is granted by him alone who has predestined us unto his kingdom and glory." Augustine thus judges that he disputed concerning the grace of God in that question as exactly as in the rest of his later works after the Pelagian heresy arose. Let the aforesaid theologians be silent, then, and humbly acquiesce to Augustine's doctrine; and the doctrine of the same concerning grace and predestination is thus proved to them.[1773] [1774] [1775] [1776]

Third, others say that Augustine is speaking not of the order of intention, but of the order of execution - not that in time, when executing, he keeps a prior examination of merits (for he is speaking of the election itself present before God, as is plain from the words recited in the preceding chapter), but of the order of execution which God keeps in his mind and eternal foreknowledge. They say, namely, that in God's foreknowledge there is a twofold order, one of intention, the other of execution; just as in any craftsman, when he undertakes a work or consults about it. The former order proceeds from the end to the means: for from this, that one wills to build a house, he first decrees to build the house, then consults about the various means. But when he has now found the means, he considers the other order, namely that of execution, in which, such means being foreseen, he at last decrees to construct the house. Thus, therefore, God first decreed to beatify this man, not yet with merits foreseen; then to give the merits as means to that beatitude: and thus the order of intention was complete. But in the order of execution, through the means of grace and merits foreseen, he again decreed to lead him unto beatitude. For he saw that the man, being prevented by this and that grace, would so work and would be worthy to be beatified. Therefore he predetermined through those means, and from those foreseen, to repay such a reward. Of this latter order they say Augustine spoke, not of the former. With which it agrees well, that God first of all, before foreseen merits, in the order of intention, decreed to give eternal life.

1773. St. Augustine, Retractationes, lib. 2, c. 1.
1774. St. Augustine, De bono perseverantiae, c. 20.
1775. St. Augustine, De bono perseverantiae, c. 21.
1776. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 4.

But certainly, if this manner of philosophizing had any foundation in Augustine, I would readily embrace it; nor would I care, though our philosophers or theologians set something different against us, provided we interpreted Augustine's mind; it would suffice. However, I judge this to agree neither with Augustine nor with the Scholastics' doctrine, nay rather to be altogether at variance with the common sense of philosophers; and so this evasion is of no moment.

And first, indeed, in Augustine it has no foundation, since he nowhere posits another order of intention in which men would be chosen unto eternal life before foreseen merits. Wherefore, since he, wherever he speaks of this will of conferring glory, alleges that glory was granted for works and merits of grace, that distinction is not Augustine's doctrine, but a device coined for the sake of evasion. Nowhere, moreover, does Augustine say that this intention of conferring glory was before merits; in chapter 6 and in those adduced just before, where he speaks of election unto glory, he openly testifies that it was made from merits. Whence, then, could we even suspect that that double order was assigned by Augustine?

Second, there is an axiom, quite familiar and most true among philosophers and theologians, that two orders are assigned there: one of intention, the other of execution; and the order of consultation, which is ours, is called the order of resolution, and the order of generation is called by Aristotle that which we usually call the order of execution - as we shall see in the Prima Secundae, question 14. Now execution keeps the order of efficient causes; and that is prior which is more remote (for what is more remote moves what is nearer more), and therefore it begins from remoter things. This Aristotle expressly set down in Ethics 3, chapter 8, in these words: "And that which is last in resolution is known to be first in generation." He calls "the order of resolution" the order of consultation and of intention; the "order of generation" he calls that which we commonly name the order of execution. But that in either order there should be what mode of speaking about the divine will - who ever taught this? In consultation and intention, or in the decree of the will, that a double opposed order can be assigned - one of execution, the other of intention - so that what is first in the one is last in the other: who ever, whether philosopher or theologian, has taught this? I except certain recent professors of theology, who, that they might defend their opinion by their own or by others' arguments, have contrived these two orders; which, indeed, for this sole reason does not lack suspicion, that you will never find mention made of them by approved philosophers or scholastics.

Third, we hardly ever repeat what we have once disposed in the order of intention; but we keep it in memory, without any new consultation, and we determine what is to be done, unless perchance some new circumstance supervenes in the work's execution, which demands a new consultation - a thing which cannot befall in the perfection and providence of God. If, then, in us, after any consultation and decree, the order of execution, as far as it depends on us, proceeds from the intention and does not require a second order of intention: how much less should we assign in God a double order in one and the same decree of the will, since in him, after consultation, there is no room for a new or repeated decree; but what he once most wisely conceived and decreed, he

forthwith and without impediment executes? Hence it is evident that, in God, from the order of intention there proceeds immediately the work, so that there is no place to interpose some new "order of intention" after the execution has been disposed.

Fourth, even if we should concede that a double order is considered by the craftsman, we never therefore speak in that manner which they here feign, as though someone said thus: first he decreed the end simply, without any respect to the means, and only afterwards decreed the means because he had previously decreed the end. Rather, we always say: because he willed the end, therefore he at once willed the means - not that one order of intention succeeds another order of intention - but that one and the same act of intention respects both the end as end and the means as means. Thus, even a physician, when he intends health, at once intends the purgation or the incision, and afterwards in execution he begins from what is fitting to be done first. In the same way, therefore, when we speak of God's election unto glory "from merits," we speak according to that very consideration under which God ordained the end together with its due means; and nothing is obtained for those who would transfer these words from the order of intention to the order of execution.

... execution will proceed, he sees that from such an incision there will follow an evacuation of the malignant humor, and with it removed there will ensue health: we do not say, therefore, that he willed to heal because he foresaw the incision; but we only say, he saw that from the incision health would follow. If, however, we were to say that he both willed and decreed to heal because he saw that an incision could be made, without doubt the convenience of the means would have impelled him to the will of the end, which otherwise he would not have willed. This, indeed, sometimes happens, as we shall say in the following chapter: when, namely, a unique means is discovered for conveniently attaining the end, such that desire of the end was not fixed apart from regard for this or that means; but if there are many means and the will of the end was determined not in view of this or that, never, when we consider the order of execution and revolve it in the mind, do we say: therefore the end was willed because such a means was foreseen or chosen; but on the contrary, because the end was willed, such a means was chosen and foreseen as to be applied: we still affirm that from such a means there will follow that same end. The reason for the distinction is that the kind of causality in willing is different from that in doing and executing: for in willing that is cause which moves as end; therefore we never say, the artisan willed such an end because he foresaw such a means - unless in the case mentioned, in which the means redounds into the very ratio of the end; yet we do say, the intellect sees that in the thing there will follow such an end from such a means: because then only the causality of an efficient cause is attended to. These things, in my judgment, are most certain. From which I show that Augustine was not speaking of the order of execution considered in the mind. For if, in the order of intention, God had already willed eternal life to some men before merits had been foreseen, absolutely and of itself; even if we were to say that He then considered the order of execution, namely how merits, as means, should be obtained, nevertheless we would never say: therefore God willed to give glory because He foresaw merits, when He had already absolutely willed it, not in view of merits. Just as of one who in the order of intention sets the end before the means, we never afterwards, not even in the order of execution,

assert that he willed the end from foreseen means, as remains proved. Wherefore, since Augustine in that question to Simplician, and Prosper in the place cited, say that therefore men are chosen because their merits were foreseen, it follows that they also spoke plainly concerning any order of intention and will. Augustine says, "Because that (namely, the purpose of justifying) would stand firm, namely to justify believers, therefore He found the works by which He now chooses to the kingdom of heaven." Prosper, moreover, says of the predestined: "Since it is certain that they also work to this end, that they may be elect." If, therefore, they are for that reason chosen by the will of God, because they are foreseen to have merits, or work to this end and are chosen, then with respect to the will merits were prior. On the contrary, we do not say, "to this end, that one may will to be healed, the vein is opened," because the will of being healed is prior in intention and will; yet we do say, "to this end, that one may be healed, the vein is opened," because here only efficacy in the thing is signified, and the particle "to this end" denotes the final cause prior in intention, but in the thing itself posterior in the execution of the efficient cause.

Fifth, whenever the means to be applied for obtaining some end are merits, and someone proposes to another the end to be obtained by those, then for the proposer the merits are prior to his decreeing to give the end, for such an end is not given except in view of merits and after the mode of a reward. The one, however, to whom such an end is proposed, is first moved toward the end; then he applies merits so as to attain it. And therefore I noted in disputation 82, chapter 5, that whenever the means to some end is moral, that means is foreseen as prior to the will of conferring such an end. It is understood, however, with respect to the will of the one who proposes the end, as when God proposes beatitude to men, not with respect to him who ought to attain it by his own merits; this will be explained more fully in chapter 9.

Finally, the very mode of speaking in causal propositions explains to us the thing itself and Augustine's meaning. For we say, "God willed to give eternal life to Peter, because He saw that he would be holy," not, "He willed to give eternal life, so that he might be holy." But if beforehand in intention He had willed to give beatitude, and then merits and holiness, it would follow that He decreed to give beatitude to this end, that afterwards He might give holiness. From that, therefore, mode of speaking - "He decreed to give glory, because He saw that he would be holy" - it is gathered that He had the ratio of merits; just as if we should say, "He therefore called Peter, because He knew that he would be holy," we would be admitting that He had the ratio of merits in order to call. Now, however, because He did not have it, we say: "He called, not because He knew he would be holy, but so that he might be holy." Augustine taught nothing against this election from merits.

Caput VIII - On testimonies of Augustine for predestination and the sense in which they are to be taken

Not only with the testimonies alleged in chapter 1 do our adversaries strive, but also with numberless others, to prove out of Augustine an election to eternal life - that is, an efficacious will of placing men - that existed before merits. Therefore now, that Augustine's mind may be made

much more perspicuous (as we promised later on), let us show that he taught nothing, namely, against an election to glory from the merits of grace, even when he disputed more sternly for grace against the Pelagians and Semipelagians. But before we produce and examine some passages one by one, let us show universally why certain persons have been deceived in Augustine.

First, then, not a few, thinking with Ockham and Gabriel (whom above in this disputation, chapter 2, we reported), that predestination is only that will whereby God efficaciously decreed to beatify some, when they saw Augustine everywhere loudly proclaiming that men are predestined freely and without merits - indeed, that they are so predestined to eternal life that, in book 6 of the Hypognosticon about the middle, to which the Council of Valence under the Emperor Lothair consented in chapter 3, they said that he plainly felt that men were chosen by that efficacious will to eternal life without merits even wrought with grace, and that in this Augustine was opposed to the Greek Fathers. Thus Augustine was understood by Driedo, Ruardus, and Sixtus of Siena, whom we cited in the last chapter of this disputation; and in this sense they follow his view. Thus also was Augustine interpreted by Catherinus, Camerarius, Osorius - alleged by us there. Although, as we saw in the same chapter, they by no means acquiesce in Augustine's opinion thus explained.

Yet these authors were manifestly deceived in two points. One is that they confound election to eternal life with predestination, which St. Thomas in this article 4 and the following plainly distinguishes. For election to glory is the will of conferring glory upon someone; but predestination is the eternal preparation of the gifts of grace: which two are far different. Furthermore, that election is an efficacious will to give grace we now suppose, and it is certain among all, for about this we are disputing. But that predestination is a preparation of the gifts of grace, besides St. Thomas and other Scholastics whom we shall mention, Augustine expressly teaches, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, where he says thus: "Between grace and predestination this only is the difference, that predestination is grace prepared (he understands this in God's foreknowledge), but grace is already the very donation."[1777] And in the book On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 14, he thus defines predestination: "This predestination of the Saints is nothing else than the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which most certainly are delivered all who are delivered."[1778] So also other Fathers, whom in that disputation, chapter 3, we shall cite, number grace among the effects of predestination. Therefore predestination is a giving of the gifts of grace; and grace and predestination differ only in this, that grace is the object, but predestination is the act of God's will and intellect decreeing and disposing it. And Augustine understands an eternal preparation, as is clear from the text, and Fulgentius noted it, in the book to Monimus, chapter 8, with these words: "Accordingly the recognition of predestination itself is instituted when Scripture says, 'and the will is prepared by the Lord' (namely Proverbs 19, according to the Septuagint translation); nor is it said to be prepared for anything else, except because it is declared that it is to be given. For by whom it is prepared through everlasting goodness, by Him it is given through unowed grace."[17791780] And why, by reason

1777. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 10.
1778. St. Augustine, De bono perseverantiae, c. 14.
1779. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, c. 8.

of congruous vocation, the will itself is said to be prepared and to be predestined, will be explained in disputation 88, the last chapter. The same thing Augustine understood in that book, book 1, chapter 9.[1781]

Wherefore the controversy was always the same for Augustine with the Pelagians and Semipelagians concerning grace and concerning predestination, whenever there was question of merits - namely, whether it would be from merits; and he judged the same rationale to apply to each. Indeed, in order to show that grace is not given in time from merits, he showed that predestination was made without the foreknowledge of merits, by the mere nod and will of God. On the contrary, when he said in the Exposition on the Epistle to the Romans that grace is given in time from the merits of free choice, he also taught that these merits were chosen for grace in the eternal predestination of God, as we shall report in the following chapter.[1782] But just as he never strove - neither against the same nor against others - to prove that glory is given in time gratis and without any merits (for Augustine could not think this, nor any Catholic), so too for proving this he never anywhere assumed that an election to glory before merits had been made: whereas, to show that grace in time is given without merits, it mattered little that God had decreed to give glory before all merits as the end. Wherefore, since in Augustine predestination is not called grace, because grace is the very donation itself...

Election to glory is not the same as predestination, nor the effect of predestination, but a gratuitous will; yet election to glory, which is that will of conferring eternal life, is neither called grace, nor can it altogether be called a gratuitous will. For a will is called gratuitous from its effect; but the effect of that election, namely glory, is not altogether grace, but grace for grace, as Augustine frequently calls it.

I admit, however, that Augustine sometimes calls predestination the very will of retribution, namely of giving eternal life, as we shall see in chapter 9; yet he does not call this absolutely predestination, but predestination of retribution. Nor is that book by all received as Augustine's, although in my judgment it contains nothing contrary to his own doctrine, as we shall say there. Nevertheless, the preparation of the gifts of grace is called predestination unto life, or unto eternal life, not because it is a bare will of giving glory and from that predestination begins, but because the gifts that are prepared order man unto eternal life. Thus also, in order that they may order unto glory, it suffices that that will be a simple antecedent will, as in this chapter and in the last chapter we shall again note.

Another point in which these authors were plainly deceived is that they thought the Greek Fathers had taught contrary to Augustine, as if Augustine asserted that men were chosen to glory without merits. Whereas in truth the Greek Fathers, and the Massilians who relied on their testimony, never so much as dreamed of impugning Augustine on that head, as we showed in chapter 4; nor has Augustine ever taught that, as will presently be evident. The Massilians merely contended that grace in time is given in view of some labor, industry, or our will; and in view of

1780. Prov. 19 (LXX): "Praeparatur voluntas a Domino" ("The will is prepared by the Lord").
1781. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1, c. 9.
1782. St. Augustine, Expositio quarundam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos, c. 60.

that they understood that men had been chosen to grace from eternity. They also understood Augustine to have pronounced against the Greeks that election to grace had been made without merits, just as grace itself is given in time without merits. For their dissension with Augustine was about this, as we plainly proved in chapter 4, not about election to eternal life. By what reasons, moreover, they argued against Augustine, and how he himself replied to the testimonies of the Greeks that were alleged against him, we shall see in disputation 91, chapters 9 and 17. What remains is to show that there is no place in Augustine where he says that election to eternal life was made before merits; and because it would be burdensome to set out all the places, I have decided to cite only the more difficult ones and those that are more frequently alleged; the rest can be explained in the same way.

First testimony is from book 5 against Julian, chapter 3, after the middle, where he first adduces the words of Romans 11: "Who has first given to him, and it shall be recompensed to him?" and says: "He chose no one worthy, but by choosing he made him worthy." And a little below: "Accordingly, this even before the constitution of the world, but a selection by the election of grace. Whence the same Doctor says, 'So then at this present time also there is a remnant according to the election of grace'; and lest perchance they should be thought to be elected before the constitution of the world from foreknown works, he followed on and added, 'And if by grace, now not by works.'" Here he clearly speaks of the election of grace, by which one is elected by God not by an efficacious will of giving eternal life, but by a gratuitous will preventing with his grace. This he urges against the Semipelagians, who said there is in us some beginning; because if it were so as they thought, then grace would not be grace. In what way this is true we shall say in that disputation 91, chapter 14.

But from the fact that one is elected to glory from the merits of grace, what follows therefrom? that grace is not grace? It follows only that glory is not grace, but reward. Nor is this absolutely gathered; for in order that it have no account of grace at all, it would have to be conferred from merits, not of grace, but of bare free choice. Otherwise, since it is from the merits of grace, even if it is the reward of good works, it is nevertheless called "grace for grace." Thus Augustine calls it in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapters 8 and 9, and tractate 3 on John around the middle; and Fulgentius, book 1 to Monimus, chapter 10.[178317841785] Therefore the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 16, says: "To those who work well unto the end and who hope in God, eternal life is to be proposed, both as a grace mercifully promised through Jesus Christ to the sons of God, and as a recompense, to be faithfully rendered according to the promise of God Himself to their good works and merits." It is called grace by reason of the principle from which it is born; but a crown of justice only, because it is rendered to merits, as Augustine explains in those very chapters 8 and 9.[1786]

A second testimony is from the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 19, where against the Pelagians and Semipelagians he adduces that of Ephesians: "He chose us in him," etc., and shows with that witness that the Pelagian error is plainly refuted, who said that we were

1783. St. Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, cc. 8 - 9.
1784. St. Augustine, Tractatus 3 in Ioannem, around the middle.
1785. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, lib. 1, c. 10.

predestined because we were going to be holy. For they thought that by our own free choice we could keep the law, be justified, and persevere. But Augustine says that testimony confutes them, because, says he, Paul wrote: "That we might be holy," not "because we were going to be holy." He adds immediately these words: "But our men (namely the Massilians or Semipelagians) perhaps say that this apostolic testimony refutes the Pelagians, where it says that therefore we were chosen in Christ, and predestined before the constitution of the world, that we might be holy and immaculate; for they (namely the Pelagians) think that after receiving the precepts, by our own selves, by the free choice of the will, we are holy and immaculate. Which future God, since He foresaw (they say), therefore He did not before the constitution of the world choose and predestine in Christ. But we (namely the Semipelagians) say (they say) that our God foreknew nothing except faith, by which we begin to believe; and therefore that He chose us before the constitution of the world that we might already be holy and immaculate by His grace and work. But let them themselves also hear in this testimony, where it is said, 'We have obtained a lot, being predestined according to purpose, who works all things.' He therefore works that we begin to believe, who works all things. For that calling of which it is said, 'The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance,' and of which it is said, 'Not of works, but of Him that calls,' when he could have said, 'but of the believer'; by the election by which the Lord signified, saying, 'You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you,' even faith itself does not precede: for He did not choose us because we believed, but that we might believe, lest we should be said to have first chosen Him." These are Augustine's words.[178717881789]

Explanation of the foregoing election to grace. From these things who does not see that Augustine only wished here to exclude the opinion of the Massilians, who said that we are chosen unto grace on account of the merit of faith, which we would have from ourselves? But about election to eternal life from foreseen merits of grace, he has not a word; for about these there was no controversy with the Massilians. Nor throughout that book and the following, where he expressly disputes against them, can anything else be found. And if against the Pelagians in that testimony he contends that we were not elected to eternal life from merits, he understands the merits of free choice: for that from the merits of grace he never denied. For they asserted that in time eternal life is given to us from the merits of free choice. What wonder, then, if also in election they asserted that God looked to these merits? This very thing he taught in this chapter in the same book, chapter 17, where also near the end he thus explains that passage of James 2, "Has not God chosen the poor in this world, rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom?": "By choosing, therefore, He makes rich in faith, just as heirs of the kingdom. Rightly indeed in them this is said to be chosen, which He chose, in order that He may make it to be in them." God, therefore, is said to choose without merits, that He may make faithful, because He makes faithful without merits; and rightly this is said to be chosen, which He Himself makes. In this way in book 5 against Julian, chapter 3, he says: "He chose no one worthy, but by choosing He makes him worthy." And so in the book On

1786. Council of Trent, session 6, c. 16.
1787. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 19.
1788. Eph. 1:4 - 5.
1789. Rom. 11:29; 9:12; John 15:16.

Predestination and Grace, chapter 5, at the end, he says: "In God these three are at once, to foreknow, to make, and to choose"; and thus, by His immutable foreknowledge, God chooses those to be made, and makes those to be chosen. As if he were saying: He chooses in order to make holy by grace, and He makes holy by choosing them; unless also this last be referred to election to eternal life from merits, when he says "to make those to be chosen," as Prosper cited in chapter 5 at the end said, "God to give to us whence we may be adorned with merits, and ourselves to work to this, that we may be chosen." In the same sense he said in sermon 11 On the Words of the Apostle: "They are chosen who are not; nor does he err who chooses. Nor does he choose in vain. He chooses, however, and has the chosen, whom He is going to create to be chosen."[1790]

There are also wont to be alleged Augustine, On Predestination and Grace, chapter 7; tractate 86 on John; epistle 105 and 106 a little from the beginning; in the Enchiridion, chapter 107; On Correction and Grace, chapter 10; and Prosper, by the Excerpts of the Genoese, to the 4th and 5th objection; Fulgentius, in the book On the Incarnation and the Grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ, chapter 18. But still Augustine and his disciples, wherever they speak of an election without merits, only strive to exclude the merits of free choice alone from that election which is unto grace.

However, two other testimonies of Augustine are more strongly urged by the more recent authors for the aforesaid opinion, which, if they be read with moderate attention, will bring in no difficulty. Another testimony is from book 2 On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 14, where about the Tyrians and Sidonians he says: "But because it was not given to them to believe, even that from which they might believe was denied to them": from which they infer that some have in their very natural genius a divine endowment of understanding, by which they are moved to faith, if they hear words or behold signs congruent to their own dispositions, and yet by a higher indication of predestination's grace they are not separated from the mass of perdition; and the very divine words or deeds by which they could believe - if they heard or saw such things - are not applied to them. From which they infer that congruent helps are therefore conferred on the predestined, because by that efficacious will of giving eternal life they are distinguished from the reprobate; but, on the contrary, that these helps are denied to the reprobate, because by such a will they have not been separated, but are left in the mass of perdition. Wherefore they say that someone is first distinguished from the reprobate by the will of giving him the kingdom of heaven, than that a congruent calling should be afforded him, which is proper to the predestined; and on the other hand, that first he is thus distinguished by that will, than that such helps should be denied them.

Explanation. I answer, briefly, by referring to Augustine himself, who in that very book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, and in the place proposed a little above, had premised such things that, if they had been heeded, one would easily have perceived these objections to be frivolous. First, because Augustine does not say that a congruent calling is not given to them because they are not already distinguished, nor that that calling is given because they are already distinguished; which is most true, even if the will of denying eternal life - even after previous works, as the adversaries also admit, and as all must concede. In like manner one can say that a

1790. St. Augustine, Sermo 11 de verbis Apostoli.

congruent calling is conferred on those who are distinguished; and yet the distinction take place after works: because recall is not given except to those who with it work; and by reason of works they obtain eternal life, although the calling is not therefore granted because they are going to work.

Moreover, Augustine nowhere makes the distinction to consist in a will of giving eternal life, but in the predestination of grace. Predestination is the preparation of grace, not the will of giving eternal life. Thus he defines predestination in that book, chapter 10; and with the matter already stated Augustine said that the distinction is made by the predestination of grace, in the testimony cited above. By the name, therefore, of predestination of grace those Doctors understand, not rarely, a will of glory; which is not grace, save by reason of the principle, but is "grace for grace," as was said. When therefore Augustine says that to some it was denied whence they might believe; because it was not given that they should believe; and that signs or words are denied to them who are not distinguished; he is speaking (if one considers the thread of his discourse there) not of the interior grace moving to believe - for of these he elsewhere treats - but of exterior words and signs from which it commonly comes about that one believe, be converted, be preserved: as it happened with the Tyrians, not however with interior grace being wanting. Of these he rightly says that those exterior signs or words were denied, because it was not granted to them that they should believe; but to men it is granted that they believe through a congruent prevenient calling. Likewise, those signs or words were not granted to some, because they had not been beforehand distinguished by the predestination of grace from the mass of perdition; for in that whole work, and wherever he treats of distinction, Augustine attributes it to prevenient grace, just as he also attributes election unto grace to it, and not to a will of giving glory. Whence, then, do those Doctors gather that Augustine is speaking of a will of giving eternal life, by which the good are distinguished from the bad, and not of the predestination of prevenient grace; or that, by the reason of that interior grace, by which the wills of those who are to be made blessed are distinguished by God, he speaks not of interior grace but of exterior signs; nor of a will of giving them glory, but of preparing interior grace, does Augustine speak?

Another testimony is taken from On Correction and Grace, chapter 7, where, after he has shown that election was made before works, he says of that election that it was made according to grace, not according to works: "Therefore those are elected out of men's mass who perish, whom God has chosen to be delivered; man perishes of himself, God of himself saves; a man, if he will, perishes, no one if God wills remains un-saved: God therefore chose them unto obtaining the kingdom," and so forth. And in the same book, chapter 9, he speaks everywhere such that anyone who carefully goes through the whole context will see that concerning that election to grace, which he everywhere calls according to grace, he is contending, not of a will of giving eternal life; nor that glory is given to man apart from the merits of his free choice; but, as Augustine himself says a little above in that same chapter 7: "They are therefore the elect who are called according to His purpose, not according to our merits before one is called; because men are chosen before works, not from preceding merits of their own, but through the gift of grace, by which He makes the impious just," which he subjoins.[1791]

Explanation of Augustine's sense. First, it is there treated, that no one can deny that glory is given out of works that have proceeded from grace; who would dare to deny that it is given out of works, where Augustine also grants it? Then also, nowhere does he understand, as something absurd, that glory is not grace if it is given out of works; rather, he deduced this about grace alone against the Semipelagians, according to the doctrine of Paul in Romans 11, not about glory. As we have seen above, he himself and Augustine often call glory "grace for grace," which, although it is conferred out of the merits of grace, is still grace proffered for grace already received. To this point what he says about the election of grace ought not to be understood of an election and a will of giving eternal life, but of the election which is unto grace itself.

It is denied, because by such a will they are not set apart, but left in the mass of perdition. Wherefore they say that someone is first distinguished from the reprobate by the will of giving him the kingdom of heaven, than that a congruent calling be prepared for him, which is proper to the predestined; and, conversely, it is first the case that one is not distinguished by this will, than that helps of this sort be denied him.

Explicatur. I answer: if the adversaries had attended to the phrase of St. Augustine which he had premised, book 2 of On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, and if they observed what he says here,[1792] they would easily have detected this objection to be frivolous. First, because Augustine does not say, "therefore a congruent calling is not given to them, because they are not distinguished," nor, "therefore that calling is given, because they are distinguished"; but rather, "it is not given to those who are not distinguished" - which is most true, even if the will of denying eternal life is after foreseen works, as the adversaries also admit, and all must concede. In like manner he could have said that a congruent calling is conferred on those who are distinguished, even if the distinguishing takes place after the works: because in fact it is not given except to those who will work with it, and who on account of works will attain eternal life; although the calling is not on that account granted because they are going to work.

1791. St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, cc. 7 and 9.
1792. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 2, c. 10.

Besides, Augustine does not understand by "distinguishing" here a will of giving eternal life, but the predestination of grace; for predestination is the preparation of grace, not a will of giving eternal life. Thus he defined predestination in book 1, chapter 10; and, when the occasion was given, Augustine said that the distinguishing is done by the predestination of grace, in the testimony cited above.[1793] Therefore, under the name of predestination of grace these men vainly understand the will of glory, which is not grace except by reason of its principle, but [is] grace on account of grace, as has been said. When, therefore, Augustine says that to some it is denied whence they may believe, because it has not been given that they believe; and thus that signs or words are denied to them who are not distinguished, nothing would oppose the doctrine preached, even if the denial of the signs were causal. For in that place Augustine sets the discourse concerning external signs and words, whence it comes about that someone believes and is converted, as the Tyrians did, but not concerning the interior grace that moves within. Concerning these he rightly says that therefore these external signs or words were denied, because it had not been granted to them that they believe; but to men it is granted that they believe by a congruent prevenient calling. Likewise these signs or words were not granted to some, because by the predestination of prevenient grace they are not distinguished from the mass of perdition. For, in that whole work and wherever he treats of distinguishing, Augustine attributes it to prevenient grace, as also election to grace, not to a will of giving glory. Whence, then, do those Doctors gather that Augustine is speaking of a will of giving eternal life, by which the good are distinguished from the evil, and of interior prevenient grace, so that for this reason this interior grace is given to some, because by the will of making them blessed they are distinguished by God - when Augustine is speaking not of interior grace, but of external signs, and not of a will of giving them glory, but of preparing interior grace?

Aliud argumentum; Alterum testimonium est in On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 7; where, after he has at length shown that election was made before works, he speaks thus concerning the elect: "If any of these perish, God is deceived; but no one will corrupt [Him], because God is not deceived. If any of these perish, God is overcome by human fault; but no one will corrupt [Him], because God is overcome by nothing. Moreover, they are elected to reign with Christ; not in the way Judas was elected to the work, when it was fitting." And again of them he says: "These therefore He chose to obtain His kingdom." He speaks in the same way in that book, chapter 9.[17941795] But whoever shall run through the context of the whole chapter, or even read it lightly, will immediately see that Augustine is speaking not of election to glory, as the adversaries contend, which is the will efficacious for leading to eternal life, but of the will of giving grace, to which men are chosen without merits of free choice. For a little before in that chapter 7 he had said: "Assuredly they are elected by the election, as has been said, of grace, not of their preceding merits; because grace is for them every merit." And above: "Who also chose them in His counsel before the

1793. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1, c. 10.
1794. St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, c. 7.
1795. St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, c. 9.

foundation of the world, by the election of grace. But if by grace, now not by works; otherwise grace is no more grace." If, however, he were speaking of election to eternal life, he would not deny that it is given from the merits of grace, nor would he say, "if by works of grace, now it is not grace."

It is proved first, because no one can deny that glory is given from works perfected by grace, just as he ought to deny that grace is given from works, as Augustine there contends. Then also because nowhere does he infer, as if it were absurd, that glory is not grace if it is given from works; but he deduces this only concerning grace against the Semipelagians, according to the doctrine of Paul in Rom. 11. For glory, as we saw above, Augustine himself often calls "grace for grace," because it is conferred from the merits of grace. Moreover, since he speaks of the election of grace, it ought not to be understood of election and a will of giving glory, but of grace.

Furthermore, in the same chapter he says of the same elect: "Therefore they are elect, because they have been called according to purpose": which he repeats again. But if the discourse were of election to eternal life, which the adversaries wish to be prior to any foreknowledge of merits, he would not rightly say: "Therefore they are elect, because they have been called according to purpose"; but: "therefore they are called according to purpose, because they are elect." For the calling "according to purpose," as is clear from Disputation 88, cap. last, is said of that which is congruent; and it is frivolous indeed, nay unworthy, to suppose of so great a man that, in so few words, he either changed his opinion or spoke variously, now of election to grace, now of election to glory; or at least, since from the context it plainly appears, that he constantly spoke always of the same kind of election. Therefore, when he says, "they are therefore elect, because they have been called according to purpose," he renders the cause as it were formal, so that they are said to be elect inasmuch as they have been called according to purpose. He speaks in the same way in book 1, On the Predestination of the Saints, c. 17: "They are elect by that calling by which God accomplishes what He has predestined." Of that same election to grace he surely must be understood also in that chapter 9 that was cited.

Explicatio notanda Augustini. But why, when speaking of the elect to grace, did he say that they are elect "to reign with Christ," or "to eternal life," if indeed in that election of grace there was not yet an efficacious will of giving them the eternal kingdom? I answer: because grace is eternal life, and the seed of it; therefore with the best right, speaking of the elect to grace, he said that by this very thing they are elect to glory and to reign with Christ. In the same way must Augustine be understood wherever he shall have said that "the kingdom of heaven is predestined without merits." For since predestination is the preparation of grace, and this is given without merits of free choice, and is from eternity prepared, and in it there is the kingdom of heaven, indeed in Scripture it is called "the kingdom of heaven"; it is rightly also said that "the kingdom of heaven without merits is predestined." Yet this does not hinder but that God has decreed to confer eternal life only from merits foreseen of grace.

From what has been said it is gathered that Augustine, in the places cited, did not teach things contrary to himself in this, that he asserts that election was made "from works," or that "the wills were elect," and in turn that "no one was elect from works." First, because Augustine does not speak in both places of the same kind of works: in this part he does not contradict himself. For

when he asserts that "the wills of men were elect," he does not mean works of free choice alone, but those brought forth from grace; but when he says that "election was not made from the foreknowledge of works, but from grace," he excludes the works of free choice against the Pelagians and Semipelagians, as has now been sufficiently explained; although Augustine himself, while still a presbyter, taught the opposite.

By the same reasoning I think that Paul is to be reconciled with James: Paul in Rom. 3, 4, and 11, and in Gal. 2 and 3, affirming that man is not justified from works, but from faith; and James in c. 2 when he says that man is justified not from faith only, but from works. For Paul excludes works, not ceremonial only, but also moral, which are from free choice alone; and he teaches that from these a man is not justified; because justification is not grace. This, however, he understands as much of the first justification as of the second, that is, of the increase of the first: for of both justifications, both to be acquired and to be increased, there is the same ratio, so that in neither way can it be from free choice alone. For as often as a man, by good works, is either promoted to acquire justification, or in the justification acquired grows, he always works by the help of the grace of God; and therefore Paul brought forward the example of Abraham, who, at the time when he believed God and it was reputed to him unto righteousness, was already just before God. But James says that a man is not justified from faith alone, whether we understand him of the first justification or of the increase, but from works proceeding from faith; because it is not enough to believe, but one must work from faith; and therefore he brought forward examples both of the first and of the second justification: for Rahab by works of mercy proceeding from faith obtained the first justification, obtaining from God to be numbered among the people of Israel, and true compunction of sorrow. Then he says that Abraham, whose example Paul also had adduced, was justified from works, whom nevertheless Paul had said, not from works, but from faith; because both for acquiring and for increasing justification, in this there is an equal reason.

Perperam, therefore, some think that Paul spoke of the first, but James of the second justification; since each of them uses one and the same example of the second justification, and James also adds an example of the first. Nay rather, when James says, "And the Scripture was fulfilled, which says, Abraham believed God, and it was reputed to him unto righteousness," he interprets the Scripture of Genesis 15, where that is said, "Abraham believed," etc.; and Paul, who uses that testimony, in such a way that works done from faith are not excluded; but are proved from Scripture itself, because Abraham not only believed, but from faith also offered his son; by which deed, says James, the Scripture, which seems to attribute justification to faith alone, ought to be supplied, so that it be understood of working faith.

Then also from another point Augustine is not contrary to himself: because when he says that election was made from justice with the examination of works premised, he understands it of eternal life; but when he says that "without examination, and not from works, but by grace men were elect," he understands it of grace.

Caput IX - Election to glory after merits is proved a priori

It is fitting that we confirm this same opinion by reasons, and first propose in this chapter those which show the matter a priori. The first is taken from the common doctrine of the Theologians, who with one voice admit that God by His primary and antecedent will willed to give to all eternal life, and therefore that will is common to all: but the antecedent and primary will is before the forevision of merits: therefore the will of God before foreseen merits is equal to all. Wherefore, since God did not decree by an efficacious will to give glory to all, it follows indeed that no one was elected to it by an efficacious will except from the foreknowledge of merits. Moreover, that antecedent will is that which is from God alone, without any foreknowledge of merits, has already been sufficiently proved by us in Disputation 83, cap. 3, where we also showed that it is not for this reason called antecedent because it is simple and inefficacious, but because it is from God alone; nor consequent because it is efficacious, but because it comes after our works foreseen, and takes occasion from us.[1796]

No less efficacious reasons can be brought forward from the doctrine handed down in Disputation 82, c. 5, namely, that in the decree and in the prescience of God the ratio of prior and posterior, according to our mode of understanding, can be assigned in no other way than in one of two ways. One is by analogy and likeness to the human mind, which deliberates about things and determines them, so that we assign to God also the order which He may observe in things when He proceeds in an orderly way. The other is on the part of the objects which God is said to foreknow and to foreordain: for although He does not will one created thing for the sake of another, that is, because He wills another; yet He does will one to be for the sake of another, as was proved in the preceding chapter; when, therefore, we must constitute, according to our mode of understanding, an order in the divine prescience and foreordination, we must constitute that which the objects have among themselves. From either head we shall not obscurely show that election, and the efficacious will of giving eternal life, was from the foreknowledge of merits; indeed, if it could be done in this way, it could not have been done otherwise, if in time glory was to be given from merits.[1797]

The second reason, then, can be from human things to divine. For if some king should propose some prize to those who compete well, and with this condition, that no one should obtain it unless he were victor, certainly he would never determine with himself to confer that prize for certain upon someone - however much he loved him and desired the prize for him - before he saw him to be victor. He could indeed give him better arms, a better horse, and other things necessary for the contest; but to determine with himself to confer that prize would surely be foolish, if he wished to propose it as a prize. But if he were prescient of the outcome, and knew that he would be victorious; from the foreknowledge of the victory he could determine with himself to give the prize: but if he were not prescient of the victory, he could not but in time await the victory, so that in view of it, and on account of it, he might determine to award the prize. Therefore, since God proposes

1796. Vázquez, Disputatio 83, cap. 3.
1797. Vázquez, Disputatio 82, c. 5.

eternal life to all as a prize, and promises it lawfully only to him who strives according to the rules on account of victory and perseverance, He could not but await the victory, so as to determine to confer such a prize in view of it. But because He is prescient of future things, and sees them clearly as if present, He indeed awaits the victory, not in time, but according to reason in His eternity, so that in view of it He may confer [glory]: for it would be foolish to foreordain the prize without respect to it, if He promises it only on account of victory, as we said of the king. Although therefore God should desire the prize of eternal life more for some than for others - even before He sees the victory - namely, for those to whom He has decreed to confer better grace for meriting glory, who are called predestined: nevertheless by no reason must it be affirmed that to them He efficaciously decreed glory before He saw the victory.

It is fitting that we confirm this same position with reasons, and first bring forward in this chapter those which show the matter a priori. The first is taken from the common doctrine of the theologians, who with one voice confess that God by His primary and antecedent will willed to give eternal life to all, and thus that will was common to all: but an antecedent and primary will is prior to the forevision of merits; therefore God's will before merits were foreseen is equal toward all. Wherefore, since God did not decree by an efficacious will to give glory to all, it follows clearly that none was chosen to it by an efficacious will, except from the foreknowledge of merits. Moreover, that antecedent will - since it is from God alone, without any foreknowledge of merits - has already been sufficiently proved by us in Disput. 83, cap. 3, where we also showed that it is not called antecedent because it is simple and inefficacious, but because it is from God alone; nor consequent because it is efficacious; but because it is after our works foreseen, and takes occasion from us.[1798]

No less efficacious reasons can be produced from the doctrine delivered in Disput. 82, cap. 5, namely, that in the decree and foreknowledge of God the reason of what is prior and posterior - according to our way of understanding - can be assigned only in one of two ways. One is by analogy and likeness to the human mind, which consults about matters and proceeds by order; the other is from the side of the objects about which He is said to decree and determine. For although we must posit in the divine determination, according to our mode of conceiving, a certain order - which, however, in God is most perfect - yet we must also assign to God an order of acting; but no order is to be attributed at will without foundation in the objects about which He operates. Whence, as we showed there, God is not said to ordain one thing to another by His mere will, except inasmuch as the very objects are ordered and referred among themselves. Now such an order is constituted in the things themselves, that if something is a means to an end as a physical cause of attaining the end (as medicine is for health), in intention the order is inverted, so that health is first willed; for although it is an effect of medicine under the genus of efficient cause, it is nevertheless the end of it; but the end, as related to the will, is prior, and the will of it is prior, than the will of the means. If, however, the means to some end are moral - such as merits: whether condign, or congruous, or impetratory - although he who wishes to attain from another such an end through merits may first

1798. Vázquez, Disputatio 83, cap. 3.

think about the end and by an efficacious will wish to have the merits as means; nevertheless, he who promises to another the attainment of the end through merits as through means never decrees to give that end until he sees or foresees the merits, as we noted in cap. 6 of that Disputation.[1799]

The reason indeed is that a moral mean, which is merit, is not a physical mean which by its own action really effects and attains the end, as medicine does health; but it is a mean after the mode of impetration, related to the will of him who confers the end in view of it. But merit can never in time be a divine mean, unless He who in act confers the end bestows it on account of merits; whence it is that He must first see before He decrees to give the end which He has proposed. Now this order, which the will keeps in time - namely, that merits be first, before the end is given - God also keeps in foreknowledge; because both foreknowledge and merit in time itself are compared as a moral mean with the will of Him who confers the end; and thus in His mind, in order to impetrate, it must precede.

For this reason, when the Massilians (the men of Marseilles) tenaciously defended that the first prevenient grace is given to us in time in view of our labor and solicitude, and so conceded some merit at least congruous and impetratory of grace, they consequently said that we were elected to grace by God's election on account of the merits of our first labor: whether from faith, or from the will of rising from sins, which they supposed to be from us; or from some other work of ours, as is clear from the letters of Hilary and Prosper, often alleged. Nor anywhere does St. Augustine, disputing against them, impugn their position from this, that the end ought first to be determined before the means, and thus that grace - which in the opinion of the Massilians is the end of labor - ought to be prior to the labor itself; but he always presses them with this reason: that, just as grace is not given in time in view of any work or merit, so neither could it have been prepared from eternity out of the foreknowledge of works or merits; for he thinks the same account holds in both cases, namely, of the very donation of grace in time, and of the predefinition or election to it in foreknowledge.[1800]

Add that since St. Augustine himself, when he was a presbyter, had been in the same opinion with the Massilians, thinking that grace is given on account of the merits of faith from one's own powers, by the same token he said that in the eternal election to grace God had had regard to our faith, and that we were elected from the foreknowledge of it, or that our very faith had been elected. Thus he taught in the book of Expositions of certain propositions of the Epistle to the Romans, cap. 60, which afterwards he retracted in book 1 of the Retractations, cap. 24, and first, in book 1 De praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 3. Therefore he afterwards held that election to grace was not from the foreknowledge of faith, because he understood that faith itself is the gift of God, and thus is not prior to grace. His words are: "I had not yet diligently inquired, nor had I yet discovered, what the election of grace is, of which the Apostle says, 'the remnant were saved according to the election of grace'; which truly is not grace if any merits precede it to obtain that it be given, rather than that it be given not according to grace, but according to debt rendered to merits. But if truly

1799. Vázquez, Disputatio 82, cap. 5.
1800. The letters of Hilary and Prosper, often cited in this matter.

grace in time were given from merits, Augustine would not shrink from conceding - indeed would be compelled to say - that election to grace was made from merits; nor would any absurdity follow therefrom."[180118021803]

In the same way, in Tractate 86 on John, after the middle, explaining that, "You have not chosen me" (John 15), he says: "Here surely is vacated the vain reasoning of those who defend the prescience of God against the grace of God; and therefore they say that we have been elected before the foundation of the world, because God foreknew us as going to be good, not that He Himself would make us good. He does not say this who says, 'You have not chosen me.' For if for this reason He had chosen us, because He had foreseen that we were going to be good, He would at the same time have foreseen this, that we were going to choose Him first." Augustine therefore infers that election to grace was not made from the foreknowledge of merits, because otherwise in time we should first be good and should choose, or merit, God, before He moved us. But if in time it would be thus future, we should not deny that even in the eternal election we were foreknown as good, and therefore elected by God. Since therefore in time we, truly aided by the grace of God, do choose and do merit the kingdom of heaven, it follows that in the eternal foreknowledge from these merits we were elected to it. In precisely the same way, if something in time was the meritorious cause of our first grace and of the entire effect of predestination, it was also in foreknowledge the cause of it; just as the prayers of Stephen, on account of which God called Saul, and the merits of Christ, which were the cause of all grace and of the glory to be conferred on us, were in God's foreknowledge the cause of the predefinition and election by which He chose Saul, or us, to grace, as we shall say in Disput. 94. Finally, whatever in time is given in view of merits is in the eternal election decreed for the sake of those merits.[18041805]

Wherefore their opinion is not approved by me, because they assert that God chose us to glory - which He proposed without us - before He foresaw the merits of Christ; and that the Blessed Virgin was first chosen to be the Mother of God before her merits were foreseen: provided that they once concede that she obtained this dignity by merits, as all confess. Nor does that manner of speaking stand in the way: "Christ was predestined that we might be sanctified and glorified; and the Blessed Virgin was sanctified that she might be the Mother of God"; where the particle "that" denotes the final cause, which is prior in intention: because when the end is to be attained in the thing itself through merits, and the gift in time depends upon them, the end alone is willed prior in the order of intention by a will of simple affection and inefficacious; inasmuch as he who desires such an end for another proposes it only under the condition, if it be merited: and as in fact He will give it only through merits, so also in His decree He never efficaciously defines to give except through merits. And indeed it is absurd to assert that anyone was efficaciously elected to eternal life among men before He who was the cause of salvation for all was foreseen: for thus someone would not be elected in Christ, which is manifestly false, as we shall prove in that Disput. 94.

1801. St. Augustine, Exposition of certain propositions of the Epistle to the Romans, cap. 60.
1802. St. Augustine, Retractationes, lib. 1, cap. 24.
1803. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1, cap. 3.
1804. St. Augustine, Tractate 86 on the Gospel of John.
1805. Vázquez, Disputatio 94.

From this also it follows - which we shall show more copiously at III, q. 2, a. 1 - that the merits of the holy Fathers could not in time have been the cause of the Incarnation of Christ according to substance, if indeed it was preordained from eternity that it should be in time, and if in time it was bestowed upon them in view of the merits of Christ Himself; for if from eternity their merits had been the cause, it would not in time have been granted in view of Christ's merits.[1806]

For this reason St. Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of God, chapters 2 and 3, seems to have taught that there is a twofold predestination: one of "binding," namely of natural things into their ends; the other truly of condition, namely of men to punishment or to eternal life. Whence at the end of chapter 3 he says thus: "From the foreknowledge therefore of offenses, as a just judge He predestined punishment; just as from the foreknowledge of virtue, predestination is wont to be made of remuneration." Thus does he explain that passage to the Romans (8): "Those whom He foreknew." Where, first, note that predestination is called by Augustine not the preparation of grace, according to his common phrase in book 1 De praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 10 and elsewhere, but the will of giving glory. Yet he did not say absolutely "predestination," but "predestination of remuneration"; and he admits this to be from foreknowledge, because it is a predestination under condition, namely, if one shall merit well and persevere; which is to propose eternal life as a prize.[1807]

Moreover observe that although this book is counted by Erasmus among the spurious works which are ascribed to Augustine, nevertheless the reasons by which he is induced to believe this are frivolous. One is because the work is brief; yet there are many others in the ninth tome much briefer which undoubtedly are Augustine's. Another is that it contains doctrine contrary to Augustine himself; but Erasmus is mistaken: for where he teaches that predestination is made without merits, he speaks of that predestination which is the preparation of grace and is called absolute predestination; but here he speaks of the predestination of the reward and of remuneration, which we commonly call election to glory. But now let us come to the third reason.[1808]

The third reason, no less efficacious for our position, is taken from the order of objects among themselves. For according to the doctrine handed down to us in Disput. 82, cap. 5, we must assign in the divine decree the same order which objects have among themselves in the thing itself, according to the different genus of cause under which they are compared among themselves; for otherwise we could not constitute order and predefinitions among the decrees of God according to reason; and since God has a most perfect mode of disposition, we ought to assign the very order which He observes in things. We will, however, handle in the last chapter whether God can, by a peculiar desire, will for someone eternal life before He foresees his merits, then only, when He decides to confer upon him greater means of grace.

1806. III, q. 2, a. 1.

1807. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione Dei, cc. 2 - 3.

1808. Erasmus judged that book to be among the spurious works attributed to St. Augustine; his reasons are refuted in the text.

...than if God were to bestow glory on one who had no merits. For then, just as in time He would not give it on account of merits, since there were none, so neither would He from eternity have decreed to give it from those merits.

The same, which up to now we have said of adults, think it said also of little ones; namely, that they were not efficaciously elected to eternal life before others except from the foreknowledge of justification. Indeed, in time glory is bestowed upon little ones only if they are justified, and the justification of these demands it condignly, if not as a reward, at least as a paternal inheritance, to which by that very justification they are adopted; and the very same ratio altogether ought to be held for it, as if it were bestowed as a reward.

The same position is shown from freedom of the will.

Caput X - A posteriori reasons: against the absurd consequence from the opposing view; on liberty

No less effective are the a posteriori reasons by which it can be proved that election to life was defined by God from the foreknowledge of the merits of grace. The first reason tries to draw the opposing view to this absurdity, that in the elect true freedom (*libertas*) of attaining and of losing beatitude (*beatitudo*) does not remain. For if God, from Himself alone, having no regard to merits (*meritum*), efficaciously decreed to make some blessed, it would follow that it would not remain in their free power not to attain glory and to be damned; since no one can resist the decree of God or make it void: which is plainly absurd and contrary to Scripture. But that this reasoning may be made firmer for me, two things must be proved: one is, that what we infer from this reasoning is false; the other is, that from the opposing view that very thing is clearly gathered.

As to the first, then, that what we infer is false is clear from Scripture, which often repeats that each one of us will receive on the day of judgment according to his works, whether good or evil, which would be said in vain unless it lay in our power. It is confirmed, first: we would also in vain say, "Thy kingdom come," if to attain or to lose it were not placed in our freedom, nor in any way depended on our prayer. Thus the men of Marseilles inferred against St. Augustine, when the discussion was about election to grace. But the ratio of that matter is far different, as we shall explain in our disputation on grace, chapter 17.[1809] In the present difficulty, however, it follows most rightly that it would be in vain to ask beatitude from God, if it in no way depended on our prayer and freedom.

It is confirmed, second: No one, who once has been elected to glory as a vessel unto honor, could make himself a vessel of dishonor and of damnation by his own iniquity. For whether he will have been good or evil, he will always be a vessel elected unto honor and glory, since to make that election, once made, void is not in his power. But Paul in 2 Timothy 2 does not think that anyone,

1809. Vázquez, Disputatio de gratia, cap. 17.

by cleansing himself from sins, can become a vessel unto honor from a vessel of dishonor any more than, on the contrary, from a vessel unto honor one can become a vessel of dishonor if he fall away from justification.[1810]

It is confirmed, third: That saying would be said to the elect in vain, Apocalypse 3: "Hold fast what thou hast, that no one may take thy crown." For if no one had it in his own hand in such wise as to be able to lose it, he would rightly answer that it is laid up in the hand of God, from which neither could any other snatch it, nor could the elect himself lose it. For if God has the key, and so shuts that no one can open, and opens that no one can shut, surely for the elect the gate of hell will thus be shut, and that of the kingdom of heaven open, so that it would not be in their power to shut for themselves what is open and to open what is shut. Wherefore it will not be free to them to enter into hell with the doors shut; on the contrary, with the door of the kingdom of heaven open, no one will hinder them, if they will to enter, however they may have conducted themselves in this life.[1811]

Some reply, following the opinion of St. Augustine, chapter 13 of On Correction and Grace, that Scripture so speaks, not because the crown of the elect can be lost, but that man may stand in fear. But neither is this the opinion of St. Augustine, nor could anyone fear for himself that which he knows to be impossible and in no way placed within his capacity. St. Augustine therefore in that place only teaches that the number of the predestined is certain, even if this also be said to them, "Hold fast what thou hast," etc.; indeed from this very passage he proves that the number of the predestined is certain in the aggregate, namely a thousand or some other, nor will it ascend beyond that: because unless one should lose his crown, another need not be substituted. He adds these words: "But that even to the saints who will persevere these things are said, as if it were held as certain that they will persevere, should not be heard otherwise by those to whom it will be expedient not to be wise above measure, but to fear. For who, from the multitude of the faithful as long as he lives in this mortality, would presume that he is in the number of the predestined? for that must be kept hidden in this place, where pride must so be guarded against that, lest he be lifted up, the Apostle was even buffeted by the angel of Satan."[1812]

The number of the predestined is certain only in foreknowledge; for certainty does not belong to the things themselves, but to their cognition and to knowledge, as was noted in Disputation 68, cap. 5.[1813] But foreknowledge supposes the very outcome of things as future from our liberty. Therefore that certainty proceeds both from our liberty and from the infinite divine intellect. And because he whom God certainly knows will persevere still has in his power not to persevere, since that pre-fixed certainty does not precede but rather supposes his liberty, therefore it is rightly said to him: "Hold what thou hast," because he can fall from it; and each predestined person, to whom also it is expedient not to be wise beyond measure, ought gladly to hear that voice: "Hold what thou hast." On this account Paul, certain indeed of his predestination, when he still saw his salvation placed in his own liberty, said, 1 Corinthians 9: "I chastise my body and bring it into servitude, lest

1810. 2 Timothy 2 (on vessels for honor and dishonor).
1811. Apocalypse 3:11.
1812. St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, cap. 13.
1813. Vázquez, Disputatio 68, cap. 5.

perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become reprobate."[1814] The word "perhaps" indicates the liberty by which he could fall and become reprobate. Therefore, lest that which he could bring about should follow, he chastised his body. For the certainty of his salvation was not pre-fixed before his consent, but after it; and so it remained in his power. Also for this reason, lest, though he could, he should be wise beyond measure, he was buffeted by Satan, as St. Augustine notes. He also observed that the name "reprobate" in that place either signifies one excluded from the kingdom of God - in which sense the Scholastics use this word - or denotes what we call "improper" and "vicious," which in the same way serves our reasoning. For if Paul had been elected to the kingdom of heaven before merits, and could not by his own sin lose it, then by his own will and life even to the end he could not become improper. But if the crown is pre-fixed without our liberty, and altogether prior to it from God alone, there is nothing for anyone to fear that he might lose it, since it is not free for any other to snatch it from the hand of God, nor for the predestined man himself to lose it; and up to this point concerning the first point which we proposed to prove.

Next, it must be shown that from that decree such a necessity is imposed from without upon our liberty that those who are elect are not at all left free not to obtain the crown; and hence their liberty is injured and impeded. I do not undertake to prove that from that supposition of a decree there follows a necessity of each and every work; for however necessary it would be for someone to persevere in grace, he could exercise himself in various good works with liberty; just as Christ, to whom it was not free to sin, could, according to his will, do these or those works. But I contend that at least it is necessary for the elect to obtain glory and not be damned, in such wise that no liberty at all remains to them toward the opposite. Wherefore it is also necessary for this, that someone at some time persevere in grace unto beatitude, and that he die without mortal sin, because it has been so ordained by God; it will not be free for the elect not to persevere; or, even if he should die in sins, they could obtain beatitude: both of which are absurd.

In the first place, the doctrine of Waldensis must be supposed, which I brought forward above in Disputation 68, cap. 1, namely, that it is a manifest error to concede in us an absolute necessity that we be saved or that we act, and also to concede a necessity which he calls "relative," that is, arising from a supposition that takes away liberty; from such an election prior to works there arises a necessity which is clearly shown in us, not only absolute necessity, but also necessity from a supposition which removes our liberty, as is proved there.[1815][1816]

For, with such a decree posited, either a man can fail to persevere in grace and be damned, or he cannot. If he cannot, it follows that in him there does not remain indifference toward either part, and hence neither liberty; for liberty is nothing else than an indifference toward either alternative, and it cannot remain along with an impossibility and an implication of contradiction toward the other part; thus the free faculty is not apt for either, but is by a necessary determination fastened to one part. But if still he can fail to persevere and be damned, then it is possible in reality. For if that

1814. 1 Corinthians 9:27.
1815. Waldensis, as cited above in Disputatio 68, cap. 1.
1816. Vázquez, Disputatio 68, cap. 1.

which is possible can be, no impossibility follows, as Aristotle says in the Prior Analytics, book I, chapter 12;[1817] but if from the positing of something an impossibility follows, that thing is not possible. Let us then suppose that some elect person should not obtain glory; it follows that an efficacious decree of God becomes void; but this is impossible: therefore so also is the antecedent.

Various adversaries try to reply to this argument, but in no way can they shake its force. First, some reply that, the decree posited, man indeed is saved of himself, but not free toward either alternative. But this doctrine cannot be defended by any reason. For heretics, with Calvin, say that from the foreknowledge and will of God a necessity is imposed on our free choice, so that although liberty and indifference toward either be taken away, nevertheless spontaneity remains - something which even in brute animals, according to the Philosopher in Ethics III, chapter 1, is found - namely, because the operation is from an intrinsic principle of cognition.[1818] But, as to single works, it is not enough to concede spontaneity; one must also assert liberty: so also in perseverance and the obtaining of beatitude, it does not suffice, but one must assert liberty; otherwise by the predefinition our liberty will be injured, although spontaneity should remain intact, and in this respect we should not differ from brute animals.

Second, others reply that, with the supposition made of the decree of God and of divine election, a necessity is imposed upon our will so that now it cannot go to the opposite part, yet of itself and by its own power it is free, and in the manner of acting nothing is changed in it from within; because the impediment is from without, nor does it physically flow into our will: for they think that, with a merely extrinsic impediment posited - as was, in Christ, the precept of dying - liberty is in no way taken away, but only by an impediment physically influencing and determining our will. But this solution is frivolous. For although our will, of itself and according to its manner of acting, would otherwise be free, nevertheless, with the decree of God posited, however extrinsically it be added, and even if it do not physically influence, it cannot act indifferently, or incline to either part; in no way here and now does it remain indifferent: therefore neither does liberty remain; and consequently the decree of God injures and will impede our liberty, which is absurd. For what, indeed, is liberty other than indifference toward either part? If therefore now indifference does not remain, liberty will not remain; whether the mode of acting be changed intrinsically, or only something be added extrinsically, upon the positing of which indifference does not remain. In what way, however, in Christ, with the precept of dying, liberty remained in the observance of that precept and the ratio of merit, we shall say in III, q. 18.[1819]

Third, some reply that no other kind of necessity is imposed on our will from the decree of God than from his knowledge. For just as, the supposition being made that God knows Peter will sin, he cannot not sin, yet simply his liberty to not sin is not taken away - wherefore simply thus he will sin, in such wise that he can not sin - so, with the supposition of God's election, man cannot be damned and not obtain glory, and yet simply thus he will freely obtain it, in such wise that he can lose it, because necessity from a supposition does not simply take away liberty nor diminish it. But

1817. Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, c. 12.
1818. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, c. 1.
1819. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae III, q. 18.

this solution is manifestly refuted by the doctrine of Anselm, which we adduced in Disputation 68, cap. 4 and 5.[1820] For as he himself teaches in the work De concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis, cap. 1, there is a twofold necessity: one antecedent, the other consequent. The antecedent is that which precedes our liberty, that is, which arises from something that so precedes our liberty that its positing or its non-positing does not depend on us, as for example that the sun will rise tomorrow, or something similar. The consequent, however, is that which follows our liberty, that is, which, the supposition being made of that which will be future from our liberty, is necessarily inferred. By the former, he says, our liberty is taken away: for if something imposes on us a necessity of willing one part so that we cannot will the opposite, and that thing precedes our consent and liberty, nor is supposed to be from our liberty, it follows together with that necessity - because it is prior - that our liberty does not stand. For how can it be that something befalls me without my consent, and I am by necessity inclined to one part, and nevertheless my liberty be unharmed? The consequent necessity, however, according to the opinion of Anselm, does not take away or diminish liberty, because every supposition upon which such a necessity follows is posterior to liberty and even depends upon it. Such is the necessity which follows from the knowledge of God; for, this being posited, we also posit the thing to be future; but the thing is future from our liberty. Therefore the supposition is subject to our liberty, and hence the necessity which arises from it, being posterior, will preserve it unharmed, as we showed in that place.[1821]

But now, in the proposed difficulty, the supposition of the election of God prior to merits is prior to all our liberty, and in no way depending on it. Wherefore, if from such a supposition there arises a necessity - as stands proved - our liberty is altogether impeded. And this is clearly deduced not only from the doctrine of Anselm, but also from the reasoning made immediately above. But we must defend liberty against every kind of necessity, so that we truly remain free both to persevere and not to persevere, to obtain beatitude and to lose it. Nor is it enough to assert that otherwise we would freely persevere, if that supposition were not made; for there are heretics who, with Melanchthon, concede to the will liberty of itself, yet assert that from the knowledge or decree of God it by no means remains free, as we recalled in that place; and against these also, whatever supposition be made, true liberty in us must be defended.

But the adversaries go further and, that they may wholly escape the force of the argument, admit Anselm's doctrine to be true, namely that an antecedent necessity impedes our liberty, not a consequent; however, from that supposition of the election to glory there is not inferred to our will an antecedent necessity, but a consequent one, such as follows upon the supposition of God's knowledge. For although there did not precede an absolute knowledge of merits, yet there did precede a conditional knowledge, by which God saw under a condition that, if he should prevent this man by such and such a vocation, he would freely persevere to the end of life. Therefore, when with this liberty known he determined absolutely to give this man beatitude, he does not take away the indifference of will which he had known under the condition, but supposes it; whence the

1820. Vázquez, Disputatio 68, caps. 4 - 5; cf. Anselm, De concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis, c. 1.
1821. Anselm, De concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis, c. 1.

necessity which is subject to the decree is posterior to the liberty of that will. Nothing therefore prevents God, after this decree, from preparing various vocations by which the man may freely persevere to the end of life and freely obtain glory.

This conditional knowledge, which God has, some theologians abuse for explaining many difficulties; but if it be rightly weighed, in the present difficulty it has no force, but rather utterly fails for the safeguarding of our liberty, as if God had known nothing under a condition. First, for God to have known earlier under a condition that very perseverance - under this and that vocation - unto the end of life as free, and then, after this liberty was known, to have determined absolutely to give this man beatitude: does this not, by the very fact that the absolute election precedes our consent and is not in any way dependent upon it, put the event outside my power, according to what we have said in Disputation 68, caps. 6 and 7?[1822] Therefore, if it was not in my power, and from that there arose for me a necessity, there does not remain in me liberty. For even if God had earlier known under a condition liberty in me for persevering, yet with the absolute remaining, perseverance will be necessary. For that supposition of an absolute election was not constituted from the fact that earlier, under a condition, there was my liberty - as all must concede; otherwise even the reprobate could be said to be elected, since of some of them under a condition it is known that they would persevere, if they were prevented by such a vocation. Besides, as we showed in Disputation 67, cap. 4, from St. Augustine and Prosper, merits under a prior condition, which in truth were not absolutely future, could not be for God the cause either of damning someone or of denying grace, or likewise of conferring grace or glory; and on this point those Fathers call such merits fictitious and feigned. Therefore in that prior decree, in which God determines to give glory, it is not to be said that he has regard to merits under a condition or to the foresight of them, but that he absolutely wills to give as gratuitous and to render as retributive for merits absolutely future; but merits under a condition are not absolutely future. Therefore the decree to give in view of merits cannot be constituted upon those that are only under a condition; and so, in the case proposed, liberty cannot in any way remain in me, with my consent defined from without.

Next, in order that in the absolute order the same liberty be preserved which was in that order under a condition, it would be necessary that the same series of all motions be constituted. But the adversaries, in the present solution, constitute one order under a condition and another order when absolute; therefore it is no wonder if in that which is under a condition liberty is found, but in the absolute it cannot be. In such conditional suppositions they posit: Peter will be called thus; under that vocation, through successive occasions, if he shall freely persevere in life, he will obtain the consequent good, that is, he will freely obtain beatitude. Yet indeed in the absolute order, liberty under a condition does not give rise to liberty under an absolute, because it does not posit the same series of motions; and consequently, if one adds to the decree of election and of glory the presupposed liberty under a condition by a pact, that God should foresee before all under a condition, and then foresee likewise, and also will the calling as following in the end - certainly one must say that then the human free choice would remain, as far as that conditional supposition goes; but one unique decree of election would then be constituted, as if even the decree itself were

1822. Vázquez, Disputatio 68, caps. 6 - 7.

conditional in itself, or as if, taken in the absolute order, it were not absolute, but absolute only upon a condition. But if our case is that in the absolute future order, and in that very order the decree of election be absolute, then, even if under a condition it is added that liberty shall be preserved, it does not follow that, in the absolute, if such a decree be posited, liberty will be preserved.

They assert that it is true - namely, that our liberty is hindered by a necessity that is prior, not one that is subsequent; moreover, from that supposition of election unto glory there is not inferred for our will a necessity antecedent, but a subsequent one, such as is that which follows upon God's knowledge. For although the knowledge of merits under an absolute mode did not precede, yet a conditional knowledge did precede, by which God saw under a condition that, if I should forestall this man by such-and-such a calling, he would freely persevere unto the end of life. Therefore, when with this liberty thus known He absolutely resolved to give this man beatitude, He does not take away from him the indifference of will which He had known under the condition, but He presupposes it - because the necessity of this decree is posterior to the liberty of that will. Nothing, therefore, hinders that, after this decree, God should prepare various callings by which man would freely persevere to the end of life and freely obtain glory. Some theologians abuse this conditional science, which God has, to explain a thousand difficulties; if it be rightly weighed, however, it has no weight at all in the present difficulty, but is just as ineffectual for saving our liberty as if God had known nothing under a condition.

Refellitur primo. - First refutation.

First, that God earlier knew under a condition my perseverance by this and that calling does not prevent that that absolute election unto glory should precede my absolute consent, nor that it should in any way have been in my liberty under a condition; in this manner liberty under a condition is rightly defended by the sole predefinition of prevenient and concomitant grace, according to what we have said elsewhere.[1823] If, therefore, it was not in my power - and such is the knowledge of God, according to those things which we have said - then, if from it necessity arises for me, it will not leave liberty in me. For although God beforehand knew under a condition in me a liberty for persevering, nevertheless the perseverance under an absolute mode will be necessary.

For that supposition of absolute election was not made from this - that my liberty was foreseen under a condition - as all must concede; otherwise even the reprobate would be chosen: for each of them is known under a condition to be one who otherwise would persevere, if he were forestalled by such-and-such a calling. Then also, because, as we have seen elsewhere, merits foreseen under a condition, which in truth were not going to be absolute in the future, could not have been to God a cause either of damning someone, or of denying him grace, or likewise of conferring grace or glory upon him; and therefore those Fathers call such merits confected (i.e., fabricated) merits.[1824] Since, therefore, in that prior (order), in which God decreed to give glory according to the former opinion, He did not foresee merits as absolutely future, but only under a condition, one cannot say that God

1823. Vázquez, Disputatio 68, caps. 6 - 7.
1824. Vázquez, Disputatio 67, cap. 4, citing St. Augustine and Prosper.

foreordained glory on account of those merits that were to be future under a condition: because by this reasoning the merits are fashioned such that something should be given out of regard for them; whereas, after the decree of giving glory, nevertheless they can absolutely not be going to be, and in that prior (order) they are not absolutely future; yet the decree of beatifying is absolute and regards beatitude as to be conferred absolutely, not as to be conferred in time only in view of merits. Add, moreover, that when it is decreed that something be given on account of merits or in view of merits, such a will is one of gratitude and retribution; but who, even a fool, would determine to recompense out of gratitude because of merits not yet absolutely future, but under a condition? About which more below in chapter 11. Therefore the election in no way was in my liberty, but was determined without my consent.

Next, in order that in the absolute order the same liberty be preserved which existed in that order under a condition, it was necessary that the same series in all things be constituted; but the adversaries in the aforesaid solution constitute one order under a condition, and another absolutely: hence it is not a wonder if in that which is under a condition liberty is found, but in the absolute it cannot be. In the conditional they thus suppose: if Peter were called by this and that calling at each opportunity unto the end of life, he would freely persevere and would freely obtain beatitude. And indeed, if another decree under a condition be not added, liberty under a condition in this way is rightly defended by the sole predefinition of prevenient and concomitant grace. But if they would add a decree of election unto glory before liberty foreseen under a condition, thus: if God had decreed before all things to beatify man, and then to forestall him by this and that calling even unto the end, certainly no one would say that this man would remain free; for then there would be presupposed a decree of election before every knowledge - even conditional - of merits and works. Either, therefore, in the absolute order they should not suppose a decree of giving glory before works absolutely future, so that in it the will may remain free, and thus the order under a condition and the absolute order be entirely the same; or, if in the absolute they add that decree before works absolutely future, let them add it also in the conditional before works future under a condition: for if it would be added in the conditional, then in it liberty of persevering would be taken away under a condition, just as in the absolute, if such a decree be posited, absolute liberty is impeded.

Caput XI - Another a posteriori argument against the former opinion

Another a posteriori reason against the former opinion strives to infer this: that in the elect merits do nothing at all toward obtaining glory. For if God, not having regard to the reason of merits, not out of gratitude, but out of His sole gratuitous liberality and mercy, decreed from eternity to beatify Peter at such a time, then even if afterward he should have merits, God will not, in time, repay glory in view of them, but will give it gratuitously and out of mercy, just as He decreed. Indeed, although He should not find merits, nevertheless He will grant glory.

Exemplo res illustratur. - The matter is illustrated by an example.

Just as if some king should once and for all resolve to choose Peter as counselor, not looking to these endowments of mind, nor out of gratitude or mercy, but should establish that he chooses him solely by his gratuitous will, even if afterward he should ascertain that he is learned and prudent and has had merits, nevertheless by force of the prior decree he would choose him, not on account of his merits, but because it so pleases him. And again, although he should find him to be ignorant and foolish, still by force of the prior decree, when he chooses, he must either change his will or in his prior determination he will have regarded no merit by reason of which he would, when he wished, choose him. For when a man does not look to some merit when he determines to give something, by the reason of which he grants it, but is moved by his sole liberal and merciful will to benefit someone, assuredly by his gratuitous will he determines to give that; and therefore afterwards he will give it gratuitously in every respect and not out of gratitude, unless he should change his resolve. If, therefore, God had first with Himself resolved to give glory not in view and by reason of merits, it follows that it is by His sole kindness that He does good and not out of gratitude, because He so decreed: and since the decree of God once posited cannot be changed, it follows that by force of that decree He confers beatitude upon the elect in time altogether gratuitously, not out of gratitude nor in view of merits, although they may have many merits; indeed, even if they should have committed many sins; since the decree of God was entirely out of liberality and gratuitousness, as has been proved: therefore merits have nothing at all to do with obtaining beatitude - which is supremely absurd against the testimonies of Scripture, so manifest and accessible that it would be superfluous to bring them forward here. And accordingly it will truly be what Faustus, cited by us, said: that already we are not born to be judged, but judged, since our merits contribute nothing at all to beatitude, nor do sins impede it; although that author in another sense and without reason speaks thus against St. Augustine, as we shall see elsewhere.[1825]

This argument, too, the adversaries twist badly to their own advantage; and while they attempt in various ways to extricate themselves, they entangle themselves in more difficulties.

Prima adversariorum responsio. - First reply of the adversaries.

They reply first that that prior decree was not gratuitous nor out of merits, whence it does not follow that beatitude, once predestined by God, is given gratuitously. But there is no one who is ignorant that the will of giving something and of doing a kindness is either out of merits - if not equal, at least lesser ones; in which case the gift is said to be given on account of a cause, or in return, and as a remuneration - out of gratitude: or (it is) a will of giving not in view and by reason of some merit either had or received, but from sole benignity, liberal, or merciful; if therefore God had decreed to beatify men out of the special regard of some gratitude, the will would have been one of liberal kindness and gratuity; and whether it be named in this way or that, if from eternity it had been not by reason of merits absolutely future, in that same way in time the effect would have been borne, since the will of God does not change: for even if there were no merits in time, there would always remain the same motive by which God from eternity had decreed to beatify men, which would be mercy alone and liberality. But when the motive of some affection remains, the

1825. Vázquez, Disputatio 91, cap. 17.

affection itself remains, with all others excluded which do not pertain to the motive; then the motive of mercy would remain, which is the misery of the recipients, and the motive of liberality, which is munificence toward those being given gifts.

Secunda adversariorum responsio. - Second reply of the adversaries.

They reply secondly that indeed the will of God, in the order of intention in eternity, can be absolute from merits, that is, not by reason of merits; but that beatitude is to be consigned in execution through merits; and by this reasoning they also defend that Christ the Lord was from eternity predestined not by merits foreseen of the Fathers; yet in time His Incarnation was consigned to execution by the merits of those (Fathers). And this indeed happens in human affairs: for in the order of intention we first determine to obtain an end; then we consult about the means: but execution is through means, and the means themselves truly conduce to the obtaining. Although, therefore, God earlier in intention should have decreed to give Peter glory, and later to give merits so that he might obtain it; nevertheless those very merits could in execution contribute to the obtaining of beatitude.

Efficax argumentum contra illa responsa. - An effective argument against those replies.

But a manifest reason stands against this solution: for if God from eternity decreed to give something altogether gratuitously, not out of gratitude, but out of His sole liberal and merciful will, He certainly decreed that such a donation should in time be consigned to execution from that same liberal and not remunerative will: just as things which are freely given are so given in time as they were determined from eternity. For it is not fitting that He who decreed purely from liberality and from mercy to give something should later execute it in time out of gratitude, unless He should change His will. Moreover, there is a manifest difference between means which work physically toward the attainment of an end - like medicine toward health - and merits, which are moral means, as we have noted in part elsewhere and in this (discussion).[1826]

According to a real and physical operation, and not as a motive referred to the will. Wherefore, if God should decree efficaciously first to send Christ before He foresaw the merits of the saints - since He had preordained that He would in fact come, and, in execution, to His coming in act the merits of the saints would contribute nothing - because, if in the intention they had not had the ratio of a motive, in execution they would not have it either, unless there were a new will; for the efficacy of these means is nothing else than to move the will toward something. Add also that, according to the opposing opinion which concedes that there is a certain efficacious will of granting eternal life before foreseen merits out of liberality, we are necessarily compelled to admit another efficacious will of granting eternal life out of gratitude, namely on account of foreseen merits, as a reward; or we must say that the prior will, which was out of liberality, is changed into another, out of gratitude, which is absurd. For since we cannot deny that God wills to give eternal life to the just out of gratitude on account of merits, therefore either this is a new will distinct from the prior, or the prior was changed: and both seem false. The former indeed is superfluous, because in God that double will is posited in vain; the latter is absurd, because the will of God cannot be changed.

1826. Vázquez, Disputatio 81, cap. (cited generally).

Moreover, it is in vain to posit that prior efficacious will of liberality and mercy, if it is never to have its effect from itself and from its own motive alone: therefore it will suffice to ascribe to God an inefficacious will touching the end, which precedes the foreknowledge of merits.

Third reply from the doctrine of Cajetan. Others reply thirdly that, in the first sign of reason in which He decreed to give eternal life, He established that not in the explicit foreknowledge of merits, but not without them. They gather this doctrine from Cajetan on III, q. 1, a. 3, where he teaches that Christ was predestined before the forevision of sin and its remedy, but not without it; that is, prior causally, not prior by the consequence of being together in conversion. From which Cajetan himself infers that otherwise Christ would not have come, if sin had not been, even if He were prior causally to be preordained.[1827] In the explanation of which he notes that something can be prior to another causally and not by the consequence of being together; then it will be at once consequent together with it and yet prior causally: just as the luminous is prior causally to the very illumination, but at the same time it is the consequence together with it, because from the one the other is rightly inferred, and conversely. For it is rightly inferred, "It is luminous: therefore it illuminates," and, "It illuminates: therefore it is luminous." The prior of consequence is that from which a conversion does not hold: thus "animal" is prior to "man"; because it is rightly inferred, "He is a man, therefore he is an animal," but it is not reciprocated. Both kinds of the prior and the posterior are assigned by Aristotle in the Categories, in the chapter on the modes of the prior.[1828] And so recent theologians say that glory, being preordained prior causally as the end, is at the same time together by conversion with merits: because from the one the other is rightly inferred, and conversely.

But for the reason by which Cajetan's doctrine does not obtain in the predestination of Christ, it can in the present case obtain in no way. For that doctrine is true only when the cause that is preordained and its effect, or the means, are connected by mutual necessity. Then indeed, although the cause be preordained as prior causally, yet it is together by conversion with the effect, and thus never without it. But whenever the effect or the means does not have a necessary connection with the cause or the end, but the cause or the end can be without it, then, with a priority of causality, there is also already a priority without conversion; nor is the effect, or the means, converted with the end. For instance, if the end can be had through many means and in many ways, none of those means is determinately at once consequent together with the end, and each is posterior causally. If, however, there were a single means, Cajetan's doctrine would altogether fit. Therefore, since beatitude, which, as the adversaries contend, is preordained prior causally, could be given not only through merits, but also by another way - namely by the mere will of God - it follows that merits are not necessarily connected with it, and thus are not at once with it either in causality or by conversion, unless we say that God decreed to give out of them or through them, which is the same, so that with respect to the will of giving glory they would have some ratio after the manner of a cause and of a motive: then, however, their prescience would be prior to the will of giving glory. Finally, by the reasoning made above it is very well shown that, with that absolute will of giving

1827. Cajetan, on St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 1, a. 3.
1828. Aristotle, Categories, on the modes of the prior.

something which was not in view and in the ratio of merits, merits have no connection at all - neither necessary nor voluntary: wherefore without them it would have its effect in the same way, as was shown above.[1829]

But if someone should again say that God could from eternity with Himself have established, before the foreseen cooperation of the will, to make Peter blessed through merits - not determining these or those, but then to apply to him congruous graces on various occasions, by which he would freely have merits - there follows from this way of speaking that it is indeed in man's freedom to have these or those merits; but that it is not in his freedom not to have merits and not to obtain glory, which also is absurd; because from such a decree there arises an antecedent necessity which takes away our liberty, as was shown in the preceding chapter.

From what has been said there is inferred a no less infirm answer of others, who teach that, although by the nature of the thing beatitude is not necessarily connected with merits, nevertheless God could have bound His will of giving glory to this means rather than to another. As when someone wills to go to Toledo, even if he can go by carriage, or on horseback, or in a litter, nevertheless he can bind his will to this means, so as to will to go only in a litter. This answer of theirs is no less easily refuted.

First, because when someone wills not to go to Toledo except in such a way, he never first decreed absolutely to go. For if he had decreed it, by the force of that decree he would go in this or another way; nor would he bind his will to this rather than to another means, unless he changed his resolution on account of some difficulty or inconvenience which he had not previously considered. Wherefore, when he himself would afterward bind an absolute decree of the end to one means, in some way he would be changing it. But since from the beginning he considered everything well, and in this and in that means he saw some inconvenience which deterred his will from the attainment of the end, before he found a convenient means, he never decreed determinately and efficaciously to go to Toledo, until such a means occurred; but before there was in him only a simple affection by which he would will to go, unless there were difficulties and inconveniences. Then indeed, when an apt means is now found, he efficaciously decrees to go to Toledo; surely that single means is related to the end willed in such a way, namely without inconvenience and difficulty. Wherefore it is not surprising if that will of the end is bound to one means, and with it there is at once conversion and consequence, so that the end will never be without it. But thus it could certainly not happen to God, who from eternity considered all things well, and therefore an absolute will of giving glory - which He could in various ways also give without merits - He could not afterward bind to merits. But because, as our opinion holds, He did not first decree absolutely to give glory, but always willed to propose it as a reward, and in this way the single means was merits, even if all should desire it with a simple affection; He never determinately willed to give it except to one having merits, nor such great glory except to one having so many or such great merits. And so merits, in the consideration of God by which He willed to give glory, were the single means, and therefore He preordained it only with them foreseen. For the convenience of a single

1829. Vázquez, Disputatio 89, cap. 9.

means redounds into the very ratio of the end, when that end is not willed absolutely by the ratio of its own goodness, but in such a manner and with such a convenience. Which rule obtains even when the means are physical, as has been explained, how much more when they are moral, such as merits, which by another reasoning explained above are referred to the will as a moving reason.

Next, that God cannot bind His will to one means when there are many means to the end which He Himself has constituted, is proved by a special reason drawn from what we said in Disputation 83, chapter 6: for no one will deny that God can leave His will free and indifferent to this or that means, if there are several. Let us grant, then, that it is now so, that, several means standing, God remains free and indifferent to any of them; then, if He were to bind His will to one means, there must be some variation either in God Himself or in things. For, as we noted in that same chapter 6, if things hold themselves in the same way and God in Himself likewise perseveres in the same way, we cannot say that God wills and orders things now in one way and now in another. But in God there cannot be any variation; rather, He is now in Himself in the same way from eternity in which He would be if He had willed otherwise: therefore there must be a variation in the things themselves. But in these there is none, if the same end remains and the same several means; or let them show what variation there would be in the things. It remains, therefore, that God should always will in the same way, and be able to will the end in no other way than in that same way: namely indifferently to several, if there are several, and He decreed the end first; or determinately through one, when there is only one.

Lastly, someone could say, from the proposed argument, that the same thing can be given under two titles - both gratuitously and onerously - and thus that eternal life is given to us by a gratuitous will, by which God...

Rejection: - But this too does not satisfy our argument, because even if the same thing could be given under two onerous titles, as certain people say the exaltation of Christ's body was granted under that twofold title, nevertheless a gratuitous and an onerous title are altogether mutually repugnant. For that title is gratuitous which presupposes no merit in him to whom the thing is given; but it cannot happen that the same man both buys the same thing and obtains it by merits, and without merits: therefore the same thing cannot at once be given to the same person under a gratuitous and an onerous title; and in human affairs nothing of the sort is experienced.

Explication of the words of the Council of Trent: - But what is adduced from the Council of Trent is to be understood far otherwise, as we explained above in chapter 8: namely, for this reason glory is called grace, because the merits leading to it are conferred gratis; on account of which it is said that grace is given for grace, or grace in the root; not because it is given as such for free without any regard, since it is never conferred except from merits; and he would be manifestly in error who would say that in the very execution glory is given at once under a wholly gratuitous and an onerous title, since in truth it is given only because of merits, as Scripture everywhere proclaims. And yet, as Fulgentius noted, not only is eternal life called grace, because it is given for another grace - namely for merits wrought from the grace of Christ - but also because the retribution overflows; but that is not to be understood as though glory were given without merits, or had been pre-appointed without them; rather because, either, as some more recent writers

think, something is given to the blessed beyond the condignity of their merits, which was never pre-appointed without merits; or because, although glory does not exceed the condignity of merit according to power and potency, nevertheless it exceeds in that which is formally in merits: to this sense, because for a small and momentary labor there is rendered eternal rest and great delight and repose. Which Fulgentius seems to indicate when adducing that in 2 Corinthians 4: "What is momentary and light," etc.[1830] - Now for us it will suffice to have said that, even if something of glory be given beyond condignity, that was not pre-appointed without something else which was to be conferred without merits, as is manifest. - Add that the same reward cannot be owed equally to two in such a way that it be repaid to each as to one and the same equal debtor. This is manifest in debts of justice: one payment cannot make full satisfaction in solidum for two. By the same proportion it seems one must speak in the matter of merits and retribution: that which in very truth is given by reason of merit, equally and condignly, is not to be given as a gift, because otherwise it would be condignly owed for another reason; and thus the exaltation of Christ's body would have been granted by reason of his labor, which nevertheless seemed to be condignly demanded by the union, so that otherwise God would not have given it, unless he suffered: I speak, however, in virtue of the decree according to which in passible flesh he was predestined as a remedy for sin; for we are not speaking of another way in which he could have come and been predestined. - Therefore Christ himself in Luke 24 said to the two disciples: "Was it not necessary for the Christ to suffer thus, and so to enter into his glory?" But if otherwise he were going to obtain glory, it would not have been necessary that he enter thus, for he would have entered in another way. - In this manner Cyril speaks in the fifth Dialogue on the Trinity, about the middle of it, where, replying to the interlocutor Hermias, he says: "I will say it without concern, even if now it seem less decorous, since it was necessary, on account of the lapses of men and our sins, that the Only-begotten should suffer. Let him himself have the highest thanks; yet let him know that the crimes of humanity were the occasion for his divine glory. For if we had not sinned, he would not have been made like to us, nor would he have endured the cross; and if he had not died, he would not have obtained that he should be venerated by the Saints - he understands, even by the angels - of whom he had spoken before."[1831] - Therefore Cyril holds that otherwise Christ would not have been to be adored, nor would knee have been bent to him by the heavenly, earthly, and infernal - namely, which was the exaltation of the body - unless he had suffered for us. For that the Incarnation condignly demanded this exaltation of the flesh and glory is not sufficient for us to say that God would have granted it to Christ even if he had not suffered, since in fact he so disposed that he should lack it until he suffered for us, and, after the merit of the Passion, should grant it to him.

Lastly, that efficacious decree of making men blessed, before, according to our way of understanding, their merits were by God foreseen as absolutely future, could not have had its origin from merits foreseen under a condition, as was shown above in chapter 10 of this disputation. Add that, although we say the merits were always foreseen under a condition, God

1830. St. Fulgentius, Ad Monimum, book 1, ch. 10, adducing 2 Corinthians 4.
1831. St. Cyril, Fifth Dialogue on the Trinity.

could not, out of gratitude in view of them, determine to bless men. For gratitude, as we also said there, cannot be exercised, as about its matter, around merits that are future under a condition: since not even a foolish man could do this. For who would determine to repay for those merits which would be under a condition, until he sees that they are absolutely going to be? And hence it follows that that decree was one of mercy and liberality, and thus, as we said above, the effect of habits from the sole motive of mercy and liberality, even if the motive of gratitude is lacking.

Caput XII - Responses to the testimonies which prove that the election to glory was made before merits

Thus far, of the two parts of the latter opinion which we proposed in chapter 2 of this disputation, only the former has been confirmed; the latter I will show in the following chapter, as much as shall be necessary, chiefly in solving the argument. But first it is fitting that we respond briefly in this chapter to all the testimonies; for they are very easy, if those things which we said in chapter 4 are rightly kept in memory.

How the testimonies of Scripture, before we reply to the aforesaid testimonies, are to be understood, it will be worth the effort to explain the mind of St. Thomas, who is usually cited for the prior opinion. If therefore we consider the words of this Article 4, there is nothing by which he signifies that the Doctor speaks of the election to a blessed life as having been before the predestination of merits: for he has only these words: "Whence the predestination of some unto eternal salvation presupposes, in a second notion, that God wills their salvation," to which pertains election and love. By the name of eternal salvation, however, there is no need that we understand the beatitude of the other life; but we can understand justification and perseverance in grace, to which God has chosen some rather than others, and to this end he has prepared by predestination each and every aid. For St. Thomas himself, in this Article 4, reply to the first, concedes an election of grace and of glory; yet he does not say that the election of glory was made before the foreseen merits and before the predestination of grace. But when we say that God chose men before the foreseen merits unto eternal salvation - that is, unto justification and perseverance - this is not to be taken as though he pre-appointed it without our foreseen consent: because from that it would follow that our liberty is taken away, as above we were inferring against an election unto glory before merits; but because God, before merits and the foreseen cooperation, so loved certain ones above others that, in general, he decreed to give them all the congruous prevenient helps by which they might obtain the salvation of the soul, which is eternal salvation, by cooperating with such helps, just as God knew they would. Then, by predestination, he decreed in detail all such helps even unto perseverance, that they might obtain the end which he generally set before himself. From which there does not follow any antecedent necessity that removes our liberty; but only a consequent one, which does not oppose liberty, as will be clear from what we shall say in disputation 99.

Now then, to all the testimonies of Scripture adduced in chapter 1, I answer first, that they are explained by all the expositors of Scripture about the election of grace, and no one, especially among the Fathers, understands them about the election unto glory. I except the recent Scholastics who, to defend their opinion, interpret out of their own head about election unto glory. But besides the consensus of the Fathers and of all the interpreters, the very passages of Scripture clearly expound themselves. For what else does Paul strive to commend in all the places cited, than grace - in that it is not given to us from the works of free choice? What then would he be speaking of the election unto glory, which is not grace, but grace for grace? For if he wished to commend this, he would not say that it is given gratis without any works, but that it is conceded to no one unless he has lawfully contended by the grace of God, and is proposed to all as a prize.

As to Paul's mind, moreover, and how, when he excludes works from justification, which James admits, he nevertheless agrees with him, this is sufficiently...

Caput XIII - Refutation of two reasons for the opposing opinion

It remains to satisfy the reasons adduced in the first chapter for the opposing position. To the first reason I answer from the doctrine of Ockham, I, dist. 41, q. 1, at the end, that the efficacious will of the end is always prior to the efficacious will of applying the means to that end. For the end can be considered in a twofold way: either it is referred to the power and will of him who must attain it, and for this he applies the means; or it is referred to the will of him who does not propose it for himself but for another, and leaves to that other's liberty the attaining of it.[1832]

In the former way, no one can be moved to apply the means so as to obtain the end, except from an efficacious will of the end; wherefore that will must be prior to every will concerning the means. And thus whoever, from the will of attaining glory, wills to be justified and to have merits, first wills glory; and from the efficacious desire thereof he wills the means, namely justification and merits.

In the latter way, the efficacious will of the end is not prior to that of giving the means. For example, one desires his son to become learned in theology, and from this desire he provides him with all the necessary means: he indeed has an efficacious will concerning the means, since he gives them; but he does not have an efficacious will concerning the end, only a simple desire, because such an end is not subject to his power. The same can happen even if the end be in the power of the proposer, if nevertheless he decides to leave it to the labor and industry of another; and especially when he intends to give it under no other title than as a reward and prize of merits, as domestic examples sufficiently prove, as was shown above, cap. 9.

The reason for the difference is this: the end which is proposed to another to be obtained, is not so much the end of the proposer as of him to whom it is proposed. For he who proposes it does not himself attain the end, but leaves it to another to merit or to obtain; wherefore it is enough if he himself, with a simple affection, desires the end for another, and with an efficacious will provides

1832. William of Ockham, Ordinatio (Sentences), I, dist. 41, q. 1, at the end, on the priority of the efficacious will of the end over that of the means.

the means. But the end which one apprehends as to be obtained by himself pertains to himself; and therefore he must first efficaciously will to obtain it before applying the means, because both the end and the means are subject to his own power and will, and are committed to him to carry out. Thus, then, it is not surprising if God, proposing to others eternal life as a prize, does not decree of himself to give merits, but, with a simple affection desiring it for men, with an efficacious will wills to give the means of grace, that they may merit it and obtain it.

Which he also observes with respect to the reprobate, to whom he so gives certain means of grace that, from the desire with which he wills eternal life to them, he grants them. But that he wills to give to some only sufficiently efficacious means, and to others even efficacious ones unto the end of life, does not argue in God an efficacious will of giving to some eternal life before merits; rather, from the same simple affection he can give to one efficacious means, and to another only sufficient ones. Just as among men it also happens: if someone proposes a prize for legitimate contending in a contest, and among many who come to that contest he gives to one better arms which he knows will prove efficacious, and to another not so good ones, however much he who received the better arms desires the palm more, he never by an efficacious will decrees to give him the prize unless the victory is foreseen. Therefore, from a simple affection concerning the end an efficacious will of giving the means can proceed, both of sufficiency and of efficacy.

But someone will say: just as among men no one gives better arms for that end unless he desires for him to whom they are given the victory and the prize, so too in God let us concede a greater efficacy of giving glory to those for whom by his own predestination he has, from a greater abundance, prepared the means of grace than for others; otherwise, by a special will God would determine the end for someone, nor would the peculiarity consist in the beginning in that instant in which he prepared greater means of grace for one than for another, and in this would be placed the election of grace, about which Augustine disputes much and wisely against the Pelagians and the Semipelagians.

And indeed, first, as to Augustine's mind, this opinion is easily proved from the fact that in chapter 4 we showed more than sufficiently that there never was any contention between Augustine and his disciples on the one part and the Semipelagians on the other concerning whether consequent glory is given from merits; rather, that contention was with Pelagius, who said it is given from the merits of free choice. Therefore, whenever the Semipelagians dispute about eternal election and contend that it was made without merits, we are speaking not of glory but of grace; whereas whenever the Pelagians speak of glory as given for works, Augustine nowhere says that God, by a special affection, willed to give it to someone before the merits of grace. Moreover, we would not on that account be forced to say with the Scholastics alleged in the first chapter that before all works God decreed with an efficacious will to choose someone unto glory, in which sense they plainly speak. But neither according to Augustine's doctrine, nor according to reason, are we compelled to philosophize in this way. Rather, according to the aforesaid opinion it must be said that, before God decreed to prevent the elect by his grace, as regards glory there was equal in him the will of giving glory to the predestined and to the reprobate; the discrimination, however, only

began from that instant in which he prepared greater means of grace for one than for another, and in this is placed the election of grace, about which Augustine disputes much and wisely against the Pelagians and the Semipelagians.

Ad Ephes. 1. As to that place, "He chose us in him, that we should be holy," it is said that Augustine understood it of election unto glory in the book To Simplicianus, book 1, question 1; yet elsewhere he clearly interprets it of election unto grace, as the context itself shows. Thus he himself expounds it of election unto grace in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 19; and St. Jerome agrees on that place. But adversaries gather from it that this election was made without merits, because the Apostle said, "that we should be holy," not, "because we would be holy." And certainly, if he were speaking of election unto glory, in the sentence stated above - which, as Augustine taught, would rightly be said - "because we were going to be holy by his grace," since election is said to be made from merits. But also the common mode of speaking shows this: for we do not say, "therefore God justifies us or calls us because he is going to give glory," but, "that he may give glory." If, however, he had first decreed to give glory, we would rightly say, "he chose us unto glory, that he might call and justify," not, "because we were going to be just." On the contrary, it would not be said, "he calls and justifies that he may bestow glory," but, "because he is going to give glory." For the particle "because" signifies that the election was first made absolutely; but the particle "that" only denotes that glory is the end of calling and of justification, which it suffices to set forth as a prize, and first to will by a simple will, according to the doctrine set forth above. But because Paul openly speaks of election unto grace, he rightly said, "that we should be holy," and not, "because we would be holy." For grace is not given from the merits of free choice, even future ones, but that we may have merits

As to that, Romans 9, "That the purpose of God according to election might stand," Augustine most excellently explained it, question that to Simplicianus, of an election before any examination of works, which, according to the Apostle's meaning, did not intervene, in order that grace might be conferred upon Jacob.[1836] He thus expounds it in this sense: when as yet neither Jacob nor Esau had done anything good or evil, so that, after a premised examination of works, God would will to justify the one and reject the other - since, I say, they had done nothing of the sort - it was said from the caller, "the elder shall serve the younger." Which exposition is indeed very subtle. It could also be explained thus of a promise of election unto grace without any examination. Since those two brothers had not yet done anything good or evil, and if among many one had merited nothing more than another, so that, according to the spontaneous bounty of grace, the purpose of justifying which he had proposed might be followed, from the grace of calling the lesser is preferred to the greater. For vocation is ordered unto justification and is conferred for that end; not that God first decrees by an efficacious decree to justify than to call - for to justify he does not determine without us, that is, without our consent, whereas to call he absolutely determines without us - but because by a simple will he first willed to justify, for that is the end of calling willed by a simple will alone, and this will is called the purpose of God. Therefore, to the end that justification may not fail and may have its effect, as God desires of itself, so he calls from himself and prevents us by his

1836. St. Augustine, To Simplicianus, on Romans 9, "That the purpose of God according to election might stand."

congruent grace. Yet from this nothing follows against our opinion; nor is there any of the Fathers who so interprets this place as to assert either that election unto glory was efficaciously predetermined before the foreknowledge of merits, or that the purpose of justifying was efficacious before our consent. Therefore, in vain do the recent writers, interpreting Scripture according to their own sense, accommodate it to their position, forcing the strength only upon words which can have another most excellent sense.

I have said these things according to the opinion which affirms that there Paul is treating of the predestination of Jacob and the reprobation of Esau. But if we follow the interpretation of others, who say that Paul there speaks only of the temporal kingdom in which Jacob was preferred to his brother Esau, there will be another sense; but nothing will harm our present opinion, about which we shall discourse below, disputation 95, chapter 8.

As to the testimony Romans 11, "The remnant according to the election of grace are saved," I have already noted, chapter 6, that it can be explained of an election of grace without merits; nay, that to be the genuine sense of that place, although Augustine seems in some place to have understood it of election unto glory from the works of grace, as we reported there; but in neither way can it harm our opinion.

Finally, as to John 15, "You have not chosen me," who doubts that it is to be understood of an election unto the apostleship? And if we wish to extend it to all others, as Augustine extends it, Tractate 86 on John, and in the first book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapters 17 and 19, and elsewhere frequently, it must be expounded not of election unto glory, but unto grace, as Augustine understands it in those places. For if we speak of election unto glory, since he himself says in Matthew 25, "Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungry, and you gave me to eat," who would doubt that they, aided by the grace of God, prepared glory for themselves, and therefore chose God for themselves? And certainly, if the Apostles had first received Christ into hospitality and had conducted themselves well toward him, so as to merit and obtain the apostleship, just as we merit eternal life, by no means would Christ have said, "You have not chosen me as master, but I have chosen you as disciples and apostles."

They adduce also that testimony, Romans 8, "Whom he foreknew, he also predestined," and so on, to prove that election unto glory was prior to the predestination of grace, since the Apostle first says, "Whom he foreknew," that is, chose unto glory, "those he predestined." But there is no one who interprets that place in this way. We shall set forth the true explanation in disputation 91, chapter 18.[1837] And thus far about the testimonies of Scripture first adduced.

Then, as to the testimonies of the Fathers, there has already been sufficient reply in chapter 4 of this disputation, where we showed more fully that Augustine, Prosper, and Hilary never contended with the Greeks, the Massilians, and the Gauls about election unto eternal life, but about election unto grace; nor did the Massilians, Faustus of Riez, and the other bishops of Gaul understand Augustine otherwise; nor, on the other hand, did Augustine wish to prove that election unto glory

1837. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputatio 91, chapter 18, for the explanation of Romans 8:29 - 30.

was made from the merits of grace, but only that grace is given to us from merits, or from some beginning of good of free choice; from which we also plainly demonstrated, chapters 8 and 9, that nothing against election unto glory made from the merits of grace was taught. Furthermore, what Augustine's true opinion is, how absurd is that of the Greeks, Massilians, and Gauls as regards the election of grace, and how modestly Augustine answers the authority of the Greek Fathers in this very sense, will appear in disputation 91, chapter 11. Therefore those later theologians cited by us in chapter 1 of this disputation, not having well considered both the matter and the history, thought that Augustine, Prosper, and Hilary contended against the Greeks, the Massilians, and the Gauls about election unto glory, whereas they can show not the least indication of such a contention.

But to posit in God some peculiar will of giving glory to the elect before foreseen merits contributes nothing at all to the commendation of grace, since glory itself is not the grace which St. Augustine and Paul commend, but is grace for grace. Why then, when Augustine was striving to prove that grace is given without merits, would he have had recourse to that peculiar will of giving glory? Why moreover men are said to be elect by that election of grace unto life and to reign with Christ, I explained in chapter 8 of this disputation.

Further, the same point is proved by reason from the doctrine of St. Thomas above, question 20, article 3. When it was asked whether God loves all things equally, after premising a distinction he rightly replied that, since to love is to will some good to another (as we showed from Aristotle in that place), we can understand that one is loved more than another in a twofold way. In one way, on the part of the very act of love, because it is more intense toward one than toward another; and thus it happens among men that, when someone wills to two persons some equal good, he sometimes wills it more intensely to one than to the other. But in this way God cannot love one more than another, but loves all things equally; because, on the part of the act of love by which God loves creatures, it is his own essence, which in itself is altogether the same, greater and lesser being impossible in it. This is judged so true by theologians that they assert that by the very same act of love by which the Father and the Son eternally love the Holy Spirit, they also love creatures, although not equally in respect to the Holy Spirit and to creatures; which diversity is not taken on the part of the act, but on the part of the creatures themselves, because they have being less necessarily than the Holy Spirit, as we said in disputation 145, chapter 5.

In the other way one is loved more than another, not because the love is more intense, but because we desire for him a greater good; and in this way God can love one more than another, inasmuch as he desires greater goods for one than for another. Add also that, since in the same act by which we will some good to a person there is a twofold regard of love, namely of friendship toward the person, which is called complacency, and of concupiscence toward the thing which we desire for him, as has been explained by us in that place, we could consider in God a greater complacency toward rational creatures than toward irrational, because they are more perfect - if love toward irrationals could be borne under the notion of complacency and friendship. But because in irrationals it is not borne in this manner, as we have noted there, this comparison of the love of friendship cannot be made in God. Whether indeed toward a single rational creature he is borne with a greater love of friendship and complacency, we shall see a little below.

From this doctrine there is excellently inferred what we were saying, namely that God does not have, before foreseen merits, a peculiar or greater affection and simple desire of eternal life toward the predestinate than toward the reprobate. For this inequality cannot be taken on the part of God - I do not say only that it cannot be known by us, but that in reality it is plainly not so: for the acts of God in themselves (which is his essence) cannot be greater and lesser. On the part of the thing willed such an inequality cannot be attended to, because before foreseen merits he desired the same glory for all, nor a greater for one than for another, but for each one, as far as it is in itself, without measure, unless man by his own merits set a limit. For just as God does not efficaciously decree to give eternal life before merits because he is going to give it on account of merits, so neither does he more desire for one than for another so great or such glory, unless from such and so many merits. Indeed, if we consider prevenient grace and the present justice of certain reprobates, such as was in the Apostle Judas, and in other most holy men who at length fell from grace, he desired for them a greater glory than for others who by one or another less merit attained it. Who will deny that holy men desired for themselves all that glory to which their merits referred? Yet that, compared in this way, was much greater than the beatitude of many predestinate. How then did he more love the predestinate? Certainly not because by an antecedent will he ordained them to a greater glory, but because by an efficacious will after merits he willed glory for them, while for others most holy, who fell from grace, in this manner he did not will it. Then also because he willed for the predestinate a greater grace, efficacious namely all the way to the end of life, which is a greater gift, but for others he did not.

1. Moreover, if God by a greater will desired eternal life for the predestinate than for the reprobate, the inequality would not have to be taken on the part of the thing willed, as has been proved, but on the part of the persons, because toward one he would be more affected with the love of friendship and complacency than toward others - not indeed on the part of the act, but because one person in himself would be nobler and more perfect in nature. But neither in this way does he will beatitude before merits more for the predestinate than for the reprobate: for there are many reprobate who, according to their nature, please God more, to whom nevertheless he has attributed lesser gifts of his grace and has desired for them a lesser glory. Then also, when God wills beatitude for someone, or his own grace, as it is that person's good, even if the person pleases according to nature, nevertheless from this in God the measure of willing that good is not taken; for he bestows as it pleases himself, not according to the dignity of the nature to which he bestows; and thus by bestowing grace on a man he constitutes him pleasing and a friend to himself, to whom previously he had only an affect, not that love which is friendship, although it was love of benevolence; for friendship is with mutual communication, and a likeness of nature, which does not befit man before he is justified - and when he has been justified, he is accordingly joined.

Furthermore, God wills any created thing, which he wills, only as means, not as an end, as we proved in disputation 82, chapter 2.[1838] Therefore, just as adversaries ought to admit that God, from the same love by which he loves himself as end, wills more eternal life for one than for another, so also from the same will by which he wills eternal life for all he can desire grace more for one than for another, because he wills to give to one a greater grace than to another. Therefore the supreme reason with God is his will and good pleasure, because it has so pleased him. "For who resists his will?" as Paul says to the Romans (Rom 9). He speaks not so much about resistance which could be done by power, as about reason, as we explained in disputation 91, chapter 4, and by the context of the place is shown.[1839]

Objection: However, someone will argue from that axiom of Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, book 1, chapter 2, "For the sake of which each thing is such, that is more such."[1840] Since God wills grace for the sake of glory, it follows that he wills glory more by the same efficacious will; therefore earlier also he efficaciously wills grace for the sake of that glory.

I answer: First, in God this argument has no force; for he does not will things for the sake of another, but he thus wills one thing on account of another, as was explained in disputation 82, chapter 2.[1838] Hence it is not that, if he more "determines" eternal life for men before works because of grace itself - rather, what is more principal and primary is that he wills glory than grace; and thus it is: he also desires, as what is greater, that men be blessed and imbued with beatitude itself, than that in this life they live justly.

Second: granted that among men it happens that he who proposes a prize to be obtained by merits first wills that that prize itself be obtained before he wills to give the means - because, namely, the means are for the sake of obtaining it - and that therefore in this case, with respect to the end, he truly is said to will the means on account of the end, and not only to will one thing on account of another; I say that from that axiom it does not follow that he who wills the end for another, and on account of that end wills to supply the means, wills efficaciously equally both; for if he efficaciously wills to give the means, as they are means, he must will also effectively the order: that if the man refuse, he himself withdraw the gift; and in this same way he ought not to be said to will the consequence, but to propose it to another according to rule, not to posit it; nor to will efficaciously before all to give that man the end. Therefore it is enough if he will the end more intensely than the means - either as something principal - and that grace stand as means. For likewise, if the intention of the will be toward the end as the principal thing, and grace be for it, the thing is secured.

1838. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputatio 82, cap. 2, on God willing creatures only as means, not as end.

1839. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputatio 91, cap. 4, on the sense of "Who resists his will?" in Rom 9.

1840. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, book 1, chapter 2, on the axiom "For the sake of which each thing is such, that is more such."

1838. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputatio 82, cap. 2, on God willing creatures only as means, not as end.

Disputatio XC - Whether at least some exceptionally loved by God were elected to glory before foreseen merits

Among men this indeed happens; but God, for the reason stated, cannot desire that [end] more intensely. Therefore it is enough that he desire it as something principal; and let these things suffice concerning the first reason.

Ad secundam rationem cap. 3 ab adversariis adductam respondeo: the distinction of the predestined from the reprobate, even if it does not begin from an efficacious will of giving eternal life, nevertheless does begin before the consent of those persons as absolutely foreseen, and thus that they were distinguished by God alone, not by themselves, from the mass of perdition - namely, by preventing grace (*gratia praeveniens*), which God decreed to give without them, and to prepare their wills, through each occasion, even to the end of life. This is that grace of congruous calling (*gratia congruae vocationis*), about which much was said in Disputation 88, last chapter, which, although it is peculiar in the predestined - inasmuch as it is given in that proportion and measure in which God certainly knows it will have its effect - is rightly said, by it, to discern the predestined from the reprobate; and because it is given to us without our consent, it is rightly also said that God is not chosen by us, but that we are altogether chosen by God by grace. How, in respect of the knowledge whereby God knows that it will have its effect, it is called a peculiar grace, will be explained in Disputation 98, chapter 6. To this therefore men are chosen before merits, yet not by an efficacious will of giving them eternal life. Accordingly, St. Augustine in De correptione et gratia, ch. 7, said that among those called some are for this reason elect, because according to purpose - that is, they were called by a congruous vocation - they were called

Hence this instance, and the order of reason in God's predestination, we can now assign: that God, by his antecedent will (*voluntas antecedens*), willed eternal life equally to all - not in a determinate degree, but such that each should obtain it by his own merits. Then, seeing what the free choice of each one would do, with this or that calling, if it were given through each several occasion even unto death, to some he willed to give a congruous [calling] for a fixed period of life by which they would die in grace, but to others not. Finally, seeing the end of each one, to the one having merits and dying in his grace he decreed efficaciously to give eternal life, but he excluded the other from the kingdom. Wherefore election unto glory - which does not occur unless a prior examination has been made, as we have proved above from Augustine - is altogether posterior in this order; but election unto grace is prior, which precedes the merits also. Nor is election unto glory simultaneous with merits, as Bartholomaeus Camerarius and others thought, but [it is] from the merits of grace as from a cause.

Fulgentius not obscurely indicated this order, in the book On the Incarnation and the Grace of Jesus Christ, in the epilogue of that work, with these words: "God, indeed, who created man, by his very predestination prepared the gift of enlightenment for believing, and the gift of perseverance for advancing and for remaining (behold the various helps of grace on several occasions), and the gift of glorification for reigning, for those to whom he willed to give [these]."[1844] Wherein, in the

order of predestination, he places glorification itself in the last place, just as also in the thing itself it is. And that it was disposed by God in the same order - namely, from merits - as it is given in time, he explains with the following words: "And he does not bring to completion in work otherwise than he has disposed in his own eternal and unchangeable will." Behold, he does not assign one order in the mind of God but another in the very execution, but says that the same [order] exists, according to those things which in chs. 7 and 9 above have been noted by us.[1845]

But before these, note also what pertains to God's love: by giving grace to a man, he establishes him as pleasing to himself and as a friend, toward whom previously there was only an affection, not a love which is friendship, although his love was borne toward him after the manner of benevolent love. For friendship is with mutual communication and likeness of nature, which does not befit a man before he is justified, about which we will discuss more at length in I-II, q. 113, a. 2.[1846] Moreover, when God wills to someone a natural good from complacency in the person, according as the nature is such, he loves the better [one] more and bestows greater gifts of nature upon him - those which were, as it were, owed to that very nature.

From what has been said, therefore, it is clear that before foreseen merits God does not desire eternal life for one more than for another, but [desires it] equally for all; and the whole inequality of love toward the predestined and the reprobate, referred to glory as to the good willed, lies not in [God's] desiring greater glory for one, but in this: that he wills greater grace to one than to another. Therefore the will of God, referred to glory as to the willed good, is common and equal before merits; but referred to grace, it is greater toward the predestined and elect than toward others; and for this reason they are called elect, because they are destined by God to greater grace before merits, not because to greater glory, as is shown by St. Augustine in chs. 4 and 8.[1847]

It is objected: But someone will argue from that axiom of Aristotle in Posterior Analytics 1, ch. 2: "For the sake of which each thing is such, that is more such."[1848] If, therefore, God wills grace for the sake of glory, it follows that he wills glory more; but he wills grace by an efficacious will; therefore earlier, too, he efficaciously wills glory.

It is answered, first, that in God this argument has no force. For he does not will one thing on account of another, but he wills that one thing be for the sake of another, as was explained in Disputation 82, ch. 2.[1849] Whence it does not follow that he should desire eternal life more for men before works than [he desires] grace itself; but [it follows] that he should will glory rather than grace to be the more principal and primary thing - and so it is: for he esteems as something greater that men be blessed and by beatitude just, than that they live justly in this life.

- Moreover, because among men it happens that the one who proposes to another a reward to be obtained through merits may first will that that person attain the reward rather than that

1844. Fulgentius, De Incarnatione et gratia Iesu Christi, epilogue.

1845. See above, chs. 7 and 9, where this same order is noted between the divine decree and its execution.

1846. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 113, a. 2, on the nature of justification and friendship with God.

1847. St. Augustine, chs. 4 and 8 (as cited by the author) on why the elect are so called on account of grace rather than greater glory.

1848. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1, ch. 2: "For the sake of which each thing is such, that is more such."

he give the means by which he should attain it, and he who proposes the end in this case is truly said to will one thing on account of another, and not only to will that one thing be for the sake of another; for this reason it is declared that from that axiom it does not follow that one who wills the end for another and, for the sake of that [end], wills to provide the means, must efficaciously will the end, if he efficaciously wills to give the means. For since he himself ought to give the means and ought not to leave it to his care [i.e., to the other's], he ought to will those [means] efficaciously; but since he himself ought not to attain the end for himself, but proposes [it] to another to be acquired, he need not efficaciously will, before all things, to give that [end]. Therefore it is enough if he will this sort of end more intensely than the means, either as something principal, and that grace be for it; and so also it happens among men. God, however, cannot, for the reason stated, desire that [end] more intensely; therefore it is enough that he desire it as something principal; and let these things suffice concerning the first reason.

Caput I - On the opinion of Ockham, Gabriel, and Catharinus

If the things said in the preceding disputation were rightly set forth, no difficulty would remain for us. For the reasons there alleged prove the same, not only about certain persons, but also about all the predestined universally. But because some more recent [authors], with Catharinus, have thought that with respect to the angels - indeed even about certain men exceptionally loved - there was some peculiar basis, therefore in this disputation I have judged it necessary to argue somewhat against them. There are, then, among more recent theologians some who think that there were three orders of angels in the divine predestination, in the same arrangement as Catharinus establishes them among men; yet among the writers whom I have up to now read, there is no one who has posited such a peculiar ordering concerning the angels.

The first order of the predestined according to Catherinus. Speaking about men and their predestination, Catherinus, book 1 De praedestinatione Dei, last chapter, and book 3, chapters 1 and 2, sets up three orders of men: the first, of the predestined, whom he calls the preeminently predestined, and he asserts that these were predestined to glory by God alone and absolutely before the forevision of merits; that is, that God thus of himself willed to give them glory, with no foreseen perseverance in their merits, so that it would not be left to them to fail to persevere in merits. For this author holds (as also the others whom in the preceding disputation, chapter 8, we enumerated) that predestination is the will alone of giving glory, not the preparation of the gifts of grace. But he says that that passage, Rom 8: "Those whom he predestined, he also called," is to be understood not as if first there were predestining, that is, a willing to give glory by an efficacious decree, and then willing to call; and that passage Ps 34[33]: "The Lord does not know the ways of the stained," and Ps 1: "The Lord knows the way of the just." He thinks that these preeminently predestined are the Blessed Virgin, the Apostles, and other men of singular holiness, who in this

1849. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputatio 82, cap. 2, on God's willing not one thing on account of another, but willing one to be for the sake of another.

life are said therefore to have been confirmed in grace, because they could not fall from it. For that God can impose on the will of a merely human being in this life a necessity, so that liberty is not left for sinning, is taught also by Marsilius in 2, q. 16, art. 5, dub. 1, and by Gabriel in d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, 3, dub. 1; indeed, in reality with respect to these preeminently predestined God actually did this, as the same Gabriel and Ockham teach, as we shall presently report.[1850]

The second order of the saved. He says that the remaining men are left by God under common providence; yet he divides them still into two other parts. Therefore the second order is of those whom he calls the "to-be-saved," about whom he asserts that they were not predestined to glory before merits, but that by a common will antecedent to them glory was proposed by God, and then the common helps of grace, as for those who are damned, were provided; in which distribution of helps he thinks that no one received a special grace, nor that any one of them was prevented by a special grace, but that the common grace was left to them, that they might use it well by their own free choice; and that after foreseen merits God decreed to save them. About these he does not wish to say that they are predestined to glory from merits, although he says that God from eternity decreed to give them beatitude from foreseen merits, because he calls "destined to glory" only those whom he calls "preeminently destined to glory," since the particle "prae-" in that compound signifies priority of placement and excellence, as from his opinion I noted in disputation 87, last chapter. But he calls them "to-be-saved," because by merits wrought from the grace of God they will obtain the salvation of beatitude.

The third order of the reprobate. Finally, he says that the third order is of the reprobate or of the to-be-damned, whom he claims are never excluded from the kingdom and rejected by God except on account of the forevision of sins unto death; and concerning both these two orders he teaches that their number was not certain before perseverance in good or in evil: because it was free for each to be saved or to be damned. But he thinks that the number of the preeminently predestined was certain before merits and perseverance, from predestination alone. He delivered this opinion in the same way on that passage Rom 8: "We know that to those who love God," as Sixtus of Siena testifies, that he taught and defended it for a long time, but afterwards utterly abandoned it, as he saw that it was disapproved by all learned men.[1851] Ockham in 1, d. 41, q. 1, and Gabriel in q. 1, a. 2, a. 2, had taught the same first; except that these two doctors do not hesitate to call predestined both those who are in the second order and those in the first; they do not use the particle "prae-" in that signification, but in the common one, so that it signifies a precedence of duration, as we explained in that disputation 87. Yet they say that those who are of the first order were predestined before all works, but those of the second order after merits of grace: in which in fact they agree with Catherinus.[1852]

Both men and all the angels were all elected to beatitude after the merits of grace, as is asserted against Catherinus.

1850. Marsilius, In II Sententiarum, q. 16, art. 5, dub. 1; Gabriel [Biel], d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, 3, dub. 1; Ockham, In I Sententiarum, d. 41, q. 1.

1851. Sixtus of Siena, Bibliotheca sancta, book 6, annotation 248.

1852. Ockham, In I Sententiarum, d. 41, q. 1; Gabriel [Biel], q. 1, a. 2, a. 2.

Caput II - That all, even the preeminently predestined and the angels, were elected to glory after foreseen merits

I for my part judge the reasons to be common, by which in the preceding disputation, chapters 10 and 11, I in general proved that men were elected to glory from the foreseen merits of grace. Wherefore it follows without exception that no one was elected before all merits, indeed that he could not be otherwise elected by God, if truly in time merits worthy of it precede, and glory is conferred from merits in the very execution.

And certainly, if, as we showed in chapter 9, the best mode of choosing men to glory is from the merits of grace, this suffices for us to say that all were chosen in this way, even the preeminently predestined. Moreover, since there it was also proved thus, that it is possible for God to choose someone to glory before the forevision of merits, only if even in time and in execution he were to bestow glory gratis and without merits; it is much better inferred that all, not only men but even angels of the highest virtue and holiness, were elected to beatitude from the foreseen merits of grace; since to them God in time bestowed glory from merits. Therefore by that a priori reason it is excellently proved that no one was preeminently elected to glory before any and all foreseen merits, but that all equally were after merits.

The same is not obscurely shown by the a posteriori reason which we made in chapter 11, because such an election in the preeminently predestined would derogate from the virtue of merits, nor would they in any sense be said to obtain glory in time from merits; a reason which it is not necessary to repeat here. But by another a posteriori reason, which we adduced in chapter 10, John of Bologna very much presses Catherinus in part 2, on the third opinion about predestination, where he testifies that he frequently conferred with Catherinus on this matter, nor ever in their familiar and already held colloquies acquiesced to his opinion. Therefore he attacks the opinion of Catherinus, because it would follow from it that there is imposed on the preeminently predestined a necessity of persevering in grace and in merits, so that they could not freely fall from them, as about all we proved in that entire chapter.

Refutation of Catherinus's evasive reply. But, convicted by this argument, Catherinus openly confessed that such a necessity is imposed on the preeminently predestined, and that they do not remain free so that they could die in sin - something which he himself did not judge to be absurd. John of Bologna rightly disapproved this; and it can be attacked, as we refuted it in general in that whole chapter. For of the preeminently predestined that saying of Rev 3 cannot be said: "Hold what you have, lest another receive it," etc. For if it is impossible to lose the crown, it could by no means be said to the preeminently predestined, "lest another receive it." Then also Paul, who in the opinion of Catherinus was among the preeminently predestined, would say in vain 1 Cor 9: "Lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become reprobate." For if it was impossible for Paul to be made reprobate, why did he say "lest perhaps"? For that particle pertains to future contingents, which cannot be accommodated to Christ, who had no liberty to sin, lest perhaps he should become reprobate, etc. Finally, in no preeminently predestined would that

saying fit: "Who could transgress and did not transgress" (Ecclus 31), which could be attributed to Christ alone: for from the union he was determined by such a necessity antecedent to the good that he did not have liberty to sin; as in the Third Part, in its place, we shall say.

A doubt. But someone will ask: what then was granted to the preeminently predestined, or to those who are said to be confirmed in grace, as to the Blessed Virgin and the Apostles, which other predestined did not have? For all the predestined are at length, during some period of life, called by a congruous vocation and tempered to that vocation, so that they never commit mortal sin; nor, given the knowledge of God, with which such a vocation is given to them, can they sin; which is only a consequent impossibility of not sinning, or a consequent necessity of persevering in grace, with which it stands well that they freely assent to the vocation, and that they can resist it: as the Council of Trent in general hands on about all, session 6, chapter 5.[1853]

I answer that no predestined person ever had an antecedent necessity (that is, one which was not in his power) of persevering in grace; but the whole necessity was consequent upon the knowledge of God, with which full liberty remains: as we said at length in that chapter. Christ alone had this antecedent necessity from the union, which was not in his power, not indeed for individual works, but for persevering in grace, and that he should transgress no precept. The others, even the Blessed Virgin, did not contract such a necessity, but over and above the other predestined they had this alone, that by a revelation of their perseverance they had, with most certain faith, believed that they would never lose grace; with which certainty it seemed that Paul was saying in Rom 8: "Who will separate us from the charity of God?" and yet, if some expound that passage not of our charity toward God but of God's toward us, so that the sense is: what tribulation, or thing soever adverse may seem to us, can prevent that God love us in Christ Jesus? - even also with adverse things he proves and exercises us, he loves us from his heart.

But the Blessed Virgin had also this peculiar privilege, that for each and every act she was prevented by congruous grace, by which she did not sin even venially; although, if one simply prescinds from the supposition of the knowledge of God, she remained free to sin.

Various modes by which God could take away liberty, and what follows. Add that it cannot be done even by God that liberty be taken away from someone, apart from madness, or inconsideration and perturbation, for persevering in grace and for falling from it, and for sinning and not sinning, for obtaining glory by merits, and not obtaining it, which is in time to be given for merits, if God be willing to concur with him according to that one's will and inclination, just as he now does, unless in one of two modes: either by the hypostatic union, which is not in the power of the assumed nature, and once posited it cannot sin; or by the clear vision of God, which is followed by the same antecedent necessity. For if he were to impose a necessity in another mode, either it would be because he would be about to give eternal life before the forevision of merits, and in this way there would indeed be imposed an antecedent necessity, which would take away the liberty of losing it, as we showed in that whole tenth chapter; but then not only would glory not be given in time from merits, but even without them it would nevertheless be given: which if God were in this

1853. Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5.

way willing to give, it would not be within man's power to obtain it. But if in time future merits with perseverance are to be and glory is given, election to glory cannot be made from eternity before foreseen merits, as above said. Or finally, God would impose a necessity through individual works, as Scotus thinks can be done, in 4, dist. 49, q. 6 and 8. I say, therefore, by determining beforehand, and preparing our works on the way, and determining before our concurrence and the accompanying consent: yet not even in this mode could our liberty be impeded or taken away, as will be proved at length in disputation 99, chapter 8.[1854]

It remains, therefore, that for such a necessity against liberty to be able to be imposed on us, it would have to be by a subtraction of concurrence, so that if, when someone is prevented by a thought (good or evil) which inclines his free choice to one part, God should be unwilling to concur with him; if in this mode God should deal with the preeminently predestined, namely that, given an inclination by a thought to sin, he should be unwilling to concur with them, he would certainly take away or hinder from them liberty to sin. But this mode appears useless and less becoming: for since God, that which he desires, can better bring about by a congruous thought, whereby at each occasion the predestined are with effect kept back from evil and tend to good, he would choose this violent mode in vain.

And therefore from that in Rom 8, "Those whom he predestined, these also he called," Catherinus does not prove that it was prior to predestine, that is, to choose to glory, than to decree to call the predestined; but by predestination itself he decreed that they should be called, disposed for obtaining glory by merits, and not for obtaining it - for it is in time to be given on account of merits - if God be willing to concur with it according to that one's will and inclination, as he now does, unless in one of two modes. This will be easily clear from disputation 91, chapter 18, where we shall explain this passage expressly.[1855]

The remaining points which Catherinus teaches in his opinion are incidentally impugned.

Caput III - On criticisms leveled against Catherinus, and what in his teaching is false

Catherinus is attacked by critics: Dominicus Soto, on chapter 9 to the Romans, in the digression of Camerarius on predestination; and Antonius de Corduba, book 1, q. 16; and Bartholomeus Camerarius in the Catholic Dialogue, for asserting an opinion contrary to Scripture, and one they judge worthy of the note of error and of censure.[1856] Yet what he taught about a necessity of obtaining glory from predestination does not impair what is consequent, but something of lesser moment; and something in that sense which he himself did not understand. Wherefore it is necessary briefly and clearly to explain what in his opinion is false.

First, he was plainly deceived in this, that he thought that in St. Augustine predestination to glory is the will of giving it, not the preparation of the gifts of grace; and therefore, according to the doctrine of that author, all who are saved are predestined, that is, elected to glory by a will of giving

1854. Scotus, In IV Sententiarum, dist. 49, q. 6 and q. 8.
1855. See below, Disputatio 91, cap. 18, where this passage of Rom 8 is explained expressly.

it, with no foreseen merits of theirs, even from grace; a sense which many have injected into Augustine, indeed even Camerarius, who in many things opposes the opinion of Catherinus, as in the preceding disputation, chapter 8, I noted. There, however, I showed clearly that in Augustine predestination is not the will of giving eternal life, but is the preparation of the gifts of grace, by which some obtain eternal life.[1857]

Second, Catherinus speaks somewhat disrespectfully against Augustine, and is carried headlong with abuses against that very opinion of his just now explained, asserting that on that account it ought to be rejected by all, because the Bishops of Gaul and of the Massi -

But then not only would glory in time not be given from merits, but even without them it would nonetheless be given; which, if in this way God were willing to give it, would not be subject to man's power to obtain it. But if in time there are to be merits with perseverance, in order that glory be given, the choice unto glory cannot be made from eternity before merits foreseen, as was said above; or finally, God would impose necessity through each individual work, as Scotus thinks can be done, In IV Sentences, dist. 49, q. 6 and q. 9. I say, therefore, with respect to the verse in hand, that it sets before us our works as inclined to one side, and determines before our concurrence and the accompanying consent; but in neither way can our liberty be impeded or taken away. This will be proved more fully in disputation 99, cap. 8.

It therefore remains that only this necessity, which is contrary to liberty, can be imposed on us by the subtraction of concurrence - namely, if a man is anticipated with an evil or a good thought, with which his free choice inclined to one side, and God were unwilling to concur with it. But if in this way God were to deal with those predestined in an eminent way, so that, when their thought inclined to sin, He were unwilling to concur with them, certainly He would take away from them, or impede, the liberty to sin. Yet this mode seems useless and less fitting. For since God can better accomplish what He desires by a fitting thought, by which on each occasion the predestined are effectively held back from evil and tend to the good, He would choose this violent mode to no purpose. And as to what Catherinus does not prove from that [text] of Romans 8, "Whom he predestined, those also he called," namely, that one was first predestined, that is, chosen unto glory, before the decree to call the predestined, but that by predestination itself He decreed this - this will be easily made clear in disputation 91, cap. 18, where we shall expressly explain this passage. The rest that Catherinus teaches in his opinion are touched upon only in passing.

How Sotus, Corduba, and Camerarius inveigh against Catherinus

Against Catherinus, Dominicus Sotus, on Romans, cap. 9, in the digression of Camerarius De praedestinatione, and Antonius de Corduba in book 1, q. 16, and Bartholomaeus Camerarius in the Dialogus Catholicus, wax very indignant, as one whose opinion is rash, contrary to Scripture, and worthy of a note of error, they judge. Yet that which he taught about the necessity of attaining glory

1856. Dominicus Soto, on Romans, ch. 9, in the digression of Camerarius De praedestinatione; Antonius de Corduba, lib. 1, q. 16; Bartholomaeus Camerarius, Dialogus Catholicus.

1857. On Augustine's sense, see above, disputation 87, cap. 8.

among those predestined in an eminent way, they do not impugn, but matters of lesser moment, and some point in that sense which he himself did not understand. Wherefore it is necessary briefly and clearly to explain what in his position is false

First, he was plainly deceived in this, that he thought in St. Augustine predestination unto glory to be the will of giving it, not the preparation of the gifts of grace; and therefore, according to his doctrine, all who are saved are predestined, that is, chosen unto glory, by a will of giving it without any merits foreseen on their part, even out of grace - a sense in which many others understood Augustine, indeed even Camerarius, who in many things opposes the opinion of Catherinus, as we noted above, disputation 87, cap. 8. Yet there I showed clearly that in Augustine predestination is not the will of giving eternal life, but is the preparation of the gifts of grace, by which some attain unto eternal life.

Second, Catherinus speaks somewhat immodestly against St. Augustine, and, with abusive words, he aggressively attacks his teaching as he has explained it in his own way, asserting that for that reason it ought to be rejected by all, because the Bishops of Gaul and of Marseilles, indeed even many through Africa, long ago strongly disliked it, as Hilary of Arles and Prosper of Aquitaine testify in their letters to Augustine, which recount the book on the predestination of the saints. But in this Catherinus certainly slipped most disgracefully: both because, not understanding Augustine's mind, he brazenly attacks and reproves him; and because Augustine himself is honorably defended against the Massilians and others by Pope Celestine, in his first letter to the Bishops of Gaul. For Prosper of Aquitaine had fled to him, as Celestine testifies in the same letter, because he was unable to endure the obstinacy of the Massilian's opinion; whom Celestine kindly received and defended against the Massilians. Indeed, among other things in chapter 2 of the same letter he says thus about Augustine: "We have held Augustine, a man of holy memory, in our communion by his life and his merits, nor did the rumor of any sinister suspicion ever besprinkle him, whom we remember to have been once so great in knowledge that among the best masters he was counted even before our predecessors; therefore all thought the same about him in common, that he could be everywhere in sequence both to love and to honor. Wherefore we resist such persons" (he clearly means the Massilians and the Gauls who were adverse to his teaching), "whom we see growing badly." Therefore, if the controversy had been about that matter which Catherinus supposed, namely about election to glory, there would have been between Augustine and the Massilians and others a dissent; this testimony of Celestine would have sufficed to shut Catherinus's mouth. To this is added that very many other men, both of the East and of the West, consented with Augustine, as we shall see in disputation 91, cap. 11; therefore Catherinus should have kept his tongue in check. Moreover, from what we noted in the preceding disputation, cap. 4 and 5, and from the place cited we shall say below, it is plainly gathered that Catherinus did not understand Augustine's meaning and his controversy with the Gauls and Massilians.

Third, those three orders of men which Catherinus assigns are impugned by the aforesaid Doctors from that passage of Matthew 25, where two orders are constituted, one on the right, the other on the left. But this refutation is frivolous. For although there are two [orders], one of those for whom the kingdom of heaven is prepared, the other of the damned, which Catherinus does not

deny, what, I ask, would be opposed by this text of Matthew to his saying that among those who obtain glory there are some predestined in an eminent way, in the manner in which Catherinus thought, if only he meant that this does not oppose true doctrine?

Furthermore, that he is unwilling to call all who obtain glory "predestined," but only those chosen in an eminent way - this is worthy of reproof; since by this name "predestination" and "the predestined," the Fathers and Councils are wont to denote not only all who will be saved and obtain eternal life, who are predestined unto glory and obtain it, because for them the efficacious helps of grace for obtaining eternal life have been prepared from eternity; but also to signify the reprobate, who are said to be destined to punishment, or the second death, as we noted in disputation 87, cap. 4. Thus the Council of Valence under the Emperor Lothair, cap. 3, says: "And we confidently confess the predestination of the elect unto life, and the predestination of the impious unto death." There the prefix "prae-" in the composition of the word "praedestinatio" signifies not excellence but a priority in time, so that "praedestinatio" and "praefinitio" are altogether the same. Augustine too uses the name "predestination" in this sense in book 15 of the City of God, cap. 1, and very often elsewhere; and Fulgentius likewise in the book to Monimus, cap. 14 and 30. Therefore all the Fathers thought thus in common about it, as I noted in that place, who commonly call predestined simply, or predestined unto life or to the kingdom of heaven, all, as many as are saved; but all the testimonies of the Fathers are of little moment for Catherinus, who did not hesitate to introduce a peculiar mode of speaking into the schools.

Finally, the aforesaid Doctors also impugn what Catherinus said last: namely, that the number of the saved and the reprobate is not certain before perseverance, because it is in the free power both of the saved to be damned and of the damned to be saved; but after perseverance, indeed, it is already certain. They impugn this by the following reasoning: because it would follow from his opinion that God learned something in time, since those two orders were uncertain even for God up to perseverance, and so could be increased and diminished even in God's knowledge.

But this objection is trifling and empty. For those Doctors impugn what Catherinus taught only in the sense in which he understood it. He did not say that in God's eternal knowledge the number of the saved and of the reprobate is uncertain up to the time of perseverance, so that, when perseverance is seen in time, God's knowledge should begin to be certain - for who, however ignorant and unskilled, would say this? - but he asserted the number of the predestined, whether of the saved in general or of those predestined in an eminent way, to be already certain in God's eternal knowledge, in that first "moment" of reason, before merits are seen, since, once they have been chosen before merits, God's choice cannot be rendered void, nor is it left in their power to be able to be damned; hence in God's knowledge the number of those is already certain. But since in that first "moment" He did not choose others unto beatitude before merits, and still left them indifferent whether they would be saved or not saved, the number of those is not yet certain, even in God's knowledge. Nor will it be certain in the second "moment," in which He distributes the helps of prevenient grace; because, according to the opinion of Catherinus, God does not distribute such helps with conditional knowledge. For he thinks that nothing is seen by God as certain and determinate unless as absolutely future, which is already in reality present in eternity; and,

according to this opinion, which many Thomists, who also impugn Catherinus, follow today, one must say that the certain number of the predestined is not known in the distribution of the aids of prevenient grace, but in the following "moment," in which consent with perseverance is seen. This is Catherinus's opinion, sincerely explained according to his meaning; for which the Thomists ought not so readily to accuse him of error, since they too are compelled to say the same thing, unless they grant election unto glory before merits, which Camerarius is unwilling to assert. But although neither do we say that this election unto glory was made before merits, and thus that the number of the elect is not certain in that antecedent will of giving glory, since then no one is chosen before another; nevertheless, in the distribution of the helps of grace, in which we proved above, according to the mind of Augustine, that an election was made, we think that the number of the elect is already certain, with liberty, however, so that each one may be able to be damned, as we shall show in disputation 101. Likewise we grant that a peculiar prevenient grace was given to the predestined, which was not given to the reprobate, as we shall again say in disputation 97, and that the opposite is far from the true doctrine of Augustine. Wherefore the opinion of Catherinus could, in this part which many theologians even of our age also follow in this way, be refuted, as will be seen there. Here, however, let what has been said suffice.

Articulus V - Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination

It is asked:

It is objected 1. It seems that the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination (*praedestinatio*). For the Apostle says to the Romans 8: "Whom he foreknew, those also he predestined." And the gloss of St. Ambrose upon Romans 9: "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy," says: "I will give mercy to him whom I foreknow will return to me with his whole heart." Therefore it seems that the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. And likewise Ephesians 1 and many other places.

It is objected 2. Furthermore, divine predestination includes the divine will, which cannot be without reason, since predestination is the purpose of having mercy, as St. Augustine says. But no other reason of predestination can be assigned except the foreknowledge of merits; therefore the foreknowledge of merits is the cause or reason of predestination.

It is objected 3. Furthermore, "There is no iniquity with God," as is said Romans 9. Yet there seems to be iniquity if unequal things are given to equals. But all men are equal both according to nature and according to original sin. But inequality is found in them according to merit or demerit of what is proper to each. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestining and reprobating, unless on account of the foreknowledge of differing merits.

But on the contrary is what the Apostle says to Titus 3: "Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us." But as he saved us, so also he predestined us to be saved. Therefore the foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination.

I answer: Since predestination includes will (*voluntas*), as was said above, so the account of the divine will is to be inquired into. Now it was said above that no cause of the divine will can be assigned on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be assigned on the part of the things willed, inasmuch as, namely, God wills something on account of something else. Therefore he was no fool of a mind who would say that merits are the cause of divine predestination on the part of the things predestined. But the question here turns upon whether on the part of the effect predestination has any cause. For this is to ask whether God predetermined that some effect of predestination be given to someone on account of merits. There were therefore some who said that the effect of predestination is predetermined to someone on account of merit preceding it in this present life. And this was the position of Origen, who posited that human souls were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their deeds they were assigned their diverse states and were united in this world to bodies. But this opinion is exploded by the Apostle to the Romans 9, saying that there had not yet been born, nor had they done anything good or evil, not from works but from the one who calls, that the greater might serve the lesser. There were others also who said that merits preceding in this life are the reason and cause of the effects of predestination. The Pelagians, indeed, set the beginning of conferring benefits to be from us, the confirmation, however, to be from God. And thus also it would happen that some effect of predestination would be given to another and not to another, because one began and prepared himself, and another did not. But this is against what the Apostle says, 2 Corinthians 3: "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Nothing, therefore, can be found in us before the first principle except thought. Hence he cannot say that there is in us some beginning of the effect of predestination, since thought itself is an effect of predestination. Therefore those who said that merits follow the effect of predestination are mistaken, since the first ratio of predestination is understood in this, that God gives grace to someone and predetermines to give to him the given thing, because He foresaw him to use grace well; just as a king gives to some soldier a horse, whom he knows will use it well. But they seem to have distinguished between that which is from grace and that which is from free will, as if one and the same could not be from both. Yet it is manifest that that which is from grace is an effect of predestination, and this cannot be posited as the reason of predestination, since this is included under predestination. But if something else on our part is set down as the reason of predestination, this is outside the effect of predestination. Nor is it a distinction to say "that which is from free will" and "that which is from predestination," just as it is not a distinction to say "that which is from a second cause" and "that which is from the first cause." For the divine providence produces effects through the operations of second causes, as was said above. Whence also that which is through free will is from predestination. It must therefore be said that we can consider the effect of predestination in two ways: In one way, in particular; and thus nothing prevents some effect of predestination from being the cause and the reason of another, the prior indeed being prior according to the reason of a final cause, the posterior, however, according to the reason of a meritorious cause; which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. As if we should say that God predestined that glory be given to someone on account of merits, and that He predestined that grace be given, by which he may merit glory. In another way, the effect of

predestination can be considered in common. And it is impossible that all the effects of predestination considered in common should have some cause on our part. For whatever is ordered in man unto salvation is contained under the effect of predestination, indeed even the very preparation for grace. Nor can this be unless by divine help, according to that of Lamentations: "Convert us, O Lord, to you, and we shall be converted." Thus in this way predestination has on the part of the effect, by reason of the divine will, that to which...

Thus in this way predestination has, on the side of the effect, as its reason the divine will, to which the whole effect of predestination is ordered as to an end, and from which it proceeds as from the first moving principle.

Reply to the first: The foreknown use of grace is not a reason for the bestowal of grace, except according to the notion of a final cause, as has been said.

Reply to the second: Predestination, considered on the side of the effect in common, has for its reason the divine goodness itself. But in particular, one effect is the reason of another, as has been said.

Reply to the third: From the divine goodness itself a reason can be taken for the predestination of some and the reprobation of others. For God is said to have made all things for his goodness, so that in things the divine goodness may be represented. Now it is necessary that the divine goodness (which in itself is one and simple) be represented in things in multiple ways, for the reason that created things cannot attain to the simplicity of the divine. And hence it is that, for the completion of the universe, diverse grades of things are required, of which some hold a higher and some a lower place in the universe. And so that the manifoldness of grades be preserved in things, God permits certain evils to be done, lest many goods be prevented, as was said above.[1858] Thus therefore let us consider the whole human race as the whole universe of things. God therefore willed, in men - so far as concerns some whom he predestines - to represent his goodness by way of mercy in sparing; and, so far as concerns some whom he reprobates, by way of justice in punishing. And this is the reason why God chooses some and reprobates others. And the Apostle assigns this cause in Romans 9, saying: "God, willing to show his wrath," that is, the vindication of justice, "and to make his power known, endured with much patience the vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he prepared unto glory." And 2 Timothy 2 says: "In a great house there are not only vessels of gold and of silver, but also of wood and of earthenware. And some indeed unto honor, some unto dishonor." But why he chose these to glory and reprobated those has no reason except the divine will. Whence St. Augustine says upon John: "Why he draws this one and does not draw that one, do not will to judge, if you do not wish to err."[1859] So too, even in natural things, a reason can be assigned, since prime matter in itself is uniform, why one part of it is under the form of fire and another under the form of earth as established by God in the beginning, so that thus there be diversity of species in natural things. But why this part of matter is under this form and that part under another depends

1858. Q. 2. art.
1859. St. Augustine, Tractate 26 on John, tom. 9.

on the simple divine will, just as on the simple will of the artisan it depends that this stone be in this part of the wall and that in another, although the plan of the art contains that some be in this place and some in that. Nor, however, for this reason is there iniquity with God if he prepares unequal things for unequal persons. For this would be against the notion of justice if the effect of predestination were rendered as a debt and not given by grace. For in those things that are given by grace, a man can at his good pleasure give to whom he wills, more or less, provided he subtract not what is due to anyone, without prejudice to justice. And this is what the householder says in Matthew 20: "Take what is yours and go: or am I not allowed to do what I will?"[1860]

Explicatio Articuli.

Conclusion: There is absolutely no cause on our part of the whole effect of predestination. Of set purpose St. Thomas said "on our part," in order to exclude merits, and any occasion solely on the side of him who is predestined, lest in the very one who is predestined some cause be assigned why he rather than another is predestined. For that the merits of one are the cause of another's predestination is not doubtful, as we shall see in Disputation 94; where also we shall have to say whether the merits of one are the effect of another's predestination. The other things, however, which St. Thomas teaches here, and the whole doctrine of the article, must be examined by us in the following disputation.

Disputatio XCI - Whether there is some cause of divine predestination on the part of the predestined

- Explicatur status controversiae. cap. 1.
- Vari errores haereticorum. cap. 2.
- That some were taught to be predestined out of the condign merits of grace by Ockham and Gabriel; but other Doctors think all are thus predestined to glory. cap. 3.
- That predestination gives a final cause on the part of the predestined, but not a meritorious or disposing [cause], was the position of Durandus. cap. 4.
- That there is given to predestination a congruous merit from the help of grace was the opinion of St. Bonaventure and Cajetan. cap. 5.
- That the first grace of predestination has for its cause the good future use of the grace itself was the view of Alexander. cap. 6.
- Henry [of Ghent], and others, grant in us only a cause or condition without which not of our predestination. cap. 7.
- The Massilians with Cassian, and the Greek Fathers, said that the beginning of first grace and of predestination is from our free will. cap. 8.
- Our theologians variously defend these Fathers from this opinion. cap. 9.

1860. Cf. the clustered references: St. Augustine, ad Simplicianum, q. 2; De praedestinatione et gratia, c. 3; De haeresibus (De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum)/De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1 c. 2; lib. 2 c. 8.

- Certain scholastics also consent to the Massilians in reality, although by words they indicate something else about predestination. cap. 10.
- It is proved by authority against the Massilians that there is in us no cause or beginning of the grace of predestination. cap. 11.
- In the same manner as the Massilians, so those who grant from us morally good works to be the beginning of grace are refuted by authority also. cap. 12.
- The same truth is confirmed by testimonies of Scripture. cap. 13.
- The same Catholic sentence is demonstrated by an a priori reason. cap. 14.
- The rationale of the same sentence by an a posteriori argument. cap. 15.
- A certain objection of the adversaries. cap. 16.
- The arguments of the Massilians against St. Augustine. cap. 17.
- Certain testimonies brought against our sentence are explained. cap. 18.

Caput I - The state of the controversy is explained

It is customary at the beginning of any question to premise the definition of that about which the disputation is taken up; lest, if what is being asked be unknown, the controversy be rendered more difficult. Wherefore in the present case a definition of predestination ought to be premised, were it not that even among the Doctors, who have held various opinions in this matter, the term predestination is employed in many ways; according to which variety, although their positions seem contrary, yet some of them in reality do not oppose one another, but differ only in word. Now therefore let it suffice, first and in general, to suppose that predestination is a predefinition, or ordination, of someone unto eternal life. What, however, is to be thought concerning it in itself, and in what manner one should speak, we shall see in the course of the disputation.

Second, it must be observed that, when it is asked whether there is given a cause of divine predestination, the question is not about the act of the divine will, inasmuch as it is the divine essence itself and an uncreated thing. Thus all the scholastics to be cited in this disputation note along with St. Thomas in this article, when they speak in 3, dist. 7, together with the same St. Thomas, 3a, q. 24, a. 4, disputing how the predestination of Christ was a cause of our predestination. The same thing was observed by Driedo in the little work On the Harmony of Free Will and Predestination, book 1, part, chapter 4, to the fourth.[1861] For it is clear that the divine predestination is not in this way a cause. The controversy, then, is about predestination taken for its effects; and it comes to the same thing to ask the cause of God's predestination on our part, as to ask for some cause of the whole effect of predestination in us, which is not to be numbered among those effects. For if something be posited as an effect of predestination, by no account could that be a cause of the whole effect.

Third note. In the acts of the divine will, foreknowledge, and predestination, which are free in God, there are two things: namely the very essence of God, and a respect of reason toward creatures known and willed, as I have expressly treated elsewhere;[1862] whence it is that, although

the divine act, inasmuch as it is the essence of God, has no cause nor meritorious [cause] that it be, neither indeed can anyone merit that the divine essence be - for although one can merit to see it or to possess it - nevertheless the respect of that act and the relation can have a cause. For this relation is born from the objects toward which the divine act would proceed. Therefore, he who is the cause of the effect and of the object is said to be the cause of that relation and respect of reason. And consequently it is the same thing to merit that some effect of predestination exist, as to merit that the divine effect be referred to one by that relation of reason by which it is completed so as to be called predestination. By the same rationale we have said elsewhere[1863] that the knowledge of God, so far as it is about future things, is in our power, and that the relation of that [knowledge], not the knowledge of God, depends upon our freedom. In this way the predestination of Christ can be the cause of our predestination, and Christ can merit that [for] us, as we shall show.[1864]

Fourth, it must also be resolved that, as we have said, in God the will has not only no final cause, nor is moved after the manner of an object, but also has no created object which could be for God a reason for willing anything, except his own goodness; yet the same created thing can be the reason and cause of another; and thus, although God does not will one created thing because of another created object, nevertheless he wills one created thing to be for the sake of another, because one is the cause of the other. When therefore we speak of the cause of the divine will among created objects, we are not seeking whether anything be a motive reason to God after the mode of a final cause, why he should will to predestine us - besides his own goodness, for nothing else can be - but whether there be a reason on account of which he wills that effect of our predestination.

Fifth note of St. Thomas. In this article the controversy is not about individual effects, whether there be given some cause or occasion on the part of the predestined; for any effect whatsoever, if compared to another, has some cause on the part of the predestined, whether that cause be final, efficient, or meritorious. For the final cause on account of which the help of grace is given is future merits; and the glory, on account of which grace is given so that one may merit glory, is the end; in order that we may obtain eternal life. Moreover, glory itself is a cause - efficient, or as it were efficient - just as grace is. Therefore of singular effects there is some cause in the very one predestined. The question, then, says the holy Doctor, is about all the effects together, whether of all of them there is given some cause; but of all of them none can be, unless there be some cause of the first effect.

Further, although this doctrine is most true, yet because this question is the same as that very celebrated among St. Augustine and the other Fathers of the Church, and is the same as that concerning the first grace that calls, which we noted in part earlier,[1865] and shall say below likewise; now that question was whether the first grace, and the grace of calling, presupposes in us something, however minimal, meritorious at least by way of impetration, or some beginning whereby God, an occasion being offered, should call us and go before us with his grace. Therefore

1861. In 3, dist. 7; with St. Thomas, Summa theologiae III, q. 24; Driedo, Opusculum de concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis, l. 1, p., c. 4, ad 4.

1863. Disputatio 68, c. 7.

1864. Disputatio 94.

1865. Disputatio 89, cap. 4.

this present question ought to be understood concerning the first effect, whether there be given some cause from the side of the very one predestined - not indeed a final [cause], for about this there is no doubt - but a meritorious or impetratory cause, or one by some mode disposing him; and here ought to be the hinge on which chiefly this whole disputation turns.

Finally, moreover, in the explanation of the article set down and in the rationale of the present controversy, it is treated of whether in another there is given some meritorious or impetratory cause of our predestination, but whether in ourselves there can be any [cause] of our predestination. How, however, these things are to be determined, we shall treat elsewhere.[1864] Therefore, with the controversy thus explained, let us next recount the state of the opinions of the heretics and of the diverse views of Catholics; and from among Catholics let us note first those which depart from the common and customary acceptance of predestination, lest they at some time oppose the truth not so much in reality as in word. Finally, let us enumerate those opinions which, speaking according to the common definition of Augustine and the Fathers, still feel otherwise than they ought about predestination, so that at length we may establish the truth both in reality and in the manner of speaking more in accord with the holy Fathers and with Scripture.

Caput II - Various errors of the heretics

So that in this controversy the various errors, not only of heretics but even of certain men who are counted by the Catholic name - though not so manifest - may be understood: therefore, first in this chapter I shall recount those errors about which there is no controversy and which are more openly condemned; then, in the order which the present disputation requires, I shall set forth the rest, I shall also mention the sentences of certain Catholics, and I shall show what of error or of danger they contain.

First error was that of the Manichaean, who, since he denied in us free choice, rejected the whole cause of our predestination (*praedestinatio*) and of eternal salvation into the diversity of the body's temperament and of condition arising from various constellations. St. Augustine, Jerome, and Prosper very elegantly refute this error; and in the Priscillianists the same error is condemned by Leo I, and by St. Gregory in a homily on the Gospels. It is, moreover, against Scripture: Jeremiah 10, "Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the nations fear"; and it is manifestly refuted by that passage of Paul to the Romans 9: "From the same conception of our father Isaac," etc.[1866]

Second error was that of Origen, who said that the cause of reprobation and predestination in this life is the works which we did in another previous life. For he thought that souls were created together with the Angels before the visible world. Jerome reports the same error and mentions it again elsewhere; more recent theologians rightly ascribe it to Origen; and among the ancients Epiphanius relates that Origen said that the souls of men, after sins committed in another life, were

1864. Disputatio 94.

1866. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, q. 2; St. Jerome, Epist. 8 ad Demetriadem, near the end; Prosper, De vocatione gentium, l. 1, c. 14 (alias 5), before the middle; Leo I, Epistola ad Turibium, c. 11; St. Gregory, Hom. 10 in Evangelia; Jer 10:2; Rom 9:10 - 13; 11:33.

sent into bodies as it were into prisons, so that they might pay the penalties of their ancient sins, and therefore were called in Greek "souls" from psýchō, that is, "I cool" or "I refrigerate," because, having been sent down from heaven to lower things, they lost their former warmth; and that the body was called sōma, which we can interpret as sêma, that is, a sepulcher or monument. Origen himself not obscurely indicated this in the work On First Principles, with these words near the end of book 1, chapter 1: "Since, therefore, the nature of all rational creatures is one, from it God, according to preceding causes of merits, as from one lump, created and formed some indeed unto honor, others, however, unto dishonor." More clearly in the same work, chapters 8 and 9 of book 2, where he adduces the etymology of the name psychē, that is, "soul," and says the same things.[1867]

Third error was that of Pelagius and Celestius and their followers, who are called Pelagians, who spoke in the same way about predestination and about grace; for of old the question about grace and about predestination between Pelagius and the Catholics was the same, as we noted in Disputation 89, chapter 4. Pelagius, then, said that man is predestined by God to eternal life from merits and the justification of his own free choice, just as he also thought that in time, for adults, beatitude is conferred from their merits; and thus he held that there is no predestination of grace and of the gifts by which a man would obtain eternal life; for he wholly denied the necessity of grace for justification and merits. In this sense he constituted predestination to glory only in a decree of giving it, and said that it is done from the merits of free choice. But since he also admitted that we are at some time justified and merit eternal life by the grace of God, which he judged to be given not simply, but more easily for accomplishing these things, so he also conceded that there is sometimes a predestination of grace to eternal life, that is, an eternal preparation of the gifts of grace by which a man would be justified and would obtain eternal life; yet he said that this is done from condign merits of free choice, just as he also affirmed that grace in time is given from the same merits. All which things are sufficiently clear from those which we said in chapter 4 of that disputation; for he preserved the same order in time and in the eternal predestination of God, namely, that what is given from merits is predestined from merits, both by the nature of the matter and from the mind of St. Augustine, as I proved; and that of old the question was entirely the same, whether something is given from merits and is predestined from them.

But concerning little children, just as Pelagius said that they are not born in original sin and yet that they need baptism so that they may obtain eternal life, he also asserted that they are predestined to glory through baptism, by which they were to be justified and to be constituted sons of God. That he actually said this of the baptism of little children is gathered from the Council of Milevis and the Second of Orange, which we shall cite below, and St. Augustine reports it in book 1 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapters 18 and 26. Nor is it an obstacle that the same Augustine, letter 106, after the middle, affirms that, according to the opinion even of Pelagius, little

1867. St. Jerome, Epist. ad Hedibiam, quaest. 10, from Plato, Timaeus; idem, Epist. 8 and the larger commentaries on Gal 4:4 ("Cum placuit ei"); Driedo, Opusculum de concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis, p. 1, c. 3; Epiphanius, Epist. ad Ioannem episcopum Hierosolymitanum (appended at the end of his works, among St. Jerome's letters as no. 60); Origen, De principiis (Peri archon) 1.1 (ad finem), 2.8 - 9.

children will have eternal life even if they die without baptism. For he understood by "eternal life" not the life of the vision of God, but another inferior life, as the same Augustine testifies in the place cited.

This error of Pelagius, which he had stated about adults, is condemned in the Council of Milevis, moreover in canons 3, 4, and 5, and in Augustine's letter 90, which is of the Council of Carthage to Innocent, and elsewhere in the places which we shall shortly allege; but that about little children is condemned in the Council of Milevis, canon 3, and in the Second of Orange, canon 2, as we shall bring forward; and Augustine relates the same, book 1 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapters 18 and 26. Yet in what he also asserted - that little children are by the grace of baptism destined to glory - this opinion, although repressed, can be disapproved.

But the Massilians, when they contended that to adults the first grace had been granted in view of some good works or of good will, so as to vindicate God from acception of persons, and thus that from this good beginning of free choice men had by the grace of God been predestined unto glory and separated from the mass of perdition; and, as is alleged in the places of Prosper, they used also the Augustinian example of little children, of whom some without merits are predestined, others reprobated; for this argument they said that these also, from the works of free choice which, if they had lived, they would have performed, were predestined and reprobated; and that from these works the separation from the mass of perdition was made; because on account of those works there was granted to them, and predestined, or altogether denied, the grace of baptism.

This opinion St. Augustine and Prosper judge to be manifest error; the testimonies of Augustine and of the Catholics are clear from that passage Romans 9: "When they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil," that the purpose of God according to election might stand, "not of works, but of him that calls" (Rom 9:11 - 12), and below: "It is not of him that wills nor of him that runs, but of God who has mercy" (Rom 9:16); and from Wisdom 4: "He was snatched away lest malice change his understanding" (Wis 4:11). From which Augustine most rightly said that such assertions are abhorrent to Christian sense, namely, that things which are not going to be committed should nevertheless be punished by God, since no tyrant would be able to have such a manner of judging as to punish someone for crimes which he had not committed. These are enough about the errors which even by the judgment of the Scholastics appear most manifest and certain. For what the Massilians taught about adults, not without error, we shall set forth; and we shall show which Scholastics agreed with them and how they ought not to have done so.

Caput III - With the errors of the heretics now set aside and made manifest, it is necessary to review the sentences of the Scholastics.

But the Massilians, while contending that to adults the first grace was granted in view of certain good works or of a good will, so as to vindicate God from respect of persons, further held that from this good beginning of free choice they were by the grace of God predestined to glory and separated from the mass of perdition; and when, as Prosper attests in the places cited, Augustinians pressed them with the example of infants, of whom some without merits are predestined and others

reprobated, in order to parry this argument they said that these too, namely those infants, were predestined and reprobated according to the works of free choice which, had they lived, they would otherwise have performed; and that by these works the discrimination within the mass of perdition was made, because on account of those works there was granted and predestined to them the grace of baptism, or else denied absolutely.

Augustine and Prosper judge this opinion to be a manifest error in the places cited; and they refute it by that text of Romans 14 and 2 Corinthians 5: "We shall all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ, so that each one may receive according to what he has done in the body, whether good or evil." For Augustine notes that the Apostle did not say "what he was going to do," but "what he has done," to show that no account is to be had of the things someone was going to do. He also brings against the same persons that saying of Luke 10, "If in Tyre and Sidon ..."; and that of Wisdom 4, "He was snatched away lest wickedness should change his understanding." Whence, and with the best right, Augustine said that it is abhorrent to Christian sentiments that such crimes, which truly are not to be committed, should be punished so severely by God, when there is no tyrant who could take account of such crimes in order to punish them. But let what has been said about errors which even our own Scholastics count as manifest suffice. For what the Massilians taught concerning adults not without error, we shall report in chapter 8; and we shall show which of the Scholastics agree with them.

With the errors of the heretics now set aside and made manifest, it is necessary to review the sentences of the Scholastics.

It is necessary, and first of all those which less in reality oppose Augustine, and perhaps differ from his opinion only in manner of speaking.

The first opinion is that of Ockham, in I, dist. 41, q. 1, and of Gabriel, q. 1.2.2 and 2.3, dub. r. For as they taught concerning election to glory, so also concerning predestination they asserted something, namely, that certain pre-eminent saints were predestined to eternal life with no merits as yet foreseen, even of grace; but that all the rest were predestined from merits of grace foreseen. [1868] Although at first glance they seem to agree with the Pelagians and Semipelagians and to be opposed to Augustine and to the Catholic sentence, in reality they teach nothing contrary: for they employ predestination in a different sense than Augustine commonly does in the books On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Gift of Perseverance, and often elsewhere, where he disputes against the Pelagians and Semipelagians about grace and predestination. For Gabriel and Ockham by the name predestination understand the decree of God and his efficacious will of giving beatitude, which we, in Disputations 89 and 90, following the mind of St. Thomas and Augustine, have called election: for both of them, and the Scholastics commonly, say that predestination is the preparation of the gifts of grace by which a man is led to eternal life.

However, since Catharinus in reality agrees with Gabriel and Ockham, as we saw in that Disputation 90, he nevertheless differs in the mode of speaking: because he is unwilling to call predestination any will whatsoever of giving glory before foreseen merits; and thus, while in general he maintains that predestination, that is, a certain exceptional election, was made without merits, yet that the rest are saved by merits of grace and that eternal life was pre-fixed for them - he teaches nothing in reality against Gabriel and Ockham.[1869]

Moreover, some recent authors, using predestination in the same way for the bare will of giving eternal life, say that all, no one excepted, were predestined to glory from merits of grace foreseen. Thus teaches Osorius, book 9 De iustitia, whom we also cited in Disputation 89, chapter 2; and many professors of theology of our time, throughout Gaul and Germany, because, as against Calvin, this way of speaking seems to them more suited for defending our liberty. And in the same sense Major seems to be understood in I, dist. 40, q. 2; and William de Rubione both speaks expressly thus and so thinks in I, dist. 41, q. 1, art. 1, and art. 2, concl. 3.[1870] This opinion of theirs they can defend by the testimonies and reasons by which in that Disputation we proved that election to glory was made from merits of grace foreseen. For the same seems to be said concerning predestination, if indeed predestination to glory is nothing other than the pre-fixing of giving glory to someone, as they take it.

Osorius, however, and the more recent authors who follow him, think that they are in reality opposing Augustine, because he said that predestination, taken in this way, was made before foreseen merits: and they judge this sentence of Augustine to be severe and very difficult; and they think themselves to agree with the sentence of the Greek Fathers, of the Gauls, and of the Massilians, who assert that predestination is made from merits. There are also many, whom I cited in that Disputation 89, chapter 2 and 7, who understood Augustine thus - although in this very sense they defend his sentence and judge it necessary to embrace it, so that we may defend the grace of God against the Massilians and Pelagians.

But we proved that all these, who so interpret Augustine, have not attained his mind, in Disputation 89, chapters 4 and 8, where we showed that Augustine never contended against the Pelagians and Semipelagians about the will of giving glory, but about the will of giving grace; and that nothing of his interest, in order to assert grace without merits, required proving that glory was pre-fixed before foreseen merits. Then in chapter 8, from Augustine we demonstrated that predestination to eternal life is not the mere will of giving glory, but the preparation or pre-definition of the means of grace and of the benefactions of God by which a man must be led to eternal life. So he taught expressly in book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, and in book 2 On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14, whose words we there recited; and finally he concludes with these words: "Wherefore predestination of God, which is in good, is grace - as I said, a preparation - while grace is the effect of predestination itself." Augustine commonly calls

1868. William of Ockham, In I Sent., dist. 41, q. 1; Gabriel (Biel), q. 1.2.2 and 2.3, dub. r.

1869. St. Ambrose Catharinus; see above, Disputation 90.

1870. Jerónimo Osório, De iustitia, l. 9; John Major, In I Sent., d. 40, q. 2; William de Rubione, In I Sent., d. 41, q. 1, art. 1, and art. 2, concl. 3.

this predestination not "to grace," but "of grace to eternal life": indeed, as often as he names predestination absolutely, he understands it in this way, especially when he commends grace without merits against the Pelagians and Semipelagians. Therefore, in his sentence grace is the effect of predestination; and to inquire whether there be, on our part, a meritorious, dispositive, or impetratory cause of predestination itself is the same as to inquire whether there be such a cause of grace on our part.[1871]

Besides Augustine in the places cited and in many others, Fulgentius expressly set forth this sentence, book to Monimus, chapter 9: "Just as therefore by predestination the will from the Lord is prepared, by which we should will the good; so also God has prepared the good works themselves, that we should walk in them" (Eph 2:10). Therefore he rightly says that both calling at a suitable time, and that we will, indeed even the good will itself, and thus the good deed itself, are the effect of predestination; and in chapter 11 he says: "Now all these things, that is, calling, our beginnings, increase in justification, and the rewards of glorification, always have the predestination of God." He gives the reason: because in calling, in justification, and in glorification, there is not only grace, but also the very preparation of what is to come, of predestination itself.[1872]

Finally, the Council of Valence, under the Emperor Lothair, chapter 3, says that God by his predestination has established only those things which, either by gratuitous mercy or by just judgment, he had done. Therefore even glory itself is commonly reckoned among the effects of predestination; and predestination is not the will of giving glory alone, but also of preparing grace - and together with grace - glory itself. Therefore the aforesaid Doctors erred in their understanding of predestination, although the error is one of word, not of thing. For what they assert, that glory by an efficacious decree was pre-fixed to no one before foreseen merits of grace, is not false, but has been proved by us with the best reasons in that Disputation 89, chapter 9 and the following; nor is it contrary to Augustine, indeed we have deduced not obscurely that it is manifestly confirmed out of him in chapters 7 and 8. And should the Doctors be thought opposed to Augustine and consenting with the Greeks and the Massilians, I would not therefore say that they are in error, as I noted in Disputation 90, chapter 1, against Catharinus. For Augustine's sentence has been defended by great prelates and pontiffs of the Church; whereas, on the other hand, the opinion of the Massilians has been branded with error, as we saw in chapter 11.[1873]

There are, however, some professors of theology of our time, whose opinion, it seems, Turrianus reported in his little work On Election: he distinguishes two predestinations in God - one to grace, another to glory; he says that there are, as it were, two wills, one of giving grace and one of giving glory. Of the former, he thinks, Augustine spoke when, against the Pelagians and Semipelagians, he contended that predestination was before foreseen merits: because, just as grace on our part is given without any merits, so also, from no merits, is it pre-fixed and predestined. The other they assert to be the will of giving glory; and this, they say, was made out of works and merits of grace foreseen, just as in time glory itself is conferred.

1871. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum 1.10; De dono perseverantiae 2.14.
1872. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, c. 9 and c. 11; cf. Eph 2:10.
1873. Council of Valence (Concilium Valentinum) under the Emperor Lothair, c. 3.

This sentence has nothing absurd in the matter, but is indeed probable with respect to the will of giving glory, as we have sufficiently confirmed; but concerning the will of giving grace, it is most certain, as will be clear in chapter 11. Nay more, even in their manner of speaking - wherein they seem to depart from the common School - there is some foundation in Augustine. For he himself not only calls predestination "of grace" wherever he deals with the Pelagians and Semipelagians, which at the same time he also says can be called predestination "to eternal life" or "to the kingdom of heaven," as is noted in Disputation 89, chapter 8; but even in the Enchiridion, chapter 100, he calls predestination "to grace," in that God destines men to the grace by which they are blessed. Thus too Paul, to the Ephesians, used this same way of speaking when he said, "He predestined us unto adoption of sons": that is, he destined us to have adoption and justification. Moreover, Augustine sometimes calls predestination the mere efficacious will of giving glory. In this manner he seems to speak in the book On the Predestination of God, chapter 3, if indeed that book be undoubtedly Augustine's; nor does the author simply call this predestination, nor "predestination to glory," but "the predestination of glory" or of remuneration - and indeed it is conveniently called thus. For "predestination to glory" is often said to be the very eternal preparation of grace, because, as we noted at chapter 10, times are ordained for this end, that we may obtain the glory which beforehand God willed for us by his antecedent and simple goodwill. Wherefore, these two predestinations are not at odds: one is called predestination to grace; the other predestination of remuneration, or of glory.

Furthermore, Augustine frequently speaks in yet another way: for he calls predestination to glory, predestination simply, and predestination of grace, the will and foreknowledge of those things to be prepared by God in grace unto the kingdom of heaven. And in this manner of speaking we can more safely, and more easily, defend ourselves against Calvin and uphold our liberty than can these more recent authors with their not-so-common distinction of predestination.

Besides St. Augustine indeed, not only in the places cited but in many others, Fulgentius expressed this same opinion: in book 1 Ad Monimum, chapter 9, he says: "Therefore, just as the will by which we should will the good has been prepared by predestination from the Lord (that is, just as He predestined and pre-appointed in time the fitting vocation whereby we should will - for by this He makes that we should will, as was explained in Disputation 88, chapter 11), so too God prepared good works, that we might walk in them." [1874] Accordingly he says that both are an effect of predestination: the vocation whereby we should will, and so the good will itself; and that we should do, and thus the good work itself. And in the same place, chapter 11, he says: "But all these things, that is, the beginnings of our vocation, and the increase of justification, the rewards of glorification, God has always had in predestination." He gives the reason: because both in the vocation and in the justification and in the glorification of the saints, by His grace He foreknew the works to come.

Finally the Council of Valence under the Emperor Lothair, chapter 3, says that God determined by His predestination only those things which He was going to do either by gratuitous mercy, or by just judgment. [1875] Therefore, glory alone is not to be numbered among the things of predestination;

and predestination must be not the mere will of granting glory, but also of preparing grace, and glory together. Therefore the aforesaid Doctors erred in their acceptation of predestination, although the error is of the word, not of the thing. For what they assert - that glory by an efficacious decree was pre-appointed to no one before the merits of grace foreseen - is not false, but has been proved by us with very strong reasons in that Disputation 89, chapter 9 and the following; nor is it contrary to St. Augustine; rather we have not obscurely deduced that it is clearly confirmed from him himself in chapters 6, 7, and 8. But if these doctors were to oppose Augustine and agree with the Greeks and the Massilians, they would be worthy of no light censure, as I observed in Disputation 90, chapter 3 against Catharinus. For Augustine's opinion has been defended by great men of the Church and by Pontiffs; whereas the opinion of the Massilians has been branded as erroneous, as we saw in chapter 11.

There are, however, some professors of theology of our time, whose opinion our Turrianus seems to have handed down in a little work On Election, who distinguish two predestinations in God, one to grace, the other to glory. They claim that one is the eternal will of giving grace, the other of giving glory; and they think Augustine spoke of the former whenever, against the Pelagians and Semipelagians, he contends that predestination was prior to merits foreseen: because just as grace is given from no merits, so also it is from no merits either pre-appointed or predestined. The other, they claim, is the will of giving glory, and this they say has been made on account of works and merits of grace foreseen, just as in time glory itself is conferred.

Their sentence has nothing absurd in the matter, but is probable: for concerning the will of giving glory, what we have confirmed remains solid; but concerning the will of giving grace, it is most certain, as will be evident in chapter 11. Nay more, even in the very manner of speaking, in which they seem to diverge from the common School, there is some foundation in Augustine. For he not only calls predestination to grace, whenever he deals with the Pelagians and the Semipelagians (which also can at the same time be said, and is at times by him called predestination to eternal life, or to the kingdom of heaven, as I noted in Disputation 89, chapter 8), but also in the Enchiridion, chapter 100, he called it predestination to grace, because men are destined to have grace; just as Paul also said to the Ephesians in this same manner of speaking: "Who predestined us unto the adoption of sons of God," that is, He destined us to have adoption and justification. [1876] Then too Augustine himself sometimes calls predestination the mere efficacious will of giving glory. He uses this way of speaking in the book On the Predestination of God, chapter 3, although neither is that book indubitably Augustine's, nor does its author simply call it predestination, nor predestination to glory, but predestination of glory, or of remuneration - and indeed it is more fitting to be called in this way. For predestination to glory can also be called the very eternal preparation of grace, because, as I noted in that chapter 8, grace is still ordered to an end, that we may obtain glory, which God first willed for us by His merely antecedent will and simple affection. Wherefore, lest these two predestinations be confounded, the one ought to be called predestination to grace, and the other predestination of remuneration, or of glory.

1874. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, l. 1, c. 9 and c. 11.
1876. St. Augustine, Enchiridion c. 100; cf. Eph 1:5.

Moreover, Augustine frequently speaks in another mode; for he calls predestination to glory, predestination simply, and predestination to grace, the will and eternal foreknowledge of God of preparing the gifts of grace to the kingdom of heaven. And because in accordance with this manner of speaking we can with very great ease, against Calvin, defend our liberty, more than these more recent writers with their not-so-common distinction of predestination defend, there is no reason why we should shrink from the common and customary signification of predestination, but with Augustine openly profess that it is done without merits, as will be proved in chapter 11. Now very much will conduce to the present disputation that distinction of a twofold election: one to glory with examination pre-mitted, the other to grace without examination - which is most probable in reality, and not alien from Augustine's phrase, nay even quite familiar to him, as we demonstrated in that Disputation 89. But all the arguments which the aforesaid authors can allege prove only that which we too asserted there, namely, that election to glory has been made from merits of grace; but that it is predestination according to the customary manner of speaking of Augustine and the Fathers, certainly they will not prove. However, how with regard to all who are elected to glory the same ratio is maintained, we showed there against Ockham and Gabriel. [1877]

Caput IV - That a final cause of predestination is given on the part of the predestined, but not a meritorious or disposing cause (Durandus)

Durandus. Durandus in I Sentences, distinction 41, question 2, number 11, together with the other Scholastics, agrees in this: that when inquiry is made about the cause of predestination, the question is understood solely on the part of the effect; and with St. Thomas and the rest he notes that it is about the whole effect, namely, that there is given some cause on the part of the predestined of the whole effect of predestination. [1878] But in the question thus understood, he fights on the contrary with Ockham and Gabriel: for he holds that among the effects of divine predestination the attainment of the predestined end is not to be numbered, which is the attainment of beatitude, but only the other means by which man is led unto beatitude. From which doctrine he gathers, first, that for the whole effect of predestination there is not given a meritorious cause, nor in any way a disposing cause on the part of the predestined: because whatever conduces and disposes, or merits some effect of predestination, falls under that same predestination as an effect thereof; among which one can be the cause of another, either meritorious, or disposing, or in some way impetratory. Then Durandus infers that for the whole effect of predestination on the part of the predestined there is given a final cause; because all the means which God by His predestination prepares unto glory look to that very glory as an end, in respect of which the grace of those means is said to be. If therefore glory is not an effect of predestination, as is supposed, it follows that on the part of the predestined there is constituted some end for the whole effect of predestination. But he proves the supposition by this reasoning: predestination, or providence in God, answers to prudence in us, therefore concerning it one must philosophize as concerning our prudence: but prudence in us is not conversant about the end, but about the means; for Aristotle

1877. William of Ockham, In I Sent., dist. 41, q. 1; Gabriel (Biel), ibid.
1878. Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In I Sent., d. 41, q. 2, n. 11.

says in Ethics 6, chapters 9 and 12, that the right determination about the end of virtue is made by virtue without the consultation of prudence, which, he says, is conversant only about the means that are referred to the end: therefore providence, or predestination, in God ought not to be conversant about glory, which is the end, but about the means which lead to it. [1879]

In this opinion of Durandus there are two points: one, in which, although he speaks very well, he errs not a little in the thing itself; the other, which does not so well accord with the common mode of speaking of the Scholastics and the Fathers, yet is not alien from their sense. That which in the former place he teaches - namely, that there is no meritorious, or disposing, or impetratory cause from our side of the whole effect of our predestination - has indeed been rightly said, but was wrongly understood by Durandus and by some Theologians. For Durandus estimates in II Sentences, distinction 28, question 5, number 7, that those predestined can dispose themselves to grace without a special and internal motion which is effected by the Holy Spirit, although at times not without a special providence; and this disposition he numbers among the effects of predestination in I Sentences, that same distinction 41, question 3; yet he defends that there is not given a meritorious cause or disposition of the whole effect of predestination, since he does not refuse to concede it with respect to grace: in which, how gravely he and other Theologians err, we shall see in chapter 11 and following. But what Durandus teaches in the latter place is true in the thing itself: namely, that glory is a cause, after the manner of an end, of the remaining means which are prepared unto it - not as things willed by God because of it; for, with respect to the divine will, no created thing is that for whose sake and as the reason for willing something else, but rather that on account of which He willed other things, according to the doctrine handed down by us in Disputation 82, chapter 2. Whether, however, the attainment of glory should be numbered among the effects of predestination is rather a question of word than of thing. Nevertheless the sentence of Durandus is not to be embraced even from this side: because it runs counter to the common mode of speaking of the Scholastics and of the Fathers. First, all the other Scholastics call the very attainment of glory an effect of predestination. From the Fathers, too, Augustine everywhere assigns among those things which God has prepared and predestined for the elect the prize of glory and of beatitude itself; and Fulgentius, in book 1 Ad Monimum, chapter 11, in the verses cited there, and chapter 8, says: "These things indeed God has always had in predestination"; he enumerates, moreover, among those all beatitude. [1874] Fulgentius gathers this from that of Paul to the Romans 8: "For whom He predestined, He also called, and justified, and glorified"; and immediately the Apostle enumerates what God by predestination and presence has made in the elect; he says: "Whom He predestined, these He also called; and whom He called, these He also glorified." Whereupon straightway Fulgentius subjoins: "We most truly hear that we have been at once justified and glorified; let us not therefore assign as the work of the present time at once justification and glorification." He says this because some refer that "He glorified" to consummation and to the increase of sanctity in this life, reading not "He glorified" for the same cause, but "He magnified." [18741880]

1879. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, c. 9, 12.
1874. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, l. 1, c. 9 and c. 11.

It is therefore clear that for the whole effect of predestination there is no cause after the manner of an end other than on the part of the predestined, since glory - which could be the end - is numbered among the effects. It is, however, most certain that Durandus in no way favors either the Pelagians or the Massilians, with whom he is always in agreement with Augustine about predestination by grace. For there was never any controversy among them, whether a final cause of predestination is given on the part of the predestined, in the sense here explained; but - as I noted in chapter 1 - whether they would grant a meritorious or impetratory cause, on the occasion and with respect of which God would predestine and in time give first grace, or not: nor about the whole effect at once, but about the first. Which pertains nothing to the present question that Durandus handles; nor does it concern their disputations. I have said this because some, not sufficiently understanding this doctrine and intention of the Fathers, whenever they hear that in predestination, either in this sense or in another, this or that cause is given, straightway cast it into Pelagianism - which does not befit theologians, who ought to have the mind of the Fathers, and the errors of heretics, well understood.

Moreover, the love and the intention of virtue are not proposed by prudence, nor are they the object of counsel; for this is conversant about particular circumstances and the matter in which the ratio of virtue and of the honest end is found, and these in particular prudence determines. Nay, in the mind of Aristotle choice is conversant about the end in this way, as we note at I - II, question 13, article 2. Wherefore, in the difficulty of the proposition, there is no reason for us to say that glory, insofar as it is the reward to be rendered for merits, does not pertain to the prudence of God or to providence and to predestination. For the prudent man not only disposes and appoints the means by which we may obtain beatitude, but also, for each according to dignity, weighs the price of labor, and renders the reward to merit. Therefore the very retribution of beatitude for these or those merits pertains to providence. Add that Aristotle's doctrine holds only about an end which someone proposes to himself to be acquired, of what sort it is - namely, the honesty of virtue - and not about an end which someone else proposes, in order that one might labor for obtaining it and attain it by merits. Wherefore Durandus's reasoning in no way proves what he contends.

St. Bonaventure in I Sentences, distinction 41, article 3, question 1, ad 2, employing predestination in that way of "moving" which the Scholastics above have mentioned, and Augustine and the Fathers, as is manifest in many places - and philosophizing in a way different also from them - since he thinks there are only two effects of predestination, namely justification (to which perseverance is annexed) and the attainment of beatitude, says that, because the remission of sins is obtained by the merits of congruity with the help of grace, it follows that predestination to grace has a meritorious cause de congruo, not de condigno, namely all the works which precede justification and dispose unto it, not however those done by free will alone, but by the help of exciting and assisting grace. [1881]

1874. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, l. 1, c. 9 and c. 11.
1880. Rom 8:29 - 30; Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, l. 1, c. 11 and c. 8.
1881. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 41, a. 3, q. 1, ad 2.

But on the part of the Fathers, St. Augustine, here and there, among the other things for which God prepared and predestined the elect, assigns to them the very reward of glory and beatitude; and Fulgentius proves this clearly in the places just cited, and in book 1 to Monimus, chapter 11, and chapter 8, where he says: "Now this God, as He has always had it in predestination, so He brings it about through grace, just as He had predestined it." He had, however, enumerated among all those things beatitude itself. He gathers this in that chapter 11 from that passage of Paul in Romans 8: "For whom He foreknew, He also predestined," etc. And straightaway the Apostle, enumerating the things that God brings about in the elect by His predestination and foreknowledge, says: "But whom He predestined, them He also called; and whom He called, them He also glorified." Where Fulgentius immediately subjoins: "Yet when we hear that they have been justified and glorified together, let us not assign together the work of justification and glorification to the present time." He says this because some refer that "He glorified" to the consummation and increase of sanctity in this life; for which cause they do not read "He glorified," but "He magnified."[1882]

Therefore it is common that the whole effect of predestination is not a cause after the manner of an end on the part of the predestined, since glory - which could be an end - is numbered among the effects. Yet this is most certain: that Durandus in no way favors either the Pelagians or the Massilians, with whom Augustine always had contention about the predestination of grace. For never was there any controversy between them, whether a final cause were given of predestination on the side even of the predestined, in the sense just now explained; but, as I noted in chapter 1, whether there were given a meritorious or impetratory cause on account of which, and in respect of which, God should predestine and in time give first grace, or not. Nor did they dispute about the entire effect at once, but about the first; therefore, that which Durandus taught pertains to none of their debate. I said this because some, not sufficiently understanding the doctrine and intention of the Fathers, whenever they hear that, whether in this sense or in another, this or that cause is given of predestination, immediately cast it back into Pelagianism. Which does not befit theologians, who ought to have a good grasp of the mind of the Fathers and of the errors of the heretics.

Moreover, the reasoning of Durandus does not prove that supposition which we have said; for what Aristotle says is to be understood in another way, although the proposed end be abstracted from matter and circumstances and considered according to itself, insofar as it is honorable, which the love and purpose of virtue pursue, it is not to be set forth by prudence, nor is it the object of deliberation - for this treats of particular things, circumstances, and the matter in which the rationale of virtue and of the honest end is found - and these particulars practical prudence determines. Nay, in the sense of Aristotle, choice deals with the end in this way, as we showed in Ethics 1.2, 9.13, 2.1.[1883] Wherefore, in the difficulty proposed, there is no reason why we should say

1882. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, l. 1, c. 11 and c. 8; cf. Rom 8:29 - 30. Andreas de Vega notes patristic usage of "gratia iustificationis": De iustificatione, q. 7; and Super Concilio, l. 8, c. 13. See also the African Councils: Milevis, can. 3; African under Boniface I, can. 78. Jodocus Tiletanus, Apologia pro Concilio Tridentino on sess. 6, c. 8; Franciscus a Daventria, Exegesis contra Confessionem Augustanam, fol. 46, n. 9. Marsilius, II, q. 18, a. 2, q. 3, concl. 2 - 3; St. Thomas, In II Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, ad 4; and I - II, q. 114, a. 5. Augustine, Ep. 101; Ep. 106; De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 10; De dono perseverantiae, l. 2, c. 14.

that glory, insofar as it is to be rendered according to these merits, does not pertain to the prudence of God or to providence and predestination; for it is the part not only of the prudent man to foresee all the means, that they may obtain the prize, but also, after an examination of the dignity of the labors and of merit has been made, to render to each the reward. Therefore, the very retribution of beatitude according to these or those merits will pertain to providence. Add that the doctrine of Aristotle has place only in the end which one proposes to himself to acquire, such as the honesty of virtue, not however in an end which one proposes to another, that he might labor for obtaining it, and by merits attain it. Wherefore the reasoning of Durandus in no way proves what he contends.

A congruous merit of predestination is given from the help of grace, as Bonaventure and Iavellus held.

On the same

Bonaventure, in I Sentences, distinction 41, in some manner employing predestination differently than the Scholastics above mentioned and St. Augustine, philosophizes in a mode different from theirs. For since he thinks there are only two effects of predestination - namely, justification with perseverance, and the obtaining of beatitude - and since the grace of the remission of sins is given from the merits of congruity, he infers from this that there is given to predestination to grace a meritorious cause de congruo, not de condigno, namely all the works which precede justification and dispose to it, not however those done by free will alone, but by the help of exciting and assisting grace. And he noted this expressly in IV Sentences, dist. 15, in the first part, dist. 2, art. 1, q. 5; for in that distinction 41 he said nothing expressly. But since he says the same thing about predestination as about justification, and asserts in that distinction 15 that justification is given from merits de congruo proceeding from grace and not from free will alone, he understood entirely the same of predestination in that distinction 41.[1884] The same opinion was followed by St. John Chrysostom Iavellus in his commentaries on this article, recently printed.[1885] And certain men of our time in Spain abuse his opinion to prove that God does not foreknow or predefine our free acts, since he makes no mention of that matter, but only wanted to say that predestination had not been made before the forevision of the good of free will from the grace of God. Others, however, in that same Spain have more severely censured this opinion of Bonaventure, judging it to be Pelagian, and to be contrary to Augustine. But although Bonaventure and Iavellus do not preserve Augustine's mode of speaking of predestination, because they take predestination otherwise than he, nevertheless they certainly do not contradict him; nor do they in any way consent to the Pelagian or Massilian and Semipelagian. For Bonaventure and Iavellus never said that the grace of first vocation is given by merits of free choice or is predestined; but that the grace of remission of sins and justification itself is effected in time, and is predestined in the prescience of God from congruous merits foreseen, not indeed of free choice itself, but of the help of grace - something which they themselves expressly noted - and thus they allow a meritorious

1883. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.2; III.13; VI.1 (by Vazquez's cross-numbering: 1.2; 9.13; 2.1).
1884. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 41, a. 3, q. 1, ad 2; cf. In IV Sent., d. 15, pars 1, d. 2, a. 1, q. 5.
1885. St. John Chrysostom Iavellus, Commentary on this article (recently printed).

cause of predestination on our part with the aid of grace. For they take predestination only for the preparation of justification, which will persevere unto the end, not for the preparation of all things which dispose to justification; but to assert that certain congruous or impetratory merits precede justification and the remission of sins, and impetrate them, is not to consent to the Pelagians or the Semipelagians, nor to contradict Augustine.

Indeed, this is the express doctrine of Augustine, differing from the Pelagian; for in Epistle 101 he contends with the one who, after the retraction which he had made in the Palestinian Council - when he had publicly asserted that grace is given without merits, understanding by grace the gift of creation and of free choice - should rightly explain about that grace which is through Christ for living rightly and overcoming temptations, and is given without any merits, which Paul commends in the Epistle to the Romans, and is entirely different from the gift of creation, so that in this way it might be received with joy by all into the fellowship of the Church. Then he objected to himself in these words: "They can indeed say," namely, the Pelagians, "that the remission of sins is grace, which is given without any preceding merits; for what good merits can sinners have?" as if he should say: Pelagius could grant that there is another grace besides the gift of creation, namely, the remission of sins. But Augustine replied immediately in these words: "But neither is the remission of sins itself without some merit, if faith impetrates this; nor indeed is there no merit of faith, by which faith that man said: God, be merciful to me a sinner; and he went down justified by the merit of faithful humility"; that is, it does not suffice that he concede this grace; for we, with the Apostle, seek another grace which is given from no merits, and is the beginning of every merit. And in Epistle 106 he concedes that we also by the grace of God merit the grace of doing well, which he himself calls charity. Therefore Augustine thus admits that there is some merit of the remission of sins and justification, namely, impetratory or congruous - which is the same - because the faith, which he says there is the gift of God and from which all justice takes its beginning, impetrates it. Whence Augustine gathered that it would not suffice if Pelagius conceded grace of the remission of sins; because since this is from merits, it is not that grace commended by the Apostle in the Epistle to the Romans, which precedes all merits; but it is necessary to admit such a grace, from which all justice takes its beginning, which he says is faith; and he calls it "the grace in which we are justified," or "the grace of justification," according to the phrase of the Council of Milevis, can. 3, and of the African Council under Pope Boniface I, can. 78, as we shall show at length in I-II, q. 109, a. 2 and 5, and in I-II, q. 114, a. 2 and 5; and in the same way it is called by the African Fathers in epistles 90 and 95, where they insist upon the grace which they strove to make Pelagius concede; and that in this way the grace of justification is used by the Fathers was noted by Andreas de Vega, book 8, on the Council, chapter 13. I have said this in passing (for we must dispute expressly in I-II, q. 114, a. 2 and 5), in order to show that the opinion of Bonaventure and Iavellus in no way in itself favors Pelagius, nor consents to the Pelagians or Semipelagians, nor contradicts Augustine who disputed against Pelagius; for he expressly taught the same. For it is entirely the same to assert that justification is effected from impetratory merits of faith, and that predestination is made on account of these merits, as has often been noted. Thus, then, Bonaventure and Iavellus, asserting

that predestination begins from justification, do not consent to Pelagius, nor are they contrary to Augustine, when they have been accustomed to assert that predestination is made on account of merits done with the help of grace, which are not condign, but congruous or impetratory.

In this way of taking predestination, this opinion in fact must be admitted by all who assert that the remission of sins and justification are effected from congruous merits done with the help of the grace of God, as the most learned Catholic men teach: Marsilius, in II, q. 18, a. 2, q. 3, conclusions 2 and 3; and St. Thomas, in II Sentences, dist. 27, q. 2, a. 4, ad 4; nor does he shrink from this opinion in I-II, q. 114, a. 5, as we shall explain there: for he only denies a congruous merit of the first grace, which is the principle of all merit, which is most true. The same was taught by Alexander, III, p., q. 69, mem. 5, 2, 2, 6, 1; and Laurentius Justinianus, in the book On Contempt of the World, chapter 9; Ferrariensis, book 3, Contra Regem, chapter 149, at the end; Roffensis, book against Luther; nor is the third likeness.[1886]

Again, Andreas de Vega, in the opusculum De iustificatione, q. 7, and on the Council, book 8, chapter 8 and the following; Jodocus Tiletanus, in the Apology for the Council of Trent on session 6, chapter 8; but that calumny - where he calls this merit "impetratory" - Franciscus a Daventria, in the Exegesis against the Augsburg Confession, fol. 46, n. 9. And again they will say: which opinion, in my judgment, is most true, as we shall show more fully in I-II, q. 114, a. 2.

They reply, however, that Augustine retracted that opinion, just as he retracted that which he, when a presbyter, had held - namely, that faith is not the gift of God, and that men merit the first grace from God. But this is a manifest deception: for these two are far different, that faith is not the gift of God, or that faith proceeding from one's own powers may merit first grace; and that by good works done from grace, or by faith itself, which is the gift of God, we merit another grace, or the remission of sins, or justification. Although, therefore, Augustine corrected the former, he did not by that very fact retract the latter: indeed when in his epistles he says that faith is the gift of God, and that grace is given without any merits of free choice, nevertheless he concedes some merit of the remission of sins; and truly, in the doctrine of that epistle which was written after the retraction of Pelagius, there is nothing which Augustine ought to have retracted.

But let us dismiss these trifling evasions. They object further the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 8, where it says that "faith does not merit the grace of justification." I answer that some understand that of condign merit, as Vega in the cited place; I, however, of congruous merit, but in such a way that the Council understands by "the grace of justification" the whole set of graces from first vocation; for this is the grace in which we are justified, or "grace of justification," as I noted above, in disp. 88, c. 1. Therefore I join the mind of the Council, but not wholly, so that it might be shown that justification arises from faith itself, and that that is not from one's own powers, but is reckoned among the gifts of God; but about this more at large in its own place.[1887]

Nor in any way do Bonaventure and Iavellus favor the Semipelagians or the Massilians: first, because they would then favor the very Semipelagians whom Augustine clearly refutes against Pelagius and against the Massilians; for in opposition to Pelagius he asserts the grace of vocation,

which is given without merits of free choice, in such a way that he also excludes against the Semipelagians any beginning of a good work or of will on our part on account of which grace is given. Then the Massilians so conceded a cause of predestination to grace, that they said first grace of vocation is repaid for merits, or for some beginning of good of free choice. But this in no way is asserted by Bonaventure and Iavellus; rather, from works done with the help of grace, they say, justification is effected - which works are called dispositions and congruous, not condign, merits. Therefore, in fact these two Doctors teach nothing against Augustine, but differ from him in manner of speaking when they assert that predestination is only the preparation and eternal predefinition of justification and perseverance; whereas in truth Augustine and his disciples have called predestination the preparation of all the gifts of grace from first vocation unto the end: for often, when he argued against Pelagius or the Massilians, he spoke of predestination being without merits foreseen, not of the grace by which sins are formally remitted, but by which we are called unto justice and begin, as is evident from the cited epistle, and from the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, and book 2, On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14, where he asserts that predestination is "the preparation of grace" or "of the benefits of God, by which whoever is saved is most certainly saved," as we reported in disp. 89, c. 8 of this disputation. And thus already against the Pelagians, Fulgentius, in the places cited by me, chapters 3 and the rest, in disputing about the effects of predestination, numbers among them the beginnings of our vocation; since this is the common acceptation and definition of predestination, and has no more difficulty than the opinion of Bonaventure; therefore there is no reason why, leaving the common acceptation, we should follow this peculiar one of Bonaventure and Iavellus. But how, even if many helps are given before justification, which seem common to the reprobate and the predestinate, nevertheless in predestination they are not effects of common providence, but of predestination, we shall say in disp. 93, cap. 1.

Caput VI - That the cause of the first grace of predestination is the very future good in those themselves from grace itself, with Alexander excluded

Thus far we have reviewed the various opinions of later Scholastics, with their grounds, such as either seemed to be contrary to Augustine, or, having recovered their senses, were repudiated by those who held them once they saw the difficulty, and from the very question of this disputation; but we assert the conclusion which we set out, with its supports. Now indeed there were also others, which were listed above, of this controversy, which Augustine had against the Pelagians and the Massilians most expressly

Therefore, the fourth in order is the opinion of Alexander, in 1 p., q. 28, memb. 3, a. 2 et 3, in the body and to ad 2 and 3, who asserts that on the part of the effects of predestination there is given some cause, but in a different way: for glory - good works done by grace - are a meritorious

1886. Alexander of Hales, Summa, III, p., q. 69, mem. 5, 2, 2, 6, 1; Laurentius Justinianus, De contemptu mundi, c. 9; Ferrariensis, Contra Regem, l. 3, c. 149 (in fine); Roffensis (John Fisher), Against Luther; "Nec tertia similitudo."

1887. Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 8 ("fides non mereri gratiam iustificationis"); cf. Vazquez, disp. 88, c. 1.

cause; but for the first grace the cause is a certain congruity, namely the good future use of that very grace; on account of which cause, we can say not without reason that God predestined these rather than those.

Albert seems to have handed down this opinion in 1, d. 41, a. 2 et 3, who, after he had said in a. 2 of the same distinction that no meritorious cause is given on the part of the predestined, or of his predestination, or of its proper effect which they call grace - because no merit can be prior to grace - nevertheless asserts in a. 3 that some reason is given on the part of the effect, lest God's predestination and will be without reason. This, however, in my judgment, as far as I could gather from him, in order not to teach things contrary to himself, he thinks to be the use of grace itself and the merits that will arise from grace itself: for he denied in that a. 2 that there is any merit that precedes grace, and he did not understand only condign merit, but also congruous and the least that could be; because the same author, in 2, d. 28, a. 1, ad 6, when he says that without gratis-given grace a man cannot do moral good, yet well enough without superadded grace, that is, without the gift of habitual or supernatural grace, plainly excludes every merit, even congruous, of first grace.

But this opinion can be proved, because it is not of the ratio of a meritorious cause that it should precede in time the very retribution, since to the holy Fathers of the Old Testament grace was given on account of the future merits of Christ: therefore, nothing hinders God from giving grace on account of the good future use of it; nor does it stand in the way that the good use will be future from grace itself, since a king can give to some soldier arms and a horse on account of the good use of them which he expects from the soldier; and a man can sell his vineyard to another on account of the profit which he is going to receive from its fruits. Besides Alexander I have not read anyone who followed this opinion or favored it in some way, unless the Master in 2, d. 5, c. ult., and the Antissiodorensis, lib. 3, tract. 1, c. 7, at the beginning and before the middle in the solution of a certain argument, who teaches that the Angels were created in beatitude and by subsequent works merited it. That this opinion was Prepositivus's is attested by Marsilius, in 2, q. 4, a. 2, q. 2; and Albert in 3, d. 18, a. 4, thinks it probable. But perhaps these Doctors, although they conceded about beatitude that it was given on account of subsequent works, would not have said this about grace, nor did they anywhere expressly teach it. Nay, the same Alexander, 3 p., q. 69, memb. 5, a. 2 et 3, in express words denied that grace is given on account of the good future use of it: wherefore the opinion which he had set forth in 1 p. about the predestination of grace, he openly recalled.

Of more recent authors, truly, there is none who would dare to affirm that the beginning of first grace is given from the good future use of it; some, however, had been accustomed to say that it can be so: therefore, de facto they do not teach it, lest they seem to think with Pelagius; but de possibili they thus assert it because of the reason adduced, and because concerning the possible there was no dispute in the Church of God with Pelagius.

But indeed, although I judge altogether false the opinion of Alexander from the cited 1 p., not only in word but in reality alien from the common doctrine of the Scholastics and from sanction, nevertheless it does not favor Pelagius and the Semipelagians; nor does St. Augustine differ

anywhere against it. Of the Scholastics, however, St. Thomas in this article and in I - II, q. 114, a. 2, f., ad tertium; and St. Bonaventure, in 2, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1; Gabriel, in 2, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, § 1; Scotus, q. 1, § 5 - speaking on whether grace is given to us from the good future use of it - impugn it.

But before I demonstrate each point, I will first suppose against those more recent Theologians, in that article "That grace is not given from merits or from works," that St. Augustine and the Fathers against Pelagius and the Massilians were speaking not only about the fact, but also about the possible: for against their error they always inferred that grace would not be grace if it were given from works; because it would not be given gratis, but would be repaid to merits, according to the doctrine of Paul in Romans 3, 4, 8, and 11, and Galatians 2 and 3. If therefore the opinion of those who think it probable that grace can be given from the good future use of it were to assert of the possible what Pelagius and the Semipelagians asserted of the fact, in the same way those would be convicted from Paul by Augustine and the other Fathers, namely, that grace would now not be grace; wherefore just as this is impossible, so too their opinion is false. Then I suppose: if grace could be given from the good future use of it, then also de facto it would be given so; I gather this, like many other things which I said above from the doctrine handed down in Disputation 82, c. 6, on the efficacy of free will in ... [sc. the order of grace]: namely, that God cannot will one thing on account of another and not for that reason order the other according to his good pleasure, without some congruous change made in the things themselves. Wherefore, if God were said to give grace on account of the good use of it, which now he does not grant on account of it, the things themselves would have to stand otherwise, or there would be some variation among them which now is not. For if, with things now standing thus as they are, God does not will grace on account of the good future use, it follows - with no change made in God, which cannot be made, and no change made in things, as we now suppose - that in the same way grace is not conferred on account of the good future use of it; but what change could be made in grace, or in the good use of it, such that then grace would be given on account of the good use which now is not given, does not appear. Therefore in the same way it must always be said, not only that it is not given on account of the good use of it, but also that it cannot be given.

Now indeed let us prove in detail the things we have said against Alexander's opinion. First, that it does not favor Pelagius nor the Semipelagians is clear: because when they said that grace is given from merits or from some good work and will which would be the beginning of grace; or that it is predestined by God on account of works which he foreknew; they did not assert this about the good use of grace itself, but about some works of free will alone, from which at least some beginning might be taken and an occasion of conferring grace. And thus St. Augustine and the other Fathers rightly inferred against them that grace bestowed on account of those works is not grace; wherefore it could not have been foredefined from those works in the eternal prescience of God.

Then Augustine contends everywhere in this same sense, especially in On the Predestination of the Saints, book 1, from c. 13 to 19, that grace is not predestined from future merits, the opposite of which the Semipelagians said. But when he says that it is not foredefined from future works, he does not understand "future" as from grace itself (for the adversaries never said this), but future from free will alone, which not as future after grace, or from grace, but as future in time God

foreknew from eternity: and thus he infers against them that if grace were predestined from those works, it would not be grace; which would not follow if God had decreed to give it from the works of grace itself and from the good use of it. For that grace be attributed to the works of grace does not prevent it from being grace; nor is Paul speaking of these works when he says in Romans 11 and elsewhere: "Otherwise grace is no more grace." (Rom 11)

It is clear, therefore, that Alexander's opinion is not on this point that of Pelagius or of the Semipelagians; and hence neither is it opposed to Augustine. But now it must be refuted by other reasons.

Gratia is not given on account of the good future use of free choice. First argument. Although God knows that all to whom he has predestined the helps of his grace will use that grace well, nevertheless that use of free choice cannot be in any way a reason which moves God, after the manner of merit or of impetration and of fittingness, to bestow his grace; rather, it is the end for which God from eternity prepared his grace: whence it follows that we must thus speak. God predestines the grace of his calling for us, that through it we may be holy; from which it follows that he did not give it because we were going to be holy through it. In this form of arguing St. Jerome uses that passage to the Ephesians 1: "He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy"; St. Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, book 1, c. 17; and the Council of Orange II, canon 25: for if (they say) he chose us by his vocation, that we should be holy and that we should believe, therefore not because we were going to be holy. For these two causes, "because" and "that," cannot both convene in respect of the same cause with respect to the same thing; wherefore, if vocation is given that we may be holy, it is not given because we are going to be holy. And the reason is manifest: because, in respect of the same will, the same thing cannot be both end and meritorious, that is, impetratory, cause; for an end does not impetrate the means by which rather it is going to be achieved; but merits impetrate the end. Hence also that axiom, quite familiar to theologians and most true, had its rise: The principle of merit does not fall under merit. Hence it is also proved that the merits of the holy Fathers were not the cause of Christ's Incarnation as to its substance, because they are effects of it: for thus we must speak: the saints had merits because Christ was going to come; therefore they did not have them in order that he might come. But if those merits had been the cause of the Incarnation, they would also have been the cause that Christ would come; and hence they would not be said to have had merits because Christ was going to come; which is absurd. We can use the same form of arguing thus: Christ came to seek and to save and to redeem all the holy Fathers, according to that of Luke 19: "He came to seek and to save that which was lost," and that of Paul to the Galatians 4: "Made under the law, that he might redeem those who were under the law"; which also suits the ancient Fathers, whom he is truly said to have sought and redeemed: therefore he did not come because they were going to be holy and to have good merits. But on this matter more at length in 3 p., q. 2, a. 11, and above we have said something in Disputation 88, c. 8.

Second argument. If the good future use of grace had been in some way the reason of predestining those whom he predestined, he ought not to have predestined these rather than others; since he most perfectly knew that Tyre and Sidon would do penance if he had granted them

the signs which he did in Bethsaida and Chorazin; and since there would not be lacking to God a mode of calling Esau by that vocation by which he would be saved, as Augustine noted, book 1 ad Simplicianum, q. 2, after the middle; it follows that the good future use of grace was not the cause why this one rather than that one was predestined. Moreover, the argument which we made for Alexander's opinion has little strength: we concede, therefore, that a merit can indeed be future much ...

Nor do St. Bonaventure and Javellus favor the Semipelagians or Massilians in any way. First, because if they favored the Semipelagians, then St. Augustine too would favor them in Epistle 105, and while he fought against Pelagius, he would incline into Semipelagianism - which is plainly false. For there he contends that the beginning of every justice, and even of the least merit, is faith; and yet at that time he was already sufficiently instructed against those Massilians: therefore also against the Pelagian he inquires into the grace of vocation, which is given without merits of free choice, that also against the Semipelagians he may exclude every beginning of a good work or of a will from ourselves on account of which grace is given. Yet some reply that Augustine later retracted that opinion, just as he retracted that other opinion which he had as a presbyter, namely, that faith is not the gift of God, and the opinion that some merit from God their first grace. But this is a manifest deception: for the two are far different - to say "faith is not the gift of God," that is, faith proceeding from our own forces; "to merit the first grace"; and "by good works done from grace, or by faith itself which is the gift of God, that we merit another grace, or act rightly, or the remission of sins." Although therefore Augustine corrected the former, he did not thereby retract the latter; nay, since in those epistles he says that faith is the gift of God, and that grace is given without any merits of free choice, nevertheless he grants some merit of the remission of sins; and assuredly in the doctrine of that epistle which was written after the retraction of Pelagius, there is nothing that Augustine ought to have retracted.

But let us dismiss these useless evasions. They object further the Council of Trent, session 6, c. 8, where it says that faith does not merit the grace of justification. I answer as above: some understand it of condign merit, as Vega in the cited place; I, however, of congruous merit; yet in such a way that the Council understands by "grace of justification" the whole sequence of grace from the first vocation - this indeed is wont to be called "the grace of justification," and "the grace in which we are justified" - as I noted elsewhere.[1888]

And so it says: "faith does not merit that justification arise as it were from faith itself, and that it be not from our own forces, but be numbered among the gifts of God": but of this more at its own place.

From this it follows that He did not give it because we were going to be holy through it; which manner of arguing St. Jerome uses on that passage of Ephesians 1: "He chose us in him before the foundation of the world that we should be holy"; St. Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints,

book 1, chapter 17; and the Second Council of Orange, canon 25. For if (they say) He chose us by His calling, that we should be holy and that we should believe, therefore not because we were going to be holy: for these two causes, namely that it be given so that we should be holy, and that it be given because we were going to be holy, cannot both belong, in respect of the same thing, to the same cause; wherefore, if calling is given that we may be holy, it is not given because we are going to be holy; and the reason is manifest: because, in respect of the same will, the same thing cannot be both the end and the meritorious or impetratory cause. For the end does not impetrate the means, by which rather one will arrive at it; but merits impetrate the end.[1889]

Hence that theological axiom, quite familiar and most true, had its rise: The principle of merit does not fall under merit. Hence also it is proved that the merits of the holy Fathers were not the cause of the Incarnation of Christ as to its substance, because they are effects of it. For thus one must speak: The saints had merits because Christ was going to come; therefore they did not have them in order that He might come. But if those merits had been the cause of the Incarnation, they would also have been the cause that Christ should come; and so they would not be called saints who had merits because Christ was going to come - which is absurd.

We can use the same form of arguing in this way: Christ came to seek and to save and to redeem all the holy Fathers, according to Luke 19, "He came to seek and to save that which was lost," and that of Paul to the Galatians 4, "Made under the law, that he might redeem them who were under the law"; which also befits the ancient Fathers, whom He is truly said to have sought and redeemed: therefore He did not come because they were going to be holy and to have good merits. But about this matter more at large in III, q. 2, a. 11; and above in disputation 88, c. 8, something was said.

A later reason: if the future good use of grace had been to God in any way a reason for predestining those whom He predestined, He ought rather to have predestined these than others; since in truth He knew perfectly well that Tyre and Sidon would do penance if He had granted to them the signs which He did in Bethsaida and Chorazin; and since there was not lacking to God a mode of calling Esau with that calling by which he would be saved, as Augustine notes, book 1 to Simplicianus, q. 2, after the middle; let it be that the future good use of grace was not: it could not be the reason why this one rather than that one should be predestined.[1890]

Moreover, the argument we framed on behalf of Alexander's opinion has little strength: we concede indeed that merit can be future long after the reward and wage, as is clear in the merit of Christ. For this reason nothing could have stood in the way, on account of which the grace of calling should not be given because of that future good use of it; but because the principle of merit

1888. Council of Trent, session 6, c. 8 ("fides non mereri gratiam iustificationis"). On its interpretation see Andreas de Vega, De iustificatione, q. 7; and Super Concilio, l. 8, c. 13; Jodocus Tiletanus, Apologia pro Concilio Tridentino on sess. 6, c. 8; Franciscus a Daventria, Exegesis contra Confessionem Augustanam, fol. 46, n. 9; Marsilius, II, q. 18, a. 2, q. 3, concl. 2 - 3; St. Thomas, In II Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, ad 4; and I - II, q. 114, a. 5. See also the patristic usage of "gratia iustificationis" noted by Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, l. 1, c. 11 and c. 8; and the African Councils (Milevis, can. 3; African under Boniface I, can. 78). Augustine, Ep. 101; Ep. 106; De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 10; De dono perseverantiae, l. 2, c. 14.

1889. St. Jerome, on Ephesians 1:4; St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum 1.17; Second Council of Orange (Arausio II), can. 25.

1890. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum 1, q. 2.

cannot fall under the very merit of which it is the principle, and the good use of grace is from grace itself as from a principle: therefore the good use cannot be the cause, or the reason on account of which God is said to confer grace, or to predestine it, which is the same. But the examples adduced, which seem to prove the opposite, are weak.

To that example of the fruits of the vineyard I answer that indeed in matters of justice and contracts it can so happen that payment and price are received from the fruits of the thing sold, even if no industry of the buyer is mingled with them; but the price is assimilated to merits, and the thing sold to the reward: for by merits, as it were with money, we procure a reward for ourselves. Yet from this it does not follow that the good use of grace can be the merit of receiving grace itself, which is the principle of that use. For there is a far different ratio of contracts in the matter of justice and of the retribution of reward for merits, if they be considered according to the proper ratio of merits and of reward. In exchanges one does not attend to the dignity of the work according to its goodness, but to the value of utility, according to which a thing is appraised; and by the nature of the thing in exchanges the thing given would not have more the ratio of a price than the thing received, unless by the consent of men money were established as the rule of all things. But since in every exchange there is repercussion, because each one suffers so much loss, or gives a thing for a thing, or money for a thing, or a thing for money, as he receives profit, by the nature of the thing this has no more the ratio of merit or of a wage than that; indeed, if in exchanges anything has the ratio of a wage, by the good pleasure and statute of men, it is also sometimes the very price: as when one labors in a vineyard, or lets a house, or a vineyard for such-and-such money. Finally, in exchanges each gives to the other some thing in order to have from him another as if in reward or price; but in the retribution of reward for merits there is always one who merits, and another who, for the merits, renders reward; nor does merit belong to both, nor retribution: therefore the ratio of exchange is far different from that of the merit of a good work and of reward. Wherefore it is not repugnant, from a thing which someone sells to another, to hope for its price when the ownership of the thing has been transferred to another, with its risk; but it is repugnant that the fruit of grace be the merit of grace itself, and that grace be repaid, as it were, as a wage for its future good use.

To the other example about the soldier Durandus replies, in II Sent., d. 5, q. 3, a. 8, that in that case the horse is not given to the soldier simply, but under a condition; and for this reason it can fall under the merit of good use, or under the hope of it; but grace is given simply, and glory in the same way; and thus neither can fall under the merit of the way following. But since a horse is also given simply, and not only under a condition (for the dominion of the horse that is given does not depend upon future use, even if it induce an obligation of such use), a different reply must be given. Therefore it is answered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, I - II, q. 114, a. 5, ad 3, that this is the difference between a horse, or a human gift, which is wont to be given in hope of merit and of studies of future action, not only as for a price, but truly as for a merit; and between grace, that it cannot be given on account of the future good use of it as on account of merit. For the good use of a horse, or of any human gift, is attributed to the rider's dexterity and his industry, not to the gift; and the dexterity of him who receives the gift, or the horse, is of itself such as to be worthy of the

horse or gift, with which he may serve the king: but the good use of grace is not attributed to the virtue of free choice, but principally to grace, nor is grace given because the will is of itself worthy of such a gift; but rather that it may be made able and receive a virtue to act well; and thus the good use of grace cannot be the merit on account of which grace is given, but rather it is the end for which grace is bestowed.[1891]

Henricus and others concede in us only a cause, or a condition without which not, of our predestination (praedestinatio).

Caput VII - Henry and others grant in us only a cause or condition without which not, of our predestination

At last Henry and other theologians, fearing flatly to concede a meritorious or impetratory cause of predestination, or even the least disposition - for this has always seemed suspect to Catholics - said that our free choice is a cause without which not, because the whole effect of predestination in us does not take place without our cooperation and efficacy; just as in truth no adult will be saved without merits or his own consent. Thus teaches Henry in Quodlibet 4, q. 19, and in Quodlibet 8, quaest.; and that John of Bologna, in the little work On Predestination, part 1, when he asserts his opinion, and in part 1, after the sixth opinion, when he repeats it; and Bartholomew Camerarius in the Catholic Dialogue, c. 4, § 1 and following. There are also other recent writers who, having the term cause as suspect, are unwilling to concede this cause without which not, but call it instead a condition without which not; lest, to wit, they concede something that would antecede as a cause, even as a cause without which not and per accidens. For a condition without which not is said by them to be also an effect of some operation, without which such an operation would not be, as heating without produced heat. And indeed among the Doctors cited that John of Bologna never calls free choice and its cooperation a cause without which not, but says that predestination cannot exist without our free choice; which seems sufficiently manifest.[1892]

Others, for their part, are unwilling to concede a cause without which the first gratuitous effect of predestination, that is, the first calling of grace (gratia), would not be given to us; but [they concede only a condition] without which that calling which is given to us would not be an effect of predestination, but of common providence. For that it is efficacious depends upon our consent; but if it were not efficacious, it would pertain to common providence, not to predestination. Yet that this calling rather is given to us by God than another in no way depends on us.

Still others call the reason of our predestination, not indeed that on account of which one rather than another is predestined, but why those were predestined who were going to make good use of the grace of God.

Yet all these Doctors do not touch that in which, for Augustine and the Fathers, was the chief controversy about this matter. For the Fathers never doubted that the whole predestination of grace could not be perfected without our consent, nor were they ignorant that a congruous and

1891. Durandus, In II Sent., d. 5, q. 3, a. 8; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I - II, q. 114, a. 5, ad 3.

efficacious calling is not without us; for who ever doubted this? But that whole dispute was whether that first calling which God knew would be efficacious and congruous in us is predestined to us, that is, is fore-appointed to be given to us without any cause, reason, or condition of our consent. And Augustine contends that that first effect, that is, first grace, was fore-appointed for us without any occasion of our free choice; just as also in time, without any such occasion or cause, reason, or condition without which not, it was given to us. For the same difficulty has always existed about the giving in time and the fore-appointment, or predestination, in prescience, as has often been noted. Since, therefore, in time it is given to us without any cause, reason, or condition without which not, so also it is predestined. Nor must one only deny a reason why one is predestined and others are not, as some used to say, but also why anyone is predestined, with no comparison having been made; since indeed no reason could exist on account of which God gave the first grace, save in the mode of an end, as was shown in the preceding chapter.

Further, if we speak of this first calling, not as it is in us or is given to us, which is the first effect of predestination, but as it is congruous and efficacious in us; not only is free choice a condition without which not, which in no way is a cause, as the more recent authors alleged above think; nor is it only a cause without which not, and per accidens; nor only a ratio; but it is also a true cause per se, and efficient, cooperating with the first calling and grace. For in the same way it is a cause of the efficacy of grace as is consent: for on this account is grace said to be efficacious, that it effects consent in us; but free choice is the per se cause of consent while it cooperates with grace. Therefore, if the Doctors aforesaid speak of the completion of the first effect of predestination, or of that which is that a calling be congruous and efficacious, they speak less correctly. For free choice is not a cause per accidens or a condition without which not, which properly is said only to apply an agent to acting or to remove that which hinders action, but [it is] a proper and per se cause, which concurs per se to the effect, as has been shown.

But if they say that predestination begins in us not from the calling itself, as it is in us before consent, but from it as it has efficacy; assuredly we ourselves would be the cause of our predestination, or a concurring cause cooperating per se; which Augustine by no means held, nor can rightly be said, unless we abuse the name predestination of grace. For the giving of the calling, which is done without us and before our consent, is an effect of predestination; and that it be fore-appointed for us and prepared to be given in time is to predestine. Add that it is a new sort of philosophizing in those who call a condition without which not even that which is later than the operation, without which the operation cannot be - such as is, in their opinion, the terminus of the operation. For a condition without which not philosophers commonly call a cause without which not, or a cause per accidens, which in a certain order precedes the effect and the operation, as being required for the operation.

1892. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IV, q. 19; Quodlibet VIII, quaest.; John of Bologna, Opusculum de praedestinatione, part 1 (and again, part 1 after the sixth opinion); Bartholomaeus Camerarius, Dialogus Catholicus, c. 4, § 1 ff.

But about this way of speaking we ought not to be overly solicitous. Now let what has been said suffice about opinions about which Augustine and the ancient Fathers did not dispute, nor was there in the Church of God any controversy with the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians. Yet about this sentence and way of speaking we shall say more in the disputation of the following chapter.

Massilians, with Cassian and the Greeks, said that the beginning of first grace and of predestination is from our free will (liberum arbitrium).

Caput VIII - The Massilians with Cassian and the Greeks said that the beginning of first grace and predestination is from our free will

We have come to the sentence of the Massilians, who, taking the opposite side, together with many others fought in open field against Augustine and his disciples and against the truth - not indeed disagreeing about words and manner of speaking, but, as to the thing itself, feeling far otherwise than they ought. Of these we already made mention in disputation 89, c. 4; and now again we will briefly set forth their sentence, and we shall note several others, both ancient Fathers and Scholastic Doctors, who assent to this sentence, although they confess the contrary in words.

The sentence of these men was that grace in time must be adjoined to human labor, or to the human will, or to human prayer; that is, that it is given to us on account of something of these which proceeds from our free will. By the name grace they understood not habitual grace, but the helps of grace by which we are promoted to justice; and some said more, some less; yet all agreed in this, that some beginning on our part precedes the grace of God in time and His predestination in prescience: for the ratio of giving in time and of predestining in prescience is altogether the same, as I noted to them in that same chapter and disputation. The leader of these Massilians was Cassian, whom almost all the bishops throughout Gaul followed as their author, among whom some judge Vincent of Lérins perhaps to have been one; and very many Gauls, of whom there exist with Prosper the books of objections against Augustine. Nor does it stand in the way that Vincent, in his little book On Heresies, c. 34, thus asserts against Pelagius: "For who ever, before that perverse Pelagius, presumed so great a power of free will as to think that, for persevering in good things of themselves, it was not necessary to have the grace of God?" By which words he would seem to concede that no good work from us, which could be the beginning of justification, is without grace. Yet by these words he only means that grace is necessary for each particular act to be aided and promoted, not to be aroused and begun. For in the style of writers it is not the same to aid our works and to begin them; and so he himself says that the grace of God is necessary for each particular act to aid - as if to say, to promote - whence the Massilians confessed that; but they did not confess that it is necessary for beginning, which Augustine maintained.

Others with good reason think that the Vincent whose "Vincentian objections" are found with Prosper was not that Lérinian monk who wrote against heresies, but another Vincent, a Gallic presbyter, of whom Gennadius makes mention in the book On Illustrious Men, c. 80; for in c. 64 he makes mention of Vincent of Lérins. This opinion of theirs is strongly confirmed by the fact that Vincent of Lérins, in that little book, often cites and greatly praises the epistles of Pope Celestine;

whereas against Cassian, as we shall see below in c. 17, he speaks almost the other way. Many also throughout Africa gave their consent to these Massilians; then Faustus of Riez; and certain give testimonies, and we read these very things in his book On Grace and Free Choice; and St. Peter Chrysologus; and John Maxentius; and Hormisdas the Pope, we likewise approve in the same place with others.

The sentence of the Massilians too is handed on by many Greek Fathers, as I observed in that chapter; among whom especially was St. John Chrysostom; and Cassian's teacher clearly held it. Their places ...

I already recited his passages there, but it pleases me here to set down one or another of them word for word. In Homily 17 on John, on those words, "But Jesus turning," he says: "Hence we can be admonished that God does not forestall our wills by his benefactions toward us; rather, the beginning must be from us; but when we, with a ready and prepared mind for receiving grace (grace: gratia), present ourselves, then he offers us many opportunities for salvation." And in Homily 12 on the Epistle to the Hebrews, in the moral exposition not far from the beginning, he says: "We ought indeed first to choose what is good, and then he introduces what is his; he does not go before our wills lest free choice (liberum arbitrium) be harmed; but when we have chosen, then he brings us much help."[1893]

Marcus the Hermit also agrees with Chrysostom. In the book On Paradise he says: "Let a man first know God; and when he has known, let him love, and draw forth the will; and that the mind may be exercised, let him endure toil; but that some work may be brought to completion, the grace of the Lord bestows it upon one who wills and believes; wherefore man's will is, as it were, a help inborn from nature, without which not even God works anything, although he does not lack the power to do so, which comes about by reason of the liberty of human free choice."[1894] These two Fathers, assuredly, not only concede that some beginning is from us - something to which, in a certain manner, grace is then repaid - but in a certain way they also assert that such an element must always precede on our part; not because God cannot begin in us, but because, if by his grace he were to forestall our wills, our liberty would be harmed; although Cassian and certain of the Massilians do not judge so severely, but plainly concede that sometimes the grace of God is prior and forestalls our wills, as we noted above.[1895]

Next, that same Marcus calls our nature and liberty a certain inborn help, by which he seems to allude to the opinion of those Massilians who, with Pelagius, used to take refuge in the grace of creation, so that they might attribute even the beginning that was from us to some grace; about whom we spoke in that same place.[1896] In this opinion, too, incline Clement of Alexandria, book 7 of the Stromata; Cyril, book 3 against Julian; and Damascene, On the Two Wills of Christ; and, not far from the middle, in the History of Barlaam, chapter 15. And since they all seem to concede that some beginnings on our part precede in time so that helps of grace be conferred, they must

1893. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 17 in Ioannem; Hom. 12 in Epistolam ad Hebraeos (moral exposition).
1894. Marcus the Hermit, De paradiso.
1895. See above, disputation 89, cap. 5.
1896. See above, cap. 4.

acknowledge that in eternal foreknowledge (praescientia) God had the rationale of those things, so as to predestine (praedestinare) grace for us, as I noted in that chapter. But it is no wonder; for this controversy was not so well known to the Greeks as it was to the Latins after the times of St. Augustine.[1897]

Moreover, among the Greek Fathers Gregory of Nazianzus also seems to agree with the Massilians, in Oration 31, which is upon Matthew 19. For there at number 8, explaining that saying, "Not all receive the word," he says: "To whom it has been given - add, it has been given to those who are willing and to those who are of that disposition of soul." These words seem akin to those of Cassian, book 12 of the Institutes of the Coenobia, chapter 14, which we set down in that chapter 5, and they are recited in the Second Council of Orange, canon 6, where he is condemned who shall have said that grace is given first to those who are willing without the grace of God.[1898] Yet Gregory himself clearly explains himself; for there he teaches that our very willing is not from us, lest anyone be able to glory in himself, but is chiefly from God; and therefore he thinks that saying in Romans 9 - "It is not of him that wills, etc., but of God who has mercy" - was said for that reason. Although that exposition does not entirely persuade St. Augustine, as we saw, at least it indicates to us that his mind was that our willing is not of free choice alone, which suffices for our present purpose. How far, moreover, Nazianzen is from the Massilians' position is shown by the doctrine he delivers in that place; for he compares the natural aptitude for virtue, in which sometimes one is more able than another, to flint; which, in order to produce fire, needs to be struck with iron. But, he says, our aptitude and capacity for virtue is awakened by thought, like flint by iron; and in that very thinking and awakening St. Augustine recognizes grace, which God works in us without us. In the same sense Prosper, and, in all things, Augustine himself, in the book Contra Collatorem, chapter 12, uses another comparison in these words: "Nor does one by his own strength strive toward the principles of salvation; but hidden, powerful grace of God does this: by which, the jaws of earthly opinions and of dead works being removed, it stirs the heap of the heart like a torrent and inflames it with desire for the truth, so as to subdue man, not unwilling." There he compares our nature and good disposition to an ignited hearth, because it does not draw forth the flame of good desire, or of beginning, unless it be stirred by the Spirit of the grace of God.[1899]

Second, Hilary also seems to agree with the Massilians' position on Psalm 118, at the words, "Incline my heart," etc. There he says thus: "Therefore, when we pray, the beginning is ours, so that the gift may be from God: then, because after the beginning the gift is ours again, it is again from us that it be sought, and obtained, and remain." Where at least he seems to assert that the beginning from us is prayer; for in all other things he had assigned the prior part to grace in that same place. However, Hilary speaks manifestly about man not acting and praying from his own powers alone, but already anticipated by some grace for praying. For on those words of the same psalm, "Take not the word utterly out of my mouth," he says: "He wills that all things be begun by

1897. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata VII; St. Cyril, Contra Iulianum III; St. John Damascene, De duabus Christi voluntatibus; Historia Barlaam, cap. 15.

1898. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio 31 (on Matt. 19), n. 8; Second Council of Orange (Arausio II), can. 6; cf. Rom. 9:16.

1899. Prosper of Aquitaine, Contra Collatorem, cap. 12.

his goodness," etc. And yet the beginning of prayer he attributes to us, because by prayer we obtain innumerable gifts of God, and thus we in a certain manner begin, by obtaining and impetrating them; although we are not moved to prayer itself without God's grace. "For we do not know what we should pray for as we ought; but the Spirit himself pleads for us with inexpressible groanings" (Rom. 8).[1900]

Third, the same seems to be asserted by Ambrose, book 2 On Abraham, chapter 10; for he says in a like sense that first grace and the mercy of God are obtained by us, and that we do not begin by ourselves with good pursuits and prompt faith as regards first grace; rather, he understands that, in order to obtain a richer grace and mercy, we ought, once stirred by prior helps, to begin with good pursuits and prompt faith. Incidentally it should be observed that that testimony of Isaiah 65 - "I have been made manifest to those seeking me" - is not to be taken affirmatively, but should be read with a negation, as Paul also alleges to the Romans 10 - "I was found by those who were not seeking me." The words agree with the Second Council of Orange as well: "I appeared to those who were not inquiring of me." From which place the Council of Orange secondly concluded against the Massilians the beginning not to be human invocation, but that by God's prior helps the grace of God is obtained, etc. It is also reported in Ambrose's Sermon 10 on Psalm 118; but those same words can be explained in the same sense. I pass over those things which in the Commentaries on Paul attributed to Ambrose are disputed; for those commentaries are judged by none to be Ambrose's.[1901]

Fourth, in that sense Jerome is also cited, book 3 Against the Pelagians at the beginning, where he says thus: "And yet this I know, that baptism forgives past sins, not future; nor is pardon thereafter superfluously granted for labors, and sweat, and alms, and for the rest of the virtues: mercy is of God; ours is to ask; his to bestow; ours to begin and to offer what we can; his to perfect and fulfill what we cannot." But we should be forced in vain to reckon Jerome among the remnants of the Pelagians, who in those three books inveighs so sharply against Pelagius, that in the first book he expressly asserts that the grace of God is necessary for each individual work, among which he numbers very small works of the moral virtues. Therefore, when in book 3 he says that it is ours to begin and to offer what we can, he is not understood to mean without the grace of God, but after we have already been stirred by grace; but he says it is God's to bring to completion and to fulfill what we cannot, because afterwards he offers us many things for the perfection of those works we have begun, which lie in the hand of God alone.[1902]

Fifth, Optatus of Milevis can be alleged on behalf of the Massilians' opinion, book 2 Against Parmenian, which is found in the Bibliotheca sacra; where, explaining that saying in 1 John 1:8, "If we shall say that we have no sin," etc., he says: "It is the mark of a Christian man to will the good; to will is his, and in God is that he bring to completion what he has willed well; but it is not given to man to perfect, so that, after himself there remain to God something which a man ought to fulfill,

1900. St. Hilary of Poitiers, In Psalmum 118, at "Inclina cor meum" and "Ne auferas de ore meo"; cf. Rom. 8:26.

1901. St. Ambrose, De Abraham II, c. 10; cf. Isa. 65:1; Rom. 10:20; Second Council of Orange (Arausio II), can. 6; Ambrose, Sermon on Ps. 118 (ascribed).

1902. St. Jerome, Contra Pelagianos, lib. 3 (init.); cf. idem, lib. 1, on the necessity of grace in each work.

where he has failed, that He may perfect what is lacking." By which words he in the same way concedes that it is given to man to will the good and to run, but he seems to deny that it is given to him to perfect; yet he wholly reserves perfection to God in that sense, not that it is not given to man to complete what has been begun, to will, to run; for of man speaking under the grace of God we say that to him it is granted also to perfect the work begun. But Optatus stands further from the Massilians' sense: for by the following words he explains that he is speaking of that perfection which admits no sin at all, not of the perfection of the work of justification and perseverance, about which the Massilians were speaking. Of that perfection, namely that which admits no sin, he says that in this life it has not been granted to man, even by the grace of God, except to will the good and to do it; therefore, he says, Christ did not give perfect holiness, but promised it as something to come and to be given in another age. When therefore he says that it is the mark of a Christian man to will the good and to do it, he is not speaking of bare free choice, but of the Christian man informed by the gifts of Christ. To him indeed it has been granted by the grace of God to will the good and to run, that is, to do it; but to attain that perfection which is from him most perfectly - this is a grace conceded in this life to holy men (except the Blessed Virgin).[1903]

Tertio, the same is asserted, it seems, by St. Ambrose, book 2 On Abraham, cap. 10; for he says: "Therefore present yourself with good endeavors and with ready faith, that God may take pity on you, may call you, just as he called the Church: 'I was made manifest to those who sought me; I appeared to those who did not ask for me'." But in truth all these things can be rightly explained: for Ambrose did not interpret those words as though, with respect to first grace and mercy, we begin of ourselves by good endeavors and prompt faith; he nowhere so understands. Rather, he understands that for obtaining more abundant grace and mercy we should, after being stirred by a prior grace, begin by good endeavors and prompt faith.

By the way, however, it must be observed that the testimony of Isaiah 65, "I was made manifest to those who sought me," is not to be read affirmatively, but with negation, just as the Apostle also alleges to the Romans 10: "I was found by those who did not seek me; I appeared to those who did not ask for me." The subsequent words are consonant: "I appeared to those who did not inquire for me." From which place the Second Council of Orange, can. 3, condemns the opinion of the Massilians, who were saying that by human invocation, that is, by one's own powers, the grace of God is obtained, etc.[1904] Ambrose is also cited, Sermon 10 on Psalm 118; but his words can be explained in the same sense.[1905] I pass over those things which I brought from the commentaries of Ambrose on Paul in disputation 89, cap. 3: for by those he doubtless gives support to the Massilians; but those commentaries are by many believed not to be Ambrose's.

Fourth, St. Jerome is reported for the same opinion, book 3 Against the Pelagians, at the beginning, where he has thus: "And yet know this, that baptism bestows forgiveness of past sins, not the keeping of future righteousness, which is kept by labor, and effort, and diligence, and always above all by the guardianship of God's clemency, so that it should be ours to ask, his to

1903. Optatus of Milevis, Contra Parmenianum, lib. 2; cf. 1 John 1:8.
1904. Second Council of Orange (Arausio II), can. 3.
1905. St. Ambrose, Sermon 10 on Psalm 118.

grant what is asked; ours to begin, his to perfect; ours to offer what we can, his to accomplish what we cannot."[1906] But we are attempting in vain to mention Jerome among the remains of the Pelagians, who in those three books so sharply attacks Pelagius that in the first he expressly asserts the grace of God to be necessary for each work, among which he numbers also certain works of the moral virtues. Therefore, when he says that it is ours to begin, he understands nothing except after we have already been stirred by grace; and when he says that it is God's to perfect and to accomplish what we cannot, he means that thereafter he offers to us what pertains to the perfection of what we have begun, which is in God's hand alone.

Fifth, Optatus of Milevis could be alleged for the Massilian opinion, book 2 Against Parmenianus, which is found in tome 2 of the Sacred Library.[1907] Where, explaining that text of the First Epistle of John 1, "If we say that we have no sin," he says: "It is the business of the Christian man to will what is good, and to run in God, as he has willed well; but it has not been given to man to perfect, so that, after the intervals which a man ought to fulfill, something remain to God, that he may succor one in need; because he alone is perfect." By these words, in the same way he concedes that it has been given to man to will the good and to run, while he also denies that to perfect has been given; but what is denied to man is only to perfect from his own powers: therefore in the same way it is conceded to begin, and to will, and to run. For if we speak of a man prevented by the grace of God, it has likewise been conceded to him to bring the work begun to perfection.

But Optatus was far distant from the sense of the Massilians: for by the subsequent words he clearly explains that he is speaking of that perfection which admits no sin, not of the perfection of the work of justification and of perseverance, about which the Massilians were speaking. Of that perfection which admits no sin he says that in this life it has not been granted to man, even by the grace of God, but only to will the good and to do it. Therefore he says that Christ did not give perfect holiness, but promised it as future, to be given in another age. When therefore he said that it is the business of the Christian man to will the good and to do it, he understood not the bare will, but the Christian already instructed in faith and in Christ's gifts. To this man it is given by the grace of God to will the good and to run, that is, to do it; but to attain that perfection which is without any sin has not been granted in this life even by the grace of God to holy men (the Blessed Virgin excepted).

Caput IX - Our theologians variously defend these Fathers from this opinion

Among our theologians of our time there have not been lacking those who openly attempted to defend the opinion of these Fathers, of whom we shall speak in the following chapter. Some also, speaking more cautiously, do not dare to uphold the opinion, but interpret the authors in a good sense: whose defenses, that the truth may shine forth the more, we shall briefly report in this chapter.

1906. St. Jerome, Contra Pelagianos, book 3 (at the beginning).
1907. Optatus of Milevis, Contra Parmenianum, book 2; cf. 1 John 1:8.

First, therefore, Driedo, treatise 2 On the Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race, cap. 2, p. 4, not far from the end, attempts to vindicate Faustus of Riez from this mark; although in cap. 1, p. 2, he plainly attributes this doctrine, which he himself deems absurd, to Cassian.[1908] Here, however, Driedo, an author otherwise very learned, is manifestly deceived. First, because the ancient and most learned Fathers of the Church openly lay at Faustus of Riez at least that doctrine which we have reported, as we shall relate below, cap. 11: Peter the Deacon, who lived at that time; Pope Hormisdas; John Maxentius; Isidore; and Ado of Vienne. Secondly, because his books On Grace and Free Will show this everywhere, especially in those places which we alleged in disputation 89, cap. 4. Nay rather, he speaks more severely in this matter than Cassian: for he judges it necessary that man should always begin, in order that the helps of God's grace be conferred upon him. But Cassian, as we noted in that cap. 4, concedes that God sometimes begins, and with his grace prevents us. If God were to begin sometimes, Faustus would not hesitate to assert that which in book 2, cap. 6, against St. Augustine he said, and which we recounted above in disputation 89, cap. 1: namely, that God then makes use rather of the right of a ruler than of the order of a governor. For this reason Peter the Deacon said, as we shall report in cap. 11, that among those who favor things similar to Pelagius (namely, the Semipelagians) he especially anathematizes the books of this Faustus.[1909] Why then does Driedo defend Faustus rather than Cassian?

Moreover, Driedo thus interprets the mind of Faustus, that he only, against the presbyter Lucidus, establishes and maintains our liberty, but does not derogate from the dignity of grace. For it is clear from the preface of those books of Faustus On Grace and Free Will, that Lucidus, from certain places of Augustine ill-understood, was taking away our liberty by God's predestination. I for my part do not doubt that this was the author's intention, which he himself explained in that preface. But since the Massilians and the adversaries of Augustine, nay even St. John Chrysostom, were striving to prove that God does not prevent our wills by his grace, because, if he were to prevent, some force would be brought to bear upon human free choice, as we shall see in cap. 12, and as is clear from the words of Chrysostom cited in the preceding chapter; by the same way, and reasoning as well, Faustus also wished to defend our liberty against Lucidus, as the words of that author in cap. 6 indicate.[1910]

From all these things, and from those which we reported in disputation 89, cap. 1, one may gather that Trithemius, a man otherwise careful, was deceived, plainly thinking falsely when he asserts of this Faustus of Riez that he was first indeed a Pelagian, then recalled to the true faith by Fulgentius and therefore wrote, in his favor, two books On Grace and Free Will. For first, Faustus - otherwise pious and religious - from the monastery of Lérins was never plainly a Pelagian; for in that book 1, from cap. 1 to cap. 6, and cap. 14, he elegantly proves against Pelagius the necessity of grace; but he belonged to the remains of the Pelagians, like the Massilians and Cassian, who were called Semipelagians.[1911]

1908. John Driedo, De captivitate et redemptione generis humani, treatise 2, cap. 2, p. 4; cf. cap. 1, p. 2.

1909. Peter the Deacon, cap. 11 (as cited by Vázquez), anathematizing especially the books of Faustus among the Semipelagians.

1910. Faustus of Riez, De gratia et libero arbitrio, preface and book 2, cap. 6.

Furthermore, that Fulgentius did not write those books for the reason which Trithemius supposed is clear: for in many places already cited he grants some beginning as "from us," contrary to the manifest doctrine of Fulgentius in the book On the Incarnation and Grace, and in other places which we shall cite.[1912] Also, because when Peter the Deacon had professed at Rome his own faith and that of the Eastern Fathers against these Massilians, he wrote of it a book On the Incarnation and Grace to Fulgentius, in which, cap. 8, he condemns those aforesaid books of Faustus, because in them he subordinated grace to human labor. Fulgentius, moreover, in the book On the Incarnation and Grace, which he wrote back to Peter in his own name and in that of all Africa, approves Peter's doctrine; nowhere, however, does he defend Faustus from this mark: he would have vindicated him, if he had converted him from error, and Faustus had composed those books in favor of his [Fulgentius's] books; for then he would have followed Fulgentius's judgment in all things, who attributes every beginning to the grace of God, and condemns the opposite as an error.[1913]

Secondly, Henricus Cuikius, in his annotations on Cassian, annotation 2, excuses Cassian, at least in book 12 On the Institutes of the Coenobia, caps. 11, 12, 13, and 14, where he seemed to attribute some beginning to us, on the ground that from cap. 10 to cap. 19 he wonderfully commends grace against Pelagius, asserting that our efforts are ineffectual unless they be helped by grace. For Cuikius does not defend him in Conference 13 of Chaeremon, where Cassian openly hands on this doctrine; otherwise he would have condemned Prosper, who attacks that doctrine, as a false slanderer. It seemed therefore to Cuikius that Cassian spoke well of grace, and that in that place he did not grant beginnings "from us," which in that conference he attributes to our free choice, since he asserted that our efforts are ineffectual unless at every moment we be supported in good, and that he spoke so honorably of grace.

But certainly this is a most light argument. For Cassian, and the others of the remains of the Pelagians, always speak honorably of grace against Pelagius, to promote our efforts; but for arousing and beginning they teach that it is not necessary; rather, they affirm that we begin solely "from ourselves." And if at some time Cassian says that the efforts are ineffectual unless we be supported by God in good, and his grace prevent us, he himself conceded nothing of the very beginning of a good work to be from God, as we saw in disputation 89, cap. 5; nonetheless they believed this, that among the works whose beginning they referred to God, they did not number faith, nor good will, and these he attributed to our free choice, so that to the rest God might prevent with his grace.

Moreover, that we begin not only by desire, faith, and prayer, but even by certain works "from ourselves," the same Cassian teaches in that book 12, cap. 14. For after, in cap. 13, he enumerated many good works and our efforts - vigils, reading, solitude, fasts, and withdrawals - he subjoins: "But I most firmly define, according to the sentence of the elders, that perfection indeed cannot at

1911. On Faustus's anti-Pelagian arguments: De gratia et libero arbitrio, book 1, caps. 1 - 6 and cap. 14; on Hormisdas, John Maxentius, Isidore, and Ado of Vienne, see their testimonies as cited by Vázquez.

1912. St. Fulgentius, De Incarnatione et gratia.

1913. Peter the Deacon, De Incarnatione et gratia ad Fulgentium, cap. 8; Fulgentius, De Incarnatione et gratia (reply to Peter) in his own name and in the name of all Africa.

all be attained without these, but that by these, without the grace of God, it can even be consummated. For we say that human efforts cannot grasp that perfection by themselves without God's help, thus we pronounce that mercy and grace of God are granted only to those who labor and sweat, and, to speak with the words of the Apostle, are imparted to those who will and run. And a little after: For we say, according to the Savior's sentence, that it is indeed given to those who ask, opened to those who knock, and found by those who seek; but that our petition and inquiry and knocking are not condign, unless the mercy of God has given what we ask, or opened what we knock for, or made that which we seek to be found. For the occasion is at hand to himself, once only our good will has been offered, for bestowing all these things." In which place observe also that "knocking" is not the same as "praying": for, as the author of the Opus Imperfectum on Matthew says, attributed to Chrysostom, homily 18, he who not only prays, but exercises himself in good works, is as one who not only cries with his voice at someone's door, but also knocks with his hand, so as to be heard. This author, however, felt with the Massilians, as is clear from that homily 32.[1914] Cassian therefore in that book 12 openly expressed the doctrine which he afterwards taught in that conference, and which all the Massilians followed. For in almost the same words he handed it on in Conference 13, cap. 9, for which reason, using his very words, it is condemned in the Second Council of Orange, can. 6; nay rather, in that book 12 he speaks more severely: for he asserts that the grace of God is given only to those who seek, knock, and labor, whereas in that conference 13, caps. 12, 13, and 15, he concedes that the grace of God sometimes prevents us, and that sometimes we seek the grace of God, as I noted in disputation 89, cap. 5.[1915]

Thirdly, Sixtus of Siena, book 5 of the Bibliotheca Sancta, annotation 101, interprets Chrysostom benignly, so that he derogates nothing from prevenient grace, but that his words should be referred not to prevenient grace, but to subsequent grace, which the theologians call habitual, so that this be given to us who ask and labor, once readiness toward God and an occasion of our will has been offered; or certainly it be understood of the helps of subsequent grace, which are given for perfecting what we have begun, once we already will, etc., as we said in disputation 88, cap. 10.[1916] But assuredly the words of Chrysostom, which I set out in the preceding chapter, do not admit this interpretation: for he plainly confesses that God by his gifts does not prevent our wills, but that the beginning is to be made by us. And if Chrysostom had been of that mind, namely that he judged the grace of God to hold the first place in our operations, and that by it we are excited to every good beginning and to the work to be begun, and that no beginning is given "from us" to which grace would be given, Cassian would not have thought otherwise: for this man had Chrysostom as his chief master in the East, and would gladly have corrected his opinion by the doctrine of all the other Eastern Fathers.

Nor does it stand in the way that Chrysostom, homily 38…

Cuikius, in annotation 2, excuses Cassian because in book 12 of the Institutes of the Coenobites, caps. 11, 12, 13, and 14, where he seemed to ascribe some beginning to us, he from cap. 10 through 19 in a remarkable way commends grace against Pelagius, asserting that our endeavors are vain

1914. Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum (ascribed to St. John Chrysostom), hom. 18 and hom. 32.
1915. Second Council of Orange (Arausio II), can. 6.

unless they be aided by the grace of God. For in Conference 13, of Chaeremon, where Cassian openly hands down this doctrine, Cuikius does not defend him; otherwise he would have condemned Prosper, who attacks that doctrine, as a false calumniator. It therefore seemed to Cuikius that Cassian spoke well about grace, and that in that very place he did not concede beginnings from us, which in that Conference he attributes to our free choice, because he asserted that our endeavors are vain unless at every moment we are supported in good, and that he spoke honorably of grace.[1917]

But certainly this argument is most slight. For Cassian and the others of the remnants of the Pelagians always speak honorably of grace against Pelagius, in order to promote our endeavors; but as to arousing and initiating them, they do not teach it to be necessary; rather indeed they affirm that the beginning is solely from us. And if at some point Cassian says that the endeavors are vain unless we be supported by God in good, and that his grace prevene us, that excuses him nothing. For the Semipelagians also conceded that even the beginning of a good work is from God, as we saw in disputation 89, cap. 5, and nevertheless they erred, because among the works whose beginning they referred to God they did not number faith nor good will, and these they attributed to our free choice, so that to the rest God might prevene by his grace.

Furthermore, that we begin not only by desire, faith, and prayer, but even by some works, the same Cassian also teaches in that book 12, cap. 14. For after he has enumerated many good works and our endeavors - of vigils, reading, solitude, fasts, and activity - he subjoins: "But plainly and most constantly I determine the sentence of the elders to be this, that perfection indeed cannot in any way be attained without these, yet that by these alone, without the grace of God, by no one can it be consummated. For we say that human endeavors grasp at and approach works, but that without the aid of God they cannot bring them to perfection; thus we pronounce that mercy and the grace of God are bestowed upon those only who labor and are spent out, and imparted, to use the Apostle's words, to those who are willing and who run. And a little after: For we say, according to the sentence of the Savior, that to those who ask it is given, and to those who knock it is opened, and those who seek find; but that petition and inquiry and knocking are not condign, unless he shall have given that which we ask, or shall have opened, or we shall have found that which we seek. For the occasion of good will at length being offered to itself is at hand for granting these things." There also observe that by "knocking" he understands not only prayer by voice, but also actual works; as is said in the Opus Imperfectum on Matthew, hom. 18 and also in 32: he who exercises himself not only with voice at the door, but also knocks with hand, that is, by deeds.[1918] In which words, too plainly, that doctrine is delivered in that Conference; which also the Massilians followed. And that doctrine of Cassian is condemned in the Second Council of Orange, can. 6; indeed, he asserts to those who seek and knock in that Conference that the grace of God helps, and that we meanwhile supply our part, and that all our knocking be not without fruit, since, as the

1916. Sixtus of Siena, Bibliotheca Sancta, book 5, annot. 101.

1917. John Cassian, Collationes (Conference 13, of Abba Chaeremon). Cf. De institutis coenobiorum, book 12, caps. 11 - 15.

1918. Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, homilies 18 and 32 (ascribed to St. John Chrysostom).

author says in the oration ascribed to Chrysostom, it is given not to one who hears only the clamor of a voice, but of one who hears the clamor of some working. Here you see what Cassian thought. Therefore Cassian expressed what he taught, and all the Massilians followed him. And the same thing is more severely stated by him in that book 12, that the grace of God is given only to those who knock and labor; but in Conference 13, caps. 12, 13, and 15, he concedes that sometimes we prevene the grace of God, as was noted in disputation 89, cap. 5.[1919]

Third, Sixtus of Siena, annot. 101, kindly interprets Chrysostom, so that he may not derogate from prevenient grace; as though those statements ought not to be referred to prevenient grace, which the theologians call habitual, but to subsequent grace, so that this is given to us already offered by God's promptitude and an occasion of our will; or certainly he understands the grace that follows, which is given for perfecting what we have begun.[1920] But assuredly the words of Chrysostom do not bear this, since plainly he thought that the grace of God does not prevene wills, but is obtained by our own operations, so that he would think that God is not stirred to give by anticipating us to every good beginning, nor is any given to him to whom grace is granted without our own operations; and therefore Cassian - whose very dear teacher in the East was Chrysostom - embraced this doctrine of all the Orientals most willingly, which Chrysostom in hom. 38 to the people of Antioch, and in the 12th on the epistle to the Corinthians, seems to have taught: that all our merits, faith, and virtues we have from God and that they are his gifts; for this indeed all the Massilians were saying; but only they erred, that they ascribed to us some beginnings of these things, although some said even that faith is from ourselves - in this matter indeed they were various, as was said in that disputation 89, cap. 5. Moreover, merits of eternal life, and virtues consummated and perfected, the Semipelagians ascribed to God and to his grace; and for this cause Julian also - himself so far Pelagian, against whom Augustine wrote - seemed to assert that very thing. Whose sentence Augustine in book 4, cap. 3, impugns thus: "When therefore man is divinely aided, he is not aided only toward attaining perfection," which he had set down so that he might will to be understood, "that he begins without grace that which grace perfects." For indeed in the preceding chapter and in those chapters I noted that this was the common sentence and manner of speaking of the Semipelagians: Our endeavors are vain unless they be helped. Against whom Bernard, in the little book On Grace and Free Will, very well strikes at the root: "The endeavors of free will toward the good are vain if they be not helped by the grace of God, and none avail if they be not aroused." So that he concludes that grace is necessary both for beginning and for perfecting.[1921]

Objection. Someone will object that Augustine, in a certain place On the Grace of Christ, cap. 64, benignly interprets Chrysostom, whom the adversary of Augustine alleged for himself. I answer: There a different matter is being disputed, namely, whether a man can be without sin. Augustine explains Chrysostom to have seemed to say that this can be, so that he may understand that it is by the grace of God; as also he explained above the other Latin Fathers. And truly so it

1919. Second Council of Orange (Arausio II), can. 6.
1920. Sixtus of Siena, Bibliotheca Sancta, book 5, annot. 101.
1921. St. Bernard, De gratia et libero arbitrio.

must be believed of Chrysostom: for neither he nor the Semipelagians ever contended that we can by our own powers live without sin, but only that we furnish certain beginnings from ourselves, as was also noted.

Nor let it seem incredible to anyone that the Greek Fathers of so great authority and doctrine were in this sentiment, since the Massilians, and throughout Gaul so many illustrious men likewise, were in the same opinion. For the matter was exceedingly subtle and difficult to explain, until Augustine, by the felicity of his genius, as in many other things, explained it for us. And if the Greek Fathers, because they were alleged by the Massilians against the sentence of Augustine - among whom it is not doubtful that Chrysostom is included, since he was the teacher of Cassian in the East - were being brought forward in this matter against Augustine, he would have more easily himself thus answered those objecting, that those Fathers had in vain been thus thought to be against his sentence, who had never taught the contrary. But in fact he himself answers in another way, as from the following it will be plain. For Prosper, in an epistle to Augustine, which is before the books On the Predestination of the Saints, writes thus about the Massilians: "And when we bring forward against them writings of your Beatitude, furnished with most forceful and innumerable testimonies of the divine Scriptures, they defend their obstinacy by antiquity, so that the things which are brought from the Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Romans, to manifest the prevenient grace of God with respect to the merits of the elect, they affirm never to have been so understood by any ecclesiastics as they are now taken." And Hilary, in an epistle to the same Augustine: "And this," he says, "they declare to be proved not only by the testimonies of other Catholics, but also by the earlier disputation of your sanctity"; namely, that the Massilians confirmed their sentence not only by the authority of other Fathers, but even by the writings of Augustine himself, which, when he was a presbyter, he composed.

To these things, however, Augustine does not say that those Fathers never taught the opposite of his doctrine, but plainly conceding that they were in a contrary sentence, in that book On the Predestination of the Saints, cap. 14, modestly responds in these words: "What need, then, is there that we should scrutinize the little works of those who, before this heresy (namely, the Pelagian) had arisen, had no necessity to be engaged in this difficult question to be solved?" He adds indeed at the end of the chapter: "Wherefore, let it not disturb, nor do our brethren" (he understands the Massilians) "who with us for the Catholic faith impugn the ruinous Pelagian error, build up, that such Pelagian opinions were theirs." But what Augustine himself had taught while a presbyter, cap. 4 of the same book, and in the first book of the Retractations, cap. 23, he retracts. Nay, after he became bishop, he always taught the contrary, as he there admonishes; and it is plain from the first book to Simplicianus, q. 2, which was the first he composed after his episcopate.[1922]

I pass over the exposition of others who strive to explain the Greek Fathers on election to glory, so that they assert that men have been elected from the merits of grace, but not about election to grace from the merits of free choice; for I noted in disputation 89, caps. 4 and 8, that this is not the

1922. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, cap. 14; cap. 4 of the same work; Retractationes, book 1, cap. 23; Ad Simplicianum, book 1, q. 2.

mind of the Greek Fathers. I also pass over the exposition of other more recent writers, which I shall report in the following disputation, cap. 2; for from the things said enough remains against them.

Lastly, someone could contend that the Greek Fathers never taught the sentence of the Massilians. For the Massilians did not admit that the grace of God is given for each and every work which prepares for our justification, since they conceded that there are from us certain good beginnings, because of which grace would be conferred upon us for justification. Then they said that grace is given interposed from certain merits, and in foreknowledge determined from the same. But the Greek Fathers could not have been ignorant that these are manifest errors; for Pelagius retracted each point before them in the Council of Palestine, as is clear from the epistles 90, 95, 105, 106, and 107 among Augustine's, and from the Acts of that Council, which are held in a very ancient codex of the monastery of Monte Cassino, from which I transcribed the retraction of all the errors which Pelagius made there.[1923]

I answer first that we do not assert that all the Greek Fathers were in the Massilian sentence, but Chrysostom and his disciples, and also Origen, and a few others whom we have mentioned; and that Chrysostom did not take part in the Council of Palestine is manifest. For although it was held under Innocent I, after the Council of Milevis, as is clear from epistle 106 of Augustine, and to it Chrysostom could have been present; yet since that Council was only of the province of Palestine, as Augustine writes in the cited epistle, and in epistles 105 and 107, but it was celebrated at Diospolis, as St. Jerome attests in epist. 79, with John, bishop of Jerusalem, presiding, as Paul Orosius narrates in the Apology for Free Will a little from the beginning, it is plainly gathered that Chrysostom and the other bishops of Bithynia did not take part in it. Others, therefore, of the Fathers who were present could have been well instructed against Pelagius, that he should retract his errors, either because of their own diligence, or especially because Paul Orosius, as he himself affirms, was present at the Council, who was strongly devoted to Augustine's doctrine against Pelagius; even if Chrysostom and the others with the Massilians had been in the aforesaid sentence.[1924]

Then I say that Pelagius's error was far different from the opinion of the Massilians. These, namely, conceded some very little kind of merit which impetrates and disposes, as I observed in disputation 89, cap. 4; but Pelagius thought that the merits of free choice were condign, so that grace might be granted to us for acting more easily; just as he also said that we can by our own powers condignly merit glory; although Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, cap. 2, convicts the Massilians of Pelagius's error, which he retracted in the Council of Palestine - namely, that grace is given according to our merits - which they asserted when they said that the beginning of believing is from us, but the consummation from God. For he therefore convicts them because some merit would already be from us in that beginning of faith, which they granted to be from us. Which, although it rightly follows, I nevertheless think that Pelagius taught a greater

1923. St. Augustine, Epistulae 90, 95, 105, 106, 107; Acts of the Council of Diospolis (Palestine), preserved in an ancient codex of the monastery of Monte Cassino.

1924. St. Jerome, Epistula 79; Paul Orosius, Apologia pro libertate arbitrii.

reason of merit from ourselves, from which Cassian, who was the head of the sect of the Semipelagians, when he wished to decline, conceding some beginnings from us, in book 12 of the Institutes of the Coenobites, caps. 11 and 12, said that our merits are not condign so that they can compensate for the grace of God, but that grace by divine mercy is granted to us because of those our merits. Yet from the sentence of the Massilians and Cassian it very well follows that there is some merit from us, which truly takes away the notion of grace, although it is not condign, as we shall show more at length in cap. 15.[1925]

But as to what Pelagius said in the Council of Palestine, that grace is necessary for each work, about what works he was speaking - whether about any kind of beginning, or about merits already consummated and perfect works - is not confessed and clear to all. However, about gaining victories over each and every temptation Paul Orosius plainly understands him in the cited little work; as we shall see more fully in 1, 2, 9, 10, 21, 2, and 4.[1926] And indeed, if Pelagius were speaking of each and every work, even those which could be the beginnings of justification, the Fathers of Palestine could not have been ignorant that without the grace of God we cannot even begin anything by which we obtain the very grace of God for perfecting; but this, as I have said, does not prove that Chrysostom was not in the opinion of the Massilians, because it is clear that he was not present at that Council.

Add also that the Fathers of that Council were not well instructed against Pelagius, as is gathered from the epistles of Augustine cited. For when Pelagius had retracted those errors, and had affirmed that the grace of God is necessary through each and every point, he nevertheless persisted in his own error; for by the name of grace he understood the gift of creation and of free choice. But the Fathers, because they had not yet well marked what grace it was of which Pelagius was speaking underhandedly, thinking that he understood by it the grace which is commended in the Scriptures and is granted to us through Christ, admitted his retraction. They ought, however, to have asked Pelagius whether he understood by those statements the grace of internal inspiration and holy thought: for this is the grace through Christ; for the gift of creation and of free will is not that grace through Christ.

Nota. The gift of creation is not through Christ, nor is it that grace which is commended in the Scriptures and which Catholics strive to defend against Pelagius. What wonder, then, if the Greek Fathers, who had disputed little with Pelagius, did not think so exactly about grace as did St. Augustine, who for a long time most happily sustained the war with Pelagius himself and his followers?[1927]

1925. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, cap. 2; John Cassian, De institutis coenobiorum, book 12, caps. 11 - 12.

1926. Paul Orosius, Apologia pro libertate arbitrii (section numbers as cited by Vázquez).

1927. Antonius Pantusa, De praedestinatione et gratia, cap. 6 (post medium); Dominicus Soto, De natura et gratia, lib. 2, cap. ... (as cited in the text).

Caput X - Certain Scholastics in fact agree with the Massilians, though they indicate otherwise in words about predestination

With Cassian and the Massilians not a few Scholastics agree in reality: these, namely, are they who affirm that some disposition and preparation (disposition and preparation: dispositio, praeparatio) to justification is from our free will. And first, Scotus in 4, dist. 14, q. 2, a. 1; and Gabriel in 2, dist. 27, q. 1, a. 2, conclusion 4, and a. 3, dub. 4; and in 3, dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3, dub. 2, proposition 2; and Cajetan in the first tome of the Opuscula, tract. 4, q. 1, assert that a man can be sorry for sins for God loved above all out of his own powers, and that this is the last disposition to habitual justifying grace, and a merit for it, not indeed condign, but congruous; and that this contrition, subsequently informed by habitual grace, is already meritorious de condigno of the kingdom of heaven. They differ, however, in that Scotus says justification does not take place immediately, but a little after, the contrition being continued for some brief time; but Gabriel and Cajetan assert that it takes place in the same instant of time, and think themselves far removed from error, since they do not grant condign merits for the grace of our justification, as Pelagius affirmed.[1928]

Next are to be numbered those who ascribe to our free will some disposition not so proximate, but remote, and, as Richard calls it, indirect, by which a man obtains from God helps of grace, by which he is advanced unto justice. Such are Gabriel in 2, dist. 27, q. 1, a. 2, concl. 4, and in 1, dist. 41, q. 1, a. 2; and Durandus in 2, dist. 28, q. 5, a. 7; Richard in the same distinction, a. 1, q. 2; Cajetan on 1 - 2, q. 109. Lastly, whoever judges that common proposition to be true, "To one who does what is in him, out of the powers of nature, God does not deny grace," whether they will or not, subscribes to this opinion. For Driedo, De concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis, part 2, cap. ult., fol. 50 and the following; and De captivitate et redemptione generis humani, tract. 2, cap. 2; and Ruard Tapper, 2, 7, 9; and Doctors before the Scholastics, and some more recent, deem it probable: although in another sense these Doctors understand that proposition which Gabriel, in 2, dist. 27, q. 1, a. 2, concl. 4, and in 3, dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3, dub. 2, proposition 2, expounds at length. For there he grants indeed many works which, if man should do from his own powers, he would obtain from God not only the helps of grace by which he would by degrees be disposed for the remission of sins, but even habitual grace itself, by which he would actually be justified; and in this sense he understands that proposition: "To one who does what is in him out of the powers of nature, God does not deny grace." Nay more, he adds that an unbeliever then does what is in him by the powers of nature, to the end that he may be justified immediately by the grace of God, when he conforms his free will to natural reason and with all his heart asks to be enlightened for the knowing of truth and of justice; but that a believer does what is in him, if, according to the rule of faith, he detests sin, proposing in all things to obey God for His own sake - "all which," he says, "one can perform by the powers of nature without any help of interior grace." But Driedo and Ruard only teach that, for one who uses the powers of nature well, in the exercise of certain good

1928. Scotus, In IV Sent., dist. 14, q. 2, a. 1; Gabriel (Biel), In II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 2, concl. 4; a. 3, dub. 4; In III Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3, dub. 2, prop. 2; Cajetan, Opuscula, tom. 1, tract. 4, q. 1.

moral works, the mercy of God is at hand to bestow the helps of His grace, by which he is by degrees disposed to the remission of sins.[1929] I for my part think that these Doctors also side with the Semipelagians and deem that proposition probable - as I shall immediately prove.

Others, moreover - grave and ancient Scholastics - are referred to this opinion, as if they, too, in this manner conceded the said proposition. Alexander, 3, p., q. 69, mem. 1, a. 2; and Gerson, Alphabetum, letter 24, M; and the Antissiodorensis, in the Summa, book 3, tract. 2, cap. 1, quaest. 5 - although the common run of Scholastics never understood the proposition thus. For, first, Gerson plainly says that "to one who does what is in him," that is, to one who uses well the gifts of God already had, God does not fail, but grants further ones; and since he himself, in the tract on the spiritual life, lect. 1, which is found in the Alphabetum, no. 61, under the letter G, expressly says that a man cannot do any good work, even of moral virtue, without some help of the grace of God moving interiorly, certainly he could not have asserted that proposition, "To one who does what is in him, out of the powers of nature, God does not deny the helps of His grace." In like manner, although Alexander and the Antissiodorensis affirm this proposition absolutely, yet since Alexander, 3, p., q. 69, mem. 1, a. 2, teaches that free will cannot of itself decline from evil and do good without the help of grace, but can do evil, and the Antissiodorensis, in the Summa, tract. 11, cap. 1, q. 4, says that we cannot, without grace given gratis (for thus he calls the help of grace, to distinguish it from habitual grace, as other Theologians also do), perform any good, it follows that they did not understand that proposition of him who does what is in him out of the powers of nature, but of one who acts with the help of grace; to wit, that God does not deny further gifts of His grace necessary for salvation to one who thus disposes himself: and hence they are far removed from the doctrine of the Massilians.[1930]

In the same way the most weighty Scholastics, St. Thomas, 1 - 2, q. 109, a. 2, and q. 112, a. 2 and 3, understood this very proposition against the Massilians; where he not only teaches that no preparation for grace can exist in man out of his own powers that might anticipate the help of God, but also understands the aforesaid proposition of him who does what is in him by the help of grace, not out of his own powers; nor did he ever affirm the opposite, as Cajetan falsely thinks on that article 6; indeed, he had expressly taught this in 2, dist. 28, a. 4, which place Cajetan there alleges for the contrary opinion. For he says that a man can prepare himself for grace without the habitual gift of grace - which no one denies - but not without some gift peculiarly received from divine providence, where he admits the necessity of the help of grace moving. Nor does he deny this gift in solution 4 concerning the man reared in the forests without the faith of Christ, while he follows the light of natural reason. So too Bonaventure speaks openly about the same proposition in 2, dist. 28, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2; nay more, Dominicus Soto in 2, De natura et gratia, c. 3, ad secundum, although in that place this author otherwise grants some remote disposition to grace from free will.[1931]

1929. J. Driedo, De concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis, pars 2, cap. ult., fol. 50 sqq.; idem, De captivitate et redemptione generis humani, tract. 2, cap. 2; Ruard Tapper, 2, 7, 9 (as cited); and others named in the context.

1930. Alexander of Hales, Summa, III, q. 69, mem. 1, a. 2; John Gerson, Alphabetum, lit. 24 (M), and De vita spirituali, lect. 1 (in Alphabetum, no. 61, lit. G); William of Auxerre (Antissiodorensis), Summa, lib. 3, tract. 2, cap. 1, q. 5.

1931. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I - II, q. 109, a. 2; q. 112, a. 2 - 3; In II Sent., dist. 28, a. 4. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., dist. 28, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2; Dominicus Soto, De natura et gratia, lib. 2, cap. 3, ad 2.

All, therefore, whom I have a little before reviewed I said to side with the Massilians, in that they plainly concede some beginning from our free will to which grace is adjoined. For thus we shall begin, and God will await - if not always, at least sometimes - our will, and will put our free choice to the test, and its good use, that He may bestow on us the helps of grace. But if in time it be thus, according to the sentence of these Doctors, as the Massilians affirmed, it follows that this very beginning ought also to be conceded in the eternal predestination of God: for the same ratio obtains of the bestowal of grace in time and of eternal election or predestination; so that, if grace is given on account of some occasion, or disposition, or our beginning, by the same in foreknowledge it is also prepared - as we have often already admonished, especially in disputation 89, cap. 4; nor is there anyone who can doubt this. Wherefore Gabriel - who had previously said that there is given a condign meritorious cause of predestination, because he thought it to concern only beatitude - in the place cited subjoins: if predestination also concerned grace, a cause too would have to be given on our part, namely a remote disposition from free will and a merit only of congruity; which sentence Richard in 1, dist. 41, deems more probable.[1932]

But indeed you may see some Scholastics, very religious men, when they speak about predestination, who speak less cautiously about the grace (grace: gratia) of God; although among the ancient Fathers of the Church there was altogether the same controversy about the cause of grace and of predestination on our part, and therefore they denied every merit, cause, and occasion from us of our predestination, so as to show that grace in time is bestowed on us wholly gratis, without any of these. These Scholastics therefore most constantly deny any cause of predestination on the part of the predestined; yet they admit that even the first grace is, as to its donation, connected with free will in such wise that some of the predestined dispose themselves for grace without interior motion and help of grace, though not without a special providence, as Durandus teaches in 1, dist. 38, q. 5; where he says that certain of the predestined dispose themselves to grace without interior motion and help of grace, yet not without a peculiar providence, since namely they rise from sin unto grace, in which they persevere to the end of life. For those works by which the predestined are disposed unto grace do not arise from a special interior motion of grace, but from a special providence, namely predestination: because, even if they are not unto grace, they are nevertheless effects of predestination. Now he judges these to be good moral works, of which he also said in 3, dist. 9, q. 3, n. 8, that they are meritorious by congruity of first grace. With Durandus agrees Richard in 1, dist. 41, a. 3, q. 1, who defends as probable the opinion of those who assert that there is no cause of predestination on our part, although he nevertheless concedes some disposition from us unto grace, as we have seen above; and we have found Scotus, Dominicus Soto, and Driedo to be of like mind with them.[1933]

1932. Gabriel (Biel), In II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 2, concl. 4; In III Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3, dub. 2, prop. 2; Richard, In I Sent., dist. 41.

1933. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 38, q. 5; In III Sent., dist. 9, q. 3, n. 8; Richard, In I Sent., dist. 41, a. 3, q. 1.

Nor indeed will you fail to find not a few more recent Theologians who have embraced this opinion; and on this sole account they deny a cause of predestination: because whatever efficaciously conduces to salvation by preordination, whether as cause, or as occasion, or in some other way, inasmuch as it is not apart from grace, is encompassed under the effect of predestination. For this reason Durandus and Richard taught the same opinion.

But, as I have already warned, we ought to be no less solicitous about predestination than about grace, lest we ascribe any cause to it. Therefore those who say that there is some cause, disposition, or occasion of the bestowal of grace which takes place in time ought also to concede the same of predestination. For this question is not, nor among the Fathers ever was, about predestination as it is a kind of providence (providence: providentia) comprehending all things that are in the predestined person, but as it comprises only those things which are gifts of grace; and therefore it is called the predestination of grace (predestination: praedestinatio). And when we ask whether a cause is given of predestination, we put the question about the predestination of grace. For as we proved in disputation 89, cap. 8, and cap. 3 of this disputation, predestination is the preparation of gifts and benefits, not of nature, but of grace, by which a man is saved. Thus defined St. Augustine and the others there cited. Nay more, in book 1 De praedestinatione sanctorum, cap. 10, Augustine says that grace and predestination differ only in this, that predestination is the preparation of grace, grace itself the donation.[1934]

Nor indeed did Pelagius and the Massilians ever say that predestination has as its cause that all-embracing providence by which God disposes whatever He has decreed about the predestined. For who does not understand that nothing can be given which could overthrow divine providence, and so nothing which could precede the providence of God? Hence, if by "predestination" we mean, in the common manner of speaking, that which turns about grace in regard to the predestined, then the Massilian could plausibly doubt in some show of probability whether there be something natural on our part which precedes the bestowal of grace and its predestination - inasmuch as, if the bestowal of grace is made in time, it is also prepared in foreknowledge - so that, on account of the good use of free will from the power which we received by creation, God should grant to us the grace of Christ and predestine us. And although it is most certain that nothing of that sort is in us, as we showed in cap. 5; nevertheless, because of the difficulty of the matter, one may easily be confounded, if one does not distinguish the senses of the words carefully; and even now not a few Theologians stumble. In what manner the sentence of those Scholastics does not differ from the Massilian error was set out in the preceding chapter. But we shall set forth and refute, in cap. 16 and 17, the foundations of the Massilians and of the Scholastics.

Finally, from what has been said in disputation 89, cap. 5, it is gathered that the opinion of these men wholly coincides with the Massilians, when they say, "To one who does what is in him out of his own powers God does not deny grace," and that God at no time is under any promissory obligation to bestow it; for grace is not of debt but of grace - precisely what we said there.

... as we said, but only if there were given some beginning from us.

1934. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1, cap. 10.

There are nevertheless some Scholastics who grant that proposition, "To one who does what is in him, God does not deny grace," in such a way that they do not dare to call a beginning or occasion of good works a disposition to grace: for this seems to them Pelagian, since there would then already be on our side some supernatural work. For the disposition to some form is of the same order as the form itself: but grace is of a supernatural order; therefore the disposition to it would be of the same order. Yet, as I shall show in chapter twelve, the Massilians did not hold that they asserted something supernatural to be from our powers; but that they said some beginning or occasion on our part precedes, on account of which grace is given to us. And the things which, in the following chapter, and in chapters twelve, fourteen, and fifteen, we allege against them do not only prove that from us there does not precede any merit, even impetratory or congruous, or any disposition; but also that there does not precede any least beginning or occasion on account of which grace is given: and they manifestly show this to be Catholic doctrine. Furthermore, among the Fathers you will never find the Massilian opinion condemned because they conceded on our part a disposition which they would call of the same supernatural order with grace, but because they said that grace is given on account of something of free choice, as will soon be clear.

Caput XI - That no cause, or beginning, of the predestination of grace is from us, is proved by authority against the Massilians

The Catholic opinion, therefore, is that no cause, nor any beginning or occasion on the part of the predestined can be devised, on account of which God either in time granted him His grace, or in foreknowledge decreed to give it. And, first, this doctrine is to be understood not only of the beginning of faith, prayer, or the will to attain salvation, or of other works which are occupied in some way about God, such as those of religion; but indeed also of any work of moral virtue which is referred to the honest good as such: so that in no way can anything of this kind be an occasion or beginning of the gift, or of the predestination, of grace. Moreover, we exclude not only a beginning which would be merit condignly; but also merit congruously or impetratorily, or a disposition; finally, any cause and occasion on account of which God gave, or foredecided to give, grace to this person rather than to that: so that the whole reason of preparing grace for this person rather than for that was the good pleasure of the divine will; but nothing, or at most the very least, on the part of the predestined. But before all else this doctrine must be confirmed by us in general; thereafter, the several points we have stated are to be explained in detail.

Among the Scholastics there are many reported for this opinion who in truth do not teach it; truly, however, it is handed on by St. Thomas in this fifth article, by Marsilius in the first, question 41, article 2, and by Gregory in distinction 41, question 1. I willingly cite these authors for this opinion against the Massilians, because both in words and in reality they oppose the Massilians' view, and they altogether defend Catholic doctrine. For they feel the same about grace and about predestination; and they enumerate the effects of predestination in us beginning from the first operation of grace. For, first of all, St. Thomas in the Prima Secundae, question 109, article 6, and question 112, article 3, plainly teaches that a man by his own powers cannot in any way dispose himself to grace; and he explains that proposition, "To one who does what is in him, etc.,"

correctly, as we saw in the preceding chapter.[1935] Marsilius and Gregory, moreover, since they say that no good moral work can be good in every circumstance without the help of grace moving within, by denying any cause from us of predestination, deny also a cause of the very first grace; and thus they think that there is no other effect of predestination than the helps and works of grace. About good moral works Marsilius thus taught in the First Book, question 20, article 3, propositions 4 and 5; and Gregory in II, distinction 28, question 1, article 1.[1936] Others also teach that on the part of the predestined there is no cause at all of his predestination. These are the Ferrariensis in III Contra gentes, chapter 161; Sotus in the Epistle to the Romans, chapter nine, in the digression on predestination; Driedo in the little work On the concord of free will and predestination, part one, chapter 3; Cordub. in chapter three, and in book one, question 56; indeed even Scotus in I, distinction 41, question 1.[1937]

These, however, cannot be alleged for this opinion, as it has been explained by us against the Massilians. For since Scotus, Sotus, and Driedo plainly contend that there is some beginning of grace from us, as we demonstrated in the preceding chapter, they are bound to concede some cause or beginning from the very predestined person of his predestination; and thus they not only do not oppose the Massilians, but in reality they think the very same as they, although they differ in words, as we said about Durandus. About the Ferrariensis and Cordub. it is not sufficiently clear to me in what sense they speak; therefore for this sole reason, that they say there is no cause of predestination, I would not wish to list them for this opinion. Perhaps they felt with Durandus and others.

Now among the Fathers the first author of this opinion was St. Augustine, who, since he was of keen insight and very versed in divine letters, disputing with Pelagius about the necessity of grace which is granted to us without any merits through Christ, took his starting-point by recurring to the beginning of holy cogitation and right counsel, so that he thought from there the exordium of our justification must be taken; and he ascribed to God, from whom right counsels are, pious wills and holy desires, and there he acknowledged a special grace over and above the gift of creation. From this principle he proved the necessity of grace for believing in the first book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter two, not because the object is of the supernatural order, but because, since we cannot think anything from ourselves as if from ourselves, neither can we believe, which is with the assent of what is thought; and he rightly inculcates this reason in almost all the places where he disputes against the Pelagians and the Semipelagians.[1938]

In the second book Against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, chapter eight, about the middle of the chapter, against the Semipelagians who were saying that there is some beginning from us, he says thus: "But let them also hear the Apostle. For when the Lord says, 'Without me you can do nothing,' in this one word he has comprehended the beginning and the end. The Apostle, however,

1935. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 109, a. 6; q. 112, a. 3.

1936. Marsilius of Inghen, In I Sent., q. 20, a. 3, prop. 4 - 5; Gregory of Rimini, In II Sent., dist. 28, q. 1, a. 1.

1937. Ferrariensis, Contra gentes, III, c. 161; Dominicus Soto, In Epistolam ad Romanos, c. 9, digressio de praedestinatione; Driedo, De concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis, pars I, c. 3; Cordub., cap. 3; Cordub., lib. I, q. 56; Scotus, In I Sent., dist. 41, q. 1.

1938. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1, c. 2.

as the expositor of the Lord's sentence, more openly distinguishes the man, saying, 'He who has begun in you a good work will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus.' And in the divine Scriptures, with this same Apostle, in the very place of which we speak, we find yet more. For now we speak of the desire of the good; if you wish it to begin by the will, to be perfected by the Lord, let them see what they will answer to the Apostle saying, 'Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves.'"[1939] And in book one To Simplicianus, question two, near the end, showing how our good works are chosen by God, and that nothing is derogated from grace, he says: "It remains that wills are chosen by God; but the will itself, unless something occur which may delight and invite the soul, can in no way be moved: but that this occur is in no way in man's power. For there is a holy thought which precedes all our consent."[1940]

He says the very same in the second book On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter seventeen. For asking why men are not without sin, he answers: "I could most easily and most truly answer: because men are unwilling. But if one asks of me why they are unwilling, it is a long matter. Nevertheless, if even this must be touched upon by the preliminary of a more diligent inquiry, I will briefly say: Men do not wish to do what is just, either because it is hidden whether it is just, or because it does not delight." And below: "But that what was hidden may become known, and what did not delight may become sweet - this is the grace of God." He uses "ignorance" in this place for an inefficacious cognition, because what is to be done is not considered more deeply, as we shall say below, disputation 98, chapter seven. He uses the same argument in the book On Grace and Free Will, chapter seven, and in the book On the Good of Perseverance, chapter eight, about which there is to be disputed more at length in the Prima Secundae, question 109, article two. And in the same On the Good of Perseverance, chapter nineteen, he adduces that saying of Cyprian: "In nothing is there to be glorying, since nothing is ours"; and that other: "It is not in our power - our heart and our thoughts." And Augustine adds: "Nor are deeds and words themselves passed over. For there is no word or deed of man which does not depend on the thought of the heart."[1941]

Moreover, since Augustine recalled the beginning of the grace of God against Pelagius to a holy cogitation which would not be in our power, nor would regard from us an occasion or even impetratory merit, so that thus God by His sole liberal will would distribute the gifts of grace to individuals, Cassian, the Massilians, and the rest throughout Gaul and Africa, of whom it was said in disputation 89, chapter four, bearing Augustine's sentence so severe with difficulty on account of reasons which we shall set forth in chapter fifteen, began to teach that there is on our part some beginning, not, however, deserving, for which...[1942]

But if anyone thinks that he is able to begin goodness more by his own will than by God's grace to perfect it, let him see what he answers to the Apostle saying, "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." And in the first book to Simplicianus, question two, toward

1939. St. Augustine, Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, lib. 2, c. 8; Phil. 1:6; John 15:5; 2 Cor. 3:5.

1940. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, q. 2.

1941. St. Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione, lib. 2, c. 17; De gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 7; De bono perseverantiae, c. 8, c. 19; St. Cyprian, De zelo et livore (or allied testimony), "In nullo gloriandum ... Non est in potestate nostra cor nostrum et nostrae cogitationes."

the end, showing how our good works are chosen by God, nor is anything detracted from grace, he says: "It remains that our wills be chosen by God; but the will itself, unless something occur which delights and invites the soul, cannot in any way be moved: now that this should occur is by no means in man's power. For there is a holy thought which precedes all our consent." The very same he has in the second book On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, chapter seventeen. For, asking why men are not without sin, he answers most easily and most truly: because they are unwilling. But if one asks of me why they are unwilling, I will not draw this out at length. Nevertheless, since this too pertains to the judgment of a more diligent investigation, I will briefly say this also: men are unwilling to do what is just, either because it is hidden whether it is just, or because it does not delight. And below: in order that what was hidden may come to be known, and that what did not delight may become sweet, it is the grace and mercy of God. In this place he uses "ignorance" for an ineffective cognition, because it does not penetrate efficiently to what must be done, as we shall say below in Disputation 98, chapter seven. By the same argument he uses in the book On Grace and Free Will, chapter seven, and in On the Good of Perseverance, chapter eight, about which more at length is to be discussed in the Prima Secundae, question 109, article two; and again in On the Good of Perseverance, chapter nineteen, he adds also that saying of St. Cyprian, "In nothing ought we to glory, since nothing is our own," and that, "It is not in our power, our heart and our thoughts." To this St. Augustine adds: "Nor do even deeds and words pass by; for there is no saying or deed of man which does not depend on the thought of the heart."[1943]

Moreover, when St. Augustine brought back the beginning of God's grace against Pelagius into a holy thought, which is not in our power, and did not regard any occasion from us, nor even an impetratory merit, so that thus God by His sole liberal will would distribute this grace singly; Cassian, the Massilians, and the rest throughout Gaul and Africa, of whom we spoke in Disputation 89, chapter four, not bearing so severe a sentence of Augustine on account of the reasons which we shall report in chapter fifteen, began to teach that there is from us some beginning of the bestowal of grace and of predestination to grace. Against whom Augustine composed his last work, at the request of Hilary of Arles and Prosper of Aquitaine, namely, On the Predestination of the Saints, and the other, On the Gift of Perseverance; although elsewhere also he had taught that election to grace, or predestination, which is the same, as we said in that Disputation 89, chapter eight, was made prior to any foreknowledge of merit or occasion or work on our part, as is manifest from the testimonies there alleged and from innumerable others.[1944]

This sentence of Augustine against Cassian and the rest of the Massilians the Fathers who were defenders and followers of his doctrine esteemed to be the true one, so that they reckoned it Catholic, while they branded the opposite as error. Thus Prosper, in a special book about this matter against the Collator throughout, especially in chapters eleven and twelve of the thirteenth Conference, and in the book To the Excerpts of the Genoese, doubt eight, and To the Vincentian

1942. On Cassian and the Massilians, see Disputation 89, c. 4.

1943. St. Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione, lib. 2, c. 17; De gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 7; De bono perseverantiae, c. 8, c. 19; St. Cyprian, De zelo et livore (or allied testimony): "In nullo gloriandum... Non est in potestate nostra cor nostrum et nostrae cogitationes."

1944. On Cassian and the Massilians see Disputation 89, c. 4.

Objections, to the fourth objection, does the same. Nor does it matter that Gennadius, in the book On Illustrious Men, says these words about Prosper: "I have read also the book against the work On the Collations, suppressing the name of Cassian, which the Church of God approves as saving, he defames as harmful." For both Gennadius is of no good repute among Catholics and the learned: since of Augustine too he says that he wrote many things, and therefore erred in many, because "in much speaking sin does not fail"; and many other things which can by no means befit such a man: to which calumny Augustine himself most excellently replies in the prologue of the Retractations. He also prefers Ruffinus to St. Jerome, a Doctor so well deserving of the Church of God: and yet Pope Gelasius, whom we shall cite presently, says thus of Ruffinus and Jerome: "Ruffinus, a religious man, interpreted many ecclesiastical works; but since the Blessed Jerome noted him in some things about the liberty of free choice, we hold what we perceive that that Blessed Jerome held about the aforesaid." This Ruffinus, therefore, is not well praised by Catholics; and Gennadius is not well heard.[1945]

Furthermore, many things confirm the authority of Prosper. First of all, Pope Gelasius, and that very Gelasian decree in the Roman Council of seventy-six bishops, and it is reported in the chapter Sancta Romana, 15, dist., sets Prosper among the Catholic writers, whom he calls "a most religious man," together with the books of his master Augustine, among those who contain sound doctrine; but he numbers Cassian among the apocrypha: not because they lack an author, but because they teach many things amiss. Then also, when Prosper at Marseilles defended Augustine's sentence against Cassian, and could not bear that man's doctrine, and of the Massilians who preached the contrary, on that account he fled to Rome to Pope Celestine, who received him kindly, and in a letter honorably defended his doctrine and Augustine's against Cassian, and ordered the bishops of Gaul to restrain the petulance of the Massilians, as is clear from the Life of Prosper and from that Letter of Celestine, chapter one and the following.

In addition, it is believed on most certain conjectures that the canons of the Second Council of Orange against Cassian and the Massilians and others who spoke less cautiously about grace were composed by Prosper himself, were approved by Leo the First, and were sent to the city of Orange in Gaul so that they might be received by the Fathers of that Council, as is very clear from the first chapter of that council. That they were composed by the hand of Prosper, certain conjectures persuade. The first is that he was at Rome secretary of Leo the First, who succeeded Celestine the First, as Trithemius attests. The second is that of the Louvain editors in the letter prefixed to the works of Prosper. For since Prosper had been present at the Councils of Vaison and Carpentras, and had subscribed to both and added books to them, he did not subscribe to the Second Council of Orange, which was held in the meanwhile: certainly for this reason, that then he was secretary of

1945. For Gelasius, the Roman Council, and the Gelasian Decree listing approved and apocryphal authors and books; Gennadius, De viris illustribus; St. Jerome and Ruffinus; and on Prosper's authorship and authority in this controversy, see also: Prosper, Contra Collatorem; Sententiae ex Augustino; Ad excerpta Genuensium, dubium 8; Ad objectiones Vincentianas, ad quartam objectionem; Trithemius on Prosper as secretary of Leo I; the Louvain editors' prefatory epistle to Prosper's works; the Councils of Vaison, Carpentras, and Orange (Arausicanum II), with their canons received in Gaul. On Faustus of Riez: Hormisdas, Epistola ad Possessorem; Ioannes Maxentius, Responsio ad eandem; Isidore, De viris illustribus; Ado of Vienne, Chronicon. On Fulgentius and Peter the Deacon: Fulgentius, Ad Monimum; De incarnatione et gratia Domini nostri Iesu Christi; De doctrina Petri et aliorum; Petrus Diaconus, De incarnatione et gratia ad Fulgentium.

Leo the First and was living at Rome. The third, and in my judgment the most certain conjecture, is drawn from the matter and style of the canons. For each one is a sentence of Augustine, as the Louvain editors have recently noted in the Council of Orange as published, and inserted into Prosper's works. For the sentences of Augustine had been extracted by Prosper in the book whose title is Sentences; in these the entire manner of speaking of the Massilians is condemned, as we shall presently see, and Augustine's sentence concerning grace and predestination is defended. Therefore the authority of Prosper in this matter ought to be of great moment for us.

Secondly, all the Fathers who accused Faustus of Riez, deacon and then bishop, of error in this part favored the sentence of Augustine, because he had openly said that some beginning of grace is from us. From this it is gathered that he held a view contrary to the sentence on predestination which Augustine and Paul taught, and that he stuck with the Massilians. I have recalled the places of this Faustus in Disputation 89, chapter five. For this cause Peter the Deacon anathematizes his little works On Grace and Free Will, and judges them to have been written against the doctrine of Augustine and Paul, in the book On the Incarnation and Grace to Fulgentius, chapter eight; and from chapter six to the end of the book he most excellently approves the sentence of Augustine. The words of Peter the Deacon in chapter eleven are these: "We anathematize Pelagius and Celestius and Julian of Eclanum, and those who think similar things; especially the books of Faustus, bishop of the Gauls, who, having been promoted from the monastery of Lérins: which he wrote against the sentence of predestination, it is not doubtful; in which, not only coming against the truth of all the holy Fathers, but even against the Apostle's assertion, he adds to human labor the help of grace." When he says "And those who think similar things," he indicates the Semipelagians, who did not altogether agree with Pelagius, but in a certain way taught similar dogmas. Among these, however, Faustus seemed the chief, as I noted in chapter nine. Why indeed Peter says of this Faustus that he wholly evacuates grace, since he said that it is necessary only as a rule for the remaining works, and that only the beginning of something is from us, we shall say below in chapter sixteen.

But Peter, as is gathered from the first chapter, together with other religious men who had been sent to Rome by the Eastern Church for the sake of professing their faith against the heretics, proposed this his doctrine to Fulgentius and to the other bishops of Africa: which they themselves and his fellows subscribed at the end of the work. Fulgentius indeed in a marvelous way approved it in the book which, On the Incarnation and Grace, in the name of many bishops of Africa he wrote back to this Peter: where, as we shall see below, he marvelously approves Augustine's sentence against these Massilians. And Pope Hormisdas condemns the same books of Faustus for the same cause in his Letter to the Possessor; and John Maxentius in the response to this Letter - although John affirms that that Letter is not of Hormisdas; it is, however, found in the tomes of the Library - condemns them as well. The same books are condemned by Isidore in the book On Illustrious Men, and by Ado of Vienne in his Chronicle, age six, under the year 491; although this author does not rightly note wherein Faustus erred: for he seems to ascribe to him more than the error of the

Massilians; whereas in truth he taught nothing else. He concedes indeed that this Faustus, while he tried to destroy the Pelagian heresy, fell into error. He adds finally that those who think his books in this part to be Catholic, like Gennadius, err gravely.

Thirdly, Fulgentius followed Augustine's sentence against those same Semipelagians in the first book To Monimus, chapters 8, 9, 11, and 14; but especially in the book On the Incarnation and Grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ, chapter 16 to the end of the work; and in the first chapter of that book On the Doctrine of Peter and of others, which they wrote to him, he says thus: "We have had the letters which you sent to us (namely that book On the Incarnation and Grace which we have alleged above); and when we had reviewed them, we recognized at once your joy and your faith and salvation; indeed the instruction of your faith made known to us your salvation." And at length, in the epilogue of the work, about this sentence of Augustine, which that Peter had professed in his writings and which Fulgentius himself had pursued, he says: "The truth of which predestination, whereby the Apostle bears witness that we were predestined in Christ before the constitution of the world - if anyone refuses to receive it with an interior faith of heart, or to profess it with the confession of the mouth; if before the day of the present life he has not cast away the stubbornness of his impiety, whereby he resists the living and true God, it is manifest that he does not belong to the number of those whom God in Christ before the constitution of the world gratuitously chose and predestined to the kingdom." For since that author in that chapter 16 endeavored to prove that the beginning of our salvation and grace is not from us; he held that the same thing must be said of the predestination of grace: namely, that it was predestined without any beginning or occasion from us. For in the same epilogue he had said of God in these words: "And He does not otherwise perfect in work than as He has it disposed in His eternal and unchangeable will." And about all the effects of grace which he had enumerated from the first beginning of a good will to the end of beatitude, he taught that very thing in the first book To Monimus, chapter eight: that all of them, just as they have been predestined in foreknowledge, so also are wrought by grace in time.

Fourthly, that this truth was defended by Pope Celestine in the first letter to the bishops of Gaul is no less manifest. For when Prosper and Hilary in Gaul were defending Augustine's sentence on predestination and grace, they were at length compelled, because of the authority of their adversaries who were attacking Augustine's writings, especially those which he had written On Correction and Grace, to flee to Pope Celestine, asking his judgment in this matter. The Pontiff, in the first chapter, thus begins: "Our sons, the present Prosper and Hilary, whose zealously praising of our God we approve, have been heard by us as if they were present themselves; who before us have professed that, as our see is wont to undertake inquiries, certain persons, pertinaciously opposing, teach and preach against the truth of the saints, and, impatient of your love, claim for themselves the authority of dispensing over you." By which words it is clear with what honor Prosper and Hilary were received by Pope Celestine against their audacity.

Then he blames the doctrine of the adversaries more severely in chapter two; and he gravely reproves them because they did not fear to assail Augustine's doctrine. It is also manifest to all that the dissension of Prosper and Hilary with Cassian and the Massilians, and what the matter was about, was this: namely, about grace and predestination. For the latter said that some beginning is

from us; but the former, with Augustine, said that every beginning of predestination and of our salvation is from God and from His grace, since He inspires in us what He begins, promotes, and perfects. Therefore, he at once begins from the letters of Prosper and of Hilary, which are about the beginning according to Augustine of the predestination of the saints, of which matter enough has been said by us in Disputation 89, chapters four and five.

From the same letters it is also evident that Cassian and the Massilians marked Augustine's doctrine on grace and predestination as strange, and as contrary to the common consent of the Fathers. Therefore, when Celestine defends Prosper, Hilary, and Augustine, he plainly condemns Cassian and the Massilians.

"Except from that which he has given it." Then in that same canon he asserts that all our good things are to be referred to their author, namely to God. He understands, as to the author, grace (*gratia*); and in canon 9: that thus God works in the hearts of men, and in free will (*liberum arbitrium*) itself, so that every holy thought, pious counsel, and every motion of good will is from God. For through him we can do something good, without whom we can do nothing; and, after a few words, What time then, says Pope Zozimus, intervenes in which we should not need his help? Therefore in all acts, causes, thoughts, and motions God is to be besought as helper and protector, etc.

With these passages, since Caelestine refers all good works, studies, and merits at any time, in any cause and affair, to God the author of grace, he manifestly refutes the error of the Massilians. For if he understood only those good works which are worthily meritorious of eternal life to be gifts of God's grace, he would define nothing on behalf of Hilary and Prosper against the Massilians - something very alien to his purpose. For the Massilians did not deny this, nor was the controversy with them about this matter. Therefore either he understood whatever good works and studies, even of moral virtue; and by defining in this way that all these are of the grace of God, he openly declares that there can be no beginning on our part, nor any merit - even impetratory - of grace itself; or finally, he cannot but define that all the works and studies, by which in some manner our justification (*iustificatio*) is initiated in us, are not from us; but that the whole beginning is from the grace of God, and that all these studies and all the motions of our will are to be ascribed to God, lest grace be given to us who, without grace, study and are willing, as the Massilians used to say; so that at least in this way he plainly refutes the error of the Massilians; otherwise he would have defined nothing against them.

Confirmatur ex Petro Diacono. In the book On the Incarnation, in that chapter 8, after he reported these testimonies of Caelestine and Innocent, Peter the Deacon said concerning the books of Faustus of Riez: "We anathematize the books of Faustus, Bishop in Gaul, which without doubt were written against the sentence of predestination (*praedestinatio*): in which, coming into contradiction not only with these Fathers but also with the Apostle himself, he subjoins to human labor the help of grace." Therefore Peter judges that Caelestine manifestly condemned this sentence of Faustus, which was the same as the sentence of the Massilians; for if Caelestine had not

condemned those asserting that grace is to be subjoined to human labor, as the Massilians used to say, the books of Faustus would not have been written against Caelestine's definition; for they contain nothing other than that doctrine of the Massilians.[1946]

Accordingly, since Caelestine defines that in time grace is liberally given to us without any regard to some beginning of good that is from us, by the same reasoning he decrees that from eternity, in God's foreknowledge, without any regard to a good beginning that is from us, grace is prepared; and hence that predestination, which we call of grace in God's foreknowledge, had from us no merit, no impetratory title, no cause, occasion, or beginning.

Obiectioni occurritur. Nor in truth does it matter that in the margin of Caelestine's epistle Surius noted that those chapters were added by someone: the ground of which perhaps was that the epistle seemed already closed. This, I say, matters nothing: both because Caelestine adduces all those canons from other Pontiffs, and also because such a censure without founded testimony is of little weight; since Peter the Deacon cites those testimonies as of Innocent and Caelestine, as is seen in the said chapter 8.[19461947]

Furthermore, since even after the Pontiff's epistle sent to the bishops of Gaul the remnants of the Pelagians did not rest, and many things were being said against Augustine's books On the Predestination of the Saints, On the Good of Perseverance, On Correction and Grace, to the effect that the Pontiff had not defended those books by name in his epistle, and they asserted that Augustine's doctrine had been praised, not indeed that which was in those, but that which he had written in other books, as Prosper is witness in the book Against the Collator, chapter 21, after the middle; it came about through the diligence of Prosper himself that by Leo the First, whose secretary he was, canons were issued in favor of Augustine's position against the Massilians, and were sent to the Second Council of Orange into Gaul, where they were approved by the whole Council.[1948]

Therefore in the third canon they condemn those who say that the grace of justification - that is, the helps of grace unto justification - is obtained by human prayer, that is, by our own powers; and in the fourth canon they condemn those who said that God awaits our will by which we would wish to be cleansed; and in the fifth canon it is decreed that the beginning of faith, which is the will to believe, as also the motive, is the gift of God; and in the sixth canon the same truth is defined, whose words it seemed good to subjoin, that it might more clearly appear that the sentence of Cassian, in whatever way it may have stood, is condemned.

"If anyone" (it says) "asserts that without the grace of God mercy is conferred on us who believe, are willing, desire, endeavor, labor, keep vigil, study, strive, seek, knock; but does not confess that it is divinely effected in us by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, that we may believe,

1946. Peter the Deacon, De incarnatione, cap. 8; reporting testimonies of Popes Caelestine and Innocent, and anathematizing the books of Faustus of Riez.

1946. Peter the Deacon, De incarnatione, cap. 8; reporting testimonies of Popes Caelestine and Innocent, and anathematizing the books of Faustus of Riez.

1947. Laurentius Surius, marginal note alleging later additions to Caelestine's epistle.

1948. Prosper of Aquitaine, Contra Collatorem, c. 21 (post medium); and on Leo I issuing canons sent to the Second Council of Orange.

will, or be able to do all these things as we ought; or subjoins the help of grace to human humility or obedience, and does not consent that the gift of grace itself is that we be obedient and humble, he resists the Apostle saying, What do you have that you have not received? By the grace of God I am what I am." By these canons, with the words of Cassian having been taken up, his very mode of speaking and his opinion are manifestly condemned.

For that God awaits our will, he teaches in Conference 13, chapter 13. That by human prayer we obtain the grace of God, he teaches in that book 12 On the Institutes of the Coenobia from chapter 45 to the end, where also he openly said that grace is given first to us who seek, knock, and keep vigil, etc.; which mode of speaking Augustine also condemns as that of the Massilians, in the book On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 23.[1949][1950][1951]

When, however, in that sixth canon it is said "as we ought," do not understand "as we ought" for the merit of eternal life, as some more recent men, not having the history sufficiently in view, interpret; nor, as others also more recent (I know not on what foundation) explain, that the act be supernatural: for on these two points the Massilians, whose opinion that council contends to condemn, taught nothing ever, as is clear from the histories; but understand "as we ought" for the obtaining of grace. For the Massilians used to say that we are able to begin something by some of those modes condemned there, so that it should be "as it ought" for obtaining first grace; and therefore the Council immediately subjoins, "or he subjoins the help of grace to human humility or obedience, he resists the Apostle," etc.; by which words it condemned every beginning from us, to which grace be conferred.

Hunc autem sensum aperte colligo ex the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 3; for after by the two prior canons it confuted the heresy of Pelagius, condemned in the Council of Milevis and of Africa, lest it should pass over the Semipelagians, in this canon, with the Council of Orange, second, canon 6, it says: "If anyone shall say that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit a man can believe, hope, love, or repent, as he ought, so that the grace of justification be conferred, let him be anathema."[1952][1953][1954]

By the grace of justification he understands every help by which from the beginning we are moved to justice, as I noted above in chapter five. And this interpretation commends itself to me because the Council of Trent, before it treated against Luther concerning the grace of God, wished to preface the condemnation of the Pelagian error, which it did by the two prior canons; then, that it might condemn the remnants of the Pelagians, it added the third canon. Now that this third canon was not against Pelagius is plain; because he did not admit that the grace of the remission of sins is given to us, and that it is obtained by God by our good works; but he said that the remission of sins is effected by one's own virtue, and that help is granted only sometimes for this, that it might be done better: which are condemned by canons 1 and 2. But the Semipelagians granted the

1949. John Cassian, Collationes, 13.13.
1950. John Cassian, De institutis coenobiorum, lib. 12, from c. 45 to the end.
1951. St. Augustine, De bono perseverantiae, c. 23.
1952. Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 3; cf. sess. 6, cap. 6.
1953. Council of Milevis and African Councils (condemnations of Pelagianism).
1954. Council of Orange (Arausicanum II), can. 6 (parallel to Trent, sess. 6, can. 3).

grace of the remission of sins and the helps necessary thereto; but they added that that grace and those helps are impetrated from God by our works. A beginning from us, among other things, they said to be faith, and hence hope; then also sorrow and some repentance, and hence some love, as was noted in disputation 89, chapters 4 and 5.[1955]

Wherefore that the same error of the Semipelagians was condemned, the Council of Orange, canon 2, says: "This also we wholesomely profess and believe, that in every good work we do not begin and are afterwards helped by God's mercy; but he himself, with no preceding good merits, first inspires in us faith and his love, so that we may faithfully seek the sacraments of baptism; and after baptism, by his consequent help, cooperating with him, we may be able to fulfill the things that are pleasing to him." By love he understands some love of God by which we begin to love him as the fountain of justice before baptism; as the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 6, said. For the Council of Trent there is speaking about the disposition which precedes baptism, which is not always an act of theological charity. Accordingly, that the Council of Orange and the Council of Trent may exclude every beginning from us against the remnants of the Pelagians, they define that point.

Someone could say that here the Council of Trent condemns the error of those who affirmed that a man can accomplish all those things "as he ought," so that habitual grace may be conferred - which is the grace by which formally we are justified. But by that same cut no heretic up to now has taught this, although some of the Scholastics have thought it about penance. The Council of Trent, however, only issued the canons...

It is replied: If he speaks also of habitual grace, he did not pass over ancient heretics, namely those who said that by faith, from one's own powers, the helps of grace are obtained from God - who indeed were none other than the Semipelagians. Therefore that phrase, "as is fitting" (sicut oportet), he understood of obtaining the helps of grace; about the other interpretation which the Scholiast of Cassian applies, we shall speak at the end of the chapter.

Confirmatur: Moreover, even if we were to explain that "as is fitting" as the more recent writers contend, namely, to this end, that the act be supernatural; nevertheless in that same canon 6 of Orange the error of Cassian would be condemned, since it is added: "Or if he subjoins to human humility and obedience the aid of grace." For thus the Council would condemn both the assertions, namely, to assert that we are able to perform all those things "as is fitting," that is, supernaturally (as the recent interpreters explain), and to assert that by human labor the grace of God is obtained.

Error excluditur: Lastly, in the Directorium inquisitorum, part "qui," question 9, among the errors of Raymond Lull is set down here the 64th: "That in doing good, we ought not to hope (that is, expect) that God will begin, because he has already begun when he created us, gave us the world for our preservation, that we might serve him." Therefore there is condemned what he said, that by the mere gift of creation, as the Massilians taught, we are able to begin; therefore in the same way those who said that some beginning of grace precedes from us ought to be condemned. I confess that Raymond taught this nowhere, as learned men prove in a certain little book, which below I

1955. Vázquez, disputatio 89, cap. 4 - 5 (on the Semipelagians' placing certain beginnings in us).

shall mention in disputation 134, chapter 4; yet for us it is enough that that article was deservedly condemned, that from it we may prove our opinion which we have pronounced on predestination. Therefore it is to be believed by Catholic faith, what in this chapter we have proposed.[1956]

From these things one may gather that the theologian, the Scholiast of Cassian, did not slip lightly, who, having suppressed his own name, defended the opinion of Cassian himself both in the book On the Institutes of the Coenobia and in Conference 13 from error, plainly conceding with him some beginning of grace from us. Thus he has it in proposition 3, where he concedes some detestation of sin and sorrow, which is the beginning of justification - an initiation which certain of the Massilians said was from us in our justification, as is clear from the letter of Hilary to Augustine after the middle, which we shall report below in the next chapter - and thus he concedes with the same Cassian in Conference 13, chapter 17, that God is "a supporter" of some, because, namely, he promotes their efforts toward justification; but "a savior" of others, because he altogether prevents them. Also in proposition five the Scholiast openly admits some beginning of grace, namely prayer, and some endeavor arising from the good of nature to be put forward, so that by it we may in some measure be rendered worthy of God's grace and obtain it, although we are remotely disposed to it from ourselves.[1957]

But the opinion of the Scholiast can be refuted: First, because he despises the judgment of Gelasius, who, as we saw above, for this very reason enumerated the books of Faustus among the apocrypha, that he had thought less rightly concerning the grace of God.[1958] Second, because he did not notice that the doctrine of Cassian was that of the Massilians: for he himself was their standard-bearer, as was noted above. Therefore his opinion and that of the Massilians was condemned by St. Augustine, Prosper, the Second Council of Orange, and Caelestine; or else it is necessary with the Massilians that the Scholiast dictate that Prosper, Hilary, Augustine, nay even the Council of Orange itself, and Caelestine exceeded the due measure and spoke too severely concerning the grace of God - which is absurd. Third, because since the causes of the opinion were Faustus of Riez and Cassian, in the same way Cassian's doctrine was condemned by the most grave men above mentioned, and likewise the doctrine of Faustus in this, that he asserts that some beginning of grace is from us: for thus to human labor Cassian subjoins grace, just as Faustus also does. Fourth, because it follows that to us praying without grace the grace of God is conferred, contrary to canons 3 and 6 of the Second Council of Orange.[1959]

The Scholiast replies that there is condemned there only him who says that we can pray "as is fitting" without the grace of God, that is, who grants a perfect zeal for prayer: for that is denoted by that phrase "as is fitting"; yet that some affection for praying, less efficacious, can be had without grace. But the Scholiast did not grasp the mind of the Council: for there there is not so much condemned him who said that without the grace of God we can pray to God for our justification, as him who asserted that the grace of God by prayer is obtained from God by one's own powers - even

1956. Directorium Inquisitorum, part "qui", q. 9, inter errores Raimundi Lullii, error 64; cf. Vázquez, disp. 134, c. 4.

1957. Cassianus, Collationes 13, c. 17; idem, De institutis coenobiorum, lib. 12; cf. Hilarius ad Augustinum, epistola post medium.

1958. Gelasius, Decretum de libris recipiendis et non recipiendis (inter apocryphos Fausti libros recensens).

1959. Concilium Arausicanum II (Orange II), can. 3, 6.

out of his mercy; for about this was the controversy with the Massilians, since they conceded some beginning from us, whether of prayer, or of labor, or of any other work whatsoever, so that grace be conferred. Wherefore he errs no less who says that to some lesser beginning from us than to a more perfect one the grace of God is given. For each subjoins grace to human labor and industry, which is universally condemned in that canon 6; nor does it in any way temper the error if we say that the grace of God is given to those praying, not out of justice, but by the free will of God, to those praying from their own powers or laboring. For the Massilians never said that the grace of God is given so out of justice that it could not be denied, but out of mercy and free will, as I noted in disputation 89, chapter 5; nevertheless their opinion was condemned, as we saw above.[1960]

In the same way as the Massilians think those to think, who grant from us that moral good works are the beginning of grace, as is also shown by authority.

On works preceding grace and Semipelagian error

Caput XII - On certain recent theologians who concede some moral works to precede and remotely dispose

to the first help of grace

There are some recent theologians who, in order to defend that certain moral works proceed from us, by which we are remotely disposed to the first help of grace and obtain it from the benignity of God - just as some of the ancients taught, whom in chapter 10 we have recounted - assert that the sentence of those ancients differs much from the error of Cassian and the Massilians: because the Massilians not only conceded beginnings from us which are moral good works of acquired virtue, but works also of infused and supernatural virtue, such as prayer, by which someone petitions justification for himself (for this is something supernatural), or the will and desire of justification - and that this is rightly damned, because works of the supernatural order cannot be ascribed to bare free choice. But, they say, surely no one can deny that moral works of acquired virtue are from us before the grace of God begins to help us, and that by them God is moved to bestow upon us the helps of his grace.

However, those also seem to me no less to be mistaken who suppose that by these moral works we begin and obtain the grace of God, than the Massilians: and all of them in that proposition are condemned in the Second Council of Orange, canon 6, and by Peter the Deacon in the book On the Incarnation and Grace, chapter 8: "Grace is subjoined to human labor or obedience" - which is condemned in the same way.[1961]

It is proved: First, because among Prosper, Augustine, Caelestine, the Council of Orange, or the others who disputed against the Massilians, you will never find this distinction noted, nor the least beginning of grace from us conceded: therefore this is a figment brought forth from the very brain of these Doctors. Second, Cassian, book 12 On the Institutes of the Coenobia, chapters 13 and 14,

1960. Vázquez, disputatio 89, cap. 5.
1961. Concilium Arausicanum II (Orange II), can. 6; Petrus Diaconus, De incarnatione et gratia, cap. 8.

among the other beginnings which he says precede from us, numbers certain virtues that are altogether moral, such as vigils, withdrawal from company, and other things of this sort; whence in the Second Council of Orange, canon 6, he is condemned who says that to those laboring and keeping vigil without the grace of God grace itself is conferred.[1962] Third, Faustus of Riez, who was in the same error of the Massilians, book one On Grace and Free Will, chapter 17, says that the grace of God requires a man already keeping the precepts - namely of the Decalogue, and moral precepts - so that from there, as it were by a certain handle, God may lay hold of him: which Peter the Deacon, a little before cited, rebukes, because he subjoined grace to human labor. And in the same way there are condemned in the Second Council of Orange, in that canon 6, those who subjoin the help of grace to human humility or obedience: but the Council understands by "obedience" the observance of the precepts which occur daily to be observed, namely, moral precepts. Thus Prosper reports their opinion in that letter to Augustine, before the middle, with these words: "Now here they bring forward testimonies by which the exhortation of the divine Scriptures incites men's wills to obey, who from free will do the things that are commanded while they neglect them." And after a few words interposed: "Him who seeks good, the grace of God nourishes; him who pursues evil, his own damnation takes up" - which Faustus himself thereupon follows out. But who would say, or by what foundation is it permitted to affirm that the Massilians asserted only this about supernatural precepts, and not about the precepts of the Decalogue, the observance of which they said to be the beginning for which grace was given to us? In the same way Augustine understood the opinion of the Massilians in the book On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 17, where, when he had shown that charity itself is predestined by the Lord, he subjoins by his grace: "But what I have said about charity, this about faith, this about piety, about charity, about perseverance, and - lest I go through them singly - this about every obedience by which obedience is rendered to God, can be said most truly." Therefore he teaches against the Massilians that there does not precede from us any obedience by which most truly obedience is rendered to God...[1963]

No observance of the commandments of God precedes, on account of which grace (*gratia*) would be given; rather that very obedience (*obedientia*) is predestined (*praedestinari*) by God. By obedience he understands chastity and every other virtue whereby God is obeyed, namely by observing the precepts - even in the observance of the moral commandments.

Fourth, the Massilians, as we shall say in chapter 18, used to say that some beginning from us exists. First, lest any force be taken away from our free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), if grace were to forestall it: for if free choice began to use its liberty well, or to procure grace for itself, they said that grace depended on our liberty, and thus that we suffered no force from grace itself; next, that acceptance of persons would thereby be removed: for, once a beginning from us were conceded, there would be some reason why grace should be given rather to one than to another, and it would not be referred solely to the will of God; finally, that correction might have a place in us: for if God

1962. Cassianus, De institutis coenobiorum, lib. 12, cc. 13 - 14; Concilium Arausicanum II, can. 6.

1963. Prosper, epistola ad Augustinum (ante medium); Faustus Regiensis, De gratia et libero arbitrio, lib. 1, c. 17; St. Augustine, De bono perseverantiae, c. 17.

had first to begin, correction seemed to them to be in vain, since man does not begin of himself in any way: but for another reason they did not concede any beginning from us at all. Yet these three things they themselves could equally defend by conceding some beginning from us of acquired moral virtue (*virtus moralis*), and also of infused and supernatural [virtue]; and to this Hilary seems to allude in that letter to Augustine, after the middle, proposing the objection of the Massilians against the doctrine of Augustine in this way: "For if thus men are predestined to either part, so that from some to others no one can pass over, to what does belong so great an external urgency of correction by man, if, when not entire faith arises, at least compunction of infirmity, or the peril of manifest death, deters? For if no one can fear that by which he is deterred, except by the will which is assumed, he is not to be blamed on that account that he does not now will, but in that, and with him, who at some time so willed not, that he should deserve to incur with his posterity that damnation, so as never to will right things, but always evil things. But if there is any sort of sorrow which arises at the exhortation of the reprover, this very sorrow they say is the cause on account of which either one is rejected, or another is taken up." By which words he plainly teaches that it lies in the power of man's free choice to have some such sorrow of itself, if at least he cannot have faith; and that on account of that sorrow the grace of God is predestined for the man, and he himself is assumed by God, just as on account of the opposite another is rejected; and finally, that a man is able by his own powers to do some good, by reason of which he obtains the gift of grace.[1964]

For if he could do nothing but evil, then when the man did that [evil], it would not be imputed to him, but when, together with the first parent, he lost the faculty of a good work. But once it is conceded that a man is able by his own powers to do something good, even of acquired moral virtue, by reason of which grace is given to him, then the Massilians themselves would already assign a cause why one is assumed to grace and another rejected, even if no one were predestined by reason of faith; and thus they would remove acceptance of persons, and would show that no force is brought upon free choice, since free choice itself forestalls grace: they would also assign room for correction, so that a man corrected beforehand might do good by his own powers and obtain grace from God.

But the aforesaid reasoning proves not only that no moral work from us is the beginning of acquiring grace, but also that even a remote disposition (*dispositio*) on our part can be removed - and (as some more recent authors say) a disproportionate disposition, or per accidens removing only impediments - which is said to be a disposition to grace: for a disposition to grace ought in some way to dispose toward acquiring it, and to contribute something to its attainment; with which, indeed, many Massilians, in my judgment, would be content: for they only wanted to avoid those absurdities which seemed to follow if God forestalled all our solicitude; but these they removed by conceding even the least beginning from us. But if you say that that remote disposition to acquiring grace contributes nothing, you call it in vain a disposition to grace: for it is not called a disposition to some form which contributes nothing to the attainment of it.

1964. Hilary, Letter to Augustine (after the middle), proposing the Massilians' objection against Augustine; cf. Cassian, De institutis coenobiorum, lib. 12.

How, however, without error there can be conceded some disposition from the gift of creation, not to grace, but to this - that grace may work in us better and more easily - we shall say in our disputation 93. And this has not only nothing in common with the error of the Massilians, but also is the manifest doctrine of Augustine, as we shall show there. Therefore the Massilians do not concern themselves with supernatural works, but are content if something good from us precedes, in view of which God bestows his grace.

Wherefore, since Augustine in the work On the Predestination of the Saints gathers together all the objections of the Massilians, he shows that there is no beginning of grace from us; he denies not only faith, and the works of infused virtue, but even of acquired moral [virtue]. This he very skillfully attests in book 4 against Julian the Pelagian, chapter 3, with these words: "Since therefore man is divinely helped, not only to lay hold of perfection, but also as to the beginning of that whose end grace perfects; you surely wish it to be understood that he can begin without grace that which grace perfects; but rather [it is] as the Apostle says, that he who begins a good work in us, may perfect it unto the end. For in that wherein you wish man, as you say, to be stirred by incentives to something laudable of a generous heart, in this you wish him to glory, not in the Lord, but in free choice; and thus to give the prior [place], that it may be repaid to him; and in this way grace is no longer grace, because it is not gratuitous."[1965]

Behold, Augustine universally condemns any beginning of a generous spirit to which grace would be given. But there would without doubt be some such beginning from us, if, by doing some good moral work, we were to obtain for ourselves the grace of God: for such a work - that is, of moral virtue, as conjugal chastity - Julian contended to be from us the beginning of acquiring grace.

And in book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, a little before the middle, he shows that there was no work on our part which God, looking upon, chose us for his grace, just as it had been said concerning Jacob and Esau: "When as yet they had done nothing good or evil, that the grace of God, the election of each, might in consequence be obtained"; but [that] God by his mercy makes it that man believes, and that he be merciful; and he concludes with these words: "Whence we are admonished neither in the works themselves of mercy to glory and be exalted, as if by them, as our own, he had merited God, since, that he might have that very mercy, He afforded [it] who will afford mercy to him to whom he shall be merciful. But if anyone thinks that by believing he has deserved it, let him know that He, who has mercy by inspiring faith, afforded to him that he might believe."[1966]

Here Augustine is not speaking of merit worthy of eternal life, but of impetratory merit (*meritum impetratorium*), by which someone supposed that by our own powers we merit grace and the mercy of God toward us; and this is what he says, that "we merit God for ourselves," that is, his grace; nor does he exclude these works from us from the ratio of merit because they are not condign, but because we have received them also from God through his mercy and grace; and since

1965. St. Augustine, Contra Iulianum Pelagianum, lib. 4, cap. 3.
1966. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, q. 2 (ante medium).

he says that we must not glory in works of mercy, as if by these we had merited God, that is, his grace and his mercy for us, by the same reason he excludes every moral work from us which would be impetratory merit of grace.

And this is the reason why the Second Council of Orange, canon 6, excludes every beginning from us, when it says that those who "subjoin grace to human obedience" contradict the Apostle saying: "What do you have that you have not received? If then you have received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it?"[1967] For if someone by obedience and human labor obtains grace for himself, he could glory very much in something without Christ; and in like manner could he who by moral works in some manner should obtain grace. Therefore the Council defines the same of these works as of any others whatever. For it does not condemn the Semipelagians and Massilians because they say that the works which the Scholastics call supernatural, and which are of another order, are done by one's own powers, but because they assert that we begin, and that by our own works we obtain the grace of God: a thing which is as absurd to understand of moral works as of others: for in either way the Fathers would infer that grace is not given out of mercy, but is repaid out of gratitude, as we shall see in chapter 15.

Finally, the same Augustine, in that same question to Simplicianus, near the end, concerning election to grace, says: "For I have nothing which, looking upon first, I should regard on our part in the choosing of men to saving grace - unless to the examination of this election I am by some thought premitted - unless it be a greater talent, or fewer sins, or merits; let us add also, if you please, honesty and useful learning. Whoever then shall be less entangled in sins - for no one can be in none - and polished in talent and in the liberal arts, seems to be to be chosen to grace. But when I shall have set this down, he will so laugh at me who has chosen the weak things of the world that he may confound the strong, that, looking upon [this], corrected with shame, I myself shall laugh at many; and [I shall laugh] that those who were chaster than some sinners, and orators than some fishermen, have been left, while sinners and harlots, and rude fishermen, have been chosen." These are Augustine's words. Therefore he would deride them because, although they were chaster, they had been left, but sinners and harlots chosen; and although they were orators and endowed with eloquence, they had been left, but rude fishermen chosen. And when he says that nothing can precede except either a greater talent and better natural disposition, or fewer sins, or the respectable human disciplines, and that none of these can be chosen for grace, without doubt he excludes every beginning, however least, from our powers, even of moral works, and he refers this election to the will of God alone. And when he denies a beginning in foreknowledge, so that men are chosen from eternity, he denies it also in time, so that grace be given because of it. For he often inculcates that the reason is the same for the giving in time and the election in foreknowledge.[1967]

To this is added the Council of Valence under the Emperor Lothair, chapter 3, where it says: "We confess predestination of the elect to life and predestination of the reprobate to death; in the election, however, of those to be saved, the mercy of God precedes the merits of the good." In which

1967. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, cc. 4 - 5, 10; cf. 1 Cor 4:7. See also Second Council of Orange (Arausicanum II), can. 6.

place it considers the mercy of the grace of God prior to the foreknowledge of merits from us; and since it attributes predestination to the mercy of God, it plainly excludes every even least merit, as will be proved in chapter 15.[1968]

Lastly, you see that the aforesaid Fathers, against the Massilians, excluded not only condign merit (*meritum condigni*), but any least merit, even impetratory; moreover, that the Massilians did not err in saying that grace is promised, and that by reason of the promise it cannot be denied to those who labor and begin from themselves, is evident from those things which we said in disputation 89, chapter 5. For the Massilians never conceded condign merit, but a certain remote occasion, or impetration, which God by his mercy would promote, as Cassian said in book 12 of the Institutes of the Coenobia.[1969] And of election to grace, and that the gift of it depends upon no free choice, as we have manifestly shown there from Cassian. Wherefore, no approved author of the Massilians has thought that grace is given for reasons or causes which we shall adduce in chapters 14 and 15; but the sentence of the Fathers - that grace is given, not by liberality because of some work of free choice - is proved by their authorities and reasons. Furthermore, that any grace of God is promised to moral works we shall see below in chapter 16. And the Council of Valence says the same. For when that Council had been gathered so that the Fathers should define the case of the bishop of that city, it pleased them at once to add a few documents of faith, and first of all concerning foreknowledge and predestination, because, as is said in the first chapter, the scandal of the souls of certain brethren was increasing; for the remains of those Pelagian [errors] still remained, which had begun in the time of Cassian, and for a long time flourished in Gaul. And thus far the Catholic sentence, proved by the authority of the Fathers, remains in full vigor, which we shall set forth in chapter 14.

That Scripture also clearly shows there is no human beginning even of moral works for which God would grant grace

By testimonies of Scripture it also can altogether be shown that there is no beginning from free choice, even of a moral operation, on account of which God would bestow his grace upon us; and besides those things which we shall adduce, by which this is plainly proved, there is especially the place quite familiar to Augustine, 1 Corinthians 4: "O man, who is it that distinguishes you? And what do you have that you have not received? But if you have received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it?" which he most fully explains in the first book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapters 4 and 5; and from that he proves that neither by faith, nor by any good work from itself, is one person set apart from another, but by the mercy of God alone.[1967] He infers this in this way. Since among the Corinthians there had arisen questions because one said he was of Cephas, but another that he was of Apollos, and thus each one gloried in his human teacher, wishing to

1967. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, cc. 4 - 5, 10; cf. 1 Cor 4:7. See also Second Council of Orange (Arausicanum II), can. 6.

1968. Council of Valence (Concilium Valentinum) under Emperor Lothair, cap. 3.

1969. Cassian, De institutis coenobiorum, lib. 12, cc. 13 - 14.

1967. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, cc. 4 - 5, 10; cf. 1 Cor 4:7. See also Second Council of Orange (Arausicanum II), can. 6.

repress this schism of theirs, in chapter 3 he explains what Peter, or Paul, and Apollos were, to the Corinthians, that faith and justice might be infused in them and might grow in them. He says therefore that they were ministers, who planted and watered, but that God gave the increase. Then, in chapter 4, that no one might be puffed up for one against another, contending that he had a better teacher than another, he subjoins the cause: "For who is it that distinguishes you?" By which words, as Augustine says in chapter 10, he confounds the pride of men, lest anyone glory in man, and therefore neither in himself, but in the Lord.[1967] But if anyone should take it that he has received either faith, or a moral work by which he obtains grace from God, from himself and from a gift of creation alone, without the grace of Christ, he would have wherein to glory, at least falsely, not indeed without God, who as Creator is the author of all. He also adduces that of Romans 9: "O man, who are you that replies against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why have you made me thus? Or has not the potter power over the clay, of the same mass to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?" But we shall give a fuller exposition of these places in disputation 95, chapter 8.

The same truth is confirmed by testimonies of Scripture.

Caput XIII - On explaining Romans 9 and confirming our position

But as to "unto dishonor," the context of those words must first be explained, so that thereafter we may confirm our position. Now the whole difficulty is made by that word, "You say" (Dicis), and the word, "It is asked" (Queritur), and that, "O man," etc. For if that, "You say," signifies an objection which someone could make to Paul, as most interpret; and the subject supposed by that word, "It is asked," be "God," as all the Greeks and commonly the Latins will have it; the sense is: If God has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens, why is there complaint against human beings, that they do not live justly and piously; since no one can resist his will? Again, when it is subjoined, "O man, who are you who answer back to God?" Paul seems to be replying, as both the Greeks and the Latins commonly understand, and to be rebuking the objection of the man. Yet the reason that follows, which Paul seems to adduce in confirmation of his rebuke, stands very much in the way: namely, "Does the thing formed say to him who formed it, Why have you made me thus?" For these were not the man's complaints, but rather the contrary - why, to wit, God complains of man, when he has mercy on whom he wills. For neither could the craftsman complain of the vessel itself that it had been made in this manner or that, since it was formed by the craftsman himself. Wherefore a man in turn could object to Paul that his reply is altogether lacking, in this way: I do not say why man complains of God, for, as you say, just as the vessel cannot complain of the craftsman, so neither can man of God; but I say, why does God complain of man, since a craftsman cannot complain of the vessel?

If, however, as some Latins will have it, the subject supposed by the word, "It is asked," be "Man," which is truer; still the context remains most fitting, if the word, "You say," signifies an objection: for the sense will be of this sort - "You will object to me thus: if it depends on God's free

will (*voluntas*), that he has mercy on one and hardens another, why is man further blamed that God does not have mercy on him? for no one can resist the will of God." But the reply of Paul is difficult: "O man, who are you who answer back to God?" For without cause would Paul rebuke, saying, "O man, who are you who contradict?" him who would be saying that no one can complain of God; he would most fittingly have taught that no reason of any sort can lie against God, even if it be within his liberty to act thus or otherwise.

Therefore, in order that the context may be clearer, I judge that that particle, "You therefore say" (Dicis itaque), is not of one objecting, but of one inferring a conclusion from the things said, in this way: "Therefore now you say and confess, convinced by the things we have said up to this point, that it is in vain for man to complain of God because he divides his grace (*gratia*) to whom he wills: for to his will, which is supreme equity and is in place of a law, no one can resist; I do not say by power (for the Apostle is not treating of this), but not even by reason, just as we resist kings by law and by reason when we in no way can by power. Then, when it is subjoined, 'O man, who are you who answer back to God?' these are not the words of Paul rebuking, but are to be continued with the preceding as part of the very inference, in this way: Nay rather, you say to any man whatsoever, 'O man, who are you who answer back to God and contradict?' For in the Greek there is the particle ἀλλ' οὖν γε, which is rendered in Latin, Quinimo, and it augments the inference itself. Then the rest well agrees."

From this passage, however it be understood, our position is excellently proved: for if man cannot complain of God because he chooses this one for congruent grace, but not that one, it follows that there is no beginning, reason, occasion, or even the least merit from free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) for our predestination (*praedestinatio*); just as in the same mass of clay there is not any - no, not the least - reason why out of one part a vessel is made unto honor, and out of another unto dishonor: otherwise, in some manner man could complain of God, accuse him of ingratitude, and in some way resist his will by reason; because, when he had begun of himself, as far as he could, God did not follow up his endeavor. And this testimony thus proves that there is no beginning from us of supernatural virtue, just as neither of acquired moral virtue. Add also that, since in that same place in Romans 9 and in Jeremiah 18 man is compared, in the business of his justification, to clay out of which a potter's vessel is made, although it is not only formed by the potter into a vessel, but is also prepared and made pliant by him; so also man is not only justified by God, but is also made pliant and disposed by preparatory good works: if man, by certain works of his own without the touch of God's grace, obtained the grace of God, he would in some fashion make himself pliant and prepare himself.

There are, moreover, other testimonies of Scripture which prove that grace is not found by the solicitude and prayer of him who attains it, which in the same way confirm this position: however, we shall report these below in this disputation, chapter 17. Now indeed the same position must be confirmed by reason.

1967. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, cc. 4 - 5, 10; cf. 1 Cor 4:7. See also Second Council of Orange (Arausicanum II), can. 6.

Caput XIV - The same Catholic position is shown by a priori reason

Although, for confirming the Catholic doctrine which in chapters 11, 12, and 13 I have established by authority, reasons are not lacking; yet, since this matter altogether surpasses what is natural and human philosophy, it cannot be demonstrated from principles known by the light of nature alone; rather one must in good part lean upon authority also. I will therefore set down two reasons, gathered from the authority of the Fathers and of Scripture, by which I shall explain the nature of the grace which through Christ has been restored to us and its predestination. But before the first reason, it must be briefly premised what in the disputation on grace, put. 88, cap. 7, I said, namely, that the grace of God in general is any gift whatsoever bestowed upon us liberally by God, even if you include the gift of creation; but that the grace of Christ is the daily help by which man is directed to do well and to conquer temptations, by which at length, through individual acts, he attains to justification. Therefore, when we treat of the predestination of the grace of God, we do not treat of the providence by which God decreed to create men, but of that by which through Christ He destined to lead them to justification and to a right life: whether of this there be given from our free choice any cause which is not an effect of the grace of God through Christ. For this reason we said that no good work on our part has furnished God with an occasion for giving or predestining to us the grace of Christ, because even the least thing by which man begins to enter upon the way of justification ought to be reckoned among the gifts of the grace of Christ, and thus to fall under grace itself as predestined. This is proved by the following reasoning.

Since man is of a rational nature, indifferent indeed to follow the good or the bad, nor is he by the nature of his creation determined to the good more than to the bad; but he is moved by a foregoing thought to this or that; and he does not have the first thought in his power by the gift of his creation; it follows that he obtains a new grace from God when he is moved by the thought of good, namely, that thought which proposes the object so that in reality, as God knows, the will should pursue and love it. I said the thought of good; for if the thought is of an evil object or of an indifferent one - even if it be useful for the present life - it is not grace, which the Fathers contend with the Pelagians is through Christ, and by which we are promoted to justice, although in some respect it can be called a gift on account of usefulness for this present life, as creation itself. Moreover, if such a thought proceeds from some series of external things, which God by His foreknowledge and providence has so disposed, nothing hinders that it be in itself a gift of God distinct from the gift of creation. For from the force of creation there did not follow this order of things, from which a congruous and efficacious thought would arise, rather than the opposite order. Since therefore God so disposed things that man should be moved congruously and efficaciously, He predestined to him a new gift distinct from creation.

Nor indeed is this gift only of some external protection, but also of an interior inspiration and thought, since the whole external series of things is ordered to this, that inwardly man be moved by a holy thought; which, because by the opposite order of things and by many other ways it could have been disturbed by God or altogether impeded - without any hurt at all to the gift of creation and of free choice - so that it should not have its effect, for very good reason must be called a new

grace, distinct from the very gift of creation itself, as will also be shown in disputation 95, cap. 6. And although this reason would not prove that every moral work, correct in every circumstance, is a gift of God from the grace of Christ distinct from the gift of creation (about which I do not dispute now), nevertheless it effectively proves that that work and that holy and congruous thought from which the occasion or beginning of our justification is taken, is a grace of God distinct from the gift of creation; and that, as in Adam we lost the occasion, so through Christ it was predestined for us from eternity and restored in time. For just as by the sin of the first Adam we lost justice and innocence, so also we lost justification itself and any grace that moves us to it, and likewise every occasion and beginning of it; all of which were predestined and restored to us in the second Adam, that is, in Christ.

In this way Fulgentius is to be understood in the book On the Incarnation and the grace of Christ, chapter 12, at the beginning, when he says: "Thus to the human race the divine goodness bestowed gratuitous grace, by which in men not only would every iniquity be blotted out - contracted by the obligation of propagation and with the addition of the vice of the proper will - but the faculty of holy thought, long ago lost in the first man, would be received again through the second man."[1970] And Prosper, to the Chapters of the Gauls, chapter 9: "And since with two hundred and fourteen priests, whose constitution against the enemies of the grace of God the whole world embraced (he means the African councils), by a truthful profession - as their very discourse has it - let us say that the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord helps us not only to know justice but also to do it by individual acts, so that without it we are able to have, to think, to say, to do nothing of true and holy piety. Nor do we think that these gifts are not from God, so that - because He is the author of our nature - He may be thought to have already conferred these things by ordination, since He indeed gave this faculty to man from the beginning; but we all lost it in him in whom all sinned. Whence we need to be renewed by another creation and another principle in Christ."[1971] Who, moreover, would deny that at least those moral works which furnished God the occasion and cause of our salvation are true and holy piety? Therefore Prosper thinks that these are not had from the gift of creation, but from regeneration through Christ, by whom what was earlier lost is restored to us.

Corollary against Durandus: It follows therefore from the foregoing reasoning, at least, that good moral works by which we impetrate from God the helps of grace are also from the help of grace admonishing within, and not only from peculiar providence and external protection; and thus truly are effects of the grace of God, just as they are also within predestination; indeed, for this very reason they fall under predestination, inasmuch as they pertain to grace, as we showed in chapter 10. And how Augustine put the beginning of the grace of Christ in holy thought, and in what way, we saw above in chapter 11. Moreover, from our Scholastics this kind of grace - by the determination of thought to the good side, since man is from himself indifferent - is taught by St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 109, and by Capreolus on II, dist. 29, q. 1, art. resp., conclusion 4.[1972]

1970. Fulgentius, De Incarnatione et gratia Christi, cap. 12 (init.).
1971. Prosper, Ad capitula Gallorum, cap. 9.
1972. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 109; John Capreolus, In II Sent., dist. 29, q. 1, art. resp., concl. 4.

Note, first, in passing, that the help of grace through Christ is not only called the help which by the Scholastics is said, according to its substance, to be of the supernatural order and, in their opinion, is conferred for the acts of infused virtues alone - whereby our will is compared as from itself an instrument - but also whatever good has been given to us through Christ, and, after the sin of the first parent, has been restored for living rightly, overcoming temptations, and attaining to justification - such as is that devout and holy thought of which we have thus far spoken - which indeed, according to its substance, is of the natural order, yet can in a certain way be called above nature, because it is had without our industry and solicitude; rather, it forestalls our solicitude and operation, and is conferred with a view to a supernatural end.

Moreover, many considerations persuade that the help of grace through Christ is not only for those acts of the supernatural order, but also for certain other things of the natural order.

- First, the authority of St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 136, article 3, to the second, where, treating of patience, he says that the act of political virtue is commensurate to human nature, and thus our nature can tend to it without the help of grace that makes pleasing to God. He understands, however, help according to a substance that is supernatural; yet not without the help of grace: therefore he concedes help of grace for acts of the natural order according to their substance, besides the supernatural help for acts that are, according to their substance, supernatural.[1973]
- Second, the same is proved by the authority of the Doctors, whom we a little before alleged, [1974] and of many others, who teach that all moral works are always done by the help of grace; and if their sentence, taken thus universally, does not please, at least their opinion cannot displease, because they affirm that, for acts more difficult of moral virtue and for more difficult temptations against moral precepts, the help of grace is necessary. Indeed, concerning all temptations, not a few affirm this very thing as probable; as we shall see in its place.[1975]
- Third, the same is gathered from the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 16, where it is defined that the grace of God always precedes, accompanies, and follows the good works of the just; wherein he plainly includes even moral works by which we observe the precepts, as will be clear from the same place of the Council; and we shall show below, chapter 11, article 4, that by grace there is not understood habitual grace, but the help of probation, in question, article 3.[1976]

Fourth, unless we concede this, we could scarcely defend that the beginning of our justification is not from ourselves, or that there is not some occasion on our part by natural good works, as we were proving in this chapter.

1973. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 136, a. 3, ad 2.
1974. Deza of Seville, In IV Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 3, notae 2 et 6; Franc. Rom., In lib. De libertate et necessitate operum, veritates 14 et 15; and all the distinguished disciples of the School of St. Thomas.
1975. See above, cap. 11; and below at its place.
1976. Council of Trent, sess. 6, cap. 16; cf. cap. 10 - 11 on the same session, and art. 4 as noted.

Next we ought to observe that it is of no importance to us whether this holy thought be after faith and the supernatural knowledge of God, or whether even before faith it is found; for however it comes about, that from that thought there should arise some work by which we impetrate from God some help of grace - especially that by which there is gathered a series of operations all the way to justification and perseverance - must be said to be of grace through Christ; and, inasmuch as it forestalls consent and descends to works, it is rightly called prevenient and cooperating, according to the terms of the Schools. Nor do I doubt that, by certain moral works done by the grace of Christ before someone knows the supernatural mysteries of Christ, he may obtain from God the true knowledge of them; whereas by older authors that knowledge was often attained from the law. What Augustine at times seems to deny about grace before the knowledge of faith, he teaches because he judged that, for the most part, those who do not have true knowledge of God - even if they often act concerning the matter of virtue - always act from a bad end, or with a bad circumstance; of which we shall treat in 2.2, q. 109, article 10.[1977] But how faith is the gift of God and grace, we shall say in the first and second questions elsewhere.

Caput XV - A posteriori reason for the same position

The later reason, taken from the absurd, is of this sort. If the help by which we are promoted to justification were to be posited as arising for us on the occasion of some work of ours, then it would not be grace, and consequently our justification would not be called grace but from our works; since in them it would be repaid to us...

But on the contrary: Paul in Romans 3 and 4 and to the Galatians 2 and 3 excludes works of mere free choice from our justification, and openly pronounces that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by faith; not, indeed, if one should say "by the help of grace" which is communicated to us through faith, for when he excludes works, he excludes not only ceremonial observances, but also moral works which are done from the bare knowledge of the law; so that he may show that the mere knowledge of the law, without the Spirit of grace moving within, does not suffice for justification and for the observance of the law. Now that Paul speaks not only of the ceremonial law but also of the moral is plain; because in Romans 2, showing that it matters little whether one have the law written outwardly in order to observe it, he adduces the example of the Gentiles, who by the natural knowledge alone of the law - indeed, not without the Spirit of grace moving within, but without the exterior letter - observe it and are justified; which is clearly to be understood of the moral law. And in chapter 7, showing the weakness of the law as serving only to give knowledge of sin, and that, if the Spirit of grace be lacking who moves within, sin follows, he brings forward the example of the moral law, when he says: "What then shall we say? Is the law sin? God forbid. But I knew not sin except through the law; for I had not known concupiscence, unless the law said: Thou shalt not covet" (Rom. 7:7). Which words are plainly to be taken not of the ceremonial but of the moral law. And to the Galatians, chapter 3, to show that the letter of the

1977. Cf. the discussion on those who act in the matter of virtue without true knowledge of God: Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 109, a. 10.

law sounding outwardly, without the Spirit of grace, works death rather than righteousness, thus he says: "For as many as are of the works of the law" - that is, who attempt to act by the bare knowledge of the letter of the law - "are under a curse"; that is, they incur a curse because they do not keep the law. "For it is written: Cursed is everyone that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them" (Gal. 3:10). But this curse is attached also to the moral precepts. Therefore, when Paul in both epistles says that man is not justified by works, he plainly excludes moral works done by one's own powers: either because there are no such works as could justify by themselves, or because there are no such works as would obtain justification from God and in some way initiate it.

Fourth, unless we grant this, we could hardly defend that the beginning of our justification is not from ourselves, or that there is not some occasion afforded by moral good works - as we were noting in this chapter - whereby we should observe the precepts. Then we must observe that it makes no difference for our thesis whether this holy thought occurs after faith and the supernatural knowledge of God, or whether it also is found before faith: for however it happens, from that right thought there springs some work by which we ask and obtain from God some help of grace, especially that by which the series of operations is gathered up as far as justification and perseverance. This is truly to be called grace through Christ; and, in so far as it prevents (precedes) consent, it is to be called prevenient or operating grace; and in so far as it accompanies consent, it ought to be called cooperating grace. Yet I have no doubt that by some moral works done by the grace of Christ, before a man knows the supernatural mysteries, one may obtain from God true knowledge of them, and further, by means of that knowledge the man may attain justification. If, more reservedly, St. Augustine sometimes denies grace before the knowledge of faith, he does so because, as he thought, for the most part those who do not have the true knowledge of God, even if they frequently act about the matter of virtue, always act with a bad end or with a bad circumstance; about which we shall treat at length in I-II, q. 109, a. 2. But how faith is the gift of God, and prayer likewise, we shall say in that question, article 1 first, and then second.

Moreover, we must show from the Council's very text that the word "grace" does not mean the habitual [gift], but the help; we will prove this in that question, article 3. And we shall demonstrate in I-II, q. 114, a. 4 that the place clearly includes even moral works by which we observe the precepts, as is plain from the same passage of the Council.

A posterior argument: if the help toward justification were given on the occasion of our works, it would not be grace

The posterior argument, drawn from an absurdity, is of this sort: If the help by which we are advanced toward justification were given to us upon the occasion taken from some work of ours, that would not be grace; and so our justification would not be from grace, but from our works, since it would be repaid to them as a debt - which is absurd. This plainly includes even moral works, as we noted in this chapter. And we shall show in I-II, q. 114, a. 4 that by the name of grace there is not understood the habitual gift, but help; we will prove this in that question, article 3.

Lest someone contend too far that here Paul only excludes moral works in that, of themselves, they do not have the power of justifying, but that he does not deny that by these works the grace of God is obtained: from chapter 11 to the Romans I show more clearly that by moral works done without the Spirit of grace a man does not obtain from God the help of grace such that he comes to justification. For he says: "The remnant," that is, the few, "are saved according to the election of grace. And if by grace, now not by works; otherwise grace is no more grace" (Rom. 11:5 - 6). As if he were to say: Those few who are saved were chosen by God to His grace gratuitously, and by a gratuitous election they are saved. But if they were chosen gratuitously, they could not have been chosen because of their works, whether these had gone before or were foreseen. Thus St. Augustine understands this passage, in the first book to Simplicianus, question 2, not far from the end, and in the seventh sermon on the words of the Lord according to Matthew, and in the book On Patience, chapter twenty, and in the first book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter three; and the reason is that election would then be owed, not gratuitous; whence grace would not be grace - that is, what otherwise would be grace then would not be grace. With this argument from the testimony of Paul against the Massilienses the Fathers use to prove that the bestowal of grace in time, and the election unto it in foreknowledge, is not from works, nor does it take from them its occasion. Thus argues Augustine against Julian the Pelagian in book 4, chapter 3, and in that book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 3, and very often elsewhere; Fulgentius in the book On the Incarnation and Grace, chapter 18; Prosper, book 1 On the Vocation of the Gentiles, chapter 18 at the beginning, and again near the end, and everywhere in the book Against the Collator, and in the Excerpts of the Genoese to the fourth doubt; and Petrus Diaconus in the book On the Incarnation and the Grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ, chapter 8. After he had condemned the books of Faustus for teaching that the help of grace must be added to human labor, he added: "And so, utterly evacuating the grace of Christ, he impiously professes that the ancients were saved not by the same grace by which we also [are saved], according to what the blessed Apostle Peter teaches, but by the capacity of nature." It is manifest that this Faustus did not deny grace, as Pelagius denied it altogether, but he maintained only that the beginning is from ourselves; nevertheless he seems to have utterly evacuated grace, because, if we were to begin, grace would not be grace. From which it would also follow that we would be said to be saved by the possibility of nature, because by it we would obtain from God the other things necessary to salvation. The same Petrus also says there that the books of Faustus of Riez, in which he teaches that grace must be joined to human labor, were written against the doctrine of the Apostle, because Faustus grants that grace is given to us from our works.

Yet someone may oppose this reasoning, and interpret the mind of these Fathers thus, that they speak only of condign merits, from which, if the grace of God were given - as Pelagius supposed - truly it would not be grace; because then, as it were for an equal price, it would be conferred like the glory of beatitude. For that grace should be given for some other work not condign, but only congruous, does not seem to impede the notion of grace: just as if a great gift were given for a thing of little moment. By this argument some think that, against the Semipelagians, it is not sufficiently proved that grace is not given from merely congruous and impetratory merits. This opinion was

embraced by Andreas de Vega, book 8, on the Council, chapter 5, in order to defend the opinion which he taught in the same book 8 on the Council, chapter 10, namely, that the sinner merits habitual grace and the remission of sins de congruo by preceding works done with the help of grace.[1978]

However, this opinion in no way pleases me, because it would so easily overturn the reasoning of the Fathers against the Semipelagians. For the confirmation of which it must be noted that the nature of a wholly liberal donation consists precisely in this, that it is made from no onerous cause, nor on account of any benefit received, but from the sole intention of giving and of doing good; and this is called a wholly gratuitous donation. For that which is made for some cause, or on account of some benefit received, or with some burden, is called an antidoral donation - that is, remuneratory - even if the benefit received is not equal to the return; or it is called a donation on account of a cause. Either, therefore, God bestows His grace upon us wholly liberally, with a mind to do good and out of mercy - not by an antidoral, that is, remuneratory donation - and thus not even the least merit, nor the least cause on our part, could have preceded; otherwise grace would no longer be grace wholly liberal and gratis, or of mercy, but would be conferred upon us for the sake of gratitude; and without doubt there would have preceded from us some merit or cause, if certain works had gone before by which God were inclined to give us His grace. Or else the donation of God's grace must be called remuneratory and antidoral. In which case Christ also would have suffered for us with a mind grateful toward us, and not with a mind of pity and altogether liberal; and thus our redemption would be not a work of mercy but of gratitude, nor would it be to be called simply a donation: for a donation done with a mind to remunerate is not rightly called a donation - as is marked in the legal rule on donations - which is plainly absurd.

Further, that the donation of grace is not antidoral is plain from this: in the same chapter 11 to the Romans the Apostle, when he proposes the free will of God whereby He has mercy on certain ones, namely, those whom He chose, adds: "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God!" and then, explaining wherein the riches of God shine forth, subjoins: "Or who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?" (Rom. 11:33, 35; cf. Job 41:11: "Who hath given to Me before, that I should repay him?"). By the name of "recompense" he understands any sort of remuneration and antidoral donation. And he adds: "For of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things; to Him be glory forever, amen" (Rom. 11:36). And in the same place of Scripture: "All things that are under heaven are Mine" (Job 41:2 Vg.). Therefore no one first gave anything of his own to God. If, then, God Himself is the source of all, the first grace would not redound to us by an antidoral donation, as though man had something beforehand to give; rather, all that man has he has received freely from Him, and for all things he ought to give Him thanks. Therefore the grace which God has given to us He has conferred utterly liberally, without any return, and without any account of remuneration or of "gratitude" owed on our part. Wherefore, when in the same chapter a little above he said, "If by grace, now not by works; otherwise grace is

1978. Andreas de Vega, De iustificatione, lib. 8, super Concilio, cap. 5; and in the same book, cap. 10, where he holds that the sinner merits habitual grace and remission of sins de congruo by preceding works done with the help of grace.

no more grace" (Rom. 11:6), he plainly excluded any works of free choice which would have even the slightest notion of merit, cause, or occasion, on account of which God should bestow His grace by an antidoral donation and remunerate with a grateful mind.

Moreover, as we shall note below, and as Fulgentius teaches, the grace of God through Christ is a work of mercy; because it is given solely from a mind that is moved by our misery, not from a mind of gratitude. For what is given from a grateful mind does not come from the bestowal of mercy; for gratitude regards a benefit received, but mercy regards misery alone. Therefore the Fathers rightly prove not only against Pelagius that grace is not given from condign merits of free choice - because grace would not be grace, as if it were given for an equal price - but also against the Semipelagians they show that grace is not given from congruous merits of free choice, because then grace would not be grace wholly and of mercy, but a certain antidoral and remuneratory donation, even if it were given for works of less value.

Furthermore, the Fathers alleged above stand, as I judge, in this same sentence, namely, that it is evident grace would not be grace if it were repaid even to works of free choice that are not worthy but only congruous; because in some of those places they were disputing expressly against the Semipelagians, who did not say that grace was given for condign merits of free choice, but for works which had some account of merit or of a beginning - see Disputation 89, chapter 4, expressly noted there. And Augustine, in that book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 2, against those who said that the beginning of faith is from us but the consummation from God, writes to this effect: that we must not depart from the sentence that even to begin to believe is God's gift; otherwise, if anything should precede from us which could be said to merit, then what follows would be rendered not according to grace but according to debt; so that justification, which faith is said to merit because it asks and obtains it, would be understood indeed as of that sort which some call "impetratory" or which the Schools call "congruous"; nevertheless he judges that even this does not suffice, lest grace be grace, but is said to be given "according to merits."

If he had been disposed with a mind not of pitying, but of gratitude, and altogether not generously for us, then our redemption would not have been a work of mercy, but of gratitude, nor would it be to be called a simple donation; for a donation with a mind to remunerate is not called a donation, as is defined in the law by Regulus, ff. De donationibus: but these are plainly absurd.[1979]

Moreover, that the donation of grace is not a counter-gift (antidoral) is clear from that which in Romans 11 the Apostle said, where, showing the free will of God, by which he had mercy on some, but rejected others, he says: "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God." And explaining wherein the riches of God shine forth, he subjoins: "Who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him?" (Job 41:3 [Vulg. 41:11]: "Who hath given before to me, that I should repay him?") - as if he said, No one. But by the name of "recompense" he understands any remuneration and counter-donation; for he added: "For of him, and by him, and in him are all things: to him be glory for ever. Amen." And in that same chapter of Job: "All things that are under heaven are mine." Therefore he distinctly says that no one has first from himself given anything to

1979. Regulus, Digest, De donationibus (Roman law maxim: a donation with an intent to remunerate is not a donation).

God, such that God would repay him his first grace by a counter-donation; because rather all the things that man has, he has gratefully received from him, and for all things he ought to give thanks to him: therefore the grace which God has bestowed upon us, he has conferred altogether liberally, without any return that would have the notion of any remuneration and gratitude. Wherefore, since in that same chapter, a little earlier, he said (Rom 11): "If by grace, now not by works; otherwise grace is no more grace," he manifestly excluded whatever works of bare free will which would have even the least notion of merit, cause, or occasion on account of which God would, by a counter-donation, lavish his grace and remunerate with a grateful mind.

Furthermore, as we shall note below from Fulgentius, the grace of God through Christ is pure mercy, because it is bestowed solely from a mind to alleviate our misery, not from a mind of gratitude: for what is given from a grateful mind is not conferred out of mercy, for gratitude regards a benefit received; mercy, however, regards misery alone. Rightly, therefore, the Fathers not only against Pelagius prove that grace is not given according to condign merits of free choice, because then grace would not be grace, as if it were given for an equal price, but also against the Semipelagians demonstrate that grace is not given according to congruous merits of free choice; for then grace would not at all be grace, and mercy would not be mercy, but rather some antidotal and remuneratory donation, even if something of lesser value were given in return for works.

Moreover, the Fathers alleged above in this very sense, as they judge, hold that grace would not be grace if it were repaid even to not-worthy but only congruous works of free choice; it is clear, because in some of those places they disputed only against the Semipelagians, who did not say that grace is given for condign merits of free choice, but for works that have some notion of merit or of a beginning (as I expressly noted in Disput. 89, cap. 4). St. Augustine indeed, in that book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter two, against those who were saying that the beginning of faith is from us, the consummation from God, thus writes: "Therefore we do not depart from that sentence which Pelagius, as the same acts attest, was forced to condemn in the episcopal judgment in Palestine, namely, that the grace of God is given according to our merits." But he proves this a little below with these words: "But who will say that he who has already begun to believe, from him in whom he has believed, merits nothing, whence it may be that to one now meriting other things are said to be added by divine retribution, and through this the grace of God is given according to our merits?" By which Augustine only shows that according to the sense of the Massilians some merit, even if not condign, precedes from us: because he who has begun to believe merits something, just as he himself in that same chapter, a little earlier, said that if Epistle 105 already acknowledges that faith merits justification because it obtains it, he understands at least an impetratory merit, or what the Scholastics call congruous, and he judges that this suffices for grace not to be grace, but to be said to be given according to merits.[1980]

He affirms the same also in that same book, chapter two, namely that he who begins to believe merits an increase of faith; and thus, if the beginning of faith were from us, the increase of it would not be grace, because it would be paid as a debt. And in chapter three, somewhat before the end, he

1980. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione Sanctorum, lib. 1, cap. 2 - 3; Epist. 105.

adds: "Wherefore that is not grace, if any merits precede it"; he did not say "condign" but "any," so that he might exclude every notion of merit. And finally he subjoins: "Lest now that which is given, be rendered not according to grace, but according to debt, rather than be given to merits" (he says, however, that grace is debt if it is rendered to merits), and thus not to be grace, if it is rendered to merits.

Testimony of Fulgentius. In the same way Fulgentius, against Faustus and other Gauls who were saying that it is ours to will to believe, on account of which will God would bestow upon us the grace of faith, in the book On the Incarnation and Grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ, chapter 18, says: "But if, according to their opinion, it is ours to will to believe before the grace of God begins to help us, it is not called grace, because it is not given gratis to man, but a good thing is repaid to the will. For this, as they will, grace finds in us, which it itself did not give. Nay rather, if so it is, we give to God the will beforehand, and thus we receive grace not from the mercy of one who bestows, but from the equity of God repaying. But who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made to him?" (Job 41). But those, against whom Fulgentius was contending, did not concede condign merits from our free choice, but some notion of merit, which we call congruous or impetratory. For neither were they outright Pelagians, but of the remnants of the Pelagians, as I showed in the place cited. He infers, moreover, that thus grace would not be grace, because we would first give something to God: wherefore grace would not be given out of mercy, but out of equity; for mercy does not regard a benefit received, even the least, but rather misery. Fulgentius understands by equity not condignity and justice, but gratitude; but gratitude differs altogether from mercy, because the latter supposes misery in him to whom the donation is made, the former a benefit received by him: but through Christ we have grace from mercy, not from any gratitude.[1981]

Wherefore in Romans 9 and Exodus 33 Scripture says: "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy"; therefore "it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy"; and again: "He has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens." In which words Paul calls the largess of the grace of God, to which he chose us, "mercy": and therefore he asserts that this election is not of him that runs, nor of him that wills, but of God that shows mercy. But if our diligence were to run by some good work, and we were first to will by some desire of ours by which we might incline God to choose us and to bestow his grace upon the good, Paul would neither exclude our running and our desire, nor would he say that grace is of God alone showing mercy, but rather of one who, out of gratitude, repays. Therefore, too, in that same place Paul and Hosea in the second chapter call the elect of God "a people that has obtained mercy"; and Peter the Deacon, when he says that the books of Faustus were written against the doctrine of the Apostle and that the grace of Christ was evacuated by him, was speaking of congruous or impetratory merits, which alone Faustus conceded, for he was of the sect of the Massilians.[1982]

1981. Fulgentius, De Incarnatione et gratia Domini nostri Iesu Christi, cap. 18.

1982. Prosper, Excerpta Genuensium ad quartum dubium, on Rom 11; see also Psalm 55. Petrus Diaconus, De Incarnatione et gratia Domini nostri Iesu Christi, cap. 8, against Faustus of Riez.

Finally, Prosper, in the Excerpts of the Genoese, to the fourth doubt, expounding that same place, Romans 11, "If by grace, it is not now by works," speaks thus: "Nothing of theirs preceded, which they might first give, and it be repaid to them: for for nothing he saved them" (Psalm 55). Which words he took from Augustine, book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter six at the end; and in the response to the third doubt, the same Prosper thus says: "And that faith, whence all merits begin, is the gift of God, lest grace be not grace, if something precedes it, on account of which it is bestowed." He did not say "condign," but "something on account of which it is bestowed." He asserts this, indeed, against those who were saying that faith is from free choice, and that on account of it grace is bestowed upon us: these, however, were not Pelagians, but the Massilians, who did not concede condign merit, as has been noted. Therefore Augustine and Prosper exclude every beginning from free choice in view of which grace is bestowed, because they think the donation of the grace of God through Christ to be such that it is conferred "for nothing," which would not be true if we first gave to God anything whatsoever.

But someone may object in this way: If some poor man earnestly begs for another's help and aid which he needs, a rich man can, moved by the serious entreaty of the man, succor him, and nonetheless exercise in him the work of mercy and of favor in such wise that it has no notion of gratitude and of retribution: therefore nothing hinders, but that God, moved by our prayers, may bestow grace and mercy without any return and gratitude, but by the sheer free will of showing mercy; and accordingly, even if we affirm that the grace of God is conferred upon human prayer, we do not derogate from the true notion of grace and of mercy.

I answer: The relation is far different between men, who have pity on the supplications of the poor, and God; for men are moved not to repay by any merit of work, but by the misery of the one petitioning, which by the very prayer and entreaties is made known. Wherefore, since they receive no service from the prayer, or do not attend to it, but by prayer alone simply know the misery, or better than before, even after the prayer of the poor they exercise toward them a work of pure mercy; nor in any way do they repay the merit of those petitioning: or if they repay, they do not do a work of true mercy. But God has our prayers for acceptable, although otherwise he has no need of them in order to know our misery. Wherefore by those very prayers he is said to receive some service; and hence as often as prayer obtains something from him, he is said to repay the prayer, not to give to our misery; nor would the mercy of God be moved by prayer, as in man: he is thus bent by prayer as by a certain service, to which, if he grants something, he is said to repay out of gratitude, not to give out of liberality. Therefore, if by human prayer, that is, out of our own powers, grace were obtained from God, now it would not be grace, as we have shown clearly by the testimonies of the Fathers and by reason.

These two arguments drawn from Scripture and the Fathers prove that no beginning, however least, even a remote one, of moral virtue, which would dispose toward obtaining grace, precedes from us, especially because even when we give something to God which would contribute to obtaining grace, it would be a retribution, not mercy. Nor do they only prove that men had nothing of themselves by which they might obtain grace from God, but not even angels: and hence it is rightly inferred that the predestination of both was not made from any beginning of theirs, but

from the sole will of God. What, moreover, the Fathers and the Scholastics say of the grace of the angels specifically, we shall see below in Disput. 128, cap. 3. But how the merit of congruity by which we merit the remission of sins, according to the doctrine of Augustine in Epistle 105, does not take away the notion of grace, we shall say more fully in 1 - 2, q. 114, a. 2, 5; namely for this reason, that such merit proceeds from the help of grace, not from pure nature, and thus the whole benefit of the remission of sins is referred back to the root of first grace. But the Fathers just cited only contend that the notion of the grace of Christ is evacuated if even the least merits, or some occasion from our strengths, precedes; as has been explained.

Thus far we have shown that there was no beginning of a good work from us, from which we were predestined; but that a good disposition of nature and even talent was not a cause, has been shown incidentally from Augustine, and will also be proved below, Disput. 94, cap. 4, by arguments which can confirm what has been so far set forth. For if grace were given on account of excellence of talent, it would be neither mercy, nor altogether liberal, but in a certain way a counter-gift. Whether indeed, although on the part of the one predestined no cause or occasion of his predestination is given, it can nevertheless be in another, so that one may merit for another predestination and every effect of it, we shall say in Disput. 94.

Finally, from what has been said it is clear that the Massilians did not err in this, that they asserted that in the sinner there is some merit of congruity, or of impetration: for this can be in a sinner; but they erred because they conceded that this merit, or beginning, was from our strengths without any help of grace. Nor did those err merely because they said that this beginning from us is a condign merit; nor because they said that God by promise is of necessity bound on account of it; but because, while they conceded from us some merit, even the least, it followed from their sentence that, in view of that merit, God repays his grace out of gratitude, not gives it out of liberality.

Some objection of the adversaries.

Caput XVI

The argument is of this kind. Man of himself, without any other grace than the gift of creation and of free choice, can do some morally good work; therefore something can be a beginning on our part, whereupon God would then bestow grace.

Certain people say that we render something to God, on account of which he in turn repays and gives his grace. Some concede that from our own powers, by certain moral works, a man is disposed so as to obtain grace from God; nevertheless, that these are not the cause of predestination, because under predestination all these works are comprehended. Thus thinks Durandus, cited by us above, cap. 10, and other more recent authors; but their position has already been sufficiently refuted by us in its proper place.[1983]

1983. Durandus, cited by Vazquez above cap. 10, and other recent authors.

Others, however, who admit that every effect of predestination is a gift of God's grace through Christ, answer that indeed we can perform some morally good work from our own powers, but that there is no work of acquired moral virtue that would obtain any grace from God. They call that virtue "acquired," which certain Theologians distinguish even from infused moral virtue. For of works - e.g., of mercy - they say that some are done with a certain supernatural regard, as when alms are given to one in need as to a son of God or a member of Christ; and then it is a work of infused moral virtue. But when alms are given merely to a needy man, because thus it appears honest, it is a work of acquired moral virtue. They therefore teach that by a work of infused virtue (though not by a work of acquired virtue) some help of grace is obtained from God; and because a work of infused virtue cannot be done without the help of moving grace, it follows, according to their opinion, that there is no beginning of grace from our free choice. Others also, whom we reported above in cap. 12, think that grace is not promised to moral works done from free choice, but that it is conferred on them out of the mercy of God.

Yet the former are plainly mistaken in this, that they affirm that by certain works of mercy and by other moral works of acquired virtues no help of grace is obtained from God. For since Scripture and the Fathers everywhere promise us the help of God's grace if we have mercy on the poor and forgive the injury done to us, they never use this distinction of the Scholastics; rather they commend to us those things which among men are commonly judged honest, such as are the works of mercy of acquired virtue. Concerning alms which obtains grace from God so that sins may be forgiven, you have very many manifest testimonies in Tobit 4 and 12, Ecclesiasticus 3, 7, and 29, Daniel 4, and Matthew 5 and 6, where it is said: "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy." And who would say that he is not merciful who, moved by the miseries of the poor, strives to relieve them? And Matthew 6: "For if you forgive men their offenses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you your offenses." The same sentence is found in Mark 11, Luke 6, and Ecclesiasticus 28, where it is said thus: "Leave (that is, forgive) your neighbor who has wronged you, and then, when you pray, your sins will be loosed." In which place pardon of sins is promised not so much to prayer as to the remission of the injury done, as though with such a companion our prayer were the more acceptable to God. And who that speaks reasonably would dare to say that he who, out of pity for him by whom he has been injured, lest he suffer any harm, even if at that moment he has no remembrance of God but looks only to his misery, forgives the injury so as to keep him unharmed - obtains nothing of grace with God?

Moreover, that by works of mercy done from the mere apprehension of the neighbor's misery God is moved to bestow the help of his grace upon the merciful, is proved by this reasoning. If these works, when done by a just man, are meritorious of eternal life; and if alms given to the poor, by this very fact that it is given to the poor, without this that we recall Christ, is said to be done to Christ himself; then it follows that alms done from that same single affect of compassion and of relieving misery, when done by a sinner, is also done to Christ himself, and therefore - although it is not meritorious of eternal life because it is not by a just man - still has the power of impetrating from Christ himself some help of grace. For if it is said to be done to Christ himself, what wonder if he obtain some grace from him? But that alms done in this way is also done to Christ himself is

clear from Matthew 25, where the Lord rewards the just with the recompense of beatitude in these words: "I was hungry, and you gave me to eat," etc. At which the just, astonished, will say: "Lord, when did we see you hungry, and feed you?" The Lord will answer: "As long as you did it to one of these my least brethren, you did it to me." Where, from the fact alone that alms is said to be done to one poor person, Christ himself accepts it. For if the just had done that alms to the poor man because they apprehended him as a poor man of Christ, they would not say on the day of judgment: "When did we see you hungry," etc.; just as he who should receive honorably the envoy of the King because he was his envoy, and on that account the king should grant him a reward, saying, "Receive the due remuneration for the honor that you did to me," would not answer, "Where, my lord?" For he would know that in honoring the envoy he had done honor to him.

But let us consider the same place of Matthew 25: Those who will be on the left, and will hear that sentence of their damnation, "Depart, you cursed, into everlasting fire, for I was hungry and you did not give me to eat," will say, "When did we see you hungry, and did not feed you?" And the Lord will answer: "As long as you did not do it to one of these least ones, you did not do it to me." It is manifest that those who are to be condemned because they did not occupy themselves with works of mercy, are not therefore to be condemned because they omitted alms under that peculiar respect which looks to Christ. For they were not bound by precept to give alms under this respect; but they are said not to have given to Christ because they did not give to the poor for this sole reason, that he is poor. Therefore, according to the phrase of Scripture, to give alms to Christ is the same as to give to the poor; just as not to give to Christ is the same as not to give to the poor; because that work, done solely out of mercy toward the poor, is also acceptable to Christ; likewise, not to give to the poor displeases Christ. From which things it is also gathered that those later Doctors rightly said that grace is not promised to moral works done from free choice alone; but they erred in this, that they added that grace is repaid to such works out of mercy and not out of promise, as we noted above in cap. 12. For in either way, whether out of promise or out of mercy, if grace were given to the worker without promise, it would not be grace. Wherefore, when we say that some grace is promised to moral works, we understand works done with the help of grace, not by free choice alone.

I answer, therefore, to the argument proposed at the beginning: although we should concede that some good moral work can be done without the grace of Christ - about which there is a grave controversy, which we determine in I - II, q. 109, a. 2 - two things nevertheless ought to be held beyond controversy. First, that works of mercy, and some other moral works as well, impetrate from God some grace through Christ, and dispose for it; as Driedo expressly admits in the Opuscule On the Harmony of Free Will and Predestination, part 2, last chapter, and in the Treatise On the Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race, cap. 2, part 2, and Ruard likewise in a. 7 and a. 9; and other Scholastic Doctors agree.[1984] For the opposite opinion greatly derogates from the observance of the precepts of the Decalogue, in which almost the whole justice of human life consists; for these are the things which frequently occur to be observed by us. Then it is most

1984. Driedo, Opuscule On the Harmony of Free Will and Predestination, part 2, last chapter; Treatise On the Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race, cap. 2, part 2; Ruardus Tapper, articles 7 and 9.

certain that those moral works which obtain some grace from God and dispose to it also proceed from the help of grace through Christ, and not from our free choice alone; as against the Massilians and certain Scholastics, among whom were Driedo and Ruardus, has been proven up to this point, namely, lest we attribute something prior to God out of the mere gift of creation, so that he might in turn repay and grant the help of his grace through Christ. And so in this way there will be, on our part, no beginning, cause, or occasion of the first grace which is given in time, nor of predestination, which is prepared beforehand in the eternal prescience.

Caput XVII - The arguments of the Massilians against St. Augustine

Objections of the Massilians and of those who thought with them against the sentence of Augustine were chiefly these.

Prima obiectio. If God does not wait for our free choice and some occasion, but, as it pleases him, with his peculiar grace anticipates this man or that, a manifest force seems to be brought against free choice: for thus grace will not depend on free choice, nor will it be in our power. But Cassian and others who said that sometimes the grace of God is prior and sometimes our will, by this reasoning could not maintain their cause; nevertheless St. John Chrysostom, Marcus the Hermit, and Faustus of Riez, alleged by us above in c. 8 of this disputation, touched upon it in part. [1985]

I answer that no force is brought against our liberty from this, that the grace of God anticipates the will. For liberty does not consist in this, that the will should first act of itself, and that the help of prevenient grace should depend on its own power on each occasion and in each work to which it is given; but in this, that it be free for the will - once stirred by the prevenient holy thought of God's grace - to consent or not to consent; and that it be in its power to cooperate with operating and prevenient grace, and to have it as companion through its consent. This liberty the Council of Trent briefly taught in session six, cap. 5, where, when it says that the beginning of justification starts from the calling of God, which without doubt precedes our consent, it holds that there is nothing from our free choice which gives the beginning to the grace of God. But when it adds that we freely assent to that same grace and calling, and can resist it, it clearly indicates that our liberty is in the consent by which we assent to the calling; from which it is sufficiently clear that our liberty in the acts of the will is safeguarded. By what reason, moreover, all are anticipated by that help and calling to which they can assent, and how it lies in everyone's power to make the calling efficacious, we shall say in disputation 98, chapters 6 and 8.

Secunda obiectio. If God distributes his grace without waiting for our will, it follows that God uses the right of a lord and, as it were, of a tyrant, who, as he pleases, divides grace; and not the order of one who governs, who distributes gifts according to each one's disposition. In this way Faustus of Riez attacks Augustine in book 2 On Grace and Free Choice, c. 6, whose words we

1985. St. John Chrysostom; Marcus the Hermit; Faustus of Riez.

recited above, disput. 89; and from this he also inferred that the future cause of judgment is altogether taken away, and thus that those condemned are not to be judged but rather to be judged without cause.

I answer that this objection is frivolous. First, no "acceptance of persons" and no tyranny can be imputed to God because he now calls one with that thought which is congruent and will be efficacious, and another only with that which suffices that he might respond or might contemn - and in fact will not respond. For since the bestowal of such thoughts is not due to man from creation, but is of new grace, and an act of liberality beyond the gift of free choice and of creation itself, as we proved above in cap. 4, therefore God does not "accept persons" when he freely chooses to grant to one sooner than to another a calling suited to him. For acceptance of persons is found only in a distribution which is owed according to justice. Wherefore in this distribution of graces that saying of Romans 9 is rightly applied: "It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy"; and again: "O man, who are you who answer back to God?" Men are not born "to be judged," that is, so that, without any personal merit, they should undergo judgment; rather, they are born "for judgment," that is, so that from the works which they will do they should receive reward or punishment. For a man will not be judged by God because he happened to have this calling rather than that; but because he did not will to respond to the calling which he had, when he could. For all are aroused by sufficient help and calling.

Tertia obiectio. The Massilians further argued, as Hilary and Prosper report in their letters which are found prefixed to the books On the Predestination of the Saints, in this way: If the sentence of Augustine is true, which says that that peculiar grace of the predestined is given from the sole will of God, prayer is in vain; for by human prayer grace cannot be obtained; and so all hope of impetrating grace is taken away; men also are corrected in vain, or we exhort them in vain, if grace and predestination do not depend on their free choice.

I answer: First, one person does not pray and ask in vain for another to have first grace; for sometimes one can impetrate for another the first grace, as we shall say in disputation 94; and thus it happens by the merits of one that another receives the first grace which is given in time; and likewise from eternity, as the cause of predestination. Nevertheless, the prayer of him who obtains some grace for another does not arise from free choice alone, but from the help of grace.

Then, no one can by any prayer obtain for himself his own first grace; for even the prayer by which we ask for grace proceeds from the help of grace; wherefore no prayer can precede the first of all graces. Therefore, what is defined in the Second Council of Orange, can. 3 - that by human prayer the grace of God is not obtained - must be understood of first grace; for second grace, although not by human prayer as if from our own powers, is nevertheless obtained by prayer proceeding from the spirit of grace; and in can. 6 he is condemned who says that the grace of God, namely first grace, is given to those praying without the Spirit of grace. Thus the Massilians were

deceived.[1986] The Council proves this from those places: Isaiah 65:1 and Romans 10:20, "I was found by those who did not seek me; I appeared openly to those who did not ask after me"; and 1 Corinthians 4:7, "What have you that you did not receive?"

It is also excellently proved by Job 28, where, after he has shown that many things which are precious among men have been found by human difficulty and diligence - gold, silver, etc. - he adds, in the middle of the chapter: "But wisdom - where is it to be found? and what is the place of understanding? Man does not know its price," etc.; and, since he showed that these things have been found by no one, neither by effort nor ingenuity, he subjoins: "God understands the way of it, and he knows the place of it," etc.

"But God understands its way," etc., so as to show that it belongs to God alone. Wherefore many of the words of that chapter, which lack a subject, and which some wish to refer to God, are better accommodated to man, so that thus the argument of Job may have force - namely, that many difficult things have been done and discovered by human industry; wisdom, however, by no means, but is given by God alone.

Baruch also, chapter 3, expressly set forth the same in these words: "Who has gone up into heaven, and taken her (namely, wisdom)? There is no one who can know her ways, nor who can search out her paths; but he who knows all things has known her, and by his prudence has found her; he has given her to Jacob his servant," etc. He not only said, "There is no one who can know her ways," but he added, "nor who can search out her paths," so as to show that true wisdom is obtained not only not by industry or by human prayer, but neither can it be sought out or investigated.

But, as St. Augustine in the book On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 16, answering this objection - which Prosper follows in On the Vocation of the Gentiles, book 2, chapter 8 - explains from Augustine, our prayer is not fruitless; for since the Spirit of grace, who goes before us, prevents us, that we may pray, by that prayer we can obtain another help of grace from God, and we frequently do obtain it. For certain things God gives not to those first praying and asking, such as the first of all graces, which he calls the beginning of faith; certain things he grants not otherwise than to those praying (he means praying from the Spirit of grace); among which he assigns perseverance, in this respect alone, that one end life in grace - not for all the helps which are conferred throughout the whole life after justification.

To the same end tends the doctrine of Prosper, On the Vocation of the Gentiles, book 2, chapter 36, elsewhere chapter 8, who, responding to this objection of the Massilians, proves from the sentence of Augustine that our solicitude and prayer are not taken away; for by labor of works and by the insistence of supplication the increments of merits are brought about. And he adds that, although by our prayer we may not be able to obtain the first grace, yet in received grace we can grow by prayer and solicitude, and have new merits day by day, and obtain not a few gifts from God.

1986. Second Council of Orange (529), can. 3 and can. 6, and the loci cited there: Isa 65:1; Rom 10:20; 1 Cor 4:7. Council of Trent, session 6, cap. 5.

Christ proposed this doctrine to us in two parables, Matthew 13. The one is of the hidden treasure in a field, which when a man has found, he goes away and sells all that he has, that he may buy the field; by which is insinuated the first grace, which is truly hidden, just as a treasure which, though it is not sought, is wont to be found unexpectedly: for thus too the first grace is found by those not seeking, as in the Second Council of Orange by that canon 3 it is defined.[1987] But just as, when the treasure is found, a prudent man sells all his goods, that he may buy the field and gain the treasure, so also he who is stirred by the grace of God ought with all solicitude to give his consent, that he may be able to be justified. The other parable is of a man seeking fair pearls, who by labor and industry at length finds them and sells all, that he may buy one for himself. By this indeed the second grace is denoted for us, which is now given to those praying and seeking - but from another prior grace; and when this is found, likewise we must be solicitous, that it may be made richer day by day. Rightly therefore did Augustine say that certain gifts are prepared for those not praying, but others are given not unless to those praying.[1988]

As to exhortation, Augustine says, chapter 14, that it is not in vain, because although those who do not have ears prepared by the Lord to hear do not obey, many nevertheless hear who have their dispositions from the Lord so that they may hear and obey. Therefore exhortation is not in vain: for God most often by the very means of exhortation itself opens the ears of the heart within, that men may hear and obey. He thinks the same of correction; for the same reason applies.

He subjoins nonetheless in chapter 15 that not on this account - namely, that some fall into sloth and despair - should we cease from the preaching of true doctrine, when from our silence other errors arise: such as that grace is predestined by God according to our merits, and from some beginning of ours. Which thing he himself elegantly pursues, and teaches that almost the same inconveniences commonly happen when God's foreknowledge is treated - namely, that then we pray in vain, we correct in vain, if only that shall be future which God has foreknown; yet on that account we ought not to allow any error to be taught concerning foreknowledge. How indeed the people are to be taught this doctrine prudently, he most excellently declares in chapter 22. Finally, in chapter 17, against the Massilians he turns the argument: because just as they exhort to chastity, which they would say is from ourselves, nevertheless they cannot deny that it is foreknown by God, indeed even predestined (he understands according to common providence, not grace), so we Christians can exhort men to that which we teach to be predestined by divine grace.

Caput XVIII - Certain testimonies alleged against our position are explained

They press still further some testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers to prove a cause on our part of predestination and grace. The first testimony is Matthew 25, from that parable of the man who, going on a journey, distributed various talents to his servants, not indeed absolutely, but (as Christ says) "to each according to his own ability" - which parable signifies the distribution which Christ makes of his grace, that we may live rightly and trade. For just as that man divided the

1987. Second Council of Orange (529), can. 3.
1988. St. Augustine, De dono perseverantiae, c. 16; Prosper of Aquitaine, De vocatione gentium, II, c. 8.

talents of money to his servants having regard to natural virtue and faculty, which each had of himself by nature, so also Christ divided the talents of grace according to the proportion of the natural virtue of each one; therefore according to the use of free will.

St. Thomas answers that by the name of "proper virtue" there is properly understood a man's own disposition proceeding from the aid of God's grace, according to which God divides to each the grace of remission of sins and habitual grace.[1989] And perhaps in this way St. Jerome understood that passage, although not of the grace of the remission of sins, but of other gifts of charisms, and of the evangelical preaching, as he seems to have understood it. His words are: "Having called the Apostles he delivered the doctrine of the Gospel, not giving to one more and to another less by largess and parcimony, but according to the capacities of the recipients." He understands by capacities not only natural powers, but also those furnished with the gifts of grace: thus indeed he gave a greater ministry to one, namely to Peter, than to others.

Otherwise we may more easily reply, that according to the common doctrine not all the things narrated in this parable are to be applied spiritually. For in parables the individual minutiæ are not always to be understood spiritually; but one ought carefully to attend to the end of the parable, and to explain spiritually all the things which look thereto; but other things cannot always have a spiritual sense without some absurdity, as is clear from this same parable. For he who had received one talent, and had profited nothing, said: "I knew that you are a hard man, reaping where you have not sown, and gathering where you have not scattered; behold, you have what is yours." Therefore that servant, although detained in body and mouth, returned the talent whole to his lord, although he had profited nothing; which in the spiritual talent of grace does not occur: for he who does not trade, when he ought, even loses the very talent of grace. Therefore the parable regards this alone, that the Lord is going to exact an account of the talent of Christ's grace, and of creation, which he has bestowed on us liberally, just as that master exacted it of his servants. But as to the mode of dividing the talents Christ did not care, but, telling the parable, he introduced that division only so as to show that an account would be demanded.

Lastly, the Gauls noted against Augustine that he said that some are predestined by God to evil, and that not all can be saved, which is impious and is condemned in the Council of Valence under Emperor Lothair, cap. 3, and in the Second Council of Orange, cap. 25.[1990] But this the Massilians manifestly imposed upon Augustine, as he himself bears witness in the book On the Articles Falsely Imposed upon Himself, article 1; or rather Prosper, who is believed to be the author of that book, [1991] and Fulgentius, book 1, To Monimus, cap. 30; from which calumny against the Gauls Prosper himself defends Augustine in the book To the Chapters of the Gauls, to the first, fifth, and sixth doubts.[1992] And indeed in Augustine it is most certain that no one is predestined by God to sin, just as many are predestined to believe and to live justly. But what in the book On Correction and Grace, cap. 7, he says - that Judas was chosen for the work that was congruent to him, namely to

1989. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1, ad 1. St. Jerome, as cited.

1990. Council of Valence (855) under Emperor Lothair, cap. 3; Second Council of Orange (529), cap. 25.

1991. Prosper of Aquitaine, De praedestinatione sanctorum (traditionally ascribed), or the work On the Articles Falsely Imposed upon St. Augustine, art. 1.

1992. Prosper of Aquitaine, Ad capitula Gallorum, to doubts 1, 5, and 6.

shed the blood of Christ - must be understood in that manner, that is, permissively. Secondly, nowhere did Augustine teach that men are destined to punishment and penalty from eternity, unless from their fault foreseen, as we shall show in disputation 95. Thirdly, whether he said that some, because of certain sins at some period of their life, are so left destitute that then they lack sufficient help by which they may be able to avoid sins, is indeed hard among Augustine's texts, and is to be examined by us in disputation 97. It is certainly clear, however, that Augustine never said that which the Massilians imputed to him - namely, that God leaves some without help and remedy without their own fault.

Secondly, Augustine never taught that men were destined by God from eternity to punishment and torment, except on account of their foreseen fault, as we shall show in disputation 95. Thirdly, whether he said that some, on account of enormous sins, are in some period of their life so forsaken that then they lack sufficient help by which they may be able to avoid sins, is indeed hard among Augustine's texts, and is to be examined by us in disputation 97. It is certainly clear, however, that Augustine never said that which the Massilians imputed to him - namely, that God left some without help and remedy without their own fault.

Certain testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers adduced against our opinion

Some still contend, adding testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers in favor of their opinion about our predestination and grace coming in some way from us.

The first testimony is Matthew 25, from that parable of the man who, going on a journey, distributed various talents to his servants, not indeed absolutely, but (as Christ says) "to each according to his proper ability"; which parable signifies the distribution that Christ makes of his grace so that we may live rightly and trade therewith, just as that householder distributed the talents of money, having regard to the strength and capacity of each. Thus the distribution is made by the Lord with regard not only to natural powers, but also to the gifts of grace; for in that way he entrusted his ministry, namely to Peter; otherwise, if we were speaking of grace by which each is saved by predestination, some grace would be given proportionally to the recipient, which, however, is not given to all, nor distributed, except solely from the good pleasure of God. But it is easier to answer that, according to the common doctrine, not all the things done in this parable are to be applied spiritually. Nor are all its details to be taken in a minute spiritual sense; rather those things are to be heeded which, when the parable is diligently attended to, pertain spiritually to our subject; the other things cannot be explained without some extension, though they always have a spiritual sense. For as is clear from this same parable, he who had received one talent, though he had not traded and had gained nothing, said: "I knew you to be a hard man, reaping where you did not sow and gathering where you did not scatter; and behold, you have what is yours"; and he returned the talent intact to his lord, although, being reproved, he had gained nothing. Therefore that talent does not signify the spiritual grace: for he who does not trade with it, when he ought, loses the very talent of grace. The parable therefore looks only to this, that God is going to require

an account of the talents of creation which he entrusted to us to use freely, just as that master from his servants; but as to the plan of dividing talents, Christ determined nothing, for he as a narrator of the parable only intended thereby to show that an account of those things would be demanded.

The second testimony is Romans 8: "Whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be made conformable to the image of his Son." There it is said that the predestination of grace, by which we are made conformable to the Son of God, had its origin from foreknowledge; for "whom he foreknew, them he also predestined." But no foreknowledge can precede the predestination of grace unless it be of the good use of free choice; therefore from this, as from a starting-point and some disposition, we are predestined. This sense is followed by the Greek Fathers, whom we alleged in chapter 8, and according to it the context is thus ordered: for those whom God foreknew as going to use their own free choice well, he predestined that by his grace he would justify them and make them conformable in holiness of life to his Son. But that sense has already been condemned by the Church, as we showed in chapter 10 and the following of this disputation.

Others, however, interpret Paul thus: "Whom he foreknew," that is, those to whom he decreed to give his glory beforehand according to the plan by which he would not foresee their merits - these he predestined, that by his grace he might make them conformable to his Son and to the beatitude for which they, being chosen gratuitously, might be made worthy. And this interpretation is supported by the fact that Paul seems to enumerate the things in a kind of series and order, first predestination, then calling, afterward justification, and finally glorification. Since all these things in reality have this order which they are recounted to have, it follows that predestination is prior; and since foreknowledge is placed before predestination, it follows that it was prior; and yet no other foreknowledge seems able to be prior than that of the glory to which all the predestined had first been elected; therefore from that place it is rightly proved that the election to glory was prior.

But none of the approved authors and interpreters of Paul has explained that sense more suitably; for no word of Paul even slightly insinuates it. For who will say that to "foreknow" in Paul is the same as "to determine before the works to confer glory"? As for the reason of their series I answer: when Paul enumerates predestination, then calling, then justification, he does not do so because predestination is prior or something distinct from the rest, but so that he may explain in detail the things that are contained under predestination. And whether foreknowledge is prior to predestination depends on the various interpretations which we shall bring forward below. But the argument drawn from the sequence has no force, whichever of those interpretations we embrace.

For the explanation therefore of this place it must be noted that foreknowledge is used in Sacred Scripture in two ways: first, for the knowledge of approval, which indeed is predestination itself, as Augustine observed in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 18, in accord with that in Romans 11: "God has not cast away his people whom he foreknew."[1] According to this meaning the text is: those whom God by his knowledge of approval approved, he also predestined; not that it is prior to foreknow than to predestine (for it is the same), but it is a repetition after the manner of Scripture. Then, to foreknow in Scripture signifies the speculative knowledge of God, by which he knows the good and the evil that are going to be; and in this way the sense of that place can be what Anselm and Cajetan embrace there, such that the particle "and" is taken for "also," as the

interpreter of St. Cyril of Alexandria takes it in book 5 on Isaiah, chapter 66; which particle indeed must be taken so in every exposition, otherwise the whole sense cannot be rendered integral. But the sense is this: those whom God knew as going to be conformed to the image of his Son, he also predestined to be conformed. In this way both verbs, "foreknew" and "predestined," are referred to the clause "to be conformed." Then there is not a repetition, but Paul signifies that the sons of God have been known by God as going to be, and also have been predestined to be, conformed; since otherwise God foreknows many things which he does not predestine, namely sins. Thus it is not necessary that foreknowledge be prior to predestination; but even if it be later, it is quite well said: those whom he foreknew, he also predestined.

But a much clearer sense can be deduced from what precedes by context. For he had said above that the sons of God are heirs of the heavenly kingdom, if indeed they suffer with Christ, that they may be glorified with him, which is to be made conformable to him. Then, so as to show the power and merit of labors, he said: "To them that love God all things work together unto good," meaning tribulations and hardships, as St. Jerome and St. Ambrose explain. He straightway renders the reason with the words cited: "For whom he foreknew" - as his friends and beloved by his grace - "he also predestined to this, that they should suffer and be made conformable to his Son," who endured so many labors and hardships. "But whom he predestined to this, them also he called," etc. By which words he lists all the means by which he led them to this end of suffering for Christ: for he called them, then justified them, and, after the labors and hardships, he made them glorious and great; so one reads: "He glorified," or "He magnified."

The third testimony is 1 Timothy 1, where Paul says of himself: "Who was before a blasphemer and a persecutor; but I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore Paul seems to assign some cause on his part on account of which he obtained the mercy of God's grace. Some answer that Paul expressed by these words not the cause for which he was predestined by God or called in an outstanding manner, but the condition without which he would not have been called: yet how much it matters between a cause and a sine qua non condition they do not at all explain. But if we were to assign on our part any condition which in some way would precede the bestowal of first grace, from which God might take the occasion of giving grace and of predestining - that occasion, I say - so as to be more merciful to this man rather than that, then to a degree the Massilians would agree with us. For among other things they require for this end some disposition or occasion on the part of the predestined, that they may remove the acceptance of persons and not assign the distribution of grace to the will of God alone; wherefore I would by no means concede even this minimal beginning to be from us, but from the grace of God.

Now in Paul this beginning was nothing else than that he did not sin out of malice, but sinned out of ignorance; from which it resulted that he lacked some impediment, in the presence of which he would not have obtained grace. The negation therefore of the greater sin, and not the lesser sin, was the occasion and a removing cause of the impediment, such that Paul obtained mercy from God and that God predestined him. And therefore, since it is a cause removing an impediment, it ought not be called as yet a per se impetrating cause, but a condition or a sine qua non cause, which, in my judgment, is less of a beginning than the Massilians contended for: for they admitted

some positive beginning from us which would obtain grace; whereas this here is only the negation of some impediment. And indeed, if such a thing had preceded on our part, we could not infer against the Massilians, as we argued in chapter 14 of this disputation, that the grace given to us is not grace. For this beginning from us would not be sufficient for grace to be rendered in any way by way of retribution and so lose the notion and name of grace simply, and become a quasi anti-dotal gift. For to give to someone, who has sinned less, a grace which otherwise would not be given if he had a greater sin, is not properly a retribution of gratitude. Nevertheless, if such a beginning were from us, with the Apostle in Romans 9 we could not say that God made of the same lump one of us a vessel unto honor and another a vessel unto dishonor; which is absurd. For he who sinned more, namely out of malice, was a certain lump much less fit than he who sinned out of ignorance. Therefore, in order that we may refer all this difference not to the lump, that is, to us, but to the artificer alone, that is, to God, there is need to deny such a beginning to be from us; or rather, we ought to ascribe to the grace of God whatever sins we have not committed, as many more readily grant - namely, that we have no victory over sin or temptation to be attributed to us (as we shall say in I-II, question 109, article 2), and that every morally good work in us is from grace (which whether it be so, we shall discuss there); or at least that beginning, even if it be only a per accidens cause of some grace, must in everyone's judgment be attributed to the divine grace and protection through Christ, so that from us there be an equal cause of our not sinning before any grace of predestination begins in us.

Someone could object to us what lower, disputation 93, chapter 4, we shall teach from the doctrine of Augustine - namely, that some, by the mere gift of creation, are more apt to consent more easily to the grace of God; hence it happens that the mass and mixture are not the same from which God chose one into a vessel of honor, another into a vessel of dishonor. I answer that when Paul says "of the same lump," and when we also assert that the same hardness of all men existing in the mass of perdition is before God by which grace through Christ works anything in them or prohibits certain evils in them, this is always to be understood of hardness not proceeding from the natural disposition only from creation (for this is not the cause that one is called and another is not, as we shall show in the place cited), but from the evil disposition common among men through supposed good works or through lesser sins, by reason of which it is said that the mass is not the same in all nor infected in the same way. For this different disposition would not only be a cause that grace should work more in one than in another, but also why rather to one than to another first grace should be given: and it would be either a disposition, or at least a sine qua non cause. Disposition indeed - when by good works one would be better disposed, and thus the mass would be softer so as to be taken into a vessel unto honor; whereas the cause is God himself, who works opportunities, and whose counsel is lofty and of deep ordering. Augustine therefore holds that from utterly hidden merits there proceeds what God bestows - not the first grace of mercy, but the mercy of the remission of sins and the further grace which he confers after penance - many of which come forth from hidden merits and from congruous merits; not, however, from the merits of free choice alone, but rather from a gift of grace of some sort.

...indeed, when by good works one man was better disposed, and thus softer from evil, so that he would be enlightened as a vessel of honor; but as a necessary condition without which not, when he would have fewer sins of himself: for thus he would have less hardness and impediment from himself. Therefore we say that before the grace of Christ the same evils are present with respect to one's own operation, or the stain and common sin; although with respect to creation they are not the same evil, that is, the same disposition of temperament...

The fourth testimony is of St. Augustine in the book of Eighty-Three Questions, question 68, after the middle, where he says: "Here perhaps disturbed, you return to that question: 'He has mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardens. Why then does he still find fault? For who resists his will?'" To which Augustine answers in these words: "But this will of God cannot be unjust. For it comes from most hidden merits," etc.[1993] Augustine therefore concedes merits, although hidden, on account of which God has mercy on the one and chooses him for his grace, but on the other does not have mercy. By this testimony Soto, in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, chapter 9, in the digression on predestination, and Antonio of Cordova, book 1, quaest. 56, after the thirtieth opinion, said that Augustine had indeed set down what he later retracted, namely, that a cause is given of the predestination of grace and of reprobation.[1994] But these authors did not attain to Augustine's mind: for although Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 3, and in the Retractations, chapter 23, retracted what a presbyter had taught in the book of the Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, namely, that the merits of free choice are the cause of the predestination of grace, yet he nowhere retracted what he taught in that question 68; rather, in the Retractations, chapter 26, he explained it in the best sense.[1995] For when in that question he had said: "It is little to will, unless God has mercy; but God does not have mercy - he who calls to peace - unless the will has preceded: 'peace on earth to men of good will'"; by which words he seemed to concede with the Massilians some beginning from us of a good will, and most hidden merits, so that God might have mercy on us and confer grace; he explained that in this way: "This was said after penance: for there is the mercy of God even preceding the very will, which, if it were not, the will would not be prepared by the Lord; and to that mercy there pertains the very calling, which also precedes faith. About which a little later when I was treating, I said (namely, in that question 68) that this calling, whether in individual men or in peoples, and even in the whole human race, is in time dispensed."[1996]

The last testimony is from St. Bernard in the sermon On that which is read in Job: "In six tribulations," etc., where he writes thus: "For what is less in us, he himself supplies; yet that small part, whatever is ours, he does not suffer to be withheld." By which words he seems to indicate that

1993. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 68 (post medium): "Sed haec voluntas Dei iniusta esse non potest. Venit enim de occultissimis meritis..."

1994. Didacus de Soto, In epistolam ad Romanos, cap. 9, in digression on predestination; and Antonius Cordubensis, lib. 1, quaest. 56, post 30 opinionem.

1995. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, cap. 3; Retractationes, cap. 23; and see Retractationes, cap. 26, where he explains the sense.

1996. St. Augustine, Retractationes, cap. 26, expounding his words from q. 68 of the book of Eighty-Three Questions about God's mercy preceding the will and about calling which precedes faith, and about that calling being dispensed in time in individuals, peoples, and the whole human race.

we first begin with a certain small beginning, and then God by his grace supplies it, promoting it to the better. I answer that Bernard by no means wished to signify this, but assigned only the difference between the cleansing from original guilt in children and from actual guilt in adults: that original guilt in children is remitted without personal tribulation and sorrow, but actual [guilt] in adults is not blotted out without personal tribulation; in which, he says, there is something small that is ours, and the rest is supplied by God - not indeed because the grace of God is appended to our labor and free choice, as the Massilians said, but because, while it anticipates us and is conjoined to us, it makes our tribulations condign, which by ourselves alone would not be worthy. This, therefore, is that small part of our cooperation which God requires, and which he does not suffer to be withheld, that is, which he does not allow not to be offered by us. And that the aforesaid sense of the Massilians was not Bernard's is plain from that little work of his On Grace and Free Choice, where expressly against the Massilians he taught, as we reported above, chapter 9.[1997] So much thus far about the most celebrated controversy of this matter.

Disputatio XCII - Whether the predestination of the grace of God is in the power of the predestined

- Opinion of certain recent authors, Caput I.
- Predestination is not in our power, the truer opinion, Caput II.
- The arguments of the former opinion are solved, Caput ...

Caput I - Opinion of certain recent authors

To those who teach that no cause of our predestination is given by us, yet that there is some condition without which predestination would not be, whose opinion I recalled in the preceding disputation, chapter 7, some recent authors affirm that our predestination is in our power. Others indeed, who say that there is in us a condition without which that grace which is given to us would not be an effect of predestination, assert that it is in our power that that calling belong to predestination, yet not that it be conferred on us or be predestined. The former prove that predestination is in our power: first, from that of 2 Peter 1: "Wherefore, brethren, make the more effort, that by good works you make your calling and election sure; for doing these things you shall not sin ever." From which place they argue thus: unless by good works our calling were made sure, we would not be predestined; but it is in our power by good works to make our calling sure: therefore it is in our power to be predestined. Second, the first calling is not an effect of predestination except insofar as it has its effect; but that it have its effect is in our power; and therefore the whole predestination. Third, if that which is reciprocal with predestination is in our power, predestination itself will be; but perseverance in the grace of God, which is convertible with predestination, is in our power: therefore predestination itself also.

1997. St. Bernard, Sermo de eo quod legitur in Iob: "In sex tribulationibus, etc."; and his Opusculum De gratia et libero arbitrio, against the Massilians (as cited above, cap. 9).

By the same reasons later Doctors can prove that it is in our power that some calling not be an effect of common providence, but belong to predestination: because it is in our power that it be a congruous calling and efficacious, in which way it pertains to predestination. But if it were not congruous or efficacious, it would pertain only to common providence: therefore it will be in our power that that calling be an effect of predestination, although it is not in our choice that it be given to us.

Finally they add that God could have had regard to the use of free choice, which he foreknew would be, and to other circumstances of predestination, and that it was fitting that he should in such or such a mode determine to help man: nay, they think that in this way there can be reconciled the ancient Fathers who seem to have taught contrary things about predestination - the Greeks, namely Origen, St. John Chrysostom, and others - with Augustine and the Latins: so that, when the Greeks assert that we are predestined from the good use of free choice and from the merits of that use, they understand only that there is from us a condition and reason on account of which the calling of grace pertains to predestination, as has been explained; but when Augustine and others deny that predestination was from merits, or from the foreseen good use of free choice, they understand that there was from us no beginning, so that grace should be predestined and given to us, namely the calling which was going to be efficacious: which two things, in the opinion of these Scholastics, very well stand together.

Caput II - Predestination is not in our power, the truer opinion

It is no less certain that the predestination of grace and the very first grace (which is the same thing) is not in our power, than that predestination and grace itself have no cause or occasion that precedes from us. This doctrine we establish only against those former doctors; for about the manner of speaking of the others we shall say a few things afterwards. This opinion is proved, first, because of that which truly is in our power we are the cause, as Augustine in the first book of the Retractations, chapter 22, when he says that this is in our power which, when we will, we do: but of that which we do when we will we are the cause: therefore of that also which is in our power we are the cause; and hence, if predestination and its effect are in our power, it follows that we are the cause of our predestination and of its whole effect - an absurdity.

Then, when we ask whether a cause of predestination is given, or whether it is in our power, it is the same as if we were to ask whether from us there is some cause of the whole effect of predestination, or whether the whole is in our power, as was noted in the preceding disputation, chapter 1. Therefore, when they say that predestination is in our power, they either understand the whole effect of predestination, or only the complement of it: if they speak of the complement alone, that is, of perseverance and of the consent which we give to the calling of grace, we are not only a condition or a cause without which not - which seems to be only a non-resisting cause, per accidens, removing impediments - but we are also a per se cause, not total but partial: because together with God himself, the grace accompanying, we work the consent. But if from the fact that

the complement of predestination is in our power they were to say that it is also in our liberty, we could likewise affirm that we are the cause of predestination, or a co-cause, because we are truly the cause even of the complement of predestination.

But that this does not suffice for us to say any of those things, no one denies. For all admit that there is no cause of predestination unless it be a cause of the whole effect; and the same must be said of condition; and to say that it is in our power must be asserted. For if from us no cause is given, nor is it in our power that the effect of predestination begin in us, by no means will it be in our power that we be predestined.

Or the preceding opinion contends that the whole effect of predestination from the first to the last is in our power, and thus predestination itself; and this is manifestly false. For the first effect is not the consent itself and the accompanying or cooperating grace, but the first calling and the operating grace, which, without us, that is, without our consent, God works in us, as I explained in disputation 88; but this is not in our power. For this reason St. Jerome explains that saying of Jeremiah 10: "I know, O Lord, that the way of man is not in his power," against Pelagius, of any just man, in whose hand it is not to direct his steps - not because, when stirred by the grace of God, he cannot walk rightly and still give the effect of consent to it, but because it is not in his power to be called by such a grace by which he may direct his steps aright. I well see that the sense of that place of Jeremiah is otherwise; but for us now the authority of Jerome is sufficient.

In the same way Augustine, because he had said in the book against Adimantus that it is in our power to change the will for the better, later in the first book of the Retractations, chapter 22, interprets that saying thus: "This is not against the grace of God which we preach: for it is in man's power to change the will for the better; but that power is nothing unless it be given by God; and concerning it it is said: 'He gave them power to become sons of God.'" The same teaching he has in the second book of the Retractations, chapter 1, and in the book On Perseverance, chapter 8, where he most clearly teaches that this power is communicated to us by the very holy thought which is operating and preventing grace: therefore he says, "Not therefore in the power of men, but in the power of God it is, that men should have the power to become sons of God." He gives the reason: "For they receive it from him who gives to the human heart pious thoughts." Which he confirms from St. Ambrose in the book On Flight from the World, chapter 1.[1998] Therefore, since men do not have in their own power to become sons of God unless grace prevent them, and this was prepared for us by eternal predestination without us, just as also faith is given to us in us in time; it follows that these things pertain to the effect of predestination, as from the Fathers has been sufficiently proved in the preceding disputation, chapter 3; and no one can deny it. Whether indeed it be in our power to be reprobated, or not to be predestined, we shall say in disputation 95, chapter 8. Thus far remains impugned what those former doctors, in chapter 1, taught.

But regarding that which the later writers said, we cannot deny first of all that it depends upon our free choice that some calling be congruous and efficacious in us, that is, that it have its effect in us - yet not that it be given to us, nor that it be predestined in the foreknowledge of predestination,

because what is in us is without our consent, whereas for it to be congruous to us and to have effect in us cannot be without us: for the congruity and efficacy of a calling consist in this, that our will be so tempered to it and our will so agree with it that it elicit a free consent from us. Therefore, since consent is not without us, neither can the calling itself be congruous or efficacious without us: although that calling which is going to be efficacious is given and predestined to us without us, nor is there need to contend further in this matter.

I add, however, first, that not only is it to be conceded, what the later doctors concede, namely, that there is a condition or a reason on the part of our will, so that that calling be efficacious and pertain to predestination...

But not to common providence; rather, it is also a true cause on the part of free will (*liberum arbitrium*), so that that calling in us may be efficacious and congruent: for in order that it have its effect, we are not only a condition without which not; for this is only a cause per accidens, as a remover of impediments or as applying the principal cause to act; but we are also a cause per se, which they call a partial cause, as has been explained. Wherefore it lies in our power not as in a condition, but as in a cause, that some calling be congruent and efficacious. From this, however, in no way does it follow that we are the cause of our predestination, as regards all the effects, but as regards some: which cannot be denied, as is manifest from what has been said, and will be made clearer in the solution of the arguments.

Secondly, it must not be said that it was fitting and consonant to reason that God should give first grace, or predestine it, with regard to the use of free will. For either we speak of the use of free will proceeding from grace, and here there could not be a cause, condition, or any ratio of fitness on account of which God would give grace, as we shall show in chapter 6 of the preceding disputation against Alexander: therefore one cannot say that, with respect or in view of that, God predestined grace, which is the same as if we were to say that He did not have regard to that use in order to predestine grace. Or we speak of the use of bare free will, and there can be no such reason of fitness that God should give and predestine first grace; otherwise some beginning would already be on our part, which is the error of the Massilians, which is not at all moderated by him who asserts that that beginning is only of a certain fitness and congruity, and that God was not bound so that He could not do otherwise. For neither did the Massilians wish to impose upon God any obligation or necessity to bestow His grace on account of some beginning of ours, indeed some of them even affirmed that it is sometimes given without that; they only contended that at least sometimes some beginning on our part precedes, as we have shown in the preceding disputations and in 89.

Thirdly, one can rightly say that, in the predestining of thy grace and the bestowal of the same, God had knowledge of our future consent from grace. However, this was not only fitting and consonant to reason, but even necessary: because the infinite knowledge of God could not but foreknow all those future things even under condition, as was said in disputation 67; and since His

1998. St. Augustine, Retractationes, lib. 1, cap. 22; lib. 2, cap. 1; De dono perseverantiae, cap. 8; citing St. Ambrose, De fuga saeculi, cap. 1.

predestination is the preparation of grace congruent and efficacious, God, in predestining it, could not but know the effect which it was going to have in us. But on account of such a power He established or preordained nothing at all; rather, in order that we might have such a power, He Himself prepared first grace in the foreknowledge, and in time He bestowed it: for He did not call us because we were going to be holy, but that we might be so; as in that chapter 6 we noted from St. Jerome and St. Augustine.[1999]

Fourthly, it must not be said that God ordinarily predestined only those adults whom He foreknew from eternity were going to cooperate with divine grace with perseverance, as though He had predestined certain persons outside the common order whom He did not foreknow would use His grace well. For He foreknew all the predestined, as we said, with no one excepted, as going to cooperate well with His grace, although this cooperation was posterior and in no way the cause nor a condition of predestination: for God could not but foreknow what was going to be. Moreover, what the same Doctors add - that this foreknowledge of our cooperation is together, in the order of reason, in predestination, not only with the whole effect of predestination, all the way to perseverance, but even with the first effect, namely with calling - this is proved to me by no reason at all. For, as I noted above in disputation 82, chapter five, the order of reason in eternity between the acts of the divine intellect and will must be taken from the order of cause and effect among the objects: but who will deny that, in the order of cause, someone is called before he responds? therefore the predefinition of calling will be prior to that of cooperation; and hence, prior also to the foreknowledge of cooperation. I speak, however, of absolute foreknowledge, not under condition: for foreknowledge under condition precedes every absolute predefinition, as is manifest; and of absolute foreknowledge the cited Doctors speak. They contend, moreover, to confirm their opinion by many testimonies of St. Augustine, Prosper, and Fulgentius, which, in my judgment, rightly prove that the whole predestination and its complement include our cooperation - something which no one up to now has denied: but that this cooperation was at the same time foreseen with the predefinition of calling, they by no means prove: and because those things are of little moment, I deliberately pass them over.

Lastly, the way in which they strive to reconcile the Greek and Latin Fathers so that they do not oppose each other is a vain labor, as from what has been said in the preceding disputation is sufficiently clear: since in truth, as we said, St. Augustine always thought that his opinion and that of the Greeks are altogether contrary.

But whether to be reprobated, or not to be predestined, and not to be reprobated, is in our power; and whether it follows thence also that to be predestined is in our liberty, we shall say below in disputation 95, chapter 9.

Caput III - The arguments for the first opinion are solved

As to the arguments for the first opinion, to respond will not be difficult. Reply to the first: From that testimony of Peter we say, in order that the testimony have some weight, that the word "certain" must there signify firm and stable: but in this way it not only proves that predestination is in our power as in a condition without which not, but also as in a partial cause per se. For as the calling by which someone is called becomes certain, he is not only the condition, but also the cause: and thus there the discourse will not be about the whole effect of predestination, but about some complement of it, namely about consent and the efficacy of grace, which without doubt depends on our free will as on a partial cause: yet on that account neither is predestination in our power, since its first effect is not, nor is there in us any condition of it. Moreover, this exposition fits the context better: for Peter had first said: "For whoever has not these things," namely the good works which he had set forth, "is blind, groping with the hand." He then subjoins: "Wherefore, brethren, strive the more, that by good works you make certain your calling and election: for in doing these things, you will not sin at any time." But the Greek word which the interpreter here renders, "You will not sin," he renders to the Romans "They stumbled, that they might fall." Then, the sense of this place of Peter is as follows: If you have these good works at hand, you will walk with firm steps on the way of salvation, nor as blind men will you be groping with the hand, nor will you stumble, that you should fall.

There is also a twofold other sense of the same place, if that word "certain" signifies "well-known" and "noted," according to which sense the testimony cited has less difficulty in the present controversy. Another is that which St. Thomas follows, namely that by our good works we become more certain of our salvation, as far as human conjecture allows. Another, so far as concerns OEcumenius and Bede, is that by our good works we make others who look upon us to be certain of our holy calling and election. And the Greek name bebaioos signifies each: namely firm or stable, and "well-known."[2000]

Reply to the second has more fallacy than difficulty: for when it is said that first calling is not an effect of predestination except in so far as it is efficacious, a distinction must be made. Either it is said that it is an effect of predestination only for this reason, that it produces consent in us, and this is false; for even in so far as it anticipates our consent, it pertains to predestination, since as yet it does not have its effect in our will. Or it is said that only that calling falls under predestination which is so tempered for us that at length it elicits consent; and this is true; but not for this reason alone, that it cooperates in eliciting consent in us, ought it to be said to be an effect of predestination. For in calling itself, which is congruent to the will, there are two things: both that it is given to us and that it prevents us; and this effect is the first of predestination: and that it elicits consent from us; and this is already the second. Therefore, since that first one wholly anticipates

1999. See above, disputation 92, cap. 6, where he cites St. Jerome and St. Augustine.

2000. St. Thomas, on this sense; OEcumenius and Bede on the sense that by our good works we make others certain of our calling and election.

our consent and is not in our power, it will be no more in our power to be predestined than to be called. For if predestination were in our power, then all its effects would also be, from the first to the last.

Reply to the third: When there is something in our power which is in mutual correlation with something else, that thing is simply in our power, if the first was without any supposition made; but if something be supposed which does not lie under our liberty, then, even if the complement with which that thing is in mutual correlation be in our power, the other thing with which it is conjoined will not be. In this way, if someone were able to infuse a rational soul into prime matter, he would not have in his power simply to make a human being according to the whole, unless he could also make matter and the soul: so too, although it is in our power, supposing calling - which we now suppose from predestination itself - to consent, and consent is mutually conjoined with predestination, nevertheless predestination according to the whole is not simply in our power; that is, the whole effect of predestination is not in our power, because by no means does congruent calling, by which predestination begins in us, lie under our liberty. We have therefore from what has been said in this and the preceding disputation that on our part there is no cause, nor the least beginning of the predestination of grace, no occasion, and no condition without which not: nor is it in our power: wherefore we can rightly say with the Apostle in Romans 9: "It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that has mercy."

Disputatio XCIII

Which are the effects of predestination are enumerated.

Neither sin, nor the permission of it, is an effect of predestination. Cap. 2.

Justification and merits, which are impeded by mortal sin, are in a certain way effects of predestination, and in a certain way are not. Cap. 3.

Which natural goods are effects of predestination. Cap. 4.

Although above it has been proved that our predestination begins from calling, which precedes free consent, and various effects of it have hitherto been enumerated by us, nevertheless, for greater clarity we have thought it worthwhile here to gather all together into one, and also to note some that are falsely accustomed to be reckoned among them.

First indeed, Durandus in 1, dist. 41, quest. 2, num. 10 affirms that glorification, that is, beatitude, is not an effect of predestination, but the end of it: whose opinion in this matter is not to be approved. For already above, in disputation 91, chapter 4, from the doctrine of the Fathers, we have shown against him that beatitude must be counted among the effects of predestination. That which not a few try to derive from that [place] to the Romans 8, "Whom he predestined, them also he called; whom he called, them he justified; whom moreover he justified, them also he glorified."[2001]

2001. Romans 8:30.

But little can be proved from this. For St. Jerome, St. Gregory, and St. Ambrose, St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, Theodoret, and Theodulus, bishop of Coele-Syria, who is found in tome 6 of the Sacred Library, in that place understand by "glorification" not the glory of the life of beatitude, but the glory of the present life, which God has prepared for His just ones, making them sons of God. There also agrees another reading of the same Vulgate in the amended codex which has "He will magnify"; and the Greek word edoxase denotes this rather than "to make blessed"; for doxazo signifies "I celebrate, magnify, glorify," that is, "I proclaim as great and glorious": but here it is put by the Apostle to signify that God has glorified and celebrated His friends not so much with words as that in reality He has made them glorious and celebrated: which I take to mean that He did this not only by the adoption of the sons of God - for this He expressed when He said, "He justified" - but also by the sufferings and hardships endured, by which He has made His sons, now justified, more illustrious; as I noted in disputation 91, chapter 18. But with respect to the glory of beatitude, Origen and St. Augustine in book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 17, and in Sermon 17 On the Words of the Apostle, and Fulgentius, book 1 To Monimus, chapter 17, understood this place. Therefore, in order that we may prove that the glory of the other life is an effect of predestination, let those things suffice for us which we said in disputation 91, chapter 4.[2002]

Secondly, as to calling, St. Bonaventure taught that it is not an effect of predestination, but that justification begins from predestination; and therefore he concedes some cause and congruous merit of predestination, yet not from us, but from the grace of God's calling. Again, Gabriel thought - [2003]

Although it was above proved that our predestination (*praedestinatio*) begins from vocation (*vocatio*), which precedes free consent, and we have thus far enumerated its various effects; nevertheless, for the sake of greater clarity, to collect them all here into one, and also to note those which are falsely wont to be reckoned among its effects, is worth the effort.

First indeed, Durandus, In I, dist. 41, q. 2, n. 10, asserted that glorification, that is, beatitude, is not an effect of predestination, but its end. In this matter his sentence is not to be approved; for above, disputation 91, cap. 4, bringing against him the Fathers, we showed that glorification of life is to be numbered among the effects of predestination. Those who try to prove this from the Apostle's words, "And whom he predestined, them also he called; and whom he called, them also he justified; and whom he justified, them also he glorified" (Rom 8:30), prove little. For St. Jerome, St. Gregory, and St. Ambrose, St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, Theodoret, and Theodulus, bishop of Coele-Syria, who is found in tome 6 of the Sacred Library, by "glorified" understand not the beatitude of the other life, but the glory of the present, which God bestows upon his just, making them sons of God.[2004] And since another reading of the same Vulgate codex

2002. Origen; St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, lib. 1, cap. 17; Sermon 17 De verbis Apostoli; and Fulgentius, Ad Monimum, lib. 1, cap. 17.

2003. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 41, q. 2, n. 10. The list of Fathers on Romans 8:30: St. Jerome, St. Gregory, St. Ambrose, St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, Theodoret, and Theodulus, bishop of Coele-Syria (tome 6 of the Sacred Library).

2004. St. Jerome, St. Gregory, St. Ambrose, St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, Theodoret, and Theodulus, bishop of Coele-Syria (in tome 6 of the Sacred Library).

has "he will magnify," and the Greek edoxasen rather signifies "to beatify"; for doxazo means "I glorify, magnify, honor, celebrate, make renowned": here the Apostle made his friends not so much glorious in words as made them glorious in very deed. And this he did not solely by the adoption of the sons of God - for this he expressed when he said, "he justified" - but also by the sufferings they endured, by which he made his sons most illustrious, as is noted on Romans 8 and cap. 18: "But concerning the glory of the life to come, Origen, and St. Augustine in De praedestinatione sanctorum, book 1, cap. 17, and in Sermon 17 De verbis Apostoli, and Fulgentius, Ad Monimum, book 1, cap. 17, understood this passage."[2005] Therefore let us prove that the glory of life is an effect of predestination, and let those things confirm for us what we have said before.

Various effects of predestination are enumerated. Neque peccatum, neque permissionem illius esse effectum praedestinationis, cap. 2. Iustification and merits, which are impeded by mortal sin, are in a certain manner effects of predestination, in a certain manner not, cap. 3. Which natural goods are effects of predestination, cap. 4.

Nevertheless, it is most certain that predestination begins from the first vocation, which God effects in us without us, and therefore from operative, prevenient, or exciting grace (*gratia*), as, against Gabriel and St. Bonaventure, in disputation 91, cap. 3 and 5, from the doctrine of the Fathers we have abundantly proved. Nor does it at all hinder that justification is common to reprobates and to predestinates; for that which is never lost by sin is peculiar to the predestinates: therefore this at least, as St. Bonaventure taught, will be a peculiar effect of predestination; and hence Gabriel vainly thought that beatitude alone is its effect. But if justification, which is perfected by perseverance (*perseverantia*), is assigned to predestination as its peculiar effect, it follows, also against St. Bonaventure, that some vocation which is wrought in us without our consent, and without any beginning on our part preceding, likewise pertains to predestination; namely, that by which a man begins to be moved and disposed to that ultimate justification which is never to be interrupted by sin.

Moreover, that some vocation be a peculiar effect of providence and of predestination, two things are necessary. The first is, that it go along with that knowledge and cognition by which it is known as going to have its effect in us. For if God, before he decreed to confer this or that vocation, did not know what effect it would be going to produce, he should not be thought to be preventing our will by this vocation with a special grace of God rather than by another. For if God had not yet known what that vocation would be going to do in me if it were given to me, until he absolutely decreed to bestow it upon me, it follows that the will to call me by that vocation was prior to the knowledge by which he knew my consent and the effect which it was going to have in me; and thus he did not bestow a greater grace upon me by preventing me with that vocation, than upon another whom he prevented with one equally intense, or perchance more intense, in whom nevertheless it was not going to have effect: nay rather, he would have bestowed a greater grace upon him, if he had called him by a more intense one. For the greater and lesser grace of vocation would then not be taken from a greater or lesser congruity with the free choice for eliciting consent (for this,

2005. Origen; St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, book 1, chap. 17; Sermon 17 De verbis Apostoli; and Fulgentius, Ad Monimum, book 1, chap. 17.

without the knowledge of conditional truth, cannot have the nature of grace), but from the greater or lesser intensity of the vocation. And so he who is ignorant what effect the vocation is going to have in me, and does not know the congruity of it with my free choice, does me no grace from the fact that he calls with that vocation which is going to have effect. For that which is given in ignorance cannot have the nature of a gift or of grace. Wherefore Catherinus and others who deny this knowledge of conditional truth, or who say that future things are known only inasmuch as they are together present in eternity according to the thing, cannot defend a special prevenient and operative grace in one person rather than in another; but with the same intensity of vocation preserved, they ought to assert that all are equal up to consent: which, how alien it is from the doctrine of St. Augustine and from the truth, we shall show in disputation 98. But knowledge of future things under a condition has been sufficiently proved by us, disputation 67.

The second is this: that a vocation be an effect of predestination, it is required that it be so connected with the other effects unto the end of life that it have effect into glorification (*glorificatio*) itself. Whether in truth it should be so continued with the others that it be not interrupted by any sin, we shall defer to the following chapter. Wherefore, that some vocation, or the consent from it, be an effect of predestination, it need not be understood that, in the same instant according to reason, it is thus in the predestinate, or is prepared by God, that then it effect anything into beatitude (*beatitudo*), but it is enough if thereafter it be so continued with the others in reality that all the helps together work unto beatitude.

And the order of priority according to reason between cause and effect, and according to the order of things among themselves, must be assigned also in predestination itself, so that first there be understood by God the vocation prepared unto faith, then the consent and faith itself. Finally, in each several work, inasmuch as they precede justification itself in the order of causality, the same order must be observed; yet these priorities must never be assigned according to the diversity and succession of times. And we could in general reduce all the effects to two. For there are two things which grace works in us: one without us, such as are the vocations, which are graces that prevent and operate; the other with us, such as are the consents which we offer to those vocations in our several works, and this pertains to the grace that cooperates and accompanies; between which two, two instants of reason must be set because of the order of cause and effect. Then by four other principal effects these two must be divided, namely by faith, justification (*iustificatio*), perseverance, and glorification: wherefore in each of these, through various works, those same two principal ones - namely vocation and consent - must still be multiplied. Yet the instants of reason must be constituted only from the order of cause and effect between the things themselves, as was shown in disputation 81, cap. 3.

From which it is gathered what we said at the beginning, namely, that for some effect to be ascribed to predestination it is not necessary that, in the same instant in which it is predestined, it immediately have its effect upon beatitude, but it is enough if, with a series of other things, it somehow operate toward the attainment of it. Otherwise, if in that same instant it must have an immediate effect around it, we could assign a cause of predestination. For the first effect of it in us would be to persevere in grace, that is, to finish life by some last good work in grace. Now a cause of

this can be given, though not of the whole perseverance, which must be taken from the first help after justification. For by prayer made with the help of grace we can obtain from God justification, then run the course of life in the grace of justification. It must, however, be noted that the Fathers were no less solicitous about the grace that is given to the reprobate than about that which is given to the predestinate and at length works into glory itself: they were, I say, no less solicitous, so that for no grace should a cause be given on our part; for of either there is the same reason, because grace would not be grace. They only differ in this, that the grace and mercy which are given to the reprobate for some time and work before death are granted to the predestinate for some period of life up to death. Therefore God has mercy upon the predestinate until they depart from this life, but upon the reprobate only for some part of life, or in some work before death.

Caput II - Neither sin, nor its permission, is an effect of predestination

There is no Catholic who is ignorant that sin is not an effect of predestination, even if the predestinate often take occasion from it for their salvation. For since God cannot be the cause of sin, as is defined against Luther in the Council of Trent, session six, canon seven, and as we shall more at length show in the Prima Secundae, question 79, article one, it follows that God can in no way predestine sin.[2006] Not only, moreover, can sin itself, insofar as it has the notion of moral malice, not be an effect of predestination; but neither can the act itself of sin according to its natural being. For although in this way it is an effect of the divine will, which it produces in time, nevertheless among the effects of predestination it must not be numbered: for only the works of grace through Christ, as we shall say below, are to be ascribed to predestination; but that act is not a work of grace. Then, by the same reason by which permission is not an effect of predestination, as we shall presently see, the substance also of the act of sin cannot be. Furthermore, sins also according to the ratio of moral malice are objects, or matter, around which divine predestination is engaged in that way in which penance is engaged. For once sin has been committed, God prepares in his foreknowledge a vocation by which he touches the heart of man so as to convert him to penance and make him detest the sin itself.

But concerning the permission of sin not a few think that it is an effect of predestination, and they prove this in the following way. God wills and by his eternal providence decrees to permit sin, although he does not decree to do it: therefore he can will that permission in the predestinate for this end, that it may conduce to eternal life, as in fact it sometimes is wont to conduce; but whatever God wills for this end and in fact conduces to it, is an effect of predestination: therefore the permission even of sin will be an effect of it.

Moreover, that the permission of sin cannot proceed from such an intention, thus I show. For God to will the permission on account of beatitude, and that by this means he confer beatitude upon the predestinate, he ought first, in the series of things, to will the other means by which permission could conduce to eternal life. For no one wills a means which remotely brings one to will some end unless he will first that which proximately confers upon the same end; for every

2006. Council of Trent, session 6, canon 7.

means is chosen by the reason that it is useful for the end, and therefore by another it confers, and by that also it is chosen; and since the order of intention is contrary to the order of execution - namely, that is first in intention which is last in execution - and, as was noted in disputation 89, cap. 7, it comes about that the means which proximately confers upon the end, and in the execution itself stands last after the rest, is chosen earlier than the remote means. But if the permission of sin be useful for eternal life only remotely, and not except by the proximate things it conduce - nor indeed is any nearer cause of beatitude involved here than permission - then, if God wished to permit sin in predestination by a will of leading that person to eternal life, he ought first according to reason to will to give him eternal life at least by a simple act of affection, and then, by the order of intention, to predefine and will the proximate agents and causes to be employed for attaining it; and thereafter, consequent upon those two, to will to permit, in the sinner's lapse...

It is objected: Just as sometimes in reality it is wont to conduce, so too whatever God wills on account of this end, and in very deed conduces to it, is an effect of predestination; therefore even the permission of sin will be an effect of that. Moreover, that it conduces to that end is gathered from that to the Romans 8: "To those loving God all things work together unto good," according to the exposition of St. Thomas and Anselm, who say that to those loving God even sins cooperate unto good. Although therefore sin itself is not an effect of predestination, nevertheless its permission will be, which to those loving God will cooperate unto good.

It is rejected: But the opinion of these men is by no means to be approved. First, because according to St. Augustine, book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, predestination, of which we have disputed until now, is the preparation of the gifts of grace, and thus nothing falls under the effect of predestination which is not a gift of the grace of God through Christ, as we pursued in disputation 91, chapter 3 and 10; but the permission of sin is not a gift of the grace of God, rather indeed it is a negation of it; for God is then said to permit sin, when he withholds the help of congruous grace which would impede sin. Who, moreover, would say that this withholding of grace is a gift of God proceeding from the merits of Christ and his passion, even if God by his mercy should draw good out of the sin which he permitted? Therefore permission is not an effect of predestination.

Second, it is refuted: Next, even if the permission of sin were an effect of the grace of God, it could not be counted among the effects of predestination: for, in order that something be an effect of predestination, it must not only in reality conduce to beatitude, but also proceed from the will of that predefinition; yet God did not decree to permit sin with this end, namely that by its permission he might lead a man to eternal life; therefore permission is not an effect of predestination. But that an effect of predestination must be defined by such an end is manifest: because predestination is the preparation of the means of grace unto eternal life; and although the efficacious will of this end ought not to precede, as is clear from disputation 89, nevertheless it is necessary that a simple will with respect to eternal life - according to our mode of understanding - be prior, and that from it all the means which are the effects of predestination be prepared.

Furthermore I show thus that the permission of sin cannot proceed from such an intention. In order that God should will the permission on account of beatitude, and in order that by this means he should confer beatitude on the predestined, he ought also first to will other means by which permission could conduce unto eternal life. For no one wills a means which is remotely useful to some end unless he first wills that which proximally contributes to the same end: for every means is chosen under the ratio according to which it is useful to the end; therefore, if it contributes by another thing, it is also chosen by that other. And since the order of intention is contrary to the order of execution, that is, that is prior in intention which is posterior in execution, as was noted in disputation 89, chapter 7, it happens that the means which most nearly confers utility to the end, and in the execution itself is later than the rest, is chosen before the remote means. But if the permission of sin is useful unto eternal life only remotely, and conduces not except through penance - since this is occupied more closely about beatitude than permission - then, if God willed to permit sin in the predestined from a will of leading him to eternal life, he ought first according to reason to will to give him eternal life at least by a simple act of affection, and then, by the order of intention, to predefine that he should do penance and rise more cautiously from sin; and finally, in order that the predestined should obtain these two, God ought to will to permit him to fall into sin. But God did not have this order in his intention; therefore neither did he permit sin from an intention of leading someone to eternal life. But that God did not previously have in his intention the penance of the predestined rather than the permission of sin is clear, because if penance had been prior in the intention of God, God would have willed of himself and by an antecedent will - namely, not yet with any occasion offered by us, but before all our works - to call someone to penance, if indeed he had willed penance before permission and before sin itself. But by an antecedent will God did not will penance, indeed neither could he will it, but only later by a consequent will, which is after our works; therefore before he willed to permit sin, he willed the penance of no one, nor to call anyone to it.

It is confirmed by the testimony of St. John Damascene: Moreover that the calling to penance, or correction, is not of the primary intention of God and antecedent will, but of the succeeding will, St. John Damascene has clearly handed down, On the Orthodox Faith II, chapter 29, where he speaks thus: "And first, that antecedent will, or good pleasure, is said to flow from himself; but the second, the consequent will, and permission, takes its origin from our fault; and of this permission, too, there is a twofold kind: one dispensatory and having the force of instruction, which looks to our salvation; the other proceeding from despair, which tends, as we said, to the extreme and most certain penalty." By which words he said that instruction, or correction, is of the consequent will (which he also calls permission) because it already supposes our vice; he adds that to the same will pertains the penalty of sin. Therefore penance, since it is correction and instruction, cannot be of the primary intention of God, but of the secondary and consequent, which already supposes sin, and hence also supposes the permission of it. Wherefore God does not will to permit sin in order to heal, nor from an intention of penance and correction; for these would have to be primary.

It is clear, then, that it was not of the primary intention of God to heal, to redeem, and to prepare medicine; because these are not goods simply, but goods (as they say) "in the case," namely, supposing sickness and captivity; and thus they are not of the primary intention, but of the secondary.

It is confirmed by St. Cyril: The same seems to have been taught by St. Cyril, book 2 to the Empress, chapter "On that that Christ was sanctified," a little from the beginning, where with these words he said: "God founded all things, that they might be, that the things which the world brings forth might be salutary; there would not be in them a drug of death, nor the kingdom of hell upon earth. Therefore the penalty of hell, and no drug did God will to be, from himself and by his primary intention." Which about the drug of spiritual death, too, St. Cyril seems to intend; for he adds: "But by the envy of the devil death entered into the world." Therefore the remedies of sin and of spiritual death God willed by a secondary intention, after he saw that by the envy of the devil death, and sin, had entered into the world. So also only with this secondary intention did he will the drug of bodily sickness to exist, etc.[2007]

It is proved by reason: Next, the same is proved by reason. First, because if God by a primary will, and of himself, willed the penance of man, he would necessarily will sin, without which penance cannot be understood. For whoever wills something also necessarily wills those things which are essentially required for it. Thus stands sin with respect to penance, not only according to the material being and the positive entity of the act, but also according to the malice and formal aspect of sin; because insofar as it is such, we detest it. But God could not will sin; therefore neither could he predestine penance by a primary will from himself, but by a secondary will, fault already on our part being presupposed, and hence with a preceding permission of falling into it. Therefore he first willed to permit, than that by penance sin should be destroyed; wherefore neither could he permit sin for this, that he might give penance and eternal life. Nay rather, by an antecedent will from himself God would not will there to be penance and other goods which necessarily presuppose sin, because he cannot will sin itself.

Then by another reason I thus show the same. If God by an antecedent will from himself had efficaciously decreed the penance of someone, or to bring a remedy to sin, sin could not fail to follow: because, that will of bringing a remedy being supposed, it would not remain in his power "not to sin"; and since this is an antecedent necessity, it would entirely take away liberty, as we shall show in disputation 99, chapter 3. Wherefore false is their opinion who say that God first efficaciously decreed to communicate himself to creatures in the best way, that is, by the Incarnation and as a remedy for sin, and then permitted the sin of Adam with this intention, that he might bring a remedy. For it does not belong to a prudent and pious judge or physician to permit seditions and diseases with the intention of bringing remedies; for the cure of diseases ought to be of a secondary and consequent intention.

2007. St. Cyril, book 2 to the Empress, chapter "De eo quod Christus sanctificatus est" (On that that Christ was sanctified).

But against the aforesaid someone will object St. Augustine, in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 28, where he says: "God deserts somewhat, whence the proud may learn that it is not their own but his, lest the proud should be proud." Bringing however in confirmation a testimony from the First to Timothy, he subjoins: "Some are handed over to Satan, that they may learn not to blaspheme" (1 Tim 1), that is, they are permitted to fall into sin, that they may rise more cautious. More clearly, in the book On Grace and Free Will, chapter 20, after he adduces that of David, 2 Kings 16: "Let him alone, namely Semei, that he may curse, because the Lord has said to him," he subjoined: the reason is not kept back, since the Lord had in this way said to him to curse David, "that the Lord may see," he says, "my humility, and repay me good for evils." And St. Gregory, homily 21 on the Gospels, says that Peter's fall was permitted by God, that in his own person he might learn to have mercy on others; because he was to be the shepherd of others. Therefore these Fathers think that God permitted the sins of the predestined out of the intention of some correction or patience.

I answer: I say that the Fathers spoke in the usual manner, as Scripture also is wont, when it expresses the good of events which is to be an occasion of sin as if it were an end, and speaks of it as of a final cause, whereas the true good which God draws out of sin is not of his primary will, as has been proved; and rather God, sin already foregone, draws out good, than that, in order to draw out good, he should permit sin. As St. Augustine most excellently expressed it, book 1 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 17, where, when he asks why God created him whom he certainly foresaw would be evil, he answers thus in words: not because he willed the evil itself, but because, since he knew he would go to this by his own proper will, he arranged the good so that from him good might be of profit to the good; as if to say, he did not with that intention create him and permit him to fall into sin, that he might profit the good, but since he knew that he would be an adversary against the good, he decreed that his temptations should be to the profit of the good - which belongs to a secondary intention.[2008]

Moreover, they object secondly in this way: that God wills to permit sin in order to show the riches of his grace to the predestined; he does not display those out of the sins of the reprobates, nor are those the matter about which the showing-forth of the riches of God is concerned; but God shows his riches and liberality toward the predestined by the fact that, although he could deny to them congruous helps, which he denied to the reprobates, and thus he could...

But on the contrary, when the Lord had in this way said to him to curse David, "Let the Lord see," says he, "my lowliness, and repay me good for evil." And St. Gregory, Homily 21 on the Gospels, says that Peter's fall was permitted by God, in order that in his own person he might learn to have mercy on others, because he was to be the shepherd of others. Therefore, these Fathers think that God permitted from the intention of some correction or of patience.[2009]

The sins of the predestined are explained. According to the phrase of Scripture, I answer that these Fathers spoke in the common manner, as Scripture too is wont to do, which expresses the good event that is going to be the occasion of sin as if it were an end, and speaks of it as of a final

cause; whereas in truth the good which God draws from sin is not of the primary order of the will, as has been proved, and rather God, with the sin already foreseen, draws out the good, than that, in order to draw out the good, he permits the sin: as St. Augustine most aptly expressed it, De Genesi ad litteram, chapter 22, where he asks why the Devil was created by God, when he knew that by his own will he would be going to be evil, and he replies in these words: "Not that he made the evil itself, but because, though he would by his own will be going to be evil, and would harm the good, nevertheless he created him for this, that from him he might benefit the good"; as if he should say that he did not create him and permit him to fall into sin with that intention, that he might benefit the good by tempting them; but since he knew that he would be an adversary against the good, he decreed that his temptations should be to the profit of the good - which belongs to a secondary intention.[2010]

Moreover, someone objects secondly against the same point in this way. Just as God wills to permit sin for this end, that he may show forth the riches of his grace to the predestined, as we will say in Disputation, chapter 9; nor for that reason does he necessarily have to will the sin which follows upon the permission; so too God could will to permit sin with this intention, that someone might thereafter rise more cautiously and obtain everlasting life, without his willing the sin.

It is answered: the reason is different. For penance, or correction, necessarily supposes sin as the necessary matter about which it is concerned; and therefore one who wills the correction, before he sees that sin will be, must necessarily will that the sin be going to be. Wherefore, lest we assert that God wills sin, it is necessary that we say that he first saw the sin, so that thereafter he might resolve to will the penance and the correction of it. But when God permits sin in order to show the riches of his goodness, not the sin but the non-repentance, or the correction of sin - which is concerned with the sin itself as with a necessary matter - is that which is supposed; therefore, by the negation of help he shows immediately to them his riches and liberality toward them; and thus this showing-forth can be of the primary intention, without God's willing the sin, but not the penance or the correction of sin, which deals with the sin itself as with a necessary matter.

But someone may object in this way: God cannot show his riches of mercy to the vessels of mercy from the fact that he did not grant them to the reprobate, unless he first shows to the predestined the sin of the reprobate; for from that, and from no other source, will the predestined be able to gather that the congruous grace, which God granted to himself, was denied to the reprobate. But knowledge, and thanksgiving which depends upon the knowledge of sin, cannot be of the primary intention of God, just as neither can sorrow: because it necessarily supposes sin.

I answer: although the predestined in this life can only from the event of sin come to know the liberality of God toward themselves, namely that he granted to them that special grace which he denied to the reprobate, nevertheless this is per accidens by reason of the state; and thus the knowledge in this manner, and the thanksgiving arising therefrom in this life, was not of the

2008. St. Augustine, De natura et gratia, chap. 28; 1 Tim 1:20; De gratia et libero arbitrio, chap. 20; 2 Kings 16:10 - 12; St. Gregory, Hom. 21 in Evangelia.

2009. St. Gregory, Homily 21 on the Gospels.

2010. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, c. 22.

primary intention, as the argument proves. But indeed, since in the other life God shows to the blessed this special grace, not from the event of sin, but from the nature itself of grace, and from its congruity with free choice - which the intuitive knowledge will reveal to the blessed - this knowledge and the thanksgiving arising therefrom could fall under the primary intention of God: since it does not of itself and by its own nature suppose sin in any way as matter or as occasion.

From this same doctrine one may gather that the infamy which arises from sin, or bodily labor, and other penal evils, are not of the primary intention of God; and thus, when we say that a later sin is the punishment of a prior one by reason of the effect proceeding therefrom, we must not assert that it is a punishment preordained by God, even after the foreknowledge of the prior sin. For since the prior sin, God cannot will to permit the later sin with this intention, that infamy or some other labor arise from it. For these things, since they necessarily suppose the very sin, and since sin is not predetermined by God, he cannot will the infamy proceeding from it before he sees, after the permission, the later sin; which, once seen, that infamy which follows upon the sin itself pleases him, and he approves it as a punishment of the prior sin; and this is enough for it to have the nature of a punishment of the prior sin.

Caput III - How justifications and merits impeded by mortal sin are in some way effects of predestination, and in some way not

The proper sense is explained. Although the merits of eternal life and the justifications which are interrupted by mortal sin are effects of grace, nevertheless they cannot be effects of predestination, insofar as they are first decreed by God to be brought about; but insofar as, after the sin has been committed, God determines to restore all those things by some subsequent justification which is now no longer to be interrupted by sin. And the reason is manifest: because not only are all these things common to the reprobate and to the predestined, since they are granted by God to both alike; but also because the very permission of sin, by which both in the reprobate and in the predestined merits are impeded so that they do not work unto beatitude, does not take place from the intention of restoring those things again by penance. Wherefore, thus interrupted by sin, and not further continued from the intention of God together with penance, they remain without effect and outside the way, unless by another new intention God again after the sin begin to lead the sinner back to the way of salvation, and to restore to him all the goods which he lost. Then therefore God predestines this man by a special providence to his kingdom, when he restores those things which had been impeded so that they did not work unto beatitude, and quickens them again. Wherefore, up to that restoration, God made use of a certain common providence with the predestined, just as also with the reprobate.

Yet there is another reason with respect to the helps which precede justification and advance unto it, and are never interrupted: for these, although they do not work immediately unto beatitude, nevertheless, because God by his special providence always willed them to be effected and to be continued together with the others all the way to beatitude, and did not permit any impediment to be opposed to them, always pertain to that same series of special providence. But

indeed, since justification when impeded so remains outside the way of beatitude that it needs a new ordination and intention of God, by which, being restored, it may be brought back to the way; therefore, when it occurs, it does not pertain to predestination, since it has not yet been brought back into the order and special series, but it does so when it is repaired by penance.

This reason not only proves something in the opinion of those who grant only a will of simple affection with respect to the beatitude common to the reprobate and the predestined before perseverance is foreseen, but also in the opinion of those who say that some were chosen unto glory by an efficacious will before God decreed to call them, and that from that will he called them by a special providence. For although this were so, nevertheless the helps, merits, and justifications impeded by sin could not pertain to special providence, even if they proceeded from that efficacious election unto glory: because, while they are impeded by sin, the will of God cannot be continued with the other means which will afterwards be granted to the predestined after new penance. For when God permits someone to fall, he does not permit it with the intention of calling him to penance, as has been proved, but for another end, namely of showing the riches of his goodness: therefore that justification which was impeded by sin did not remain continued by the will of God with other means which will bring the predestined all the way to beatitude; but by a new intention after the permission and the sin, he is called back to the same way of beatitude. Moreover, the aforesaid reason proves much better in that opinion which grants no special will to give glory to the predestined before perseverance. For thus an interrupted justification does not proceed from a special will concerning the end, and so neither will it on that account pertain to special providence.

Next, even if we grant, as the true opinion holds, that Christ would not have come if Adam had not sinned, and thus that the grace and merits of Adam which he had in the state of innocence were not from the merit of Christ; nonetheless it is rightly defended that the whole predestination of Adam was through Christ, because his predestination, as has been proved, did not begin from the justification and merits which were given to him in that state, but from the revivification which was after the sin: wherefore those merits pertain to predestination not as given in that state, but insofar as they were restored by the merits of Christ through penance.

Caput IV - On the distinction of natural and supernatural goods, and on whether acquired moral works are effects of predestination

Among the Scholastic Doctors, especially the more recent, that distinction of things natural and supernatural is the most received. In the supernatural order they place habitual grace, the infused virtues, and their operations; but in the natural order they place the very substance of man, and also the operations of acquired moral virtue; which, insofar as they are only from the light of nature, aim at an end known by that light. Upon granting this distinction, they vary in opinion about the effects of predestination: some think that the works of acquired moral virtue, whatever they be, are not effects of predestination; thus thinks Sotus, book 1 De natura et gratia, chapter 20.

... although Adam in the state of innocence did not have [grace] from the merit of Christ, nonetheless it is rightly defended that Adam's whole predestination was through Christ, because, as has been proved, his predestination did not begin from the justification and merits which were given to him in that state, but from the vivification which was after sin. Wherefore those merits pertain to predestination not insofar as they were done in that state, but insofar as, by the merits of Christ, he was restored through penance. Indeed, in the opinion of those who say that Christ would have come otherwise even if Adam had not sinned, and that He was predestined before Adam's sin was foreseen, concerning the effects of Adam's predestination, one must think in this way: since Adam's whole predestination is to be attributed in fact to the merits of Christ, such that, from the merit of the Passion of Christ, we say it to be what it is - for it was a predestination of redemption - yet that merit was not foreseen before the sin, but afterwards; because on the occasion of that sin Christ came, at least as mortal and to suffer death, who otherwise would not have so come, nor suffered. Wherefore, from the merit of the Passion of Christ, Adam had grace and merits in the state of innocence, as St. Augustine clearly confesses in the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 11, in these words: "He (namely Adam), in those goods (namely the state of innocence), did not stand by the death of Christ." Therefore, since from the Passion of Christ he had every effect of predestination and of election unto life eternal, it follows that those merits of the state of innocence did not fall under his predestination, but under common providence.[2012]

Objicitur Some object in this way: All the effects of God's providence in men are either of predestination or of reprobation; but since those justifications and merits do not pertain to reprobation, therefore they ought to belong to predestination.

Solvitur. I answer that neither in the predestined nor in the reprobate is every effect of God's providence an effect either of predestination or of reprobation; but some effect is of common providence, even if it pertains to the grace of Christ. For since it is not in that continuous series of means to life eternal, we say it is not an effect of predestination, which is the special providence toward the predestined, although it be an effect of grace; which is manifest in the reprobate.

On whether acquired moral works and certain natural circumstances are effects of predestination

Among the Scholastic Doctors, especially the more recent, the most received is that distinction of things natural and supernatural. In the supernatural order they place habitual grace, the infused virtues, and their operations; but in the natural order of things they place the very substance (*substantia*) of man, his nature (*natura*), and the works of acquired moral virtue, which are done solely for the honest end of virtue, known by the light of natural understanding. With this distinction premised, they vary about the effects of predestination: some think that the works of acquired moral virtue, whatever they may be, are not effects of predestination; thus thinks Sotus, book 1 On Nature and Grace, chapter 20.[2013] Others on the contrary say that not only these works

2011. Sotus, De natura et gratia, lib. 1, c. 20.
2012. St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, c. 11.

are effects of predestination, but also other natural things which efficaciously conduce to eternal life: for instance, to be born in such a place, to be endowed with such a temperament of body, to have sprung from Christian parents and to have been brought up in an excellent place, and finally to have died at such a time and on such an occasion. To this they also say that various external occasions pertain, by which a man begins to be moved to penance: for example, that a funeral should occur in the street, and that someone should see before his eyes another meet with an unhappy death, and other things of that sort.

Their sentence is proved, because that is seen to be an effect of predestination which has efficacy unto beatitude itself, and in some way contributes to its attainment; but all these things conduce to beatitude; therefore they are effects of predestination.

I, however, think a distinction must be made: for some of the things enumerated can be effects of predestination and of the grace of Christ in the manner which will be explained below; others by no means. But, that these things may be better explained, first the common doctrine of St. Augustine against Pelagius, and those who were of the remnants of the Pelagians, must be presupposed, which we set forth in Disputation 89, chapters 3 and 10: namely, that the predestination of which the Fathers dispute is not any providence of God and predefinition of things, but a preparation of the gifts of grace, not of any grace whatsoever, but of the grace through Christ, which is the grace of redemption, and, as Augustine says in epistle 95, it is conferred on adults unto living rightly, and in infants it is the grace of Baptism, by which original sin is remitted. [2014] Whatever therefore is not grace through Christ in the manner we have said cannot fall under the predestination of grace. For since predestination, as Augustine says in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, differs from grace in this, that predestination is the eternal preparation of grace, but grace is itself the donation, whatever is not grace, about which he there disputes against the Pelagians and the Semipelagians, will not pertain to predestination; but there he disputes about the grace of Christ, which is given to adults for living rightly, or granted to infants for the remission of original sin.[2015]

Next it must be observed that, among the graces which God grants us for living rightly, some are external, for overcoming temptations and persevering unto the end; others are internal, namely holy and pious thoughts, by which a pious and devout affection is begotten in us. Those external graces were conceded not only by the Semipelagians, but even by Pelagius himself, and by Celestine, as we noted in Disputation 89, chapter 4, and as is gathered from epistles 90 and 95 among the letters of Augustine. They used to say that external grace is law and preaching, by which there is given to us a knowledge of what is to be done, and they judged this to suffice without the inward ministration of the Spirit moving within. Whose error is condemned by Augustine, and by the African Fathers, and by the Council of Milevis, canon 4. Wherefore, just as Pelagius conceded the external grace of preaching, so he did not deny the grace of signs, by which a man is admonished to do well. Nor indeed did Augustine and the African Fathers, disputing against

2013. Sotus, De natura et gratia, lib. 1, c. 20.
2014. St. Augustine, Epist. 95.
2015. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 10, 14.

Pelagius, ever say that external signs and preaching are not grace, but only said that this does not suffice without the Spirit moving within, and that it is not that grace which the Apostle commends to the Romans when he says that it is given without our merits, which Christians ought to confess.

With these foundations laid, I reply to the difficulty proposed. First, that all moral works which have an effect upon life eternal - either because they are a disposition to justification, albeit remote, or an occasion, or finally because they are done by a just man - are truly effects of predestination; because they are done from the grace of Christ and his Spirit moving within, as has been sufficiently proved by us in Disputation 91, chapters 14 and 15. And that many things of this sort exist I do not doubt. First, all the things that are done by a just man, since they are truly meritorious of life eternal, as is defined in the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 16, and as we shall show more fully in I-II, question 114, article 4, without doubt have an effect regarding beatitude and therefore are effects of predestination.[2016] Moreover, there are many other things by which a man obtains from God new helps of grace, as we showed likewise in Disputation 91, chapter 16. These therefore ought to be counted among the gifts of the grace of Christ, and therefore among the effects of predestination.

Second, to the grace of Christ and to predestination pertain all the external signs which God confers in order to inspire in us the spirit of holy thought; for God prepares these for those to whom it has pleased Him to give the internal inspiration: but for those to whom He did not will to give a congruent thought for living rightly and for avoiding sins, He denied even those external signs by which they would be congruently stirred up; as Augustine clearly testifies in the book On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 14, in these words: From which it appears that some have in their very natural disposition a divine limit of understanding by which they are moved to faith, if things congruent to their minds should occur, whether they hear words or see signs; and yet, if by a higher judgment of God they are not grains separated from the mass of perdition by predestination, there are not applied to them either the words or the deeds by which they would be able to believe, if they heard such things or saw them. When he says, "they would be able to believe," he understands power together with the effect, as if he said, "they would believe." For he had said earlier, "by which they are moved to faith," not, "by which they might be able to be moved." Therefore these external signs must be said to pertain to the grace of Christ and to His predestination, in such a way that we assert that they alone do not suffice, but that internal thought and inspiration are also necessary, which the Apostle commends and which the Fathers prove against Pelagius. Wherefore, together with those signs by which the help of the grace of Christ is inwardly given to us, there is not only cooperating grace, as some falsely think, but also operating and prevenient grace, as was manifestly proved in Disputation 88, chapter 8.

In this same way regarding a premature death, which happens at such a time as to deliver a just man from a sin that was to threaten him shortly thereafter, so that he finishes his life in the grace of God, it must be said that, just as by this death the perseverance of the just man is fulfilled, so also his predestination is perfected. It is therefore a gift of God through Christ, and ought to be

2016. Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16; cf. Summa theologiae I-II, q. 114, a. 4.

counted among the effects of predestination. For, as I noted in Disputation 91, chapter 13, among the graces of Christ are counted not only the helps which the Scholastics say are of the supernatural order unto the works of infused virtues, but also those which, although they are of the natural order, nonetheless conserve piety and conduce to living rightly and to persevering in grace. Nor did the Fathers distinguish between those which are of the supernatural order and those which are of the natural, but they called all these the grace of Christ, inasmuch as, as we have said, it helps us and stirs us to live rightly and to observe even the precepts of the Decalogue. The same must be said purely about the occasion and time in which someone is born, when that occasion was of such a kind: as, for instance, that an infant who dies immediately after birth is born where he can be baptized, or among those who at once baptize him; likewise about some good occasion which befalls someone that is apt to conduce to justification and to perseverance: for all these things are gifts of grace and through Christ, though external, yet not without internal inspirations and holy thoughts.

Further, among the things pertinent to predestination is not that by which we were made, but that by which, already created and brought forth, we are called and justified: about which we can say, not indeed "before we are," but "after our creation," "If God is for us, who is against us?" The same point holds in Augustine, epistle 105; for there he also unmasks the fraud whereby Pelagius, retracting his error, when he said that grace is given to us without our merits, meant the grace of creation.[2017]

Secondly, when Augustine and the other Fathers, against Pelagius and the remnants of the Pelagians, contend in this same way that grace is given without our merits and by predestination thereto, they speak of the predestination of that same grace which they prove to be given in time and without our merits. For Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, establishes in these words the difference between predestination and grace: between grace and predestination this alone is the difference, that predestination is the preparation of grace, but grace is itself the donation; and in the same book, chapter 14, he says likewise, that the predestination of God is, as it were, prior within us - that is, the preparation; but grace is the gift itself prepared.[2015]

Thirdly, I show that those things which pertain to the natural constitution and temperament of man by no means ought to be referred either among the effects of predestination or among the effects of the grace of Christ which the Fathers defend against Pelagius; but rather they must be referred to the gift of creation; for, as the African Fathers handed down together with Augustine, first Pelagius fraudulently retracted his error in the Council of Palestine, when he said that the grace of Christ is given without merits, he was covertly understanding that by "grace" was meant creation itself, which is common to all, or the other gifts of nature. Wherefore the African Fathers, in their letters and councils, reproved this, and declared that the grace of Christ, which is given without merits, is that by which we are justified, helped, and stirred unto good works beyond the condition of nature - grace through Christ the Redeemer, and not the gifts of creation.

2017. St. Augustine, Epist. 105.
2015. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 10, 14.

But if someone should be set free a little later, with death imminent for him, so that he finish his life in the grace of God, it must be said that by this death, just as perseverance in righteousness is completed, so also his predestination is perfected. Therefore it is a gift of God through Christ and must be counted among the effects of predestination. For, as I noted in disputation 91, chapter 13, among the graces of Christ there are computed not only the helps which the Schoolmen say are of the supernatural order for the works of infused virtues, but also those which, although they are of the natural order, nevertheless contribute to piety, to living rightly, and to persevering in grace. Nor in truth did the Fathers distinguish between those things which are of the supernatural order and those which are natural, but they called everything "the grace of Christ" which, as we said, helps us and stirs us up to live rightly and to keep even the precepts of the Decalogue. The same, I think, must be said of the occasion and the time in which someone is born, when it was an occasion of salvation: as that an infant who is going to die immediately after birth is born near a font where he can be baptized, or among those who will at once baptize him. The same must be said of someone's good upbringing, which effectively conduces to justification and perseverance: for all these are gifts of grace, and through Christ, though external, not in the way that inspirations and holy thoughts are.

Thirdly and finally, those things which pertain to the natural constitution and temperament must by no means be referred either among the effects of predestination, or among the effects of the grace of Christ which the Fathers defended against Pelagius: although they do pertain to the gift of creation, for which also we ought to give thanks to God. The African Fathers taught this to us expressly, first of all, with St. Augustine, Epistle 95, before the middle: for when Pelagius, fraudulently retracting his opinion in the Council of Palestine, had asserted that the grace of Christ is given without merits, understanding by "grace" the grace of creation, which precedes all merits, the African Fathers in that epistle and in Epistle 90 showed that it is not enough if he admitted this grace, but that another altogether distinct one must of necessity be conceded. They say therefore: "And although in a certain not-to-be-disapproved way of speaking, that by which we are created is called the grace of God, because it is bestowed not by the merits of any preceding works but by the gratuitous bounty of God; nevertheless there is another, by which, being predestined, we are called, justified, glorified, so that we can say, If God is for us, who is against us?" Therefore, in the mind of the Fathers, the grace of predestination is not that by which we were constituted, but that by which, being already created and produced, we are called and justified; of which we can say, not indeed "before we are," but after creation, "If God is for us, who is against us?" The same is had in St. Augustine, Epistle 105; for there he also uncovers the fraud whereby Pelagius, retracting his error, said that grace is given to us without our merits, understanding the grace of creation.[2018]

It is proved, second, that when St. Augustine and the other Fathers against Pelagius and the remnants of the Pelagians in the same way contend that grace is given without our merits and is predestined without them, they speak of the predestination of that same grace which they prove in time to be given even without our merits. For St. Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, establishes the difference between predestination and grace in these words:

2018. St. Augustine, Epistula 95; Epistula 90; Epistula 105.

"Between grace and predestination this alone is the difference, that predestination is the preparation of grace, but grace itself is now the donation." And in the same book, chapter 14, he says: "Wherefore the predestination of God, which is unto good, is grace, I have said, preparation; but grace is the effect of that very predestination." He is speaking, however, about the grace which, against Pelagius, he was proving to be given without merits. But if our predestination began from the gift of creation - whether that be the common creation, or the peculiar one by which someone is endowed by God with an excellent natural disposition - then Pelagius and the remnants of the Pelagians would easily agree with the Fathers, conceding that there is no merit at all on our part of the whole of grace and predestination; because everything would begin from the gift of creation, before which there was no merit in us. Thus indeed some of the Pelagian remnants, because they fled to this grace of creation in order to concede grace without merits, used to maintain, as we noted in disputation 89, chapter f. Why therefore did the African Fathers in the cited epistles and St. Augustine in Epistle 105 not admit that retractation of Pelagius concerning grace without merits granted in the Council of Palestine? Since therefore those Fathers desire that a new and other grace above the gift of creation be conceded by Pelagius, and say that this is predestined by God without merits, by no means do they comprehend the gift of creation under this predestination.[2019]

Third, if the gift of creation were an effect of predestination, it ought to be the first and the foundation of the others: wherefore, those who would say that for this there is given neither cause nor merit on our part, even if they asserted that there is given a cause of the first gratuitous vocation to justification, would not on that account be compelled to concede that there is given a cause of predestination. For in order that on our part there be a cause of predestination, there must also be a cause of the first effect; but if the first effect is not a cause, even if there be granted a cause of another, we cannot be said to be the cause of our predestination. For on every opinion we are in some way the cause of the plurality of effects, as of the increase of grace, of perseverance, of consent, and of any second grace which we obtain from some prior one; nevertheless, we are not therefore said to be the cause that we are predestined, because we are not the cause of the first effect. Thus then Pelagius and the Semipelagians would not be compelled to concede a cause of predestination: rather, taking refuge in the grace of creation, they used to deny a cause in any meritorious way on our part. But since St. Augustine was speaking against them about the predestination of grace through Christ, which is distinct from the gift of creation, for that reason, outside the effects of that, the constitution and natural production of the predestined must be referred. For this reason also Peter the Deacon, in the book On the Incarnation, chapter 8, anathematizes the books of Faustus and pronounces them to have been written against the sentence of Sts. Augustine and Celestine on predestination. Because he subjected grace to human labor, as we noted in disputation 91, chapter n., namely, supposing the question to have been with St. Augustine about the predestination of grace, whether it were given in time from some beginning on our part and predestined in eternity: but if predestination began from creation, in no way would Faustus have said that grace is joined to human labor and that predestination proceeds from that.[2020]

2019. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 10, 14; cf. Disputatio 89, cap. f.

Fourth, if natural disposition were an effect of predestination, it was necessary that it itself be the cause, or occasion, of the other gifts which are conferred on us from the merits of Christ. For if it is in no way a cause, it will not be connected with the other effects of predestination, nor will it establish any order with them; but it will be only the subject of predestination, to which the whole series of graces, and consequently the whole predestination, will come from the free will of God without any other occasion. Moreover, that a good disposition is in no way a cause, or a consideration, in regard to which looking God predestines the gifts of his grace, no Catholic denies, nor did the Massilians dare to deny it. For God does not therefore call someone by his grace because he sees him endowed with a good wit, since he leaves many of this sort, while he predestines others of a very bad disposition to be called in a fitting way; which St. Augustine declares in the first book to Simplicianus, near the end, in these words expressed: "For I have nothing which I can look to in those chosen unto saving grace, if I press my thoughts to the examination of this choice, except either greater talent, or fewer sins, or virtues - let us add also, if you please, uprightness and useful learning." And a little after: "But when I shall have set this down, he will laugh me to scorn, who chose the weak things of the world that he might confound the strong, and the foolish things of the world that he might confound the wise; so that, looking back in shame, corrected, I may laugh at many, and that some are chaster than certain sinners (behold a good disposition toward virtue), and that some are orators above certain sinners (behold good natural talent). Yet God had no consideration of either," as St. Augustine attests there.[2021]

We cannot indeed deny what he learnedly teaches in the book On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 14: namely, that some, by a certain acuteness of wit from the gift of creation itself, would have the power that, if they should see miracles or should hear words which others, seeing and hearing, do not believe nor are converted, they would without doubt believe and be converted. Nevertheless, to those to whom it is granted to see the miracles or to hear words of this sort, and in whose presence God inwardly touches their hearts, this is granted not because they are endowed with the best disposition, but by the sole mercy of God. Wherefore, although a good natural talent is more easily moved by the grace of God, nevertheless it is never the cause why someone is called by a congruent thought. And consequently the predestination of grace does not take its beginning from the gift of creation, but from the very gratuitous vocation. And to many who are strong in such a talent those miracles are not granted; because, as St. Augustine says, they are not separated, for the predestination of grace, from the mass of perdition, that is, because the interior and congruent calling, which otherwise would be born from those miracles, has not been predestined for them by God. And universally there is no one of so dull a wit and so depraved a nature who is in possession of reason who cannot see such miracles and hear words by which he might be congruently moved. For neither was there lacking to God a means by which, if he wished, he might have converted Esau; but he knew many means, of which he willed to apply none, as St. Augustine notes in the book to Simplicianus, question 3, after the middle. Finally, every predestined person

2020. Petrus Diaconus, De incarnatione, c. 8; cf. Disputatio 91, cap. n.; Faustus of Riez.

2021. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1 (near the end); De bono perseverantiae, c. 14; Ad Simplicianum, q. 3 (post medium).

was fittingly called by that which God knew to be fit for him, that he might be moved, as in that question St. Augustine says; yet for that reason we do not say that the quality of wit and of creation pertains to predestination.

From what has been said it is gathered that it is not an error of the Semipelagians to concede a natural disposition from ourselves, or from a good natural endowment, not indeed for obtaining grace, but that grace, bestowed out of mercy, might work more easily in us: for thus neither the beginning nor even a remote occasion, or per accidens, is conceded to grace. But those who say that there is given from us a disposition for grace - whether they call it remote, or per accidens, and only removing impediments - I do not know in what way they can defend it. For a disposition for grace is so called because it precedes the obtaining of grace: but if such were given from us, there would already be some beginning of grace from us; we should therefore fall into the absurdities which in disputation 91 we were inferring. Therefore there is given from our creation some disposition such that grace, which was bestowed upon us gratuitously and without any occasion on our part, might work more easily in us, because it is more fitted to our free choice; not, however, such that grace is given to us.

What order, moreover, is to be assigned between the will of creating man and of justifying and glorifying him, is plain from those things which I said in disputation 82, according to which the prior should be the will of producing man, and then of calling him, although at the same time God had the intention of glorifying him by a simple affect of complacency. Whence it follows that predestination, which begins from calling, is later than the very will of creating man.

Lastly, St. Augustine, Epistle 105, uncovering also the fraud of Pelagius, who in the Council of Palestine had said that grace is given to us without our merits, understanding the grace of creation, says in these words: "Let this deceit be cast away from the hearts of Christians. For assuredly it is not that grace which the Apostle commends, by which we were created so that we might be men; but that by which we were justified, so that we might be just men. For this is indeed 'by Jesus Christ our Lord.' For Christ did not die for none, that men might be created, but for the ungodly, that they might be justified." He understands indeed the grace of justification to be faith, as he immediately explains, because by that we are moved unto justification. This, therefore, he says is the grace which Christ merited for us by his passion, not the grace of creation; and yet Christ by his passion is the cause of our whole predestination from the first effect; otherwise he would not be the cause of the whole. Therefore the gift of creation does not pertain to the grace of predestination. And although we cannot deny that some men by the merit of Christ were not only begotten, but also endowed with a good wit and disposition - those, namely, who were given by God in answer to the prayers of the faithful, as Francis of Paola and other Saints - so that in these the gift of creation pertains to the grace of Christ; nevertheless that it is not an effect of predestination can be proved by that last reason. Wherefore, besides beatitude itself, the gift of predestination is solely the Spirit, who is supplied to us for living rightly through holy thoughts and inspirations, and all the other external helps which contribute to the same effect, as has already been explained.[2022]

2022. St. Augustine, Epistula 105; cf. Disputationes 82; 91.

Articulus VIII - Whether predestination can be helped by the prayers of the saints

It proceeds thus. It seems that predestination cannot be helped by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal is impeded by something temporal. And consequently a temporal thing cannot help to the end that something eternal be. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot help to the end that someone be predestined. Therefore predestination is not helped by the prayers of the saints.

Further. Just as nothing needs counsel except because of a defect of knowledge, so nothing needs aid except because of a defect of power. But neither of these befits God predestining. Whence it is said in Romans 11: "Who has helped the Spirit of the Lord? or who has been his counselor?" Therefore predestination is not helped by the prayers of the saints.

Further. It belongs to the same thing to be helped and to be impeded. But predestination cannot be impeded. Therefore it cannot be helped by anything.

But on the contrary is what is said in Genesis 25, that Isaac prayed to God for his wife Rebecca, and God gave conception to Rebecca. From that conception Jacob was born,

But on the contrary: what is said in Genesis 25, that Isaac prayed to God for his wife Rebecca, and God gave conception to Rebecca. From that conception Jacob was born, who was predestined. But predestination would not have been fulfilled, if he had not been born. Therefore predestination is helped by the prayers of the saints.

I answer that concerning this question there have been diverse errors. For some, attending to the certainty of the divine predestination, said that prayers are superfluous, or whatever else is done to obtain eternal salvation: because, whether these things be done or not done, the predestined obtain it, the reprobate do not obtain it. But against this are all the admonitions of Sacred Scripture exhorting to prayer and to other good works. Others, indeed, said that by prayers the divine predestination is changed. And this is said to have been the opinion of the Egyptians, who posited the divine ordination, which they called fate, to be able to be impeded by certain sacrifices and prayers. But against this too is the authority of Sacred Scripture. For it is said in 1 Kings 15: "Moreover the triumpher of Israel will not spare, nor be bent by repentance." And in Romans 11 it is said that "the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance." Therefore one must speak otherwise, that in predestination two things are to be considered, namely the very divine preordination, and its effect. As to the first, in no way is predestination helped by the prayers of the saints. For it is not by the prayers of the saints that someone is predestined by God. But as to the second, predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints and by other good works: because providence (of which predestination is a part) does not draw away secondary causes, but so provides effects that the order also of secondary causes is subject to providence. Thus, as natural effects are so provided for that natural causes also are ordained to those natural effects, without which those effects would not come about; so too the salvation of someone is predestined by God in such wise that whatever promotes a man to salvation, whether his own prayers or those of others, or other good things, or anything of this sort, without which a man would not obtain salvation, falls under the order of predestination. Whence the predestined should

strive to act well and to pray: because by such things the effect of predestination is fulfilled with certainty. Wherefore it is said in 2 Peter 1: "Strive that by good works you may make sure your calling and election."

Reply to the first: That reasoning shows that predestination is not helped by the prayers of the saints as regards the very preordination.

Reply to the second: Someone is said to be helped by another in two ways. In one way, insofar as he receives power from him; and thus to be helped is a mark of weakness; whence this does not befit God, and so that saying is to be understood, "Who has helped the Spirit of the Lord?" In another way someone is said to be helped by another, by whom he carries out his own operation, just as a master by a minister. And in this way God is helped by us, insofar as we carry out his ordination, according to 1 Corinthians 3: "For we are God's helpers." Nor is this on account of a defect of divine power, but because he uses intermediate causes that the beauty of order may be preserved in things, and that he may also communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.

Reply to the third: Secondary causes cannot go out of the order of the first universal cause, as was said above, but they carry it out. And therefore predestination can be helped through creatures, but not impeded.

Explication of the article. After the fifth article it seemed worthwhile to us to interpret the eighth, that first we might treat all the things that are proper to predestination, then the things that pertain to reprobation, finally the things that are in some way common to both, according to the order assigned by us at the beginning of this question.

Conclusion. Therefore the conclusion of this article is: As far as concerns the divine preordination, predestination cannot be helped by the prayers and works of the saints; yet it can, as far as concerns its effects. With the two errors exploded which St. Thomas reports in the text, he distinguishes the things which are in predestination, just as he had distinguished in article 5: for one is the eternal act of God, which is the same as his essence, and the other things are the effects of predestination. He says, therefore, that what is eternal is not helped by the prayers either of the predestined himself or of another; just as also he had said in article 5 that no cause of it is given. But the effects of predestination can be helped. He proves it, because God's providence has willed many effects of predestination to be by means of secondary causes: for by the prayer of the predestined himself he willed that certain gifts be conferred, and his merits increased. Therefore predestination is helped by the prayers of the predestined, insofar as the whole effect of predestination is completed by the prayer of the predestined. But as to the beginning, he says, it is in no way helped by the prayers of the predestined himself: for it is certain that the prayers of the predestined contribute nothing to the inception of the effect of predestination in himself, as from those things which we said in Disputation 91, chapter 17, is clear. But about the prayers of someone else, by which the predestination of another is helped, St. Thomas teaches that they fall under the order of that predestination, just like all the other things that promote the salvation of the predestined. And since the same reason holds of the prayers of Christ, if they are referred to our

predestination, about both at once there will immediately be the same controversy. For, as regards the prayers of the predestined himself, how they confer upon his predestination, we have said enough in the place cited by us.

Disputatio XCIV - Whether the merit and the prayers of Christ, or of some Saint, have merited our predestination and election

Caput I - Various opinions of the Scholastics

There are some Scholastics not of mean name, who so extol the liberality of divine predestination that they think there is no meritorious cause, nor impetratory cause, of it, not only on the part of the predestined, but even on the part of another; but they assert that such a benefit is to be referred to the will of God alone. The various ways of speaking of these we shall report in this chapter.

First, therefore, Adam, in the Commentaries on the Epistle to the Ephesians, on that of chapter 1, "As he chose us in him," holds that our predestination and election were not made from the merits of Christ, but that these two benefits are to be referred to the liberality of God alone. He adduces no reason for this opinion; but perhaps it is this, that this author thinks that faith and the other dispositions for justification are granted to us not from the merits of Christ, but from the will of God alone. Thus he teaches on Philippians, chapter 1, toward the end, and on that of 2 Peter, chapter 1, "In the justice of God"; which opinion Capreolus had previously handed down, in 3, distinction 18, the only question, numbers 2 - 3, to the arguments of Scotus against the fourth conclusion; Ferrariense, the fourth against the Gentiles; Driedo, On the Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race, tractate 2, chapter 2, part 3, section 2, article 4, to the first objection; and in tractate 4, chapter 2, page 8, member 3; which Ruard also indicated.[2023]

Again, he objects, when he asserts that Christ sufficiently merited for us the remission of sins, but that an equal application of his merits is not made to us, this in part proceeds from our free will, in part truly from divine election; and into this opinion he cites Capreolus and Driedo. Therefore he seems to hold that, in order that the merits of Christ be applied to us, there is needed in us some prior disposition, which is not from the merits of Christ, because of which they are applied to us: and if he thinks that this is from free will alone, he thinks with the Massilians; but if from the help of grace, he must grant that that grace was not from the merits of Christ. From which doctrine the opinion of Adam, alleged above, is rightly gathered; and with it the other authors cited ought to consent: since, if for us faith and other dispositions which precede justification are not from the merits of Christ, and these pertain to predestination, as in Disputation 91, chapter ... against St. Bonaventure was sufficiently proved, it follows that predestination began in us before

2023. John Capreolus, In III Sent., d. 18, q. unica, nn. 2 - 3, ad argumenta contra Scotum, concl. 4; Franciscus de Ferrara, Contra gentiles, IV, contra gent.; Johannes Driedo, De captivitate et redemptione generis humani, tract. 2, c. 2, p. 3, sect. 2, a. 4, ad 1 ob.; idem, tract. 4, c. 2, p. 8, memb. 3; Ruard Tapper, loci indicati.

the merits of Christ were applied to us. But if the merits of Christ were not the cause of the first effect of our predestination, they cannot be said to be the cause of predestination itself, since in predestination there was no place for any merit of Christ, or of another saint.

The second opinion is of certain moderns, who, although they grant that the merit of Christ was the cause of predestination and of the love with which God predestined and loved us, nevertheless affirm that it was not the cause of our election. For between love and election they establish this difference, with St. Thomas in this question, article 4: that what belongs to love is only that God wills some good to someone without comparison and without a setting of him before another; but to election, since it is a choice among two or more, there pertains a reference also to others. Hence they say that the merit of Christ was the cause of the love with which God loved us; yet it was not the cause that he should love this one rather than that one. For this, they say, necessarily had its cause in this, that some were drawn out of the shipwreck of perdition, while others remained in the same; but Christ was not the cause that some should be drawn out and others remain; therefore neither was he the cause of that election which draws some out.

With Adam and Driedo agrees Francis Sonnius, book 4 of the Demonstration of the Gospel, tractate 3, who, treating of the passion of Christ, chapter 9, proves this very thing by another reason which he also thinks Adam insinuates: namely, that if Christ merited for us our predestination, it would be necessary that he merited every effect of it; but he could not merit every effect of it, since among the effects of our predestination are counted the incarnation, passion, and merits of Christ; therefore Christ could not have merited our predestination. To this argument some also are led; and on that account they also affirm, with Cajetan in 1, question 23, article 4, reply to the fourth, although they interpret the first opinion otherwise, that Christ could not merit for someone his predestination; since the order and merit, so far as they are effects of inferior predestination, if anything of this sort can be made plausible, follow secondarily: for whatever comes about in anyone is brought about by virtue of an interior gift of the Spirit of grace; but exterior helps are effects placed under predestination: therefore from the prayer either of himself or of another, by the power of that Spirit, the predestined obtains the effects of his predestination to be conferred; and for this also a peculiar kindness is to be ascribed to God. Moreover, Christ cannot merit our predestination; it is proved thirdly thus: that which is temporal and created cannot be the cause of what is eternal and uncreated; but the merits of Christ are temporal and created; our predestination, however, is eternal and uncreated; therefore the merits of Christ cannot be the cause of it. Fourthly it is proved: God in his providence uses no medium, but by himself immediately produces causes, although for the execution he uses secondary causes; therefore predestination is not caused through the merits of Christ, but by God himself proximate as cause.

They confirm this by the words of Scripture: John 17: "Father, I have manifested your name to the men whom you have given me out of the world; they were yours, and you have given them to me," which place Abulensis explains; and the Bishop of Hispalis also takes it in the sense that those are they whom God by his eternal election gave to the Son.[2024] In this same sense Paul uses that of

Hebrews 2: "Behold I and the children whom God has given me"; and in Ephesians he says: "He chose us in him before the foundation of the world," and "according to the purpose of his will"; by which he wished to show that the blessing depends on God alone, not on the merits of Christ, and that our election does not hang on the merits of Christ, but rests in the sole good pleasure of God. [2025]

To this there seems also to pertain that saying of Matthew 20: "To sit at my right or at my left is not mine to give to you, but for whom it has been prepared by my Father"; and that of Ephesians 1: "In whom also (that is, in Christ) we have been called by lot." For he says that we have been called "by lot" so as to show that from no merits was this election made. These reasons and testimonies, if they have any weight, prove not only that the election unto glory was not made from the merits of Christ, but neither the election unto grace.

The third opinion is that of Scotus in III, dist. 19, q. 1, n. in fine: who disposes in this order the steps of reason in God's foreknowledge and providence. First, he says, God understood himself; second, he understood all creatures; third, he preordained some to glory and grace, about others he bore himself negatively; fourth, he saw them to fall in the first parent; fifth, he provided them a remedy through the passion of Christ. From which series and order it follows that no one was predestined from the merits of Christ. For although Scotus teaches that Christ was the first of all the predestined, before the foresight of Adam's sin; nevertheless he asserts that the merits of Christ with respect to men were ordered after the foresight of the sin of the first parent, and thus after their predestination; and therefore, although in the execution the merit of Christ was the cause of every effect of predestination, yet it was not a cause in the intention, that men should be chosen and predestined. This opinion Almainus seems to embrace in the same Distinction 19, q. 1, after the fourth conclusion; and Maior the Master in q. 1, in the third argument: and some confirmation can be gathered for it from the reasons set out above. These were the various opinions which in this controversy seem less probable, which it is not necessary to refute one by one in this chapter: for in what follows, when we confirm the truer opinion of the theologians, we shall show the falsity of them all.

Caput II - That the merit of Christ was the cause of our predestination and election is proved by authority

The ancient opinion of theologians, which I judge to be Catholic, is this: that Christ not only merited for us that we should be loved by God and predestined by grace unto his glory, but also that we should be chosen out of the mass of perdition by the election of grace; about the election indeed unto glory we shall say something in the following chapter. This opinion about the election of grace and predestination must be proved for us in this chapter by authority alone: for in the following it will be confirmed by reason.

2024. John 17:6; see Alonso Tostado (Abulensis), ad loc.; and Isidore of Seville (or the Archbishop of Seville) as cited.
2025. Hebrews 2:13; Ephesians 1:4 - 5.

First, indeed, among the Scholastics many and the more notable have expressly taught it, when they affirm that the predestination of Christ is the cause of our predestination. Thus teaches St. Thomas in III, q. 4; Cajetan, and the more recent Thomists on that article; Alexander of Hales III, q. 4, mem. 5; St. Bonaventure in III, dist. 1, pars 1, a. 1, q. 3; Albert the Great, dist. 10, a. ult.; Richard, dist. 4, q. ult.; Durandus, q. 3; Paludanus, dist. 1, q. 2, concl. 2 and 3.[2026] They preface, however, a certain distinction in this way. Either predestination is taken for the act itself in the mind of God, or for its effect. If for the act in the mind of God, they say the predestination of Christ was not the cause of our predestination, because in God there was one and the same act of both predestinations; but if it be taken for the effect, they assert that the predestination of Christ was the cause of ours, because Christ himself was the cause of all the graces which God predestined for us, which they think sufficient for the predestination of Christ to be called our cause. For, as we noted in Disputation 91, chapter 1, when we seek the cause of predestination, we do not seek the cause of the divine act itself, but the cause of the graces which God predestined. The same opinion Gabriel follows, without any distinction premised, in III, dist. 19, q. 2, after the fourth conclusion, where he expressly refutes the opinion of Scotus.[2026]

As to the election of grace from the mass of perdition, the aforesaid Doctors assert nothing expressly; nevertheless, in my judgment I think it has the same reason as predestination. Moreover, the same opinion not only as to our predestination, but also as to election, is followed by Vega, book 4, on the Council of Trent, chapter 5, at the end; Viguerius in his Institutions of Theology, chapter 20, section 8, verse 3, near the end; Catherinus, book 1 On the remarkable predestination of Christ toward the end, and book 2 at the beginning; and Gaspar Caffalius, book 1 On fourfold justice, chapter 4, topic 1: although this author not only thinks that Christ was the meritorious cause of our election and predestination on the part of the effect, but even of the uncreated act in the mind of God, which some more recent authors follow; by what reason this is false we will show below.[2027]

But let us confirm this opinion by testimonies of Scripture first of all. The first testimony is Ephesians 1, where it is said: "He chose us in him (that is, in Christ) before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy." Where Paul uses the name "election," which is the separation from that mass of perdition in which many are left, there is no reason why we should deny that our election was from the merits of Christ, not only insofar as love and predestination are spoken of, but also insofar as it is called election. For indeed we are said by Paul not only to be loved and predestined in Christ, but also to be elected.

2026. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 4; Thomas de Vio (Cajetan), in eundem art.; Alexander of Hales, III, q. 4, mem. 5; St. Bonaventure, In III Sent., dist. 1, pars 1, a. 1, q. 3; Albert the Great, In III Sent., dist. 10, a. ult.; Richard of St. Victor, dist. 4, q. ult.; Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In III Sent., q. 3; Peter of Palude (Paludanus), In III Sent., dist. 1, q. 2, concl. 2 - 3; and Gabriel Biel, In III Sent., dist. 19, q. 2, post 4 concl., expressly refuting Scotus.

2026. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 4; Thomas de Vio (Cajetan), in eundem art.; Alexander of Hales, III, q. 4, mem. 5; St. Bonaventure, In III Sent., dist. 1, pars 1, a. 1, q. 3; Albert the Great, In III Sent., dist. 10, a. ult.; Richard of St. Victor, dist. 4, q. ult.; Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In III Sent., q. 3; Peter of Palude (Paludanus), In III Sent., dist. 1, q. 2, concl. 2 - 3; and Gabriel Biel, In III Sent., dist. 19, q. 2, post 4 concl., expressly refuting Scotus.

2027. Didacus de Vega, Lib. 4 in Concilium Tridentinum, c. 5, in fine; Viguerius, Institutiones Theologicae, c. 20, § 8, vers. 3, circa finem; St. Ambrose Catharinus, De eximia praedestinatione Christi, lib. 1 ad finem, et lib. 2 in principio; Gaspar Caffalius, De quadripartita iustitia, lib. 1, c. 4, t. 1.

However, Adamus, who defends the opposite opinion, judges that the particle "in" does not in that place signify a meritorious cause, but he applies a double other sense. One is that we may be said to be elected in him, just as also we are said to be in him founded or created: then indeed the particle "in" signifies a true efficient cause, but is referred to the divinity of Christ. Another sense is: he chose us to have faith in Christ.

This author is mistaken, however; and he attempts to defend by false interpretations, contrary to the sense of the ancient Fathers, an opinion less probable, indeed rash. For all the Greeks, with St. John Chrysostom, plainly teach that the particle "in" (in Greek en) signifies in that place a cause, and is put for the particle dia, that is, "through." The same sense is followed among the Latins by St. Ambrose and St. Thomas. Wherefore Adamus vainly interprets that we were elected so that we might believe in Christ.

Moreover, it is frequent in Scripture, and in the selfsame chapter quite continuously, that the particle "in" signifies "through," as when we say "in Christ," it is the same as "through Christ." Thus all understand that statement of the same chapter: "He graced us in his beloved Son," and again: "In whom we have redemption," and below: "In whom also we have been called by lot." Also in Ephesians 2 we are said to be "created in good works in Christ"; and in 2 Timothy 1: "But according to the grace which was given to us in Christ Jesus"; and the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 16, calls works "done in Christ," which were done by his grace.[2028]

Nor indeed do the aforesaid Greek Fathers interpret that "He chose us in him" in this way, namely by the cause of faith which was to be had in him. For, when a little before they explain that, "With every blessing in Christ," they openly said that Christ was the mediator through whom God blessed us with every blessing; and, therefore, when Paul says "He chose us in him," it is just as if he were to say: through the same one through whom he blessed us, through that same one he chose us. Photius expressed this most clearly, as cited by Oecumenius, explaining that "With every blessing," in these words: "He blessed through the Son, he chose through the Son, he made us beloved through the Son."[2029] But if the particle "in" denotes a cause and is put for "through," it is necessary that that cause be referred to Christ according to his humanity, not according to his divinity; and hence it follows that, in Paul's mind, the merit of Christ was the cause of our election. Thus the cited Fathers refer this to the humanity, when they say that Christ is the mediator of our blessing and election; for he is not mediator according to divinity. Therefore the same Photius thus says: "How through the Son? He answers: O wondrous thing: through his blood."

And the reason is manifest: for when Paul begins to speak about the business of our justification, and whenever he attributes any part of it to Christ, he refers it to him as mediator; otherwise, if it were permitted to interpret those places separately about Christ according to divinity, we could always understand them thus. Wherefore, when we are said to be "created in good works in him," since it is a discourse about the grace of doing good and of living rightly, which is the grace of Christ, as St. Augustine says in Epistle 105, and along with him the African Fathers

2028. Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 16.
2029. Photius, as cited by Oecumenius, on Ephesians 1: "With every blessing."

in Epistles 90 and 95, this must be ascribed to his humanity, by which he merited that grace for us.[2030] But when we are said in Colossians 1 to be "created in Christ," which must be understood about the creation and production of nature, it is attributed to Christ according to his divinity, according to which he is the cause of all things; for "in him" all things are said to have been made and created (John 1). Yet not according to his humanity, because that neither is an efficient cause of our nature, as a father is, nor a meritorious one, according to that same Augustine in the said Epistle 105, where he says that Christ did not die in order that men might be created, but that they might be justified; whence he gathers that the grace of creation is not from the merit of Christ. Therefore, when Paul with full voice says that we have been elected in Christ, who would dare to deny that our election was from the merits of Christ?

However, some, in order to protect that secure opinion, understand this election not according to that aspect by which election is election, that is, as it carries a relation to others, but insofar as it is love or predestination. I do not know, nevertheless, by what reason it is permitted thus to abuse the word: since the Greek Fathers, especially Photius cited by us, say that we have been not only predestined through Christ, made dear, or loved, but also elected. From what has been said one may gather that the interpretation which Anselm embraces is not according to the mind of Paul, who understands that "in Christ" in this way: through the right, or merit, of Christ himself; and he explains that "with every blessing" concerns blessings which are gratuitous and are had in Christ, an exposition which cannot square with the text of Paul.

The first testimony is at Ephesians 1, where it is said: "He chose us in him" (that is, in Christ) "before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy." Where Paul uses the name of election - which is that separation from the mass of perdition in which many have been left - there is no reason why we should deny that our election was from the merits of Christ, not only in so far as it is called love and predestination, but also in so far as it is called election. For by Paul we are said not only to be loved and predestined "in Christ," but also to be elected "in Christ." Photius thus says: "He blessed through the Son, he elected through the Son, he predestined through the Son."[2031]

However, Adam, who defends the opposite opinion, thinks that the particle "in" does not there signify a meritorious cause, but he applies to it a twofold other sense. One is that we are said to have been chosen in him, as we are also said to have been in him created or made: then indeed the particle "in" signifies a true efficient cause, but he refers it to the divinity of Christ. The other sense is, that he chose us to have faith in Christ.

But this author is mistaken, and, with a view to defending his opinion, he advances interpretations that are not only unreasonable but also rash and false, against the sense of the ancient Greek Fathers. For all the Greeks, with St. John Chrysostom, plainly teach that the particle "in" (Greek en) in that place signifies cause, and is put for the particle "through" (dia); that is, "by." The same sense is followed among the Latins by St. Ambrose and St. Thomas; therefore Adam in vain interprets "that we were chosen to believe in Christ." It is, moreover, frequent in Scripture,

2030. St. Augustine, Ep. 105; African Fathers with Augustine, Ep. 90 and 95.

2031. Photius, as cited by Oecumenius, on Ephesians 1, explaining "with every blessing": "He blessed through the Son, he elected through the Son, he predestined through the Son."

and very plain in this same chapter, that the particle "in" signifies "through"; as when we say, "In Christ," it is the same as "through Christ." Thus all understand that passage of the same chapter: "He hath graced us in his beloved Son"; and again: "In whom we have redemption"; and lower: "In whom also we were perhaps called." Also at Ephesians 2 we are said to be "created in good works in Christ"; and at 2 Timothy 1: "according to the grace given to us in Christ Jesus"; and the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 16, calls works "done in Christ," which are works done by his grace.[2032]

Nor, indeed, do the Greek Fathers interpret that clause, "He chose us in him," in this way, namely, through the faith which was to be had in him, as if they were to say that we were not only predestined and made dear, but also elected. For before they expound that, "with every blessing in Christ," they openly said that Christ was the mediator through whom God blessed us with every blessing; and in the same way, when Paul says, "he chose us in him," it is as if he were to say: through whom he blessed us, through the same he chose us. Photius most clearly expressed this among the passages of Oecumenius, when he explains, "with every blessing," by these words: "He blessed through the Son, he elected through the Son, he predestined through the Son."[2031] But if the particle "in" is put for "through," it must be referred to Christ according to his humanity, not according to his divinity: otherwise we could always speak that way according to the divinity in every case. Wherefore, since we are said to be justified and to live rightly through him, since he is the one who acts and operates, as St. Augustine says, and the African bishops with him in letters 90 and 95, this must be ascribed to the grace of Christ. But when we are said to have been created in Christ, or to have our natural production in Christ, that is attributed to Christ according to his divinity, which is the efficient cause of all things which are said to have been made in him, as at John 1; not according to his humanity, because that neither is an efficient cause of nature, as the Father is, nor of creation, as the Spirit is. Therefore when Paul says that we were chosen in Christ, our election was from the merits of Christ; for otherwise Christ would not be our mediator of blessing and election: for he is our mediator in Christ according to the humanity, not according to the divinity. Therefore in the same way that we are said to be washed in the blood of Christ, through which we are redeemed, we are said to be chosen by him: and the reason is the same that Paul uses in setting forth our justification and calling to the Romans, when he attributes them to Christ, to whom we were ordained; otherwise, if it were permitted, we could always interpret such expressions according to his divinity. Wherefore, since we are said to be created in good works "in him," since that concerns acting and living rightly, it is rightly to be understood of the merits of Christ, as Augustine says in letter 105 and with him the African Fathers in letters 90 and 95.

From what has been said it can be gathered what St. Anselm adopted according to the mind of Paul when he understood "in Christ" in this way: namely, as "through him"; and that, "with every blessing," and the like, which continuously occur in that chapter, which language cannot be made to fit, unless in this way it be understood.

2032. Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 16; see also 2 Timothy 1:9 - 10; Ephesians 1:3 - 14; 2:10.

2031. Photius, as cited by Oecumenius, on Ephesians 1, explaining "with every blessing": "He blessed through the Son, he elected through the Son, he predestined through the Son."

What we have so far proved is understood of election to grace, by which indeed God decreed to draw certain persons from the mass of perdition by his gratuitous and congruous calling, others being left therein. For it is in this sense that this place of Paul to the Ephesians 1 ought to be understood, as I showed in disputation 89, chapter 12. Wherefore from that same place it is no less proved that the efficacious will of God, by which he willed to give to certain persons his congruous grace, was from the merits of Christ, in so far as it is a certain kind of love. For just as "he chose us in him," so also "in him he loved us"; for the election of the elect was also their love. But if the discourse be of election to glory, from this place it cannot be demonstrated that it was from the merits of Christ, since the Apostle does not speak here of that; yet most fitly by reason, as the next chapter will deduce of the same.

Secondly, from the same chapter 1 to the Ephesians it is proved that Christ meritoriously was the cause of our predestination. For Paul says: "Who" - namely God - "predestined us unto the adoption of sons of God through Jesus Christ unto himself," than which nothing could be said more clearly, unless that contentious man Adam were to try to twist the particle "through Christ," which manifestly indicates a cause from the merits of Christ, to some other meaning. For he refers it not to the verb "he predestined," but to "unto the adoption of sons of God," so that the sense should be: "he predestined us unto the adoption, which we were going to obtain through Christ." And he seems to be favored by none of the Fathers. For Jerome, in his large commentaries on that place, where he says that it was the good pleasure of God to choose us that we might be holy and have the adoption of the sons of God, assigns no other cause of our election; not so as to exclude the merits of Christ, but to exclude ours.[2033] Next, Oecumenius on that place says: "It is great to be adopted; but greater is this, to have obtained that through the Son as mediator." By which words he refers that "through Christ" to the adoption, not to predestination.[2034] Finally, St. John Chrysostom concurs when he asserts: "It belonged to God to predestine; but to Christ to reconcile"; where he does not attribute predestination to Christ, but reconciliation, which is the very adoption of the sons of God.[2034]

But that evasion of Adam is frivolous, as we shall easily perceive, if we rightly understand the distinction between grace and predestination, which we have often recalled from St. Augustine, in the first book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10: namely, that predestination is the preparation or predefinition of grace in foreknowledge; but grace is the very donation in time. So likewise predestination unto adoption is the predefinition, or preparation, of adoption in foreknowledge; but adoption is the very justification, which is given in time. Hence it comes about that, if adoption is given to us through Christ in time, as all Catholics must confess, then also adoption through Christ - that is, from his merits - was predefined. For, as we admonished in disputation 89, chapter 9, that which God in time grants on the basis of certain merits, from those same merits also he predestined; because he predestined in the same manner in which he was going to bestow in time.

2033. St. Jerome, Commentaries on Ephesians 1.
2034. Oecumenius and St. John Chrysostom, on Ephesians 1; Theophylact and Oecumenius on 2 Timothy 1.
2034. Oecumenius and St. John Chrysostom, on Ephesians 1; Theophylact and Oecumenius on 2 Timothy 1.

Moreover, when the Doctors inquire into the cause of predestination, on account of which someone is said to be predestined, they seek only the cause of the first effect which comes about in us from predestination; and if they find any meritorious cause, or occasion, of that effect of predestination, they also concede that as the cause of predestination. Nor did Augustine ever in this matter dissent from Pelagius or the Semipelagians; but all conceded a cause of predestination, namely that they said it was the cause in time of the first effect of predestination. Therefore Photius, in Oecumenius on chapter 1 to the Ephesians, speaking of spiritual blessing "through Christ," says: "In what way?" and he answers: "Since he chose us before the foundation of the world: election and blessing are joined together for us. What is it for the ancient blessing to be 'through Christ' just as election is, unless because both were in foreknowledge, and he said both to be 'through Christ,' because, just as they were going to be in time, so they were disposed in foreknowledge."[2031]

To this also pertains that of 2 Timothy 1: "He called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his purpose and grace, which was given to us in Christ Jesus before secular times," that is, before these times which are revolved by spaces - which is as much as to say, from eternity. In which place Adam did not remember, as he ought to have done, that grace was given to us by God before secular times through Christ; because just as the Father from eternity predestined to save us, so also he foreordained the mode of our salvation, namely through Christ. This sense is followed by Theophylact and Oecumenius.[2034]

I cannot, however, but marvel how from this place Chrysostom and Theodoret gather the eternity of the Son, when the discourse there is of Christ according to his humanity, as I noted above; yet Theodoret embraces both senses. Therefore I think it just as false to assert that God in his prescience did not have respect to the merits of Christ in order to predestine grace for us, as it is to affirm that in time grace was not conferred on us in view of those merits.

Nor are Jerome, Oecumenius, and Chrysostom, who were alleged above, opposed to this doctrine. For Jerome refers our predestination to the will of God, and he assigns no other cause; not to exclude the merits of Christ, but to exclude ours. Oecumenius indeed, when he asserts that we obtained the adoption of the sons of God through Christ, refers that "through Christ" to the adoption, so as not to exclude it from predestination, as from the foregoing is manifest. Finally, when Chrysostom says that "it was of God to predestine," he denotes the efficient cause, which was God alone: for only he is said to predestine, even if he predestines on account of another's merits; for he who merits predestination is not said to predestine. But when he subjoins that "it was of Christ to reconcile," he plainly indicates the meritorious cause of our justification in time, and therefore the cause of the same in eternal foreknowledge, as has been noted.

Thirdly, from that same chapter and the testimony to the Ephesians 1, by which the adversaries confirmed the opposite opinion, our opinion is not obscurely deduced. For the Apostle says: "In whom," namely in Christ, "also we were called by lot" (sorte vocati sumus). When he says "by lot,"

2031. Photius, as cited by Oecumenius, on Ephesians 1, explaining "with every blessing": "He blessed through the Son, he elected through the Son, he predestined through the Son."

2034. Oecumenius and St. John Chrysostom, on Ephesians 1; Theophylact and Oecumenius on 2 Timothy 1.

he indicates not only that no merits on our part preceded, so that we should be called; but also that our calling was from an election, by which, others being left in the mass of perdition, he by lot called us. For lot does not befall all, but some out of many; and in a lot some are preferred to others. By the name therefore of "lot" he most aptly denoted that the benefit of our vocation was not common to all, but peculiar to us; and since it is said to have been bestowed upon us in time "by way of lot" "in Christ," that is, through Christ, it follows that we were elected in time unto the grace of vocation through Christ, which if in time we were elected through his merit, from eternity also in the same manner we were: just as indeed God calls in time through the merits of Christ, so he decreed in foreknowledge to call on account of those same merits; and likewise, if he chose in time through Christ, he decreed to choose through the same.

Moreover, that the particle "in" in that place signifies cause and is put for "through" is clear from the context; for a little above Paul had said of Christ: "In whom we have redemption"; and "to re-establish all things in Christ"; and presently he subjoins: "In whom also we were called by lot": in which places the particle "in," that is, "through," as the adversaries also grant.

To these things add that when Augustine, against the Pelagians and Semipelagians, contends that the predestination of grace in us was not made out of any of our merits, as in the book On the Predestination of the Saints and elsewhere often: he is speaking of the same grace, which he wished Pelagius to concede; but this he calls "the grace of Christ" in epistles 105 and 93, because through the merit of Christ we have it; and therefore we can say with the Apostle: "If God is for us, who is against us? He who spared not even his own Son, but delivered him up for us all." By which he denotes that this grace, which God predestines to us without our merits, is from the merits of Christ; and since it was predestined to us from eternity, it will also have been predefined from his merits. Finally, about the love by which God has loved us, the same follows if we speak of that love by which God efficaciously decreed to give us this grace - namely, that it too was from the merits of Christ, just as election itself and predestination; for in these the ratio of love also is contained. But indeed, if we speak of that love by which, with an antecedent will and simple will, God desired remedy for all men, the sin of Adam having been foreseen, that was not from the merits of Christ; rather, from that love he predestined Christ, that he might bring a remedy to us: yet from that love alone there was not bestowed upon us in time any grace at all.

From these things it is proved:

Election differs from love: for love looks only to the beloved truly and of itself, to whom we absolutely will some good, and it has no respect whatsoever to others, who are not loved. But election is the love of one before another; and therefore it is of its nature exercised about the one elected, desiring good for him, yet also regarding others, from whom the beloved is preferred. Therefore it is the same to be chosen unto a dignity or a good that separates and sets one apart from others, to whom the same good is not granted.

From this definition - which no one can deny - we shall easily show that our election from the mass of perdition was made from the merits of Christ in time, and pre-defined in foreknowledge. For since we were all together, in the first parent, condemned in the same way; and the same

sentence weighed upon all; nevertheless, certain from that same common mass of the sons of Adam, by congruous and efficacious grace up to the end, being turned away from evil, are separated from others, whence we are chosen before others; the very grace by which we are separated and not condemned with the rest was through Christ. Therefore through Christ we were chosen out of the common mass; and if this was done in time, let no one doubt that in foreknowledge it was predefined in the same mode.

Nor, however, is it as though someone should think that the cause of choosing some out of that crowd of the condemned, namely the work of Christ, is also the cause of leaving others: for Christ is the cause of liberating someone; but he is not the cause that anyone be left in damnation; rather, those are left because of their sins. And if at times in the event some seem to be more diligently attended to and to have a special interest shown to them - if they sin - than others who are not liberated, this is not to be referred to a defect on the part of Christ.

Moreover, that something be the cause for which one rather than many is chosen, there need not be a cause determining that this one rather than that one be liberated, such that it should specially intercede for this person in particular; it is enough that there be a cause, on account of which, if it so please, he can intercede for one rather than another, and by it incline some rather than others, while leaving the others not liberated. Then indeed the cause will be determinate, special, and particular with respect to the one for whom it intercedes, not, however, on the side of the cause itself, which is common and can be applied now to one, now to another, as it shall please. Thus we have Christ, who, when he suffered for all, by the merit of his death and by his prayers liberated as many as by that application were to be freed; to whom, in the elect, salvation actually came about; if Christ did not commonly apply for all the effect of his death, Scripture expressly teaches. The first sermon on the passion, attributed to St. Leo, and St. Augustine's sermon 8 on the words of the Apostle; Fulgentius, in the book On the Incarnation and Grace; Photius in his Epitome, and at the beginning of volume 3 before the Seventh Synod; and from them we learn that Christ, although he merited the grace of salvation for all, and sufficiently, and efficiently, yet he willed in the event and in application that this grace should be effectuated for some and not for others; and why? on account of the eternal disposition of God. Hence we cannot deny that Christ, by a peculiar application of his merit and of his prayer, obtained perseverance for the Apostles. For it was said to Peter: "I have prayed for you, that your faith fail not"; but to others it was not said. Nor did he say: "I do not pray for the world, but for those whom you have given me," but then at the hour of his passion he also said: "I guarded those whom you gave me; and none of them perished except the son of perdition"; with regard to whose ruin the perdition of the persecutors was permitted by God. Who then would dare to deny that Christ merited for the Apostles the grace of perseverance, both congruously and efficiently, which they later obtained? And who would deny that, in the same way, in the election and calling of certain ones it was brought about through his prayer and his merit that they should be retained? And why was this retained for some rather than for others? The certain cause must be, not on the part of men, but on the part of God, who applied this grace more to some than to others, since others obtained the same preparation.

But that Judas did not have that, was because he was not among the number of the Apostles elect unto final perseverance; it was less; nor, if Christ at that time excluded him who was already damned, did he exclude the remainder whom the Father had given him: "Those whom you have given me I have guarded; and none of them has perished, except the son of perdition." And: "Those whom you have given me are mine"; and again: "Of them whom you have given me I have lost none, except the son of perdition."

Wherefore in that prayer Christ was not heard for all, so that perseverance should be granted to all to whom unity in faith was given. Why then shall we not grant that Christ did for all the predestined what at that time he did for the Apostles, namely, that in a peculiar manner he applied his merits to them and obtained perseverance for them? For if many Saints, praying for others, have obtained their conversion and perseverance, why shall we say that Christ did not pray for all the predestined, and by his peculiar prayer obtain for them so great a glory and grace - he who rightly knew all and had them present to himself?

Finally, when by a singular calling he called Matthew and the other Apostles, Mary Magdalene, Zacchaeus, and the rest, no one can deny that he applied to them his merits by preference over others. Whence it follows that not only was Christ the cause of the election of the predestined, but even certain Saints - who by their prayers have obtained for others first grace and perseverance - have been the cause of their election, and that from the foreknowledge of their prayer the election of others was made from eternity.

As to the just and predestined of the Old Testament, one must not judge in the same way: for Christ could not, by some peculiar reason, apply his merits to these rather than to others. Since prayer is not made for things past, it does not seem by what reason Christ's merits could be applied to these rather than to others; for that a peculiar application could not be made by thanksgiving, we shall show below. Therefore Christ, by the merit of his Passion, most perfectly paid whatever was due for the grace bestowed on the ancient Fathers; yet he could not be the cause why this man rather than that should be chosen: nevertheless he was the cause of the election of those who, in hope of him, were separated from the mass of perdition, as is gathered from what has been said.

But certain persons object in this way: how, when there existed no other cause, God should have willed to send his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and should have moved his human will to this, namely, that he should pray rather for these than for those; and, being moved by his prayer, should have decreed to help these rather than others. Nor could this merit of Christ, even if it were condign, stand in the way so as to prevent the grace which he obtained for us from being grace: for although, if it be referred to Christ, it is not to be called simply grace, yet for us, who offered nothing of our own, it is to be called simply grace, a gift, and mercy.

An objection of certain persons is met.

They will moreover argue thus: just as thanksgiving, which Christ offered to God, was to be exhibited, so, when God bestowed grace on the Fathers of the Old Testament, a peculiar thanksgiving could not be a cause that to these rather than to others a peculiar grace should be granted; and thus, universally, if we should suppose that Christ's merits were to be peculiarly

applied to some, it would suffice to assign only the absolute cause of election, not a reason why this one rather than another should be chosen. For if someone should do good to another on account of a thanksgiving which he expects from someone else for a benefit conferred, in which case thanksgiving would move as a kind of future merit, he could, on this very ground, do good to one rather than to another.

I answer: whenever thanksgiving is not the effect of the benefit itself, it can well incline one to bestow a good, just as a merit is apt to do; but when thanksgiving is the effect of the benefit, it cannot be the cause of that same benefit, because the good use of grace is not the cause of that grace, as we showed in disputation 91, chapter 6. Therefore, as to that thanksgiving which Christ offered, although, as regards future things, it could, by reason of hope, be a title on account of which grace would be given to the ancient Fathers, nevertheless it could in no way be a peculiar cause why a benefit should be granted to these rather than to others. Besides, as regards Christ in relation to God, he could not be to receive rather for one than for another any benefit; for for the least grace and benefit, infinite thanks were to be returned by Christ, since the least merit of his was of infinite value; nor could God hope for a thanksgiving from Christ rather for one predestined person than for another, for for any and every predestined person equally infinite gratitude was due from Christ.

What we have said thus far proves only our election unto grace, whereby God from eternity decreed to free some from the mass of perdition, and which was effected from the merits of Christ, on account of which also in time he gave that grace by which those who are drawn from that same mass are endowed, others being left in it; and we noted above that Scripture in the preceding chapter speaks only of this. Furthermore, that the election unto glory was made on account of the merits of Christ foreseen can easily be shown. First, from Paul speaking to the Ephesians, as some adversaries themselves admit; for from that passage we deduced that the election of which Paul speaks was made in Christ and in foreknowledge. Then also we shall argue against them by the same arguments with which, in disputation 89, chapters 9 and 11, we proved that this election was not defined by God before our merits were foreseen; by parity of reason it is manifest that neither was it defined before the merits of Christ were foreseen, since by his merit also, in due time, we were to receive life and grace, and the same reason of merits holds in time and in eternity. Moreover, it seems plainly absurd to assert that God decreed to restore to anyone the gate of the heavenly kingdom - shut to the whole human race by the sin of the first parent - before he foresaw that his Son would in the future, by the shedding of his blood and by the excellence of his satisfaction, expiate that sin and break the dominion of the enemy.

And that he would will his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and would move his human will to this, that he might pray rather for these than for those; and that, moved by his prayer, he decreed to help these rather than others. Nor could this merit of Christ, even if it were condign, stand in the

way so that the grace which was bestowed on us in view of him should not truly be grace. For although, if it be referred to Christ, it is not to be called simply grace, yet for us, who offered nothing of our own, it must be called simply grace, a gift and a mercy.

Then someone will argue: just as the thanksgiving which Christ was going to render to God was a meritorious cause that God should confer grace upon the Fathers of the Old Testament; so also a peculiar thanksgiving could have been a cause that these rather than others should be given a peculiar grace; and thus, taken universally, we should assert that the merit of Christ was peculiar to certain persons, and that he himself was the cause not only of election absolutely, but also that they should be chosen rather than others in the Old Testament. For just as a man is able to do good to one person because of the thanksgiving which he expects from another for a benefit conferred, which thanksgiving moves as a kind of merit of the future; so also he could, for this specific person, do good rather than to another on account of a peculiar thanksgiving which he expects for such a hoped-for benefit.

I answer: whenever thanksgiving is not the effect of the very benefit, it can well move in hope by way of a merit, as if it were past; but when it is the effect of the benefit, as is the good use of grace, it cannot, as I showed in Disputation 91, chapter 6; and therefore the thanksgiving which Christ was going to offer could be a merit in hope, in virtue of which grace would be given to the ancients. Thanksgiving, moreover, can be a cause that this benefit rather than another be conferred on someone: similarly, that it be conferred on this person rather than on that. For if someone knew that greater thanks would be rendered for this benefit than for that, and on that account, in order that greater thanks be rendered to him, he would bestow a greater gift, certainly the greater thanksgiving would enter into the cause that a greater benefit be conferred. In like manner, if someone should know that greater thanks would be rendered to him if he should favor this person rather than that, on this hope he can do good to this one rather than to the other. But God could hope for nothing of this sort from Christ rather for one than for another benefit; for for the least grace and benefit, infinite thanks were owed by Christ, since the least merit of his was of infinite worth; nor could he hope from Christ a thanksgiving rather for one predestined person than for another, for if any were chosen, the very same Christ would completely fulfill it. Therefore his future Passion and merits could not be the cause why this one rather than another, before his advent, was chosen unto grace.

The things which we have said thus far only prove that our election unto grace, namely that God from eternity decreed to free some from the mass of perdition, was made from the merits of Christ, on account of which in time that grace was given to the elect by which they were drawn out of the common mass and a peculiar grace was granted to them, others being left in that mass; and we noted that Scripture speaks only of this in the preceding chapter. Moreover, that the election unto glory was not made before the merits of Christ were foreseen can easily be shown.

First, if Paul in Ephesians 1 speaks of heaven, as certain adversaries admit, we would easily from that place convict them: for from there we deduced that the election of which Paul speaks was made through Christ in foreknowledge.

Then also we can argue contrariwise by the same arguments by which, in Disputation 89, chapters 9 and 11, we demonstrated that this election was not defined by God before our merits were foreseen; by those same arguments it is plainly proved that neither was it before the merits of Christ, by whose power we also were going to have merits unto eternal life: otherwise, just as our merits would effect nothing towards the attainment of glory if the election had been made before the foreknowledge of them, as we showed there; so now neither would the merits of Christ, which is absurd. But if our election unto eternal life is made from our merits, because from them in time we were going to obtain it, it follows that it was made from the merits also of Christ: for our merits proceed in time from the merits of Christ.

Furthermore, it certainly seems absurd to assert that God decreed to reopen to anyone the gate of the kingdom of heaven, shut to the whole human race by the sin of the first parent, before he foresaw that his Son would say, with sin and the dominion of death overcome: "Be lifted up, O everlasting doors, and the King of glory shall enter in" (Ps 23). For he who was to be the firstborn of all creation, and who by his own blood was to break the beasts of hell, and by his own merit to enter heaven, and to bring also other sons into the same glory, as first of all ought to have been foreknown by God as destined and elected in glory before the rest, of whom he was going to be the Redeemer and head.

What do the reasons made convince? These reasons indeed at least prove that God did not first predetermine by an efficacious will and decree to beatify someone, before he saw the Word united to flesh, suffering, and glorious; but that by this efficacious will each of us who is to be glorified was loved because of those merits, and hence that the love towards us, efficacious unto glory, arose from the foreknowledge of the merits of Christ. Moreover, that this love, insofar as it is election, also arose from the merits of Christ, is proved by the same reason by which we demonstrated that the election also unto grace was made from his merits. But as to the application of the merits of Christ, whether it ought to be made before our works and merits, or when these have already been done, so that glory may be rendered to them, this is not the place; rather we shall treat of this more fully in the Prima Secundae, questions 113 and 114. For now it is enough for us to have proved that the efficacious will of beatifying someone had its origin from the foreknowledge of the application of the merits of Christ.

Nor do the testimonies of Scripture, which have been adduced in favor of the contrary opinion, at all withstand our doctrine. That the justified are said to be given to Christ by God does not hinder Christ from having obtained them by the merit of his Passion; indeed, that he obtained these rather than others: for just as they are said to be given by God as justified, even if they were sanctified by the merit of Christ, so also they are said to be given by God, even if Christ by his merits obtained them from God. Yet we cannot deny that Christ, by right of redemption and by condign merit, so acquired them for himself that their justification was for him not grace but a wage duly rendered, not a freely given gift out of mercy - although to the justified themselves and the redeemed it was grace and, to be sure, mercy, because from themselves nothing but misery preceded. Nor is there any interpreter who understands those testimonies of Scripture in the sense which the adversaries suggest, and far less those two in Ephesians 1. For that we are said to be

elected by Christ "according to the purpose of the will of God," no one so explains as if the election proceeded from God alone; but they call "the purpose of will" that which God had of justifying the elect, which is frequently so called, as St. Augustine notes, in the last chapter of Disputation 88; and therefore Augustine often says that the election of the elect is said to be "according to purpose," because it is fitting that God should carry out the purpose of justifying.

Then when we are said in Ephesians 1, "called by lot," we are not therefore said to have been called by the mere will of God, not in view of the merits of Christ; but because we are called without any of our merits, as all the Latins explain, indeed, as we not obscurely proved above from that same place, that our election was from the merits of Christ.

Next, that passage of Matthew 20, who has ever thus understood it as the adversaries do? For Christ did not say that it is not his to give the kingdom of heaven to the elect and predestined, he who said in Luke 22: "And I dispose to you, as my Father disposed to me, that you may eat and drink upon my table in my kingdom"; where he was speaking in his humanity, as those words indicate, "as my Father disposed to me." But he said: "It is not mine to give to you who seek by right of kinship the right and the left"; yet for that reason he did not deny that it is his to give to those for whom it was prepared by the eternal Father; indeed he plainly affirmed it, when he subjoined: "But to those for whom it has been prepared by my Father"; especially if the Greek particle be set for "nisi" (unless), as the same Vulgate translates in Mark 9 in those words, "They saw no one, unless Jesus alone"; nay, even the particle "sed" (but), in Latin, has this force, that it affirms that which had previously been denied: as if a judge should be asked for a crown which the petitioner has not deserved, and the judge should answer: "It is not mine to give to you, but to those who shall have been more meritorious." In which sense the Greeks continue in that passage, from which our view is gathered rather than the opposite.

Finally, that which is adduced from St. Thomas only proves that God in his eternal election took to himself no counselor, but by himself foresaw by his providence the things to be done; yet it does not deny that God, in his election, looked to something, so as to determine something; for this is not to use some medium in his counsel and providence.

That the merits of Christ were the cause of our predestination is shown by reason

Caput IV - By reason it is shown that the merits of Christ were the cause of our predestination

But truly, from the foregoing it follows that the merits of Christ were the cause of our predestination in the same sense in which we have shown that on our part there is no meritorious cause or disposing cause for those effects. For just as on our part there was no such cause of the first effect of our predestination, and therefore we were not the cause of our predestination; so also, since the merit and prayer of Christ was the cause of the grace which was granted to us and prepared by predestination, it follows that it was the cause of our predestination: for this is nothing else than the preparation of the gifts of grace. The same must be said of the prayers of the Saints,

on account of which some have been called and have obtained perseverance. For he who is the meritorious or impetratory cause of the first calling is said to be the cause of the whole effect, if from that first calling the effects of predestination begin. Whence also our predestination begins, not as the adversaries contend, from the very prayers and merits of Christ or of another Saint, as I shall show more fully in the following chapter. Now, however, with the opinion of those supposed who teach that the effects of predestination begin from that grace which is granted to us, it has been duly proved that there is given a meritorious cause of our predestination, not on our part, but on the part of Christ or of another Saint; and thus that their prayers and merits aid our predestination otherwise than ours do. For these indeed aid our predestination only by consummating our own merits and perseverance; but the prayers of Christ or of another Saint aid even by initiating the very effect of predestination.

Moreover, in confirmation of this view it remained that, against Capreolus, Ferrara, and others who defend the first opinion, we should prove that Christ merited for us faith and every good movement of the soul by which in some way we are disposed unto justification; this, however, I now suppose as known, and accordingly I judge it to be true, so that the opposite, against our faith, I deem an error - although it is proved expressly elsewhere, namely 1 - 2, q. 113, a. 2 and 3; and 3, p., q. 19: where it will be more fully explained against the heretics of our age, when and how, and to what effects, the merits of Christ are imputed or applied to us. Now, however, let what has been said suffice: for now no one is left who would dare to deny that Christ was the meritorious cause of our predestination in the manner in which Driedo and Adam denied it; namely, that the merit of his was not the cause of faith, and of other dispositions unto justification: but if some deny this, they are brought for another reason into that opinion, against whom we have thus far disputed, and in solution of arguments we shall say something.

However, Gaspar Casalius, in the book On Quadripartite Justice, chapter 4, not only grants that Christ was the cause of our predestination as to the inward effects, but even asserts that he merited the very eternal and uncreated act by which God predestined us; which opinion also pleased some more recent men to such a degree that, on that account, they also asserted that not only created grace, namely the effects of predestination, but even uncreated grace fell under the merit of Christ. But they prove this thus: whatever is a reason that God do something is also a reason moving his will to do it; and therefore a meritorious reason of the very uncreated act by which God willed to do it.

But this opinion, insofar as it casts even the very act of God, not only eternal but also uncreated, under the merit of Christ, is opposed to the common sentiment of the Scholastics, and to reason. First, indeed, all the Scholastics named above by us in chapter 2, when they affirm that the merit of Christ, or his predestination, was the cause of our predestination, or election, note expressly that it was not the cause of the very uncreated and eternal act: because of this no cause can be. He therefore denies that Christ merited the uncreated act of our predestination who says that whoever merits something is truly the cause of it.

Moreover, all the Scholastics alleged by us already in Disputation 21, chapter 1, when they inquire into the meritorious or disposing cause of predestination, conspire in this one point, that no meritorious cause of the uncreated act of predestination be investigated, because such cannot be, but only of that act's effects. But if Christ could thus merit the uncreated act, so too as to the effects of it a cause of the act itself could be given, just as there is given a cause of its effects; nor was there need of that observation of the Doctors.

Furthermore, the preceding opinion is refuted by reason. For that which falls under our merit falls in one of two ways: first, as an object to be possessed; and in this way we merit the uncreated Trinity itself, not indeed that it should be, but that we may see and enjoy it: and in this way the uncreated, taken in itself, does not fall under merit as effect or as an act caused by us, but only as the object to be enjoyed by us; the causality of merit regards on our side our created acts and habits by which we are ordered to that enjoyment, not any uncreated act.

But the adversaries, when they say that Christ merited the uncreated act of our predestination, do not assert that he merited it as the object of our fruition and possession (for in that way he also merited for us the relations of the Trinity and whatever is in God); rather, in the same sense they say that he merited for us the uncreated act of God, in the very way that he also merited the grace which God gave to us. They affirm, therefore, that Christ merited that the uncreated act be in God, and that he obtained it by that merit, just as he obtained grace. But this is absurd. For that which is uncreated does not in any way depend upon the prayer and petitions of anyone in order to be, but from itself it is so necessary that it cannot not be. Therefore Christ could not merit that which is uncreated.

It is confirmed: This is further confirmed by the opinion which we followed in disputation 80, chapter 2, namely, that in God there is no act intrinsic to him which could be in him and not be, but every act of the will of God is, from the nature of the thing, the very divine essence itself.[2035] Finally, to call the uncreated act of God "uncreated grace" is contrary to the mode of speaking of St. Augustine so often alleged by us: for in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, he says that this is the difference between predestination and grace, that predestination is the preparation of grace, but grace is the very donation; where he did not call predestination "grace," but the preparation of grace.[2036] And if in Christ the very person of the Son is called uncreated grace, this is both because by the Incarnation she is said to have been given to us, and also because by the very Godhead, and the person of the Son as a kind of form, the humanity was so deified and enkindled that, without any other gift, it was pleasing and just before God.

Nevertheless, in accordance with the things which in that disputation and in disputation 91, chapter 1, I noted, it must be said that the act of the divine predestination falls under the merit of Christ and in some way depends upon it, not insofar as it is an uncreated act and, by its very nature, the same as the divine essence, but according to that relation of reason (*relatio rationis*) by which from eternity it is said freely to be referred to created objects, to which it could from eternity

2035. Disputatio 80, cap. 2.
2036. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 10.

not be referred. For since this respect is taken from future things, as I showed in that disputation 80, and the future things - namely, the effects of our predestination - are from the merits of Christ, it follows that that very respect proceeds from them; and since the divine essence according to itself cannot be called from eternity our predestination or election without that respect of reason to things and future effects, just as neither could it be called foreknowledge, it plainly follows that thus Christ merited the divine act, insofar as it assumes the notion of predestination and election, as also the effects thereof. And therefore it is gathered that, just as Christ merited that we be called and justified by God, nay even predestined and elected, that is, that we be the object of the divine predestination and election, so too he merited that God himself should choose and predestine us. And let the same judgment be made concerning the efficacious love which God freely had.

Nor indeed does the common doctrine of the Scholastics put any obstacle in the way of our position, namely, those who on the part of the act deny a meritorious cause of predestination and concede it on the part of the effects; for they expressly understood this of the divine act insofar as it is uncreated, not insofar as it is referred by the relation (*relatio*) of predestination and election to creatures, which relation is indeed one of reason. Nor does it stand in the way that that relation is eternal and the merit of Christ and the effects of predestination are temporal; for the temporal, insofar as it is future, can be the cause of an eternal respect of reason, as we showed above in disputation 68, chapter 7.[2037] Therefore, although the adversaries can say that the act of predestination according to that eternal respect fell under the merit of Christ, and thus that Christ merited for us something that is eternal, nevertheless in no way may one say that the uncreated act itself fell under the merit of Christ. For in the act of predestination we distinguished these two: one, eternal and uncreated, which in no way could Christ merit; the other, eternal but not uncreated, which is only a respect of reason, and this Christ could merit. In what way, moreover, Christ was the exemplary and final cause (*causa exemplaris, causa finalis*) of our predestination we shall say in the Third Part, question 24, article 3, replies to 3 and 4.[2038]

Obiectio: But someone will object in this way: no cause is given of the divine will on the part of the act, but only on the part of the objects; therefore the divine will could not fall under merit.

Respondetur: I answer, as we said in disputation 82, that there is given neither a final cause nor even a sine qua non reason of the divine will among created objects; nevertheless, among the objects of the divine will one is the cause of another, and thus, because God willed one thing to be for the sake of another, we say that God willed to predestine and to justify someone from the foreseen merits of Christ. And when we concede that among the effects the one is a meritorious cause so that another be, consequently we assert that among the objects there is some cause so that there be an act of the divine will according to that respect which we have explained. Diluuntur adversariorum oppositiones.

2037. Disputatio 68, cap. 7.
2038. Summa theologiae, III, q. 24, a. 3, ad 3 - 4.

Caput V - Of the ten arguments by which in the first chapter we confirmed the positions of others, there remain only four which were brought forward for the first opinion.

For concerning the reason of the second, enough was said by us above, chapter 3; for the third opinion we adduced no reason.

To the first reason for the first opinion I reply: if it were true that faith and the other dispositions to justification were not granted to us from the merits of Christ, it would rightly follow that Christ did not merit our predestination; but that this is absurd and cannot be defended without the mark of error must be proved in the place alleged above. Wherefore it rather follows that Christ was the cause of our predestination, if he was the cause of all its effects.

To the second reason I answer that the controversy whether the prayer and merits of Christ, or of another holy man, who obtained grace for some predestined person, ought to be called effects of that predestination, is a question not of things but of words. This, however, must be asserted without doubt, so that with St. Augustine against the Pelagians and Semipelagians we agree in the thing itself, namely, that the first grace which is given to us had no merit of ours preceding it or occasion, nor our predestination, if the effects of it are said to begin from the first calling which is conferred upon us; but that of grace and predestination thus used there is merit in another - namely, in Christ, and sometimes also in some just man - as is manifest from what has been said. But if someone should wish to call "effect of predestination" the Incarnation of Christ, his merits, or also those of another saint, and should wish to call these "our grace," it must be asserted not only that there is no merit which is a cause or occasion of predestination on the part of the predestined, but also not on the part of Christ or of another saint: for neither did Christ merit his own Incarnation, nor that thought by which he was stirred to pray and to merit for us, nor did any saint. Thus, then, the beginning of our predestination would be from God alone, so that it would have had neither in us, nor in another saint, nor in Christ himself, a cause or occasion. But this way of speaking, or any other like it, derogates nothing from the very dignity of grace, which St. Augustine commends against the Semipelagians, nor from the dignity of Christ, since St. Augustine himself teaches that Christ did not merit his own predestination, in book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 15.[2039]

Nevertheless I, for my part, think that, according to the idiom of Scripture and of the Fathers, the Incarnation of Christ, his merits, and prayers are in no way to be called effects of our predestination. I say the same of the prayers and merits of some just man who obtains salvation for another predestined person. I am persuaded of this especially from the fact that whenever Augustine disputes with the Massilians concerning first grace, which he holds to be given without merits, he says precisely the same thing about grace and about the predestination of it, as is explained in disputation 89, chapter 4, and disputation 91, chapter 3. Against the Massilians, however, Augustine concludes only - as I sufficiently proved in that chapter 4 - that the first grace which is granted to us at the first calling is not from merits or from our cause, and thus neither

2039. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione Sanctorum, lib. 1, cap. 15.

from the predestination by which this grace is prepared for us by God. If Augustine had said that the first grace is the Incarnation and the merits of Christ or of some saint, he would never have contended with the Massilians about our grace or predestination. For no one - of this grace and predestination, not even Pelagius himself - said that there was any cause from us.

Wherefore Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 17, treating of our election to grace (which is altogether the same as the predestination of grace, of which he treats in that whole work) ...

But against the Massilians, he says: Let us understand, therefore, the calling by which men are made elect, not that they are chosen because they have believed, but that they are chosen in order that they may believe; and, with some matters interposed: They were elected, then, before the constitution of the world by that predestination in which God foreknew His own future works. They were elected, moreover, out of the world by that calling by which God fulfilled what He had predestined. Here at the outset Augustine judges election and predestination to be the same, when he says: They were elected by that predestination; for God, by predestining, chooses, and by choosing, predestines: I speak of election to grace, about which he always used to dispute: for predestination differs from election only in this, that election is called the separation of one from others; whereas predestination does not denote this respect to others. But when he says that they were elected by that calling by which God fulfilled what He had predestined, he clearly indicates that by that very fact they were elect and called, and that their election began from the calling. Now this was not a common calling, but according to purpose, which is proper to the predestinate, of which we spoke in Disputation 88, last chapter.[2040]

Reply to the first. And the African Fathers with Augustine, Epistle 95 a little before the middle, showing what grace Pelagius ought to confess to be without merits, say: "There is, however, another (to wit, grace) by which the predestined are called, justified, glorified," etc., by which words he seems to have comprehended all the effects of predestination. The same grace, inquiring against the same Pelagius, Augustine in Epistle 105, a little from the beginning, says to be that by which we are justified, that is, we are moved to justification, whose beginning he says to be faith. Therefore, when Augustine commends our predestination as done without our merits, because the beginning of our grace was bestowed gratuitously and without any merits, from that he judges predestination to begin whence also our grace takes its commencement.[2041]

Another. Fulgentius also adds, who, enumerating whatever our predestination effects, in book 1 to Monimus, chapter 1, thus says: "But all these things, that is, both the beginnings of calling, and the increases of justification, and the rewards of glorification, God always had in predestination, because both in calling, and in justification, and in the glorification of the Saints He foreknew the future works of His grace." He is speaking of grace, which is the effect of predestination: for he was treating of the predestination of this grace.[2042]

2040. Disputatio 88, cap. ult.
2041. St. Augustine, Epist. 95; Epist. 105.
2042. St. Fulgentius, Ad Monimum, lib. 1, cap. 1.

It is confirmed. Finally, it would have been altogether useless to the holy Fathers, against the Pelagians or Semipelagians, to dispute about another predestination than that of grace, which in us begins from the first calling. For that even the merits of Christ and of the just, by which one obtains grace for others, fall under the providence of God - indeed that these are effects of some grace - was not a matter of controversy among them: why then must we now speak otherwise about predestination? Moreover, according to the mode of speaking of Scripture, that the very Incarnation, or the merits of Christ, are not to be referred among the effects of our predestination, is clear: because otherwise it could not be said that Christ was the cause of our predestination, since He was not the cause of His Incarnation, nor of the thought whereby He was first stirred up to merit for us: for the merits of Him God also initiated in Him. But Scripture openly testifies that He was the cause of our predestination, as we saw in chapter 4; therefore not for any other reason, except that our predestination begins from our calling.

Some theologians answer that, in order that Christ be called the cause of our predestination, it is not necessary that He be the cause of all the effects, but it is enough if He be the cause of many of those which are contained under predestination itself. For to be the cause of predestination, that is, of the whole effect, belongs to God alone. Yet from this doctrine it follows that we also could be said to be the cause of our predestination, as Christ is said to be, because we are the cause of many effects by which our predestination is necessarily completed: but this is absurd: for, as we noted in Disputation 91, chapter 1, it is the same thing to be the cause of our predestination as to be the cause of the whole effect; indeed, in order that someone be said to be the cause of predestination, he must be the cause of the first effect. If, therefore, Christ was not the cause of His first calling, by which He began to merit for us - and this is the first effect of our predestination - it follows that He was not the cause of our predestination.[2043]

About the prayer and merits of the just, by which they obtain grace for others, the same must be said: namely, that they do not pertain to the effect of the predestination of him for whom they obtain grace: which point remains proved by the same reasons. But among the other arguments, this especially has force, that if the prayers of the just pertained to the effect of the predestination of another, then in the same way the merits of Christ would have to be counted among the effects of our predestination. Some, however, reply that the case is different, in that the merits of Christ were common both to the reprobate and to the predestinate; whereas the merits and prayers of the just, by which they obtained grace for others, were not so. But against this is an evident reason: because, as was said in chapter 3, the merits of Christ were not only common, but were also by a certain peculiar intercession applied to the elect after Him. If, therefore, those ought to be referred among the effects of predestination, and yet Christ Himself did not merit them, it follows that He did not merit every effect of our predestination. Moreover, that Christ did not apply His merits to the predestinate because He knew that they were already elected by God - indeed that they were elected by God because God foreknew the merits of Christ as to be applied to them - we proved in

2043. Disputatio 91, cap. 1.

chapter 3 of this Disputation. Wherefore it is more suitable to reckon the effects of our predestination from the grace of the first calling, which is according to purpose, and to set aside the merits which, on the part of others, preceded, not to number them among the effects of that.[2044]

It is objected. But someone will object: Since not only calling and justification are said to fall under our predestination, but also outward signs, preachings, and removals of impediments, by which our calling was made ready, why also should not the prayers and merits of Christ and of the just, by which we obtained the first calling, pertain to our predestination?

It is answered. I answer that the ratio is different: because the removal of an impediment, an outward sign, preaching, and the like are referred to the grace of the predestinate himself, and fall under his predestination: because for the predestinate they are a principle of acting, at least per accidens; but the prayer of another, or a merit that obtains grace for the predestinate and a good occasion for acting, is not a principle of acting for him, but on account of those things there is bestowed upon him the facility and the principle of good will and of acting.

Reply to the third argument. To the third reason, from what was said in chapter 4, I answer that a created merit is not the cause of anything uncreated, because it is not the cause of the act of divine predestination, inasmuch as it is the divine essence itself; but to be the cause of an effect of predestination, namely grace, is enough in order that it be called a cause of predestination. I add, too, that a created and temporal merit is in a certain way the cause of a respect of reason which we connote by the name of predestination and election: that respect, however, is not uncreated, although it is eternal in the way in which relations of reason are said to befit God from eternity, as I explained above in Disputation 68, chapter 7. But the merit which begins in time is said to be the cause, or the foundation, of that respect inasmuch as from eternity it is future: and thus it does not follow that the temporal is a cause of the eternal.[2045]

To the fourth from St. Thomas. To the fourth reason I say that St. Thomas only taught that God in His providence employed no counselor for Himself, as we explained in that place: but he did not deny that God in His providence looked to a meritorious cause, or another that on the part of the effects was to be considered.

From all the things that we have said thus far about predestination, one may gather the order which God in His foreknowledge kept concerning our predestination. Now, first of all, it is to be presupposed, according to the truer opinion, that Christ was predestined after the foreseen sin of Adam - this being presupposed, the instants of the divine plan, according to reason, are to be marked out in this series. In the first instant God willed to communicate Himself to creatures, from a will of simple complacency, whereby He desired for them His glory. Second, from this will of bounty He decreed to grant the gifts of grace in the state of innocence, permitting also that man should fall into sin: and He permitted it not from an intention of causing harm, as is gathered from the things we said in Disputation 93, chapter 2, but on account of another end, for the sake of which He permits sins, as we said there.[2046] Then, third, willing to prepare a remedy for fallen man,

2044. Disputatio huius, cap. 3.
2045. Disputatio 68, cap. 7.
2046. Disputatio 93, cap. 2.

He predestined Christ, and merits to Him. Fourth, out of the foreseen merits of Christ He predestined certain ones, and He chose to give His grace on each several occasion even unto perseverance, there being no cause or occasion from them. Fifth and finally, from the grace of God, for those persevering He efficaciously decreed to give glory, which before the merits of grace were foreseen He had never efficaciously foreordained, as was proved in Disputation 89. But let these things suffice concerning all the articles of this question, in which the Angelic Doctor treats of predestination. Now indeed let us treat, around the third article, of all the things that are worth knowing about reprobation.[2047]

Pars II - On reprobation

Articulus III - Whether God reprobates any man

The third point is proceeded to as follows. It seems that God reprobates no man.

1. No one, indeed, reprobates him whom he loves; but God loves every man, according to Wisdom 11: "You love all things that are, and you hate nothing of the things which you have made." Therefore God reprobates no man.
2. Further, if God reprobates any man, reprobation must be related to the reprobated as predestination is to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will be the cause of the perdition of the reprobate. But this is false. For it is said in Hosea 13: "Your destruction is from yourself, O Israel; only in me is your help." Therefore God reprobates no one.
3. Further, nothing ought to be imputed to a man which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates someone, he cannot avoid sinning. For it is said in Ecclesiastes 7: "Consider the works of God, for no one can correct him whom He has despised." Therefore it is not to be imputed to men that they sin. But this is false. Therefore God reprobates no one.

But on the contrary: it is said in Malachi 1: "Jacob have I loved, but Esau I have hated."

I answer that God reprobates some. For it was said above that predestination is a part of providence. But to providence it pertains to permit some defect in the things that are subject to providence, as was said above. Wherefore, since by divine providence men are ordered to eternal life, it also pertains to divine providence to permit some to fall short of this end. And this is called to reprobate. Thus therefore, as predestination is a part of providence with respect to those who are divinely ordered to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence with respect to those who fall short of this end. Whence reprobation does not name foreknowledge only, but adds something according to reason, just as providence does. For as predestination includes the will of conferring grace and glory, so reprobation includes the will of permitting someone to fall into fault, and of inflicting the penalty of damnation for the fault.

2047. Disputatio 89.

Reply to the first: It must be said that God loves all men, and even all creatures, inasmuch as He wills some good to all; yet He does not will every good to all. Inasmuch therefore as to some He does not will this good, which is eternal life, He is said to hate them, or to reprobate them.

Reply to the second: It must be said that reprobation is otherwise disposed in causing than predestination. For predestination is the cause both of that which is expected in the future life by the predestined, namely glory, and of that which is received in the present, namely grace. But reprobation is not the cause of that which is in the present, namely fault; but it is the cause of dereliction by God. Yet it is the cause of that which is rendered in the future, namely eternal punishment. But fault arises from the free choice of him who is reprobated and is deserted by grace. And according to this the saying of the Prophet is verified: "Your destruction, O Israel, is from yourself."

Reply to the third: It must be said that the reprobation of God does not take away anything from the power of the reprobated. Whence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this is not to be understood according to an absolute impossibility, but according to a conditional impossibility, just as it was said above that the predestined must be saved with a conditional necessity, which does not take away the freedom of the will. Whence, although one who is reprobated by God cannot obtain grace, nevertheless what in this he sins, or that he falls into that, happens from his free will. And therefore the guilt is deservedly imputed to him for the fault.

1. No one reprobates what he loves; but God loves every man, according to Wisdom 11: "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man.
2. Further, if God reprobates some man, reprobation must be related to the reprobated as predestination to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will be the cause of the perdition of the reprobate. But this is false. For it is said in Hosea 13: "Thy perdition, O Israel, is from thee; only in me is thy help." Therefore God does not reprobate any man.
3. Further, no one ought to have imputed to him what he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates some man, he cannot avoid perishing; for it is said in Ecclesiastes 7: "Consider the works of God that no man can correct whom He has despised." Therefore it ought not to be imputed to men that they perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate any man.

But on the contrary: It is said in Malachi 1: "Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated."

I answer: It must be said that God reprobates some. For it was said above that predestination is a part of providence. But to providence it belongs to permit some defect in the things subject to providence. Therefore, since by divine providence men are ordered to eternal life, it also belongs to divine providence to permit some to fail of that end. And this is called to reprobate. Thus, just as predestination is a part of providence with respect to those who are divinely ordered to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence with respect to those who fall away from that end.

Hence reprobation does not name foreknowledge only, but adds something, just as providence includes not only foreknowledge but also the ordaining to an end. For just as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory, so reprobation includes the will to permit someone to fall into fault, and to inflict the punishment of damnation for the fault.

Reply to the first: God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wills them some good; yet He does not will every good to all. Insofar, therefore, as He does not will to some this good which is eternal life, He is said to hate or to reprobate them.

Reply to the second: Reprobation is not related to the reprobated as predestination to the predestined. For predestination is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined, namely glory, and of what is received in the present, namely grace. But reprobation is not the cause of what is in the present, namely fault; it is, however, the cause of what is assigned in the future, namely eternal punishment. But fault comes from the free will of the one who is reprobated and deserted by grace; and according to this, damnation is from the justice of God.

Reply to the third: The reprobation of God does not take away anything from the power of the reprobated. Whence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this is not to be understood according to an absolute impossibility, but according to a conditional impossibility, just as it was said above that the predestined must be saved with a conditional necessity, which does not take away the freedom of free choice. Whence, although one reprobated by God cannot obtain grace, nevertheless what in this he sins, or that he falls into that, happens from his free choice. And therefore the guilt is deservedly imputed to him for the fault.

The conclusion is affirmative and of faith: for it is clear from Scripture that many are reprobated by God. St. Thomas proves it by this reasoning: predestination is a part of providence; but it belongs to providence to permit certain defects from the end; therefore it will also belong to reprobation to permit that certain men do not attain glory. When he says, "it belongs to providence to permit certain defects from the end," he is not speaking of a particular providence, but of the universal one, of which he had spoken in Question 22, article 2, ad 2, and of Him who has general care and providence of all things, whom he there calls the universal provider.[2048] Now, as Cajetan observed, in this article St. Thomas does not argue in this reasoning from the universal to the special - that is, from predestination in general to reprobation, which is a species and a certain part of it; for this would be a useless form of arguing - but from a likeness, in this way: just as it pertains to the common providence of other things to permit some of them to fail from their ends, so also it will pertain to the providence by which God directs men to eternal life to permit also that some fail from that end. Moreover, it is to be noted that by this reasoning there is only proved that reprobation and the permission of failing from the end, whatever it be, pertain to the providence of God; just as also the very ordination to the end pertains to the providence of God: yet it does not prove in the same way that now the providence of God permits certain men to fail from their end, just as it also leads certain others to their end: for the providence of God could have so led all things to their ends that it would permit none to fail from it.

2048. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 2; cf. Cajetan, Commentary on ST I, q. 23, a. 3.

This is followed by Durandus in I, dist. 41, q. 2, especially no. 14; Gregory in q. 1, art. 2, conclusions 4 and 5; Marsilius on I, q. 41, art. 2, conclusion 4 and the following; Driedo, book 1, part on the harmony of free will and predestination, chapter 3, conclusions 1 and 3; Ferrariense, book 3 Contra Gentiles, chapter 161; to whom we can add St. Thomas in this question 23, article 5, ad 3.[2049] Yet among these Doctors St. Thomas, Driedo, and Durandus do not say absolutely that no cause of reprobation is given on the part of the reprobate, but that there is no cause on account of which this man rather than another is reprobated; or, which is the same, why this man is predestined and separated from the mass of perdition, while that other is left in it and reprobated. The opinion of these some more recent writers chiefly defend, conceding indeed that there is a cause common to all men, namely original sin, or that of the first parent, on account of which each one could sufficiently be reprobated, and some were in fact reprobated; but that no particular cause is given, besides the good pleasure of God, on account of which this man rather than that other was left in that mass. The rest, however, teach absolutely that no cause of reprobation is given on the part of the reprobate; yet they seem only to speak of the actual sin of the reprobate himself, such that no such sin was the cause of his reprobation; but concerning original sin, Marsilius teaches altogether the same; the others say nothing expressly.

There are then also some Thomists who so severely follow this opinion that they affirm God to have observed the same order in reprobation as He held in predestination; namely, that before the foreseen sins He decreed by His will alone to exclude certain persons from the kingdom of heaven, although He did not destine them to the punishment of sense; just as, conversely, in their view He willed effectively to bestow the kingdom of heaven upon the predestined before foreseen merits. Then those whom He willed to exclude, He permitted to fall into sin with this intention, that He might exclude them from the kingdom, as He had decreed; just as also, on the other side, after the election of certain persons to glory, He effectively called them. Yet the Doctors alleged at the beginning of the chapter in favor of this opinion do not teach that before foreseen sins God willed to make anyone an exile from the kingdom of heaven, nor do they deny it; but they confirm that no cause of reprobation is given, because no cause is given of the first permission into sin.

But concerning little children, although they do not speak expressly, they ought altogether to say the same thing, counting the effects of reprobation from the permission by which God permitted them to fall into original sin. I except Durandus, who in I, dist. 40, q. 2, art. 6, expressly concedes, in the same plan in which God, before works, decreed to choose some effectively unto the kingdom of heaven, that He also rejected others, namely the reprobate, from it; and he considers this to be reprobation, or at least that reprobation begins from there. And he assigns to it only two effects, namely to exclude from the kingdom and to destine to the punishment of sense: the former

2049. Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 41, q. 2 (esp. no. 14); Gregory (of Rimini), q. 1, a. 2, concl. 4 - 5; Marsilius, In I Sent., q. 41, a. 2, concl. 4 and following; Driedo, De concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis, l. 1, c. 3, concl. 1, 3; Ferrariense, Contra Gentiles, l. 3, c. 161; add St. Thomas, ST I, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3.

moreover he thinks is not equally and directly opposed to predestination, but to a certain antecedent to predestination, namely to the election unto eternal life, which he judges to have been made before merits. I also except Ferrariense, who in that chapter 5, under the title "Pro solutione," near the end plainly indicates that God willed to damn no one or to reject anyone from His kingdom - he himself calls it "to dismiss" - unless a fault were foreseen.

First, this opinion is proved by the authority of Scripture, namely Wisdom 12: "Neither king nor tyrant shall in thy sight inquire concerning those whom thou hast destroyed; since therefore thou art just, thou disposest all things justly, and thou thyself also, as thou hast judged those worthy of punishment, condemning them, hast exterminated them from thy kingdom." Therefore, before anyone is foreknown as worthy of some punishment by his own iniquity, God has exterminated him from His kingdom and has destined him to eternal punishment. It is confirmed.

Then in Romans 9 this same view is insinuated often. First, in those words: "But if God, willing to show his wrath and to make known his power, endured with much patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy [supplement]" - "Why then does man still complain?" or, which is the same, as St. Augustine supplies: "But who are you, O man, who answer back to God?" - for the speech is elliptical, and from the preceding that part must be supplied.[2050] Or we can explain the participle "willing" so that it has the force of a verb, and the sense be: "but if he was willing" - that is, if he willed - to show wrath, to this end assuredly he endured vessels fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory, etc. From either sense, however, it is plainly gathered that God first willed to show wrath, that is, to destine men to punishment, and for this He permitted them to fall into sin, and for a long time endured them, that they might be found worthy of the severity of His judgment: therefore God awaited no guilt from them, nor foresaw it, in order to reprobate them - that is, to exclude them from the kingdom of heaven and to permit them to fall into sin - by which two things each one's reprobation consists.

Second, the same thing the Apostle expressed there in Pharaoh, who a little earlier says: "For the Scripture says to Pharaoh: For this very purpose I have raised thee up, that I might show in thee my power," that is, might; as if he had said: therefore I have endured thee for a long time, and permitted thee to fall into sins, that I might inflict the punishment which I had predestined for thee. From which it seems to be gathered that before every will of permitting sin God decreed to punish some and to expel them from the kingdom of heaven; which, in order to accomplish, He endured them in much patience, permitting them to fall into many sins.

Third and finally, in the same chapter the Apostle says of those two brothers, Jacob and Esau, that "before they had done anything either good or evil," Jacob had been loved by God, and Esau hated.

2050. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, l. 1, q. 2 - 3 (on Rom 9), middle.

From the Fathers indeed, St. Augustine in book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, and book 11 (or 1) on Genesis ad litteram, chapters 16 and 18, and frequently in the books On Predestination and On Perseverance; and Prosper, book 1 On the Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 21 (elsewhere 7), seem to have taught the same view.[2051] From all of which...

Ratione probatur. Lastly it is confirmed by reason, because predestination and reprobation are parts of the divine providence, as it were looking upon the same thing in an even balance: therefore in two men, of whom one is predestined, the other reprobated, they begin equally; but predestination in the predestined begins from the first congruous calling, which is connected with perseverance: therefore reprobation will begin from the denial of congruous calling; but of this no cause is given: therefore neither of reprobation. For if there were any cause of it, it would be a preceding sin; but there can be no sin which does not precede permission: therefore in the end we must come to the first permission, of which there is no cause. This reason proves only the opinion of those Scholastics who say that no cause is therefore given of reprobation, because none is given of the first permission; it does not, however, prove that, before foreseen sins, God decreed to exclude some from the kingdom of heaven.

Confirmatur. Next, if a cause of reprobation were given on the side of adults, it would follow that it was in their power to be reprobated and not to be reprobated. But if it lies within them not to be reprobated, then it would also be free to them to be predestined, for there is no mean; and whoever is not reprobate ought to be predestined: but no one has it in his power to be predestined: therefore neither has he that he be not reprobated.

That we may refute this opinion, two things must be established: one is that God did not decree, before foreseen sins, to expel anyone from beatitude; the other is that reprobation, or rejection from glory, in the reprobate does not begin from the first permission, although some reprobation does begin thence. We shall show both in chapter 4 and chapter 5, confirming our opinion.

Caput II - The opinion of Scotus and of others

Scotus, however, differs from this opinion. For in the first book, distinction 41, question 1, 9, "Potest aliter," he asserts that there is in God a twofold reprobation, one he calls punitive, the other truly permissive.[2052]

In this opinion of Scotus I judge that certain things are altogether true and to be embraced; others, if explained in a good sense, can be true; finally, some are false, of which I have not resolved to refute all in this chapter. First, it is most true, and to me more than probable, that before foreseen sins God willed to punish no one with the pain of sense; that also before the foreknowledge of their sins no one was expelled by the eternal counsel of God from beatitude - which will be proved in chapter 4. Secondly, I judge it true that before foreseen sins there was some reprobation and repulse appointed by God. But whether this is to be called permissive reprobation,

2051. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, l. 1, q. 2; De Genesi ad litteram, l. 11 (or 1), cc. 16, 18; De praedestinatione sanctorum; De bono perseverantiae; Prosper of Aquitaine, De vocatione gentium, l. 1, c. 21 (alias 7).

2052. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 41, q. 1, 9 "Potest aliter," positing a twofold reprobation, punitive and permissive.

or even that reprobation which Scotus calls punitive - indeed, that reprobation from eternal life was from the same foreknowledge of sins - we shall prove in the same place. Thirdly, finally, that God behaved negatively toward the reprobate in those two instants, I judge false; which I will now briefly set forth point by point.

But the doctrine handed on by us in disputation 79, chapter 3, is to be presupposed, namely that the will (voluntas) of God cannot comport itself altogether negatively with respect to those things which are not going to be in time; rather, as was proved there, for the things which will not be, God expressly willed that they not be. Wherefore concerning the reprobate, across those various instants, I judge the divine will to have comported itself thus. In the first instant indeed, positively he desired beatitude for them, but with the affect of simple complacency, which he had toward all universally, as was noted in disputation 89, chapter 9. But that they be excluded from the kingdom, displeased God with the same simple affect; for just as of himself God desires beatitude for all, so also that they be deprived thereof supremely displeases him, unless there be a cause, namely sin. But as regards the efficacious act (actus efficax) of the will in that instant, God comported himself negatively toward the reprobate; first, because then he did not will to exclude them from the kingdom - for if we should say that then he willed to exclude them, many absurdities follow, as we shall say in chapter 4; and also because he did not will not to exclude them: for if he had efficaciously willed not to exclude them, they would truly attain beatitude.

Nor is that contrary to this which we said in the place cited above, namely that from eternity God did not comport himself negatively concerning those things which are not going to be in time, but expressly willed that they not be. For this is not to be understood of every sign and instant of reason whatsoever, but of one or another, so that there may be nothing that is not going to be in time which God did not expressly will not to be: and thus that the reprobate not attain glory, God expressly willed from eternity - but not in the first instant, in which he did not yet consider the sins on account of which alone he willed to exclude them from the kingdom of heaven. After therefore in the third instant he foreknew sins, from then on, in the fourth, he expressly willed to deny glory to them. Which, generally speaking, is to be asserted of those things which God willed not to be, and that for some cause or occasion; for he is not understood to have willed them not to be before he foreknew the cause.

Wherefore what Scotus affirms about the second instant - namely, that in it God comported himself negatively concerning the permission of sin and the denial of grace - is false. For although concerning sin, precisely as it is sin, God may have comported himself negatively by an efficacious act, since he neither willed it to be nor willed it not to be; nevertheless concerning permission, which is the denial of efficacious grace, he could not comport himself negatively, as we have already proved in the place cited above. Moreover, in that second instant God positively and expressly willed to deny congruous grace - for since from eternity he was going to have this express will from himself, it is clear: because he was going to deny grace from himself, not on account of any cause, just as also in time he is going to give it from himself to whom he will: therefore in that instant he expressly willed to deny it to those to whom he in fact denied it, just as he willed to give it to those to whom he was going to give it; nor is there need to wait for another sign of reason in

which God would have this will. Concerning glory, however, it must be said in the same proportion - namely, in the same instant, to wit after foreseen works, that he willed to give it to some, but to deny it to others; because each decree concerning glory depends upon the foreknowledge of works. And thus in the first instant, namely in which we consider that God from himself alone willed, so far as concerns the efficacious act, he comported himself negatively concerning glory either to be conferred in time or to be denied; and for another following sign of reason we remit the decree of each, because each depends upon foreseen works, as has been noted, but works in that first sign of reason do not yet appear.

Caput III - That original sin is the cause of reprobation, as some more recent authors think

Thirdly, others hold - as Catherinus and John of Bologna report - that some cause of reprobation is given, and that it is original sin contracted in each one; and that among the effects of reprobation permission to fall into actual sins is to be counted; and of this a sufficient cause is original sin, in whose punishment all helps of grace are denied, whatever are not granted. They report in this opinion Valdes,[2053] where he disputes not about the cause of reprobation, but about the immutability of the divine knowledge. But St. Thomas expressly handed on this opinion, in De veritate q. 6, a. 24, ad 9, and in chapter 8 on the Epistle to the Romans, lecture 3, etc.[2054] Nor is that an obstacle which he said in this question, article 4, ad 3, and which we alleged for the first opinion: for both can be true, both that no cause is given which could be proper to reprobation, or, to speak more precisely, that no peculiar cause of this division is given, as he taught in article 4; and yet that there is a sufficient and common cause on account of which, whoever is reprobated is reprobated - namely original sin - as he taught elsewhere. Concerning infants it can be asserted for certain that the cause of their reprobation is this very sin; and so, as effects of this reprobation, they only reckon the punishment and penalty; yet the series of instants in the divine mind is thus constituted. In the first instant God saw the first man with all his posterity fallen into sin. In the second he decreed to apply the remedy through the incarnation of Christ. In the third, out of men lost in the same mass, he willed efficaciously to give eternal life to some, but to exclude others from the kingdom, leaving them in the mass of perdition in which they were. Hence too he permits adults to slide down into actual sins, and to persist in them. The other instants can easily thereafter be assigned. In this way these Doctors most excellently defend that reprobation is an act of justice, which by its nature requires sin and merits punishment. What they think, however, about the reprobation of the angels, we shall say a little later.

2053. Valdes, tomo 1, pars 1, lib. 1, cap. 17, where he treats not of the cause of reprobation but of the immutability of divine knowledge.

2054. St. Thomas, De veritate q. 6, a. 24, ad 9; Commentary on Romans, c. 8, lect. 3, etc.

Confirmatur auctoritate. They prove this first from St. Augustine in many places, especially Epistle 105, in the Enchiridion c. 57, and in On the Predestination of the Saints c. 14, where he affirms that in his mercy God has by predestination freed certain ones from the mass of perdition, but in his just judgment has left certain others in it: moreover Augustine presupposes that all were in the same mass of perdition before any distinction was made by their merits.[2055]

A third opinion of others. Some judge, as Catherinus and Ioannes a Bononia report, that for adults there is given a cause of reprobation, and that it is original sin contracted in each one; moreover they reckon among the effects of reprobation the permission to fall into actual sin; but the sufficient cause of this is original sin, in whose penalty all helps of grace are denied, whatever are not granted. They report in this opinion Valdés, tom. 1, part 1, book 1, ch. 27, where indeed he does not dispute about the cause of reprobation, but about the immutability of divine knowledge. [2056] But St. Thomas expressly handed on this opinion in De veritate q. 6, a. 24, ad 9, and on Romans c. 8, lect. 3 and 4.[2057] Nor does what he said in this question, a. 3, ad 3, and which we alleged for the first opinion, stand in the way; for both can be true: both that no cause is given why this one rather is reproved while that one is predestined - for there is no peculiar cause of this division, as he taught in article 5 - and that there is given a sufficient and common cause on account of which whoever is reproved is reproved justly, namely original sin, as he taught elsewhere in other places. As to infants, they assert that the same sin is the cause of their reprobation, and to such a degree that as the only effect of this reprobation they list punishment and penalty.

According to the sequence of this opinion they set up the instants in the mind of God thus. First, God saw the first man with his whole posterity fallen into sin. Second, he decreed to apply a remedy through the incarnation of Christ. Third, out of men lost in the same mass he willed to give eternal life efficaciously to some, but to exclude others from the kingdom, leaving them in the mass of perdition in which they were. Hence too he permitted adults to slip into actual sins and to persevere in them to the end. The other instants can afterwards be easily assigned. In this way these Doctors excellently defend that reprobation is an act of justice, which by its nature requires sin and the merit of punishment. What, however, they think about the reprobation of the angels, we shall say a little below.

They prove it first from St. Augustine in many places, especially Epistle 105 around the end, in the Enchiridion c. 57, and in On the Predestination of the Saints c. 14, where he affirms that in his mercy God has by predestination freed certain ones from the mass of perdition, but in his just judgment has left certain others in it: therefore Augustine presupposes that all together were in the same mass of perdition before either they were predestined or were reproved by God.[2058] Then they confirm it by a consideration which has great force in the school of the Angelic Doctor: since Christ was predestined on the occasion of the sin of the first parent, therefore before his predestination all were under a common debt and the death of sin; but Christ's predestination preceded ours, and

2055. St. Augustine, Epistula 105; Enchiridion c. 57; De praedestinatione sanctorum c. 14.
2056. Valdés, tom. 1, pars 1, lib. 1, cap. 27.
2057. St. Thomas, De veritate q. 6, a. 24, ad 9; Commentary on Romans, c. 8, lect. 3 - 4.
2058. St. Augustine, Epistula 105; Enchiridion c. 57; De praedestinatione sanctorum c. 14.

therefore also the reprobation of the damned: therefore original sin could have been the common cause of reprobation. Wherefore he did not speak in the same way about the reprobation of demons and of men: for the demons could not have had any cause of their reprobation of this sort. Therefore about them they assert with the Doctors of the first opinion that before any sin was foreseen they were reproved and excluded from the kingdom of heaven and permitted to fall into sin.

This opinion, to the extent that it agrees with the first, is impugned by us below in the same way. But whether in this point, in which it asserts that the cause of the reprobation of men was original sin, it is true, will be explained there in the same place. However, that which it supposes in the argument, namely that original sin contracted in each one was foreseen before our predestination and Christ's, is manifestly false. For from that it would follow that the Blessed Virgin not only contracted original sin and was foreseen with it, but also could not have been preserved from it by Christ. For if before Christ's predestination all had been foreseen as about to be born with original sin, Christ's merit could have profited them nothing so as to preserve anyone from it, if indeed the preservation, if it were conceded to anyone, would have been prior to the merit of Christ. Therefore only the grace of God, without any merit of Christ foreseen, could have prevented the Virgin so that she did not contract original sin, which is absurd: since all confess that whatever grace was bestowed on the posterity of Adam and on the Blessed Virgin was the grace of redemption from the merits of Christ, as we observed against Durandus in the preceding disputation, c. 4.

The adversaries answer: that the Blessed Virgin in the order of intention was foreseen with original sin, but was freed in the order of execution. But the distinction of the order of intention and of execution, which is wont to be assigned by the Doctors, can in no way be accommodated to the present difficulty. For it is this, that what in execution will truly be posterior is prior in intention; that is, the man first consults and deliberates about it and by his will decrees, as we explained in disputation 89, c. 7. But things which in no way were going to be future in reality could not have been prior or posterior in intention and execution. Wherefore, since the Blessed Virgin was in no way going to be born in original sin, it follows that neither earlier in intention nor later was she foreseen in it.

How the position set down is refuted by others. Then Catherinus and Ioannes a Bononia attack the same opinion in the opuscules On Predestination in this way: original sin contracted in each one was not in reality the cause why many damned did not obtain beatitude; for many were justified from original sin: therefore it could work nothing toward their damnation, not only so that on account of it glory would be denied them, but not even grace; for once original sin is remitted, it could not leave a fitting subject to be deprived of grace or of glory. More suitably, then, one would assert as the cause of reprobation the sin of the first parent in himself alone, and not yet derived into his descendants, inasmuch as of itself it was apt and sufficient to infect the whole posterity. For although in the first parent by penance it was blotted out as to the guilt, the stain, and the penalty due to himself, nevertheless there remained a debt of being without grace in the whole posterity, which Christ by his merit, as to sufficiency, condignly compensated, although many in

fact on account of it lacked the grace of a congruent calling and were permitted to fall into sin and were damned. But in what way, and in what sense, this sin of Adam could have been a cause of reprobation will be said below.

Caput IV - Certain notes for an explication of the truer opinion

Note the first. Now in order that we may explain a more probable opinion both about the manner of speaking and about the thing itself, four points must be premised, of which three regard the thing itself, but the fourth regards the words. The first is that on the part of him who falls into the first actual sin after he has been justified from original sin there is no cause of that first permission; this I judge to be as certain as what was said about the first calling from the mind of St. Augustine and others in disputation 91. Therefore just as for the first calling no cause is given, so neither for the permission, in him who is permitted after he has been justified from original sin. But among the Massilians and the Greek Fathers, with whom St. Augustine strongly contended about the first calling, this is not all that certain. For yet they could in no way assert that before the first permission there had preceded some sin on account of which someone would be allowed to fall into the first sin; nonetheless they asserted this: that for little ones who are damned the grace of baptism was denied to them because of sins which they would have committed if they had lived, as we reported in disputation 91, c. 2. Moreover, since they thought that adults dispose themselves from free choice in such wise that grace is conferred on them, and on the part of him whom grace prevents they did not grant a peculiar congruent grace, as we shall say in disputation 98, c. 4, they would not so easily concede that the permission of sin is a subtraction of some preventing grace which otherwise would impede the sin; but perhaps they would say that up to the consent into sin all are called with equal grace. But for those who respond and who persevere, a peculiar grace, and for those who do not persevere, to be given by God, will be proved in that disputation fully and beyond enough. From which it follows that there is no sin which is not preceded by some permission, that is, a negation of a congruent calling, by which God knows that the sin would otherwise be prevented if it were granted.

Note the second. Secondly it is certain, nor can any Semipelagian even deny, that every permission of sin must rightly be attributed to the merit of the sin of the first parent, although it cannot be ascribed to original sin which has already been blotted out by baptism or the love of God. For thus Fulgentius in the book On the Incarnation and Grace, ch. 12 and 13 at the beginning, taught that the human race lost in Adam every holy and pious disposition, and recovered none except by the merit of the second Adam.[2059] Nor does it stand in the way that Adam's sin in himself was utterly blotted out by penance: for there remained that obligation of punishment, indeed even the obligation of original guilt, which he merited for the whole posterity; but original sin contracted in anyone after it has been remitted by baptism or by the love of God is in no way a cause either of

2059. Fulgentius, De incarnatione et gratia, c. 12 - 13.

the permission of sin or of eternal damnation. And therefore in the preceding chapter I noted that it can be better assigned as a sufficient cause of reprobation, the sin of the first parent, than original sin contracted in each one.

Note the third. Thirdly I for my part judge it to be most true, against many recent writers whom I have mentioned for the first and third opinions, that no one was by God excluded from the kingdom or destined to punishment before foreseen works. To this opinion indeed Scotus subscribes, and those who follow his view (except Antonio de Corduba), and all whom in the following chapter we shall adduce for our opinion; and besides the testimonies of the Fathers which we there then cited, it can also now be proved to others and confirmed with efficacious reasons.

It is proved, first from Scripture, and is confirmed by efficacious reasons. The first testimony is Deuteronomy 32: "God did not make death, nor does he take pleasure in the destruction of the dying"; as if to say, of himself he would not have death, nor absolutely does he take pleasure in it, except on account of, and by the merit of, our sin. For since God has appointed punishment and death for sin, it is not the case that he is pleased with it according to itself, but so that he may preserve justice and equity.[2060]

The second testimony is St. John Damascene, book two On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 29, where he teaches that by the primary and antecedent will, which he says is from God himself, with no occasion as yet offered by us, God desires and wills not the salvation of only some, but of all; and it is impossible that God of himself should at once will that some man be saved and perish, admit him to the kingdom and exclude him: therefore before foreseen works he denied beatitude to no one.[2061] For that he should will of himself that someone be made blessed, but by the fault foreseen he should will with regard to the same to damn, are not contrary wills. For the same human judge of himself most ardently desires life to someone whom nevertheless on account of guilt he decrees to be afflicted with the punishment of death. This consideration not only proves that no one was by God damned and expelled from beatitude before the foreseen sin of the first parent, but also not after the sin; for although that sin was foreseen, the will of salvation and beatitude still remained in God, because he provided sufficient remedies for this after Adam's fall: from which it follows that he simply willed their end, namely beatitude.

But someone may object that nothing prevents there being at once in the same God a simple will of salvation for someone and an efficacious will of punishing and damning the same; therefore in God these two wills could at once have been, a simple will of blessing men with beatitude, and an efficacious will of expelling them from the kingdom of heaven. I answer: these two wills are not contrary when they arise from different causes, as, if someone of himself should will salvation to another, but on account of that man's guilt should will punishment; but to will from himself that someone be blessed, and from himself to will to damn the same, is altogether contrary and repugnant.

2060. Deuteronomy 32; cf. Sapientia 1:13: "Deus mortem non fecit, nec laetatur in perditione vivorum."
2061. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, c. 29.

The same line of reasoning can be shown by which in disputation 89, c. 9, 10, and 11, we made use to prove that no one was elected to the kingdom of heaven before the merits of grace were foreseen. The first is that the order in the mind of God ought to be assigned from the order of the objects among themselves; wherefore whenever God does something in time from merits, it must be said that he did not decree otherwise than from merits: therefore since in time God excludes from the kingdom of heaven and destines to punishment and the penalty of fire from merits, it follows that from eternity he decreed that thing only from the foreknowledge of those same merits; this reason is had in that chapter 9. The second reason is: if of himself God had efficaciously predetermined to exclude someone from the kingdom before foreseen works, a necessity of his damnation would be imposed on him, and it would be altogether impossible that he be saved, and all liberty would be taken away by which a man could be saved: which is absurd; just as on the contrary in c. 10 we proved the same about the consequence of glory if God had decreed to bless someone before works. The third reason is that from the opposite opinion the efficacy of sins is taken away with regard to punishment itself, or expulsion from glory. For if this was defined by God before foreseen works, then sins in time contribute nothing at all to the inflicting of this punishment; just as in c. 10 I proved the same about good merits with respect to glory, if this had been predetermined before those. Which reasons indeed must be drawn in the same way, and confirmed, as those which in those chapters we pursued.

Note the fourth. Fourth it must be observed that the words Reprobation, to reprobate, and reprobate (reprobus) are rarely found in Scripture and in the Fathers, especially in the signification about which the dispute is for us; and in some places where they would seem to be so used, it is not certain that they have that signification. The passages of Scripture are Ecclesiasticus 9: "The beauty of a strange woman has many in admiration; they have become reprobates," and 1 Corinthians 9: "I chastise my body and bring it into servitude, lest perhaps when I have preached to others I myself should become a reprobate," and 2 Timothy 3: "And these resist the truth, men corrupted in mind, reprobate concerning the faith," and Titus.[2062] But in these places "reprobate" does not mean one who is cut off and repulsed from the kingdom of heaven and from the grace of God, but the same as "wicked, depraved." For the Greek is adokimos, which also signifies wicked. Nay rather the word reprobus among the Latins is more often used in this signification. It is set also in 2 Corinthians 13; but in this signification rather, I judge, it is to be understood. Now if in these places we should understand "reprobate" in that signification about which we are now disputing, then from those places it would not follow that the cause of reprobation preceded; nor does the sequel -

We shall say what the word "reprobo" signifies. Now the Latin word "reprobo," being set over against the word "probo," denotes to disapprove or to reject something; in which signification it is more frequently employed in Scripture: Mark 8; Luke 9 and 17; and 1 Corinthians 1; and in this latter place, if anywhere, it is set in this signification.[2063] But whether from that place we can gather any cause of reprobation, in the same, the following chapter must be said.

2062. Ecclesiasticus 9; 1 Corinthians 9:27; 2 Timothy 3:8; Titus 1:16; 2 Corinthians 13:5 - 7.
2063. Mark 8; Luke 9; Luke 17; 1 Corinthians 1.

Finally, St. Augustine and the other Fathers do not use the name "Reprobation," or the verb "I reprobate": once I found the word "Reprobate" in Augustine; but in what sense, and whether he assigns its cause, is afterward to be explained. Rather, Augustine and other Fathers oppose to predestination to eternal life, predestination to the second death; and to election unto grace, dereliction in the mass of perdition. Those, however, who are left in the mass, and are not separated from it by the mercy of God, Augustine says are deserted by God, and that God does not have mercy on them.

Caput V - On the cause of reprobation in adults; the truer opinion

Since a good part of this controversy is about a word, it will be easy, in accordance with the things that have been noted, after a certain distinction has been premised, to pronounce the truer opinion, and one more conformable to the testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers. But since reprobation (*reprobatio*) is both of little ones and of adults, and the case of each is not the same, for greater clarity it has seemed good to treat only of adults in this chapter, but in the following to discuss little ones.

Therefore, since to reprobate is the same as to disapprove someone and to reject, if "reprobation" is used for the act by which someone is rejected by God, a distinction is needed. Either we speak of the act by which someone is rejected from the grace (*gratia*) of God; or of that by which he is rejected from the kingdom of heaven. If the discourse is of the former, it must be asserted that there is no cause on the part of him who is rejected except the sin of the first parent. And it must be understood that the negation is of the first negation of grace and of congruous calling (*vocatio congrua*), by which man is rejected from the grace of the predestined, yet in such wise that God rejects no one from his grace with this intention, namely, that he also exclude him from the kingdom of heaven. For from such an intention it would follow that God from eternity, before the negation of congruous grace and before foreseen sins, had pre-appointed someone an exile from beatitude (*beatitudo*), which is absurd, as was shown in the preceding chapter. Wherefore this mode of reprobation is not opposed to predestination to glory on the part of the end to which it is directed, but only on the part of the means of grace which are granted to the predestined, but are denied to the reprobate, yet not with a contrary intention, namely of excluding them from the kingdom. In this mode of reprobation that saying in Romans 11 can be understood: "God has not cast off his people whom he foreknew," that is, he has not cast off from his grace that small part of the Israelite people which he chose for himself, as he cast off the remaining multitude of that same people, until the fullness of the Gentiles enter into the Church; for "the remnant," that is, the few, "have been saved by the election of grace." On the contrary, many of them were repulsed and cast out from the grace of God.[2064]

But the other places of Scripture, if they are understood of reprobation, are to be taken, in the signification of the Scholastics, not of reprobation from first grace, but of reprobation from glory, or from some further grace, as we shall say presently. Of this reprobation, therefore, I see no other

2064. Romans 11:2, 5.

common cause besides the sin of the first parent. For since original sin is blotted out by the grace of God in many even of the reprobate, that cannot be the cause of reprobation from grace; yet the common sin of the first parent can be such a cause (as I observed in chapter 3).

In this view agree with us the doctors of the second opinion, except Corduba, in so far as they assert that no one before foreseen works has been excluded from beatitude. But for reprobation from grace, which they call permissive, they do not posit a cause on the part of the reprobate himself. Nor do they deny that Adam's sin is a sufficient cause of that. Only this in their opinion does not please me, that they assert, concerning the negation of congruous grace and the permission of sin, that God bore himself negatively; which was impugned in chapter 3. The doctors also of the first opinion we can interpret in this sense. For no one said that before foreseen sin God decreed to cast out someone from beatitude. Wherefore perhaps they speak of reprobation from first grace; and for that reason they said that the effect of reprobation begins from the first permission.

In this mode to reprobate is the same as not to have mercy; and not to have mercy, as Augustine noted in Ad Simplicianum, book 1, question 2, is the same as to harden, with the Apostle when in Romans 9 he says: "Whom he will, he has mercy on; and whom he will, he hardens."[2065]

But of this hardening there is, on our part, no cause other than the sin of the first parent, if hardening is taken from the first permission; for if we speak of other permissions, by which, after many sins committed, someone is forsaken by God, on the part of the one abandoned the prior sins are the cause of the later hardening. St. Augustine in that place sets down this distinction between mercy, by which God lavishes a congruous calling (*vocatio congrua*), and hardening, which arises from the negation of grace (*gratia*); which, although by reason of the prevenient calling the Apostle says, "It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that has mercy," namely a work proceeding from grace, because it was God's alone thus to call that the will should be moved and should do; yet it cannot be said, "It is not of him that is unwilling and that despises, but of God that hardens," because God does not prevent us so that we sin and are worse, but he does prevent us so that we be better and consent to the calling; only this is not dispensed by God (says Augustine), namely something by which we may be better, when, to wit, a congruous calling is denied, by which we would act rightly and would not consent to sin. Yet of this reprobation (*reprobatio*) in the demons there was no other cause than the will of God: for at the first permission no sin preceded in them, or in others, which could be its cause.

Second, if we speak of reprobation in so far as it is opposed to predestination (*praedestinatio*) on the part of the end, by which namely a man or an angel in the eternal foreknowledge is excluded from the kingdom, it has a cause in the reprobate himself, namely the sins in which he ends his life. Wherefore this reprobation does not begin from the first permission and the negation of grace, but from the very destination by which someone, from sins foreseen, is excluded from the kingdom and consigned to eternal torments. Of this the Fathers speak more frequently, when they treat of the contrary of predestination. This Fulgentius and the Council of Valence under the Emperor Lothar

2065. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, q. 2; Romans 9:18.

call predestination to death, namely the second; the cause of this, however, is the sins in which a man perseveres unto death, against the more recent authors whom we have mentioned above; this can easily be proved.

And first of all, if in the passages of Scripture above cited the word "reprobate" or "I reprobate" is used in the signification customary among the Scholastics when they dispute concerning reprobation, without doubt from them it would be gathered that there is some cause of reprobation. For that passage Ecclesiasticus 9 indicates a cause of reprobation, when it says: "Many have admired the beauty of a woman"; and 1 Corinthians 9, when Paul says that he chastises his body, "lest perhaps I become a reprobate," he understands that the sins which otherwise he would commit, unless he restrained his body, would be the cause of his reprobation. But in 2 Timothy 3, where it is said that some are "reprobate concerning the faith," the cause is there set down manifestly, when it says, "corrupted in mind." In these places, however, and in others, I noted in the preceding chapter that these words are not used in that signification, but that "reprobate" is the same as "wicked" and "vicious." In 1 Corinthians 1 the verb "I reprobate" is set down and denotes to disapprove or to condemn, when it is said: "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the prudence of the prudent I will reprobate." But there it does not signify the reprobation about which we are now disputing. And if Paul were speaking about that, he would have indicated a manifest cause of it; for the wisdom which God reproves is that of the wise of this world, who, inflated with the sense of their flesh, have judged the wisdom of God to be foolish. This therefore God will "reprobate," that is, he will condemn it, convicting them of folly, since through the preaching of the Gospel, which seemed to them folly, he will save believers.

Omitting therefore the testimonies of Scripture, this our sentence is proved from the Fathers; first, from the Council of Valence under the Emperor Lothar, chapter 3, where it is thus said: "We confidently confess the predestination of the elect to life, and the predestination of the impious to death; yet in the election of those to be saved the mercy of God precedes the good merit; in the damnation, however, of those who are to perish, the evil merit precedes the just judgment of God"; where he opposed two predestinations to each other on the part of the end. Of that one, which is of the impious to death, he said that the cause is merit and proper sin. Nor does he speak only of destination to the pain of sense, which all confess to be from the forevision of sin, but also of the second death, which is damnation, and principally consists in the privation of beatitude. Then the Council adds that by predestination God determined only those things which he himself was going to do by gratuitous mercy or by just judgment. This sentence it took from Augustine in the book To the Articles Falsely Imputed to Him, article n., or rather from Prosper, who is rightly believed to be the author of that book; and it is found in Fulgentius, book 1 To Monimus, chapter 13.[2066] He holds therefore that God did nothing in the predestination of the wicked which he was not going to do by just judgment: since therefore from eternity God expelled some from beatitude by just judgment, and hence on account of their own fault he so predestined; for just judgment demands this cause.

2066. Council of Valence (Concilium Valentinum) under Emperor Lothar, c. 3; Augustine, Ad articulos sibi falso impositos; Prosper as probable author; Fulgentius, Ad Monimum, lib. 1, cap. 13.

Second, it is proved from Augustine, book 6 of the Hypognosticon, a little after the beginning, where he writes thus: "But since God is just and merciful, and foreknowing of things to come, from this damnable mass, not by the acceptance of persons, but by the judgment of his equity, those whom he foreknows to be prepared by gratuitous mercy, that is, he predestines to eternal life: but he punishes the rest with penalties; whom he therefore punishes, because he foresaw what they would be; yet he himself did not make them to be punished, nor predestined them." And a little after the middle, concerning little ones and adults, he says: "It must be held as a fixed rule in this shaken dispute, which has shone forth by divine testimonies, that sinners were foreknown in their own evils before they were in the world, as not predestined (he understands, to sin), but that punishment was predestined to them according as they were foreknown. He also predestines unbaptized little ones to be liable to punishment, who were foreknown, not by their own wills, but only in Adam's sin, which they drew contracting it by being born, and, remaining in this, they paid out the time of the present life." When Augustine says that punishment was predestined by God from the foreknowledge of sin, he understands this not only of the pain of sense, but also of the greatest of all, which is the privation of beatitude; for he says that it was predestined to little ones from the foreknowledge of the sin which they contracted and in which they ended their life. But when he affirms that God does not make men to be punished, nor predestines them, he understands this as "from himself without a foreseen cause": for if from himself, before the foreknowledge of sin, he were to decree to exclude a man from eternal life, he would make him to be punished, and would destine him to the sum of punishment and to the second death. Then, in book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, after the middle, he has these words: "Esau therefore would not, and did not run; but if he had willed, and had run, he would have attained by the help of God, so that, if the calling had been despised, he would be made a reprobate." He holds therefore that the cause on account of which he would have been made reprobate, if he had not run, would be that he had despised the calling; and hence the cause of that man's reprobation would have been sin.[2067]

Third, the same sentence is gathered from Prosper, first from the book Ad capitula Gallorum, chapter 3, where he says: "Those therefore who, having fallen thus, ended in this evil without the correction of repentance, did not have a necessity of perishing, because they were not predestined; but they were therefore not predestined, because they were foreknown to be going to be such from voluntary prevarication." The same he says in the book Ad capitula Gallorum, to objection 7, and about the end in sentence 7, which I shall report below in chapter 9. He calls "not predestined" the reprobate, or those destined to the second death; and he says the cause is proper prevarication. For this author cannot be understood by "non-predestination" to mean the negation of every congruous grace from the first help unto the last; for of this no cause is given, just as neither of predestination itself, in the doctrine of that doctor whom, for the sentence of Augustine, we alleged in disputation 91, chapter 12: or at least the cause of this non-predestination in his opinion is not the proper prevarication, but the common fault of the first parent, as was explained above; and to the Vincentian objections, response 11, he says that God did not predestine sin, but the judgment

2067. Pseudo-Augustine, Hypognosticon, lib. 6; Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, q. 2.

by which he was going to render to each one according to his works; where he concedes the cause of predestination to punishment and of just judgment, when he says that God will render to each one according to his works.[2068]

Fourth, in the same sentence Fulgentius can be alleged, book 1 To Monimus, chapters 13, 14, 19, 24, and 27, where he opposes to the predestination of a man to life the predestination of a man to death, not to the first, which is sin, but to the second, which is punishment, such as is the perpetual privation of beatitude.[2069]

Finally, by reason the same opinion is proved; I confirm thus. If of reprobation, in so far as it is truly predestination to the second death and to the privation of beatitude, there were not a cause on our part, this would be because it would begin in us from the first permission of sin, that is, from the first negation of a congruous and efficacious calling, for which on our part no cause can be assigned, except the common one, which was the sin of the first parent: but that first permission does not pertain to this reprobation, since it is not from the intention of excluding someone from the kingdom of heaven, as we showed in the preceding chapter; it follows that he was not predestined by God to this end. Wherefore, when God permits someone to fall into sin, or denies him his efficacious grace, he does not "reprobate" someone, so to speak, from beatitude, nor reject him from it, but only from his grace. For although from such permission a man will sin, and on account of sin be excluded from the kingdom of heaven; nevertheless, precisely in the instant in which God permits or denies congruous grace, he does not intend, nor determine, to expel him from beatitude by such a means. What other end he has, we shall say in the solution of the arguments. The very same judgment must absolutely be made concerning the reprobation of the demons in this second signification: for the reason which we have just given proves the same about the demons as about men. He prepares sufficient means, by which he himself may make use, or another on his behalf, unto that end.

Caput VI - On the cause of the reprobation of little ones, what is to be held

With the foundations laid in chapter 4, it is easy to gather what is to be said about the reprobation of little ones, with the same proportion kept as that with which I have spoken about adults. Therefore, if we speak of that reprobation by which someone is rejected from grace, in the case of little ones themselves who have contracted original sin, by no means was there any cause at all of their reprobation in themselves: for nothing could have been prior in them than that God should deny them His grace; from which it came to pass that they contracted original sin. But the true cause of this reprobation was the common sin of the first parent, by whose merit sin entered into all, except Christ the Lord and the Blessed Virgin; apart from this cause there was no other, unless the will of God - a thing which no one can deny.

2068. Prosper of Aquitaine, Ad capitula Gallorum, c. 3; Ad capitula Gallorum, ad objectionem 7, and sententia 7; see also Vazquez, disput. 91, c. 12; Responses to the Vincentian objections, resp. 11.

2069. Fulgentius, Ad Monimum, lib. 1, cc. 13, 14, 19, 24, 27.

If, however, we speak of that reprobation by which one is expelled from beatitude, some think that one ought not to philosophize in the same way about all little ones. For there are some who not only contracted original sin, but for whom no remedy could be applied by human diligence, divine providence so disposing,[2070] as we shall dispute in 97. These therefore they purify in God's foreknowledge as excluded from the kingdom of heaven, not after original sin was contracted by them, but straightway after the sin of the first parent was foreseen, so that after it God no longer had the antecedent will to lead them to life eternal or to free them from sin, which He had towards all before the sin of the first parent. For if, once that was foreseen, God determined to deny to certain persons the helps of salvation in such wise that no human diligence could be applied to them, He Himself did not will with antecedent will to save them; for from this we infer that there is in God at least the will of simple complacency to lead a man to some end, because He prepares sufficient means by which he himself, or another on his behalf, may be able to be applied unto that end. But if He Himself preclude access, so that by human industry and diligence the means cannot be applied to that end, how shall we believe that God willed to lead such a man to that end? Therefore, although God of Himself, before every sin, willed beatitude for all by that primary and antecedent will; nevertheless, with that sin of the first parent foreseen, by a consequent will He no longer willed glory for those to whom by no manner of concession could the means be applied, but by a consequent will, because of the sin of the first parent, He willed wholly to exclude them from the kingdom. I, however, judge that the reprobation of these was brought about in the second signification straightway after the sin of the first parent: and that the permission also to contract original sin in themselves was an effect of this reprobation - yet in this order, namely, that straightway after the foreseen sin of Adam God did not by an efficacious decree determine to exclude them from the kingdom of heaven, but it simply pleased God with a non-efficacious affection to deprive them of beatitude because of the sin of the first parent, and by a consequent will the sin of the first parent made it displeasing to bestow glory on those to whom, of Himself, before the sin was foreseen, by an antecedent will He desired glory. From this simple complacency about the end, to wit, of punishing them by the privation of beatitude, in the following instant He permitted them, without remedy, to fall into original sin; and in the third instant He efficaciously decreed to exclude them from the kingdom of beatitude. From this it follows that the permission to contract original sin, and to die in it, is an effect of the reprobation of these, taken in this manner; whereas the permission into actual sin in adults is not an effect of reprobation thus taken.

The reason for the difference is that, in order that the permission of falling into sin be an effect of reprobation, it must arise from some intention of excluding the very reprobate from beatitude; but this intention did not exist with respect to adults before the permission of sin, and therefore the permission is not an effect of reprobation; it did exist, however, with respect to little ones, as we have said, and thus, if from that intention God permitted them to fall into sin, such permission, as from God, is an effect of their reprobation.

Therefore we do not grant that God had an efficacious will to exclude little ones from the kingdom before the sin of Adam was foreseen, because certain inconveniences follow which we brought forward in opposition to those who assert that God decreed to beatify someone before foreseen merits of grace.[2071] The first inconvenience in the reprobation of little ones would be that that efficacious will to exclude them from the kingdom, straightway after Adam's sin was foreseen, should still have been going to remain even if that child were afterwards baptized and God efficaciously applied to him remedies against original sin: which must be proved in the same way that in chapter 10 of that disputation we showed that he who was efficaciously elected to the kingdom of heaven is in the same way nevertheless to be glorified even if he were to die in sins, as if he were to depart with the merits of grace.

Then it would follow that original sin contracted in time would in no way be the cause of excluding these little ones from beatitude, nor would they be excluded because they would not have grace, but because their first parent sinned; whose sin alone would be the entire cause of losing the kingdom of heaven: just as also we proved in chapter 11 that merits would do nothing at all toward glory if glory had been efficaciously preordained by God before works. Therefore, since in time the proximate cause on account of which the little one does not attain beatitude is the privation of grace, because he lacks the grace which he ought to have; it follows that from that privation he is deprived of the kingdom of heaven, and hence that in the eternal foreknowledge by the prevision of that privation he was efficaciously expelled from beatitude: just as also I proved in that disputation, chapter 9, that merits were foreseen in eternity, so that from them election should be made unto glory, because in time they were to be rewarded; and therefore man is to be glorified because he was to have merits.

Someone will object in this way: if God by an intention even of simple complacency to exclude a little one from the kingdom wills the permission of sin, He must also will the very original sin which proximately brings it about that someone is deprived of glory. For we said in disputation 92, chapter 1, that therefore God did not will of Himself penitence and the correction of men by a primary will, because He would have to will also sin, as sin, which under that formal aspect penitence and correction necessarily regard. If therefore of Himself He willed by a simple affection to deny glory to the little one, He also ought to have been pleased with that one's original sin, by which He had to execute what by a simple affection He desired, namely, to exclude little ones from the kingdom of heaven.

I answer that the difference is manifest. For he who desires penitence for someone, before he sees that person's sin already committed, by that very fact desires for him the necessary object of this act, which is sin as sin; and thus, if for that end he permits sin, he also must will that he himself sin. But from the fact that, the sin of the first parent being foreseen, by whose merit the grace promised to posterity was lost, it pleases God to deny glory to certain ones, there is no need that their original sin, as guilt and as sin, please Him also; but that it please Him also to deprive

2070. Vazquez refers ahead to his own Disputation 97.

2071. Vazquez alludes to arguments set out above, Disputation 89, and to the structured proofs in the same disputation, chs. 10 - 11.

them of the promised grace, which is the seed of glory, if indeed it pleases Him to deprive them of glory. Therefore God considers the privation of grace, not as, by relation to the voluntariness of the first parent, it has the ratio of guilt - for so it cannot please Him - but as it is the privation of a certain gift without that relation and with a moral being; and under this aspect God directly wills it, and by the will whereby it pleases Him to deny the fruit, namely glory, it also pleases Him to deny the seed, namely grace itself.

Then I judge that all the other little ones, for whom God left remedies which human diligence could apply, but which, through negligence or even through the sins of their parents, were not applied to them, were not reprobated by God except after the end of their life in original sin was foreseen. And first I do not doubt that God did not decree efficaciously to exclude these from the kingdom straightway after the sin of the first parent, but after the negligence of the parents was foreseen; otherwise it would follow that by no diligence could they have been saved, or that, even if they were baptized, nonetheless they would have had to be excluded from the kingdom of heaven, as we proved above about the other little ones.

Next, not only did God not decree efficaciously to expel them from His kingdom, but He did not even with a simple affection desire this for them. For when after the fall of the first parent He granted them means and left these in the power of their parents, He had not yet been displeased to beatify them, until He saw that through the negligence of their parents the remedies had not been applied to them, and therefore that they had died in original sin. For as long as God saw that the remedies could have been applied to them, He still desired beatitude for them: for if the beatitude of little ones had already displeased God, He would not have placed in the power of others the remedies by which little ones could be saved. Therefore in these little ones reprobation began with the destination to the punishment of the privation of glory after their end in original sin was foreseen; whereas the reprobation of the other little ones began with the very permission of contracting original sin. The reason for the difference arises from the diverse manner in which God bore Himself concerning their beatitude straightway after the sin of the first parent was foreseen. For the reprobation of those whose beatitude straightway displeased God began from the permission, because the permission was born from the will of the end of reprobation; but the reprobation of those to whom God always of Himself willed to give beatitude, until He foresaw their end, could not begin from the permission of falling into original sin: because that permission did not arise from any will of excluding them from the kingdom of heaven, which is the end of reprobation.

From this doctrine, both concerning adults and concerning reprobate little ones, we may assign, in the mind of God according to our manner of consideration, this series: first, that God foresaw all in the mass of perdition, subject to sin, because of Adam's transgression. Second, that, this notwithstanding, He willed by a primary will of Himself that certain little ones and all adults should attain beatitude, and for this granted sufficient means, though He denied efficacious and congruous means, not with the intention of excluding them from the kingdom, but of pouring forth His riches upon vessels of mercy. Third, that He foresaw who would die in sin, whether actual or original. And on account of this, in a fourth instant He efficaciously decreed to expel them from

beatitude, and besides destined adults to the pain of fire; from which fourth instant their reprobation from glory begins. But with respect to the other little ones, to whom He did not grant that remedies could be applied, He had already constituted the order in the divine foreknowledge, and we have shown that their reprobation began from the denial of grace.

Further, it follows that reprobation from beatitude is a part of providence concerning men, opposed indeed to the predestination of grace; yet it does not begin in all from the same instant from which predestination begins. The difference, however, arises from the diversity of intention with which God permits sin and denies congruous grace to the reprobate; whereas for the predestined He prepares efficacious means of grace, as is clear from what has been said above. Nor, indeed, does it commend itself to me, what Durandus said, in the First Book, distinction 40, question 3, number 6,[2072] that reprobation is proved

Caput VII - The testimonies alleged for the first opinion are explained according to our own sentence

After the various opinions which we have set forth, there remains only that we solve the reasons of the first, which were brought forward also in chapter 1; and first those which are taken from the testimonies of Scripture. The first was Wisdom 12: "Neither king nor tyrant," etc. This place St. Gregory the Great explains in book 3 of the Morals, chapter n., about Christ, who, though He had no sin for which He should be punished by God, was offered to death, and therefore is said to be condemned by God and cast out from His power, according to that in 2 Corinthians 5: "Him who knew no sin" (namely, Christ) "God made sin for us," that is, a victim for sin.[2073] The ordinary Gloss took the same exposition from St. Gregory.[2074] Others interpret it thus: that he who in the judgment of men would seem not worthy of punishment, Thou, O Judge most high, who knowest all things, condemnest. And certainly, if we were to follow the letter of that text in the way we cited it in chapter 1, as it is had in some Latin codices, we should be compelled to admit some one of these interpretations, lest we say that God punishes someone without merit - which is absurd and by no means to be asserted of the goodness of God. But the letter of the text is faulty; indeed, the place seems to have been corrupted; for in the emended Vulgate codex of Sixtus V it has been corrected, according to which the text is plain and without any difficulty. For thus it is read, in conformity with the Greek, and the earlier reading could have been corrupted by a copyist with a few letters changed and by the addition of the particle "and" [et]. Thereafter, as to those places from chapter 9 to the Romans

Among little children the reprobation of some began from the destination to the penalty of the privation of glory, after their end was foreseen in original sin; but the reprobation of other little ones began from the very permission of contracting original sin. The reason for the difference arises from the diverse way in which God bore Himself toward their beatitude immediately after

2072. Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In I Sent., d. 40, q. 3, n. 6.
2073. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, lib. 3, cap. n., interpreting Wisdom 12 in reference to Christ.
2074. Glossa ordinaria on Wisdom 12, from St. Gregory's exposition.

the foreseen sin of the first parent. For the reprobation of those whose beatitude at once displeased God began from permission, because the permission was born from the will of the end of reprobation; but the reprobation of those to whom God of Himself always willed to give beatitude, until He foresaw their end, could not begin from the permission of falling into original sin, because that permission was not from any will of excluding them from the kingdom of heaven, which is the end of reprobation.

From this doctrine, both concerning adults and concerning reprobate little ones, it will be permitted, according to our small measure, to assign in the mind of God this series. First, God foresaw all in the mass of perdition, liable to sin, on account of the transgression of Adam. Second, this notwithstanding, by a primary will from Himself He willed certain little ones and all adults to attain to beatitude, and He granted for this sufficient means, although He denied efficacy and what is congruent, not with the intention of excluding them from the kingdom, but of showing His riches in vessels of mercy. Third, when He saw them fall into sin, either actual or original. And for that reason in a fourth instant He efficaciously decreed to expel them from beatitude, and besides to destine adults to the pain of fire; from which fourth instant their reprobation from glory begins. But with regard to other little ones, to whom He did not grant that the remedies could be applied, we have already established the order in the divine foreknowledge, and that their reprobation began from the denial of grace.

Moreover, reprobation from beatitude is a part of providence concerning men, indeed opposed to predestination of grace; yet it does not begin in all from the same instant from which predestination begins. The difference arises from the diversity of the intention with which God permits sin and denies to the reprobate congruent grace; whereas for the predestined He prepares the means of efficacious grace, as from the foregoing is clear enough. Nor, in truth, does it approve itself to me, what Durandus said in I Sentences, dist. 40, q. 2, n. 6, that reprobation is directly opposed to election to glory before works are foreseen; for if that were to follow, reprobation would be prior to foreseen merits, which is absurd, as we have shown.[2075]

First testimonies of Scripture are explained. Wisdom 12: "Neither is there any God beside Thee ... and him who ought not to be punished Thou condemnest, dost Thou think him to be outside Thy power?" That place St. Gregory explains of Him "who had not known sin," that He should not be punished by God, when as a victim He is offered to God; and therefore He is said to be condemned by God and to be outside His power, according to that of the Apostle, 2 Cor. 5: "Him who knew no sin (to wit, Christ) He made sin (supply: God), that is, a victim for sin, for us." The same exposition the ordinary Gloss took from St. Gregory.[2076] Lyranus, however, explains it of the just, who, although they do not deserve punishments, are nevertheless afflicted by God, so that by men they may be judged as outside the divine favor: just as Job, smitten by God, seemed to all his friends alien to His grace. Others thus interpret: "And him who by human judgment seems not worthy of punishment, Thou, most exact judge, who knowest all things well, condemnest." And certainly, if

2075. Durandus of St.-Pourçain, In I Sent., d. 40, q. 2, n. 6.

2076. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, book 3, cap. n., interpreting Wisdom 12 in reference to Christ; Glossa ordinaria on Wisdom 12 from St. Gregory's exposition.

we were to follow the letter of that text in the way we recited it in chapter 1, which is had in some Latin codices, we should be compelled to admit some of these interpretations, lest we say that God punishes someone without merit, which is absurd, and is in no way to be affirmed of the goodness of God. But the letter of the text seems faulty; and it has been better corrected in the emended codex of the Vulgate by Sixtus V, according to which the sense is plain and without any difficulty. For thus it is read: "And him, who ought not to be punished, to condemn - do you think him to be outside Thy power?" This reading agrees with the Greek, and the earlier reading could have been corrupted by a copyist with a few letters changed, by writing "Thou condemnest" in place of "to condemn," and by the addition of the particle "and." Thereafter as to those places from chapter 9 to the Romans ...

I answer to those two first [texts], "But if God, willing to show His wrath, etc.," and "For this very purpose I have raised thee up, etc.," that Paul by no means meant to signify what the adversaries contend, namely, that by a primary intention, which would precede (according to the ratio of foreknowledge) the foresight of merits, God decreed to show wrath in some, and to make them vessels of dishonor by the mere expulsion from beatitude. For all the damned made themselves vessels of wrath by their own iniquity, which God, looking upon, willed to show power in His justice; yet not in such a way that He should show it as the end of His will, He willed to exclude them from the kingdom and to permit them to fall into sin. Thus explains St. John Chrysostom, Homily 16 on the Epistle to the Romans, and Theophylact on that earlier place; and it is plainly gathered from that of the same Apostle to the Romans 2: "Or dost thou despise the riches of His goodness and patience and longanimity? Dost thou not know that the kindness of God leadeth thee to repentance? But according to thy hardness and impenitent heart thou treasurest up to thyself wrath in the day of wrath." There Paul is speaking with all whom God long bears with in this life and at length by their own fault condemns. Since therefore he says that by the longanimity of God they are tolerated, that they may be led to repentance, he indicates openly that even after sin has been committed, the primary will of God is to correct them; and therefore He sustains them in great patience. That God should will to show His wrath and for this to endure them, is clear, by no means because His benignity should not be bringing them to repentance and inviting them, especially if before whatsoever of their sins were foreseen He would will to manifest wrath upon them. From intention therefore rather of mercy than of justice He sustained them, and in longanimity expected [them]. And for this reason Paul said: "But according to thy hardness thou treasurest up to thyself wrath in the day of wrath": that is, the wrath which God did not have from Himself, when rather He invited thee to repentance; the hardness of thy heart thou didst conciliate to thyself, and thou didst make it to be in God, which otherwise would not be in Him.

Accordingly the particle "that" (ut), which Paul set down in those two places to the Romans 9, and which seems to indicate the final cause and the intention of God, does not signify the cause, but the event proceeding from that which God "endured with much patience." This is frequent in Scripture, Luke 8: "That seeing they may not see," which is brought from Isaiah 6 and elsewhere frequently. We think, therefore, that the particle "that" is to be interpreted thus: first, whenever the thing to which it is joined is against the intention and will of God, such as sin. Second, whenever it

is not from the primary and antecedent will, such as is any punishment, or manifestation of wrath or vengeance, which God did not will before sin was foreseen; for at foreseen sin He is not angry of Himself, nor does He inflict evil. And although by a just judgment God could have this intention of excluding men from beatitude immediately after the sin of the first parent; because, however, this was not in God, as is proved in chapter 4 above, therefore we say that God sustained no adult from such an intention. Third and finally, the particle "that" signifies event as often as there is said that sin is permitted "for correction"; because this too pertains to the secondary and consequent will, as in Disputation 92, chapter 1, was shown. For as often as the particle "that" signifies cause, it is referred to the antecedent will; because then it denotes an end, on account of whose preceding design God does something. But when the event is according to the will of God, and pleased Him first before the means, then the particle "that" denotes the intention of God: as John 10, "I came that they may have life, and that they may have it more abundantly." Wherefore when in John 9 it is said: "For judgment I came into this world, that they who see not may see, and they who see may become blind," in the former part is signified the true intention of God, with which He came into the world; but in the latter only the event is denoted.

Therefore, in that very chapter 9 to the Romans, when Paul says: "Therefore He hath mercy on whom He will; and whom He will He hardeneth": and again, "Or hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?" he does not therefore speak thus, as though God should do these things with the intention of showing His wrath; but he says first that God hardens someone, because He denies him His grace, as will be explained in the following chapter. Then he says that God makes vessels unto dishonor, not indeed with the intention of bringing in dishonor, but because He permits man by his own fault to become worthy of dishonor; and this in no other way than by denying to him a congruent vocation. But with what intention He denies this, He does not deny it "so as to show wrath," as will be made clear in chapter 9. But we understand this, if Paul is speaking of the same mass which is stained by the sin of Adam alone: from this indeed God does not intend first to bring in dishonor and punishment, nor does He positively make man worthy of dishonor; but He permits him, by his own merit, to become such.

If, however, Paul understands by "mass" one stained by actual sin of its own, then God makes from that mass vessels of dishonor, by at once destining him to punishment, although from that same mass He makes another vessel unto honor, purifying it by His grace.

Of this mass it seemed that Paul was speaking, in order to show in what way God rejected the Jews, and destined them to dishonor on account of their own sins, while He admitted the Gentile people, and by His grace cleansed it unto honor. In this way St. Augustine seems to understand the Apostle, as a little below we shall see; and Fulgentius, in the book to Monimus, chapter 26, where thus he says: "What we confess in the sacrament of Christ, we ought to understand in this place of Paul" (to wit: that "we by the death of Christ were loved; we, who were not of God's flock, unless by the visible iniquity of our sins He had foreknown that we should be precisely such"). And so, on account of actual sins, men become vessels of wrath, i.e. unto dishonor.[2077]

Explanations of the places from Romans 9 concerning Jacob and Esau.

Caput VIII - On Jacob and Esau

This locus from Romans 9 the Doctors of the first opinion use most frequently; and they say two brothers are treated, Jacob and Esau: of whom the one is called loved by God, the other indeed hated, before they had done anything good or evil; so that in this way Paul might show that on the part of the persons themselves there was no cause why Esau should be hated and Jacob loved. But that place, if it be asked and considered, has no force at all: for if we admit with St. Augustine, book 3 to Simplicianus, q. 2, and with the Greek Fathers on that same place, that Paul is speaking of the spiritual predestination of Jacob and the reprobation of Esau; or the discourse is of reprobation and election to grace, or to glory: of the former, it is not said that God first hated Esau, and that He willed to deny to him the first grace congruent to the edifice of faith; but that He less loved him: He is said to have less loved him who, if anything is given to him over and above, does not agree, as the greater is graced and the lesser is granted less. By what reason he understood that, Luke 14: "If anyone comes to Me and does not hate his father and mother," that is, who loves father and mother more than Me. Whence this position is followed by John of Bononia, in the little work On Predestination: the first...[2078]

If by "mass" the Apostle Paul understands a mass steeped in its own actual sin, God makes out of that mass vessels of dishonor, by at once destining it to punishment; yet from that same mass He makes another vessel unto honor, purifying it by His grace (*gratia*).

Of this mass Paul seemed to speak, in order to show how God repelled the Jews and, on account of their sins, destined them unto dishonor; but He admitted the Gentile people and by His grace cleansed it unto honor. In this way St. Augustine seems to understand the Apostle, as we shall see a little below; and so does Fulgentius in book 1 To Monimus, chapter 26, where he says thus: "I beg you, most dear Monimus, that you diligently attend to this place of Paul (namely that cited by us above). For it is known that the wrath of God cannot be said to be, unless it be believed that man's iniquity has preceded." Therefore, on account of their own actual sins, Fulgentius thinks that men are made vessels of wrath and of dishonor.[2079]

But let us return to him who, although he thinks that Paul in that place is not treating of the spiritual election (*electio*) and reprobation (*reprobatio*) of Esau and Jacob - as we shall say below - yet explains that phrase, "I have hated," as being the same as "I have loved less."

If, however, it be set about reprobation from beatitude, the second exposition, in which St. Augustine and the other Fathers plainly understand that phrase, "I have hated," is to be taken properly. For when God decreed to exclude Esau from beatitude, He hated him; but on account of sin. Thus, moreover, Esau himself was already a vessel of dishonor, but made so by his own iniquity, as Augustine and all the Greeks understand in this place, where, after many things which

2077. Fulgentius, Ad Monimum, cap. 26.
2078. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1 (commonly cited as lib. 3), q. 2; various Greek Fathers ad loc.; Luke 14:26.
2079. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, cap. 26.

Augustine there teaches against this place of Malachi 1, he adduces that of Wisdom 11, "You hate nothing of the things which You have made," and at length concludes: Therefore God does not hate Esau the man, but God hates Esau the sinner - which he himself pursues more at large. But what he afterwards subjoins concerning the reprobate, that "He makes them (namely, God makes them) vessels of perdition," He makes them for the use of the correction of others: let him not understand this of the perdition of sin - for this God does not make - but of the perdition of punishment, which God inflicted on them on account of sin. For a little above he had said: "And that out of the number of the impious, whom He does not justify, He makes vessels unto dishonor, He does not hate in them that which He makes; for, insofar as they are impious, they are execrable; but insofar as they become vessels, they are made unto some use, so that by their ordered punishments the vessels which are made unto honor may profit." Where Augustine thinks that nothing else is meant by "to be made vessels of dishonor" than "to be destined to punishment on account of their own sins"; and, he says, this destination God does not hate, because He Himself makes it.

Nor indeed can it be gathered from the context of Paul that Esau was held in hatred by God before Esau had done anything evil; for he says in this way: "For when they were not yet born, or had done nothing good or evil, that, according to election, the purpose of God should stand, not of works, but of Him who calls, it was said: The elder shall serve the younger; as it is written, Malachi 1: Jacob I loved, but Esau I have hated." In which place that "I have hated" ought not to be conjoined with "before they had done anything good or evil." But that testimony is adduced to prove what Paul had said about the two brothers, namely, that the younger was preferred to the elder in grace and in the kingdom of God, not of works, but of the sole will of Him who calls. He proves this difference most fittingly from the effect, for if Esau was held in hatred and Jacob was loved, it is rightly said that Jacob was preferred to his brother Esau; whence it happened that Esau, by his own iniquity, drew upon himself the hatred of God.

Another passage on Romans 9 concerning Jacob and Esau

Another passage in Romans 9, quite familiar to the Doctors of the first opinion, is about the two brothers Jacob and Esau, of whom one is said to have been loved by God and the other held in hatred, before they had done anything good or evil, so that Paul might thus show that in no respect was there a cause on their part why Esau should be hated and Jacob loved. But if that place be more closely considered, it has absolutely no force.

For if we admit the first exposition of the place with St. Augustine in book 1 To Simplicianus, question 2, and with the Greek Fathers on that place, that Paul is there speaking of the spiritual predestination (*praedestinatio*) of Jacob and the reprobation of Esau - either the discourse is of reprobation and ejection from grace (*gratia*), or from glory. If of the former, it is not said that God properly hated Esau because He willed to deny the first congruent grace; but "to hate" is the same as "to love less": for it has the manner of one who hates, who does not grant some gift to another,

or who denies the greater and grants only the lesser. In this way some understand that of Luke 14, "and does not hate father and mother," that is, who loves father and mother more than Me. This exposition is followed by John of Bononia in the little work on predestination, the first part.[2080]

But let us return to him who, although he thinks that Paul in that place is not treating of the spiritual reprobation of Esau and election of Jacob - as we shall say below - yet explains that "I have hated" as being the same as "I have loved less."

If, however, the discourse is of reprobation from beatitude (*beatitudo*), the second exposition, in which Augustine and the other Fathers plainly understand that "I have hated," is to be taken properly. For when God decreed to exclude Esau from beatitude, He hated him; but on account of sin. Thus, however, Esau himself was already a vessel of dishonor, but made so by his own iniquity, as Augustine and all the Greeks understand in this place, where, after many things which Augustine there teaches against this place of Malachi 1, he adduces that of Wisdom 11, "You hate nothing of the things which You have made," and at length concludes: Therefore God does not hate Esau the man, but God hates Esau the sinner - which he himself pursues more at large. But what he afterwards subjoins concerning the reprobate, that "He makes them (namely, God makes them) vessels of perdition," He makes them for the use of the correction of others: let him not understand this of the perdition of sin - for this God does not make - but of the perdition of punishment, which God inflicted on them on account of sin. For he had said a little above: "And that out of the number of the impious, whom He does not justify, He makes vessels unto dishonor, He does not hate in them that which He makes; for, insofar as they are impious, they are execrable; but insofar as they become vessels, they are made unto some use, so that by their ordered punishments the vessels which are made unto honor may profit." Where Augustine thinks that nothing else is meant by "to be made vessels of dishonor" than "to be destined to punishment on account of their own sins"; and, he says, this destination God does not hate, because He Himself makes it.[2081]

But both the context and the intent of Paul in that chapter, if we consider them more deeply, we shall perhaps find that he is not treating of the spiritual reprobation of Esau and predestination of Jacob, but of the temporal kingdom and primogeniture, to which Jacob was elected, his brother Esau being rejected: not of their works, but of the sole will of God who calls and says in Genesis 25: "The elder shall serve the younger." Thus Bartholomaeus Camerarius in the Catholic Dialogue, cap. 6, book 1, and John of Bononia in the place a little above alleged think that Paul is to be understood; which can be confirmed by these reasons.[2082]

- It is proved first: Because in Genesis 25 the discourse seems to be of primogeniture, when the Lord said to Rebecca: "Two nations are in your womb, and two peoples shall be divided out of your womb, and a people shall overcome a people, and the elder shall serve the younger." Which is narrated to have been fulfilled in chapter 27, when Isaac blessed Jacob and made him the ruler of his brother.

2080. John of Bononia, Opusculum de praedestinatione, prima pars.
2081. Cf. St. Augustine and various Greek Fathers on Malachi 1; Wisdom 11:24.
2082. Bartholomaeus Camerarius, Dialogus Catholicus, lib. 1, cap. 6.

- It is confirmed second: In Malachi 1, which the Apostle cites, the prophet manifestly speaks of the temporal kingdom and inheritance, in which Jacob was chosen and preferred to his brother. For thus the prophet begins: "I have loved you," namely the Israelites, says the Lord, and you have said, "In what have you loved us?" "Was not Esau brother to Jacob?" says the Lord, "and I have loved Jacob, but Esau I have hated; and I have made his mountains a wilderness, and his inheritance into dragons of the desert." By which words God plainly shows that from this He hated - or rather had Himself as one who hates - that He gave to Esau for inheritance and possession unfruitful mountains and an uninhabitable solitude; which is not properly "to hate," but "to love less." Wherefore St. Jerome confesses on this place that this testimony of Malachi and that of Genesis 25, which plainly speak of temporal inheritance and rule, were adduced by Paul in Romans 9 in a mystical sense.[2083]
- It is confirmed third from the text of Paul: For to the very same scope wholly looks the example of the two brothers Jacob and Esau and of the other two, Isaac and Ishmael, between whom also God chose Isaac, as the text plainly indicates. For, after he has adduced the example of Isaac and Ishmael, Paul subjoins: "Not only she," namely Sara, "but also Rebecca, having from one intercourse our father Isaac," provided us with an example of this matter which we have said, "for when they were not yet born," etc. Who, moreover, would dare to assert that Paul was treating so immediately of the election and predestination of the grace of Isaac, that he thought Ishmael was reprobated from grace and from the kingdom of God, as Esau was - since nowhere is there evidence of that man's damnation? That Paul, however, made use of the example of Isaac and Ishmael, although he did not expressly make mention of Ishmael, will straightway appear.

Therefore, that by this way we may unfold the text of Paul, three things must be premised. First, that the two testimonies of the Old Testament were adduced by Paul in the historical and literal sense; second, that they are to be understood historically of the temporal inheritance and primogeniture; third, that nevertheless in that chapter Paul is treating of spiritual election, not indeed of Isaac and Jacob, but of the Gentile people, and of spiritual reprobation, not of Ishmael and Esau, but of the Jewish people, until the fullness of the Gentiles may enter.

But the text of Paul is to be ordered thus: when at the beginning of the chapter he had shown that he was anguished with great sorrow because he saw the Jewish people rejected by the Lord and reprobated, and had said that with them were the promises made by God, he subjoins, "But not as though the word of God has failed," as if he said, it does not follow that the promises made to that people have been void: he then renders the reason in these words, "For not all who are of Israel, these are Israel, nor are all who are the seed of Abraham children," namely of Abraham; "but in Isaac shall your seed be called." That is, therefore, that the promises made to the people of Israel have not proved void, although the greatest part of those who according to the flesh derive

2083. St. Jerome, on Malachi 1; cf. Genesis 25.

their origin from him be rejected; because not all who spring from our father Israel in this way are true Israelites according to the sense of the Scriptures, to whom God promised so many and so great things.

He proves it, moreover, by example in this way: just as not all who are of the seed of Abraham according to the flesh are counted as the sons of Abraham according to the sense of the Scriptures and of the divine promise, which promises temporal inheritance and primogeniture; whence in Genesis the posterity of Ishmael is not said by the Lord to be the posterity of Abraham, but of Isaac alone - because Isaac alone was to be the heir of his father Abraham by divine promise. But after he has adduced the example of Isaac and Ishmael, in order to show that not all who descend from Israel are true Israelites according to the promise of the divine Scriptures, he straightway adds: "that is, not the children of the flesh are the children of God, but the children of the promise are reckoned for the seed."

... "the children of the flesh, these are not the children of God, but the children of the promise are reckoned for the seed." With these words he explains the allegory which he had brought forward of the two brothers: as if he were saying, thus it is cited (for thus the particle "that is" is to be interpreted): they are not the children of God to whom the Spirit of adoption has been promised - whoever are born from Israel according to the flesh - but only those to whom pertains the promise and the spiritual inheritance of Abraham and of Israel; these, I say, are the children of God and are counted in the true spiritual seed of Israel. He adds presently: "For this is the word of promise: According to this time I will come, and there shall be a son to Sara" (Genesis 18); as if he were saying: just as Isaac was born by a supernatural power from the promise of God, when in Genesis 18 God said, "According to this time I will come," and so in him he says that the seed of Abraham is computed according to the sense of the Scriptures and of the promise; so too the true spiritual Israelites and sons of Abraham are those whom grace and the power of the spiritual promise have regenerated through faith. Therefore, since in these persons the promises have been fulfilled, even if Israelites born according to the flesh are rejected and are not partakers of those promises, they ought not for that reason to be judged vain.

He then adds another example in the verses just above cited: "Not only she," namely Sara, "but Rebecca also having one conception by our father Isaac. For when the children were not yet born," etc. That is, not only does the case of Sara, conceiving a son by promise, from whom the inheritance of the father was to be had with another son rejected, show us that not all who descend from the same seed are computed in the seed and are heirs in the house of the father; but much more the case of Rebecca, who from the same father's seed had two sons in the same womb, and by the sole will of God calling and saying, "The elder shall serve the younger," the younger was the heir of the father and was computed in the seed, while the elder was rejected from the inheritance. This example demonstrates the matter much more expressly, because Isaac and Ishmael, even if born of the same father, were not born of the same mother; whereas Jacob and Esau were not only from the same father and mother, but even from the same seed and act of conception: yet in their case the word of God established this difference, that the younger should be heir, according to the promise, the elder being rejected - and that not from works, but from the mere will of God calling

and foretelling. Thus therefore the lesser people, namely the Gentile, was heir of the spiritual promise of Israel; and the Israelite people, who according to temporal generation was born from him, was not a partaker of the promise. From which things those three points which we proposed at the beginning are made clear, and the whole difficulty about reprobation remains solved.

But if there are any testimonies of St. Augustine and of other Fathers which seem to indicate that a cause of reprobation is not given, they are to be understood of reprobation from grace; nor do they use the name "reprobation" in those places. Indeed Augustine everywhere says that the cause of this reprobation is the mass of perdition infected by the sin of the first parent.

Now two other arguments must be refuted. To the first, therefore, I answer that the first permission of falling into sin is an effect of reprobation from grace, but in no way of reprobation from the kingdom of heaven. The first point is well known; the second is gathered from what was said in chapters 4 and 5; for the effect of that latter reprobation ought to be from an intention of expelling one from beatitude to whom grace is denied. But God does not deny congruous grace, nor does he permit sin with the intention of damning and excluding from the kingdom of heaven, as was shown there; therefore that permission is not an effect of that reprobation.

Yet someone will ask, if God does not permit for that end, for what other end does he permit? I say first that it suffices for us what has been sufficiently proved in those places, namely, that no sin is permitted by God with the intention of damning or of excluding from beatitude, even if another end, which God in his secret judgment has regarded, is not made known to us. I add furthermore that Paul has expressed another end for us in Romans 9 (as Augustine seems to indicate in book 2 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 16, and very clearly noted in the book On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 12) with these words: "But if God, willing to show wrath and to make known his power, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory" (Romans 9). Therefore the end is to show the riches of his grace and the liberality which he has used toward the predestined; for by denying congruous vocations to the reprobate, he shows to the predestined those same vocations, by which they were prepared for glory, to have been bestowed upon them wholly gratuitously; since to them, in the same way as to the reprobate, they could have been denied. The same end was expressed by Augustine, book 4 Against Julian, chapter 8, a little before the middle, with these words: "Showing in those whom he condemns what is owed to all, that from this they may learn, those whom he frees, that the due punishment is remitted, and what is an undeserved grace is granted." He was speaking of little children whom God does not will to free, but condemns on account of the common sin; which Augustine repeats in the same chapter.[2084] Indeed, as he rightly observed in book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 19, sometimes God denies even to the elect those helps of operating grace which he calls "certain knowledge" and "victorious delight," so as to show them that those are his gifts, which he distributes as it pleases him; about this end enough has been said by us in disputation 95, chapter 2.[2085] Augustine indicates another end, book 1 To Simplicianus, question 2, after the middle:

2084. St. Augustine, Contra Julianum, lib. 4, c. 8; cf. De peccatorum meritis et remissione, lib. 2, c. 19.
2085. St. Augustine, De bono perseverantiae, c. 12; cf. Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, q. 2.

namely, that from the perdition of the reprobate the elect may be cleansed by fear; in which sense he explains that saying of Psalm 57: "He shall wash his hands in the blood of sinners." But since that fear was not the primary intention of God, just as neither is repentance, as is evident from what was said in that disputation 93, chapter 3, it must be said that God never permitted the sins of the reprobate for that end, but, once they were done, ordered them to this, that by the fear of them he might cleanse the predestined.

To the second argument I answer that it is in the power of each one to be reprobated and not to be reprobated, if the discourse is about reprobation from the kingdom of heaven. And although it follows rightly, "he is not reprobate; therefore he is predestined," nevertheless it is not inferred, "it is in my power to be predestined"; just as we said in disputation 92, chapter 3, it is not rightly concluded, "it is in my power to persevere in grace; therefore it is in my power to be predestined," even if perseverance is correlative with predestination. For which point it must be noted that reprobation, in this sense in which we now take it, begins from the destination to punishment, and its cause is perseverance in sin. Therefore it is directly opposed to the attainment of glory, which is sought from perseverance in grace. From this, therefore, that it be free to anyone to be reprobated and not to be reprobated in this way, it follows only that it is in his liberty to attain glory - which is directly and adequately opposed to reprobation - and to persevere in grace. But to be predestined is not only this, but also that the first congruous vocation be prepared for someone, and that this be given in time, or be prepared in foreknowledge - this is not in the liberty of anyone; therefore neither is predestination itself in the power of anyone. However, the vocation being supposed, from then on it is free for each one to persevere in grace and to attain glory, or to lose it; and thus it lies within him to be reprobated or not to be reprobated. Therefore, because predestination is not opposed adequately to reprobation, but begins much earlier, even if "not to be reprobated" and "to be predestined" are correlative, both are not in our power in the same way. And when we say, "if it is in the power of someone to lack one of two contraries, it will also be in his power to have the other," when from the privation of the one the presence of the other follows, it is to be understood between contraries which are adequately and directly opposed, as is manifestly clear. Wherefore, since in our power there is one thing which is correlative with another, that other sometimes is not, as in the present case we showed in that third chapter cited above.

Moreover, there is no lack of some more recent theologians who think it is placed in the power of each one "not to be predestined," just as also "to be reprobated" or "not to be reprobated"; yet even if it is in no one's power "to be predestined"; so that on the part of each reprobate there was some cause on account of which he was not predestined. In favor of this opinion they report Henry of Ghent, St. Bonaventure, and Alexander of Hales in the places alleged in disputation 91.[2086] They confirm it by authority and by reason. First indeed by the authority of Scripture: Ezekiel 18, "I will not the death of the sinner. Be converted and live ... In the iniquity which he has wrought, the impious shall die"; Hosea 13, "Your perdition is from yourself, O Israel; only in me is your help"; and 2 Peter 3, "God deals patiently for your sakes, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to penance." In all these places, and in others of this kind, Scripture shows that God

2086. Henry of Ghent; St. Bonaventure; Alexander of Hales; see the loci reported above in Disputation 91.

of himself willed our salvation, whereas from ourselves our damnation has arisen. If God had of himself - no occasion being taken from us - excluded some from the benefit of predestination, he himself would have been the cause of their perdition; since it is certain that those who are not predestined are going to perish.

Then they prove it by the authority of the Fathers. For Augustine, in the book On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 8, says: "Let him who is freed love grace; let him who is not freed acknowledge the debt." And in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 14: "The grace of God is given freely to whom it is given; but by a just judgment it is not given when it is not given." Which sentence Augustine often repeats.

St. Augustine, and from him Prosper in the book To the Chapters of the Gauls, to objection 7, takes up the point that he is speaking about that grace which is proper and peculiar to the predestined. Therefore, since he says that it is denied by the just judgment of God to whomever it is denied, and that in the same matter each one ought to acknowledge his own debt, it follows that the denial is imputed to anyone to whom it is denied by his own fault, and hence that it is in his power not to be predestined, that is, not to be anticipated by such grace. And in book 2 On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, chapter 17, concerning the grace of God, he says: "Insofar as the wills of men are aided, insofar as they are not aided, the cause is in themselves, not in God." Prosper likewise, book 2 On the Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 19 (elsewhere numbered chapter 7), after saying that God wills all men to be saved, adds: "And let those who are bereft of grace be reproved for their own iniquity, and those who have attained to its threshold let them glory not in their own merit, but in the Lord." And chapter 12: "Let us most certainly know that no one of the faithful who does not depart from God is abandoned by God, nor is anyone's ruin disposed by a divine constitution." And near the end, in the seventh sentence, To the Chapters of the Gauls, he writes thus about those who were going to sin: "And because He foresaw that they would do this - that is, sin - by a voluntary defection, therefore He did not have them in the election of predestination." He speaks in nearly the same way to the third and seventh objection, where, instead of the particle "Therefore," he uses the particle "Because."[2087]

Finally, by reason the same position is proved: first, because if it arises from God Himself that men are not predestined, it would follow that salvation is impossible for them, since no one can be saved without predestination. Therefore, if God by His antecedent decree does not predestine someone, not looking to his sins, it follows that salvation - which without predestination can happen to no one - was not in his power. Moreover, it is in the power of any man not to consent to the calling, which is denied to no one: therefore it is in the power of anyone to render the calling inefficacious, and thus to prevent there being the effect of predestination and that he himself be not predestined; for without the grace of predestination no one can be predestined.

Yet I cannot but marvel at the opinion of these Doctors, who, when they affirm that it is not in anyone's power to be predestined, because it is not in anyone's power to be anticipated by peculiar grace, nonetheless say that it is in our power not to be predestined, that is, not to be anticipated by

that peculiar grace; whereas the reason is entirely the same for both. For although, antecedently and in the order of power, it is free to each of us to resist any calling, even a congruous one, as we shall show below in Disputation 98, chapter 8; and thus it is in our power that the calling bestowed on us pertain to predestination or to non-predestination, as was proved in Disputation 92, chapter 2; nevertheless, as I said there, it is not in our power to be anticipated, or not to be anticipated, by that grace which God knows will have its effect in us. Wherefore, since to be predestined is that that grace which God knows will have its effect in us be prepared for us, and not to be predestined is that that grace not be prepared for us, and neither is in our power, it follows that to be predestined or not to be predestined is not in our power. Moreover, that it is not in our power to be anticipated, or not to be anticipated, by this grace by which God knows the effect will be had in us - who can doubt it? Therefore for this reason we said in the preceding chapter that it is not in our power to be reprobated, if reprobation be taken for the negation of grace and for permission.

But by this authority our opinion can be confirmed no less than by the foregoing reason. First, the Apostle to the Romans 9, after he had said that it is free to God to have mercy, and that this is not of him that wills nor of him that runs, gathers from all: "Therefore He has mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardens." Where he would not refer hardening to the sole will of God, if some cause from us had preceded, or if it had been in our power. Now he takes hardening as the negation of congruous grace, the first help; for he opposes it to mercy, which begins in preventing grace. And then in the same chapter: "Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast thou made me thus?" and he adds other things by which he removes every cause of complaint against God - not because something proceeded from us on account of which we are not predestined, but because no one can in any way resist His will, as we explained in Disputation 91, chapter 13. And when Paul says that from the same lump one is chosen unto grace, another is rejected from the same grace, he clearly indicates that nothing more preceded in one than in the other; and hence that it was in no one's power to be predestined or not predestined, to be anticipated by the peculiar grace of God or not anticipated; otherwise something would already have preceded in one which had not been in the other.

Moreover, Augustine in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 9, says: "All whom He teaches, mercy teaches; but those whom He does not teach, judgment does not teach." And in the book On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 11, at the end, about mercy and the peculiar grace from which the series of the effects of predestination begins, he says: "But why it is given rather to these than to those, who has known the mind of the Lord?" And again in the same book, chapter 12: "But why He rather frees these than those, again and again we say: O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" Clearly Augustine understood that there is no reason or cause in the power of him who is not predestined, on account of which he rather than another is not predestined. To the same point tends what he says in tractate 26 on John: "Why He draws this man, and does not draw that one, do not wish to judge, if you do not wish to err." He says the same in epistle 105 at the end.[2088]

2087. Prosper of Aquitaine, Ad capitula Gallorum, ad obj. 7; De vocatione gentium, lib. 2, c. 19 (alias c. 7), c. 12; cf. Ad capitula Gallorum, sent. 7.

Those, however, who defend the opposite opinion reply that Paul and Augustine denied not the cause on account of which someone is not predestined absolutely, but conjunctively; namely, the cause on account of which this one rather is not predestined, is not drawn, rather than another; they say, moreover, that this does not hinder in the least that it be in the power and liberty of each not to be predestined. But this is a fairly useless evasion. For if it is in the free power of each not to be predestined, and it depends on himself that he not be predestined, in the same way as that he not be saved, as the adversaries contend; it follows plainly that he who is not predestined, and he who is not drawn, has given the cause on account of which he rather than another is not predestined; just as also he who is damned to the eternal punishment of fire has given the cause on account of which he rather than another is damned - since he, being hardened in sin, ended his life, whereas another in grace. But if the choice or the desertion of one rather than another has its origin from God alone, it is not to be said that it was in anyone's power not to be predestined.

Now from the doctrine set forth above it will not be hard for us to overturn the foundations of the former opinion; to those testimonies of Scripture and the like I answer in a word: if they are to be counted of any moment, they prove only this - that God of Himself excluded no one from the kingdom of heaven and from salvation; since to all He granted of Himself sufficient helps that they might not be damned, if they willed, as we shall more fully show in Disputation 97. But that by peculiar and efficacious grace, or by congruous calling, which is proper to the predestined, He excluded all the reprobate by His own antecedent will, with no occasion at all taken from them. For the negation of this grace, which is permission, altogether precedes our liberty. Nor indeed is it permitted us on that account to conclude that God was the cause of the perdition and damnation of the reprobate: for, in granting to them the necessary and sufficient means that they might not be damned, if they would, He persevered in the antecedent will of their salvation; and from their malice it arose that they did not correspond to such helps, and hence they are damned by their own proper sin.

And by those two testimonies Augustine only denotes that in the negation of that peculiar and congruous grace which is proper to the predestined there is to be acknowledged the just judgment of God and debt - not of the actual and proper sin of each (for that is not even likely, since the first permission of falling precedes every sin, even in the doctrine of Augustine), but the debt of the common sin of the whole human race, namely of Adam, by which all of us were in evil perdition. Hence he rightly says that those who from this corrupted mass are freed by the grace of God are freed by pure mercy; but those who are left in that mass, that congruous, peculiar, and proper grace of the predestined being denied them by which they would be freed, are not freed by a just judgment on account of that common sin. For who would say that because of someone's own sins the first peculiar grace was denied him, seeing that the permission of sin, which is prior to the sin itself, is the negation of this grace?

2088. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 9; De bono perseverantiae, c. 11 - 12; Tractatus in Ioannem 26; Epistula 105.

Reply to the third testimony of Augustine: we answer that he is speaking of helping and accompanying grace; and of it he rightly said that the cause is in us that it does not help and accompany us, because we can respond to the sufficient help by which all are anticipated; but of the first stirring grace, peculiar and proper to the predestined, he does not say that by our fault it is denied us - in the very denial of which consists not to be predestined.

Reply to the first testimony of Prosper: I reply that he rightly said that those who are bereft of the grace of God - namely, of the peculiar and congruous - are to be reproved for their own iniquity, and to be punished for it: because they do not respond to sufficient grace; yet from that it does not follow that, on account of their iniquity, they were not predestined, that is, that the congruous grace was denied them.

To the second testimony of the same I say that when Prosper says that no one is abandoned by God unless God is first abandoned by himself, he does not speak of the first permission and negation of first grace, but of a later one; for the first precedes every sin, and thus it does not follow that because of one's own injustice someone was not predestined. Whether, however, he speaks of the negation of sufficient help or of efficacious help, we shall say in Disputation 97, chapter 6.

To the third testimony of the same I answer that either by the name "non-predestination" he understands reprobation strictly so called, as we explained above in this disputation, chapter 6 - of this there is a cause from us, as we explained there also, because it is in our power; or certainly the particles "Because" and "Therefore," which denote a cause, do not with Prosper signify the cause of the thing, but of knowing. For in that reply to the seventh objection of the Gauls he says, in effect: since those virtues are proper and are brought forth by a person's own will, to this point no one would attribute his own perdition to predestination. For since the choice in Christ foreordained them to have these [virtues], and since perseverance in good to the end is not a debt but a gift of God, it is manifest from this very thing - that they did not persevere - that they did not have it. He did not say: because they did not persevere, therefore they did not have the gift of perseverance; but from the fact that they did not persevere he certainly infers that they did not have this gift. In the same way the rest are to be understood.[2089]

A retort: From our prior argument one might retort: since without predestination no one can be saved, therefore God does not of Himself predestine anyone; for then the help of salvation would lie in Himself alone. But this similar argument turns back upon them. For as it is impossible for someone to be saved without predestination, so with predestination someone cannot be damned. Therefore, if God of Himself, without any occasion from us, or without anything that is in our power, confers predestination upon someone, it would follow that he cannot be damned - which is surely absurd. Yet the same conclusion is easily resolved by the doctrine to be treated more at length in Disputation 101, chapter 3: namely, that this necessity by which we say "one who is predestined cannot be damned," or "one who is not predestined cannot be saved," is a consequent necessity, which follows only upon the divine knowledge; and in no way does it harm our liberty, as we shall explain there. And thus, this not hindering, we say that anyone can be saved or damned.

2089. Prosper, Responsiones ad capitula Gallorum, ad septimam objectionem.

A later reason, from the doctrine of Disputation 92, can very easily be dissolved. For just as, with respect to the effects that depend on us, that we make the calling bestowed on us to be efficacious in us is not the effect of predestination - since the first effect of predestination is not the effect of the calling, but the bestowal of that calling which God knows by conditional knowledge will have its effect in us - so too, although it be in our power that the calling whereby we are anticipated not have its effect in us, nevertheless it is not in our power to be deprived of that calling which God knows by conditional knowledge will have its effect in us; now this privation is the beginning of not being predestined.

Finally, not without reason St. Bonaventure, Alexander, and Henry confess that it is in our power not to be predestined, when they themselves, according to the various modes of speaking that we set down in Disputation 91, affirm that from us there is a cause or condition that we be predestined. I am amazed, however, at those more recent authors whom I mentioned above, who, while they confess that there is in us no cause, occasion, or condition of predestination, and that in no way is predestination in our power, nonetheless affirm that it is in our power not to be predestined.

Ad primum Prosperi: I answer that he spoke rightly, that those who are bereft of the grace of God, namely of the special and congruous sort, are to be reproved for their own wickedness and punished on account of it, because they do not respond to sufficient grace; yet it does not follow from this that, on account of their wickedness, they were not predestined - namely, that congruous grace was denied to them

Ad secundum eiusdem testimonium: I say that when Prosper says that no one is left by God unless he first be left by him himself, it is to be understood that he is not speaking of the first permission and the first denial of grace, but of a later one; for the first precedes every sin, and thus it does not follow that, because of his own iniquity, someone was not predestined. Whether, however, he speaks of the denial of sufficient help or of efficacious help, we shall say in Disputation 97, chapter 6

Ad tertium eiusdem testimonium: I answer that either by the name "non - predestination" he understood reprobation from glory, as I explained above in this Disputation, chapter 6; and of this, as I there also explained, there is given from us a cause, and therefore it is in our power; or certainly the particles "because" and "therefore," which denote a cause, do not in Prosper signify the cause of the thing, but the cause of the cognition. For in that response to the seventh objection of the Gauls, he says thus: "Because he foreknew that they would fall by their own will, for this reason he did not distinguish them from the sons of perdition by any predestination. For how could the election, preordained in Christ, have them, since it is not doubtful that perseverance in good unto the end is the gift of God, which these, from the fact that they did not persevere, manifestly did not have." He did not say that from the fact that they did not persevere they did not have the gift of perseverance - for rather from the fact that they did not have various efficacious prevenient graces they did not persevere, as is manifest - but he certainly gathers that they did not have this gift from the fact that they did not persevere: the rest are to be understood in the same way

Ex rationibus vero: the first indeed is frivolous. For although God of himself willed not to predestine some, that is, not to prepare for them efficacious grace, it does not follow that they are necessarily damned; for he did not altogether desert them, but he forestalled them with sufficient help by which they could be saved, as we shall say in Disputation 97. But the adversaries press in this way:

Obiectio. Without predestination no one can be saved: therefore, if God by himself predestines someone, he thereby takes from him the power over his own salvation.

Retorsio. But a like argument can be turned back upon them in this way. As it is impossible for someone to be saved without predestination, so, with predestination, no one can be damned: therefore, if God of himself, without any occasion on our part, or without anything that is in our power, predestines someone, it follows that he cannot be damned; which indeed is as absurd as that someone cannot be saved. But of both there is the same easy and common solution, of which we shall say more in Disputation 101, chapter 3 - namely, that this necessity, whereby we say that the predestined cannot be damned or that the non-predestined cannot be saved, is a consequent necessity, which follows only upon the knowledge of God, and in no way harms our freedom, as we shall explain there; and therefore, that not withstanding it, we say that anyone can be saved or damned.

Posterior vero ratio, from the doctrine of Disputation 92, can be very easily dissolved. For just as we there conceded that it is in our power that the calling bestowed upon us be efficacious, or have its effect in us - without which there would not be the effect of predestination - nonetheless the first effect of predestination is not in our power, because the first effect is not the effect of calling, but the bestowal of that calling which God knows by conditional knowledge will have its effect in us. In like manner, although it be in our power that the calling with which we are beforehand fortified not have its effect in us, nevertheless the privation of that calling, which God knows by conditional knowledge is not going to have its effect in us, is not in our power; and from this privation there begins the being-not-predestined.

Finally, I am not surprised if St. Bonaventure, Alexander, and Henry admit that it is in our power not to be predestined, when they themselves, according to the various modes of speaking which we reported in Disputation 91, affirm that from us there is a cause or condition that we be predestined. I am amazed, however, at those more recent authors whom I mentioned above, who, while they confess that there is in us no cause, occasion, or condition of predestination, and that in no way is predestination in our power, nonetheless affirm that it is in our power, and depends upon our power, not to be predestined; whereas the same ratio applies to both, as I said above; and thus the reasons of the first opinion remain solved.

Obiectio. But someone will object: since reprobation is a part of providence, and this is concerned more with means than with the end, why do we assign to reprobation only an effect around the end?

Responsio - I answer that, with respect to God, nothing created has the ratio of an end, as we said in Disputation 82, chapter 2, but all things are arrayed as means; nonetheless, reprobation is not only engaged about expulsion from glory after foreseen perseverance in sin, but it is also further ordered by God, to show his power and his justice, which exacts vengeance upon unjust and depraved men. St. Augustine too is defended by Prosper against his slanderers in the book To the Chapters of the Gauls, chapter 6, and in the book To Vincent's Objections, to the fifth and eleventh objections, which book is believed to be the same as that On the Articles Falsely Imputed, and whose author is thought not to be Augustine, but Prosper of Aquitaine; and Fulgentius is cited in the above - mentioned Disputation 91, chapter 18. How, moreover, God is not the cause of sin must be treated expressly in 1 - 2, question 79, article 1.

Caput X - In what way God is the cause of hardening

God not only withdraws his grace from the reprobate once or again, but also through various occasions and through various spans of time; whence it comes about that their heart is hardened in sin. And since this hardening is more often ascribed to God in Scripture, it must be considered what it is, and how God is said to be its cause.

A twofold acceptation of hardening. Hardening (which in Scripture is also called blinding, aggravation, and a reprobate mind) is customarily taken by the Scholastics in a twofold way. First, for the very sin by which one resists whatever calling of God, or for the sin by which we oppose God speaking and much calling. Then, for permission and the subtraction of grace, either whereby someone is permitted to slip into a first sin, or whereby he is allowed to persevere in the same sin for a long time. The Scholastics, to be adduced a little below, thus divide hardening. Concerning hardening in the former mode, the heretics of our times have dared to affirm that God is the proper and per se cause of it, just as he is of grace and of good works. But this error is condemned in the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 6, and in the Second Council of Orange, canon 25, and at Valence under the Emperor Lothair, chapter 5.[2092] Moreover, articles 5 and 11 were falsely imputed to Augustine by Vincent and others throughout Gaul, as is clear from Augustine's own book On the Articles Falsely Imputed, in which place he excuses himself. Augustine too is defended against his slanderers by Prosper in the book To the Chapters of the Gauls, chapter 6, and in the book To Vincent's Objections, to the fifth and eleventh objections, which book is believed to be the same as that On the Articles Falsely Imputed, and whose author is thought not to be Augustine, but Prosper of Aquitaine, and Fulgentius is cited in the above-mentioned Disputation 91, chapter 18.[2090]

But that God is the cause of hardening in the latter mode, Alexander,[2093] St. Thomas,[2094] St. Bonaventure,[2095] Soto,[2096] Canus,[2097] Roffensis,[2098] and Driedo[2099] confess; and in this sense they concede that the hearts of the reprobate are hardened by God. Yet although hardening and

2092. Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 6; Second Council of Orange, can. 25; Council of Valence under Emperor Lothair, cap. 5.

2090. Prosper of Aquitaine, Ad capitula Gallorum, cap. 6; Ad objectiones Vincentii, ad 5 et 11; cf. Ad articulos falso impositos (ascribed to Prosper rather than Augustine); Fulgentius, cited above in Disputation 91, cap. 18.

2093. Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, q. 29, memb. 4 - 5.

reprobate sense - things which seem to pertain to the will - are not taken for permission, but for the sin of the will, nevertheless the Doctors explain in various ways why God is said to harden or to hand over into a reprobate mind.

The first is Origen's, in the third book Peri archon, chapter 1 before the middle; St. Augustine in Epistle 105, and in the book On Predestination and Grace, chapter 4; and in the book On the Essence of God, which is ascribed to Hugh of St. Victor; St. Jerome on that passage to the Romans 1, "God delivered them over to a reprobate mind"; St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, and St. Anselm on the same place, and on that in Romans 9, "Whom he wills he hardens." They think that hardening and a reprobate mind are ascribed to God from this alone, that he is the cause of permission, subtracting and denying the help of his grace, whence only, and per accidens, the hardening of the will and the reprobate mind proceed; just as the Lord is accustomed to say, says Origen, to his servant: "I ruined you, in that I permitted certain evils with impunity."[2100]

But Canus, in the place cited, judges that something else also is to be added to permission, by reason of which God is said to harden and to hand over into a reprobate mind. "Therefore," he says, "in three ways God is the cause of hardening and of a reprobate mind. First, because God removes the sweetness of grace"; and this mode is the same as the former. "Second, because God uses his minister Satan as an instrument, and thus is said to effect it; for what his minister, strengthened by his authority, does, he himself is said to do." But for this mode to be true, it too must be understood through mere permission; for in no other way does God instruct Satan than by allowing him; wherefore this mode also collapses into the same.

"Third," Canus adds, "just as the same Sun hardens the clay and melts the wax on account of the diverse disposition of the matter, so also the same light of grace is said to enlighten and soften some, but to blind and harden others, because of the diverse disposition of hearts." This third mode seems to add something to permission, but Canus does not sufficiently explain it. This mode of hardening is taken from St. Jerome in the Epistle to Hedibia, which is the 150th; from Origen and Theophylact in the place cited; and from the imperfect work on Matthew, at St. John Chrysostom, homily 46, column 2. And although it has mixed with it permission and the denial of that grace of calling which would soften the heart itself, nevertheless it has something positive, which I shall say is an occasion of hardening and of sin.

From this doctrine we can interpret that good saying in St. Augustine, book 1 against Julian, chapter 3; On Sin and Grace, and On Free Will, book 3, chapter 1, where he asserts that God not only delivers into a reprobate mind by deserting, but also by inclining the will, according to "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; wherever he will, he will incline it" (Proverbs 21). For

2096. Domingo de Soto, De natura et gratia, lib. 1, cap. 18; and In IV Sent., d. 15, q. 1, a. 1.
2097. Melchior Cano, De locis, lib. 2, cc. 4, 7.
2098. John Fisher (Roffensis), Contra Lutherum, art. 36.
2099. John Driedo, De concordia liberi arbitrii, cap. 1, and the last chapter ad quattuor.
2094. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I - II, q. 79, aa. 2 - 3.
2095. St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 40, a. 3, q. 1; and in IV, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1.
2100. Origen, Peri archon (De principiis), III, c. 1 (ante medium); St. Augustine, Ep. 105; De praedestinatione et gratia, c. 4; the work De essentia Dei (ascribed to Hugh of St. Victor); St. Jerome on Romans 1; St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, and St. Anselm on Romans 1 and 9.

indeed, while it is established by many passages of his, that God in no way predestined sin nor can be its cause - as we note elsewhere - so too, in the Questions on Exodus, question 18, he himself explains that Pharaoh was hardened by God, because God set before that heart signs which he knew would - by reason of prior malice - become for him an occasion of obduration and of sin. In these places he speaks of hardening and of a reprobate mind, which indeed seem to be referred to the will and to be used for the sin itself and for the resistance of the will. But by a certain acceptation they more properly pertain to the intellect; for sometimes Scripture takes the effect for the cause. For blinding is what is opposed to vision; and aggravation, which is the same as obduration, seems to pertain to the intellect, inasmuch as it is opposed to hearing; and thus both blinding and aggravation are frequently taken in Scripture as acts of the intellect. Of this blinding and of this aggravation on the part of the intellect, God is the cause, by denying the suitable particular light (lumen) which he knew to be congruent with the will, so as efficaciously to incline it; and the Church prays for this light in the first week of Lent on Wednesday at Vespers, when it says: "Direct our minds, O Lord," so that all may be enlightened by the Lord.

Further, it is said that He effects it in this way: because what His minister, being strengthened by His authority, does, is said to be effected by Him. But this mode, if it is to be true, must also be understood through mere permission; for in no other way does God instruct Satan than by allowing him; wherefore this mode too falls back into the same kind.

Third, Canus adds: just as the same sun hardens the clay and melts the wax, on account of the differing disposition of the matter; so too the same light of grace is said to enlighten and soften some, but to blind and harden others, on account of the differing disposition of those persons. This third mode seems to add something to permission, but Canus does not explain it sufficiently.

Driedo sets it out better when he expounds that last chapter, and in his work On the Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race, tract. f., c. 4: namely, that God is therefore said to harden not only because He permits, but because, outwardly or even inwardly, as it were, He offers occasions by which He certainly knows a man will be provoked to evil, even if those occasions pertain to the grace of God - such as signs and scourges, indeed even the very preaching of the truth.[21012102] Nor, however, does God offer them with the mind that he should fall; for God is the tempter of no one to evils, James 1; rather with this sole intention, that He may bring him to repentance. Therefore, since from the work of God man takes occasion for sinning and for greater resistance, God is said to harden him, because there was the occasion of hardening.

Now these occasions are not said to be permitted by God, but to be willed (yet not with the intention of the sin and the hardening); because everything that is not sin takes place in the world by the will of God. And although it is not always free to men to offer similar occasions to their brothers without their own fault, even if otherwise they be good, according to the rules that St.

2101. St. Jerome, Epistula ad Hedibiam (ep. 150); Origen and Theophylact at the place cited; and likewise thoroughly Theophylact on Matthew, under St. John Chrysostom, homily 46, col. 2.

2102. John Driedo, De captivitate et redemptione generis humani, tract. f., c. 4; and also in the last chapter.

Thomas elegantly assigns in II - II, q. 43, aa. 2, 7, and 8; nevertheless to God, who is the supreme Prince and Governor of all, who does injury to no one and is opposed to no law, since He lets things operate freely, it is always permitted to send similar occasions and thoughts.[2103]

And hence is gathered a great difference between God and us, when we in a similar manner are the occasion of another's sin, and therefore it is imputed to us: for to God our sin is never attributed, nor is it voluntary for Him, nor is it imputed to Him as to a moral cause, because He was not obliged not to offer that occasion; but it is imputed to us and is called voluntary, because we ought not to have offered the occasion. For just as, for an outcome of this sort, following upon the will of John, to be voluntary in Peter, it was necessary that Peter owed it to that person to stand firm and to hinder him (as we shall say in I - II, q. 6, a. 3).

This mode of hardening is taken from St. Jerome in his Epistle to Hedibia, which is the 150th; from Origen and Theophylact at the place cited; and likewise most thoroughly from Theophylact on Matthew, under St. John Chrysostom, homily 46, column 2. And although it has mixed in it permission and the denial of that grace of a calling which would soften the heart itself, nevertheless it has something positive, which for the reprobate becomes an occasion of hardening and of sin.[2101]

From this doctrine we can interpret in a good sense St. Augustine, Contra Iulianum, book 2, c. 3, before the middle, and De gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 21, when he asserts that God not only hands over into a reprobate mind by deserting, but also by inclining the will, according to that saying: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall incline it" (Proverbs 21). For from many places of his it is clear that God by no account predestined sin nor can be its cause, as we noted above; and in the same way, in the Questions on Exodus, q. 18, he himself explains that Pharaoh was hardened by God, because in his presence God did signs, by which He knew that by his malice he would become worse day by day.[2104]

Thus far we have spoken of hardening and of a reprobate mind, which indeed seem to be referred to the will (*voluntas*), and are used for the very sin and repugnance of the will. But blinding pertains rather to the intellect (*intellectus*): for it is the same as not to see the things that must be done, although sometimes it is referred back to the will, taking the effect for the cause. Nay more, aggravation, which is the same as stopping of ears, seems to regard the intellect. For just as blinding, because it is opposed to sight, first befits the intellect, to which vision is also attributed; so too, since aggravation is opposed to hearing (for in Scripture there is "the heaviness of ears," Isaiah 6 and Zechariah 7), and this too pertains to the intellect, aggravation itself seems rather to belong to the intellect.

Both, however, are found in him who sins; because neither does he so see nor so hear the things that must be done, that he pursues them; but he is affected just as if he did not see or hear, and he suffers some defect in his intellect, as we shall treat more fully in disp. 98, c. 7, and in I - II, q. 77, and II - II. Of this blinding and aggravation on the part of the intellect, God is the cause by denying

2103. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae II - II, q. 43, aa. 2, 7, 8.

2101. St. Jerome, Epistula ad Hedibiam (ep. 150); Origen and Theophylact at the place cited; and likewise thoroughly Theophylact on Matthew, under St. John Chrysostom, homily 46, col. 2.

2104. St. Augustine, Quaestiones in Heptateuchum, In Exodum, q. 18.

that special calling which He knew was so congruent to the will that it would efficaciously incline it; and the Church asks for that calling in the first week of Lent on Wednesday at Vespers, when it says: "O Lord, illumine our minds with the light of Thy brightness, that we may be able to see the things that must be done, and to do the things that are right." And on the Sunday within the Octave of the Epiphany: "Pursue, we beseech Thee, O Lord, with heavenly pity the vows of Thy suppliant people, that they may see the things that must be done, and may be strengthened to fulfill the things they see."

And in this way St. Augustine is to be understood, De peccatorum meritis et remissione, book 2, c. 19, when he teaches that sin happens from ignorance, that is, from a defect of consideration: for which cause he there calls the calling which moves to acting and inclines the affection a certain knowledge. But in the book De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 8, concerning those who, when the preacher sounds from without, do not believe, he says that they do not believe because within they do not hear from the Father. For God is said to open the ear of the intellect, by sending that thought which inclines the intellect to faith. For this reason the Lord in Luke 8 and in Apocalypse 2 says: "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear," that is, ears not stopped up, but fit to hear.[21052106]

Finally, of this blinding and aggravation, insofar as it is only in the intellect, God is thus the cause through various thoughts which He sends, that He may will and dispose it: for whatever precedes sin, as I said above, is set in order not only by God permitting, but also by God willing, yet without the intention of sin. Nor on that account does he suffer violence whose intellect is exercised: for that thought is always offered to him, by which he could resist if he wished, as we shall say in disp. 98, c. 7 and 8. Nor can anyone complain against God because to another man a thought is denied, as was noted in disp. 91, c. 8.

Finally observe that hardening of the will (*voluntas*) happens in two ways: first, in any sin whatsoever, when we resist God calling; then, after many sins, when we withstand God calling long and much. Of the former Augustine speaks in book 2 Ad Simplicianum, in what way it is the same that someone be hardened by God as that God not have mercy on him, as he himself there explains. But of this permission and not-showing-mercy, which precedes the first sin, there is no cause given on our part, as is clear from the above. Of the latter the same Augustine speaks in book 83 of Questions, q. 68, and teaches that it comes from most hidden merits.[21072108]

Disputatio XCVI - On whether God has provided all infants with sufficient remedies for salvation

Huiusmodi remedia omnibus parvulis fuisse provisa, nonnulli opinantur. cap. 1. Communis, verior sententia. cap. 2. Diluuntur rationes prioris opinionis. cap. 3.

2105. St. Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione, II, c. 19; De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 8.
2106. Luke 8; Apocalypse 2.
2107. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum de diversis quaestionibus, II.
2108. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 68.

Caput I - What is agreed upon in this matter

There are truths in this matter which among right-thinking persons are altogether indubitable and ought not to be called back into controversy. First, that for infants to be saved under the law of the Gospel, it does not suffice for the faith of the parents to be applied to them without baptism, or by the sign of the cross alone, or by the invocation of the Trinity alone, or in any other way; whose opposite, against all the Doctors, Cajetan had taught on III, q. 68, aa. 2 and 11. Yet in the Roman impression renewed by order of Pius V, Supreme Pontiff, the passages of the said commentary were expunged.[2109] Therefore it is certain that those dying in the mother's womb and those born into the light who die without baptism are damned; in whose stead martyrdom, by a special privilege, can be supplied in infants, as many affirm. Nor indeed do we approve what Gabriel says on the Fourth Book, dist. 4, q. 2, a. 2, dub. 2, namely, that by His power, which is not bound to the Sacraments, God perhaps saves some infants without baptism: for although God could do this, yet since in His Scripture He has established baptism as the sole remedy for infants, it is not to be granted that now some attain salvation without it.[2110]

Next, it is certain that the merit of Christ and all the remedies which He instituted both for infants and for adults are in themselves sufficient for salvation and effect it, if in fact they are applied. The controversy therefore is not whether Christ instituted remedies in themselves sufficient for all infants, but whether He so provided and disposed them that He left the application of them in the free power of someone. For if these remedies, which in themselves are sufficient, remain so disposed that by no human diligence can they be applied to any infant, we shall not say that a sufficient remedy was provided for him: because only to him is a sufficient remedy said to be provided to whom it can be applied and can profit. The difficulty therefore proposed is whether God has so provided these remedies for infants that by some human diligence they can be applied to them.

This matter is indeed outside controversy, unless it has seemed to certain more recent men to maintain that God has in such wise provided sufficient remedies for all infants, even if by accident they were impeded; and this they assert even of infants who die in the mother's womb. They prove it first, because although to many infants such remedies have not been applied, it only follows from this that efficacious remedies were not provided for them; it does not follow that sufficient remedies were denied: for to many adults as well the remedies which Christ left were not applied; yet on that account no one dares to assert that sufficient means were not provided for all adults, although efficacious ones were not granted. Then too Christ died for all infants and adults, since He willed - just as God of Himself and by a will of primacy - to save all men even after Adam's fall; therefore by His Passion He merited at least sufficient remedies for all, and granted them to them; otherwise it could not be said that He took death upon Himself for all, and willed to save all. For he who does not grant to someone the means necessary for some end, in order that he may use them if

2109. Cajetan (Tommaso de Vio), Commentary on Summa theologiae III, q. 68, aa. 2, 11; later Roman edition corrected by order of Pius V, with the said passages expunged.

2110. Gabriel Biel, In IV Sententiarum, d. 4, q. 2, a. 2, dub. 2.

he wills, or another for him, so that solely through someone's fault he is deprived of them - how could he, by an antecedent will, be said to desire that end for him? These are what certain professors of theology of our times have taught, to whom the judgment of learned men - who assert that to some infants sufficient remedies were denied by God - seemed too severe.

Caput II - The common and truer opinion

Among the Scholastic Doctors who have sent their writings to press there is no dissension in this matter, but all think in the same way: first, that for certain infants - namely those brought forth into the light, and those who die in the mother's womb through the negligence of their parents - sufficient remedies were provided which could be applied to them, although through the negligence of adults they were not applied; then, that for certain infants God in no way granted that sufficient remedies could be applied to them by human diligence, whether they were brought forth into the light when water is not available, or die in the womb by the sole force of nature. Thus teach Gregory on the First Book, distinction 46, question 1, after the middle; Richard of St. Victor on the Seventh Book; Gabriel on IV Sentences, distinction 4, question 2, articles 2 - 3, doubt 2; St. Thomas on IV Sentences, distinction 6, question 1, article 2, and question 1, article 9, reply to the first; Driedo, On the Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race, tractate 1, chapter 5; and Dominicus Soto indicates the same at the end of De natura et gratia.[2111]

The first part of this opinion is proved from Prosper, On the Vocation of the Gentiles, book 2, chapter 20 (elsewhere numbered 8), where he says of infants: "Those of a few days belong to that part of grace which has always been bestowed upon all nations, by which indeed, if their parents should have lived well, they themselves would be saved through the same."[2112] Here Prosper is not speaking of all infants universally. For, first, when he says "those of a few days," he understands only those brought forth into the light: for those who die in the womb cannot be called men of a few days. Then, when he adds "by which indeed, if their parents should have lived well," etc., he not obscurely intimates that he is speaking only of those to whom the diligence of parents could bring aid. Therefore, according to Prosper's view, there are some infants to whom sufficient remedies were thus granted that by the diligence of adults - namely of their parents or of others - they could be applied. And the same reason seems to hold for those who die in the womb not by force of nature but through the carelessness of their parents or of others: for these are deprived of sufficient remedies not by God but by men in whose power it lay to apply them.

The latter part is no less expressly stated by St. Augustine in many places. In the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 12 at the end, after he has admitted that some infants die without baptism through the negligence of their parents, he adds that nevertheless there is room for God's secret judgment, who entrusted the infant's salvation to negligent parents; and he subjoins: "What

2111. Gregory the Great, On the First Book of the Sentences, d. 46, q. 1, post medium; Richard of St. Victor, On the Seventh Book; Gabriel Biel, In IV Sententiarum, d. 4, q. 2, aa. 2 - 3, dub. 2; St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Sententiarum, d. 6, q. 1, a. 2; q. 1, a. 9, ad 1; John Driedo, De captivitate et redemptione generis humani, tract. 1, cap. 5; Dominicus Soto, De natura et gratia, in fine.

2112. Prosper of Aquitaine, De vocatione Gentium, l. 2, c. 20 (alias 8).

shall I say, that sometimes the infant is snatched away before one can by the ministry of the baptizer succor him?" And in On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 22 at the beginning, about the grace of baptism which he contends is given without merits, by God's sole benignity, he says thus: "And sometimes this grace is afforded to the children of unbelievers, when by God's hidden providence they in any manner come into the hands of those prior; sometimes the children of believers do not obtain it, some impediment being present whereby aid cannot be brought to those in peril." More plainly, in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 8: "But I say, an infant born in that place where by Christ's baptism help could not be given him, being forestalled by death, was therefore such, that is, went forth without the laver of regeneration, because it could not be otherwise." This same opinion, with changed words, Paulus Orosius took from Augustine in the Apology for Free Will somewhat after the middle; in which places Augustine clearly shows that for some infants remedies could not be applied.[2113]

Moreover, on account of the sins of parents, or on account of their negligence, that infants were not deprived of that remedy is clearly indicated in epistle 105 after the middle, in these words: "What am I to say of unexpected and innumerable sudden deaths, by which even children of devout Christians are often forestalled, and baptism snatches infants away; whereas, on the contrary, sacrilegious enemies of Christ, coming somehow into the hands of Christians, depart from this life not without the sacrament of regeneration, and with few moments interposed? What, then, were the merits that preceded? If you consider those same infants, there are none proper to them: for the same common mass belongs to both. If you look to the parents, those are good whose sons are destroyed by sudden deaths without Christ's baptism. But if they perished through some negligence and fault of their parents, then the Pelagians win their invincible point, that there is some sin of the parents on account of which the grace of regeneration was not granted to the infants." Since therefore Augustine thinks there was no evil merit, it follows, in his opinion, that infants perished necessarily not by the negligence of the parents but because God so willed. Therefore, what he immediately subjoins about an infant who, suffocated through the drowsiness of the mother or nurse, died, he does not so understand as though he perished through their fault. For that a mother or nurse, overcome by sleep, should smother a child, happens without any fault of theirs. But most clearly he teaches the same in epistle 107 after the middle, where he proves that grace is not given according to merits: "Since to many children grace is not given, and without it very many die who have not a contrary will; and sometimes though the parents desire and make haste, and the ministers also are willing and prepared, nevertheless, since God does not will it, it is not given, because suddenly, before it is given, the infant expires, for whom one was running that he might receive it." With Augustine Prosper entirely agrees, in the book De ingratis, chapters 20 and 21.[2114]

But it is proved by reason: for it is certain that, without any negligence and fault of parents, some infants, by the sole force of nature, die either in the womb or outside it so quickly that no human diligence can bring them aid. Where then did God provide for them sufficient remedies

2113. St. Augustine, De dono perseverantiae, c. 12; De gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 22; De natura et gratia, c. 8. Paulus Orosius, Apologia pro libertate arbitrii, post medium.

which by the care of others could be applied to them? The adversaries say: in natural causes, which of themselves were sufficient that infants be brought forth into the light and receive baptism; but because God permitted other contrary causes to impede them, therefore the remedies could not profit the infants - not because God of Himself expressly willed to impede the application of the remedy.

Refutatur primo: But this evasion is useless. First, because even if God had only permitted the birth of infants to be impeded by natural causes, this would suffice for us to say that He had not granted to the infants sufficient remedies which could be applied by human diligence, although He had not expressly forbidden it. Secundo: Then, who would dare to say that that order of causes which impedes the birth of the infant, or in such a time and place cuts him off when born, was not specifically and minutely preestablished and ordained by God? For if "of two sparrows which fly, one of them shall not fall upon the earth without your Father" (Matthew 10), who will assert that some infants, either in the mother's womb or outside, perish without God's providence so ordaining? Since God is the author, by His will and providence, of all things and events apart from sin, it cannot be denied that the death of an infant in the womb or outside, at such a place and time, was predetermined by Him, not only permitting and allowing the causes to act, but also ordaining and willing. Wherefore I do not doubt that those are manifestly in error who ascribe this series of causes to divine permission and not to will and ordination.

But whether in God the will to deny remedies was prior, and to this end He disposed the order of causes, or the other way around, I do not much care, provided the adversaries concede that God expressly willed to deny to certain infants remedies which could be applied to them and profit them by human diligence. Nevertheless I judge that the prior will was to deny remedies, and that to this end He disposed natural causes. For that effect is compared to an end, whose will ought to be prior. Yet, lest any inconveniences should follow, it is better to assert that this will of denying remedies was only a simple affection before He disposed causes - just as we said in Disputation 95, chapter 6 about the will of rejecting these infants from eternal life.

Respondent alii: Others reply that to some infants, without any fault of their parents or of others, remedies could not be applied; nonetheless one must say that God provided them with sufficient remedies which could be applied: because non-application always depends on some voluntary act of the parents or of others, even if without any fault of theirs: as when a woman goes out of the house, or does something similar voluntarily; which, if she had not done, the remedies could have been applied to the child. Finally, whenever remedies cannot be applied, they always reduce this impotency to something done voluntarily by the parents or by others.

Improbas: But since God is said to have provided sufficient remedies for infants which could be applied, and this in the care of others by whom they ought to be applied, surely in no other way would He be said thus to have provided sufficient remedies for infants such that they could be applied, unless He had entrusted those remedies to the cares and solicitous oversight of the parents. Who, however, will say that such remedies were entrusted to their care, if by no human

2114. St. Augustine, Epist. 105, post medium; Epist. 107, post medium. Prosper of Aquitaine, De ingratis, cc. 20 - 21.

providence can they forestall the infant's premature death which happens without any fault of theirs, as in the cases set forth by Augustine? It makes little difference, therefore, whether a pregnant woman freely goes out of the house, or freely lays the child in his bed: if afterwards by some casualty which she could not foresee the infant dies prematurely without baptism, we cannot on that account say that the care either of her or of another about the remedy of baptism, which could have been applied, was committed to them.

Ad secundum respondetur ex Prospero: Concerning the other argument, Prosper, in the work Against the Objections of the Vincentians, chapter 1, and in the Chapters against the Gauls, chapter 9, asserts that Christ died for all as regards the greatness and power of the price, and as regards that one cause which pertains to the human race; not because He willed, even for all infants, to effect and decree those remedies which could be applied to them. And in truth the two testimonies of Scripture, from which we gather that God, by a prior and antecedent will, wills and desires the salvation of all, are to be understood of adults only. One is 2 Kings 14: "God does not will the soul to perish." The other is 1 Timothy 2: "God wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." In the former indeed the sacred text proposes the sentiment of a wise woman to induce David's mind to mercy toward his son Absalom; in the latter Paul immediately subjoins, "and to come to the knowledge of the truth," which shows that he is speaking of adults. He also exhorts Timothy "that supplications be made for all," namely for kings, etc., that, established in all dignity, they may accept from God that they be saved, and may come to a true knowledge of God

Ceterum we can, for three reasons, say that Christ died for all infants - who yet is by no means said to have died for the demons. First, because the cause on account of which He came was common to infants and to all men, for whom He also prayed; whereas demons are altogether outside that cause. Second, because He did not, either justly or piously, expressly deny to those infants the merit of His own [work], or exclude them with the Father from the fruit of His Passion, as the demons are rejected. Third, because we may no less piously affirm that Christ by a will of simple affection desired salvation for all infants without exception - even though, after the sin of the first parent, He did not will it efficaciously - just as He Himself desired life for Himself, and so prayed for all that they might obtain salvation, as He prayed for Himself that He might be spared from death, yet with that condition which He added to His prayer: "Nevertheless, not my will, but thine be done" (Matthew 26). On which St. Jerome seems to intimate that, when He said "Let this chalice pass from me" (Matthew 26), He prayed in a certain manner for all, and asked salvation and grace for all creatures. This, however, must be understood of all infants who were born after Christ; for for all those who died before, He could neither pray nor obtain grace for them.

Caput III - The refutation of the arguments of the prior opinion

Ad primum argumentum: The arguments of the prior view are easy. To the first I answer that from this fact - that remedies were not applied to infants on account of the impediments of natural causes, which no human industry could correct - it follows not only that efficacious remedies were denied to infants, but also sufficient ones. For when we say that sufficient means which could be

applied were not granted to them, we do not deny that in the Church there are remedies which are in themselves sufficient and, if they are applied, have their effect; but [we assert] that no such remedies could be applied to infants by human diligence. To many adults indeed counsels and congruous sufficient helps are afforded while efficacious ones are at the same time denied; because to them there is in reality granted only the sufficiency of vocation, not its efficacy. But if it happened that they were neither called with sufficient vocation, nor was there granted to them the Sacrament which by their own industry they could have applied to themselves, we would plainly say that no sufficient remedy was set and offered to them - even though in the Church sufficient Sacraments had been instituted and remained

But how the will of God stood toward those infants to whom no remedies could be applied has been said in Disputation 95, cap. 6. For although grace was bestowed on all, not all obtained the fruit of the Passion, indeed in the case of many it could in no way be applied. For these, therefore, he will be said to have died only, as Prosper says, with respect to the commonality of the cause and the greatness and power of the price; nor can the adversaries assign any other particular mode by which Christ may be said to have died for them, or to have offered his death and merits to the Father for them.

Moreover, for three reasons we can say why Christ is said to have died for all, even for infants, yet not for demons. First, because the cause was common to infants and to all men, on account of which he came and for which he prayed, outside of which demons were altogether excluded. Second, because we justly and piously believe that Christ did not expressly deny his merit and the fruit of his Passion to any infants before the Father, nor excluded them, as he rejected the demons. Third, because we can no less piously affirm that Christ by the will of simple affection desired salvation for all infants, without exception, even after the sin of the first parent, just as he desired life for himself; and thus that he prayed for all, that they might obtain salvation, as he prayed for himself that he might be delivered from death, but with that condition which he added to the prayer made for himself: "Nevertheless, not my will, but thine be done." Although St. Jerome and other grave authors think that by that prayer, "Let this cup pass from me," he prayed for the sin of the Jews who were going to slay him, and asked salvation and grace for them. Yet this should be understood of all infants who were going to be born after Christ. For for all those who had already died before, he could not pray nor give thanks for the grace bestowed on them, since not all obtained the fruit of the Passion, indeed in the case of many it could in no way be applied. For these, therefore, he will be said to have died only, as Prosper says, with respect to the commonality of the cause and the greatness and power of the price; nor can the adversaries assign another special mode by which Christ may be said to have died for them, or to have offered his death and merits to the Father for them.

Disputatio XCVII - Whether God has provided sufficient helps for salvation to all adults

- Error of Armacanus. Cap. 1.
- That sufficient help is sometimes denied to adults on account of prior sins: held by Henricus and others. Cap. 2.
- That sufficient help is lacking to no one in this life is the truer opinion. Cap. 3.
- That for the observance of a present precept and for conquering an imminent temptation sufficient help is lacking to no one. Cap. 4.
- That for repentance and for faith God bestows sufficient help not at all moments, but at certain times. Cap. 5.
- The arguments of the former opinion are dissolved. Cap. 6.

Caput I - The error of Armacanus

Although "sufficient help" is said in two ways, as we noted in Disputation 88, the last chapter, nevertheless in this present disputation we call "sufficient help of grace" (auxilium sufficiens), without which a man cannot be saved, and with which he can be, even if it is not efficacious. For about the efficacious [help] it is undoubted that it is not granted to all; about the sufficient, but inefficacious, there can be some controversy. But before we recount the opinions of the Scholastics, a certain error of Armacanus must be refuted. Therefore this author, in book 9 of the Questions of the Armenians, question 27, asserts that there are some sins of men in this life which, according to the law enacted by God, cannot be remitted, such as the sins of the demons. St. Thomas rightly judges this opinion to be an error in the faith; and Dominicus Soto refutes it; and most copiously Andreas de Vega.[2115]

But for us it will be enough, first, [to consider] that passage Matthew 11: "Come to me all you who labor and are heavy laden, and I will refresh you." There Christ invites all, and rejects no one from himself; therefore he denies to no one reconciliation with himself and justification from sins. Second, that passage of 1 Timothy 2: "Who [that is, God] wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth," which we proved in Disputation 83, cap. 2, to be understood of all and each. But if he were unwilling that the sins of some be remitted, and had so established by his law, it would follow that he does not will salvation for all.

Third, Catholic truth will be sufficiently established by us, if we show that the testimonies in which the grant of pardon seems to be denied to certain sins signify no such thing.

The first is 1 John 5: "There is a sin unto death; I do not say that anyone should pray for that." Now John would not prohibit praying for a sin unto death, if he knew that every sin can be remitted; for what else can hinder us from praying for someone than that, according to the law, his sin lacks pardon, as the sin of the demons? The Fathers interpret this passage in various ways. But

2115. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 86, a. 1; Dominicus Soto, De natura et gratia, cap. 18; Andreas de Vega, On the Council of Trent, bk. 13, cap. 1 and the following.

whatever exposition we follow, it in no way favors the opinion of Armacanus. St. Augustine in book 1 On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount, at the end, understands it of the sin of envy and against fraternal charity, for which he thinks one should not pray. Bede embraces this exposition on that passage of John. Yet afterwards Augustine retracted this in book 1 of the Retractations, cap. 19, and adds that of no one in this life should despair be entertained: by which the opinion of Armacanus is clearly overthrown. He interprets John's testimony of the sin of final impenitence, for which he says one should not pray. This interpretation Bede also follows, though he himself approves the former more. Andreas de Vega embraces the same in book 13 on the Council, cap. 11. But John seems to speak of the sin of those who dwell in this life.[2116]

Origen, tract. 35 on Matthew, on those words "and going out outside," thinks that the sin unto death called so by John is the denial of the faith after grace has been received, for which reason the Novatians used to call the sin unto death the denying of Christ in torments. And although they denied the sacrament of reconciliation to one sinning in this way, nonetheless they encouraged him to contrition, and therefore did not think that in this life it could not be remitted, nor did they forbid praying for it. But in what sense John says, "I do not say that anyone should pray for that," Origen does not explain.

Ambrose, however, book 1 On Penance, chs. 8 - 9, calls "sin unto death" the gravest sin in any kind; for which, he says, one should not pray, that is, anyone at all from the people, but [only] a man of eminent and singular virtue. Others [understand it] of the sin to which excommunication is annexed, for which it is not lawful to pray publicly; but John certainly understands it of any prayer, even private.

The exposition is most approved by me which a few indicate - St. Jerome in Dialogue 2 against Jovinian, and Cajetan on that passage - and which from the very context is easily gathered. John had said: "And this is the confidence which we have toward God, that whatever we ask according to his will he hears us. And we know that he hears us in whatever we ask; we know that we have the petitions which we ask of him. If anyone knows his brother to be sinning a sin not unto death, let him ask, and life will be given to him, [to him] who sins not unto death." By which words he exhorts that we already ask God with confidence for our brother, certainly hoping that we shall obtain pardon for him, if the sin be not unto death. He immediately adds: "There is a sin unto death; I do not say that anyone should pray for that," as if he said: Of a sin which is unto death I do not promise so certainly the pardon, if someone should pray for another sinning unto death; and therefore I do not say that one should pray for him with so great a confidence and certitude of obtaining pardon; nevertheless he does not absolutely forbid to pray. But Cajetan understands "sin unto death" to be every special sin against the Holy Spirit, to which also pertains sin committed with certain knowledge. I, however, think that "sin unto death" is called a grave sin in any kind, especially when it is committed with a will hardened in evil, from which no rising again is hoped for.

2116. St. Augustine, De sermone Domini in monte, at the end; Retractationes, bk. 1, c. 19; Bede, on 1 John; Andreas de Vega, On the Council [of Trent], bk. 13, cap. 11.

The second passage of Scripture is Matthew 12: "Who shall speak a word against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in the future." Yet Armacanus from this passage proves nothing, as will be evident from the expositions of it. St. Augustine, in the Inchoate Commentaries on the Epistle to the Romans near the end, and in Epistle 50 also near the end, and in book 4 Against Cresconius, cap. 8, teaches that this sin is that of final impenitence. Nevertheless Christ the Lord seems to speak of some particular sin in this life: for he opposes the blasphemy against the Son of Man, which he said is forgiven in this age, to the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, which he asserts is not forgiven in this age nor in the future.

Andreas de Vega, book 13 on the Council, cap. 9, thinks that the sin against the Holy Spirit can, according to the law of God, be forgiven, but never is forgiven; and that Christ in Matthew 12 willed to signify this; but that the sin against the Holy Spirit, he says, is blasphemy against the divinity. But certainly this author is too bold here: for who would believe that no blasphemer against the Deity is justified in this life? Athanasius in Oration 2 against the Arians, and Basil in the Briefer Rules, response 253, St. John Chrysostom in Homily 42 on Matthew, and Anastasius in the Questions on Scripture, q. 68, which are found in tome 6 of the Sacred Library, affirm that the sin against the Holy Spirit is some word uttered against the divinity. Which indeed the Lord seems to have understood, when he opposes it to the word spoken against the Son of Man, that is, against Christ himself. But the other Fathers, besides Chrysostom and Anastasius, do not explain that [clause], "It shall not be forgiven," etc. Chrysostom indeed first thinks it is said for this reason, not that it is impossible, but that it is difficult. He adds another interpretation, which Anastasius also follows: "It shall not be forgiven him, neither in this age nor in the future," that is, if it be not blotted out by penance, he will be punished in this age and in the future; for other sins, even against the Son of Man, if they be blotted out by penance, by the common and ordinary law are not punished in both ages.

The third passage is Hebrews 6: "For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, have also tasted the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Spirit, and have nonetheless tasted the good word of God and the powers of the world to come, and have fallen away, to be renewed again unto repentance, crucifying again to themselves the Son of God and making a show of him." Which, in my judgment, is more difficult than the rest; but if it bears witness to our opinion, it not only proves that there are certain sins, as Armacanus contends, which according to the law of God in this age are not remitted, but even that any sin committed after justification is such. Yet nothing can be proved from this testimony, as will be evident from the interpretations to be set forth below.

St. John had said: "And this is the confidence which we have toward God, that whatsoever we ask according to his will, he hears us. And we know that he hears us in whatever we ask: we know that we have the petitions which we request from him. If anyone knows his brother to be sinning a sin not unto death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him who sins not unto death. There is a sin unto death: I do not say that one should ask concerning that." With these words he exhorts us that, with confidence and trust, we should even now ask God on behalf of our brother, confidently hoping that we shall obtain pardon for him, if the sin is not unto death. He adds immediately:

"There is a sin unto death; I do not say that one should ask concerning that," as if he were to say: with respect to the sin which is unto death, I do not promise so certain a pardon if someone should pray for another sinning unto death; and therefore I do not say that one should pray for that with such confidence and certitude of obtaining pardon. Nevertheless he by no means forbids prayer.

Cajetan, however, understands by "sin unto death" every special sin against the Holy Spirit, to which pertains also sin committed with certain knowledge. I for my part think that "sin unto death" is called a grave sin of any kind, especially when it is committed with a will hardened in evil, from which no resurrection is hoped.

The second testimony of Scripture is Matthew 12: "Whoever shall speak a word against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him, neither in this age nor in the future." Yet Armachanus proves nothing from this place, as will be clear from the interpretations set forth below. St. Augustine, in the inchoate commentaries on the Epistle to the Romans near the end, and in Epistle 50, also near the end, and in book 4 against Cresconius, chapter 8, teaches that the sin against the Holy Spirit is not said to be unable to be remitted as though absolutely impossible or as though it could not be remitted in this life; rather, when Christ asserts that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is not remitted "neither in this age nor in the future," he signified that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit would never be remitted to those who persist in it to the end; and he spoke thus to deter excessive audacity at that point, not to deny that any blasphemy whatsoever can be remitted in this life by penance. Others of the Fathers assert that "neither in this age nor in the future" means that it will not be forgiven in this age, nor will it be forgiven in the future by way of any purgation; Chrysostom, however, thinks the phrase was said not because forgiveness is impossible, but because it is exceedingly difficult; he also adduces another interpretation, from which it follows likewise that it is not forgiven in this age, and in the future it will be punished. For other sins, if by penance they are not remitted in this age, they are remitted in the future (according to some); but blasphemy against the Holy Spirit will not be remitted even in the future. Many Fathers besides Chrysostom explain that saying: Athanasius, St. Basil, St. John Chrysostom, and Anastasius.[2117]

The third place is Hebrews 6: "It is impossible for those who were once enlightened, have tasted the heavenly gift, were made partakers of the Holy Spirit, have tasted the good word of God and the powers of the world to come, and yet have fallen away, to be renewed again unto repentance, crucifying again to themselves the Son of God and holding him up to contempt." This is more difficult; but it treats not only of sins (as some contend), but also of the return after justification. There is, meanwhile, nothing to be proved from this testimony for Armachanus, as will be evident from the interpretations.

Ambrose, Jerome, Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Theodoret on that place, and Augustine, book 1, On True and False Penance, chapter 3, explain it of the renewal through baptism, which they say is impossible to those who have already once tasted the gift of heavenly grace; to wit, to those to whom Paul was speaking, and who, after receiving baptism, had cast away the faith, thinking

2117. Athanasius, Oration 2 against the Arians; St. Basil, Briefer Rules, response 253; St. John Chrysostom, Homily 42 on Matthew; Anastasius, Questions on Scripture, q. 68, in tome 6 of the Bibliotheca sacra.

according to the Jewish custom that they could be baptized again; and on this point some note that Paul did not say, "It is impossible to repent," but "It is impossible to be renewed again unto repentance." He understood by "repentance" baptism. And when he says, "crucifying again to themselves the Son of God and holding him up to contempt," he indicates the same thing; for baptism, in which we are buried, is a figure of the death of Christ (Romans 6). Therefore he wishes it to be understood that he "crucifies Christ again" and exposes him to mockery, who again wishes to be baptized. In the same manner they interpret that other text, Hebrews 10: "For if we sin willfully after receiving the knowledge of the truth, there no longer remains a sacrifice for sins," as Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Anselm understand it: that baptism is a figure of the death of Christ, and therefore is called a "sacrifice for sin"; thus "there remains no sacrifice" is interpreted to mean no second baptism.

This doctrine indeed contains what is true and is most consonant with Scripture; but it does not square well with Paul's context, neither with what precedes nor with what follows, as will soon appear.

Accordingly, the exposition of Anselm pleases me, who takes "impossible" in that place to be the same as "difficult." For in morals, that which happens rarely and with difficulty is wont to be called "impossible." For this reason John 5 says that Christ said to the Jews: "How can you believe, who receive glory from one another, and do not seek the glory that is from the only God?" They could not believe, and so forth. This sense the context itself declares. For when in the preceding part he had spoken many and noble things about the priesthood of Christ according to the order of Melchizedek, he immediately subjoins: "Concerning which we have much to say and hard to explain." He gives, moreover, the reason why he said that the discourse was hard to explain, with these words: "Because you have become sluggish"; for they had fallen into sins. Wherefore he says that they, through their sloth, had rendered themselves such that they needed milk rather than solid food of higher instruction, and thus had need that to them the first rudiments of the faith be again delivered.

Paul begins chapter 6 in this manner: "Therefore, leaving aside the word of the beginning concerning Christ, let us be borne on unto perfection," with the following words he exhorts them to leave the first rudiments of faith, which in baptism itself are proposed to catechumens, and to be carried to the instruction of higher doctrine. He immediately subjoins: "And this we shall do, if indeed God permits"; which words must be referred to that "let us be borne on to perfection," lest the Jews think that they of themselves would diligently perform that, but only "if the Lord permits." Now he said "if indeed the Lord permits" for no other reason than that they themselves were too dull to understand, because they had gone backward from the grace received.

Then follows: "For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, have tasted also the heavenly gift, were made partakers of the Holy Spirit, have tasted the good word of God and the powers of the world to come, and yet have fallen away, to be renewed again unto repentance, crucifying again to themselves the Son of God and holding him up to contempt." The particle "for" gives the reason for what he had said, "if indeed the Lord permits": as if he were to say, for this reason I added "if indeed the Lord permits," because I deem it difficult that those who have once

been enlightened and have received copious gifts of the Holy Spirit, if they fall into sins by which they seem again to crucify the Lord and to hold him up to mockery, as you, after so many charisms, have fallen, should return again into God's grace by penance; and insofar as you return, you are too dull to be fit for the higher instruction of doctrine beyond the first rudiments for catechumens.

He said "crucifying again to themselves the Son of God," because by the new sin they added a new cause of the cross and death of Christ. He explains this difficulty by a common example when he subjoins: "For the earth which often drinks upon itself the rain coming frequently, and brings forth useful herb for those by whom it is tilled, receives blessing from God; but that which brings forth thorns and thistles is reprobate and near to a curse, whose end is unto burning." In like manner those who, after the copious shower of gifts and graces, by which their soul was irrigated and enriched, do not bring forth the fruit of good works, but the thorns of sin, are near to a curse and to reprobation, unless repentance renew them. Immediately, however, he consoles them, saying: "But we are persuaded concerning you, beloved, better things and nearer to salvation, although we thus speak. For God is not unjust to forget your work and the love which you have shown in his name, you who have ministered to the saints and do minister." He consoles them, therefore, with a most apt reason, and shows that they are nearer to salvation than to a curse and reprobation; because although they had fallen into sin, yet by works of mercy which they had rendered to the ministers of the Gospel, and were still rendering, they would obtain the mercy of God. For God is not unjust and unfaithful that he should forget the promise of mercy which he has made to the merciful.

By the way, it must be observed that the Apostle in this place is not speaking about the retribution of eternal life, which he has promised to the good works of the just, but about that whereby he has promised mercy and the remission of sins to the merciful. When, however, the Council of Trent, at session 6, chapter 16, says that the words of the Apostle are to be proposed to just men, from 1 Corinthians 15, "Always abounding in every good work," and from Hebrews 6, "For God is not unjust," it rightly admonishes that these and similar passages are to be proposed to the just; because eternal life is not less, but more, promised to the good works of the just than remission of sins is promised to the works of sinners. Therefore, since God is not unjust, so as to forget what he has promised to the impious and sinners, much less will he be unjust by not fulfilling what he promises to the works of the just.[2118]

Moreover, the Fathers alleged above, in treating of baptism, interpret also that passage at Hebrews 10: "For if we sin willfully after receiving the knowledge of the truth, there remains no more sacrifice for sins: but a certain fearful expectation of judgment and the zeal of fire that will consume the adversaries"; as if Paul were to say that for such there is not left a second baptism; which interpretation does not please me either. For Paul, in that chapter, a few words earlier, when he was proclaiming the excellence of Christ's priesthood, had set him in opposition to the priests of the Old Testament, because they repeated the same sacrifices each day; but Christ with one oblation has consummated and purged all things. Then, after some intervening words, he inserts:

2118. Council of Trent, session 6, cap. 16, citing 1 Cor 15 and Heb 6.

for those who sin willfully there is not left for them a new sacrifice and oblation (for this is what the word "is not left" signifies), but the ancient one, by which our Christ the priest once offered, is sufficient to expiate all.

Caput II - Sufficient help (auxilium) is sometimes, on account of prior sins, denied for a time to adults: this was the view of Henry [of Ghent], and others.

There is none among the Scholastics, besides Armachanus, who says that sin by its very genus, by ordinary law of God, cannot be remitted; yet there are not a few, and not of the least name among theologians, who judge that sometimes, because of prior sins, men are so destitute during some determinate period of life that neither sufficient nor necessary help is granted to them by which they might be able to observe the commandments of believing, of penance, and other such, and to avoid sins. This is the opinion of Henry in Quodlibet 8, question 9, although he somewhat doubts about it; but more clearly do teach it Abulensis on Matthew 6:11; Gregory, on the First [Book of the Sentences], distinction 46, the single question, concerning the third solution when he impugns the second solution; Cajetan on chapter 12 of John, on those words, "They could not believe"; Roffensis in article 26 against Luther; Ruard Tapper in article 7, page 254, who, although he asserts that the opposite opinion is more pious, nevertheless thinks this one is much more conformable to the doctrine of the Fathers.[2119]

They prove it, first, from Scripture: Ecclesiastes 7, "Consider the works of God, that no one can correct him whom he has despised." Second, 2 Maccabees 9, about Antiochus, it is said: "The wicked man was praying to the Lord, from whom he was not going to obtain mercy." Of Pharaoh too, Scripture everywhere reports in Exodus that his heart was hardened, that he might not be moved by signs and wonders. John 12: "Therefore they could not believe," namely the Jews, "because again Isaiah said: He has blinded their eyes and hardened their heart." Isaiah 6. In these places, and in many others which Driedo relates for this opinion, Scripture signifies that it is impossible for some to be converted to God, or to believe, or to consent to good works.[2120]

Second, it is proved from the Fathers. Isidore, in the book On the Supreme Good, chapter 15: "Some are so despised by God that they cannot bewail their evils." St. Augustine and his disciples have taught this most clearly of all. I set aside the many testimonies of Augustine, wherein he teaches that those who are reprobate or hardened, or on whom God has no mercy because he does not call them with a congruous vocation, cannot respond to God: such is that passage, book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2: "To others the call indeed comes, but because it was of such a sort as could not move them, they could indeed be called, but not chosen." Something similar is found in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapters 6 and 8; in On the Gift of Perseverance, chapters 8 and 14; in On Predestination and Grace, chapter 15; in On Nature and Grace, chapter 18; and in the Enchiridion, chapter 103. For from these one could easily reply that Augustine there affirmed an

2119. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 8, q. 9; Alonso Tostado (Abulensis) on Matthew 6:11; Gregory [of Rimini], on the First Book, dist. 46, the unique question, about solution 3; Cajetan on John 12: "Non poterant credere"; John Fisher (Roffensis), art. 26, against Luther; Ruard Tapper, art. 7, p. 254.

2120. Eccl 7:13; 2 Macc 9; Exodus on Pharaoh's hardening; John 12:39 - 40 citing Isaiah 6; see Driedo, passim.

impossibility following upon the foreknowledge of the vocation, which in no way takes away liberty and the faculty of doing the opposite; yet, foreknowledge being supposed (with which it is conferred, because the effect that is not going to be is also supposed), it is impossible to operate rightly with it. About that consequent impossibility, and the opposite necessity, enough and more than enough has been said by us in disputation 68, chapter 4.

I will therefore refer the manifest testimonies of this Father, reduced to two classes, by which he seems to have expressed this view. The first is of those in which he says that no one is forsaken by God unless God is first forsaken by the man: therefore, in the book on the Articles falsely imputed to him, article 2, to wit: God, unless he is first forsaken, forsakes no one; and no one is forsaken unless he himself is the deserter and commits [the desertion]. What the sense of that proposition of Augustine is - "God, unless he is first forsaken, forsakes no one" - is this: God forsakes him by whom God himself is forsaken, and he forsakes no other. For logicians expound that proposition, "No one except Peter disputes," thus: Peter disputes, and no one else disputes. It follows, therefore, that God denies sufficient help to the sinner - which is to forsake him - and he denies it to no other.

To this also pertains the statement of Augustine in the same book On the Articles falsely imputed to him, whence Prosper took what he has in the book in response to the Vincentian objections, response 15: "To no one, he says, does God deny the way of correction; nor does he deprive anyone of the possibility of good..."[2121]

He was not able to obey, but because he had so comported himself that his heart should be hardened. But if at the time when he did not obey he had had sufficient help whereby he could obey, then not to obey would have been imputed to him. And although afterward he retracted many things in that book, this he never corrected.

Next, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, where already as bishop he spoke most exactly about the grace of God, thus he writes a little after the middle, about the help necessary for man and angel: "But if this help had been lacking either to the angel or to man when first they were made, since their nature was not made such that it could remain without divine help if it willed, assuredly they would not have fallen by their own fault; for help would have been lacking without which they could not remain: now, however, that this sort of help is lacking to some, is itself the penalty of sin." For these words are to be understood not of congruous and efficacious help, but of sufficient. For whoever sins lacks congruous and efficacious help; to whom nevertheless guilt is imputed: but the help of which St. Augustine speaks is such that, if it were lacking, fault would not be imputed to those acting; now this can be nothing other than sufficient and necessary. Therefore, since Augustine says of it, "Now, however, that this sort of help is lacking to some is itself the penalty of sin," he plainly holds that now it is denied to some men; yet because it is denied on account of their fault, therefore sin is nonetheless imputed to them: which, however, would not be imputed to the first man or to the angel, if without any fault of theirs such help were withdrawn from them.

2121. Prosper of Aquitaine, Against the Objections of the Vincentians, response 15; Augustine, De articulis sibi falso impositis.

Third, the foregoing opinion is proved by this argument. Without congruous and efficacious grace no one can consent or act: therefore this grace is necessary for acting. But this is denied to all who do not act as they ought: therefore the help of grace that is necessary is not granted to all. But this argument confirms the foregoing opinion less than it introduces a new difficulty: for this grace is denied to all who sin, even in the first sin; yet the aforesaid opinion does not assert that to all who sin, but only to some on account of very great sins, sufficient help is denied. Moreover, the foregoing opinion distinguishes efficacious and sufficient help: but this argument seems to prove them altogether the same; for efficacious help is necessary, if this argument proves anything; but necessary and sufficient are the same. Accordingly we adduced this argument not so much to confirm the aforesaid opinion as to satisfy the difficulty which it has.

That sufficient help is lacking to no one in this life is the truer opinion.

Caput III - Proofs for the common opinion

The proposed opinion has long since been so approved by the common vote of all the Scholastics that very many do not hesitate to brand the former with the mark of error. It therefore asserts that in this life no man, however hardened and rebellious, lacks sufficient help, but that it is offered to all. Thus teach Adrian in IV, q. 1 de Penance; Dominicus Soto, I, On Nature and Grace, c. 18; Driedo, On the Redemption and Captivity of the Human Race, c. 5 and 3; Andreas de Vega, book 3 on the Council of Trent, c. 13, col.; and it is gathered moreover from St. Thomas, III, q. 86, a. 1, where he charges with error those who say that some sin cannot be blotted out by penance, either because they seem to take away man's freedom, or because they detract much from the power of grace, or finally because man's malice would outweigh God's mercy: all of which, or some of which, follow against those who affirm that man in some period of life is deprived by God of sufficient help.[2122] This opinion we shall prove universally and without any distinction in this chapter; in the following ones, in order to explain it better, after a prefixed distinction we shall show the way in which God offers sufficient help to all.

It is proved first from that of Matthew 11: "Come to me all you who labor and are burdened, and I will refresh you." Since Christ there invites all to repentance, it follows that he also offers sufficient help to all; for he would invite them thus in vain without such help.

Second, it is proved from 1 Timothy 2: "Who wills all men to be saved." For if to some he denied at least sufficient helps, it would follow that in no way did he desire their salvation.

Third, some prove it from Augustine, in the book Exposition of Certain Propositions in the Epistle to the Romans, c. 62: "Just as that mercy is attributed as a merit to the preceding faith, so this hardening to the preceding impiety: although man's free will is not taken away either for believing God or for impiety, so that judgment may follow us." And in the book On Predestination and Grace, c. 15, where of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar he says: "Here, feeling the hand of the

2122. Adrian of Utrecht, In IV Sent., q. 1 de Poenitentia; Dominicus Soto, De natura et gratia, c. 18; John Driedo, De redemptione et captivitate generis humani, c. 5 and 3; Andreas de Vega, Lib. 3 in Concilium Tridentinum, c. 13; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, III, q. 86, a. 1.

Lord, the one groaned in the remembrance of his own iniquity; the other, by his free will, fought against the most merciful truth of God." And c. 14, he writes about Pharaoh: "The patience of God ought to have availed him unto salvation, whereby, delaying his punishment and deserved chastisement, he repeatedly multiplied the scourges of miracles: could he not, just as by scourges he expelled the people when beaten, so by the miracles, believing, recognize God of so great power?" Where, while Augustine commends the patience of God, he speaks plainly of that whole time during which Pharaoh's hardening persisted. He judges therefore that during that whole time he could, by believing the miracles, dismiss the people, and obey the word of God. If therefore Pharaoh, the distinguished example of hardening, had this faculty of obeying, it follows that he never lacked God's sufficient help. Yet since in that same c. 62 and in the other places cited he so openly denies sufficient help of God to the hardened, I would not wish to confirm our opinion by his authority. Also, it is not sufficiently certain whether he speaks of that whole time during which Pharaoh, stirred by miracles and scourges, refused to obey, or only of that part in which, not yet destitute of sufficient help of God, he could obey; for in that c. 62 he assigns some time in which he could no longer obey, nor would it then be imputed to him as a fault, but in the beginning, when he so presented himself as to deserve from God to be hardened.[2123]

Further authorities for sufficient help

The same seems also to be proved, first from Prosper, book two On the Vocation of the Gentiles, c. 25, otherwise 8, where, after he has shown that there are certain general gifts of grace (for from God's common benefits and effects men can recognize their author), he subjoins these words: "But it pleased God to grant this to many, and to remove that from no one." Fulgentius agrees, Epistle 7, with these words: "As for a physician there is no incurable wound, so at no time can the heavenly medicine fail." Passing over, however, the testimonies of these Fathers - which perhaps held the same opinion as Augustine, as we shall say below - there is present to us Paulus Orosius, himself too a contemporary of Augustine and a most keen defender of his doctrine, who writes in the Apology for the Freedom of the Will, rather before the middle, as follows: "This has always been my faithful and undoubted sentence: that God supplies his help not only in his body, which is the Church, to which, on account of the faith of believers, he lavishly bestows his special gifts of grace, but also to all the nations in this world he, in long-suffering, ministers his eternal clemency: not, as you assert with your disciple Celestius - whose secret nature of impious dogmas was indeed crushed at the African Synod - that one grace is bestowed generally upon all in mere natural good and in free will; but that, in a special manner, daily, through times, through days, through moments, through atoms, atoms, to all and to each he ministers." In which place he acknowledges that helps of grace, distinct from the gift of creation, are offered to individual men on individual occasions. Moreover, he also teaches there that this help is conferred for conquering temptations and for knowing the true God, as we shall report in c. 4. Finally, Origen, book 3, Peri archon, c. 1, affirms that a man can come to such a pass of evils as to be equal to the malice of demons: yet he

2123. St. Augustine, Expositio quarundam propositionum epistolae ad Romanos, c. 62; De praedestinatione et gratia, c. 14 - 15.

adds that all sinners, as long as they are in this life, can be restored. Note: nonetheless in that same place certain of his words must be guarded against, in which he assigns various remedies by which a fallen man can be healed.[2124][2125][2126][2127]

I confess indeed that the testimonies of Prosper and Fulgentius are somewhat suspect to me, because they are most diligent and most exact disciples of Augustine, and seem to follow the opposite opinion, as is clear from the testimonies cited in the preceding chapter in the first class. Therefore, in the places now alleged by us, perhaps they granted the grace of outward signs and the medicines of benefits - even outward ones - of sin; but in other places they denied the help of inward inspiration, which is now the matter in controversy.

But in very truth, since we ought by right to presume many and great things about God's mercy, and Scripture proclaims such excellent and splendid things, and since it depends solely on God's will that such help be denied to anyone, unless it were manifest to us concerning this will, we ought in no way to affirm it. Now that will can become known to us from nowhere else than from Scripture, or revelation, or tradition. Since therefore by none of these means is God's purpose known to us, we shall rashly affirm that that help is denied to some. And from Augustine and others who taught that, we can ask whence they were more certain of this will of God. For passages of Scripture - if there are any - that seem to favor the prior opinion, we shall easily explain in c. 6; some also have been set out by us in c. 1 of this disputation.

That for the observance of a present precept and for conquering an imminent temptation sufficient help is lacking to no one.

Caput IV - That in various ways we need the necessary and sufficient help of God

But beforehand I note those things which seem to favor the prior opinion, we shall easily explain in c. 6; some also have been set out by us in c. 1 of this disputation. St. Augustine, too, in the place on Pharaoh writes thus: The patience of God ought to have availed him unto salvation, whereby, delaying punishment and the requital of merit, he redoubled the frequent blows of miracles: could he not, just as, smitten with scourges, he expelled the people, so by believing the miracles he might acknowledge God of such power? Where, while Augustine commends the patience of God, he speaks plainly of that whole time during which Pharaoh's obduracy persevered. He judges, therefore, that during that whole time he could, by believing the miracles, dismiss the people and obey the word of God. If then Pharaoh, a remarkable example of obduracy, had this ability to obey, it follows that he never lacked God's sufficient help. However, since in that same chapter 62 and in the other places cited he so openly denies sufficient help of God to the obdurate, I would not wish to confirm our opinion by his authority. I grant indeed that it is also not sufficiently clear whether he is speaking of the whole time during which Pharaoh, stirred by miracles and scourges, was unwilling to obey, or only of that part in which, not yet deprived of

2124. Prosper of Aquitaine, De vocatione gentium, lib. 2, c. 25 (alias c. 8).
2125. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Epistola 7.
2126. Paulus Orosius, Apologia pro arbitrii libertate.
2127. Origen, De principiis (Peri archon), lib. 3, c. 1.

sufficient help of God, he was able to obey: for in that chapter 62 he assigns some time in which he could no longer obey, nor would that then be imputed to him for fault, but at the beginning, when he showed himself such that he deserved to be hardened by God.[2128]

The same seems also to be proved, first, from Prosper, in the second book On the Vocation of the Gentiles, chapter 25, alias 8, where, after he has shown that there are certain general gifts of grace (for from God's common benefits and effects men are able to know their author), he subjoins these words: But it has pleased God to grant this to many, and to remove that from none.[2129] Fulgentius agrees, in Epistle 7, with these words: As for a physician no wound is incurable, so at no time can the heavenly medicine fail.[2130] Passing over, however, the testimonies of these Fathers, who perhaps were of the same opinion as Augustine, as we shall say below, we have Paul Orosius, a compatriot of Augustine and a most ardent defender of his doctrine, in the Apology for the Freedom of the Will somewhat before the middle, where he writes thus: This has always been my faithful and undoubted opinion, that God supplies his help not only in his own body, which is the Church, to which, on account of the faith of believers, he lavishly bestows his gifts of grace, but also to all the nations in this world, by his long-suffering and everlasting clemency, day by day and moment by moment, administering to all and to each distinct helps of grace.[2131] Likewise Origen, in On First Principles, book 3, chapter 1, affirms that a man can come by which he be made equal in regard to the assistance of God; and yet in the same place he adds that all in this life are set in such alternations and agitations that they can be healed by the remedies which God's mercy furnishes; and there he designates certain helps of his, namely remedies, by which the sinner, while he still lives, can be recalled to the true God.[2132]

Note. The testimonies of Origen, Prosper, and Fulgentius seem to me suspect, since, as most diligent disciples of Augustine, they appear to follow his opinion. Therefore, in the passages now alleged by us, perhaps they conceded the grace of exterior aids and remedies; in other places, however, concerning interior inspiration - about which the present controversy turns - they denied it.

But truly, because of the great and excellent mercy of God, we ought not to presume, nor rashly affirm, on the mere ground of the divine will, that help is denied to anyone. For that will can be made known manifestly to us by no other means than by Scripture or by revelation; since therefore in no such way is it known to us, we shall not affirm as certain that such help is denied to some. And if there are any places of Scripture which seem to favor the prior opinion, we shall easily explain them in c. 6; some, too, have been set out by us in c. 1 of this disputation. That for the observance of a present precept and for conquering an imminent temptation sufficient help is lacking to no one.

2128. St. Augustine, Expositio quarundam propositionum epistolae ad Romanos, c. 62; De praedestinatione et gratia, c. 14 - 15.

2129. Prosper of Aquitaine, De vocatione gentium, lib. 2, c. 25 (alias c. 8); cf. lib. 1, c. 13 (alias c. 5), c. 9 (alias c. 7).

2130. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Epistola 7.

2131. Paulus Orosius, Apologia pro arbitrii libertate.

2132. Origen, De principiis (Peri archon), lib. 3, c. 1.

We need, then, the necessary and sufficient help of God, first, for the observance of a precept when it occurs, and for conquering a temptation; further, for works of virtue outside the time of a precept, as for penance when one is in sin, but the opportunity of this precept has not yet occurred. In the present chapter we must treat of the former; of the latter in the following: from which it will be clear whether God ever denies such help.

As to the first, it must be observed that there are certain precepts which the Schoolmen call supernatural, such as those of faith, hope, and charity; and certain others which are natural, such as those of the moral virtues which they call acquired. Note, furthermore, that those precepts which are supernatural require, for their observance as their principle, a cogitation of the supernatural order, nor in any way does a merely natural cogitation suffice.

These things being posited, I pronounce that the obligation of a precept or a temptation never occurs to us without sufficient cogitation by which we can both conquer the temptation and observe the precept. I speak of an affirmative precept, for which not only does the time exist in which it is wont to bind, but also the obligation of which comes to memory: for if no thought of it were to come up into the mind, no obligation of it would press upon us, as is manifest, and we shall show this in 1 - 2, q. 76, a. 2 and 3.[2133]

Further, that upon an occurring precept or an urgent temptation sufficient help is given to all is proved for a twofold reason. The first is that otherwise it would follow that sometimes the wayfarer knowingly transgresses a precept or yields to temptation and yet no fault is imputed to him. Wherefore, neither of that man whom God for a long time bears with and yet he is hardened in evil and is deprived of such help, could that be said which is in Romans 2: "According to your hardness and impenitent heart you treasure up for yourself wrath in the day of wrath and of the revelation of the just judgment of God." For if transgression is no longer imputed to him for fault because he is deprived of sufficient help, it follows that he does not merit a new punishment, and hence that he daily treasures up nothing of God's wrath for himself, which is absurd.

It will be said, on the doctrine of Augustine which we related in the cited place, that then indeed, when the hardened man in act transgresses a precept or consents to temptation, fault is not imputed to him, but rather to that time when he showed himself such that he deserved to be forsaken by God. But on the contrary: this is a manifest reason, because, in order that the event of obduracy be imputed, it ought to have been in some way foreseen or thought upon. But when someone sins and thinks nothing of such an event, neither has any reason for doubting, nor does any suspicion occur, or because - according to the more probable opinion - he thinks that such help is never denied by God, such an event can be imputed neither in itself nor in its cause; and therefore he in no way merits the greater punishment and the wrath of God.

It is proved, second: Although it be true that a supernatural precept cannot be fulfilled if supernatural cogitation is lacking, nevertheless, because whenever the obligation of a supernatural precept occurs to the mind it offers itself not without supernatural knowledge, therefore freedom in the will never fails for its observance on account of a defect of cognition. And since nothing

2133. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I - II, q. 76, a. 2 - 3.

contrary can occur which necessarily draws the will to itself as long as a man is in possession of himself, it comes about that in the will there always remains freedom to fulfill a supernatural precept whenever cogitation of it occurs. Further, when some temptation offers itself, it does not necessarily move and draw the will to itself as long as reason is not disturbed and advertes to the opposite; therefore no one is so hardened that he cannot fulfill an occurring precept and overcome or avoid an urgent temptation by not consenting.

Moreover, that the will is not necessarily drawn either by something occurring against a precept or by a temptation which offers itself is manifest; because, according to the common opinion of the Doctors, the will is not necessarily moved as to exercise unless by an object in which every ratio of good appears and under which no ratio of evil can be apprehended. Wherefore St. Thomas, 1 - 2, q. 10, a. 2, plainly affirms that in this life our will is necessarily moved by no object; indeed there are theologians who think that it is not drawn necessarily even by the highest good clearly seen. But a temptation, and that which occurs against a precept, cannot be apprehended under every ratio of good, as is evident; therefore neither can it necessarily move the will to itself. Hence it is that not only does God leave no one destitute of sufficient and necessary help, with which the integrity of the will's freedom stands fast, but neither can he take that freedom away whenever reason is not disturbed and sufficiently advertes; for if either of these should occur, then the man does not remain morally free, nor is fault imputed to him.

Caput V - That for penance and for faith God confers sufficient help not at all moments, but at certain times

It now remains that we say something of the other point which we proposed in the preceding chapter, namely of the sufficient and necessary help which God confers for believing on those who have heard nothing of the mysteries of our faith, and of the help for penance when one is not yet bound by the precept of faith or of penance. And first this must be presupposed: God does not stand at the door and knock at all moments. For since God is said to do this in us in no other way than by holy cogitation, whenever a man is thinking of other things and considers nothing of penance and his sins, nothing of the mysteries of faith, he is not to be said to stand at the door and knock. But this happens often, as experience has taught; therefore God does not continually confer help, even sufficient help, for these works. But if someone should say that at every moment of time God knocks and offers his help, let him explain, I beg, what this sufficient help is in us, with which he is said to knock. To say what some have asserted, that this help is the preparation of the will of God, whereby it is of itself at hand unless an impediment from us occur, is said without foundation. For here we are not treating of the preparation of the will of God; for the adversaries also concede that this is of itself prompt in God unless the impediments of sins on our part stand in the way; but the controversy now is about the help which is wont to be in us as the effect of the will of God - whether it is always given to all, or is sometimes denied on account of sins. Since therefore God does not continually, nor at every moment of time, arouse our cogitation to penance, it must be said that only at certain intervals of time he touches our heart; and although he always stands at

the door, yet he does not continually and always knock, but behaves as one who knocks with his hand at a friend's door, and after a single knock waits to see whether there is a reply from within, then adds a second, and so on in succession.

From this it follows that there are various excitations by which we are called to penance; for there is not one only, but many excitations, as many as are the limits of life, since they are not infinite. Hence it follows also that there is a last visitation, which God best knows, after which the heart of man will no longer be aroused: which we have learned from experience. For it happens that men, seized with fear, scarcely before think seriously of penance, and yet are not moved to it; and little by little they cease from such consideration and attend to other things; and, with the distraction of mind continuing, either they perish or die suddenly. In this case that last excitation and sufficient help for penance was that final thought before death; and the same must be said of all who die of disease after a long illness. For although more frequently they are touched by that thought, nevertheless at length the same agitation is ended in a last time, after which they think nothing further of penance. If anyone, therefore, at that time when danger of death is imminent, is not stirred to penance but suddenly perishes, thinking only of escaping the danger, and dies in sin, on account of other sins he will be justly condemned, nor can he complain of God for not having aroused him to penance.

As to how sufficient help for believing is given, one must think otherwise: when the preacher is present who proposes the things to be believed, and when the obligation of the precept lies upon one and the preaching has its place, that very preaching is an excitation sufficient for believing. Yet if, after he has heard the preaching, the unbeliever withdraws and the preacher departs from him, he is not forthwith and continually touched and excited to believe, any more than the sinner is to penance; but at set times and at certain intervals, so that it tends toward a last excitation - which we shall prove in the same way.

As for the Gentiles, who have heard absolutely nothing supernatural, it must be said that countless persons were never proximally excited by some sufficient cogitation to believe, and yet were not altogether destitute of sufficient help for salvation and for believing. For on many occasions by their works they were excited to act well and not to consent in sin, their cogitations mutually accusing and defending one another, as the Apostle says to the Romans; to whom there was supplied some grace of God not only of creation but also of governance, which is through Christ, for living uprightly; which if they used well, God would grant further and greater [helps] for believing - those things which are supernatural having been granted - and thus there was for them some measure of grace, because this whole universe and the celestial machine, which proclaims the maker of all things whom we ought to invoke, is set before all. Hence Wisdom 13 says: "Vain are all men in whom there is not the knowledge of God," and concerning those who from the goods of the world "could not understand him who is" nor, by attending to works, "acknowledge the workman, but either fire, or wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon, they thought to be the gods that rule the world." It then goes on to show how they cannot be excused who from this fabric of the universe have not come to know the true God and the author of all things.

The same particular helps of grace for all the Gentiles are granted by Prosper in the book On the Vocation of the Gentiles, book 2, chapter 25 (alias 8), and also in the first book, chapter 13 (alias 5) and chapter 9 (alias 7), whose words it has pleased me to report: that God, by benefits and by that very providence of his which is inseparably extended to all creatures, admonishes all; and that then, when the Word was made flesh and sent into the world, through the very preaching of the truth by which men are helped to seek the true God, the effusion of this grace was poured more broadly.[2129]

The same is attested by Psalm 18: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament announces the work of his hands," which place Paul cites in Romans 10 to show that without preaching no one hears and believes in him whom he ought to invoke.[2134] The Fathers commonly hold that that place is adduced by Paul in a mystical sense and is understood of the Apostles - since the Psalm literally speaks of the heavens of this visible universe - whereas the Apostle applies it to the Apostles, of whose preaching he says: "Their sound has gone forth into all the earth."[2134]

- With his hand he knocks at the friend's door, and afterwards waits, whether they will answer within; then he adds a second, and so on.
- Hence it follows that there are various excitations, by which we are called to repentance; for the call is not one continuous thing, and they are finite, because they are not infinite. Wherefore it also follows that there is a last one, which God knows best, after which man will no more be stirred to repentance; a fact we have learned by experience. For it happens that a man, seized with fear, thinks seriously about repentance for his past life, yet is not moved to it at all, and little by little ceases from such consideration and turns to other things; and with that distraction of mind persisting, he either is killed, or suddenly dies. In this case indeed that last thought about his past life was the final excitation and sufficient help for repentance; and the same must be said of all who die of sickness. For although they are more frequently touched by that thought, nevertheless at length they come to some last one, after which they no longer think of repentance. But if someone, at the time when danger of death impends, is not stirred to repentance, but, suddenly terrified, thinks only of escaping the danger, and on that account dies in sin, he will be justly damned on account of other sins, nor can complaint be made against God that he did not stir him to repentance. In what manner he stirred him.
- Next, of sufficient help for believing, one must think otherwise: for when a preacher is present who sets forth the things to be believed, then the obligation of the precept comes to bear, and the preaching itself brings with it sufficient excitation for believing; although the infidel who once heard the preacher and afterwards departed from him is not forthwith

2129. Prosper of Aquitaine, De vocatione gentium, lib. 2, c. 25 (alias c. 8); cf. lib. 1, c. 13 (alias c. 5), c. 9 (alias c. 7).
2134. Psalm 18(19):2; Romans 10:18.
2134. Psalm 18(19):2; Romans 10:18.

touched and excited to believe, just as neither is the sinner to repentance; but at fixed times and at certain intervals, so that one may come to a last excitation, which is to be proved in the same way.

- But concerning the Gentiles, who have heard nothing at all that is supernatural, it must be said that they were indeed never proximately stirred by some sufficient thought to believing; nevertheless they were by no means destitute of sufficient help for salvation and for believing. For through many occasions of works they were variously stirred to act well and not to consent to sin, with thoughts accusing and defending one another, as the Apostle says to the Romans; and to them there was imparted something of God's grace not only of creation, but also of governance, which is through Christ for living rightly, which if they were to use well, God would grant further and greater helps for believing, which are supernatural. A certain measure of grace was also granted to them, because this whole universe, and the celestial fabric, proclaims God the author of all, whom we ought to invoke. Therefore in Wisdom 13 it is said: "But vain are all men, in whom there is not the knowledge of God: and of the good things that are seen, they could not understand him that is" (Wis. 13); nor, attending to the works, did they recognize who was the craftsman, but either fire, or spirit, or the swift air. Then it continues to show how those cannot be excused who from this fabric of the universe did not know the true God and author of all.
- The same portion of grace Prosper grants to all the nations, in book 1 of On the Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 21 (alias 7), and again in book 1, chapters 13 (alias 5), 19 (alias 7), and 25 (alias 8), whose words I thought good to report here: "Whether, then, they contemplate the latest ages, or the first or the middle, it is notably and piously believed that God wills all men to be saved, and has always willed it. And this is shown from nowhere else than from his own benefits and that providence of God which is imparted commonly and indifferently to all generations. For there have been, and are, gifts of such a sort so general, that by their testimonies men might be helped to seek the True God; to which gifts, bearing witness to their author through all ages, a largess of special grace has been superadded. Therefore he holds that to those who use well that prior and general grace another special grace is poured out."[1]
- The same is attested by Psalm 18(19): "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament announces the work of his hands." The Apostle cites this passage in Romans 10 to show that without preaching no one can hear and believe in him whom he ought to invoke. The Fathers commonly hold that that place is adduced by Paul in a mystical sense and is understood of the Apostles, since the psalm literally speaks of the heavens of this visible universe. They accordingly say that it is understood by Paul of the Apostles, of whose preaching he says: "And indeed, into all the earth their sound has gone out." Either because, in prophetic fashion, he uses the past for the future; or because by that time preaching had already been accomplished throughout all Palestine, which, after the manner of Scripture, is called "all" or "the whole earth."

- Yet with this exposition of the Fathers not standing in the way, Jansen thinks with some probability that that place is cited by Paul in the literal sense and understood of the corporeal heavens. For they themselves proclaim their author God, as the psalm itself signifies, and as Wisdom 13 states; and their preaching reaches all. From which Paul proves that all, both Jews and Greeks, or barbarians, can know God and invoke him; and this sense is clearly proved from the very context. For Paul had said: "For there is no distinction between Jew and Greek (namely, with God). For the same Lord is rich unto all who call upon him. For everyone who shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." By which words, under the name "Greek," he understands the rest of the nations universally besides the Jews, so as thus to show that God's grace is equal toward all nations. But Paul objects to himself: "How shall they call upon him in whom they have not believed? Or how shall they believe without a preacher?" as if to say: there is a distinction between Jew and Greek with God, nor does he himself lavishly bestow the gifts of grace equally upon all, since not all can call upon him, because without some preacher they cannot have knowledge of him, and he has not sent preachers thus far to all nations. He answers these words, however: "And indeed into all the earth their sound has gone forth, and unto the ends of the world their words." He understands beyond doubt not only into Palestine, but into Greece as well, and into all barbarian nations. He speaks, moreover, not of what was going to be by the preaching of the Apostles, but of what had happened up to that time. Because, namely, at every time God excludes no one from his grace, whereby he might not be able to invoke him; and therefore by this machine and beauty of the heavenly bodies he has always manifested himself to all.
- If, therefore, the Gentiles were to use this grace of God well, a more abundant and more explicit knowledge of the mysteries of faith would be given to them. But because they had that beginning, it is rightly gathered that they were not destitute of sufficient help for believing and for salvation: not because help was granted to them which would proximately excite them to the faith of all the mysteries, but because something was given, whereby they could in some manner worship and invoke God; by the good use of which they would have greater things day by day. Thus about these common helps think Alexander, St. Bonaventure, Durandus, Gabriel, Adrian, Soto, St. Thomas, and Paulus Orosius.[2]
- But in this matter one must beware lest in any way we say that to a man acting well from free will the helps of grace are conferred: for this is absurd, as we have sufficiently shown in Disputation 91.
- And from this doctrine is easily understood that which the Scholastics commonly assert concerning the man brought up in the woods. Of this man we must not think otherwise than of a man among the Indians, or in the midst of paganism, where he has not even heard a single word of the mysteries of our faith. Of these therefore it must be said that they have many common helps, by which, if they were to act rightly, God also without a miracle would from eternity have so arranged matters that there would not be lacking to them someone to teach the rest of the things necessary for salvation. For he could easily, even without a miracle, ordain that some Christian, or surely several, should penetrate into those far

regions, as already they have penetrated, enticed by the craving for gold and silver. But that as yet no one has landed in these or those provinces has come about by the just judgment of God, because from eternity he saw that they would use ill the many common helps.

- But someone will ask whether these common helps are only from the grace of creation, or from the grace of Christ, which is necessary for living rightly. I answer: if someone uses well some prior help, and on account of that good use of it God gives some other grace, without doubt that prior help was not a gift of creation alone, but through Christ for living rightly: because to one acting from the gift of creation alone, grace is not given, as was sufficiently demonstrated in that Disputation 91.
- I add also, besides the common helps which seem necessarily to follow from the gift of creation, by which a man will never act rightly so that the grace of Christ be conferred upon him, that there are also other powerful helps of that grace of Christ, which is given for living rightly, while inwardly a thought moves a man to the knowledge of the true God, to the right life, and to overcoming temptations, to which helps the Gentiles sometimes, or almost always, resist.
- Yet it is undoubted that whenever the true knowledge of the mysteries is denied them, they have committed more sins, and they have misused the other more common helps of grace, and therefore greater helps are not granted to them.

Wherefore it will be necessary to admit that Augustine held that opinion; others, however, can more easily be explained in a good sense: therefore now let us speak to each in its order.

- To the testimonies of Scripture I answer: in Ecclesiasticus 7 and John 12, "cannot" - which is the same as "impossible" - cannot be taken for "difficult": so that it be said that no one can be corrected whom God has despised, and that the Jews cannot believe, for this reason, that it is difficult to correct such a one, as it was difficult for the Jews to believe; or certainly it is more fittingly understood of an impossibility consequent, which is brought along with the foreknowledge of God. For of necessity it is gathered in this way: He is corrected, therefore he is not despised by God; and he believes the preaching, nor is the glory of this world an impediment by which he believes less; therefore he does not seek that glory. For thus he who is corrected and he who believes is prevented by grace, so that he be called congruously against all adversities. But he who is not so congruously called cannot answer by an impossibility consequent, because thus called, he is foreknown not to be going to answer.
- The testimony of Antiochus proves only that he was not going to obtain from God mercy and repentance, although he asked with tears, because he did not ask rightly; not because he was destitute of help by which he could ask rightly.

- To the testimonies of the Fathers, first I say that those of Isidore, and if there be any others who speak in that way, can be explained, just as the testimonies of Augustine (which I purposely passed over), of an impossibility consequent, not antecedent: for he who is not called with a congruous calling is supposed from the foreknowledge of God already not to be going to answer; and with this supposed, he cannot answer. And these indeed are easier.
- Other things, however, which we brought from Augustine, distributed into two classes, in my judgment cannot be rightly explained. Wherefore I would not hesitate to say that Augustine, and his disciples Prosper and Fulgentius, held that opinion; which seems to me very probable, since I see that never by Prosper and Fulgentius is Augustine in this part excused, although they defend him from many other charges and interpret his sayings in a good sense. And although those things which we related in the first class we might somehow interpret in a good sense, as we shall expound the words of the Council of Trent which we there recited; yet since those which were adduced in the latter class admit of no benign interpretation, therefore I would not doubt that in both he had the same opinion.
- As for the words of the Council in that chapter 11, I think they are to be understood in one of two ways. First, so that the particle "nisi" not be exceptive, but have the force of a condition, and the sense be: God does not desert those justified by his grace, unless, that is, if not, they are first deserted by them. And let it say this most certain thing: that the justified are not left destitute by God of his sufficient help, if they do not first desert God; but what about, if they themselves desert God, the Council does not decree, and perhaps it wished to define nothing against Augustine's opinion. Or then we could explain that the Council is not speaking of prevenient help, but of accompanying help. Of this, however, it is true that it is denied by God to no one unless he first deserts God: because accompanying help is lacking to no one except because he does not cooperate and because he resists the prevenient help. And of this it manifestly speaks in the cited chapter 13, when it asserts: "For God, unless they fail his grace, as he begins a good work, so will he perfect to will and to accomplish." Men, however, are said to fail grace, because to God who excites and calls by a vocation they do not consent and cooperate. And therefore St. Anselm says in the book On the Fall of the Devil, chapter 3, that the bad angels did not receive perseverance because they were unwilling to receive it, as he himself strives to prove by many arguments; which must be understood not of prevenient help, but of accompanying help: for the prevenient help of perseverance does not depend on their consent.
- In the same way Hugh of St. Victor, in the Summa Sententiarum, tractate 2, chapter 3, and in book 1 On the Sacraments, part 6, chapter 24, says: "But those who were converted were therefore moved well because they had cooperating grace; but the one who turned away did not have it," - that is, he was not so moved because he did not have cooperating grace.[3]

Disputatio XCVIII - On peculiar grace in those who consent to the calling

I can also interpret Augustine and his disciples thus, when they pronounce: "God deserts no one unless he is first deserted," so that they be understood to speak of cooperating help. For it is prior that a man resist prevenient grace and do not cooperate with it, than that God deny his concurrence. And what they subjoin, "And he converts many deserters of himself," I could explain in this way: he later converts many who failed to answer his calling grace by a more abundant and congruent calling to himself, and he makes them do what they ought to do. But since from the testimonies of the later class it is so manifest to us what Augustine's mind was, it does not seem sufficient to explain those earlier sayings in this way.

There remains that we answer the argument which was brought forward last. I say, therefore, that the grace necessary for acting, without which no one can act, is twofold: one is antecedent, the other concomitant. And in this disputation the discussion is about the antecedent - whether that, without which a man cannot act, is denied to anyone. For as to the concomitant, no one doubts that it is not granted to many, because they fail and resist the calling and prevenient grace. And when, by the argument alleged above, adversaries infer: "Therefore God does not give to all the things necessary for acting," a distinction must be made. For there are some things necessary for acting with a necessity that is antecedent - that is, on the part of the cause - which are prior to consent itself; and these are the callings, excitations, and operating graces, which are denied to no one, as has been explained above. But other things are necessary with a necessity that is concomitant with our consent, which are required together with it; and these are in our power, as will be evident in the following disputation, and they are denied by God to those who by their liberty are unwilling to be helped by them; and such are the cooperating or concomitant graces. From this, God does nothing to harm our liberty, since these things are placed in our power, and by our liberty they are lacking to us. For that without them we cannot act is the same as that we cannot act without our liberty: just as, therefore, a consequent or concomitant necessity does not take away our liberty, as was shown in disputation 68, chapter 4, so also that the things necessary for acting, which are necessary only with a concomitant necessity, be lacking to someone, is no prejudice in the meantime, and looking humbly to the definition of the same Apostolic See, I shall sincerely state what seems to me more probable and more consonant with the doctrine of the Fathers.

An omnes, qui vocationi consentiunt, peculiari gratia excitentur.

Out of two who are equally stirred by grace, sometimes one consents and the other resists - the more recent hold this. cap. 1.

- The foregoing opinion, understood in three ways, is rejected. cap. 2.
- The one who answers the calling was stirred by a greater prevenient grace than the one who resists: as a more probable opinion it is proved by the testimonies of Scripture. cap. 3.
- The testimonies of the Fathers for the same opinion. cap. 4.
- A threefold explanation of the preceding opinion is refuted. cap. 5.

- A more probable exposition of the same opinion is confirmed. cap. 6.
- An answer to the testimonies of the prior opinion. cap. 7.
- A solution of the reasons of the same opinion. cap. 8.

Certain theologians hold that, out of two equally stirred by grace, it sometimes happens that one consents, the other resists the calling; and thus they think the whole difference between him who consents and him who resists is on the part of the concomitant and cooperating grace, which each one, once stirred by prevenient and operating grace, has in his own power. This opinion is favored by Catherinus, and by those who deny to God the knowledge of future contingents under a condition, as we shall note in chapter 6. Accordingly he affirms that it sometimes happens that he who was called by a greater grace resists, while he who was called by a lesser grace consents. They add, next, that not a few men are saved with sufficient and common grace, which is deduced from the foregoing foundation.

They prove this opinion, first, from St. Augustine, De civitate Dei 12, chapter 6, where he writes thus: "If two men are equally disposed in soul and body, and if, upon seeing the beauty of a body, one of them is moved to illicit enjoyment, while the other remains steadfast in chaste will, what do you think is the cause?" And though many causes which one might assign Augustine himself had admitted, and among them had numbered the inspiration of the Lord, rejecting the rest, he expressed the proper cause in these words: "What else appears, except that the one willed, the other was unwilling, to despise chastity?" Therefore he refers the diversity of the event to the liberty of each one, not to some peculiar prevenient grace.

Secondly, they confirm it from the same Augustine, De praedestinatione et gratia, chapter 15, where he says about Nabuchodonosor and Pharaoh: "As to nature, both were men; as to condition, both were kings; as to the cause, both were possessors of God's captive people; as to punishment, both were kindly admonished by scourges: what, then, made the ends of the two different, except that the one, feeling the hand of God, groaned in the remembrance of his own iniquity, while the other, by free will, strove against the most merciful truth?" He, therefore, assigns no other cause of the diverse effect than the freedom of the will.

Thirdly, from St. Jerome, epistle 150 to Hedibia, where, explaining that to the Corinthians, "To some we are the odor of life unto life," etc., he says: "Therefore our odor, which is of itself good, by the virtue of those who receive it, or do not receive it, passes into life or into death," etc. If, however, from some peculiar grace it befell that Paul's preaching was to some the odor of life, and, from the defect of it, to others the odor of death unto death, he would attribute that diversity not to the virtue and vice of men, but to a peculiar grace, or to the negation of it.

Finally, they prove it by reason. For, that God may begin in us, and that we may ascribe to him the prior parts of a good work, nothing else is required than a calling: that granted, nothing else seems to remain than our consent, by which we follow the one calling; but this is placed in our liberty, as also is to dissent: therefore it is not repugnant that, the same grace of calling standing, the one consent and follow the one calling, the other resist. From which they also infer that which we set down at the beginning of the chapter, namely, that with sufficient and common help some

are saved, indeed even with less than is conferred on others who are damned. Further, that with common and sufficient grace alone some are saved, they prove; because, if that be sufficient, it will bestow the faculty of acting, whereas faculty and potency which never come into act, at least in some singular instance, are vain: therefore someone will be saved with that alone. This opinion seem to be indicated by Domingo de Soto, De natura et gratia, book 1, chapter 16, and by Andrés de Vega, book 6 on the Council, chapter 9: for he teaches that not all whom God more favors by his stirring and prevenient grace are converted; contrariwise, that not a few whom he prevents with a lesser grace are saved. They adduce the example of Tyre and Sidon, to whom, if the signs that were exhibited to Bethsaida had been granted, they would have done penance, as Christ testifies in Matthew 11. They add, however, that all those whom God more favors by his aiding and accompanying grace always work better. Add also John of Bologna in the little work On Free Choice, section 9. From his very words, where in the question, "Why, out of two hearing the same word, is the one converted, the other not?" he says, one ought not to flee to that solution, "because one was drawn by the Father, the other not"; nor to that, "because God willed one to be converted, the other not"; but because "it seemed good to the one to be converted, to the other it did not seem good."[213521362137]

Caput II - The preceding opinion, understood in three ways, is rejected

In this chapter I shall indicate in brief three particular ways in which it is wont to be defended by its advocates, and what in them does not persuade us. For in that in which all agree, namely this - that the one who responds to the calling is not always stirred by a greater prevenient grace - we have resolved in the following chapters, with reasons added, to refute the position.

Some, then, understand the aforesaid opinion thus: that to respond to God who calls is not only from free will, but also from grace; yet that the first origin and cause of the determination to consent is the created will, to which God accommodates his grace as a cooperator. But this manifestly does not stand, as will be clear in the following disputation, chapter 5.

Others, in a second way, understand that not only is the created will the first cause and the origin of the free determination, but that even the free consent depends solely on it. These Doctors, though they give the first place to the grace of God, nevertheless think that grace adds nothing to our consent beyond moving us beforehand and exciting the will to desire the good; but that the consent itself proceeds from our will alone. Yet this mode can be refuted by the express testimonies of the Fathers. First indeed, in the Second Council of Orange, chapter 9, it is said: "Whenever we work, God works in us and with us"; therefore the grace of God not only works in us by preventing, but also works with us by accompanying.[2138] Secondly, the same thing is proved from Augustine, whom we alleged above from the treatise On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 11, where he distinguishes for us the grace that prevents and works from the grace that cooperates and helps; and he explains

2135. Domingo de Soto, De natura et gratia, lib. 1, c. 16.
2136. Andrés de Vega, De iustificatione, lib. 6 super Concilium Tridentinum, c. 9.
2137. John of Bologna (Ioannes Bononiensis), Opusculum de libero arbitrio, mansio 9; cf. Matt. 11.
2138. Second Council of Orange (Arausicanum II), c. 9.

it openly. So too Prosper, in the Capitula of the Gallicans, chapters 6 and 7. Fourthly, Fulgentius, book 1 To Monimus, chapter 14, and St. Bernard, in the little work On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 8, bring the same testimonies. For he affirms that it is ours only to dissent from grace; but that to consent is ours and also of the heavenly help. Fulgentius proves it from that text of Philippians 2: "For it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish, for his good pleasure"; and from Ezekiel 36: "And I will make you to walk in my justifications."[2139][2140][2141][2142]

Finally, the reason is confirmed. For he who consents to the prevenient calling is moved to it both by the calling itself and by the origin of the act from the faculty that receives it: therefore by the virtue of that prevenient grace he consents and acts. Wherefore, in those affections and works in which prevenient grace and the consent of the will are both necessary, the consent to the prevenient calling is to be attributed at once to the calling and to the will, since the motion proceeds from both. And therefore, as I noted in disputation, chapter 6, one and the same calling is altogether prevenient and concomitant grace, operating and cooperating: for, as often as it precedes consent, it is operating and prevenient; inasmuch as it flows into our consent, it is cooperating and concomitant.

Nor does reason only prove this - that the consent of the will is from the will itself and from grace together in men after the Fall - but also in the state of integral nature and in the Angels. For, to speak generally, in all whom he has stirred and prevented to any work, consent is not elicited except in the virtue of the calling and preventing thought; which Augustine expressly hands down to us in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 11, where, speaking of the first man, he says: "He did not have that grace whereby he should never be able to will evil; yet he certainly had that whereby, if he willed to persevere, he would never be evil." And he himself assigns the difference between the grace of that state and that which we have received through Christ: for they received a grace by which they were able to persevere, and without which they could not persevere; yet not the grace with which they would persevere; but through Christ we receive a grace with which we do persevere. Augustine, therefore, judges that even in the state of integral nature there is a peculiar grace, with which one can persevere; and thus that to consent, to will, and to work is to be attributed not only to the will, but also to grace. He teaches the same of Angels. Indeed, there was no sect among the Pelagians, or of the rest of the Pelagians, which, while conceding prevenient and operating grace, denied cooperating and helping grace to that work and consent to which operating and prevenient grace is given. For it would be to assert, contrary to the reason we have just set down, that grace is given to operate and to prevent with respect to some work, but that no helping and accompanying grace be given if consent follows.

Moreover, certain more recent authors, who think that to consent itself in Angels and in man in the state of integral nature is not from grace, but from free will alone, object to us Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 11, where, speaking of the first man, he says: "Why does he who can will

2139. St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, c. 11.
2140. Prosper of Aquitaine, Ad capitula Gallorum, c. 6 - 7.
2141. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, lib. 1, c. 14.
2142. St. Bernard, De gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 8; Phil 2:13; Ezek 36:27.

the good not give thanks to God?" Whence they gather that, when one consents to the calling grace, he does not need the help of that same grace. For, they say, it is the same thing to receive the good and to consent to a good calling. But what Augustine subjoins straightway removes this objection from the midst: for he renders the reason in these words, namely, because even that very willing of the good is from the grace of God; "for what do you have that you did not receive?" so that both to will and to accomplish be from him who works in us.

As I noted in the disputation, chapter 6, the very same calling is at once prevenient grace and accompanying grace, namely operating and cooperating: for insofar as it precedes consent it is operating and prevenient; but insofar as it elicits consent from us, it is cooperating and accompanying.

Nor does this line of reasoning only prove that the consent of the will is at once from the will itself and from grace in men after the fall; it proves the same even in the state of integrity and in the angels. Indeed, in all these cases, whenever grace anticipates some work, consent is not elicited except by virtue of the preceding calling and consideration; which St. Augustine expressly hands on to us in the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 11, where he speaks thus of the first man: "The first man did not have that grace by which he would never will to be evil; but he certainly had that grace, in which, if he were willing to remain, he would never be evil." And there he assigns the difference between the grace of that state and the grace which we receive through Christ: because they received a grace with which they could persevere, and without which they could not persevere, but not a grace with which they would in fact persevere; whereas now through Christ we receive grace with which we persevere.[2143] Augustine therefore judges that in the state of integrity too there is a peculiar grace with which one perseveres; and thus that to consent, to will, and to act ought to be ascribed not to the will alone, but also to grace. He teaches the same about the angels. And assuredly, no one up to now, whether a Pelagian or one of the remnants of the Pelagians, conceding prevenient and operating grace, has denied cooperating and helping grace toward the same work and the consent for which operating and prevenient grace is given. For it is against the manifest reason we have just set out, to assert that for some work operating and prevenient grace is given, but not helping and accompanying grace, if consent follows.

Moreover, this is also confirmed by reason. For the one who consents to the prevenient calling is enticed and drawn by that very calling and by the object known; therefore by virtue of that calling he consents to it and acts. Accordingly, in those affections and works in which prevenient grace is necessary, the consent of the will is to be attributed at once to the prevenient calling itself and to the will, since an affection proceeds from each; and hence in those matters the cooperation of grace itself unto consent is not excluded.

But some more recent writers, who think that to consent in the angels and in man in the state of integrity is not from grace but from free will alone, object against us with Augustine, On Correction and Grace, chapter 11, where he thus speaks of the first man: "For, to receive the good, he did not need grace." From which they infer that for consenting to the calling of grace he did not need the

2143. St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, c. 11.

help of that same grace; for, they say, to receive a good and to consent to a good calling seem to be the same. But what Augustine immediately subjoins removes this objection out of the way: he gives the reason in these words, namely, because he had already received the good in the justification in which he had been created by God; he was therefore said not to have needed a new grace in order to receive the good, since the good which he had received in justification he still possessed and had not yet lost. Yet, in order that he might abide in that good, he needed a new grace and help; and he received only that whereby he could persevere, not that whereby he would in act persevere. He thinks therefore that from the very help proceeds not only the ability to persevere, but also the act of persevering; but this does not come to be without consent: therefore the consent itself in that state would be from grace itself. That the same is Augustine's mind - that not to have and not to receive from God are the same - is clear from chapter 10 of the same book: speaking of that first man he says, "He did not therefore have perseverance in that good; and if he did not have it, he assuredly did not receive it." And in chapter 12 he plainly teaches that aid of perseverance was given to the first man, by which he could persevere, not by which he would persevere. Anselm says the same in the book On the Fall of the Devil, from the first chapter up to the third; and in that first chapter he understood that text, 1 Cor. 4: "What do you have that you did not receive?" not only of men but also of angels.[2144] It is therefore quite wrongly that some assert that to consent to the calling of grace in angels is not from grace itself, but from free will alone.

They object again with those words of Augustine in that same chapter 11: "He had given (namely, to the first man) help, without which he could not remain in that justice if he willed; but, that he should will, he left in his own free choice." But by these words he signifies only this, that it was free to the first parent, even when helped by grace, to resist the grace that was calling - just as also the Council of Trent, session 6, teaches that it is free to anyone who consents to the calling of grace to resist the same; which is to be understood of a congruous calling: how much more then of a non-congruous and merely sufficient calling, which was granted to the first man in that state.[2145] From the fact, however, that it was free to man to consent to the calling of grace, it does not follow that the cooperation of grace itself unto consent is excluded; otherwise the same thing would have to be said of man after the fall, which our adversaries do not concede.

Third, they allege the same Augustine, chapter 10 of the same book, where he says: "Thus (God) ordered the life of angels and of men, that first he might show what their free will could do, and then what his grace's benefit and the judgment of his justice could do." But if these words favor their opinion in some way, they prove too much - namely, that in their justification the first places ought to be ascribed to free will. Therefore I answer that Augustine only wished to signify that God permitted the first man and many angels to fall into sin, that in this way he might show to them what their free choice could do - namely, to sin. Then in man he showed the benefit of his grace, but in the angel the judgment of his justice; and this suffices for the second mode of explaining the former opinion.

2144. St. Anselm, De casu diaboli, c. 1 - 3; cf. 1 Cor 4:7.
2145. Council of Trent, Session 6 (De iustificatione).

A third mode is that of certain theologians of our time, who, in order to defend the aforesaid opinion, affirm that the consent of the will is at once from free will and from grace, not only in time, but also causally; yet, on the side of exciting and prevenient grace, sometimes a reprobate is equal to a predestined man and does not receive a peculiar benefit of grace. In this mode there remains only this for us to attack, that in which all who follow this opinion conspire, namely, that from two who are called by equal grace, sometimes one consents, the other resists. For what pertains to the cooperation of consent, those who understand the aforesaid opinion in this third way teach rightly. But that in which all agree we shall refute in the following chapters, while confirming the truer opinion.

Caput III - That one who responds to the calling is excited by greater prevenient grace than one who resists is proved, as the more probable view, by testimonies of Scripture

They, taking their stand in Augustine and defending it with all their might, pronounce that all who respond to the calling have been stirred by a greater benefit of antecedent grace than those who resist. Accordingly, in those who consent, and in all the predestined, the operating, prevenient, and exciting grace is greater than in others; and from two to whom an equal grace comes beforehand, they think it never happens that one consents with the other resisting. Therefore they judge that between him who responds and him who resists there is a difference not only on the side of cooperating and accompanying grace, as the Doctors of the former opinion assert, but also on the side of operating, prevenient, and exciting grace. For this opinion there are not obscure testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers; a cogent argument too commends it. Yet, for greater clarity, in this chapter we will bring forward testimonies of Scripture alone.

First testimony is John 6: "No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him": where to God as the disposer in a peculiar manner is attributed that someone is drawn to the Son. Augustine so understands this passage in the book Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 3, where he notes that this is the same as what is said in that same chapter 6 of John: "Unless it has been given him by my Father." He gives the reason in these words: "He indeed is drawn to Christ to whom it is given to believe in Christ; now this is only that one who responds to the one calling: therefore to this man something is given by God which is not granted to that other who does not respond." Moreover, that something peculiar of prevenient grace is granted to him who is drawn, Augustine indicates while explaining the same passage in chapter 19 of that book, when he says: "He is drawn in wondrous ways in order that he may will by him who knows how to work within in the very hearts of men: not, that men should believe while unwilling (which cannot occur), but that from unwilling they should be made willing." For if in accordance with his foreknowledge God works within wondrously in the hearts of those who acquiesce in the calling, it follows that God does not work equally with his prevenient grace within the hearts of those who resist and of those who respond to the calling; since in the hearts of those who resist he does not work preveniently in those wondrous ways.[2146]

2146. St. Augustine, Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, c. 3 and c. 19; John 6:44.

In the same sense he explains that saying of the same chapter 6 of John, "Everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned comes to me," in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 8; from which we shall cite some things further on.[2147] And to the same point looks the testimony of Prosper, which we shall report below.[2148]

Second, it is proved from Rom. 11:33, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God," and Matt. 11:25, "I confess to you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and prudent, and have revealed them to little ones. Yes, Father, for so it was well-pleasing before you." For it would be said in vain in this manner, if he who responds were not excited by a greater operating grace than he who resists. For on the part of God working, the grace would be equal in both; and so every cause of wonder would cease, nor should it be thrown back upon the sole will of God.

Third, unless God prevened him who responds with greater grace, one would not say that he has mercy on one rather than another, and that he hardens one rather than another: for in Rom. 9 the Apostle says, "Whom he wills, he has mercy on; whom he wills, he hardens." Therefore, because by a peculiar mercy he excites one which he does not grant to another, he is said to have mercy on this man and not on that. Treating this passage Augustine, book 1 to Simplician, question 2, about the middle, speaking of those who were called by God but were not elect and did not obtain mercy, thus says: "If he willed also to have mercy on them, he could so call them in the way that would be suited to them, that they too would be moved, understand, and follow"; and a little after: "But of him on whom he has mercy, thus does he call him, in the way he knows to be congruent to him, that he may not spurn the One calling." Therefore since Augustine says that God has mercy on those whom he excites by a congruent calling, and on others he does not have mercy - indeed, according to the Apostle, he hardens them - it follows that this is said for no other reason, except that to those who respond a peculiar and greater operating grace - which, because it is greater, is called mercy - is conferred. For if God were to prevene all equally, and then one, by his liberty, were to act from that grace while the other resisted, he would not have mercy on one more than on another. For that cooperation with divine grace is in the power of anyone: once excited by God, he can have it as he wills. But the mercy by which God is said to have mercy on one rather than another is not referred to cooperating grace, but to prevenient grace, as the testimonies cited plainly demonstrate. It is also proved because when Paul says, "Not of him who wills, nor of him who runs," he excludes our cooperation; he adds, "but of God showing mercy": and he says that it is of God showing mercy alone. Wherefore Augustine rightly refutes there the explanation of St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 31.[2149]

1. The place in which St. John Chrysostom and the Greek Fathers agree, that therefore it was said, "Not of him who wills, nor of him who runs," because our will alone does not suffice, is also refuted by St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 32, as I noted in disputation 88,

2147. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 8; John 6:45.

2148. Prosper of Aquitaine, Ad Simplicianum? Sc. the testimonium is adduced infra (cf. Ad capitula Gallorum).

2149. Rom 11:33; Matt 11:25; Rom 9:18; St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, quaest. 2; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio 31.

chapter 8.[2150] He subjoins, moreover, these words in that question to Simplician: "Therefore it is not to be thought that it was said: Not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God showing mercy (Rom 9:16), because without His help we cannot attain what we will: but rather for this reason, that without His calling we do not will." He therefore refers the mercy of God, which is denied to the reprobate, to the calling itself, not to cooperation; and below: "Likewise it is true, 'Not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God showing mercy,' because even if He calls many, yet He has mercy on those whom He so calls as it is fitting for them to be called, that they may follow." Finally, the same Augustine in that question 2, book 1, to Simplician, a little before the middle, says: "Let him know that He granted him to believe, who has mercy by inspiring faith; on whom He had mercy so as to bring the call even to him while still an unbeliever." Augustine therefore establishes the mercy of God in the calling itself and the inspiration, which pertains to prevenient grace (*gratia praeveniens*). But how the mercy of God, in Augustine's mind, is given only to those who respond, we shall say in the following chapter.[2151]

Further, Augustine used both Pauline testimonies in Epistle 105, a little before the middle, to show what is the cause why one man responds, another resists. "But why" (he says) "this one believes, that one does not believe, though both hear the same thing, a miracle is done in the sight of both, both see the same, 'the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God' (Rom 11:33) - 'whose judgments are unsearchable' - while 'He has mercy on whom He wills and He hardens whom He wills' (Rom 9:18)." He has the very same in the book On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 8.[2152] But if the adversaries' opinion were true, a manifest cause of this difference could be assigned, namely, that one, aided by grace, consents by his freedom, while the other resists the same grace. Augustine, however, refers the cause of this to the hidden judgments of God; for it proceeds only thence, that one is so called as to respond, and on that very account God is said to have mercy on him; but another is so called as not to respond, and therefore God is said not to have mercy on him.

Lastly, that which Baruch, chapter 3, said about the giants, whom God did not choose, can most aptly be accommodated to all the reprobate: "These the Lord did not choose, neither did they find the way of discipline; therefore they perished; and because they had not wisdom, they perished through their folly" (Bar 3). For although not everyone who sins sins from ignorance, nevertheless everyone suffers such a defect of consideration that, although freedom is not thereby impeded, yet he is rightly said to lack wisdom. For wisdom is that consideration which so apprehends and considers the matter as to move the affection to act rightly. This defect is found in all who sin; of this there is no doubt, as St. Thomas testifies, I-II, question 77, article 2, where we shall treat this more fully; therefore Scripture calls him blind who acts evilly; indeed, Aristotle likewise says in Ethics III, chapter 1: "Therefore every vicious man is ignorant of what he ought to do" - that is, he

2150. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 32; cf. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputatio 88, c. 8.
2151. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, lib. 1, quaest. 2.
2152. St. Augustine, Epist. 105; De bono perseverantiae, c. 8.

does not attentively consider what things are to be done. Therefore there is inequality on the part of the consideration which God disposes according to His will, as we shall show in chapter 7 of this disputation.[2153]

Caput IV - Patristic testimonies for the same position

If we carefully go through the writings of Augustine, we shall discover not only that the aforesaid opinion was always on his lips and ever in his heart, but also that he vehemently championed it against the Massilians; so that from this likewise we may understand of what weight it ought to be with us, when Augustine's cause against the Massilians was highly approved by the most grave Fathers of the Church and the Roman Pontiffs, as we showed in disputation 91, chapter 5.[2154] There are, therefore, splendid testimonies of Augustine, by which he seems not obscurely to have delivered our view.

Let the first testimony be from book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 19, where he writes thus: "But as much as it has been granted, let us be wise and understand, if we can, that the Lord God, being good, for this reason also sometimes does not grant to His saints the righteousness of some work, either certain knowledge or a conquering delight, that they may know that not from themselves but from Him they have the light by which their darkness is illuminated, and the health by which their earth yields its fruit." By "certain knowledge" he means the congruent cogitation and consideration of that which ought to be done, as we said in disputation 88, the last chapter; by "conquering delight" he means the affection which proceeds suddenly from this knowledge, and by which the will is enticed that it may freely consent to the call; and we showed in the same disputation, chapter 4, that these two pertain to operating, exciting, and prevenient grace.[2155]

Therefore Augustine says that this operating grace is sometimes denied by God to His elect, namely, when He permits them to fall into sin, that they may learn it is a gift of God; and thus he judges that, when a man sins - even if he be among the elect - there is lacking to him that certain knowledge and conquering delight. Therefore there is not equal excitation on the part of the intellect and the first movement of the will in him who responds and in him who resists. For Augustine had said in that book, chapter 17, that every sin comes from a defect of certain knowledge and conquering delight, in these words: "Therefore each of us now knows, now does not know, to undertake, to do, to fulfill a good work; now is delighted, now is not delighted, that he may know that it is not of his own capacity but of the divine gift, either that he knows or that he is delighted." Certainly he is not speaking of that delight which is already with consent, as is clear from the foregoing, but of that whereby, together with a congruent cogitation, God so disposes our affection that He elicits consent from it; from the defect of which sin proceeds, as he himself testifies.[2156]

2153. Baruch 3; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I-II, q. 77, a. 2; Aristotle, Ethics III, c. 1.
2154. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputatio 91, c. 5.
2155. St. Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione, lib. 2, c. 19; cf. Gabriel Vázquez, Disputatio 88, c. 4 et cap. ult.
2156. St. Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione, lib. 2, c. 17.

Secondly, it is proved from the same Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 6, where he says: "Many hear the word of truth, but some believe, others contradict; these therefore will, but those will not: who is ignorant of this? But since for some the will is prepared, for others it is not prepared, it must be distinguished what comes from mercy, what from judgment." Therefore he assigns the difference on the part of the divine predefinition, because God prepared and preordained the will of the one by a congruent calling as the means, but did not prepare the will of the other; and in the former he acknowledges mercy, in the latter judgment. And as Augustine himself expressly noted in Epistle 107, after the middle: the will is prepared by a hidden inspiration; but inspiration is operating and prevenient grace, as we said above in disputation 88, chapter 9. And again in the same epistle he says that the will is prepared by the antecedent grace of God; therefore Augustine acknowledges inequality not only in the cooperation with grace but also in the antecedent grace itself; so that it may be greater in him who responds, but by judgment be denied to him who does not respond, and so be lesser in him. Now mercy, in Augustine, is not that by which any grace whatsoever is granted, but that by which efficacious grace (*gratia efficax*) is granted. For in book 1 to Simplician, question 2, as we saw in the preceding chapter, he says that God has mercy on those whom He calls with a congruent calling, which is efficacious; as is manifest from that whole question. Moreover, Prosper, in the book to the Excerpts of the Genoese, resolving the third doubt and explaining this Augustinian passage, which had seemed difficult to the Genoese, establishes this difference in time and in the very donation of grace, in these words: "Is it at all doubtful that, when the word of Truth is preached, some believe by their will, others by their will do not believe? But when God has opened the heart of some and has not opened the heart of others, it must be distinguished what comes from mercy, what from judgment."[2157]

In the same way the same Augustine, in the same book, chapter 8, after the middle, shows this difference in the very division of grace which occurs in time, in this manner: "When, therefore, the Gospel is preached, some believe, some do not believe. But those who believe the preacher without, who sounds without, inwardly hear from the Father and learn; but those who do not believe hear without, yet do not hear inwardly nor learn." And explaining what it is to hear inwardly, he subjoins: "This is, that to them it is given to believe; to those it is not given: because no one" (he says) "comes to me, unless the Father who sent me draw him" (Jn 6:44). What, I ask, is it "to be given to someone to believe" and "not to be given to another," if not that the sound of the internal inspiration be so fitted to the one's intellect that he hears and believes, but not be fitted to the other's, from which it comes about that he neither believes nor hears? Now this diversity of calling is from God alone, who knows how to call in one way and in another. But who will say that he who has not received to believe has received equal grace and prevenient mercy from God with him to whom it has been granted to believe? And a little above, showing that some are taught by God and others are not taught, he says: "For if He had willed to teach those to whom the word of the cross is foolishness, that they should come to Christ, surely they too would have come." He then objects to

2157. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 6 et c. 8; Epist. 107; Prosper of Aquitaine, Ad Excerpta Genuensium, ad tertium dubium.

himself: "Why," they say, "does He not teach all?" He himself answers: "If we should say that those whom He does not teach are unwilling to learn, it will be replied to us, 'And where is that which is said to Him, Lord, Thou shalt turn and quicken us?' (Ps 84). Or if God does not make willing out of unwilling persons, why does the Church, according to the Lord's precept, pray for its persecutors?" But according to the adversaries' view God teaches equally at some time both him who hears and learns and him who neither learns nor hears; and therefore He does not teach all because not all are willing to learn. Augustine, however, impugns this from that Psalm 84: "O God, Thou turning shalt quicken us," showing that our quickening and discipline proceed from God in a peculiar manner, and that we ask as something peculiar on behalf of persecutors that which all have who learn: for thus is one taught, that he may also learn - that is, that this kind of teaching be granted as a peculiar benefit to some by God's mere liberality. And therefore neither is the grace of God, and His prevenient mercy, equal and disposed in the same way in both, nor has the excitation of their will existed equally; for that, from which it comes about that one responds, is prior to our consent, and thus pertains to prevenient grace.

The same thing is clearly taught by St. Gregory in Homily 30 on the Gospels, in these words: "For indeed the same Spirit opens within the heart of the hearer and gives utterance to the tongue of the teacher. Therefore let no one ascribe to a human teacher what he understands from the teacher's mouth; because unless He who teaches within act, the teacher's tongue that sounds from without labors in vain. Behold, all alike hear the voice of the speaker; yet they do not all alike perceive the sense of the voice they hear. Why is this, unless because understanding is not in the hearts of many hearers, unless the very Father grant it? He is the Master who, with regard to the understanding of the voice, teaches something in a special way." In which he assigns a special doctrine of the Spirit moving within, peculiar to those who respond; and in that special inward operation a special grace is required, namely, a congruent calling.[2158]

reply to the Massilians' charge of desperation

It is taught that they might learn that the cheeks of doctrine, as it were a peculiar benefit, are conferred upon certain persons for us out of God's mere liberality. Gregory has handed down the same very plainly: Homily 30 on the Gospels, in these words: "Because unless the same Spirit be within the heart of the hearer, the tongue of the teacher labors outwardly in vain. Let no one, therefore, attribute to the man who teaches what he understands from the mouth of the teacher; for unless there be a spirit within that teaches, the tongue of the teacher labors to no purpose. Behold, you all equally hear one voice of the speaker, yet you do not equally perceive the sense of the voice you hear. Why, if the voice is not different, is the intelligence of the voice different in your hearts, unless because, besides this, that the voice of the speaker admonishes in common, there is a master who in particular teaches certain persons concerning the intelligence of the voice?"[2159] Behold, Gregory attributes a special teaching of the Spirit moving within to those who respond; and in that inward operation we must recognize a special grace that works.

2158. St. Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia, hom. 30.
2159. St. Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia, hom. 30.

Thirdly, it is confirmed from the same book of St. Augustine, chapter 16, where he plainly shows that there is a peculiar calling in him who responds. "God," he says, "calls the predestined many sons, that he may make them members of his only-begotten; not by that calling by which those were called who did not wish to come to the wedding, but by the calling by which he calls the predestined," which the Apostle distinguished when he said, 1 Cor 1: "To those who are called, Jews and Greeks, we preach Christ"; and a little below: "Knowing that there is a certain sure calling of those who are called according to purpose." Of this same calling, after a few lines, he adds: "But by what calling is he a believer?"[2160] Therefore Augustine shows that among all the predestined there is not a common, but a singular calling, which the Apostle distinguished. Since that calling is a grace that works (*gratia operans*), it follows that there was granted to all the predestined a peculiar grace that works and arouses, by reason of which same thing Augustine teaches in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 6, that the will is prepared for the predestined, whereas for others it is not prepared. "Many," he says, "hear the word of truth, but some believe, others contradict. Therefore these will to believe, but those do not will. Who is ignorant of this? But since for some the will is prepared and for others it is not prepared, we must discern what comes from mercy and what from judgment. What, therefore, comes from mercy if not that very believing itself? And what from judgment if not that very contradicting?"[2161] Therefore Augustine thinks that for those who believe the will was prepared out of mercy, but for others, out of judgment, it was not prepared; and consequently neither did there exist in each an equal prevenient grace of God and mercy, nor a will disposed and aroused in the same way; for that - namely, the very believing, whence it proceeds - comes first according to our sense, and so pertains to prevenient grace.

The last testimony shall be taken from Hilary of Arles, in the letter to St. Augustine which is placed before the book On the Predestination of the Saints, where, against Augustine's doctrine, he reports the murmuring of the Massilians in these words: "Then they take it ill that grace is thus divided, which either was then first given to the first man, or is now given to all: that he received perseverance not so that he might not be able to persevere without free choice, but so that he might persevere if he would by free choice; but now to the holy ones predestined by grace to the kingdom, no such aid of perseverance is given; rather, such that perseverance itself is granted to them - not only that without this gift they could not be persevering, but even that by this gift they cannot fail to be persevering. By these words of your holiness they are so moved as to say that a certain despair is set before men. For if," they say, "Adam was so helped that he could stand in justice and could decline from justice; now the saints are so helped that they cannot decline, if indeed they have received that perseverance, so that they cannot will otherwise; or they are carried along in such a way that either they do not come at all, or if they have come and have received [it], they say the profit of exhortation or of commination pertains to that will which had the free power of persisting and of failing: not to that will to which the not willing justice is joined with an invincible necessity." And a little later: "Whence also in this alone will they say that the first man differs from all, namely, that him in integrity of the powers of the will grace helped as willing, without which he could not

2160. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 16; cf. Rom 8:28 - 30; 1 Cor 1:23 - 24.
2161. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 6.

persevere; but these, with powers lost and ruined, as only believers, not only does it raise up prostrate, but also supports while they walk." But whatever may have been granted to the predestined, they contend to admit and hold it by their own will.[2162]

From which it is gathered that the Massilians never thought that the free will of man or angel could persevere without the grace of God, as Sander calumniously ascribes to them, book 7 De visibili monarchia, heresy 99; for by the cited words they plainly confess that man in integral nature could not persevere without the help of the grace of God. Faustus of Riez also, who was a most ardent defender of that Massilian sect, as I noted in Disputation 89, cap. 4, expressly taught this; for in the book On Grace and Free Will, cap. 1, against the Pelagian he speaks thus: "I judge that the liberty of free choice by itself alone could not suffice (namely, unto salvation) without the safeguard of grace, even before the transgression violated the privilege of that [state]."[2163]

Therefore the Massilians only murmured against Augustine, and were offended at his words, because he distinguished two prevenient graces, one special in those who persevere, by which they are made persevering, which was not granted to the first parent in the state of innocence; another, with which men can persevere, but do not persevere, which was given only to the first parents and to the bad angels.

These two graces Augustine had distinguished in the book On Correction and Grace, cap. 11; where, concerning the grace which through Christ was given after the fall of nature, he thus writes: "And by so much the more is help (*adiutorium*) given through Christ our Lord to those to whom it has pleased God to give it, that it may not only be present, without which we cannot remain even if we will, but also be such and so great that we will." The same two graces he most clearly distinguishes also in the same book, cap. 12, where are contained the words which Hilary recited in that letter and by which the Massilians were offended. Moreover, in that same chapter 11 he adds that the grace which we receive through the second Adam is indeed more powerful than that which was granted in the state of innocence to the first parents, although that former was more joyous; for in that state it existed without any strife and perturbation of passions; nevertheless it did not have the effect of perseverance; now, however, with great struggle of passions it makes the predestined to persevere.[2164] Therefore the Massilians felt that prevenient grace is common, by which all are aroused on each single occasion so that they may persevere; nor is there a special grace in those who in fact persevere; because otherwise, if those alone who persevere had that special grace, it would follow that no one could persevere without it, and no one with it could fail to persevere. Whence they inferred that all way to correction and commination is closed off, and a certain desperation is induced.

But indeed Augustine induced neither desperation nor necessity; for he did not say that without a peculiar grace no one is able to persevere, but rather that no one in fact perseveres without it. He distinguished, however, another common grace sufficient, and another efficacious; nor, when he

2162. Hilary of Arles, Epistula ad Augustinum, placed before St. Augustine's De praedestinatione sanctorum.

2163. Nicholas Sander, De visibili monarchia, lib. 7, haer. 99; Faustus of Riez, De gratia et libero arbitrio, cap. 1, contra Pelagium. See also Gabriel Vázquez, Disputatio 89, cap. 4.

2164. St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, cc. 11 - 12.

said "man is able to persevere," did he deny that without that special grace no one in fact perseveres. If he had said that without that special grace no one is able to persevere, he would have to be understood not of an antecedent impossibility, which is on the part of the cause, but of a consequent impossibility, which is joined with the foreknowledge of the future event (about which we have often spoken). This impossibility, just as the consequent necessity, neither takes away nor harms our liberty, but rather supposes it.

In this sense Augustine speaks openly in the book On the Good of Perseverance, cap. 6, where, replying to that objection of the Massilians which Hilary had written to him, he says: "But those brothers (as you write) are unwilling that perseverance be so preached that it cannot either be merited by suppliant prayer or lost by contumacious pride: but they do not attend carefully enough to what they say. For we are speaking of that perseverance by which one perseveres unto the end; that is given because it has been persevered unto the end; but if it has not been persevered unto the end, it has not been given. And a little below: True perseverance unto the end, since no one has it unless he has persevered unto the end, many can have, no one can lose. And again after a few lines: since when each one has persevered unto the end, neither can this gift be lost, nor can there be added other gifts which could be before the end." Therefore Augustine teaches that it is impossible that the grace of perseverance be lost, in that sense in which we say that a thing, when it is, cannot not be; which impossibility or necessity is only a concomitant or consequent of the thing, by no means contrary to liberty, as has often been said.[2165]

And of that consequent necessity Celestine too seems to have spoken in that epistle 1 to the bishops of Gaul, canon 7, where he says that not even a baptized man is fit to overcome the snares of the devil and to conquer the concupiscences of the flesh, unless by daily help he has received perseverance in good conduct. But, as Augustine bears witness in the book On the Good of Perseverance, cap. 1 and 6, perseverance - which the name itself indicates - no one has who, de facto, does not persevere, even if he has that from which he could persevere. Therefore when Celestine says that no one is fit to overcome temptations unless he has the gift of perseverance, it must be understood not of antecedent impossibility, but of the consequent. For if it were a matter of antecedent [impossibility], then with sufficient help, which is not called perseverance, or the gift of perseverance, each one can persevere and overcome all temptations.

In the same way Innocent is to be understood, as he is reported in epistle 91 among the letters of Augustine, whom Celestine also cites in that same canon 7, when he says: "If we do not firmly rely upon what is conferred on us (namely, the daily helps), by no means shall we be able to cut off human errors. For it is necessary that by Him by whose help we conquer we be again conquered if He does not help." These words are to be understood of efficacious and congruous help. For when he says "if God does not help," he signifies "if God permits." But God is said to permit not because he denies sufficient help, but because he denies congruous [help]. Therefore he says that it is necessary that we be conquered if we are left without congruous help and without that special gift

2165. St. Augustine, De bono perseverantiae, cc. 6, 15, 22.

of perseverance - with a necessity only consequent, not antecedent. For of antecedent [power] the Council of Trent teaches clearly, session 6, chapter 5, that we are able to respond to the grace that calls us, so that we are able also to resist it.[2166]

Finally, although the predestined are able, by antecedent possibility, to persevere and to resist the calling, nevertheless they cannot but have that peculiar grace with which God prevents them; the opposite of which the Massilians seemed to insinuate. We have, therefore, by the judgment of Augustine, Celestine, and Innocent, that in him who perseveres the special gift of perseverance is found, and hence that one is always stirred up by a greater grace than he who does not respond to the one calling; and that the opposite opinion, which some Scholastics follow, once pleased the Massilians.

But what those Massilians urged against Augustine, namely, that correction and commination are of no use, has no force, as we have shown in Disputation 91, cap. 18. Moreover, Augustine pursues the Massilians in that book On the Good of Perseverance, cap. 15 and 22, showing in what way those who persevere received a peculiar help of grace, which was not granted to others; which he calls the help of pitying grace. Prosper also comes in, himself thoroughly Augustinian, in book 2 On the Vocation of the Gentiles, cap. 23 (alias 8), who, showing that there is election among adults and among infants - so that to some the grace of election is given, to others it is not given by the sole will of God - says: "Just as, with respect to the greater [i.e., adults], besides that general grace which, more sparingly and more hiddenly, knocks at the hearts of all men, by a more excellent work, by a more liberal gift, by a mightier power, a special calling is exercised; so also with respect to innumerable little ones the same election is manifested." Therefore he thinks that to adult elect there is granted a more excellent work, a greater gift, a more powerful virtue, and a special calling. And in the book Ad capitula Gallorum, cap. 5, where the Gauls raise this proposition against Augustine as absurd, which they gathered from his writings, namely, "that those who are called are not called equally, but some so that they might believe, others so that they might not believe," Prosper replies in these words: "If calling in the Gospel be understood only as preaching, it is not truly said that to some and to others it is preached otherwise and otherwise, since there is one God, one faith, one regeneration, one promise. But if one looks to the effect of planting and of watering, something else has been done with those whose outward ears have been struck by a bodily voice; something else in those whose inward sense God has opened, and in whose heart he has laid the foundations of faith," etc.[2167]

To all these we can add the splendid testimony of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 112, a. 4, where, when he asked whether grace is greater in one than in another, he replies that indeed it is greater; and he is speaking of habitual grace, to which, when he had assigned the diversity of disposition, by which we are prepared for grace, as the cause of this inequality, he subjoined these words: "But on this side the first reason for this diversity cannot be taken, because preparation for grace is not of man, except in so far as his free will is prepared by God. Whence the first cause of this diversity is to be

2166. Council of Trent, sess. 6, cap. 5.

2167. Prosper of Aquitaine, De vocatione gentium, lib. 2, cap. 23 (alias 8); idem, Ad capitula Gallorum, cap. 5; cf. also cap. 7 of this Disputation.

taken on the part of God himself, who in diverse ways dispenses the gifts of his grace." Therefore, since the holy Doctor wishes to grant inequality not only in the actual disposition itself wherein there already is cooperating grace, but also in the very largesse of the gifts by which the will is prevented, he plainly indicates that, in prevenient grace, those who obtain unequal habitual grace had been unequal.

A triple explanation of the preceding opinion is refuted.

Caput V - A triple explanation of the foregoing opinion is refuted

Before I confirm the same opinion by no obscure reason, I have judged it worthwhile...

I have judged it worthwhile to set forth its sense. For some, not grasping the mind of St. Augustine, from whom that sentence was taken, have so interpreted it that to very many and learned men it has seemed overly severe and alien to the truth. We can explain it, then, in four ways; but the last sense of it is to be embraced and demonstrated by reason. Therefore it will be necessary in this chapter to refute the other three.

First, then, some understand the aforesaid sentence in such a way as to assert, first, that with that aid alone which is called sufficient, no one can answer unless efficacious aid is granted to him; then they add that, when that efficacious aid is granted, the will is so moved to consent that it cannot dissent from it. Which interpretation, if it be understood of the aid of prevenient and exciting grace, and of antecedent impossibility which is on the part of the cause, as the more recent authors understand it, has always seemed to me very difficult. For from the first part of it the following seems to result: that it is in vain called sufficient aid, if with it the will of itself cannot will and act; moreover, with that alone granted, it is not placed in the liberty of the will to consent or to dissent; since without another aid, efficacious and congruous, the will cannot be moved by an impossibility on the part of the cause.

But some answer that, if a man were to use that aid of sufficient grace well, God would grant to him that peculiar aid which is called efficacious. Yet this reply can easily be refuted. For if a man were to use that sufficient aid well, he would already be consenting to it and answering the vocation - either by pursuing with affection what the vocation proposes to be pursued, or by fleeing what it admonishes should be fled; and in either way nothing would remain to be done for that work which the vocation and sufficient aid proposed, nor would efficacious aid any further be necessary for it. For if to him who uses well the first aid there is granted another, a second, certainly that is granted for another work, not for the same. But when we inquire whether to him who answers there is given a peculiar grace which is not bestowed on another who does not answer, or not, we understand this of the aid of grace for each single work for which grace is necessary. In each single instance, therefore, that is peculiar and efficacious to which the will consents, and it is called a congruous vocation; but that is only sufficient, to which one can answer and yet does not answer.

Nor is what the latter part of the interpretation of this sentence teaches any less easily refuted. For if the discussion be about the exciting and prevenient aid, which is not in our power, the aforesaid sentence can first be confuted from the Council of Sens, celebrated in the year 1528,

chapter 15, where it is written thus: Nor yet does so great a necessity of grace prejudice free choice, since it is always at hand, nor does even a moment pass in which God does not stand at the door and knock: to whom, if anyone opens the door, He will enter to him and will dine with him: nor finally is such the aid of this sort of drawing God, to which one cannot resist. There the council clearly speaks of prevenient efficacious aid, to which we consent: both because it speaks of one who draws, and drawing is of efficacious aid; and also because it speaks of a man who opens his heart to God by consent. But explaining the nature of this drawing, it immediately says: God indeed draws, but we run to His odor; we are not forced, we are not snatched by a hook. And yet that application which the aforesaid sentence is trying to establish seems to be nothing other than a certain hook which so seizes our will that, once seized, it cannot run or stand still.

Then the same sentence can be refuted from the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5; for concerning the manner in which our will assents to and cooperates with divine inspiration, it says thus: Nor does man himself do nothing at all when he receives that inspiration, since he can reject it. Now the Council speaks of that special inspiration by which those who answer are excited; and it says that this is received by them, when they consent to it, in such a way that they can reject it and resist it by not consenting. But if that be understood of the aid of accompanying and cooperating grace, it is altogether outside the matter and controversy proposed. For no one doubts that he who answers has some grace or effect of grace which another who does not answer does not have - namely, a cooperation with divine grace. But the difficulty proposed is about prevenient grace - whether it is peculiar and greater in him who answers, so that he may consent, than in another who resists. To assert, therefore, that a man so consents to this grace and prevenient inspiration that he cannot resist it seems to be against the definition of the Council of Trent cited above, which Prosper expressed when he said in book 2 On the Vocation of the Gentiles, chapter 28, alias 9: He (namely God) grants so to will obedience to Himself, that even from those who will persevere He does not take away that mutability which can not will.[216821692170]

The opposite to this doctrine of Prosper was said by Calvin, book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 3, where he writes thus: God moves free choice, not as it was believed for many ages - that thereafter our election might be to obey or to resist the motion of God.[2171]

Then it seems to follow from this opinion that our liberty is injured and impeded by prevenient grace, if indeed, that posited, it is not in our election to consent and to resist. For it is not enough to say that that necessity is from supposition. For whenever a supposition is of such a kind that it precedes our liberty and, that being posited, liberty does not remain - which is indeed called antecedent necessity - election is altogether taken away and our liberty impeded, even if the necessity which follows from the supposition of a future event, from our liberty, since it is posterior, can in no way harm it: which distinction we have set forth at length in disputation 68,

2168. Council of Sens (Concilio Senonensi), held in 1528, cap. 15.
2169. Council of Trent, session 6, cap. 5 (De iustificatione).
2170. Prosper of Aquitaine, De vocatione gentium, lib. 2, cap. 28 (alias 9).
2171. John Calvin, Institutio Christianae Religionis, lib. 2, cap. 3.

chapter 4. From which it is also inferred that those are likewise refuted who affirm that, some ultimate judgment having been posited on the part of the intellect, the will cannot but consent; for these, while in the same mode they concede antecedent necessity, seem to take away liberty.

But they answer that the intellect is applied to that judgment by the will itself, and therefore the consent innate from such a judgment is free by reason of the preceding application. Yet this reply can easily be confuted. First, because in this life no object can be proposed which necessarily moves it, as was noted in the preceding disputation, chapter 4. Moreover, although the will freely applies the intellect to judge about this matter, nevertheless it does not apply it freely so that it judges for this or that side: rather it leaves that to the intellect; therefore the will has not yet decreed to follow this or that side. Wherefore, if later, when a peculiar judgment about one side has been posited, the will could no longer resist, it would follow that it had never of itself been determined to that side, but was moved by the judgment of reason against its liberty: which is absurd. Indeed, in the doctrine of St. Thomas there is a certain act of the intellect which is called command, as we will say in I-II, question 17, article 1, upon the positing of which the work cannot but follow, unless an external impediment be present; but this act is posterior to the free election of the will, and arises from its impetus, so as to direct to the work, as we will say there; and therefore by it our liberty is in no way impeded. But a judgment preceding election cannot be of such a sort that, when posited, the consent of the will and election necessarily follow.[2172]

Wherefore I do not see how the sentence of those can be true who say that in this life some are so called by God that they respond only spontaneously, not freely. For, as I will show below in disputation 99, chapter 8, the will in this life cannot suffer any necessity in giving consent, as long as it does not see God - neither from the vocation on the part of the intellect, nor from divine praedefinition. What necessity the human will contracts from vision and the hypostatic union, we will say there.

In a second way the preceding opinion can be explained, namely, that a peculiar grace always prevents him who responds - not only a peculiar vocation on the part of the intellect and the first indeliberate motion on the part of the will, but indeed also a certain efficacious application, which is prior to our consent and cooperation, and upon the positing of which the will cannot dissent from the vocation. But we have taken care to show that this application is impossible in disputation 88, chapter 5; and in the following disputation, chapter 3, it will be proved more fully. Moreover, all the arguments which we adduced against the preceding mode seem to fight against this one also. For from it seems to follow, first, that free choice cannot resist exciting grace - which we answer, as Calvin said, is against the manifest definition of the Council of Trent. Then, by this antecedent necessity our liberty is taken away, as was proved above.

But when they are pressed with the testimony of the Council of Trent that we have adduced, the adversaries reply in various ways. First, that free choice, once excited and applied, consents freely: because, with the full judgment of reason judging that that good is not necessary, it is moved - otherwise than by God clearly seen in beatitude. I nevertheless ask them whether the will is so

2172. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I-II, q. 17, a. 1.

moved by a full judgment that it can fail to be moved and resist. If it can resist, then it will be able to reject the inspiration and the application, which the adversaries will not concede; because an actual application cannot exist without consent. If it cannot but consent, how then does it consent freely? It will indeed be able to do so spontaneously, but not freely - which ought to be with indifference.

Then they answer that free choice can resist, not the efficacious prevenient grace, but the inefficacious; and that the Council spoke of the aid of grace in general, so that "to be able to consent" is understood with respect to one, but "to be able to resist" with respect to another. Yet this solution seems to evade the words of the Council. For the Council speaks of that prevenient grace which man receives by consent, and says that man so receives it that he is able to cast aside the same, namely by resisting. Finally they answer that man can resist in the "divided sense" (as they call it), that is, if he is not prevented by that efficacious grace; but in the "composed sense," that is, as he is prevented by efficacious grace, he cannot resist. However, by this solution, first, it seems to follow that our liberty is taken away, as we will immediately say. Then it seems to be contrary to the sense of the Council. For when the Council says that our will can cast aside the inspiration, it understands that inspiration to which the will in fact consents; and therefore it speaks in the composed sense.

Furthermore it must be added that these theologians torture themselves to no purpose in assigning that actual motion and application of the will to consent, beyond the vocation on the part of the intellect and the first indeliberate motion on the part of the will, as though to oppose the Massilians, who, against St. Augustine, thought that all are equally called, both those who respond and those who resist. For St. Augustine refutes the Massilians, in the places cited, merely by assigning a special grace to the predestined on the part of the vocation and the first indeliberate motion of the will, by reason of which God is said to do in us that we may do, while by that congruous vocation and the motion of the will He so excites us that He knows we will freely consent. Nor was there anywhere any dissension between Augustine and the Massilians concerning that application which the theologians commonly posit. For in order to commend God's predestination and the peculiar gift of prevenient grace which God bestows on the predestined, it was enough for Augustine to assign unequal grace of vocation and excitation to the predestined and to those who respond, as we will explain in the next chapter. Then, too, it is not necessary to concede this prior application on the part of the divine mover in order to assign the prior share to divine grace and to defend against the Massilians that the initiation of our salvation is not from us; for the controversy with them was far different. For they asserted that we begin from ourselves by certain good works before grace begins in us, as we have sufficiently shown in disputation 91. But as for that application - whether it were prior or not - you will find no word in the Councils and ancient Fathers. For the testimonies which signify that God's grace begins in us are clearly understood of prevenient grace, as we showed in disputation 88, chapter 8. Therefore they fall into those straits to no purpose, while the adversaries contrive that application unto consent.

Third, one could explain the peculiar prevenient grace in him who responds in this way and defend the preceding sentence: that, on the part of the vocation in the intellect and the first indeliberate motion of the will, it is equal; then that no application precedes in him who responds, as the preceding opinion said; but that the inequality be solely on the part of the will and of God's decree antecedent to our consent, by which He decreed to cooperate with us. Yet this way also does not commend itself to me. First, because the question with the Massilians was about the inequality of prevenient grace; but the will of God is not called grace; rather grace is the effect of it. And the controversy of St. Augustine with Pelagius and the Massilians was always about the effect of the divine will. For, as he himself says in the first book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, between grace and predestination this alone differs: that predestination is gratuitous preparation, namely in the eternal prescience of God, but grace is the donation itself. Concerning this donation, therefore, Augustine strove to prove to the Massilians that it is not equal in him who responds and in him who does not respond.[2173] Second, our liberty seems to be no less impaired by the decree of the divine will preceding our consent than by prevenient grace, or that prior application upon the positing of which a man cannot dissent. For in both cases there is antecedent necessity, which is contrary to liberty, as we shall say in the following disputation, chapter 3. Third, that decree preceding our determination is posited to no purpose, unless in the thing itself and in the donation something precede, as will be explained there.

More probable exposition of the same opinion, and confirmation.

Caput VI - Sincere exposition of the later opinion judged truer

With those three explanations of the later opinion, which I said was truer, chosen, I shall subjoin its sincere exposition briefly. First, I judge that the vocation in the intellect and the first indeliberate motion of the will, in which operating grace, exciting, and prevenient consists, has something in him who responds, by reason of which - although in itself it may be more remiss - it is called peculiar and a greater grace, a greater gift and benefit, greater mercy, a greater help, indeed it can even be called a greater vocation; and consequently, he who responds is always visited with a greater grace than he who resists. Second, by such a vocation the will always consents, although it can freely resist it. Third, that peculiar grace which we mention is in a certain way necessary, in order that we may respond: all of which must be proved by us point by point.

The first part is handed down by Driedo in the work On the Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race, treatise 4, chapter 5, at the last confirmation of the second argument, and by Ruardus, article 7 after proposition 5.10. They call that peculiar feature which precedes on the part of the vocation in him who consents something intentional, namely the removal of impediments which, within and without, would stand in the way and impede the consent of the will. For fuller explanation of which, the doctrine handed down by us in disputation 88, chapter 11, must be observed - namely, that one vocation is congruous, another not congruous. Congruous, according to St. Augustine in book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, is so called because it so suits and is

2173. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 10.

tempered to free choice (*arbitrium*) that it responds; by contrast, that to which free choice does not consent is called not congruous. And this congruity of free choice with the vocation is known to God by His infinite wisdom and under a condition. Wherefore God not only knows, by the knowledge of vision, what a man will do after He has decreed to call him, but also what he would do if he were called, before, according to our way of understanding, He decrees to forestall him by that vocation. Therefore, when in His predestination God decrees to distribute vocations over individual occasions, He decrees to distribute them out of that foreknowledge, not awaiting in uncertainty our consent as absolutely future, but looking upon all things most rightly under a condition. That the knowledge of events as future under a condition befits God we showed above in disputation 67. We have often spoken of this congruous vocation, especially out of the mind of St. Augustine in those disputations 88 and 89. And since this congruity of free choice with the vocation is known by God from its circumstances, among which is numbered the removal of impediments which would hinder it within and without, those learned authors cited rightly said that what is peculiar in the vocation of those who respond is something intentional, which is not taken only from the intrinsic variety of the operation itself, but from that operation joined with all the circumstances with which it is conjoined.

This foundation laid, the first part of our opinion is proved by this reason. Although the operation of our intellect, inasmuch as it is a certain operation, or intellection in itself, can be said to be greater or lesser from its intensity or remissness, from greater or lesser clarity and representation - in which there is, as it were, a certain spiritual extension to many things - nevertheless, inasmuch as it is called grace, mercy, gift, and benefit, it must be considered under another respect, from which also its magnitude must be weighed. Since all these are referred relative to the subject to whom they are given, that grace and mercy, that benefit and gift, must be called greater which is more useful to him to whom it is conferred. For the same thing, because on account of diverse circumstances it is more suitable or less useful, must be called a greater or lesser grace and mercy, a greater or lesser gift and benefit. Indeed, for the same reason a thing of lesser value, on account of a diverse circumstance, is a greater grace and mercy, a greater gift and benefit, than a thing of greater price: for to give bread to the hungry when he is in need, and to drive away that hunger, is a greater grace and mercy, a greater gift and benefit, than then to offer a heap of gold. But a congruous vocation is more suitable and useful than a not congruous one, if indeed the latter does not work good consent in us, while the former has this effect: therefore, although considered in itself it is a more remiss operation, inasmuch as it is an intellection, nevertheless it ought to be called a greater grace and mercy, a greater benefit and gift. Therefore, since he who responds always has a congruous vocation offered in that time and mode in which God knew it would have its effect in him, it follows that he who responds had been prevened with a greater grace and mercy, a greater benefit and gift, than another who does not consent, or even than himself when he does not respond.

Wherefore it is true, as we were saying in disputation 91, chapter 14, namely, that a holy thought, which is congruous by the removal of external impediments out of which a contrary thought would arise and prevent the effect, pertains to internal grace. For that thought, as free

from impediments, has regard to a new congruity with free choice, by reason of which not only is it grace, but it must also be called a peculiar grace. For we said that the ratio of grace is constituted and also grows by the order by which it respects him to whom it is given, although the substance of the operation and of the thought is not diverse in itself.

It must also be observed that the ratio of mercy, with respect to him to whom it is given, of gift and benefit, does not only look to him to whom it is given, but also to the mind of the giver; for grace is not said to be grace, nor a gift what someone bestows unwillingly or in ignorance. For the mind of a gratuitous and beneficent giver ought to be free and liberal; and the mind of one who affords mercy ought to be intent on relieving misery. But he who is ignorant is not free; and he who is overcome by some force or fear has something involuntary, and hence is not liberal. Likewise, he who would give a precious thing while ignorant of its worth and usefulness would not be said to have given much. Similarly, he who is ignorant of the congruity of that which he gives for relieving misery either does not have mercy or does not have much mercy, from the fact that that gift in reality relieves misery, if he, at the time when he decreed to give it, was ignorant of it. Hence it follows that the conditional knowledge of truths is necessary for God, so that He may know how great grace, greater benefit, and a gift to be conferred will be with respect to the one who consents. In like manner, the same knowledge is necessary for it to be said that God has mercy on one whom He congruously calls, but hardens another (as St. Augustine says), to whom He denies a congruous vocation; finally, it is necessary for us to assert that some grace operating, prevenient, and exciting is a peculiar effect of predestination, as we noted in disputation 93, chapter 1.

Wherefore Catherinus and others, who say that absolute futures alone are foreknown, because presences are really eternity, and that futures under a condition are by no means known for certain by God, can by no reason defend the donation of prevenient grace as a peculiar grace, benefit, or mercy God has bestowed on us, unless by reason of greater intensity, which cannot be the rule, as is manifest from what has been said in this and in that. Therefore they must assert that all the saved are equal up to consent and perseverance, unless they wish to distinguish them from the damned by that will and efficacious choice of giving glory: which was judged rather difficult to defend in disputation 89. It follows, therefore, according to St. Augustine's opinion, that the predestined is best distinguished from the reprobate not only by consent itself and cooperation, but also by the donation of grace that excites, prevenes, and operates. For from that point the peculiar grace, mercy, and care of God toward them begins. Wherefore the reason of that saying is rightly able to be the one in 1 Corinthians 4: "Who is it that discerns thee?" As if he should say: not thou discernest, but God alone, who has prepared for thee rather than for another the congruous vocation - which reason plainly proves the same about men as about Angels.

The same reason likewise shows that a congruous vocation, by the very fact that it is congruous, even if the operation is more remiss, is not only a greater gift and benefit and greater grace, but also a greater help and must be called a greater vocation. It is proved concerning help, because since help is said not absolutely but relatively to him to whom it is given, that will be called greater which suits him more, is more useful, and more helps so that it works; such is a congruous vocation; not, however, that which in itself is something greater. Hence it is often said of vocation:

for this, since it is said with respect to the one who hears, who because of impediments sometimes does not hear, will be greater the more often it is offered to someone without impediments, so as to move him when He rouses him up, than when he is so called that, being hindered by something else, he does not hear. But Dominicus Soto and Andreas de Vega, whom we reported in chapter 1, seem to have been deceived, when they asserted that those to whom God is more favorable by His grace sometimes do not respond, for example in the case of the Tyrians and Sidonians: which indeed is not to the point. For that only proves that he who is prevened by fewer and less lavish external signs sometimes consents, with another resisting to whom greater signs are exhibited; but it does not prove that someone responds to a lesser interior grace, with another, or the same one, resisting with greater help: about which the controversy now before us is.

Finally, it is gathered that it is not enough, if we concede that on the part of a congruous vocation there is something which is not on the part of a not congruous vocation, unless we also absolutely assert that by reason of that there is a greater and special grace: as the reason adduced above and the testimonies of St. Augustine confirm. I have noted this because of some more recent authors who, although they concede that to those who respond the vocation is given with a certain conditional knowledge of future consent, by reason of which we absolutely call it congruous, greater, and special grace, nevertheless absolutely pronounce that with equal grace the same man sometimes responds and sometimes does not, and that out of two, one complies and the other resists: whose mode of speaking seems to be opposed to St. Augustine. Whether there is something peculiar on the part of the intellect in him who responds will be said in the following chapter. In this way I explained the mode of peculiar prevenient grace in him who responds, at Rome in the year of our Lord 1587, and publicly in our college here; which, when afterwards it had been approved and confirmed by the most learned men of our Society, supported by their authority, I established much more; and as most apt for composing the long-standing controversies of the more recent writers in this matter of controversy, I always chose and publicly defended it; and already long before, from the year 1580, I had often taught and defended it. And so much for the first part of this opinion.

The second part is manifest from the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5, and sufficiently established by us in the preceding chapter, which is this: given such a congruous and peculiar vocation, a man so freely consents that he is able to resist.

The third part, which asserts that this peculiar grace of which we have spoken is in a certain way necessary in order that a man may respond, is plainly proved from those things which in chapter 4 we noted against the Massilians. For there is a twofold necessity, or impossibility, as I said there: one antecedent, which is on the part of the cause; the other consequent, which follows upon or accompanies the position of the effect. Therefore, when we say that a peculiar grace operating and prevenient is necessary in order that one de facto may respond - beyond the sufficient and common grace, as Innocent and Celestine said in chapter illo 4, cited above, and chapter 9 - we prove a consequent necessity or impossibility, namely that which is brought along by God's knowledge, with which the helps of prevenient grace are prepared: for this supposes that the consent will be future. Wherefore, rightly is it gathered in this way: If someone consents to the one calling, it

necessarily follows that he has been prevened by God with a congruous vocation, and therefore it cannot happen that someone consents and yet has not been stirred by that congruous vocation. Just as it is impossible that someone consents and is not foreknown by God - which necessity, or impossibility, since it supposes the thing to be future, does not prevent its being future freely, as we have treated more fully in disputation 68, chapter 4. Respondetur testimoniis prioris sententiae.

Caput VII - On dislodging the foundations of the prior opinion

It remains to dislodge the foundations of the prior opinion. To the first testimony of St. Augustine I answer, first, that in that place he is not disputing about the necessity of grace, as in the others alleged for our opinion. Second, I say that those works On the Predestination of the Saints, On the Good of Perseverance, On Rebuke and Grace, On the Merits and Remission of Sins, among others are remarkable works of St. Augustine, especially in what pertains to the treatment of the necessity of grace; but in the books On the City of God Augustine disputed little or nothing about it. Wherefore, since in that On the City of God he seemed to have reduced the difference between him who sins and him who does not sin to the sole will of the persons themselves, in book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 17, and On the Predestination of the Saints, chapters 6 and 8, he did not remain content with this reasoning, but reduced this difference to the entire preparation of the will, as we saw in chapter 4, and we shall see in this also. Therefore those testimonies cited for our opinion are to be preferred to that one from the City of God.

Third, I add that in that chapter of the City of God Augustine, by that example of the two men, does not prove an equality of operating and exciting grace in him who responds and in him who resists, nor does he insinuate it in that way; but he shows only that the will is the cause from the oblique side, that there is nothing besides it as a cause of malice from the man himself - something which is to create out of nothing - about which we shall say more below in disputation 231. By his manner of arguing he proves that there is no cause of evil which is some nature higher or lower, nor the Devil by suggestion without one's own consent; and he concludes that the very faculty of the will is the cause.

But he concludes that the very faculty of the will, not insofar as it is nature and good, but insofar as it is from nothing, is the cause of the evil effect; and in the following chapter he proves that there is not given an efficient cause of the evil affection, but a deficient one.

And if it could so happen that out of two who are equally affected, and in every way alike in their willing, and in all other respects alike, one should consent to the calling, the other should resist; nevertheless he would by no means deny, nor according to the doctrine he handed on elsewhere could he have denied, that to him who was going to respond a peculiar grace had been granted. For since God was rousing him by such a vocation, He rightly knew that the vocation was so congruous to him that he would be going to respond. But, on the contrary, that to him who would not be going to respond the vocation was not congruous and not efficacious. And since the diversity of grace sufficiently arises from the diversity of the science of God, as has been shown above, therefore even in that case a greater grace would have been granted to him who would be going to respond.

Therefore that book of the City of God teaches nothing against the diversity of grace which we have thus far assigned from a diverse congruity with the free choice. For there he only contends that, with an equal temptation, one can consent and the other dissent, even if they are affected in the same way and other things are equal; which in no respect is opposed to the aforesaid doctrine of the diversity of grace.

But in that case whether both would respond or resist, St. Augustine would think otherwise, according to the doctrine which he handed on in the books cited for our opinion, where, whenever out of two hearing the same words, or seeing the same signs, one consents and the other resists, he constitutes the cause of the diversity in this, that inwardly they hear in a different way from the Father; and he refers that diversity to the secret judgments of God inwardly calling and rousing in a different way. But if on the part of God inwardly preventing there were no inequality, he would by no means refer the diversity to the inscrutable judgments of God. Moreover, since in that book 2, On the Merits and Remission of Sins, c. 17, he teaches that every sin proceeds from a defect of certain knowledge and of conquering delight, which nevertheless, he says in c. 19, is given to the predestined, it follows that that which adversaries contend for in that book of the City of God about two equally affected, never happens.

If therefore St. Augustine seemed to teach against us that it sometimes happens that out of two equally affected, and seeing the same object in the same way and thinking in the same way, virtue and sin are proposed equally to each of them, so that one of them pursues evil with a varied thought, but the other good - this I judge cannot happen. For he who consents to sin, since he is not moved from it by a thought of virtue, without doubt considers more efficaciously that which delights in sin than that which delights in virtue. Wherefore although it can happen that someone embraces virtue by a lesser thought excited to good than he who sins; nevertheless this always happens, that in him who follows virtue the thoughts alluring to sin are lesser than those inviting to virtue. Otherwise that would not be true which St. Thomas says in I-II, q. 77, a. 2, from the doctrine of Aristotle - namely, that he who sins has a defect in his intellect, which we explained in its place, that he more lightly considers those things by which the soul ought to be called away from sin; which the same St. Augustine very clearly handed down, On the Merits and Remission of Sins, book 2, c. 17, where, when he had asked why men are not without sin, and had said one could briefly answer, "because they are unwilling," he subjoins: "But if I am asked why they are unwilling, the discussion would be long." And a little after: "Men are unwilling either because it is hidden from them whether it is just, or because it does not delight them; for we desire nothing more vehemently than that which we more certainly know to be good, and we are inflamed the more ardently, the more it delights us." Therefore he who sins is less delighted by the good and considers it less than he who does not sin but resists the temptation according to virtue. And when he says "because it is hidden," he does not understand a pure ignorance of what must be done; for thus there would be no sin except from ignorance; but he understands a certain defect of consideration, to which in c. 19 of the same book he opposes a "certain and efficacious" knowledge. For everyone who sins suffers some defect of consideration in his intellect. If there were not such a defect in the

intellect and of involuntary delight in him who sins, St. Augustine would not give another cause why men are not without sin except "because they are unwilling." Nor would he have gone further, but would have necessarily stopped there.

Therefore, although out of two equally excited by thought to evil and equally prevented by thought of good against the temptation one can not consent to sin, not from an affection contrary to virtue, but from a mere negation of consent to sin and by turning away his thought from evil; nevertheless one of them cannot resist the temptation by an affection of virtue, with the other consenting to sin, unless he has been prevented by a more distinct and more explicit thought of good. For it is impossible, when two objects are equally proposed, that someone be carried to that which is less explicitly proposed; and therefore it is necessary that in him who sins a defect of the thought of good precede, as I professedly say in I-II, q. 77, a. 2. But this diversity on the part of cognition in him who resists temptation according to virtue is not a greater intensity of thought; for it can happen that a more intense thought is less congruent; but it is a peculiar mode of representation, which is congruent to a will affected in this or that way. For out of two opposing thoughts, that one does not always draw the will to consent which is more intense; but that which in a peculiar way more expressly represents the object so that it be congruent to the will, as we shall again say in disputation 209, cap. 3.

Objicitur thus. If it is necessary that that more efficacious thought of good should precede, that someone may resist the temptation out of an affection of virtue, and man does not have it in his power, but receives it solely from the preventing mercy of God: it follows that it is not in the power of man to have victory over temptations according to virtue. I answer: To turn away the mind without a new dictate from the more efficacious to the less efficacious thought, and to apply the intellect so as to consider the more efficaciously opposed (object), is in the power of the will; and therefore, if he consent to the more efficacious thought, he consents freely. Yet it is repugnant that he consent to that which he thinks less and which delights less, in comparison with that which delights more and is considered more efficaciously; just as concerning the choice of a lesser good which is a means to an end I speak according to the sentence of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 13, a. 6. For it is necessary that in any sin there precede in the intellect some defect of consideration, as we shall say at I-II, q. 77 in order.

The other testimonies which we adduced for the prior opinion are of no moment. Therefore to the second testimony from the same St. Augustine I answer: Those two Kings were altogether equal in signs and other external circumstances, and in these only did St. Augustine make them equal; but certainly he did not judge them to be equal in the inward calling and in the affect, the first motion of delight, about which the present controversy is. I give the same reply to the third testimony, which was from St. Jerome, namely, that the same external preaching of the Apostles was to some "the odor of life unto life," to others "the odor of death unto death"; for of this alone was Jerome speaking there, just as Paul also was. Of the inward grace that moves and excites Jerome did not deny what we have said thus far, nor did he teach anything contrary.

In the very same way must St. Athanasius be understood, in the sermon a little from the beginning, where he says something like this: That rain which falls is the same, yet it produces a manifold seed; for it makes barley, millet, and corn. He speaks not of the inward, but of the outward grace of preaching. For he immediately subjoins: One, therefore, is that which descends, but many are the things which from it grow, and the sameness of the rain passes into a manifold fruitfulness; to make it clear that the fruit is not from the skill of the sower (nor even of the waterer), but from the power of God. Therefore St. Athanasius judges that the various fruits of preaching do not come from a diversity of the preaching itself, which is compared to rain, but from the grace of God inwardly moving, which gives the increase. He takes this doctrine from Paul, 1 Cor. 3: "Neither he who plants is anything, nor he who waters; but God who gives the increase." Just as planting and watering are done from without, but the increase is communicated by an inward operation: so preaching and signs are applied from without, but the grace of God moves inwardly and excites to the work, by which one is nourished and grows in virtue. And in the best way the Professor distinguished this in the place alleged by us, cap. 4 of this disputation, when he says that in the very external preaching there is no difference, because it is the same; but in the effect of planting, which is the increase, something else is done by God in him who responds than in him who does not respond.[2174]

Finally, concerning the aforesaid testimonies it must be observed that by them it has not yet been rightly proved that external preaching and signs - although in themselves they are equal, indeed the same - are equal grace to all who see and hear. For to those to whom they are congruent so as to work a greater benefit and grace, they ought to be reckoned greater than to others, as is not obscurely gathered from what was said in cap. 6. Therefore by those testimonies it is only proved that the signs and things which are exhibited from without are indeed equal in themselves. Wherefore the same signs done in Bethsaida, if they had been done in Tyre and Sidon, would indeed have been greater gifts and benefits of grace for the Tyrians and Sidonians, because to them they would have been congruent, than to the Jews, to whom they were not congruent.

In order that we may refute the reasons made for the same opinion, the twofold necessity must be recalled to mind, the antecedent, namely, and the consequent, about which we spoke in this disputation. We say, then, that to any vocation whatsoever, whether it be congruent or not, anyone can respond by a possibility on the part of the cause; for there is no vocation which of itself prevents consent, nor does it take away that the will remain free on either side, as we said there; but by a consequent impossibility, which God's science brings with it, to which science, when some vocation is given, no one can respond except to a congruent vocation; that is, God's science being supposed, which also supposes that another will not consent, no one can respond to that one.

2174. 1 Cor. 3:7; cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 2 (from Aristotle); I-II, q. 13, a. 6. See also St. Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione, lib. 2, c. 17; De praedestinatione sanctorum, c. 19. On the distinction between equal external preaching and unequal inward increase, see the Professor, cap. 4 of this disputation. On Jerome, cf. his exposition where he treats the Apostle's "odor of life" and "odor of death." On St. Athanasius, see the cited sermon with the analogy of one rain producing diverse fruits.

Which necessity is the same as that by which that which we say - "the future, as future, cannot but be future" - does not derogate from our liberty, but leaves it intact, at least that suppositive liberty, as we showed in disputation 88, cap. 8.

Therefore, when in the arguments it is said that, besides the common vocation, no other peculiar grace operating and preventing is necessary in order that a man may respond: if we speak of the antecedent necessity on the part of the cause, it is true; but if of the consequent necessity, then indeed a congruent vocation is required; whence it is that whenever a man consents, there was never lacking to him a peculiar grace of vocation and a peculiar preventing mercy.

Objicitur: It is in our power to respond to any common, non-congruent vocation; therefore it will be in our choice to make any vocation congruent for us. On the contrary, it also follows that, since it is in our power to resist a congruent vocation, it is in our power to make a congruent vocation not congruent. I answer: If we set aside the science of God that foreknows any vocation with its event, and speak of any vocation before the prescience is posited, it is in our power to consent to it and to resist it; and accordingly to make it congruent and not congruent. For whether a vocation be congruent or not congruent depends upon free choice, as to whether we receive it or do not receive it; as, for example, to be or not to be free from a bond depends on free choice by paying the price; but whether that vocation be conceded to us, which will be congruent in us, does not depend on us. As I noted in disputation 92, cap. 2. But if the discussion be of a congruent vocation on the supposition of God's science, with which it is conferred, which science supposes that that vocation will have its effect: in this way it is not in our power to make a congruent vocation not congruent, or the contrary. For it would be the same as to make that a future thing, inasmuch as it is supposed to be future, not be future; just as we said in disputation 66, cap. 7, that it is in our power that God should know something from eternity or not know it, no supposition of God's science being made; but once the supposition that God knows is made, then it is not in our power that He not know it.

From this it is gathered that, from sufficient non-congruent help, anyone can be saved as to a possibility on the part of the cause and antecedent; but not as to being saved in fact; because a non-congruent help is that which God knows will not have its effect. Nor therefore will that presence be frustrated which is never reduced to act. For if the peculiar effect were some nature; or if there were a determination of helps which are said to be sufficient for all in their kind; we would rightly conclude that they would be frustrated, unless in some individual they were reduced to act. But the sufficient helps of which we speak are to be referred to true and actual sufficient helps for single occasions in the same man as they occur, and not to some common nature of sufficient help. And of such helps the adversary must concede many that have no effect which they could have; but it is enough if, through the whole latitude of helps of grace for single occasions, there is some help that is sufficient, not efficacious, and another that is efficacious; thus the potency will be reduced to act. But when we say that it is free for the will to respond to a non-congruent vocation, it must be understood thus: because a man can stir himself up, so that that which is proposed as an object by a non-congruent thought he may consider better, and thus there be made a congruent thought by which the affection is moved. And this the will can do by that very fact that it turns itself away from

the end, and does not consent to the thought by which the object is proposed more efficaciously, and it turns itself away to external things; nor does it need for this a new thought that something must be considered anew.

Now, that we may dissolve the reasonings advanced for the same position, that twofold necessity must be recalled to mind, namely the antecedent and the consequent, of which we spoke in this disputation, cap. 5. Therefore we say that to any calling whatever, whether it be congruent or not, anyone can respond by a possibility on the part of the cause; for there is no calling which, insofar as it prevents consent, does not leave the will free on either side, as we said there; but there is an impossibility consequent, which no one affirms to be together with the foreknowledge of God, when a calling is given, that one can respond except to a congruent calling, that is, presupposing God's knowledge, which also presupposes this one or that one not to consent, no one of those can respond. And this necessity is just like that by which we say that the future, as future, cannot not be future, which derogates nothing from our liberty, but presupposes it entire and unharmed, as we showed in Disputation 68, cap. 8.[2175] When, then, it is said in the argument that, besides the common calling, there is no other peculiar grace operative and prevenient necessary in order that man may respond, if we speak of necessity antecedent on the part of the cause, it is true; but if of consequent necessity, a congruent calling is required; whence it is that as often as man consents, a peculiar grace of calling and a peculiar prevenient mercy is never lacking to him.

But someone may object: If it is in our power to respond to any common and not congruent calling, then the making of it congruent will also be in our power. Likewise, since it is free for us to resist a congruent calling, as was set forth in caps. 4, 5, and 6, it follows that it is in our power to make a congruent calling not congruent.

It is answered: If we set aside the knowledge of God which measures the calling along with the event, and consider any calling before prescience, it is free to each to consent and to resist, and consequently to make it congruent or not congruent. For a calling is congruent or not congruent as it depends upon free choice; just as it depends on free choice that this or that be or not be, although it does not depend on it that a calling be conferred on us which is going to be congruent in us, as in Disputation 92, cap. 2. But if the discussion be about any calling, the supposition of the knowledge of God having been made, together with which it is conferred, which supposes this calling to be going to have its effect, then it is not in our power to make a calling congruent or not congruent, or the contrary: for then it would be just to make that which is future, insofar as it is supposed future, not be future; as we said in Disputation 66, cap. 7, it is not in our power that God know something from eternity and not know it, no supposition of the knowledge of God having been made; but once it is supposed that God knows it, then it is no longer in our power that He not know it.[2176]

From this it is gathered that, with sufficient help not congruent, anyone can be saved, by a possibility on the part of the cause and antecedent; but that in fact no one is saved, because that help is not congruent which is known by God as not going to have its effect. Nor indeed is that

2175. See Disputation 68, cap. 8, where the author treats the necessity "that the future, as future, cannot not be future," as compatible with liberty.

potency vain which is never reduced to act: for if there were some specific nature, or a measured help determined, which of itself would be said to be sufficient for all, we would rightly conclude it to be in vain unless it were reduced to act in some individual. But since sufficient help, for the several occasions even in the same man, is diverse, we say of each one of them severally, not of some common nature of help, that it is sufficient, with which man can act, but he will not act. And this potency, which is found in the singular individual, even if it is never reduced to act, is not vain; and the adversary ought to concede many callings of this sort which do not have the effect which they could have. But it is enough if, in the totality of the helps of grace, through the several occasions, there be some help sufficient and not efficacious, and another efficacious: thus at length is potency reduced to act. And when we say it is free for the will to respond to a not-congruent calling, this is to be understood thus: because a man can rouse himself that that which was proposed by the not-congruent consideration be considered better; and a congruent thought be made by which the affection is moved. And the will can effect this by the very fact that it halts itself and does not consent to the consideration which proposed the object in a more efficacious mode, and it turns itself away from it to other things; nor does it need for this a new consideration that something must be considered anew.

From what has been said in this whole disputation it is inferred, first, that the very act of responding to the calling is from grace and free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) together as from two causes per se necessary; but not to respond is from free choice alone as from a cause per se, yet not from God except as from a remover preventing, which by the philosophers is called a cause per accidens. For from this, that God denies efficacious help congruent, it follows in a certain manner that man does not respond, namely by a cause per accidens. In what manner, however, prevenient grace which is not congruent does not work in the man whom God calls, because the man himself resists and is unwilling to consent, was explained above, in the preceding disputation, cap. 6, from the mind of Anselm, Hugh, and the Council of Trent.[2177]

Then it is further inferred that certain recent theologians assert in vain that efficacious help, without which no one is converted to God, is habitual grace; whereas, when one treats of efficacious help, one is not dealing only with that which is required for the supernatural love of God, but with any works of grace which also are done by sinners without habitual grace.

Pars III - On predestination and reprobation together

The third part of this q. 23 and of the whole treatise on predestination is common to predestination and reprobation. In it, however, it is treated of the certitude of predestination and its necessity; and the same is to be understood of reprobation in a certain proportion. Moreover, from this q. 23 only two articles are to be explained severally.

2176. See Disputation 66, cap. 7, on the distinction between what is in our power before the supposition of divine knowledge and what is not after it has been supposed.

2177. See above, the preceding disputation, cap. 6 (citing Anselm, Hugh of St. Victor), and the Council of Trent, sess. 6, canons on justification.

Articulus VI - Whether predestination is certain

To the sixth, one proceeds thus. It seems that predestination is not certain. For upon that of Apocalypse 3, "Hold what thou hast, lest another receive thy crown," St. Augustine says that another is not going to receive it unless this one should have lost it. Therefore the crown, which is the effect of predestination, can both be acquired and lost. Therefore predestination is not certain. [2178]

1. Furthermore, once a possible is posited, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that someone predestined, as Peter, sin, and then be killed. But this posited, it follows that the effect of predestination is frustrated. Therefore this is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.
2. Furthermore, whatever God could, He can. But He could not predestine one whom He did predestine. Therefore now He can not predestine. Therefore predestination is not certain.

But on the contrary: Upon that of Romans 8, "Whom he foreknew, he also predestined, etc.," the Gloss says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever is to be set free is most certainly set free."[2179]

I answer that predestination most certainly and infallibly attains to its effect; yet it does not impose necessity, namely that its effect should proceed from necessity. For it was said above that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things which are subject to providence are necessary; but certain things happen contingently, according to the condition of proximate causes, to which effects the divine providence has ordered them. And yet the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above. Thus therefore the order of predestination is certain, and yet liberty of the will (*voluntas*) is not removed, from which the effect of predestination comes contingently. To this also are to be considered the things said above about divine knowledge and divine will, which do not take away contingents from things, although they are most certain and infallible.[2180]

Reply to the first: A crown is said to be "of someone" in two ways. In one way, from divine predestination; and thus no one loses his crown. In another way, from the merit of grace. For what we merit is in a certain way our own. And thus someone can lose his own crown by mortal sin. Another, however, receives that lost crown, insofar as he is more quickly substituted in his place. For God does not permit some to fall without raising up others, according to that of Job 34: "He shall crush many and innumerable, and he shall make others to stand in their stead." Thus indeed, in the place of the fallen angels men have been substituted, and in place of the Jews, the gentiles. And the one substituted into the state of grace also, as far as this goes, receives the crown of the one falling, in that in eternal life he will rejoice in the good which another did, in which life each one will rejoice in goods as much those done by himself as by others.

2178. St. Augustine, on Apocalypse 3:11; cf. also his De dono perseverantiae, c. 14.

2179. Gloss on Romans 8:29: "Predestinatio est praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, qua certissime liberatur quicunque liberatur."

2180. Cf. St. Thomas, I, q. 23, a. 1 - 4; and on providence in general I, q. 22; on divine knowledge I, q. 14; on the divine will I, q. 19.

Reply to the second: Although it is possible that he who is predestined die in mortal sin, considered in itself, nevertheless this is impossible, insofar as it is posited together with his being predestined. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fail.

Reply to the third: Since predestination includes the divine will, as was said above, that God should will something created is necessary ex suppositione by reason of the immutability of the divine will; yet absolutely it is not thus to be said here about predestination. Whence one ought not to say that God can "not predestine" one whom He has predestined, in the composite sense of the expression; although absolutely considered, God can predestine or not predestine. But from this the certitude of predestination is not taken away.[2181]

Explanation of the article. The conclusion is that predestination is most certain and infallible, yet it does not impose necessity upon our will; and the same is to be asserted of reprobation. The confirmation of this conclusion St. Thomas remits to q. ad q., art. 4, where it remains proved that providence over the whole is certain; yet from that the liberty of free choice is not harmed. Wherefore, since predestination and reprobation are parts of providence, the same account will wholly apply to them. In the reply to the third, the Doctor shows in what way the predestination of God cannot be changed; but of this we will have no further disputation; for already concerning knowledge of God, q. 14, art. 15, and concerning will, q. 19, art. 7, we have said enough.[2182]

Disputatio XCIX

Caput I - Preliminary observations

Before we come to the proposed disputation, certain things, both certain and indubitable, must be premised in this chapter. First, the same difficulty obtains about predestination, and about providence, and about the will (*voluntas*) of God, which in this place we have reserved; although it is not of the class of speculative knowledge and will: for the knowledge of God can be reconciled with our liberty much more easily than the divine will. Concerning knowledge, moreover, we have already said enough in Disputation 68. But about will, providence, and predestination the difficulty is plainly greater: because, although some think that providence and predestination, which is a subjective part of it, are acts of the intellect, yet they are acts of practical intellect by way of command, which depend upon the motion of the will. When, therefore, they suppose the will of the same thing, there will be altogether the same difficulty about will, providence, and predestination.

Second, whether there be in the will and mind of God one sole act of providence, or whether it be twofold - one of providence, the other of government, as St. Thomas seems to intimate above, q. 22, art. 3 - about which has there been said enough, the controversy will be altogether the same.

2181. On the distinction between necessity ex suppositione from the immutability of the divine will and absolute necessity, cf. St. Thomas, I, q. 19, a. 3; I, q. 23, a. 4 ad 3.

2182. St. Thomas, I, q. 23, a. 4; I, q. 14, a. 15; I, q. 19, a. 7.

For each of those acts, whether it be of the will, or whether, if it be of the intellect, it presupposes the operation of the will: therefore it will be equally difficult to reconcile our liberty with the one and with the other.

Third, it must be observed, over and above the errors enumerated by us above in Disputation 68, cap. 1, that there were some heretics who were taking away our liberty; others, however, conceded the will to be free in itself, but to be hindered by the prescience or the will of God and to contract a certain necessity contrary to its liberty - which also is absurd. For, as we were saying in that disputation, cap. 1, there were certain heretics who conceded that the will is free in itself, but is impeded by the prescience or the will of God, and contracts a certain necessity contrary to its liberty; which is absurd. For indeed Catholics all assert our liberty in the same way, yet they vary in assigning the reason and the way by which it can stand together with the will of God. We shall examine their various opinions before we explain our own. But the reason of the difficulty in which the question among Catholics, as it were, sticks is this: How can it stand with the will of God that which is the cause of our operation, and is in itself immutable; with which our liberty is to stand, which can resist any power whatever; our will is free by its nature and, as experience itself teaches, often strives against what God seems to will? Hence the opposition, to which God's design, as they say, is opposed.[2183]

Some, moreover, imposed this error upon the Predestinati, as Sigebert relates in his Chronicle under the year of the Lord 415, and Sander in his book on the visible monarchy, who asserted that works do not profit even to those living piously, if at death they were predestined; nor, on the contrary, that the impious are harmed because they live wickedly, if they were predestined to life. From which error Prosper, in the book To the Chapters of the Gauls, cap. 8, and in epistle 2 to St. Augustine, which is had before that book on predestination, argues against the Gauls; Prosper, moreover, reports that from this there followed that the necessity of perseverance stands, and from it follows the necessity of damnation; but we do not approve that glossing of our opponents, since it very greatly impairs our liberty. Yet the same error the Waldenses laid upon Coelestius first, and Sander under Leo. But it does not seem to have thrived in the time of Leo; nor is it doubtful that in the time of Coelestine there was that opinion; and to the same the Pontiffs consent, that the Gauls, with St. Augustine, were defending doctrine with Pontifical authority. Afterwards this error flourished in Holland and Friesland, some, in the year of the Lord 1548, damned the interior errors of Wiclif and John Hus in the Council of Constance, in the sixth session; and in the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 17. Further, another error of the Jovinians is referred by Augustine, De haeresibus, cap. 82; and St. Jerome numbers the Jovinians among those who, after baptism, thought it possible no more to sin. They are also damned in the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 23; where universally anathema is declared against one who should say, or sense, that one justified can no longer sin.[2184]

2183. See Disputation 68, cap. 1, for the catalogue of errors concerning liberty and divine foreknowledge or will.

2184. Prosper of Aquitaine, Ad capitula Gallorum, cap. 8, and Ep. 2 ad Augustinum; Sigebert, Chronicon, sub anno Domini 415; Nicholas Sander, De visibili Monarchia; Council of Constance, sess. 6; Council of Trent, sess. 6, canons 17 and 23; Augustine, De haeresibus, c. 82; St. Jerome (as cited).

Therefore, among Catholics it is a thing doubted by none, that the will of God, and providence, and predestination in no way harm our will of the creature created not only as free, but by nature apt to resist any power whatever, save by no decree, and by predestination of God to be impeded. But when we speak about liberty, we understand the more legitimate, as we said in Disputation 68, namely the liberty of contradiction, by which one can will and not will, and the liberty of contrariety, by which one can will and not will, or this and its contrary. We must strive, then, as much as is in our power, so to defend our innate liberty that it be in no way harmed by any extrinsic decree and will of God.

Opinions of Durandus; Cajetan; and John Medina.

Caput II - First assertion.

Another peculiar error was that of those who were called the Predestined, as Sigebert reports in his Chronicle under the year of the Lord 415, and Sander in his book On the Visible Monarchy: they asserted that works do not benefit the pious if they are predestined at death, nor, on the contrary, do they harm the impious if they are predestined to life; which the Gauls imputed to St. Augustine, as is gathered from Prosper in his work To the Chapters of the Gauls, chapter 6, and in the Letter to Augustine which is placed before the book On the Predestination of the Saints.[2185] Therefore these heretics inferred from God's predefinition a necessity of salvation or damnation, and thought that no liberty remained in us as to the choice (*adoptionem*). Valdens reports this error under Celestine I, and Sander under Leo. But although it flourished in the time of Leo, it is not doubtful that it arose in the time of Celestine; for to him Prosper fled, as is clear from the first Letter of Celestine, so that, against the Gauls, he might defend his and Augustine's doctrine by Pontifical authority. Certain persons in Holland and Frisia followed this error in the year of the Lord 1548, and it is condemned among the errors of Wyclif and John Hus in the Council of Constance, session 15, and in the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 17.[2186]

There was another error of Jovinian, as St. Augustine reports in De haeresibus, chapter 82, and St. Jerome, book 1 Against Jovinian, after number 7, who asserted that one baptized could no longer sin. He is condemned also in the Council of Trent, the sixth session, canon 23, where a universal anathema is pronounced against him who shall teach or think that one once justified can no longer sin.[2187]

Wherefore among Catholics it is undoubted that the will (*voluntas*) of God, His providence (*providentia*), and predestination (*praedestinatio*) do not at all harm our will; but that the created will is not only of itself and by its native power free, but also is impeded by no decree or

2185. Sigebert, Chronicon, sub anno Domini 415; Sander, De visibili monarchia; Prosper of Aquitaine, Ad capitula Gallorum, cap. 6, and the Epistle to Augustine placed before Augustine's De praedestinatione sanctorum.

2186. Council of Constance, session 15; Council of Trent, session 6, canon 17.

2187. Augustine, De haeresibus, c. 82; St. Jerome, Adversus Iovinianum, l. 1, post num. 7; Council of Trent, session 6, canon 23.

predefinition of God. And when we speak of liberty (*libertas*), we understand - as in Disputation 68, chapter 1 - the liberty of contradiction, which is the power to will and not to will, or to do this and its contrary.

The opinions of Durandus, Cajetan, and John Medina

The first opinion would have been true, that of Durandus in the First Book, distinction 1, question 5, asserting that God in time does not concur or cooperate with any cause, but that second causes, conserved proximately by God, operate of themselves. On that view, the predestination of God would easily agree with our liberty: if, consequently, we were to say that in God there was no other will except the will of conserving our free choice for its own operations. For if in time free choice operates, and God does not concur with it, He does not will from eternity to concur with it to operate. Therefore He will have no efficacious decree about our works individually and specifically. But if there were any will in God concerning the positing of those things, it would only be a will of simple affection (*voluntas simplicis affectus*), which free choice can very well resist, as is shown in Disputation 83, chapter 4. But because that opinion of Durandus about the concurrence (*concursus*) of God to individual effects does not please learned men, indeed is branded by all with the note of error - as we shall show at length in the First Part of the Second [Part], question 79, article 1 - therefore it will not be permitted to philosophize about the will of God in that manner.

The second opinion is that of John Medina, a learned man of Complutum, as Anthony of Corduba reports in the place to be cited below: he said that God does not operate by a mediating intellection and will, but immediately by His essence, by which He is in Himself indifferent for operating and concurring with all singular causes, just as a universal and common created cause operates by its own substance and essence. From this indifference truly no necessity at all can be imposed upon our free choice, nor can the proper mode of operating be changed, which free choice has from itself; as is quite clear.

Yet although it is true, as we explained in Disputation 90, chapter 6, that God does not will anything or understand by an elicited act (*actus elicitus*) added to His essence, but by His own essence, to which only a respect is added according to reason on our mode of conceiving; nevertheless, because the very essence (*essentia*) of God itself, insofar as it has the notion of will and intellect, is the principle of all things - as we also showed there, which the phrase of Scripture demonstrates - the difficulty always remains in what way our liberty can stand with the essence of God, insofar as it has the notion of will and decree, by which it is the cause of our operations; for to such a will and decree our liberty in no way can resist. I confess indeed that our liberty is more easily reconciled with the will of God according to the opinion of those who say that the act of willing and understanding is not an immanent elicited operation, or freely added to the essence itself, than if we were to say that it is a certain free elicited act; yet in either way we must strive to safeguard our liberty together with the will of God.

The third opinion is that of Cajetan, above on question 22, article 4, who, speaking about providence - which we have said has the same ratio as will and predestination - promises in a few words to satisfy the difficulty proposed. For from the decree of providence there does not follow the avoidability or the inevitability of our operation, but something in the middle, which, he says, is ineffable. But Cajetan seems to play with words, that he may elude us, and rather by marvelous taciturnity slip past the difficulty proposed than resolve it. For what else is it to call ineffable that which, by the will and providence of God, follows in our operations, than to suppress the matter in silence? But by reason we shall prove that there cannot be any middle between those two, as Cajetan imagines. For the avoidable and the inevitable are mutually opposed, just as the possible and the impossible; and the inevitable is the same as the not-avoidable, and the impossible the same as the not-possible. And since there is no middle between the possible and the impossible, therefore neither can there be a middle between the avoidable and the unavoidable. Let us then put the question to Cajetan in this way. The decree of God standing, either we are able to avoid the work, or we are not able; then, either we are able to act, or we are not able: for no middle can exist between these, since contradictories are opposed. If we are able, therefore our operation is avoidable by us; if we are not able, therefore it is unavoidable. Therefore, the divine decree standing, one or the other must be affirmed about our operation; and so that ineffable middle Cajetan has devised is vain.

Caput III - A fourth opinion of the older Scholastics

The older Scholastics attempt to dissolve this difficulty in another way. They say that the will (*voluntas*) and providence of God are of such power and efficacy that, although no created potency and liberty can resist, nevertheless He sweetly moves all causes, and, according to the nature of each, impels them to operate either necessarily or freely. For He not only brings about what He wills, but also holds in the cooperation the very mode which He wills, and by various causes He also produces various effects. In this way St. Thomas answers the proposed difficulty above in question 19, article 8, and in question 22, article 4; Durandus in 1, distinction 46, question 1, number 7; Dionysius the Carthusian on distinction 39, question 2; Capreolus on distinction 45, first question, conclusion 5; the Ferrariense against the Gentiles, chapter 83; Driedo, the work On the Harmony of Free Will and Predestination, part 2, chapter 3, to the first.[2188] And indeed the teaching of these men very greatly pleases some theologians, and from it, together with those places of St. Thomas cited, they infer that the contingency and liberty of our operations are not to be reduced to free choice alone, but also to God as to the first and principal cause of contingency, on account of His extraordinary power and excellence - lest we should say that free and contingent effects happen apart from the sentence of God.

This doctrine is indeed true as regards its former part; yet what it teaches in the latter place is difficult, as we shall see in the following disputation. For it is certain that the will of God - being of infinite power, and joined with highest wisdom - can in the best way direct any second cause to its

proper operation, according as the nature of that cause requires, and move it in that mode which He knows to be congruent to it; nor are knowledge or power for this wanting to Him. But to assert this is not enough to remove the difficulty set forth, and to stop the mouths of barking heretics. For that the will of God is of infinite power and is directed by infinite wisdom does not seem sufficient, that it could or would know how to move our will freely, if that is not possible; since neither His power nor His wisdom can attain what is impossible. Moreover, that it is impossible, the decree of God being posited, for our will to be moved freely, seems to be proved by this reasoning: If God's predefinition (*praefinitio*) precedes our will, and once posited cannot be changed, nor by any of our power be hindered from its effect, it follows that our liberty cannot resist it, nor operate against it. Therefore, in what way, the predefinition of God supposed, will our will be moved freely with a liberty of contradiction and of contrariety, to ...?

Nor indeed is it enough if we refer all contingency and the liberty of our operations to the liberty of God, who from the beginning freely defined what would be. For heretics will not deny this (I except John Wyclif, who, as we related in Disputation 68, chapter 1, even denied to God the liberty of contradiction and of contrariety); for with this they can affirm that no liberty remains in us in operating, which is absurd. And much more does the difficulty proposed at the beginning grow according to the opinion of more recent men - who think that the doctrine of St. Thomas and of the older theologians is to be understood thus - that God has from eternity pre-established each of our operations; and that His predefinition was prior in the order of cause to our determination and cooperation: because, without any regard had to it, God, of Himself, decreed each of our works. And this they judge to be true not only in works of grace, but in other works also, even of sin, if the discussion is not about the malice, but about the substance of the act. Hence the difficulty increases: for from this opinion, understood in this way, there follows in our works a necessity ex suppositione which is altogether contrary to our liberty; although absolute necessity, and from the nature of the thing, does not follow. But we noted above that a necessity which harms liberty is not to be conceded. For it is of faith not only that free choice is free of itself and by its nature, but also that it always remain so free that by no extrinsic cause is it harmed. Wherefore, when we concede some necessity in its operation, such a necessity must be of the sort that leaves its liberty entirely unharmed.

From the aforesaid opinion it will not be difficult to prove that there follows for our liberty an impediment which utterly takes it away. However, we must recall to mind that doctrine of Anselm in the opuscule On the Harmony of Free Will and Predestination, chapter 1, which we adduced in Disputation 68, chapter 4, and have often inculcated: namely, that in one of two ways some effect is necessarily going to be. Either by antecedent necessity, or by consequent necessity. Antecedent necessity is that which comes from a cause, or from something which precedes the effect, which, once posited, the effect cannot fail to follow. Consequent necessity, however, is that which follows the effect itself. In this way, of an effect already posited, we say that it is necessary when it is; or

2188. St. Thomas, I, q. 19, a. 8; I, q. 22, a. 4; Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 46, q. 1, n. 7; Dionysius Carthusianus, In I Sent., dist. 39, q. 2; Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 45, q. 1, concl. 5; Ferrariense (on Contra gentiles) c. 83; Driedo, Opus de concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis, pars 2, c. 3, ad 1.

that it will be, insofar as it is going to be. But about the former necessity Anselm plainly teaches that it is of a nature to harm the liberty of free choice: because with it liberty cannot stand; which also on this account has been proved, in Disputation 89, chapter 10. For if something precedes our consent, from which it follows necessarily that we will consent, and our will cannot in any way, that antecedent being posited, will the opposite; and that which precedes was in no way in our power; it comes about that nothing of liberty, nothing of indifference, can remain in us; as we have shown there more at large. The latter necessity, however, does not take away liberty: because that from which the necessity follows is presupposed from our liberty; and thus, since consequent necessity is of this sort, it cannot harm it. But those who concede that the decree of God so precedes as to predefine our works individually with no regard had to our consent and determination of our will, are compelled to concede that the oper...

Our work would come to be by a certain antecedent necessity: because once the decree is posited, which in the order of cause precedes, our will cannot will the opposite; therefore no liberty at all remains in it.

Confirmatur ex Thoma Valdense. By this line of reasoning Thomas Waldensis, tom. 1, lib. 1, c. 25, against several grave Theologians of his time, who plainly conceded that our works are done by a preceding necessity, says these words: "Antecedent necessity therefore is not compatible with the liberty of free choice, and therefore it does not befit human affections. Therefore perilously (as it seems to me) some great Men posit this antecedent necessity in human works; and even that it flows from the will of God, especially since, when they attempt it, they can find nothing consonant with the ancient Fathers of the Church; and that text which they adduce, 'The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, and to whatsoever he will he inclines it,' the very text explains itself as being understood of a necessity of traction or inclination, not however of that necessity which precedes according to Anselm."[2189]

Moreover, once that antecedent supposition has been made, that liberty does not remain together with that necessity we have amply proved above in disputation 89, c. 10. For once that supposition is made, an indifferent and free will does not remain, so as to be able to will one or the other, but is tied to one side, since it is in no way able to resist the decree of God.

Prima adversariorum Responsio. Yet to this argument many attempt various replies: however, since in that chapter we have expressly impugned their solutions, here we shall only touch them in passing. First they answer, that even with the decree of God posited our will remains free. And when we press them thus: If our will could tend to the opposite, it would already resist the will of God, which is absurd; but, once possibles are posited in being, nothing impossible follows (as Aristotle says, Prior Analytics 1, c. 12); they say: Yes indeed, then, if the will were to do the opposite of that which God has decreed will be, the supposition of God's decree would be taken away; just as, if we were to do other than what God knows will be, the supposition of God's knowledge would be taken away.[2190]

2189. Thomas Walden (Thomas of Walden), Doctrinale antiquitatum fidei, tom. 1, lib. 1, c. 25.
2190. Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, c. 12.

Refutatur. But we have shown there that this solution is weak: because, according to their own opinion, the supposition of God's decree is prior to our liberty; and therefore, if it remains, as is supposed, the will cannot will the opposite, it follows that it does not remain free; but if it can and does, the supposition ought not to be taken away, which is absurd.

Secunda Responsio. Secondly they answer, that once the supposition is made, the will does not remain free, yet in itself it is free. But in this way we would seem to fall into the error of Melanchthon and others, who, although they do not concede an absolute necessity in our works, as Wyclif taught, yet affirm that by an extrinsic decree or foreknowledge of God our liberty is harmed and impeded, as we recounted in disputation 68, c. 1. And if someone should concede that, once the supposition of God's decree is made, there remains a root of spontaneity; but without the liberty of contradiction; this avails nothing at all. For since spontaneity is also found in brutes, it is not enough to concede that for human operations; rather it is necessary to ascribe to the will the liberty of contradiction and contrariety. For spontaneity without liberty even the heretics of our time concede, together with Calvin, Institutes, book 2, chapter 5, §§14 - 15.[2191]

Tertia Responsio. Thirdly others answer, that by the decree of God there is not imposed upon our will an antecedent necessity, but a consequent one, such as comes from knowledge; and hence by the decree of God our will is not impeded. They prove the assumption: because the decree of God precedes conditional knowledge, whereby God most perfectly knows under a condition what each one would do if he were to be forestalled by such a vocation; therefore, that, this being foreknown, God should decree that it be done, and should by such a vocation stir the will to it, does not impose antecedent necessity: because that which he knows under a condition he decrees absolutely.

Refellitur. We have expressly impugned this solution in the same disputation 89, c. 10, when the question was treated of a decree of giving glory before the merits of grace were foreseen; and now it can be refuted in the same way. First, because from the fact that God knows under a condition that I will freely consent to such a vocation, it does not follow that in my liberty there had been an absolute decree of his, whereby he predetermined that I would do such a work: therefore it could have been that, before he absolutely decreed to call me, and before he foresaw my determination as absolutely future by such a vocation, he, of himself, decreed that I would absolutely do such a work; it follows that an absolute determination was altogether prior to my liberty and absolute determination; and hence an antecedent necessity would be imposed on my will.

Secundo. Next, these doctors do not keep the same order under condition and absolutely: whereas, if there were to be the same ratio on both sides, the same series would have to be constituted. For they say that God thus foresaw: If I forestall Peter with such a vocation, he will freely consent: but they do not add a predetermination under a condition, namely, what if I were to predefine his work before the vocation and foreseen determination? For if this were posited, just as

2191. John Calvin, Institutio Christianae Religionis, lib. 2, c. 5, §§14 - 15.

in the absolute order, there would be equal difficulty on both sides. Wherefore I judge this knowledge under a condition, thus understood, to profit nothing for reconciling the decree of God with our liberty, as was also noted there.

Postremo. Finally, if the decree of God, whereby he predefines sin as to the substance of the act, precedes our cooperation and does not depend on it in any way; by that very fact, if God were to reveal to someone his sin, as to the Apostle Peter, he could not strive to the opposite, lest he should attempt to frustrate the decree of God. Wherefore either by denying he would not sin, lest he make void the decree of God, which he well knows; indeed, he would do well by denying, lest he go against the definition of God; or he would be perplexed. But since in fact He leaves his decree in our power, because He accompanies it and does not precede it, a man both can rightly and indeed ought to strive to the opposite; because there still lies upon him the precept of God, of which in I - II, question 19, article 10.

Quarta responsio eorum probatur. Fourthly, others answer that by the decree of God concerning individual works, even if it should precede, according to the notion of foreknowledge of our cooperation, our liberty is not taken away, although necessity is imposed on it: because the decree does not change the intrinsic mode of operating, nor does it physically (as they say) predetermine the will; but the decree is altogether extrinsic. We have sufficiently impugned this solution of theirs in disputation 89, c. 10, where we have shown that by an extrinsic impediment our liberty is taken away in exactly the same way as by an intrinsic and physically influencing one, when from the supposition there follows an antecedent necessity.

These are the things that seem to follow against the aforesaid opinion, as it is understood by more recent Theologians, who plainly concede a decree antecedent to our consent, from which they are compelled to admit antecedent necessity in our works. For as to the more ancient Theologians commemorated in this chapter, we cannot affirm that they conceded such a preceding decree, and therefore an antecedent necessity, in our works. And indeed, of St. Thomas, Waldensis in the same book, c. 28, says that he never taught this necessity. For in that time, as even now, there were not lacking Theologians who would interpret the holy Doctor in that sense; from which opinion Waldensis strives to vindicate him, as from a less probable interpretation.[2192] Only against the aforesaid Scholastics we have noted above that their doctrine is less sufficient for the solution of the present difficulty, although it be true; and therefore another must be sought which will satisfy altogether.

Caput IV - The fifth and sixth opinions of more recent authors

Theologians of our time, in order to temper the severity of this position, teach with Gregory of Rimini, in 2, dist. 28, q. 1, art. 3, to ad 8 and 12th argument, that in the order of cause the motion of God is prior to our cooperation and determination in good works; but in works of sin, even as to the substance of the act with the malice set aside, our determination is prior; and that in eternity these are to be compared with one another in the same order. For they think with the same Gregory

2192. On St. Thomas, see Thomas Waldensis, tom. 1, c. 28.

that in time God, of himself, first applies our will and impels it to act, whereby it cooperates in good works; but in evil works, on the contrary, the will is first determined of itself before God cooperates with it. From which they infer that God has predefined good works before our determination was in any way foreseen, but evil works, as to the substance, by no means, unless the determination of our will was foreknown. As to good works this is proved, because in them the first part must be assigned to God: therefore both the decree and the predefinition of God ought to be prior. As to evils, they confirm this by many testimonies of the Fathers, who deny that sin is predefined by God. Thus it is said in the Council of Valence under the emperor Lothar, c. 5. With this there agree Augustine "on the articles falsely imputed to him," articles 11 and 13, or rather Prosper, "To the objections of Vincentius," who is believed to be the author of that book of responses; and Bede, tom. 8, in the book of Questions, q. 13; and Fulgentius, book 2, To Monimus, from chapter 13 through many chapters. Next, because God would seem to be the author of sin, and to him rather than to the sinner should that sin be imputed, if he, of himself, predefined in foreknowledge the sinful work without regard to our determination, and in time moves us and applies us before we are determined by ourselves; for then the sin should rather be ascribed to him than to us, since he impels us to that act which malice necessarily follows.[2193]

Others finally philosophize in almost the same way, except that they further distinguish among good works. For they think that certain works are of grace, and others works of nature. As to works of nature they say what the preceding doctors taught as to evil works, namely that in them the determination of the creature is prior in relation to God; and they affirm the same of the order of prescience and of eternal predefinition, that God, not in any way before our determination was foreseen, predefined the good works which are of grace, but the others after our consent was foreseen. They distinguish thus, so that at least in works of grace we may assign the prior part to God, since he is said to work and to do all things in us, that we may do them. And since Gregory judged that all moral good works are from the grace of God, in all good works he conceded that we are first moved and applied by God to act, before we act, as we noted in disputation 88, c. 1.

But these distinctions are applied in vain, since rather one ought to think the same way about all. And first of all, if the Doctors of this opinion judge that, even with the predefinition of God supposed and with that prior application to act in good works, nonetheless our will freely determines itself to those works, they ought to say the same in evil works. For what greater reason can there be, by which on account of that predefinition and prior application to act liberty is taken away in evils and not in goods? But if, the predefinition and application supposed, the will still remains free to sin, there is no reason why malice should be imputed to God or ascribed to him, since by his predefinition he leaves our will in the hand of its counsel, and decrees only the act of sin as to the substance, just as he also in time does and produces it. For that he in some manner wills it either before the consent, or together with it, or after it, no one can doubt, since the things which he produces in time he produces by his will; but his will is eternal. From the fact, however,

2193. Council of Valence (Valentinum) under Emperor Lothar, c. 5; Augustine, Ad articulos sibi falso impositos, arts. 11 and 13; Prosper of Aquitaine, Ad objectiones Vincentiani; Bede, In libro Quaestionum, q. 13 (tom. 8); Fulgentius, Ad Monimum, lib. 2, c. 13 ff.

that God concurs with us to the act of sin, as the faculty of free choice requires - whether before, or after, or together - it does not follow that malice is to be ascribed to God, since that follows only from the mode of operating of the created cause, as we shall say in I - II, q. 79, a. 1.[2194]

As to the Fathers commemorated, they either merely contend that sins, under the notion of sin and malice, were not predefined by God, that is, destined and determined from eternity to be done. The particle "prae" does not denote an antecedence of cause with respect to our determination, but a priority of time. For only St. John Damascene, as we shall note below, seems to have used the particle "prae" in that signification, so that it should signify an antecedence of cause. Or certainly, if the Fathers are speaking of the very act of sin as to its substance, they not only deny that God predefined it before our determination was foreseen, but also that he determined it in any way. For, as we shall say in I - II, q. 79, a. 1, Augustine in the book On Free Choice 2, c. 10, and indeed St. Jerome in the second Dialogue Against the Pelagians, seem not obscurely to teach that the very act and operation of sin are not from God. Wherefore, since the other Fathers alleged were most devoted to the doctrine of Augustine, it is not to be wondered if in that sense too they denied that sins were predestined by God. The Master also relates in III, dist. 37, that certain men in his time followed that opinion, lest sin should be cast back upon God as the author of malice, if he were presented as the author of the act of sin as to its substance; and in this opinion was the Auxerre master, book 2 of the Summa, tract. 27, c. 3, although he judges the contrary to be probable; the Master, however, dares to define nothing.[2195]

From among the Fathers, I have read only Anselm, in the little work On the Harmony of Free Choice and Predestination, chapter 2, who says that the act of sin as to its substance is from God. But as to what Augustine says in the book On the Manners of the Manichees, c. 2, that God is the cause ...

St. Anselm says that God is the cause of all natures and substances; from which he would seem to concede that God is the author of the act of sin according to its substance, because it is a certain nature. He does not, however, in that place prove or hold the sentence that the act of sin according to its own entity is from God; for by "nature" he himself understands substance, not operation. Therefore, against the Manichees he there contends that there is no substance evil by nature, which he signifies by the name "nature." He so understands it in the same book, chapters 2 and 8, and in book 1 Hypognosticon in the last words almost, book 4 at the beginning, and book 2 De libero arbitrio, chapter 20. In the same way John Maxentius speaks in the confession of his faith at the end, which is found in the Sacred Library, and St. John Damascene, book 2, chapter 19 of the History.[2196] Therefore the Fathers did not at all care whether the predestination of the act of sin was from God before the foreseen determination of our will.

2194. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, I - II, q. 79, a. 1.

2195. The Master (Peter Lombard), Sentences, III, dist. 37; the Auxerre master (Antissiodorensis), Summa, lib. 2, tract. 27, c. 3; St. Anselm, De concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis, c. 2; St. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, lib. 2, c. 10; St. Jerome, Dialogi contra Pelagianos, dialogus 2.

2196. John Maxentius, Confession of Faith (at the end), in the Sacred Library; St. John Damascene, Historia, book 2, chapter 19.

But if God had predetermined in his eternity the act of sin according to its substance, not with our determination foreseen, he would impose a necessity upon our will that would impede its liberty; and so it would follow not only that sin ought to be thrown back upon God, if there were any such thing (for he would compel us to do it), but also that no sin could be imputed to human choice. Further, if such a necessity in evil works arose from that predetermination, the same would assuredly hold for good works, and therefore no merit could be imputed to us - which too is absurd. Therefore the same account must be given. And by the same mode one should judge of predestination both in good works and in evil works according to their substance.

Wherefore the opinion does not please me of those who teach that our will, after vocation, is not only applied by God - of which we have often spoken - before our consent to a good work, but also to consent to the work of sin according to its substance. For from their sentence many things seem to follow which by no reason can be conceded.

First: that we are moved by God, driven, indeed even compelled, to the works of sin, even if God is not the author of the malice of sin. For if God applies our will, with thought and temptation set beforehand, so as to elicit the work of consent, then he impels and urges to such a work; and since, once that application is posited, free choice cannot fail to operate and does not in any way depend upon itself, but that application of God precedes its liberty, it follows also that we are not only impelled but also compelled; for antecedent necessity, as has often been said, is contrary to our liberty. In this mode Beza speaks, answering Sebastian Castellio in his second refutation of the calumnies, explaining Calvin's sentence in aphorism 220, where he says that free choice is not only ended in the work of sin, but is also impelled, excited, moved, and ruled toward it. Nor truly does he say that God is the author of sin insofar as it is evil and deformed; for in that respect he ascribes sins to the created will alone, in aphorism 31; but he says that to the very work of sin our will is impelled, excited, moved, and ruled by God.[2197]

Second: it seems to follow from this sentence that God, by an antecedent will and from himself, willed and decreed the works of sin, and thus in his primary intention destined some to such works. For according to Damascene, book 2 De fide, chapter 29, the primacy of will in God has its origin from himself alone, taking no occasion from us; and in this reason it is said to be antecedent with respect to us; but the secondary will, which is called consequent, has its origin from us, such as is the will to punish. To say, however, that by his primary will God predestined the works of sin according to their substance is not permitted; for by this primary will, as Damascene witnesses, God wills all men to be saved, to lead a tranquil life, to do nothing that will be in the future against reason; for this is a good and acceptable thing before the Lord, who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of truth, as the Apostle writes to Timothy, 1 Timothy 2. It is impossible, however, that God by his own self, by his primary or antecedent will, both will this, and at the same time by that same primary will predestine the work of sin according to its substance, to which deformity is conjoined.[2198]

2197. Theodore Beza, Responsio ad Sebast. Castellionem in refutatione secunda calumniarum; and Aphorismi, aphorism 220 and aphorism 31.

2198. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, book 2, chapter 29; 1 Timothy 2:4.

Third: it seems to follow that by this same primary intention, that men may give consent to the works of sin, God not only sends the thoughts from which he knew sin would be in the future, but even by the same will impels consent into such thoughts; which cannot be said. For although God is the author of the thought and of the occasion, from which he knew the work of sin would be in the future, because he would of himself will that it not be committed, it can by no account be said that by that intention, so that men consent to the work of sin, God sends the thoughts or offers the occasions.

Fourth: from this same sentence it is gathered that one must simply say that certain men are destined by God alone to the work of sin, just as others also to the work of virtue. For if God, the determination of man not being foreseen, from himself decreed that this man commit the work of theft, but that man the work of adultery, and that he should accomplish it in time, since we say he was applied and moved by God, it must be said simply that to these works of sin some men were destined by the will of God alone: which is against the doctrine of the Council of Valence under Emperor Lothar, chapter 3; and of St. Augustine, in the Articles falsely imputed to him, article 11; or of Prosper, in his Responses to the Objections of Vincent, responses 11 and 13, of which book he is thought to be the author; and of Fulgentius, book 1 To Monimus, chapter 13, in many chapters; and of Bede, tome 8, in the book of Questions, question 13. They deny that sin is foreordained by God, and that men have been destined by God to sin; nor do they only deny that malice was foreordained by God, but also that anyone was created and predestined by God to this, that God might impel him to the work of sin.[2199]

This inference is shown to be false from this, that God by his own self, by his primary will, wills that the work of sin, even according to its substance, not be done; because, according to Damascene, book 2 of that work De fide, chapter 29, God by his own self wills the salvation of all, and that all works be done according to reason; with which will another will cannot be consistent, by which he would will the work of sin to be done according to its substance, unless by some occasion taken from our determination and cooperation.

Fifth: it seems to be inferred from this motion and application of our will to the work of sin that the liberty of that will is taken away, as has often been said, and therefore that there is no sin at all, because every sin ought to be free and voluntary: or at least, if yet moral sin remains, one must say that God is the author of it.

Those, however, who follow the opposite sentence answer that God indeed is the author of the work of sin according to its substance; yet that the malice and the moral deformity is referred to free created choice alone: so that that work, insofar as it is from God, is not sin; but insofar as it is from free created choice. Moreover, one must observe that not all the heretics of our time have taught that God is the author of sin, insofar as it is sin. There are some who plainly say that sin, as sin, is not to be referred to God as to a cause, but only that God is the cause of the work of sin in that mode we have explained above according to their mind. So teaches Beza in Aphorism 31;

2199. Council of Valence under Emperor Lothar, chapter 3; St. Augustine, Ad articulos sibi falso impositos, article 11; Prosper of Aquitaine, Ad objectiones Vincentiani, responses 11 and 13; Fulgentius, Ad Monimum, book 1, chapter 13, through many chapters; Bede, In libro Quaestionum, question 13 (tom. 8).

Calvin, Institutes, book 3, chapter 23, §§6, 9; Zwingli, in the Sermon on Providence, chapter 6. Although this solution of the adversaries may have a place in their sentence who say that the work of sin according to its substance is done by God cooperating with us, with our determination taken into account; yet for those who assert, not only that God decreed to cooperate with us and to concur in time, but also, with no regard had to our determination, to apply us to the work of sin, to excite, rule, and impel us - this distinction and solution can avail nothing. For thus, as we were saying above, either there is no sin at all, or it rather belongs to him who from himself contrived and ordained that such a work be done.

There are, however, some Theologians who expressly do not say that our will is applied to the act of sin before it itself consents, although that plainly follows from their principles; since they assert that by nature a second cause is first applied to its operation by the first cause before the second cause itself operates. Yet those Doctors expressly teach that, if the human will is not applied to the good, it will infallibly sin. The sentence of such men seems to be rejected, just like the former, if that "infallibly" they take for a necessity antecedent and on the part of the cause, as they themselves seem to signify; for if it be referred to the knowledge and intellect of God: God infallibly knows that man will sin, not indeed if he be not applied to the good by that application which we impugned above, but unless he be prevented by a congruous and special vocation according to the purpose of God; as is clearly evident.

But some say that, at least in the works of grace, it is necessary to concede a predetermination before the determination of our will: because in time also a certain application precedes our determination, besides vocation and the first motion of the will, so that in this way they may satisfy the mode of speaking of St. Augustine and of the other Fathers. But that application and predetermination, understood in this way, is not only not according to the mind of Augustine and of the Fathers, but neither is it possible in this manner; and from it there furthermore seems to follow something against our liberty. That it is not according to the mind of Augustine and the other Fathers, nor possible, I dispute in Disputation 88, chapter 5, where it is proved. That moreover it does not impede our liberty, from what was said in the preceding chapter. For with such a predetermination posited, the will cannot be free in either part; for true predetermination is supposed without our consent and is prior to it: from it therefore is born an antecedent necessity which impedes liberty, as we proved above: the same must be said of that application in time. For it is of such a nature - as the adversaries themselves confess - that, once posited, operation and consent of the will cannot but follow. Therefore Ruarus Tapper rightly taught, article 7, §4, in the Tenth Proposition, that one must think the same way of the works of grace and of nature universally: namely, that operations are not foreordained in another way, nor in another way are causes applied to operate, as far as pertains to priority, posteriority, or concomitance; as below in chapter 7 will be said more fully. Scotus holds entirely the same in 4, distinction 49, question 6: "I say then, to the point proposed: when it is asserted that our will is not first applied by God to operate, than it itself consents - for by that in some way its liberty would be taken away - this same reason properly proves concerning the works of sin and of nature as concerning the works of grace."[2200]

Finally, other recent men philosophize in another manner. They say that God from eternity, our free decision in no mode foreseen, even under a condition, has predestined our works severally; but that in time our will is moved by God in such a way that, in the same instant of time and of nature (as they themselves speak), the action proceeds both from God and from us; nonetheless God is prior by the priority which they call "from which," not by the priority "in which," and so he forestalls our cooperation: thus only, they say, does there follow that necessity which we are wont to say, "Whatever is, when it is, is necessary to be." They add besides that our will is not always moved by God in this way, but sometimes in this way, sometimes otherwise, without this priority on the part of God.

Yet this opinion can be impugned by us less easily than the others. First indeed, as far as it regards the predetermination of God not with our determination foreseen, even under a condition, it has already been sufficiently set forth; for from it there seems to follow a necessity not only consequent, but coexistent and antecedent: by which our liberty is altogether harmed, as has been shown more than enough. Next, as to the point that the application and motion by which God moves us precedes, this sentence seems to play only with words; for first, if in the same instant of time and of nature God and our free choice operate, how will God move free choice by a priority

2200. John Duns Scotus, Sentences, IV, dist. 49, q. 6.

"from which"? For if it is necessary to assign some natural instant prior, then first God moves; which does not suit our free choice; and thus the concurrence of both will not be simultaneous in time and nature.

Then too, these Theologians abuse the vocabularies of the arts. For Aristotle, in the Categories, in the chapter on the modes of priority, among the modes of "prior" assigns one which we are wont to call "prior from which," but such a kind of priority cannot be exercised altogether indiscriminately; for it is not thus called "prior," from which the other does not subsist or follow equally in every respect, but in a particular respect and in a certain respect of the things that pertain to man; which pertains to the controversy at hand.

Lastly, what they assert, that sometimes God operates in us by this kind of priority, sometimes not, is said without foundation. For in order that we assign to God diverse modes of operating, it is necessary that in him there be something on account of which he should assign diverse modes of operating; but in our actions we cannot assign any diversity, as is evident; therefore we cannot assign to God diverse modes of operating. Add that there is no utility to that priority which the aforesaid opinion attributes to God: since sometimes without it God may cooperate with us, and nevertheless nothing is derogated from divine grace - to which we ought to attribute the first place - nor from the certitude of providence: since it is always certain, and sometimes even these Doctors concede this without this kind of priority. And elsewhere in Disputation 88, chapter 7, we showed that, without this priority of divine operation conceded, nothing derogates from the certitude of that; but rather these Doctors themselves add that sometimes this is the case, and sometimes the other, in such a way that nothing derogates.

Whether the application of our will to consent unto the good precedes its determination and free choice

...so that in this way they may satisfy the mode of speaking of St. Augustine and of other Fathers. But that application and predetermination, understood in this way, is not only not according to the mind of Augustine and of the Fathers, but neither is it possible in this manner; and from it, furthermore, there seems to follow something against our liberty. That it is not according to the mind of Augustine and of the other Fathers, nor possible, I dispute in Disputation 88, chapter 5, where it is proved. That it does not impede our liberty, from what was said in the preceding chapter. For with such a predetermination posited, the will cannot be free in either part; for true predetermination is supposed without our consent and is prior to it; from it therefore is born an antecedent necessity which impedes liberty, as we proved above: the same must be said of that application in time. For it is of such a nature - as the adversaries themselves confess - that, once posited, operation and consent of the will cannot but follow. Therefore Ruarus Tapper rightly taught, article 7, §4, in the Tenth Proposition, that one must think the same way of the works of grace and of nature universally: namely, that operations are not foreordained in another way, nor in another way are causes applied to operate, as far as pertains to priority, posteriority, or concomitance; as below in chapter 7 will be said more fully. Scotus holds entirely the same in 4,

distinction 49, question 6. "I say then, to the point proposed: when it is asserted that our will is not first applied by God to operate, than it itself consents - for by that in some way its liberty would be taken away - this same reason properly proves concerning the works of sin and of nature as concerning the works of grace."[2200]

At length, other recent men philosophize in another manner. They say that God from eternity, our free decision in no mode foreseen, even under a condition, has predestined our works severally; but that in time our will is moved by God in such a way that, in the same instant of time and of nature (as they themselves speak), the action of our free choice proceeds both from God and from us; nonetheless God is prior by the priority which they call "from which," not by the priority "in which," and so he forestalls our cooperation: thus only, they say, does there follow that necessity which we are wont to say, "Whatever is, when it is, is necessary to be." They add besides that our will is not always moved by God in this way, but sometimes in this way, sometimes otherwise, without this priority on the part of God.

Yet this opinion can be impugned by us less easily than the others. First indeed, as far as it regards the predetermination of God not with our determination foreseen, even under a condition, it has already been sufficiently set forth; for from it there seems to follow a necessity not only consequent but also concomitant and antecedent: by which our liberty is altogether harmed, as has been shown more than enough. Next, as to the point that the application and motion by which God moves us precedes, this sentence seems to play only with words; and first indeed, if in the same instant of time and of nature God and our free choice operate, how will God move free choice by a priority "from which"? For if it is necessary to assign some natural instant prior, then first God moves; which does not suit our free choice; and thus the concurrence of both will not be simultaneous in time and nature.

Then too, these Theologians abuse the vocabularies of the arts. For Aristotle, in the Categories, in the chapter on the modes of priority, among the modes of "prior," assigns one which we are wont to call "prior from which": but such a kind of priority cannot be exercised altogether indiscriminately; for it is not in this way called "prior," from which the other does not subsist or follow equally in every respect, but in a particular respect and in a certain respect of the things that pertain to man; which pertains to the controversy here at hand.

Lastly, what they assert - that sometimes God operates in us by this kind of priority, sometimes not - is said without foundation. For in order that we assign to God diverse modes of operating, it is necessary that in him there be something on account of which we should assign diverse modes of operating; but in our actions we cannot assign any diversity, as is evident: therefore we cannot assign to God diverse modes of operating. Add that there is no utility to that priority which the aforesaid opinion attributes to God: since sometimes without it God may cooperate with us, and nevertheless nothing is derogated from divine grace - to which we ought to attribute the first place - nor from the certitude of providence: since it is always certain, and sometimes even these Doctors concede this without this kind of priority. And elsewhere, in Disputation 88, chapter 7, we showed

2200. John Duns Scotus, Sentences, IV, dist. 49, q. 6.

that, without this priority of divine operation conceded, nothing derogates from the certitude of that; rather, as the same Doctors concede, sometimes this is the case, sometimes the other, so that nothing is derogated.

This opinion, however, is less easily impugned than others. First, because in order to produce the actions of the will (*voluntas*) and of the intellect (*intellectus*), God at least needs in some way our free choice as a co-operating cause; for without it He could not produce such effects in us as free, at least. Next, this "priority," such as it is, is only a priority of perfection; inasmuch as, according to Aristotle in the Predicaments, chapter on the modes of the prior, that which is more noble is said to be prior: but in this way not sometimes but always the efficacy of God is prior, not only in works of grace (*gratia*), but also in all other works, even natural ones, and in the very substance (*substantia*) of a sinful act: which is of no relevance for defending that God predefines (*praefinire*) our free works and predetermines the will (as they say) without regard to our concurrence; and much less for assigning to the grace of God the first and chief parts, as is clear from the foregoing. For that the first and more powerful parts are to be assigned to the grace of God, in another way, according to the mind of St. Augustine and the Fathers, is clear from Disputation 88. And thus far we have fought against the fifth opinion, variously expounded: now let us move on to the sixth degree.

Caput V - Two other opinions of the Theologians

Some Theologians on the contrary have said, first indeed, that God did not predefine our acts, whether good or evil as to their substance, before the foreseen determination of our free choice; then, that the determination to one side rather than to the other, whether in good or in evil acts as to their substance, is indeed from us and from God, but that the first root and cause of it is free will. From this they infer that our determination is understood as prior to God's predestination and predefinition, just as things among themselves are compared in eternity in the same way as in time. They also assign the same order in the works of grace, as regards consent and cooperation: they concede, however, that before our cooperation and God's there precedes operating and exciting grace, namely calling.

This opinion was handed down by Catherinus in the little work On the Foreknowledge and Providence of God, last chapter; Antonius de Corduba, book 1, question 55, doubt 10; Julius Sirenus, book 8 On Fate from chapter 11 to 14; Osórius, book 9 On Justice; the same order in evil works was posited by Marsilius, in 1, question 45, article 2, in a certain doubt after the fourth conclusion.[2201]

From this doctrine Antonius de Corduba gathers a distinction between secondary causes that are natural, and free. For although both in their own ways dispose and determine the divine concurrence, yet not in the same way: for natural causes determine God only to a mode of

2201. Catherinus, Opusculum de praescientia et providentia Dei, cap. ult.; Antonius de Corduba, lib. 1, q. 55, dub. 10; Julius Sirenus, lib. 8 De fato, cap. 11 - 14; Osórius, lib. 9 De iustitia; Marsilius, in I, q. 45, art. 2, in quodam dubio post 4 conclusionem.

operating naturally, not to the production of this or that in species or in the individual; because of Himself God is determined to bring about this rather than that, even if a natural and particular cause modifies the universal created cause, namely the heavens, so that it may produce this rather than something else, not only in species but also in the individual. But free agents determine God's efficacy and concurrence not only to a mode of operating freely, but also to producing this rather than that in the individual: so that of Himself God is indifferent, that by His will He co-operate with our will to that side to which He sees it determine itself. Therefore the aforesaid Doctors concede three instants: first, in which our will is prevened by grace; second, in which it determines itself to consent to the calling, or to resist it; third, in which God co-operates with it: and they establish the same order in the eternal prescience, proportion being kept. Nay more, among the more recent who embrace this opinion, some affirm that one should speak thus: not "because God willed me to speak, I speak," but "because I speak, God willed me to speak." In favor of all these Ruardus Tapper, article 7, 9, Decima propositio.[2202] He who judges it to be free asserts to maintain that the determination of our will, or of the divine [will], is prior in the consent and free operation, both in works of grace and of nature; although he inclines more to the opinion we have reported up to now. But those who follow this opinion philosophize thus, so as in this way to explain and defend the harmony of our liberty with divine predefinition. For since it seems necessary to assign some order between the determination of our will and of the divine [will], if by any account God's predefinition were prior, no liberty would seem to remain in us, as has been proved: therefore the decree of God must be posterior to our liberty and determination, just as also divine prescience is, so that from it there arise in our actions no antecedent necessity, but only consequent, which does not take away, but rather presupposes entire, our liberty. Then also, because if our will were not determined from itself, but by another, it would seem rather to be acted upon than to act, and to move itself: which most greatly repugns liberty.

Some Theologians of our time mark this opinion more harshly than was fitting. For it seems to them Pelagian, in that it says our determination is by nature prior to the cooperation of grace, and thus consents to the Pelagians, who used to say that the beginning of good works is from us. However, although the opinion is in no way approved by me, yet it is not worthy of that censure, for it is far removed from the error of the Semipelagians with which it is charged. For they, as we saw in Disputation 89, chapter 4, granted the beginning of good works and of justification to be from us in such a way that certain good works preceded in time (not by nature) from free choice alone without any prevenient grace, in view of which God would bestow prevenient and operating grace: which the aforesaid Doctors in the opinion mentioned by no means concede: because they teach only that free will, prevened by exciting and co-operating grace, is of itself by nature prior determined to consent, than that grace and the will of God co-operate with it. They affirm, indeed, that the same consent proceeds simultaneously in time from our free will and from grace and the will of God co-operating. Therefore the Second Council of Orange taught nothing against these men, nor did St. Augustine, when they dispute against the Semipelagians and prove that God makes it to be in us that we consent: for they did not think this to be done by any application

2202. Ruardus Tapper, art. 7, 9, Decima propositio.

(*applicatio*) of our will which would be from God alone, before it determined itself, but by calling alone, which excites and prepares our will: as we have warned in the preceding chapter and in Disputation 88, chapter 8. Nor do they violate the Second Council of Orange, nor St. Augustine to be examined, since the point under examination was whether the prior determination of our will is from an application of our will by God alone, or from divine cooperation.

Yet the aforesaid opinion is by no means approved by me. First, because it is impossible that in any moment prior by nature our will should operate first, or be determined - which is the same - than that God should operate with it: for neither can its determination be understood in eternity without a decree of God to concur with it. Then also, because this opinion seems somewhat to derogate from co-operating grace: for since our will needs not only excitation in order to act, but also the cooperation of grace, that it may consent, it will need also cooperation that it may determine itself to consent: how then is it understood to be determined in some prior [instant] without the cooperation of grace? Wherefore that mode of speaking, "Because I speak, God wills me to speak, not the other way around; and because I believe, God wills me to believe, not the other way around," I indeed could by no means grant; since the very act of believing and of speaking would be attributed to free choice without the cooperation of grace.

Finally, some, pressed by this difficulty, say that God from eternity did not will and decree our operations individually, but that in general only and universally He determined to be ready to cooperate with any one whatsoever according to his determination. And they embrace this opinion so as to defend that from God's predefinition no necessity is imposed upon our will contrary to its liberty. Then also, because if it were necessary that God predefine and will from eternity even the works of grace individually, it would follow that for those who do not act, nor consent to the calling, something necessary to acting would be lacking - namely that decree - and hence it would not be a wonder if they did not act, since without that they cannot act at all.

However, this opinion too is not approved by me, and I impugned it in Disputation 87, chapter 1. For since it is necessary to acknowledge not only in some, but also in all works a distinct and singular providence of God, it is also necessary that the will of God be engaged about each of our works individually. Thus it is necessary to concede that there was from eternity a singular will of God about each work: just as it is necessary that in time the will of God be engaged distinctly about each. But God in time works each of our works by His distinct and singular will: therefore from eternity He foreordained them with us individually. This the Fathers expressly hold; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia, book 7, chapter 4, where he says: "God, foreseeing all things, decreed before the ages how He would dispense through the ages." The same is taught by the Cretan [Commentator] on St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 1, on those words: "But that all voices..." and by the Council of Valence.[2203]

[no explicit gloss]

2203. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia, lib. 7, cap. 4 ("Cuncta Deus praevidens..."); the Cretan commentator on St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio 1; the Council of Valence.

Caput VI - The true sentence, and the rationale for the concord of our free will with the predefinition of God

Finally, some, hard pressed by this difficulty, say that God from eternity did not will and decree our works individually, but only in general, and in the universal, He determined that He would be ready to work with whatever person according to that person's own determination. They embrace this opinion in order to defend that by God's predefinition no necessity at all is imposed upon our will contrary to its liberty. Then too, because, if it were necessary that God should predefine and will from eternity even the works of grace individually, it would follow that to those who do not act, nor consent to the calling, something necessary for acting would be lacking, namely that decree - and so it would not be surprising if they did not act, since without that they could not act.

However, the opinion of these men does not please me, and I have impugned it in Disputatio 87, cap. 1. For since it is necessary to acknowledge not only in some things, but even in all works, a distinct and singular providence of God, it is necessary also that the will of God be occupied concerning each of our works individually. For it is necessary to concede a singular will of God concerning each thing from eternity, just as it is necessary that in time the will of God be occupied distinctly concerning each thing. But God in time works each of our works by His own distinct and singular will; therefore also from eternity He foreordained them with us individually. This the Fathers expressly hold; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia, book 12, cap. c., where he says: "God, foreseeing all things, decreed before the ages how He would dispense through the ages." The same was taught by Elias of Crete on St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 1, on those words: "But that all voices..." and by the Council of Valence under Emperor Lothair; Fulgentius, book 1, To Monimus, cap. 14; and St. Augustine in many places, when they assert that God from eternity predestined what in time He was going to do by His will.[2204] But what St. John Damascene denies - that there is an eternal predefinition in God of our works - has another sense, about which we shall speak in the following chapter.

Moreover, that God does not fail in what is necessary for acting, even if from eternity He did not decree to concur with these or those, is plainly deduced from what we said in Disputatio 93, cap. 6. The same must be said of the eternal decree by which He determined to concur in time, and of the concurrence and cooperation itself; for the decree of God to act is not necessary otherwise than as the very cooperation of God is necessary. Now that cooperation is denied of all those who are unwilling to respond to grace when it excites; yet it is granted to others who do respond. But since this cooperation of God is, for each one, within his power, and it is lacking only to those who are unwilling to consent, therefore one must say that nothing is lacking to anyone which is necessary for acting by antecedent necessity; there is, however, something necessary by consequent necessity. And thus such a defect does not conflict with the liberty of free choice, as we explained in the place cited. Exactly the same must be thought about the external decree of God to concur with us:

2204. Gregory the Great, Moralia, lib. 12, cap. c. ("Cuncta Deus praevidens..."); Elias of Crete on Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio 1 ("Sed ne omnium voces..."); Council of Valence under Emperor Lothair, cap. 3; Fulgentius, Ad Monimum, lib. 1, cap. 14; St. Augustine, passim.

because it is not necessary in any other way than the cooperation in time itself is necessary. Therefore by this reasoning that course of action which has been up to now indubitable to all, and is supremely fitting for the supreme perspicacity and provident care of divine providence, ought not to be denied, namely that God from eternity has foredefined distinctly and individually each work of ours which He does with us in time.

If the things which were delivered by us in Disputatio 68, cap. 4, and Disputatio 88 are considered more attentively, it will be no less easy to reconcile our liberty with predestination and the decree of God than with foreknowledge. The rationale of this concord is as follows. From the predefinition (*praefinitio*) of God there is gathered for our works only a consequent, or accompanying necessity - which is altogether the same; and therefore our liberty can in no way be harmed or impeded, but rather remains of itself determined and entire.

To prove what is proposed - namely, that the predefinition of God is not prior, in the order of cause, to our determination, but is together with it according to what that determination itself demands - first, in this chapter, we shall confirm it by authority; then, in the next, by reason.

First, therefore, what I said is gathered from St. John Damascene, book 2, On the Faith, in the last chapter, where he says thus: "It is important to know this, that God indeed foreknows all things, but He does not predefine all things. For He foreknows even those things which are in our power and free choice, but He does not thus predefine them." He subjoins the reason: "For He neither wills that vice be admitted, nor again does He put compulsion upon virtue." And in the book Against the Manichees, not far from the end, he expressed the same thing more openly in these words: "Since these things are so, God foreknowing those things which will be voluntary on our part, that is, those which are in our power - namely virtue and vice - He predefines only those which in no way consist in our free choice." He concedes, therefore, in both places, that the work of virtue and of sin is by God only foreknown, yet not predefined, when he says: "He predefines only those things (namely, God) which in no way consist in our free choice"; otherwise, since sin and virtue are in our choice and free decision, if God predefined virtue, He would predefine some things which are in our free choice. Nor indeed does Damascene deny the predefinition of these works as certain more recent authors, commemorated in the previous chapter, deny it - that is, the decree of works, distinctly and individually, so that the particle "prae" signify only priority of time or duration; for that would be false, and contrary to the doctrine of the Fathers whom I alleged there. Rather, he speaks so that it signifies a priority and order of that which is prior with respect to our determination: as if he were to say that God does not predefine what we are going to do, without any regard for our consent and our determination, but, together with that and as it requires, He decrees. And in the same sense he had said in cap. 18 of the same book, at the beginning, and in that last chapter cited, that God predefined those things which are not in our liberty - that is, that from Himself He decreed them before our consent and determination, without any regard to them. The reason also which Damascene subjoined confirms this sense, as will immediately be evident.

Indeed, when St. Thomas set this testimony of Damascene before himself as an objection in this Question 23, article 1, argument 1, to prove that men are not predestined by God, he replies that Damascene denied the predefinition of our works - that is (says he), the imposition of necessity. So he judges that Damascene means: God did not predefine our works, that is, He did not impose necessity upon our works. The Holy Doctor gathers this interpretation from those words which Damascene added: "For He neither wills that vice be admitted, nor again does He put compulsion upon virtue."

However, in my judgment Damascene's mind is another. For no reason appears why he should rather use "predefine" than "foreknow" for that which is "to impose necessity." For if "foreknow" were taken in that sense, by the same token he would deny that all things are foreknown by God, as also that they are predefined. Moreover, by those words he did not explain what he meant by the name "predefinition," but he gave the reason why God does not predefine our works. He proves this as follows. Our works are either sins or virtues. Now God does not predefine sins, because He in no way wills them to be done; likewise He does not predefine virtues, because He would compel our will and impose necessity upon it - which cannot be understood in any other way than if, with no regard to our determination, He predefined the works themselves beforehand, as we proved in cap. 3. Therefore He predefines none of the works of our will. He thus concludes in that last chapter with these words: "Wherefore the predefinition conjoined with the just foreknowledge of God effects it." He speaks not only of those things which are not in our power, but also of those which are in it. Therefore he says that those things are predefined by God (which nevertheless he had previously denied), but by a predefinition conjoined with foreknowledge. For God, foreseeing the determination of our will in the manner which will be explained in the following chapter, predefines the consent of that will and its works, imposing upon it no necessity. From which it is also clear that Damascene spoke of the predefinition of human actions in another way than the Fathers cited in the previous chapter, and that he used the particle "prae" in another sense. For among those other Fathers it signifies the priority of time or duration; but in Damascene it denotes only the priority of cause.

Then the same thing is proved from St. Anselm in the little work On the Harmony of Foreknowledge and Predestination with Free Will, cap. 2, where, treating that question by what mode the things which God has predestined come about freely - since from the predestination of God there follows a necessity - after he said that even the act of sin, according to substance and entity, is predefined by God, he answers the question in this way. "Therefore it ought not to be doubted that His predestination and His foreknowledge do not disagree, but are most exact: what is foreknown is what is predestined." And after adding a few matters he shows in what predestination and foreknowledge agree: "He has foreseen, therefore, by some necessity that those things which are foreseen are to be, and those which are predestined; yet certain foreseen and predestined things do not come about by that necessity which precedes the thing, but by that which follows the thing." But in cap. 1 he teaches that antecedent necessity destroys the liberty of free choice. Therefore, when he says that certain things predestined do not come about by antecedent necessity, he understands those things which are established in our liberty. Consequently, he holds

that the decree of God does not precede our liberty: for if it were prior to our liberty, it would induce antecedent necessity upon us - which nevertheless he himself denies. This we must needs prove by reason.

Foundational point presupposed, as it was explained more fully above. In this disputation, and in the preceding one, we have often inculcated - and we treated it expressly in Disputatio 68, cap. 4 - that the necessity by which something is said to be necessarily going to be is twofold: one antecedent, the other consequent. The antecedent is that which comes from a cause from which the effect is going to be, or from something prior which, if posited, such an effect cannot fail to be; and the positing of that thing is not in our power. I said "prior in the order of cause"; for that which is prior in duration does not hinder our liberty, as is shown there. By this necessity it is necessary that tomorrow the sun rise, and that fire heat. Consequent necessity, however, is that which follows upon the positing of the future effect: for from the fact that a thing is said and supposed to be future, it is also said to be necessarily future. This necessity too can be called accompanying, because it is simultaneous with the thing that will be.

This foundation having been laid, the concord above asserted is explained by this reasoning. The decree of God by which He predefines our works individually does not, in the order of cause, precede the determination of our will, but accompanies it; therefore the necessity which follows upon the positing of the decree of God is an accompanying, or consequent necessity to our liberty and determination. For by the very fact that we suppose an absolute decree of God, we also suppose the determination of our consent and our liberty, which the divine will accompanies. Therefore the necessity which we infer from stating the decree of God also follows upon our determination, or accompanies it; and therefore, since it does not precede that determination, it cannot impede it nor in any way wound it, but rather supposes our liberty as of itself determined and entire. For just as the necessity which is inferred from God's knowledge does not impede our liberty - because it follows upon our determination - so in the same way the necessity from God's decree will not take away our liberty, because it supposes it as of itself determined, and is posterior to it. But in order that this reasoning may show what we contend, the assumption in the proving must be established, namely, that the predefinition of God is not, in the order of cause, prior to our determination, but is together with it according to what that demands.

It is fitting that by reason we confirm what, in the preceding chapter, we assumed in order to prove the concord of liberty with divine predestination: namely, that the decree of the divine will concerning each of our works, even of grace, is not prior to our determination. Three things, however, must first be presupposed.

First, that the same order obtains, as regards the relations in God's eternal foreknowledge, between God's decreed effects either considered as referred to His will or as referred to our will and its determination, as obtains in time between those things which God does alone and those which God and we do together, as we explained in Disputatio 82, cap. 6.

Second, note that God brings about in us only two kinds of works. One is before our liberty - of which sort are thoughts and sudden movements of the will, which pertain to grace - and they are called exciting, prevenient, and preventing; God works these in us without us, that is, without our liberty. The other is of those things which God does with us, that is, with our consent; and if these be of grace, they pertain to accompanying, cooperating, and helping grace. In truth, God by His efficacy accompanies our consent in such wise that He does nothing prior, by sole causality, without us; but He concurs together, not by parts separately, but mixedly and not severally, simultaneously and not by turns, with us. Nor, indeed, is there anything prior from God alone, touching accompanying grace, even in the very application unto consent; save only the calling on the part of the intellect, and the first sudden motion on the part of the will; as we have proved in Disputatio 88, especially cap. 5. Third, from Disputatio 69 it is to be presupposed that God most certainly knows what our free choice will do with this or that calling, if it be aroused.

Hence it is proved that the decree of the will of God, which determines our works not by an order of cause prior to our determination, has not been before our determination. For it is not fitting for God in those acts which He works with our consent to operate anything prior by Himself alone, whether as to the consent itself or as to that which pertains to the application and tending unto it, except only what is before on the side of God as to the vocation on the part of the intellect, and the first sudden motion on the part of the will; as has been set forth by us in Disputatio 88. Therefore, as Tertius or Disputatio 69 laid down, God most certainly knows what our free choice, with this or with that vocation being made, will do, if it be aroused.

From this, therefore, it is proved that the decree of the will of God, which determined our works not in an order of cause prior to our determination, was not before our determination. For it is not fitting that God in those works which He does with our consent should operate anything prior by Himself alone, whether as to the consent itself or as to its application and tending; except only what is before on the part of the intellect as vocation, and the first sudden motion on the part of the will; as we have proved above in Disputatio 88, especially cap. 5. And thirdly, from Disputatio 69 it is to be presupposed that God most certainly knows what our free choice, with such or such a vocation, will do, if it be aroused.

Therefore it is proved that the decree of the will of God, which determines our works not by an order of cause prior to our determination, was not before our determination: for in those works which He does with our consent - namely, with our consent if they be of grace, they pertain to accompanying grace - God's concurrence is not by sole causality without us; but in truth God by His efficacy accompanies our consent in such wise that He does nothing prior by Himself without us; but mixedly, not severally, simultaneously, not by turns, He concurs with us. Nor indeed is there anything prior from God alone as to accompanying grace, either in the very application unto consent or as to the consent itself, except only the vocation on the part of the intellect, and the first sudden motion on the part of the will; as has been proved by us in Disputatio 88, especially in cap. 5. Third, from Disputatio 69 it is to be presupposed that God most certainly knows what our free choice, with this or that vocation being made, will do, if it be aroused.

...to have predestined, except for the vocation on the part of the intellect, and the first not-deliberated motion in the will.

By reason it is shown that the predefinition of God in foreknowledge could not agree together with our determination, nor could it agree with it, unless there preceded a knowledge on God's part, not indeed of that which is absolutely future - for this the predefinition of God presupposes - but of that which is known under a condition, whose foreknowledge precedes every predestination. For God most excellently knows what would be future under a condition in this way: If Peter were aroused by such a vocation of mine, and my concurrence did not fail him, which the vocation proportioned to such a free choice postulates, and which cannot without force and miracle be denied, without doubt he would consent; but if he were called by such a mere thought, then he himself would fail me, and therefore I ought not to cooperate with him. Since, therefore, God foreknows these various and innumerable combinations of vocations with the free choice of each, and what the free choice would do with any one of them; in the first sign he decrees absolutely to prevent someone with such a vocation, to which he knew he would respond under a condition; but in the second he decreed to cooperate absolutely with the determination of the will, which under a condition he had known, and therefore he does not precede our determination by his decree, but accompanies it; and the necessity which follows upon such accompaniment can in no way harm the liberty of our free choice, which is posited together with the predefinition, as is clear from what has been said above.

But if there did not precede a knowledge under a condition, it does not seem by what reason God's absolute decree concerning our works would not either altogether precede our determination, or follow it - of which both are false. For from the former there would follow antecedent necessity in our operations, as was said above; from the latter there would follow that our operation is prior to God's concurrence: for in no other way can God by his decree accompany our consent and determination than by first knowing to which part the free choice tends. It is therefore the same to say, "What is predestined by God is necessarily going to be," and to say, "What is foreknown by God is necessarily going to be." For just as, by the very fact that something is said to be foreknown, it is supposed to be future, and thus "to be foreknown to be future" is the same as "for the future to be future," as Anselm says in the aforesaid little work, chapter 1, so also, when some free operation of ours is said to be predestined by God, it is also said to be future by our free choice and by its free determination. And therefore the necessity by which it is said that "what is predestined by God is future" is consequent upon our liberty and agrees well with it; which Anselm expressly noted in the little work, chapter 2, whose words we cited in the preceding chapter. By this same knowledge under a condition - which paves the way for divine providence so that, our liberty remaining unharmed, it may decree our works - the divine will also is guided, so that in time it may concur with our will with the same gentleness, and in no way harm it.

Wherefore Almain rightly defines in tractate 1 of the Moralia, chapter 2, at the beginning and in the middle, a free cause in this way: That which, all the things required beforehand for operation being posited, can will and not will. He adds that he said "things required beforehand," not "things accompanying," because although, positing God's concurrence, or a decree concurring with our will

(which is the same), our will could not fail to operate, nevertheless this does not take away its liberty. For God's concurrence and the will to concur with our will are not of the things required beforehand and necessary for operating, but of the necessary things accompanying. He himself gives no further reason for this. But it is very easy, the one which we have assigned thus far, namely, that the necessity which follows from the things required beforehand for operating is a necessity preceding our liberty and therefore takes it away; but that which follows from our determination and from the things accompanying it, such as is God's concurrence, is a necessity consequent upon our liberty, and is posterior to liberty itself, and so can in no way harm it. However, some more recent writers reprove Almain because he said that God's concurrence is not of the things required beforehand for operating, since without it the will can do nothing. But this reasoning only proves that God's concurrence is necessary to us for operating, which Almain does not deny; it does not, however, prove that it is something required beforehand, since in reality it is not, but accompanies our operation - which is what Almain contends.

Moreover, the things we have said are easier to understand if we consider that the decree of God's will is not an elicited act over and above the essence, but is the naked essence itself, with an added respect of reason to a future effect. For thus we more easily understand that the will of God is always accommodated to the things to which it has an order, since in itself it has nothing more when it wills these things to be than when it wills them not to be; and perhaps to this John Medina, whom we cited in chapter 1, had regard. Nevertheless, by the reasoning which we have explained above, we could no less easily defend our liberty together with God's decree, even if it were an elicited act and added to the essence; as is evident from what has been said, although I judge that opinion to be false, as I noted above in Disputatio 80, cap. 2.

It is confirmed by authority. This mode of the concord of the divine will with ours seems to be indicated by Alexander [of Hales] and St. Bonaventure, when they assert that, notwithstanding God's providence, which disposes things to be, our acts are voluntary and free, because the divine will is not the whole cause, but [works] with free choice, which, since it is the proximate cause, modifies the concurrence of the first cause. Which would not be true if God's efficacy were prior to our determination; but in fact, because it is simultaneous and proportioned to that which our will, aroused by such a vocation, demands, the concurrence of God is tempered to it, and preserves it unharmed, as has been explained. The opinion of these doctors, I do not know for what reason, is reproved by St. Thomas, q. 19, a. 8. For that it follows from this, he says, that a free effect would be beyond God's intention, if the ratio of the free were to be taken from a particular cause modifying the first, whence it would be rightly inferred, I do not see. For the fact that an effect turns out free because it is produced by a proximate free cause does not hinder its happening from the will of God, since He Himself decreed to concur with a free cause according to that which it demands; and this is enough that the effect not be beyond God's intention.

But this is most certain, namely, that the ratio of being free and human belongs to our act, not by respect to the first operating cause, nor therefore is it free and human because God alone decreed and made it to be done, but rather by respect to the mode of operating of the created cause; with which varied, although the act remains the same according to its substance, and the

concurrence of God in the same way, the act does not remain free. For liberty is only a relation of reason to the mode of operating with the indifference of created free choice; which indifference indeed fails by this alone, that there is not present consideration on the part of the intellect, as we shall say at 1 - 2, q. 71, a. 6. Nor indeed do I think that our opinion is contrary to St. Thomas and other Scholastics whom we mentioned in chapter 3: for they do not teach that God's predefinition is prior to our determination; they only assert that our works have been defined by God singly, which we do not deny. But to the difficulty proposed concerning the concord of our will with the divine, we noted in chapter 3 that they do not fully satisfy. Moreover, that St. Thomas did not grant antecedent necessity in human works was very well noted by Waldensis, cap. that 3 cited. But he would have to grant it, if he judged that God, of Himself, before our determination was foreseen, had determined our works.

Nevertheless, some more recent theologians think that our will is determined by the first cause in such a way that our will does not modify the efficacy of the first cause; and they think this to be defined in the second Council of Orange, canon 4, where he is condemned who has said that our will is waited for by God and not rather prevented. For, if our will modifies the efficacy of the divine [will], and God accommodates Himself to it, because He sees under the condition to which the will would incline when prevented by such grace, it follows that God is waiting for our will. But the aforesaid doctors did not have a sufficiently clear view of the heresy of the Semipelagians, against whom that canon was promulgated; for, as we noted in chapter 5, there he alone is condemned who has said that some good work precedes on our part, on account of which grace is given to us: but about the modification and determination of the first cause by the second the Semipelagians said not even a word; nor did the Council have, nor did its scope allow, to define anything about this matter: for it was dealing solely against the Semipelagians. Furthermore, we warned in chapter 5 that the concurrence and determination of our will are not without grace. That God also accommodates Himself to secondary causes and, according to that which they demand, operates with them, no Philosopher can deny.

Caput VIII - Corollaries of the foregoing doctrine

For a greater clarity of the things we have said, it is necessary to add a few points. The first is that the opinion of those is true who say that God pre-defined our works without us, that is, before our free determination...

For a greater clarity of the things we have said, it is necessary to add a few points. The first is that the opinion of those is true who say that God pre-defined our works without us, that is, before our free determination, not indeed explicitly and one by one in themselves, but in the congruous calling, which, together with the foreknowledge of what He would be going to do, He predestined for us. For just as He bestows on us in time the congruous calling before our free determination, so too He pre-defines it, since He keeps the same order in predestining from eternity and in operating in time: therefore in that calling, as in a cause whose congruity He knows most excellently, He pre-

defines our free consent and operation. But this pre-definition does not impede liberty, just as neither does congruous calling: because it is in the power of anyone freely either to resist a congruous calling or to obey it, as we said in disputation 98, chapter 5.[2205]

It must, however, be observed that there is a difference between a congruous thought for acting rightly and a temptation, from which God knows that there will be a future sin: for although in each, as it were in a cause, there lies our consent either to a work of virtue or to a work of sin, nonetheless God is not said in any way to pre-define the sin, even if He predestines the thought from which He knew it would be future; He is said, however, in a certain way to predestine the work of virtue in the very calling. The reason for the difference is that, since of Himself, before He pre-defines the calling, He desires with an antecedent will that man consent to good thoughts and works, and from this will He predestines a congruous calling, He is rightly said in that calling to predestine the consent, whose will He pre-defines by the calling itself. But because God does not will of Himself that sin be done, not only with deformity, but not even according to its substance, therefore while He pre-defines the thought without our consent, from which He knows that we will freely sin, He is not said in it to pre-define, as in a cause before our consent, the work of sin even according to its substance. But in the following instant He does pre-define the work of sin according to its substance, because He decrees to concur with the will, just as it itself demands; yet this will in God is not antecedent, but accompanying our own, and hence, there being as yet no antecedent will in God, the work of sin according to its substance has not been predestined as yet in a cause. Moreover, that God does not will with an antecedent will the work of sin even according to its substance is manifest. For just as of Himself He commands that it not be done, so also of Himself He desires that it not be, as is evident from the things said in disputation 83, chapter c.[2206]

Second, it must be observed that the same order which we posit between the concurrence of God and our determination in operating is to be kept between God's eternal definition and the determination of causes in His foreknowledge, in the case of natural things, between God and the other natural causes - namely fire, water, etc. Therefore just as God does not first concur for heating before the fire cooperates, so He does not first pre-define that He will concur with fire before He sees the fire's determination. But He sees this both from the fact that He knows its nature and its determination to heating, according to which it demands a concurrence that could not be denied without force and a miracle against its internal inclination; and also from the application to matter by which it burns. In time, moreover, the fire is not first applied by God for burning, nor does God first operate that the fire burn, but He operates together with it; this is clear in the same way in which we proved it about the works of free choice, namely because the effect of the fire is in such a way wholly from God and wholly from the fire that, in thought, one cannot discern what is from the one and what from the other. Much less, therefore, can there be in reality and in the real order of cause something prior to something else within the fire's very effect. And since pre-definition has the same order with the concurrence of a secondary cause in foreknowledge that it has in time, it follows that God from eternity decreed the effect of natural

2205. Vazquez, disputation 98, chapter 5.
2206. Vazquez, disputation 83, chapter c.

causes together with their cooperation. But when St. John Damascene says that God has pre-defined the things that are not in our power, that particle "pre-" does not denote a precedence with respect to the natural cause, but with respect to our will freely consenting: as if he were to say that the things that do not depend on our will He pre-defines before it, although not before the concurrence of the natural cause; but the things that will be from our will He does not decree before it, but together with it.[2207]

Third, from the things said in this whole disputation and in disputation 82, chapter the last, it is gathered that not only did God not pre-define our free works before the determination of our will, but He also could not have pre-defined them beforehand. The reason is manifest, because since the order of prior and posterior among the decrees of the divine will ought to be assigned, not from God's mere good pleasure, but from the diverse order of the things that are predestined by God, it follows that there must be variation among the things themselves, so that we may assign diversity in God's decree; otherwise, as we noted there, with things standing in exactly the same manner, we would say in vain that God decrees in one way and in another: for He is not said to define this or that variously from various acts elicited by His essence, but the very same essence, unchanged in itself, by various aspects of reason toward the objects; wherefore, if the objects are in the same condition, there will always be in God the same mode of predestining and pre-defining. But God, concurring with our will, not only does not act first, nor first apply it to operate before it cooperates, but He also cannot: for the argument made in disputation 88, chapter 5, also manifestly proves this; therefore, by His pre-definition God cannot precede the determination of our will, and hence He cannot impede its liberty by a pre-definition of its operations. Wherefore He can only take away liberty by predestining something that precedes our cooperation and free consent. But this He must do in one of three ways: either by disturbing the thought so that there is not in us a full power of deliberating; or by a hypostatic union; or by the beatific vision; of which the latter two ways impede liberty only with respect to sinning, but leave the will free with respect to other good works - although the vision also necessarily moves to the love of the Deity - whereas that first way wholly removes liberty. But in any other way our liberty of will cannot be removed or impeded: because, as St. Thomas rightly teaches, our will can be necessarily moved by no created object, so long as the use of reason remains without disturbance.[2208]

Fourth, note that various ways of speaking by causal propositions can be allowed concerning God's decree, or His concurrence, and the cooperation of our will - not because by them we signify that God operates first, or that He wills to operate with us without regard to our cooperation, or conversely (for neither can happen, as has been proved), but so that we may denote the different mode (as the saying goes) of dependence or connexion of one cause in operating upon the cooperation of another. For example, it can be said: because God wills me to consent, and to cooperate with me unto consent, I consent: in which way of speaking it is indicated only that our operation depends upon the help and concurrence of the divine will, not that it operates consent in us first, but that without it, as the first cause to which it is essentially subordinated, we can in no

2207. St. John Damascene; the particle "prae" denotes priority with respect to our free will, not to the natural cause.
2208. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I-II, q.10, a.2; see also Vazquez, disputation 88, chapter 5.

way operate. Similarly, we can say: because I will and consent, God wills me to consent, and to will: by which is indicated only that our cooperation, as a secondary and proximate cause modifying and determining His efficacy, is required by God's will and concurrence. We also add that, in the consent of the will, the first cause and the second are so mutually connected that the second is essentially subordinated to, and depends upon, the first, as superior, for the whole effect and every account of it; and perhaps for this reason some have said that the first cause operates prior to the second in the same work: because the second is subordinated to the first, as in all things essentially dependent upon it. Indeed, this kind of priority ought to be reduced to a priority of dignity and excellence, as I said in chapter 5.

Finally, from what has been said it is inferred that for no reason ought it to be said that from God's pre-definition any necessity is imposed upon our will. For although we have granted that from pre-definition there follows upon our will some necessity, yet, because that necessity is posterior to our liberty and consequent upon it, it cannot be said that such a necessity is imposed upon our will. By this manner of speaking is denoted an antecedent necessity, which alone can be imposed; for that which is posterior is not imposed, rather it is subordinated afterward.

Disputatio C - An, if the first cause should operate necessarily, our will could still be moved freely

Opinio Scoti, cap. 1.[2209] Quid was thought by Gabriel and Corduba, cap. 2.[2210] The truer opinion of Cajetan and Camerarius, cap. 3.[2211] Even if no cause were free, some effects would be in a certain manner contingent, cap. 4.

On whether, if the first cause were to operate necessarily, our will could be moved freely

Caput I - The opinion of Scotus

In this question, thus understood, the first opinion is that of Scotus in the Second Book, distinction 1, question 2, and likewise in distinction 29, question 1. He there sets forth, against the first conclusion at the first instant, a third position that affirms the following.[2212]

First proposition of Scotus. The first reason of the one who affirms that our will, on account of an extrinsic impediment of the first cause, would then not operate freely, is necessary. He proves the first point thus: a cause that moves necessarily, in that wherein it moves, necessarily moves; but our will moves itself, inasmuch as it is moved by the first cause: therefore, because then it would necessarily be moved by the first cause, it would also necessarily move itself. He explains the

2209. Scotus's opinion to be treated in chapter 1.
2210. Gabriel and Anthony of Corduba's views to be treated in chapter 2.
2211. Cajetan and Camerarius's truer opinion to be treated in chapter 3.
2212. Scotus, In Sententias II, d.1, q.2; and d.29, q.1. Corduba: Book I, q.55, dub.4. Durandus is also referenced.

major proposition by Scotus's example of a staff, which then necessarily moves a stone when it itself is necessarily moved, but now moves it freely when it itself is also moved freely. But that the will moves itself inasmuch as it is moved by the first cause is clear, because it essentially depends on that cause in operating; whereas the first cause does not depend in its operation on the second. Then he proves thus: the first cause more deeply reaches the effect than the second cause, and hence by a prior nature; wherefore, if the first cause were to operate necessarily, in that prior [order] the effect produced by the first cause would be left unfree, and hence would be so necessary that it could not be freely impeded by a second cause.

But besides the fact that Scotus's reasons are weak, they do not sufficiently agree with his own doctrine - as we shall see in chapter 3 - his opinion does not please me. Cajetan impugns it in the Prima Secundae, question 19, article 8, and question 1, distinction 4, article 13. Passing over, however, his other arguments, we can refute the same on our own.

First indeed: from God's mode of operating our liberty would be impeded; since a created will cannot but be subject to God's mode of operating, it would be impossible for the will ever to operate freely. Therefore liberty from an intrinsic principle would be impossible: for where the act is impossible, the potency is also impossible; and so what Scotus was presupposing is destroyed, namely, that the will would remain free in itself if the first cause were to operate necessarily.

Second: from Scotus's position it follows that the whole liberty of our operations would be reduced not into our will, but into the first cause; and thus our acts would now be free, not because they are elicited from our free will, but because they proceed freely from God; and so they would not be in our liberty, but in God's - which is absurd. For if our will even then moves itself freely, insofar as it is moved freely by God, as a staff [is moved], it follows that it has no liberty of its own and no dominion of its operations.

Third: if by a prior nature an act of the will is produced by God rather than by our will, by reason of God's being the first cause, it follows that now also, with God operating freely, there would be no operation free on the part of our will. For if it is first produced by God because He is the first cause, our will will not be able to impede it; and in consequence there would follow - contrary to what we shall prove later in this disputation, chapter 7 - the opinion of Alexander and of St. Bonaventure and the older view, who reduce the liberty of our operations into our will as into its proper cause.

Caput II - What Gabriel and Corduba thought

The second opinion is that of Gabriel in the First Book, distinction 28, which in the second article he proposes; and Anthony of Corduba follows it in Book I, question 55, doubt 4, and he judges it to be Scotus's opinion. He asserts three things. First: if Durandus's opinion were true, which in the first question of the second distinction affirms that God does not concur with secondary causes, but that they operate without Him, then even if the first cause were to operate necessarily, our will would remain free - which is sufficiently clear. Second, with Gabriel he asserts that, if the first cause necessarily concurred with the second, because the second cause acts

mediately and by itself, our will would remain free. Third, as both affirm, if God proceeded wholly outside in such a way that by Himself alone He could bring about whatever a secondary cause brings about, then, the first cause operating necessarily, liberty would not remain in our will. From this part Corduba thinks that he and Gabriel agree with Scotus, and he confirms it by Scotus's latter reason.

However, this opinion differs from Scotus's. For Scotus holds that our will even then would not be free when it would operate together with the first as a partial cause; but this opinion asserts that then our will would operate freely, even if the first cause operated necessarily, when our will were a partial cause - only then would it be deprived of liberty when God alone by Himself would effect the whole. Nevertheless, this opinion does not commend itself to me: first, because it supposes that vital operations, especially those of the will, can be produced by God alone, which is absurd, as we shall show more fully in I-II, question 3, article 2.[2213] Moreover, because here we are treating of the liberty of the will in acts elicited by it - namely, whether, God operating necessarily, the will itself would elicit them necessarily or freely; for concerning acts produced by God alone, no one can doubt that they do not depend upon the liberty of our will, since they do not proceed from its efficacy. And although God could by Himself alone produce these acts in our will, nevertheless because the will could also operate by itself, there would still remain to it liberty for acting.

Caput III - The truer opinion of Cajetan and Camerarius

I embrace the opinion of Cajetan in the places cited, which Bartholomeus Camerarius adopts in the Catholic Dialogue, part 2, chapter 3; they absolutely teach that, even if the first cause operated necessarily, our will would operate freely, if it is of itself and intrinsically free. From this opinion it is rightly gathered that the proper cause of liberty is our will, and that by God's decree or mode of operating the mode in which it operates freely is not varied. And this opinion is proved and explained by the following easy reasoning.

If, while God operates necessarily, our will could not freely consent, this would occur in one of three ways. First: either because God would be necessarily determined to prevent it by His call; and this would not suffice to cause the will necessarily to will, unless there were such a consideration on the part of the intellect that by it our will would be moved necessarily. But no other such consideration can be had than the clear vision of God, which presents the supreme good under every aspect of good; for other things would not propose the object under every aspect of good, and thus would not necessarily move, as I noted in disputation 97, chapter 4.[2214] But for the will to be moved necessarily by this vision of God, there is no need that God operate necessarily; it is enough that He grant such a vision voluntarily and freely.

2213. Below, in the Commentary on the Prima Secundae, question 3, article 2, where it is shown at greater length that vital operations, especially of the will, cannot be produced by God alone.

2214. See disputation 97, chapter 4, on the necessity arising from the clear vision of God proposing the supreme good under every aspect of good.

Or second: our will would be moved necessarily, because God would be bound necessarily to cooperate with it as it demands; and in this way He would not take away its liberty, since He would cooperate in accordance with what the will demanded, nor earlier than it operated, but together with it, as is sufficiently clear from the preceding disputation, chapter 7, and disputation 88, chapter 3.[2215]

Or finally, third: God would then impede our liberty by predetermining our works and consent before our free determination, in such a way that we could not do this; but in no way, even when He operates freely, can He predestine our free acts so that they would be such, as was said in the preceding disputation, the last chapter; therefore by no route would our will suffer a necessity that would take away its liberty. It remains, therefore, that God's liberty, with which He freely cooperates with us, contributes nothing at all so that our operation be free, but that the whole reason of the "free," which lies in an extrinsic denomination, depends on our will alone. For whether God operated freely or necessarily, our action would be free in the same way. Therefore the first and sole cause of the liberty of our act is the created will.

Scotus's arguments can in fact be easily dissolved. To the first, Cajetan answers very well that the proposition, "Things which move inasmuch as they are moved [move] necessarily if they are themselves moved necessarily," is true when the cause demands to be moved by another as a previous form, or disposition, by which it itself moves, as appears in the example of the stick; but certainly our will does not require God's motion in this manner, in order that it operate and move itself, but it requires only God's motion as a helper and cooperator, because by itself alone it cannot operate. But in this way the first cause is tempered to the second, and elicits the operation according to the latter's mode: so far is it from being the case that, if it operated necessarily, it would take away the liberty of the second cause.

To the second, Cajetan also replies well, that the first cause, even though it is principal and most powerful and for this reason prior, does not touch the effect in any priority before the created will cooperates, as is established from disputation 88, chapter 3.[2215] Yet you will object: the first cause does not depend on the second in operating; therefore it touches the effect before it. I answer: the first cause does not depend on the second in this sense, that it receives from it the power for operating; but it does depend on it in that, without it, it cannot effect an operation - especially a free one - in it, and therefore they ought to cooperate with it. And indeed Scotus ought to have remembered this: for he taught the opposite in II Sentences, distinction 37, question 1, 5; to the solution; and in IV, distinction 49, question 6, § Dico ergo, which we reported in disputation 88, chapter 5.[2216] Therefore, as we said in chapter 1: if the first cause, operating necessarily, would, because it is prior, touch the effect first, then even now when it operates freely, because it is prior,

2215. See disputation 88, chapter 3, and also the preceding disputation, chapter 7, on the simultaneity of the first cause's concurrence with the created will.

2215. See disputation 88, chapter 3, and also the preceding disputation, chapter 7, on the simultaneity of the first cause's concurrence with the created will.

2216. Cf. Scotus, In II Sententiarum, distinction 37, q. 1, 5; and In IV Sententiarum, distinction 49, q. 6, § Dico ergo; reported in our disputation 88, chapter 5.

in the same manner it would touch (the effect) first, and so would leave no liberty to our will. But if now, when it operates freely, it does not touch (the effect) first, and so does not hinder liberty, it follows that not even then, even if it operated necessarily, would it produce the effect first.

Caput IV - Even if no cause were free, still some effects would be, in a certain respect, contingent

Quorundam opinio. There are some who say absolutely that, if there were no cause free and indifferent for operating, there could be in no way a contingent effect. Thus teach Gabriel and Corduba in the places cited. They prove this, because if there were no free cause, all things would be determined to one side by a force and necessity of nature; therefore there would be no contingency. For thus Aristotle in Perihermeneias, chapter 8, defines the contingent: "What is not determined to one side."

However, the opinion of Henry pleases me - Quodlibet 8, question 4 - who teaches that the "contingent" is twofold, or that a thing can be called "contingent" in two ways (for the controversy seems to be about the word rather than the thing). First, something is said to be contingent on the side of the effect, when it is of such a nature that it does not repel being or not being, but from its intrinsic principles either can befall it. Such are all corruptible things compared to created causes too, by which they can be produced and corrupted, or impeded. Thus a man can be and not be, rain likewise, and so on. Then something is called contingent on the side of a free cause and with the indifference of the agent.

Henry therefore gathers that "contingent" in that first way can exist even if no free cause exists, because created things, especially corruptible ones, are of such a nature that they can be and not be; and on that account they are said to be "not necessary"; but "not necessary" is entirely the same as "contingent," which can be and not be. Whether therefore these things are impeded or corrupted by a necessary agent or by a free agent, nevertheless they can of themselves be and not be, and therefore they are called contingent. Further, he says that in that case no effect is contingent as referred to its cause, because since causes operate naturally and necessarily, whatever they effect - whether by producing, or corrupting, or impeding - they effect not contingently but necessarily. For only the free cause is that which, from an apprehended form, acts with indifference toward either alternative; the rest are determined to one side. Of contingency in this latter way Aristotle speaks in the place cited; wherefore Henry's opinion in no way stands opposed to him.[2217]

2217. Aristotle, Perihermenias (De Interpretatione), chapter 8; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet VIII, question 4.

Articulus VII - Whether the number of the predestined is certain

Ad septimum sic proceditur. It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which addition can be made is not certain; but to the number of the predestined addition can be made, as it seems: for it is said in Deuteronomy, chapter 1: "May the Lord our God add to this number many thousands more"; and the Gloss there says that it is not defined with God, who knows who are His. Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain

Further, no reason can be assigned why God should preordain men to salvation in this number rather than in another; but nothing is disposed by God without a reason. Therefore a fixed number of the saved preordained by God is not certain.

Further, God's operation is more perfect than the operation of nature. But in the works of nature, the good is found as in the majority, but defect and evil as in the fewer. Therefore, if the number of the saved were established by God, there would be more to be saved than to be damned. The contrary of which is shown in Matthew, where it is said: "Wide and spacious is the way that leads to destruction, and many there are who enter by it."[2219]

I answer: The number of the predestined is certain. But some have said that it is certain formally, but not materially; as if we were to say that it is certain that a hundred, or a thousand, will be saved, but not that these, or those, in particular. But this destroys the certitude of predestination, of which we have spoken above. And therefore it must be said that the number of the predestined is certain to God not only formally, but also materially. Yet it must be considered that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God not only by reason of knowledge, because, to wit, He knows how many are to be saved (for thus also the number of the drops of rain and the sands of the sea is certain to God), but by reason of a certain choice and definition.

For the understanding of which it must be known that every agent intends to make something finite, as appears from what has been said above about the infinite, in question 7, articles 2 and 3. Whoever, moreover, intends some determinate measure in his effect, devises some number in the essential parts of it which are of themselves required for the perfection of the whole. For he does not of himself choose some number in those things which are not principally required, but only on account of something else; but he takes so many of such things in number as are necessary for something else. Thus the builder devises the determinate measure of the house, and also the determinate number of rooms he wishes to make in the house, and the determinate number of measures of the wall or of the roof; but he does not choose a determinate number of stones, but takes as many as suffice to fill out the set measure of the wall.

Thus, therefore, it must be considered in God with respect to the whole universe, which is His effect. For He preordained in what measure the whole universe ought to be, and what number would be suitable for the essential parts of the universe, which namely have some order to perpetuity: how many, to wit, spheres, how many stars, how many elements, how many species of things. But individual corruptibles are not ordered to the good of the universe as principally, but as

2219. Matthew 7:13.

secondarily, inasmuch as in them the good of the species is preserved. Whence, although God knows the number of all individuals of ox or of gnat, nevertheless the number of suchlike is not of itself preordained by God. But of suchlike the divine providence has produced so many as suffice for the conservation of the species.

Among all creatures, however, rational creatures are more principally ordered to the good of the universe; for inasmuch as they are such they are incorruptible, and most especially those who attain beatitude, who most immediately attain the ultimate end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a certain principal predefinition. It is not thus altogether with the number of the reprobate, who seem to be preordained by God into the good of the elect, "to whom all things work together unto good."

But as to the number of all predestined men, what it may be, some say that out of men as many will be saved as angels fell; others, that as many will be saved as angels remained; others, that out of men as many will be saved as angels fell, and in addition as many as were the angels created. But it is better said that the number of the elect to be placed in supernal felicity is known to God alone.

to the first: It must be said that that word of Deuteronomy is to be understood of those who are pre-noted by God with respect to present justice. For of these the number both increases and decreases, and is not the number of the predestined.

Reply to the second: It must be said that the measure of the quantity of any part is to be taken from the proportion of that part to the whole. For thus with God there is the reason why He made so many stars, or so many species of things, and why He predestined so many, from the proportion of the principal parts to the good of the universe.

Reply to the third: It must be said that the good proportioned to the common state of nature happens as in the many, and fails from this good as in the few. But the good which exceeds the common state of nature is found as in the few, and it fails from this good as in the many. As is clear, that there are more men who have sufficient knowledge for the governance of their life, but fewer who lack this knowledge, who are called simpletons or fools: yet very few, in comparison with others, attain to having a profound knowledge of intelligible things. Therefore since eternal beatitude, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially according as nature is bereft of grace through the corruption of original sin, fewer are saved. And herein also the mercy of God especially appears, that He raises some to that salvation, from which very many fall away, according to the common course and inclination of nature.

The earlier conclusion is this. The number of the predestined is not only certain formally, but also materially: that is, it is not only certain how many are predestined, but also who they are. The later conclusion: The number is certain not only by foreknowledge (*praescientia*), but also by a certain principal predefinition (*praefinitio*). But the number of the reprobate, and of other things which are not ordered principally to the good of the universe, but only secondarily, is not so.

By what mode the number of the predestined is certain. Disputation 101.

- Two scholastic opinions. Caput I.

- The final opinion. Caput II.
- How it is truly said: A reprobate cannot be saved; a predestined one, or one to be saved, cannot be damned. Caput III.
- That there are more reprobates than predestined. Caput IV.

Disputatio CI - On the certainty of the number of the predestined and of the reprobates

Caput I - Two scholastic opinions

Before we bring forward our own and others' opinion, it is necessary to explain briefly the state of the question. And first of all it must be observed that what the Scholastics call "certain" or "infallible" is something other than "necessary" or "inevitable": for the former two refer to the intellect, whereas the latter two are said of the things themselves, considered in themselves. In like manner "uncertain" and "fallible" pertain to cognition, while "contingent" and "free" belong to the things themselves, considered in themselves.

Concerning the contingency, freedom, and necessity of predestination (*praedestinatio*) and reprobation, we have already said enough; now, however, we must dispute about certainty, insofar as it pertains to the intellect. And although no Catholic doubts that the number of the predestined and of the reprobates is most certain in the science of God not only formally but also materially, as was said in the earlier conclusion of the article, nevertheless the question is, whence this certainty of the predestined begins, account being taken of the "instants" which, according to our mode of understanding, are posited in the divine decree.[2220]

In this controversy, the first opinion is that of Catherinus in book 1 De praedestinatione, in the last chapter, where he affirms that the number of the predestined is certain in a different way than the number of those to be saved.[2221] For he himself, as we saw above in Disputation 90, distinguishes the predestined from those-to-be-saved. Accordingly he first asserts that the number of the predestined is certain in the predefinition, by which God decreed efficaciously to beatify them before any merits, even of grace, were foreseen. In like manner, he says, the number is certain in the predefinition of the means of grace by which they are to be led to eternal life. For he thinks these means are such that, given them, it is not within their own power not to persevere. And if these two predefinitions were thus in God, it would plainly follow that in both ways it would not only be certain in foreknowledge after the one or the other predefinition, but that it would also be necessary that it be thus future, and in no way contingent and free.

2220. Above, Disputation 90; on the logical "instants" in the divine decree see the same disputation.
2221. Catherinus, De praedestinatione, book 1, last chapter.

Next he teaches that the number of those to be saved is not certain in the election to glory before all works, even of grace, because he thinks that they were not elected in this way, but were ordered to glory by a common kind of will of simple affect, which they could quite well resist; and therefore the number of them could not have been certain by any knowledge from an election prior to works.

Finally he asserts that the number of those to be saved is not certain in the predefinition and providence of the means of operating grace (*gratia operans*), because they were only prevented by common grace, which they too could resist. For he does not deny - as some falsely impute to him - that the number of those to be saved is certain in the predefinition by which God decreed to cooperate with individuals; nor does Catherinus anywhere deny such a decree. And thus, when he says that the number of those to be saved can be increased and diminished, he understands the number not as it is in the foreknowledge of God with the cooperation of each one foreseen, but absolutely and in itself, prior to this foreknowledge, from the sole predefinition of operating and preventing grace. For he thinks that our future works are not otherwise known by God than from their real presence in the eternity of God; and hence, in the sole predefinition of operating and preventing grace, before the decree of concurring and cooperating is added, nothing is known by God with certainty. This opinion seems to have been followed by the Massilians: for Hilary, in the letter to St. Augustine which is before the book De praedestinatione Sanctorum, writes thus of them in the middle of the letter: hence it is that "they likewise do not accept that there is a defined number of those to be chosen and those to be rejected." They were thinking against St. Augustine, as we saw in Disputation 96, chapter 4, that to the predestined there had not been granted by God a peculiar operating grace for persevering, by which God would certainly know that they would persevere; but that He had provided for all a common grace by which they could persevere and could fail to persevere. And therefore, in the predefinition of the helps of operating grace, they thought the number of the predestined to be uncertain and indefinite to God. For they would by no means have said that the number of those to be saved is altogether uncertain, who knew very well that all future things are at length certainly known by God from eternity.

The second opinion is that of Cajetan in this article, to which the more recent authors accede, and which all ought to follow who assert that the predestined were chosen to glory by an efficacious will before any merits were foreseen - whom we cited in Disputation 89, chapter 1.[2222] They therefore teach that in this election the number of the predestined is certain and determined, both formally and materially, as was set forth in the first conclusion; and that St. Thomas signified this when he said that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only in foreknowledge (he understands: after works), but also by reason of a certain election and definition (he understands: the election to glory before works). But they think that the number of drops of water, of worms, and of other things, indeed even of reprobates, is not in this way certain: because they hold that all these were not defined through themselves before the foreseeing of a cause, in such a way that God would first will there to be so many worms before He willed anything else, and then would determine the causes to this number; but rather that He willed there to be as many as would be expedient for the good of the universe, and that to this end He applied the causes. Therefore, in the

2222. Cajetan, on this article; see also the recent authors cited by us in Disputation 89, chapter 1.

first predefinition, they say, He did not determine the number of worms, nor of the reprobates; because of Himself He did not will before all things to reprobate men, but as would be expedient for the number and end of the predestined: whereas the predestined, through themselves and before all things, He efficaciously chose in a certain number to beatitude. They confirm this by the example of an architect, who first determines the measure of the house and the number of dwellings, because this is his intention; then he does not decree a determinate number of stones considered in themselves, but so many as he judges necessary for the end he has set before himself.

Caput II - The final opinion

From the things set forth by us above in Disputation 89, chapter 2, and Disputation 95, chapters 4 and 5, we shall easily gather what ought to be thought in this controversy.[2223] First, I judge it highly probable from what we said in Disputation 89, that the number of the predestined is not certain from an election to beatitude before merits. For I showed there that it is sufficiently probable that no one was elected to glory before merits of grace were foreseen. But that the number of the reprobates is not certain from a will reiecting them from glory before sins were foreseen, is more than probable: because, as was shown in the aforesaid disputation, and in Disputation 95, chapters 4 and 5, God rejected no reprobate from the kingdom of heaven before sins were foreseen. And if predestination in that way were an election, and the reprobates a rejection from the kingdom, then not only would the number of them be certain in the foreknowledge of God from that sole predefinition, but it would also be necessary therein, nor in any way would it be placed under a free will, as was proved in the same place.

Some, however, try to prove that the number of the elect is certain from the election to glory by that saying of 2 Timothy: "For the firm foundation of God stands, having this seal: The Lord knows who are His." But I do not know from which word of Paul they draw that, since he only says that the number is certain in foreknowledge. For he says that this is a firm foundation: "The Lord knows who are His." And he calls it a firm foundation, in whatever way the subverting doctrine of certain persons might overthrow it, as Hymenaeus and Philetus had been deceived; for those heresies would stamp upon souls, and as it were imprint, this testimony - that they are sons of God and well known to God Himself, and remain immovable. Rightly so: "For the Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are sons of God" (Romans 8).

Secondly, it must be said that the number of the predestined and of the reprobates is certain as to the foreknowledge of God from the providence of the means in a twofold way. First, from the preordination of the means of operating grace, or of prevenient guidance; and, further, from the condition of cooperation of free will: both of which are consistent. For God has a distinct and peculiar providence, by which He determines each in particular, as was proved in the preceding disputation, chapter 5.[2224] Indeed, Catherinus seems to acknowledge God's providence only in the predefinition of operating and prevenient grace, not in the decree of cooperating with free choice.

2223. Disputation 89, chapter 2; and Disputation 95, chapters 4 - 5.
2224. The preceding disputation, chapter 5.

This twofold providence therefore being posited, the number is not only certain in foreknowledge - that is, not only certain and infallible to the divine science concerning it - but the very number is consequent-necessary: by that necessity of the consequent which we have said above; which we call the necessity that something future, as future, is necessary to be future, and with which our liberty altogether agrees; yet not by an antecedent necessity, which would wholly take away or hinder our freedom, as was explained in an earlier disputation.[2225]

Thirdly, even from the sole predefinition of the means of operating and prevenient grace the number is certain in foreknowledge, yet still under a condition, until the decree of cooperating and concurring with free choice is added; for under that condition God knows what free choice would do with this or that calling, if He Himself should not decide according to His own will; and the will, foreseeing with such a consideration, sets forth the plan: therefore, under this condition, the number of the predestined is known as certain from the sole preparation of prevenient grace. Nevertheless, since together with the counsels of prevenient grace God can deny concurrence - which being denied, the vocation does not obtain the response of free choice - until the decree of cooperating with free choice is added, the number is not absolutely certain in foreknowledge; but when that is added, it is certain - by a consequent necessity, yet not necessary for us, nor including a removal of liberty, but free, contingent, and mutable. For the certainty of knowledge together with that consequent necessity does not take away from us liberty, mutability, and contingency, since it presupposes liberty itself entire in us. The same must be said, mutatis mutandis, concerning the reprobates.

Nor, moreover, does St. Thomas in this article oppose the opinion we have set forth: when he says that the number of the predestined is certain not only by reason of knowledge, but also by reason of a certain election and definition. For by "election" he did not understand an efficacious election to beatitude before merits were foreseen; but he understood "election" as we ourselves have explained his mind in Disputation 89, chapter 1, namely, as a decree by which God from eternity seals that He will cooperate, with all the predestined, with a cooperation reaching to perseverance, and finally confer eternal beatitude; and from these ways it is certain that then the number of the predestined is determined. Nor does there arise from this any necessity by which our liberty is impeded, as we related in Disputation 95.[2226]

But as to natural effects, which proceed from a necessary and natural cause, even not only in the present but also in heaven, their number is known certainly and necessarily. Whether, however, God first from ...

2225. On the distinction between the necessity of the consequent and of the consequence, see the prior discussion referenced in the same context.

2226. Disputation 95.

Caput III - How it is truly said, "The reprobate cannot be saved; and the predestined, or the one to be saved, cannot be damned"

Whether God first determined the number of these things in themselves, or with a view to a higher end, is manifest. For he did not predestine the number of these things according to themselves, but on account of another higher end, as it pleased him. But the number of the reprobate, with respect to the denial of efficacious and congruous help, was thus and thus great from the mere will of God: for although he decreed to deny them those helps, in order to show the riches of his mercy upon the vessels of mercy, nevertheless for this end such-and-such a number of the reprobate was not necessary.

But he understands these propositions, inasmuch as they are about a future contingent and inasmuch as that event is referred only to its proper causes; for inasmuch as it is in eternity, or is subject to the knowledge of God, he does not doubt that these propositions are determinately true or determinately false; and that of some predestined one it is true that he will be saved; but of another, that he will be damned, taking "non-predestined" as he himself distinguishes it from those especially predestined and elect, as we saw in that Disputation 90. Otherwise, how would he call these "to be saved" or "to be damned," if neither in reality nor in the prescience of God would it be true that they are to be saved or to be damned?

However, besides the fact that this doctrine rests on a false foundation, since it distinguishes between those "to be saved" and the predestined, as we showed there, there is another reason why it is not true. For although it is antecedently free, on the side of the cause, for the predestined to be damned and for the one to be damned to be saved; both because no one is chosen before all works unto eternal life, as was shown in Disputations 89 and 90; and also because no one is so stirred up by grace that he cannot resist it, as we said in Disputation 90 and Disputation 98; nevertheless every proposition about a future contingent and free event, in that formal aspect in which it is referred to its proper cause, is determinately true, as we more fully showed in Disputation 66, chapter 1. Therefore those two propositions, if they are enunciated of any individual whatsoever, are determinately true or determinately false. For if they are taken universally, each is false; if vaguely, each is true. For not every non-predestined will be saved, nor will every condemned be condemned, if "non-predestined" is taken in the sense of Catherinus: for he calls predestined both the one to be saved and the one to be damned, as was said; but some one will be saved, and someone else will be damned.

Therefore from the above things it was clear; but because Catherinus, relying on his own principles, has philosophized in a peculiar way in this matter, it was necessary to note a few things in passing against him. In his third book, on predestination, chapter last, he says first that this proposition is true: The predestined will necessarily be saved; but he understands "necessity" as antecedent, which is not in the power of the predestined, such that by the force of predestination a man is not left free to be saved or to be damned. For he thinks both that the elect were efficaciously chosen unto glory before foreseen merits, and also that they were so prevented by operating grace that it is not free for them not to obtain glory, nor not to persevere in grace. Yet we have shown this

to be false in Disputation 89, from our reply against Catherinus in Disputation 90, where we show that no one was so efficaciously chosen that it was not free for him to attain beatitude and to lose it; nor that anyone was so prevented by grace for Christ as that he could not fall away from it by his own liberty.

Then he teaches that these propositions, A non-predestined one will be saved; and, a non-predestined one will be damned, are neither true nor false, but contingent and possible either way. Moreover, by "non-predestined" he calls all those who before merits were not efficaciously elected, nor confirmed in grace; under which he comprehends as well those who are to be damned as those who are to be saved. He understands these propositions, inasmuch as they are about a future contingent, and inasmuch as that event is referred only to its proper causes; for inasmuch as it is in eternity or is subject to the divine knowledge, he does not doubt that these propositions are determinately true or determinately false; and that of some predestined person it is true that he will be saved; but of another, that he will be damned, taking "non-predestined" as he himself distinguishes it from those especially predestined and elect, as we saw in that Disputation 90. Otherwise, how would he call these ones "to be saved" or "to be damned," if neither in reality nor in the prescience of God would it be true that they are to be saved or to be damned?

Finally, Catherinus asserts this proposition, The reprobate will necessarily be damned, to be true. He gives the reason, because the reprobate, as reprobate, is supposed to be going to be in guilt unto the end of life; but once this supposition is made, it is not open to him not to be damned. He adds also that this proposition is true, If the foreknown is saved, he will be saved; but not this one, The foreknown, being saved, will necessarily be saved. But these two claims which Catherinus makes do not sufficiently cohere with each other. For by the same necessity, and by no other, it must be that the reprobate be damned, and the one to be saved be saved. And this is the following necessity, by which it is said that what is future is necessarily future, with which liberty rightly stands, so that the one of whom we say, "he will be saved," or "he will be condemned," may freely be saved or be condemned. Therefore in the opinion of all this must be conceded: The predestined will necessarily be saved, and the reprobate or foreknown will be condemned. So conceded Alexander, 1 part, question 28, members 4, 2, 3; Gabriel in 1, distinction 40, article 2, question 1; Gregory, questions 1, 2, 3; the Major Doctor, unique question; Marsilius in 1, question 41, article 1, corollary 1; and the following, when they affirm, in the composite sense, that this is true: The predestined, or the one to be saved, cannot be damned, but will necessarily be saved; and similarly this: The reprobate, or the foreknown, will necessarily be damned, and cannot be saved.[2227] However, in order that the sentence of these be true, they ought not to concede any antecedent necessity, whether from the supposition or in the composite sense, but only a following one, as from what has been said before in Disputation 68 is sufficiently clear.

Accedes also St. Augustine, book 3 against Cresconius, chapter 66, and book 4, chapter 51, where he compares the whole congregation of the faithful to a threshing-floor, in which chaff and grain are together; but the multitude of the chaff is greater. And "chaff" signifies those who are

2227. Alexander of Hales, Summa, 1 p., q. 28, membra 4, 2, 3; Gabriel Biel, In Sentences, 1 d. 40, a. 2, q. 1; Gregory of Rimini, q. 1, 2, 3; John Major, In Sentences, unique question; Marsilius of Inghen, In Sentences, 1 q. 41, a. 1, coroll. 1.

destined to be burned with fire, according to Matthew 3 and Luke 3: "His winnowing fan (namely, of Christ) is in his hand; he will thoroughly cleanse his threshing-floor, and gather his wheat into the granary, but the chaff he will burn with unquenchable fire." The same is indicated in that parable of the sower, Luke 8, in which the field was divided into four parts; only one bore fruit. But that parable signified the preaching of the Gospel by Christ, and what would befall at the preaching of his disciples; and it is clear that all four parts were received in some part of the ground, which denotes the faith received from the preaching by the hearers. But since only one gave fruit, it seems to indicate that fewer of the faithful are to be saved. This opinion is supported by Lyranus and the Interlinear Gloss on those passages of Matthew.[2228] I, however, judge rather that all these things should be left to the judgment of God than that anything should be rashly defined: as also that other question, whether the number of human beings predestined is greater than that of the Angels, or not; especially because controversies of this sort do not much pertain to the edification of the faithful. And thus far it is enough to have spoken of this whole question of predestination.

Caput IV - That there are more reprobate than predestined

That the number absolutely of the reprobate, and of those who are damned, is greater than of the predestined and of those who are saved, is clearly established from Scripture: Matthew 7, "Strait is the way which leads to life, and few there are that find it"; and elsewhere often by number. But concerning the faithful there is a doubt, whether the greater part of them is damned. There are, indeed, those who piously think that more of the faithful are saved, because more depart from this life having received the sacraments of the Church, of whom we probably believe that the greater part is saved. And this is confirmed by that parable in Matthew 22, in which, of those found for the wedding, by whom the faithful are signified, only one was found not having the wedding garment. But others think that the greater part indeed of the faithful is damned, to whom St. Gregory favors, Homily 19 on the Gospels, on those words of Matthew 22: "Few indeed are elect," where he says that many receive the faith, but few are saved.[2229]

Quaestio XXIV - On the book of life

Articulus I - Whether the book of life is the same as predestination

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the book of life is not the same as predestination. For it is said in Ecclesiasticus 6:24, "These things are all the book of life"; the Gloss says, that is, the New and Old Testament. But this is not predestination.

Then we must consider the book of life. And concerning this three things are asked.

2228. St. Augustine, Contra Cresconium, l. 3, c. 66; l. 4, c. 51. On Matthew 3 and Luke 3; the parable of the sower in Luke 8; Nicholas of Lyra and the Interlinear Gloss ad loc.

2229. St. Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, hom. 19, on Matthew 22: "Pauci vere electi," where he says that many receive the faith, but few are saved.

Whether the book of life is the same as predestination

Objicitur 1. It seems that the book of life is not the same as predestination. For it is said in Ecclesiasticus 24, "These things are all the book of life"; the Gloss says, that is, the New and Old Testament. But this is not predestination.[4]

Objicitur 2. Further, Augustine in book 20 of the City of God says that the book of life is a certain divine power, by which it is brought about that each one's deeds, good or evil, are brought back into memory. But a divine power does not seem to pertain to predestination, but rather to an attribute of power. Therefore the book of life is not the same as predestination.[5]

Objicitur 3. Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. If, therefore, the book of life were predestination, there would be found a book of death, just as there is a book of life.

But on the contrary: It is said in the Gloss on that Psalm 68, "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living": "This book is the knowledge of God, by which he predestined to life those whom he foreknew."[6]

Respondeo dicendum: The book of life in God is said metaphorically according to a likeness taken from human affairs. For it is customary among men that those who are chosen for something are enrolled in a book: for example, soldiers or counselors, who of old were called "Fathers enrolled." But it is clear from the foregoing that all the predestined are chosen by God for the having of eternal life. Therefore the very enrollment of the predestined is called the book of life. For metaphorically something is said to be written in the intellect of someone which he holds firmly in his memory, according to that of Proverbs 3: "Forget not my law, and let your heart keep my commandments"; and a little after it follows: "Write them in the tables of your heart." And also in material books something is written to aid memory. Hence God's very knowledge, by which he firmly retains that he has predestined some to eternal life, is called the book of life. For as the writing of a book is a sign of the things that are to be done, so God's knowledge is a certain sign with him of those who are to be brought to eternal life, according to that of 2 Timothy 2: "The firm foundation of God stands, having this seal: the Lord knows who are his."

Ad primum ergo dicendum: The book of life can be spoken of in two ways. In one way, as the enrollment of those who are elected to life; and thus we now speak of the book of life. In another way, the book of life can be said to be the enrollment of things that lead into life. And this in two ways: either as of things to be done, and thus the New and Old Testament is called the book of life; or as of things already done, and thus that divine power by which it is brought about that each one's deeds are recalled to memory is called the book of life. Just as also "book of soldiery" may be said either of that in which those elected to the soldiery are written, or of that in which the art of warfare is handed on, or of that in which the deeds of soldiers are recited. Whence the reply to the second is clear

Ad tertium dicendum: It is not customary to enroll those who are rejected, but those who are chosen. Hence to reprobation there does not correspond a "book of death," as to predestination the book of life

Reply to the fourth: According to its notion, the book of life differs from predestination. For it imports the knowledge of predestination, as also appears from the Gloss adduced.

Explicatio Articuli.

Conclusion: The knowledge by which God firmly retains that he has predestined some to eternal life is the book of life. From which it is clear that St. Thomas did not answer the question directly. For in the whole article he defines nothing else; from which, however, it is not obscurely gathered that the book of life is not predestination itself, even in the school of St. Thomas; who thinks that predestination is an act of the intellect. For he himself, and those who follow his opinion, hold that predestination is an act of the practical intellect after the manner of command, which precedes future things, and not of the speculative intellect which looks upon them. But the book of life, in the mind of the Holy Doctor, as is clear from the conclusion of the article, is an act of the speculative intellect, insofar as it is referred to memory; and reason proves the same: for by translation a thing is said to be written in someone's intellect, not insofar as the intellect by its command is the principle of that thing, but insofar as it is held in memory; but memory is not a practical act, as, in the opinion of St. Thomas, predestination and command are, but a speculative one.

Articulus II - Whether the book of life regards only the glory of the predestined

Objicitur 1. It seems that the book of life is not only with respect to the glory of the predestined. For the book of life is a knowledge of life. But God by his own life knows other life. Therefore the book of life is said chiefly with respect to the divine life, and not only with respect to the life of the predestined.

Objicitur 2. Further, as the life of glory is God's, so is the life of nature. If therefore the knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life, so also the knowledge of the life of nature will be called the book of life.

Objicitur 3. Further, some are elected to grace who are not elected to the life of glory, as is clear from that which is said in John 6: "Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" But the book of life is the enrollment of the divine election, as was said. Therefore it also is with respect to the life of grace.

But on the contrary: The book of life is a knowledge of predestination, as was said; but predestination does not regard the life of grace except insofar as it is ordered to glory. For they are not predestined who have grace and fall away from glory. Therefore the book of life is said only with respect to glory.

Respondeo dicendum: The book of life, as was said, imports a certain enrollment or knowledge of the elect to life. But one is chosen to that which does not befit him according to his nature; and again, what one is chosen to has the ratio of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or enrolled for this,

that he be armed, but for this, that he fight; for this is the proper office to which soldiery is ordered. But the end existing above nature is the life of glory, as was said above. Hence properly the book of life regards the life of glory.

Ad primum ergo dicendum: The divine life, even as it is a glorious life, is natural to God. Hence with respect to it there is no election, and consequently neither a book of life. For we do not say that a man is chosen to have sense, or any of those things which follow upon nature. Whence by this the solution to the second is also clear. For with respect to the life of nature there is neither election nor a book of life

Ad tertium dicendum: The life of grace does not have the ratio of an end, but the ratio of that which is to the end. Hence one is not said to be chosen to the life of grace, unless insofar as the life of grace is ordered to glory. And on this account those who have grace and fall away from glory are not said to be simply elect, but in a qualified sense. And similarly they are not said to be simply written in the book of life, but in a qualified sense: inasmuch, namely, as in the divine ordination and knowledge it stands concerning them that they are to have some order to eternal life according to participation in grace

Explicatio Articuli.

Conclusion (of St. Thomas): The book of life is said more with respect to the life of glory than of grace. For the explanation of this, it must be observed that here the life of glory is not being compared with the eternal death of hell, when it is asked whether there is a book of the life of glory, but with the life of grace, which is the means to the life of glory. St. Thomas answers that the book is said rather of the life of glory than of grace, taking the analogy from the "book of soldiery," in which soldiers are not said to be written, or chosen, in order that they be armed, but that they fight; for this is the end of soldiery. Thus also the predestined are not said to be written in the book of life in order that they be justified - for justification is the means - but in order that they be glorified; for glory is the end for which they are chosen and enrolled. But in the preceding article, in the reply to the second, St. Thomas had said that God's foreknowledge is not wont to be called the "book of death" and "of the reprobate," but only "of life" and "of the predestined," taking the metaphor likewise from human affairs. For those who are rejected from the soldiery are not written in any book; therefore the reprobates are not said to be in God's foreknowledge as in a book of death and of damnation.

Still, Basil, on Isaiah chapter 4, on those words, "And it shall be, that he that is left," says that there are two books: one of the living, that is, of the predestined, in which are written the disciples of Christ to whom he himself said in Luke 10, "Rejoice, because your names are written in heaven"; the other of those who are damned, according to that of Jeremiah 17, "They that depart from thee shall be written in the earth."[7] The same is the sense of St. Gregory Nazianzen, in Oration 9, the Discourse to the Jewish Tax-collector, no. 41, where he says to him: "Unless perhaps you have never heard anything of a certain book of the living and of the perishing; there we shall all be written, or, to speak more exactly, there we have been written." Where, although he does not distinguish two books, yet he says there is one in which both those who are saved and those who

are damned are written. And indeed although soldiers who are cast out of the militia are not written - because those are accustomed to be written who are to be condemned by death - another book of the reprobate also can not inaptly be posited in God.[8]

Articulus III - Whether anyone is blotted out of the book of life

Objicitur 1. It seems that no one is blotted out of the book of life. Augustine says in book 20 of the City of God that the prescience of God, which cannot fail, is the book of life; but from the prescience of God nothing can be subtracted, nor likewise from predestination. Therefore from the book of life no one can be blotted out.[9]

Objicitur 2. Further, whatever is in something is in it according to the mode of that in which it is; but the book of life is something eternal and immutable. Therefore whatever is in it, is there not temporally, but immovably and indelibly.

Objicitur 3. Further, deletion is opposed to writing. But one cannot be newly written in the book of life. Therefore neither can one be blotted out from it.

But on the contrary: It is said in Psalm 68, "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living."

Respondeo dicendum: Some say that from the book of life no one can be blotted out according to the truth of the thing; yet someone can be blotted out according to the opinion of men. For it is customary in the Scriptures that something is said to be done when it is made known; and according to this some are said to be written in the book of life, insofar as men think them to be written there on account of the present justice which appears in them. But when it appears, either in this age or in the future, that they have fallen away from this justice, they are said to be blotted out from it. And thus also the Gloss expounds such deletion on that Psalm 68, "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living." But because "not to be blotted out of the book of life" is set among the rewards of the just, according to that Apocalypse 3: "He who shall overcome shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot out his name from the book of life" (and what is promised to the saints is not only in the opinion of men), it can be said that to be blotted out or not to be blotted out of the book of life is referred not only to the opinion of men while it lasts, but also with respect to the reality. For the book of life is the enrollment of ordinations unto eternal life. And to this someone is ordained in two ways: namely, by gratuitous predestination - and this ordination never fails - and by grace. For whoever has grace is by that very fact worthy of eternal life. And this ordination sometimes fails; and therefore some are ordained, by grace had, to have eternal life, from which nonetheless they fall away.

[4]: Gloss on Ecclesiasticus 24: "Haec omnia liber vitae," i.e., the New and Old Testament.

[5]: St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, l. 20, c. 14, "a medio."

[6]: Ordinary Gloss on Psalm 68: "Deleantur de libro viventium," drawn also from Cassiodorus.

[7]: St. Basil, on Isaiah, homily on chapter 4, on the words "Et erit quod relictum fuerit"; Luke 10:20; Jeremiah 17:13.

[8]: St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 9, To the Jewish Tax-collector, no. 41.

[9]: St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, l. 20 (on the book of life as prescience).

In the preceding article, in the solution to the second, St. Thomas had said that the prescience of God is not wont to be called the book of death and of the reprobate, but only of life and of the predestined, the metaphor being taken also from human practice. For those who are rejected from the army are not written in any book; therefore neither are the reprobate said to be in the prescience of God as in a book of death and damnation. Basil, however, on Isaiah 4, on the words, "And it shall be that which is left" (erit quod relictum fuerit), says that there are two books: one of the living, that is, of the predestined, in which are written the disciples of Christ, to whom He Himself said in Luke 10: "Rejoice, because your names are written in heaven"; the other of those who are damned, according to Jeremiah 17: "Let them be written in the earth." From which Nazianzen also in Oration 9, To the Jewish Tax-collector, no. 41, gathers as much, where he says to him: "Unless perhaps you have never heard anything of a book of the living and of the perishing; there all of us shall be written, or, to speak more rightly, we are inscribed there." Although he does not distinguish two books, he nevertheless says that there is one in which both those who are saved and those who are damned are written. And indeed, although soldiers who are ejected from the army are not written in some book, yet those who are to be condemned to death are wont to be written; hence another book of the reprobate can without ineptitude be posited in God.[2230]

Ad tertium sic proceditur. It seems that no one is blotted out of the book of life

1. For Augustine says in De Civitate Dei, book 20, that the prescience of God, which cannot be deceived, is the book of life; but from the prescience of God nothing can be subtracted, and likewise neither from predestination. Therefore from the book of life nothing can be blotted out.[2231]
2. Furthermore, whatever is in something is in it according to the mode of that in which it is; but the book of life is something eternal and immutable. Therefore whatever is in it is there not temporally but immutably; and hence deletion, which is something temporal, cannot be opposed to it, so that something there could be anew.
3. Furthermore, deletion presupposes that someone is first written; but someone is not written in the book of life. Therefore neither can he be blotted out from it.

But on the contrary: "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, and let them not be written with the just" (Psalm 68[69]:29 Vg.).[2232]

I answer that it must be said: By "book of life" is meant the inscription of those who are ordained to eternal life. Now to that ordination one proceeds in a twofold way, namely, from divine predestination - which ordination never fails - and from grace. For whoever has grace is by that very fact worthy of eternal life. And yet this latter ordination sometimes fails, because some are

2230. St. Basil, Homily on Isaiah 4, on "Et erit quod relictum fuerit"; Luke 10:20; Jeremiah 17:13; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 9, To the Jewish Tax-collector, no. 41.

2231. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, book 20, c. 14, "a medio."

2232. Ordinary Gloss on Psalm 68: "Deleantur de libro viventium"; see also Cassiodorus.

ordained from grace received to have eternal life, from which, however, they fall away through mortal sin. Those, therefore, who are ordained to have eternal life by divine predestination are simply written in the book of life, because they are there written as going to have eternal life in itself; and these are never blotted out of the book of life. But those who are ordained to have eternal life, not from divine predestination, but only from grace, are said to be written in the book of life, not simply, but in a qualified sense, because they are there written as going to have eternal life not in itself, but in its cause. And such persons can be blotted out of the book of life, in such wise that the deletion is not referred to the knowledge of God, as if God first knew something and afterwards did not know it, but to the thing known: because, to wit, God knows that someone was first ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not ordained, when he falls from grace.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that deletion (as has been said) is not referred to the book of life on the side of prescience, as if there were some mutability in God, but on the side of the things foreknown, which are mutable.

To the second it must be said that although things are in God immutably, nevertheless in themselves they are mutable. And to this the deletion of the book of life pertains.

To the third it must be said that in the way in which someone is said to be blotted out of the book of life, it can be said that he is written there anew, either according to the opinion of men, or according as he anew begins to have an ordination to eternal life through grace. Which is also comprehended under divine knowledge, although not anew.

Observations concerning the article. The conclusion of the article is this: Some are blotted out of the book of life not according to the knowledge of God, but according to some effect of grace. Cajetan very well explains these things in his Commentary, namely, that to be blotted out of the book of life according to knowledge is nothing else than that what previously had been foreknown by God should not be foreknown; since the knowledge of God cannot vary, as in q. 14. Thus, to be said to be blotted out of the book of life is not only referred to the opinion of men, but also to the reality. For the book of life is the inscription of those ordained to eternal life. Now someone is ordained to it from two sources, namely, from divine predestination (and this ordination never fails) and from grace. For whoever has grace is by that very thing worthy of eternal life. And yet this latter ordination sometimes fails, because some are ordained from grace received to have eternal life, from which, however, they fall away through mortal sin.

Accordingly, those who are ordained to have eternal life by divine predestination are simply written in the book of life, because they are written there as going to have eternal life in itself, and such are never blotted out of the book of life. But those who are ordained to have eternal life, not by divine predestination but only by grace, are said to be written in the book of life, not simply but in a qualified sense: because they are written there as going to have eternal life not in itself, but in its cause. And such can be blotted out of the book of life, so that deletion be not referred to the knowledge of God, as if God first knew something and afterwards did not know it, but to the thing known: namely, that God knows someone to be first ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not ordained, when he falls from grace. Hence, from what was said at 2.15, it follows that no one is

blotted out of the book of life according to knowledge. But to be blotted out of the book of life according to some effect of grace is the same as to lose grace, by which a man pertained to the state of glory. Wherefore he who loses charity is said in a certain sense to be blotted out of the book of life, who according to present justice pertained to glory, afterwards through sin becomes guilty of damnation.

But against the conclusion there are three difficult passages of Scripture.

The first is Exodus 32, where Moses thus prayed to the Lord: "Either remit the sin of this people, or blot me out of the book which you have written." But since Doctors variously expound this passage, from it no way can it be proved that someone is blotted out of the book of the knowledge of God. The first exposition is of some who said that Moses, moved by a disturbance of mind, uttered that - yet Lyranus rightly reproves this; for of Moses, a most holy man and very gentle, such disturbance of mind is not to be presumed. The second interpretation is of Burgensis in the addition on that passage, who interprets "book of life" not as the knowledge of God, but as the book in which the deeds of illustrious men of the people of Israel used to be written, which he calls the book of the just; and Hilary favors this interpretation on Psalm 68 in those words: "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living." Yet Turingus, replying against the addition of Burgensis, sharply reproves it, proving from the context that Moses had spoken of the book of predestination; for immediately the Lord answered these words: "No; but he that has sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book" - as if to say, "Him alone will I blot out of the book of predestination." In my judgment, however, this does not prevent the sense of Burgensis from being able to square with the letter. For although Moses may have asked to be blotted out of the book of illustrious men of Israel, nevertheless the Lord would have answered well that no one is to be blotted out of that book except he who by his sins had merited it. A third exposition of the same passage is given by Lyranus and Dionysius the Carthusian, such that Moses asked this according to the inferior part, which was showing his affection toward his people; or in such a way that from excessive affection Moses desired, if it could be done, to be blotted out of the book of life and to be deprived of glory without his own fault, so that God might pardon the sin of His people. Finally, Augustine in Question 247 on Exodus thinks that Moses asked of the Lord either that he be blotted out of the book of life, or that the sin of the people be remitted: because just as he did not fear that he would be blotted out, so also without hesitation he trusted that the sin of his people would be remitted by the Lord.[2233]

From among these interpretations, that which is of Burgensis, adduced in second place, is most approved by me.

The second passage is Romans 9, where of himself Paul says: "I wished (optabam) to be anathema from Christ for my brethren." Doctors also variously explain this. First, Origen, St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, and St. Thomas in his commentaries on that Epistle say that the imperfect "I wished" (optabam) is used for the perfect of resolve, "I could wish" (optaverim), by which Paul expresses the disposition which he then had, to be anathema from Christ for his

2233. St. Augustine, Quaestiones in Heptateuchum, on Exodus, q. 247.

brethren; that is, if it could be done without sin, to be deprived of the fruition of Christ. Accordingly, Origen notes that Paul said these words from devotion of mind, not from prevarication, so as to show the affection with which he pursued his own people. Secondly, Anselm expounds that "anathema" is the same as "death"; as if Paul were to say that he desired to die for his brethren: which interpretation he took from St. Jerome, in the Epistle to Algasius, which is 151, q. 9. Nevertheless it stands against this that Paul added "from Christ"; for anathema "from Christ" signifies not bodily death but spiritual. But preferable to these seems the exposition of Jerome, Anselm, and Cajetan on that passage; whom Bartholomew Camerarius follows in the Catholic Dialogue, ch. 6, namely, that Paul speaks of the time in which he was in Judaism and with such zeal and love pursued the people of Israel and the ceremonies of the ancient law against the Gospel of Christ, that he then desired to be anathema and wholly separated from Christ for his brethren; that is, that he might defend the laws of his own brethren the Jews. Now this sense coheres correctly with the preceding and the following: for in the preceding chapter Paul seemed to have said many things with injury to the Jews, which in truth he had not said out of ill will; and in this chapter, since again he was going to speak of their reprobation, in order to show the sincerity of his own mind he under oath affirmed that he is tormented with great sorrow because he sees the Jews cast out from the grace of God; and for its confirmation he adduced the natural affection with which he pursued his own nation and the ceremonies, when he was in Judaism, by these words of Paul: "I speak the truth in Christ Jesus, I do not lie, my conscience bearing me witness in the Holy Spirit: because sorrow is great to me and continuous pain in my heart" (Rom 9:1 - 2). By which, under oath, he asserted that he was afflicted with great grief that he saw his brothers expelled from the grace of the Gospel. Then he confirms it from the affection with which he had always pursued them, saying: "For I myself wished to be anathema from Christ for my brethren, who are my kinsmen according to the flesh" (Rom 9:3).

The third passage is Psalm 68, which St. Thomas alleges in the argument "on the contrary": "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, and with the just let them not be written." Of this a twofold exposition is had: one is of Augustine, Ruffinus, Cassiodorus, and the Ordinary Gloss on that place, that "let them be blotted out" be taken not absolutely, but according to the hope and opinion of those men, and the sense be: let it become known to them that they are not written in the book of the life of God, who thought themselves to be signed in it; because according to the phrase of Scripture it is sometimes said that a thing is then done when it becomes known. The other interpretation is of Hilary and Jerome, that the verb "Let them be blotted out" signify the same as "that they may not be written" or "are not written." And this interpretation very well squares with the words that follow; for it is subjoined: "and with the just let them not be written." St. Thomas does not reply to the argument "on the contrary," but from the doctrine of the article what must be said is gathered. For since according to some effect of grace one is said to be blotted out of the book of life, David rightly asks: "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living," while he imprecates evil upon them on account of their sins.[2234]

2234. On the book of life as prescience, see St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, book 20.

Quaestio XXV - On the power of God

According to the division handed down, after the treatment of knowledge and will, let us treat of power, by which God outside Himself produces all things except sin, with most fitting right. In this our disputation St. Thomas differs; for this, as will be proved in the following disputation, is referred also to the intellect and to the will, just as predestination.

Articulus I - Whether there is power in God

To the first it is proceeded thus. It seems that in God there is no power. For just as prime matter stands to potency...

Objicitur primo: It seems that in God there is no power. For as prime matter stands to form, so does power to act. But prime matter, considered in itself, is without any act. Therefore the first agent, which is God, is without power.[2235]

Objicitur secundo: Further, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics IX, every power is surpassed by its act. For form is better than matter, and action than active power, since action is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God, because whatever is in God is God, as was shown above. Therefore there is no power in God.[2236]

Objicitur tertio: Further, power is a principle of operation. But the divine operation is His essence, since in God there is no accident. Now the divine essence has no principle. Therefore there is no power in God.

Objicitur quarto: Further, it was shown above that the knowledge of God and His will are the cause of things; but cause and principle are the same. Therefore one ought not to posit power in God, but only knowledge and will.[2237]

Sed contra is what is said in Psalm 88: "Powerful art Thou, O Lord, and Thy truth is round about Thee."

Respondeo dicendum: There is a twofold power, namely passive, which in no way is in God, and active, which one must supremely posit in God. For it is manifest that each thing, insofar as it is in act and is perfect, so far is it an active principle of something. But a thing suffers insofar as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above that God is pure act and absolutely and universally perfect; nor has any imperfection place in Him. Whence it chiefly befits Him to be an active principle and in no way to suffer. But the ratio of an active principle belongs to active power: for active power is a principle of acting upon another, whereas passive power is a principle of being acted upon by another.

2235. "Philosophus dicit 5. Meta. Relinquitur ergo ..." and "Lib. 9. Metaph. cap. tex. 19, 10 m. 03." (Aristotle, Metaphysics, as cited in the margin of the text).

2236. "Secundum Philosophum in 9. Metaphysicae ..." (as in the printed marginal citation).

2237. "Q. 3, art. 3; q. 4, art. 4; q. 19, art. 4." (Summa Theologiae I, as cited in the margin).

Ad primum ergo dicendum: Active power is not divided against act, but is founded upon it. For each thing acts according as it is in act; whereas passive power is divided against act, for each thing suffers according as it is in potency. Hence this power (namely, passive) is excluded from God, not, however, active

Ad secundum dicendum: Wherever act is something other than power, it must be that the act is nobler than the power. But the action of God is not other than His power, but each is the divine essence, since neither is His existence other than His essence. Hence it is not necessary that anything be nobler than the power of God

Ad tertium dicendum: Power in created things is not only a principle of action, but also of effect. Thus in God the ratio of power is saved as to this, that it is a principle of the effect, but not as to this, that it is a principle of action, which is the divine essence, unless perhaps according to our mode of understanding, inasmuch as the divine essence (which in itself simply contains beforehand whatever perfection is in created things) can be understood both under the aspect of action and under the aspect of power, just as it is also understood both under the aspect of a supposit having a nature and under the aspect of nature. Thus therefore in God the ratio of power is preserved as to this, that it is a principle of the effect

Ad quartum dicendum: Power is not posited in God as something differing from knowledge and will according to the thing, but only according to reason, inasmuch, namely, as power imports the notion of a principle executing that which the will commands, and to which knowledge directs. And these three in God agree according to the same. Or it should be said that the divine knowledge or will itself, insofar as it is an effective principle, has the notion of power. Hence the consideration of knowledge and will precedes in God the consideration of power, as a cause precedes operation and effect

Notatio circa articulum.

Conclusio est: In God there is active power.

Besides many things worthy of observation were present around the text of St. Thomas; only one seemed good to note here, the rest must of necessity be explained in the following disputation - namely, his mind in this question, in which he treats only of power by which God produces effects outside Himself, although he also hands down not a little in this article about power to immanent operations, as we shall report in the following disputation. But of the power of begetting the Son and breathing the Holy Spirit he treats in q. 41.

Disputatio CII - Whether the power of God is in any way distinct from His knowledge and will

- Status controversiae. Caput 1.
- What Durandus thought. Caput 2.
- That the truer opinion holds that power in God is formally the knowledge and the will. Caput 3.

- How power in God is knowledge and the intellect. Caput 4.
- Reply to Durandus's arguments. Caput 5.
- The doctrine of St. Thomas in the solutions of the arguments is explained. Caput 6.

Caput I - Status of the controversy

When we inquire about the power of God, what it is, we mean not passive power, but active. For it is certain, as St. Thomas teaches in this article, that passive power is not in God, as is clearly gathered from q. 3, on the simplicity of God, and q. 9, on immutability. Concerning the power of God as agent, two points lie outside controversy. One is that there is not a true active power in God in comparison to the immanent actions which are common to the Trinity, as intellection and volition. For although between St. Thomas and his school on the one side, and Scotus and his disciples on the other, there is the question whether in God the intellect is distinguished from intellection, and the will from volition, by nature of the thing and not merely by our intellect (since in general they do not think in the same way about the distinction of the attributes among themselves and from the essence, as we shall see in disputation 116), nevertheless there is no one who teaches that these immanent actions in God are true productions proceeding from the intellect and will by nature of the thing. For thus it would also be necessary to admit in God essential processions common to the three persons; whence it would also follow that there were more persons than three, indeed multiplied to infinity. Since therefore, in order that we concede some producing power by nature of the thing, it is also necessary to attribute to it a production which is a production not only according to our mode of understanding, but also by its own nature; and since none of the Scholastics has hitherto said that those productions through intellect and will, which we call essential operations, are common to God; it follows that no one teaches that in God there is by nature of the thing an active power of the intellect for understanding, and of the will for willing, common to the three persons - although some Scholastics do admit an active power in the Father by nature of the thing for begetting, and in the Father and the Son a producing power in the same way for spirating, of which we must speak in disputation 164. Therefore, with respect to the immanent operations that are common and essential, we ought only to concede active powers according to our mode of understanding, that is, powers which are conceived by us after the manner of an agent and efficient cause, although in reality they produce nothing. And this must be understood whether powers are distinguished from acts by nature of the thing, as Scotus thinks, or by reason alone, as St. Thomas holds: because a power which by nature of the thing is truly a power, and is not only conceived and named after the likeness of a power, produces some operation in reality; but such a power is not common in God with respect to understanding and willing. This is openly the mind of St. Thomas in this article, reply to the third objection, and in Contra Gentiles II, chapter 10, and of Ferrarensis in the same place.[2238]

2238. "St. Thomas. in hoc art. 1 ad 3; 2 Contra Gentiles, cap. 10; Ferrarien[sis] ibidem." (as in the printed marginal citations).

Another point without controversy is that in God there is an active power in comparison to creatures; for there is in God a principle by which truly and ...

But on the contrary is what is said in Psalm 88: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and thy truth is round about thee."

I answer that it must be said that there is a twofold power (*potentia*), namely passive, which in no way is in God, and active, which must in the highest degree be posited in God. For it is manifest that each thing, insofar as it is in act (*actus*) and perfect, is in this respect an active principle of something; but a thing suffers insofar as it is deficient and imperfect. But it has been shown above that God is pure act and absolutely and universally perfect, nor does any imperfection have place in Him. Whence it befits Him in the highest degree to be an active principle and in no way to suffer. Now the notion of an active principle belongs to active power. For active power is a principle of acting upon another; passive power, however, is a principle of being acted upon by another, as in the 5th book of the Metaphysics.[2239] It remains, therefore, that in God there is in the highest degree active power.

Reply to the first: Active power is not divided against act, but is founded upon it. For a thing acts insofar as it is in act; but passive power is divided against act. For a thing suffers insofar as it is in potency (*potentia*). Whence passive power is excluded from God, not active power.

Reply to the second: Although every act is other than power, and an act is nobler than power, nevertheless the action of God is not other than His power, but both are the divine essence (*essentia*); but still necessarily His action is other than His essence - no, rather: His action is not other than His essence. Whence it is not necessary that there be in Him anything other than the power of God.

Reply to the third: Power in created things is not only a principle of action, but also of effect. Thus, in God the notion of power is saved insofar as it is a principle of an effect, but not insofar as it is a principle of an action which is the divine essence - unless perhaps according to our mode of understanding, inasmuch as the divine essence in itself simply contains beforehand whatever of perfection is in created things, and so it can be understood both under the notion of action and under the notion of power; just as also in our way of understanding the same thing has the notion of supposit (*suppositum*) and of nature (*natura*). Thus in God the notion of power is saved only insofar as it is a principle of an effect.

Reply to the fourth: Power is not posited in God as something different from knowledge (*scientia*) and will (*voluntas*) according to thing, but only according to notion; inasmuch, namely, as power imports the notion of a principle executing that which the will commands and to which knowledge directs. These three come together in God according to the same [reality]. Or it may be said that the very knowledge or will of God, insofar as it is a principle that is effective, has the notion of power. Whence the consideration of knowledge and will precedes in God the consideration of power, just as cause precedes operation and effect.

2239. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5; also 9, text 19 (as in the margin).

Note on the article.

The conclusion is: In God there is active power.

Besides the many things worthy of observation around the text of St. Thomas, it pleased us to note only one, the rest of which it will be necessary to explain in the following disputation. This is, namely, that his mind in this question is to dispute only about the power by which God produces effects outside Himself, although he also treats somewhat in this article of the power with respect to immanent operations, as we shall report in the following disputation. But he discusses the power of generating the Son and of spirating the Holy Spirit in q. 41.

Whether in some way the power of God differs from His knowledge and will

Status controversiae - Caput I

When we inquire about the power of God, what it may be, we do not choose to speak of passive power, but of active. For it is certain, as St. Thomas holds in this article, and is clearly gathered from q. 3 on the simplicity of God and q. 9 on immutability, that there is not in God passive power. But about the active power of God two points stand outside controversy. One is that there is not a true active power in God in comparison to immanent actions, which are common to the Trinity, as in intellection and volition. For although between St. Thomas and his school on the one hand, and Scotus and his disciples on the other, there is another question, namely whether in God the intellect is distinguished from intellection and the will from volition by nature of the thing and not only by our intellect (since, as we shall see in Disputation 116, they do not hold the same view about the distinction of the attributes among themselves and from the essence), yet there is no one who teaches that these immanent actions in God are true productions proceeding from the intellect and will by nature of the thing; for thus it would also be necessary to admit in God essential processions common to the three persons, whence it would follow that there are more persons than three, indeed multiplied to infinity. Since, therefore, if we concede some power productive by nature of the thing, it is also necessary to attribute to it production which not only according to our way of understanding, but also by its own nature is production; and none of the Scholastics has hitherto said that there are in God those productions through the intellect and will which we call essential operations common to God; it follows that no one teaches that there is in God by nature of the thing an active power of the intellect to understand and of the will to will common to the three persons; although some Scholastics do admit an active power in the Father by nature of the thing to beget in the Father, and in the Father and the Son a productive power in the same way to spirate, of which we must speak in Disputation 164. Therefore, with respect to immanent operations that are common and essential, we ought to concede only active powers according to our way of understanding, that is, powers which are conceived by us after the manner of an agent and efficient, although in reality they produce nothing. But this is to be understood whether powers are distinguished from acts by nature of the thing, as Scotus holds, or only by reason, as St. Thomas thinks; and this, because a power which by nature of the thing is truly a power and is not only conceived and named after the manner of a power, produces some operation in reality; such,

however, a power is not common in God for understanding and willing. This is openly the mind of St. Thomas in this article, reply to the third objection, and in Contra Gentiles II, chapter 10, and of Ferrarensis in the same place.[2240]

Another point without controversy is that in God there is an active power in comparison to creatures; for there is in God a principle by which truly and really He produces creatures, and an active power is nothing other than a principle of production and of action; wherefore there is in God not only according to our mode of understanding, but also in reality an active power.

Moreover, when we say that this active power of God truly is in God with respect to creatures and not only according to our way of understanding, we do not believe that it is distinguished by nature of the thing from the essence, although Scotus feels so; but for this reason we say that there truly is in God an active power and not only by the consideration of our intellect, because something proceeds according to the thing from the cause, whether the power be the same as the essence, or be distinguished from it by nature of the thing. For in the question it is posited whether even in creatures the active power is distinguished by nature of the thing from the essence to which it belongs: nevertheless all assert that in creatures there truly is active power and not only according to the consideration of our intellect, but also in reality.

From this, however, that we concede in God a power in reality with respect to creatures, we do not therefore assert that there is in this power a relation more than of reason to creatures; nor did St. Thomas wish to teach this when in Contra Gentiles II, chapter 10 he said: "It is manifest that 'power' is said of God by respect to things made according to the reality, not by respect to the action, as some falsely suppose; otherwise there would also be in the power of God a respect more than of reason to things made, which would accrue in time, which is absurd: but that 'according to the reality' ought to be referred, not to the respect, so as to denote a real respect inherent, but to the power, so as to denote that there truly and really is in God a power producing those things which are made; but that the power of immanent actions is only according to our consideration." Later we shall show in Disputation 104, chapter 6, that in God there is no respect to creatures more than of reason. These things being supposed, the present controversy is what in God the active power is with respect to creatures, whether it be the intellect and the will, or something else; and since in God by His very nature all things are one except what are relatively opposed, the question now is whether, according to our mode of understanding, active power differs from the intellect and the will.

What Durandus thought.

This opinion is marvellously approved by some more recent writers; and by the same proportion they distinguish in the angels the motive faculty, by which they move themselves and bodies, from the will and intellect - some indeed with Scotus by nature of the thing, others with St. Thomas by our intellect. Wherefore they thus think that the executive power differs in God and in the angels from the will and intellect, so that it includes neither the intellect, nor knowledge, nor the will in its

2240. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 25, a. 1 ad 3; Contra Gentiles II, c. 10; Ferrarensis, ibidem.

formal notion. St. Thomas also in this article, in the first solution to the fourth objection, seems to favor this opinion, where he seems to distinguish according to reason the executive power in God from the intellect and will.

But Durandus confirms this first: because the will and the intellect are not the proximate principle of things; but power is the proximate principle; therefore power is not the intellect and will. That the intellect and will are not the proximate principle, he proves because a power which, according to its proper notion, equally regards a created and an uncreated object is not the proximate principle of producing something outside; for the principle of producing does not regard that which cannot be created. But the intellect and will, according to their proper notions, regard both the created and the uncreated, since they deal with creatures as with God, who cannot be created, as also with impossibles, which likewise cannot be created; therefore they cannot be the principle of producing creatures; wherefore the power of God which is constituted as the principle of these things must be distinguished from them. Then it is confirmed: because, since in God all the attributes are in reality something one most simple and are distinguished only by our reason, after the manner of those things which we see in created things; and in created things, as in animals, which are moved by cognition and appetite, besides these two powers there is another executive of motion; by the same proportion in God besides the intellect and the will another power must be posited which is the proximate principle of producing creatures by executing that which the intellect has judged and the will has decreed. This opinion seems to Cajetan probable in this article, although he judges the opposite more probable and more conformable to the mind of the holy Doctor.[2241]

Caput III - The truer opinion holds that power in God is formally knowledge and will

The truer opinion is that of others, who teach that no other executive power is to be constituted in God besides the intellect and will, or if it be distinguished only by our reason. Of God thus St. Thomas expressly thought in this article, and Scotus in the first book, distinction 37, question "Utrum proximum principium operandi in Deo sit potentia vel voluntas," agrees that God understands and works, but not according to a distinct subsistence, as if there were in Him something immense, since one and the same is His essence and the divine operations. The same doctrine is held by Bañez in q. 8, article 1; by Ferrarensis in the eighth distinction, question 1, ad 2 and to the first; by Cajetan in this article; and St. Thomas in the solution to the fourth objection also favors it, and elsewhere in responding to the argument he says that nothing else besides the power of God is the proximate principle by which He produces effects, but the very will, insofar as it acts, and the intellect, insofar as it knows, and the will, insofar as it chooses. And in my judgment this opinion is the more probable.

2241. Cajetan, In Iam q. 25, a. 1, ad 4 (as cited in the margin).

We must confirm and explain this opinion; two things must be shown to us. One is that it is in vain to posit in God an executive power besides the intellect and will, which will be proved in this chapter. The other is, whether power in God is the intellect and will themselves, or the operation of each, namely knowledge and volition, which must be explained in the following chapter.

The former, therefore, is proved in a twofold way, both in general about God and the angels, and also by a particular reason about God. In general, indeed, and quite well, as Cajetan teaches below on q. 54, article 5, the power moving according to place in the soul and in intelligences is the intellect; and it is only diversified on the part of the body, for since the body is subject to the soul, it needs another force and faculty by which it may obey it: therefore, and much more, in God there is not to be attributed a moving and executive power distinct from the intellect and will. Moreover, in separated substances it is in vain to posit such a faculty absent that which is the principle of things; and in this sense we can interpret St. Thomas whom in the preceding chapter we have alleged according to the truer sentence. But the opinion of Durandus, which distinguishes power from knowledge and will so that it in no way includes them, or any one of them, we shall confirm and explain by showing two things. One is that it is pointless to constitute in God an executive power besides intellect and will; this will be proved in this chapter. The other is whether power in God is the intellect and will themselves, or the operation of each, namely knowledge and volition; which must be explained in the following chapter.

The truer opinion is that of those who teach that in God no other executive power (*potentia exequiens*) is to be constituted, besides intellect (*intellectus*) and will (*voluntas*), or else only distinct by our reason. Of God Scotus speaks expressly in this way in the First Book, distinction 37, question 1, when he proves that God can be understood to act where He is not according to substance, otherwise He would not be immense, because His omnipotence is His will; the same is taught by Ballolis in the Second Book, distinction 8, question 1, § Quantum ad primum; Ferrarensis on Contra Gentiles II, chapter 10; and Cajetan in this article; St. Thomas also favors this in the fourth reply, when, answering the second argument, he says that the power of God is nothing other than knowledge or will, inasmuch as it is the principle of things; and Carnariensis judges this more probable in the Prima Pars of St. Thomas, question 27, article 1, disputation 4, part 2.[2242]

Accordingly, in this opinion, power in God includes knowledge (*scientia*) and will, or both together, but adds the respect and notion of a principle: that is, knowledge and will themselves, inasmuch as they are efficacious for producing things, are called in God power. And on that account, in our mode of understanding, power and will differ as including and included, because power includes will and knowledge; but knowledge and will in themselves can be considered apart, and be distinguished from it by us.

Deinde confirmatur: since in God all the attributes are really something one most simple, and, according to the truer sentence, are distinguished only by our reason in the likeness of those which we see in created things; and in created things, as in animals which are moved by cognition and

2242. Scotus, In I Sent. d. 37, q. 1; Ballolis (In II Sent.) d. 8, q. 1, § "Quantum ad primum"; Ferrarensis, In Contra Gentiles II, c. 10; Cajetan, In Iam, q. 25, a. 1; St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 25, a. 1, ad 4; Carnariensis, In Iam, q. 27, a. 1, disp. 4, pars 2.

appetite, besides these two powers there is another that executes movement; by the same proportion, in God, besides intellect and will, another power ought to be constituted which is the proximate principle of producing creatures by executing that which the intellect has judged and the will has decreed. This opinion Caietan seems to judge probable in this article, although he deems the opposite to be more probable and more conformable to the mind of the holy Doctor.

Prius ergo, in general, let us speak briefly concerning God and Angels, and then we will confirm it in particular by reason.

In animals there is also constituted an executive power in the body itself; this is because the soul, since by its nature it is conjoined to the body, does not perform corporeal effects except by the body as by an instrument; and therefore, as we shall say below, chapter 3, of question 194, separated it cannot move the bodies which it moves when conjoined. Therefore, since neither God nor the Angel needs a body, it is pointless to ascribe to them, besides appetite, that is, will, another executive faculty; otherwise this would also befit souls when conjoined.

Confirmatur: furthermore, an executive faculty distinct from appetite is constituted in such a way that it is set under it and operates only at its nod. Such subjection we rightly understand in man, who consists of a twofold substance, one spiritual, the other corporeal; but in the most simple substance, which is God, and in the Angel, which lacks composition, it is not sufficiently intelligible how one faculty would obey another for executing, or what necessity there is for us to constitute such a distinct faculty.

Ceterum in God no other faculty can possibly exist besides will; this is proved by testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers: as in Ephesians 1, "He works all things according to the counsel of His will"; in Psalm 134 (Vulg. 135), "All that He willed, the Lord has done"; in Psalm 148, "He said, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created." Likewise the authority of the Fathers confirms it; for Leo I, in his sermons on the Nativity, says: "God, whose nature is goodness, whose will is power," etc.; and Augustine, in the book of Meditations, chapter 29, on God: "Whose will is deed; whose willing is being able."[2243] Yet these, and many other testimonies, only prove that the production of all things depends upon the nod of God; but that there is not also another executive power which depends upon will, as in us, is certainly not gathered from them. For of any man whatever it is rightly said: "He walks when he wills; where he wills; and whither he wills," solely because, at the nod of his will, his power, moving itself according to place, operates. And with respect to those things which are subject to the nod of his will, it is said that "his being able is his willing"; by no other reason, except because that is wholly subjected to his will.

Hac tamen ratione efficaci id confirmari potest. For although in God we consider many perfections and attributes, distinct by our reason in the likeness of those which we see in us, and this does not conflict with His supreme simplicity, nevertheless we ought never to multiply in God attributes and faculties, even in our mode of understanding, if in any way detriment is thereby done to the perfection and infinite efficacy of His; but to constitute an executive power distinct

2243. Leo I, Sermons on the Nativity: "Deus, cuius natura bonitas, cuius voluntas potentia"; Augustine, Meditationes, c. 29, "De Deo": "Cuius voluntas opus, cuius velle posse est."

from intellect and will detracts from the perfection of the divine will: for from this it follows that will, according to itself, is conceived by us without perfect and infinite virtue, since another faculty is assigned to it for executing - just as in us, according to itself, it is not efficacious and complete for operating, since it needs another faculty as an instrument. Therefore another executive faculty is not to be constituted in God distinct, even according to reason, from will; for the will ought to be conceived so perfect in the notion of will, that, when it wills and desires to do something, it attains it by itself.

At dicunt aliqui: God is able to operate outside Himself inasmuch as He is infinite, not in the genus of one knowing and willing, but simply in the genus of being; for this infinity in the genus of being simply befits God, inasmuch as, by a certain eminent reason, He has in Himself every perfection which He can communicate to others. Therefore the notion of omnipotence befits God, not by reason of intellect and will, but proximally by reason of His essence, which is simply infinite in the genus of being. And this very thing would belong to the other forms as well, namely, that without an accident added to them they would operate, unless they were limited: but God, as His infinity according to existence (*esse*), not only by reason of His essence has in Himself to be, but also to be able to operate; and thus omnipotence befits God, not mediately through intellect and will, but proximally by reason of His essence.

Respondeo: first, that infinity according to existence, of which the holy Doctor treats in question 7, is an attribute different from omnipotence; which two the aforesaid Doctors confound without reason, when they say that infinity according to essence is nothing else than to contain in itself by an eminent reason, as cause, all other beings and their perfections. Then, as is established in disputation 25, infinity according to essence is not to contain every perfection, even a created one, by an eminent reason, but to depend on none. Wherefore that proposition which the adversaries assume - "God is powerful, insofar as He is infinite according to essence" - if the particle "insofar as" denotes that the formal reason of infinity and of power is the same, is false: for the sense is, "God is powerful by that by which He is infinite"; and therefore, since infinity and power are two distinct attributes, the proposition will be false in the formal sense, just as if I should say, "God is intelligent by that by which He is infinite." But if the particle "insofar as" be a note which they call "of per se-ness," the proposition will be true: because from this, that God is infinite according to essence, He has, in our mode of understanding, that He is intelligent, willing, and powerful. From this, however, it does not follow that power is distinct from intellect and will, but rather that it is the same in the way which will be explained in the following chapter.

How power in God is knowledge and will

Since it has now been proved that power in God is to be reduced to intellect and will, it remains that we see whether this power is the intellect and will themselves in first act (*actus primus*), or else in second act (*actus secundus*), namely knowledge and volition.

Ponitur autem knowledge besides will for the constituting of power, because will is not understood to be powerful by itself, but by the direction of intellect, by whose operation it is said to be constituted in first act.

Caput IV - In what way the power in God is knowledge and intellect

Since it has already been proved that power in God is to be reduced to intellect and will, it remains that we see whether this power is the intellect and will themselves in first act (actus primus), or else in second act (actus secundus), namely knowledge and volition.

Reason for doubting. On the one hand it seems that power ought to be assigned to the intellect and will in first act, because power is necessarily in God, whereas not every volition necessarily befits God. On the other hand, power seems to be knowledge itself and volition, because power ought to be the proximate principle of operation; but God accomplishes all things by knowledge and by volition as the proximate principle, whereas by intellect and by the faculty of willing as a remote principle.

I, however, judge that a middle course must be taken: namely, that power is to be attributed to God, first, so that it is in Him necessarily and from the nature of the thing, nor could it in any way not be; then, saving this condition, so that it be the nearer principle of operation that can be. And in order that these two be rightly observed, we shall assign power to nothing more fittingly than to the knowledge of God and to the will, which is the faculty of willing. By knowledge I understand not the vision which is of future things - for this is posterior to power, since God is understood as powerful before He knows any future; moreover, that knowledge of future things cannot be practical, as we noted in disputation 69, chapter 2 - but I understand the knowledge of possibles, insofar as it is practical, as is there explained.[2244]

Knowledge is posited besides will for the constituting of power, because will is not understood to be powerful by itself, but by the direction of intellect, whose operation is said to be constituted in first act. Yet more certainly we say that knowledge in act rather than the very faculty of the intellect pertains to power: because, so far as can be, power ought to be constituted as the nearer principle of work; but knowledge operates more proximately than the intellect. On the part of will, however, at whose nod all things are done, that ought to be constituted as power which is the very faculty of willing, not volition; although volition is nearer to effect than the faculty, nevertheless we must assert that power is the proximate principle of operation in such wise that, from the nature of the thing, it inheres in the agent, and not freely, and that God is not powerful because He wills, but because He is; as St. Thomas very well noted, ad primum. For even if God should will to produce nothing, nonetheless He would be powerful and would be said to have power, just as He now has it, to produce things that will never be: therefore His power is not the act of willing, but the very faculty of will.

But one could object that in God, according to our way of understanding, there are a twofold effect of will: one by which He necessarily loves possible things; another, free, by which He wills to produce the things that shall be, as we explained in disputation 80, chapter 2. We could therefore assert that power in God is the affection of will which necessarily inheres in Him with respect to possible creatures. I answer that this affection is not the principle of things as they exist, and so does not pertain to power. Moreover, that it is not the principle of them is proved: first, it is not a principle through itself, because it is only a certain love of simple complacency, as we there noted, and hence of itself inefficacious; by this love, indeed, God loves things which He will never bring about. Then, this love is not a principle through another efficacious effect, by which God should will to produce whatever He will produce in time; for in God an efficacious affection does not arise from an affection of simple complacency, as happens in us, in whom these two affections are distinct. Therefore that affection concerning possible things does not pertain to power: rightly then it has been said that the power of God is knowledge and the faculty of willing. For by these two He is by His nature powerful to do whatever He does.

To this power, moreover, we ought to assign besides the external operation which is to be in time, also another immanent operation of His will itself, by which He immediately operates all things, namely an efficacious affection and decree by which He foreordained all things from eternity.

From what has been said it follows that, even if we say that the action of the divine intellect pertains to the power of God, by no reason does there pertain to it that action of the intellect which is called a command: for this action of the intellect is an insinuation of the will, which is wont to be called an intimation after the mode of speech, as we shall show in 1 - 2, question 17, article 1.[2245] But such an insinuation of the will would have to be of the free will, by which God would decree to do something, as is evident: therefore, since it has been proved that the affection of free will in God is not His power, because it is free in God, it follows that the insinuation itself is not power, because that too would be free in God, if such an insinuation befitted God. Add that, as we said above in disputation 87, chapter 3, such an insinuation and command in God is not in order to provide for things, or to effect and govern them: therefore such insinuation is not the power of God.[2246]

In the same proportion, in angels the moving power according to place is not at all distinct from will and intellect, but includes them, insofar as they are a true principle as referred to the very motion. But because in an angel neither does knowledge nor volition inhere always, whereas power ought to, therefore we say that no knowledge, nor any volition, pertains to power, but the bare intellect and will; yet neither of these powers works proximately through itself, but through an elicited immanent act of knowledge and volition.

But some object in this way. Since power in God is a certain attribute of God, peculiar and distinct from others, we ought to assign it as simple according to our way of conceiving, and not as if pieced together from two others, namely from intellection and from will. I answer: since God acts

2244. Disputatio 69, cap. 2.
2245. 1 - 2, q. 17, a. 1.
2246. Disputatio 87, cap. 3.

outside Himself, not insofar as He is, but insofar as He wills, and will cannot act without cognition, it ought not to seem strange if from these two we constitute in God the power which is the principle of operating: for such an agent requires two principles, in order to be understood as powerful; yet in such a way that each is not the principle of the work in the same mode; for the intellect is a principle after the mode of a director, but the will after the mode of an impeller, as was said in disputation 81, chapter 2.[2247]

To the actions put forward for the opinion of Durandus we can easily reply.

Reply to the first argument of Durandus. To the first we say that the intellect and will are not the proximate principle of things, because they work by means of knowledge and volition; nevertheless the faculty of will, without the operation of willing, pertains immediately to power, although the intellect pertains only by reason of knowledge, as has been explained. For thus we must constitute power as the proximate principle of operation, yet so that it is not in the agent freely, but naturally and necessarily: therefore on the part of will we said there is no act that is itself power, but the bare faculty of willing. The reason by which Durandus proves that the intellect and will are not the proximate principle of operation is trifling: for that the intellect and will of God are conversant about the created and the uncreated, whether about God or about impossible things, does not prove that they are not in some way the power of God. I say "in some way," because intellect and will extend more widely than power; for power regards creatures only; but the intellect, as intellect, also regards the uncreated, as God, or even impossibles that cannot be created, as was said in disputation 61; the will, however, as will, is at least conversant about God Himself: for about impossibles it does not operate, unless perhaps by an act of hatred and displeasure. Therefore that reason of Durandus does not prove that intellect and will, under a peculiar mode, are not the power of God, namely by the operation whereby they are principles of things; from which only it would follow that power in God is not at all distinct from will and intellect, in such a way that it does not include them; it does, however, rightly follow that it differs from them, as the includent from the included, or as that which exceeds from that which is exceeded.

Reply to the second. I answer to the latter reason from what I said in chapter 3 at the end, namely that, according to our way of understanding from created things, there are to be distinguished in God various attributes, so that nothing be derogated from infinite perfection and virtue; but so that whatever imperfection there is in creatures we remove when we transfer their properties to God, and that which in us proceeds from imperfection - that power which executes being altogether distinct from will, because will is not of itself efficacious to operate by itself - we attribute to God after another mode than to us: for the will of God is most perfect; and thus we attribute to God an executing power otherwise than to ourselves.

Moreover, certain recent writers, in favor of the more proper opinion of Durandus, that power in God is not intellection and will, use this reasoning. God is not therefore omnipotent because He knows all things; rather, He therefore knows all things because He is omnipotent: for in Himself, as omnipotent, as in a cause, He knows all other things: likewise, He is not therefore omnipotent

2247. Disputatio 81, cap. 2.

because He wills, as St. Thomas very well said, ad primum; indeed, He is not omnipotent because He can will to produce: therefore neither intellect nor will pertain to the power of God. I answer first, that, according to our way of understanding, God does not therefore know all things because He is omnipotent, but rather He beholds them in Himself, not in their cause, because He is omnipotent, but in Himself, as in an expressed species; both points above I showed in disputation 60.[2248] Then as to will I say, God is not power because He should will to produce - that which already in the preceding chapter we expressly noted - and thus we said that the willing of God is not the power of God; but rather God is therefore powerful because He can will to produce: for unless He had a will by which He could will, He would produce nothing. Ill do therefore those Doctors assume that God is not therefore omnipotent because He can will.

What we have hitherto said is in accord with the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor in the replies to the arguments, if it be rightly understood; yet if Caietan, with his wonted subtlety interpreting his mind, did not fully attain it.

First, then, among other things which he treats in dissolving the second and third arguments, is this proposition: "Action, if transferred to God, is the same as the divine essence." Concerning this proposition he himself doubts how it can be that the notion of power, which in creatures is transitive, is so to be attributed to God that it is altogether the same by nature with the essence itself. He answers this two ways, according to the two opinions which St. Thomas seems to touch in the solution to the fourth: for if we say that the power of God is the same as intellect and will, then it is plain how the action of power, transferred to God, is the same as His essence; because the immanent action of intellect and will - by the means of which He operates outwardly - is as to the power of God the same as the essence, but not the transitive action which is produced in the creature. But if power in God be something wholly distinct from intellect and will, as Durandus thought, which opinion too St. Thomas seems to indicate in the solution to the fourth, then one must not have recourse to immanent action, but the action of power is to be said to be the same as the divine essence, because in every agent that works by a transitive operation, besides the relation of the agent there remains also something absolute, which is the foundation of that relation, distinct from the very power of acting. But in God, operating by power, that foundation is altogether the same as the essence, by reason of which that proposition set above is true, namely: the action of power, if transferred to God, is the same as the essence.

But besides the fact that the foregoing doctrine of Caietan is manifestly false and against Aristotle, it is also against the mind of the holy Doctor. First, assuredly, it is false and against Aristotle: for he, in Metaphysics V, chapter 15, does not think that the relation of the agent is founded upon some absolute thing which remains in the agent, but upon the very action; for he says that relatives, according to the genus, are only powers and the actions of powers.[2249] Second, if some absolute thing should arise in the agent while it acts, then the agent, insofar as it acts, would be moved; which Aristotle judges absurd in Physics III, chapter 3, and from there proves that action is not in the agent but in the patient.[2250] Third, it cannot be understood, much less explained,

2248. Disputatio 60.
2249. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, c. 15.

what that absolute thing in the agent should be in which the relation is founded besides power itself; therefore it is asserted in vain. Wherefore Ferrarensis more rightly teaches, against the Contra Gentiles, that from a transitive action nothing remains in the agent besides relation.[2251] Whether indeed this can be considered after the mode of act and of action, we shall speak below in disputation 175, chapter 1.

Moreover, that the mind of St. Thomas is otherwise is easy to see for one considering the solution of the second and third arguments.

Articulus II - Whether the power of God is infinite

It will easily be clear that St. Thomas nowhere insinuated that proposition which Cajetan draws out. Rather, in the second solution he speaks only of power compared with an immanent act, and shows that then only is the act nobler than the power when the act is distinguished from it, as in us intellection is distinguished from the intellect. But he does not speak of the transitive action of the power itself, just as in the third solution; nor does the argument contend that this action is nobler or more perfect than the abiding power.

Therefore St. Thomas answers to that argument, that in God there is not a power with respect to immanent acts, for which acts would not be nobler, because the act is the same as the essence, and the power itself by the nature of the thing; although in solution 3 he concedes for another reason that there is not a power by the nature of the thing with respect to immanent actions. Therefore, in solution 3 he asserts that in God there is no power with respect to operations, that is, actions, understood as immanent - except according to our manner of understanding: because, as we said in the first chapter, in order that there be power according to the thing, it is necessary that by its nature the power be distinguished from the operation. He nevertheless concedes that there is in God a power with respect to an effect, that is, with respect to a transitive operation - for so he calls it - and he distinguishes it from the immanent, which he calls action, on the ground that the effect produced outside God is by the nature of the thing distinguished from God himself and from his power. There can therefore be in God a real power to an effect, and not only according to our manner of understanding.[2252]

One must also observe that the immanent actions of the intellect and will, by which God produces creatures outside himself, are nowise transitive actions of the divine power itself - as some Thomists have wrongly thought - but besides the immanent actions of intellect and will, which rather are the principle and efficient cause of the operation and of the effect that transits outside God, there is also a transitive action and operation, which is the same as the effect itself. For every cause has an act that is middle between itself and the effect: just as form by a middle, namely information, as by its proper act gives existence, and matter by a middle, namely reception which is passion, has existence from form: so likewise an agent by a middle, namely action,

2250. Aristotle, Physics III, c. 3.
2251. Ferrarensis, in Contra Gentiles, cap. (as cited in the text).
2252. Compare above, disputation 60.

produces existence - not by a middle action which should be to it as a form for producing an effect, such as intellection is to the intellect and volition to the will for operating outside, but by that which is a way between the cause itself, as informed in first act, and the effect itself - such as creation is in the creature produced, and generatedness-created in the thing generated. This doctrine is gathered from St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 2, chapter 1.[2253]

Secondly, concerning the doctrine of the second solution, note that then the act is more perfect than the power when it is immanent, as intellection is more perfect than the intellect; for that act is the perfection of the power abiding in it. But as often as the operation of a power is transitive - like building - it is not nobler than the power which is the principle of it. For such an action is not the perfection of the power itself, but the effect and the thing produced outside, as St. Thomas teaches in the same place; and thus the art's power is much more perfect than the work of the art itself and the production thereof. Nor does it stand in the way that the more perfect be ordered to the imperfect: for it is not ordered to it as to the ultimate end, but by means of it to a further end of man and of the universe.

Third, it must be noticed that, of the two solutions which St. Thomas employs to the fourth argument, the former is that power differs according to reason from knowledge and will so that it does not include them; but that solution does not entirely satisfy the holy Doctor, and therefore he added the latter solution, which teaches that power is knowledge itself and will, insofar as they are principles of things - a position Ferrarensis deems truer in the place alleged, book 3, chapter 1.[2254] Wherefore Ferrarensis was deceived in Contra Gentiles, book 2, chapter 1, ad 4, when he said that the former solution was of St. Thomas's mind, and that the latter is not found in the ancient codices; for if that were true, he himself, in the same book, chapter 10 - where he says that power in God is knowledge and will themselves - would have taught against the holy Doctor; or he would not have remembered himself, as he ought.

Objection 1. It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For every infinite thing is imperfect, according to the Philosopher in Physics 3. But the power of God is not imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite.[2255]

Objection 2. Further, every power is manifested through its effect, otherwise it would be in vain. If, therefore, the power of God were infinite, it could produce an infinite effect. But that is impossible.[2256]

Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher proves in Physics 8 that, if the power of some body were infinite, it would move in an instant. But God does not move in an instant; rather he moves a spiritual creature through time, and a bodily creature through place and time, according to St. Augustine in the Literal Meaning of Genesis, book 8, chapters 20, 22, and 23. Therefore his power is not infinite.[2257]

2253. St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles 2, c. 1.
2254. Ferrarensis, in Contra Gentiles, cap. (as cited in the text).
2255. Aristotle, Physics III; cf. the scholastic loci indicated in the margins.
2256. See the loci noted in the margin: c. 19; Opusc. 9, c. 4; and the references in Metaphysics.
2257. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, lib. 8, c. 20, 22, 23.

But on the contrary: Hilary says in De Trinitate, that God is of immense strength and power. But every immense thing is infinite. Therefore the divine power is infinite.[2258]

I answer that, as has already been said, active power is found in God according as he himself is in act. But his existence is infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by any recipient, as is clear from what was said above when the infinitude of the divine essence was treated. Wherefore it is necessary that the active power of God be infinite. For in all agents this is found: the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts, the greater is its power in acting. Thus, the hotter a thing is, the greater power it has to heat. And it would indeed have an infinite power to heat, if its heat were infinite. Therefore, since the very divine essence through which God acts is infinite (as was shown above), it follows that his power is infinite.[2259]

Reply to the first: The Philosopher speaks of the infinite that is on the part of matter not terminated by form - the kind of infinite that befits quantity. But thus the divine essence is not infinite (as was shown above), and consequently neither is his power. Hence it does not follow that it is imperfect.

Reply to the second: The whole power of a univocal agent is manifested in its effect. For man's generative power can do nothing more than generate a man. But the whole power of a non-univocal agent is not manifested in the production of its effect: just as the power of the sun is not wholly manifested in the production of some animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is manifest that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing else can agree with him either in species or in genus, as was shown above.[2260] Hence it remains that his effect is always less than his power. Therefore it is not necessary that the infinite power of God be manifested in this, that he produce an infinite effect. And yet, even if he produced no effect, the power of God would not be in vain: for that is in vain which is ordered to an end which it does not attain. But the power of God is not ordered to an effect as to an end; rather it is itself the end of its effect.

Reply to the third: The Philosopher in Physics 8 proves that, if some body had infinite power, it would move in non-time; and yet he shows that the power of the mover of the heaven is infinite, because it can move through an infinite time. It remains therefore according to his intention that, if there were an infinite power of a body, it would move in non-time; not however the power of an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is that a body moving another body is a univocal agent. Hence the whole power of the agent must be manifested in the motion. Therefore, the greater the power of the moving body, the faster it moves; and thus if it were infinite, it would move disproportionately swiftly, that is, it would move in non-time. But an incorporeal mover is a non-univocal agent. Hence it is not necessary that its power be manifested in motion in such a way that it move in non-time - especially since it moves according to the disposition of its will.

Note concerning the article. The conclusion of the article is: The power of God is infinite. Its rationale is clear in the text, and will be more fully explained in the following disputation. For the present, only note, in regard to St. Thomas's text, that here he is not treating of the infinity of the

2258. St. Hilary, De Trinitate; see also the articles cited in the margin.
2259. See above, q. 7, art. 1.
2260. See above, q. 3, art. 3; and q. 9, art. 4, 21, 36.

essence - about which he disputed in question 7 - but of the infinity of the power, which differs in ratio from the infinity of the essence, just as power is distinguished from essence itself: and this difference will be made clear in the disputation.

How being and nothing are said to differ infinitely. Although between no power and any effect whatsoever there is no proportion, nevertheless the distance is not infinite: for nothing is exceeded by being except by reason of entity, which is finite. If, however, nothing and something are said to differ infinitely, as one species from another and a genus, this infinitude is not absolute, but a certain likeness: namely, because they are so distant between themselves that neither by increase nor by decrease can the one reach the other, which is proper to the comparison of the finite to the infinite. But such an infinitude does not seem sufficient to require an infinite power in the genus of power. For that some power should produce only one species, as happens in univocal agents, and another two species, as in equivocal agents, which produce many things diverse in species, does not prove an infinite power in that which produces an effect diverse in species. We shall examine and confirm this reasoning more fully below in disputation 277, chapter 1.

Disputatio CIII - What the infinity of the power of God is, and in what way it is distinguished

- Various opinions, chapter I.
- The scholastic explanation and demonstration of the infinity of the power of God, chapter II.
- An argument against the aforesaid position, chapter III.

Caput I - Various opinions

The first opinion: of those who assert the infinity of the power of God from the production of things from nothing. Certain authors - Henry and St. Thomas among them - prove the infinity of the power of God from creation: for, in the manner in which an agent, in order to elicit an effect from some potency of a subject, requires a special power, and for eliciting it from a lesser potency a greater power (because the difficulty increases on the side of the subject), so, to produce an effect from no potency at all - that is, from nothing - an infinite power is required, since there remains no proportion whatsoever between nothing and the power to create.

Scotus and Durandus impugn this reasoning; their objections will be set forth below.[2261]

...or received from another, which is so proper to God that it cannot belong to a creature even through an infinite time. But this kind of infinity belongs rather to the essence (*essentia*) than to the power (*potentia*), as power, about which we have more at length treated in disputation 25.[2262] For the essence of God is said to be infinite, as in the same place, cap. 5, we explained, because it has existence (*esse*) from itself and from no other; but at present the debate concerns the infinity

2261. Scotus and Durandus argue against this line; their arguments will be taken up in the sequel of this disputation.
2262. See disputation 25, cap. 5.

which is proper to power, and certainly these are matters not to be confused one with another, but to be distinguished, just as the infinities of duration, of presence, and of comprehension are also diverse in notion from the infinity of essence.

The third argument is Durandus's, in 1, distinction 43, question, number 13, which is taken from the effect, thus. That power is infinite which either produces an infinite effect at once, or at least can produce it successively. For what is found successively in the effect is, virtually, at once in the power itself. And since Durandus himself, in 1, distinction 44, question 2, affirms that diverse species of things cannot be produced to infinity, about which we shall speak in disputation 106, he infers the infinity of God from the sole infinity of individuals that can be produced.[226322642265]

Refutation. But this argument proves nothing: for if the heaven and the sun had existed from eternity and had successively generated, from putrefaction, infinite animals at least diverse in number, nevertheless for that reason the power of the sun or of the heaven would not be infinite in the notion of power, but only in the duration of a participated eternity, about which there is no present controversy. Therefore, in order to prove the infinity of God's power in the genus of power, one must use another line of reasoning. Indeed, this line would demonstrate what we contend, if the power of God could at least successively produce without end new species of things to infinity, as we shall see in the next chapter; but on Durandus's view it certainly proves nothing. I pass over many other arguments of authors, which seem of lesser moment, and I make my way to a manifest demonstration of this matter.

Caput II - In what way some understand the infinity of the power of God

Some think to explain that power is infinite, and that each attribute - also in our mode of understanding - in such wise that one is essentially included in another, as being is in all things; and since the divine perfections and attributes are infinite, therefore they teach that God's very essence, and each of his perfections, is infinite. But, besides the fact that in our mode of understanding the attributes are so distinguished from one another that one does not include another, as we shall show in disputation 119, cap. 2 (otherwise they would be confounded even in our cognition, which would greatly hinder the way of speaking which it is necessary to use among men), on this path neither can the infinity of power which we are inquiring into be explained or defended; also because in this way essence and power would have the same infinity according to reason, whereas they are distinguished by us. For every perfection, in our mode of conceiving, is attributed to God so that it is understood and named as infinite in its own genus. For we do not say only that God is perfect on account of this or that perfection, or that he is so adorned with infinite perfections that nothing is lacking to him; but also that he is so powerful that his power is infinite in the genus of power, and on that account he is said to be omnipotent, not indeed infinite because he can, for example, at once know, act prudently, and act justly, but because he can do all things, and has a virtue for some effect to infinity; just as the knowledge of God is not said to be infinite

2263. Durandus, In Sentences, book 1, dist. 43, q., n. 13.
2264. Durandus, In Sentences, book 1, dist. 44, q. 2.
2265. See disputation 106.

because it is at once justice, holiness, and other perfections, but because he knows infinitely; and his duration, or eternity, is not infinite because it contains in itself other perfections and attributes, but because it is without beginning and without end. Since, therefore, to each attribute its own infinity in its proper genus is fitting, power must be said to be infinite from its object, as also knowledge and will.

Now, therefore, the infinity of the power of God must be proved to us by reason.

The first argument is that which the Holy Doctor asserts in this article in this manner. The essence of God is infinite, as is clear from question 7, article 1; therefore also the power, which in our mode of understanding follows it as a passion, will be infinite in its own genus.[2266] This argument indeed proves that there is infinite power in its own genus, if on the part of the object there is no repugnance, that is, if one can conceive some power infinite in the genus of power in comparison with its object: for if any such can exist, that will be the one which follows an essence infinite in the notion of essence; for an infinite power is not to be ascribed to a finite essence. Yet it does not prove that there is some object to which there corresponds some virtue and infinite power; because, although God is infinite according to essence, if nevertheless there were no possible object which required an infinite power, we should not say that in God there is an infinity, in so far as it is understood by us as referred to an object and on this account as distinct from the other attributes; but we should say that there is the greatest power that can be.

The later argument proves that God's power is infinite in the genus of power, as referred to the object, thus. There are some things possible indeed to be done, which nevertheless cannot be done except by an infinite power: therefore it is necessary that there be an infinite power in the nature of things; and if this belongs to anyone, it must be ascribed to the first cause. St. Gregory uses this line of reasoning in 1, distinction 43, question 2, which clearly demonstrates the point, once what it assumes is made manifest.[2267] Now this can be proved by supposing that the possible species of things are infinite, as many think; for thus, although all could not be produced at once, yet once one is given, another could be made; and so it is rightly inferred that in the first cause there is infinite power: for if it were finite, at length it would arrive at some species beyond which it could not add another; otherwise it would thereby make the virtue of the power itself in itself, in so far as it can operate, to be infinite. But since some deny that the possible species of things are infinite, about which we shall dispute in the last article of this question, therefore that point must be proved from elsewhere; for it is more certain that the power of God is infinite in the genus of power than that the possible species are infinite, since even from infinite individuals alone one does not gather an infinity of virtue in power, but an infinity of duration, whereby infinite individuals can successively be produced by the virtue of a finite power, as I noted above in cap. 1.

Therefore St. Gregory proves it by many examples, of which one will suffice for us. Every body is so apt to be moved that it can be set in motion faster and faster without a term: therefore it is necessary that there be some power by which it can be moved faster and faster without a term; but

2266. St. Thomas, I, q. 7, a. 1.
2267. St. Gregory, In Sentences, book 1, dist. 43, q. 2.

if every power were finite, there would also be some determinate limit of velocity, beyond which it could not move faster. Since, therefore, velocity can increase to infinity, it is necessary that there be some power of infinite virtue; and although it cannot produce an infinite velocity in any motion, as is clear, nevertheless the virtue of the power itself will be infinite in itself, because actually it has that virtue by which it can move a body faster and faster to infinity; and hence it has a virtue without end and limit in the notion of power.

There is also an infinity of God's power in the genus of power because in the production of singulars it has no limit: for he can make more and more to infinity, not only in the course of time, but also at once; but if it were finite, it would have a limit beyond which it could not produce more things at once, as is gathered from the reasoning made. This argument, as to the former part, without controversy demonstrates the infinity of the power of God. In our view, moreover, we who taught in disputation 26, cap. 3, that an infinite could be produced by God at once, even as to the latter part could thereby prove the infinity of the power of God.[2268]

Finally, it must be observed that this infinity of power is so proper to God that it cannot be communicated to a creature in the same manner. For although God should communicate to a creature, as to an instrument, the virtue of moving a body faster without limit, nevertheless it would never have the virtue from itself, nor in itself, to move a body faster to infinity; both because it would have that virtue from another, by whom it would be assumed as an instrument; and because it would not have that virtue actually infinite; for it would never receive it except for a finite and limited effect. In that way, therefore, the infinity of the power of God is distinguished from the infinity of a created power, if such could be communicated to it, just as we said in disputation 25, cap. 5, that the infinity of the duration of a creature, if it were communicated to it, differs from the infinity of God's eternity: for the duration of a creature would not have from itself the infinity which God's eternity has from itself. And the same must be said if God were to communicate to a creature the virtue of creating infinitely.[22622269]

Caput III - An argument against the foregoing opinion

There is, however, an argument which, though it is not difficult, has nonetheless given some trouble to certain people...

There is, however, an argument which, though it is not difficult, has nonetheless given some trouble to certain people, to prove that an infinite power does not befit God, and it runs as follows.

Proponitur argumentum. If God had an infinite power, He would not only be able to move from place to place through a medium ever more and more swiftly to infinity, but also most swiftly, that is, in an instant - just as Aristotle, Physics VIII, chapter 10, proves that there cannot be found in a body an infinite power for moving, on the ground that it would effect motion most swiftly not in time, that is, in an instant. For a power that moves in time is finite, and there could be a greater

2268. See disputation 26, cap. 3.
2262. See disputation 25, cap. 5.
2269. See again disputation 25, cap. 5.

one, namely that which would move in a shorter time: therefore an infinite, and the greatest of all, would move in an instant. But it is impossible for motion to be made in an instant from place to place through a medium: therefore it is impossible that there be in God an infinite power and virtue; otherwise, by the same argument Aristotle would not rightly prove that such a power cannot befit a body.[2270]

Averroista solutio. Averroes replies in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, commentary 41, that from the infinite power of God there does not follow motion in an instant, as the argument contends, because second causes, which are finite, limit and modify the efficacy of the first.[2271]

Reijcitur. St. Thomas and Aegidius impugn this solution in Physics VIII, chapter 10 (as Caietan reports in the commentary to be cited below), because it does not give the reason why the second cause should so modify the infinite power of the first as to impede motion's being in an instant, and yet not impede that every motion may be infinite in duration.[2272] Caietan for his part tries to assign a reason why the second cause does not take away the infinity of duration in motion, but does impede the infinity of speed. On which, in my judgment, one need not labor much; since it is clear that the infinity of duration does not arise from an infinity of power in the genus of power, but from the infinity of the duration of the cause - which may be communicated to any created agent.

Scotus also attacks Averroes's solution; for since, according to him and Aristotle, God acts necessarily, it follows that His infinite efficacy cannot be limited by a second cause; because a cause that acts necessarily will operate in the same manner together with another as it operates of itself. Thus argues Scotus in book 1, distinction 8, the last question.[2273]

Tuetur Caietanus. Yet Caietan most aptly replies on behalf of the Commentator as follows: although an agent may act necessarily, nevertheless when it concurs with a second cause for some effect, its power is terminated and determined by that cause, inasmuch as it accommodates itself to operate along with it - just as the sun operates in diverse ways with diverse inferior causes. However, although the reasoning of Caietan and the Commentator shows that then the first cause does not move something in an instant when it moves by means of a second cause, it does not, for all that, prove that God by Himself cannot move some body in an instant - especially if He acted necessarily, like a body. For if a body having an infinite power would move in an instant, by the same reasoning a spirit would move so too, if it operated necessarily. Therefore one must meet the foregoing argument in another way.

Caietanus accordingly, in tome 3 of the Opuscula, treatise 2, question 1 (which he mentions also in his commentary on this article), answers in three ways.

Prima solutio. First, he says it suffices for the power of God to be infinite if an effect infinite in duration corresponds to it. But from what was said in chapter 1 it is clear that from the infinite duration of an effect there is not gathered a proper infinity of power in the ratio of power. Add that

2270. Aristotle, Physics, book 8, chapter 10.
2271. Averroes, In Metaphysicorum, book 12, commentary 41.
2272. St. Thomas; Aegidius, on Physics 8, chapter 10, as reported by Caietan in the place cited below.
2273. Scotus, In Sentences, book 1, distinction 8, the last question.

this solution does not satisfy the proposed argument: nor does it explain sufficiently how from an infinite power that would be in a body Aristotle gathers that motion would be in an instant; and why the same should not follow from God's infinite power.[2274]

Secunda solutio eiusdem. The second response (which Caietan sets in the third place) is that from the infinite power of God there cannot be made motion in an instant, because that is impossible - not indeed on account of a defect in the power of God, but on the part of the movable, which is not capable of such an effect. This solution does not please me either; because if we cannot assign to the power of God an infinite object, or one that requires an infinite power, we shall not be able to attribute to God an infinite power in the genus of power as related to an object, in the way we distinguish it from the essence and from other attributes - although the divine essence is infinite in the genus of being. And by the same token Aristotle's argument would not prove that an infinite power is not in a body on the ground that a motion in an instant would follow therefrom: for one could answer that a motion in an instant does not follow because it is impossible, not on the part of the moving body, but on the part of the movable, which is not capable of such an effect.

Tertia solutio S. Tho. & Caiet. The true solution is that which St. Thomas insinuated briefly in this article, reply to the third, and which Caietan also sets in the second place among other answers (omitting another which the same Doctor also indicates there), and it is of this sort. If a body had an infinite power, then a motion in an instant would follow (we are always speaking of motion through a medium), because that agent would be natural, and by force of its nature determined to one effect in such a way that it would not be in its power now to move less, now more, but would always exert its whole force for moving. Wherefore, if it were to move in time, however swift the motion, it would not be supremely swift, and hence would not require an infinite efficacy in the mover. Therefore, in order that the mover's power be infinite, some motion would have to be made which is the swiftest of all: but such a motion cannot be, unless in an instant: therefore either there would have to be a motion in an instant, or, if that could not be, there would be in a body no infinite power to move.

But since God acts freely, the efficacy of His power is not determined to one effect, but He produces diverse effects as He pleases, and thus He can move a body with respect to place ever more and more swiftly. From this it is rightly inferred that the virtue of His power is infinite. For that He can in the effect produce more and more without a terminus - even if He does not produce actually an infinite - argues an infinite efficacy: for if it were finite, there would correspond to it some motion in time which is the swiftest, which He could produce. Therefore, to gather that there is in God an infinite power which operates freely, it is not necessary to assign to Him a motion that is the swiftest, either in time or in an instant: for in neither way can it be. Not in an instant, as we shall show elsewhere; not in time, because to any determinate motion one can assign a swifter one without end. Therefore the infinity of power is rightly inferred, not from some determinate motion, but from those which are in potency to infinity.

2274. See above, chapter 1 of this disputation.

Infinitas divinae potentiae confirmatur primo. Thus far it has been shown from the mere speed of motion that God's power is infinite; but I think it can also be proved in another way. First, because He can create and conserve an infinite multitude of spirits, or even of bodies, as I taught in disputation 26. Whether that be a multitude of individuals in finite species, or in infinite ones, the very same follows. For although from the fact that some agent can successively in infinitum produce individuals of the same species there is not gathered an infinite power of that agent (as I noted in chapter 1), but only an infinity of duration, yet from the fact that it produces at once, or conserves, an infinite multitude under the same species, an infinite virtue of that agent is rightly inferred. Then too, the infinity of God's power is deduced from this, that He can produce infinite species either at once, or also successively, as was said in chapter 1. Whether, however, there is a definite number of species that can be made, we shall examine in disputation 106, chapter 4. Besides these ways by which the infinity of God's power is proved from effects, Gregory also adduces others in the place cited, which it would be long to recount.[2275]

Articulus III - Whether God is omnipotent

To the third, the procedure is as follows.

Objicitur 1. It seems that God is not omnipotent. For to be moved and to suffer something belongs to all things: but this God cannot, for He is immobile, as was said above. Therefore He is not omnipotent.

Objicitur 2. Further, to sin is to do something. But God cannot sin, nor deny Himself, as is said in 2 Timothy 2. Therefore God is not omnipotent.

Objicitur 3. Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence most by sparing and having mercy. Therefore, the ultimate thing which the divine power can do is to spare and to have mercy. But there is something much greater than to spare and to have mercy, as to create another world, or something of that sort. Therefore God is not omnipotent.

Objicitur 4. Further, upon that passage 1 Corinthians 1, "God has made foolish the wisdom of this world," the Gloss says: He made foolish the wisdom of this world, by showing possible what that [wisdom] declared impossible. Whence it seems that not everything should be judged possible or impossible according to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges, but according to the divine power. If therefore God is omnipotent, all things will be possible. Therefore nothing will be impossible. But with the impossible taken away, necessity is taken away. For what is necessary to be, it is impossible not to be. Therefore nothing will be necessary in things, if God is omnipotent; but this is impossible. Therefore God is not omnipotent.

Sed contra: what is said in Luke 1: "No word shall be impossible with God."

Respondeo: It is answered that all commonly agree that God is omnipotent. But to assign the reason of omnipotence seems difficult. For there can be doubt as to what is comprehended under this distributive, when it is said that God can do all things. But if one considers rightly (since power

2275. St. Gregory, In Sentences, book 1, dist. 43, q. 2; and see also disputation 106, cap. 4.

is said with respect to possibles), when God is said to be able to do all things, nothing is more correctly understood than that He can do all things possible; under this He is called omnipotent. Now "possible" is said in a twofold way according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics V: in one way with respect to some power. Thus what is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. It cannot, however, be said that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends to more. But if it be said that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His own power, there will be a circularity in the manifestation of omnipotence. For this will be nothing else than to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that He can; it remains therefore that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things absolutely possible. Now something is called possible or impossible absolutely from the habitude of the terms: possible indeed, because the predication fits the subject, as for a man to sit; impossible indeed absolutely, because the predicate repugns the subject, as for a man to be an ass. Moreover, since each agent produces its like, to any active power there corresponds as proper object the possible according to the notion of that act on which the power is founded. Thus the heating power is referred to what is heatable as to its proper subject. But the divine being, upon which the ratio of the divine power is founded, is an infinite being not limited to some genus of being, but having beforehand in itself the perfection of all being: whence whatever can have the notion of being is contained under absolute possibles, with respect to which God is said to be omnipotent. Nothing, however, is opposed to the notion of being except non-being. Therefore that repugns the notion of the absolutely possible, which is subjected to the divine omnipotence: namely what implies being and not-being together. For this is not subjected to omnipotence, not because of a defect of the divine power, but because it cannot have the notion of a possible or of a makeable.

Reply to the first: It is answered that God is called omnipotent according to active power (*potentia*), not according to passive power, as has been said; hence that he cannot be moved and suffer does not oppose omnipotence.

Reply to the second: To sin is to fall short of a perfect notion. Hence to be able to sin is to be able to fail in acting, which is repugnant to omnipotence. And for this reason God cannot sin, who is omnipotent. Although the Philosopher says in Topics 4, chapter 2, that God and the studious man can do wicked things, this is to be understood either under a condition whose antecedent is impossible - as, for instance, if we say that God can do wicked things, if he should will; for nothing prevents a conditional from being true whose antecedent and consequent are impossible, just as if it be said: if a man is an ass, he has four feet - or so that it be understood that God can do certain things which now seem wicked, which, if he were to do them, would be good; or he speaks according to the common opinion of the pagans, who said that men were transferred into gods, as Jupiter or Mercury.[2276]

Reply to the third: The omnipotence of God is manifested most of all in sparing and having mercy; for by this it is shown that God has the highest power, that he freely remits sins. For it is not his who is bound to a superior law to remit sins freely. Or because by sparing men and having

mercy he leads them to a participation of the infinite good, which is the ultimate effect of the divine virtue. Or because (as was said above) the effect of divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is owed to anyone, except on account of that which has been given to him by God not as a debt. And in this especially is the divine omnipotence manifested, that to him pertains the first establishment of all goods.

Reply to the fourth: The absolute possible is said neither according to higher causes nor according to lower causes, but according to itself. But that which is said possible according to some power is named possible according to the proximate cause. Whence those things which are immediately apt to be done by God alone, as to create, to justify, and the like, are said to be possible according to the higher cause; but those things which are apt to be done by lower causes are said to be possible according to lower causes. For according to the condition of the proximate cause the effect has contingency or necessity, as has been said above.[2277] And in this the wisdom of the world is judged foolish, because it judged those things which are impossible to nature to be impossible even to God. And thus it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not exclude impossibility and necessity from things.

Note concerning the Article.

The conclusion of the article is affirmative, and is of faith, as is clear from many testimonies of Scripture. The doctrine of the whole article is most true and subtle, yet so perspicuous that it does not need explanation; we shall, however, set it forth in the following disputation and confirm it by reasons. Only this is to be noted from Cajetan concerning the solution of the fourth, that when St. Thomas says that the wisdom of this world is foolish, which thinks that things impossible to nature are impossible to God, he is not speaking of philosophy according to itself (for that does not teach the false), but of the philosophy which philosophers abuse, and by rash judgment apply to divine things, which their natural philosophy does not attain.

Disputatio CIV - Why God is called omnipotent

Status controversiae. cap. 1. Quid senserit Gabriel, & Scotus. cap. 2. Opinio Scoti. cap. 3. Verior sententia. cap. 4. Quomodo omnipotentia versetur circa non ens. cap. 5. Neque relationem omnipotentiae, neque ullam aliam ad creaturas esse realem in Deo. cap. 6.

Caput I - Status of the controversy

Among all Catholics it is undoubted that God is omnipotent, for Scripture everywhere proclaims it. But what Abailard and John Wyclif thought about God's omnipotence, we shall say in disputation 106, chapter 3.

2276. Aristotle, Topics, book 4, chapter 2.
2277. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q.14, a.13.

Caput II - What Gabriel and Scotus thought

Nevertheless some doubt whether by natural reason it can be demonstrated that God is omnipotent. For Scotus in the First Book, distinction 42, question 1, and Gabriel, the same distinction, question 1, articles 1 and 2, assert that only the power of the first cause can be demonstrated, by which it can produce all things either immediately by itself, or remotely by concurring with second causes; but that the power of the first cause, by which it can by itself do all the things which it can do by means of second causes and other things that do not imply a contradiction - in the manner in which the theologians speak about omnipotence - cannot be demonstrated by natural reason, but is to be believed by divine faith alone. For although by natural reason it is evident that there is a first cause of all things, which has in itself the power of all causes, nevertheless it is not so manifest that it does not need the concurrence of second causes for operating.

Yet from the infinity of power (*potentia*), which in the preceding disputation we demonstrated by natural reason, it is clearly gathered that by its own power and of itself it can reach, and produce in a subject or outside a subject, whatever can by its nature be in a subject or outside a subject. For if a power is infinite in the genus of power, no effect, nor mode of operating, will be able to elude it, if it is possible. Just as, because the science of God is infinite in the genus of science and cognition, no knowable can be hidden from it: the sole difference is this, that the knowable is necessarily referred to the science of God, for it is necessarily borne to everything that it can know; whereas not every thing is necessarily referred to the power of God so as to be produced by it, but so as to be able to be produced, because the power of God does not operate except according to the good pleasure of his free will. Yet provided it does not imply a contradiction for something to be of itself or to inhere in another, it must, because the power of God is infinite, fall under it as subject so as to be able to be produced.

If, however, a vital operation of cognition or of appetite cannot be produced by God alone, the reason is that it essentially depends on a second cause, and it continually asks to be conserved by it, so as to render it knowing or appetitive; and thus it implies a contradiction for intelligence or appetite to inhere in a subject unless it be conferred by that cause. But those things which depend on a second cause in such wise that they can remain without its conservation will be able, by the omnipotence (*omnipotentia*) of God in the concurrence of the second cause, to be produced and conserved. Finally, whatever does not imply a contradiction, without doubt an infinite power ought to embrace under itself. Therefore rightly from the infinity of the power of God the rationale of omnipotence is deduced.

But indeed, since power is said relatively to those things which it can, and therefore one will say omnipotence because it can all things, it must be seen what those "all things" are with respect to which omnipotence is said - whether they are the possibles which are possible according to themselves, or those which can be done by another power, or finally those which are possible to be done by the power of God itself.

What Gabriel and Scotus thought

Gabriel, on the First Book, distinction 43, question 2, teaches that the power of God is called omnipotence because it can all possibles. He calls them "possibles" not because of themselves, before they are referred to omnipotence itself, they are possible, but insofar as they are compared with it. For the possible is said to be that which can be done by a power. There must be at once a power and a possible, insofar as it is possible, because they are mutually referred to each other. He judges that there is nothing absurd if omnipotence be defined through the possible, and the possible through omnipotence, and that in their definitions a circle be made; for the circle is not useless, when one relative is defined through the other and conversely - just as a father is said to be one who has a son, and a son, one who has a father.

This way of defining and explaining omnipotence is refuted by St. Thomas in this article: because in this way there is committed in the definition of omnipotence the fault which he calls a circle. For it is the same thing to say, God is omnipotent because he can all possibles, as to say, because he can do all that he can do, or because he can do all that can be done by him, which the holy Doctor with very good right judges absurd.

Then it can be impugned from the doctrine of Aristotle in Metaphysics, chapter 15: for he shows in what way certain things are said to be referred to another, because other things are first referred to them, from which they receive their denomination; thus, he says, "measurable," "knowable," and "intelligible," because something else is said with reference to them; that is, for this reason all these are denominated from the prior reference of the other to them.[2278]

Gabriel, on the First Book, distinction 43, question 2, teaches that the power of God is called omnipotence because He can do all things possible. But he calls them possible not because of themselves, before they are referred to omnipotence, they are possible, but precisely insofar as they are compared with it. For what is said to be possible is what can be done by a power. It is necessary, indeed, that there be at once a power and a possible, insofar as it is possible, because they are mutually referred to one another. He judges, however, that there is nothing absurd if omnipotence is defined through the possible, and the possible through omnipotence, and that a circle is made in their definitions; for the circle is not useless when one relative is defined through the other and conversely, just as when a father is said to be one who has a son, and a son one who has a father.

But St. Thomas refutes this way of defining and explaining omnipotence in this very article: because in this way there is committed in the definition of omnipotence the fault which he calls a circle. For it is the same thing to say, God is omnipotent because He can all possibles, as to say, because He can do all that He can do, or because He can do all that can be done by Him, which the holy Doctor with very good right judges absurd.

2278. Aristotle, Metaphysics, chapter 15.

Then it can be impugned from the doctrine of Aristotle in Metaphysics, chapter 15: for he shows in what way certain things are said to be referred to another, because other things are first referred to them, from which they receive their denomination; thus, he says, "measurable," "knowable," and "intelligible," because something else is said with reference to them; that is, for this reason all these are denominated from the prior reference of the other to them.[2279]

He adds the reason for these matters as follows: "For 'intelligible' signifies that of which there is an intellect; but the intellect is not referred to that of which it is the intellect" - for, in truth, the same thing would be said twice; as if he were saying: therefore something is called "intelligible" because the intellect can be engaged about it; but the intellect is not referred to the intelligible as intelligible, because it would also be said to be referred to that of which it is the intellect, and thus the same thing would be said twice; that is, there would be a useless repetition, since the thing defined would be repeated in the definition itself.

Some explain it thus: the intellect is not referred to the subject of which it is the intellect, because the same thing would be said twice - namely, that it would be referred both to the object and to the subject. But this interpretation does not square with the context; for there Aristotle proves in what way the intelligible is said, from this very fact, to be referred to the intellect, namely, because the intellect is said to be referred to it first. He proves, moreover, that the intellect is first referred to the object before the object is intelligible: for if it were referred to the intelligible, when the intelligible is thus defined, "that of which there is an intellect," the intellect would be said to be referred to that of which it is the intellect, and thus a certain nugatory repetition would be made. Therefore that, of which there is an intellect, is not the subject, but the object under the denomination of intelligible.

He pursues the same point by another example in this way. Likewise sight: it is sight of something, not "of which sight is" (and although it is true to say this), but of color, or of something else of that sort; but in the former way the same thing would be said twice, namely that sight is that of which sight is. That is, sight is not said to be referred to that of which it is the sight, namely to the visible; for visible is thus defined, like intelligible. Wherefore by those words, "of which there is sight," Aristotle does not understand the subject of sight, as the Commentator and Alexander of Aphrodisias falsely interpret; for in discussing these relatives, would he say that it is not referred to object and subject because the same thing is said twice, that is, that it would be referred to two things? For this would not be absurd, nor would it seem to make to the point. Rather, Aristotle understands by those words the object under the denomination of visible, and so he says: sight is said to be to something, not to that "of which there is sight" (that is, not to the visible as visible - for thus the same thing would be said twice by a repetition of the same thing already defined in the definition, as was explained), but to color or something else. He adds, "or something else," so as also to include light, and thus to prove that "visible" and "intelligible" are said with reference to sight or to intellect, because sight and intellect are referred to the things which receive the denominations "visible" or "intelligible." He added, moreover, in a parenthesis (and although it is

2279. Aristotle, Metaphysics, chapter 15.

true to say this) because we truly say that sight is "to the visible," on the ground that it is to the visible color which is called visible. But it is not rightly defined through "visible," nor is it referred to that, as visible, for the reason assigned.

From this doctrine of Aristotle it is rightly concluded that the power of God is not referred to the "possible" under this denomination, but to something prior; first, because (as Aristotle says) the same thing would be said twice - which St. Thomas also noted in this article[2280]; for it would be the same to say, omnipotence is that which can all possibles, as to say, it can all things which can be done by omnipotence itself. For the "possible," under this relative denomination, is so called because it can be done by some power. But it is manifest that omnipotence is not to be defined through the "possible-to-be-done" by another created power; therefore through the "possible-to-be-done" by itself - and in that definition there would be committed that nugatory repetition which we mentioned.

Furthermore, the same is proved by Aristotle's reason. For if "possible," under this denomination, is so called because it belongs to a power, just as "visible" because it belongs to sight, and "intelligible" because it belongs to intellect: therefore power is first said with reference to its object before the object receives a denomination from power. Wherefore power is not said from a habitude to the "possible" under this denomination, just as neither is sight from its ordering to the visible, but from something prior. For, as we shall show below, disputation 159, chapter 6, this kind of relations, which are called "non-mutual," are referred to an absolute terminus before the terminus obtains a relative denomination, as "visible," "intelligible," and "possible." Whether indeed the same should be asserted of mutual relatives - namely, that they are never referred to a related terminus as related, but to an absolute [terminus], because otherwise there would be a negative repetition - we shall also say in the same place.[2281]

Caput III - The opinion of Scotus

Scotus, in the First Book, distinction 43, the single question, teaches that the power of God can be considered in a twofold way. First, as it is in itself absolutely, because in reality it is not referred to creatures, as we shall say in chapter 6; and in this mode it is not omnipotence by respect to possible creatures, however those may be called "possible." Then the power of God is conceived by us relatively to that which it can do; and in this way, he says, omnipotence is said with respect to possible creatures. But it does not fall into that circle impugned above; because he holds that the creatures to which omnipotence is said to be referred are possible not from the power of God itself, but from the intellect insofar as He knows them, and produces under a certain diminished being. He judges this knowledge in God to be prior to our mode of understanding, indeed prior by its own nature to power too, since among all the attributes he establishes a distinction according to the nature of the thing: for, according to his opinion, as we saw in disputation 103, chapter 3, the omnipotence of God is His will, which is preceded by knowledge. He could teach the same even if

2280. St. Thomas, in this article.
2281. Vazquez, infra, disputation 159, chapter 6.

he thought that the intellect also pertained to power, as does the will: because only practical knowledge together with the will would be power; but things, in his opinion, have to be "possible" from the speculative knowledge of God, which also is prior to the practical.[2282]

But for a clearer declaration of this opinion note that Scotus does not deny that the denomination "possible," which is attributed to the things themselves, proceeds from the divine power, insofar as it is said to be referred to the things themselves; but when he says that things are possible from the divine intellect knowing, not from power, he understands "possible" (as they say) materially and fundamentally, not formally: that is, that things have from the divine intellect that they are under the divine omnipotence and can be, and that from this they take the denomination "possible."

Nevertheless this opinion has seemed rash to many, namely that it grants all things, by the force of the divine intellect, to have that diminished being from eternity, that is, some existence. Yet in this sense, which Scotus never dreamed of, they attack him in vain, as I noted above, disputation 70, chapter 2; for he himself did not think that that diminished being is produced from eternity by some real production which would be terminated at some "existent" being; rather he called "diminished being" that objective being of things which they have in the intellect by the force of the intellection itself: for by this they are present to the intellect, not only the things which are absent, but also those which do not yet exist. No one, however, will deny that all possible things are objectively present to the divine intellect by the mere force of intellection, even if in reality they were produced; therefore neither will he deny that they have some diminished being through intellection. For in what way would Scotus call that "diminished" if it were true being of existence and really outside of causes?[2283]

Nonetheless, for another reason this opinion of Scotus, as far as the present controversy is concerned, does not please me: because just as things are not said to be going to be, or to be of such a nature, because they are known by God - nay rather, they are known to be going to be, or to be of such a nature, because they are going to be and are of such a nature - so likewise things are not possible because they are known, but they are known for this reason, that they are possible; that is, they are therefore known to be able to exist and to involve no contradiction, because truly they can exist. In the same way also, as we shall say in I - II, question 71, article 6, some sins are not evil because they are known to be evil, or because they are even forbidden by God; but rather conversely: for the speculative intellect does not make, but presupposes the being and the object which it knows. Wherefore, even if otherwise God existed, even if He did not know, still by what they call the intrinsic place, creatures would be possible, that is, from themselves they would not imply a contradiction, to be of such or such a nature, and could be produced in time, if in some other way than by cognition and will God were omnipotent. Therefore, prior - according to our way of understanding - is that a thing be possible, that is, from itself not imply a contradiction, than that it be understood by the divine intellect.[2284]

2282. Vazquez, disputation 103, chapter 3.
2283. Vazquez, disputation 70, chapter 2.
2284. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I - II, q.71, a.6.

Caput IV - The truer opinion

The truer opinion, which St. Thomas set forth briefly in this article, is this: namely, that the things which are said to be the object of the divine omnipotence do not have it that they are possible and objects of it either from the intellect, or from omnipotence itself insofar as it is referred to them; but they are the object of omnipotence insofar as in themselves they do not imply a contradiction in terms. Wherefore the divine power is not called omnipotence because it can make all things "possible" to be; for that would be a useless repetition; nor because it can do all things which it knows, if we wish to assign the first ratio of the object - for before God understands, already, by omnipotence, He can make and produce whatever does not imply a contradiction of itself; so that in this way there is assigned the proper and proximate object of omnipotence, and every useless repetition is removed. Therefore prior is it that things of themselves do not imply a contradiction, than that God be actually referred to them as omnipotent; just as it is prior that the eye be referred to color, than that color be called visible.

In this opinion Henry of Ghent, in part, concurs, Quodlibet 6, question 6: whose doctrine must be noted exactly; for he not a little illustrates the sentence of the Angelic Doctor. He observes, then, that God's "being able" is to be considered in a twofold way: first in Himself, then in reference to another. That is, first the active power of God is to be considered in itself, as a perfection of the first being, which of its own nature presupposes nothing else, nor asks anything with it in order to be; and therefore is by its very nature absolute from every prior and concomitant. Then, in a second way, insofar as it is actually referred to its object. By the same proportion, the passive capacity of creatures can also be conceived in a twofold way: in one way, in itself and absolutely, without any respect - that is, that in this way a thing of itself does not imply a contradiction; in another way, insofar as it is actually referred to the power of God under the denomination "possible," insofar as it is said to be able to be produced by it. These, then, are four items which are compared among themselves (says Henry): first is the active perfection in God in Himself, as befits the perfection of the first being; next follows in order the logical "passive can-be" of the creature in itself - that God in Himself is a more perfect being than that man not imply a contradiction to be; and by the intrinsic place it rightly follows: if God were not, it would imply a contradiction that man exist; not, however, conversely, that if it implied a contradiction that man exist, it would imply that God exist. And thus far Henry rightly teaches.[2285]

He adds then, next, that from this absolute passive capacity of creatures - in itself, that is, from the fact that the creature in itself does not imply a contradiction - there arises proximately the act of terminating, on the creature's side, the relation of the divine power; that is, that we say "possible" and "producible" are denominated from the power of God; and finally from this passive "can-be" as related there arises in God, too, a relation to creatures: in which sense his opinion seems to be corrected in accordance with what he himself taught, Quodlibet 8, question 8. For just as color is called visible from sight, and a being intelligible from intellect, by the same reason the "possible" or "producible" is denominated from the power of producing. Therefore prior is the act

2285. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet VI, q.6.

of terminating the power actually referred to the object, which is denominated "possible" or "producible," than that the object itself should receive such an appellation. Wherefore, although by the order of assignment adduced by Henry we should not fall into that useless repetition, nevertheless that order is not the one to be assigned, as will be proved; and although in another philosophical manner it is rightly said, yet even so that circle is tolerated.

We say, therefore, with the same Henry (Quodlibet 8, question 8), that as soon as there is considered the absolute passive capacity, in itself - that is, that things do not imply a contradiction - there are already of themselves sufficient absolute objects, so that there is at once constituted the terminus with respect to the divine omnipotence, according to the manner of Aristotle's dictum; the respect of sight is terminated at color. Wherefore thus we understand the "possible object" of God under a relation: namely that we first consider the divine omnipotence with respect to the effect as to things insofar as they do not imply a contradiction; and finally, from the fact that God's power is in this way referred to things and to their absolute passive "can-be," in those very things there arises the passive related relation, that is, that denominated relation "possible" or "producible": just as Aristotle said that from the fact that sight is terminated at color, color is denominated visible, and in the same way things are intelligible from the intellect.[2286]

Yet we must discern an obscurity: for color is called visible from this, that by its own nature it is referred to sight; but things are not called possible because God's power of itself, by its own nature, is referred to them. Rather, it is referred according to the order of the understanding, and by a denomination - just as in turn the things themselves are referred to the power. But between both denominations we preserve the same order.

In this opinion Henry in part agrees, in Quodlibet 6, question 2, whose doctrine must be accurately noted, for it will marvelously illustrate the opinion of the Angelic Doctor.[2287] He notices, therefore, that God can be considered powerful in Himself in a twofold way: first, in Himself, by Himself; then relatively to another. That is, the active potency of God Himself is first to be understood as He is in Himself, and has from Himself the power of operating; then as He is now actually referred as potent to an object. In the same proportion the passive potency of creatures can likewise be conceived in a twofold way: in one way, as it is in itself absolutely, without any respect, which is nothing other than that some thing does not of itself imply a contradiction so that it be, and it can be called logical potency; in another way, as it is actually referred to the power of God under the denomination "possible," inasmuch as it is said to be producible by it.

Accordingly, these four are compared among themselves (says Henry): the active potency of God in Himself is prior, because it is the perfection of the first being, which by its own nature supposes nothing else, nor does it require along with itself, in order that it be; and hence by its nature it is absolute from all that is prior and concomitant, as will be proved in chapter 6; otherwise, it would not be the highest and first being. After this there follows, in the order of logical reason, the passive potency of creatures in itself: for God in Himself is a perfect being prior to the

2286. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet VIII, q.8.
2287. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 6, q.2.

fact that man does not imply a contradiction so as to be; and by an intrinsic locus it rightly follows that, if God were not, it would imply a contradiction that man be; not, however, conversely, that, if it implied a contradiction that man be, it would also imply that God be, as will be proved in the same chapter. And thus far Henry speaks rightly indeed.

He adds, however, next, that from that absolute and in-itself passive potency of creatures - that is, from the fact that the creature in itself does not imply a contradiction - there arises next the proximate passive potency of those same things as actually related to the power of God, that is, that they are said to be possible to be produced by the power of God; and finally from this related passive potency there can arise in God an act also actually related to creatures. In this point, indeed, his opinion seems to need correction according to what he himself taught in Quodlibet 8, question 3. For just as color is called visible from sight, and being intelligible from intellect, by the same reason a thing is denominated possible, or producible, from the productive power. Therefore it is prior that the active power be actually referred to the object which is denominated possible or producible, than that the object itself acquire such an appellation. Wherefore, although by the order assigned by Henry we would not fall into that useless repetition, nevertheless, because that order is not rightly assigned, as we have proved, it is necessary to philosophize in another way, yet so that that circle be removed.

Explanation. We say, then, with that same Henry, in that Quodlibet 8, question 3, that as soon as the passive potency of things is considered absolutely and in itself - that is, that things do not imply a contradiction so that they be - already there exists a sufficient absolute object to terminate actually the reference of the divine omnipotence, just as Aristotle said that the reference of sight is terminated at color. Wherefore at once we understand the active potency of God under relation; that is, we straightway consider the power of God, under the respect of potency, actually to be referred to things, inasmuch as in themselves they do not imply a contradiction. Lastly, from the fact that the power of God in this way is referred to things and to their absolute passive potency, there arises in those things a related passive potency, that is, a predicated denomination "possible" or "producible": thus, as Aristotle said, from the fact that sight is terminated at color, color is denominated visible; and in the same way things are intelligible from the intellect.

Note, however, a difference: for color is called visible from this, that sight by its own nature is referred to it; but things are not called possible because God's power is referred to them in reality and by its own nature: it is referred extrinsically only by a denomination, just as in turn the things themselves are referred to the power. But between both denominations we preserve the same order which we see in creatures between active power and the denomination of the object, as between sight and the visible.

From this doctrine it is gathered, first, that that nugatory repetition is removed which can be committed in the definition of omnipotence, if it be defined by "possible": and by this reckoning the proper object of it is established as St. Thomas in this article assigned. Accordingly, if you define omnipotence thus: It is the power by which one is able to produce whatever does not of itself imply a contradiction so that it be, in this way the relation of omnipotence is referred to the absolute passive potency of creatures.

Second, by the same doctrine Anselm is explained in the book On the Fall of the Devil, chapter 12, when he says that something is possible because it can be made by another. For if he speaks of the possible absolutely, he cannot deny that the possible is first in itself, not a physical, but a logical potency, as we have said thus far; and in Disputation 82, chapter 1, we shall explain what it is for something to be said able to be made by some power. But if he understands the related possible, it is most true that nothing is said possible except because it can be made by another.[2288]

Third, it must be observed that by the name of "that which does not imply a contradiction, and is the object of omnipotence," there is not understood or comprehended the essence of God, or any of His persons, but only that which, being outside God, does not imply a contradiction. For this reason, in Disputation 169 we shall show that the three divine persons are of equal omnipotence, because they are equally able to produce creatures, although it does not belong to them equally to produce a person.[2289]

How omnipotence is related to non-being.

Caput V - How omnipotence is related to non - being

But from St. Thomas in the article we have only this: that that is not the object of omnipotence which implies a contradiction in itself; that is, it implies in itself at once to be and not to be. Wherefore he never excludes non-being from the notion of the object of omnipotence except insofar as it implies a contradiction: for thus he philosophizes. Since God contains in Himself every perfection of being, whatever can have the notion of being falls under the absolute possible, which the divine omnipotence regards as its proper object: but nothing is opposed to the notion of being except non-being; therefore that is opposed to the object of omnipotence which implies in itself a contradiction, that is, implies in itself to be and not to be. From the reasoning of St. Thomas, however, it seems to follow that every non-being, however it be, is not the object of the divine omnipotence. For since from the fact that God has in Himself every perfection of being it follows that everything which has the notion of being falls under omnipotence, it also seems to be gathered that everything which is not is in no way the object of that [omnipotence]; and thus in the Second Contra Gentiles, chapter 22, by the second argument he said that the omnipotence of God is referred to all things which do not repel the notion of being; whence he infers that non-being is not the object of omnipotence, because it is opposed to the notion of being, which in this article also he had insinuated.[2290]

But in I, Distinction 42, question 5, article 2, and in De potentia, question 1, article 3, he asserts that everything which can have the notion of being or of non-being is the object of the divine omnipotence; and that only that is outside it which implies a contradiction, that is, at once to be and not to be. From which it is not sufficiently clear whether non-being is the object of the divine omnipotence or not.[2291]

2288. St. Anselm, De casu diaboli, c.12.
2289. Vazquez, disputation 169.
2290. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles II, c.22 (secunda ratio).
2291. St. Thomas, In I Sententiarum, dist.42, q.5, a.2; Quaestiones disputatae De potentia, q.1, a.3.

Cajetan in this article teaches that the omnipotence of God is occupied about being and non-being, yet in a different way: about being, by producing it; about non-being, by not producing, or by ceasing from production. Although this is true, it does not sufficiently explain what St. Thomas said in this article and in Contra Gentiles II, namely, that non-being does not fall under the omnipotence of God.[2292]

Wherefore the doctrine of Ferrariensis is to be observed here...[2293]

St. Thomas in this article gives us only a briefer account, namely, that that is not the object of omnipotence which implies a contradiction in itself, to wit, to be and not to be at once; wherefore he never excludes non-being from the notion of the object of omnipotence except insofar as it implies a contradiction: thus in fact he philosophizes. Since God in himself contains every perfection of being, whatever can have the notion of being is counted under the absolutely possible, which the divine omnipotence receives as its proper object; but nothing is opposed to the notion of being except non-being: therefore that is opposed to the object of omnipotence which implies in itself a contradiction, that is, which implies in itself to be and not to be.

Yet from St. Thomas's reasoning it seems to follow that every non-being, however it be taken, is not the object of the divine omnipotence; for since from the fact that God has in himself every perfection of being it follows that whatever has the notion of being falls under omnipotence, it also seems to be gathered that what is not is in no way its object; and thus in the second book Contra Gentiles, chapter 22, in the second argument, he said that the omnipotence of God is referred to all things that do not oppose the notion of being; whence he infers that non-being is not the object of omnipotence, for it is opposed to the notion of being; which also in this article he had intimated.[2294] But elsewhere, in I Sentences, distinction 42, question 5, article 2, and in De potentia, question 1, article 3, he asserts that everything that can have the notion of being or non-being is the object of the divine omnipotence; and that outside it is that which implies a contradiction, that is, to be and not to be at once.[2295] From which it is not sufficiently clear whether non-being is an object of the divine omnipotence or not.

Cajetan in this article teaches that the omnipotence of God is occupied about being and non-being, yet in a different way: about being, by producing it; about non-being, by not producing, or by ceasing from production.[2296] Although this is true, it does not sufficiently explain what St. Thomas said in this article and in Contra Gentiles II, namely, that non-being does not fall under the omnipotence of God. Wherefore the doctrine of Ferrariensis is to be observed here, who very clearly illustrates the Teacher's mind in 2 Contra Gentiles, in that chapter.[2297]

Note therefore that "non-being" can be said in a twofold way. In one way, as it were essentially, for that which has no essence at all, but rather implies in itself a contradiction; and about this non-being omnipotence is in no way occupied, neither by production nor by destruction: of this sort is a

2292. Cajetan, commentary on this article.
2293. Ferrariensis (Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara), on this article.
2294. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles II, c.22 (secunda ratio).
2295. St. Thomas, In I Sententiarum, d.42, q.5, a.2; Quaestiones disputatae De potentia, q.1, a.3.
2296. Cajetan, commentary on this article.

chimera, which God cannot produce, nor have as a term of destruction; and this kind of non-being is opposed to being, which is the object of the divine omnipotence, to wit, the absolutely possible. Of this St. Thomas spoke in this article and in the second book Contra Gentiles, chapter 22; wherefore concerning non-being taken in this mode we can say: God cannot make that; although St. Thomas in this article, for modesty's sake, affirmed it would be better to say, "non-being cannot be made by God." Henry notes in Quodlibet 8, question 3, that non-being, that is, what implies a contradiction, cannot be done by God, not on account of a defect of power in God, but rather on account of an abundance of power; so that it is true to say, "God, the more powerful, cannot make that which implies a contradiction."[2298]

In another way "non-being" is said, as it were denominatively, from the mere negation of existence, although otherwise it is said to have an essence, that is, it does not of itself imply a contradiction: in this way a rose, or a non-existent man, is called non-being; and this is the object of the divine omnipotence, not by production, but by the negation of act: because the omnipotence of God not only produces a man, but also destroys and corrupts him; although Ferrariensis called the annihilation of a thing "corruption," he seems to have spoken by an extended signification of the term. Of this kind of non-being St. Thomas is to be understood in the places cited in I and in De potentia, when he says that that does not fall under the omnipotence of God which cannot have the notion of being or of non-being: but this is what implies a contradiction, namely, what implies in itself to be and not to be. But that which can either be or not be, that is, exist or not exist, is the object of the divine omnipotence, so that it be, or not be, in the manner explained.

Further, two things must be noted.

- First, the omnipotence of God is in a certain manner occupied about being and non-being; just as sight is about the visible and the invisible; about light and darkness; and in a certain way it is not occupied. For if non-being be taken in the former way, omnipotence regards it as sight regards darkness, not by a positive act, nor by destruction and annihilation, as it is occupied about non-being in the latter way; but because sight is said to be "of" darkness, since in respect of them there is in sight the privation of vision, as in its proper subject, whereas there is not the privation of vision with respect to sound and silence; so also omnipotence is referred to non-being in the former way: because with respect to non-being there is a negation of act in the omnipotence of God, as in its proper subject, since non-being in the former way is directly opposed to the object of omnipotence. But if non-being be taken in the latter way, omnipotence is referred to it otherwise than sight is to darkness; the opposite of which Cajetan taught without cause in this article. For sight is not occupied about darkness as about its own object, but as about what is directly opposed to its object, in regard to which a negation of operation follows in it as in its proper subject. But omnipotence

2297. Ferrariensis (Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara), on this article; idem, on Summa contra Gentiles II, c.22.
2298. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 8, q.3.

regards non-being in the latter way as a proper object made by itself, because omnipotence thus makes a thing not to be by withdrawing the action of its conservation, and by destroying, just as it makes a thing to be by producing it.

- Then note from Henry, Quodlibet 6, question 3, that the absolutely impossible, and in itself, is prior to there being in God, absolutely and in itself, a negation of active power. For he thinks, and rightly, that from the fact a thing is absolutely not possible, that is, from the fact it implies a contradiction, it follows that the power of God is said not to be able to make it; and from that negation of power in God things themselves are again denominated relatively impossible: nor did Henry teach the opposite in Quodlibet 8, question 3, as Scotus imputes to him in I, distinction 43, the sole question; for there he only asserts that something is impossible because it cannot be done by God: he speaks, however, of the impossible as referred to active power; in which sense he most truly teaches. But in Quodlibet 6 he speaks of the absolutely impossible; about which he rightly said that it first in itself implies a contradiction, than that in God there be any active impossibility, that is, any negation of power; in which opinion Scotus seems to have agreed in I, distinction 43, the sole question.[22992300]

On eternal relations and whether they are real in God

Caput VI - Neither the relation of omnipotence, nor any other, to creatures is real in God

That no real relation comes to God in time was shown above in question 13, article 7, not only according to the opinion of St. Thomas, but also of all Theologians, even of the Nominalists and of Durandus, to whom the contrary opinion is unjustly attributed by some recent writers.[2301] But because God is in various ways referred to creatures from eternity, we must now speak of eternal relations. Among these relations some belong to God freely: such is the relation of the science of vision and of efficacious will. That these are not real relations must be proved by the same argument by which we showed in Disputation 78, chapter 2, that there is no act of willing in God that is free in such a way as to inhere in him so that it could fail to inhere: for the same absurdity follows in both cases, if we say that real relations, or some real act of will intrinsic to God, belongs to him freely. Why moreover these relations are so eternal that they cannot be changed nor begin in time, we said in question 14, article 15.

Other eternal relations to creatures are predicated of God necessarily: such is the relation of idea, of the science of simple intelligence, of omnipotence, and even of the Word itself: for besides the real relation by which it regards the Father, it is also referred to creatures, of which it is called the Word, not only to possibles, but also to futures, as we shall show within Disputations 143 and 144. Although it freely regards future things, nevertheless it is referred to possibles necessarily.

2299. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 6, q.3.

2300. Scotus, In I Sententiarum, d.43, q.unica.

2301. Above, Quaestio 13, a.7; and see Durandus of St.-Pourçain. Also Vázquez's own Disputation 78, c.2; and for what follows, Disputationes 143 - 144.

Concerning all these eternal and necessary relations it remains to see whether they are real, that is, intrinsically inhering in God himself, so that by their very nature God would not be absolute and referred to himself, but would be referred to creatures in very reality.

The matter is wholly beyond controversy among Scholastic writers, who, with no one dissenting, affirm that there is in God no relation intrinsically to creatures from the nature of the thing, but only of reason. But against certain more recent writers, because they seem to think the opposite, the point must be established by authority and reason. Some therefore assert that, besides the three personal relations by which the divine persons are mutually referred, there are also in God respects to creatures, not only by our reason, but inhering in reality and intrinsically: and they judge to be of this sort the eternal and necessary relations of omnipotence, of idea, of the science of simple intelligence, and of the Word.

They explain their opinion thus. In creatures there are certain relations which, although they are real, are not called relations according to being, but according to saying; nor are they in the predicament of relation, because they are of the essence of something absolute, as is the relation of cognition to the thing known: but they are called transcendentals, because they transcend all the predicaments, nor do they necessarily require a terminus actually existing; and these are not properly called real relations. Other relations, however, are relations according to being, which are properly called real relations and are placed in the predicament; nor are they essential to anything absolute, but come to their foundations and subjects accidentally; and they require a terminus actually existing, as paternity and likeness. In the same way in God a twofold kind of real relations can be distinguished: for some are of the essence of the divine nature itself and do not require a terminus actually existing, such as the relations that belong to the attributes; and therefore they are, as it were, relations according to saying, and could be called transcendentals, although they in very reality are in God and are God himself. Others, however, are similar to predicamental relations, such as the personal ones; because without them the divine essence would be understood to be essentially perfect. Thus do these Doctors expound their opinion.

But as to what other reason they allege for proving that those real relations, which they themselves call transcendental, inhere in God, I do not see, unless it be that omnipotence, as it is omnipotence, is necessarily referred to creatures, and we define it through an order to them; and the same must be said of knowledge and of the idea: and since no absurdity follows, there is no reason why we should deny such relations to God. There are also adduced in favor of this opinion both that, in order to defend that by the force of the vision of the divine essence some creatures are seen on account of the respect which it has toward them, and also that they may teach that the divine Word proceeds by a cognition of possible creatures as of those per se pertaining to its production, as that which proceeds by a cognition of omnipotence, as omnipotence is.

But, as I said above, they assert these things without foundation. First, because they have no Scholastic authority for themselves; next, because most of the more ancient and weighty authors plainly affirm the opposite; finally, because by reason they can manifestly be convicted. First indeed, there is absolutely no one who has taught thus. For what Gregory of Rimini said in the First Book, distinction 30, question 3, conclusion 3, that God is referred from eternity to a creature not

yet existing, because (as he himself says) he is causative and foreknowing, in no way favors the aforementioned opinion: for in conclusion 4 he asserted that God is really referred in time to a creature; and yet, as we noted above in question 13, article 7, neither he, nor the Nominalists who speak in the same way, understand by a real relation one that is intrinsic to God himself, but one which receives a denomination from something extrinsic and real.

Secondly, against the aforesaid opinion, the most weighty theologians teach that in God there is no real relation to creatures, not only not in time, but neither from eternity. Thus taught St. Thomas above, in question 13, article 7; and Cajetan in the same place; and the same holy Doctor in the Second Book contra Gentiles, chapter 12, and Ferrariensis there. Concerning this and the following [matters], Henry of Ghent in Quodlibet 9, question 1; Scotus in the First Book, distinction 30; Capreolus, in Question 1, article n., conclusion 3, and to the first of Gregory against the same conclusion; and in article 2, conclusion 3, to the third of Gregory against the same; and Deza of Seville, in article 1, conclusion 3 (if it be compared with the fifth), and in article 4 to the first argument of Gregory against the third conclusion.[2302]

But perhaps you will interpret these Doctors as speaking only of predicamental relations, or of those which correspond to predicamental relations, and not, however, of relations which are like the transcendentals, which some call "second intention," although they are within the nature of the thing. But this interpretation cannot have place: because all of them expressly affirm not only that in God there is no real relation to a creature, but also that every relation becoming to God toward a creature is a relation of reason; and they speak expressly of the relations of power and of knowledge, which necessarily belong to God.

Moreover, St. Thomas expressly says that God is referred to creatures only for this reason, because creatures are referred to him; just as the knowable is only referred to knowledge because knowledge is referred to it: which he understands of a relation of reason alone, and in no way from the nature of the thing. Furthermore, no one up to now has dared to concede in God a respect more than of reason to creatures, even possible ones, as we shall see below in Disputations 143 and 144. Nor does St. Thomas, in 2 contra Gentiles, chapter 10, concede in God a relation more than of reason to creatures, as I noted in Disputation 102, chapter 1.

Third, by manifest reason the opposite opinion is refuted. Omitting, indeed, what he teaches about relations secundum dici and secundum esse, of which we shall speak more at length below in Disputation 173, chapter 4, one single argument, which Scotus briefly indicated in the place cited, will suffice for us, which is of this sort. Every nature which in reality is referred to another is so connected with it, and with itself requires it in that mode by which it is referred to it, that to be without it implies a contradiction: wherefore both must be necessary; and by the topic from the intrinsically connected, with the one taken away, the other must also be taken away. But if relation is altogether the same as the thing itself and the nature in which it is, as happens in God, in whom every relation is God himself, then by its very nature that thing, according to which it is referred,

2302. Capreolus, Quaestio 1, art. n., concl. 3, and reply to Gregory against the same conclusion; and article 2, conclusion 3, to the third of Gregory against the same. Deza of Seville, article 1, conclusion 3 (if it be compared with the fifth), and article 4, to the first argument of Gregory against the third conclusion.

requires the term as a whole, and without it cannot be; just as neither can the relation itself. All of which consequences are certain. But God, in order to be, by his very nature requires no creature, not even a possible one, nor is there any of equal necessity with him, nor, with any [creature] taken away, is God removed by the topic from the intrinsically connected: therefore, to no thing in reality is he referred.

Moreover, that God does not require any possible creature in order that he himself be, is manifest: because, in order that God be, it is of no account that an ape be able to be of such a figure and property. Which is then made clearer. For it is more necessary that God be, since he is the first being (*ens*) and of himself infinite, than that a creature be able to be: for a possible creature supposes God, as we said in chapter 4, so that it is true: because God is, it does not imply a contradiction that there be a creature; yet not conversely. But that by which each thing is such, that is more such: therefore God, who is the first being, is more necessary than a possible creature is. Which is confirmed by the doctrine of Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 18, when he says that "more and less are present in the natures of things": whence it comes to be that among truths one is greater than another. Who, moreover, will deny that it is a greater truth to say "God is possible" than to say "man is possible"? St. Thomas, following also this doctrine of Aristotle, above, question 2, article 3, that he might show that God exists, in the fourth way proceeds thus: In things there is found something more and less good and true and noble: therefore there is something which is most true; and accordingly supremely being: for those things which are most true are most beings, as is handed on in Metaphysics II, text 4; but this we call God. Now, a greater truth cannot have a necessary connection with a lesser from the nature of the thing, otherwise they would be equal: therefore "that God is" is a truth absolute from creatures.

Lastly, this is declared more in this way: by the topic from the intrinsically connected it does not follow, "If an ape were not possible, God would not exist in rerum natura"; for if that inference is not rightly drawn, "An ape is not possible, therefore man is not possible," as is well known; much less will it follow, "Therefore God is not possible": since God is the highest and supreme being, supremely necessary, and the root of all necessity and possibility.

Some of the more recent [authors] reply that, with the supposition made that a man were not possible, it is rightly inferred by the topic from the intrinsically connected that God is not possible; because, if an ape were not possible, God would not be omnipotent, and hence would not be God: therefore neither man, nor any other creature, would be possible. However, manifest reasons stand in the way of this solution.

First, because for God to be omnipotent in himself does not require that this or that nature be able to be created, but he must have such a perfection in himself that, if some creature does not imply a contradiction, he can produce it. But not to be able to produce those things which imply a contradiction takes away nothing of perfection and of omnipotence from God. Wherefore, if some creature among those that can be made were to imply a contradiction, indeed even if none were possible, God in himself would be of such perfection and in such a mode as he is. I think this to be a natural demonstration by which the contrary opinion is clearly refuted.

Secondly, even with that supposition made, nevertheless, even if a man were not possible, God could do whatever does not imply a contradiction: therefore he would be omnipotent: for omnipotence, defined above, is nothing else than a power regarding those things which do not imply a contradiction. When indeed it is supposed that something implies a contradiction, nothing is supposed against the omnipotence of God: for against omnipotence it would be only if something not implying a contradiction did not fall under it: for that which implies a contradiction is by that very fact outside omnipotence. And it would be vain for someone to say that omnipotence depends upon those things which now do not imply a contradiction: for omnipotence from itself only regards that which does not imply a contradiction, whether this or that be so.

Thirdly, it is more false to say "God is not" than to say "a man is not possible": just as, conversely, it is more true to say "God is" than to say "a man is possible." For, as Aristotle said, Metaphysics IV, text 18, among falsehoods and those which imply contradiction, one is more false than another. For it is more false (he says) to say "two are a thousand" than to say "two are five"; although both are false and impossible. But if there were a necessary and mutual connection and relation between God and creatures, then it would be as false to say "God is not" as to say "creatures are not possible": which is absurd.

They reply: with the supposition that the most similar things are not possible, it is rightly inferred by the topic from the intrinsically connected that a man too, and God, are not possible, because God would not be omnipotent: and therefore God would be necessary; wherefore neither a man, nor any other creature, would be possible. To this solution, however, manifest reasons stand in the way. First, because, for God to be omnipotent in himself, he does not require that this or that nature be able to be created, but he ought to have such a power in himself, that, if some creature does not imply a contradiction, he can produce it. Not to be able to produce those things that imply a contradiction takes away nothing from God's perfection and omnipotence. Wherefore, if some creature among those that can be made were to imply a contradiction, indeed even if none were possible, God in himself would be of such perfection and in such a mode as he is. I think this to be the natural demonstration by which the contrary opinion is manifestly refuted.

Secondly, even with that supposition made, nevertheless, even if a man were not possible, God could do whatever does not imply a contradiction: therefore he would be omnipotent. For omnipotence, defined above, is nothing else than the power over those things that do not imply a contradiction. When indeed it is supposed that something implies a contradiction, nothing is supposed against the omnipotence of God: for against omnipotence it would be only if something not implying a contradiction did not fall under it. For that which implies a contradiction is, by that very fact, outside omnipotence. And it is in vain that someone should say that omnipotence depends upon those things which now do not imply a contradiction: for omnipotence from itself only regards that which does not imply a contradiction, whether this or that be the case.

Moreover, it is more false to say "God is not" than to say "a man is not possible": just as, conversely, it is more true to say "God is" than to say "a man is possible." For, as Aristotle said, Book 4 of the Metaphysics, text 18, among falsehoods and those which imply contradiction, one is more false than another. For it is more false (he says) to say "two are a thousand" than to say "two

are five"; although both are false and impossible. But if there were a necessary and mutual connection and relation between God and creatures, then it would be as false to say "God is not" as to say "creatures are not possible," which is absurd.

Articulus IV - Whether God can make that past things have not been

It seems that God can make that past things have not been.

1. For what is impossible in itself is more impossible than what is impossible by accident. But God can do that which is impossible in itself, as to enlighten the blind or to raise the dead. Therefore much more can God do that which is impossible by accident. But that the past have not been is impossible by accident. For it happens that for Socrates not to run is impossible from this, that it is past. Therefore God can make that past things have not been.
2. Moreover, whatever God could do, he can now, since his power is not diminished. But God could make, before Socrates ran, that he not run. Therefore, after he ran, God can make that he has not run.
3. Moreover, charity is a greater virtue than virginity. But God can restore lost charity. Therefore [he can restore] virginity also. Therefore he can make that that which was corrupted not be corrupted.

But on the contrary: St. Jerome says, "Although God can do all things, he cannot make a corrupted [woman] incorrupt." Therefore, by the same reason, he cannot make any other thing that is past not to have been.[2303]

I answer that, as was said above, nothing falls under the omnipotence of God that implies a contradiction; but that the past have not been implies a contradiction. For just as it implies a contradiction to say "Socrates sits" and "he does not sit," so [it implies a contradiction to say] that "he sat" and "he did not sit." But to say that "he sat" is to say that it is past; but to say that "he did not sit" is to say that it was not. Hence that the past have not been does not fall under divine power. And this is what St. Augustine says contra Faustum: "Whoever thus says, If God is omnipotent, let him make that the things which have been done were not done, does not see that he is saying this: If God is omnipotent, let him make that those things which are true by this very fact that they are true be false." And the Philosopher says in the sixth of the Ethics that God is deprived only of this: to make not-begun what has been done.

Reply to the first: It must be said that, although "the past not to have been" is impossible by accident if that which is past be considered, that is, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past be considered under the aspect of the past, its "not to have been" is impossible, not only per se, but absolutely, as implying a contradiction. And thus it is more impossible than a dead man rising, which does not imply a contradiction. That which is said to be impossible according to some power, namely, the natural power - such things are subject to the divine power.

2303. St. Jerome, Ad Eustochium de custodia virginitatis, aliquantulum a principio.

Reply to the second: It must be said that, just as God, as regards the perfection of divine power, can do all things; but some things do not fall under his power, because they fall short of the notion of the possible: so, if the immutability of divine power be attended to, whatever God could, he can. Some things, however, once had the notion of the possible when they were to be done, which now fall short of the notion of the possible when they are done. And thus God is said not to be able now to make those things which cannot be made to be done.

Reply to the third: It must be said that God can take away all corruption of mind and of body from a corrupted woman: yet this cannot be removed from her, that she was not corrupted; just as neither can he take away from any sinner that he has not sinned, and that he has not lost charity.

The conclusion is: "That the past have not been" implies a contradiction, and therefore does not fall under omnipotence. Nothing in this article needs explanation, provided that we understand the mind of St. Thomas. But as for what he teaches,

Disputatio CV - Whether God can make that the past have not been

Caput I - Two opposed opinions

Antonius de Corduba reports various opinions on this matter, Book 1, Question 55, in the last doubt. I, however, think there are only two, which seem rather to conflict in words than in reality; for what Antonius attributes to Gabriel must be understood otherwise than he himself reports, as we shall note below. The first opinion is that of the Antissiodorensis, Book 1, Summa, chapter 11, question 6; and of Alexander, Part 1, question 21, member 5, article 4; of Gregory on the First Book of the Sentences, distinction 42, question 1, article 2; and even of Gilbert upon Boethius, Book 1, On the Trinity, chapter 9, which Corduba judges the more probable, namely, that there is now in God the potency toward the past, that it not have been; which Gregory at the place cited broadly proves. But since, explained in a good sense, it is true and does not differ in reality from the opinion of St. Thomas, I set aside a confirmation of it.

The latter view is that of St. Thomas, of Cajetan, and of other Thomists in this article, and of Ferrarienis there; of St. Bonaventure on the First Book, distinction 42, question 3; and of Capreolus in the same question, article 3, to Gregory's arguments against the seventh conclusion; who hold that there is not in God a potency such that He can make the past not to have been. This view is wont to be proved by the testimonies of the Fathers and by reasons, some of which we shall report below.[2304]

2304. Antissiodorensis, Summa, lib. 1, c. 11, q. 6; Alexander of Hales, Summa, pars 1, q. 21, memb. 5, art. 4; Gregory of Rimini, In I Sent., dist. 42, q. 1, art. 2; Gilbert of Poitiers on Boethius, De Trinitate, lib. 1, c. 9; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 25, a. 4; Cajetan, In Iam, q. 25, a. 4; Ferrarienis (Ferrariensis), In Contra Gentiles II, c. 25; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 42, q. 3; Capreolus, In I Sent., dist. 42, q. 1, a. 3, ad argumenta Gregorii contra conclusionem 7.

Caput II - In what way in God there is no potency toward the past

I certainly think that the aforesaid Doctors do not, in reality, teach contraries, though they seem to contend with one another in words. That we may reconcile their opinions, it must be observed that the omnipotence of God in itself is eternal and wholly permanent all at once, so that nothing of it passes away; yet, inasmuch as it is said relatively, potency looks to our time according to the differences of past, present, and future. Therefore we state concerning it that it can and that it cannot do something, inasmuch as it is referred to our time. The Doctors of the first view, therefore, did not hold that God could, by His omnipotence, strip a past thing, once it is past (as Cajetan puts it) of its pastness - that is, that God could make that, after a thing was past, afterwards it was not past; for who does not see that this is impossible, nor lies under divine power? Nay rather, the aforesaid Doctors expressly noted that God cannot make the past not to have been in the composite sense (as they call it); but they now say that there is in God a potency such that the thing which was past not be past, if the divine potency be referred to the thing itself, taken in itself, before it is posited to have been or not to have been. For once it is posited that the thing has been, no one said that God could make it not to have been. In this sense the Scholastics alleged above spoke, especially Alexander in the place cited, to the second argument, where he begins, "As to that of Augustine, read and it will plainly appear." For since the divine potency remains the same in itself, and compared with things before they were, God could make that they not be; therefore they said that there is in God a potency toward the past, which is shown by this figure:

- Potency of God related to the same time, whether past, present, or future, can respect any part of a contradiction, although it cannot change the other at another time, because the potency of God would then be referred to different times simultaneously. In this sense Gabriel said, on I, distinction 38, question 1, article 2, doubt 3, this proposition: "God is, Peter will not sin" is not necessary - that is, knowledge of future things does not necessarily befit God, because there is potency in God that He not have known. He did not say that there is potency that, after He has known, He can have not known; but that from the beginning He so knew, that it was possible that He not know; just as it was possible that a thing which is future not have been future. Antonius de Corduba misreports Gabriel's view, if what we have gathered from Gabriel himself be compared with what he alleges.

But St. Thomas, and those who follow the latter opinion, merely contend that the divine power, referred to the present time, cannot now make that what is already past not be past - which is to be understood in the composite sense. For since it is impossible that the past have not been past, after it is posited to be past, it is not subject to the divine omnipotence to make that, when the past is posited as past, it not be past; and by the same reason He cannot make that the present, when it is present, not be present; and that the future, when it is future, not be future, as is noted in Disputation 68, chapter 4. In this way is to be understood what Aristotle, Ethics 6, chapter 2, reports from Agathon, in these words: "This also God Himself is said to be without power to do, to make what has been done not to have been done." So too speaks St. Augustine, Contra Faustum,

Book 26, chapter 5, when he says that it is impossible for the past not to have been; with whom St. Anselm agrees in the Proslogion, chapter 7, in the beginning, and On the Concord of Free Will and Predestination, chapter 4. In the same way St. Jerome in the epistle to Eustochium, which is the 22nd, says: "I barely think it possible that a virgin, after ruin, be repaired by God" - that is, I do not think that the virginity lost can be restored; and Augustine, in the place alleged above, said likewise that it is as impossible that what is to be, not be future, as that what is past, not be past. Whence it follows that it does not fall under divine omnipotence that the future not be future, just as the past not be past.

From what we have said it is gathered that what Bonaventure teaches on the First Book, distinction 49, article 2, question 1, and Durandus on the First Book, distinction 44, question 4, on the third, is true: that God cannot now do all the things that He could do; because He could raise Christ, and now He cannot, unless Christ were again to die. For although the divine nature is not changed in itself, nevertheless, according to those things which it connotes, it can be variously related; that is, when it is referred to diverse times, it is said to be able in diverse ways. But the verb "can" connotes time. Whence Alexander also infers in Part 1, question 21, member 4, in this way: Although this proposition be true, "God has whatever power He had," nevertheless this is not true, "God now has every power of a thing which He had before"; nor this, "Whatever God could do, He can do now," if the potency be referred to time. Others, however, together with the Master on the First Book, distinction 44, say that God can whatever He could - so that potency not look to an effect at a different time; as if we were to say, "God can have raised Christ, and not have raised Him." Both, however, according to what we have noted, are very true.[2305]

Articulus V - Whether God can do what He does not do

To the fifth, we proceed thus. It seems that God cannot do except the things which He does. For God cannot do the things which He does not foreknow and preordain that He will do; but He does not foreknow nor preordain that He will do anything, except the things which He does. Therefore He cannot do except the things which He does.

Further, God cannot do except what is just and ought to be done; but God ought not to do the things which He does not do, since He does not will to do them. Therefore God cannot do except the things which He does.

Further, God cannot do except what is good and fitting to things made. But for things made by God, it is neither good nor fitting to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except the things which He does.

But on the contrary is what is said in Matthew 26: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask my Father, and he will even now supply me with more than twelve legions of angels?" Yet He Himself did not ask, nor did the Father supply them to resist the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not do.

2305. The Master of the Sentences, In I Sent., dist. 44; cf. Alexander of Hales, pars 1, q. 21, memb. 4; Aristotle, Ethics VI, c. 2, citing Agathon; Augustine, Contra Faustum, XXVI, c. 5; Anselm, Proslogion, c. 7; De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis cum libero arbitrio, c. 4; Jerome, Ep. 22 ad Eustochium.

I answer that, concerning this, some have erred in two ways. Some indeed posited that God acts as if by necessity of nature, so that, just as from the action of natural things no other things can proceed except those which do proceed - e.g., from the seed of man a man, from the seed of olive an olive - so from the divine operation no other things can be, nor can there be another order of things, except as it now is. But we showed above that God does not act as if by necessity of nature, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is the divine will naturally determined, as by a necessity, to these effects. Whence in no way does it follow that the course of things proceeds from God by such necessity that other things could not proceed.

Others indeed said that the divine power is determined to this course of things on account of the order of divine wisdom and justice, without which God does nothing. But since the power of God (which is His essence) is not other than the wisdom of God, it can fittingly be said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom comprehends the whole "can" of the power. Yet the order impressed upon things by the divine wisdom, in which the ratio of justice consists, as was said, does not equal the divine wisdom so that the divine wisdom be limited to this order. For it is manifest that the whole ratio of the order which a wise man imposes upon things made by himself is taken from the end. When, therefore, the end is proportionate to the things made, the wisdom of the maker is limited to a determinate order. But the divine goodness is an end that surpasses created things disproportionately. Whence the divine wisdom is not determined to some one order of things, so that no other course of things could flow. Therefore it must simply be said that God can do other things than the things which He does, according to His justice and His wise intellect. Then, because the will is not determined by necessity to these or those things (save perhaps by a supposition, as was said above), nor is the divine wisdom and justice determined to this order (as was said above), nothing prevents there being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not contained under the order which He has established for things. And because power is understood as executing, but the will as commanding, and the intellect and wisdom as directing, that which is attributed to the divine power as it is considered in itself is said to be within God's absolute power; and of this sort is everything in which the notion of being can be preserved, as was said above. But that which is attributed to the divine power according as it carries out the command of a just will, this God is said to be able to do by ordained power. According to this, therefore, it is to be said that God can, by absolute power, do other things than those which He has foreknown and preordained that He would do; yet He cannot bring it about that He should do other things than those which He has foreknown and preordained that He would do, because the very doing lies under foreknowledge and preordination, but not the very being-able, which is natural. For God therefore does something because He wills; yet He is not therefore able because He wills, but because such is His nature.

Reply to the first: In us, in whom power and essence are one thing and will and intellect another, and again intellect is one thing and wisdom another, and will another and justice another, it can happen that something be in power which cannot be in just will or in wise intellect. But in God power and essence and will and intellect and wisdom and justice are the same. Whence nothing can be in the divine power which cannot be in the just will or in the wise intellect.

Reply to the second: God owes nothing to anyone except to Himself. Hence when it is said that God cannot do except what He ought, nothing else is meant but that God cannot do except what is fitting and just. But this "fitting and just" can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that it be joined first with this verb "is," and thus be restricted to stand for what is fitting and just as things now are, and so be referred to power; and thus what is said is false: for the sense is, "God cannot do anything except as it is now fitting and just." In another way, it can be understood to stand for what is fitting and just absolutely; and thus what is said is true. For God ought to do nothing except what befits His own goodness and justice; and in this sense also it is said that "He cannot deny Himself," because He cannot do anything that would impede or oppose His own goodness.

Reply to the third:

... that God does not act as it were from a necessity of nature, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is the will itself determined naturally and of necessity to these things. Whence in no way does this course of things proceed from God by necessity, so that others could not proceed. Others, however, said that the divine power is determined to this course of things on account of the order of divine wisdom and justice, without which God does nothing. But since the power of God (which is His essence) is not other than the wisdom of God, it can fittingly indeed be said that there is nothing in the power of God that is not in the order of divine wisdom. For divine wisdom comprehends the whole ability of power. Yet the order imprinted upon things by divine wisdom, in which the notion of justice consists, as was said above,[2306] does not so equal the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom be limited to this order. Now it is manifest that the whole ratio of the order that a wise agent imposes upon the things made by himself is taken from the end. Therefore, when the end is proportioned to the things made for the sake of the end, the wisdom of the maker is limited to some determinate order. But the divine goodness is an end that surpasses created things disproportionality. Hence divine wisdom is not determined to any order of things in such a way that another course of things could not flow forth. Therefore it must be said simply that God can make other things than those which He makes.

Reply to the first: In us, in whom power and essence are other than will and intellect, and again the intellect is other than wisdom, and will other than justice, there can be something in power which cannot be in a just will or in a wise intellect. But in God power and essence and will and intellect and wisdom and justice are the same. Hence nothing can be in the divine power which cannot be in His will and wise intellect.

Then, since the will is not determined of necessity to these or those things, unless perhaps by supposition, as was said above, nor are the wisdom and justice of God determined to this order, as was said above, nothing prevents there being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not contained under the order He has established for things. And because power is understood as executing, will as commanding, and intellect and wisdom as directing, what is attributed to power considered in itself is said to be what God can do according to absolute power. And of this sort is everything in which the notion of being can be preserved, as was said above. But

2306. See above, q. 21, a. 3.

what is attributed to the divine power according as it executes the command of a just will, this is said to be what God can do by ordained power.[2307] According to this, therefore, it must be said that God can do other things by absolute power than those which He foresaw and preordained that He would do; yet it cannot be that He should do anything which He did not foresee and preordain that He would do, because the very doing is subject to foreknowledge and preordination, but not the very being-able, which is natural. For this reason God does something because He wills; yet He does not on that account have power because He wills, but because He is such in His own nature.

Reply to the second: God ought to do nothing to any other than to Himself. Hence when it is said that God cannot do except what He ought, nothing else is signified except that God cannot do except what is fitting and just for Him. But this that I call "fitting and just" can be understood in two ways. In one way thus, that that which I call fitting and just is first understood to be joined with this verb "is," so that it is restricted to stand for things present, and thus is referred to power. And thus what is said is false; for the sense is, "God cannot do except what in the present mode is fitting and just." But if it be first joined with this verb "can" (which has an amplifying force), and afterward with this verb "is," there will be signified something present and confused, and the expression will be true under this sense: "God cannot do except that which, if He were to do it, would be fitting and just."

Reply to the third: Although this course of things is determined by these things which now exist, nevertheless the divine wisdom and power are not limited to this course. Hence, although given these things which now come to be no other course would be good and fitting, nevertheless God could make other things, and impose upon them another order.

The conclusion is: God can do many other things which He does not do.

Articulus VI - Whether God can make better things than those which He makes

To the sixth we proceed thus. It seems that God cannot make better things than those which He makes. For whatever God does, He does most powerfully and most wisely; but something is the better, the more powerfully and more wisely it is done. Therefore God cannot make anything better than He makes.

1. Further, St. Augustine, Against Maximinus, argues thus: if God could and would not beget a Son equal to Himself, He was envious; by the same reasoning, if God could make things better than He has made and would not, He was envious. But envy is altogether removed from God; therefore God made each thing the best. Therefore God cannot make anything better than He has made.[2308]

2307. See above, this question, art. 3.
2308. St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum, lib. 1, cap. 7, ad fin. (tom. 6).

2. Further, that which is supremely and very good cannot be made better, because nothing is greater than what is maximal. But, as St. Augustine says in the Enchiridion, the individual things which God made are good, but all together are very good, because from all there consists the admirable beauty of the universe. Therefore the good of the universe cannot be made better by God.[2309]

3. Further, the man Christ is full of grace and truth, and has the Spirit not by measure. And thus He cannot be better. Created beatitude also is called the highest good, and thus cannot be better. Likewise the blessed Virgin Mary is exalted above all the choirs of Angels, and thus cannot be better. Therefore not all things which God has made can be made better.

But on the contrary: It is said in Ephesians 3 that God "is able to do all things more abundantly than we ask or understand."[2310]

I answer that the goodness of a thing is twofold. One indeed is that which is of the essence of the thing; as to be rational is of the essence of man; and with respect to this good, God cannot make any thing better than the thing itself is (although He can make some other thing better than it), just as He cannot make a greater quaternity. For if it were greater, it would no longer be a quaternity, but another number; for the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is related as the addition of unity is in numbers, as is said in the eighth book of the Metaphysics. The other goodness is that which is outside the essence of the thing; as the good of man is to be studious or wise, and according to such a good God can make the things made by Himself better. But simply speaking, with respect to any thing made by Himself, God can make another thing better.

Reply to the first: When it is said that God can make something better than He makes, if "better" is taken as a noun, it is true: for of any thing He can make another better. The same thing indeed He can make better in a certain respect and in a certain respect not, as has been said. But if "better" is taken as an adverb and imports a mode on the part of the agent, thus God cannot make better than He makes, because He cannot act from greater wisdom and goodness. If, however, it imports a mode on the part of the thing made, thus He can make better, because He can give to the things made by Himself a better mode of being with respect to accidentals, though not with respect to essentials.

Reply to the second: It belongs to the very notion of the Son that He be equal to the Father when He has come to perfection; but it does not belong to the notion of any creature that it be better than it was made by God. Hence the reason is not similar.

Reply to the third: The universe, given these things, cannot be better on account of the most fitting order attributed by God to these things, in which the good of the universe consists. If one of these were made better, the proportion of order would be corrupted; as if one string were tightened more than is due, the melody of the lyre would be spoiled. Yet God could make other things, or add others to these things already made; and thus that universe would be better.

2309. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, cap. 10 (tom. 3).
2310. Eph. 3:20.

Reply to the fourth: The humanity of Christ from the fact that it is united to God, and created beatitude from the fact that it is the enjoyment of God, and the blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the Mother of God, have a certain infinite dignity from the infinite good which is God; from this side nothing can be made better than they, just as nothing can be better than God.

Cajetan gathers the conclusions from this article. The first is: God cannot change, or make better, any thing as to essence. The second is: God can make the same thing better as to accidents. The third is: God can make a species better as to essence than any other produced, unto infinity. This is the sum of the doctrine of both articles, which is to be examined in the following disputation.

Disputatio CVI - On whether God can do more than He has done

- In what manner God operates from necessity of justice: cap. 1.
- What is called ordained power, and what absolute: cap. 2.
- That God can do more than He has done is certain by the Catholic faith: cap. 3.
- That not only infinitely many individuals, but also infinitely many species, can be made by God: cap. 4.

Caput I - In what manner God operates from necessity of justice

Before we enter upon the disputation itself, two things must be premised, by which the state of the present controversy will be more elucidated. One is, in what manner the power of God is bound to justice, so that He can do nothing which is not just, and consequently that God operates necessarily out of justice; which will be explained in the present chapter. The other is, what is called ordained power and what absolute; of which we shall speak in the following chapter.

The manner, however, in which the power of God is bound to His justice is rightly explained by St. Thomas in this article, ad 1, and by Alexander, part 1, q. 21, memb. 2, art. 5, ad t., and by Durandus in I, dist. 43, q. 1, and by Gabriel, q. 1, a. 1, a. 4.[2311] For they distinguish a twofold necessity of justice in acting: one which is wont to be called as to specification; the other, as to exercise. The former necessity is thus posited, that as to specification God can do nothing which is not just. If therefore we speak of this necessity, we can still speak of justice in a twofold way: first, as it includes debt (debitum), and in this way there does not always lie upon God a necessity, as to specification, of doing only what is just. For although He does some things out of debt, because He has promised by His word, nevertheless He does many things without any obligation. Then we speak of justice inasmuch as it is only what befits and is decent to the divine goodness; and that is just which, being done, befits and is consonant with the goodness of God Himself. And in this way God operates necessarily as to specification, because He can produce nothing that does not befit His goodness.

2311. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 25, a. 6, ad 1; Alexander of Hales, Summa, pars 1, q. 21, memb. 2, art. 5, ad t.; Durandus, In I Sent., dist. 43, q. 1; Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., q. 1, a. 1, a. 4.

The other necessity of justice is as to exercise, whereby, namely, one so operates that he cannot not operate. Yet in no way does God operate by a necessity of justice in this manner, if justice be taken merely for becomingness, as was explained above; because God can omit many things which, if they were produced, would befit the divine goodness. But if justice be called a debt whereby God is bound to do something, sometimes He operates from justice by a necessity as to exercise, because He has promised something, and according to a just promise He ought to do it.

It must, however, be observed that the aforesaid Doctors do not admit in God a debt of this sort whereby He is said to owe anything to another, even if He has promised it, but only whereby He may be called a debtor in a certain sense. I, however, think that by His word God is bound not only to Himself, but also to another as debtor; and thus, although He promised of His own will, nevertheless, since He has promised, He would be unjust if He did not fulfill.[2312] And so, with respect to things now present, I say that, since He has promised to give what He has promised, if He were not to do what He promised, this would not be just.

What is called ordained power, and what absolute.

Meanwhile it is to be noted, for the explanation of the state of this question, what we ought to understand by the name of absolute power and of ordained. For when we ask whether God can do some things which He does not do, if we stand on the mode of ordained power, we must answer otherwise than if we stand on absolute power. The Schoolmen interpret these terms variously. St. Thomas, in this article ad 1, and in Contra Gentiles III, cap. 98, calls the power of God "ordained" inasmuch as it executes the command of the will and is determined by it; but he calls that "absolute" which is referred to the will considered in itself, and is not determined by the command of the will; and it is therefore called absolute because it is only from the determination of the will that it is such. By "ordained" power God is said to be able to do that which, the decree of His will being supposed, He has established to do; by "absolute," that which by His power considered in itself, not bound by a decree, He could do. Wherefore, if God had decreed to free someone dying in mortal sin from hell, and to transfer him into the kingdom of heaven, it would be said that He could do that not only by absolute power but also by ordained power, because He would do it according to power determined by the decree of His will.

Caput II - What is meant by ordained power and by absolute power

Note, as was explained above: God can fail to produce many things which, if they were produced, would befit the divine goodness. But if "justice" is said to be a debt, whereby God is bound to do something, sometimes He operates out of justice necessarily as to the exercise, because He has promised something, and according to the promise He owes to do it.

2312. The author here takes a stronger view of promissory debt in God than some Schoolmen, who deny that God can be said to "owe" anything to a creature even on the basis of promise.

Note, however, that the aforesaid Doctors do not admit in God a debt of this sort whereby He would be said to owe anything to another, even if He had promised it to him, but only such that He would be said to be a debtor to Himself alone. I, however, judge that by His word God makes Himself a debtor not only to Himself but even to another; as I shall show more at length in 1 - 2, question 114, article 3, where I shall also explain the mind of St. Thomas.

Moreover, those same Doctors, except for Durandus, add that this proposition is true: "God can do something which is not just," if the "just" be referred to the present time; for now many things are not actually just, because they have not been ordained by God, which nevertheless can be done by Him. But if "just" is not referred to the present time, it must be said that nothing can be done by God which is not just, that is, which, if He were to do it, would not be just.

When we ask what is called ordained power, and what absolute:

When we inquire whether God can do certain things which He does not do, if the discussion concerns ordained power, an answer must be given different from that which concerns absolute power. The Schoolmen, however, interpret these terms in various ways.

St. Thomas, in this article ad primum and in the third book of the Contra gentiles, chapter 98, calls the power of God "ordained" insofar as it is determined to the execution of a rightful command of the will, and by that is determined; but he calls "absolute" the power which befits Him according to itself and is not determined by the command of the will; and therefore it is called absolute because it is loosed from the determination of the will. Wherefore, by ordained power God is said to be able to do those things which, the decree of His will being supposed, He has established to do; by absolute, that which by His power considered in itself, not bound by a decree, He could do; as was explained above.

But Scotus, in I, dist. 44, q. 1, to whom Major consents in I, 43, q. 1, at the beginning, understands both powers otherwise: for he says that "ordained" and "absolute" are referred to a law enacted by God Himself, so that "ordained" is that which is determined and bound by that law; but "absolute," that which does not follow the law, but is loosed from it. Wherefore, if God had decreed now to free someone from hell, He would be said in Scotus's sentence to do that according to absolute power, not according to ordained; whereas in the opinion of the Angelic Doctor the contrary must be said: for according to him He would be said to do it by ordained power, that is, by power determined by the decree and command of His will.[2313]

For my part, I think one should speak with a distinction: namely, where a law has been promulgated by God, such as this - "He who dies in mortal sin is to be punished with perpetual pain" - there "ordained power" will be said to be that which is determined by that law and according to that law; but "absolute" will be that which is not bound to it, but works beside it or against it. Yet in those matters about which God has promulgated no law to men, "ordained power" will be that which is determined by the decree of the will of God; but "absolute," that which, considered in itself, is not bound nor directed by a definition and decree itself. Wherefore, if God

2313. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 25, a. 5 ad 1; Contra Gentiles III, c. 98. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 44, q. 1; John Major, In I Sent., d. 43, q. 1, in princ.

were now to free Judas from the pains of hell because He had so decreed, He would be said to act by absolute power in the former mode - that is, absolute with respect to the law which He promulgated in general against the damned; in which manner, too, He is said to have preserved the Virgin from original sin, because He did that beside the law commonly enacted. But if He were now to create a new star, or to do something concerning the course of the heavens beside the common order which the heavens have hitherto observed, He would then be said to act by ordained power, not absolute; "ordained," I say, that is, determined by the command of His will. And thus in part each opinion can have a place.

Moreover, it must be observed that the power which we have called "ordained" is not to be called "ordinary," as the more recent authors commonly call it. First, because the ancient theologians called it "ordained" only; secondly, because, although it is said that God commonly does those things He does "ordinarily," nevertheless it is not said that He can do them "ordinarily," nor is His power styled "ordinary." These points being presupposed, the proposed question is to be understood of absolute power in both modes: namely, whether God can do certain things which He has not done, the law and decree of His will being set aside.

Caput III - That God can do more things than He does is a truth certain by Catholic faith

Peter Abelard erred in this, as Walden testifies, tom. 1, book 1, article 1, cap. 10: he held that God cannot do anything other than those things which He has done, or will do. Thus Walden says that Bernard reported this error in the text of Abelard's words, cap. 3. He also alleges Bernard's Epistle 190, where among the errors of Abelard Bernard reckons this - namely, that he assigned omnipotence to the Father, semi-potence to the Son, and nullipotence to the Holy Spirit. From which, to be sure, how this error is gathered I do not see. The same error, with the name suppressed, is mentioned by Hugh of St. Victor, book 2 De sacramentis, part 2, cap. ultimo, and by the Master in I, dist. 43, whom Walden confutes in that chapter and the following by many testimonies of the Fathers. Read St. Augustine, Epist. 3, and De spiritu et littera, cap. 1, and De Genesi ad litteram, book 9, cap. 26, and book 4, cap. 1. It is refuted also by that testimony of Matthew 26: "Do you not think that I cannot beseech my Father, and He will now furnish me with more than twelve legions of angels?" and of Mark 14: "Abba, Father, all things are possible to You; remove this chalice from me." Finally, this error, together with the rest of the same Abelard, was condemned in the Council of Sens, where Abelard recanted and, converted to a better disposition, lived a religious life among certain monks. By reason, too, it is manifest that God can do many other things which He does not do: for if any human can do many things which he does not do, much more can God. Moreover, this error of Wyclif arose from another error: since he said that God acts by absolute necessity and with no liberty, as we reported in disputation 68, cap. 1, he was driven also to assert that God can only do those things which He has done and will do; and the same about man he frequently had to think, since he denied liberty of acting to each.

But indeed it is not only certain that God can do many other things which He has not done and will not do, but also infinitely many, all of which He knows most excellently, as in disputation 65, cap. 7, against that same Wyclif, and certain philosophers, whose memory St. Augustine noted in City of God 12, cap. 18, we have shown. They used to say that God only knows and can do finite things, but that for infinite ages He has always operated - not indeed by producing new things, but by repeating the same; which error Augustine there at length refutes. Among the Schoolmen, however, there is controversy whether this infinity of things which God can produce is only of individuals, or also of species. About this we shall differ in the following chapter.

Caput IV - Not only infinitely many individuals, but even infinitely many species can be made by God

Concerning the multitude of species which God can produce, our Schoolmen have thought variously. Aureolus, as Capreolus reports in I, dist. 43, q. unica, art. 2, in the arguments against the conclusion, endeavors by various ways to persuade that an infinite multitude of species cannot be produced by God, not for defect of power, but because the possible species are not infinite. He understands not only that they cannot be produced all at once, but neither successively, in such wise that among the possible there be a last one, after which, once produced, another could not be created. In the same sentence is Durandus, in I, dist. 44, q. 2. Cajetan also, in this article, reports Scotus in III, dist. 13, q. 1, when he asserts that created grace in the soul cannot be increased and perfected to infinity. For the reason by which Scotus proves that, also persuades that a certain species of any perfection whatsoever cannot be given to infinity. It is of this sort: if for any given grace there could always be a greater, then the whole latitude of the increase of grace would be infinite, and consequently there would be some grace which was at an infinite distance from the lowest grace; therefore it would be infinite, because it would exceed another infinitely. But grace cannot be infinite; therefore neither can its increase proceed to infinity.[2314]

By the same reasoning it seems to be proved that, for any species assigned, another more perfect according to the same cannot be created: for if it could be produced, it would follow that the whole latitude of species would be infinite, and that some of them would stand at an infinite distance, according to the same ratio of perfection, from the lowest species, and consequently would be infinite, because it would exceed the lowest species infinitely; which is absurd: for the imitation of the divine perfection, which is infinite, cannot be infinite in creatures.

I, however, think the truer opinion is that of St. Thomas and Cajetan in this article: namely, that, whatever species you assign, there can be given another and yet another beyond it to infinity, more and more perfect. Yet this opinion ought not to be judged so certain that the opposite should straightway be held a notable error, as some more recent authors seem to think; for their reason for proving it was this: that if there were not infinite possible species, God would not be called omnipotent. But no consequence follows: for God is not called omnipotent because He can produce

2314. Aureolus, as reported by Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 43, q. unica, a. 2; Durandus, In I Sent., d. 44, q. 2; Cajetan, In I, q. 25, a. 6, reporting Scotus, In III Sent., d. 13, q. 1.

infinite species, but because He can do all things which do not involve a contradiction. Now, that is not effected except by possible species which are finite; for only finite species do not involve a contradiction; and all those, and only those, could be produced by God; and nonetheless He would truly be omnipotent.

Of all the other reasons which Durandus brings forward for this opinion and dissolves, this one is chiefly used to prove it: every creature is a certain imitation and participation of the divine perfection; but none can imitate God in the mode of perfection itself; therefore there can be given another and another which will always imitate God in a more perfect mode. For if there were given one which did not imitate the most perfect prototype in the most perfect mode, there could be given another which would in that same mode imitate more perfectly. But I answer: from this reasoning one could indeed prove that assimilation and imitation, according to the variety of form and nature, can go on increasing to infinity, because that which is proposed to be imitated is infinitely perfect. Whence it comes about that a picture which imitates its prototype in figure and colors can grow until it equals that one's perfection. Wherefore, if the species of created things imitated God thus, without doubt, for whatever one you suppose, there could be produced another which would more perfectly resemble God; because there would always remain something to be imitated. But in fact creatures are not assimilated to God according to a variety of forms and natures, but in a form of a far different order, which they participate from Him; therefore it does not follow that the imitation of creatures can be extended to infinity through infinite species.

A second reason: even if the possible species were not infinite, that would not prejudice the infinitude of God's power in the genus of power; for divine power is not called infinite because the number of producible species is infinite. And since, as we noted elsewhere, God's power can from other grounds be shown infinite in its genus, this reason does not sufficiently prove that the possible species are infinite.

A third reason of this sort: "It does not involve a contradiction that there be infinitely many possible species of things; therefore one must not deny that they can exist." Now that it does not involve a contradiction is clear by induction; for the arguments that are wont to be adduced for the opposite part are easily dissolved. For if any had force, that one would have which we set forth first in behalf of Durandus's sentence.

But to that I reply: even if the possible species are infinite toward the superior part, it by no means follows that there is some supreme which stands at an infinite distance from the lowest. For neither does it follow that there is some supreme grace which stands at an infinite distance from the lowest; rather, either there is always a higher grace, or, if in that case there would be a highest grace, there would not be a most perfect species - nor is that what must be avoided. For these two manifestly conflict with each other: either to proceed to infinity in species or in graces, or to posit some supreme which stands at an infinite distance from another. Therefore, whatever one you posit, there is given another superior. And this is true if we constitute the progression in species toward the superior part as going on to infinity; for, if toward the inferior part one could again

posit a lower and lower, less and less perfect, nothing absurd seems to follow - there will never be some determinate species which, although it does not stand at an infinite distance from another, nevertheless terminates the rest; yet the perfection of creatures will never be infinite.

Articulus VII - On the infinity of possible species and the increase of grace

If the increase of grace were to go on without end, it would follow that the whole latitude of the increase of grace would be infinite, and consequently that there would be some grace which stands at an infinite distance from the least grace; therefore that grace would be infinite, because it would exceed another infinitely. But grace cannot be infinite; therefore neither can its augmentation proceed to infinity.

By the same reasoning it seems to be proved that, with any species assigned, another more perfect according to essence cannot be created: for if it could be produced, it would follow that the whole latitude of species would be infinite, and that some of them stand at an infinite distance according to essence from the lowest species, and hence that one would be infinite, because it would exceed the lowest species infinitely - which is absurd; for infinity according to essence can befit God alone. To this point also seem to look the principal reasons of Aureolus, and what Durandus asserts; therefore it has seemed to me good to pass over all of them.

I for my part judge the opinion of St. Thomas and Cajetan in this article to be truer, who teach that, with any species assigned, there can be given another and another, to infinity, more and more perfect. Yet this opinion ought not to be held so certain that the opposite should be judged worthy of any noted infirmity, as some more recent men falsely think; for their reason by which they attempt to prove it is not firm, namely, that if infinite possible species did not exist, God would not be called omnipotent. This in no way follows: for God is not called omnipotent because He can produce infinite species, but because He can do all things that do not imply a contradiction. And if only finite species were possible, then only finite things would not imply a contradiction; and all those could be produced by God; and nonetheless He would truly be called omnipotent.

Passing over other reasons which Durandus brings forward for this opinion and solves, the following is chiefly wont to be urged to prove it. Every creature is a certain imitation and participation of the divine perfection; but no creature can imitate God in the most perfect way; therefore there can be given still another and another which always imitates God in a more perfect way. For if some picture is not assimilated to the prototype in the most perfect way, there can be given another which is assimilated to it in a more perfect way. But someone could reply that by this reasoning it is wont to be proved that assimilation and imitation, according to the unity of form and nature, can grow to infinity, if that which is proposed to be imitated is infinitely perfect. Whence it follows that the painted image which imitates the prototype in figure and colors could grow until it equal the latter's perfection. Therefore the species of created things would thus imitate God that, no matter what one you posit, without doubt another could be produced which would resemble God more perfectly; because there would always remain something to be imitated. But in

truth, because God is not assimilated univocally according to the unity of form, but in a mode of form far different in notion, which creatures receive from Him by participation, it does not follow that the imitation on the side of the creature can grow to infinity through infinite species.

Second reason: if there were not infinite possible species, the power of God would not be infinite in the genus of potency; but it is infinite, as was proved in article 2; therefore species too are infinite. But since the infinity of God's power in the genus of potency can be proved on other grounds (as we noted in Disputation 103, chapter ...), this reason does not sufficiently prove that there are infinite possible species.

Third, finally, the reason is of this sort: it does not imply a contradiction that possible species be infinite; therefore it is not to be denied that they can be. That this implies no contradiction is clear by induction: for the reasons that are wont to be adduced for the opposite side are easily dissolved. For if any had force, it would especially be that which we brought at the beginning for the opinion of Durandus. To that I reply that, even if the possible species are infinite toward the superior part, it by no means follows that there is a supreme one which stands at an infinite distance from the lowest. So too it does not follow that there is a supreme grace which stands at an infinite distance from the lowest, or from some inferior grace: because neither in that case would there be given a most perfect grace, nor a most perfect species, for the reason that there would not be a last. These two things manifestly are mutually repugnant, namely, that there be an infinite progression in species or in graces, and that there be a supreme, or some determinate one which stands at an infinite distance from the others: since, whatever one you assign, there is given another superior. And this is true if we constitute the progression toward the superior part in species as going on to infinity; for if toward the inferior part it could be made infinite in things less and less perfect, it scarcely seems absurd, namely, that there would be some determinate species which, although it did not stand at an infinite distance from another also determinate, would nevertheless be more perfect than infinitely many. But if it exceeded infinitely many in perfection, it would plainly be infinite according to essence.

The same inconvenience seems to be inferred if we grant that between one species and another there can be produced infinitely many: for it follows that the extreme species stand at an infinite distance, and thus that the highest would be infinitely perfect. It infers no absurdity. Nevertheless, not even in this way does it seem that an absurdity is concluded. For the extremes would stand at an infinite distance only when, between them, an infinite multitude could be produced by the participation of the same form: as if, between one quantity and another, there could be infinitely many unequal quantities, not communicating, nor according to any proportion; for if this could be, it would follow that the highest would be infinite. The same is to be said in qualities and in the increase of grace. But that there be infinitely many between one species and another, or that one exceed infinitely many in perfection, does not seem sufficient for that one to be infinite essentially. For it would not be said to exceed others either by the multitude of perfections, or by quantity, or by intensity, but by an essential grade. But infinity of essential grade, which belongs to God alone, is nothing else than to have no cause of one's existence, but to be from oneself, as we explained in Disputation 25, chapter 5. But that one species exceed infinitely many others in essential perfection

does not seem to argue this infinity according to essence, but a certain distinct grade, more perfect than infinitely many, to which others cannot attain. For the same reason we also concede that one species stands at an infinite distance from another, because one cannot arrive at the state of the other.

Disputatio CVII - Whether God can make better things than He has made

Caput I - That God can produce a universe more perfect in certain parts than He produced

When we ask about the universe whether it can be made better than it has been made, we speak of the universality itself of created things apart from God. For if you also join God Himself with the universe, says Durandus in I, distinction 44, it can still be made better if better creatures are added to the universe: not that God is better with creatures than without them, but because the universe would then include more goods formally than it does now. For although God is infinitely good, yet because He does not contain all created perfections formally, therefore, if together with Him the universe had more and better creatures, it would be more perfect extensively. In vain, however, does Durandus compare two universes with one another, including God Himself in each; since, with God, comparison is unfit, and the whole comparison must be made on the side of the creatures, which are said to constitute the created universe: for God is not something belonging to the universe, but is said to be its author. Nevertheless, if someone wishes to compare this universe with another, even with the author of the universe conjoined to both, it must be said that another universe could be made more perfect than this one, provided that "more perfect," which signifies a comparison, does not denote continuous quantity of bulk or of power, but a discrete quantity, in this sense: it can be more perfect, that is, containing within itself more other perfections or perfect natures. Whether "more perfect" can denote either kind of quantity, we shall consider below in art. 1.

But if the controversy is understood about the universality of creatures itself, there still remains the question whether a better universe can be made.

All the Scholastics whom I have read agree, and against Aristotle, De caelo I, chapter 9, affirm that God can make another universe, distinct only in number, with other heavens, elements, and mixed bodies. Thus teach St. Bonaventure in I, distinction 44, question 1; St. Thomas there, question 1, article 2; Durandus, question 3; Gabriel, the single question, article 2; Major, question 1; Capreolus, in I, distinction 43, single question, article 2 - their opinion greatly pleases me; for Aristotle's argument has little force, which is this. If there were two universes, the earth of one would be moved toward the center of the other; therefore it would be moved both upward and downward. For it would have to ascend in its own universe, so that, having pierced the heaven of each universe, it would descend to the center of the other - which is absurd.

But this argument is trifling. For who does not see that within any universe whatever there is a proper center and a natural place only of the elements of that universe? Therefore the elements of one would not tend to the center of the other, because to them it would not be natural: for the center, by the constitution of the very bodies of the universe, claims its own place. For just as, if God were to destroy this universe and make another, the elements of that other would remain naturally within it; so too, with another produced and this one remaining, the elements of each would tend only to their own proper center: for the center of the other, with which they would have no communication, would not be natural to them. Wherefore, since Aristotle knew nothing of God's absolute power, nor otherwise did the will of God become known to him, by that reason he could not prove that there is not now another universe. But we, even if we say that God can make another, can be most certain that there is not another, although it could be produced by God: because from Sacred Scripture it is known to us only that this universe has been created.

Now, whether another universe can be made better, that is, containing created perfections, is a matter of controversy. All admit, however, that it certainly can be made, at least with perfections of creatures distinct only in number. But whether it can be made with creatures whose perfections are distinct in species, Durandus doubts. For since he thinks that creatures distinct in species cannot be produced to infinity, but that all the possible ones are finite, he judges it uncertain whether all those which can be created by absolute power have been produced, or whether others remain. We, however, since we said that there can be produced more species to infinity by God, must also assert that the universe can be made more perfect with other natures distinct in species.

Caput II - Whether there can be another better universe consisting of all parts different in species from the parts of this our universe

Among the Scholastics also there is dissension whether God can produce another universe made up of all its parts different in species from the parts of this our universe. Of these, Durandus first doubts whether such a universe can be produced, because he does not take it as established whether there are more possible species of things than have been produced. Next, even if more were possible, he nonetheless teaches that another universe distinct in species cannot be produced. He proves this by the following reason: all the species which would be produced would have an order to those which now exist in this universe; therefore one could not call that a distinct universe - for a universe is not merely some one thing by aggregation. The minor, however, on which Durandus relies in this reasoning, seems to many not proved; or, if he asserts that a universe distinct in species cannot be produced, he at least grants one distinct in number, since in the same way he seems to prove of one as of the other.

But other Scholastics teach that another universe can be produced, all of whose parts are different in species from the parts of this universe. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Capreolus, Gabriel, and Major in the places cited; and, taken generally, their reason confirms it: since species can, by God, be multiplied to infinity, nothing seems to stand in the way by which an entirely distinct universe, in every part different in species, could be produced. For if

anything stood in the way, it would be especially Durandus's argument; but that is very weak. For although the species which are produced have an order of superior and inferior, this does not prevent their constituting another universe really distinct, if God so wills, any more than order prevents a multitude of beings from being gathered under one universe when God so disposes.

Nevertheless the true opinion seems to be this: although we say that species can be multiplied to infinity, it is not thereby certain whether simple elements, as such, and of other species than these, can be produced by God; therefore we cannot confidently affirm that another universe, distinct in species according to all its parts, can be produced. What is less, however, is easier to admit: namely, that God can produce another better universe with many parts different in species; but whether with all its parts different in species from those of this universe is uncertain.

Caput III - That this universe, its parts remaining, can be perfected

But truly, because even if we say that species can be multiplied to infinity, nevertheless it is not certain whether the simple elements, as such, and the rest of a different species, can be produced by God; therefore we cannot confidently affirm that another universe, distinct in species according to all its parts, can be produced. For of mixed bodies it can more easily be defended; although if that universe ought to have, as this has, a rational corporeal creature that could preside, as it were, over every corporeal creature, it cannot be produced diverse in species: because it is much more probable that another rational corporeal creature, diverse in species from man, cannot be created.

This universe, its parts remaining as they are, can be perfected.

Sententia - St. Thomas in article 6, to the third, affirms that this universe cannot be made better with the parts remaining that it has: because its goodness consists in the proportion and order of the parts among themselves; but if some part were made better, the proportion in which it was set by God would be dissolved; and that being dissolved, that due order, which is one, would be taken away. Then it is proved from St. Augustine, book 3 On Free Choice, chapter 5, where he says thus: "Whatever shall occur to you as better by true reason, know that God has done it, as the maker of all goods": which he himself pursues more fully.[2315]

Confirmatur - This opinion of Durandus in the question cited above does not lack probability, namely, that this universe can be made better, all the parts, or some of them, having been changed for the better. The reason is that this harmony and consonance of the parts among themselves to generations and all the rest is not singular, but has a latitude: therefore it could be made better, with the very parts themselves also made better. Moreover, if all things had persevered as in the state of innocence, and the elements had obeyed man himself, and had in no way been able to harm him, and man himself had persevered in that state, the universe would have been rendered much more beautiful. But it is clear that the parts of the universe cannot be perfected according to substance, but accidentally; and we speak of this perfection: and from what has been said the solution appears to the argument alleged for the prior opinion.

2315. St. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, III, c. 5.

Aug. testimonium explicatur - I answer to Augustine, that he does not deny that things can be better, or produced in a better state: for he says there in these words: "Wherefore, if a creature delights you which by most persevering will does not sin, there is no doubting that by right reason you set it before one that does sin; but as you set it before by your thought, so the creator God has set it before by his ordering." Therefore he judges both by our judgment and by God's that the creature which does not sin is better: if therefore this universe should serve man in the state of innocence without sin, it would be much more beautiful, for it would serve a much better creature. Wherefore Augustine admits that the creature of the universe could have been made better and ordered to a better state; nevertheless he adds that God left it in the hand of its own counsel and permitted it to fall into sin: in which he strives to prove by many arguments that God kept a better mode. Augustine does not say that man is now better than he would have been in the state of innocence, but that God on his part kept a better mode by leaving him and permitting him to slip into sin: and to this only he adduces the words alleged for the prior opinion. For thus piously must one speak of all the things which God does, that we judge it better that he do them now thus; and not rashly judging let us say that God would do better, if he did thus or so. But if God had done in another way, we should say that that too was better: for his will, which is above every law, is most rightly said to do when it effects or decrees something.

Lastly, it must be observed that this universe cannot be made better with respect to the order which it has to its end; that is, it cannot be ordered to a better end, as St. Thomas, Durandus, and Capreolus teach: for it is on account of God, than whom no end can be better; but with respect to rational creatures it could be perfected around the end, not that they would be referred to a better end, but that more of them, and more perfectly, would attain it. With respect to irrational creatures, likewise, it could be perfected relative to the end in the same way; because they would serve man more perfectly and would represent God's goodness more perfectly.[2316]

Quaestio XXVI - On divine beatitude

Lastly, after the consideration of those things which pertain to the unity of the divine essence, consideration must be given to divine beatitude.

And concerning this four things are asked.

Articulus I - Whether beatitude befits God

Objicitur 1. It seems that beatitude does not befit God. For "beatitude is the state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods." But the aggregation of goods has no place in God, just as neither has composition. Therefore beatitude does not befit God.[2317]

2316. St. Thomas; Durandus; Capreolus.
2317. Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy.

Objicitur 2. Moreover, beatitude, or happiness, is the reward of virtue according to the Philosopher in Ethics I. But reward does not befit God, just as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.

Sed contra: The Apostle says (1 Tim. 6): "Which in his own times he shall show, God, blessed and only Mighty, King of kings and Lord of lords."

Respondeo: I answer that beatitude most of all befits God. For under the name of beatitude nothing else is understood than the perfect good of an intellectual nature, whose it is to recognize its own sufficiency in the good which it has, and to which it belongs to join to itself something either well or ill, and to be mistress of its own operations. But both of these most excellently befit God, namely, to be perfectly good and intelligent. Whence beatitude most of all befits God.

Ad primum: Therefore it must be said to the first, that the aggregation of goods is in God not by way of composition, but by way of simplicity, because those things which in creatures are multiple, in God are found simply and in unity, as was said above

Ad secundum: To the second it must be said that although the reward of virtue befalls beatitude or happiness, inasmuch as someone acquires beatitude, just as to be the term of generation befalls a being inasmuch as it goes forth from potency into act; so therefore God has being, although he is not generated, so he has beatitude, although he is not merited

Articulus II - Whether God is called blessed according to the intellect

Objicitur 1. The second proceeds thus. It seems that God is not called blessed according to the intellect. For beatitude is the highest good; but good is said in God according to the essence; and good regards being according to essence, according to Boethius in the book On the Hebdomads. Therefore beatitude is said in God according to the essence, and not according to the intellect.[2318]

Objicitur 2. Moreover, beatitude has the ratio of end. But the end is the object of the will, just as is the good. Therefore beatitude is said in God according to the will, and not according to the intellect.

Sed contra: On the contrary is what St. Gregory says in the Moralia, book 3: He himself is glorious, such that, whatever is professed of him, he needs no acceding praise. But to be glorious signifies to be blessed. Moreover, God is enjoyed according to the intellect, because "vision is the whole reward," as St. Augustine says.[23192320]

Respondeo: I answer that beatitude (as has been said) signifies the perfect good of an intellectual nature. And from this it is that, just as each thing appetites its own perfection, so also an intellectual nature naturally appetites to be blessed. But that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the operation of its intellect, according to which it in a certain manner comprehends all things. Whence the beatitude of any created intellectual nature consists in

2318. Boethius, De hebdomadibus.
2319. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, III.
2320. St. Augustine: "Visio est tota merces."

understanding. But in God there is not one thing which is being and another which is understanding according to reality, but only according to the ratio of intelligibility. Beatitude therefore is to be attributed to God according to the intellect, just as to the blessed, who by assimilation to his beatitude are called blessed.

Ad primum: To the first, therefore, it must be said that from that reasoning it is proved that God is blessed according to his essence, not however that beatitude befits him according to the ratio of essence; but rather according to the ratio of intellect

Reply to the second: It is answered that beatitude, since it is a good, is the object of the will; but the object is presupposed to the act of the potency. Hence, according to the mode of understanding, divine beatitude is prior to the act of the will resting in it. And this cannot be anything other than an act of the intellect. Hence beatitude is attended to in the act of the intellect.

Articulus III - Whether God is the beatitude of any blessed person.

It is proceeded thus to the third. It seems that God is the beatitude of any blessed person. For God is the highest good, as was shown above. But it is impossible that there be several highest goods, as also is evident from the foregoing. Since therefore it belongs to the notion of beatitude that it be the highest good, it seems that beatitude is nothing other than God.

1. Besides, beatitude is the ultimate end of a rational nature. But to be the ultimate end of a rational nature befits God alone. Therefore the beatitude of any blessed person is God alone.

But on the contrary: The beatitude of one is greater than the beatitude of another, according to that of 1 Corinthians 15: "Star differs from star in glory."[2321] But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something other than God.

I answer: The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In which two things can be considered, namely, the object of the act, which is the intelligible; and the act itself, which is to understand. If therefore beatitude be considered on the part of the object itself, thus God alone is beatitude: because from this alone is one blessed, that he understands God, according to that of St. Augustine in book 5 of the Confessions: "Blessed is he who knows you, even if he is ignorant of other things."[2322] But on the part of the act of the understanding subject, beatitude is something created in the blessed creatures; whereas in God there is, even in this respect, something uncreated.

Reply to the first: Beatitude, as to the object, is the highest good simply; but as to the act in the blessed creatures, it is the highest good, not simply, but in the genus of goods that are participable by a creature.

2321. 1 Corinthians 15:41.
2322. St. Augustine, Confessions, V, "Beatus est qui te novit, etiam si alia ignoret."

Reply to the second: The end is twofold, namely, "of which" and "by which," as the Philosopher says, namely, the thing itself and the use of the thing. Just as for the miser the end is money and the acquisition of money. Therefore for the rational creature God indeed is the ultimate end as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the use, or rather the enjoyment, of the thing.

Articulus IV - Whether in God's beatitude every beatitude is included.

It is proceeded thus to the fourth. It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all beatitudes. For there are certain false beatitudes. But nothing false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace every beatitude.

1. Besides, according to some, a certain beatitude consists in bodily things, such as pleasures, riches, and the like. But these cannot befit God, since he is incorporeal. Therefore his beatitude does not embrace every beatitude.

But on the contrary: Beatitude is a certain perfection; but the divine perfection embraces every perfection, as was shown above. Therefore the divine beatitude embraces every beatitude.

I answer: Whatever is desirable in any beatitude, whether true or false, wholly and more eminently pre-exists in the divine beatitude. For from contemplative happiness it has continuous and most certain contemplation of itself and of all other things; but from active, the governance of the whole universe.

As to earthly happiness, which consists in pleasure, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius in book 3 of the Consolation, it has joy in itself and in all others by way of delight; for riches it has every sort of sufficiency which riches promise; for power, omnipotence; for dignity, the governance of all; but for fame, the admiration of the whole creation.[2323]

Reply to the first: A certain beatitude is false according as it falls short of the notion of true beatitude; and thus it is not in God. But whatever it has of likeness, however slight, to beatitude, wholly pre-exists in the divine beatitude.

Reply to the second: The goods which are in corporeal things corporeally, are in God spiritually according to his mode.

And let these things said be sufficient concerning those matters which pertain to the unity of the divine essence.

Note: In this whole question there is nothing worthy of disputation except those points which, concerning the beatitude of a rational creature, must be said in the Prima Secundae, question two; for in the same proportion must we philosophize about the beatitude of God. Nor indeed is there anything peculiar in his beatitude, except that God is understood by us to be blessed by his very own nature and substance, inasmuch as we apprehend it as an operation; whence it also follows that beatitude is not a reward for God, but is by his nature; whereas in us it is an accident and the reward of labors.

2323. Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, III.

FINIS.

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Complacency — *Disputatio XXIV, Quaestio VI, Articulus IV, Disputatio XXXVII, Quaestio XII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio LXI, Quaestio XIV, Articulus IX, Caput II, Disputatio LXXVII, Quaestio XVI, Articulus V, Disputatio LXXIX, Quaestio XIX, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio LXXX, Quaestio XIX, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio LXXX, Quaestio XIX, Articulus IV, Disputatio LXXXII, Quaestio XIX, Articulus V, Caput V, Disputatio LXXXIII, Quaestio XIX, Articulus VI, Caput I, Disputatio LXXXIII, Quaestio XIX, Articulus VI, Caput IV*

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Genus — *Disputatio I, Quaestio I, Articulus I, Caput I, Disputatio IV, Quaestio I, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio VI, Quaestio I, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio VI, Quaestio I, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio VII, Quaestio I, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio VII, Quaestio I, Articulus IV, Disputatio IX, Quaestio I, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio X, Quaestio I, Articulus VII, Caput I, Disputatio X, Quaestio I, Articulus VII, Caput VII, Disputatio XVII, Quaestio I, Articulus X, Caput III*

Glory — *Disputatio II, Quaestio I, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio III, Quaestio I, Articulus I, Caput II, Disputatio XII, Quaestio I, Articulus X, Disputatio XIII, Quaestio I, Articulus X, Caput II, Disputatio XVI, Quaestio I, Articulus X, Caput III, Disputatio XX, Quaestio III, Disputatio XX, Quaestio III, Articulus II, Disputatio XXVI, Quaestio VIII, Articulus I, Disputatio XXVIII, Quaestio VIII, Articulus I, Disputatio XXXII, Quaestio X, Articulus VI*

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Governance — *Disputatio II, Quaestio I, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio XIX, Quaestio II, Articulus III, Disputatio XX, Quaestio II, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio XX, Quaestio II, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio LXIV, Quaestio XIV, Articulus XIII, Caput II, Disputatio LXXXVII, Quaestio XXII, Articulus IV, Disputatio LXXXVIII, Quaestio XXIII, Caput III, Disputatio LXXXVIII, Quaestio XXIII, Caput IX, Disputatio LXXXVIII, Quaestio XXIII, Pars I, Articulus I, Disputatio LXXXVIII, Quaestio XXIII, Pars I, Articulus IV*

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H

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I

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Immediation — *Disputatio XXVIII, Quaestio VIII, Articulus I, Caput V, Disputatio XXX, Quaestio VIII, Articulus IV, Disputatio LXXXVII, Quaestio XXII, Articulus IV*

Immensity — *Disputatio XXV, Quaestio VII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio XXV, Quaestio VII, Articulus IV, Disputatio XXVIII, Quaestio VIII, Articulus I, Disputatio XXVIII, Quaestio VIII, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio XXVIII, Quaestio VIII, Articulus I, Caput IV, Disputatio XXVIII, Quaestio VIII, Articulus I, Caput V, Disputatio XXVIII, Quaestio VIII, Articulus II, Disputatio XXIX, Quaestio VIII, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio XXIX, Quaestio VIII, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio XXIX, Quaestio VIII, Articulus II, Caput V*

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Imperfection — *Disputatio IV, Quaestio I, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio VI, Quaestio I, Articulus II, Caput II, Disputatio VI, Quaestio I, Articulus II, Caput III, Disputatio VII, Quaestio I, Articulus III, Caput III, Disputatio IX, Quaestio I, Articulus V, Disputatio XIX, Quaestio II, Articulus I, Caput III, Disputatio XXII, Quaestio III, Articulus VI, Disputatio XXII, Quaestio IV, Disputatio XXVI, Quaestio VII, Articulus IV, Caput III, Disputatio XXXVI, Quaestio XI, Articulus III*

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Impossibility — *Disputatio LXXXIX, Quaestio XXIII, Articulus IV, Caput X, Disputatio XCIV, Quaestio XXIII, Pars II, Articulus III, Disputatio XCV, Quaestio XXIII, Articulus III, Caput I, Disputatio XCVII, Quaestio XXIII, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio XCVII, Quaestio XXIII, Articulus III, Caput VI, Disputatio XCVIII, Quaestio XXIII, Articulus III, Caput V, Disputatio XCVIII, Quaestio XXIII, Articulus III, Caput VII, Disputatio XCIX, Quaestio XXIII, Articulus VI, Caput II, Disputatio CIV, Quaestio XXV, Articulus III, Caput II, Disputatio CIV, Quaestio XXV, Articulus III, Caput VI*

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Infinitude — *Disputatio XXV, Quaestio VII, Articulus II, Caput V, Disputatio XXVI, Quaestio VII, Articulus IV, Caput II, Disputatio CIII, Quaestio XXV, Articulus II, Caput I*

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J

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L

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