

Twisse, Animadversions, 36-45 (Tenth Proposition, Sections 1-5)]

Tenth Proposition.

SECTION ONE.

RESPONSE. Let us set aside Junius's philosophy, placed in the distinction of nature and natural things, as not at all necessary for the present undertaking. How sound that distinction may be, let others judge. I see no reason at all why it should cause trouble for Arminius at the very outset. Nevertheless, I see that Junius's not altogether sound (if I may judge) exception has, not unhappily—God so providing—succeeded. For Arminius, provoked by this to defend what he had affirmed, pronounced things which otherwise one could scarcely have extracted from him.

That Adam, our first parent, was created in grace, the ancient Scholastics handed down—a view (in my judgment at least) sound and orthodox: that is, although he was indifferent to doing anything whatsoever by a natural indifference, he was nevertheless not indifferent to good and evil by a moral indifference, but by a holy inclination was disposed toward the true good, that is, toward obeying God and complying with His commands. For in our regeneration, when God inspires in us the holiness of faith and morals, we are said to be renewed according to the image of God who created man. Eph. 4:24; Col. 3:10.

This holiness, although it can be called natural insofar as it was implanted in nature at its very origin and, had he remained upright, would have been made hereditary—not so much by the power of nature informing and propagating, as by the indulgence of God and the benefit of assisting grace—nevertheless, as regards its origin, it is more probable that it was supernatural. For otherwise he would by no means have been very good in his kind from creation, just as the other things were very good in their kind. And this argument for the truth, drawn from the Scriptures themselves, is of greater weight than what has hitherto been put forward by Junius while he strives against it.

Certainly the body was formed before the soul was breathed into it; and see whether we do not contend with a stronger inference for our position than that by which Junius contends for his, when we reason thus: just as when the body was being formed all bodily qualities were simultaneously implanted, so when the soul was being breathed in and created, all spiritual qualities were simultaneously inserted into it, to the end that he might be created very good by God. And why, I ask, should it not be considered a grace of creation, especially since it is neither of natural emanation nor of natural acquisition?

Nor does it follow, therefore, that those gifts would have been common to the race or would have passed to posterity by propagation—which holds true only in the case of things that are of natural emanation. Meanwhile, that those gifts would have been common to the race and transmissible to posterity as if by hereditary right, provided the primeval integrity of the parents had remained

manifestly unimpaired, is no more than probable—with nothing in Junius's reasoning to the contrary standing in the way, unless perhaps by its obscurity alone it obliterates the matter, so that his refutation cannot become fully clear.

I understand the sense in which nature is called the principle of motion and rest. But in what sense he takes *supernatural things to be ordered by this principle*, or what the inference he draws from it amounts to, I do not yet comprehend. I used to marvel at Junius's genius, and at the same time at my own misfortune, since his conceptions utterly eluded my comprehension. But let us try, if you please, to open a way to the Author's meaning. That principle has already been indicated to be nature. Therefore, for supernatural things to be ordered by this principle is the same as if he had said, ordered by nature. But what does this mean, *that supernatural things are ordered by nature*, unless perhaps it amounts to the same as if he had said, *communicable through nature*? But we deny that supernatural things were, in any state, communicable to posterity through nature, but only through grace.

You will perhaps say: But if they are to be communicated, then through nature, because communication is motion; and nature is the principle of motion. Therefore I respond: the communication of supernatural things is not a natural motion but a supernatural one—truly a change rather than a motion, but a perfective change, namely through the immediate inspiration of God. And nature, although it is the principle of natural motion, is nevertheless not the principle of supernatural motion. And we have already denied above that inference by which, from the creation of supernatural things, he deduced a common communication and transmission of the same to posterity—although we have professed that, by the good pleasure of God, they would have been communicable to posterity, had Adam not placed an obstacle by his transgression.

Junius adds that *it is the nature of supernatural things not to be common*. I respond: certainly it is the nature of supernatural things not to be common by the propagation of nature; but this does not prevent them from becoming common, if it so pleased God, by the communication of grace. That man could have been considered, and even was able to be considered, apart from the consideration of supernatural things, we by no means deny.

God contemplated man in pure natural endowments (he says) *upon whom He would confer supernatural things by His decree*. It absolutely cannot be denied that God from eternity decreed to confer supernatural things upon human nature; whence it follows that the consideration of human nature as regards its complete essence is premised to the decree of conferring supernatural things upon it. But in this way man is considered only as possible. For just as the conferral of natural things, in God's intention, cannot precede the conferral of supernatural things—lest in execution supernatural things would be conferred before natural things, which is impossible—so also the reverse.

But it should be noted in passing that the supernatural things with which Adam was endowed before the fall are not as closely connected with eternal salvation as are those supernatural things that are bestowed upon people in regeneration.

It was an act of His singular will to create man, and another singular act to augment them with supernatural things—which acts, even if they had been simultaneous in time (which does not seem necessary to me, for the reasons that have just been adduced), nevertheless could not be simultaneous in nature, since one is called natural, the other supernatural.

We by no means say it was necessary that they be simultaneous, since it was not even necessary that they exist at all. Nevertheless, we have already argued that man was also created in grace, notwithstanding the reasons urged to the contrary. Concerning the simultaneity of their condition according to nature, the question has not yet been raised; nor do I understand on what grounds such a question would be raised, since they were not at all made by nature but by the pure good pleasure of God. But since God Himself can rightly be called the nature of all things, if they existed simultaneously (which has been proved), it is manifest that they were simultaneous by generating nature.

As for intending nature: if they were not simultaneous in nature, then either the natural things were intended first, or the supernatural things first—neither of which can be said, since in that case one would be prior to the other in execution. But there is granted a certain priority of nature that is commonly called the priority of non-existence in consequence: for example, if something is an animal, it does not follow that it is a man; but if it is a man, it follows that it is an animal; therefore animal is prior by nature. So also, by the same reasoning, natural things are to be called prior to supernatural things. But this priority belongs to generating nature, and thus an embryo customarily lives first the life of a plant, secondly the life of an animal, and thirdly and lastly the life of a man. Nevertheless, although this order holds in the generation of man, it did not hold the same in creation. In what Arminius has to say against these points of Junius, nothing occurs that I need comment upon. And so I proceed to the following Section.

SECTION TWO.

That interpretation of Arminius's words which Junius offers does not please me, when he says *the image of God is not nature in man but supernatural grace*—that is, *it is not of nature but of grace, or not from nature but from grace*. For nature, although placed second, nevertheless fills the role of subject, and the image of God the role of predicate. But it would be absurd to say that the nature of man is not from nature; and no less absurd to say it is from grace. For if to be from God is to be from grace, then by the same reasoning, since all things were created by God, they would all be said to be from grace.

Therefore let me use friends: Socrates is a friend, Plato is a friend, but it is fitting that truth be a greater friend. And so I freely confess that Arminius's carelessness on this point seems to me preferable to the obscure diligence of the learned Doctor (I mean Junius). If it be an error that the

image of God is placed in the grace of sanctification, I would certainly rather have erred thus with Arminius than have put on such a censure of the same statement with Junius.

Junius himself interprets those passages at Eph. 4:24 and Col. 3:10 as referring to the image of God according to which man was created, and professes that the image there mentioned is placed in qualities, at Gen. 1:26. And when at Gen. 5:3 Adam is said to have begotten Seth in his own image, *that is* (says Piscator) *like himself, namely corrupt from corrupt; not upright from upright, as he himself had been created by God. For* (he says) *the antithesis between these words and those of v. 1, "He made him in the likeness of God," is to be noted.* (Moreover, he says, by both phrases *one and the same thing is signified, as also above at 1:26, which can be indicated even from the fact that the order of those phrases is there reversed. For there image comes first and then likeness follows; but here the order is the opposite. The same is also clear from the fact that sometimes only one of these expressions is used: as above at c. 1:27, also below at c. 9, v. 6, only image is named. Which* (he says) *is to be noted on account of those who fabricate a distinction of meaning between these two words, referring image to substance and likeness to qualities.*)

In the same manner, on Gen. 5:3 Junius says: *Adam begot a son in his own likeness, that is* (he says) *not according to that pure image of God, according to which he had been created by God (for it had been deformed), but according to that image which was then in Adam and his wife Eve, corrupted from pure by sin.*

Just as Peter teaches us that we are made partakers of the divine nature through regeneration. 2 Pet. 1:3–4. Is not the son, and the son alone, the image of the Father? But we are sons of God only through faith, Gal. 3:26 and John 1:12. Indeed, we are said to be sealed by the Spirit of God only at Eph. 4:30, as though we then at last receive the image of God and His character.

You will say, then: will you deny that human nature itself reflects God, so that even apart from holy qualities the image of God shines in it? I do not deny, nor will I deny, that it can in some measure be called the image of God, insofar as it is rational, and in part spiritual, and immortal—and also with respect to dominion over the lower creatures. And also insofar as the man is the image of God with respect to the headship he has over the woman, so that in a certain respect the woman was not created in the image of God.

Yet who would not think it should be asserted without qualification that holy women, as daughters of God, reflect the image of God, but not devils—even though they are rational, and in every respect spiritual, and immortal, and eminent in authority? Without doubt, the complete image of God is nothing other than a rational and holy nature, according to the Apostolic interpretation of the image of God (Junius himself conceding this at Gen. 1:26): Eph. 4:24; Col. 3:10.

Therefore Arminius's argument stands in its full force, with nothing hitherto in Junius's exception standing against it. But it is by no means incumbent upon us to maintain Junius's position concerning man *considered in pure natural endowments* as the *object of predestination*, nor to

defend it from the arguments by which it is attacked—because we by no means concede Junius's position on this point. Nevertheless, since not all arguments proceed correctly when they attack some error, we submit this argument of Arminius to examination.

Thus when Arminius argues as follows: *no man was ever created by God in pure natural endowments; therefore neither can one so created be considered in the decree of God by which He determined to deal with man at some point*—this argument is utterly weak and diluted, which can be shown in many ways.

For if even an interval of a single little hour had intervened between the creation of Adam and the conferral of supernatural things, this argument would have had absolutely no place at all. And what sober person would affirm that, if this had been the case, the consideration of the object of predestination would have been altered?

Again, he conducts himself in this argument as if the creation of man in pure natural endowments had to have happened yesterday before he could be predestinated.

Third, it is by no means necessary that the subject be considered according to everything it encompasses.

As for his saying that God by His decree determines that He will at some point deal with the object by His act—this holds only of external acts; internally He is already dealing with it when He predestinates. And when that predestination takes place, Adam had been created neither in supernatural nor in natural endowments. But the external acts by which He will at some point deal with His object are of such a kind that they do not at all presuppose him endowed with those supernatural things with which he was clothed in creation. For the conferral of efficacious grace for believing and repenting will not find man clothed with those supernatural things; nor will the conferral of glory find him furnished with the supernatural things he had received in creation.

Even if it should find him so furnished, it would nevertheless not follow that the decree of conferring grace presupposed the consideration of those things. For the conferral of grace finds man furnished with natural endowments; yet it is not necessary that the decree of conferring grace presuppose the consideration of natural endowments, otherwise than in potentiality. For it is possible that the decrees of creating man and of granting him grace be simultaneous. Indeed, it is necessary that they be simultaneous; for neither can be prior to the other—not the decree of conferring grace prior to the decree of creating, which anyone would readily grant; but neither, I say, can the decree of creating be prior to the decree of conferring grace. For if creation were prior in God's intention to the conferral of grace, it would certainly be posterior in execution, which is impossible.

Fourth, let it be asked how man is considered when God deals with him by the decree of creation. Will it not be answered: only as possible? But by the same liberty of arguing, you could deny, with Arminius, that since no one was ever created in a state of possibility, the possible is the object of creation; and by the same reasoning he would have to be established as the object of

predestination, since the intention to create man precedes by no moment of nature the intention to glorify man—because if it did precede, it would be the end of glorification, and glorification would be the means to creation. For no other order of priority has a place in intention except that which exists between the end and the means to the end. And consequently, creation in execution would also follow glorification.

Therefore it can be said that God considered man in pure natural endowments when He predestined him—in pure natural endowments, I say, not as actually existing (for so considered, he would be falsely considered), but according to his essence abstracted from existence, that is, as a nature fit to be both created and glorified.

Let us proceed to what follows.

SECTION THREE.

In this section we will be more laborious in chastising Junius than Arminius. He denies that *the image of God is supernatural grace*, or that this is clear *from the description of the image of God* at Col. 3:10 and Eph. 4:24—even though at Gen. 1:26 he professes that the image of God in man consists not in nature alone, but also in qualities and attributes. *By nature*, he says, *the eternal and spiritual essence is meant. By qualities: for man had been created according to God unto justice and holiness of truth.* And so, since the essence of man is called by Junius in this place the image of God, so also according to him those qualities—namely justice and holiness—are to be called the image of God; and he indicates that this is clear from Eph. 4:24, when he expresses this in the Apostle's own words, and then immediately directs the reader to the Apostolic passages discussed here, namely Eph. 4:24 and Col. 3:10.

But let us undertake a comparison of the interpretation he offers of each Apostolic passage, one by one. *In the former place*, he says, *namely Col. 3:10, it does not say that the image of God is the knowledge congruent with the image of Him who created him*, etc. But, I say, although it does not say this in so many words, it nevertheless says that from which it follows that this knowledge or recognition is the image of God—namely when it openly asserts that *the new man is renewed in knowledge according to the image*, etc. By these words he openly indicates that knowledge (in which he signifies that renewal consists) is according to the image of God; which means nothing other than that this knowledge is congruent with the image of God, or reflects God's image, and is congruent with that knowledge which, when man received it in creation, he was said to have been created in the image of God.

The explanation he appends does nothing at all either to establish his denial or to refute Arminius's affirmation. Indeed, he admits that the manner of the new man's knowledge is according to the image of God; and again, that it is *according to the image of Christ and of God*

our Creator. Therefore a man renewed by this knowledge has been renewed unto the image of God. It also cannot be denied that a man imbued with such knowledge in his re-creation was by that very fact created in the image of God. Therefore, since such knowledge was the image of God in creation, it follows that such knowledge is also the image of God in renovation.

But, he says, the image of God is not said to be knowledge; rather, knowledge is said to be renewed according to the image of God. But neither, when man was created, is his knowledge said to be the image of God; and yet Junius in the same place professes that his holy qualities (among which is the knowledge of God) are the image of God. But when the Apostle signifies not that knowledge is renewed *according to the image of God, but that the knowledge by which man is renewed is according to the image of God*—what is this other than that holy knowledge or recognition of God represents the image of God in our minds, or by this very fact restores the image of God which had been removed in this respect? In creation, less is said about the knowledge of God than what the Apostle says here. Yet Junius does not hesitate to say that the image of God in man consists not only in the nature or essence of man, but also in the holy qualities themselves.

What then is knowledge? An act of the image of God. What is the image of God? A source or principle of the act, formally informing the act or habit of this image. By the same reasoning, when man is said to have been created in the image of God, man would by no means be called the image of God

either according to essence or according to qualities, but only an act of the image. If knowledge is an act of the image, then the image is the principle of the act; therefore either the principle *which* [quod] knows, or the principle *by which* [quo] man knows. It is not the principle *which*, for this principle is man himself. But if it is the principle *by which*, then either the remote principle by which he knows in general—and this sort of principle is human reason itself, or the intellect, namely the rational faculty of understanding—or else it is the proximate principle *by which*, namely by which he knows in a holy manner; and this is the gracious habit. We do not deny that this habit is the image of God. And when we philosophize about holy knowledge as about the image of God, we do not distinguish the habit from the act, just as Junius himself does not in the following words: *whichever way you take it* (that is, whether as act or as habit, as is clear from the preceding) *it makes no difference to me*; and on p. 107, *Act or habit*, etc.

But Junius denies that this act or habit is the image of God in man, since he wants the image to be the principle or source of both; which indeed cannot be referred to anything other than to the grace or Spirit of God assisting—which assisting grace or Spirit of God is not an image in man but rather outside man. Yet this principle which he calls such, and this source, he wants to inform the act or habit—a phrase, I well know, that is hardly philosophical. For the office of informing pertains only to the formal cause; but acts and habits, being accidents (which certainly do not consist of matter and form), are not informed by other forms but by themselves, for they are simple forms. It remains that it should be understood of an efficient principle, not a formal one.

But the efficient principle of a gracious act or habit is the Holy Spirit, who indeed assists man but does not inform man as an inherent form.

But what is now being asked about is the image of God not outside man but inhering in man; and we say that this is the knowledge of God illuminating the intellect and holiness affecting the will, and we assert this relying on the present testimonies of the Apostle Paul, Col. 3:10 and Eph. 4:24.

Junius continues: I appeal to you yourself as judge whether this can rightly be called a fitting description: *The image of God is knowledge congruent with the image of God.* This proposition is certainly more fitting than most of Junius's propositions opposed to it, which proceed so far beyond reason and philosophical sobriety. Nor would anyone raise a dispute about its congruence, had the position been more fully set forth. For the Apostle compares the renovation of man with his creation in the image of God, and signifies that renovation is congruent with creation, inasmuch as he had long ago been made in the image and likeness of God. This is the same as if he had said: just as man was created in the image of God, so also he is renewed unto the same image of God; whence it follows that, just as holiness in creation was the image of God in man, so also the holiness to which we are renewed is the image of God; and thus image is congruent with image—namely, the image of God produced through renovation is congruent with the image of God introduced through creation.

Therefore this Junian dissertation is of no value, however great a confidence in this kind of reasoning he displays. From here Junius proceeds to the other passage, Eph. 4:24. *Here indeed* (he says) *you say something more than before; but not yet enough. That recognition of which you spoke before is a member of truth. For truth is in our mind. Here you establish both truth and justice and holiness.* But indeed, I say, it is not so much Arminius who says or establishes these things, as the Apostle. Nor are more things said here than in the former passage. Here only the holy affection of the will is mentioned. For the Apostle is not speaking about the truth of knowledge but about the truth of holy affection. But the comparison of passages indicates that neither should knowledge, as pertaining to the image of God and the constitution of the new man, mentioned to the Colossians, be excluded from holiness; nor should holiness, expressed to the Ephesians, be excluded from knowledge.

But *let us see* (he says) *what the Apostle says: he says namely that the new man is he who is created according to God in justice and holiness of truth.* I do not dispute *what many interpret "according to God" as if the Apostle were saying by the power of God acting in us. I accept that in meaning those words (κατ' θεόν) intend the same thing as if you had said "in the image of God" or "according to God's image."*

But do you not see here, my brother, the same order which we have just indicated was observed by Paul, and that subject, principle, and acts or habits informed thereby are most conveniently distinguished? The subject is man, who is the same whether old or new. The principle is the image of God, which is the same whether old, new, or growing whole from corruption. The acts

or habits informed from that principle are justice, holiness, truth: justice, holiness, truth are not the image, but belong to the image.

Surely if you were to maintain this, you would contradict yourself, since at Gen. 1:26 you interpret these very Apostolic passages as referring to the image of God in man. But who those are who argue to the contrary, I have not yet discovered. This distinction by no means squares with the Apostolic teaching, which merely teaches in what the new man consists—*namely in justice and holiness of truth*—and that by this very fact he is *according to God*, that is, in the image of God. The image of God here rather has the role of an exemplar than of a principle, unless you mean an exemplary principle—though I would more correctly say that the Apostle merely draws a comparison between the new man and man in the state of creation, as if to say: just as the first man was created in the image of God, so when man is renewed he is renewed unto the image of God.

But I cannot sufficiently marvel at the corollary that follows, when he says that the image of God is the same, old, new, *and growing whole from corruption*. For what does *the old image* mean? Does it signify that the constitution of the old man is the image of God? For the new image seems to signify the constitution of the new man. Or does he rather mean by the old image the image of God in man before the fall? I confess this to be nearly the same as the new image, that is, the image of God in renewed man. But this interpretation of Junius's proposition harms rather than helps his case.

Does he then mean by the *old image of God* the nature or essence of man, corrupted in faith and morals, and by the new image the same human essence but renewed and, as he puts it, *growing whole from corruption*? It is more probable that the Author's words are conformed to this sense. Thus, I confess, it fits the present purpose, but by no means fits the words of the Apostle. For what is signified is an image of God to which one arrives through renovation, and which consists of justice and holiness of truth—to which the phrase *according to the image* precisely refers, just as Junius himself places virtually beyond dispute at Gen. 1:26. It is most certain that there is nothing about an old image of God in the Apostle, except insofar as it has a relation to the image of God implanted in mankind at creation; and "old" in that sense does nothing to support Junius's position.

I come to Arminius. He proves that the knowledge of which the Apostle speaks at Col. 3:10, together with the justice and holiness of truth, are supernatural gifts. But hitherto I had thought that Junius had expressly professed to acknowledge these gifts as supernatural, although in what follows he seems, I confess, to have argued otherwise—which Arminius also noticed before he entered the arena of this dissertation's scrutiny. On this very point I cannot sufficiently marvel that Franciscus Junius was so slippery and changeable.

The first argument of Arminius is of this kind: *Whatever we have from regeneration through the Spirit of Christ is supernatural; but we have the knowledge of God, justice, and holiness of truth from regeneration through the Spirit of Christ; therefore they are supernatural.* I am indeed glad

that Arminius has been cast into arguments of this kind, which have absolutely no congruence with his own peculiar doctrines. For what? Did he hold that the operation of faith and repentance comes from the supernatural operation of God? Since the Arminians acknowledge no operation of God preceding faith itself that operates otherwise than by way of persuasion, or that merely impresses the sense of the thing to be believed or done—as Corvinus explains—but not assent or volition, except subsequently, provided we ourselves are willing. What, I ask, is here found of supernatural operation by which faith and repentance would be counted as supernatural gifts?

Again, when he says: *If anyone should say that we do not have those things (namely the knowledge of God together with justice and holiness) entirely from regeneration, but only the renovation of the same in their corrupted form, I do not see how this could be proved. For the Apostolic expressions teach otherwise. For he who must put on the new man is not clothed with the new man, or any part of him. Again: It is not a corrupted recognition that is renewed, but an illuminating intelligence, a new recognition, which had been expelled through the darkness of the old man. And with a few words interjected, he adds: And that knowledge differs from the knowledge of the old man not only in degree but in its entire kind.*

These words will serve us excellently, with which we may stop the mouths of the Arminians when they philosophize about the remnants of spiritual life that supposedly still survive in natural men. Nor do I doubt that Arminius would have philosophized in the same manner about the other gift affecting the will of man (I mean justice and holiness).

Nevertheless it will be worth the effort to make some observations on this argument of Arminius. First, someone might say that the major premise is to be understood only in a qualified sense [*secundum quid*], namely with respect to the state of corruption, not absolutely; so that the gifts received in regeneration are indeed above corrupted nature, but not above nature absolutely, that is, above integral nature. For example: even if regeneration were more perfect than it usually is in this life, and removed all rebellion of the flesh against reason, that state would by no means be above integral nature. For even a man constituted in pure natural endowments would not be created on the condition of bringing that rebellion into the world with him—I mean the rebellion of the flesh against reason, not the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. For even from uncorrupted self-love, which is natural to man as created by God and not yet corrupted, he would proceed according to reason rather than against reason.

Here I do not know whether Arminius so conspires with the Papists (especially with his idol Bellarmine) as to deny that pure natural endowments exclude this rebellion, holding it instead to be no less natural than everything else, merely restrained as by a bridle by the addition of supernatural gifts, but by no means removed. However the matter may turn out in the future, once it has been found opportune, we will most gladly contribute our meditations on this subject as the occasion arises, following the Scholastic method of disputation.

Second, this major premise holds for no other reason than that regeneration itself is supposed to be a supernatural action. But, I say, for this reason it does not seem to be of such great value or

force that it ought to prevail. For who would call moral virtues supernatural—which, nevertheless, cannot have been inscribed in man except by a supernatural operation? For example: it pleases Durandus that Adam was furnished with all moral virtues even in creation; yet they could not have proceeded from the principles of the species or the individual; therefore it is more than probable that they were implanted in man by a supernatural operation of God. And who doubts that God can by immediate operation bring it about that human nature has an inclination toward the good, which ordinarily comes about through any habituation or frequent practice of good actions? Given this scenario, although they may be called supernatural in respect of the manner and mode of their acquisition—because they are acquired by the inspiration of God, not by one's own habituation—nevertheless the moral virtues are by no means to be called supernatural absolutely. So also by the supernatural operation of God the gifts of tongues and gifts of healings were granted; yet those faculties are not supernatural absolutely.

Third, whatever has been implanted in us from birth, however it may have come about by the supernatural operation of God, is most conveniently called natural, especially if it would have passed to posterity. By this consideration, therefore, even the supernatural gifts of Adam—that is, however bestowed upon him by supernatural operation—can nevertheless most conveniently take on the character of natural things. For they both belonged to him from birth, and, had he persisted in his integrity, would have been propagated to posterity—unlike the gifts communicated to us through regeneration.

Arminius's second argument follows: *Those things according to which we are and are called partakers of the divine nature and sons of God are supernatural; but according to knowledge, justice, and holiness we are and are called partakers of the divine nature and sons of God; therefore they are supernatural.* The minor is clear from 2 Pet. 1:1–4. Participation in the divine nature is nothing other than renovation unto the image and likeness of God; and sonship likewise contains only two things: the likeness of God and adoption unto an inheritance. But Arminius does not deny that the likeness and image of God are found in man even according to his essence. And who doubts that Adam, created in pure natural endowments and persevering in them, should have been called a son of God and could have been adopted to obtain the heavenly inheritance—especially since even for the sons of God there is no inheritance except by the grace of God?

The third argument follows: *Those means that have a commensuration with supernatural felicity are supernatural; but such are the knowledge of God, justice, and holiness.* This commensuration, if it were from the dignity and merit of qualities inhering in us, would rightly conclude that they are supernatural; but since it is only from grace, the inference does not hold.

The last argument remains: *The immediate causes of supernatural actions are supernatural; but the knowledge of God, justice, and holiness are the immediate causes of supernatural acts; therefore they are supernatural.* Without doubt, whoever denied that the qualities themselves are

supernatural would deny the minor premise. And so these two latter arguments are weaker than the former ones.

SECTION FOUR.

In this section again Junius causes us far greater trouble than Arminius. *Let us return* (he says), *if you please, to that principle which the Fathers handed down: that natural things were corrupted and supernatural things removed.* From this you will certainly conclude without difficulty: *Justice, holiness, and truth have not been removed; therefore they are not supernatural, etc.*

On the contrary, these things have all been removed. For what? Are these not gifts of the sanctifying Spirit? Are they not bestowed in regeneration? You will perhaps say that justice is found even in a pagan man; but what about holiness? Junius indeed says so, but with excessive liberty of speech. Are not only the called ones holy, and only the children of the holy ones holy? Therefore we profess that neither justice nor holy truth is found in the carnal man, because holiness is lacking: for they do not do just things for God's sake or for the sake of conscience of the divine law. *But we know that virtues are to be distinguished not by their outward performances but by their ends*, as Augustine once said, who did not hesitate to affirm that the best works of pagan men are nothing greater than splendid sins.

If they had been removed (so Junius), *no principles of them would remain in us from nature.* I respond: no proximate principles of these things remain in us from nature, but only remote ones, such as are found even in the devils themselves. And by the same reasoning someone could say that holiness has not been entirely removed even in the devils, those most impure spirits, the most hostile and troublesome enemies of God and His Church.

The same reasoning applies to the image of God. No, it is not the same reasoning; for according to you yourself the image of God shines even in the essence of man, not only in the holy qualities of the soul; they even extend the image of God to the body, by which they undoubtedly comprehend his dominion over other living creatures.

Nowhere in Scripture is it said to be restored, but only to be renewed. But I say, the image of God is nowhere said to be renewed; the new man is said to be renewed according to God at Eph. 4:24. The image of God is not said to be renewed. If it were said to be renewed, it would by no means follow that it had previously existed, even in a decaying state; for the new man too is said to be renewed at Eph. 4:24, and yet before that renewal the new man was not to be found. Nor is he who refashions an image erased from a tablet undeservedly said to be renewing the image once erased. We have already said that holiness no more survives in corrupt and unregenerate man than in demons.

Moses narrates that man was made in the image of God. This therefore is the constitution of human nature. And if of nature, then the image of God pertains universally to the human species,

since natural things differ from personal ones precisely in that they are common. He narrates that man was made in the image of God. This was indeed the constitution of human nature; but from this it by no means follows either that human nature was not adorned with supernatural gifts, or that the image of God did not shine most especially in them. I say supernatural insofar as they did not emanate from human nature but were superadded by God; which, however, were also to be communicated to posterity, had Adam persevered in his integrity; and to that extent they could also be called natural, just as things implanted from birth.

The image of God, insofar as it is considered in the essence of man, pertains universally to the species; not insofar as it is completed by the holy qualities inspired by God—which, however, would not only have pertained to the species universally, but would have been communicated, had not Adam by his transgression defrauded his posterity of this grace of God.

Adam (he says) at Gen. 5:3 begot Seth in his own likeness, in his own image; but Adam had been made in the likeness of God; therefore he begot Seth in God's likeness. Alas, how far he was from that Hector! Certainly no more than Junius was from Junius—Junius in these exercises, from Junius in his annotations on that passage Gen. 5:3. *Adam begot Seth in his own likeness—not (he says) in that pure image of God according to which he had been created by God (for it had been deformed), but in that image which was then in Adam and Eve, corrupted indeed by sin.*

Rightly so! For what? Was it fair that he should be considered to have begotten a son in the likeness of God, which he had lost, or rather in the likeness of the Devil, into which he had been corrupted? You will perhaps say: but the image of God had already been reformed in Adam through regeneration. I respond: even today not a few are children of God through regeneration, which notwithstanding, they generate carnally and propagate children not according to the Spirit but according to the flesh. For although the olive is one thing and the wild olive another, yet from either seed nothing but a wild olive is born. Augustine, Ep. 105, to Sixtus.

Junius continues: *But the image of God and the image of Adam differ, someone will say, and are distinguished by Moses. They differ indeed, but in mode, not in their essence: for the image of God was in Adam whole, in Seth through Adam deformed; yet both are images. And by the same reasoning this image, remaining in the human species according to corruption, is called the image of the earthly, and according to restoration, the image of the heavenly.* But because it differs *only in mode, not in essence*, it is said to be restored and renewed, not generated anew or created, inasmuch as it differs not in essence but in mode and degree.

The image of God, by your own admission, at Gen. 1:26 consists not only in essence but also in holy qualities. After the fall of Adam, the essence still remained, but did the holy qualities survive? This you had previously affirmed—namely that they were not removed but corrupted, namely justice and holiness. The more distinctly this is stated, the more easily it falls to refutation. It is absurd that qualities should be corrupted and not removed. For what else is it for a quality to be corrupted than for it to be removed? For it cannot be corrupted except by the succession of its opposite, and by that very succession it is so corrupted that it is simultaneously

removed. Not even a man is corrupted except by the destruction of his form—not by deformation—how much more so accidents, which are nothing other than simple forms; they are not corrupted otherwise than when they are removed. Nor is the image of *the earthly and the heavenly* rightly constituted in this way. For the image of the earthly is spoken of according to the mortality of our body, the fruit of sin, not according to the essence or qualities of the soul. And

likewise the image of the heavenly, of whatever sort it will be that we shall bear, must signify the condition of immortality, not the essence or qualities of the soul. We have already said above that the image of God is never said to be restored or renewed, but that the new man is said to be *renewed according to God*. Even if it were so said, it would by no means follow that it had not first been destroyed.

As for the image considered distinctly according to its distinct parts: it is apparent that the essence of upright man differs from the essence of corrupt man neither in essence nor in degree or mode. But the holiness of upright man differs from the holiness of corrupt man not only in mode and degree but in essence. For there is no holiness of corrupt man. No true likeness of holiness adorns him; rather, a phantom of holiness fills its place.

Likewise Gen. 9:6: *Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for God made man in His own image*. If the image of God were not in the posterity of Adam who are killed, Moses's argument would be inept and irrelevant. This is the one passage that seems to show that man as man, even when corrupt, retains the image of God—yet it only seems so to those who carefully weigh the whole matter. Moses's argument is apt according to its own structure, not according to an alien fiction. For Moses says that whoever kills a man must be killed, not because the image of God remains in Adam's posterity—for this is the interpreter's fiction—but *because man was created in the image of God*.

Junius had perceived this, and therefore admits that his own interpretation would be more strongly confirmed if the passage proceeded from man making man in the image of God rather than from God. But although Junius was not ashamed to put forward this interpretation, he was nevertheless ashamed to approve it by his own verdict. We grant, however, that the reasoning may be extended to mark the present condition of man, as one in whom the image of God resides with respect to his essential attributes, but not with respect to accidental ones, especially with respect to the holy qualities of the soul.

He denies, finally, that Adam received supernatural gifts by the power of creation, and offers the reason that *creation is the principle of nature, and supernatural things differ in their entire kind*. But Junius does not explain by what operation of God supernatural things would then be conferred. And no wonder; for no transient operation of God can be conceived that is more sublime than creation. It is beyond dispute that supernatural gifts are not produced by way of generation; it is beyond dispute that they are produced from nothing. What then prevents them from being said to be infused by creating, and created by infusing?

What he discusses at the end about the essential and relative light of man compared with the native and adventitious light of the moon, and what he secondly repeats about Adam having been augmented in creation even by supernatural grace, lead me to think that by the natural holiness which he considers not entirely removed, Junius meant to understand the obedience of the flesh toward reason—the rebellion against which I cannot but acknowledge to be preternatural, even against the will of the Papists. Meanwhile, that the holiness which is contained under the governance of the Spirit, just as it arose from nothing other than supernatural grace, so from the fall of Adam was both entirely corrupted and removed—this must be confessed according to Junius's own position. On this point, in my judgment, he has philosophized with sufficient accuracy.

I turn to Arminius. But nothing presents itself here that I wish to take issue with. I embrace what he says: *That the knowledge which is according to piety, that justice and holiness of which the Apostle speaks, were not corrupted but removed, and no principles of them remain in us after the fall.* Indeed, I congratulate him on this profession. Likewise what he says about moral virtues, as having only an analogy and resemblance to spiritual virtues, by which resemblance those who do not accurately discriminate between these and those spiritual virtues can easily be deceived—I consider this very much to be approved.

Finally he returns to the establishment of his position concerning the object of predestination. *He wants man to have both natural and supernatural endowments before God deals with him by the act of predestination;* but he interprets this by way of divine consideration. Evidently he had perceived the need for some remedy to temper the absurdity [*ἀτοπίαν*] of this too outrageous position. For since predestination was made from eternity, it is obvious for anyone to wonder how its object can be said to be clothed with both natural and supernatural endowments before it is predestinated.

Therefore he wants this not to have been so truly and really, but only according to divine consideration—not noticing that consideration alone adds nothing to things, but takes them as they are found as the object it contemplates. But to consider things otherwise than they are is not so much to consider as either to err or to feign. Thus, whenever we conceive a Chimera, we are not merely considering but feigning, and only after we have feigned do we then consider. Therefore, to avoid fiction, one must suppose the decree to create man and to endow him with supernatural things, from which God will indeed consider him as one to be created and clothed in the future, but not as created or clothed in the present.

But neither can such a decree be soberly placed before the decree of predestinating to salvation. The reason is that the order of intentions has a place only in respect of means and end, so that the intention of the end is prior and the intention of the means toward the end is posterior. But creation and the conferral of supernatural things cannot take on the character of the end in respect of salvation; on the contrary, it is more probable that salvation takes on the character of the end in respect of creation and the conferral of supernatural things. Whence it follows that the

intention of salvation should rather be considered prior than posterior to the intention of creation, etc.

Again, if the intention of creation were prior to the intention of salvation, then certainly the execution of creation would be posterior to the execution of salvation, according to the most widely accepted and most certain rule about the inverse order of intention and execution. But nothing more absurd can be devised than to maintain that salvation must be conferred on man before he is created.

As for his distinction between the decree of providence and of predestination—that what is decreed by the decree of providence is to be conferred under condition, but not what is decreed by the decree of predestination—I cannot sufficiently marvel at this. For what? Will not eternal life be conferred under the condition of faith and repentance, and final perseverance in the same? *Whoever believes will be saved*, etc. Certainly, even though the conferral is conditional, the decree of conferring is nevertheless not conditional—which holds true both of the decree of providence and of the decree of predestination. Although by the same reasoning by which he distinguishes between providence and predestination, he would by the same reasoning distinguish between animal and man. But we customarily contradistinguish coordinate things, not subordinate things.

To Arminius's principal argument we have already said what we thought needed to be said. At the end he says: *That man, as considered together with supernatural endowments, could not have been passed over; or at least was not passed over, unless it was foreseen that he would lose those supernatural endowments by his own transgression and sin.* If this were true, the passing over would have followed Adam's transgression, not preceded it. But this is utterly false, without a distinction of the proposition. For unless Adam had already been passed over with respect to the conferral of efficacious grace, he would never have transgressed. Therefore the decree of so passing him over preceded the foresight of Adam's transgression, or at least it could not have followed it. Nothing is clearer than this, or requires less laborious proof to secure assent.

What you say (so Arminius), that these things are equally true, but do not oppose that position which considers man in common: that point would carry weight if it were proved that man could be considered in common by the decreeing God, or was so considered. On the contrary, rather: if God could not consider man except in supernatural endowments, and not apart from sin, having that as the object of the act of predestinating and reprobating, then he could not be considered in common. For *the common consideration is excluded by the necessity of some particular circumstance which constitutes the formal reason of the object of consideration.*

But Piscator had already proved that these three considerations of man are found in predestination—namely, of man not yet created, created but not yet corrupted, and finally both created and corrupted—corresponding to the various acts found in predestination. For the decree of creating (so he says) *presupposes one not yet created; the decree of permitting sin presupposes*

one created but not yet corrupted; the decree of raising from the fall presupposes one both created and corrupted.

No Arminian has yet, so far as I know, attempted to overturn these points. Nevertheless, I desire greater precision in these matters: the act of permitting sin presupposes creation, but not the decree of permitting in the same way; again, the act of raising from sin presupposes corruption, but not the decree of raising in the same way. Nevertheless, to give this position a more fitting sense, it can be said that man in the decree is considered commonly in the consideration, but not as actually so existing—say, as created or corrupted—but in potentiality.

Those who attribute a threefold consideration premised to the object of predestination would deny that the consideration of a particular circumstance excludes the consideration of the remaining circumstances, because predestination does not consist of a single act but of multiple ones, as has been said, each of which claims for itself the consideration of a certain particular circumstance. These individual considerations, although they exclude the others from their own act, do not exclude them from predestination itself, which encompasses both this and the remaining acts within its scope.

SECTION FIVE

In these writings of Junius there is scarcely anything I would criticize, except that a single proposition concerning the reason for the election of Angels and men seems both poorly stated and poorly explained, namely in this manner: *The election of Angels and men has one and the same reason with respect to which they are chosen. For this is the image of God, which according to the purpose of His will He called to Himself—whether conserved or restored—and joined immutably to Himself as abiding in Christ, and which He had placed in the common ground of its own nature, from which they fell by their own will, to be condemned by His judgment.* In these words, only this much is stated perspicuously and clearly: namely, that the image of God is the reason with respect to which Angels and men are chosen. This, in my judgment, labors under no less an absurdity than the subsequent statements labor under obscurity. For election is the purpose of conferring grace and glory; but why the image of God should be established as the reason with respect to which these purposes are made—or either of them—altogether escapes my understanding. For since the image of God signifies something outside of God, as appears from those things attributed to the image—when it is said to be either *conserved* or *restored*, and likewise when some are said to have fallen from it—it would follow that something outside of God is the reason for divine election; which I judge to be impossible, and able to be refuted by clear arguments. Secondly, the reason for election is something that has the character of moving God to choose someone. Therefore, either the image

of God insofar as it signifies the essence of man would accomplish this, or insofar as it signifies holy qualities superinfused into man. Not insofar as it signifies the essence, since that is the same in the reprobate as in the elect, and is no more a reason for election than for reprobation. Nor insofar as it signifies holy qualities—both because holy qualities originally inhered in all, both reprobate Angels and elect, and also in all men in Adam; and because in that case election would not be from the mere good pleasure of God, but from the justice and holiness of the creature, which I know well would by no means have pleased Dr. Junius. If I am not mistaken, his meaning is that there was nothing in man that God would have considered as a moving cause for choosing him; but that God merely had in view the capacity for His image, through which he was naturally suited to become a vessel of glory—yet he was equally suited to become a vessel of wrath. For it is not brute beasts but only rational creatures that are capable of either. And perhaps this is exactly what Junius means:

namely, that nothing had been considered by God in men or Angels from which He would more incline toward the election of those same persons than toward the reprobation of those same persons. But thus understood, this is not to state a reason for election, but rather to state why they could, according to God's good pleasure, be either elected or reprobated. Furthermore, is election the decree either of conserving the image of God, as in the Angels, or of restoring it, as in men? For this indeed is accomplished by grace in some measure, and by glory in a far greater measure. But whether the image of God can fittingly be called the reason why God wills it either conserved or restored, let anyone judge. And then, what manner of speaking is this: that God *called His image to Himself and joined it to Himself*—that is, an Angel or a man? Yet I do not deny that man is not only said to have been made according to the image of God, but also is sometimes called the image of God (1 Cor. 11). But it could equally well be said that God *did not call His image to Himself when it was not conserved or not restored, but rather repelled it from Himself forever*; and yet the image of God could not for that reason have been fittingly called the reason for reprobation. And then, what does it mean for that image to have been *placed by God in the common ground of its own nature*? Here he distinguishes the image from nature, and calls nature the "ground" of the image—by what analogy these things proceed, let whoever wishes consider at greater length. I turn to Arminius.

If there is no election and reprobation of men except after the entrance of sin, then man is not considered generally, but precisely with the circumstance of sin. This notwithstanding, Junius had affirmed that man was considered by God generally. But defending Junius's position—previously recalled to Piscator's position, as was stated above—against Arminius, thus: Even if there is no election and reprobation except with the prior consideration of sin (which, however, I am not pleased to affirm), so that in this particular act of predestination man is not considered generally, it by no means follows that in the universal act of predestination man is not considered

generally. The reason is that the act of predestination, according to Junius and Piscator, encompasses not only the act of electing and reprobating, but also the act of decreeing the permission of sin, as well as the act of decreeing creation—one of which presupposes man not yet corrupted, the other not yet created. So that in predestination taken universally, there is a threefold consideration of the object: namely, not yet created, then not yet corrupted, and finally both created and corrupted. Let these things be said in defense of Piscator and Junius on this point, as teaching things that are consistent with one another.

But it is opposed* (he says) **by authority, reason, and example. The authority is drawn from three passages of Scripture. None of them is against me: for I do not deny that election and reprobation were made from eternity; I do not say that sin is the cause of sin, but only a condition required in the object. Even though Junius did not adhere to that condition of election (namely, that it is said to have been made from eternity), we shall nevertheless adhere to it. From eternity there was neither a sinner nor a man at all, except with respect to potency; therefore, although he could have been considered as one to be created, or as a future sinner, yet as actually created and as a sinner he could not have been considered. Molinaeus wished that the consideration of sin should be premised before reprobation; yet the same man confessed, as if by surprise, that things cannot be considered except as they are. For, as has been said, to consider a man not yet created as a sinner is not so much to consider as to fabricate. But let us undermine the foundations: he wishes the decree of creating to precede election and reprobation. But even if this were granted, it would nevertheless follow from this that the object of divine consideration could only be as one to be created, not yet actually created; for the decree of creating does not make someone immediately created, but only to be created in due time. But that imagining is false which holds that the decree of creating must be premised before the decree of conferring either grace or glory. For intentions are not prior to one another, except insofar as they are intentions of end and means. But creation,*

compared with grace and glory, by no means has the character of an end; nor do grace and glory, compared with creation, take on the character of means. It would also follow from this that man would in execution obtain grace and glory before creation. For what is prior in intention holds a later place in execution. Nor does any other appearance of reason present itself in the opposing position than this: that because sin precedes the conferring of grace and glory, therefore the consideration of sin is supposed to precede the decree of conferring grace and glory—a consequence which they thrust upon us as legitimate by sheer force of assertion alone, yet which they are never able to support with any appearance of reason. And on the contrary, there stands a clear argument founded on the best-known principle. For since the prevision of sin presupposes the decree of permitting sin, it would follow that the permission of sin in God's intention is prior to the conferring of grace and glory; and consequently it would have to be later in execution—

that is, men would first obtain the remission of sins before they were permitted to sin. From these things it is evident—not by bold assertion, but by clear demonstration—that sin is not even required for constituting the suitable object of predestination or reprobation. I pass over the utter lack of candor with which Arminius wraps himself in this distinction, since he everywhere professes that the cause of the decree is the same as the cause of the execution; and who does not know that sin is not merely a condition, but also the cause of reprobation, or damnation?—and this will be confirmed much more clearly with respect to those not yet created, that no account was then taken of even original sin.

But the Apostle (says Arminius) *attributes everything to the vocation of God, which is from mercy and is administered only toward sinners.* Doubtless he retreats to his old paths and his customary non sequiturs. For indeed, because sin precedes vocation, he wishes to conclude from this that therefore the consideration of sin precedes the decree of vocation—a kind of consequence that betrays neither art, nor learning, nor ingenuity; and with this removed, you know well how poorly *his tale would stand on its feet.* Every enthymeme can be reduced according to the rules of logic to a legitimate syllogism. I challenge here all the professors of the Arminian school to contend by syllogism. But they dare not, lest their sophistry thereby become apparent and vanish. Indeed, what is argued against here is deduced by the clearest consequence. For the prevision of sin must necessarily presuppose the decree of permitting sin. But if the permission of sin in God's intention were prior to vocation, it would follow that it would have to be later in execution—that is, men would first have to be called to faith in Christ, by which they receive the remission of sins, before they were permitted to sin. Again, I further demonstrate the inconsistency of the opposing argumentation as follows: Glory is conferred by way of reward for good works. But reward is administered only toward those who are diligent in good works; therefore the decree of rewarding with glory also premisses to itself the consideration of good works.

The third argument of Arminius is of the same caliber: *Because the purpose of God which is firm from the one who calls, not from works, is a gracious purpose in Christ, of whose promise it is said in Rom. 4:16 that it is firm for all the seed by faith and through grace: namely by faith of Christ or in Christ, which belongs only to sinners; for he who has not sinned has no need of faith in Christ, since through the law justice, and thence life, can be attained.* Doubtless because the inheritance of eternal life comes to us from faith which presupposes sin, therefore from the consideration of faith which presupposes sin proceeds the decree of conferring the inheritance of eternal life. We deny that consequence as resting on no evidence whatsoever, which yet they do not even attempt to prove—nor has any Arminian ever attempted it (in my experience). Doubtless what they cannot argue even probably, they nevertheless dare to affirm boldly, quite confidently. Again: *it is a gracious purpose in Christ, therefore only in those who believe in

Christ.* Doubtless they are happy in stringing together consequences, but they would show themselves more learned in proving and confirming them. The purpose of conferring faith is also a gracious purpose in Christ—does it therefore presuppose believers, rather than make believers? Again, the purpose of conferring salvation is in Christ—but in what sense? Let Arminius be heard here, in both his public and private disputations: namely, insofar as things are conferred upon us by predestination on account of Christ. Let the conferring of these things be granted; suppose it presupposes faith: does the decree of conferring therefore also presuppose faith? By the same force of reasoning, it will be established that the decree of glorifying presupposes good works in temporal existence. *This is the response to that passage, as if it were to be understood of the proper persons of Esau and Jacob beyond the type. But the sense of that passage is far different, as he could prove, if necessity demanded it.* Behold the benevolent gladiator, who restrains himself lest we experience his strength to the greater damage of ourselves and our cause! You would believe that they have at hand more than sufficient resources for defending their cause. Arminius did us the same favor in his analysis to be worked out on the ninth chapter of Romans. But away with these clearly crafty arts! We come to defend our cause relying not on your benevolence, but fortified with sound reasoning. The argument of the Apostle is this: *Before Jacob was born, or had done anything good, it was said to Rebecca that Jacob would serve Esau; by which it was signified that Jacob was even then beloved by God; therefore the election or love of Jacob by God was by no means made from his good works.* Before Esau was born, or had done anything evil, it was said that Jacob would rule over Esau; by which it was signified that Esau was hateful to God. Therefore his reprobation was by no means made from his evil works. Keep this Pauline argument inviolate, and accommodate it to other persons than Jacob and Esau if you can. To whatever persons you accommodate it, it will always be true that *election is not from good works, and reprobation is not from evil works*, and this is clear from the fact that election and reprobation were made before those who are elected and reprobated were born.

I come to the passage cited from Eph. ch. 1. That passage is so far from being contrary to my position that *I shall afterwards firmly establish my position from the same passage.* For election is said to have been made from eternity: I confess the same. It is said to have been made in Christ: I agree. It is said to have been made for the adoption of sons through Christ: I consent. But I see nothing in these things to prevent this also being true: that sin is a condition required in the object of election and reprobation. The reason of ourselves as cause of our election is removed. *Predestination precedes persons with respect to their actual existence, not as they are considered by God. It precedes causes actually existing from themselves, but not as foreseen from eternity by God: although in the foreknowledge of God they are not*

causes of predestination, but a condition required in the object. We shall consider the proofs of your position from Eph. 1 after they have been set forth. Let us now show how the eternal condition of election runs directly counter to your position. Our election, as made in Christ, is set forth in order to exclude not so much sin as faith, or some congruous disposition in man, in contemplation of which someone would be chosen. If insofar as it was made in Christ it excludes the reason of ourselves as cause, then it is false what Arminius says in his response to the thirty-one articles imposed upon him, where he professes, regarding art. 16, that *serious grief over sins is of such a kind that by it, according to the multitude of His mercies, He is moved to show grace to the sinner.* Likewise in private disputations, Thesis 18, on the Will of God, Sect. 5: *A creature and its action or passion can be the ἀρχηγομένη cause, without which God would refrain from that act of willing.* He therefore wishes our action to be able to be the ἀρχηγομένη cause of the divine willing—yet he strives to conceal this opinion of his by deliberate effort. Therefore he reduces the procatactic cause according to its outcome to a *sine qua non* cause; but that is not the nature of a procatactic cause; for to provoke is to move toward doing something of such a kind that it can sometimes happen even without the provocation. Secondly, every notion of a good condition as required in the subject is also removed. The reason is that God confers faith, repentance, and whatever completes our sanctification for no reason other than on account of Christ. It is false that the existence of men is considered by God before they are predestined: both because to consider non-existent things as existent is either to err or to fabricate, neither of which is fitting for God; and because the decree of creating is not posterior to the decree of predestining, as was proved above; and consequently the prevision of existence before predestination is a mere fiction without foundation. In Matt. 25, the blessed of the Father are said to possess the kingdom prepared for them by the sheer benediction of God: 1. But by a benediction in Christ, by which the curse is removed—which those same blessed ones had deserved in the foreknowledge of God, before they were blessed in Christ; 2. But a kingdom which was prepared for them by the blood of Christ; 3. A kingdom to which they are raised up from the disgrace and servitude of sin. If your dignity had considered what it is that is in controversy, you would never, I think, have supposed these passages to be deployed against me. I respond: When Christ is mentioned and election is said to have been made in Him, the cause of the gifts of God prepared for us by election is noted—which gifts are grace and glory, as Arminius himself interprets in both private and public disputations. But from this it does not follow that Christ is noted as, or is, the cause of the decree itself or of the divine will concerning the conferring of those gifts. Nor does it at all follow: the conferring of grace and glory presupposes sin; therefore the decree of conferring also presupposes either sin or the consideration of sin—for glorification also presupposes good works, yet the decree of glorifying does not presuppose either good works or the consideration of good works. It is said with a remarkable liberty of speech that men have deserved the curse in the foreknowledge of God—not to say that this is plainly false. For if it is so, then God knew that they had deserved the curse before they are blessed in Christ—that is (according to Arminius), before the decree of God to bestow grace or glory upon them. (For if the blessing here is taken as the temporal granting of

some gift, it would not be said that they had deserved the curse in the foreknowledge of God, but simply.) But God does not know this; for it cannot be said that He knows what is false; and it is false that men have deserved the curse before they are predestined. You would more fittingly say that God knows they will deserve the curse before they are predestined, rather than that they have deserved it. Although that too is false. For the permission of sin is not intended by God before the conferring of grace and glory. For if it were intended first,

it would certainly obtain its execution later—that is, they would first obtain grace and glory, and then afterward incur the curse. 2. If "preparation" denotes the decree of God, it is false that the blood of Christ is its cause. But if it denotes the cause of merits, or the procurement of it by merit—of this, I confess, the blood of Christ is the cause; but the argument does not follow: the blood of Christ is the cause of why the kingdom is procured for us by merit; therefore it is the cause of the decree of procuring by merit. The conferring of the kingdom presupposes indeed the disgrace and servitude, but not so the decree of conferring. If Arminius had thoroughly understood the constitution of his own position, and had been even moderately educated in elementary disciplines, he would by no means have thrust such insipid consequences upon this learned age as legitimate ones.

The arguments fight against the position that makes sin the cause of the decree, not against the one that wishes sin to be a condition required in the object. But you too make sin the cause of reprobation; therefore on this point the arguments do fight, and powerfully fight, against your position. I add also that these arguments can be so applied that they simultaneously overturn the premise of sin as a condition required in the object of predestination, which has also been shown.

To the first I say that my position entails no absurdity, until one is demonstrated. What Junius meditated on this point, since he did not yet indicate it, I prefer not to divine.

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To the first I say that my position entails no absurdity, until one is demonstrated. What Junius meditated on this point, since he did not yet indicate it, I prefer not to divine. But the absurdities with which we burden the position of the adversaries are these: It premisses the decree of

creating before the decree of predestining to salvation—that is, it wishes the intention of creation to be prior to the intention of salvation; whence it follows that since priority in intention belongs only to the end, and posteriority to the means toward the end, creation would be the end of salvation, as if men were saved for this purpose: that they might be created—when it is much more probable that men are created for this purpose: that they might attain salvation. Again, from this it follows that creation, since it holds the prior place in intention, would rightly hold the later place in execution—that is, that men would attain salvation before they are created. They strike upon the same rocks when they premiss the foreknowledge of sin before predestination to death and life, while failing to notice that by this very fact they establish the decree of permitting sin to be prior to the decree of predestining both to life and to death. Whence the absurdities mentioned above revive: For if the permission of sin is prior in God's intention to salvation and damnation, since priority in intention has its place for no other reason than on account of the end, and posteriority for no other reason than on account of the means toward the end, it would follow that the permission of sin is the end for the sake of which some are saved and others are damned—when on the contrary it is more probable that the permission of sin tends rather toward this end: that from it the way may lie open for saving some by the way of mercy and damning others by the way of justice. Again, by the same method it would follow that in execution the salvation of some and the damnation of others would occur before their sin is permitted—because, of course, sin is established as prior in intention, and what is prior in intention must necessarily be later in execution. Yet our position does not drive us to establish, conversely, that the intention of saving and the intention of damning are prior either to the intention of creating or to the intention of permitting sin—although they thrust this upon us, and by this plausible but merely apparent anomaly of our position create hatred and envy toward us. Although fair judges of matters would much more fittingly say that God intends the salvation of these and the damnation of those before He intends either creation or the permission of sin, than if someone were to say that God first saves some men by mercy and damns others by justice before He either creates them or permits them to sin. But truly, I say, our position does not even drive us to this point, nor does the true understanding of

its constitution. For although we deny that creation or the permission of sin is prior to, or can be prior to, the intention of saving and damning, yet it by no means falls to us to say that the intention of saving and damning is prior to the intention of creating and permitting sin. Rather, we say that neither of these intentions is prior to the other, and this for the following reason: that the things entering into the intention are by no means ordered among themselves as end and means, but joined together they constitute one complete and adequate means toward a certain end distinct from all of them—which end is the manifestation of divine glory by way of punishing justice on one hand, and sparing mercy on the other. These things are by no means noticed by our Arminians.

The second and third arguments change the state of the question. For they exclude sin from the decree itself as the cause on account of which God adopted sons for Himself, or from which He made that decree—which is not the question. How invalid this exception is, and on two counts, we have already taught in the first place. *I say therefore to the second: that the discussion here concerns adoption made in Christ, which befalls no one except through faith in Christ, to which we are not regenerated but led back by God.* From which it is proved that it is of sinners, and from sinners equal in sin, not from men equal in nature. I confess that the discussion concerns adoption in Christ, but not according to its actual execution in the nature of things—for who would doubt, or what grounds would there be for doubting, whether adoption precedes sin?—but with respect to its intention in the decree of God. We deny that this intention premisses to itself either faith or sin. Nor does it follow: adoption is made from men equal in sin; therefore when adoption was being decreed, men were considered as equal in sin. Indeed, they were not even then considered as equal in actual nature—not because they were not equal, but because they had no nature, since they had not yet received nature from God. But in potential nature, in possible being, they both were and were considered by God as equal, capable of whatever condition God saw fit either to implant in them with creation or to procure for them after creation.

To the third I respond. First, what befits the wisdom and grace of God more or less is to be judged from the Word of God. This is most certain, and was not denied by Junius but rather supposed as a foundation, although not expressly stated here. For the Scriptures say that it is permitted to God to create His creatures in whatever condition He wishes, and to constitute them for whatever end He wishes—namely as either vessels of wrath or vessels of mercy. *Secondly, I say that it equally befits the wisdom and grace of God to adopt sons for Himself from non-sinners as from sinners, and vice versa, if He so wills. For what is said concerning the hypothesis of contemplation is beside the point.* The question is not about adoption, but about the decree of adopting: that this decree should be made from the consideration either of faith or of sin, or from the simple presupposition of sin as a condition required in the object, I have already proved to be impossible. When he says that *what is said concerning the hypothesis of contemplation is beside the point*, he wishes to seem not to premiss at all the consideration either of faith as a cause by which God would be moved to elect some, or of sin as a cause by which He would be moved to reprobate others. But all is done craftily and deceitfully and without candor: he merely seized the opportunity in these matters to advance his position with smoother sails among superficial judges of things and those given more to emotions than to judgment. But we deny that even conditions can be premised at all, as we have long since taught, having demonstrated the absurdity of that position under various headings.

*Thirdly, the wisdom and grace according to which God adopts sons for Himself from among men is that hidden wisdom, etc., and the grace is joined with mercy, which is for the sinner,

which is in Christ: which indeed makes far more illustriously for the glory of God than grace insofar as it is distinguished from mercy: and indeed by so much as he who has deserved evil is more unworthy than he who* has deserved neither good nor evil. These things contribute absolutely nothing to the matter at hand, for we do not say that any grace of sanctification flows from God to men that is not by way of mercy—which indeed, although in execution it presupposes sinners, in intention had by no means presupposed the consideration of sin, or the condition of preexisting sin. But that it could not even presuppose this we have already proved, and therefore on this point we declare that Junius philosophized less accurately, in that he referred the matter to the grace and wisdom of God, as though what was more congruent with these guided the election—when on the contrary it has already been demonstrated that it could absolutely not have been otherwise. As for what he says—that the glory of God is much more illustrious in showing mercy to a sinner—first, this is entirely beside the point, for the only place for this comparison is between Angels and men; since to the former alone He showed grace by preserving them from sin, while to men He shows mercy by pardoning their sins. But we bring this comparison into neither the question nor the consideration, nor was this done by Junius.

But rather, it more pertains to illustrating the grace of God (understanding mercy, not grace disjoined from mercy, as Arminius fabricates as material suitable for his digression and response) that God bestows grace upon man without any contemplation of a condition in man, than from such contemplation. But the Arminians (although Arminius has been reluctant thus far to be called by this name) wish God to proceed to the election and predestination of man to eternal life only from the contemplation of faith and final perseverance therein. It could, however, be called into controversy (if it were necessary) which grace of God is more illustrious: that by which, notwithstanding sin, He saves men, or that by which He both saves some and preserves them from sin, as is seen in the elect Angels. Yet with respect to the means of redemption—namely, through the death of Christ—I profess the mercy of God to be more illustrious; and yet far more illustrious still is that grace by which He not only kept Christ holy and innocent, and translated Him to glory, but also assumed Him into hypostatic union with His Son, and constituted Him the author of salvation for His elect.

The example of the Angels has been previously shown to be not similar but dissimilar. He willed the salvation of men in a different manner than that of Angels, etc. Because He does in men what He does not do in Angels; and what He does not do in Angels; and for whatever end He wills to constitute them—namely as either vessels of wrath or vessels of mercy. *Secondly, I say that it equally befits the wisdom and grace of God to adopt sons for Himself from non-sinners as from sinners, and vice versa, if He so wills. For what is said concerning the hypothesis of contemplation is beside the point.* The question is not about adoption, but about the decree of adopting: that this decree should be made from the consideration either of faith or of sin, or from

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Arminius taught different effects, which no one doubts; and in this it was easy for Arminius to digress. But who would soberly say that the reason for the predestination of those same persons is different with respect to causes or conditions prerequisite in the object? Even in the election of men it can happen that the effects of this person's election and that person's election are different. For the effect of David's election was the pardon of the crime of adultery and homicide, but this does not occur in all. Most people God preserves from such crimes and wickedness, especially after their vocation: but is it therefore said that the reason for David's election was different from that of others?