Fr. Francisco Suárez, S.J.

Summa Theologiae 4

Commentaries & Disputations

Translated by Osvaldo R.

COMMENTARY AND DISPUTATIONS
ON THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

COMMENTARIES AND DISPUTATIONS

— VOLUME IV —

ON THE ANGELS I

LATIN PUBLISHED BY LOUIS VIVÉS, BOOKSELLER
AND PUBLISHER, ON 23 CASSETTE STREET

PARIS, 1856

This rendering into English of the Commentaries and Disputations upon the Summa Theologiae of the Reverend Father Francisco Suárez, S.J., the *Eximious Doctor*, of revered memory, is offered freely and without recompense, for the edification of students and the greater flourishing of that School which bears his name, to whose enduring service this labor, undertaken across many volumes, is consecrated, that the light kindled by so great a master may not fail among us, but spread, multiply, and abide.

Given the 10th day of July, in the Year of Our Lord 2026.

TO THE FLOURISHING CULTUS OF SUÁREZ

PRAISE OF SUÁREZ

Because Suárez illuminates the monuments of St. Thomas,
the craftsman's hand, worthy to be seen, is added to gold.
Things that had long been hardly passable to a sluggish mind
now are like roads made easy by the rising sun.
Things too little certain take strength from learned art,
and, firm from joined strength, have strength.
Aquinas recognizes Francis's excellent service;
such things he would have said, if he were speaking.
Without you I lived not wholly without glory, but now
I myself am rendered more illustrious by your services.
For you too great glory awaits, not to be lessened through the age:
live by your service, live by mine.
One day, and this is no empty trust, you will be another Aquinas.
Live always by your own name, live by mine.

PREFACE TO THE READER

1. *That this treatment also belongs to theology.*—Since there is a twofold consideration of God: one absolute, by which we contemplate the divine nature, its attributes, and the persons who subsist in it; the other respective, by which we consider the same Lord as he communicates himself to creatures, and turns and recalls them to himself; scholastic theology embraces both. Therefore, although it disputes many things about creatures, it never turns aside from its object, which is God, because it considers creatures only as either they emanate from God, or tend to him, or, what is the same, as knowledge of them is necessary for knowing God better according to the state of this life. And so theologians dispute about God under the prior absolute aspect with the Master, in *Book* 1 of the *Sentences*, but under the posterior aspect in Book 2, from the beginning. But St. Thomas, in his *First Part*, embraced both considerations, for he pursues the prior through the first forty-four questions, and the posterior through the remaining questions, or rather through the other parts of his theology.

2. *Reason for the extended work.*—But we, in earlier years, brought to light the prior part of this doctrine, worked out according to our slight ability, in the work that we entitled *On God One and Triune*, and, as opportunity allowed, promised to pursue the other. And although in the other works published afterward we did not depart from the proposed intention, for in all of them we tried either to illustrate or to defend true knowledge of God; nevertheless, on account of various occasions either of teaching or of writing that came up, we could not continuously pursue the work that had been begun. But now, partly freed from other occupations, and having obtained the convenience and

opportunity of time, we at last provide this, imploring the divine mercy that he who gave us to begin may also grant us to complete.

3. *Reason for the title.*—Therefore we entitle this whole present second part *On God the Effector of All Creatures*, because every consideration of God that is taken by respect to creatures must be founded in some genus of cause. For no kind of relation between God and creature can be considered that does not rest upon the character of cause and effect, or is not reduced to it. But God is the cause of other things in two principal ways, namely, either as efficient cause or as final cause. And according to these two genera of causes this respective contemplation of God is divided into two parts: for one concerns God as first efficient cause, the other concerns the same God as ultimate end. But these two characters of cause are compared with each other in such a way that, although the final cause precedes in the mind of the one acting, or in intention, execution begins from the efficient cause, and through its influence the perfection of the one acting is especially made manifest to us. And therefore, after the absolute disputation concerning God one and triune, this disputation on God as the effector of all creatures follows by a fitting method; and St. Thomas also observed this order in his *First Part*. Hence, although this work, because it contains a part of the science of theology, is rightly entitled concerning God, nevertheless it must be occupied directly and proximately with explaining his works, because God cannot be rightly known under that respect unless his works are known. And therefore we will divide the work itself into various treatises on the diverse effects of God. The first indeed would have been on the work of creation in general, since the works of God outside himself begin from it. And so both St. Thomas, in his *First Part*, from Question 44 up to Question 49, and the Master and the other scholastics dispute about it at the beginning of the second book of the *Sentences*. But we treated creation in volume one of the *Metaphysics*, disputation 20; we did not think it necessary to repeat that disputation here, nor, under that general aspect, does anything at present occur that must be added as belonging to the theological undertaking. For if perhaps anything was lacking, all of it will be better stated in particular when we dispute about the various creatures.

4. *Distribution of the whole second part concerning God the creator.*—Therefore there will be three principal treatises of the present work, or of the second part concerning God. The first will be on incorporeal creatures, whom we call angels. The second will be on corporeal creatures, insofar as they were created, adorned, and distinguished by God in six days, where we will also speak of the creation of the first man, of the state of innocence, and of its loss. The

third we will undertake with St. Thomas concerning the soul, especially the rational soul.[1] [2] For just as man, among all creatures, has a singular composition of body and spirit, so he also calls for a special consideration, especially of that part which is principal in him, and which is the foundation of every good or evil, happiness or misery. We judged that this treatise should be added to this work chiefly for this reason: because, just as in the *Metaphysics* we laid the foundations of speculative theology, so here we desire to prepare the way for moral theology. But moral doctrine depends upon internal knowledge of the soul and of its faculties and works. Therefore whatever we judge useful for that end, we will take care to inquire into and explain diligently in this treatise on the soul, which for this reason we have often promised.

Prelude to the whole treatise on Angels,
Or on Spiritual Creatures.

1. *Natural theology and philosophy also treat angels in a certain lower way.* —The disputation concerning spiritual creatures, considered in itself, belongs to natural theology, or metaphysics, whose proper office is to treat of things that in their being abstract from matter. Indeed, it is also touched upon by the natural philosopher under a relation to the sensible motion of a heavenly body. And so Aristotle treats angels under the aspect of heavenly movers in Book 8 of the *Physics*, and at greater length in Book 12 of the *Metaphysics*, where he calls them "intelligences," of which he often makes mention in his other works. And his ancient commentators, both Greek and Arab, did likewise. Plato also disputed many things about these spirits, whom he sometimes calls "secondary gods," sometimes "souls of the heavens and stars," sometimes "separate species." St. Thomas explained his meaning extensively in little work 15, chapter 1. But Marsilio Ficino, in the commentary on Plato's *Symposium*, oration 6, chapter 3,

[1] This third treatise was interrupted by the author's death; nevertheless it was supplied from his lectures formerly given in the school [in the Vivés text].

[2] Our divine Master was called to join Our Lord, Our Blessed Lady, and all the saints before this treatise could be completed; his revision reached no further than the first twelve chapters of Book One, corresponding to Disputation I and the first six Questions of Disputation II. The Vivès edition supplies the remainder from Suárez's earlier commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* as printed by Father Balthasar Álvares, S.J., an edition shown by later scholarship to depart from the manuscript tradition in several respects. For this reason it has not been included here. The youthful commentary has instead been translated separately, from Dr. Salvador Castellote's critical edition, with the revised twelve chapters appended there for comparison; the reader is referred to the note prefacing that volume for the full account.

and in the argument to Book, or dialogue, 11, *On Laws*, at the beginning, interprets Plato's words in a good sense. And Augustine of Eugubium gathers other things from the philosophers about angels in Book 8 of the *Perennial Philosophy*. And for this reason, in volume 2 of the *Metaphysics*, we undertook disputation 35 on spiritual substances, in which, insofar as could be done, we investigate their nature and properties from effects or natural principles. These things should not be repeated here, but either the same things must be confirmed in a higher way, or those things that natural reason does not attain must be added.

2. *But Christian theology treats them in a higher way.—The name of angels is taken from office, not from nature.*—But Christian theology disputes about these same substances under a higher light and from principles revealed by God, and it also calls them by a proper name taken from the divine writers: angels. Concerning this name one must know that it is taken from an office, although now it signifies the substances themselves insofar as they are spiritual and immaterial. So Dionysius, chapter 4, *On the Divine Names*, and the Fathers commonly on that text of Psalm 103: *He makes his angels spirits*, and on that text of Hebrews 1: *They are all ministering spirits*. And in this way one must understand what Gregory said, homily 34 on the Gospels: the word "angels" is a name of office, not of nature, namely, according to its first imposition. Isidore has the same in Book 7 of the *Origins*, chapter 5, and Book 2 of the *Sentences*, chapter 10. And Cyril had taught it earlier, Book 1 on John, chapter 2, and before him Hilary, Book 3 *On the Trinity*, showing from this that this name can be attributed to the Word of God without prejudice to his divinity. So also Augustine, Book 2 *On the Trinity*, chapter 13, says that the name of angel is sometimes attributed to the incarnate Word, as in Isaiah 9, *Angel of great counsel*. And in Malachi 3 he is called the Angel of the Testament; and he adds that it can also be said of the Holy Spirit, because it was said of him, *He will announce to you the things that are to come*, John 16. But the Father is not called an angel, because he is not sent, as Isidore noted, Book 7 of the *Origins*, chapter 3.

3. *Men are called angels by reason of office.*—Hence also, conversely, men are customarily called angels in Scripture by reason of office, as John the Baptist, Malachi 3: *Behold, I send my angel*, as Christ explained, Matthew 11. And priests, Malachi 2, Revelation 1, 2, and 3. In this way many explain that text of 1 Corinthians 11: *A woman ought to have authority over her head because of the angels*. Hence Tertullian rightly said, Book *Against the Jews*, chapter 9, that it is not new for the Holy Spirit to call those angels whom he has set over as

ministers of his power. Hence Jerome, letter 150, to Algasia, question 5, said that the apostles are called angels. And Ambrose said the same about the prophets, on Galatians 5. Nevertheless, by more frequent and common usage, the higher spirits are called angels, according to that text of Paul to the Hebrews 1: *They are all ministering spirits, sent for ministry*. There also he cites that text of Psalm 103: *He makes his angels spirits*, that is, those who by nature are spirits, he makes to be his angels by enjoining on them the office of announcing, as Augustine explains there, and in Book 15 of *The City of God*, chapter 23. Hence Dionysius, chapter 4 of *The Celestial Hierarchy*, says that the heavenly spirits deserved the name angelic before all others because, when the splendor of divine brightness first flows into them, they afterward transmit those higher announcements from above to us; and Chrysostom has similar things in the homily *On the Incomprehensible Nature*, from the middle.

4. *The name angel is more commonly taken in a good sense.—The name angel is attributed to demons.*—From these words of the Fathers we gather that the name of angels, said absolutely and as it were by antonomasia, is taken in a good sense and signifies the holy angels, because they are especially God's messengers, whom he properly sends to manifest his mysteries and to procure the good of the whole universe. And hence even men of singular holiness are customarily called angels, as Augustine notes, in the Book of *Questions on Genesis*, question 3, and Ambrose, Book *On Noah and the Ark*, chapter 4. Nevertheless, this name is also found attributed to demons in Scripture, as Matthew 25: *Which was prepared for the devil and his angels*, where also the name of angel seems to be a name of office, because the lower evil angels are ministers of the devil, that is, of the supreme evil spirit, of whom it is said in Revelation 12: *That great dragon was cast down*, etc. *And his angels were sent with him*. And thus also Paul, 2 Corinthians 12, calls him an angel of Satan, and in 1 Corinthians he said, *Do you not know that we will judge angels?* Explaining this, Augustine, on Psalm 86, says: The Apostle threatens that he will judge angels. Which angels, except apostate angels? Finally, the name of angels is customarily taken both generally and specially. For among angelic spirits there are various grades or orders, as we will see below, to all of which the name angels is common; but sometimes the lowest of those orders is said to be that of angels, as though the name of the genus were applied to the lowest species. But in the present case we speak of angels generally, as the name is common to good and evil, highest, middle, and lowest, and signifies their nature.

5. *St. Dionysius wrote a few things about angels.—Erasmus denying this is rejected.—And Cajetan doubting it.*—Therefore, after those things that the

canonical writers touch upon, Dionysius was the first of all to write expressly about these substances, in the Book *On the Celestial Hierarchy* and *On the Divine Names*. Later writers have used his doctrine above all to confirm what they hand down about angels. For this reason I thought it worthwhile, at the beginning of this treatise, to warn that one must beware the boldness of Erasmus and others, who deny that these books belong to Dionysius the Areopagite; Cajetan partly imitates them at the end of his commentary on Acts 17, calling this into doubt. But among prudent men no doubt can arise on this matter, for ancient tradition sufficiently confirms the truth. We will now abstain from a longer disputation, defense, and confirmation of the truth, because most learned men have provided this with great erudition and diligence: Matthew Galen, in *Areopagita*, Sixtus of Siena, in *Bibliotheca*, Book 2 on Dionysius, and Book 6, annotation 229, Baronius, volume 2, year of Christ 109, from number 51, and others whom Lorinus mentions at the end of Acts 17. Athanasius, Book of *Questions to Antiochus*, question 4, and Gregory, homily 34 on the Gospels, cite especially the book *On the Celestial Hierarchy*. Cajetan interprets Gregory badly, as though Gregory cited it with doubt, because he said: But Dionysius the Areopagite, namely an ancient and venerable Father, acknowledges that one says, etc. But those words are not of one doubting about the author of that work, but about a certain opinion of his, which he afterward treats and explains with great reverence, and he always supposes it to be of that holy Father.

6. *Cajetan's objection.—Baronius's response.—It does not satisfy.—A more probable response.*—What Cajetan objects could have more force: that Jerome, in the Book *On Ecclesiastical Writers*, made no mention of Dionysius the Areopagite. Baronius responds that Jerome, in the preface of his work, professes to list only those writers whom he had found listed by Eusebius. Hence, because Eusebius made no mention of Dionysius and his works, Jerome also kept silence about him. Yet with a different trustworthiness: for Eusebius, as Baronius wishes, concealed the works of Dionysius with a heretical spirit, because they are contrary to the Arian error; but Jerome omitted them because he did not find them in Eusebius. But, whatever should be said about Eusebius, I do not read in Jerome that he proposed to mention only those whom Eusebius had named; rather, his words are: "Although Eusebius Pamphili, in the ten books of *Ecclesiastical History*, was of the greatest help to us, and the volumes of individuals about whom we are to write often testify to the ages of their authors." In these words he does not say that he took the authors only from Eusebius, but that he was aided by his history; and when he says "aided," he indicates that he also took many things from elsewhere, especially from the volumes of those

same writers, as he immediately signifies. Therefore, from other words that Jerome adds, I think it can be said that he did not have knowledge of the works of Dionysius. For he says thus: "But if any of those have been passed over by me in this volume, they ought to impute it to themselves rather than to me, for I could not know things that I have not read; and what perhaps was known to others was unknown to me, hidden in this corner." Therefore the same could have happened to him with these writings of Dionysius.

7. *Which other Fathers and scholastics wrote about angels after Dionysius.*— After Dionysius, Theodoret, in the orations or books *Against the Greeks*, entitled the third book on angels, but he spends the greater part of it in refuting the false gods of the gentiles; near the end, however, he gathers a few things concerning good and evil angels from the divine Scriptures, so that by comparison with them he may confound the errors of the gentiles. Augustine likewise, in the Book *On the City of God*, touched upon many things about angels, especially in Books 9, 10, 11, and 12, where he treated their creation, the glory of the saints, and the fall of the evil angels. The same Augustine, in the books *On Genesis According to the Letter*, especially Books 3, 4, and 11, and in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 57 and following. Likewise Origen, Book 1 of *Periarchon*, chapters 5, 7, 8, and following. And Damascene touched briefly on the same things, Book 2 *On the Faith*, chapters 3 and 5. Bernard, Book 5 *On Consideration*, chapters 3, 4, and 5. Gregory also, in the said homily 34, taught some things about the orders of angels and their properties and names. And Isidore hands down many things like theorems about them in the places of the *Etymologies* and *Sentences* cited above. But other Fathers, treating them only incidentally, speak of them in various places; we will bring forward their opinions according to the needs of the disputations. The scholastics dispute about angels with the Master in Book 2, from distinction 2 up to 12; Alexander of Hales, part 2, from question 19 up to 43; the Auxerre Summa, Book 2 of the *Summa*, through the first five treatises; Albert, in part 2 of the *Summa*, treatise 2; and especially St. Thomas, first part, from question 50 up to 64, and Book 2 of *Contra Gentiles*, from chapter 46, and the disputed questions *On Spiritual Creatures*, and little work 15. But we will comprehend this matter in a treatise through eight books. The first four will concern angels considered according to their natural properties; the next four, afterward, will consider the supernatural properties of the same angels.

TABLE OF CONTENT

TREATISE I. [P1]
ON THE ANGLES OR CELESTIAL SPIRITS

Book I.	On the nature of angels, their production, and attributes as it were substantial	1
Chapter I.	Whether it is certain that there are in the world intellectual creatures higher than man, which we signify by the name angels	2
Chapter II.	Whether angels are eternal or began to be	8
Chapter III.	When angels were created	13
Chapter IV.	Where the angels were created	28
Chapter V.	Whether angels are wholly corporeal in their substance	31
Chapter VI.	Whether angels are corporeal as composed from body and spirit?	39
Chapter VII.	Whether there is any substantial composition in angels	59
Chapter VIII.	Whether angels in essence and in all quasi-essential attributes are of finite perfection	65
Chapter IX.	Whether angels are altogether incorruptible and can be called necessary beings	70
Chapter X.	Objections against the doctrine of the preceding chapter are met	76
Chapter XI.	Whether angels exist in a great number, and how great that number is	82

Chapter XII.	Whether all angels are of the same specific nature, or whether an essential distinction is found among them	92
Chapter XIII.	Whether the whole number of angels is conveniently distinguished into three hierarchies and nine choirs or orders	98
Chapter XIV.	What the essential unity or distinction is between the hierarchies and orders of angels	113
Chapter XV.	Whether all angels of individual orders differ in species, or whether some are given who differ only numerically.	127
Book II.	On the intellective power of angels, and on all things that pertain to its natural cognition	142
Chapter I.	Whether an angel needs a power and act distinct from his own substance in order to understand?	143
Chapter II.	What is the adequate object of the angelic intellect, from which the intellective power of an angel takes its proper species?	155
Chapter III.	Whether angels need intelligible species for understanding	172
Chapter IV.	How each angel sees himself and all things that are in him	193
Chapter V.	Whether each angel understands all others through their essences or through species, and whence he could have had them	210
Chapter VI.	How angels know singular material things	230
Chapter VII.	Whether the intelligible species concreated with an angel emanate effectively from his intellect, or are made by God alone, with the angel being only passive	249
Chapter VIII.	Whether an angel has concreated species of all universal and singular existing things pertaining to the order of nature	262
Chapter IX.	Whether an angel can know future things through species given to him from the beginning	269
Chapter X.	Whether through given species of singular things not yet existing an angel immediately and evidently knows in themselves that they are future	284
Chapter XI.	Why angels, just as they see singular things as present when they exist, do not see them as future before they are	292
Chapter XII.	How angels certainly know past things through implanted species	307

Chapter XIII.	Whether an angel can know all possible things of the natural order through innate species	319
Chapter XIV.	Whether the species of angels are universal or particular	328
Chapter XV.	Whether the higher angels understand through more universal species	340
Chapter XVI.	How variety in the universality of species belongs to different angels	345
Chapter XVII.	Whether angels naturally have an implanted proper species of God, through which they know his essence directly and immediately	360
Chapter XVIII.	Whether an angel naturally knows God through his own substance	367
Chapter XIX.	Whether an angel knows himself and God through his own substance by the same act or by distinct acts	375
Chapter XX.	What sort of knowledge of God an angel can acquire through the species of other effects	384
Chapter XXI.	Whether one angel knows the internal acts of the will of another without the latter's consent	394
Chapter XXII.	Various opinions against the resolution of the preceding chapter are reported and rejected	400
Chapter XXIII.	What is the proper account on account of which angels cannot naturally know the acts of another's will	409
Chapter XXIV.	Objections against the account posited are met	425
Chapter XXV.	Whether not only the affections of the will, but also the cognitions of the intellect are hidden from angels	430
Chapter XXVI.	Whether angels manifest their internal concepts or affections to others through sensible or spiritual signs	440
Chapter XXVII.	Whether one angel, by effecting nothing in the hearer, manifests his acts to him	457
Chapter XXVIII.	The resolution of the preceding chapter is confirmed by the solutions of several difficulties and doubts	481
Chapter XXIX.	Whether things supernatural in their substance are comprehended under the natural object of the angel's intellect, so that in some way they can be known naturally by them	528
Chapter XXX.	Whether angels naturally know effects that are supernatural only as to their mode	567

Chapter XXXI.	Whether the natural knowledge of angels with respect to all natural objects which they know through proper species is comprehensive	582
Chapter XXXII.	Whether angels know by composing and dividing	593
Chapter XXXIII.	Whether cognition through discourse is found in angels	604
Chapter XXXIV.	Whether angels always actually consider all things that they can know in first act	625
Chapter XXXV.	Whether an angel is necessarily always in some second act of understanding	635
Chapter XXXVI.	Whether an angel necessarily knows anything outside himself	653
Chapter XXXVII.	Whether an angel can understand several things at once by one act or by several acts	657
Chapter XXXVIII.	Whether there are intellectual habits in angels, whether natural or acquired	676
Chapter XXXIX.	Whether truth and falsehood can naturally be found in the minds of angels	686
Chapter XL.	Whether in angels there is morning and evening cognition, and what each is	689

TREATISE I [P1]
ON THE ANGELS OR CELESTIAL SPIRITS

— PROOEMIUM —

To the first four books on Angels

Since the order of nature is presupposed to the order of grace, we also observe that method in writing about angels, in whom both orders are found. Therefore, in the four books set out below, we will treat the substance, production, and other affections connatural to angels, not only in the way metaphysicians are accustomed to do, namely by natural discourse, but according to the principles of theology, which are also especially useful for treating this natural matter more exactly. For in this way what we handed down about angels in the Metaphysics within the limits of a lower light will be understood more fully here. Therefore the first book will concern the essence or substance of angels and the attributes not distinct from it; the second, the intellect and its perfections and actual cognition; the third, the will and its acts; the fourth, the power of acting outwardly.

BOOK ONE
ON THE NATURE OF ANGELS, THEIR PRODUCTION, AND ATTRIBUTES AS IT WERE SUBSTANTIAL

Although science is customarily supposed to presuppose that its subject exists and what it is, when this is known through itself, in the present matter it is

necessary for us to investigate the nature of angels, which is very remote from us and unknown. But we will treat both questions at once, namely whether angels exist and what they are, since, once the signification of the word has been supposed, these questions can scarcely be separated in the present case. For we suppose as known by faith that angels exist, that is, certain creatures distinct from men, from human souls, and from the other sensible things that we see or experience by the senses. For this is manifest from the way in which the Scriptures speak about angels. But if we understand that by the name of angels are signified certain incorporeal, spiritual, and simple creatures, or creatures having similar properties, then it is not so manifest that angels exist, nor can it be shown otherwise than by investigating the nature and essence of angels conceived under the prior confused aspect. Therefore we will do this in the present book; and at the same time we will explain certain properties of theirs which do not so much add something to their substance as declare it to us through certain negations, such as being incorruptible, simple, immaterial, finite, and whatever similar things there are, because through all these attributes the nature and substance of angels are explained, and not their proper accidents, about which we will speak afterward.

CHAPTER I
WHETHER IT IS CERTAIN THAT THERE ARE IN THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL CREATURES HIGHER THAN MAN, WHICH WE SIGNIFY BY THE NAME ANGELS

1. *The error of atheists and Sadducees is rejected.*—We cannot better define the question whether angels exist than by declaring the thing signified by that name under some general aspect and through comparison with other species or genera of creatures. On this point, therefore, only atheists, who deny that God exists, will consequently deny that creatures of this kind are given, because they think that in the world there is nothing besides these corporeal things and man. The Sadducees, who denied that there is a spirit, as is reported in Acts 21, can also be brought under the same error. But we will speak of their error in the following chapter; the prior error we pass over as resting on a foolish foundation. But once the existence of God the creator is supposed, it is very well inferred from this that intellectual creatures higher than man are possible. Hence it can also easily be proved by a very likely reason that such creatures exist in the nature of things, as I showed in the said disputation 35 of the *Metaphysics*, section 4. Now the question must be defined from the principles of

theology, and therefore I proposed the question concerning the certitude rather than concerning the thing itself.

2. *First conclusion.—It is certain by faith that angels are intellectual.*—I say, therefore, first: it is certain that those substances which Scripture calls either holy angels or wicked spirits are of intellectual nature. The conclusion is of faith, for Scripture attributes to angels those properties and actions which belong only to an intellectual creature. One is to see God, Matthew 18: *Their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father who is in heaven*. Another is to bless and praise God, which is everywhere attributed to angels in Scripture. A third is to guard men, Psalm 90, Matthew 4. To this also belongs directing, defending, illuminating, teaching, instructing, and speaking, as Zechariah 1: *And the angel who spoke in me said*, all of which, and similar things that are often read in the prophets and elsewhere, cannot be thought without intellect, as is known through itself. A fourth is to sin and become worthy of punishment, 2 Peter 2: *God did not spare the angels when they sinned*. From this it is also evidently gathered that angels have free choice, without which neither is evil done nor is one rightly lived. And from this their intellectual nature is evidently concluded, because freedom of choice is founded in reason. Here Bernard, in the said Book 5 *On Consideration*, chapter 4, said: *That angels are endowed with intellect we grasp not by faith, not by opinion, but by intellect, because those lacking this cannot at the same time be participants in God.* But since we hold this very thing, namely that angels are participants in God, not by intellect but by faith, it is necessary that by the same faith we believe that they are intellectual. Therefore Bernard is speaking of intellect with respect to the evidence of the consequence, not of the thing, so that this is a certain mediated faith, or a scientific theological assertion. A sufficient theological reason a priori is that, since God can make intellectual beings, and since he makes none, nor can make any, supremely perfect, otherwise it would be equal to him, he can multiply them. But it pertained to the perfection of God's works in that grade to make many creatures, whom we call angels. I explained this reason at length in the said place of the *Metaphysics*, and it will become more manifest from what is to be said.

3. *Second conclusion.—It is certain that angels are more perfect than man in the intellectual grade with respect to nature.—The error of George of Venice is rejected.*—I say second: it is certain that angels, in the intellectual grade or in the use of reason, are more perfect than man with respect to nature, or are more excellent. Against this assertion George of Venice erred in *Harmony of the World*, third volume, canticle 3, chapter 2; and John Arboreus reports him, Book 1 of *Theosophy*, where he says that men surpass angels not only by grace, but

also by power and nature, thinking that grace is always proportioned to nature, which is most false. Therefore the assertion is most received and certain, and Arboreus confirms it there from the Fathers. Now it is proved briefly, first from that text of Psalm 8, *You have made him a little lower than the angels*, where the Psalmist speaks of man, whom he says was made lower than the angels, certainly in nature, and therefore *a little lower*, for in grace and glory he is honored above the angels. But Paul, in Hebrews 2, taught us that these words, although said of the whole human species, were written by antonomasia about Christ, who by reason of human nature was made lower than the angels.

4. *First evasion regarding the passage from the Psalm.*—This passage, however, is weakened in two ways. One is because in Hebrew the name *Malachim*, which signifies angels, is not had, but *Heloim*; hence it would have to be translated, *You have made him a little lower than God*, and thus nothing is proved from it. And Jerome translates it thus in the Psalm, and many follow him. But although this translation is not to be rejected, as far as the Psalm is concerned, nevertheless the other is to be preferred. First, because the name *Heloim* also admits it, for in Scripture it is often attributed to angels, as in Psalm 96: *Adore him, all his angels*, etc. Second, because the Hebrews explain it thus, and the Septuagint translate it thus. Third, because Paul understood it thus. For, comparing Christ with the angels, he adduces those words, without doubt interpreting them of angels; and therefore the common interpreter rightly translated it thus. Finally, because man is more truly and properly said to have been made a little lower than the angels, for he is not a little, but infinitely, lower than God. And therefore the Fathers have also more frequently understood the comparison thus.

5. *Second evasion.*—Another evasion is that, since according to Paul the discourse is about Christ, it can be explained with Augustine, Book 3 *Against Maximinus*, chapter 23, that he is said to have been made lower than the angels not in the perfection of the assumed nature, but in the passible state that he had on the way, and especially in the death of the cross. For a little below Paul says: *We see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels, because of the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor*. Therefore he thinks he was made lower only until death; hence many explain that expression *a little lower* according to the Hebrew idiom, that is, *for a short time*. Indeed Athanasius, Book of *Questions to Antiochus*, question 157, explains that he is said to have been made lower because he was among the dead for three days and three nights. But in the book *On the Incarnation of the Word*, near the beginning, he thinks he is said to

have been made lower on account of the passion. Therefore from this the lesser perfection of the nature is not proved.

6. *It is weakened.*—But although this sense can be admitted to amplify the prior one, nevertheless the prior comparison in the perfection of nature cannot be excluded, especially in the Psalm, in which David speaks not only of Christ but also of the whole human nature. Yet Paul also chiefly intends that comparison. For in the first chapter, in order to show the divinity of the Son of God, he compares him with the angels and sets him above them all, certainly suggesting that angels are in the highest grade of perfection and nearest to God. And from this, in chapter 2, he infers that the words of Christ must be received with greater reverence and obedience than the word made through angels; and he tacitly gives the reason, because, although according to the human nature Christ seems to have been made lower than the angels, nevertheless in glory, honor, and power, by reason of his divinity and of the union of the humanity to it, he is superior to them. Hence Ambrose, Book 3 *On the Faith*, chapter 4, rightly said that Christ is said to have been made lower than the angels in the same way that he is said to be less than the Father, certainly by reason of the assumed nature; and this is true not only by reason of the passion, but also by reason of the less perfect nature. Augustine has the same in the treatise *On the New Song*, chapter 7; and Tertullian, Book *On the Flesh of Christ*, chapter 14, likewise explains that Christ was made lower than the angels because of the assumption of a soul and flesh, and not of an angelic nature.

7. *The conclusion is proved second.*—Moreover, in 2 Peter 2, angels are said to be greater than man in strength and power. But he is speaking about evil angels; hence he is speaking only about the perfection of nature. And in Job 41, it is said of Satan: *There is no power upon the earth that can be compared to him*. Therefore, just as he excels men in power, so also in perfection of nature. And in a similar way Scripture everywhere speaks of angels as of things of a higher order than the whole sensible mode and than men. Indeed Augustine, tractate 110 on John, at the end, gathers the excellence of their nature above human nature from the irremissible sin of the angels. *The fault was punished as so much more damnable*, he says, *as the nature was more sublime*. And so this truth is received by the consensus of all the Fathers. Dionysius especially declares and amplifies it in chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names*. Moreover, even all gentiles and unbelievers hold it as ascertained that there are certain invisible things or substances higher than man, which can harm him and benefit him, from whom they expected oracles, requested benefits, and feared teachings. Frequent discourse about these is found in histories and in the ancient philosophers, as

Lactantius notes, Book 2 of *The Divine Institutes*, chapter 15, Theodoret, in the said Book 3 *Against the Greeks*, and Cyprian, Book *On the Vanity of Idols*, as I said in the cited place of the *Metaphysics*. Finally, the faithful even now experience certain effects of demons in those possessed by them, or energumens, and in the seized; these plainly show both a greater penetration of demons in understanding and a greater power in acting than exists in man. This is also most openly seen in the incantations of magicians and in the false miracles of the ministers of the demon, which are read in Scripture, Exodus 7; and greater signs are predicted of Antichrist. These signs certainly show that there are in the world certain invisible substances that surpass men in power and natural perfection, whom we call angels.

8. *A tacit objection is met.—Another objection is met.—The conclusion is finally confirmed by an ontological reason.—See disputation fourteen, question two, number three.—And by a reason a priori.*—For those effects cannot be attributed to God alone. First, because one must not have recourse to the first cause when effects can be reduced to second causes. Second, because such effects are often depraved, and directed to the evil and destruction of men; indeed, they are done in hatred and injury of God himself, as the demons themselves very often manifest. Finally, because in the very mode of acting there is often shown either moral malice or a certain impotence of the one acting, because they produce works of this kind not through command and supreme power, but as it were by some art, applying active things to passive things. Nor can these effects be attributed to the separated souls of men who have departed from this life, because, according to true philosophy, the separated soul can no more operate upon subjacent matter than it could when conjoined; rather, it can do less, because when joined to the body it could at least through it change other bodies, although in a limited and ordinary way; but when separated it can do nothing, as we now suppose, and perhaps we will touch on it in the third treatise. According also to the principles of theology and faith, only angels, if they are holy, are ministering spirits for those who are to be saved, as is said in Hebrews 1. But if they are evil, they are permitted to go around, seeking whom they may devour; while souls, according to the ordinary law, are not permitted to go forth from those places to which they are assigned according to their merits. Nor should any other reason for this truth be sought a priori except the one that is taken from the will and power of the creator. For just as the distinction of natures arises immediately from those natures themselves, so also the excess of perfection of one over another. But this excess of the angelic nature

above the human will be manifested from the things we will say about it in the following chapters.

9. *Third conclusion.—It is certain that angels are given.*—Therefore from these things we conclude third: it is most certain that angels are given, because by this word we signify nothing but certain intellectual substances, lower than God and higher than man, invisible and insensible to us. Hence, once the signification of the word is supposed, the assertion remains proved from what has been said. Nor does it have difficulty or doubt on account of those things that remain to be treated concerning the nature of angels. Only the words of Augustine, in the Book *On the Quantity of the Soul*, chapter 34, can be objected against what has been said: *Just as it must be confessed that the human soul is not God, so it must be presumed that among all the things he created nothing is nearer to God*; and below he says: *Something is worse than the soul of man, namely, the soul of a brute; something equal, as an angel; something better, either nothing*. And in Book 3 *On Free Choice*, chapter 11, he says: *Rational souls are unequal to the higher powers in office, but equal in nature*; and in Book *Eighty-Three Questions*, question 54: *Nothing*, he says, *is better than the rational soul except God*; and he repeats the same, Book 3 *Against Maximinus*, chapter 25, and he seems to rebuke him because he had said that angels are greater than Christ according to the form of man. So also Bernard said, Book 5 *On Consideration*, chapter 3: *God is spirit; angels also are spirits, and they are above you. But God is superior by nature; angels are superior by grace.*

10. *Response.*—I respond that these and similar locutions must be explained piously, either with respect to the intellectual grade, or with respect to the immediate relation to God as to the ultimate end and as to lawgiver and supreme Lord, or with respect to the capacity for grace, glory, and the blessed vision. And Bernard seems to speak in the first sense, and it can be taken from Augustine, Book 1 of the *Retractions*, chapter 16. In the second and third sense the same Augustine speaks in the first and second places cited above. But in the third and fourth places already cited, I judge that he is not speaking of natural perfection precisely considered, but of absolute perfection, which belongs to someone when all gifts both of grace and of nature have been weighed. And thus it is true, according to an absolute comparison, that there is nothing better than the rational soul except God. But I say "by absolute comparison," because, if the comparison is made to individual souls, something below God can be better than some soul, but not simply, because there is a soul that absolutely exceeds all angels. And thus Augustine also says there, that human nature in Christ is more perfect than angelic nature. Otherwise the same Augustine, Book 11 of *The City*

of God, chapter 5, said: *The angelic nature precedes all other things that God has made in dignity of nature*. And in Book 1 of the *Retractions*, chapter 26, reviewing the last place mentioned from question 54, he seems to correct the locution, saying: *Where I said: what is better than every soul, that we call God, it should rather have been said: what is better than every created spirit.*

CHAPTER II
WHETHER ANGELS ARE ETERNAL OR BEGAN TO BE

1. *Something can be eternal in two ways.*—The resolution of this point seems to belong to the completion of the question whether angels exist, and therefore, before we inquire or explain further what an angel is, it seemed fitting to examine this in this place. Therefore it can be understood in two ways that something is eternal: in one way from within, in another way from the eternal influx of another. Among these two ways, among other differences, this is one: that a thing eternal in the prior way is eternal both on the side before and after, or both with respect to past duration and with respect to future duration, whether real and true or possible and imaginary. For since it exists through itself and not from another, it cannot have a beginning; and since it depends on nothing, it cannot be deprived of being or have an end of duration. For why would such a being, which is said to be from itself or not from another, have begun to exist at such a point rather than before? Or if at some time it did not exist, how would it begin to have being unless being were given to it by another? Therefore it is evident that what at some time has being without the effecting of another always and necessarily had it, because it could not have that from which it newly sprang up, but exists because from its intrinsic and essential notion it has that it is an actual being. And from this it is also evident that the same thing will necessarily endure forever, because it always has the same necessity of existing, and because it neither destroys itself nor depends on another by whom it can be destroyed. But if some thing exists not from itself, but from the benefit of another, then, although it is supposed to be eternal, it will be able to be eternal on the side before, or compared to past duration, even though it will not endure perpetually; just as, conversely, it will be able to be eternal for the future, although it was not from eternity; or, according to the mode of operating of the efficient and conserving cause, or according to its good pleasure, if it acts freely, as God really operates, it will be able to be eternal on both sides. Therefore here we chiefly treat eternal duration on the side before, or into the past; but we will speak of the eternity of angels into the future in chapter eight.

2. *First two-part conclusion.*—First, therefore, let it be certain that angels are not eternal from within, or essentially, nor from any absolute necessity and through themselves. This assertion is not only most certain of faith, but also evident, supposing what we have already shown, that angels exist in the nature of things. And the first part is easily proved, because they do not have that being from themselves, but from some efficient cause; therefore they do not have the necessity of being from themselves; therefore neither eternity. The consequences are evident. But the antecedent is of faith, which teaches us that God is the creator of all visible and invisible things that are not God. Such are angels, as Athanasius rightly proves, question 1 to Antiochus, and Chrysostom, homily on fasting, after the homilies on Genesis, from that text of Psalm 148: *Praise God, all his angels*, and below: *He spoke, and they were made*, for there they are numbered among the works of God and are invited by the Prophet to praise God. And in a similar way Daniel 3, after the youths said: *Bless the Lord, all works of the Lord*, etc., they added: *Bless the Lord, angels of the Lord*. And in Colossians 1 Paul says of Christ: *In him all things were created, whether thrones*, etc. St. Gregory proves the same, Book 32 of the *Moralia*, chapter 9, from that text of Job 40: *Behold Behemoth, whom I made with you*. And finally among the articles of faith it is placed that God is the creator of invisible things, as is found in the Nicene Council. And in the following treatise, Book 1, chapter 1, we will speak again. It can likewise be shown by reason from another principle handed down in the *Metaphysics*, disputation 28, section 1, and disputation 29, sections 1, 2, and 3, namely, that there can only be one being from itself. For from this principle it is evidently inferred that whatever is distinct in things from that one being which has being from itself cannot exist except through its efficiency, as we showed in the same *Metaphysics*, disputation 20, and especially concerning angels, in disputation 29, section 2, from number 29. Therefore angels are not eternal from themselves.

3. *The second part is proved.*—It could be responded that, even if they do not have being from themselves, they can have it necessarily, because they necessarily emanate from their cause, and in this way they can have necessity of duration and consequently eternity. But this evasion, as was noted in the same places of the *Metaphysics*, is easily refuted, and at the same time the other part of the assertion is proved, because this absolute necessity is impossible. For it can arise neither from the nature and condition of the efficient cause of angels, nor from the nature of the angels themselves, and therefore it can exist in no way. The first part of the antecedent is proved, because it is repugnant for God to act outside himself by necessity of nature: both because he is intellectual in the

highest perfection and therefore supremely free, and also because he needs no thing outside himself, and therefore he loves nothing outside himself in such a way that he necessarily wills it to be or wills to make it, and also because, since he is omnipotent and of infinite efficacy, he could act upon nothing determinate unless he determined it through free will. For if he acted by necessity of nature, why would he have created these angels rather than other possible ones, or why so many rather than more? Hence the other part is easily demonstrated, namely, that necessity of this kind cannot proceed from the special condition of the angelic nature: both because, since it is of finite goodness and is not God's end, nor does it confer anything upon him, it cannot determine his will by necessity to love or effect it; and also because, since infinite angels are possible, why would those who were made have introduced this necessity into God more than infinite others who were not made? Therefore it is evident that angels do not have eternity, not only as it properly means a duration necessary through itself and independent of another, but also as it can mean a duration absolutely necessary under any title whatever.

4. *Second conclusion. It is of faith that angels were not created from eternity.* —Second, one must say that angels in fact are not eternal on the side before, or were not created from eternity. Natural reason alone cannot attain this assertion, at least not by a necessary reason, because it cannot be shown by a certain reason that eternal creation from the free will of God is impossible, as in the *Metaphysics*, disputation 20, section 6. But if any eternal creation is possible, it is especially the creation of angels, who are, among created things, most indivisible and permanent, the two conditions that eternity can require. Hence their intrinsic duration comes closest to eternity and is called aeviternity, as the theologians teach, and as was said in the *Metaphysics*, disputation 60, sections 5 and 6, and as St. Thomas with his commentators hands down, in the first part, question 10. Therefore the assertion cannot be demonstrated by natural reason, although it can be persuaded in some way, as I will say below. Nevertheless the conclusion is certain in theology, for all theologians agree on it, as we will see a little later. Likewise, the Fathers, both those who say that angels began together with this corporeal world and those who thought that they existed before, all agree in this: that angels did not exist from eternity.

5. *First proof.*—And it can be proved first from Scripture, Proverbs 8: *The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning*, where it is openly said that God and divine wisdom existed before he created anything, and consequently also before the angels; for they also are something made. Nor does it matter that the Septuagint translated in place of

those words, *for his works*, a reading that many of the ancient Fathers use. First, because the common reading must be maintained and suffices for a Catholic proof. Second, because that reading, *he possessed me for his works*, is clarified by the other. For God possessed his wisdom for works even when he was operating nothing outside himself, just as one is said to have knowledge for teaching even when he is not teaching. Third, because the Catholic Church publicly sings and receives that sentence under those words and believes that it contains the true meaning. Finally, because the words of the same wisdom in Ecclesiasticus 24 are almost similar: *I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, firstborn before every creature*. For *before every creature* says the same thing as *before he made anything*. Therefore God and his wisdom preceded every creature from eternity, and consequently also angels. Therefore they are not eternal.

6. And therefore Paul, in Hebrews 13, said singularly of Christ: *Yesterday and today, he is the same forever*, as though it were proper to him always to be, which does not belong to angels, as Ambrose weighed, Book 5 *On the Faith*. Therefore, when Christ says in John 17 that he had glory with the Father *before the world was made*, and when Paul says in Ephesians 1: *He chose us in him before the constitution of the world*, angels are comprehended under the name of the world, for they belong to the constitution and completion of the universe. For this reason, in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, chapter *Firmiter*, it is said that the one sole true God is eternal, namely, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who are coeternal; or, *not three eternals, but one eternal*, as Athanasius said in the creed. Nor can this be explained to mean that he alone is eternal by a proper eternity independent of every cause, but absolutely that he alone has always existed. For from this it then infers that this eternal God, *by his almighty power, in the beginning of time founded from nothing both creatures*. Hence the assertion set down must be held as certain of faith.

7. *It is proved second, from what is prior and from congruities.*—But the reason a priori is the free will of God sufficiently revealed to us. A congruity can be given, either because, in order that God's excellence and eminence over every creature, and how freely he communicates himself ad extra, might be more evidently manifested, it was fitting that the production of angels also not be eternal, but that this mode of infinity be reserved for the productions ad intra. Or second, because every creature, even an angelic one, is mutable according to operation, and therefore an eternal production is not sufficiently agreeable to the nature itself. For a thing produced from eternity will necessarily remain for a certain infinite duration in that disposition in which it is produced, as is shown in physics and metaphysics. For whatever comes to be from eternity must

remain through some eternity, and so through some infinite duration, whether what is produced is produced primarily through itself, as substance is, or whether it is produced together with it in that same eternity, because if something of this kind remained only through a finite duration, by that very fact it would have a beginning of its duration and therefore would not be eternal. So also, conversely, if some angel were created from eternity without grace, he would necessarily remain without it for an infinite duration, and only at the beginning of some time or created duration could he receive it. Therefore, if an angel were created from eternity while at the same time eliciting an act, he would necessarily remain in that act through an infinite duration; or, if he were created without act, he would remain without act through eternity. But this mode of immobility is beyond the nature of an angel, and therefore to be created without a beginning and novelty of being is not agreeable to created nature, even angelic nature, even if it is not repugnant for it to be done by absolute power.

8. *Objection.*—Against this truth, however, I see that only the words of Basil can be objected, homily 1 of the *Hexaemeron*, around those words: *In the beginning he created*, etc., saying that it can be believed that something existed before the constitution of this world. Explaining this, he adds: *There was surely a certain state higher than the generation of the world, accommodated, as was fitting, to those powers abstracted from material concretion and superior to the world: a state also prior to the condition of time, namely eternal and perpetual.* In these words, only the final ones have some obscurity; for in the prior words Basil only says that angels, whom he calls powers abstracted from matter, had a certain higher state, prior to time, which they could have had even if they were not from eternity. But whether they were so, we will immediately see. As for what he adds, that that state was eternal, I think it must be understood not of eternity on the side before, but on the side after. And I weigh that he did not say only that it was before time, but said that it was *prior to the condition of time*, as though he were saying that the state of spiritual creatures preceded this material and corporeal time in duration because it is also superior to it in natural condition. For he had said a little earlier: *Things that began from time are not so utterly the same in being that they will not someday be future and be consummated*. But now he says that angels did not begin from time, certainly from heavenly and corporeal time, but existed before it, because they are not defective as corporeal things are, but eternal and perpetual; he sufficiently explained this sense by adding the word "perpetual."

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III
WHEN ANGELS WERE CREATED

1. *It is certain that the corporeal world did not precede angels.*—This question is necessary for the completion of the preceding one, and therefore seemed suited to this place, although it is treated by St. Thomas in question 61, toward the end of the matter. But, regarding the proposed point about the beginning of the creation of angels, one thing is undoubted among all, namely, that this corporeal world was never, even for a moment, without angels, and consequently that the heavens were not created before the angels, or that angels were not made after bodies. For all the theologians and Fathers to be cited agree on this, and the things we will bring forward prove it a fortiori. For now the words of Job 40 suffice, where Behemoth, that is, the demon or Lucifer, is called *the beginning of the ways of God*, because either he himself was created before all, or at least nothing was created before him. For that passage is commonly understood in this way of the beginning of creation, and it is best explained of the beginning of time or duration by St. Thomas there and by others. Or at least, even if it is understood of the beginning of dignity, there consequently the beginning also of creation or existence is included. Against this assertion, however, Gennadius and Rupert can be cited, who signify that angels were created at least after some bodies; but I will explain and refute their opinion in the course of the chapter. Acacius also is cited from Lippomano, in the Chain on Genesis, but I could not find the place.

2. *But it is doubted whether angels preceded.—First opinion, which the Greek Fathers handed down.*—Therefore the difficulty is whether angels were created before the corporeal world, that is, before that moment about which it is said, *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*, or at the same point. On this there was an ancient opinion that angels were created before heaven and earth. Among the Greeks Origen taught this, homily 4 on Isaiah, where it is clear that certain things existed before the world. But tractate 9 on Matthew, near the end, he openly says: *Angels are older not only than man, created afterward, but also than every creature created for his sake.* Hence what he says in the preface to *Periarchon*, at the end, that it is not clear when angels were created, can be understood as meaning that it is not clear when before the world they were made. Basil taught this more openly, in the said homily 1 of the *Hexaemeron*, and he repeats the same in the second, from the middle, where he speaks

conditionally, saying that if angels existed before this world, they were not in darkness, but in spiritual and divine light. And Anastasius of Sinai followed Basil by reporting him, Book 1 of the *Hexaemeron*, at the beginning. Nazianzen followed the same opinion, oration 38, on the Nativity, and oration 42, on Easter. Damascene approves it more, Book 2 *On the Faith*, chapter 3; and Nicetas followed him, on oration 39 of Nazianzen, paragraph *Since therefore*. Chrysostom taught the same, Book 1 *On Providence*, near the beginning, for he says that God existed without any beginning of his substance before he founded angels, then that he created angels and other incorporeal substances, and afterward man and this whole world. He also indicates the same, homily 22 on Genesis, insofar as he says not only that angels sinned before man was created, but also that *the devil and his cohort had long ago fallen from that glory and had been made ignominious*. Through this way of speaking he indicates a great precedence. Moses, bishop of Syria, hands down the same in the Commentaries *On Paradise*, part 2, chapter 7, although he says: *The Syrians held the contrary, denying that angels existed before the corporeal world.*

3. *Those among the Latins who signify the same.*—Among the Latin Fathers, Pope Clement signifies this, Book 8 of the *Constitutions*, chapter 12, saying: *God, who before all things made the cherubim and seraphim, ages and hosts, virtues and powers, principalities and thrones, archangels and angels, and who after all these things fashioned this visible world and all things contained in it.* Ambrose taught this more clearly, Book 1 of the *Hexaemeron*, chapter 5, saying: *Although angels began at some point, they nevertheless already were when this world was made.* And the Prophet in the Psalm says that before the beginning the seraphim sang *Holy, Holy*, etc. And Hilary, Book 12 *On the Trinity*, after the middle, said that the origin of angels is found to be older than the creation of the earth. Jerome held the same, on Titus 1, and Cassian, conference 8, chapter 7, asserts that none of the faithful doubts this. Isidore is also cited, Book 1 *On the Supreme Good*, chapter 10, but he explains himself in another sense, as I will say below.

4. *The absurd estimation of Gennadius on the proposed matter.—It is rejected.*—Gennadius is also customarily added by some, in the Book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*, chapter 10, while others contend that he is not correctly cited. Yet in my judgment he had a singular and very absurd opinion. For he did not posit that angels were created before all bodies; indeed he thinks that the earth and water, covered with darkness, were made before the angels, and nevertheless he indicates that angels were made many ages before corporeal light; and consequently he thinks that between that beginning in which God

made heaven and earth and the point at which he said, *Let there be light*, many ages were interposed. The words of Gennadius are: *And while darkness still concealed the water itself, and the water hid the earth, angels and all the heavenly powers were made.* In these words he sufficiently indicates that angels were made after the aforesaid bodies and while darkness existed in the corporeal world, and consequently before material light. But that this precedence was through many ages he declares by giving the reason for the creation of angels in these words: *So that the goodness of God would not be idle, but would have beings in which it could show its goodness through many spaces beforehand.* This reason would be frivolous, or rather would have no place, if light had been created a little after darkness, for then, even if angels were not created while darkness endured, the goodness of God would not be idle through many spaces. But each part of this opinion is improbable. The prior part is improbable because it rests on no foundation, since God could create angels before light and nevertheless create them together with the world covered with darkness; nor is there any reason why the creation of angels would have been delayed. It is true that Gennadius does not expressly affirm this, for it could be explained that angels were made while darkness still existed because they were created together with it; for the particle "still," although less properly, permits this sense. But the other part, about the duration of darkness through many ages or spaces before the creation of light, is repugnant to the narration of Gennadius, as will be said expressly in the following treatise. And therefore, if angels are supposed to have been created together with heaven and earth, it is certain that they could not have existed through many spaces of time before light.

5. *The first opinion itself is persuaded from Scripture.—It is persuaded by reason.*—The said opinion about the creation of angels is customarily persuaded from certain passages of sacred Scripture. The first is Job 38: *Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth?* And below: *When the morning stars praised me together*, that is, the angels, of whom it is added, *and all the sons of God rejoiced*, that is, the angels of God, as another text has it. Therefore the angels already existed when God created bodies. The second is Job 40, where it is said of Behemoth: *He is the beginning of the ways of God*, that is, of creatures. Therefore Lucifer, who afterward became Behemoth by sinning, was the beginning of creatures. Therefore he was made before this world; and the same reason applies to the other angels, for the whole army of angels was named from its head. The third is Titus 1: *Which God, who does not lie, promised before secular times*. For something had to exist before all times, to which God would promise; but nothing can be thought of except angels. Fourth, a reason is added:

because it seems foreign to divine goodness and glory that through infinite ages he would exist, as it were, solitary, without any communication ad extra and without the company of praising creatures.

6. *The true opinion is that angels were created together with the corporeal world.—The reason of Theodoret is refuted.*—Nevertheless, one must say that angels were not created before the corporeal world, but together with it. The theologians commonly embraced this opinion: St. Thomas, first part, question 61, article 2, and there Cajetan and all moderns; the other scholastics with the Master in Book 2, distinction 2; Alexander of Hales, the Auxerre Summa, and others who have disputed about this. The ancient Fathers handed down the same. Among the Greeks, Epiphanius, heresy 65, where he says that Scripture clearly indicates that angels did not exist before heaven and earth: *Since this word is plainly unchangeable, that before heaven and earth nothing created existed*. Theodoret agrees, question 3 on Genesis. Yet he uses a weak reason, namely, because an angel needs a place in which he may be received. *For if there is not in the nature of things something that comprehends*, he says, *how will there be something that is comprehended?* But now we do not care about the reason, for an angel through itself does not need a corporeal place, as is known. Procopius likewise, in the preface on Genesis, reporting both opinions, prefers this one, and says that Moses comprehended angels under the name of heaven when he said: *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*, where the container is also placed for the contained.

7. *Which Latin Fathers taught it.*—Among the Latins, Augustine taught this opinion, Book 11 of *The City of God*, chapters 6, 9, and 33. Yet he says in chapter 32 that, if anyone thinks otherwise, one must not contend with him, provided he does not say that angels are coeternal with God. And he signifies the same in Book 22 *Against Faustus*, chapter 10, and in the *Unfinished Work on Genesis*, chapter 3, and Book 2 *On Genesis According to the Letter*, chapter 8, and on that text of Psalm 89: *Before the mountains were made, or the earth was formed*, etc. Hence what is said in the Book *On Divinity and the Incarnation*, volume 6, number 4, namely, *when angels were created, or what they are like, or how they are, is not distinguished clearly enough*, although the book is not Augustine's, nevertheless does not disagree from his mind. For Augustine held this opinion as the more probable, not as certain. And Gregory followed him, Book 32 of the *Moralia*, chapter 9, otherwise 10, where he says that God founded spiritual and corporeal things at the same time. And he signifies the same in chapter 18, otherwise 24, and more in Book 26, chapter 7, otherwise 14, where he says that concerning the nature of rational spirits it is believed that it was the first to be

founded in time. Here I weigh the particle "in time," for he is speaking openly of the time known to us, and he calls it "first" either in dignity or negatively, because none was created prior, although it was created in time together with others. Hence in Book 27, chapter 24, otherwise 25, explaining those words of Job 37: *Were you perhaps with him when the heavens were fashioned?*, he understands angels by the heavens, although Job is speaking about the time of the first creation. Hence Gregory adds that Moses too, when he said that God made heaven and earth in the beginning, understood angels by heaven.

8. *Bede also agrees.—Rupert's excess in this opinion.*—Bede agrees, volume 4, in the *Hexaemeron*, saying that angels were founded in the beginning with heaven and earth, and therefore Moses said of the earth that in the beginning it was formless and void, because it lacked fruits and inhabitants; but he did not say this of heaven, because *as soon as it was created, it was filled with its inhabitants, that is, the most blessed spirits of the angels*. And in volume 8, Book of *Questions on Genesis*, in the manner of dialogue, when the disciple asks about the order of things made in the beginning, he responds: *In the very beginning of creation, heaven, earth, angels, air, and water were made.* And nevertheless, in the Book of *Various Questions*, question 9, he says that in the beginning, before the creation of the world, angels were created. But it must necessarily be understood either that they are said to have been created prior *by order of preeminence, not by quantity of time*, as he himself immediately adds, or that they are said to have been created before the creation of the world, that is, of the consummated and formed world, as it was formed through six days. For he is not contrary to himself, especially because in the course of the same question he often suggests that angels were created with heaven. Rupert is also customarily cited for this opinion, Book 1 on Genesis, chapter 11, who without doubt taught that angels were not created before the world and thinks they are signified by the name of light when God said: *Let there be light, and light was made.* But he goes too far, because he signifies that they were not created in the very beginning of time together with heaven and earth, but a little later on the first day from the thick and moist air such as it already was, *when darkness was over the face of the abyss*. But in this he erred, because he did not think well concerning the substance of angels with respect to the bodies he attributes to them, as we will see below. And nevertheless he could have said that angels were created together with heaven and earth, water and air, even if they had airy bodies, because it was not necessary that they be formed from already created air, as the body of man was formed from the earth, but it could be created together with the angelic

spirits. Finally, Hugh of Saint Victor confirms the same opinion well, Book 1 *On the Sacraments*, part 1, chapter 5, and part 5, through the first five chapters.

9. *It is now proved from Scripture.—The passage of Scripture adduced does not settle the matter.*—This opinion is customarily proved from Scripture especially by the testimony of the Wise Man in Ecclesiasticus 18: *He who lives forever created all things together.* On account of this testimony Augustine taught, Book 4 *On Genesis According to the Letter*, chapters 33 and 34, that God created all the things of the world, both spiritual and corporeal, in one moment. But as regards corporeal things, it is not necessary to understand this of all their species formally and in themselves, so to speak, because not all mixtures were created together, as is evident and will be said in the following treatise. Rather, all bodies are said to have been created *together* either with respect to those that are made through proper creation, so that the predicate determines the subject, that is, because all bodies that are immediately produced from nothing were made together; or all are said to have been created together virtually, because the heavens and the elements were made together, in which other things were contained virtually and as it were in seed, and from these they were afterward made, as Gregory explains, Book 32 of the *Moralia*, chapter 29, and St. Thomas, first part, question 74, article 2, reply to 2. But both seem to understand the particle *together* of duration, and in this way that spiritual things were created together with the corporeal world. And because spiritual things are not made one from another or by another, that explanation has no place in them, but it must necessarily be understood of all angels, whether distinct in genus, species, or number, for all and each were created together with the corporeal world. But it is customarily explained otherwise, so that all things are said to have been made together not mathematically, that is, in the same indivisible moment, but in a human way, because all things were made in a brief time, namely in six days. But, first, when neither necessity nor reason urges, one should not depart from the propriety of the word. Next, even from this it follows that angels were not created long before the corporeal world, which the prior opinion nevertheless wishes and consistently states; for it is superfluous and wholly without reason or congruity to invent a precedence of a short time. And finally, in that sense the Wise Man, through the particle *together*, alludes to the six days of the first creation. Hence he also thinks that the creation of angels was made within those days, even if we are not forced by the force of those words to say that it was made in the first instant of creation. Nevertheless, as Jansenius notes there, this passage does not force the particle *together* to be said of duration, so as to exclude prior and posterior from it, because it can very well signify

collection or community. For the Greek word corresponding to it, κοινῇ, signifies this, and it could be translated "equally," or by a negation that excludes exception, namely, all things, nothing excepted, or equally all. And in this sense it is also said in Psalm 13: *All have gone astray; together they have become useless*, and Psalm 48: *The unwise and the fool will perish together.*

10. *First proof.*—Second, this opinion is customarily proved from Genesis 1: *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*. For to say *in the beginning* was the same as to say "before all things"; therefore before the creation of heaven and earth God created nothing. Augustine adduces this testimony thus in Book 11 of *The City of God*, chapter 6, saying: *If the sacred letters, which are most true, so say that in the beginning God made heaven and earth, that he is understood to have made nothing before, because this would rather be said to have been in the beginning if he had made anything before the other things altogether that he made*, without doubt the world was not made in time, but with time, and in force he infers that nothing had been made before. You will say that this testimony does not compel. First, because that particle *in the beginning* has many explanations, as we will see in the following treatise, and one can be "in the beginning of time," certainly of corporeal and heavenly time, which is absolutely and truly called the beginning of time, whether other things of another duration were created before or not. Second, because that "in the beginning" is referred to heaven and earth, which are then said to have been created; hence, although it denies the precedence of other things, it could suitably be understood of corporeal things, about which Moses was speaking there. But although it is true that this testimony does not make the matter certain, it is nevertheless highly probable.

11. *Moses did not entirely omit the creation of angels.*—Especially because it is most likely that Moses did not entirely pass over the creation of spiritual things, but comprehended it under the heavens, because, since in that book and the following ones he would often mention angels, he had to comprehend them in some way under the creation of the world, lest they be thought uncreated. We will return to this matter again in the following treatise, chapter six. Now I only add that what Moses had said implicitly seems to be explained by David, Psalm 148, where he first invites the heavenly things in general to the praise of God, saying: *Praise the Lord from the heavens; praise him in the heights*. Then he declares what he comprehends under the name of heavenly things, saying: *Praise the Lord, all his angels; praise God, all his powers; praise him, sun and moon; praise him, all stars and light; praise him, heavens of heavens and all waters that are above the heavens; let them praise the name of the Lord.* And at last he adds:

Because he spoke and they were made; he commanded and they were created, certainly alluding to the words of Genesis: *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*, because he did not create otherwise than by speaking and commanding, as is declared through the word *let there be* in the same Genesis. Therefore, in these passages joined together and compared with one another, Scripture sufficiently indicates that all those things were comprehended under the name of heaven and earth, and consequently were created together, or, what is the same, that angels were not created before that creation.

12. *Third proof.—What Ferrariensis thinks about the cited text, and likewise what Vázquez thinks.*—Third, the assertion is customarily proved from the Lateran Council, in the chapter *Firmiter*, where it says of God: *By his almighty power he founded from nothing both creatures together, from the beginning of time, the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the angelic and the worldly, and afterward the human*, etc. Through these words it seems not only to teach the aforesaid truth, but also to interpret the said testimonies of Scripture in the said sense. For when it first says *together*, and afterward adds, *and afterward the human*, it plainly indicates that the particle *together* excludes succession and is opposed to *after*, or *afterward*. And by adding *in the beginning of time*, it signifies that the place in Genesis must be understood in this way and that angels were created in that beginning. On account of this testimony Ferrariensis, Book 2 of *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 83, at the end, teaches that this truth now belongs to the faith, because it has already been defined by the Church. But Vázquez, first part, disputation 224, chapters 3 and 4, teaches not only that it has not been defined, but that it could not have been defined by the Church, because the foundation of such a definition is found neither in Scripture nor in tradition. For the Church defines not through new revelations, but through sacred Scripture, or tradition, or evident deduction from them. Indeed he adds that this opinion has received no certitude from that decree, but remains within the order of probable or more probable opinions. For he thinks that the particle *together* in the said words of the Council does not exclude succession, nor state simultaneity of duration, but community, collection, and equality, so to speak, in dependence on God through creation. And similarly he thinks that the Council, when it said *in the beginning of time*, was not speaking of this time of ours, or of duration, whether angelic or human, in such a way that saying *in the beginning of time* was the same as saying, not from eternity.

13. *Vázquez is rejected.*—Therefore, first, I judge that the Church can define this truth, because, although it is not evident that it is contained in Scripture, nevertheless it is evident that it is contained there according to some

sense of the words agreeable to Scripture, as is manifest from what has been said about the testimonies of Scripture. But afterward the Church, when necessary, can teach and define for us which was the sense intended by the Holy Spirit in some passage of Scripture when that sense is doubtful. Therefore, even in the present point, since that particle *together* is doubtful in the prior testimony, and in the posterior testimony the particle *in the beginning* is doubtful, the Church could open a certain sense, either from comparison with other passages of Scripture or even from the common sense of the Church, which is gradually taught by the Holy Spirit about many things; and what was doubtful at one time gradually becomes clear afterward, while the whole Church gradually tends unanimously to one side. Next, in the words of the Council, I understand that the particle *together* signifies simultaneity of duration, and I am led strongly by the weighing made above and by the comparison with the following particle *afterward*, which signifies posteriority of time, and to which the particle *together* is opposed. Nor does it matter that the Council, under the particle *afterward*, adds only human nature. For indeed it could also have listed other mixtures; but because they are not composed of body and spirit, as man is, it therefore mentioned only him. And in a similar way I think that, when the Council said *in the beginning of time*, it was speaking of common and known time, which we use as a common measure, because words must be taken in the customary and common sense, and it is not likely that the Council was thinking of angelic time, sufficiently unknown to us.

14. *Ferrariensis is refuted.*—And nevertheless I judge that it was not the mind of the Council to define this opinion as of faith, even if it spoke according to it as more probable. This is taken from St. Thomas, first part, question 61, article 3, where he says that the prior opinion was not erroneous in his time, although the Lateran Council had already been celebrated then. And although Ferrariensis above eludes this statement of St. Thomas with words, by distinguishing between those things that are of faith directly and indirectly, he labors in vain. First, because for a proposition to be erroneous, it is enough that it be contrary to the truth of faith, whether directly or indirectly. Second, because if this assertion had been defined in itself by the Council, it would already be directly of faith. For we showed both in the matter *On Faith*. Others say that St. Thomas did not have knowledge of that Council. But this is said gratuitously and by divination, and it is incredible, because not only Innocent III, but also Gregory IX, by whose authority the Decretals were compiled, preceded St. Thomas by some years. Hence it is incredible that St. Thomas did not have knowledge of the Decretals, or did not read their first title, especially

because St. Thomas, little work 23, explained that decretal, and nevertheless said nothing there about this definition. And so Cajetan, in the said article 2, and the other moderns there, and Sixtus of Siena, Book 5 of the *Bibliotheca*, annotation 5, followed this part. And the reason is that the Council said this not expressly for the purpose of defining it, but incidentally and as though doing something else. For in that chapter the Council did not intend to define new dogmas, but to profess old ones; and St. Thomas explained it thus in the said little work 23, and so it is also received by the common sense of the Church.

15. *To opine against the proposed opinion is rash.*—But I add that from those words of the Council no small authority has accrued to this opinion, and therefore it is not without rashness now to think against it. Valentia judges thus, volume 1, question 12, point 2, at the end, and Bañez, in the said article 3, saying that it is the common opinion of modern theologians. Therefore one must judge about this assertion as all judge about the assertion that angels are incorporeal. For although that same Council, when treating the doctrine of faith, calls angels incorporeal and spiritual, because it says this not expressly for the purpose, but incidentally, it is not judged to have defined that truth, although it approved it in this way, as we will see below. Hence, since Vázquez grants both in that controversy, disputation 168, chapter 3, I do not see why he says in the present case that, if the said words of the Council are understood of simultaneity and of the beginning of our time, it necessarily follows that it did not define this as of faith. And since he also acknowledges that it is now rash to contradict that Council in the prior opinion concerning the incorporeity of angels, there is no reason why he should deny this in the present case, because that mode of speaking of the Council shows the very common sense of the Church, to which the concordant opinion of the scholastics and later Fathers was afterward added. And therefore one who now taught the opposite would rightly be accused of rashness. Nor is any injury thereby done to the more ancient Fathers, because in those times the matter was more controversial and less declared. And at one time a proposition can be not rash, and later be rash, when the authority of the Church and a common agreement and consensus have intervened.

16. *It is persuaded by a final reason.—Theodoret's arguments to the contrary are frivolous.*—Finally, we can persuade this truth by reason; it cannot be demonstrative, because the matter depends on the will of God, and without any doubt God could have created angels before bodies if he had wished. To deny this would be erroneous and against God's omnipotence. For on the part of the effect no repugnance can be thought, since an angel does not depend on bodies, as St. Thomas excellently taught, question 3 *On Power*, article 19. And therefore

I said above, number 6, that Theodoret's reason was frivolous when he argued that angels were not created before bodies because they would not have had places in which to be received, as though an angel needed a corporeal place in order to exist, or could not be without it. Indeed, even in bodies that reason is invalid; otherwise not even the empyrean heaven could be created without another in which it would be contained. Nor is the other reason of the same Theodoret more efficacious, namely, that angels before bodies would not have been ministering spirits, because there would be no corporeal things to which they would minister, although Paul says that they are ministering spirits. The reason is invalid, I say, because to be actual ministers, so to speak, does not belong to the nature of angels, but to their highest aptitude, because by their nature they are intellectual, subject to God, and higher than man, from which an aptitude for that ministry arises. In this sense Chrysostom said, homily 8 on Genesis, that all angels are ministers, and homily 28 on Matthew, he adds that this is a property of the angelic nature, certainly by aptitude. For actual ministry depends on the will of God. And therefore he could have created them before the world, when their ministry was neither necessary nor even possible, because even then they could praise God and be prepared to minister at the time defined by God. Otherwise they should not have been created even before man, because Paul says that they *are ministering spirits, sent for ministry because of those who receive the inheritance of salvation*, although it is certain that they were created before, because they were created not because of men but because of themselves.

17. *Ostensive reason from St. Thomas.*—It is confirmed a posteriori.—Therefore the proper reason is the one St. Thomas touched upon, because God created this universe in the manner of one perfect work of art consisting of various parts. But this universe, in order to be perfect, ought to consist of corporeal and spiritual things. Therefore God produced both as parts of the universe, and therefore did not produce one part before another, but at the same time the perfect universe consisting of both. And this alone can be given as a reason as though a priori, from the intention of God and his omnipotence. And for confirming this reason some congruity can be taken from what precedes, as may be seen in Alexander of Hales, part 2, question 19, member 3, article 1. But a posteriori it can be shown in this way: when angels sinned, the heavens had already been created; but angels sinned a little after their creation; therefore they were not created before heaven. The consequence is evident, and it also holds for the other angels who did not sin. First, because all were created together, for there is no probable reason to posit succession among them in their production. Second, because the first angel among those sinning is believed to be first and

most perfect in natural properties among all created angels, and therefore, even if there were prior and posterior in the creation of angels, it would not be likely that any angel had been created before the first sinning angel; hence he is called *the beginning of the ways of God* in Job. Finally, because, when the evil angels sinned, good angels already existed, because they resisted them and a battle arose among them, as is said in Revelation according to one probable sense. The minor of the principal argument is supposed from what is to be said below about the sin of angels, where we will show that there was a very brief little delay between creation and the fall of the evil angels.

18. *Angels sinned after heaven was created.*—But the major is taken from various passages of Scripture. For in Luke 10 Christ says: *I saw Satan falling like lightning from heaven*. Jerome explains this passage about the ruin of the angels when they sinned, and about the corporeal heaven from which they fell, Book 3, at the beginning, and Book 6 on Isaiah, around those words, chapter 14: *How you have fallen from heaven, Lucifer*. He understands these words about the same fall of the angel, and says that he fell from heaven to earth, tacitly interpreting them of the corporeal heaven. And concerning the same thing he says that the Savior spoke, Luke 10, and therefore did not say "I see," but *I saw*. And this is the common exposition of the Fathers: Cyprian, *On the Cardinal Works of Christ*, chapter on the fasting and temptation of Christ, and Gregory, Book 23 of the *Moralia*, chapter 4, otherwise 7. And Origen, Book 1 of *Periarchon*, chapter 4; Prosper, *On the Half Time*, chapter 3; and Theodoret, Book 5 of the *Heretical Fables*, chapter on the devil; and it is taken from Chrysostom, homily 3 *On the Words of Isaiah*, and homily 10 *On Repentance*. Isidore favors it, Book 1 *On the Supreme Good*, chapter 10, saying of the devil: *As soon as he was created, he broke out into pride and was cast down from heaven*. Moreover, in this way many of the scholastics explain the great battle said to have taken place in heaven in Revelation 12, supposing both that the evil angels sinned in heaven and that the holy angels resisted them. This could also have been intended in that passage of Revelation, although another sense, about the battle that the angels wage in the Church for the salvation of men, is more literal. Hence also the Fathers commonly think that angels were created in heaven, as I will say at the end of the chapter.

19. *It is confirmed second.*—A similar argument can be taken from the place into which the angels who fell from heaven were thrust, and from the punishment they immediately felt. For Peter says, 2 Peter, chapter 2: *God did not spare the angels when they sinned, but, drawn down by the ropes of hell into Tartarus, handed them over to be tortured.* Jude said the same in other words: *He*

reserved them in eternal chains under darkness. Here all the Fathers understand by hell a corporeal place established in this lower world, whether it is the proper hell existing under the earth, which the name Tartarus indicates more, or this dark air in which demons dwell. For it is explained by the saints in both ways, and each place is the dwelling of demons: hell as their proper and perpetual dwelling, but this air for a time by permission for the exercise of men. Therefore these lower places already existed when angels sinned. But concerning punishment Christ says openly, Matthew 25: *Go into the eternal fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels.* Hence it is clear that they were immediately punished with the punishment of fire; indeed Christ indicates that from the beginning that fire was prepared for those who would sin. Augustine explains these passages thus, Book 11 of *The City of God*, chapter 33, and Book 21, chapter 23, saying that *angels sinned and were thrust down into the lowest parts of this world.*

20. *To the first testimony to the contrary in number five.*—To the foundations of the contrary opinion the response is easy. For to the first testimony from Job, Theodoret, in the said question 3 on Genesis, admits that from it it is gathered that angels were created before the stars were made, for he reads the place thus: *When I was creating the stars, my angels praised me*. And Cassian, who relied on this testimony, reads thus: *When the stars were made together, all my angels praised me with a loud voice*. But Theodoret responds that it does not follow from this that angels were created before the world, because the stars were made on the fourth day, and angels were created in the beginning; and so they could very well praise God when he was creating the stars. This is not only true, but we can also add that, even if the stars were created from the beginning, which is probable concerning their substance, as we will see in the second treatise, nevertheless angels praised God in the creation of the stars, because for this it is enough that they were created together; for praise is a work that happens in an instant. Therefore, just as it will truly be said that the sun illuminated when it was created, so also it is true that angels praised God when the stars, or the heavens, or light were created; indeed, that he had created them, they immediately praised God. But those words, as they stand in the Vulgate, need no explanation, because they do not have: *When the stars were made*, but, *When the stars praised me*, etc. Hence by the *stars* the angels themselves can easily be understood; they are also called sons of God, as seems more probable. Nevertheless, from these words joined with the preceding context, it is clearly gathered that angels were present and praised God in the very creation of things and formation of the world. And therefore the said response must also be

adapted in this way. For these words rightly prove that angels were created at least with the corporeal world, but not before it.

21. *It is responded to the second testimony.*—To the second testimony from Job 40, although there are diverse opinions on whether the discourse there is literally about Lucifer or about the elephant, for now we admit that God is speaking about the creation of Lucifer, which is also the more common exposition of the Fathers, whom Pineda reports copiously in that place. Once this is posited, it is responded first that Behemoth is called the beginning of the ways of God either by order of duration or of dignity, or by both reasons together. In the prior way, "beginning" must be understood negatively, because nothing was created before him. But because this would not be enough for him to be called the beginning rather than other things created with him, the other reason is rightly added: because among those things that were created in the first beginning, he was nobler and more worthy. And thus Gregory said, Book 32 of the *Moralia*, chapter 18, otherwise 24: *Behemoth is called the beginning of the ways of God because, when he was creating all things, he founded this one first, whom he made more eminent than the other angels.* Bede has the same, in the said question 9 from various authors: *He existed created earlier by the order of preeminence, not by quantity of time*. He took these words from Isidore, the said chapter 10, Book 1 *On the Supreme Good*, where he says at the same time both that angels were created before every creature and that the devil was created before the other angels; and immediately he declares that this must be understood of dignity, not quantity of time, which must be referred to both comparisons.

22. *It is responded to the third testimony.*—The third testimony, from the first chapter to Titus, must be explained through the other of the same Apostle, 2 Timothy 1: *According to his purpose and grace which was given to us in Christ Jesus before secular times*. For what he here calls purpose, there he called promise. For God's purpose, because of its firmness and certainty, is judged to have the force of a promise. And therefore, just as God's purpose does not suppose the created thing for which he proposes to do good, neither does the said promise. And so Ambrose, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Anselm, and Augustine, Book 12 of *The City of God*, chapter 16, explain it there. Add that those words, *before secular times*, signify precedence to all times and consequently eternity, because before all times there is nothing but eternity. Hence Chrysostom, homily 2 on 2 Timothy, explains: *that is, without any beginning*; and Theophylact and Theodoret, Ambrose, and the others follow; and Augustine, Book 3 of *Hypognosticon*, chapter 6, treating the passage to Timothy:

You hear, he says, *secular times, when man was in God's foreknowledge and not in the age, because the age did not yet exist.* Therefore God is said to have promised before secular times, that is, from eternity. Therefore he could not promise angels, since we all suppose that they did not exist in all eternity. Therefore God promised his wisdom, so to speak, and his immutable truth; this is the same as proposing by predefining or predestining.

23. *Paul's passage, even taken of a proper promise, does not conclude.*—But let us grant that the discourse is about a proper promise ad extra. Certainly, even in this way it could not be understood of a proper promise made to angels, for nowhere do we read that God promised angels, but that he would give grace or eternal life to men; nor did such a promise belong to angels or their state. But he promised men immediately in the beginning of the world, when he revealed the hope of salvation and of the Redeemer to Adam, and said to Eve: *She shall crush your head*. But if we wish to explain the passage of this promise, that phrase *before secular times* must not be taken as signifying eternity, nor also as indicating some times that existed before this whole time of ours, but so that secular times are said to be all the ages and courses of years that existed in the whole past time. For in this way Augustine, Book *Against the Priscillianists*, chapter 6, said that there those times are called secular before which no times preceded. But that promise will be said to have been made before all those ages, not because it was made before their beginning, but because it was made in the beginning itself, before any age of this time had run its course. For this signification is not outside the propriety of that phrase, which is ambiguous because of the varied signification of the Greek word αἰὼν, which signifies both age, aeviternity, and eternity, as Augustine hands down more fully in Book 16 of *The City of God*, chapter 26, and it was treated more fully in disputation 50 of the *Metaphysics*.

24. *It is responded to the reason in the same number five.*—Finally, the reason introduced in the last place, which Cassian uses, either proves that angels were eternal or proves nothing. Hence, since the first is not admitted even by Cassian and others, they use that reason undeservedly, as Theodoret rightly noted, in the said question 3. The major is proved: because if angels were created in the beginning of some time, even if that time was before the beginning of our time, eternity would have preceded that creation of angels. Therefore through all that eternity and through infinite ages that could have been in it, God was as it were solitary, without those praising him and without communication of his goodness. Therefore if this is judged unfitting, let angels be said to have been created from eternity; but if it is not unfitting, there will likewise be no

unfittingness that angels did not exist until the creation of the corporeal world. For even if they had existed before, it would only be through a finite duration, which is reckoned as almost nothing in relation to the infinity of eternity. Especially because, given or conceived any beginning either of angels or of the heavens, God could have created both angels and men before it, and such or such a beginning is determined solely by the will of God. But, supposing that God decreed to create nothing from eternity, it makes no difference, in our mode of conceiving, whether he created things at this or that point, earlier or later, in so great or so great a duration. And therefore the congruity of creating angels together with the world or before it is not to be sought on the part of God, but on the part of the creatures themselves. For God is as good, blessed, and sufficient unto himself when he does not communicate himself ad extra as when he creates, and when he is without companions as when he has myriads of them, as Augustine said in a similar matter, Book 2 of *The City of God*, chapter 5.

CHAPTER IV
WHERE THE ANGELS WERE CREATED

1. *First opinion: the Angels were created in the empyrean heaven.* On this point nothing has been openly revealed to us in Scripture, or defined in Councils, or handed down by common agreement from the Fathers. Hence there are various ways of speaking. First, the scholastics commonly teach that all the Angels were created in the empyrean heaven, because the evil Angels fell from there, as is gathered from the testimonies cited above; and since the fall was almost immediately after creation, it is not likely that they were created elsewhere and afterward transferred from there before they sinned. Hence it is also gathered that the holy Angels were created there, because where the evil Angels sinned, the good stood firm and were set over them, conquered them, and expelled them from there. Thus divine Thomas thinks, in the said Quest. 61, art. 4, and others with the Master, in Book 2, dist. 2, Alexander of Hales, part 2, Quest. 19, member 3, art. 2, with the Gloss at the beginning of Genesis, and Hugh in the *Sum of Sentences*, tract. 2, chap. 1, and Bede, at the beginning of the *Hexaemeron*, tome 4, which work others ascribe to Junilius. His words I have quoted above. The same can be taken from Jerome, book 6, on Isaiah, chap. 14, when he thinks that Lucifer fell from that heaven, saying: "From where he descended by pride, we can ascend by humility."

2. *Second opinion: the Angels were created in the air.—Third opinion: the good Angels were created in heaven, the evil in the air.—Fourth opinion.* But the

opinion of others is wholly opposed to the preceding one: that the Angels were created beneath all the heavens, in the region of the air. Thus Rupert, book 1, on Genesis, chap. 11, whom Eugubinus follows, book 7, *On Perennial Philosophy*, chap. 38. But they are led by another false opinion, that Angels are corporeal, and as to body formed from air; this foundation we shall later overturn. Others, however, judge that not all the Angels were created in the same place, but the good in a heavenly place, the evil in this lower air. Augustine treats this opinion in book 3, *Genesis ad litteram*, chap. 10, and does not disapprove it, but says only conditionally that, if it is so, it must be understood of the highest region of the air, to which earthly exhalations do not ascend, and which is usually included in Scripture under the name of heaven; and consequently it must be said that the evil Angels were cast out from that region and fell into the lower region. Finally, others teach that the higher Angels were created in the empyrean heaven, but distinguish from them the lower Angels, who either move the orbs or preside over the elements, whom they think were created individually in their own lower places. Divine Thomas thinks this, in the said art. 4, reply to 2.

3. *First conclusion.—The Angels were created within this corporeal world.* In a doubtful matter, one thing seems certain within the latitude of opinion, namely, that the Angels were created within this corporeal world, and in some body, that is, with presence to and non-distance from some determinate body. It is proved first, because all the stated opinions, and thereafter all the Doctors, agree in this. Second, because by the same reason or congruity by which they were not created before bodies, they also had to be created within the corporeal world; for the reason is the same, namely, that the unity and perfection of the universe, consisting of all things, might be shown, and because they were created with some order of presidency or causality toward bodies.

4. *Second conclusion.—All the Angels were created in the same place.* Second, it is more likely that all were created in the same place, or in the same region, whether of heaven or of air. It is proved first, because this is the more common opinion. Second, because they were created after the manner of one commonwealth and mystical body, and with subordination among themselves; for they are all of the same genus and rank, and to imagine different genera of Angels in this matter is voluntary, as Augustine said in a similar case, book 11, *Genesis ad litteram*, chap. 19. Third, because no probable reason for disparity or difference can be established. For before sin was committed no distinction in this respect should have been made between the good and the evil, both because that would have been a certain punishment imposed before fault, which Augustine rightly judges absurd, book 11, *Genesis*, chap. 17, and also because

place is conferred by the author of nature according to the condition or dignity of nature or of grace; and among the evil Angels there were many more perfect in natural gifts and in grace than the good. Nor was it necessary that the Angels who preside over the lower heavens or the elements be created in them, because they had to be created according to their proper dignity and nature, and afterward distributed when they would receive their ministries. This is especially so since neither the motion of the heavens nor the formation of the elements began at the same time.

5. *Third conclusion.—It does not seem probable that the Angels were created in the air.* Third, it does not seem probable that either all or some of the Angels were created in the air. It is proved because it is not probable that either all or some have bodies, especially aerial bodies, which is the foundation of the contrary opinion; when that is destroyed, the opinion falls. For since Angels are most noble spirits, they ought to have been created in a nobler place. Hence Theophilus of Alexandria, in the first Paschal Letter, around the middle, lays it down as certain that Principalities and Powers were established in the region of the heavens, although he does not declare in particular which heavens he understands.

6. *Fourth conclusion.—The Angels were not created in the empyrean heaven.* Fourth, it is quite likely that the Angels were not created in the empyrean heaven. As to this part, the opinion of Rupert does not displease, nor does his conjecture taken from comparison with man. For just as man was not created in the earthly paradise, because it in some way surpassed his nature, but outside it, and afterward was transferred into it so that he would recognize a special benefit, so the Angels should not have been created in the proper place of glory, which is like a spiritual paradise, but outside it, so that afterward they would be transferred into it according to their merits. In addition, it belongs to the excellence and dignity of that place that it always was most pure from every stain of sin, and consequently that the Angels neither sinned in it, and thereafter that they did not enter into it until they were constituted in an impeccable state. Therefore especially for this reason they should not have been created in that place. And this can be confirmed from those words of Lucifer, "I will ascend into heaven," etc., as I now declare.

7. *Fifth conclusion.—The Angels were created in the heaven immediately below the empyrean, or in the starry heaven.* Finally, it seems quite likely that they were created in the starry heaven, or in that heaven which is placed immediately below the empyrean. Lorinus followed this opinion on 2 Peter 2, and it seems possible to take it from Jerome, whom he cites in book 6, on Isaiah,

chap. 14, concerning those words: "I will ascend into heaven," which he first says can be referred to the first fall of the Angels. And then he asks: "If he was still placed in heaven, how does he say: I will ascend into heaven?" And he responds: "But because we read, 'the heaven of heaven is the Lord's,' when he was in heaven, that is, in the firmament, he desired to ascend into the heaven where the throne of the Lord is," not by humility, but by pride. Therefore he thought that he did not sin in the empyrean heaven. But we suppose that where he sinned, there he was created, because of the very brief delay, and because he should not have been changed by another nor could he be changed by himself, since he sinned in his first deliberation. Consequently the same follows concerning the others, according to what has been said. Innocent III favors this, on Psalm 5 of Penance, around the words: "As a covering you will change them, and they will be changed," where he says that the Angels sinned in the heavens in which the stars and luminaries are, and therefore that it is probable that those heavens too are to be changed and purified; this cannot be said of the empyrean. Finally, according to this opinion, the Scriptures are understood with all propriety and ease when they say both that Lucifer fell from heaven and that he desired to ascend into heaven. Thus also it is fittingly understood that it was done so that the Angels first had a place consonant with their nature, but afterward received one worthy of their merits. Nor in this way of speaking does anything difficult or incongruous occur. For what some object, that only the empyrean heaven is immobile, while the others are moved, is of no importance at all: both because an Angel is not in some body in such a way that he is necessarily borne along by its motion, since he does not occupy corporeal place; and also because now they can be in the even lower heavens and not be moved by their motions; and finally because in that first moment, when the Angels were created, the heavens were not yet being moved, although the starry heaven was moved immediately afterward, which could not obstruct the creation or existence of the Angels in it. For its mover was one of the Angels, and yet he was not moved with it. Therefore this opinion is very likely.

CHAPTER V
WHETHER ANGELS ARE WHOLLY CORPOREAL IN THEIR SUBSTANCE

1. *Angels are supposita.* First it must be supposed that, since Angels are certain substances, as has been shown, it is necessary that they be certain supposita subsisting in their complete natures, whether they are distinguished

from those natures or not, which we shall touch on later. This foundation is sufficiently proved from the very signification of the name "Angel," as received by the agreement of all. For just as the word "man" signifies a thing subsisting in a complete rational nature, so also the name "Angel" signifies a thing subsisting in a complete intellectual nature. For that word has been received in common usage in this way, because Scripture speaks of Angels in the same way as it speaks of men, as of proper supposita subsisting in their integral natures. It can also be declared by reason, because since an Angel is of an intellectual nature, he cannot fail to be after the manner of act and form, because to understand is a great perfection, as will immediately be declared more fully. Therefore either he is a complete and integral form, and so he will be a complete substance, which is what we intend; or in him there is an act after the manner of form, as the rational soul is, and so it is necessary that he compose through himself some integral substantial nature. Therefore that nature will be complete in the account of a substantial nature, and in it there will subsist some suppositum, which is a first or complete substance. Therefore let a name be imposed on it. For it will not be a man, since it is of a higher nature, and a fortiori it will not be heaven or earth, or anything sensible inhabiting them, because all those are lower than man. Therefore it will be a certain higher substance, and this we call "Angel."

2. *In what ways the nature of an Angel can be considered.* Second, it must be supposed that this substantial and complete angelic nature can be conceived or thought in various ways: namely, either as composed of act and substantial potency really distinct, as corporeal natures are. Then, if it is simple, it can be thought either as incorporeal, that is, not subject to quantity of mass, nor having extension of parts, which quantity either makes or requires, or as corporeal and extended by quantity; and then it will be necessary that it be wholly corporeal and extended, because it is supposed to be simple as to physical essential composition, and in a thing that is simple no corporeal and incorporeal part can be distinguished, as is self-evident. But if the nature of an Angel is posited as composed of act and substantial potency, it can be thought in three ways. First, as each part is material and has extension of parts from quantity and under quantity, as the nature of the sun and moon has. Second, as it consists of corporeal matter, subject to quantity, and a spiritual form, as the rational soul is, though of a higher nature and essential perfection. Third, as it consists of both form and spiritual matter lacking quantity. Therefore such a nature can be thought in three ways: either as wholly corporeal as to the whole entity of the nature, or wholly spiritual, or mixed from body and spirit. And the two former ways can be subdivided into a simple or composite nature; but the third can be

thought only through composition. Here, therefore, we deal only with the first way of corporeal nature, and therefore we have added the particle "wholly" in the title, so that we may exclude the third way of corporeal nature through composition. For although absolutely it is denominated corporeal from the inferior part, it is not nevertheless wholly and totally, so to speak, corporeal.

3. *First opinion.—That Angels are wholly corporeal.* On the present point, therefore, some of the ancients thought that Angels are wholly corporeal as to the whole substantial entity of their nature. This error can be attributed to the ancient philosophers, who thought that nothing exists besides bodies, as Aristotle reports, book 1 of the *Metaphysics*, and book 1 of the *Physics*, through various chapters, and book 4 of the *Physics*, texts 52 and 67, and divine Thomas, in the said opusc. 15, chap. 1. But these men did not so much assert that Angels are corporeal as deny that Angels exist. And the Sadducees followed their error, as divine Thomas notes in the same place; of them it is said in Acts 23 that they were in this error, that they said there is no resurrection, nor Angel, nor spirit. There Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact, the Carthusian, Lyra, and others say that they universally denied that there is a spiritual thing, even God himself, although it is not credible that they denied that God exists, but that, in affirming this, they denied that he is a spirit. But concerning Angels, it is not clear whether they denied wholly that they exist, or whether they are said to have denied them in the same sense, because they thought that those whom Scripture calls "Angels" are not spiritual but corporeal, which in reality was to deny true Angels. Hence Theophylact, in that place, thinks that to deny Angels was the same as to deny that there are spirits. Tertullian was in the same error, according to Isidore, book 8, *Etymologies*, chap. 5, and it is taken from that book *On the Flesh of Christ*, chap. 6. And although Pamelius, paradox 2, calls this into doubt, nevertheless, since elsewhere Tertullian makes not only the rational soul but also God corporeal, as the same Pamelius broadly reports, paradoxes 4, 7, and 15, it does not seem doubtful that he thought the same about Angels. Hence he consequently should have said that they are not only corporeal but wholly corporeal. For if he believed that God is corporeal, and from this inferred that the rational soul is corporeal, it is necessary that he thought the same about angelic nature, either simple, or about its soul, if he believed it to be composite. And so Augustine attributes this to him, book 10, *Genesis ad litteram*, penultimate and final chapters, where he says of him: "Fearing that it would be nothing if it were not a body, he was unwilling to think otherwise even of God." And in Letter 158, to Optatus, he has many similar things.

4. *What some Catholics think on this matter.* On this side also can be reported some of the Catholic Fathers and Doctors, who differ from the preceding error in this, that they confess God to be incorporeal, but seem to agree in this, that they think nothing created is incorporeal. For if this is true, certainly Angels can neither be incorporeal nor have any incorporeal part or form, because whatever they have is created; and thus it follows, according to that general statement, that they are wholly corporeal in the sense explained above. Now Elias seems to hand down that principle, canon 5, on Matthew, saying: "There is nothing which is not corporeal in substance and creation, whether in heaven or on earth, whether the elements of visible or invisible things have been formed. For even the species of souls, whether bodies of those who resist or of those exulting from bodies, nevertheless obtain a corporeal nature under substance, because everything that is created must necessarily be in something." Thus also Elias said, in Oration 1 of Nazianzen, § "For nothing to me": "God alone is free from circumscription, because he alone properly lacks a body; but Angels are circumscribed, because neither are they properly incorporeal, even if they are said to be incorporeal in relation to us." And Cassian, Conference 7, chap. 13: "Although we pronounce that there are some spiritual natures, such as Angels, our soul, and subtle air, nevertheless they are in no way to be judged incorporeal; for they have a body according to themselves, by which they subsist." And he adduces the words of Paul, 1 Corinthians 15, saying that there are heavenly bodies and earthly bodies, etc. "From these," he says, "it is manifestly concluded that nothing is incorporeal except God alone." And a similar opinion is found in the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*, chap. 11, where it is similarly said that nothing is incorporeal by nature except God alone, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. And in chap. 12 it is added that Angels, although they do not have flesh, are corporeal, and the reason given is "because they are circumscribed locally." Macarius the Elder seems to have been of this opinion, tome 4 of the *Bibliotheca*, homily 4, because he says that not only Angels and demons, but also the souls of men, are tenuous and subtle bodies. Hence he also indicates that Angels are simple corporeal entities, as he thought about the soul. Indeed, in the same sense John of Thessalonica, reported in the seventh Synod, said that Angels are corporeal, which he also affirms about the soul; hence he plainly understood that they are wholly corporeal. The other Fathers of that Council did not contradict him, because that matter was not being treated. Finally, a certain Faustus published a little book in which he tries to show that nothing incorporeal is inesse in creatures, and consequently that Angels are wholly corporeal; it is found in tome 4 of the *Bibliotheca*. For he

brings forward arguments of some moment, and the chief one is "that Angels and souls are local," that is, enclosed within certain boundaries of place or body, "and consequently circumscribed."

5. *True opinion.—It is certain that Angels are not wholly corporeal.* Nevertheless I judge it certain and beyond opinion that Angels are not wholly corporeal in the sense declared. I prefer to explain this sense more by the words of Augustine, Letter 28, where, after he had established that the soul is incorporeal, he adds: "Let me not either superfluously make a controversy about a word, or unwillingly endure one. If every substance or essence, or whatever that is more fittingly named which in some way is in itself, is a body, the soul is a body. Again, if it is pleasing to call only that nature incorporeal which is supremely unchangeable and whole everywhere, the soul is a body, since it is not any such thing. But if a body is only what is so situated or moved through a space of place by some length, breadth, and height, that by a greater part of itself it occupies a greater place, and by a shorter part a shorter place, and is less in a part than in the whole, the soul is not a body." Therefore, because "body," or "corporeal," is properly said only in this last way, namely, of an entity having extension of this kind, and conversely only that thing is called incorporeal which is incapable of this kind of extension, therefore in this sense we say that Angels are not wholly corporeal, but have in their substance something incorporeal after the manner of act or form, whether that is their whole substance or not. We shall show this assertion by authority in the following chapter.

6. *It is proved by reason, first.* Now we briefly prove it by reason. First, because God according to faith is incorporeal in the stated way, as we now suppose; therefore he could establish some created entity similar to himself in that property; therefore he established some such entity; therefore especially angelic nature, or at least he composed the substance of an Angel from such an entity. The first consequence is proved because no repugnance can be shown that a creature participate in that property of God in a lower way indeed, but truly and properly, both as to the indivisibility of substance and the lack of extension and of composition from parts as it were integrating substance, and as to independence from matter capable of quantity of mass. For in these ways, and not in others, we can explain the account of incorporeal substance. Nor do those who make only God incorporeal, if they are speaking about this property, bring forward a probable reason by which they might show that it is repugnant to a creature to be incorporeal. The second consequence is proved both because Scripture often speaks of spiritual creatures, distinguishing them from bodies,

and can be understood with propriety; and also from the perfection of the works of God, to which it belongs that he made a universe most similar to himself as to all grades of things, as divine Thomas argues, part 1, Quest. 50, art. 1, and as we have pursued more broadly in the said place of the *Metaphysics*. The last consequence is proved because a creature, if there is one that is incorporeal, is more perfect from its genus than a corporeal creature, since God is incorporeal; but Angels are in the supreme grade of creatures, as is clear from what has been said in the preceding discussions, and as will be clear from the whole course of the matter. Therefore, if any created substance is incorporeal, angelic nature especially ought to be so.

7. *It is proved, second.—Third error.* Hence I argue second, because man is not purely corporeal, but has an incorporeal soul; therefore much less is an Angel, but he will be either pure spirit or at least composed from spirit. I judge the antecedent certain and of faith, because in the chapter *Firmiter* the Lateran Council under Innocent III defines that human nature is composed of the spiritual and the corporeal. Hence I also judge it to be of faith that the soul of man is incorporeal, and therefore is there called spiritual. The same is taken from the Lateran Council under Leo X, session 8, defining that the rational soul is immortal by its nature, and consequently independent of the body and incorporeal. Hence Augustine, on Psalm 145, not far from the beginning, says: "The soul is a spiritual thing, an incorporeal thing, a substance neighboring God." And Letter 157, touching on the error of Tertullian, who said that souls are corporeal and arise from corporeal seeds, he adds: "What can be said more perverse than this?" And he adds that Tertullian fell into that error because he also thought God corporeal. And book 10, *Genesis ad litteram*, chap. 24, he adds that, since the soul is to the image of God, "there is nothing nearer, or perhaps nothing so consequent, than that, once it is believed that the soul is a body, God too is believed to be a body." Hence he concludes: "Let no one dare to say that the soul is a body." And finally in the following chapters he is found against Tertullian. And hence also Isidore, book 8 of the *Etymologies*, places the Tertullians among other heretics because they said that the soul is corporeal, although immortal. We shall speak again of this matter below in tract. 3; but in the present matter it was necessary to premise these things, because from this principle what we intend is necessarily concluded.

8. *It is confirmed, first.—It is confirmed, second.* Therefore the consequence is proved in this way, because if angelic nature is wholly corporeal, either it is as composed from corporeal matter subject to quantity and from a form coextended with it and corporeal, or it is as a simple entity that is wholly

corporeal. But each is repugnant to the things faith teaches about the perfection of angelic nature. Therefore. The major has already been explained, nor can a third member be devised. As to the minor, the first part is proved from what has been said, because a spiritual and incorporeal form is more perfect than a material and corporeal one; but it has been shown that the soul, which is the form of man, is incorporeal; therefore it is necessary that the angelic form, if there is any, be incorporeal, because it has been proved that the nature of an Angel is more perfect than human nature. Add that it has also been demonstrated that angelic nature is intellectual. But if it consists of a material body and some form, it cannot be intellectual by reason of the body, as is self-evident. Therefore by reason of the form. Therefore it is necessary that that form be incorporeal, because it is especially from this that the soul of man is clear to be incorporeal and spiritual, namely, because it is intellectual or rational. And from this the other member, concerning the simple entity, is more evidently proved. First, because a simple, complete, and corporeal substance perhaps is not possible, as the more common opinion holds about the substances of the heavenly bodies; or certainly, if it is possible, it will be most imperfect, because most potential and material, as I showed in the *Metaphysics*, disput. 13, sect. 10; but this is contrary to what has been said about the perfection of angelic nature. Second, because such an entity would much less be capable of intellectuality than any corporeal soul. Indeed, it would be less capable of divine vision than a corporeal eye, according to Augustine's discourse in the said Letter 111. And therefore the same Augustine rightly said: "Even if the angelic body exists, it is inferior to the soul," because whether one imagines a body that is part of the nature, or a simple body that is the whole and integral nature, it is always more potential and less capable of intelligence, and especially of divine vision. Therefore let it be wholly certain and evidently consequent from the principles of faith that angelic nature is not wholly corporeal.

9. *It is responded to the authors to the contrary in numbers 3 and 4.—Why Angels are depicted in human form.* To the authors alleged to the contrary in the first order, nothing needs to be responded except that they erred, although we shall immediately add something about Tertullian. But to the latter authors, first we say that, since they did not err concerning God, they could have erred concerning creatures without a persistent error, because at that time the truth was not so manifest as to this part, or even as to the rational soul. For this reason we confess that that John of Thessalonica was of that opinion; indeed, that he also thought angelic bodies have a figure according to which they can be depicted, as is reported in the said seventh Synod. But because the discussion

there concerned not angelic bodies but images, the Council approved the assertion, but neither approved nor disapproved the reason, nor wished to dispute it. And therefore Tarasius in the same place, recapitulating his opinion, accepts only the conclusion and the other reason touched on by him, namely, that Angels are depicted in human form because they appeared in that form. Hence in the same Council, in the preceding session, around the end, it had been said according to the opinion of Athanasius that Angels are incorporeal, but that they are depicted symbolically; and this also, as regards images, without asserting anything about the reason, the Council accepted.

10. *Some sayings of the Fathers are piously interpreted.—Tertullian is rejected.* It must be added, however, that some locutions of the Fathers can be piously explained; for example, that Hilary and Caesarius call every being corporeal which is not pure act, infinite and immense, in the way Angels are usually called material in comparison with God, because they have something of potentiality. Augustine indicated this exposition in the words I cited from the twenty-eighth Letter. Rather, the same Augustine, in the book *On Heresies*, chap. 86, also excuses Tertullian from heresy in this way in regard to the fact that he said God is corporeal, namely, that he did not understand this properly of a body having extension and mass, but by a certain metaphor, to explain that God is not something empty, nor of another quality, nor a part, but a true being existing in himself and whole everywhere, "although concerning the soul," he says, "he thought it was a body even in the former way." In other places, however, he does not excuse him even from the former error. Nor do we need to be solicitous about that matter, because he was not Catholic, and he spoke clearly enough on this point, as Pamelius notes, paradox 15. Nor from the fact that Paul distinguishes heavenly and earthly bodies does Cassian rightly or even plausibly gather that nothing is incorporeal except God, because either Paul by heavenly and earthly bodies understands nothing other than the incorruptible heavens and corruptible bodies, and it is not said that there is nothing in the works of God except those two kinds of bodies; therefore besides them there can be created incorporeal substances. Or Paul speaks about the bodies of men, and calls these mortal bodies earthly, but those which will exist in glory heavenly, according to what he immediately adds: "An animal body is sown, but a spiritual one will rise," spiritual, that is, by quality, not a substance truly incorporeal, or even needing neither body, as we shall now say of the Angels.

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VI
WHETHER ANGELS ARE CORPOREAL AS COMPOSED FROM BODY AND SPIRIT?

1. *The first affirmative opinion is persuaded from the Greek Fathers.* The first opinion affirms that Angels are corporeal, not because they have nothing spiritual and incorporeal, but because they do not subsist without bodies, even if they also have spirit. Thus Origen thought among the Greeks in *Periarchon*. For in the proemium he says that demons have subtle and tenuous bodies, "as it were air," and in book 1, chap. 7, he says that the stars are animated and that a spirit is inserted into them; and in book 2, chap. 2, he universally thinks it impossible "for rational natures to remain entirely incorporeal, but it is necessary," he says, "that they always be joined to bodies." But he is speaking of created natures, for in chap. 1 he had shown that the divine nature is wholly incorporeal; and in the said chap. 2, book 2, he concludes that it is impossible to affirm that, besides the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, any other nature lives without a body. And in chap. 8 he says that Angels are animated and have souls, which he without doubt thought were incorporeal, both because he had said so about the human soul in book 1, chap. 1, and because in the said chap. 2, book 2, he thinks the same about all rational natures, which he says "are not entirely corporeal," because they have incorporeal souls, although they do not subsist without bodies. Caesarius is plainly of the same opinion, Dialogue 1, after the middle, at the end of the works of Nazianzen, saying that Angels according to their nature have subtle bodies, free from our dense matter. Likewise Elias, in Oration 1, § "For nothing to me." Basil also is usually cited for this opinion, book *On the Holy Spirit*, chap. 16, where he says that, just as a cautery is not understood without fire, although the subject matter is one thing and the fire another, so in the heavenly powers: "Their substance," he says, "is an aerial spirit or immaterial fire, as it is written: 'Who makes his Angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire.'" And in the exposition of Isaiah 13, concerning those words: "Every soul of man will be terrified," he says "of man" was added because neither will the soul of an Angel be terrified, on account of excellence, nor the soul of a brute, on account of incapacity. Hence he thinks that an Angel is composed of soul and body. Athanasius is added, in the book *On the Common Essence of the Father*, at the end, because he defines an Angel as a rational living thing without matter, apt for singing hymns, immortal. And in the Letter to

Serapion, *That the Holy Spirit Is Not a Creature*, he says that Angels are circumscribed by place, which is proper to bodies. Finally Methodius is alleged, in the sermon on the Resurrection.

2. *It is confirmed from the Latin Fathers.* Second, among the Latin Fathers Augustine at times taught this opinion, as can be seen in the book *Eighty-Three Questions*, Quest. 47, where he attributes very luminous and ethereal bodies to the holy Angels. When he reviews that place, book 1 of the *Retractations*, chap. 26, he does not retract what he had said about Angels, but corrects the comparison he had made concerning the bodies of men rising, saying that they will be similar to them. And book 7, *Genesis ad litteram*, chap. 17, he attributes most subtle bodies to demons; and book 3, chap. 40, he calls them aerial living things because they are vigorous with the nature of aerial bodies. And book 9, *City of God*, chap. 12 and 13, reporting the same opinion from Plato, he does not reject it; indeed, he adds that the holy Angels have ethereal bodies, and universally defines an Angel as a rational mortal living thing. He repeats the same about demons, book 11, chap. 23. But in book 13, chap. 16, reporting Plato's opinion that gods are composed of body and soul, and therefore mortal of themselves, although immortal by benefit of the creator, he does not reject it, but leaves the matter to be discussed by others. And book 21, chap. 11, he also leaves doubtful the question concerning demons, whether demons can be tormented by fire because they have their own bodies, or because, although they are spirits, God can make them be tormented by fire. Besides, book 3, *On the Trinity*, chap. 10, among the heavenly things we do not investigate, he places angelic bodies according to their proper dignity, and their corporeal action. And book 3, *On Free Choice*, he says, "Spiritual creatures can be joined not by places and the mass of bodies, but by parity of affections, and separated by disparity, although they possess some bodies." Likewise, Letter 111, he seems to attribute corporeal eyes to the holy Angels, and in 115 he calls Angels "aerial and ethereal living things," evidently because of the evil and the good. And on Psalm 85, around the words: "You have rescued my soul from the lower hell," he says that our body in glory will be "such as are the bodies of Angels."

3. Hence divine Bernard, sermon 5, on the *Song of Songs*, proposing the question quite distinctly, says that the Fathers think variously on this point and that he does not know what is truer. And in book 5, *On Consideration*, chap. 4, after he had attributed bodies to them, he added: "If anyone says that this should be placed among matters of opinion, I do not contend." But Rupert, Bernard's contemporary, professedly defends this opinion, book 1, *On the Trinity and Its Works*, on Genesis, chap. 11, where he thinks that the Angels were established

below heaven, and from air as to their bodies. And he defends this more expressly, book 1, *On the Victory of the Word*, chap. 38; and Claudianus, at length in book 3, *On the State of the Soul*, around the middle, tome 4 of the *Bibliotheca*, attacking Faustus cited above, teaches that Angels are not wholly corporeal, but mixed, or composed of body and incorporeal form. Vasquez, disputation 193, chap. 2, num. 4, attributes the same opinion to Fulgentius, saying that Fulgentius thought Angels were corporeal, although their bodies are not from the elements. But he reports no other place besides chap. 3, *On Faith to Peter*, where I do not find that opinion; and what he says there has another sense, as I shall say in the following book, chapter five. Among moderns, however, speaking chiefly of demons, Eugubius followed this opinion, book 8, *On Perennial Philosophy*, chaps. 27, 30, and 41, and he adduces several philosophers. Niphus, *On Demons*, chap. 3, Francis Georginus, book 1, *Problems*, chaps. 57 and 74, and book 6, chap. 334, and Cajetan on Ephesians 2, also followed them.

4. *The same opinion is proved from Scripture.* The foundations of this opinion are taken from certain places of Scripture badly understood. The chief is that passage of Genesis: "When the sons of God went in to the daughters of men," where the Septuagint reads, "Angels of God." Hence many of the ancient Fathers, understanding the place of proper Angels, gather from it that Angels have bodies by which they could know women and beget giants. Tertullian thought thus in many places, which Pamelius gathered together in paradox 1, and he joins to them Justin, Clement of Alexandria, Athenagoras, Methodius, Eusebius, Lactantius, Cyprian, and Josephus. Among these Lactantius, book 2 of the *Divine Institutes*, chap. 14, declares the opinion more broadly, saying that those Angels were sent from heaven for the guardianship of men, and were deceived and enticed by demons so that they burned with concupiscence for women, and thus sinned, and for that reason were excluded from heaven and sent down into hell; but the giants begotten by them were neither Angels nor men, but intermediate between them, whom he calls earthly demons, so as to distinguish them from the earlier demons who sinned in the beginning. Irenaeus, however, book 4, chap. 70, omitting so many fables, says only that the transgressing Angels were commingled with women, and others speak in the same way. And among the Hebrews, Philo, book 4, *On the Giants*, interprets this of evil Angels; but he devises many fabulous things about the Angels, whom he calls souls or aerial living things, both there and in the book *On Dreams*. But Josephus, book 1 of the *Antiquities*, chap. 4, otherwise 5, says that Angels approached women; but in what way, or who they were, he does not explain.

5. *It is confirmed.* This can be confirmed. First, because demons are said to be delighted by sensible things, such as good odors and other things, as Augustine reports from the ancient philosophers, book 8, *City of God*, chap. 16, and book 9, chap. 16, and book 10, chap. 11. Likewise Cyril, book 4, against Julian, and Theodoret, books 3 and 7, *On the Affections of the Greeks*. But they cannot suffer these things without bodies. Second, the passage Hebrews 1 is usually brought in: "They are all ministering spirits," etc., because they would not be apt for this ministry if they were not corporeal, because they could not run here and there, enter and go out, speak, be touched, be seen, be depicted, and the like, which are attributed to them in Scripture, as Bernard argues in the said sermon 5. Third, Cajetan argues by a philosophical congruity, because it belongs to the complement of the universe that, just as in it there are grades of living things without sense, of sentient things without proper local motion, and of sentient and self-moving things with reason, so also there is a grade of living things that understand and move themselves corporeally without sense. Therefore Angels should be placed in this order.

6. *First conclusion.—Angels are wholly spiritual.—The passage Psalm 103 is less certain for the conclusion.* Nevertheless I say first that Angels are wholly spiritual and incorporeal substances, that is, in their natural and intrinsic constitution, not having substantial composition from body and an incorporeal part. I judge this assertion at this time almost certain, on account of the common agreement of the Church, with a nearly manifest definition founded both in Scripture and in the Fathers. Therefore it is proved first, because this opinion is more consonant with Scripture, in which Angels are frequently called spirits. But the name "spirit," taken properly, signifies an incorporeal thing. Therefore it should not be drawn away from that propriety unless the circumstance of the place compels it, and that necessity does not occur in such places. The major is proved concerning the holy Angels from Acts 8: "The Spirit of the Lord snatched Philip away." For Didymus very well explains that an Angel is signified there, book 3, *On the Holy Spirit*, a little after the middle, where he adds Hebrews 1: "They are all ministering spirits sent for ministry," etc.; where he expounds of the same the passage Psalm 103: "Who makes your Angels spirits, and your ministers a burning fire." But in this place of the Psalm it is not established that spirit is taken for a spiritual substance. For Theodoret there, and divine Thomas on Hebrews 1, understand winds by spirits, and expound the place comparatively, that is, he makes his Angels ministers swift as winds and efficacious as fire. And this is a quite suitable exposition, as Genebrard, Bellarmine, and others hand down there. Yet the exposition of the Fathers is not

to be despised, who explain that God makes his spirits Angels, that is, messengers, as I reported from Augustine and Gregory at the beginning of this book; and this is consonant with Paul, who for this reason calls Angels "ministering spirits." Or even if we explain it as saying that God makes the Angels themselves spirits, it can be understood properly and substantially of an immaterial spirit, that is, he makes his ministers spiritual substances and essences, and efficacious in operating. Genebrard reports this exposition from the Latins and Hebrews. And if it is read attentively, Damascene hands it down, book 2, *On Faith*, chap. 3, and Nazianzen, whom I shall report below, who explains the word "makes" as meaning "conserves." And thus God is not said to make Angels spirits when he sends them, but when he created them as spirits, so that they would be fit ministers for him.

7. *A more efficacious passage from Apocalypse 1 and 5.* But expressly the Angels who assist God are called spirits. In Apocalypse 1 "seven spirits" are said to be "in the sight of the throne of God," and in chap. 5 "seven spirits" are said to be "sent into every land," who in other places are declared to be seven Angels. Through them either the multitude of all the holy Angels is signified, as Lyra and others wish, or the seven principal Angels who assist God in procuring the salvation of men, as Ribera, with Clement of Alexandria, book 6 of the *Stromata*, interprets very well, and Viegas follows. Therefore the holy Angels are called spirits absolutely in Scripture. But concerning the evil Angels, the places are very frequent in the Gospels. Matthew 8: "He was casting out spirits by a word"; and chap. 10 they are called "unclean spirits"; and Luke 10: "The spirits are subject to you"; and chap. 11: "He takes seven other spirits more wicked than himself"; and often elsewhere. On these places Didymus should be seen, in the place cited above.

8. *Spirit properly signifies an incorporeal thing.* Now that the name "spirit," taken properly, signifies an incorporeal thing is openly gathered from Acts 23, where the Sadducees are said to have denied that there is a spirit, because they denied that there is an incorporeal thing, just as they denied that Angels or the soul are incorporeal. Then it can be sufficiently proved from the two extremes of spirit, so to speak. For this name is especially attributed to God, either absolutely and by antonomasia, as John 4: "God is spirit, and must be adored in spirit and truth," or with an addition he is called the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of God. The other extreme is our soul, which is also called spirit because it is immaterial and incorporeal, as James 2: "The body without the spirit is dead," that is, without the soul; and 1 Corinthians 5: "To hand over one of this kind to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, so that the spirit may be saved on the day of the Lord,"

that is, so that the soul may be saved; and 1 Corinthians 2: "No one knows the things of man except the spirit of man, which is in him." Therefore in a similar way Angels, who are intermediate between God and man, are called spirits because they are incorporeal. Of them, and at the same time of the souls of men, the universal locutions of Scripture are rightly understood: "Let every spirit praise the Lord," Psalm 150, and Daniel 3 distinctly says: "Bless the Lord, spirits and souls of the just." Here it can also be weighed with Augustine, book 1 of the *Retractations*, chaps. 10 and 16, and book 2, chap. 14, that Angels in Scripture are never called souls, but are called simply spirits, because they are not like the spirits of men, which are at the same time souls, because they are incomplete and imperfect spirits. But Angels are never called souls, because they are only subsisting spirits, not spirits informing bodies. Hence neither is it found in Scripture that they are said to have souls, as men are, but to be spirits assisting God, or ministering, or praising him; by all these things it is signified that they are integral spirits and wholly incorporeal. Finally, that in preserving this propriety of the name "spirit" there is no incongruity seems self-evident, and from the reasons by which this truth will be proved it will become manifest.

9. *It is proved, second, from the definition of the Church.—The opinion of Rupert is rejected.* Second, it is proved from the definition of the Church, for the Lateran Council under Innocent III, which is also reported in the chapter *Firmiter*, *On the Supreme Trinity*, says: "From the beginning of time he at once established each creature from nothing, spiritual and corporeal, namely, the angelic and the worldly, and then the human, as common, constituted from spirit and body." From these words we understand first of all that Angels are spiritual creatures, that is, incorporeal, for they are distinguished against corporeal creatures. Then we understand that, just as corporeal creatures, as distinguished against men, are merely corporeal and not mixed from spirits, so on the contrary Angels, as distinguished both from men and from the whole worldly creature, are pure spirits and not mixed from body and spirit. Third, we gather that, just as the corporeal creatures created by God are integral substances and supposita terminating creation simply, so Angels are integral substances and wholly spiritual supposita. Fourth, from the stated words the opinion of Rupert and of others saying that Angels were created from air is rejected, for the Council openly defines that they were created from nothing, and therefore that they are not corporeal, since they were made from no body, but are wholly distinguished from bodies in their creation. Finally, I weigh that under the creation of the corporeal creature air is included, however subtle and invisible a body it may be, and therefore Angels are called spirits as they are

distinguished from wind and from every body, however tenuous and invisible, and therefore are properly incorporeal spirits. For these reasons nearly all now confess that this was the meaning of that Council.

10. But if someone objects that from this it follows that this dogma is now of faith, although even after that Council many Catholics thought the contrary, such as Cajetan, Eugubinus, etc., we could respond that they did not sufficiently weigh the words of the Council. But there still remains the difficulty that almost all scholastics afterward wrote, and nevertheless they do not teach this as of faith. Hence Bartholomew Carranza, in the Annotations to the seventh Synod, act 5, simply asserts that this controversy has not yet been ended by the censure of the Church, thinking that the aforesaid words of the Council do not have the force of a definition, for which he gives no reason. Cano thinks the same, book 5, *On Places*, chap. 5, at the end, Quest. 4, and Sixtus of Siena, book 5, *Bibliotheca*, year 8, and he gives the reason that the mind of the Council was directly only to define that God established all things at the beginning of time, and said the rest incidentally, following the more common opinion. Others say that the Council only wished to define that God is the author of all things, and said the rest incidentally and in the more probable way. Thus almost the modern interpreters of divine Thomas teach, part 1, Quest. 50, art. 1, and Quest. 51, art. 1. Nevertheless, because of the authority of the same Council, they teach that this opinion cannot be denied without temerity. I assent to them without doubt in this last part; nor do I dare to say against them that it is a definition of faith, especially because I see that it has not been received by the Church in this grade. Nevertheless I weigh that the Council began thus: "We firmly believe and simply confess," and whatever under these words it teaches about the substance and attributes of God and about the Trinity is a dogma of faith. But afterward concerning his operation it first says: "One principle of all things, creator of all things spiritual and corporeal," which also belongs to a definition of faith. And yet it proceeds in the same tenor, saying: "Who by his almighty power at once from the beginning of time established each creature from nothing," etc., up to this: "and the human creature, constituted from spirit and body." In these words also, that God established from nothing a spiritual substance, and that man consists of spirit and body, certainly belong to the definition of faith. Likewise what it immediately joins, that demons are evil not by nature but from themselves, is a definition of faith. Therefore it can seem strange that only those few words interposed about the distinction of angelic nature from corporeal nature and from that composed of body and spirit are believed to have been said only incidentally and not under the same certainty. I consider this not with the

intention of teaching that this dogma is of faith, but to show how great is the temerity of opposing so great an authority, or of weakening it by a voluntary interpretation.

11. *It is proved, third, from the authority of the Fathers, and first from Dionysius.* Third, the assertion is proved by the authority of the Fathers, and first of Dionysius, who in chap. 1 of *On the Heavenly Hierarchy* insinuates this truth by various names and modes of speaking. For he calls Angels "heavenly spirits," whose spiritual nature in order to our knowledge he explains thus: "Let us be raised to the simple understandings and assimilations of heavenly things, shaded by no figures. Nor is it possible for the human mind to ascend to that spiritual imitation and understanding of heavenly distinctions," etc. And below: "And other things in this way, which are handed down as divine and from above to heavenly and spiritual substances, but to us through signs." And in chap. 2 he teaches that all Angels are spiritual by perfection and operation, although they are represented by corporeal signs for the human capacity, and at times by certain things that seem absurd, "lest those who are unable to contemplate anything higher than this mortal light and the appearance of bodies" think that Angels are such. But much more clearly and copiously, chap. 4, *On the Divine Names*, at the beginning, he says of them: "By the grace of God all intelligible and spiritual substances subsist," etc., "and have unfailing life." And below: "They are understood to be wholly incorporeal and lacking matter," and as "spirits they understand in a mode above the world."

12. Someone perhaps will say that these things are attributed by Dionysius only to the holy Angels. For in the fourth part of the same chapter he says: "In demons there is irrational fury, mad concupiscence, reckless imagination, and for this reason." Because of these words, divine Thomas, Quest. 16, *On Evil*, art. 1, reply to 3, said it is probable that Dionysius, with the Platonists, was of the opinion that demons are certain living things having appetite and sensitive apprehension. Nevertheless, what the same Saint immediately adds is much truer: that Dionysius metaphorically attributed fury and concupiscence to demons in order to signify the disorder they have in operations and affections, which respond in the will to those passions of the appetite. And by a similar reason he signified their disordered intellectual thoughts by the name of phantasy or imagination. And he confirms this excellently from the doctrine of the same Dionysius, chap. 2, *On the Heavenly Hierarchy*, where he declares that similar affections are attributed metaphorically to the holy Angels and to God himself. And therefore I think that in the said chapter four he added those words signifying imperfection, namely, "irrational," "mad," and "reckless," so

that he might indicate the peculiar mode in which they are metaphorically attributed to demons. But that he thought demons, as to substance, are of the same nature as the holy Angels, he clearly shows when he adds: "Nor do we say that the angelic gifts granted to them have been changed; rather, they remain at once whole and most luminous." More evidently, lower down, he proves from this that the first origin of evil is not the body, "because wickedness can creep in without a body, as in the demons." Irenaeus seems to have thought the same, book 3, chap. 23, saying: "Angels are without flesh," especially since in book 2, chap. 54, he distinguishes from material things, which are under heaven, those things which are above it, which he calls more spiritual.

13. Besides, Athanasius, whom Germanus, Patriarch of Constantinople, reports in the Letter to Thomas the Bishop, which is reported in the second Nicene Synod, act 4, says that images of Angels are symbolic: "Because Angels are spirits and fires alien from every corporeal figure and nature." Hence in the book *On the Testimonies of Sacred Scripture, on Natural Communion, or on the Common Essence of the Father and the Son*, he defines an Angel thus: "He is a rational living thing without matter." Here he calls it a living thing in a broad way, that is, living; otherwise he would contradict himself in the other part, "without matter." Nazianzen thinks the same, oration 34, which is the second on Theology, at the end, where he explains the passage Psalm 103: "He makes his Angels spirits and his ministers a flame of fire," thus: "The Angel is called spirit and fire; the former because he is endowed with an intellectual nature, the latter because he is applied to purging our souls. For that primary essence is called by the same names in Sacred Scripture. But let them indeed be incorporeal, or as close as possible to this." From this last word someone can seize an occasion for eluding this testimony, but without merit, because it rather confirms and declares his mind. For since he had said that God is called spirit, which name is also attributed to Angels, in order to show the difference between them, he adds that Angels indeed are incorporeal, but not so pure as God is; rather, they come close to him, because in reality they lack a body, yet not in that purity and simplicity by which God does. Hence lower down he says of them that they are "intelligent powers, or rather minds and pure natures." In these words he also sufficiently signifies that they are simple natures, wholly intellectual, and therefore do not consist of mind and body, but are wholly minds pure from corporeal concretion.

14. Gregory of Nyssa also, in the book *On Prayer*, around those words, "Your will be done on earth as in heaven," says that a mystery lies hidden there, because "every rational creature is divided partly into incorporeal nature and

partly into corporeal nature. Now the angelic species is incorporeal; the other species is we men. And since that incorporeal species is incorporeal, it is grasped by mind alone." And in the book *On the Life of Moses*, a little from the beginning, he says that Angels, "who are incorporeal by nature," are destined for the guardianship of men. Basil agrees, homily 9, "That God Is Not the Author of Evils," around the end. For asking what the nature of the demon is, he says: "His nature is incorporeal according to the Apostle, saying: 'Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against the spiritual things of wickedness.'" Here he understands spiritual things properly, that is, incorporeal; and "in the heavens" he explains as meaning "in this air," from other words of the same Paul, Ephesians 2: "And you, when you were dead in your offenses and sins, in which once you walked according to the age of this world, according to the prince of the power of this air, of the spirit who now works in the children of distrust." Here Paul both calls the demon a spirit and designates the air as the place of his principality, in each case showing that the demon is wholly spiritual and incorporeal and invisible, in a very different way from air. Therefore Basil's intention is the same.

15. Chrysostom plainly agrees with these, and in homily 22 on Genesis 6 he proves from this that an Angel fell before man was in paradise, because he envied him: "Otherwise," he says, "how is it consonant with reason that an incorporeal Angel and one established in such dignity should envy man, clothed around with a body? But he envied because he was cast down from the highest glory into the lowest disgrace, although he was incorporeal." And in what follows he often and constantly calls them incorporeal. And from this he proves that the ancient Fathers, to whom Angels appeared visibly, did not see the substance of Angels: "For in what way," he says, "can an incorporeal substance be seen?" And below he calls it "an incorporeal and spiritual nature," which does not admit the embrace of a body. And in a similar way, homily 44 on Matthew, around the end: "Is not the devil of an incorporeal nature?" he says. "Was he not much better than men? Yet he was turned from light into darkness." In the same way Cyril, book 4 on John, chap. 10, calls Angels incorporeal; and book 3 on Genesis, around the beginning, from this he shows that those who desired women were not Angels, because they are incorporeal. And below: "Nor do they need intercourse, since they are free from bodies," and he adds, "and Scripture teaches this." And in the following chapter he says that the demons were of the same incorporeal nature and fell by their own fault. Theodoret has the same expressly, Questions 20 and 47 on Genesis, and Zechariah 4, at those words "I saw in the night," etc.; and Didymus, book 4, *On the Holy Spirit*, at the

beginning: "It is manifest," he says, "that the Holy Spirit is foreign not only to bodies, but also to incorporeal creatures." Here by incorporeal creatures he could understand only Angels, for he speaks of creatures capable of sanctification and distinguishes them from corporeal ones, that is, from men. He declares this evidently and by the proper names of men and Angels in what follows; and he also calls an Angel "an invisible creature, which," he says, "it is customary to call a rational and incorporeal substance," which he also says is simple through itself, subsistent, and capable of sanctification. And book 3, at the beginning: "Angels," he says, "although they are spirits and are sent to various ministries on account of those who will receive salvation, are nevertheless not authors of salvation; rather, they interpret and announce him who is the author of salvation."

16. Damascene is a witness of the same truth, book 1, *On Faith*, chap. 17, where he says that an Angel is in a finite place, not however in a corporeal but in an intellectual mode. But in book 2, chap. 3, he says: "An Angel was made from nothing, a nature without body, as a certain spirit and to the image of God." And below: "Moreover, an Angel is an intelligent essence, endowed with perpetual motion and freedom of choice, without body." Nor does it matter that he immediately adds that an Angel compared to God is found to be "coarse and consisting of matter," for this, as Clichtoveus rightly notes there, is said not because he has true matter of bodies, but because of the potentiality and composition which an Angel has when compared with God. And in the book *On Decrees and Opinions*, first instruction, chap. 7, distinguishing essence into corporeal and lacking body, he adds: "Here I call an incorporeal essence an Angel, a demon," and afterward he also numbers God; hence it is clear that he speaks with every strictness about the lack of body. Similarly Anastasius of Nicaea said, in *Questions on Sacred Scripture*, Quest. 20, that Angels are "wholly free from bodies and do not have this mixture." And he cites Theodoret, in the said Quest. 20 on Genesis. Sophronius favors this, oration on the holy Angels, tome 2, *Bibliotheca*, when he calls them "the divine armies of God, free from matter, intelligences endowed with mind and reason." Finally, in tome 6, *Bibliotheca*, in the Greek Liturgies, in a certain Ode 6, Genebrard reports these words: "The holy Angels, second lights of the first light, excelling by a participation free from matter and by most blessed beauty." From all these it is sufficiently gathered that this truth was most received in the Greek Church and its Fathers.

17. *It is proved from the Latin Fathers.* From the ancient Latin Fathers we do not have testimonies so express and special, yet we have a certain general way

of speaking by which, distinguishing angelic nature from corporeal nature, they call it spiritual, certainly signifying that Angels are pure spirits and lack bodies. Thus Pope Leo, Letter 93, to Turibius, chap. 6, says: "The true faith, which is Catholic, confesses the good substance of all creatures, whether spiritual or corporeal." And Hilary, book 8, *On the Trinity*, around the end, calls Principalities and Powers "spiritual things" which "remain in Christ the image of God," and in book 5 he had said that God "makes his spirits Angels" when he sends them into ministry. Hence also Jerome, on Isaiah 63, treating those words "The Spirit of the Lord was his leader," says, "Here we ought to understand the Spirit as the Angel who was leader of the people of Israel," according to that passage: "Who makes his Angels spirits." And in the Letter to the Hebrews: "They are all ministering spirits. Let us also consider what is written in Acts: 'The Spirit of the Lord snatched Philip away,' whether we ought to take it of an Angel." The same Jerome says, on Isaiah 49, in the last words, that a spirit is incorporeal. And in the same sense Ambrose said on Hebrews 1, on the words "Who makes his Angels spirits": "Do you ask the name of this nature? It is spirit. Do you ask the name of the office? It is Angel. From what he is, he is spirit; from what he does, he is Angel." And in the exposition of the Creed, chap. 32, he declares that the spirit who snatched Philip away was an Angel. Here we may rightly add Gregory's question and Peter's response, book 4, *Dialogues*, chap. 29: "Tell me, I ask you, do you suppose that apostate spirits cast down from heavenly glory are corporeal or incorporeal? Who with sound sense would say that spirits are corporeal?" Hence the same Gregory, book 2, *Moralia*, chap. 4, otherwise 5, speaking of angelic nature, says: "Spiritual nature is not double from mind and body," and immediately calls the same nature "incorporeal," and book 4, chap. 8, he said that Angels are "only spirits." And finally Richard of St. Victor, book 4, *On the Trinity*, final chapter, professedly attacks those who said that angelic nature is composed of body, and confirms the truth with excellent reasons, which we shall touch on a little later.

18. *It is proved, fourth, from the agreement of the scholastics.* Fourth, this opinion is proved by the common agreement of the scholastics, which is of great weight when, with either no one or almost no one dissenting, they agree on some theological assertion. And it is clear that this happens in the present matter from divine Thomas, part 1, Quest. 50, art. 1, where he defines that an Angel is wholly incorporeal, and for a greater explanation adds in the second article that he does not consist of matter and form; and Quest. 51 he adds that Angels do not have bodies naturally united to themselves. In these places Cajetan and all the expositors hand down the same. Likewise book 2, *Contra*

Gentiles, chap. 49, and more properly chap. 90, 91, and following, where Ferrariensis comments. Likewise the Master with the other scholastics, in Book 2, dist. 8, and Albert, in the *Summa*, part 2, tract. 2, Quest. 6, Alexander of Hales, Altissiodorensis, and others alleged at the beginning of this matter.

19. *It is proved by reason.* Finally, we can add reasons which can be taken either a posteriori from effects or signs, or a priori from causes. In the former way philosophers investigate the nature and perfection of intelligences from the motions of the heavens; I spoke of this discourse and its efficacy in disputation 35 of the *Metaphysics*. Here, therefore, from revealed signs and effects we can argue theologically, because Angels descend and ascend from heaven to earth, as Scripture very often testifies. Therefore they penetrate the heavens, for they pass through them without their division; for since the heavens are incorruptible, they are not divided. Therefore Angels are incorporeal, for with bodies they cannot penetrate the heavens. Clichtoveus uses this reason on Damascene above. Yet it could be responded that this is affirmed in Scripture only of the holy Angels; and that they can penetrate the heavens by reason of glory, not by reason of nature. For although they have bodies, they do not have them in pure nature, but with the endowments of glory by a much greater reason than the bodies of holy men will have such endowments after the resurrection. Hence by that reason it is not proved that Angels do not have bodies, but that they have glorious bodies. But concerning demons, we do not read that they ascend into the ethereal heaven, but at most that they move about in the aerial heaven. Hence Athanasius, Quest. 8, to Antiochus, treating those words of Job 1: "When the sons of God came to stand before the Lord, Satan also was among them," gathers that that assembly did not occur in heaven, because Satan cannot ascend there. But if one presses that the demons at least, when they sinned, fell from the heaven in which they had been created, as Athanasius also says there, therefore they penetrated it without an endowment of glory, and consequently this will have to be attributed to their immateriality and to their being incorporeal, it can be responded that they were not created in the proper and ethereal heaven, but in this lower world, so that they would be transferred there through glory, as we reported above from Rupert.

20. Nevertheless, as regards demons the response does not satisfy, for in the preceding discussions it was shown that all the Angels were created either in the empyrean heaven or in the firmament, which is sufficient for the force of the reason, as is self-evident. Then, what is said about the endowments of the bodies of the holy Angels is new. For the subtlety, agility, and swiftness they have in their substance has always been believed to be not adventitious or supernatural,

but connatural to them. Nor will any mention of such endowments of corporeal glory in the holy Angels be found either in Scripture or in the holy Fathers. Therefore the argument made is very probable.

21. *First confirmation.* And this is especially so because demons, although they do not ascend the heavens, penetrate these lower bodies, for they enter into a room closed on all sides and into the bodies of men. Nor can it be said that they enter through pores, because pores are not continuous. Hence they cannot enter through several pores at once, because the body of the demon would have to be cut into as many parts as there were pores through which he entered, because otherwise he could not penetrate the parts existing between the pores. Nor could the whole body of the demon be reduced to such subtlety that it would enter through the narrowest pore after the manner of a very long and very subtle line. For if an Angel has a natural body, it certainly must be incorruptible and very perfect, so that it is proportioned to his spiritual perfection. But such a compression of a body cannot be understood without great imperfection and an internal mutation, alteration, and condensation or rarefaction of the body according to its diverse parts. But if it is said that the body of an Angel is in itself of so minimal a quantity that it can enter through the smallest opening of one pore without internal mutation of itself, certainly such a body would be very imperfect and most unfit for every use of a spiritual form. Therefore it is incredible that such a body is connatural to an Angel.

22. *Second confirmation.* And this excellently confirms the argument which Richard of St. Victor and Clichtoveus above take from the fact that in Mark 5 and Luke 8 a legion of demons is said to have entered into the body of one man. For one legion includes the number of 6,666 demons. What kind, therefore, could the bodies of demons be, which without penetration among themselves, or with the parts of the body of the possessed man, could exist simultaneously within one man? But this sign can be weakened according to the opinion which says that by the name of legion a certain and definite number need not be signified, but an indefinite multitude, because there were many, as Mark says. Nevertheless, although this is granted, it still cannot be denied that a great multitude is signified. Hence Jerome there also indicates an even greater multitude by exaggerating the number ten thousand, and so although we grant that the number is uncertain and indefinite, it is enough for the force of the argument that it was quite great.

23. *Second reason a priori.* Second, principally, reasons a priori are added, which should be drawn especially from the efficient and final cause. The first is that God was able to produce intellectual creatures that are complete, spiritual,

and incorporeal substances, and it belonged to the perfection of his works that he produce them; therefore it must wholly be affirmed that he produced them. First indeed, because no repugnance on the part of such an effect can be designated; hence if this could not be, it could be attributed only to a defect of God's power, which is contrary to his omnipotence, and thereafter contrary to faith, at least by an inference that would be evident. Second, because it is of faith that God could produce, and did produce, a certain incorporeal and intellectual substance, although incomplete, so that it could be the form of a body. Therefore it is almost equally certain that God could create an integral and complete intellectual and incorporeal substance subsisting through itself and without a body, or an ordering to it. The consequence is proved because from that example it is clear that immateriality, or the lack of corporeity, is not repugnant to a created substance. But given this, it is evident that it is no more repugnant to a complete substance than to an incomplete one. Indeed, that condition seems of itself more congruent with an integral substance wholly abstracting from body than with an incomplete one. With this truth about the possible supposed, the minor is proved by excellently applying the discourse of divine Thomas in the said Quest. 50, art. 1, while preserving the same form of arguing, because it belongs to the perfection of the universe that it be similar to God also in its mode of being, as far as can be. But God is an integral intellectual and incorporeal substance. Therefore it belonged to the perfection of his works that in the universe there be some creatures similar to God in that mode of completely subsisting and understanding without a body. Or otherwise, because it belongs to the perfection of the universe that all grades of things be in it. But one of these grades is the intellectual grade, complete and perfect in its order. Therefore this too had to be created. Indeed, the more perfect this grade is than the others in natural perfection, the more necessary it is for the complement of the universe. And by the same reason it could not be only inchoate and imperfect, as it is found in the rational soul, but had to have its complement and integrity. I pursued these reasons more broadly in the said place of the *Metaphysics*, and therefore I do not judge it necessary to say more about them here.

24. *Third reason.* The other reason is taken from divine Thomas, part 1, Quest. 51, art. 1, which he explains more and completes, Quest. 70, art. 3; it is founded chiefly on the final causality which must intervene between matter and form, or between body and soul, so that they may be fittingly united to constitute one nature. For if Angels were corporeal, as consisting of body and spirit, it would be necessary for the body to be compared to the spirit as matter

to form, because they could not be united through themselves except after the manner of potency and act. But it is clear that between body and spirit the former is the potency and the latter the act. Therefore an Angel will consist of body and spirit as of matter and form. But an angelic spirit cannot be united to a body in this way. Therefore Angels cannot be corporeal in this way. The minor is proved because a spirit is not united to a body as form to matter principally for the good of the body, but so that it may use it as an organ and instrument for its own proper operation, which is to understand; for the form is not for the sake of the matter, but rather the matter for the sake of the form, because the ignoble is always for the sake of the noble, not the contrary. But a body cannot serve an angelic spirit for its operation. Therefore such a spirit is not the form of a body, nor by its nature is it ordered to actualizing a body. For just as affirmation is the cause of affirmation, so negation is the cause of negation, when the reason or cause is adequate. And so it is in the present case, as can be seen in the soul of man. For it is united to a body as form because it needs it as an organ for its proper function of understanding and acquiring knowledge. If this end is removed, such a union would be irrelevant, and thereafter would not be intrinsic and connatural. But that this end ceases in angelic spirits, as was assumed in the minor, is proved because the body does not serve the spirit for intellectual knowledge and for acquiring knowledge except through the mediation of sense-knowledge. But if an Angel had a body, it would not have organs of sense, and consequently neither the faculty of sensing. Therefore it would be useless for the operations of intellect, and thereafter incapable of a natural and substantial union to an angelic spirit. The minor is proved because such a body would be simple and not mixed, because it would be immortal and incorruptible, and therefore inalterable and incapable of touch and of the other senses.

25. *Response of Cajetan.—It is refuted.* Someone will say with Cajetan above that it is sufficient that such a body could serve the spirit for local motion, which it can have even if it lacks senses. But this is easily refuted, because either the discussion concerns the motion of other bodies, to which an Angel is not united as form, or the motion only of that proper body to which he is imagined to be united. For the former motion, union with a body that neither senses nor has organic operations which can be instruments for moving another body is irrelevant, as now my soul moves a pen through the hand; for in a simple and uniform angelic body such a mode of moving cannot be understood. Hence, although an Angel were corporeal, he would not have snatched, for example, Philip or Habakkuk through his body, but "by the impulse of his spirit," or by his

will and command, which he can do just as well and more readily through his spiritual powers, even if he has no body. But if the discussion concerns only his intrinsic body and its motion, the substantial union of the spirit with the body is irrelevant on account of such a motion alone. Both because that motion does not serve the spirit at all, since even though he himself would be moved together with the body, he could move himself more readily and more through himself first without such a body than with it; and so in that motion he would serve only the body, and consequently he would be united to the body for the body alone, not for himself, which is repugnant to the right order of things, as was shown. And also because, for moving that very body only locally, substantial union to it would be irrelevant, because assistance and presence are sufficient, with a locally motive faculty, which is of itself extrinsic and requires only the accidental conjunction of mover and movable. Therefore that middle grade of corporeal substance living with intellective life, with only a power locally motive of a body, is falsely constructed by Cajetan. Both because it does not belong to the perfection of the universe, and also because local motion, considered through itself and precisely, is not a vital action on account of which an intrinsic principle of life is necessary through itself first, but only insofar as it occurs through some vital action which must be exercised through the body; as in animals, progressive motion is a corporeal vital action because it occurs through the mediation of phantasy and vital appetite. But if the living thing is purely intellectual, the motion of a body will proceed only from acts of intellectual life, which through themselves do not depend on a body; and therefore that grade of life is not joined substantially to a body on account of local motion alone. And consequently such a grade of living things is not required for the perfection of the universe.

26. *Another response.—It is refuted.* But someone could escape the force of the stated reason in another way, by attributing to corporeal Angels some cognition through the body which would not be of the same account as our sensitive cognition, but of a more perfect account, through corporeal powers simpler than our senses and of another account. But first, this would be imagined without foundation and beyond human understanding, because we have no principle for devising such a mode of corporeal cognition, or of a corporeal cognitive faculty that is not sensitive; or if it is called sensitive because it is posited as corporeal, it is abstracted from these sensible qualities which we experience. For although perhaps it cannot be positively shown that such a mode of corporeal cognition is impossible, nevertheless it is impossible for us, from the things we experience, to conceive it; and therefore it would be vain and

voluntary to attribute it to Angels. And then such corporeal cognition would bring imperfection rather than perfection to Angels, because they would always understand dependently on a body, and could acquire knowledge only through a body; these diminish the perfection of understanding, since to understand through itself abstracts from body, and is more perfect the less it depends on body.

27. *The same reason is confirmed.* And hence by this reason it is further concluded, not only that there are some Angels that are integral and complete incorporeal substances, which the preceding reason concluded only, but also that all Angels are incorporeal in this way, and consequently that besides man no rational corporeal substance is given. It is proved because every Angel is intellectual, and on that side incorporeal; and otherwise no Angel is capable of the senses or of cognition through a body, because there is no Angel who has a corruptible body, or a body composed from a mixture of qualities accommodated to the organs of the senses. Therefore there is no Angel who has a spirit substantially mixed with a body or united after the manner of form. Hence some attribute bodies to demons in vain and not to the holy Angels, as I said more broadly in the said disputation 35 of the *Metaphysics*, sect. 3, num. 10 and following.

28. *It is responded to the Fathers brought forward for the first opinion in number one. What is cited about Augustine in number two.* To the Fathers alleged for the preceding opinion, we first confess that some were of that opinion, especially Origen, Caesarius, and Elias of Crete. But Basil, since he explained his mind elsewhere, is rightly explained as calling an Angel an aerial spirit according to metaphor, because of invisible subtlety and swiftness, just as he also calls him fire and adds "immaterial," which word sufficiently declares the metaphor. And similarly by the soul of an Angel he signified the very life and mind of the Angel. The same must be said about Athanasius, for from the definition of an Angel cited there the contrary is rather gathered. But when he says that an Angel is circumscribed by place, he does not understand this of a corporeal mode, but by the limitation of nature, because they are not immense, as we shall say below. Concerning Augustine, however, we cannot deny that he often inclined to that side with the Platonists, as even divine Thomas confesses. But sometimes, and not rarely, he speaks under doubt and leaves the matter undecided. But when in the *Retractations* he denied that an Angel is or has a soul, he sufficiently indicates that an Angel is a simple substance, which he could not posit as wholly corporeal, since he confesses and defends that our soul is incorporeal. And so the true opinion is gathered from Augustine's principles.

And finally, book 15, *City of God*, chap. 23, when he says that Angels by their nature are spirits, speaking generally, he judges them to be incorporeal, although afterward he does not dare to define whether at least some of the evil ones have aerial bodies.

29. *To Bernard in number two.* Hence it is also not strange that Bernard was doubtful in this question, or that he inclined more to that side with fear and by opinion. Nor in sermon 6 on the *Song of Songs* does he adhere more firmly to that opinion which attributes bodies to Angels, when he speaks thus: "So that the following discourse may cohere with the preceding, you hold that it was granted above that only the supreme and uncircumscribed spirit needs no bodily instrument or service for anything he wishes to make or to have made." For he speaks of a body as an organ or instrument abstractly, whether joined substantially or only accidentally, as mover to movable, or as the heaven is usually called the instrument of the intelligence moving it, and the body assumed by an Angel is an organ necessary to him for some operations. And from this necessity of using a body and an instrument, in one way or another, Bernard says that God alone is free because of his omnipotence and immensity. And in the same sense he adds: "Therefore let us safely grant to God alone true incorporeity, as also immortality, because he alone of spirits so far transcends corporeal nature that he needs no body in any work whatsoever." Hence rather from this it could be explained that, when he says Angels are corporeal, he understood this especially of a corporeity opposed to that incorporeity of God, which includes a certain illimitation and excludes every need of a body. And, to note this in passing, although it is true and can easily be defended that God does not need a body for acting, nevertheless it is most true that he needed an assumed body for suffering, meriting, etc.; but of this elsewhere. Concerning the other authors of that opinion, it is not necessary to say anything.

30. *To the passage Genesis in number four.* But concerning the passage Genesis 6, on which the foundation of that opinion chiefly relies, I shall say few things, because the matter is very common. First, the words do not compel us to understand that the discussion there concerns angelic spirits. For when Scripture says, "When the sons of God saw the daughters of men," there is no reason why we should understand Angels by "sons of God." Rather, Chrysostom, there in homily 22, gathers from the same word that Angels are not understood, because in the Old Testament Angels were never called sons of God. This perhaps, as Pamelius notes in paradox 1 of Tertullian, could be sustained according to the translation of the Septuagint. For otherwise nothing prevents the holy Angels from being called sons of God, because although they are not

natural sons in the way Paul, Hebrews 1, said, "For to which of the Angels did he ever say: 'You are my Son'?" namely, natural; nevertheless they are properly and truly adoptive sons of God no less than men. Hence the other Saints teach that they are often called this even in the Old Testament. Yet granted that this is so, since the name "sons of God" is more common and is also said of men, there is no reason why in that place of Genesis it signifies Angels rather than just men, or those procreated from the just. Then from the matter itself it is certain that those who sinned with women could not have been the holy Angels, who were already blessed at that time, and thereafter impeccable. Nor can it be said that they were evil Angels, because either they were previously good and became evil by that sin, and this cannot be said, because when Adam sinned, the Angels who became evil had already fallen; or those Angels who approached the women were already evil and demons, and so Scripture would never call them sons of God.

31. *The more common exposition of the aforesaid passage.* For this reason the Fathers commonly understand that in that place those men are called sons of God who descended from Seth through Enos, who "began to invoke the name of the Lord." For that family was judged to be familiar to God and to worship God specially, and therefore those born from it were called sons of God. On the contrary, because Cain had withdrawn from God, the women descended from him are called daughters of men. And just as those families were diverse in morals, so also earlier they were not joined in marriages, but afterward they were joined through concupiscence, and from this were born those who are called "giants." Thus Athanasius explains it, in Questions 19 and 98 to Antiochus, and Cyril excellently, book 9 against Julian, around the beginning, and book 3 on Genesis, and Augustine, book 15, *City of God*, chap. 23. And Ambrose plainly thought nothing else, in the book *On Noah and the Ark*, chap. 4. For although he first says that those giants were generated from Angels and women, afterward he declares that Scripture often calls Angels sons of God, because they are generated from no man, that is, insofar as they are sons of God. Hence he adds: "And so God did not disdain to call faithful men his sons. Therefore, just as men of approved life are called sons of God, so those whose works are carnal we call sons of the flesh." And finally many of those who think Angels are corporeal follow this exposition, as Cassian, Conference 8, chap. 21, Caesarius above, and others. Nor will it obstruct this interpretation even if "Angels of God" is read there, as the old edition of the Septuagint has it, because holy men also are usually called Angels of God in Scripture.

32. Besides, in that place by the name of sons of God could also be understood men who were powerful, robust, and strong; for "sons of Elohim," which is found there, signifies all this, as Cyril notes above and Pineda broadly pursues on Job 1, around the words, "When the sons of God had come"; and this seems a suitable signification for the said place of Genesis. For from this it could happen that men powerful in strength and bodily vigor, approaching women with great ardor and affection because of their beauty, generated giants, that is, robust and tall men. More things about these can be seen in Cyril, Theodoret, and Augustine above; and others are gathered by Fevardentius, in the scholia to Irenaeus, book 12, chap. 53, num. 2, and book 4, chap. 70, num. 4, and Pereira. Finally, even if we granted that they were evil angels by whose work those men were begotten, they could not have done this through bodies connatural to them, as Pereira broadly proves, tome 2, on Genesis, book 8, disput. 2. But at most they could have done this in assumed bodies, as Augustine, in the said book 15, chap. 23, hands down, and as we shall treat below in its proper place. And so even from such an effect it could not be gathered that demons are corporeal. To the other arguments, however, enough has already been responded.

CHAPTER VII
WHETHER THERE IS ANY SUBSTANTIAL COMPOSITION IN ANGELS

1. It is certain that angels are not composed of integral parts. Nor from corporeal matter. Some attribute composition from another matter to angels. From what has been said up to now it is very well concluded that in angels there is no composition from integral parts, because this is not found, nor can it be understood by us without quantity, with connatural extension and bulk. Therefore, since it has been shown that an angel neither has corporeal bulk proceeding from quantity, nor a natural capacity for it, it is clearly concluded that he does not have composition from integrating parts. Hence it is also left that he does not have substantial composition from this matter from which corporeal substances are composed, because if they had this matter, they would also naturally require quantity, because quantity is a property connatural to such matter, as I showed more fully in disputation 13 of the *Metaphysics*, section 14, numbers 3 and 4. Nevertheless, St. Thomas, first part, Quest. 50, art. 2, after settling the prior question concerning the incorporeity of angelic substance, thought that one must ask whether angels are composed from matter and form.

Either because another genus of spiritual matter can be devised, incapable of quantitative extension, but only in the manner of a certain spiritual potency needing a spiritual substantial act in order to exist; or certainly because there were not lacking those who attributed composition from matter and form to angels, even abstracting from quantity. For Avicebron, in the book *Fons Vitae*, as the same St. Thomas reports in the said art. 2 and in Opusc. 15, chapter 5, posited composition from matter in angels. But what sort of matter he judged that to be he does not sufficiently declare. For in the former place he attributes to him that he said the same matter is universal to corporeal and spiritual things. But in the other he says that he attributed to angels matter not receptive of quantity, and therefore of another order. In this sense some scholastics seem to have followed that opinion. And St. Thomas, in the said opusculum, reports many authorities for it, which I omit because they are frivolous. I shall only touch on those which provide occasion for explaining another composition. One reason, therefore, is that it is necessary that angelic substance not be altogether simple even in its substance, so that in this it may be distinguished from the creator; therefore it is substantially composed; therefore from substantial act and potency. But every substantial potency is matter. Therefore. Another can be because angels are composed from genus and difference, because, since they are finite, and since they agree with other substances in the common account of substance, they are under some genus and must be terminated and defined through a difference. But composition from genus and difference is founded on composition from matter and form. Therefore it is necessary that this be supposed in angels.

2. The true opinion. Angels are not composed from spiritual matter. It is proved first. But it must be said that the angelic nature is not composed from spiritual matter which would be a true substantial potency really distinct from substantial form and needing it in order to exist. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in the cited places, and of other theologians whom I reported in the said place of the *Metaphysics*, number 5, where I proved it at length; and therefore it is now shown briefly. First, because the Fathers who teach that angels are incorporeal call them immaterial, or lacking matter, as is clear from the things alleged in the preceding chapter. And although someone could evade this by saying that they are speaking of this matter of corporeal things, still from this we also gather that they understood that God created no other matter of things. Second, this is also very well shown from the natural condition of the rational soul. For in itself it is a simple substantial entity, and so, separated from the body, it is not composed from matter and form; otherwise it would have the

same composition in the body, because it does not migrate from matter into matter in order to be preserved in being; otherwise it would not be immortal of itself, and it would migrate from body into body better and in a manner more accommodated to its nature. Nor can it be said that in the body it consists of matter and form; otherwise it would be unsuited to inform the body, because either it would simultaneously and immediately inform two matters, one spiritual and the other material, which is frivolous and monstrous and entirely irrational; or together with its spiritual matter, and as though through that as mediator, it would inform the body, which also is repugnant, both because it is contrary to the account of matter to inform, since every matter in its own order is the first subject, and also because the soul thus composed from its spiritual matter and form would already be a complete substance, and consequently could not be the substantial form of the body nor compose one per se with it.

3. It is proved second. Therefore the rational soul, whether conjoined or separated, is a simple substantial entity lacking composition of essential parts, namely, of matter and form, even spiritual ones. Therefore much more the whole angelic nature is simple in its essence, namely, with that simplicity which excludes that composition. The consequence is proved, first, because the angelic essence is nobler than the rational soul both in species and in the mode of its entity; and it is more perfect to have one's whole substantial perfection through a simple entity than through such composition. Second, because in an angel there is something in the manner of an intellectual form, and that precisely considered is more perfect than the rational soul; therefore it can subsist and remain without actual union to any matter; therefore that angelic form always remains in this way, and has this mode of existing as connatural, without need of any matter, indeed also without capacity to inform it. The antecedent was proved above. But the first consequence is proved, because the angelic form is more perfect and more spiritual and intellectual than the human form. But this human form, from the fact that it is intellectual and spiritual, can remain in its own being subsistent apart from every body and matter, or subject. Therefore much more can an angelic form exist of itself in this way, nor does it require being affixed to some matter or subject in such a way that it could not remain separated from it. But now the other consequence is proved, both because, if a form does not need a subject in order to be sustained by it in being, nor in order to use it for its operations, there is no reason why it should be its act or should have a natural aptitude toward it; and also because, if an angelic form is apt to subsist of itself, and consequently also to operate without any subject, why would it be perpetually and inseparably united to that subject without any other

use or utility from it? I pursued this reason with others at greater length in the said place of the *Metaphysics*. Therefore concerning this composition from essential parts, namely, matter and form, it is most certain that it is not found in angels.

4. Some notes for the solution of the first argument in number one. But the first foundation of the contrary opinion requires us to ask whether some substantial composition is found in angels. In this doubt, one must distinguish concerning real composition, in which the components are distinguished really, or at least from the nature of the thing, or concerning composition of reason, such as that from genus and difference, which are distinguished only by reason. Likewise, either we can speak of the angelic nature as conceived quasi-abstractly, or of the angel concretely, in whom the suppositum is included. Finally, even the angelic nature abstractly conceived can be regarded either precisely according to the being of essence or insofar as it is an actual being, or actually existing.

5. Satisfaction is now given to the argument through three pronouncements. The first. First, therefore, speaking precisely of the angelic nature considered in its essence, it must be said that it includes no real composition in its concept, because as such it is not yet conceived as composed from being and essence, since it is not yet conceived as actually existing. Nor is it conceived as composed from nature and personality, because it is conceived abstractly and as the whole form of the suppositum, and composition from parts has already been excluded. But no other genus of real composition can be considered in any nature. Therefore in the essence, or angelic nature, no such composition is found. Nor does it follow from this that it is altogether simple, or pure act, because as regarded in this way it is something potential and apt to enter into some composition in the manner of a form and of a whole nature; and this is sufficient so that it is neither pure act nor has the simplicity pertaining to perfection simply speaking, or founded on it, such as is found only in divine simplicity.

6. The second pronouncement. Second, if the angelic nature is considered in the state of essence having actual entity, in this way it has some composition, namely, being and essence. For this composition is found in all created things actually existing, and in substances it must be judged substantial, because in a substantial thing both the essence and the being are substantial, and they compose one per se in the genus of substance. But whether that composition from being and essence is real, as from things really distinct, or as from a thing and a mode diverse from the nature of the thing, or is only of reason according to diverse respects or considerations of the mind, it has exactly the same

question in angels as in any created being; and therefore what we said at the greatest length concerning that point in disputation 31 of the *Metaphysics*, especially in section 13, must not be repeated here.

7. The third pronouncement. Third, if we speak of an angel, who is an intellectual person, it must be said that he is something composed from a substantial nature and its terminus, which is called supposithood or personality, and is a positive mode of the nature distinct from it from the nature of the thing, and therefore making some real composition in it. This composition is substantial, for from it one per se in the genus of substance results, indeed it pertains to the complement of a created substance. But all these things, proportion being preserved, are common to all created persons and supposita, nor do they have another special account in angels, except that in them, as also in the rational soul, subsistence is simpler, because it is a spiritual mode and therefore altogether indivisible. But it has distinction from angelic nature from the nature of the thing, as is found in the remaining created supposita. These matters were treated at length in disputation 34 of the *Metaphysics*, sections 2 up to 5, and therefore nothing must be added here. And these things suffice for the solution of the first argument.

8. For the second argument in the same number, metaphysical composition is further excluded from angels. But in the second argument it is asked whether in angels there is composition of reason from genus and difference, and whence these can be taken in them, if they altogether lack real material composition. But this matter is metaphysical, and generally has been sufficiently treated by us in disputation 6 of the *Metaphysics*, section 11, and specifically concerning angels in disputation 35, section 3, from number 34, to which nothing must be added. But by briefly recapitulating those things we say that this composition from genus and difference must be admitted in angels, as it is admitted by all theologians, with the sole exception of Durandus, in 2, distinction 3, question 1, who, in my judgment, teaches contradictory things. For he says that an angel is in a genus, or under a genus, which is most true, because angels agree univocally either among themselves in the account of created spirit, or with the other substances in some limited grade of being from which the common account of genus can be abstracted. Nevertheless, Durandus adds that angels are not composed from genus and difference. But this involves a repugnance with the former. Because an angel is not a part of substance or some incomplete substance, but a perfect and whole one. Hence, if he is in some genus or under some genus, especially indeed in the genus of substance, therefore substance is a genus with respect to an angel and to other things. Therefore it is

necessary that an angel differ through something from other things contained under that genus. Therefore it is necessary that he be composed according to reason from that genus in which he agrees and from that predicate in which he differs. But this is composition from genus and difference. Therefore, supposing that principle, this composition cannot be denied in angels. And the same argument can be made concerning angels among themselves, with the addition of the essential diversity which can be found in them, as we shall say below. Therefore there is no doubt that angels are composed from genus and difference; nor is this composition repugnant to their simplicity, because it is only a composition of reason. Nor is it necessary that it be founded on real composition from matter and form, but on univocal agreement or likeness, complete or incomplete, by reason of which the generic and specific concepts can be abstracted from diverse things, as we explained more fully in the cited places of the *Metaphysics*, where we also said that the principle, genus is taken from matter, difference from form, understood of proper physical matter and form, is neither necessary nor true; and therefore, so that it may somehow stand according to a certain proportion, it must be understood only because genus is something potential, as matter is, and difference is the act of the form proportioned according to its own mode. Nor is it necessary to remain longer in these things, which are foreign to theology.

9. Yet composition from substance and accidents is not excluded from angels. Lastly, it can be asked here whether composition from substance and accidents is found in angels. For there were not lacking philosophers who removed all accidents from angels, as the Commentator on book 12 of the *Metaphysics*, comment 23, and Simplicius in the aforesaid chapter on Quality. Indeed Maximinus also, on Dionysius, *Celestial Hierarchy*, absolutely said that every accident must be repelled from angels; and he is not speaking only of material accidents, as St. Thomas sometimes piously interprets him, but of intellectual accidents. Nevertheless, it is certain that in angels there is composition from substance and accident. Thus all theologians teach, especially St. Thomas, first part, Quest. 54, art. 1 and following, and I-II, Quest. 50, art. 6, where he reports and refutes the aforesaid doctrine of the philosophers. Because angels are not pure acts, but with respect to many perfections are only in potency; and therefore they can be perfected through accidental acts. Likewise their substance is of finite and limited perfection, and therefore cannot through itself participate every perfection of God, and consequently can be perfected by accidents. Finally, from the same root of their limitation they are mutable; but

mutation cannot be understood without some composition. And this will be more evident from what is to be said concerning the properties of angels.

CHAPTER VIII
WHETHER ANGELS IN ESSENCE AND IN ALL QUASI-ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES ARE OF FINITE PERFECTION

1. On the various attributes through which the nature of angels is investigated. Since in this life we cannot know angelic nature as it is in itself, or by its proper concept, as I proved in the said disputation 35 of the *Metaphysics*, section 2, it is therefore necessary for us to declare the essence of angels, as far as we can, through certain negative or comparative attributes, either in relation to God or to other creatures. And therefore in this chapter we shall speak of those attributes which are common to all angels; afterwards, however, we shall descend, as far as we can, to declaring their natures in particular. It will be useful to have before our eyes the negative attributes which we explained concerning God in the preceding volume. For either after their likeness, or through the removal of them, or at least through opposites conceived confusedly, we must declare what kind and how great a perfection the angelic nature is. But we omit those attributes which are transcendent to all beings, such as truth, goodness, and unity, which we explained in God through his singular excellence. But in angels they belong from the common account of created being, under which account they were treated by us in the *Metaphysics* from disputation 3 up to 11. But the peculiar mode in which they are found in angels will be clear from the declaration of the other properties. And because we have already spoken about the simplicity or composition of angelic nature, we shall speak briefly about the rest. Among these predicates, however, some diminish perfection, others increase it, but both are necessary for declaring the true essence of an angel.

2. First affirmative conclusion. In what sense this conclusion is of faith. It is proved by reason. First, therefore, we say that angels are of finite and limited perfection in essence. This assertion supposes one thing known per se and adds another thing certain by faith. For it supposes that there is in angels some essential perfection, which is known per se by the same reason by which it is known per se that every being has some goodness; for transcendental goodness and the perfection of a thing are the same, as was shown in the *Metaphysics*. Therefore we add that the perfection of an angel is limited, and consequently, insofar as finite and infinite are said of the quantity of perfection, angelic nature is finite in this way, not infinite simply speaking. And so the assertion is of faith.

Because Scripture attributes the singular excellence of infinite perfection to God alone. For in Psalm 144, David begins to praise him singularly, saying: *I will exalt you, my God, King*, etc., indeed by proclaiming what is proper to you. And among other things he adds: *Great is the Lord and exceedingly worthy of praise, and of his greatness there is no end.* Such greatness, therefore, is proper to God, and therefore he adds: *Let all your works confess to you, O Lord.* Hence Paul in Romans 11 declares God's excellence through this, that *from him and through him and in him are all things*. Therefore it is singular and proper to God to contain all things in himself. But this is necessary for infinite perfection simply speaking. Therefore this infinity is proper to God, and consequently is not found in angels. Finally, Paul teaches this sufficiently expressly in Hebrews 1, in that comparison which he makes between the natural Son of God and the angels, saying: *Made so much better than the angels, as he has inherited a name more different than they.* Hence he plainly shows that the angels are not equal to the Father as the Son is, and consequently that neither are they equal to the Son himself, or to the Holy Spirit, or to God. And if they were infinite in essential perfection, they would be equal to God. Therefore it is certain by faith that they do not have such infinity. Hence also in Psalm 34 it is written: *Lord, who is like you?* And among the angels those holy ones persevered who followed that cry, *who is like God?* Finally, this truth is so well known in the Church, as repeated by the holy Fathers, that it is superfluous to confirm it further by authority. The reason also is evident, because angels are creatures, as we suppose, because they do not have being from themselves. For a being having being from itself is only one, as was shown at length in the preceding volume and in the *Metaphysics*. Therefore angels have being received from another, and consequently dependent and made from nothing. Therefore it is limited and finite. But what Aristotle thought on this matter I said in disputation 35 of the *Metaphysics*, section 3, numbers 24 and 32. Moreover, it can be asked whether an angel can be called infinite at least in a certain respect, namely, in his proper genus or species. But, as I said from number 25, this question pertains not so much to the matter as to the manner of speaking; and I treated both sufficiently there, nor does anything to be added occur.

3. Second conclusion. The essence of an angel does not require all perfections. And from this we can first gather that it does not pertain to the essential perfection of an angel that he contain in himself all the perfections of being. It is proved, because this can belong only to being simply infinite. For the perfections of things can be multiplied and increased to infinity; hence they cannot be contained except in a perfection infinite simply speaking. But in order

that this may be better understood, the common distinction of the perfections of being must be supposed. For some are called simply simple, because they include no imperfection and are of themselves better than all others repugnant to them; on account of which a perfection simply speaking is usually defined as that which in an individual of being is better than not itself. But others are perfections not simply, but in a certain respect. These are called such because they are not always better than their opposites, or because they either suppose imperfection or include it. Among these there is this difference, that the former must be found formally in the supremely perfect being, while as to the latter it is sufficient that they be contained eminently, because by the very fact that they involve imperfection, or opposition to other equal perfections, they cannot be formally required in every being perfect from every side, as I declared in the previous volume, tractate 1, book 1, chapter 8, number 11, and tractate 3, book 3, chapter 10, and disputation 30 of the *Metaphysics*, section 1, from number 8.

4. But further one must note that a substance can include either all or some of these perfections in two ways. First, by force of essence alone, regarded precisely in its substance; second, through superadded accidents. In the former way God has every perfection formally or eminently by force of his essence and substance alone, as I proved in the said places. But angels, since they neither are from themselves nor have an unlimited essence, cannot in that way contain every perfection essentially, or through their precise substance. But from the perfections simply speaking they include essentially only those which are formally necessary for constituting a complete substantial nature, such as being an entire nature, that is, one not of itself ordered to composing another, and consequently substantial, living, intellectual. For these predicates carry perfection simply speaking, as is manifest from its definition. Nevertheless, because they are ordered per se, so that the later ones per se suppose the prior ones, and the prior ones are per se contracted or determined through the later ones, therefore they are included in a finite and limited essence through a special difference. But some are perfections simply speaking which, although they formally and substantially belong to created substances, do not belong essentially, such as actually to be or to subsist; nevertheless they do not belong to them essentially, because they have actual existence neither per se nor from themselves, and consequently they also do not have an altogether immutable mode of existing. Consequently they have both outside the essence, though not through accidents, but through a substantial mode.

5. Finally, angels can participate other perfections simply speaking properly and formally through superadded accidents, although they do not

include them essentially or in their substance, such as wisdom, moral virtue, actually understanding or willing, and the like, about which we shall speak later. Finally, there are other perfections simply speaking which angels in no way participate, nor are they capable of them, such as necessity of being, simplicity which excludes every composition and aptitude for it, omnipotence, omniscience, and any similar things there are, which, if they are attentively considered, include infinity simply speaking and independence from every extrinsic cause. And from this it is manifest that an angel cannot in his essence eminently include every perfection that is not simply speaking, because any angel is, as it were, a private being by force of his limitation, and therefore there is no source from which he could be, as it were, a universal being eminently containing the others. Indeed, not even through superadded accidents can he participate so great a perfection, because, if the accidents are connatural, they are limited according to the capacity of the essence; but if they are added extrinsically, even if they are many, each one must be limited and finite, and all must be finite in number, and beyond all those there could be other more perfect things not eminently contained in them. Therefore in no way can it belong to an angel to contain every perfection formally or eminently, especially essentially. But whether he contains eminently some of the perfections that are not simply speaking, we shall examine in the last book of this tractate.

6. Third conclusion. The negative attributes which belong to God as infinite in perfection are not found in angels. And from these things we further conclude that none of these negative attributes which belong to the divine nature by reason of its infinity can be attributed to angels. This is proved generally, first, because when the foundation is removed, all things founded on it must be removed. Second, this is clear from the positive attributes which suppose infinity simply speaking in essence, such as omnipotence, omniscience, or comprehensive knowledge of the divine nature, and similar things. Third, the same is proved by a brief induction. For first an angel cannot be immense, that is, capable of ubiquity simply speaking, which can fill not only places actually created but also all creatable places. For this immensity belongs to God from infinity, as I declared at length in disputation 30 of the *Metaphysics*, section 7. Therefore it cannot belong to angels, which in the said disputation 35 of the *Metaphysics*, section 3, number 6, I proved and declared by reason. But here, so that the matter may also become certain for theology, it can be proved from the Fathers, who for this reason call angels circumscribed by their nature, as I reported above in chapter three from Athanasius in the letter to Serapion; and Damascene speaks in the same way, book 1, *On Faith*, chapter 17, and book 2,

chapter 3, and Theodoret, question 3 on Genesis, Anastasius of Sinai, *On the Right Dogmas of Faith*, toward the end, where he says that ministering spirits have obtained a circumscribed essence. The same is Gregory, book 1, *Moralia*, chapter 2, and book 3, chapter 3, and homily 34 on the Gospel. For by circumscription they do not understand material containment within a surrounding surface, such as is found in bodies, either actually, as in all bodies below the highest, or by aptitude, as in the highest heaven, or the empyrean; but they understand limitation of nature opposed to immensity, just as they call the essence of God uncircumscribed, and Anastasius proves this at length in *On the Right Dogmas of Faith*. And thus the assertion is rightly proved from those places of Scripture in which angels are said to be present somewhere and absent elsewhere, or to be transferred from one place to another, as we shall see in book four. For now we assert nothing about angelic place, but only remove from them immensity and ubiquity explained in the said sense.

7. Next, consequently, it happens that angels are not altogether immutable, because this also belongs to God by reason of infinity. But this can be understood of substantial immutability, or immutability in one's being simply speaking; and thus it proceeds from infinity insofar as this includes or supposes being from oneself, or independence from another in being. But how angels participate some immutability in this will be said in chapter nine. Second, immutability can exclude capacity for motion according to place, and thus it proceeds from immensity, and therefore cannot belong to angels. But how they can be moved according to place we shall say in book four. Third, immutability can be opposed to accidental mutation, and thus it proceeds from infinity of perfection in understanding and loving, and therefore it also cannot be connatural to an angel. Because by the very fact that they understand and love not through their substance, but through accidental acts, they can receive mutation in acts and pass from one to another; both because they never have an act filling their whole capacity, and also because it would be a greater imperfection to adhere immovably to one imperfect and inadequate act than to be able to pass from one into another, and thus to know or love various things, and finally because they are of free choice, as we shall see below, and therefore they can apply themselves to various acts of intellect and will, nor is there a source from which they would have immutability in them. And from this it also happens that they are not immutable in moral goodness, nor impeccable by their nature, about which we must speak professedly in book seven. But whether in one or another act an angel has some immutability or natural necessity, and how through grace or glory they become immutable in good, or by sinning

become obstinate in evil, will be treated in the following books, especially in the seventh and eighth.

CHAPTER IX
WHETHER ANGELS ARE ALTOGETHER INCORRUPTIBLE AND CAN BE CALLED NECESSARY BEINGS

1. Something can be called incorruptible in two ways. Up to now I have explained some properties or negative divine attributes which cannot belong to angels, because they are founded on the infinity of God. But this attribute about which we are now treating seems to be founded more on divine immateriality or spirituality, and therefore it must be briefly declared how angels can agree with God in it or differ from him. Therefore, in order to explain this, one must premise that something can be called incorruptible in two ways. In one way, as incorruptible excludes only the proper mode of corruption, which is properly opposed to generation, because just as it belongs to the account of proper generation that it occurs from a presupposed subject, so it belongs to the account of proper corruption that in it a subject remains, from which something else is generated, or at least can be generated. In another way, incorruptible can be taken as altogether excluding cessation and the capacity to lose being in any way; for the sake of greater explanation, this can be called inannihilable.

2. First conclusion. It is certain that angels are incorruptible in some way. First, therefore, it is certain that angels are in some way incorruptible, or immortal. In this all theologians agree. And it is proved first from the effect, because it is certain by faith that angels will endure perpetually, the good in glory and the evil in punishment. Therefore they were created by God so that they may remain forever, according to that of Psalm 149: *He established them forever and unto the age of the age.* But he was speaking about the angels, whom, together with other heavenly things, he had summoned to the praise of God. Therefore they received a nature of itself apt for remaining perpetually, which is to be incorruptible. Second, the Lateran Council under Leo X, session 8, speaks in this way concerning the human soul. For in a certain declaration of faith of Pope Leo approved by the whole Council against those who, *speaking of the nature of the rational soul, say that it is mortal*, it is said that this is *one of the pernicious errors always rejected by the faithful.* And it is added: *With this sacred Council approving, we condemn and reject all asserting that the soul is mortal*, namely, by its nature; for the preceding words and the following declare this sense. For it is added: *Since it not only truly exists per se and essentially as the*

form of the human body, but is also immortal. Therefore, a fortiori, the same must be said of angels, because they are higher and more immaterial. Hence Dionysius, chapter 4, *Divine Names*, first said that angels have from God an unfailing and inviolable life, very far removed from corruption and death, and afterwards says that the human soul after the angels has immortal life, so that it may be and may look to the lives of the angels.

3. Third, the saints commonly speak in this way about angels. For besides Dionysius, in the cited place, Damascene, book 2, *On Faith*, chapter 3, says that an angel is an intelligent essence and has divinely obtained immortality by nature. And in the book *On Decrees and Opinions*, etc., chapter 7, he says: *What lacks a body is a participant in reason and immortal, as mind, angel, and demon.* And thus also Athanasius, in the definition of angel, placed *being immortal*, as I alleged above from the book *On the Common Essence of Divinity*. And in the tractate *On Definitions*, at the beginning, he says that an angel and a mind are called eternal, *because although they had a beginning, they are immortal and live eternally*. And thus also Basil, at the beginning of Psalm 44, says that angels are not mutable in their being, because *in whatever state they are created, in that state they remain perpetually, with the simple and same immutable substance of their proper nature preserved*. Augustine also, 12, *City of God*, chapter 15, calls angels *immortal creatures, whose immortality*, he says, *is in time neither past, as though it now were not, nor future, as though it not yet were*. And in the tractate *On the Knowledge of True Life* attributed to Augustine, chapter 6, an angel is defined as a *substance incorporeal, intellectual, immortal*. And Isidore, book 1, *Sentences*, chapter 1, says: *Angels and souls are immortal, but they are not immutable, and therefore God alone is called immortal, because he alone is unchangeable.* And Julian, archbishop of Toledo, in book 1, *On the Origin of Human Death*, chapter 2, volume 9 of the Library, says that an angel was established by God in such a way that, although he sinned, he could not die at all; but man in such a way that, if he were obedient, he would not die, but angelic immortality would follow. This truth will be declared by reason by explaining the mode of angelic immortality.

4. Second conclusion. Angels cannot physically be corrupted even by God. Second, therefore, it becomes certain that, if incorruptible is taken as only excluding proper physical corruption, an angel is incorruptible not only in order to created causes, but also compared with God himself. It is proved because proper physical corruption does not occur except through the separation of form from matter, in such a way that after the corruption of the whole something of it remains, namely, matter. But an angel is not capable of such

corruption in order to any power, even God's. Therefore. We suppose the major from the definition of physical corruption, and we declare that we are speaking here of it taken under the said account. For corruption is distinguished from annihilation and from transubstantiation in this, as is common. But the minor is evident, because the angelic nature is simple and indivisible. Therefore by no power can it be divided or resolved into matter and form, from which it is not composed. Hence in this the incorruptibility of angels differs greatly from the incorruptibility of heaven. For although the heaven is incorruptible with respect to any created or even creatable cause, because there can be no created force which dissolves the union of the form of heaven with its matter, nevertheless with respect to God it cannot be called altogether incorruptible, because God can separate the form of heaven from its matter by introducing another form in place of that one, or by preserving the matter without form. But an angel is capable of no such corruption, because of the reason given.

5. Third conclusion. Angels are annihilable, and in that way corruptible. The conclusion is of faith. Third, it is certain that an angel can be deprived of his being by his creator, and for this reason is not altogether incorruptible if this word excludes every mode of cessation, even annihilation; and therefore in the contrary sense he can be called corruptible. This is certain by faith, because it is of faith that angels depend on God not only in being made, but also in being conserved; and likewise it is certain by faith that God, just as he freely created angels, so also freely conserves them, and that God can, absolutely and speaking per se, not conserve them if he wishes. All these things are general to all created things, and have the same account in angels, and therefore it is not necessary to prove them further. For we did this in disputation 21 of the *Metaphysics*. And so in this way, on the words of Paul in 1 Timothy 6: *Who alone has immortality*, among other explanations the holy Fathers hand down this one, that God alone can in no way cease to be, because he alone in his being does not depend on another; while, on the contrary, angels are mortal, insofar as mortality is opposed to immortality. Hence Justin, in the questions which the nations propose to Christians, at the beginning, to the 11th question, says that God alone has immortality, because he does not depend on the will of another, but this belongs to him by his own nature. Similarly Jerome, dialogue 2, *Against the Pelagians*, a little from the beginning: *God alone has immortality, because he has it through nature and not through grace.* And Ambrose has similar things in book 3, *On Faith to Gratian*, chapter 2. And other saints to be cited immediately think the same.

6. Fourth conclusion, twofold. Angels are indefectible from within, etc. Fourth, it must be said that angels cannot cease to be through an intrinsic real potency, but only through the extrinsic power of God; and therefore immutability of being, after they have been produced, is in some way connatural to them. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, said Quest. 50, art. 5, which his disciples and commentators commonly follow. And Cajetan there and Ferrara, 3 *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 55, especially declare it rightly, and Durandus follows it, in 1, distinction 8, part 1, question 2. And the former part is proved. Because every intrinsic real potency is active or passive. But angels have neither toward non-being. Therefore they cannot cease to be through an intrinsic real potency. The major is known from philosophy. The minor, as to the former part concerning active potency, is known per se, because an angel can do nothing in order to destroy himself or deprive himself of existence. For since he is indivisible, he does not have parts so that by acting through one on another he could corrupt himself in that way in which, in corporeal living things, death and corruption occur through an active potency in some way intrinsic. Nor can one even conceive an active potency in an angel through which the same thing according to its whole self, and as though through itself first, acts toward its own corruption, both because either no thing acts in this way on itself, or it acts only toward its own perfection, and especially because, in order that it act on itself, it necessarily supposes itself and its existence both in the account of agent and in the account of patient. Therefore through such action it cannot kill itself. Hence the other part concerning passive potency is easily proved, because passive potency is never directly toward non-being, but toward some or other being incompossible with another being. Hence in a simple entity such a potency cannot be understood, as seems known per se. Therefore there also cannot be in an angel an intrinsic passive potency toward non-being. Therefore he cannot cease through an intrinsic real potency, because to be able to cease is nothing other than to be able not to be.

7. Next, the other part of the conclusion is proved. Because whatever is conformed to the natural inclination of a thing is connatural to it. But being, and perpetually being, is most conformed to the natural appetite of angels. Therefore perpetuity in their being simply speaking is connatural to them. Second, it is explained further, because from the fact that a thing has been produced by God, its conservation can be called connatural to it, because it is due to it from a certain connatural order; and there can be no natural or created cause which impedes this conservation with respect to angelic nature. Therefore perpetual conservation is connatural to an angel, and consequently also

perpetuity of being, or, what is the same, absolute incorruptibility, is connatural to him. Third, although by absolute power God can annihilate an angel, nevertheless annihilation itself is not natural to an angel, but rather is praeternatural to him, indeed quasi-supernatural. Therefore, on the contrary, immutable and perpetual duration is connatural to an angel. And consequently an angel is not naturally destructible, so to speak, even if he can be destroyed by divine power. It is confirmed by a similar case, because it is natural to fire necessarily to heat when a patient is present, although it cannot heat without God's influx, and God can freely not give that concurrence, because it is enough that that concurrence is connaturally due to it and that the denial of it is praeternatural. Therefore likewise it is natural to an angel to exist always by necessity, even though he cannot exist without God's influx and God by his liberty can deny the influx, because for that necessity it is enough that that influx is connaturally due and cannot be denied without a miracle and praeternatural mode.

8. The erasion of some. It is impugned. In the tractate on the voluntary, second disputation, second question. Some say that the account is diverse, because fire has an innate power for heating, so that if the concurrence is denied, it is violent for it not to heat. But an angel does not have an innate power to conserve himself with the concurrence of God, and of himself non-being is no more repugnant to him than being; nor does he have inclination in the manner of potency to being, since in him essence is not distinguished from its being. But the response does not satisfy, because it supposes many things from a private opinion which either are uncertain or less probable and less common. For first, that the lack of action in fire from the sole negation of divine concurrence is violent, is uncertain and less received, because although it is not natural, perhaps it is not violent, but obediential. Next, that response seems to suppose that the violent is only with respect to receptive potency, which we have shown elsewhere to be false. Hence although it is true that the nature of an angel does not have active power to conserve itself, as heat has for heating wood, this has nothing to do with the argument, because here a comparison is not made of equality or likeness in the same genus of potency, but of proportionality. For just as concurrence for acting is due to heat by reason of natural active power, so influx for existing is due to a spiritual substance because it is naturally receptive of such existence and naturally desires it.

9. The impugnment proceeds. Hence when it is said that it *does not desire that through the mode of potency*, if this is understood of active potency, it is indeed true, but it does not stand in the way, because in order that an act be

connatural and due according to the order of nature, it is not necessary that it be due by reason of active potency. For form is due to prime matter, even though it does not have an appetite of active potency for it; and the inseparability of the form and matter of heaven from each other is connatural, although in neither of them is there active potency toward the union, but only passive and formal potency. But if it is understood of any potency at all, even receptive potency, what is said is false, because every created essence is in its own way in receptive potency to actual existence from God. And although before the production of the thing this potency is only objective, because the thing is supposed only to be in possible being with order to actual existence, which it can receive through creation, nevertheless, after the thing is produced, it now has actual entity, through which it is apt to receive perpetuity in existing, which perpetuity it naturally desires. Nor is it necessary for this that essence be distinguished from existence; rather, it is enough that persevering be in some way distinct from being, just as conservation is in some way distinct from production, not indeed physically or actually, but virtually and eminently.

10. It is declared further. This is declared very well from elicited appetite, for an angel cannot desire or ask to be created or first to be. But now, once created and existing, he can desire and ask to be conserved and to exist perpetually. But this desire is most consonant with natural inclination. For who would deny this? Therefore this is enough for conservation to be called connatural to an angel, and consequently also for his perpetuity to be due to him according to the natural order no less than concurrence for acting is due to heat. And therefore Cyril seems expressly to make that equation, book 8, *Thesaurus*, chapter 2, saying: *Those things which are chiefly in natures are nothing with respect to God the creator. Therefore, just as fire is indeed combustible, but not to God, so also an angel is indeed immortal, but not to God.* The sense of these words is: just as it is natural to fire to burn, and nevertheless God can make it not burn, so it is natural to an angel to be immortal, and nevertheless by God's power and will he can be deprived of his being. Hence it is necessary that *immortal* there not be opposed to that which properly can die; for in this way an angel cannot die through the power of God, as I have declared. Therefore it is taken for a thing which can in no way naturally fail; for that also can be destroyed through the power of God. Such, therefore, is an angel according to Cyril's opinion.

CHAPTER X

CHAPTER X
OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF THE PRECEDING CHAPTER ARE MET

1. Vasquez says three things in the present matter. The doctrine handed down in the preceding chapter and taken from St. Thomas is impugned by Father Vasquez, disputation 182, and he contends first that, although an angel is called immortal according to his nature, just as the rational soul is called naturally immortal, nevertheless both must be understood with respect to created causes, not with respect to God. Hence he says first that with respect to God angels are not immortal through nature, but through grace. You confirm this with testimonies of the Fathers speaking in this way, as can be seen in Cyril, said book 8, *Thesaurus*, chapter 2, who also in book 2 *Against Julian* reports a similar opinion from Plato in the *Timaeus* and does not disapprove it. And Sophronius speaks in the same way in the letter reported in the Sixth Synod, action 11. Many scholastic doctors imitate these Fathers, such as Bonaventure, in 1, distinction 8, part 1, art. 2, question 2, Scotus and Gabriel in the places to be cited, and Alensis, part 1, question 4, member 3. On account of this the said author adds, second, that it is erroneous to say that an angel is immortal and incorruptible by comparison to the power of God, not through the grace of God, but by his nature; because he thinks that this is equivalent to saying that angels do not depend in being conserved on the free will of God. Third, he adds that angels are annihilable not only through the extrinsic power of God, but also from their intrinsic nature, and consequently through a real and native potency. He proves this first, because the said Fathers say that angels are not immortal simply speaking, that is, indefectible and inannihilable, so to speak, by their nature. Therefore they are mortal and annihilable by their nature, because from two opposites it is necessary that one be connatural according to some internal power. Second, I argue in this way, because an angel is not annihilable because God can annihilate him, but rather, on the contrary. Just as he is not possible because God can produce him, but rather on the contrary, because potency supposes its object at least as possible, lest a circle be committed. Therefore an angel is annihilable of himself through internal potency and capacity, and not only through the extrinsic power of God.

2. It is responded to the three sayings. To the first: an angel is properly immortal. Although this disagreement is for the most part about the mode of

speaking, by that very judgment one must not depart from the mode of speaking of St. Thomas and from his opinion, especially because, if there can be any diversity in the matter, the opinion of St. Thomas is really more probable, as the reasons made above prove and as will be declared more by responding to those three sayings which we have reported. To the first, therefore, we say that if immortal is taken properly, as it is opposed to that which can cease through proper corruption or death, then an angel is immortal simply speaking with respect to any cause. Because we have now shown that it cannot be brought about by any power that an angel ceases to be through corruption or death, because he can be divided neither integrally nor essentially, nor can he be deprived of being through separation from a subject, since he is not the form of any subject, nor can he be deprived of existence through the induction of any form, because a substantial form cannot be induced into him and an accidental form cannot destroy him, since it necessarily supposes his existence. In this sense St. Thomas especially seems to speak in the said art. 5, and thus understood his reason and assertion proceed not only with respect to a created cause, but also with respect to God and his absolute power. This is also true in the rational soul, and it is not necessary to add a limitation concerning the respect to this or that cause, which neither the Lateran Council added, nor is included in the word itself according to its common use. Nor is it necessary, because although God can annihilate the soul in the same instant in which it is separated from the body, still he will not bring about, or cannot bring about, that it be mortal, that is, that by force of separation from the body it ceases to be, or that it be corrupted, or dies together with the man. For in this way and no other way can some form be mortal or corruptible. But in that case the soul would not cease by force of separation from matter, and so would not die together with the man, but God would destroy it through a new mode and through negation of his influx. Just as, on the contrary, although God creates the soul in the instant in which a man is generated, the soul is not generated together with the man, nor can it be generated together in any way, because it cannot be educed from matter, nor depend on it in the genus of material cause, as wise and judicious philosophers think.

3. How an angel is defectible. But if the discourse is about immortal as it is opposed to every cessation, that is, about what is altogether indefectible and as it excludes every potency both extrinsic and intrinsic, then indeed an angel is not simply inconvertible, as Bonaventure speaks, namely, into nothing, because by respect to the extrinsic power of God and by denomination from it he is annihilable. Nevertheless, if by that privative term only intrinsic and real

potency to non-being is excluded from an angel, then absolutely an angel is indefectible in being even with respect to God, because even with respect to him an angel does not have intrinsic potency to non-being, but can cease only through God's extrinsic power and liberty. A sign of this is that he cannot cease through positive action by which he receives or loses something, but only through negation of conserving action, as I suppose as certain. Another sign also is that this defectibility of an angel does not proceed so much from the power of God as such as from liberty. For if God acted from necessity of nature, even if he were equally omnipotent in acting, nevertheless he could not annihilate an angel or deprive him of his being, because this is not to act, but to suspend action, which does not pertain to power considered per se, but as it is subject in acting to the liberty of the will.

4. It is responded to the Fathers and authors cited for the same first saying. To the Fathers and theologians it is responded that this proposition, *An angel by his nature is perpetual and therefore altogether indefectible*, has a manifold sense with respect to that particle *by his nature*. For in one way it signifies the same as, by force of his essence and from himself without the influx of another; and in this sense the proposition is heretical, because in it it is affirmed that an angel has independent and uncaused being, so to speak. And in the same sense the Fathers deny that an angel, or anything outside God, is immortal by its nature. And they oppose to this being immortal through grace, that is, through the benefit of God, such as also is the benefit of creation; for both benefits, of creation and of conservation, are of the same order, and insofar as it is given from the liberality of God, it is called grace. And Bonaventure and others speak in the same way. Hence from this they prove that an angel is not by his nature inconvertible into nothing, because only that thing is inconvertible in such a way which has from itself that it can stand. In another way that particle *by his nature* can be taken as signifying only natural inclination and appetite founded in the real active or receptive, or quasi-receptive, potency of an angel or of another similar thing; and thus it can and must be said that an angel by his nature is indefectible, because this alone is connatural to him, and after he is supposed existing, he has only for this an internal real potency and aptitude.

5. It is responded to the second saying. It is not erroneous to say that an angel is indefectible by his nature. And in the same sense it is not erroneous to say that an angel is indefectible by his nature even with respect to God, but it is altogether true, if it is legitimately understood. For the sense is not that God cannot annihilate him, but that such annihilation can never be according to the nature of the angel, nor from his internal real potency or inclination. Just as a

stone cannot be called movable upward by its nature even with respect to God, because although God can move a stone upward, he nevertheless cannot make such motion natural to it, or from within, but only violent, or at most obediential. Thus, therefore, it is with annihilation. Nor could the said author deny this; for in chapter three he admits that, if an angel were annihilated, the annihilation with respect to him would be supernatural in some way, because it would be above the natural order of God's providence, and similarly he says it would in some way be against nature and violent to an angel already existing. Therefore an angel now existing is rightly said, in the stated sense, to be inannihilable by his nature, because in his nature he does not have a principle of annihilation, although he can be annihilated through extrinsic power. And this is also sufficient so that not being annihilated is grace taken in a broad way, that is, a gratuitous benefit of God, although of the natural order and consonant with nature, indeed somehow due to a thing already existing and lacking internal potency to non-being, just as general concurrence is called grace in a broad way, as has been declared in its proper place.

6. It is responded to the third. Hence to the third we deny that there is in an angel an intrinsic real potency to non-being, for the contrary has been sufficiently proved. To the first proof from the Fathers I respond that, in the way in which angels are not by their nature immortal, that is, indefectible essentially and by force of their nature, they are also defectible, or annihilable, from their nature, because from their nature they have that they depend effectively on an extrinsic cause in their being. But this defectibility on their part is not some real passive or active potency, as was shown, but is only non-repugnance, because of themselves and from their nature they do not have that by which they would be repugnant to annihilation, if God wished to annihilate them, or rather, although it comes to the same thing, if he did not wish to conserve them. Nevertheless, simply speaking, it is natural to them that, as far as they are concerned, they can endure perpetually and lack an intrinsic principle of the loss of their being. And for this reason they are rightly called immutable from within in existing, as far as they are concerned, although they are mutable from without. Hence it is easy to respond to the second, for we admit that an angel is annihilable just as he is creatable. But he is not creatable through real potency existing in him, but objectively creatable through non-repugnance on his part to receive being, and formally through denomination from the power of the creator. And universally the object of God's omnipotence, as contradistinguished from it and from the denomination taken from it, can only be understood through non-repugnance to be or become, as I declared in disputation 30 of the *Metaphysics*, section 18,

from number 10. Therefore in a similar way an angel is annihilable before denomination from God's power through non-repugnance alone, namely, because actually not being is not repugnant to the angelic essence, because to exist is not of his essence; nevertheless he is not annihilable through an intrinsic real potency, because he does not have that. And so that denomination which is signified by the word *annihilable*, or *convertible*, or *mortal*, or *corruptible* taken broadly, insofar as it is positive, is only extrinsic from the free power of God.

7. You will say: that non-repugnance is founded in the intrinsic nature of an angel; therefore this is sufficient for him to be called by his nature convertible into nothing, and for it to be denied that he is inconvertible by his nature. I respond by denying the consequence. First, indeed, because that non-repugnance is founded in the nature of an angel according to the being of essence precisely considered, because as such it is indifferent to being and non-being, and thus neither is repugnant to it. But after it is supposed existing, it now has a positive determination to being, and an intrinsic real capacity with natural inclination and appetite for perpetuity of being; and therefore absolutely it is connatural to it both to be able always to be and to endure actually perpetually, although it always has non-repugnance to lacking such being. Second, because these two can be simultaneous, namely, that non-repugnance to some act is connatural, and nevertheless the contrary and perpetual state is connatural, as, for example, it is not repugnant to heaven that its form be separated from matter, and nevertheless perpetual inseparability is connatural to it.

8. Whether angels can be called necessary beings. And hence another question is decided, whether angels should be called necessary beings or not. For some contend that they cannot be called beings necessary of themselves, which Scotus thinks, in 1, distinction 8, question 5, art. 2, to the question, and in 4, distinction 49, question 6, at the beginning. And Gabriel thinks the same, in 2, distinction 2, question 1, art. 2, conclusion 6, insofar as he says that an angel no more determines perpetual being for himself from himself than corruptible substance does, because God can conserve a corruptible substance just as he can an angel. And Ockham says the same, in 2, question 13, to the first reason. But St. Thomas, in the said art. 5, calls angels necessary beings; and in Quest. 9, art. 2, he calls angels immutable and invariable according to being, and says that they lack potency to non-being, which is equivalent to saying that they are necessary beings. And to the second he declares that this immutability of being belongs to angels according to nature, but angels have immutability of election according to divine power. And in 2 *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 30, he says that things lacking matter are simply and absolutely necessary, or exist from

necessity. This he shows there, and in chapter 55, by many reasons, and in Quest. 5, *On Power*, art. 3. And thus the Thomists also commonly speak, Cajetan, Ferrara, and other moderns, in the cited places. And this opinion seems to follow from what has been said, for it is the same to be immutable in being simply speaking and to be a necessary being. But it has been shown that an angel from his nature is immutable in his being simply speaking. Therefore from his nature he is a necessary being.

9. The true opinion. An angel of himself is a necessary being, yet can be deprived of existence by God. But this diversity seems to be only in the manner of speaking, for it is clear that an angel is not a being so necessary that he cannot be deprived of being by any power. And because necessity of being spoken absolutely seems to exclude every possibility of not being, whether through extrinsic potency or through intrinsic, therefore in that sense it cannot be attributed to an angel, nor should it be attributed without some addition which declares the true sense. Hence an angel can be called a necessary being as far as concerns himself and his intrinsic principles, although he can be deprived of his being by another. For those two things do not fight with each other, because that necessity which is from intrinsic principles has an extrinsic cause on which it depends and through which it can cease. Or the same can be declared in another way, because something can be a necessary being from within in two ways, namely, positively and negatively. I call it positive when the thing is necessary either from its essence, or, if some thing were imagined which were of such a nature that, after it has been made, it could be conserved or endure without the influx of another, or at least had in itself an active potency by which it would conserve itself in being, at least with the concurrence of another. But I call that a necessary being negatively which, after it exists, has in itself no principle of not being, nor real and positive potency toward non-being. For such a being, as far as concerns itself, always exists, and therefore it can deservedly be called a necessary being to distinguish it from those beings which have intrinsic potency to non-being and are therefore called contingent. For the lack of contingency is a certain necessity.

10. Angels are not necessary beings in the first way, but in the second. Therefore in the former way an angel is not a necessary being, because neither from essential principles does he have that he be actually a being, nor is he of such a nature that, after he has been made, he can exist through himself without the influx of an extrinsic cause. For this is above the nature of every created or creatable being. Nor does he have a potency by which he would actively and positively conserve himself, because this also involves repugnance, since every

effecting, in every moment in which it is, supposes the existence of the thing for the same instant. And this sense is intended by the cited Scholastics, and Richard declares it more in 1, distinction 8, question 2, although he does not use the words necessary being or contingent being. But in the latter way an angel is rightly called a necessary being as far as concerns himself, because in himself he does not have a potency of not being; and although in being conserved he depends on the influx of God, he requires this very influx from his nature, as has been sufficiently declared. And thus Athanasius said, in the tractate on definition, at the beginning: *Angels are not said to be without beginning, but they are called eternal, since indeed they are immortal and will live eternally.*

CHAPTER XI
WHETHER ANGELS EXIST IN A GREAT NUMBER, AND HOW GREAT THAT NUMBER IS

1. It is supposed first, from faith, that there are several Angels.—Up to this point we have explained the angelic nature and essence with respect to those things that are common to all Angels. But now, so that a more distinct knowledge of that nature may be had, it is necessary to inquire into other agreements or substantial differences among the Angels themselves, and to declare them according to our capacity. This investigation, however, first supposes that the angelic nature is found and multiplied in several supposita. For that there are several Angels we suppose as known from Scripture. Philosophers also investigated this in some way from the motions of the heavens, as I have declared in disputation 35 of the *Metaphysics*, section 1, art. 21. But that, when supposita are multiplied, natures are multiplied, is self-evident and certain from faith. For that in God there is unity of nature with plurality of supposita is a singular mystery and proper to God because of the infinity of the divine nature. But it is certain from faith that every angelic nature is created and essentially finite, and therefore it is most certain that in the Angels there are multiplied as many natures as there are supposita, whether that multiplication of natures is only numerical or some other greater multiplication, which we do not investigate.

2. It is supposed second, that the Angels are very many in a great and immense multitude.—Whether demons are the third part of the Angels.—Second, we suppose that the Angels are not only several, but also very many, indeed in a great and immense multitude. What the philosophers thought about the number of Angels I have declared at length in the said place of the

Metaphysics, but they were guided only by conjectures or by some human tradition. We, however, are certain from divine oracles that the multitude of holy Angels is innumerable, besides the evil Angels, who also exist in a great number. For of the holy Angels it is said in Daniel 7: "Thousands of thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him." And in Revelation 5: "I heard the voice of many Angels." And below: "and their number was thousands of thousands," which number is put indefinitely, to signify that they are innumerable, and, to increase the magnitude of the number, in the former testimony there is added the number "ten thousand times a hundred thousand." Accordingly, it is indicated that the multitude is so great that it exceeds human capacity, according to Job 25: "Is there any number of his soldiers?" Here by the name "soldiers" are understood the armies of the heavenly Angels, according to the plain context and the common exposition. And so also Paul said in Hebrews 12: "You have come to the heavenly Jerusalem, to the assembly of many thousands of Angels." And these things concern the good Angels. But concerning the evil ones, although from Scripture it is clear that they are several, Psalm 77: "Sendings through evil Angels"; Tobit 6: "He drives away every kind of demons," nevertheless their number is not signified with such great exaggeration. But that it is sufficiently great Paul indicates in Ephesians 6, saying that "we have war against Principalities and Powers," etc. And John, in Revelation, chapter 12, saying that Michael with his Angels has battle with the dragon and his angels. From that chapter some gather that the number of the evil angels is the third part of all the Angels that were created, and therefore that the number of Angels is only twice as great as the number of demons, because there it is said that the dragon "drew with him the third part of the stars." But nothing certain can be proved from this, both because, according to the letter, the discussion there is more about Antichrist and the multitude of just believers whom he is going to deceive than about Lucifer seducing and drawing with himself his companion evil angels; and also because, even if the discussion were about the fall of the Angels, the third part would not have to be understood precisely and definitely, but as signifying indefinitely a great part, as Viegas shows well there from other places of the same Revelation.

3. The number of Angels can be called infinite with respect to us.—Nor can we say anything more certain or definite about the number of Angels, except that it is very great, or greatest, so that with respect to us it can be called infinite and innumerable, as Gregory calls it, book 17 of the *Morals*, chapter 9, otherwise 7; Anselm, on Revelation 5; and Irenaeus, book 2, chapter 6, where he says they are innumerable, as the Prophets confess, and he cites the words of Daniel,

which Dionysius also weighed in this way, chapter 4 of *The Celestial Hierarchy*. And from the same place Gregory of Nyssa gathers, book *On the Making of Man*, chapter 17, that although there is no propagation among the Angels, nevertheless "their hosts are infinite in a certain number." But the primary reason for this number is the omnipotence and will of God, concerning which will we are certain through Scripture. But the congruities that can be thought out as to why God willed to create so great a multitude of Angels are several.

4. The first is taken from the perfection of the angelic nature, or of the intellectual grade in which the Angels exist, for it was fitting that the noblest creatures be produced in great quantity. And since in Angels magnitude of mass, or of continuous quantity, has no place, it was necessary that they be produced in the greatest and, as it were, immense number. The second reason is taken from the majesty of God, for Angels were created so that they might stand before God, minister to him, and fight for his honor. But God is a pure spirit and the King of infinite majesty; therefore it was especially fitting that he should have an infinite household of spirits standing before him and ministering to him, and innumerable legions of soldiers, which Christ indicated in Matthew 26, saying that it was easy for him "to have more than twelve legions." And that of Proverbs 14 agrees: "In the multitude of the people is the dignity of the King." This reason proceeds concerning the holy Angels. But it can be accommodated to the evil ones, insofar as on God's part they were created for the same end, or insofar as even those made evil are ministers of divine justice. A third reason can also be added, because Angels have free choice and are flexible toward evil, and therefore they were created good in so great a number that, although many might fail, there would still remain a most sufficient and most abundant number of spirits praising God. And other similar congruities can easily be found, which show that the number of Angels is immense, but not how great it is. Hence those who have defined it, saying that it is one hundred, or three hundred, or six hundred thousand thousands, could rather have dreamed this than known it, as can be seen in the marginal note to Giles in 2, distinction 3, question 2, art. 2, doubt 3, to the arguments.

5. Whether the Angels are more numerous than all human beings.—The negative opinion.—To explain this number of the Angels further in a human way, certain comparisons are customarily made or questions are asked. The first is whether the number of Angels is greater than that of all human beings who are to exist from the beginning up to the consummation of the world. For some think that the number of human beings will be greater. Gregory gives no little support to this opinion, homily 34 on the Gospels, for he says that in glory there

will be an equal number of Angels and human beings. William of Paris tries to persuade this by many conjectures, treatise *On the Universe*, in the first part of the second part, chapter 64 and following. From this it plainly follows that the number of human beings will be greater, because the number of evil Angels is smaller than that of the good, whereas the number of reprobate human beings is greater than that of the elect. Indeed, from this it can also be gathered that, although the blessed Angels will be more numerous than human beings, nevertheless absolutely the number of human beings is greater, because the number of holy Angels is only twice as great as the number of evil Angels, as is believed, but the number of human beings to be saved will be as great as the number of evil Angels, because they were created to repair their seats. Therefore, in beatitude the number of Angels is only twice as great as the number of blessed human beings. But the number of reprobate human beings is not only twice, but even three times and four times, or perhaps even ten times greater than the number of human beings to be saved, as is known from Scripture and from the facts themselves. Therefore, by comparing together the collection of all Angels with the collection of human beings, the number of the latter will be greater. And thus Durandus grants, in 2, distinction 3, question 4, to 1. And the Master holds the same, in 2, distinction 11.

7. It is refuted with respect to the second principle.—Likewise, the other principle, that the human beings to be saved will be neither in a greater nor in a lesser number than the damned Angels, is equally unknown. For although it is probable that the ruins or seats of the Angels, which the evil ones left empty, are to be filled from human beings, as is the opinion of Augustine, 2, 2, *The City of God*, chapter 1, and in the *Enchiridion*, chapters 61 and 62, whom Bede follows on Ephesians 1, Anselm, Bernard, and others whom I mentioned in book 1, *On Predestination*, chapter 12, nevertheless this is not certain. And it is still more doubtful whether those seats of the Angels are to be restored by human beings in the same number and according to the same proportion. For perhaps those seats will be filled, not by equality of number, but by the excellence of the glory of many human beings, so that, although they are fewer in number, because of their abundance of glory they may be equivalent to many or to more; for example, if through the glory of one virgin those several seats are said to be repaired, or in its own way through the glory of martyrs and of others who can say: "We have passed through fire and water; you have brought us out into refreshment," Psalm 65. Concerning these Bernard says, sermon 58 on the *Song of Songs*, that God's praise in glory would not have been complete if those who could say this had been lacking in it. And finally, although it is probable that the

number of human beings to be saved will not be less than the number of evil Angels, because otherwise not all the seats of the Angels would be restored, nevertheless it does not follow from this that elect human beings will not be in a greater number than the evil Angels. Indeed the opposite can be inferred, because human beings were chosen not only on the occasion of the fall of the Angels, but in themselves and for their own sake, as I taught in the cited place. And thus Anselm gathers, book 1 of *Why God Became Man*, chapter 18. And Augustine, in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 29, said that, through the restoration of human beings, not only "will that heavenly city not be deprived of any numerical abundance of its citizens, but perhaps it will reign with an even richer abundance. For we do not know," he says, "how great is either the number of human beings to be saved or the number of evil angels." Hence the Master in distinction 11, chapter 2, supposes as certain that there will be as many human beings saved as there are good Angels. Yet I do not see from where he can prove this. But if that is posited, and if evil Angels are fewer than good ones, it rightly follows that the number of human beings will be greater. The same is well inferred if the number of elect human beings is posited to be greater than the multitude of reprobate Angels, because in this way the multitude of human beings is increased even more, since the number of reprobate human beings exceeds the number of the predestined in many ways, which cannot be said of the Angels among themselves. But granted that this is so, nevertheless the conjecture from other heads remains uncertain, especially because it is wholly unknown how great the number of evil Angels is.

8. The affirmative opinion.—Hence others hold as certain that the number of Angels is far greater than that of human beings. This seems plausible by another conjecture. For guardian Angels of human beings are taken only from the last order of Angels, as we shall see later. But to each human being his own guardian Angel is assigned. Therefore, at a minimum, the number of Angels exceeds the number of human beings existing together at any time, because it is necessary that the number of human beings existing together, however much it grows, can never equal the number of Angels of the lowest order. For, if that equality were ever given and one human being were born anew, it would be necessary for a new guardian Angel to be created for him, because all the rest would already have their charges, and none is deputed to guard two human beings at the same time. Indeed, it is probable that the same Angel does not even successively guard several human beings; otherwise he would always be engaged in that office, which does not seem consonant with their dignity and with the divine munificence. But if this is so, in the lowest order of Angels alone there are

as many Angels as there will be human beings in the whole of time, from the beginning of the world to its end, or even more. But beyond that order there are eight other orders of Angels more perfect. And it is probable that the more perfect an order of Angels is, the more it also exceeds in number, according to the rule given, that in things intended by God per se, the more perfect exceed either in magnitude or in multitude, just as in the heavens also we see that the superior are always of far greater magnitude. Therefore, all things considered, the multitude of Angels exceeds the multitude of human beings.

9. Another congruity also occurs, because, speaking simply, the number of the blessed will be greater than that of the damned, insofar as each number is composed of Angels and human beings. But this cannot be unless the number of human beings is greater than that of Angels. Therefore. The major is taken from St. Thomas, in 1, distinction 39, question 2, art. 2, reply to 4, and it is probable in itself, both because in those things that are chiefly intended by God, such as intellectual creatures, it was fitting that the good should be in more than the evil, and also because it is fitting that divine mercy together with distributive or reward-giving justice be shown in more than vindicative justice. Hence St. Thomas above judges it probable that the blessed Angels alone are more numerous than all the damned, both Angels and human beings taken together. But from this the excess in the number of Angels clearly follows, because human beings who are damned are incomparably more numerous than those who are saved. Therefore, in order that the number of the predestined exceed the number of the reprobate, it is necessary that the holy Angels be incomparably more numerous than predestined human beings, and consequently the whole number of Angels will surpass the number of all human beings, although the quantity of the excess is unknown.

10. An opinion concerning the excess by which the number of Angels exceeds the quantity of human beings.—This opinion is rejected.—Some, however, as Athanasius reports in the questions to Antiochus, question 2, said that the number of Angels exceeds the number of human beings by ninety-nine parts, led only by the parable of the woman who, when she had ten drachmas, lost one and overturned the house to seek it, etc., Luke 15. So it is found in the codex that I use. Yet it seems rather that it should have been founded on the parable of the lost sheep, to seek which the shepherd left the ninety-nine in the desert. For the Fathers are accustomed to interpret the ninety-nine sheep as the Angels, as Hilary and Theophylact there, and Gregory, homily 34 on the Gospels, and Ambrose indicates in the book *The Apology of David*, chapter 5, and more at length book 10, on Luke, at chapter 15, where he has a phrase that

could have provided an occasion for that opinion: "The rich Father," he says, "of whom we are the hundredth portion, has innumerable flocks of Angels, Archangels, and others." Nevertheless, the argument taken from that parable is frivolous, both because it is not certain that in it the Angels are signified by the ninety-nine sheep. For Augustine, book *Eighty-Five Questions*, question 65, says that sinners and proud human beings are rather signified, because Christ was speaking only about human beings. But others think that the sense of the parable is not that Christ left some in order to seek a human being, but only that Christ willed to signify through that parable that he sought the human being with so great an affection that, if there were only one hundred human beings and only one of them had fallen, he would come to seek him, leaving the others. Also because the same thing is signified by the parables of the sheep and of the drachmas, and yet the excess of one to ten and to ninety-nine is not the same. Therefore the force of the parable must not be placed in either proportion. Finally, also because Augustine, in the cited place, explains that through both parables only this was signified, that the completed number of the predestined, or the beatific state, would not have been future unless the lost sheep of human nature were recalled to it, just as the number in any species is not perfect if unity is lacking, which is found both in those numbers mentioned by Christ and in others greater or lesser. Hence Augustine says: "Numbers to which one is lacking so that they may be perfected can vary by smallness or magnitude," etc.

11. The excess of the number of Angels over the number of human beings is uncertain.—Accordingly, that opinion about so great or such and such an excess of the number of Angels over the number of human beings has no foundation. But that, speaking absolutely, the number of Angels is greater, although the definite excess is unknown, is probable; nevertheless this very thing is uncertain. For the conjecture made supposes many uncertain things, and especially that one Angel guards only one human being in the whole succession of human beings. For from where can this be known or proved? Or that it is unfitting that, after the death of one human being, another newly born should be entrusted to the same Angel? Certainly, there is no ground. For the Angels of kingdoms or provinces preside over them for a very long time, even though in the course of time individual human beings pass away and others succeed. Therefore there is no reason for us to say that individual Angels of private persons exercise the ministry of guarding for only the very short time of one human being's life. Indeed, I add that it is not certain that one Angel is not deputed at the same time to the guardianship of several persons, because although it is certain that each human being has an Angel deputed to guard him,

nevertheless it is not certain that the Angel of one is distinct from another, or that each human being has an Angel to guard him alone. For even if he guards several at the same time, he will be able to exercise his office fully and perfectly with respect to each. Still, even if this is granted, and we grant that the number of Angels of the lowest order exceeds the number of all human beings who exist together at individual times, it does not follow that the number of all Angels is greater than the number of all human beings. Both because we do not know whether all the orders of Angels are equal in number, or, if they are unequal, whether the inferior orders are more abundant than the superior, for congruities can easily be thought out on either side; and also because the number of human beings existing in the whole duration of the world from beginning to end surpasses any number of human beings existing together not only in an eightfold proportion, but even in a hundredfold proportion, and thus it cannot be known which excess is greater. Therefore this comparison also is uncertain.

12. The opinion asserting that Angels and human beings will be equal in number is rejected.—Nor is it said with less gratuitousness by some, as Athanasius also reports, that human beings and Angels will be equal multitudes. For this cannot be persuaded by any authority, or reason, or probable conjecture. They introduced the words of Deuteronomy 32: "He established the boundaries of the peoples according to the number of the sons of Israel," reading according to the Septuagint: "according to the number of the sons of God," by whom they understand the Angels, and they explain it in this way, that God established the number of the multiplication of human beings according to the number of the Angels. But this opinion and interpretation is very foreign, and, as Abulensis said, on the said chapter 32, question 4, both because the Vulgate reading is to be preferred, and the Septuagint do not depart from it in meaning, since the Israelites too are called sons of God because of God's special protection and election; and also because, even if it is properly read "according to the number of the sons of God," the ancient Fathers gather from this only that human kingdoms and empires were divided according to the number of Angels who were deputed to their guardianship, as Theodoret explains, oration 10, on Daniel, around those words: "The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me," etc. And according to the same sense Clement of Alexandria said, book 7 of the *Stromata*, a little from the beginning: "By divine and ancient command Angels are distributed among the nations. But the opinion of believers is the Lord's portion." Hence the author of the *Imperfect Work*, on Matthew, homily 48, understands that place of evil Angels. But if the opinion concerning Angels is admitted, it is better understood of the good ones; for to them, and not to the

evil, God handed over human beings to be guarded. And thus many Fathers from that place prove the guardianship of Angels, as we shall see below in its proper place. But the number of Angels, or its comparison to the number of human beings, can in no way be gathered from that place. Therefore this whole comparison is uncertain, but it is more credible that the number of Angels is greater, for this has been received from the common sense of the faithful and of the more learned theologians, as will be confirmed more from the following comparison. I omit that Dionysius the Carthusian reports, on Dionysius, *The Celestial Hierarchy*, chapter 14, that it was revealed to Saint Bridget that the number of Angels is much greater than that of human beings.

13. Whether Angels are more numerous than bodies.—The affirmative opinion.—The other comparison is customarily made between Angels and bodies, namely, whether there are more spirits than bodies. To this St. Thomas responds, in the said question 50, art. 3, that immaterial substances exist in so great a multitude that they exceed every material multitude. And in confirmation he adduces Dionysius, chapter 14 of *The Celestial Hierarchy*, saying: "The army of the supernal minds exceeds the commensuration of our material numbers." But Vasquez notes there that material or corporeal numbers are not spoken of on the part of the numbered things, but on the part of the human beings numbering, which Ripa strongly attacks. But in reality that is the legitimate sense, especially because those words are read otherwise according to the translation of Ambrose the Florentine, namely: "For there are very many armies of the heavenly spirits, which far transcend the weak and brief measure of our mortal numbers." These words openly give the said sense, according to which the comparison is made not on the part of the numbered things, but on the part of the mortal human being numbering, namely, because our numbering does not reach that number, nor does it have a name by which it might explain so great a multitude. This can be said not only of the number of spiritual things, but also of the multitude of corporeal things, such as the fish of the sea, or the sands of its shore, or human beings, according to Revelation 7: "After this I saw a great crowd, which no one could number." But St. Thomas adds the conjecture already touched upon, that God, intending the perfection of the universe, produces more of the more perfect things and of those intended per se, so that excellence may be greater in them. Then he adds a proportional reason, because just as he made more perfect bodies greater in magnitude, so he increased spiritual things in multitude, because they were not capable of magnitude. These reasons are attacked by Durandus and defended by Cajetan and others. But there is no need to dwell on this, because they are adduced only as probable

congruities or conjectures, and for this they are most sufficient. The way Scripture speaks also makes this opinion more plausible, especially since Gregory and Anselm, cited above, gather from those ways of speaking in Scripture that the number of Angels is, as it were, infinite to us, although it is finite to God and to the Angels themselves.

14. Whether this comparison is understood according to species and according to number.—But the moderns doubt whether the comparison is made between Angels and all corporeal things even differing only in number, or only according to the multitude of material species. For St. Thomas said with a distribution: "exceeding every material multitude." Therefore he is speaking of every multitude, whether of individuals or of species. And thus Lincoln, on the said chapter 14 of Dionysius, thinks that the number of Angels exceeds the number of all corporeal individuals existing together at any time. Others, without limitation, speak of all individuals going to exist at any time, as Pesantius reports. But the Thomists commonly understand the comparison to be made between the number of Angels and the number of material species. Indeed Bañez even limits this, so that it should not be understood of all specific natures, but only of those that are primary parts of the universe, because St. Thomas, as he says, is speaking only of specific natures that are intended for their own sake. But this is too little, since from the lower orders of Angels alone individual Angels are deputed as guardians for individual species of corporeal things, and besides, individual Angels for individual human beings, and for cities and provinces, apart from the immense multitude of superior Angels.

15. The opinion of St. Thomas.—Therefore it is at least more probable that the number of Angels exceeds all corporeal specific natures, as Cajetan teaches on the said art. 3, and Ferrariensis, 3, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 92, and other moderns; and they take it from St. Thomas, the same First Part, question 112, art. 4, reply to 2, because he says that "incorporeal natures surpass corporeal natures," which word is properly said of species. But St. Thomas seems immediately to limit this when he adds: "Nor is this said in the sense that the number of Angels is only so great, but that it is much greater, because it exceeds every material multitude." Therefore more clearly in book 2, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 92, although in the third reason St. Thomas speaks absolutely of all bodies and of the whole multitude of material things, nevertheless in the fourth reason he limits the discussion and the proofs to the species of material things, and according to this limitation the other places seem to be explained. And similarly, question 7, *On Power*, art. 6, at the end of the body, in the first reason

he concludes only that incorporeal substances transcend every multitude of material species.

16. The true opinion of the author.—Therefore this manner of speaking is simply more probable. But it occurs that one should add that, if among Angels there are several of the same species, as below we shall probably say, it is credible that the number of Angels exceeds the number of the essences of corporeal individuals, at least of those that are not distinguished wholly per accidens, but in some way per se. For two genera of individuals can be considered in material things. Some are those that are multiplied by the division alone of continuous quantity, as happens in homogeneous things, such as the elements and all non-living mixed bodies. And these individuals I say are distinguished as it were per accidens, such as several fires, stones, sands; and I judge that with these the comparison should not be made, because it is a very accidental multiplication. For, speaking per se, all those things ought to compose one individual of immense mass. But others are those that require distinction per se, because they require a determinate magnitude and organization, as living things do, and especially animals. And with respect to these I judge it probable that not only are the angelic species more numerous than the species of such things, but also, given in the species of Angels the multiplication of individuals differing only in number, according to that multiplication the number of spiritual individuals exceeds the number of material individuals, either existing together or perhaps even successively; for the multiplication that happens in material things by propagation happens in Angels by creation, and happens together. Yet I except the individuals of the human species because of the nobility and permanence of souls. For it is not plausible that in any one angelic species so many individuals are multiplied as in the human species, whatever may be the case concerning the rest. But if in angelic species there are not several individuals, as the Thomists judge, then their comparison with species alone proceeds better.

CHAPTER XII
WHETHER ALL ANGELS ARE OF THE SAME SPECIFIC NATURE, OR WHETHER AN ESSENTIAL DISTINCTION IS FOUND AMONG THEM

1. The first reason for doubting, from the Fathers.—The first reason for doubting is taken from various sayings of the holy Fathers asserting that all Angels are of the same nature or essence, which absolutely is said only of things of the same species. For no one will say that a human being and a horse, indeed

not even a lion and a horse, are of the same nature. Basil speaks in this way, book 3 against Eunomius, at the beginning, where he not only says: "All Angels, just as they are of one appellation, so they are of the same nature among themselves"; but he also adds that, although they are unequal in dignity and principality, "they do not therefore have another nature." And finally he wishes that, just as the Holy Spirit is of the same individual nature with the Father and the Son, so the Angels among themselves are of the same common nature. Hence he seems plainly to be speaking of the identity of nature immediately after numerical identity. Likewise, Gregory of Nyssa very openly, *On the Making of Man*, chapter 17, says that, although among the Angels there is no propagation, nevertheless "they are diffused into almost infinite thousands in such a way that they can be both one and many in number." And in the book *On the Lord's Prayer*, around those words "Your will be done as in heaven," he speaks of the angelic and human nature as of two essences and species. Likewise Athanasius, in the oration on "All things have been handed over to me," and near the end, after saying that human beings can be called of one substance because they are of the same nature, adds: "Angels also among themselves, by reason of genus, and all other kindred things, are of the same nature." And in the *Questions to Antiochus*, he says that "a demon does not differ from an Angel in essence, but in will." And question 4, he says: "Of Angels, Archangels," etc., "there is one essence, just as there is one essence of human beings." Damascene, although in book 2, *On the Faith*, chapter 2, he had said that only God knows, and that it is not known to us, whether Angels are unequal or equal in essence, nevertheless in the book *On Decrees and Opinions*, chapter 1, says: "There is one nature of each species, and there is one nature of all Angels, and one nature of all human beings," etc.; and chapter 7: "I call soul, Angel, demon an incorporeal essence, for each of these is a weak species." And Anselm, book 2, *Why God Became Man*, chapter 21, says that "Angels are of the same nature, although they are not of the same genus, as human beings are; for not all Angels are from one Angel, as all human beings are from one human being." There he signifies that Angels are of one nature in the way human beings are, although they differ in the mode of multiplication.

2. The second reason for doubting, or theological conjecture.—Second, we can make a theological conjecture from what has been said. For if there were anything that would compel us to establish an essential difference among the Angels, it would especially be because Scripture and the Fathers distinguish among them hierarchies and orders of Angels and Archangels. But an essential distinction is not necessary for this enumeration and distinction. Therefore it

must not be admitted by us. The major is proved because all the other things that Scripture hands down concerning the Angels are common to all, and only through those names, or equivalent ones, is some distinction shown. The minor is proved both from the sayings of the Fathers, who, while commemorating that distinction of orders, nevertheless deny an essential distinction, or at least judge that the whole series of angelic orders can subsist without such a distinction. Bernard otherwise holds this, book 5, *On Consideration*, chapters 4 and 5; and Augustine in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 58, when he says that, although those various names of Angels are known to us, "yet what the difference of those persons is is unknown to us." And he has similar things in the book against the Priscillianists, chapter 11. Finally, the consequence is proved because, setting authority aside, there is no reason that induces one to establish an essential difference among Angels. Indeed rather, the greater the unity among Angels is, the more perfect their state seems, because unity pertains to perfection, and therefore God is supremely one. Therefore, since the angelic nature could not attain that unity with plurality of persons, the more it is one, the more perfect it will be.

3. The third reason for doubting, from philosophy.—Third, some argue philosophically, because in so great a simplicity as exists in the angelic nature, the multiplication of species seems impossible, since Angels agree in all attributes and powers, namely, intellect and will, and in their mode of operating. And it is confirmed, because spiritual substance is distinguished into two grades, namely rational and intellectual. But a spirit or rational soul cannot be multiplied according to species. Therefore neither will an intellectual spirit or angelic nature be capable of that distinction. And thus William of Paris taught this opinion from the ancient theologians, in the book *On the Universe*, in part 1 of the second part, through many chapters; and Albert the Great, in the *Summa*, part 2, tractate 2, question 8; and Bonaventure does not disagree in 2, distinction 3, art. 2, question 1, and chooses this side as more probable.

4. The first conclusion.—Angels differing in species can be created by God. —Nevertheless, it must be said first that Angels differing in species could have been created by God. Thus I taught in disputation 35 of the *Metaphysics*, section 3, art. 43, and almost nothing occurs that must be added, nor is it necessary to repeat what was said there, because the matter is clear and seems most certain. And the Fathers seem to suppose it, not only those who in fact admit that distinction, but also Augustine, Damascene, and Bernard. For when they doubt, or assert that they are ignorant whether it is so, they certainly suppose it to be possible. And all the scholastics take this as known. And certainly the opposite

greatly conflicts with the omnipotence of God. For it is remarkable that in all the lower grades of things God could produce so many species of things, and in the supreme intellectual grade willed to create only one complete in its order. But I say "complete in such a grade," because although the rational soul and the Angel agree in some way in that grade and differ from each other in species, nevertheless the soul is not a complete substance in that grade, nor wholly abstracted from matter, since it essentially regards matter as the true form of the body. But what reason or repugnance can be given on the part of the complete intellectual grade on account of which species essentially distinct cannot be multiplied within it? Certainly none. Therefore, if God could not produce them, it would be from a defect of his power, which to affirm is the same as denying his omnipotence. The minor is proved because, if something on the part of created spiritual substance were opposed, it would be either its simplicity or its perfection, for nothing else can be thought out. But simplicity is not opposed, because it is not so great that it does not admit some composition, either from esse and essence, or from nature and suppositum, and a fortiori from genus and difference, as was shown above. Also because simplicity opposed to composition from matter and form does not exclude essential multiplication, because the proper reason of this distinction, even in things thus composed, is not matter but form. Therefore it can much better be found in forms subsisting without matter or order to matter. Nor is the perfection of that grade opposed, because every angelic nature is finite, and therefore another essentially more perfect can easily be understood. This difference can be understood and explained by us through a different mode of operating, as we shall say below. Indeed, from this an effective argument is taken, because every angelic substance participates in a finite way the intellectual perfection of God according to the mode connatural to a creature. Therefore a superior spiritual substance can easily be understood to be possible, one that would participate divine perfection in that grade in a more perfect essential way. Therefore, on the part of such substances, nothing is repugnant to an essential diversity being found among them. Therefore neither can it be repugnant on God's part, and consequently such diversity and multiplication is possible.

5. The second conclusion.—It is more probable that there is diversity of species among the Angels.—I say second. It is far more probable that in the angelic grade there are several spirits substantially differing in species and essence. Thus St. Thomas teaches with all his followers, and Alexander of Hales, Scotus, Giles, and others whom we shall mention in the thirteenth chapter. But from Scripture and the Fathers we can bring few things in confirmation of this

assertion. For from them we have only the various names by which the various orders and hierarchies of holy spirits are signified. But they do not explain to us how great or what kind the distinction signified by those words is, nor is it sufficiently known to us from the words themselves. Therefore we can only weigh certain words that they use in distinguishing those orders, which are explained and accommodated much more easily and plausibly if a distinction of natures is supposed among the angelic orders themselves. But we pursue this argument more conveniently in the following chapter. One can also weigh what the Fathers are accustomed to say, that the Angels received grace according to natural proportion. For by this they suppose inequality in their natures before all grace. Likewise they say that Lucifer was more perfect than the rest, either simply more perfect than all, or at least more perfect than all of some order or orders, more perfect, I say, not only in grace, but also in nature and in the force and perspicacity of understanding. This is also signified through various metaphors, in either the mystical or the secondary literal sense of Ezekiel 28 and 31. For although among human beings that excess which is declared through those metaphors is easily understood according to dominion and principality, political power, and similar external or human perfections, nevertheless among Angels it does not seem capable of being accommodated, nor can a sufficient reason for it be given, unless such an excess of perfection or state has its foundation in the substance or essence.

6. Finally, supposing the possibility of this essential variety among Angels, it is much more consonant with the beauty of the universe, and consequently also with the order of divine wisdom, that the Angels were created in a great variety of species. First, because distinction and order of species is per se and increases the perfection and nobility of the universe more than the mere multiplication of individuals. Therefore not only the latter, but especially the former, ought to exist in the angelic grade. Second, because the multitude of species in the lower grades of bodies or of living things adorns the universe in a wonderful way and shows divine wisdom, goodness, and power. But the grade of separated substances pertains more to the perfection of the universe than all the lower grades. Therefore this variety especially ought to be found in it. Third, because in lower things we find several middle essences between the things extremely distant in the same grade, as between a human being and imperfect animals there are innumerable species of perfect and irrational animals, and so with others. Therefore much more, between God and a human being, which are as it were extremes of the greatest distance in the intellectual grade, many grades of intellectual natures diverse in species ought to have been produced. Finally,

fourth, in the heavenly bodies and stars there is found variety of species; why, then, will it not also be found in the Angels, or movers of the heavens, or other more worthy things?

7. The response to the testimonies of the Fathers in number one.—To the second reason for doubting in number two.—To the testimonies of the Saints alleged at the beginning, therefore, it can first be said that they spoke of the angelic nature as of one species like the human, because just as that in which human beings agree is what is most perfect in them, so the Angels agree most in that which in them pertains to perfection simply, such as the intellectual spiritual grade, wholly abstracted from matter. And because this is almost all that we know concerning the substance of Angels, therefore the Saints speak of their nature like the human nature. And hence some of them also seem to have descended into that opinion concerning the specific unity of Angels, which is not to be wondered at in an obscure and opinable matter. But others speak generally of the unity of angelic nature, either by abstracting from the mode of unity, or by doubting how great and what kind it is. The second argument, however, requires us to explain the mode of distinction among the hierarchies and orders of Angels. We shall satisfy that request in the following chapter. To the third, the response has been given through the first assertion.

8. To the third and to its confirmation in number three.—But to the confirmation concerning the unity of the rational soul, it is responded by denying the parity of reason, because the rational soul is the other extreme of the whole latitude of the grade of intellect, certainly the lowest, and extremely distant from God, and therefore in that lowest grade a multiplication of natures was not necessary. A multiplication of individuals suffices, which is accommodated to the imperfection of that extreme. For on the part of God, or of the other extreme, because of his supreme perfection no multiplication of nature was necessary or possible. But the angelic order is middle between these two extremes, and therefore, for its perfection and as it were for its completion, a variety of natures was necessary, as has been declared. It could be disputed here whether several species of immaterial and intellectual forms informing bodies are possible. But this question is not necessary for the present undertaking, and perhaps it will be touched upon in the treatise *On the Soul*. For now it is sufficient that it is not necessary for the perfection of that grade or terminus, nor intelligible according to the order of inferior bodies instituted by God. For it does not seem that, according to the due order of intellectual natures, any intellectual substance can be united to a body as form, unless through that body it can receive cognition. But the soul cannot receive cognition through the body

unless it is capable of sensitive cognition adapted for abstracting intellectual cognition. But in that mode of knowing either it was not necessary that essential variety be found, because it is imperfect, or perhaps it could not be found, because it is too determinate and particular.

CHAPTER XIII
WHETHER THE WHOLE NUMBER OF ANGELS IS CONVENIENTLY DISTINGUISHED INTO THREE HIERARCHIES AND NINE CHOIRS OR ORDERS

1. What a hierarchy is and in what things it is found.—What a choir or order is.—We cannot explain the distinction of Angels through substantial genera and species unless we first explain their various grades or orders of dignities, as handed down to us by Scripture and the Fathers. St. Thomas treated this matter separately in the First Part, question 108, and the Master with the Doctors in 2, distinction 9. From them it must be supposed that the name hierarchy is common both to Angels and to human beings, for, according to the etymology of the Greek name, it signifies the same as sacred principality, that is, a collection of persons sacred in some way under some Prince. Hence it cannot be found in irrational things, because they are not capable of proper principality or of sacred dignity. Nor can it be attributed to God because of the trinity of persons, since among them there is neither principality nor order of dignities, as St. Thomas rightly noted above, art. 1, with Dionysius, chapter 3 of *The Celestial Hierarchy*, saying that "God is outside and above every hierarchy; for every hierarchy exists in imitation and likeness of him." Therefore Bonaventure and Gabriel above distinguish hierarchy in vain into created and uncreated, for there is no uncreated hierarchy. But created hierarchy is found both in heaven and on earth, yet not in hell, where there is neither anything sacred nor any order, but everlasting horror dwells. How there is some prelation among demons we shall say in book 8. Therefore there is a heavenly hierarchy, that of the Angels, about which we now treat, and an ecclesiastical hierarchy, that of human beings tending toward that one, about which, God granting, we shall speak elsewhere. But a hierarchy consists of choirs or orders, as we shall say. And therefore it must also be supposed that by the name choir or order is signified a collection or multitude more special and contained within a hierarchy, of sacred persons having among themselves a peculiar likeness in some office of grace, as we shall explain the matter itself more in treating it.

2. The true affirmative resolution of the question.—This being posited, it must first be established that among the Angels there is an order of inferiors and superiors according to various grades of dignities, which grades are constituted in three hierarchies, first, second, and third, and thus there are nine orders, which are named Angels, Archangels, Principalities, Powers, Dominations, Virtues, Thrones, Cherubim, and Seraphim. This foundation taken in common, by abstracting from the mode of distinguishing and ordering the aforesaid orders, is of faith. First, because it is found in Scripture. For Paul, in Romans 8, commemorates three orders, saying: "neither Angels, nor Archangels, nor Principalities." And he adds three others in Colossians 1, numbering Thrones, Dominations, Principalities, and Powers. To these he adds Virtues in 1 Corinthians 15, and in Ephesians 1; and in 1 Thessalonians 4 he says that Christ will come to judgment with the voice of an Archangel. And Jude, in his epistle, calls Michael an Archangel. But Peter, in 1 Peter, chapter 3, says of Christ: "Having gone into heaven, with Angels, Powers, and Virtues subjected to himself." Concerning the Cherubim, Genesis 3 says: "God placed before the paradise of pleasure the Cherubim." And in Hebrews 9 Paul says that over the ark there were Cherubim of glory overshadowing the propitiatory. Although these were figures and images, they represented Angels, as Ribera explains with Bede and others, book 2, *On the Temple*, chapter 6. Finally, mention of the Seraphim is made in Isaiah 6.

3. It is proved from the Greek Fathers.—Second, from these places of Scripture the Fathers gathered that through those words are signified nine orders of Angels unequal in dignity and grade. Martial touched on this in passing, in the epistle to the Toulousans, chapter 42; Anthony the abbot, in epistle 5, near the end, which are found in volume 3 of the *Library*; and Sophronius, in the epistle related in the Sixth Synod of Constantinople, saying that God produced visible and invisible, or intellectual, things, and the differences of many thousands of these. But Dionysius was the first of all to hand them down distinctly, in chapter 5 of *The Celestial Hierarchy*, where he omitted the Dominations, but in chapter 6 and following he numbers all in the same order in which they have been recited by us above, and in the following chapters he declares those orders at length. Ignatius numbers the same orders, epistle 5 to the Trallians, yet in a different order: "And I," he says, "can understand the angelic orders, the heavenly armies of Archangels and distinctions, the differences of Virtues and Dominations, the diversities of Thrones and Powers, the magnificences of Principalities, and the excellences of Cherubim and Seraphim." But Irenaeus, book 2, chapter 54, while numbering the other orders,

is silent about the two supreme orders and numbers the Thrones in the third place after the Archangels, and then Dominations, etc. And he preserves the same order in book 3, chapter 8. Hippolytus, however, in the oration *On the Consummation of the World*, near the end, omits Archangels, and after Angels he commemorates Thrones, Powers, Principalities, Dominations, Cherubim, and Seraphim in this order, also passing over the Virtues, of whom he had previously made some mention. Athanasius, often making mention of these orders, sometimes numbers three or four, also changing the order, as can be seen in sermons 3 and 4 against the Arians. Yet in question 4 to Antiochus, positing nine, he recites the lower hierarchy in its own order by ascending from the lower to the higher order, but the supreme in the contrary way, for he begins from the Seraphim and through the Cherubim descends to the Thrones. Likewise, in the oration on "All things have been handed over to me," he says: "Because he is near to God, to Cherubim and Seraphim." And in the book *On the Common Essence*, he adds Thrones, and adds the rest by ascending. But in the second order he gives the middle place to the Virtues, and seems to place Dominations above them, and he professes to follow the doctrine of Dionysius.

4. Basil, in the *Liturgy*, numbers those orders in this order: "Angels, Archangels, Thrones, Dominations, Principalities, Powers, Virtues praise you, and the many-eyed Cherubim stand around you, the Seraphim." Nazianzen, oration 34, question 2, *On Theology*, reciting seven orders, omits Cherubim and Seraphim, and, beginning from Angels, places Thrones in the third place, then Powers, Principalities, Dominations, Virtues. And Chrysostom preserves almost the same number and order, homily 2, *On the Incomprehensible Nature of God*, except that he places Dominations in the fourth place. But in homily 4 on Genesis he changes this order. For by ascending he places Virtues in the third place and immediately Thrones, and the rest as above, to which he there joins Cherubim and Seraphim. But Cyril of Alexandria, book 1 on Genesis, around the middle, numbers thus: "Angels, Archangels, Thrones, Powers, Virtues, and Principalities, also the supernal Seraphim," and afterwards adds "Cherubim," saying that it is written of Satan: "I placed you with the Cherubim. But the holy Cherubim," he says, "have firm glory." Finally, Damascene too, book 2, chapter 3, by alleging Dionysius, distinguishes the same three hierarchies, and in the first and third he recites the orders in the same series. Yet, beginning from the superior orders, he distinguishes the second as follows: "of Dominations, Virtues, and Powers." And Maximinus interprets Dionysius in the same way in chapter 6 of *The Celestial Hierarchy*. But Euthymius, on the contrary, Luke 15, by alleging Dionysius, distinguishes the second hierarchy thus in order of dignity,

beginning from above: "Dominations, Powers, and Virtues." Therefore, although they agree in the number of hierarchies and in the order of the first and third, there is great variety in the second.

5. It is proved from the Latin Fathers.—The same can be seen in the Latin Fathers, among whom I first place Clement of Rome, although perhaps he wrote in Greek. Therefore he says as follows in book 8 of the *Constitutions*, chapter 12: "Lord God, innumerable hosts of Angels adore you, of Archangels, Thrones, Dominations, Principalities, Powers, Virtues, the Cherubim of eternal armies and the Seraphim endowed with six wings." But Hilary on Psalm 134: "Whatever the Lord willed, he did," while numbering the other orders, omits Virtues. And beginning from Thrones he proceeds, saying: "of Dominations, Principalities, Powers, Cherubim and Seraphim, Angels and Archangels." Gregory also is varied. For in 32 *Morals*, chapter 18, otherwise 25, he numbers as follows: "Angels, Archangels, Thrones, Dominations, Virtues, Principalities, Powers." But in homily 34 on the Gospels, distinguishing more expressly the same choirs and orders of Angels, he preserves the order of Dionysius in the two lowest and the three principal orders, but differs in the four intermediate ones. For in ascending he places "Virtues" immediately above Archangels, and then "Powers, Principalities, Dominations." And afterwards, in declaring the distinction of these, he judges the order of dignity among them to be the same. And Innocent III imitates him in all things, in book 2, *On the Mysteries of the Mass*, chapter 62; as do Lawrence Justinian, in the sermon *On the Angels*, and Sedulius, book 1, chapter on Ephesians. Bernard holds the same, sermon 27, otherwise 19, on the *Song of Songs*, and book 5, *On Consideration*, chapter 4. For although in numbering and ascending he places Dominations in the fourth place above Virtues, and afterward Powers and Principalities, nevertheless in explaining he declares that Dominations are in the sixth and more perfect order. But Rupert, book 2 on Genesis, chapter 15, beginning from Angels after Archangels, places "Thrones, Dominations, Principalities, Powers, Virtues," etc. And Isidore, book *On the Highest Good*, or *Sentences*, chapter 10, follows almost the same order in numbering, and differs only because he subjects Virtues to Principalities and Powers. Bede follows him literally in the book *Various Questions*, question 9. Anselm, on 2 Corinthians 12, imitates Dionysius and orders the second hierarchy thus: "Powers, Virtues, and Dominations," and ascends from the lower to the higher order, as he declares more at length in chapter 1 on Colossians. But Hugh of Saint Victor, agreeing in other matters, places Virtues in the first order of the third hierarchy, but Principalities in the last order of the second hierarchy.

6. It is certain that these dignities are given among Angels.—It is doubtful whether all those words signify diverse persons.—From all these things it is gathered that in the grade of separated substances there are those dignities and orders that are signified by those words. For the expressions of Scripture, declared with such great consent of the Fathers and received in that sense by the constant tradition of the Church, produce sufficient certainty of this truth. But a doubt remains whether all those words, each and every one, signify various persons distinct in dignity, office, and order, or whether the same person under different notions admits those denominations, either all of them or several. And the reason for doubting can be, first, because either all or several of the names are common to them, which is especially clear concerning the name Angels. The same is true concerning the name Virtues, as Dionysius testifies, chapters 5 and 11 of *The Celestial Hierarchy*. And it extends also to the other names, because the reasons for such names are found in all. Indeed, even the name Cherubim can be said of all, because all are perfect in knowledge. Hence it is probable that the Cherubim who were in the temple represented not one order of Angels, but simply all Angels, as Abulensis holds, Exodus 25, question 19. There he also teaches that the name Cherubim is common in Scripture to all Angels, as when God is said in Psalm 17: "He ascended upon the Cherubim." And in Psalms 79 and 89, and Isaiah 37, he is said to sit upon the Cherubim. Second, because Augustine, in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 58, doubts whether Archangels are the same as those called Virtues, so that the saying of Psalm 148, "Praise the Lord, all his Angels; praise him, all his Virtues," was said in the same way as "Praise God, all Angels; praise God, all Archangels." Likewise he admits that he is ignorant what those four words mean in Paul, Colossians 1: "whether Seats, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers."

7. The true opinion. Individual names by a peculiar signification are appropriated to individual orders.—Nevertheless, it must be said that, although it is probable that not only the name Angels, but also the rest, or many of them, and especially those three, Virtues, Thrones, and Cherubim, are sometimes taken as common to all or several orders of Angels, nevertheless all those names, under another signification, are proper to individual orders that are in some way distinct among themselves. This is the express doctrine of Dionysius, which the other Fathers have followed. And the very way of speaking of Paul in Ephesians 1 and Colossians 1, "whether Thrones, or Dominations," etc., compels one to admit that through those words classes of persons distinct in some way among themselves are signified. Hence Augustine, against the Priscillianists, chapter 11, because of those words, says: "Therefore, I most firmly believe that Seats,

Dominations, Principalities, and Powers exist in the heavenly arrangements, and I hold with undoubted faith that they differ in some way among themselves; but what they are and how they differ among themselves, I do not know." Therefore Augustine took it as certain that those names differ not only in titles, so to speak, under which they can signify the same person, but also in the persons or orders of persons whom they signify. And the same reason applies to the other names.

8. Why the name of one order is attributed to another.—Nor is it opposed that sometimes those names are used in some common and broader signification, so that the proper name of one order is attributed to an Angel of another order. Thus the name Angels, although it is proper to the lowest order, is often attributed to all, as in Hebrews 11, when Angels are called ministering spirits. For there Paul was speaking of all created and blessed spirits. And, conversely, Gabriel is called an Angel in Luke 1, although it is plausible that he is at least an Archangel. And there are those who think he was of the Seraphim because of the excellence of the mystery of the incarnation, to announce which he was sent. And Michael is called an Archangel in the epistle of Jude, although he is from the first Princes, and is called the Prince of the people of God in Daniel 10; in chapter 12 he is called "the great Prince, who stood for the people of God," and now he is believed to stand for the Church. Hence in Revelation 12 he is said to be the Leader and Prince of the Angels fighting with the dragon. And Lucifer is called Cherubim in Ezekiel 28, according to the probable sense, although he is believed to have been from the supreme order, or perhaps supreme. The reason for this sort of communication or appropriation of the same name is that these names of Angels are taken from some ministries, offices, or conditions of Angels known to us in some way. But those properties or offices are common either to several or to all, and on this side such names are sometimes used commonly. But insofar as such a property is found in some order in a special way, the name taken from it is also appropriated to such an order, taking into account the greater or lesser perfection both of the property from which the name is taken and of the order of Angels to which it is appropriated, so that a proportion between them is preserved, as will be declared in explaining the distinction among the orders themselves.

9. In the first hierarchy, from where the name Angel comes.—Finally it must be explained what the properties of the individual orders are from which the names proper to each are taken, and how great a distinction of those orders and hierarchies is signified through them. In this the Fathers and theologians speak variously; nevertheless I shall briefly propose what seems more plausible

to me. And beginning from the lowest order. The name Angel is taken from an office common to all Angels, because all are "ministering spirits," as Paul testifies, Hebrews 1, and the name Angel is the name of an office, as we said at the beginning. Therefore under that notion the name is also common to all. Yet because that ministry, taken generically, indicates the least perfection in Angels, for any grade of that genus suffices for it, therefore that name has been appropriated to the lowest order, namely, in the way in which the name of a genus is customarily accommodated to the less perfect species. And thus under that word, so appropriated, are contained Angels who receive the very work of ministry in the lowest mode. These are judged to be those to whom the guardianship of individual human beings is peculiarly committed, and who are sent immediately to private persons. And in this Dionysius, Gregory, and others agree.

10. From where the name Archangel is taken.—To what ministries Archangels are deputed.—But since the name Archangel is also taken from ministry, it signifies a certain excellence and principality in that ministry, and thus it does not belong to the lowest order, because such excellence or principality is not found in it. But in itself it is common to all the superior orders, because all are ministering spirits, and both in their dignity and in the office of ministering they have some excellence. Yet because this excess in ministering or announcing is the least that can exist among the Angels, that name is appropriated to the second order of Angels. But it can be noted that the particle Arch can be taken in a twofold sense, for that preposition signifies a certain excellence or excess of perfection above the Angels. Therefore this excess can be understood either only in absolute perfection, or in dignity in ministry, or also in a relation of commanding and governing the Angels themselves. Thus among human beings, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, an archdeacon is called one who among deacons is of greater dignity or has a higher ministry, even if he does not have some power over the other deacons. But in another way one is customarily called an archpriest, not only because he is of greater dignity, but also because he has some power over other priests, whom he has in some way subject to himself. Therefore in the present matter it is probable that Angels of the second order are called Archangels because of some greater dignity in the work of ministering, not because of some power that they have over Angels of the first order, as if for ruling or moving them. For Angels are deputed to guard private persons, but to Archangels is committed care for Kings, Princes, Pontiffs, and similar persons. Angels are destined to private benefits of common human beings, but Archangels to more serious business and public advantages of

human beings, as Gregory indicates in the said homily 34. But Dionysius adds, chapter 8, that it also pertains to Archangels to preside over Angels in some way. This I think must be understood only in order to their ministry. For if, for example, an Archangel is the guardian of one ruler of some city or community, whose good depends on the actions of individual citizens, that Archangel will be able to have some power over the Angels guarding individual persons subject to such a ruler, and to illuminate, direct, or move them, as will have been expedient for the end of his office.

11. From where the name Principality comes.—But, speaking absolutely, according to Dionysius commonly received, the first order of this hierarchy is called Principalities. They are called Princes because they preside over all Angels and Archangels in those things that pertain to the salvation of all human beings, both private persons and Princes, and both individual persons and communities, both by instructing and illuminating, and by moving and commanding, according to the disposition of the divine will manifested to them. It is likewise plausible that some of these Princes by themselves undertake the care of principal kingdoms or of the greatest Kings or Pontiffs, and that those who in Daniel 10 are called the Prince of the Persians or of the Greeks were Angels of this first order of the third hierarchy, and that there the name "Prince" is taken properly and not commonly, as Dionysius also holds, chapter 9, by placing Michael in this order. Hence it also becomes plausible that all those Angels of whom it is said in Revelation 12 that Michael and "his Angels fought with the dragon" pertain to this order of Principalities. For if the opinion of those who say that Michael is an Angel and Prince of this first order is true, it is rightly gathered from that place that the principal care of this war is committed to this order. And although under those words "Michael and his Angels" all the Angels of this hierarchy can be comprehended, because all fight under Michael, and both Archangels and Angels fight in this battle, nevertheless the Principalities are as it were their leaders and governors, and they resist the demons in a higher and more universal way.

12. In the second hierarchy.—From where the name Powers is taken.—In the second hierarchy the Powers are judged to hold the lowest grade according to Dionysius and Gregory. But according to Dionysius it pertains to them to order the things that are to be done through the whole third hierarchy, so that the execution pertains to the three lower orders, to each according to its grade, but to Power it belongs as it were to command and order the things that are to be done by them. But Gregory specially adds that the Powers have peculiar efficacy over the demons, and are so called because "the opposed forces are

subject to their sway and are especially restrained by their power." This is probable and is perceived more easily and clearly. Nor is it repugnant to what we said about the ministry of the Principalities. For we can understand in two ways that the holy Angels fight against demons in this spiritual war of human beings with demons. First, on the part of human beings, by illuminating them, moving them, etc., and this pertains to all the Angels of the lowest hierarchy respectively and with a suitable distribution among its orders. In another way demons are resisted on the part of the demons themselves, by commanding them with power and coercing them, restraining and binding them, if necessary, and this belongs by a certain higher reason to the Powers, but to proper guardians in a lower mode, as we shall declare in book six.

13. From where the name Virtues comes.—But Gregory attributes to the Virtues that through them "signs and miracles are done more frequently." Here one must note the word "more frequently," by which it seems to be denoted that these Angels are as if from office destined to these works, although it is always free to God to perform signs also through others, either inferior or superior. But under signs and miracles I think there is comprehended whatever happens outside the common course of the causes of the universe in this sensible world, although often it is not known to human beings that in such a work something divine and preternatural has intervened. For this happens not rarely and is often necessary for the governance or preservation of human beings, and therefore it is plausible that this order of Angels is deputed to all these things. Nor does this sort of explanation differ from the words of Dionysius. For he says, in chapter 8, that the appellation Virtues signifies "a certain manly strength by which, in all their divine actions, they powerfully rise up to the imitation of God," etc. Nevertheless there is a difference between Dionysius and Gregory, because Gregory places the Virtues in the third order of the third hierarchy, and the seventh of all Angels, ascending from the lowest, and thus he puts the Powers before them. But Dionysius establishes the Virtues in this order explained by us, which, because of the authority of Dionysius, is more commonly approved. And indeed, when the offices that Gregory attributes to these two orders are also considered, the virtue of working miracles seems more excellent and universal than the power of keeping demons in check and restraining them. And therefore the name taken from it indicates a greater dignity and perfection of order.

14. From where the Dominations are named.—But above the Virtues, and consequently in the first order of the second hierarchy, the Dominations are placed. Concerning them Dionysius says, chapter 8, that they are full of the mystery indicated by their name, because they are "certain intelligences higher

than every lower submission, free, and superior to every servile work subject to diminishment." By these words he signifies that the Angels of this order are not destined to perform by themselves any external ministries ordered to the governance of the world or of human beings, but in a spiritual and lofty way they preside over all the lower invisible ministers of divine providence and grace, and dominate them, and in that genus of subjection are subject to none. And this, as I think, he calls "lower submission"; for in a higher way they can be subject not only to God, but also to the Angels of the first hierarchy. And in this Gregory does not differ from Dionysius, for he places the Dominations in the same grade of perfection and gathers it from the name itself. "For those," he says, "hosts of Angels which are preeminent by wondrous power, because the rest are subject to them for obedience, are called Dominations."

15. In what the Principalities and Dominations are distinguished.—But if it is objected that from this it follows that Dominations are not distinguished from Principalities, for Gregory himself had placed the Principalities in the same second hierarchy immediately under the Dominations, and had said of them: "They are called Principalities because they preside also over the good spirits of Angels themselves, and, while they dispose the things to be done for other subjects, they rule over them for carrying out the divine ministries"; the same Gregory responds: "Those Angels are called Dominations who also transcend the Powers of the Principalities by a high dissimilarity. For to rule is to exist as prior among the rest, but to dominate is also to possess whatever subjects." But since he also attributes to the Principalities presiding over inferiors, therefore they not only are first among them, but also dominate them, because in that genus of governance there does not seem to be one thing to preside and another to dominate. Therefore the Principalities are better placed above Angels and Archangels in the third hierarchy, and are numbered among those to whom the general execution of ministry concerning the guardianship of human beings has been entrusted, and in that grade they are first, and consequently Princes or Principalities, both because they carry out by themselves certain principal works of that ministry, and, insofar as it is expedient to their office, dispose the things to be done by the inferiors. But the Dominations are above all the orders of executors, so to speak, and have all those as subject to themselves, either by ordering, or by intimating to each what must be done by each, whether by distributing offices in general or sometimes by revealing to them in particular the will of God.

16. But before we speak about the third hierarchy, one must observe that in the letter of Dionysius, with respect to the second hierarchy and its orders, there

is variety. For Ambrose Camaldulensis, abbot, in his translation, in chapter 8 of *The Celestial Hierarchy*, disposes those three orders as we have explained, just as St. Thomas also does, First Part, question 108, and Damascene, book 2, chapter 3, who reports the opinion of Dionysius in the same order. But the same abbot, in chapter 6, recites those orders differently, namely, Powers, Dominations, Virtues, plainly ascending from the less perfect to the more perfect. The translations of Perionius and of others in the Carthusian on Dionysius have the same. But on the contrary Bonaventure, in 2, distinction 9, before the first article, § "After these things," and Gabriel, question 1, art. 1, note 3, according to Dionysius dispose those three orders thus, beginning from the more perfect: "Dominations, Powers, Virtues." But since the truer reading of the Greek exemplars is not clear to us, we can say only that this third reading is founded on no authority, but the other of Perionius and of others is probable. But the one we have explained is more approved by us because of the authority of Damascene and St. Thomas, and because, according to what we have said, it also seems more consonant with reason. And finally, although in various places perhaps Dionysius recited those orders differently, not always strictly preserving the order of perfection, which can be observed in other Fathers and in the office of the Angels that the Church recites, and in Paul himself, nevertheless as to the matter, from chapter 8 of *The Celestial Hierarchy*, it is evident that Dionysius declared those three orders in the order proposed by us.

The third hierarchy.—Orders.—Lower.—And the reason of the names.—The higher and more elevated the third hierarchy is, the less known it is to us, and therefore we can say little about it, because we can scarcely declare the reason for distinguishing those three orders. But the said Fathers with the greatest agreement teach that in it are placed Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones, and that, beginning from the more perfect, they are to be numbered so. And they teach that it is common to all of them to stand before the divine majesty and to be occupied perpetually in his praises, in such a way that they do not intend the works of divine providence, nor are they ordinarily sent to them. Therefore they are distinguished only through different relations to God, and a greater or lesser perfection either in the acts they exercise concerning him, or in the way in which they are united to him, or receive immediate influence from him. And thus Seraphim are judged the most perfect, because they are borne toward him with most ardent love. But Cherubim are placed in the middle order, because they are eminent in the perfection of divine knowledge. But Thrones are placed in the third and lowest, because they are, as it were, the seats

of God, in whom he sits and dwells as in lofty Thrones proportioned to the divine Majesty.

17. Against the nearest hierarchy.—Four difficulties.—But in this distinction difficulties immediately arise. The first is that this distinction is taken according to the state that those holy Angels have in beatitude. But in that state one cannot excel in love unless he is also more perfect in knowledge, nor conversely, because the one who loves more is holier and consequently enjoys a more perfect vision of God, and conversely the one who sees God better also loves more. Therefore, on account of excellence in one or the other of those acts, those two orders cannot be distinguished. The second difficulty is that, granted that they could be distinguished in that way, the supreme order should rather be denominated from knowledge than from love, because the supreme knowledge of holy spirits is the vision of God. But the vision of God is more excellent than love, as we suppose. Therefore the highest order should be named from its greater perfection. The third is about the Thrones, because to be the seat and throne of God is a common perfection of all holy spirits, indeed of all the just, because it is written of the soul of the just that it is the seat of divine wisdom, and the dwelling of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, and the temple of God, all of which are equivalent and indicate a property that is found in the blessed with greater perfection. Therefore by this the Thrones also cannot be distinguished from the other orders. Or certainly, if in some way they can be distinguished by that property, by that property a greater excellence is indicated in that order than in the prior ones. For that perfection belongs through grace, which is the first and more excellent perfection of the just, and therefore the order that is commended by the excellence of that grace is shown to be more perfect. For it is signified that it has a greater quasi-substantial union with God, which grace effects. Finally, the fourth difficulty is that that inequality in the proper gifts of sanctifying grace or essential glory is found uniformly in all the blessed Angels. Therefore, by inequality in these gifts, Cherubim, for example, cannot be distinguished from Seraphim any more than the Seraphim themselves among themselves. For example, if we compare the last Seraph to the one immediately superior in that order, and to the first Cherub, the last Seraph will exceed the first Cherub with the same proportion by which the same Seraph is surpassed by the one immediately preceding. Therefore there is no reason why a new order should begin to be constituted from that Cherub, and not rather that he should have a lower grade in the same seraphic order. But if this is admitted, the same argument will be made about the Angel immediately following, and so

concerning the whole first hierarchy; indeed the same will also be true of the following, if they are not distinguished by order to exterior ministries.

18. To the first difficulty in the preceding number.—Why greater excellence is taken from love rather than from knowledge.—To the first difficulty. First, both for that difficulty and for the rest, it must be supposed from the doctrine of St. Thomas already touched upon, and of Dionysius, that the distinction of these orders is sometimes taken from properties common to other orders, but according to some peculiar excellence that such a property has in that order which is distinguished from the others by it. For that difference suffices for constituting a distinction. Second, the difficulty supposes that the name "Seraphim" is derived from the excellence of love, but the name "Cherubim" from the multitude of knowledge. And concerning the first there is indeed no controversy; concerning the second, however, there is some, as we shall see in the sixth book. But now we receive that part as handed down by the Fathers, especially by Dionysius, chapter 7 of *The Celestial Hierarchy*, Clement of Alexandria, book 5 of the *Stromata*, § 3, Jerome, epistle 103 to Paulinus, at the end, and on Isaiah 6 and Ezekiel 10 and 28, likewise from Fulgentius, to Ferrandus, question 3, at the beginning, Philastrius *On Heresy*, chapters 101 and 102, and Anastasius of Sinai, book 1 of the *Hexaemeron*, at the beginning; and Philo taught the same, book *On the Life of Moses*. Therefore, supposing this interpretation, I respond that it is indeed true that love and knowledge, as they are found in the homeland, are necessarily conjoined and preserve proportion. Yet by the excess of love the greater perfection of the supreme order of the first hierarchy is indicated, because divine love, considered abstractly according to its genus, is a more infallible sign of greater excellence than knowledge, as is clear in the way. Indeed, although in the homeland those two preserve equality, nevertheless, because love supposes cognition and not conversely, therefore in the excellence of love the excellence of vision is as it were intrinsically contained, and not so conversely, because vision does not suppose love, but gives birth to it. And therefore, also with respect to us, it is not as evident that the perfection of proportionate love is necessarily conjoined with the perfection of knowledge, even blessed knowledge, as it is conversely that perfect love supposes perfect vision. Thus, therefore, the Seraphim are preferred to the rest from the excellence of love, because in that excellence the others are included.

19. It is responded to the second.—Why the Seraphim are judged nobler from love.—Hence almost the same is the response to the second. For, abstracting now from that controversy that is treated between the school of St. Thomas and that of Scotus, which act in beatitude is more perfect, vision or love

of God, we respond that, although by making a precise comparison, vision is more perfect, nevertheless through the excellence of love the greater excellence of the Seraphim is designated. For beatific love is not separated from vision, nor is love according to its precise and general account separated from saving knowledge or cognition, but intrinsically supposes it. And although vision also from its special account necessarily has love conjoined to it, nevertheless, because the account of knowledge, considered per se and generally, does not include love nor necessarily infer it, therefore the supreme perfection of the Angels is described through love rather than through knowledge. And perhaps from this it happened that, although Lucifer in substantial perfection was from the order of Seraphim, nevertheless after the fall he is never called Seraphim, but is called "the Cherubim who once was in the midst of fiery stones," Ezekiel 28, because he retained the perfection of knowledge, at least natural knowledge, although he fell away entirely from love. Hence one can also say that the excellence of the holy Angels is commended more from moral perfection than from natural or necessary perfection, even if it is supernatural. But love has more of moral perfection than knowledge, because the vision itself, considered per se, deserves honor rather than praise. But if it participates in some account of praise, this is only insofar as it is attributed because of the praiseworthy love of God in the way. And similarly, the love itself of the homeland, although it necessarily follows vision, is not praiseworthy, but honorable and lovable. Yet, insofar as it draws its origin from the free love that the holy Angels had in the way, it is imputed to their praise and participates in a certain account of moral good and perfection. Therefore, when the Seraphim are commended from love, this does not happen without respect to the love of the way, through which they arrived at that outstanding state of glory. But in the way the highest perfection of charity exists, and concerning charity alone is it a certain and infallible sign of holiness. And what Anthony the abbot writes in epistle 2 is consonant with this doctrine: "These names were added to the Angels because they kept the will of their own Creator."

20. It is responded to the third.—Through what the Thrones are distinguished from the rest.—To the third difficulty, first we admit that that perfection from which the appellation of Thrones is taken is in the thing itself common to the superior orders, indeed it is found in them with greater perfection, as the argument made there proves. But this is no obstacle to one order being distinguished from others through the special excellence of a common perfection, as I said at the beginning. But to the reply we say that through this property the excellence of the Angels of this order above all the

Angels of the lower hierarchies is very well indicated, because the excellence of these is described through an immediate relation to God and to union with him, but that of the others through some relation to exterior ministries. But with respect to the superior orders a greater excellence is not indicated, both because the prior orders are described not only from habitual perfection, but especially from an actual tendency into God through love or knowledge, whereas the third is described more from habitual perfection, through which they are found capable and worthy of existing as Thrones and the highest seats of the divine majesty. This perfection is also supposed in the superior orders, but is signified in a higher way through the acts of love and knowledge. Also because, although in this appellation of Thrones some actual perfection can be considered, it is considered only as a disposition by which a seat is prepared for God through purity of spirit. Hence Dionysius says, chapter 7, that through this appellation of Thrones it is designated that "those substances are very far removed from every lowliness of earthly affection." And below: "They receive his divine coming without any disturbance or impediment of matter." And below: "They are always open to receiving his splendors." And thus they are described as apt and prepared for receiving perfection, but the superior orders as exercising it. And thus their excellence is described in a higher mode.

21. The choirs of Angels are distinguished not only by order to God, but also by influence on inferiors.—One can also add from Dionysius in the same chapter that these choirs are distinguished not only by order to God, but also by the influence on the lower orders and on us which they participate from him. And so the Seraphim are said to be such not only as burning in themselves, but also as setting others on fire; likewise the Cherubim, not only as knowing, but also as illuminating others. And so also Angels of the third order are called Thrones because God, dwelling in them, sits as upon Thrones, both to show his majesty and to excite others to reverence and adoration of himself, or also to govern and judge them. In this way Gregory said that those are called Thrones "over whom almighty God always presides to exercise judgments. For since we call thrones seats in Latin, those who are filled with so great a grace of divinity that the Lord sits in them and decrees his judgments through them are called Thrones." This is not to be understood as though God does not also sit and preside in the superior orders, but because this perfection is more accommodated and as it were appropriated to commending the perfection of these Angels of the third order. But because the prior actions of setting on fire and illuminating are higher, therefore through the names taken from them the greater perfection of the others has been indicated.

22. It is responded to the fourth.—From where the distinction among Angels of the same order is taken.—To the fourth difficulty, which seemed more obscure to me, I admit that through all these things the special reason is not sufficiently explained on account of which Cherubim are distinguished from Seraphim as diverse orders, and the lower Seraphim do not differ in that way from the higher. For if we mentally distinguish the whole seraphic order into two parts, higher and lower, we will find in them the same inequality in the ardor of love that is considered between the whole orders of Seraphim and Cherubim, while preserving proportion. Therefore I say that, by the force of those names and of the perfections from which they are taken, I cannot find the reason of the diversity. And therefore I rather believe that the orders themselves are supposed as distinct, and that their distinction arises from other properties of theirs unknown to us. For we hold their distinction not by knowledge, but by a certain faith. And, supposing the distinction, we appropriate and accommodate some names to individual orders, so that they may be proper to them and signify them as distinct, although they do not sufficiently indicate the special reason for distinguishing some Angels as belonging to different orders, and others only as more or less perfect in the same order. Nor does a better response now occur to me. But, as far as it can be done, we shall declare this very response more from the things to be said.

CHAPTER XIV
WHAT THE ESSENTIAL UNITY OR DISTINCTION IS BETWEEN THE HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS OF ANGELS

1. *First doubt.*—In the preceding chapter we only showed that in the multitude of Angels there are those distinctions of Hierarchies and orders which we explained through accidental and extrinsic differences, more with regard to the etymology of the name than with regard to a substantial difference. It remains, therefore, that, as far as is possible for us, we also say something about this distinction, which we dispatch through certain brief doubts. And first it occurs to be investigated whether that distinction is accidental, or also essential, so that all Angels of different Hierarchies differ from one another in species, and similarly, within the same Hierarchy, all Angels of one order are essentially distinguished from Angels of another; and indeed those who make all Angels to be of the same species consequently say that there is only an accidental difference between the orders and Hierarchies.

2. *First opinion.*—And this seems to be made probable from what has been said, because the whole distinction is taken from gifts or ministries of grace or glory, which are accidental with respect to the natural substance of an angel, to which essential distinction pertains. The antecedent is clear from what has been said, because the distinction of Hierarchies is taken through certain general relations to ministries of grace. For there is a certain Hierarchy that is not deputed to minister, but to assist God, and this is the first, which differs from the second and third as if through the lack of external ministry, because the second and third belong to those who minister, in which they agree with one another. But they differ because the second ministers in a higher way, namely, by directing and commanding, not by executing; or if it executes anything through itself, this is in certain extraordinary and higher works. But the third is of those who minister more particularly and through themselves by executing or announcing. And by a similar proportion the individual orders are distinguished from one another, as we explained. But these ministries are accidental, and assistance before God is also not by force of nature, but from the gifts of glory. Therefore the whole distinction that is founded on these is accidental. It is confirmed first, because this distinction is founded on merits; but merits are accidental and depend on the use of freedom. It is confirmed second, because among human beings there is found an Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, containing within itself diverse orders of dignities and powers, whose distinction is accidental, as is clear.

3. *The true opinion.—The three Hierarchies differ essentially.—The orders of each Hierarchy differ among themselves in species.*—Nevertheless, supposing the resolution of the preceding chapter, that not all Angels are of the same species, it must consequently be said that at least the three Hierarchies differ essentially, as, besides St. Thomas and his followers, theologians more frequently teach in 2, dist. 9, Alexander of Hales, part 2, quest. 20, memb. 6, art. 2, § *For the sake of this matter*. It is proved, because if it is true that there are several substantial species of Angels, we should above all establish such a difference among those whom, from other signs and from their actions, we conceive to be most distant from one another. But the distinct monarchies stand in this way. Therefore. And by the same action and proportion it is certainly more probable that the three orders of each Hierarchy differ from one another in species also in their substantial nature. For also among them we conceive a great distance in natural perfection from their ministries and from the manner in which Scripture and the Saints speak of them. And so St. Thomas and his whole school commonly think, and others more frequently, in 3, dist. 9, with the Master there, Gabriel,

quest. 2, art. 2, Richard, art. 2, quest. 4, Durandus, Scotus, and others, Alexander of Hales above. And it is further confirmed because, although that diversity is in some way founded on merits, nevertheless the grace from which merits proceed is judged to have been given to Angels according to the proportion of their natural gifts, as we shall say below, in which all theologians place a difference between human beings and Angels; and therefore merely numerical distinction is not sufficient for so great a variety of grades or orders among Angels.

4. Otherwise it could happen that, from Angels equally perfect, one Angel would be only an Angel, another an Archangel, another a Prince. Indeed, it seems that it could also follow that a less perfect Angel would be in a higher order, and, conversely, a more perfect one in a lower order. But neither of these can stand with that axiom, nor does it seem consonant with the manner of speaking of the Fathers. The consequence is shown because, among spiritual substances differing only numerically, supposing there are such, either equality is posited among them in substantial individual perfection and in intellect and will, or inequality is admitted, for just as this is disputed about rational animals, so it can be doubted about Angels. Therefore, if we philosophize in the first way, it follows from the stated principle that equal grace was given to all Angels at the beginning, because it was given according to the proportion of their natural gifts. Therefore, if all Angels of one Hierarchy had a proportion of equality in natural gifts, since they had received the same grace, then in the first instant of their creation there could not be a distinction of orders in the same Hierarchy, neither according to nature, nor according to grace, nor according to merit, because they would also have all been equal in merit in that instant, since in that instant all acted well and with the whole effort of grace and proportionate to grace. And consequently, even in the second instant, although a distinction was made between the good and the bad through free choice, either only on the part of the bad, or with cooperating grace on the part of the good, nevertheless among the good of the same Hierarchy there would have been no discrimination, because in that instant all, with equal grace and with the whole effort, would have acted well and in the same kind of virtue, especially of love and reverence and submission toward God, as far as can be thought by us with foundation. Hence also in the homeland they would be equal in essential glory, and consequently among the Angels, for example, of the first Hierarchy, there would be no distinction in vision or love of God, or in union with him, or in preparation for that union. Nor in the second or third Hierarchy would there be among the orders of each any distinction of ministries or dignities with a foundation on their part, but only from God's choice and will, which is both

foreign to the holy Fathers and of itself seems incredible. Therefore it is necessary to posit some inequality in nature among those orders; therefore, if that inequality is not individual, at least it must be specific.

5. But if individual inequality is admitted, for perhaps it is more probable that such inequality is possible, as I shall touch upon below, although in some way inequality of orders can be preserved with proportion to the inequality of merits and grace, and this with proportion to nature, nevertheless it seems little likely that God observed so great a proportion in distributing grace and its helps among the Angels because of only an individual difference, since we believe that among human beings no account of this numerical diversity was taken, nor will it be easy to assign the reason for the difference. Therefore, just as a soul less perfect in individual natural perfection, both in substance and in intellect and will, will be able through grace to ascend to the order of the Principalities, while another more perfect one is left in the lowest order, so also that inequality alone will not prevent, among Angels, the less perfect from being in a superior order, because, being anticipated and aided by greater grace, he had greater merits and by reason of them obtained a better place of dignity or ministry. And for the same reason it will be able to happen that two Angels, although unequal in numerical perfection, received in the first instant equal habitual grace, yet were not equally illuminated or excited to act well efficaciously in the second instant, but he who is less perfect in his individual nature was aided more efficaciously or toward more acts; and so even then it would follow that the less perfect in nature pertains to a higher order.

6. *It is confirmed from the Fathers.*—Therefore we conclude, according to the doctrine of the Saints, that it is far more probable that both the Hierarchies among themselves and the orders of each Hierarchy among themselves are essentially and specifically distinguished in natural gifts. This can also be urged from certain formulas of speech of the holy Fathers. For Dionysius says, chapter 5, *On the Celestial Hierarchy*: *The traditions of the sacred volumes announce that the superior substances differ from one another by the height of their grades.* And Gregory Nazianzen, oration 34, quest. 2, *On Theology*, says of the holy Angels that they are *pure natures, perpetual choirs moving around that principal cause, suffused from there with the purest splendor, or, according to the nature of each order, illuminated in different ways according to proportion*. But in oration 40, on holy Baptism, he is doubtful and says that he cannot determine *whether splendor is imparted to him according to the account of his class and order, or rather whether according to the mode of divine illumination he receives this or that seat*. And Damascene speaks in a similar way under a disjunction, book 2, chapter 3,

saying that the orders differ in divine splendor, *whether a seat has been established for each according to the portion of splendor, or, conversely, whether they are participants in splendor according to the difference of their seat and class, and some illuminate others because of the excellence of order and nature*. Chrysostom also favors this in his manner of speaking, homily 2, *On the Incomprehensible Nature of God*; he calls the orders of Angels, many of which he had first named by their own names, *innumerable celestial kinds*. *God created all these with such facility as no one can express in words.* There he sufficiently indicates that from the force of nature and creation that variety of kinds exists in Angels. Then Isidore, book 1, *On the Highest Good*, chapter 10, also speaks in this way: *Ministries were distributed to them according to the dignity of their grades*, indicating that inequality of dignity and perfection in nature itself is supposed before offices and ministries. And perhaps for this cause and reason Jerome, on Ephesians 1, said that the distinction of these orders would be perpetual, because it is founded on the distinction of natures and species. Finally, there is a congruity, because, since specific distinction of things belongs of itself to the perfection and beauty of the universe, it is not likely that in the highest grade of things only three species were founded, namely, the three Hierarchies. Therefore at the minimum it must be conceded that within each of them the species of Angels were multiplied according to the distinction of orders. Therefore at the minimum nine species of angelic natures must be admitted. But whether it should be believed that there are more, we shall say presently.

7. *Second doubt.—First opinion.—It is proved.*—Second, it can be asked whether among Angels of the same Hierarchy there is a greater agreement than between those same Angels and Angels of another Hierarchy, and consequently whether between the orders of diverse Hierarchies there is a greater essential difference than between the orders of the same Hierarchy. Hence consequently, or virtually, it is asked whether Angel is one genus proximately divided into nine orders as into nine species, or whether it is more immediately divided into three genera or three subaltern species, under which other more remote species are contained. About this point the scholastics say almost nothing distinctly, perhaps because the holy Fathers left us almost no light on it. But in a certain little work *On the Nature of Genera*, attributed to St. Thomas, and it is 42, in chapter 5, it is said that separated substances do not have a subaltern genus, because a single difference suffices for the perfection of each. And Albert thinks the same, in the treatise *On the Four Coevals*, part 1, quest. 5, quest. 22, and in the *Summa*, part 2, tract. 2, quest. 8; and a fortiori Durandus thinks the same,

who in 2, dist. 3, quest. 1, thinks every composition from genus and difference is repugnant to the simplicity of Angels. Giles also inclines this way, in 2, dist. 3, quest. 2, art. 4. But that, once such composition in Angels is admitted, one difference suffices, is proved in the mentioned little work, because the more perfect a nature is, the more things it has unitedly in a simple grade. Therefore an ultimate angelic species does not come together from several divisions of genera and differences. Therefore it has only one proximate genus, from which, with one single difference, individual species arise. It is confirmed because Angels are simple intellectual substances, which can be distinguished only in a more or less universal mode of knowing. But this difference seems always immediate with respect to intellectual substance as such, because with the same proportion it contracts the genus of Angel to the first species of Angels and distinguishes it from the second, as it contracts it to the second and distinguishes the same from the third, and so consequently down to the last. Therefore no greater essential agreement can be found in any of those species among themselves than with others or among others. Therefore all those species will differ among themselves only by ultimate and immediate species, and consequently the three orders of the first Hierarchy will agree only in some accidental property, by reason of which they are more specially placed in one Hierarchy. And so Bañez supposes this opinion as more probable, part 1, quest. 56, art. 2, doubt 2, and cites Capreolus and St. Thomas, part 1, quest. 50, art. 4, reply to 1, and in 2, dist. 3, quest. 1, art. 4; but in neither place does he say anything. Nor does that author bring forward any reason of weight.

8. *The true opinion.*—Therefore it seems more probable that the orders of one Hierarchy agree with one another in some proximate genus, and so differ from the other orders of distinct Hierarchies not only by ultimate species, but also by a subaltern species; and accordingly there is not in Angels only one immediate genus common to all the species of Angels, but there are in them subaltern species or middle genera between that first genus and the ultimate species. This opinion, as to this last part, Henry expressly teaches in quodlibet 7, quest. 8, although he does not apply it to the distinction of Hierarchies. Uldarius is also cited, book 5 of his *Summa*, and Alexander of Hales sufficiently signifies it, part 2, quest. 20, memb. 6, art. 1, in its second part, insofar as he says that the Hierarchies of Angels are distinct and ordered according to diverse grades of nature. And St. Thomas speaks in nearly the same way in the cited quest. 108, and in the cited quest. 50, art. 4, reply to 1, compares Angels under the grade of intellectual nature in this respect to animals under the grade of sensitive nature, and others with the Master, in 2, dist. 8, and especially Richard, art. 2, quest. 4,

in the body, with the second solution to 3. And this opinion can first be explained by the example of the genus of irrational animal, or brute, which, although it is a genus with respect to all species of brutes, is nevertheless not immediate, but under it three immediate subaltern species can be distinguished, of terrestrial, aquatic, and flying animals. For these both differ essentially among themselves as if immediately, and contain under themselves various more particular species. Thus, therefore, in the genus of Angels it can easily be understood, because this is not repugnant to their simplicity, since that whole composition is of reason; and that variety of superiors, middles, and inferiors, with greater essential agreement and likeness of superiors among themselves than with others, and so for the rest, pertains to the beauty of the whole grade. For if this is found in the grade of vegetative or sensitive things and pertains to the beauty of those grades, why will it be denied in the grade of intellectual things?

9. And it is confirmed, because either this mode of generic agreement and subaltern specific difference among the Angels themselves, beyond the most universal agreement in the account of spiritual substance, is impossible, or it is possible. The first surely seems unable to be said with any probability, both because no repugnance can be assigned, and also because in that intellectual grade there can be conceived modes of understanding essentially distinct, with an infinite variety more or less like one another. Therefore it is not repugnant that orders of Angels be made that, under the universal genus of separated substances, have a special essential agreement among themselves, according to which they agree among themselves and not with others in a more proximate genus. But if this is conceded to be possible, it also cannot be denied that it pertains to the beauty of that grade and is most apt for explaining the distinction of Hierarchies. Why, therefore, shall we deny that it was done in this way? The assumption is explained, because, once this kind of special essential agreement among the choirs, for example, of the second Hierarchy is posited, it is easily understood why the two lowest Thrones are placed in the same Hierarchy, and nevertheless the lowest Throne and the highest Dominion pertain to distinct Hierarchies, although in fact, just as between those two species of Thrones there is no intermediate, so between the last species of the first Hierarchy and the highest of the second there is no middle species. For the reason is that among Thrones there is greater essential agreement and likeness than between a Throne and a Dominion of any order and perfection.

10. *In what the greater essential agreement of Angels of the same Hierarchy consists according to St. Thomas.*—But in what this essential agreement among

the Angels of individual Hierarchies consists, by reason of which the orders are said to agree among themselves in a more proximate genus and the Hierarchies to differ among themselves by a similar genus, St. Thomas explains thus, part 1, quest. 108, art. 1, because Angels are distinguished by us from one another according to a more or less universal mode of knowing; for we cannot investigate the essences of things except from operations or effects. But there are three modes or grades of universal cognition, namely, either because the accounts of things through which Angels know proceed proximately from God as from the universal principle, or insofar as those accounts of knowing depend on created universal causes, or insofar as such accounts of knowing are applied to individual things as they depend on proper causes. He says the first mode is common to the orders of the first Hierarchy, the second to the middle, the third to the lowest. And so he thinks that from the first is taken the essential subaltern difference in which the orders of the first Hierarchy agree among themselves and primarily differ from the others, and so for the rest.

11. *The preceding account of St. Thomas is difficult.*—But in this discourse it is obscure what St. Thomas understands by accounts of things, and however those accounts are understood, it is no less difficult to understand how those accounts are distinguished through a relation to those three orders of causes. For if by accounts of things we understand the intelligible species of the Angels, and compare them to the principle from which they proceed, then in all Angels they proceed from God as from the first and proper cause, as we shall see in the following book; and there is no order of Angels that receives them from created causes, whether universal or proper. But if we consider them as principles or accounts of knowing through these or those causes, then all Angels also use their species to know all created things, both through the most universal and first cause, which is God, and through the middle universal causes, and through the proper causes, because all know things perfectly and consequently according to every dependence that they have on all their causes. But no Angel naturally knows God himself through himself and in himself, as I suppose, nor through a cause, since God has none, but each through his own substance or other effects. Hence, if by accounts of knowing we understand not intelligible species, but as it were principles or media of knowing on the part of the object, the same difficulty remains, because all those media of knowing are common to all Angels. Therefore through that distinction of causes it is difficult to explain the essential distinction of the three Hierarchies, together with the essential and peculiar agreement of the orders of each Hierarchy among themselves.

12. *St. Thomas is explained.*—I, to confess the truth, cannot affirm with certainty in what sense St. Thomas established that three-membered division. But he seems by accounts of things to understand not intelligible species, which are media of knowing on the part of the Angel or the one understanding, but the objective accounts of things, as is gathered from those words: *The accounts of things about which Angels are illuminated can be considered in three ways.* For Angels are not illuminated about intelligible species, but about the things themselves or accounts of things that are represented through species. But although all Angels know all accounts of things according to their relation to all those causes, as was objected, nevertheless some can from their nature have a greater proportion with one mode of knowing, or with one relation of those accounts, than with another, and according to this commensuration, so to speak, that tripartite division can be sufficiently accommodated. We can also say that, although among Angels some understand through more universal species than others, as we shall see in the following book, which variety suffices to establish an essential distinction among them, nevertheless agreement in equal universality with respect to intelligible species and the mode of knowing several things together by one single intuition or act does not suffice for specific unity, but can be only generic. For in the same grade of universal cognition there can be variety in a higher and more subtle mode of knowing, which is enough for specific diversity. Thus, therefore, the three supreme orders of Angels perhaps agree in a mode of knowing through species equally universal and more universal than all the species of the inferior orders, and so through this difference they are essentially distinguished from all the inferiors, yet among themselves they agree only in genus. For in that as it were extensive universality there can be various modes of knowing, essentially different in as it were intensive perfection. And in the same way, with proportion, generic agreement and specific difference can be explained in the remaining Hierarchies. For in order that we may assert these things probably, it is enough that no repugnance be found in them; indeed, that they be consonant with reason and perfection and the most beautiful order of that supreme grade of substances, and that they rightly agree with what Dionysius and the other Fathers teach about these Hierarchies. All these things are found in the stated discourse, as will be clear to one considering it. For thus what Dionysius says about the orders of the first Hierarchy, chapter 6, *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, is easily understood: *The orders of the first Hierarchy have intense equality and unity, insofar as that whole Hierarchy adheres proximately to God and is inserted into him and is joined by greater proximity to his first splendors.* For through all these words he sufficiently

signifies that there is among those orders some agreement in essential perfection, in which the lower orders are not assimilated to those first ones. But that agreement among those three orders is not so great that it excludes a substantial distinction among them, because, as I said, it can be in universality and immediate relation to God, even if in that very perfection determinations and participations essentially diverse can be found. And with the same proportion Dionysius indicates that one should philosophize about the other two Hierarchies. Hence also, in chapter 9, he said that Archangels are equal to Principalities, certainly according to a certain general account, as he himself explains a little after and as Richard noted above, to 4.

13. *Third doubt.—The truer resolution of the doubt.*—But it can further be doubted whether within the same order or choir of Angels a specific difference with some more special generic agreement is found. Thus far we have only shown that between different Hierarchies there is an essential generic or subaltern difference, and consequently that diverse orders of the same Hierarchy agree among themselves in a more proximate genus and differ in species. But whether Angels of the same choir are of the same species has not yet been said, nor do I think it can be known by us or defined by any special reason taken from effects or ministries. Nevertheless, using general conjectures, it is more probable that not all Angels of the same choir are of the same ultimate species. Henry thinks this in the cited quodlibet, and Richard, above to 4, inclines more to the same side, and St. Thomas and his whole school especially profess it, and others whom Carthusianus reports and follows, in 2, dist. 9, quest. 5. But the reason is that it is not likely that only nine species are found in the whole grade of Angels, since in inferior things innumerable species are found, and in each grade the multiplication of species pertains to the great perfection of the universe. This is especially true in intellectual nature, which is intended more for itself and on account of itself. But there cannot be more than nine angelic species unless there are several species of Angels in one order, as is self-evident. Hence what was shown above, that the number of Angels exceeds the species of material things, can and should be understood so that the species of Angels exceed in multitude the species of material things, for the reasons given there urge this. Hence it becomes probable that the species of immaterial natures contained in the intellectual grade alone exceed the multitude of all species of the lower grades taken together. For the intellectual grade, as the highest of all, is not multiplied with respect to grades, but only with respect to genera and species of the same grade. But lower natures are multiplied according to various grades of sentient, vegetative, and inanimate things, because, since they are

imperfect, they can be distinguished by a greater or lesser distance from the first; and therefore, although genera and species are multiplied in all these lower grades, nevertheless the variety of species ought to be greater in the single highest grade on account of its perfection than in all the lower grades even taken together.

14. *Inference from the nearest resolution.—Dionysius is explained.*—From this we consequently infer that in each order there are more than three species. For Dionysius distinguished in each order the first, middle, and lowest, and therefore some have thought that by those three he signified three species of each order, and consequently that the species of Angels should not be further multiplied. But even in this way the species of Angels are diminished too much in number, which is not consonant with the perfection of that grade, as I have said. Nor is a sufficient foundation taken from that opinion of Dionysius, because although the multitude of species is much greater in each order, all of it will be able to be reduced to those three grades, as is self-evident. Especially because it could be doubted about the species of the same order whether some of them agree among themselves in some more proximate genus under which others are not contained, and consequently whether within one order there is a distinction not only specific but also generic. For this will become very probable by applying the reasons given above. And so it can be believed that each order of Angels is immediately distinguished into three proximate genera, which can be called first, middle, and last; nevertheless under each of them innumerable species are multiplied, perhaps immediately, or also mediately according to our reason, if they could be conceived by us through proper concepts. But whether individuals are given under those species, we shall say in the following chapter. For first it is necessary to dispatch briefly certain incident corollary doubts.

15. *Incident doubts are resolved from what has been said:—First doubt.*—For from what has been said there is decided first an incident doubt, whether this distinction of Hierarchies and orders is in Angels from the nature of the thing or from grace. For it must be said with St. Thomas, cited quest. 108, and Alexander of Hales, cited quest. 20, memb. 6, and others with the Master, in 2, quest. 9, that fundamentally it is from nature, but that it is completed according to the order of grace. The prior part is known from what has been said, because Angels from their nature have a distinction in essential perfection according to three principal genera and three principal subaltern species contained under each one of those genera. But on this variety Hierarchies and orders are founded. Therefore they are in some way, or fundamentally, from nature. But the other part is also known from what has been said, though in it the thing itself

can be subdistinguished from the imposition of names. For the thing principally consists in the gifts of grace, which were distributed to the Angels according to the proportion of their natural gifts: first indeed and of itself, in the gifts of sanctifying grace, by which each Hierarchy, or the individual orders, adhere to God more or less perfectly; secondarily, however, in graces as if freely given, or in the ministries of Angels. But the names have been taken from these gifts or ministries, either in order to God or through relation to human beings. For Angels are as it were middle beings between God and human beings, for of themselves and as if intrinsically they tend toward God and adhere to him, but from God's providence they are destined for procuring human salvation. And because the prior relation is principal, the first orders of Angels also take their names from it; but the remaining orders take theirs from the second relation, as I explained sufficiently in the preceding chapter.

16. *Second incident doubt.*—Second, another question is decided, namely, whether this distinction of Hierarchies and orders began in Angels in creation itself and endured for the state of wayfarers, or began in the state of glory. For it must be said, first of all, that it began in the very instant of creation with respect to the diverse grades of natural perfection according to the stated genera and species, because since all Angels were created at the same time, in that same instant they necessarily had the aforesaid distinction; and consequently with respect to the various grades of grace, which they received together with nature and with proportion to natural inequality, as we shall show in the fifth book. Hence consequently it follows that the same distinction of Angels with proportion persevered in the second instant of the way in the holy Angels, because it is credible that all of them, with their whole effort, were uniformly though diversely converted to God and increased in the grace received and in merits. Hence according to order toward God, they could also then have some distinction with respect to illuminations and revelations that they received for that state. For it is likely that the superior Hierarchy was illuminated immediately by God even on the way; for from its innate perfection it has an immediate order to God, and consequently from this it becomes credible that through it the inferior Hierarchies were illuminated by God and excited to persevere and to resist Lucifer, with due order also being preserved among the inferior Hierarchies and among all their choirs among themselves. But with respect to the distinction of Hierarchies and orders in ministries toward the salvation of human beings, it is clear that it did not begin until the state of glory; indeed, not even immediately at the beginning of the beatitude of the holy Angels, since human beings had not yet been created. Nevertheless, it could

have happened that before the creation of human beings God distributed the ministries of the holy Angels with respect to office and as if in first act, so to speak, although the use of ministering could not begin until the creation of human beings.

17. *Third incident doubt.*—Third, satisfaction is also easily given from what has been said to another question, whether the distinction of the Hierarchies and orders of Angels will also endure after the day of judgment. For it must be said that, with respect to the natural distinction in essential perfection as to various genera and species, it will endure perpetually, because the Angels themselves will endure perpetually and cannot be changed in essential agreement or difference; and for the same reason it will remain perpetually with respect to the various grades of perfection, both in essential glory and in all endowments or perfections of accidental glory that are as if habitual and permanent. That distinction will also be able to remain insofar as it is made in order to ministries, either with the denomination taken from a state or from an as if permanent office, or from its past use, or certainly from the proportion or proximate capacity for such ministry that each angelic order has from itself or by reason of its state for this or that ministry. But after the day of judgment those distinctions will cease with respect to actual ministries, or perhaps also with respect to new illuminations and revelations, because these will not be necessary for that state, as St. Thomas teaches, cited quest. 108, art. 7, thus explaining that saying of Paul, 1 Corinthians 15, who says that the end of the world will be then *when Christ has brought to nothing every Principality, Power, and Virtue*. For if we take these words of celestial powers, they must be understood with respect to the ministries of these orders. They could also be understood of human powers and principalities, or also of those that are found among demons, as we shall now say.

18. *Fourth incident doubt.*—Fourth, another doubt can be dispatched from what has been said, whether these orders and the hierarchical order are found among demons, because these names are also attributed to them. For in Matthew 9 he is called *the prince of demons*, and so forth; in 12 he is said to be *Beelzebub*, and in John 12 *the prince of this world*; and in Matthew 25 Christ said that fire was prepared *for the devil and his angels*, indicating the eminence of the one who by antonomasia is called *the devil* above the rest of the bad angels. And Paul, in Ephesians 6, calls them *princes and powers and rulers of this darkness*. Hence it cannot be denied that in some way these orders are found in demons. But this can be understood in two ways. First, according to the ancient, so to speak, appellation or its foundation. And in this way it is certain that these

orders are found in demons insofar as it is true that some fell from the orders of Angels. For, supposing this, it is clear that they retained after the fall the same diversity, agreement, and distinction of nature that they had at the beginning, for that is immutable. Moreover, since we suppose that the bad Angels were in grace before they fell, it is also consequent that, according to the state of grace, they were inserted into the other orders of Angels, and thus that some who were previously numbered in the order of Principalities, Powers, Virtues, and so forth are now from the crowd of bad Angels. And this we call the ancient appellation. It could be absolutely verified even if now among demons there were no prelation or ministry signified by those words. But in another way those names can be attributed to them now because of some foundation that they now have, not only in the grades of perfection of unequal nature, but also in the mutual order of demons among themselves according to some prelation and subordination. And in this way too St. Thomas teaches that among demons there is their own mode of principality and power, part 1, quest. 109, and this is sufficiently consonant with the words of Christ and Paul cited above. And it can be founded either on the natural order that demons also have among themselves in natural perfection, by reason of which the superiors can command the inferiors; or also on the order of divine providence, because the inferiors by sinning imitated the superiors, and all were induced by the supreme one and in some way overcome, and therefore they were handed over to his power even as a just punishment. Yet that prelation does not redound to the good of the superiors, but even to greater evil, because to preside over the evil and in evils is miserable, as St. Thomas said, cited quest. 109, art. 2, at the end.

19. *Fifth incident doubt.—It is certain that not all human beings will ascend to the order of Angels.*—Finally there is dispatched from what has been said the doubt that St. Thomas treats, cited quest. 108, art. 8, whether the predestined human beings are assumed into the orders of Angels. For it must be said that according to natural perfection human beings cannot ascend to the orders of Angels, because their natural perfection cannot be essentially changed, and therefore, however much they grow in other perfections, they always remain inferior to Angels in nature, in the way in which even the incarnate Word himself was made a little lower than the Angels. But according to the order of glory, many human beings can be assumed into the orders of Angels. Indeed, one human person, even created, ascended above all the choirs of Angels, namely, the most holy Virgin. But whether, besides her, some human beings will be more blessed than all Angels is uncertain and cannot be affirmed with foundation, although neither can it be denied with greater foundation. Indeed, if

it is true that Lucifer was the most perfect of all Angels in nature, and consequently would have been supreme in glory if he had persevered, because he was also created in greater grace, it follows most probably that some human being will occupy that seat according to the doctrine of the Saints handed down above, that human beings are assumed to repair the seats of Angels, namely, by ascending to that height of glory which they would have had. Hence it consequently follows that such a human being is more blessed than the rest of the Angels. Nor can this be attributed only to the Virgin, for she is placed far above that seat of glory and beyond every choir. And so it must consequently be said of all the seats of Angels that remained vacant in all the orders of the three Hierarchies. Yet human beings are not assumed into the choirs of Angels with respect to the ministries that they exercise about human beings and the Church, because human souls are not from the ministering spirits who are sent into ministry according to the common law, because this is not so consonant with the nature of a rational soul, as we shall say later in its place. Finally, it is certain that not all human beings will ascend in perfection of glory to some order of Angels, for many are inferior in glory to all Angels, as is manifest about infants who died in grace and about other sinners who are justified late and imperfectly. Therefore they can be said either to constitute a new order or to be aggregated to the lowest order of Angels, nor is it necessary to contend about this, because it pertains only to a manner of speaking.

CHAPTER XV
WHETHER ALL ANGELS OF INDIVIDUAL ORDERS DIFFER IN SPECIES, OR WHETHER SOME ARE GIVEN WHO DIFFER ONLY NUMERICALLY.

1. *Threefold sense of the question.*—Two or three points are usually treated about this question. The first is whether God by his absolute power could produce two or several Angels of the same species and distinct only numerically. The second, granted that this does not imply a contradiction, is whether at least it can be said to be impossible either according to God's ordained power or according to the common course of nature, or according to what immaterial substances connaturally require. The third is whether in fact God created several Angels of the same species, or whether all, however many there are, differ in species. And this last point is what principally pertains to this place, for the prior points concern Metaphysics more, and so they have been defined by us there. Nevertheless, because they are necessarily preliminary, we shall set them

down first, not repeating what was said elsewhere, but gathering it summarily and adding something to it.

2. *First sense.—First opinion denying that Angels of the same species can be given by absolute power.*—Therefore, on the first point, some Thomists deny that it can happen that Angels are multiplied only numerically under the same ultimate species; and they expressly declare that this is to be understood even according to God's absolute power. And they attribute it to St. Thomas because he uses those words *it is impossible*, as in the cited quest. 50, art. 4, and more broadly in tract. 3 of the opuscula, tract. 7, *On Being and Essence*, chapter 4, quest. 9, where, although he does not use the words *implying a contradiction* or *by absolute power*, nevertheless in reality that is his opinion, not only because he says simply that it is impossible, but also because he says that, if an Angel of one species were annihilated, if God wished to repair that species, he would necessarily reproduce the same Angel, and that angelic nature is no more universal than the divine nature itself, and accordingly is essentially incommunicable to many individual natures, just as that nature is. Hervaeus is also cited for this opinion in 2, dist. 3, quest. 2, art. 2, whom I have not been able to see. But other ancient Thomists are usually cited for this opinion who do not say this. For Capreolus, who especially seems to have taught that opinion, in 2, dist. 3, quest. 1, concl. 5, and in the solutions of the arguments against it, finally, to 2 of Durandus, in solution 4, does not disapprove the contrary even from the mind of St. Thomas. Abulensis also indicates the same opinion, on Matthew 21, quest. 19, and in Paradox 4, chapter 34, although he does not distinctly say that it implies a contradiction, nor does he expressly speak of absolute power. The foundation is that matter alone is the intrinsic principle of numerical distinction; but when the internal principle of distinction is lacking, it is repugnant for distinction to occur. But Angels lack matter. Therefore they are not capable of such a distinction. Second, it is explained because an Angel is a simple form. Therefore two Angels cannot be distinguished except by form. Therefore formally. Therefore essentially. Third, because an essence that is abstract and subsisting through itself and absolutely cannot be multiplied numerically, because it has the whole perfection of its species. But an Angel is an abstract form subsisting through itself. Therefore, and so forth.

3. *The affirmative opinion is true.*—But it must be said that God by absolute power can produce several Angels of the same species and distinct only numerically. I taught this in *Metaphysics* 5, sect. 2, art. 23, and in n. 28, and for it I alleged Scotus, Durandus, Gabriel, Marsilius, and Alexander of Hales, to whom I now add Bonaventure in 2, dist. 3, its first part, and Richard there, art.

5, quest. 1, Argentinas, quest. 2, art. 2, and Albert, in the *Summa*, part 2, tract. 2, quest. 8, Henry, quodlibet 2, quest. 8, and quodlibet 11, quest. 1, Giles, quodlibet 2, quest. 7. And from the Thomists, besides Capreolus cited above, who at least says that this can be admitted even in the school of St. Thomas, Ferrariense consistently taught it, 2, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 93; and from the moderns Bañez, Cumel, and Ripa defend it, to omit others whom I shall name in the third point. I also reported above the place of St. Thomas, which all also report, in opusculum 16, § last. But it remains where, at the end of the solution of the first objection of Averroes, he says: *He argues very crudely to show that God could not make many intellects of the same species, believing that this implies a contradiction.* There St. Thomas thinks that the contrary opinion is not only false, but also very crude and therefore improbable. This also seems so to me, because it denies to divine power some finite effect without a probable foundation by which implication of contradiction in such an effect could be shown. I explained and proved this at length in the cited place of the *Metaphysics*, and therefore I will be content only with a brief response to the foundations of the contrary opinion, because by the very fact that, on the part of the thing, the impossibility is not shown and cannot be shown, it is sufficiently proved that it can be done by God; for to say that God cannot do it from his impotence would be erroneous.

4. *Response to the arguments.*—Therefore, to the first, the major is denied if it excludes every other distinctive principle even by absolute power, and especially if it is understood universally of the whole breadth of being, whatever the case may be concerning material things. Therefore things lacking matter can be distinguished by their entitative realities simply, even if they are entirely alike in their integral essence, for no repugnance is involved in this. And then that distinction will be only numerical, although it is not through proper matter nor through any subject, but through the entitative realities themselves, which, since they receive being from God, can also receive two numerically distinct acts of being. To the second it is responded that there is an equivocation in the second and third consequence. For I confess that Angels, if they are created distinct only numerically, are distinguished by their entitative realities, and because those entitative realities are certain forms, they will also be distinguished by their forms, or rather by themselves. For they are not called forms because they inform, but because they are complete natures and essences subsisting without matter. Hence it is badly or ambiguously inferred in the second inference that those Angels are distinguished formally. For to be distinguished formally properly means to be distinguished in the formal effect or in the formal account;

and in this sense the consequence is denied, because although that distinction is a distinction of subsisting forms, it is not a formal distinction, because they are not distinguished in that which is formal and essential in them, but only in singular entitative reality, which is distinguished from another only entitatively, although it agrees with it in the formal account. Hence if in that second consequent formal distinction is taken broadly, insofar as it can be the same as a distinction of forms, then the last inference to essential distinction is not valid; for two forms can be distinguished in entitative reality and not essentially, as is clear in the rational soul. But if it is said that in souls there is a principle of distinction because of a relation to the body, this does not stand in the way, because we are now not treating the principle of distinction but the mode; and we say that a distinction of forms without essential distinction can be preserved through only the distinction of entitative realities, which it is not repugnant to find in forms entirely absolute from a relation to matter, even through their own entitative realities. Hence to the third, the major is denied, because nothing is repugnant in a form abstracted from matter and from a relation to it being multiplied according to number and with integral essential likeness. And to the proof, that a form thus abstracted has the whole perfection of its species, it is responded that this is true of the whole essential perfection, not of the whole entitative perfection, or, which is the same, of the whole intensive perfection, not the extensive. For that abstraction does not prevent such a form, once placed in the nature of things, from being individual, as St. Thomas rightly proves in the cited little work. But such a created individual nature adds something according to reason to the species itself which is not of its essence. For just as actually to exist is not the essence of such a nature, even if it is not distinguished from it in reality, so individuation is not of the essential concept of such a nature, for this is proper to the divine nature. And therefore, although in such a form there is the whole species as to essence, which we call intensive perfection, nevertheless there is not the whole entitative perfection that can be multiplied in such a species, which we call extensive perfection, as was explained more broadly in the cited place of the *Metaphysics*.

5. *Second sense.—First opinion denying that Angels of the same species can be given by the ordinary law.*—The second point is whether, according to the ordinary law, or by ordained power, or according to the order connatural to things, it is possible for Angels under the same ultimate species to be multiplied according to number. The first opinion says that, although this is possible by God's absolute power because it does not imply a contradiction, nevertheless it is not possible according to the common order of the universe connatural to

separated substances. This seems to have been the opinion of St. Thomas, for he seems to have explained his mind in that way in the cited opusculum 16, so that when in other places he says that this is impossible, he is speaking of this ordinary power, not of the absolute. Hence he says *that although separated substances do not have in their nature a cause of distinction or a natural course of multiplication, nevertheless they can receive multiplication from a supernatural cause, nor would there be implication of contradiction*. And Capreolus inclines to this opinion in the cited place, although he does not explain it more. But Ferrariense, cited chapter 93, around reason 5, § *To this it must be said first*, adds something further. For he thinks that according to the mind of St. Thomas, God can absolutely make several Angels of the same species even while this order of the universe stands. *And perhaps*, he says, *in fact there are several in one species, although the cause of their distinction is not manifest to us.* Hence where St. Thomas says that this is impossible, he explains it as meaning with respect to the modes of natural multiplication known to us, or with respect to the mode of numerical distinction that Aristotle handed down to us. But St. Thomas nowhere spoke so broadly, and he does not treat what Aristotle taught, but what is in the thing itself; and he says not only that we do not know the mode of distinction, but also that we know there is no natural mode of such a distinction, and therefore in the cited little work he demands a supernatural cause for such a distinction. Finally, Giles is in this opinion, in the cited quodlibet 2, quest. 7; for he says *that God could do this according to the order that we see, but it was not fitting*. He tries to explain this in a long and sufficiently obscure discourse, and finally says that, according to the ordinary course, it is as perfect to give being to separated substances as they themselves can receive. But those substances, as far as concerns themselves, can receive perfect being in their species. And therefore, if God gives them perfect being according to their natural capacity, they cannot be multiplied according to number. *But God could*, he says, *besides the course of nature, not give the whole being of which a separated substance is capable, but limit it, and so he could multiply them in the same species.*

6. *It is investigated what ordinary law is in the present matter.*—But I have never been able sufficiently to understand how, in this effect, absolute power can be distinguished from ordinary power, unless by confusing the question about the possible with the question about the fact, which, however, we are now distinguishing. Hence, so that a controversy about words may be removed, I ask whether ordinary law in the present matter is said to be the very will of God by which in fact he decreed to make only these things, as sufficient for that perfection of the universe which he intended; or whether ordinary law is said to

be the one that the things themselves demanded according to the mode due to their nature. The prior sense does not serve the present question, both because it confuses the question about the fact with the question about the possible, for what else is it to ask whether there are several Angels of the same ultimate species than to ask whether God created them? And because God creates nothing except what he wills, it is the same as to ask whether he willed to create them. Therefore, if ordinary law is the same as God's actual will or his free decree, it is the same thing to say that this is possible by the ordinary law as to say that God willed to do this. Hence it follows that impossibility according to ordinary law in that sense is only composite, that is, supposing the will of God by which he resolved not to create several Angels of the same species, they cannot exist, which is quite frivolous. For in the same way someone could say that there cannot be more species of Angels in any of their orders according to the ordinary law than there now are, nor that a more perfect Angel in nature is possible than Lucifer is, if he was supreme of all, because, supposing that God decreed not to create a more perfect one or more species in such an order, something else is not possible.

7. *What ordinary law is resolved.*—Therefore by ordinary law it is necessary to understand a law founded in the very natures of things and consonant with them, and thus due to them, so that the contrary law would be beside or above the natures of such things. And similarly, when the production of several Angels of the same species is said to be possible or not possible according to the common course of the causes of the universe, the free decree of God considered absolutely should not be included among those causes, because it is known that without it nothing can be done, especially in these things that can be made only by God himself, such as separated substances. And so, if the composite sense is made even in this, then Angels cannot be multiplied in the same species according to the common course of causes, not only by the ordinary law but also by absolute power, unless the free divine decree is included in this course of causes. Therefore the order of causes must be taken as including God among them as the proximate and only cause of Angels; and in God himself there is not to be supposed a free determination of the will toward creating one or several individuals in each species of Angels, but the divine will should be considered as if in first act toward willing to create the universe. And in this way it must be asked whether, according to the common course, that is, according to the connatural mode of creating things of this kind, God could have willed to create several Angels in the same species, so that in willing this he would act in

nothing supernaturally or in a supernatural mode, but would operate only as a cause of the natural order, as he operates by creating and multiplying souls.

8. *The true affirmative opinion in this sense.*—Therefore, with the sense of the controversy thus well explained, I say that God can create several Angels of the same ultimate species by ordinary power, or by operating in a connatural mode consonant with the angelic natures themselves, no less than by absolute power. The remaining theologians whom I cited for the second opinion in the preceding point think this. And it is proved first, because either in Angels considered in possible being, prior by reason to God's willing to create Angels or to produce one or several in their individual species, there is a possible intrinsic principle of distinction of individuals in the same species on the part of the possible entitative realities of such Angels, or there is not found in such natures an intrinsic principle of distinction. If the first is said, that multiplication of individuals will be possible not only by absolute power but also by ordinary power. But if the second is said, such multiplication will be impossible not only by ordinary power but also by absolute power. Therefore such a distinction has no place in the present effect. The consequence holds by force of the sufficient partition made in the major, as is manifest from the terms of contradiction. Therefore the prior part of the minor is proved, because, once capacity or possibility on the part of the object is supposed, just as God can by his freedom will to create only one Angel in each species, so by the same freedom he could have willed to create several, since on their part the possibility and objective capacity is supposed. And if he had willed this second thing, he would not act beyond the ordinary law any more than by willing the first, because before the free determination of God's will no ordinary law is supposed on the part of God himself, nor on the part of the angelic species itself is unity of individual demanded more than plurality, since each is equally possible or not repugnant on its part. Therefore, given that hypothesis about capacity on the part of the object, multiplication is possible both by God's ordinary and absolute power. And it is openly explained, because if we posit that God wills to create two Angels in one species, the creation of each of them would be as natural as if he alone were created, and God would operate in as connatural a mode, or according to the order of nature, by creating two as by creating only one. Therefore the creation of several is as possible according to the common course as the creation of one. The antecedent is clear, because on the part of God it is not more difficult to create several than one, supposing non-repugnance on the part of the object, nor by creating two does he effect anything supernatural in either of them or in both, so that they may be distinguished, because they would

be distinguished only by their own entitative realities; for such a distinction is supposed possible in those simple entitative realities considered in possible being. Hence neither in the mode of production would anything supernatural be necessary, but only the multiplication of creations, which includes no supernaturality. Therefore that multiplication of individuals would be natural from every side, and accordingly possible according to the common course or law. And this will be confirmed more from the following point.

9. Therefore the other part of the minor is proved, because if in angelic nature considered in possible being there is not pre-understood a possible intrinsic principle of distinction of individuals within the same species, such multiplication could be made by no power even of God's absolute power, because a repugnance is supposed on the part of the object itself. This is proved because it is impossible for individuals to be multiplied within any species unless they receive in themselves an intrinsic principle of distinction, nor can this principle be added from within if it is not found intrinsically in the thing itself. Therefore, if we suppose that in Angels such an intrinsic principle is not possible, they will in no way be able to be created numerically distinct in the same species. The consequence is clear and the antecedent is proved, because the distinction of one thing from another, considered on the part of the things themselves, is as it were a certain formal effect, which cannot occur without a proper intrinsic form, or as it were form; nor can God supply it, because he cannot supply an intrinsic formal or material cause, nor can he make it the case that something belongs to a thing intrinsically which is not native to it. And it is explained first, because just as things are not actual beings unless they are made by God, so they will not be actually distinct, that is, as actual beings, unless God makes them distinct. Therefore, just as a thing cannot be made an actual being unless in the order of reason it is supposed possible from itself, so two things cannot be created by God as distinct unless objectively they are supposed from themselves to be distinct in possible being. For God cannot will that things actually be distinguished if he did not know them in possible being as distinct; just as, on the contrary, he cannot make those things to be one entitative reality which he knows in possible being to have distinction of possible entitative realities. Therefore, if he does not foreknow in a specific angelic nature several entitative realities distinct in possible being, he cannot in any way produce them as distinct. It is explained second, because if those entitative realities are not distinct from within, something will have to be added to them by which they may be distinguished. But in order that something of this kind can be added to them, they must be supposed distinct. For how would what is superadded be

distinct if it is supposed that what it is added to is one and the same? Therefore numerical distinction would be utterly repugnant if it were not pre-understood as possible, as intrinsic to the entitative realities themselves and altogether connatural to them. And therefore the comparison is not rightly made between other effects, which God can make supernaturally in things because they depend only on him as efficient cause and end, and this effect of numerical distinction, which cannot be made supernaturally in things if it is not found intimately and connaturally in the entitative realities themselves.

10. *Finally the true opinion is proved by attacking other false modes.*— Finally it is explained by attacking other modes of speaking. For those who say that specific angelic nature according to itself is individual and incommunicable to many, and by its nature lacks an intrinsic principle of numerical multiplication, and accordingly that an individual Angel now adds nothing real above the species of Angel, even something distinct from it by reason, and nevertheless say that God can multiply Angels in the same species, plainly say contrary things. First, because it implies a contradiction for what is indivisible to be divided, or what, considered through itself and precisely, is individual to be communicated to many individuals, as these teach about the angelic species. Second, also because it is impossible for the angelic species itself to be multiplied, which is supposed to be entirely ultimate and complete. Therefore, if a singular Angel is nothing but the species itself precisely placed in the nature of things, individuals can no more be multiplied than the species itself, because things that are altogether the same receive the same unity or multitude in created things. Finally, because if the angelic species as created in the nature of things did not have an entitative reality of itself apt to be distinguished from another similar entitative reality of the same species, I ask what God could add to such a species so that it might become individual and be able to be distinguished from another individual. Certainly nothing else can be understood except actual being itself, by which such an actual entitative reality comes about. For all accidents suppose the entitative reality of the substance singular and individual; indeed, subsistence also supposes the individual entitative reality of the nature, while actual being itself, which cannot be anything but individual and particular, constitutes an individual actual entitative reality, even in angelic nature itself. But this actual being itself is now found in any singular angelic substance, and if several of the same species have been created or can be created, each has nothing else by force of its substance. Therefore, if such multiplication is not intrinsic by force of the natural entitative

realities themselves, it cannot be made through anything superadded, whether natural or supernatural.

11. *Giles's mode of speaking is rejected.*—But the mode of natural unity or preternatural multitude that Giles devised is certainly neither probable nor intelligible. For when he says that God gives separated substances as much of being as they themselves can receive, not only do we confess this, but we also add that, supposing God wills to create an Angel, he necessarily gives him as much of the substantial being of that nature as the nature itself can receive. For what he says, that God can restrict or diminish this being, cannot be understood, because this being is nothing other than the substantial entitative reality itself of such a nature. But that entitative reality is indivisible, so that it can neither be intensified or remitted, nor increased or diminished in entitative reality. Therefore neither can diminution or addition be understood in the existential being of such an entitative reality. Indeed, to abstract from the question about the real distinction of existence from essence, even if being itself were a distinct thing, it would also be an indivisible thing, and in it no greater or lesser enlargement or restriction could be understood. For this reason, if God can produce several Angels of the same species, each of them will have as much substantial being as he himself can receive, because, as I showed, it is not capable of restriction or diminution. Nor would that multiplication be made as if through partition of one perfect being into two imperfect beings. For who can understand this? Or what necessity compels it to be devised or imagined? Rather, it would be made through the production of several entitative realities, each of which would have the whole being that it demands according to its nature, because the production of one would not diminish the perfection of the other. And finally, in whatever way two created Angels differing only numerically are thought of, they would be simple substantial entitative realities, numerically distinct by themselves and not through another. Therefore this distinction is connatural to those entitative realities, and each of them will have as much being as it is apt to receive. Therefore no diminution or restriction in such being is necessary for this multiplication to occur.

12. *The assertion in this second point, or sense of the question, is concluded.*—Therefore I conclude that, just as it is possible for Angels to be multiplied numerically in the same species by God's absolute power, so also by ordinary power, and that for this multiplication no supernatural or preternatural action is necessary; and accordingly that it can occur according to the common course of natural causes, including even the first cause itself among these causes as operating in a natural and ordinary mode. It is proved, because if that

multiplication is possible by absolute power, it is supposed on the part of angelic nature considered in possible being that it is not repugnant, nor is an intrinsic principle of numerical distinction under the same species lacking. Therefore by the same ordinary power by which God can create that species, he can produce it in one or in many individuals, as he wills. Moreover, we can prove this by showing directly that individual difference is not necessarily taken from some entitative reality distinct from the individual thing itself, but in the same simple entitative reality can be founded both specific and individual difference, according to diverse comparisons to other similar things, just as generic and specific difference are founded in the same; and accordingly metaphysical composition from species and individuating difference can be found in Angels no less connaturally than composition from genus and difference. And consequently, the multiplication of individuals in the same species, if it occurs in Angels, is as connatural as the multiplication of species under the same genus. For although perhaps the latter pertains to greater perfection and better order, nevertheless each in its own grade of perfection is equally connatural, because neither exceeds the order or causality consonant with nature. And the stated equivalence consists in this alone. But that foundation concerning the principle of individuation physically indistinct from the entitative reality itself of the thing, even in simple beings, was treated at length in the cited place of the *Metaphysics*, and therefore this is sufficient concerning questions about the possible.

13. *Third sense.—First opinion denying that, in fact, Angels of the same species are given.*—The third point is what should be thought in fact: whether God created several Angels under their ultimate species differing only numerically, or only one. St. Thomas everywhere denies this, and in this all Thomists agree, both those who said that the contrary is simply impossible and those who think it cannot be done by ordinary power. And they speak consequently, because the creation of Angels was made in a mode consonant with the nature of Angels, and accordingly according to the ordinary course, such as can be considered in the work of creation. But from others, who think that neither way makes it impossible for several Angels of the same species to be created, Argentinas held that they were not in fact created, in 2, dist. 3, quest. 2, art. 2, at the end. And it can be attributed to Giles, cited quodlibet 2, quest. 7, insofar as he says that it could indeed have been done, but nevertheless, according to the order that we see, it was not fitting. He proves this by other reasons in 2, dist. 3, arts. 2 and 3, although at times he mixes in reasons that

either prove the thing to be impossible or prove nothing, to which we have already sufficiently responded.

14. *It is proved.*—Therefore the conjectures by which it is urged that God did not multiply Angels within the same species, although he could have done so even according to ordained power, are these. First, an order through itself is nobler than an order per accidens. Therefore in the angelic grade there will be greater perfection if the whole order of them is through itself, so that the whole multitude of persons existing in that grade differs through itself and essentially. But if it is said that, once the whole number of sufficient species in that grade is posited, they would exist in a more perfect mode if each were found in several individuals than if in only one, against this it will be pressed that, if that whole multitude that is devised in all species is also of species, there will be greater perfection. The second reason is that a multitude of individuals is ordered only to the conservation of the species. But it is not necessary in Angels on account of this end, as is self-evident. Therefore it is superfluous and for that reason should not be asserted. Third, this reason is strengthened by the example of the heavens, in which things are not multiplied under an ultimate species because they are incorruptible, and that order is more beautiful and more perfect.

15. *The true affirmative opinion.—It is proved first by the authority of the Fathers.—Second from congruity.*—Nevertheless, in a doubtful and uncertain matter, it seems more credible that in all or in several species of Angels, several differing only numerically were created. The scholastics more frequently hold this: Alexander of Hales, Albert, Bonaventure, Scotus, Gabriel, Durandus, Marsilius, in the places cited above. For although they differ among themselves in asserting a greater or lesser multiplication of such individuals, nevertheless on this point, that in fact many individuals are given under angelic species, all agree. And from the moderns Molina and Valentia agree with them. But Vázquez only says that the matter is doubtful and uncertain. Pesantius also thinks the same, part 1, quest. 50, art. 4, saying that each is probable. But the assertion is proved first by the authority of the Fathers whom we cited in chapter twelve. For it cannot be denied that all those Fathers suppose as clear that this is possible while preserving the whole order of nature, and that many of them simply believed that it had been so done, although, because it is neither revealed nor can it be shown by evident reasons, they sometimes say that the matter is doubtful and unknown to us. Yet none will be found who absolutely denied that it is so, whereas many simply affirmed it. Therefore this is a sign that it is more likely. Second, this is made probable because, supposing a sufficient multiplication of angelic genera and species, the multiplication of individuals

under species also pertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe. For this perfection and beauty is not in only one greater perfection, but arises from the variety of all things, and it pertains to this variety that in so great a multitude all modes of distinctions among those persons be found.

16. Third, this congruity is increased by a political reason, because it pertains to the adornment of a Prince's court that in every order or grade of persons there be some multitude with equality, so that with greater proportion they can serve the same ministries. Fourth, it also pertains to the perfection of friendship and society to have companions of the same grade and order. Hence if the multitude of Angels is considered in pure natural gifts after the manner of one republic or society, it seems most fitting that individual Angels have companions perfectly like themselves in specific nature, with whom they can be joined by a certain greater familiarity, proportion, and society. Fifth, we can add that among the blessed there are found some wholly equal in grace and in the beatific vision, not only in the essence of vision or grace, but also in grade, as seems certain concerning children dying with only baptism and concerning the holy innocents. Therefore with greater reason separated substances will be able to be wholly alike in specific essence. And sixth, it can be added that it is very likely that, since God had foreknown by conditional knowledge that some from many angelic species would be damned, he produced not only those in such species, but also others whom he foreknew would be saved if they were created, lest some whole species should perish. For this seems to pertain much to divine providence and mercy, as Augustine thought, in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 29. And consequently, even if in many other species God foreknew that several would be saved if all were created, for that reason he ought not to have created only one, since perseverance foreknown in one should not harm the others, and the beatitude of several like beings, other things being equal, increases divine glory.

17. *The contrary arguments in number fourteen are solved, to the first.*— Finally, the contrary conjectures do not seem to have as much weight as the preceding ones. Therefore, to the first it is responded that, although the order of species, or through itself, is of its kind more perfect than an order per accidens, or of individuals, for that reason the prior alone should not be posited in Angels, because, as I said, the perfection of a multitude or mystical body does not consist in one single mode of perfection, even if it is better or greater, but in the variety and completion of all, with the sufficiency of each. It can also be added that, although the order of species is more through itself and of its kind nobler, nevertheless in particular some multiplication of individuals can exceed in

something an equal multiplication and number of species. For the number of two Seraphim, even if posited to be of the same species, is absolutely more perfect materially or entitatively than a similar number composed of one Seraph and another Cherub. Hence, if the number of Angels or of Seraphim was not to be increased otherwise, it would be better to create two Seraphim of the same species than only one with one Cherub. Thus each multiplication has its own perfection, and they stand in some way as that which exceeds and that which is exceeded; and therefore in each considered through itself in such a genus of beings, a sufficient reason is found on account of which it could have been made and ought not to have been omitted because of the other.

18. *To the second.*—To the second the antecedent is denied as to the exclusive particle, if it is understood universally of all individuals, as it must be taken in the argument so that it does not proceed from pure particulars. Therefore only in the species of corruptible things does that peculiar cause demanding the multiplication of individuals on account of the conservation of the species have place. From this it can only be inferred that such multiplication is not as necessary in immaterial substances as in material ones, as Ferrariense rightly observes, 2 *Contra Gentiles*, cited chapter 93, around reason 3. It can also be inferred that the multiplication of individuals in immaterial substances cannot occur through generation or through emanation of one individual from another individual, as happens in corruptible species. Yet from this it does not follow that the individuals of those substances cannot be multiplied in a higher mode, namely, immediately by the creator himself, by whom alone they can be produced, and accordingly all at once, because no reason for succession intervenes, since the creator can create and conserve several at once as easily as one. And finally, although that purpose of conserving the species is lacking, there is not lacking manifold other fittingness on account of which it was necessary to multiply Angels also in this way, as is clear from what has been said and will be made clearer from the following solution.

19. *To the third.*—To the third, taken from the example of the heavens, it is responded first that what is assumed is not settled. For there is great controversy among philosophers about the specific difference among all celestial bodies. And although it is probable that whole bodies themselves are of diverse species, and similarly that the planets differ in species, about the stars of the firmament it is not improbable that either all or at least many are of the same species, because it is not repugnant, nor is something else established from effects. Then we say that there is a very different account of bodies and spirits. For in bodies the distinction of individuals occurs by means of quantity, and in inanimate and

homogeneous bodies, as the heavens for the most part are, the multitude of individuals consists in the discontinuation of parts, and so in corruptible bodies it ordinarily occurs through the division of quantitative parts. Therefore, because incorruptible bodies are incapable of such division, and the native union and continuation of parts pertains to their greater perfection, for this reason the multiplication of individuals is not so necessary or fitting in them; rather, this is supplied through the magnitude of the body and through the potential multitude of similar united parts. But in spiritual things numerical distinction does not arise from the division of a continuum, but from the nature of such entitative realities; and therefore in them a much greater reason for such multiplication is found. Finally, there is a notable difference between the heavens and angelic spirits. For the heavens were not created for themselves in the way Angels were. The heavens were created chiefly on account of the integrity of this universe and on account of the necessity of their influence for the generation of lower bodies, which finally are ordered to completing the number of the predestined. And therefore they were created in such a number as was necessary and sufficient for that end. But spiritual substances are in a much different way intended through themselves and are immediately ordered to the praise and glory of God. And therefore in them not only species but also individuals are intended through themselves for the perfection of the universe, as St. Thomas said about the individuals of the human species, part 1, quest. 23, art. 7; and therefore the number even of individuals in angelic species is not limited by some utility or necessity for an extrinsic end, because, although they are many, all and each are most apt for praising God, and the more numerous they are, the more they increase God's glory, other things being equal. And therefore God alone, through the counsel of his will, can set a definite limit for that number. But no reason is found why he did not choose some proportionate multitude rather than singularity of individuals even in those species.

END OF BOOK ONE

BOOK TWO
ON THE INTELLECTIVE POWER OF ANGELS, AND ON ALL THINGS THAT PERTAIN TO ITS NATURAL COGNITION

Sequence of matters to be treated. — In the preceding book, together with the essence of the substance of angels and all the attributes that most closely concern it, we also explained their causes, although we reserved some points about their creation for the following treatise, which we shall complete in the first book of that treatise, chapter six. Now, therefore, it follows that we must speak about their other properties. Theologians, however, especially Saint Thomas, are accustomed first to dispute about the place and motion of angels before the higher faculties, perhaps so that they may proceed from what is more universal and what seems to have greater agreement with physical things to what is higher. Nevertheless, it seemed right to us to reduce this part concerning the faculties or properties of angels to three heads, namely, intellect, will, and motive power both of themselves and of others, or, what is the same, operative power ad extra. For when treating of God we reduced similar positive attributes to those three, knowledge, will, and power. Therefore we adapt the same division to angels, because they participate the pure intellectual grade of God, and through the same participation they have the same positive attributes, which are understood by way of operative faculties. And we begin from the intellect, because it is nobler; and then we shall speak of the will, and afterward of power, because in this too angels imitate God, that they operate only through intellect and will. And consequently there we also speak of their local motion, because it is the act of that power; and subsequently of its term, which is the where, or place.

But one must further observe that, just as an angel and a soul agree in some way in the intellectual grade, so also many things concerning the faculty of understanding, its object, its acts, and the principles necessary for them are disputed commonly of both, and have almost the same account in both. Therefore matters of this sort will not have to be disputed expressly in the present treatise, but are to be referred to the treatise on the Soul; and we shall speak expressly only of those matters that are proper to angels, or have a special account in them. Especially, indeed, we shall speak about those that in some way exceed the discourse of natural reason, unless it is assisted by principles of faith; for regarding the other matters, which are merely natural, what we said in

disputation 35 of the *Metaphysics*, section 4, seems capable of sufficing. Yet those matters that depend on their proper places and on theological principles we shall confirm and explain more in the present treatise.

CHAPTER I
WHETHER AN ANGEL NEEDS A POWER AND ACT DISTINCT FROM HIS OWN SUBSTANCE IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND?

1. *Points to be supposed.* — I suppose first of all that angels are purely intellectual in their nature. This was sufficiently explained and proved in the preceding book. But I say *purely* so as to exclude from angels every lower mode of knowing, because they do not have senses, since they do not have bodies; and besides the senses there is no other mode of knowing except through intellect. Hence I suppose, second, that in angels there is both a principal and a proximate faculty of understanding. For since understanding is an act of life, it requires action. But action cannot exist without the said principles, because for acting there is required a principal power, which is as it were the radical principle on the part of the agent, and a proximate power, which in some way intimately reaches the action itself, as was said more fully in the *Metaphysics*, disputations 7 and 8. But whether these two faculties are really distinct or not was treated at length in that eighth disputation, section three, where we resolved that the affirmative part is regularly true in creatures.

2. *First conclusion. — The angelic intellect is distinct from the substance of the angel. — Durandus is rejected.* — With these things posited, I say first. Besides the substance, which in spiritual things is the principal principle of understanding, there is in angels an intellect, which is the proximate faculty of understanding and a power distinct from substance. Thus Saint Thomas teaches in the First Part, Quest. 54, art. 3, and his whole school, and Alexander of Hales, and all the scholastics who think thus about the soul and its intellect teach the same about angels, with the one exception of Durandus, in book 2, dist. 3, Quest. 5, who, while admitting the distinction in the soul because it is the act of a body, denies it in an angel because he is an integral substance. This reason is irrelevant, and therefore there is no doubt that one must philosophize about angels in the same way as about the soul. And so Dionysius, chapter 11, *De caelesti Hierarchia*, says, distinguishing even in the highest created spirits, that there are three things: substance, power, and operation. Anselm imitates him, *De Casu diaboli*, chapter 8, saying that the will of an angel is not his substance, although it is some essence; and the same reason holds for the intellect. And

there he evidently supposes that, as regards this point, the same account applies to angels and to our soul. Hence I have always been persuaded that the necessity of this power distinct from substance arises from the limitation of created substance, and therefore in every created spirit, however perfect, we posit that distinction. And hence Cajetan rightly extends this even to every creatable spirit, because if an angel were creatable who could understand in a connatural mode without an intellect distinct from his substance, by no probable reason could we divine that such an angel was not made; indeed, it would be credible that either all angels or many created angels were of this sort. Hence those who admit that intelligent spirits could be made through their own substance, and yet prove that the angels who have been made are not such because they are limited creatures, do not seem to me to speak consistently. But I treated this matter at length in the cited disputation 18 of the *Metaphysics*, section 3, and below, in treating of the soul, we shall add something.

3. *Second conclusion. — The act of understanding is distinct from the substance of the angel.* — I say second that the act of understanding is also a thing distinct from the substance of the angel. On this point there is greater agreement among theologians with Saint Thomas, cited Quest. 54, arts. 1 and 2, and with the Master, in book 2, dist. 3. And it is taken from the cited place of Dionysius, who distinguishes operation in angels from substance and from power, as also Anselm above, and in *De Concordia gratiae et liberi arbitrii*, a little before the end, distinguishes the will as instrument and the will as use, that is, the power and the act, which he also touches upon with respect to reason in *De Conceptu Virginis*, chapter 4; and Damascene teaches the same in book 2, *De Fide*, chapter 6. And Pope Leo, epistle 91, otherwise 93, to Toribius, chapter 5, says: *No one is his own wisdom*; and although he is speaking there about men, he immediately adds: *But God alone is in need of no participation.* And almost similar things are found in the fifteenth Council of Toledo, shortly after the beginning. But how efficacious these are for persuading the assertion, and to what degree they prove it, will be clear from the following point. This truth, moreover, is also common to the rational soul; hence it can be proved by general reasons, which we leave to the treatise on the Soul. But because the Commentator and some philosophers, although they concede that in the rational soul intellection is something distinct from its substance, teach the contrary concerning intelligences, as I reported at the beginning of disputation 35 of the *Metaphysics*, section 4, I shall therefore show this truth briefly in a special way concerning intelligences, and I shall explain more fully what I said in the cited place of the *Metaphysics*, number ten and following.

4. *The preceding conclusion is explained. — It is proved.* — For it can be understood in two ways that some spiritual substance is its own understanding. First, formally and essentially; second, only identically, but not essentially or formally, just as motion is really the same as the movable thing, although it is not of its essence. And, conversely, understanding can be understood to be distinguished from the substance of a thing in two ways. First, as a mode existing outside its essence, although it is not a thing or a quality wholly distinct. Second, it can be distinguished really as a co-distinct entity. Concerning the former mode of identity, it seems altogether certain that an angel is not his own understanding. For if actual intellection were of the essence of an angel, he would be as immutable in understanding as he is in being, or in essence, because he could not be changed in intellection without being changed in essence. But it is established that an angel is changed in his intellection while his essence or substance is not changed. Therefore. The minor is proved, both because he knows many things habitually which he does not always actually consider, either because he cannot attend to all things at once, or because he does not will to do so; and also because he does not know future contingents before they come to be, and afterward he can behold them.

5. *What some respond to the preceding proof.* — To this, however, it can be responded first, according to Aristotle's doctrine in book 12 of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 7 and following, that it is not necessary that they understand all things other than themselves in particular, but that each intelligence knows only itself and those things that it can know through itself without any change. For thus he philosophizes about the first mover in book 12 of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 9, text 51, where he seems to think in the same way about the other intelligences. Once this is posited, the force of the reason just made ceases. But to this we say first of all that it is not established that Aristotle thinks the same in this matter about the other intelligences as about the first, because he says that only the first is most perfect, and on that perfection he founds that mode of knowing. But he says that the other intelligences are lower, and he does not explain sufficiently how they are related to their own understanding. Next we say that, if perhaps he thought thus about angels, and in this respect equated the lower intelligences with the first, he both erred gravely and said this without foundation, since they are not of equal perfection, as he himself admits. But the other reason he brings forward is frivolous, namely, that if an intelligence were not its own understanding, it would be wearied by perpetual intellection. For the inference is denied, because the act of understanding, although it is distinct from the angel, is connatural to him and harms a spiritual nature in no way; and therefore

it can always be continued without weariness, indeed with delight, as faith teaches concerning the beatific vision.

6. *Another response.* — Second, it can be responded that, although an angel understands all things through his own substance, so that his understanding is his essence itself, and consequently his intellection is as invariable and immutable as his substance, nevertheless it can admit variation, increase, or decrease on the part of the objects, without change or increase in its own entity or in any real intrinsic mode, through only a relation of reason to such objects, which it reaches intentionally. For true theology teaches in this way that God beholds present or future things which he would not behold if they were not future, without intrinsic variation in his understanding. Averroes and others did not understand this, and therefore they attributed to God ignorance of some changeable and contingent things; and so that they might grant to him the perfection of immutability in knowing, they denied to him the perfection of most universal knowledge, or, what is the same, they thought of ignorance or lack of knowledge of some things in him. But they were deceived, because each perfection is necessary for the excellence of the divine intelligence, and those perfections are not mutually repugnant or incompossible, as I taught against the same philosophers in disputation 30 of the *Metaphysics*, section 16, n. 40. Therefore by equal reason in the other intelligences those two perfections will be able to be combined; and consequently, from the fact that the cognition of an angel extends to things that are variable, it does not follow that it is mutable in itself, and consequently neither does it follow that it is outside the essence or substance of the angel.

7. *The said response is rejected.* — It is responded: the comparison and equalization have no weight, for in this point the account of God and of angels is very dissimilar. First, indeed, because that perfection and eminence of divine intellection belongs to God from his infinite perfection, and it is so excellent that the human intellect cannot grasp how the same intellection, wholly necessary and immutable in itself, can freely represent many things, with no change, addition, or diminution made in it. But angelic intellection does not reach that infinity or simplicity of divine intellection; therefore that perfection cannot be attributed to it with foundation or likelihood. Next, it is proper to God that he beholds only his own substance as the primary and, so to speak, direct object, but understands other things, which are outside him, secondarily and as if by resultance from the comprehension of himself. Therefore it is also proper to God that by the same act of understanding, unchanged in itself, he beholds variable objects and their diverse states of future, present, or past.

Therefore an angel cannot have so great a variety in cognition on the part of the object without some change on the part of his act. The first antecedent is proved, because only the divine substance is the supreme cause eminently containing the accounts of all things; but from this eminence it comes about that by comprehending himself, he comprehends all other things and beholds them as they are. Therefore it is also proper to him to know all things in himself in the said way. For since an angel does not eminently contain all things and is not the necessary cause of other things, he cannot know all the rest by force of cognition of himself, as we shall say more fully below. But the first consequence is proved because divine intellection has this above all from the fact that, while existing in itself as invariable, it immutably beholds all variable things: that it immutably sees itself, and, by comprehending itself, naturally represents all other things as they are. The other consequence is clear from what has been said. Another argument can be made: God has that mode of knowing by force of his eternity through essence, because his intellection also is eternal through essence, which created intellection does not have by the very fact that it is created. Finally, not even God himself could have that immutability in his act if he could newly consider and actually behold what he did not previously understand actually, or not actually understand what he once considered. But because, by reason of his immutability, what he now sees he understood from eternity, and what he once saw he always and necessarily actually beholds, therefore he immutably understands all mutable things. But an angel does not have this excellence; rather, he now sees what he did not see before, and conversely now he does not actually consider what he considered before, because he cannot actually understand all things at once, as we shall see below. Therefore he cannot have that variety without some change in his acts.

8. *A third response, threefold.* — Third, it can be responded that from this change in angelic intellection there follows at most a modal or formal distinction between the substance of the angel and his act of understanding, because that distinction suffices for this sort of change; and a greater distinction is not to be admitted without necessity, since it does not pertain to perfection. Add that, in every act of understanding, a distinction from the nature of the thing between that act and the substance of the angel is not gathered from change alone; for although he undergoes variety and change in the actual consideration of other things, he perpetually beholds himself immutably. Therefore at least he understands himself through himself, without any entity or mode superadded to his substance, because there remains no way by which we may gather a distinction between such an act and substance. Finally, if the

intellective power is not really but only formally distinguished from the substance of the angel, there is no reason why the act should be distinguished more from both. But if the power is a distinct thing, although consequently it must be admitted that the act too is really distinguished from substance, since it does not inesse in the substance except through the mediating power, nevertheless it is not necessary that it be distinguished from the power itself by more than a modal distinction, because so many entities must not be multiplied without cause.

9. *The first part of the preceding response is treated.* — Concerning the former point, some judge that, although it is certain that the understanding of an angel is not of his essence, nor formally pertains to his substance, nevertheless it is enough that they be distinguished formally. Thus among the moderns Daniel Malonius teaches in book 2, dist. 3, disp. 5, sect. 2, and he says that others think thus, whom he does not report. And he is founded on this, that he thinks it certain that an intellection cannot exist separated from an angel. But Saint Thomas thinks the contrary in the First Part, Quest. 54, art. 1, and all the Thomists there. And Scotus thinks the same in book 4, dist. 1, Quest. 1, § *Second proposition*, where he expressly proves that the intellection of an angel is not substance but an accident, because *an angel can have one intellection and another really*, in which he indicates that intellections in one angel are accidents really distinct among themselves, and consequently also from substance. Gregory too, in book 2, dist. 7, Quest. 2, art. 2, teaches that the intellection of an angel is essentially distinct from substance; and Marsilius, in book 2, Quest. 7, art. 1, in the second part of that article, says that an angel understands through a superadded intellection. Gabriel thinks the same in book 2, dist. 3, Quest. 1, art. 2, conclusion 1, with Ockham, in book 2, Quests. 14 and 15; and Giles, Argentina, and others in book 2, dist. 3, openly suppose it, for although they do not expressly declare the mode of distinction, they always speak of intellection as of a thing distinct from an angel. And I proved the same opinion in the cited disputation 35 of the *Metaphysics*, section 4, n. 12, both from the fact that intellection is a perfect form and therefore has its own proper entity and is not only a mode, and also because it formally represents the thing understood and therefore arises from the object and the power; and besides because supernatural intellections, such as the blessed vision, faith, and so on, are acts really distinct from the substance of an angel, and they cannot suitably be understood otherwise, as we proved generally in the matter on grace. Finally, what the contrary opinion supposes in its foundation, that an intellection cannot exist outside substance, is true if it is understood of natural power; but

the inference has no weight, for the same is true of the accidents of bread, which naturally cannot exist without substance, and nevertheless they are distinct beings, as the mystery of the Eucharist has confirmed. But if that antecedent is understood of the absolute power of God, it is false and begs the principle.

10. *The second part is treated.* — Concerning the second part, Durandus, in book 2, dist. 3, Quest. 5, reply to 1, while admitting that the intellections of an angel are really distinguished from his substance, adds this limitation: *when he understands a thing other than himself.* By this he indicates that the intellection by which he understands himself is not distinguished from his substance; and perhaps he is founded on this, that in cognition of himself he cannot receive change, but is necessarily always present to himself, as he teaches in the same place, Quest. 8. Nevertheless this opinion is false, as I said in the cited place of the *Metaphysics*, and Henry teaches well in Quodlibet 15, Quest. 8, Marsilius in book 2, Quest. 7, art. 2, and all there. For if Durandus thought that an angel understands himself through his own substance formally and essentially, so that actually understanding himself is of the essence of the angel, his opinion is surely improbable and absurd, both because it is against all other theologians, who, as regards this part concerning the act of understanding, unanimously teach that an angel does not know himself through his own substance; and also because God can conserve the existing substance of an angel while he is not actually understanding himself. For who would dare to deny this, since it implies no contradiction? And finally because in an angel the faculty by which he understands himself and other things is the same. Therefore, if actually understanding things other than himself is not of his essence, neither will understanding himself be of his essence. Finally, the intellection by which an angel understands himself is a vital action that is effected by the angel himself. Therefore it cannot be formally and essentially his substance, which he himself does not make. But if Durandus understood that there is not so great a real distinction in an angel between the act of understanding himself and his substance as there is between the same substance and the acts through which he understands other things, then the opinion is not so absurd. Still, it is also without foundation, because the account of created intellection is the same in each intellection; and therefore intellection of oneself has its own proper entity, existence, and separability from substance as much as any intellection of another thing. Nor does it matter that perhaps intellection of oneself is more necessary and naturally immutable, because this greater connection can exist with an equal real distinction, as is known in itself.

11. *The third part is treated.* — In the third part of that response, the question is asked whether, just as the understanding of an angel is distinguished from his essence, so too it is distinguished from his intellect. To this we respond briefly in the affirmative. This first of all is certain according to the opinion saying that the intellect is not really distinguished from the substance of an angel, because if substance and intellect are one thing, even if they are posited as formally distinct, and intellection is a thing distinct from substance, it is necessary that it also be a thing distinct from intellect, because in created things any two cannot be really the same as one third thing without being really the same among themselves. But if the intellect of an angel is a thing distinct from his substance, then too it is evident that intellection is really distinguished from substance, since between substance and act the power intervenes; and likewise it is certain that the act of understanding of an angel is distinct from his intellect from the nature of the thing, because the same power is affected by diverse acts, and is changed from one to another, and according to acts is illuminated or elevated to a higher order of knowing, while the power nevertheless remains wholly the same in itself. And hence, according to the argument made, it is also concluded that the act in respect of such a power is a perfect form and a thing or quality distinct, and not only a mode; and therefore the distinction between those two is truly real, of two things mutually separable at least by absolute power, and not only modal.

12. *A corollary from what was just said, consonant with Saint Thomas. — It is proved. — What sort Saint Thomas's reasons for the same point are.* — From these things I infer that both the intellective power and the act of understanding are things distinct from the existence of an angel. This is taken from Saint Thomas, cited Quest. 54, art. 2, insofar as he defines there that the understanding of an angel is distinguished from his being, and it is commonly received by all. And in our opinion it does not need a new proof; for above we showed that the essence or substance of an angel is not his own understanding, but that they are distinct things. This, however, must be understood of essence and substance as an actual entity, because essence in potency is not the principle of actual operation, but essence actually existing is. Therefore the intellection of an angel is a thing distinct from the actual entity of his essence or substance. But according to the opinion that we judge to be wholly true, actual essence is the same as its existence, by which it is formally and intrinsically constituted in the being of actual entity. Therefore it is necessary that the understanding of an angel be really distinguished from his being or his existence just as from his substance or essence. But Saint Thomas, in the cited Quest. 54, arts. 1, 2, and 3,

uses other reasons to prove the distinction of the intellection and intellective power of an angel from his being and essence; these are more difficult, and Cajetan labors much in explaining and defending them, and writes most copiously. And in the schools we once undertook that disputation at length; but now we have judged it more useful to abstain from it, both because those reasons are not demonstrations and suppose some general principles that have been treated elsewhere, and to repeat them here would be laborious and troublesome; and also because those reasons at most prove that understanding is not formally of the essence of an angel, which is almost outside controversy. But a modal or real distinction is persuaded more clearly and easily by the reasons made by us, which suffice according to the capacity of the matter; and anyone who is not satisfied by them will be much less persuaded by the very obscure reasons that undergo greater difficulties.

13. *Third conclusion: in an angel there is only one cognitive power.* — I say third. The intellective or cognitive power in an angel is only one. This assertion is also commonly received by theologians, and in it we suppose that every cognition of an angel is spiritual and immaterial, because, as we said, he does not have sensitive cognition, nor a body through which he could know as through an organ. Therefore every cognition of an angel is abstracted from body, and spiritual or immaterial. But every spiritual cognition is intellective. Therefore all acts of knowing of any angel are intellections. But for all intellections of the same person one intellective power suffices. Therefore in any angel there is only one intellect, or one intellective power. The minor is proved first from ourselves, or from our rational soul, for it has only one intellect for eliciting all its acts of understanding. Therefore much more does one intellect suffice for an angel, because he is more perfect, and in a more perfect agent the power is more united and more universal. Second, because the intellect from its general account is a power that is ordered to knowing the true as true. But the true is convertible with being. Therefore the intellect of itself extends to every being insofar as it is intelligible. Therefore one intellect suffices in every intelligent being for every object intelligible by it, and consequently for every act of understanding that it can elicit. For this reason Saint Thomas said, in the cited Quest. 54, art. 2, that understanding as such has a certain infinity, because, as far as it is of itself, it extends to all beings insofar as they have the account of the true. Therefore an angel through one and the same power is capable of all things intelligible by him. Nor is it an obstacle that acts of understanding are multiplied in an angel, as we said, because a power is a universal principle of acts, and so one power suffices for many acts, which can differ under special objective

accounts, although they agree in the general account of the adequate object of the power, as we shall say more fully in the treatise on the Soul.

14. *An objection asking whether there is a twofold intellect in an angel. — On the possible intellect. — It is proved.* — But here it can be objected that in our soul there is a twofold intellect, agent and possible. Therefore there will also be in an angel, because the multiplication of such spiritual powers pertains to perfection, which cannot be lacking in an angel. Especially since the necessity of intelligible species, for the effecting of which an agent intellect is attributed to our soul, also has a place in angels. This objection demands the doubt that Saint Thomas treats in the cited Quest. 54, art. 4: whether in angels there is an agent and possible intellect. We shall settle it briefly, because once the terms are explained, it has a very easy resolution; and if it contains any difficulty, that depends on what will be said below concerning the species of angels. Therefore first the name "possible intellect" must be explained. For it can signify that intellective power which of itself is in pure potency to all acts of understanding that it can have, and to all principles of such acts that it can also receive in itself, whether they are intelligible species or habits. And in this signification the intellect by which the rational soul understands is usually called possible, from Aristotle, book 3, *De Anima*, chapters 4 and 5, where he teaches that our intellect in the beginning, when it is created, is like a blank tablet on which nothing has been depicted. But then it is not called possible in the way in which a being not yet made is called possible, because we are speaking of the intellect already created; rather, it is called possible with respect to becoming other things in intelligible or intentional being, and in this way it implies not only passive potency absolutely, but as including the privation of every act, by reason of which privation it is said to be in potency, according to Aristotle's manner of speaking in book 9 of the *Metaphysics*, text 17. Speaking in this way, therefore, of the possible intellect, the intellect of an angel is not possible simply, because from its nature it never has being in pure intellectual passive potency, neither as to first act, because from the beginning it has concreated intelligible species, nor as to second act, because it always understands something, as we shall say below. But in another way every intellect that is an intellectual passive potency can be called a possible intellect, whether it is a potency to an act that it can receive, whether it always has that act, or partly has it actually and partly in potency. And in this way Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Scotus, and others to be cited below call the intellect of angels possible; indeed, so does Saint Thomas in book 2, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 96, reason 6. The reason is that, in the foregoing sense, every created intellect is possible, because it is really a passive power, that

is, receptive of acts informing it, either in first act, such as species, or in second act, such as acts of understanding. For although such a power is always joined to its act, nevertheless it is truly passive and receptive of such an act, just as the matter of the heaven is passive potency to its form, although it is always joined to that form. And this is especially because an angel does not always have every act of his, nor always the same act; for in second acts he receives change and passes from one to another, and he can also receive some intelligible species anew, either infused or acquired, as we shall see below.

15. *On the agent intellect. — In angels there is no agent intellect. — The contrary opinion is rejected.* — Second, the name "agent intellect" must be explained. For according to its proper imposition it signifies a certain active spiritual power which, as such, is only active of intelligible species in a possible intellect lacking them. And in this way philosophers posit an agent intellect in the rational soul, through which it can receive intelligible species from phantasms. Whether this is a power really distinct from the possible intellect in our soul is a matter disputed among philosophers, which we shall treat in its own place. Nevertheless, it is certain among all that the agent intellect, taken under this precise concept, is not a cognitive power, nor a power productive of acts of understanding, but only of species, which are proximate principles of such acts. Therefore, when the agent intellect is taken in this way, it is not found in angels, both because, since they have concreated species, they do not need an intrinsic faculty productive of them; and also because they cannot abstract species from phantasms, since they do not have sense and phantasms. Hence the agent intellect taken in this way, although it brings some perfection to the rational soul, nevertheless supposes an imperfection repugnant to angelic nature, namely, being the act of a body and lacking innate species and acquiring them through the body; and therefore such a perfection is not consonant with angelic nature. But Scotus thinks against this part in book 2, dist. 3, last Quest.; and Richard there, art. 6, Quest. 2, reply to 1; and Bassolus, Quest. 4, art. 3. And Alexander of Hales, to be cited below, seems to think the same. Bonaventure, however, in book 2, dist. 3, second part of the distinction, art. 2, Quest. 1, in the first part of the body seems especially to defend this opinion, and nevertheless at the end of the body destroys the foundation, which, once removed, makes the opinion fall. For those authors suppose that an angel receives species from material things, which is false, as we shall show below; and so they rest on a false foundation. But I say *from material things*, because although perhaps an angel could receive species from spiritual objects, he would not need an agent

intellect, because the object itself, actually intelligible, would of itself be effective of such species, as I shall explain below.

16. *In what sense the opinion now rejected could be admitted.* — But if by the name "agent intellect" is signified that power which is the producer of acts of understanding, then the angelic intellect can be called an agent intellect, because, since it is a power of life, it is really an active power of its own act. But because that term is not customarily used in that signification, one must not speak in that way without sufficient explanation. Now the agent intellect taken in this way is not a power distinct from the possible intellect in the second meaning explained above in n. 14. Hence, although in these significations an agent and possible intellect are admitted in an angel, the intellects or intellective powers are not multiplied, but one and the same is active and receptive, because it acts through an immanent action, and so it acts upon itself; and by acting it receives, because it draws forth from itself what it acts. This indeed pertains to the complete account of a perfect vital power, and therefore it is common to all powers, both knowing and vitally appetitive. And in this sense Alexander of Hales, Second Part, Quest. 22, member 3, could be explained when he calls the intellect of an angel agent. But I very much doubt whether this was his mind. For he does not call it this because it effects the act itself of understanding by which it knows, but *because it leads the potency of the possible intellect into act through a certain reception of species*. And so he seems to posit in an angel an intellect producing intelligible species and agent in that way, which we do not admit.

17. *Albert introduces an agent intellect in angels in another way. — He is refuted.* — Finally, in another way Albert, book 3, *De Anima*, tract. 2, chapter 18, and in the *Summa*, Second Part, tract. 4, Quest. 14, member 3, art. 1, reply to 1, and in *De Quatuor coaequaevis*, book 4, First Part, Quest. 5, arts. 11 and 12, attributes an agent intellect to angels not for producing species, but for illuminating species, even concreated and innate ones. So also some attribute to our agent intellect the illumination of first principles. Yet this mode either distinguishes the illumination of species from the act of understanding through them, or it calls the same action of understanding an illumination of the species. But in the former way such illumination is invented in vain, as is a special power on account of it; in the latter way, an agent intellect is posited in an angel in name only. The first part is declared and proved, because if such illumination is an action distinct from the act of understanding, it will be prior to it as its cause and as a disposition for it. But such an action is invented in vain and cannot be understood. For if it is a special real action, it is necessary that it have a real

term, especially since it is not an immanent action. What, then, is it that comes to be through that action? Or in what is it received? Certainly neither can be explained, because it cannot be received immediately in the species itself, since that is not the subject of an accident, nor in the intellect, because nothing comes to be in the passive intellect except acts, species, or habits. Likewise, that term cannot be some new quality, as seems known in itself, nor a mode of a preexisting quality, namely, of the intelligible species itself, because it is not an intension, nor an extension, nor anything similar. For by the same reason that an angel cannot effect intelligible species in himself, neither can he intensify them, or in another way increase or change them; but he can only use them for understanding. Therefore there is no such illumination. Likewise, in us too the agent intellect cannot have any such illumination concerning first principles, as we shall say below in its own place. But the other part is manifest, because that illumination is nothing other than cognition of the object represented through the species. This action, however, is not made by any other power except by the passive intellect, or by the intellective power, which, as effecting such an action, can be called the agent intellect, as I said above. Hence through that action the species are not properly illuminated; rather, the object represented through it is illuminated, because it is manifested through such an act, and everything that is manifested is manifested by light. And finally, because of such illumination, intellects are not multiplied in an angel, which is what we chiefly intend here.

CHAPTER II
WHAT IS THE ADEQUATE OBJECT OF THE ANGELIC INTELLECT, FROM WHICH THE INTELLECTIVE POWER OF AN ANGEL TAKES ITS PROPER SPECIES?

1. *It is supposed that an adequate object of the angelic intellect is given.* — In the preceding chapter we almost only settled the question whether there is an intellective power in angels, and only in general and as it were through certain transcendental predicates did we set forth its nature. Now, therefore, in order to hand down a distinct knowledge of it, it is necessary to set forth its nature more particularly; and because a power is accustomed to take its species from its object, we therefore begin from it. Writers are accustomed to declare this object by treating in particular of the several things that fall under the cognition of an angel. Yet before we descend to them, it is necessary to suppose that the angelic intellect has some adequate object, because every power has an object, in which it requires both some unity and adequation. Unity, indeed, because since the

power itself is one, although it reaches many things, it is necessary that it regard them under some one account. Adequation, however, because all things that are comprehended under that one account, and no others, can be reached through such a power, since neither can a power be borne outside its object, nor can anything be contained under the object into which the power cannot be borne. Therefore it is necessary first to speak of this adequate object of the angelic intellect, because every power takes from an object of this sort its species and difference, through which it is distinguished from others.

2. *The first difficulty of the question: what the aforesaid object is.* — But it can seem difficult to designate an adequate object for the angelic intellect. For either it is some particular being, or being taken with some determination, or it is being in common and taken most abstractly. But neither seems capable of being said. Therefore. The prior proposition is evident in itself, because the disjunction is adequate and is made through members immediately and contradictorily opposed. But the minor is proved as to the prior part, because under whatever determination being is taken, the angelic intellect extends beyond it. For if it is posited as created being, it is not adequate, since an angel also knows God, uncreated being; and, conversely, uncreated being cannot be adequate, because it is neither concerned with that alone nor first and of itself concerned with it. Likewise, it is not spiritual being, because an angel also understands material things, and conversely. Nor is it possible being, because he also knows actual things; nor is it only being in act, because he also knows possible things; and so of the rest.

3. But the other part is now proved first, because if being in common were the adequate object of the angelic intellect, whatever is contained under being would be comprehended under the adequate object of the angelic intellect. The consequent is false. Therefore. The major is manifest from the very account of adequation, for something is called adequate because it neither exceeds nor is exceeded. But the minor is proved because there are many beings that an angel cannot know. Therefore they are comprehended under being and not under the object of the power, because if they were contained under the object of the power, they could be reached and known through the power. The antecedent is proved by induction. For first, God as he is in himself, or the Trinity, would be comprehended under the adequate object of the angelic intellect, and consequently he could naturally be seen and reached by it, which cannot be said. Likewise, otherwise all possible and creatable beings would fall under the natural cognition of an angel, because they are comprehended under that object; and thus an angel by his nature will require species of all possible beings, which

is not credible. Likewise, grace and supernatural mysteries are beings, and yet they do not fall under the object of the angelic intellect, because they are above the powers of the angelic intellect. Likewise, thoughts of hearts cannot be seen by an angel. In addition to these, material singulars, and especially future contingents, do not fall under the powers of the angelic intellect. Therefore there are many kinds of beings that are outside the object of the angelic intellect, and therefore being cannot be constituted as the adequate object of such a power.

4. *Second difficulty. — There does not seem to be one adequate object, lest absurdly one species alone of the angelic intellect be gathered.* — The second principal difficulty is that, if the adequate object of the angelic intellect were being taken abstractly, all the intellects of angels would have the same adequate object. The consequent does not seem capable of being said, because otherwise all angelic intellects would be of the same species, since they take their species from the object and therefore would take the same species from the same object. But the consequent can be admitted, because angels differ in species, as we saw above. Therefore they have connatural properties diverse in species. But the first and most proper property of any spiritual substance is its intellect. Therefore, and so on.

5. *The true resolution.* — Nevertheless, from what has been said, it is certain that there is some adequate object of the angelic intellect, as the reason made above in number 1 proves. But this object can be assigned either as one and the same with respect to all angels, or as proper to each one and diverse from the others. And each seems necessary according to diverse accounts. For since all angels agree in one common account of intellectual substance, it is necessary that they have some one common adequate intelligible object; and since they differ in their particular and proper intellects, consequently it also seems necessary that they have some diversity in their proper adequate objects, as the reason made in the last place, n. 4, persuades. Therefore, to explain these points, one must observe that an adequate object of a power can be assigned in two ways, namely, either in the being of a thing, or according to real agreement, or in the being of an object, or in some formal account under which that whole object is reached. In other words, this object is usually distinguished into material and formal, or into the formal object that the power reaches and the formal account under which it reaches it. This distinction is handed down generally in the *Metaphysics* and in the treatise on the Soul, and in the present matter it must be applied and explained proportionally. For an adequate object must be assigned to the angelic intellect in each way.

6. *First conclusion. — The material object is being simply, as true.* — Therefore I say first. The adequate object of the angelic intellect in the being of a thing, but what is reached by it, is being, simply and taken in its whole breadth, insofar as it is true. This assertion has a place in every created intellect, even a human one, as we shall say below in its own place. And it is taken from Saint Thomas, Quest. 54, art. 2, who says that understanding has for its object the true, which is convertible with being, and therefore of itself extends to all things. For he takes understanding for the adequate operation of the intellect; and the adequate object of the power is the same as the object of its operation, because the power reaches the object only through the mediating operation. He expressly teaches the same in Quest. 55, art. 1, and in the First Part, Quest. 79, art. 7, and often in other places. It is proved by the reason given, because the intellect of an angel can know all beings. Therefore all are contained under its adequate object, because whatever is known by a power pertains to its object, since actually to be objected is nothing other than to be known. But all things intelligible by an angel do not have real common agreement among themselves except in the common account of being. Therefore being taken in this way is the adequate object of such a power. For an adequate object must embrace all things that can be objected to the power. The consequences are both clear in themselves and have been sufficiently proved in passing.

7. *And first as regards angels themselves with respect to themselves.* — The first antecedent is shown by a brief induction. For any angel first knows himself, as all theologians regard as established with Saint Thomas, cited Quest. 56, art. 1. Because each angel, since he is a spiritual substance, is of himself actually intelligible, and is most joined to his own intellect and commensurate with it. Therefore an angel can most of all understand himself. Rather, this cognition of himself is as it were the foundation of other cognitions, especially natural ones, as we shall explain below. Therefore each angel, both according to his substance and according to all the accidents that he has in himself, is contained under the adequate object of his own intellect. You will say: therefore the same intellect is at least a partial object of itself, as it is an intellective power. I respond by conceding the inference, nor is this inappropriate, because that power is spiritual and consequently reflexive upon itself, and therefore can at once be both the faculty of understanding and one of its real objects. Yet it is true that it is not the primary object into which the power itself is borne of itself first and directly, but that it is known concomitantly by an angel with his substance, which he primarily beholds and comprehends.

8. *Second, as regards each one with respect to the others.* — Second, one angel can know all others distinct from himself directly and properly, and therefore all are comprehended under the adequate object of any angelic intellect. In this also theologians agree with Saint Thomas, cited Quest. 56, art. 2. And it is evident, because every angel is actual, since he is immaterial. Therefore each is intelligible by any other. The consequence is proved because any intellect is capable of all actually intelligible things of the same order, such as all angels are. And the inference is confirmed because, if lower angels are compared to the intellects of the higher in the account of object and power, they are not only proportioned to them but even unequal and lower. Therefore lower angels could easily be known, indeed comprehended, by higher ones. But if a higher angel, in the account of intelligible object, is compared to the intellect of a lower one, in this way he can seem in some way exceeding and disproportionate. Yet this excess, since it is finite, does not exclude sufficient proportion in the account of object and of that cognitive power, although perhaps it knows that object less perfectly; nevertheless, this is not sufficient for its not being comprehended under the object of that power. And it is confirmed: for angels need this mutual cognition among themselves; otherwise they could neither communicate anything among themselves nor act, nor could they have civic dealings, so to speak, among themselves, or constitute among themselves something like one republic, which is against what Scripture teaches about angels and against their nature and perfection, because an intellectual nature, no less than a human one, is of itself sociable and capable of mutual communication.

9. *First objection against what was just proved. — Second. — Third.* — But it is usually objected that what exists within prevents what is extraneous, as Aristotle testifies in book 3, *De Anima*, text 4. Therefore the angelic intellect, beholding itself and its own substance, is incapable of cognition of others. Likewise, because otherwise one angel could not hide himself from others even if he wished, which seems inappropriate; for if a man can hide himself from others in such a way, and sometimes it is expedient, why not an angel? Third, the words of Justin can be objected where he says, in the book *Responsiones ad Christianos de diversis quaestionibus*, in Quest. 76: *Neither does a mind understand or see a mind, nor an angel an angel, nor a demon a demon.*

10. *The first objection is solved.* — To the first, the consequence is denied, which can be founded in two ways. One is that an angel cannot know many things at once, and therefore, since he always and necessarily beholds himself, he cannot be occupied in considering others. This reason would equally prove that an angel can know nothing except himself, which is most absurd. Therefore

one can think in two ways about the intellection of an angel toward himself. In one way, that it is an action adequate to his power and free; and then he will be able to respond that an angel needs cessation from such an act in order to understand another, but that he can cease from it, and so the argument does not proceed, because perhaps neither can one angel behold all the others at once, but in order to think about one, it is necessary that he turn his consideration away from another. The second and better way is that an angel beholds himself by a certain natural necessity; but that action is not adequate to the power of his intellect, according to which he can at the same time be applied freely to understanding other things. And so he can at the same time know other angels, more or fewer, according to the perfection of the intelligence and proportion to the objects, as we shall see below. Another foundation of that first consequence can be Aristotle's axiom alleged in the antecedent, about which we shall speak in the treatise on the Soul. For now it is said briefly that it has a place in corporeal natures and in very limited and contracted natures, and in material powers that receive species from things through a material medium. But it has no place in spiritual nature, because it is of itself abstracted from matter, and therefore capable of receiving other intelligibles in itself purely and without impediment, and especially those that are allied to it and of the same order, as Saint Thomas said in the cited art. 2, reply to 1.

11. *The second objection is solved. — An angel cannot hide himself from others.* — To the second it is responded first by denying the inference; for suppose that one angel could hide himself from another, nevertheless he would be comprehended under the object of the other's intellect, because if he does not hide himself, he will be seen by another. Hence the argument could rather be turned back: because if one angel were not an intelligible object by another, he could not manifest himself to him, nor be seen by him. The consequent is false. Therefore. Second, it is responded by admitting the inference, namely, that one angel cannot hide himself from another, certainly as to his substance and all things that are in that substance, with only the thoughts of hearts excepted, about which we shall speak below. This will be evident from what will be said below concerning intelligible species through which angels know. For if one angel has the innate species of another, the other cannot prevent him from knowing his substance. For what impediment will he place? For a man can hide himself so that he is not seen by another because sensible vision depends on a medium, which can be impeded by the interposition of an opaque body and by removing what is luminous. But the cognition of an angel depends neither on a corporeal medium nor on local presence, nor does it need another light besides

the intellectual and proper light of the one understanding. Nor does one angel in the use of his intellect and of his species depend on the will of another. Therefore in no way can one angel prevent another from seeing him, either as to essence and substance, and properties connatural to that substance, or as to actual existence, or as to local presence; for the account of all these is the same. And a very good argument is taken from the thoughts of hearts; for they alone are excepted in Scripture on account of a special reason, whence this is as it were a special exception that confirms the rule to the contrary with respect to all other things. Nor is this any inconvenience, because there is no necessity in angels of such hiding in other things outside the thoughts of hearts; for they are of a condition very different from men, as is evident in itself. I know that the author of the incomplete homily 5 on Matthew, at the end, wrote that a holy angel can hide himself and render himself invisible before the devil, even if he does not depart from the place: *Because*, he says, *unless the good angel wills, he is not seen by the devil*. But first, this is not asserted by that author to occur by natural power, but by divine power, as he indicates, both because he says it happens *according to the dispensation of God*, and also because he thinks this is special to good angels with respect to evil ones. And besides, this very point is uncertain and founded only on the conjecture of that Father.

12. *The third objection is solved.* — To the third I say first that many doubt whether those questions are by Justin Martyr, or, if they are, whether they are pure and in all respects contain and express his true opinion. But especially in that question the words are perplexed and either contain contrary things, or the cited words have another sense than they present on their face. For immediately before those words he says that *minds* (certainly separated minds) *by the sense of intelligence see both themselves and the things that are under them, and besides, angels and demons*. And again, after the words alleged in the objection, he says: *But by the sense of intelligence, which is called this, they both see themselves and others see each other, back and forth, and besides, all things that pertain to the body*. And he speaks both of minds and of angels and demons. Therefore either the prior words are corrupt and in them the word *understands* is superfluous, so that they can be explained of corporeal vision, or they are to be referred to the intelligence of minds as to their thoughts; otherwise they are not true.

13. *The induction proceeds third as regards God.* — *Third,* God himself also is contained under the object of the angelic intellect. This assertion is as certain as the preceding ones. Because it is most certain that angels know God, either naturally by abstractive cognition or supernaturally by intuitive cognition. But neither could occur unless God were comprehended under the adequate object

of the angelic intellect. Therefore. The minor is proved, both because whether a power knows a thing perfectly or imperfectly, and whether it conceives and reaches the thing immediately and through itself or its proper species, or mediately and through another, it can never be borne outside its own object, because the thing known is always in some way comprehended by the intellect under the adequate object of the intellect. Hence if the cognition of GOD in an angel is merely natural, God as so known or knowable is contained under the adequate object proportioned to angelic nature. But if the cognition of God is supernatural, by which God is known in a more perfect mode, it is necessary that it suppose in GOD at least the general account of an adequate object of the intellect, because the intellect could not be elevated to knowing God in that perfect mode unless some proportion of object and power were supposed between that intellect and God, because a vital power cannot be elevated to operating wholly outside its object, although it can be supernaturally strengthened to know its object in a more perfect and higher mode than it could reach it by natural powers, as I explained more fully in the preceding volume, tract. 2, book 2, chapter 7, nn. 19 and 20.

14. *Fourth, as regards material things.* — Fourth, material things also, both in genus, species, and individual, are contained under the adequate object of the angelic intellect. This too is beyond controversy, because all these can be known by an angel. It is proved because they are intelligible at least in potency, as is known in itself, and an infinite power is not required in order that they be known, since any such thing is of finite perfection. Hence from this side they can be known more easily than spiritual things, which are more perfect. Nor because they are material are they disproportionate to the angelic intellect, which wholly abstracts from matter, because the thing known can be in the knower in a higher mode than it is in itself. Therefore nothing can prevent these material things from being known by an angel. Therefore they are comprehended under his object. Therefore by greater reason they are contained under the object of the angelic intellect. The consequence is proved because the angelic intellect is higher and more universal than the human intellect; and although it is more elevated from matter, this cannot be an obstacle, since the divine intellect is much more elevated, and it knows all material things, even the lowest, most distinctly. It is confirmed from effects: for angels move the heavens, preside over this corporeal universe, and guard men. They could not do these things without cognition even of singular material things. All these points will become better known from what follows. Therefore from these things it is sufficiently proved that there can be no other adequate object of the angelic

intellect except being taken most abstractly, because not all those things we have enumerated are comprehended under an account of being that is less abstract; nor does being thus abstracted comprehend anything that does not fall in some way under angelic cognition. Therefore it is rightly constituted as the adequate object. But we added that being, insofar as it is true, is the object of the intellect, so that we might distinguish it from the object of the will and designate the formal property of being under which it pertains to intellect; concerning this matter we have spoken more fully in the *Metaphysics*, disputation 8, section 7, n. 24 and following.

15. *Second conclusion, threefold. — The first part of the conclusion is proved.* — I say second. This object taken absolutely is not proper to the angelic intellect, nor is it specific with respect to diverse angelic intellects; and therefore it is not formal, but rather as it were material or generic; and consequently it is necessary that it be adapted to the several intellects under some specific and more formal account. The first part of this assertion supposes that the angelic intellect is distinguished in species from the human intellect. In this part, although Scotus seems to doubt, in book 2, dist. 1, part 6, the remaining theologians agree. For all assert without doubt that an angel and a soul differ in species, as was touched upon in the preceding book, and as Saint Thomas teaches in the First Part, Quest. 75, art. 7, and book 2, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 94; Alexander of Hales, Second Part, Quest. 20, member 5; Giles, in book 2, dist. 3, part 2, Quest. 2, art. 5; Bonaventure, dist. 1, second part of the distinction, the whole of article 2; and others commonly there. And it pertains more to the doctrine on the Soul. From this principle, however, it is rightly gathered that the intellect of an angel and of a man also differ in species; for those whose essence is diverse also have a property, especially the first and most proper, diverse in species. But the intellect is such a property. Therefore. Likewise, the said authors argue, especially Saint Thomas, from the diversity of the intellective operation of an angel and a soul, gathering diversity in substance; but operation more immediately shows diversity in power than in essence. Therefore, if an angel and a soul differ in species in substance, a fortiori they differ in intellect. And thus Saint Thomas argues almost in cited chapter 94, the last reason. Finally, the same Saint Thomas argues in the First Part, Quest. 79, art. 2, from the greater or lesser potentiality of those intellects. For the human intellect is pure potency in the genus of intelligibles, but the angelic intellect by its nature requires that it always be in act, either in complete first act or even second act to a great extent; for this diverse natural property sufficiently shows an essential difference. But in the eighth article of the same question, reply to 1, he says: *The cognitive power of*

angels is not of another genus from the cognitive power of reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect. But he understands this of the perfect and imperfect essentially under the same genus, as is openly clear from his doctrine in the cited Quest. 75, art. 7, and book 1, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 3.

16. *The response of some to the preceding proof.* — But some say that the human and angelic intellects, insofar as they are properties flowing from diverse essences, are diverse in species, and that only this is concluded by the said reasons. Nevertheless, insofar as they regard the same adequate object, they are of one species. Ferrariensis hands down this distinction about the very understanding of an angel and of a man, cited chapter 94, last §, saying that it is not repugnant that the same acts, insofar as they regard operators of diverse natures, be diverse in species, insofar as they flow from natures diverse in species, and nevertheless agree in species insofar as they tend to the same formal object. And he brings the example of the visions of a man and a lion regarding the same visible object. And he applies the same distinction to the visual powers themselves of the same, whence he thinks the same concerning the intellects of an angel and a man. And Cajetan generally approves this distinction, First Part, Quest. 77, art. 3, around the body of the article, where, after explaining generally how powers take their species from objects, he adds that this doctrine is to be understood of powers insofar as they are powers. For insofar as they are properties of a nature, they are distinguished according to the diversity of natures. Nevertheless the same Cajetan, same First Part, Quest. 79, art. 7, although he admits that distinction in the external sensitive powers, denies it in intellects, and says that the intellect of an angel and of a man are wholly diverse in species, not only insofar as they are properties of diverse natures, but also insofar as they are powers having order to objects. And his foundation is that the diversity of intellects is not taken from diversity of object. He proves this because the object of the intellect is twofold, motive and terminative. The first, he says, is not adequate to the power, and therefore it is not sufficient for distinguishing powers. But the second is the same in all intellects, namely, the account of being, and therefore the distinction of powers cannot be taken from it.

17. *The said response is rejected and attacked first.* — But that distinction concerning powers, namely, that insofar as they are powers they have specific unity and insofar as they are properties they differ in species, when understood of proper and ultimate specific unity and of the distinction opposed to it, has always displeased me. First, because such a power is one simple entity, which has only one essential specific difference. But if some other formal account by way of

an ultimate species is considered in it, it will be accidental to such an entity, as I showed in the disputation of the *Metaphysics*, section 1. Therefore, if the same quality that is a power and a property is constituted according to those accounts in two ultimate species distinct from the nature of the thing, I ask which of them is essential and which accidental. Certainly the species that is taken from the object cannot be called accidental, for such a quality is first of itself instituted for the sake of its act, by which it tends to such an object, and so it takes its first essential and specific difference through its relation to that object, as Cajetan rightly declares in the former place, and as we shall show in the treatise on the Soul. Therefore the other difference that such an entity is imagined to have, insofar as it is the property of such a nature, will be accidental, because it will only be a difference in the mode of emanation from such a nature or of union to such a subject. Thus, if the heat of fire and of air are of the same species in the absolute essence of heat, they can differ only accidentally in emanation from such or such a form of air or fire. And light produced by the sun in air and in the moon, since they are of the same essential species in the account of light and also agree in the action by which they emanate from the sun, can only be thought accidentally diverse in the mode of union to this or that subject, not to mention the difference in intension and remission that they can have, which is much more accidental. Therefore, by applying the distinction to the angelic and human intellects, surely if by comparison to the object they are of the same ultimate species, simply they are of the same specific essence, and the diversity in the mode of emanation is extrinsic, insofar as it is not in the quality and power itself, but only in the mode of emanation from such or such a principle. But the consequent is incredible in itself and contrary to the theologians alleged, who say that the intellects themselves in angels and men differ in their essence and entity, and not merely their emanations.

18. *It is attacked second.* — Add that, if the intellects in themselves are of the same species, the emanations too will be of the same species, because they produce a term of the same species, although they proceed from diverse principles. For this does not make a specific diversity in the action if the term is of the same account. And the same holds proportionally concerning union to a subject. But that in the quality itself, which is a power and a property, as it is a thing distinct from the nature of the thing from the mode of union or emanation, several specific differences cannot be understood on account of the transcendental and quasi-aptitudinal relations that they have to nature and object, is proved because those two relations, although they are distinguished by us through inadequate concepts by reason, each is of the essential and specific

account of such an entity, and they have an intrinsic and necessary connection with each other. For the human intellect, for example, does not emanate from the soul except as it is a power having such a relation to such an object through the mediation of such an operation; and therefore, as it is such a power, it has a connatural proportion with such an essence and requires that it emanate from it. And conversely, that very power according to its ultimate difference of such a power emanates from such an essence. Therefore according to those relations two species of quality cannot be distinguished in that power and entity. Therefore, if two intellects as powers regarding objects are of the same species, they will also be in the same species as properties or passions. This is especially so because a passion as passion, or a property as such, does not constitute a species of quality distinct from power, but makes the power be natural. Therefore, if they are of the same species in the account of power, and each is natural to its subject, no specific difference can be thought there with foundation.

19. *It is attacked third. — The proof of the first part of the assertion is concluded.* — And this doctrine proceeds not only in intellects but also in wills, nor only in spiritual powers but also in senses or other material principles. Hence I do not see why Cajetan in the later place rejects the opinion that uses that distinction in the human and angelic intellects, but uses it in sight or in the other external senses, or rather generally admits it in the former place. Scotus does better in book 2, dist. 1, Quest. 6, reply to the arguments, when, touching on that distinction in operations, he says that although two operations are called of the same species on the part of the object and diverse on the part of the nature or principle from which they proceed, nevertheless one must concede simply that such operations are distinguished in species, and only in a qualified respect are of the same species. For that agreement in such an object cannot give unity simply, but at most unity in a qualified respect, when from elsewhere there is given a principle making diversity in species; because, as he adds very well, any specific diversity suffices for distinction simply, but not any identity in something suffices for identity simply, because identity simply requires an integral cause, while any diversity suffices for distinction. Therefore, if the human and angelic intellect, by the very fact that they emanate from principles diverse in species, have a sufficient account of specific and essential diversity between themselves, even if they have the same adequate object, they will not have from that object identity simply, that is, specific identity, but at most they will have a generic unity in the account of intellective power, through which they are distinguished from the senses; yet from that they will not have the

proper species of such or such an intellect. And this alone is persuaded by Cajetan's reason, namely, that such powers do not have diversity from that object. Yet it does not prove that they have from it specific unity simply, that is, ultimate unity; nor does it even prove that they do not have from it some generic or subaltern unity. And hence the second assertion is left proved as to its first part, because that object, namely being, in its whole breadth is also adequate to the human intellect. Therefore it is not proper to the angelic intellect. Hence it is further inferred that it is the specific object of neither, that is, not the formal object giving the intellect its ultimate species; indeed, by the contrary reason it can be called generic and as it were material, because from it is taken the generic difference, which is compared to the specific as quasi-material.

20. *The second part is proved: the intellects of angels diverse in species differ in species.* — But the second part of the same assertion must be explained and proved in almost the same way. For it supposes that the intellects of angels differ in species, namely, of those angels who differ in species among themselves; for if any are of the same substantial species, this distinction will not have a place in them, nor is there any difficulty about them, for they will be able to agree in the adequate object, both material and formal, just as human intellects agree among themselves. But that in angels differing in species the intellects also differ in species can be shown from what has been said in the preceding point, with proportion, because there is as great a distinction between properties following upon nature as there is in the nature itself. Therefore, if angels differ in species in substantial nature, the intellects too, which are properties most connatural to such substances, will be distinguished in species. Likewise, the intellectual operations of angels diverse in species differ in species by a more subtle, more universal, and more immaterial mode of knowing, as we shall see in what follows. Therefore the intellective powers too differ in species. Nor in this part does the distinction concerning intellect as power or as the property of such an angel have a place; for what we said about the angelic and human intellects compared with each other proceeds in the same way in the intellects of angels of diverse species. For the difference constituting each angelic intellect in its essential species is unique, and it must be considered in such a quality or power considered according to itself and separated from every mode of emanation or union. Therefore, if the intellects agree in such a difference, they will simply be powers of the same species; and whether they emanate from this or that substance, or inhere in this or that substance, they will retain the same species in their essence, even if they are distinguished in their principles or subjects.

Hence, conversely too, if properties diverse in species emanate from distinct substantial essences, and such properties are powers or intellects, they are also distinguished in species in the account of powers or intellects. Therefore in this way the intellects of angels distinct in species are distinguished among themselves.

21. *How the object of the angelic intellect in common is related to the several species of that intellect.* — From this, finally, it happens that being in common, insofar as it is the adequate object of the angelic intellect with respect to the several intellects in species, is not the specific object, nor formal in the being of an object, but is only generic and as it were material in the being of a thing. This is evident from the reason given, because it is an object common to all angelic intellects; hence they cannot have from it as such that they are such or such intellects, but only that they are angelic intellects. Indeed, if one considers the matter rightly, not even the common account or difference of angelic intellect can be taken from that object unless it is determined in some more formal way. For that object is adequate to created intellect. Therefore by force of it, it is no more determined to angelic intellect than to human intellect. The antecedent was proved above; and the consequence is proved because created intellect is immediately divided into human intellect and angelic intellect as into species essentially diverse, as was proved. Of these, one, namely human intellect, is an ultimate species, and the other, namely angelic intellect, is subaltern. But they cannot have this distinction from that object, since it is common to each member. Therefore it is necessary that that object be determined in some other way to each of those members. Hence a fortiori it follows that angelic intellects differing among themselves in species cannot have their ultimate species from that object, not only as it is common to created intellect, but not even as it is in some way more determined, yet common with respect to angelic intellect taken in general.

22. *Concerning the third part of the conclusion, various ways of speaking. — First way of speaking. — Specific diversity is not always taken from the object, but sometimes from the mode of tending. — This way of speaking is probable.* — Hence, therefore, follows the third part of the conclusion, in which we said that it is necessary that that common object be adapted to the several species of intellects under some more formal account, with proportion. Concerning this part there can be various ways of speaking. One is that it is not necessary that every specific difference of intellects be taken from the object, but that it can come from elsewhere, especially from the mode of tending into such an object, just as it is not necessary that motions or actions always be distinguished from

their terms; for diverse actions can tend to the same term in a diverse mode, as creation and generation, and so on. Therefore, in this way, although diverse intellects tend into the same adequate object, they can be distinguished among themselves in species by their mode of tending into it. This variety in the mode of tending can occur in many ways. First, because one tends with greater actuality and immateriality than another; in this way the human intellect can be distinguished from the angelic, because the human intellect, in order to intelligible being, is more potential than the angelic intellect, because the former can be in pure potency both to act and to the whole object. But the angelic intellect is always in act in some way, as was explained in the preceding chapter. Likewise, since intelligible being is twofold, namely in potency and in act, the human intellect, which by its nature is reduced to act through the mediation of the body, has a certain greater proportion to intelligible being in potency, which is material, and it begins through that and knows other things according to its mode. But the angelic intellect knows intelligible being in act of itself first, and begins from it, and in some way elevates the rest to its order so that it may understand them. And so these two grades or orders of intellects, although they agree in adequate object, can be distinguished by mode of understanding, to which can also be added diversity in the mode of understanding that is simple or compositive, with discourse or without it, and similar modes. For from these the theologians alleged gather a specific diversity between an angel and a soul; therefore from this, with proportion, the specific diversity of intellects can also be taken. But among angelic intellects themselves there can be considered a diversity in the simpler and more universal mode of knowing intelligible objects both in act and in potency. We shall explain this diversity as to the mode of universality more fully later. But as to simplicity or immateriality, it can be understood from proportion to the angelic substances themselves; for one is subtler, purer, and more immaterial in its entity than another, as I declared in the preceding book. But power is proportioned to substance, and act to power. This will be set forth more in the following point. Therefore this way of speaking is probable; and Cajetan suggests it in the cited art. 7, and at least it is true with respect to the adequate object in the being of a thing, or in the formal account known and abstracted from some real agreement among the particular objects themselves comprehended under the common. For by taking the adequate object in this way, without doubt diverse intellects can have the same adequate object and be distinguished by other modes.

23. — *Second way of speaking. — Specific diversity is taken from the motive object most proper to it.* — Second, it can be added that, when the specific

difference of intellects cannot be taken from the adequate terminative object, it must be received from the most proper and intrinsic motive object. This doctrine can be taken from Saint Thomas, First Part, Quest. 12, art. 4, where he posits three grades of intellects, supreme, lowest, and middle, that is, divine, human, and angelic, and distinguishes them from the objects most proportioned and as it were motive for each. For the divine intellect is moved as it were connaturally to understanding by its essence alone, which is its subsistent being, and through it alone it knows all things. But it is connatural to the human intellect to be moved to knowing by things existing in matter, although it knows them in a more abstract and immaterial mode than they are in themselves, and through them it ascends to immaterial things. But the angelic intellect of itself first understands created immaterial natures, which are in the middle between God and material things; and through them it ascends to God; but it knows material objects from the abundance of its power, as it were, in a higher mode than man. And this mode of distinction can be applied to the various species of intellects contained in that middle grade. For in the supreme grade, because of its highest perfection, there is no multiplication; but in the third grade, because of its lowest condition, there is not a specific multiplication, although there is a numerical one. But in the middle grade a specific distinction is found, which can be explained proportionally through direct intrinsic and maximally connatural motives. For each angelic intellect connaturally requires that it intimately behold its own proper substance, from which it emanates, and that it be immediately joined to it, and consequently that from it, of itself first, it be moved and stirred to understanding itself. And therefore each angelic intellect in its specific and essential perfection is commensurate with the essence from which it emanates, and in the mode of understanding is as it were adequate to its own substance as to the first intelligible object; and therefore it receives its specific difference from that object. Hence it is no obstacle that this object is not adequate, which Cajetan was objecting, because it is enough that it is maximally proportioned.

24. *Third way of speaking. — This specific diversity is taken from various formal accounts under which. — Objection. — Solution. — It is declared.* — Third, this specific diversity of intellects can hence be declared according to the opinion of certain persons who say that, although all angelic or created intellects agree in the adequate intelligible object as what is known, nevertheless in that object several formal accounts must be considered, under which it can be known by various intellects, because according to them it takes on various accounts of a formal object, through which intellects can be essentially

distinguished. For although the object that is understood is the same, it is reachable under diverse accounts; and so, according to the diverse reachabilities, as they say, it can bestow various species on intellects. This way of speaking can be displeasing in this respect, that it seems to beg the principle or commit a circle. For those diverse accounts or reachabilities that are considered in that adequate object consist only in this, that it can be understood more perfectly or less perfectly, or through itself or through another, primarily or secondarily, or in other similar modes. But all these and similar diversities or reachabilities are only extrinsic denominations from the powers that can reach such objects in those various modes. Therefore the powers are not distinguished from the diverse accounts or reachabilities of the same adequate object; rather, from the diversity of intellects it comes about that the same object is reachable in diverse modes. On account of this reason, this mode of distinguishing intellects from the object does not please many, when some intellects agree in the real and adequate object. But nevertheless it can be responded by denying that those diverse accounts or reachabilities that are considered in the object are only extrinsic denominations proceeding from distinct powers or their acts. For before these denominations an aptitude must be considered on the part of the object, by which it can be reachable in such or such a mode. For just as being itself, insofar as it is being, is supposed to be true and intelligible before the extrinsic denomination from an intellective power, as we said in the cited place of the *Metaphysics*, so also it is supposed to be intelligible in various modes, namely, in itself or in another, adequately or inadequately, and so on. And this is declared by an example. For the will and the intellect are distinguished from objects, not because there is a distinct object in reality that is reached by them, for the same being is known and loved, but because it is reached by those powers under diverse accounts. These accounts are not denominations from the powers, but objective aptitudes, so that they are reached in this or that mode. Therefore in the same way, in the same intelligible being, diverse aptitudes can be distinguished, so that it is represented in this or that mode, and according to them several intellects can be distinguished.

25. *It is confirmed. — To the difficulties adduced in nn. 2, 3, and 4.* — And to explain these various aptitudes, those things can be brought in that I said in the preceding volume, tract. 1, book 2, chapter 9, about the proportion required for understanding between the mode of being of the object and the power. And what was said in the two preceding paragraphs can also be applied. For the human intellect, because by its nature it inesse in a soul seeking conjunction with matter, therefore understands all things with some relation or proportion

to material things. But this mode of understanding supposes on the part of the things themselves, even immaterial ones, some agreement or conjunction with material things, by reason of which they are of themselves apt to be known in such a mode. And thus although our intellect has being, insofar as being, for its adequate terminative object, nevertheless it regards it insofar as it is of itself apt to be understood in such a mode. And the same holds proportionally in the angelic intellect; for it understands all things according to its own mode and through species accommodated to its mode of knowing. And so on the part of things it supposes an aptitude to be representable otherwise and otherwise through such or such species. And God himself, although knowable by every intellect, is not knowable in the same mode by all, but in one way by himself, in another by a created intellect; and by the latter, in one way as elevated and in another as operating through its own powers; and in one way through this medium, and in another through that one. All these modes, although they are exercised and as it were completed through various acts and principles of understanding, nevertheless have a foundation in God himself, insofar as he is intelligible either according to himself or as the cause of a creature, and as representable through such a species, or as participable through such or such light. Thus, therefore, although being insofar as being is the adequate object of the angelic intellect, diverse accounts under which it is reachable can be considered in it; according to these it can be objected to intellects differing either in species or as it were in genus, and concur in their distinction or specification in the genus of object. And through these things sufficient response has been made to the two reasons for doubting placed at the beginning.

CHAPTER III
WHETHER ANGELS NEED INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES FOR UNDERSTANDING

1. The general question is here restricted to angels.—Having explained the common object of the angelic intellect, something must also be set down in general concerning its concurrence with angelic acts of understanding, so that afterward we may proceed to explain in particular the mode of knowing each object, or the knowledge that it has of each. But such a question coincides with the one that has been proposed, concerning the necessity of species in an angel for the act of knowing. For if such species are necessary, it is only so that they may supply the role of objects when these cannot of themselves cooperate with the power; and thus we will speak of both at once, and we will restrict the

question to the species of those objects that cannot of themselves be united to the angelic intellect. Finally, this question is usually treated in general in the matter concerning all cognitive powers, namely, the external and internal senses, and the human intellect. But now we will abstract from those, for we are dealing only with angels.

2. The first negative opinion in general.—There is, therefore, a first opinion, which universally denies that species are necessary for knowing. Thus Durandus teaches, in II, distinction 3, question 6; Gabriel, question 2, where in article 1, notable point 4, he speaks of the external and internal senses through various conclusions, while in article 2 he multiplies several conclusions concerning angels. Bassolus follows, there question 3, article 2, at the end; Gregory, distinction 7, question 5, article 1; Ockham, in II, questions 14, 15, and 16, and he adds many points concerning the senses, questions 17 and 18. Baccarius also inclines to this, in the said distinction 3, questions 4 and 5, and distinction 6, question 1; Gregory in some part, distinction 7, question 3, article 3. Nearly all of these speak generally. Hence this opinion can be proved by reasons common to man and to angels. And there seem to be two principal reasons. One is that things must not be multiplied without necessity. But for cognition there is no necessity for positing species, or anything that concurs in place of the object for cognition. Therefore. The major is assumed from that common axiom: what can be done by fewer things is done in vain by more. But we will examine the minor by proving the true position and refuting the various ways of explaining cognition without the concurrence of the object through species. The second reason, Durandus's, above number 17, is that an intentional species is of the same species as the thing it represents. But there cannot be in the mind of an angel forms of the same species as the things to be known by the angel. Therefore. The minor together with the consequence is evident. He first proves the major concerning color and its species by particular reasons, which both have little weight in themselves and do not pertain to the present issue, and therefore I omit them. His general reason, then, is this: a species does not lead into the cognition of another thing except by reason of likeness. But likeness does not exist among things that are of the same species.

3. The second opinion, Henry's singular opinion.—A second opinion can be reported as the singular one of Henry, *Quodlibet* 5, question 14, where at first he seems to agree with the preceding opinion. For at the beginning of the question he says that impressed species are posited in vain; for although they are posited, they can do nothing toward the act of understanding, and once they are posited another motive for the act of understanding is still necessary, which can

equally move to the act without them; and therefore they are superfluous. He proves the assumption, because a species is posited chiefly for this, that the object may become present to the power in intelligible being. But a species cannot provide this. Therefore. The minor is proved, because either the species is impressed by the object, as in sight, and then it supposes the presence of the object; or it comes from another cause, because you have the object, and thus it does not make the object present, because a thing cannot become present except as singular, while a species impressed by another cannot represent a thing as singular, but as universal. From these points, Richard concludes from a certain text that species are given only in the senses, but not in the human intellect, because representation in the phantasm precedes, which suffices for the intellect to begin cognition, through which it acquires habits that it can afterward use for knowing things in their absence. But concerning the angel he adds that, although it neither has species nor is moved by phantasms or reduced from potency to act, it nevertheless needs a certain scientific habit, which it has as connatural from nature, so that it may be perfect and may be able to make present to itself all things naturally knowable by it, which are virtually contained in that habit. And so he thinks this habit is necessary so that the angel's intellect may be constituted in a first act sufficient for understanding. He establishes this difference between these, that if an angel had species, it would always and necessarily actually understand all things of which it had species; but it uses that scientific habit not necessarily, but by its own freedom. He tries to prove this difference by a lengthy discourse, which I omit, because it is both very obscure and of no efficacy, just as the other things I have reported plainly are, as will appear. Hence Scotus, in I, distinction 7, question 6, and in II, distinction 3, questions 8 and 10, and Capreolus, there question 2, to Henry's argument against the fourth conclusion, where he reports others, refute this opinion at length.

4. The third opinion, admitting species in men, but not in angels.—The third opinion agrees with the first in its negative conclusion as far as angels are concerned, even though it does not deny sensible or intelligible species in men. And it can be founded on this: although the sense or intellect of man is only an inchoate and imperfect active power of its own act, and therefore needs the cooperation of the object by means of a species in order to effect its act, nevertheless the intellect of an angel through its entity alone is the complete active power of its own act, and therefore it needs neither any concurrence on the part of the object nor an impressed species in order to effect its act. This opinion, by reason of its foundation, can be attributed to the author of Auxerre,

book 2 of the *Summa*, tractate 5, chapter 4. For he says that an angel sees a thing existing in its own genus through its intellect alone, as through a medium, because the intellect of an angel is through itself a sufficient image of all things that can naturally be known by it. And therefore, for it to gaze upon them or actually know them, it needs only to will to direct the gaze of the mind upon the things themselves. This direction he calls the medium by which; but it is nothing other than the freedom of the angel, or its use. Father Vasquez, I, part, disputation 200, also prefers this opinion to the others. He is moved almost by the reason already made, because without species an integral and universal effective power of its own act can easily be understood in the angelic intellect, at least with respect to connatural acts. Therefore it must not be denied to it. Again, once this is posited, all the difficulties that are found concerning intelligible species, if they are admitted, are avoided. Therefore there is no reason why such species should be posited in angels. Nor will it stand in the way that the object is necessary for cognition, because it can be necessary not as a con-cause of the act, but as determining a universal cause by way of term, or of the matter about which such a cause is occupied. For the intellect is a universal cause of its acts, and therefore, in order to be determined to producing such a species of act, it needs some determinant, which is nothing but the object. But it is not necessary that that determination take place through the efficiency of the object, but only by way of term; for by the very fact that the angel wills to operate concerning such an object, it cannot have any but such acts. So also the will is a universal cause of its own act, and is determined to effecting this or that act by the object, not as by something co-efficient, but only as by something terminating such an act.

5. The fourth opinion.—The substance of an angel concurs by way of species for other objects.—In the fourth and final place, one can report here the opinion which, although it generally admits that the intelligible object concurs toward the understanding of itself, either by itself or through something supplying its role, nevertheless denies that species of any objects whatever, even of those distinct from themselves, are necessary for angels, because its own proper substance can sufficiently serve each angel by way of species, so that it can know any thing whatever. This opinion is usually attributed to Averroes and Alexander of Aphrodisias, on book 12 of the *Metaphysics*, texts 44 and 51, and to the author of Auxerre above, and to Ulrich, book 4 of the *Summa*, as Carthusianus reports, in II, distinction 3, question 5. It can be urged, because this is not repugnant, nor does it exceed the perfection of a finite substance. Therefore there is no reason why it should be denied to angels. The major is

proved, because the divine substance is representative of all things. Therefore that perfection is not repugnant to substance as such. But that it is not repugnant even to a finite substance is proved from the minor, because that perfection is not infinite. This is proved, because according to others that representation takes place through species, which are finite both in perfection and in number. Indeed, it could take place through one accidental species of the supreme angel. Therefore it is a finite effect, and it will be able to take place more easily through a nobler form, such as an angelic substance is. Hence the first consequence is proved: because angelic substance is most noble and is a form actually intelligible. Therefore it is proportioned to this intentional representation. Therefore this perfection must not be denied to it. And it is confirmed: because unless an angel in this way informed its intellect in intellectual being through its substance, and sufficiently constituted it in first act for knowing all things, by its nature it would be as if blind and unable to know in second act, because it would not have a natural way of obtaining the species of all objects, as we will object more fully in what follows.

6. The fifth is the true affirmative position.—Nevertheless, the common and true position is that angels need species distinct from their intellects and superadded to them for conceiving whatever they proximately and directly understand as distinct from themselves. This is the position of St. Thomas, I, part, question 55, article 1, which must be taken with the stated limitation, for afterward he disputes concerning the mode by which an angel knows itself and God. And Cajetan and others understand and follow that opinion in this way, as does Ferrariensis, *Contra Gentiles* II, chapter 96; Capreolus, in II, distinction 3, question 2, article 1, conclusion 4, and in III, to the arguments against the third and fourth conclusions; and Hervaeus there, question 4, article 2; Giles, part 2 of the same distinction, question 2, articles 1 and 2, through various doubts; and in the same place, Argentina, question 2, article 4; Richard, article 6, question 1; Bonaventure, part 2 of the distinction, article 2, question 2; Scotus, questions 8 and 10; Major, question 3; Albert, article 15, and in the *Summa*, tractate 4, question 19, article 11; Alexander of Hales, part 2, question 24, members 2 and 3; Marsilius, in II, question 7, article 1; Aureolus, in II, distinction 11, question 2. For although he seems to confuse the species with the act, he nevertheless supposes the species themselves. Indeed, even Henry, *Quodlibet* 4, question 7, seems to suppose these species in angels, at least for knowing other things outside themselves; and *Quodlibet* 1, question 12, he thinks that they are taken from objects, which we will see later. Moreover, concerning these species St. Thomas expounds, lecture 10, on the *Book of Causes*, that author's proposition

10: *Every intelligence is full of forms*, which he says is proposition 177 in Proclus under these words: *Every intellect is full of species.* And the same St. Thomas gathers a similar position, in the said question 55, articles 1 and 2, from Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, chapters 4 and 7, at the beginning of each. For by the reasons of things which Dionysius says there are in angels, not received from divisible or sensible things, but implanted by divine wisdom, St. Thomas understands intelligible species. Chapter 5 of the same book is also usually cited, because at the end of it he says that the exemplars and reasons of things exist unitedly and most simply in the divine mind, and are communicated from there to lower beings. It is also usually attributed to Augustine, chiefly in the books *On Genesis according to the Letter*, insofar as he says that God made in the angelic minds in an intelligible mode all things that he created in their own existence. We will examine his passages more broadly below, when treating the evening and morning knowledge of the angels, and in what follows we will touch on some of them incidentally.

7. The true position is founded through six propositions.—First proposition.—Therefore, in order to confirm this position by reason and discourse, we must proceed gradually through various propositions. And first, we suppose that it belongs to the nature of intellection, indeed also of cognition, that it takes place through a certain assimilation within the mind of the one understanding. This foundation seems to be like a dogma and principle received by common consent in philosophy and theology, and taken from experience itself. For in the external senses, especially in sight, which is most of all the sense of learning, we experience that vision takes place through a certain intentional assimilation of the one seeing to the object seen. We see the same thing happen in the internal sense, or imagination, and consequently also in the human intellect joined to the body; for it does not know except by turning itself to phantasms and forming in itself some likeness in accord with them. For this reason the philosophers called the soul the place of forms, whom Aristotle praises on this point, *On the Soul* III, chapter 4. There he also says that the intellect by understanding becomes the intelligible itself, surely through a certain assimilation. And Augustine, book 11, *On the Trinity*, chapter 2, said that sight, in seeing, is informed by the thing seen through the mediation of its likeness; the same thing, with due proportion, is found in the intellect and the intelligible thing. Moreover, even in the divine intellect itself cognition is through a certain assimilation, and therefore the ideas of all things are posited in the divine intellect and are specially attributed to the divine Word, which proceeds through intellect. And from the same principle theologians give the

stronger reason why the divine Word proceeds as Son, namely because he proceeds through intellect, and procession of intellect is a certain assimilation or representation, as St. Thomas teaches, I, part, question 27, articles 2 and 4, and as we have explained at length, book 11, *On the Trinity*, chapters 5 and 6. Hence, then, it is plainly concluded that angels too understand through a certain assimilation and by understanding become what they understand in a certain representative or assimilative being. This is proved because the angelic intellect is midway between the divine and the human. Therefore, if understanding takes place in that way in the extremes, it also does so in the middle. The consequence is proved, both because we cannot judge concerning the angelic intellect except either from our own intellect, by attributing to it in a more perfect mode the things that pertain to understanding and cognition, or from the divine intellect, by attributing to it a certain participation and imitation of that intellect in a more excellent way; and also because that property of intellection, that it is assimilative, does not arise from the particular condition of this or that intellect, but from the natural property of the intellective faculty as intellect, which consists in being perfected and constituted in act by drawing to itself the things understood through their reasons, just as, on the contrary, the natural property of the will is to be borne and inclined toward the things loved, as St. Thomas rightly teaches, I, part, where above, and question 16, article 1, and question 82, article 3. Hence, just as an angel loves by producing a weight toward the thing loved, so it understands by producing in itself some likeness of the thing understood.

8. Second proposition.—Second, another principle must be joined to this one, which is inferred from it, namely, that the angelic intellect, as pre-existing actual intellection either in order of duration or of nature, must be supposed to be constituted in first act, sufficient for forming in itself an expressed likeness of the thing understood. It is proved, because second act supposes a proportionate first act. But the second act of understanding consists in actual assimilation, even in the angelic intellect. Therefore, in the order of nature it supposes the angelic intellect sufficiently constituted in first act for forming in itself the expressed likeness of the thing understood. And it is further declared from the extremes, as was done in the preceding point. For in the human intellect, because it is such a thing in pure potency, some first act must precede by which it is rendered able to elicit a second act, as Aristotle demonstrates, *On the Soul* II, chapters 4 and 5, and as is treated more broadly there. But in the divine intellect considered in itself, first act and second act are not properly found, because it essentially and formally is its understanding, and this understanding

in the most eminent mode represents all things and contains the exemplars of all things. Yet if, according to reason, we pre-understand God as if constituted in first act for eliciting, according to our mode of conceiving, intellection, he must necessarily be conceived as constituted through his essence, which eminently contains all things in a most perfect and most eminent first act, for forming in his mind a concept representing all things and containing in itself the exemplars and ideas of all things. Therefore the same, with due proportion, must be attributed to the intermediate angelic intellect, on account of the reasons already given.

9. Third proposition.—Hence, third, we add that it is common to the angelic intellect with the others that not only the intellective power, but also the thing understood, in some way concurs with it toward its intellections. Thus that axiom of the philosophers, *knowledge arises from the object and the power*, has a place even in angels. Now that axiom was handed down concerning us by Augustine, book 9, *On the Trinity*, chapter 12, where he says: *It must be held clearly that every thing, whatever it is, that we know co-generates from us knowledge of itself. For knowledge is born from both, the knower and the known.* And he is plainly speaking of the knowledge of the intellect; and he says the same of vision, book 11, chapter 2. But in God, because there is not an understanding that is made, but understanding through essence, it is rather the cause of things intelligible outside God than an effect of them. Nevertheless, if according to our mode of conceiving the divine understanding is conceived by way of a second act elicited by the intellect, it is also understood to be from the object known, namely from the divine essence itself, as containing formally or eminently whatever is intelligible, which as such is the adequate object actually intelligible by the divine intellect. Therefore, in the way in which, without imperfection and according to reason, we conceive divine intellection to be from the divine intellect, with due proportion we must conceive it to be at once from the intelligible object of the same intellect. But I say *with due proportion*, both because every imperfection must be excluded, and an emanation according to reason only and according to our mode of conceiving must be understood, not according to reality; and also because God understands only himself as primary object, and other things as secondary. And therefore only the divine essence is the proper object from which, together with the intellect, divine intellection is conceived to be; but the remaining objects, which are secondarily intelligible, generate knowledge of themselves not according to themselves, but as they are eminently contained in the essence, although they terminate that knowledge secondarily even as they are in themselves. Therefore in the angelic

intellect also intellection must proceed from the object and from knowledge in some way proportioned to it, which must consequently be explained by us. The consequence is proved both by the reasons given in the first point, because we cannot judge concerning intermediate intellects except through some proportion to the extremes; and also because it has been said that the faculty of understanding, before it is conceived as actually understanding, must be pre-understood as sufficiently constituted in first act for forming in itself a likeness of the thing understood. But it cannot be constituted in that way except through the object itself joined to it in some way, that is, either through itself or through some likeness or eminence of it. Therefore. The minor is now proved only because no other mode can be thought of with foundation, but it will appear more from what will be said.

10. Fourth proposition.—Fourth, I conclude from this that the angelic intellect by itself alone cannot be constituted in a sufficient first act by way of proximate principle for understanding all things intelligible by it. This is proved by a proportional discourse: because the human intellect, taken nakedly in itself, is not the complete active principle of its intellection, as we suppose from the treatise *On the Soul*, and as we will say below, and as can be sufficiently proved from the third supposition. Again, the divine intellect itself, if according to our mode of conceiving it is apprehended as the proximate principle by which of its intellection, is not the complete principle, but the divine essence itself concurs with it as an object actually intelligible. Therefore this is a sign that this mode of eliciting intellection as if partially in the character of proximate principle does not belong to the intellect insofar as it is this or that intellect, but simply from the precise character of intellect, and consequently belongs to every intellect, and consequently also to the angelic intellect, although it belongs to each according to its mode and according to the grade of its perfection. Moreover, I argue in this way: because it belongs generally to the nature of intellection that it be from the object and the power, as has been proved. Therefore in angels it cannot be from the power alone as proximate principle, unless the intellective power of the angel virtually contains in itself all the objects intelligible by it. But this cannot be attributed to it. Therefore neither can the complete activity of its intellections. Each inference is clear in itself.

11. The second proof itself proceeds.—But the minor, namely that such virtual containment cannot be attributed to the angelic intellect, is proved because that eminence cannot exist except either in being, by reason of some power, or in representing, by reason of some assimilation; for no other mode seems able to be devised. But neither of those is probable. Not the former,

because the substance of an angel does not eminently contain all the things intelligible by it. Nor even the latter, because the intellect, as intellect, does not through itself have that virtual representation, because neither does the human intellect have it, nor the divine intellect precisely considered and not as including the essence, nor as in some way actualized by it. Therefore it cannot with foundation be attributed to the angelic intellect. There is also the point that, although in the divine intellect such representative power is understood, it would belong to it by reason of the divine substance eminently containing all things, of which it is conceived as a sort of property. But the angelic intellect is a power flowing from a substance so limited that it eminently contains nothing outside itself. Therefore there is no source from which it would have so eminent an active and representative power. Finally, this is confirmed: because otherwise the naked angelic intellect, lacking every other form or habit, would be knowing in first act all things intelligible by it, and consequently it would know in first act and be able to contemplate in second act all possible things, even those never to be future, just like the others that are future. And it could immediately and directly contemplate any thing, even God himself. Indeed, it would also necessarily actually consider all things, because it could not be applied by the will more to considering these than those. All these things are false. But how they follow and how they are to be rejected depends on what follows, and therefore it will be discussed afterward.

12. Fifth proposition.—Fifth, I add that no angelic intellect is constituted in a complete and proximate first act for understanding things other than the understanding angel itself by the substance alone of the understanding angel. For we suppose that the substance of an angel is distinct from its intellect, and therefore we add this proposition, which St. Thomas teaches in the said question 55, article 1, and all the authors cited for our position agree, as do Gregory and others, who admit at least some species in angels. But I said *for understanding other things outside the one understanding*, because there is a special reason concerning cognition of itself, as we will see in the following chapter. We are speaking, however, of cognition of a thing directly and immediately in itself. For if it is known through another medium, then the species and cognition of that medium are a principle of the cognition of the other, as we will say below concerning the cognition of God. Therefore the reason for the assertion so explained is this: because the substance of each angel is finite and does not contain formally or eminently things distinct from itself. Therefore it is not of itself sufficient, by way of object or of something having the role of object, to constitute its intellect in a first and proximate act for understanding other things

distinct from itself. The consequence is proved because the intelligible object is compared to the intellect that understands it by way of form. But a power is not actualized through a form except with respect to those things that are contained in the form. Therefore, since the substance of an angel in no way contains things distinct from itself, the angel cannot through it be sufficiently constituted in first act so as to understand those things by proper cognition and as they are in themselves. For it is chiefly of this cognition that we are treating. And this, in sum, is the reason of St. Thomas in the said first article.

13. Objection against the reason of St. Thomas.—The reason of St. Thomas is sustained by distinguishing two modes of concurring in place of the object.—But this does not satisfy some, because in order to represent all things intentionally and by way of object, or as it were of an instrument bearing its role, perfection simply infinite is not necessary, and therefore neither is an eminent containment of all things necessary. For thus an intelligible species of a substance can represent that substance, although it does not eminently contain it. And God could make one intelligible species that, on the part of the object, would be the principle of understanding all the things that one angel can understand, even though it would not have infinite perfection or eminent containment, just as he has now made one intellective power that can know all those things. Therefore, for such representation neither infinite perfection nor eminent containment is necessary. Therefore it will be able to belong to each angel through its substance. Nevertheless, I think that the reason of St. Thomas is excellent and almost demonstrative, if it is rightly weighed. But I explain and press it in this way. For it can be understood in two ways that one thing is the proximate principle on the part of the object, or the medium that they call unknown, for knowing other things. First, by way of seed or instrument principally instituted for this, that it may take the place of another and concur in place of it, and thus be a medium for knowing it. Second, some thing can be a principle of knowing others, not because it is in itself first instituted to represent them, but because, since it is a thing wholly absolute from this transcendental relation, by its perfection it has the force of leading into the cognition of others by way of proximate principle in the character of intelligible object and of a sufficient medium for knowing other things directly and perfectly.

14. The objection proceeds concerning the first mode of concurring.—Therefore the objection proceeds concerning a medium of the first kind. For such are accidental sensible or intelligible species; they are, as it were, instruments or seeds of objects, and therefore they do not need to contain them eminently or to have equal perfection with them. And for the same reason God

could effect one intelligible species representing several, or even infinitely many, things intelligible by some angel, without eminent containment of them, because it would have only an instrumental or quasi-seminal concurrence, and consequently without infinite perfection, except in a very qualified sense, namely in that mode of representing, which is simply imperfect, as will be said more broadly in what follows. And the example concerning the intellect also proves only this much. For one intellect can be a proximate principle for understanding many, and even infinitely many at least successively, without eminent containment of intelligible objects, because with respect to them it is compared more as a passive power than as an active one. For as active it is not the power of the thing understood, but of the one understanding; and therefore it does not need infinite perfection for that efficiency, except only in a qualified sense and in such a genus of power. And for the same reason the very substance of one understanding angel can be the radical and principal principle of understanding innumerable things distinct from itself without eminent containment of them, because in that influx it does not operate as if in the place of the intelligible things themselves, nor because it contains them, but it operates by a power connatural to it and befitting the grade of such a nature. Its own formal perfection suffices for this, namely with respect to the principal influx on the part of the one understanding required for understanding, beyond which the influx of the power and of the object is necessary, as has been declared.

15. Not so concerning the second mode.—It is confirmed.—But if the substance of an understanding angel were a sufficient principle of understanding all things distinct from itself, even with respect to the influx necessary on the part of the objects, it would not have this in the said prior mode, that is, by way of an instrument of other objects, instituted in itself to supply their role, as is evident in itself, because one substance, especially a perfect and integral substance, spiritual and simple, such as an angelic substance is, is not in itself and intrinsically ordered to serving another created substance, nor is it instituted to be as it were the seed or instrument of it. Therefore, for the substance of one angel to be a medium for knowing distinct things, it would need to be such a medium in the posterior mode declared above, namely, because it suffices for this by the force of its absolute perfection. But this mode cannot be understood unless such a substance contains other things in some eminent way. For why will it be able to supply the role of other intelligible objects, of which it is not the instrument or seed, unless it contains them in itself in some way? But it does not contain them formally, as is evident in itself, nor instrumentally, as is supposed. Therefore no mode remains except the eminent

mode. For what other can be devised? And it is declared by an adapted example: for one substance cannot supply the role of another for generating, or for doing anything else, unless it is either its instrument or seed, or contains it eminently. Therefore, in the same way, one substance cannot bear the role of another in the character of intelligible object unless it contains it eminently, since it is not its intellectual seed or instrument, as is supposed. And it is confirmed: for the divine substance itself would not be a sufficient reason for understanding all things unless it contained all things eminently. Therefore much less can a created substance be this, since it does not eminently contain the other things.

16. There is also something that must be noted: that the substance that is a medium for knowing others in this posterior and eminent mode is not an unknown medium, but must be a known medium. For God knows all things through his substance in such a way that by knowing it primarily of itself, he secondarily knows the others. And those who see God through his essence in place of an intelligible species see creatures through it as through a species in such a way that they see them in the known essence itself, nor can they see them otherwise through such a medium, as I showed in the preceding volume, book 2, *On the Negative Attributes of God*, chapter 25, especially from number 50. But an angel cannot through itself, as through a known medium, know all other things distinct from itself, as we will see in what follows. Therefore neither can it know them through its substance alone as through a species, or through an unknown medium. Hence, conversely, it comes about that, if an angel can know something through its substance as through a known medium, it does not need for such a mode of cognition a proper species of such a thing, but is sufficiently constituted in first act through its substance, as we will afterward say concerning the properties or actions of the same angel. Finally, here too one easily understands why and how it is excellently inferred from the limitation of angelic substance that it is not a sufficient medium for knowing all other things: because it would be necessary that it contain the others eminently. But an angel could not eminently contain all things knowable by it unless it were of infinite perfection simply, both because those things are infinite, or multiplicable to infinity, and also because if it contained them eminently it could effect them, although many cannot be made without infinite power, since they cannot be made except by creation. Finally, it cannot happen that a less perfect substance eminently contain a more perfect one. But one angel can know all the other angels by proper cognition and in themselves. Therefore, in order to know all through eminent containment, it must have no superior, nor be able to have one, and consequently it must be of infinite perfection.

17. Sixth proposition.—Notes for proving the proposition.—It is now proved that material objects do not cooperate effectively with angels toward their cognition.—Sixth, I say that the intellect of an angel is not immediately aided by all the other things that it knows outside itself, as by objects immediately cooperating with the angel's intellect toward the cognition of themselves. This assertion is against some of the authors cited, especially in the first opinion, who, while supposing that cognition does not occur without the concurrence of the object known even in the genus of efficient cause, nevertheless deny that species are necessary, because the object itself by itself can effect the intellection of itself with the intellect of the angel. Thus Gabriel, Ockham, Gregory, and more broadly and expressly Bassolus think, distinction 3, question 3, article 3, § *I say therefore*, and question 4, article 2; indeed even Scotus, question 10, before the solution of the arguments, agrees in this, although otherwise he does not deny species. Therefore, in order to prove the assertion, it is necessary to take only those things intelligible by an angel that are distinct from its substance. For, as I have already advised, we are now abstaining from cognition of itself. Likewise, we are properly speaking of other created substances, because concerning the divine substance there is a special difficulty to be treated below. And furthermore, here we are speaking only of the things that an angel can immediately and directly know in themselves. But naturally it cannot understand the substance of God in this way, either through a species of God or through the essence, as we will say later. We are dealing, then, with created substances, under which we include accidents, which are known in and with those substances; or however they are known, the same reason, with due proportion, applies to them as to substances, as we will also say later. Finally, it is necessary to distinguish between spiritual and material objects. For the former are actually intelligible, while the latter are only in potency; and therefore there is a special difficulty in the former, namely whether an actually intelligible object, even if it is a substance distinct from the one understanding, can through itself co-effect the act by which it is understood by another, together with the intellect of that other. We will treat this question, both as to the possible and as to the fact, in the following chapter. But in material substances, not only does it seem clear that they can be known by angels without the effective cooperation of the objects themselves, but it also seems evident that such cooperation is not possible according to the order of nature. The former part can be proved both because it is a great imperfection for angels in their acts to depend efficiently on material objects, and also because otherwise they could not see objects of this kind except within a certain space or distance, which is against everyone and

against the perfection of angels. The sequence is clear, because a material thing cannot effect at any distance whatever, but only within a certain space. Indeed, according to the common position, it would be necessary that the angel be undistant, or substantially present and near to the thing to be known, because a material thing could not have such efficiency through a medium; otherwise it would influence the angelic act of understanding not by itself, but through some species flowing from itself, which is against the hypothesis, because we are now treating only of this influx. For with respect to the other efficiency, that of species, the medium would not be capable of such action. Therefore the object would have to be altogether proximate and undistant, because according to the common position of the philosophers, a thing, at least a material one, cannot immediately act at a distance.

18. It is then proved, indeed, that such cooperation is impossible.—The response of some is refuted.—But the other part is proved further, namely that such efficiency is impossible, because a material thing cannot immediately and through itself effect something in a spiritual thing, especially by an innate and merely natural power, even if such efficiency is partial. Therefore a material object cannot through itself influence a spiritual act of understanding in an angel. To this reason some respond that the material object is illuminated by the angel itself, so that it can influence the angel's act. Yet this illumination is fictitious, for it rests on no foundation or indication; and besides, it is either insufficient or impossible. For if it is material, it will be equally insufficient for the object to effect a spiritual act, and from another side it is outside the nature of a spiritual object to effect a material light. But if it is spiritual illumination, it will be necessary that through it some spiritual light be produced that is received in the material object, and indeed also in the medium, which is impossible either altogether or at least according to the order of nature. This matter will come up again below.

19. Durandus's response.—It is rejected first.—For this reason Durandus, whom others follow, denies that this efficiency of the intelligible object in the angelic act of understanding is necessary. Still, he thinks that the mere presence of the object in itself, or in its cause or effect, suffices for it to be known by the angel in the way in which it is. For by the very fact that this object is intelligible, and this power is intellective, once sufficient presence of the object has been posited through the existence of the object, or through some nearness, if it is necessary, intellection will follow without the efficiency of the object. For the necessity of a present object does not imply its causality, especially efficient causality, as Gabriel, Gregory, and Bassolus seem to infer, but implies either that

it is a necessary condition, or at most that it is a quasi-material cause, not from which, but about which such an act is occupied, and which is rather the necessary term of its relation. But this response first of all destroys the principle posited above, that knowledge proceeds from object and power. For that is understood of procession as from an efficient principle. And in this sense it is proved by the reason given above, because the cognitive or intellective power through itself does not suffice to effect in itself the actual likeness of the intelligible object, since it does not contain that object in its precise entity, and therefore it needs the object so that it may be aided by it in forming in itself an expressed image of it. But the power is not aided for this by the mere extrinsic presence of the thing to be understood, according to its real existence or local nearness, if it effects nothing with the power. Therefore that objective presence does not suffice for intellection to follow in the angel, unless either some likeness of the object is supposed in the power or is produced by the object itself. And we can confirm this from sensibles, through which we are led by the hand to intelligibles. For in order that our sight may see, it is not enough that the visible object be present and that the sense itself be visual; rather, it is necessary that sight be aided by the visible for seeing, by co-effecting in some way. And because it cannot by itself concur with sight, it emits some form that, in its place, actualizes sight and effects vision with it. Therefore, by like reason, in an intelligible object cooperation beyond presence is necessary; and for that cooperation, the extrinsic presence of the object does not suffice unless it is in some way intimately united to the power itself.

20. Second.—There is also the point that in actual cognition it cannot be sufficiently explained how this extrinsic presence of the object is both necessary and sufficient for cognition. For in the intellect one cognition is intuitive, another abstractive. For the former, real existence of the object must indeed be supposed in some way; but this is not enough for the angel to gaze upon the thing by the very fact that it is. Otherwise it would always necessarily actually gaze upon all things that exist, because according to the contrary position, in order for vision to follow, it is enough that this be visible and that the power be visual. Nor can it be said that some things are not seen because of excessive distance, because in intellectual vision local nearness is not necessary; therefore the real presence of existence suffices. Nor can it be said that, although an intelligible object is of itself sufficiently present, it is not immediately and necessarily seen by the intellect because it is not applied by the free will, under which it lies. For although this freedom of knowing is truly asserted, nevertheless in that position its use cannot be explained. For if the present

object does not excite the intellect, nor is there supposed in the intellect anything representative of such an object, how will the will be able freely to apply the intellect so that, from many objects equally present on their side, it considers these rather than those? For this election cannot be understood without some prior cognition of the things among which it takes place. Therefore either intellection follows from necessity of nature, and then all things will necessarily be seen, or the intellect will not be able to be applied by the will to gazing actually upon these rather than those. How this difficulty ceases once species are posited, we will say below.

21. The response of the opponents.—But in abstractive cognition it is certain that the presence of an existing object is not required, because such cognition abstracts from this kind of presence, whence it is called abstractive, and yet that cognition too is not without presence. They respond that abstractive cognition supposes intuitive cognition of the same thing, or at least of its cause or effect, by which, once seen, it is known. And in this way, they say that the presence of the object suffices for intuitive cognition without any other efficiency of the object; but from intuitive cognition abstractive cognition is left behind, and consequently the object's presence mediately suffices for abstractive cognition.

22. It is refuted.—Evasion.—It is blocked.—But against this, first, angels have not only abstractive cognition of the things that they have at some time seen intuitively, or that they have known from things upon which they have gazed, but they also directly understand many things abstractively whose cognition they did not obtain through any intuitive cognition. Otherwise angels from their nature would have only that knowledge of things which they had obtained by their acts, which is false, as we will see below. Second, for abstractive cognition to be founded in some way on the preceding existence of the object, it is not enough that the object existed, but it is necessary that from its presence something be left in the intellect through which it can be known abstractively. For if it has ceased to be and has left nothing in the intellect, it will afterward be no more able to be known than if it had never been, as is plainly evident in memory. For although an object exists, if while it exists it is not seen, it can no more leave a memory of itself than if it had never existed. But if it leaves something, then through that it afterward concurs effectively toward the abstractive cognition of itself. Therefore, with greater reason, its concurrence is necessary for intuitive cognition. You will say: the object as left in memory does not concur actively toward abstractive cognition, but only by way of terminating object, just as the object is said to concur toward intuitive cognition; so that the

difference is only this, that intuition is terminated at the object as existing in itself, but abstractive cognition at the object as represented in the species left in memory. For thus many of the cited authors respond. But this is easily attacked, because in the direct cognition of some thing, whether abstractive or intuitive, an impressed species is not the object proximately terminating such cognition, as Durandus rightly proves, in II, distinction 3, question 6, number 10 and following, and as we will see in the treatise *On the Soul*, because a species cannot have the character of object without being immediately known. But it is not known through direct abstractive cognition of the thing represented, as is evident by experience. Therefore it does not have the character of term, but of principle, and consequently it cooperates in effecting such cognition. Therefore this is a sign that the power is of itself insufficient to effect such an act unless it is aided by the object. Therefore, with greater reason, the same must be said of intuitive cognition.

23. Final proposition.—There are in angels intelligible species for knowing directly and properly other things distinct from themselves.—Finally, from what has been said, it is concluded that there are intelligible species in angels by which they are aided in understanding objects outside themselves by direct and proper cognition. We conclude this assertion from what has been said in this way: the angelic intellect is not by itself alone sufficiently constituted in first act for understanding all the objects intelligible by it, but it needs the cooperation of the object. But it is not constituted in first act, nor is it aided, by external objects immediately through themselves or through their essence alone. Therefore it is aided through species. The antecedent, as to all parts of the discourse, has been proved. But the consequence is proved because no other mode of concurring has been found, nor can one be thought of with foundation. For if the object does not aid the power through itself, it must aid it through something else placed into the power itself; and whatever that is, we call it an intelligible species. Then, by reason of a similar discourse, the philosophers posited species in the senses and in the human intellect, as we will say in its place. But in angels, preserving proportion, there is the same reason, insofar as they too understand through assimilation, and their bare intellective power is not a sufficient proximate principle for effecting this assimilation, as has now been proved. Therefore there is in angels the same necessity for species. Moreover, as to abstractive cognition, and that which is through memory concerning past things, there is no one who denies such species to angels, although perhaps they do not attribute to them the same mode of cooperation, as can be seen in the authors cited in the earlier opinions. And that reason, or experience, is

convincing. For an angel remembers past things that it saw, as is supposed and will be proved below; and it would not remember those things now past unless, when they were present, it had known them, because with respect to that angel they would stand in the same way as if they had not existed. Therefore this is a sign that something was left in the intellect or memory of the angel from the present thing or from the cognition of it. This we call a species. Augustine uses this argument for positing species in us, book 10 of the *Confessions*, chapter 15, and book 11, chapter 18, and often elsewhere, and it presses equally in angels. Again, for the new cognitions of future things that angels can have through illuminations and locutions, nearly everyone posits species, because without them they cannot be understood, as we will see in their own places below, and Dionysius indicates this, chapter 3 of *The Celestial Hierarchy*. Finally, as to intuitive cognition too, that there must be something in the angelic power that represents the present object has been sufficiently proved in the preceding point, and it will be explained more broadly afterward in the individual objects. Therefore for all cognitions of external objects it is necessary for an angel to have species.

24. To the foundations of the first opinion.—The response to the reasons of the other opinions is easy from what has been said. For to the first reason of Durandus we deny that species are posited in vain; for their necessity and activity even in angels has already been sufficiently declared. But to the second, it is denied that an intentional species is of the same species as the thing whose species it is. In the third treatise we will show that this is most true in the senses and in our intellect; and the same reason applies to angelic species. Nor does it matter that species are principles in some way similar to their objects, because they are not similar in natural being, so to speak, but in representative being; or they are not similar really, but intentionally, and not through formal agreement, but through virtual and quasi-seminal efficiency. Just as the power of seed is not of the same species as the generating animal, and nevertheless it is effective of a similar animal by way of instrument of the generator, so, with due proportion, a species is compared to the object.

25. The second opinion, brought forward in number three, is overthrown from two heads.—From the first head.—But Henry first brings no probable argument by which he may persuade that species are not given either in our intellect or in the angelic intellect; second, he does not speak consistently when, after species have been removed, he invents a scientific habit in angels. I prove the first part, because first of all the assumption that species can cooperate nothing toward the act of understanding is false. But when, in the proof, he

assumes that species are principally posited for this, that they make objects present in intelligible being, we say that there is a twofold function of the intelligible object, namely, to cooperate with the power and to terminate its act. But through a species the object does not become present in the character of term, but in the character of principle, which is otherwise usually called not terminative but motive. Now in this way an object is made present through a species, whether it is made by the object or by another superior agent. For when it is made in the first way, as in sight, although the object is supposed sufficiently present either for effecting the species or for terminating the act, nevertheless it is not sufficiently present for effecting the vision itself, because existing outside the power it cannot concur with that power, as has been shown. And therefore it is made present to the power for this, that is, it is joined to it through a species. And in the same way the object becomes present to the power when the species is made by another cause, even if the object is a singular and particular thing. For even a species impressed by another cause can represent a singular thing and be the proximate principle of knowing it, as we will see below; and the contrary is undeservedly assumed without proof in that discourse, since it is false.

26. From the second head.—I show the other part concerning the scientific habit, because as Henry imagines it, it is nothing other than a certain most universal intelligible species, which is the principle of understanding all things intelligible by an angel. Hence, if the matter is rightly weighed, he differs from us only in the number of species. For we say that it is not necessary that in individual angels there be only one intelligible species, which will become almost evident from what follows; but he contends that there is only one habit in each. As to the singularity of such a quality, he proves this by no reason, nor could he prove it. But that this habit is an intelligible species is proved: for both that habit and intelligible species can be called habits, because they endure permanently in the intellect and are first acts with respect to it, as Scotus above well noted. And then some intellectual habit is said to be, and is, an intelligible species when it is not posited on the part of the power for facilitating or strengthening it in its activity, but on the part of the object, so that it confers the power of representing it. But intellectual habits facilitating the power on its own part in order to natural acts are not given in angels, as we will show below. Therefore that habit which Henry posits cannot be a proper habit on the part of the power, whether necessary or useful. Therefore it can contribute something only on the part of the object. Therefore it is an intelligible species. This is especially so because habits facilitating a natural power are not usually

absolutely necessary or connatural with the nature, but are acquired by acts. But that habit which Henry devised is said to be necessary, connatural, and antecedent to every act of understanding. Therefore it can only be an intelligible species. Finally, Henry himself teaches that that habit virtually contains intelligible objects and represents them to the intellect. Hence in the end he admits that under that aspect it can be called a species. Why then does he admit one rather than several? For that difference which he invents between a habit and species, namely that the use of that habit lies under the free will of the angel, but not the use of the species if there are several, is entirely arbitrary, nor can I gather from him any probable reason by which he urges it, nor do I think one can be given. This is both because we use intelligible species freely, even though we have several, and also because the unity or plurality of instruments is irrelevant to their free use. Indeed, in a certain way we more easily use one instrument or another by our freedom when they are distinct than we use one and the same instrument for this or that work when it is useful for several.

27. To the foundations of the third opinion in number four.—The third opinion brings forward nothing new to which a response is necessary. For we have already given the reason why a created intellect, neither by reason of the substance from which it flows and a fortiori not by reason of its own limited perfection, can be a sufficient proximate representative principle of all intelligible things. Hence it is false that it is of itself an image of all things, although it is capable of such intentional images, which we call species. But the difficulties occurring concerning the intelligible species of angels are not so insuperable that on account of them one must deny both the common position and the more probable natural reason and the great guidance from sensibles. But those difficulties touch particular questions concerning these species, and therefore they will be more suitably treated in the following chapters. But as to what that opinion adds, that the determination of the intellective power to such an act sufficiently takes place from the presence of the object, this could perhaps have a place with respect to some determination of intuitive or abstractive cognition, once the sufficient constitution of the intellective power in first act has been supposed, as we will declare below. Yet it does not have a place with respect to a naked intellect existing in pure potency with respect to the object, as has been declared. Nor does the comparison between intellect and will proceed on this point, both because the will is not a power that operates by way of assimilation, but only by way of impulse, and therefore, once the object has been represented, it is the complete active principle of its own act, which the intellect does not have because of the contrary reason, as I have explained; and also

because the will supposes the object present not outside, but within the soul or angel by means of cognition, and therefore it can be excited by it, and metaphorically moved as by an end, without its proper efficiency and in a certain intimate way. But extrinsic objects are not joined to the intellect in such a way that without the intervention of species they can move or determine it.

28. To the foundations of the fourth opinion in number four.—Finally, to the foundation of the last position, the reason has already been given why a finite substance is not of itself intelligibly or intentionally representative of other intelligible things distinct from itself, which it neither contains eminently nor is the instrument or quasi-seed of them ordered to representing them. And therefore the comparison with the intelligible species that is made there does not proceed, for this is familiar and proper to finite substances, that by means of accidents they can effect many things that they cannot through themselves. But to the confirmation, in which it is inferred that an angel would be by its nature as it were blind if it could not see other things through its substance, the consequence is denied, because one is not blind who lacks species, but one who lacks a power capable of visible species, or has that power altogether impeded. But an angel from its nature has a faculty capable of intelligible species, and it has no impediment to receiving them; indeed perhaps it has them connatural, as we will say. And therefore that inference has no plausibility.

CHAPTER IV
HOW EACH ANGEL SEES HIMSELF AND ALL THINGS THAT ARE IN HIM

1. *Four kinds of objects knowable by an angel.*—We have explained in general the object and the medium of angelic intellection; now we must descend to particular objects. We can reduce these objects to four heads, which are either the angel knowing himself, or other angels and all immaterial creatures, or bodies and all material things, or God himself, whom we place last, because he can be known naturally not through himself, as created things can, but through all other created objects. And because in the first chapter it was shown in passing that all these can be known by each angel, two things remain to be explained concerning each one, namely, the principle or medium through which it is known, and the act or mode by which it is known. Therefore, concerning an angel knowing himself, we must see whether he needs an intelligible species as the proximate principle or medium of knowledge of himself, or what medium he uses for knowing himself. And in this sense the question is proposed by the

theologians in these words: whether an angel knows himself through his essence. Marsilius badly understood this, in 2, quest. 6, art. 1, and therefore attributes to St. Thomas the assertion that an angel knows himself through his essence as through the act of knowing, which is very foreign to his mind and teaching; for he defined every angelic intellection as a thing distinct from the angel's essence, Quest. 54, art. 1. Therefore, when it is asked whether an angel knows himself through his essence, the sense is not whether he knows himself through it as through the act, but as through the proximate principle of the act, which is usually a species.

2. *First opinion, that an angel needs a proper species for knowledge of himself.*—On this point the first opinion is that an angel needs a proper intelligible species of his substance, so that he can understand it. This opinion is usually attributed to Alexander of Hales, part 2, quests. 23 and 24. But I find nothing of this in him there; for in quest. 23 he deals only with morning and evening knowledge of creatures. And although, besides morning knowledge, which is in the Word, he distinguishes a twofold evening knowledge, one which is of creatures as they are in angelic minds through impressed species, and another which is of creatures as they are in themselves through species received from things, still he never says that an angel has this twofold evening knowledge of himself, although he also does not exclude it, but speaks indifferently. In quest. 24, while treating how an angel knows God, other angels, and material things, he disputes nothing about the mode by which an angel knows himself. Hence his view is doubtful; for either he thinks the same about knowledge of oneself and of others, or surely he supposes as known that an angel knows himself through himself. Marsilius can also be cited for this view, but he only denies that an angel knows himself through his essence as through an intellection. But there he does little to distinguish between species and intellection, and therefore he does not seem very far from this view, which is also attributed to Scotus. But this is not his opinion, as I will say below; indeed, he attributes this view to Henry and attacks it. Vasquez, however, excuses Henry, saying that he taught that one angel knows others through a sciential habit, but not himself.

3. *What Henry thinks on this point.*—But Henry, in *Quodlibet* 5, quest. 14, near the end, under letter V, adds these express words: *I say that an angel does not understand things other than himself through his essence, and what is more, neither does he understand his own essence, as was already said, but only through something added to his essence and differing from it in reality.* By this added thing he clearly understands a sciential habit, for he had said of this that although an

angel understands through his essence as through an intellective power, which he does not think is something other than the essence, nevertheless for the act of understanding there is required, besides the essence, *something differing from it, which is on the part of the intelligible*, namely, a sciential habit. And concerning this he adds that it is necessary not only for knowing other things, but also for knowing one's own essence. And in the same sense he adds: *To understand through one's own essence as through the notion of understanding first and per se, whether oneself or other things than oneself, belongs to God alone.* There he is not speaking of understanding through one's essence as through a second act, but as through the notion of understanding on the part of the intelligible thing. And in this sense he teaches that it is proper to God to know himself through his substance alone, not only as through the act of understanding, but also as through the proximate and integral notion of understanding himself. For he thinks that a created substance, besides the act, needs a proximate principle distinct from the substance, which is not the intellect, since, as I said, he does not distinguish this from the substance, but is the sciential habit which he himself devised. But in the preceding chapter we showed that this sciential habit cannot be anything except a very universal intelligible species; therefore, according to Henry, an angel knows himself through a species in the same way as he knows others. The foundation of this view can be that the substance of an angel, although it is naturally joined to its intellect, as an essence to a property which flows from it and remains in it, nevertheless is not through itself united to the intellect as an intelligible object, nor as a form constituting it in first act for eliciting the act of understanding itself; therefore, it needs an intelligible species of its substance in order to know it.

4. *Second opinion.—It admits in an angel a species for abstract knowledge of himself.*—The second opinion distinguishes in angels two kinds of knowledge of themselves, one intuitive, the other abstractive, and says that the former is made through the substance of the angel himself without a species, while for the latter a species is necessary. Thus Scotus thinks, in 2, dist. 3, quest. 10, at the end of the body, *just before the solution of the arguments*, and Bassolus there, quest. 3, to 2. The same is suggested, though more obscurely, by Major there, quest. 1, in the proofs of the conclusion and in the solution to 3, and Gabriel, quest. 2, art. 3, in its first part, concl. 3, together with 4 and 10. We will speak later of the prior part of this view, for we judge it to be true. The latter part, however, can be understood in two ways. First, so that an angel can cease from intuitive knowledge of himself, as is probable; once this is posited, it is also probable that he can know his quiddity abstractively, prescinding from actual existence. For

no repugnance appears in this. For a higher angel can know a lower angel abstractively, and the same angel can know higher and lower angels abstractively when he does not see them intuitively; therefore, also himself. Therefore it is now proved that that abstractive knowledge is not made through the essence, because the essence of an angel can concur toward knowledge of itself only as actually existing; but by concurring in this way it necessarily induces intuitive knowledge; therefore, if an angel has abstractive knowledge, it proceeds not immediately from the essence itself, but from a species. The minor is proved, because the substance of an angel terminates knowledge of itself in the same way as it effects it, because it effects as much as it can and, as it were, reflects upon itself; therefore, just as it effects as actually existing, so it is seen as actually existing, and hence intuitively; therefore, for abstractive knowledge of oneself a species is necessary. It can be understood in another way, so that an angel, without ceasing from intuitive knowledge of himself, at the same time knows himself abstractively, because it is not repugnant to have two acts at the same time, as we will see below, and they do not have any special repugnance between themselves, because they are not opposed in a negative abstraction, so to speak, which includes privative or contradictory opposition on the part of the object, but they are distinguished according to a precisive abstraction on the part of the object, which does not include opposition. And Major expressly affirms this, and Gabriel thinks it. Therefore, just as those two intellections are distinct, so they proceed from proximate principles; therefore, the intuitive is through the substance immediately, the abstractive through its species.

5. *Third opinion.—That an angel knows himself immediately through his intellect.*—The third opinion is that an angel does not know himself through an intelligible species, nor even immediately through his substance, but immediately through his intellect alone, because with respect to knowledge of his substance he is sufficiently constituted in complete and proximate first act through himself. But because such an intellect has this perfection through emanation from its essence, therefore an angel can be said radically to know himself through his substance. This opinion is commonly attributed to Cajetan by the modern Thomists; nevertheless Vasquez denies that Cajetan taught this, and Valencia also indicates this. Yet Cajetan, 1 part, quest. 54, art. 3, to 4, says quite openly that the substance of an angel does not concur toward intellection of itself *as eliciting, but as the source of the intellect in act with respect to itself*. But Valencia explains that he only intended to teach that the substance of an angel does not concur as an inhering form, but as united to the intellect *fontally*, for it is its origin and source. But this is not correct, for the argument was not about

inherence, but about efficiency, because a created substance is not the proximate principle of an accidental action. And Cajetan responds by granting that the substance of an angel *is not the efficient principle of the intellection of itself, because it does not concur as eliciting*, certainly proximately, *but as source*. And he thinks the same at Quest. 56, art. 1, § *To that*, where he explains it, because just as the substance of an angel is both a certain essence and an intelligible object in act, so the power flows from it under both notions, and hence sufficiently actualized, or formed, for eliciting the intellection of such a substance. And so Bañez and Ripa understand and follow Cajetan, in the cited art. 1. Its principal foundations seem to be two, which have been touched upon in passing: one, that a created substance is not the proximate principle of an accidental operation; the other, that since the same substance is intellective and intelligible in act, there can flow from it an intellect which, through its entity under both notions, is the proximate principle in first act constituted per se with respect to the intellection of the same substance.

6. *What Vasquez approves in this opinion and what he rejects.*—And Vasquez approves this opinion as to the assertion, disput. 204, cap. 2. But he is displeased that this is posited as something special in an angel with respect to the intellection of himself, for he thinks the same follows with respect to others, or even all things naturally intelligible by an angel. For other things too are intelligible by an angel, because they are comprehended under his object. Therefore, if the proper substance of an angel, because it is intelligible by that angel, can be understood by virtue of the intellect, even though it does not concur by way of principle in the notion of object, but only in the notion of term, by the same reason an angel will be able through himself to understand all objects intelligible by him, even though they do not concur by way of principle through themselves or through a species. He proves the consequence, because for concurring by way of term it makes little difference that the intellect of an angel is really joined to his own substance and not to other things, since for the notion of term no natural or local conjunction is necessary, but can be required only for concurrence by way of principle. And thus he judges that an angel does not need a species for knowledge of himself for no other reason than that he does not need one for knowing other distinct objects. But this is rather a certain objection against this third view, leading it to a certain unacceptable consequence, than a fitting proof of a true assertion, since it proceeds from a false foundation. Nor is that objection of great moment against that view. For that view does not assert that the natural union between one's own angelic substance and its intellect is necessary so that the substance can be a terminative

object and determine the intellect to such an action; rather, it asserts that this union is the cause and reason on account of which the intellect flows from the substance constituted in first act with respect to it. And therefore it does not follow that it has the same actuality per se with respect to other substances or objects, because it does not flow from them, nor does it receive its whole power of understanding from them; and therefore, not improbably, a special reason is considered with respect to knowledge of one's own substance.

7. *Third and true view.—First conclusion.—An angel does not need an impressed intelligible species for understanding himself.*—Nevertheless the common and more probable view of St. Thomas is much different from the preceding ones. And to explain it I say first: an angel, in order to understand himself intuitively, does not need an accidental intelligible species representing his substance in first act. Thus St. Thomas teaches, in the cited Quest. 56, arts. 1 and 2, *Contra Gentiles*, cap. 98, and Quest. 8, *On Truth*, art. 6. Scotus and all the authors cited in the second and third opinions agree, as do other theologians to be cited in the following assertion. Hence Bonaventure, in 2, dist. 3, part 2, quest. 1, supposes this view as certain, saying: *all who have understood anything have posited that an angel knows through species other objects besides those which exist essentially in the knowing angel.* The reason for this assertion should not be sought from the fact that such a species is absolutely impossible. For if an intelligible species of one angel could be given to a lower, a higher, and an equal angel, if two angels of the same species are given, why not to the same angel? Certainly no repugnance can be conceived. Therefore the reason must be taken from the connatural order of natural things; and thus such a species can be said to be naturally impossible, because the angelic intellect naturally neither demands nor admits it. Therefore it neither flows naturally from his essence nor is it infused by God in a connatural way. The consequence is clear, because connatural action and passion keep proportion. The antecedent is proved, because a nature which has one intrinsic and sufficient principle for its proper connatural action neither demands nor connaturally admits another; but the substance of an angel is a sufficient principle; therefore it does not demand a species.

8. The minor with the consequence is proved, because a species is posited only so that it may supply the place of the object; hence with respect to the intellect it is necessary in one way for material objects, and in another way for immaterial objects. For with respect to material objects, a species is necessary first so that through it they may become intelligible in act, since of themselves and as they are in themselves they are only intelligible in potency. Some do not

admit this distinction, either because no thing is properly intelligible in act unless it is actually understood, for of itself it is only apt to be understood, which is to be intelligible in potency, as the very word ending in "-ble" denotes; or because, if a thing is said to be intelligible in act because it actually has the aptitude to be understood, all material beings are intelligible in act, because of themselves they are apt to be understood and to be seen intuitively by an angel, if they exist. Nevertheless, material things are deservedly called by philosophers and theologians intelligible in potency, not in the notion of term, but in the notion of principle. For the intellective grade is immaterial, and therefore material things, from the mode of their entity, are not of themselves apt to be immediate principles of intellection; nevertheless they can be made apt through intelligible species. And therefore in themselves they are intelligible in potency, and as they are represented in species they are called intelligible in act, not because they are actually understood, but because they are now, in first act, sufficient principles of understanding in their order. Thus, therefore, species of material things are necessary for understanding, first indeed so that through them objects become intelligible in act, and then so that through the same species they may be united to the power and so constitute it in first act, or in proximate potency, for understanding. But in immaterial objects the prior reason ceases, because by reason of their immateriality they are constituted actually in the grade of intellectual things and things proximately intelligible; therefore from this head a species is not necessary for an angel to intuit himself. Nor is it necessary because of the union of object with power, because the substance of an angel is sufficiently united to its own intellect. Therefore. It will be said that it is united naturally, not intelligibly, or that it is united as essence and property, not in the notion of object and power, nor in the notion of an efficient principle. But these points will be refuted in the following assertion, and this reason will be completed.

9. *Second conclusion.—The essence of an angel immediately through itself completes his intellect in first act for knowledge of himself.*—I say secondly: the essence of an angel through itself constitutes his intellect in proximate potency, and hence in its own way in first act, for understanding himself, and immediately influences with it the act by which he understands himself, and not only remotely or fontally. This is without doubt the sense of St. Thomas in the prior conclusion, as is sufficiently clear from his words in the cited places. For in the cited art. 1 he says that the essence of an angel, although it is subsisting, is the form and principle by which an angel understands himself. And in the cited art. 6, quest. 8, *On Truth*, to 2, he says that the essence of an angel, although it is

not compared to his intellect as act in being, is compared as act to potency in understanding. And, to 6, he says that the essence of an angel is in his intellect as the intelligible in the one understanding. And thus Ferrariensis understood and defended St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* 2, cap. 98, around the second doubt; Soncinas, *Metaphysics* 12, quest. 59; and before them Capreolus, in 2, dist. 3, quest. 2, concl. 5 and to the arguments against it; Giles, ibid., part 2 of the distinction, quest. 2, art. 1; Argentina, quest. 2, art. 3, concl. 1; Richard, art. 6, quest. 1; Durandus, quest. 6; and Scotus, quest. 8. And Henry taught this concerning the separated soul, *Quodlibet* 1, quest. 12; hence it is necessary that he say the same of angels, even if elsewhere he contradicts himself. For there he says that the separated soul knows itself without any other species, and the reason which he adduces proceeds more evidently concerning angels, since it coincides with the reason made in the preceding conclusion. And in *Quodlibet* 4, quest. 7, he speaks more generally of every created intellect, both human, namely separated, and angelic, and teaches that it understands itself and all things that are in it essentially without any mediating species. Finally, other moderns agree: Pesantius and Molina on the cited art. 1, and Valencia, disp. 4, quest. 7, point 1, to 4.

10. *It is proved first.*—And first I prove that it is said without foundation that the angelic intellect is more in complete first act with respect to intellection of itself than of others. First, because even with respect to itself it is only an intellective potency; but an intellective potency does not have complete proximate activity for its act; therefore neither does it have it for knowledge of its substance. Also, because although the same substance of an angel is his essence and a certain object intelligible by itself, still powers do not flow from it as it is an intelligible object, but as it is the essence or nature of such a suppositum. Hence no thing, as it is an intelligible or sensible or knowable object, has any property naturally resulting from it. Therefore the intellect of an angel does not flow from him as from an intelligible object, but as from an intellective essence; therefore it does not flow with all the activity necessary for understanding, even on the part of the object, but only with that which belongs to the intellective power. Moreover, because by the same reason by which an intelligible species which is the principle of understanding himself does not flow from the substance of the angel into his intellect, by the same reason there does not flow into that intellect an eminent representative power of the object, as if in place of a species, because when the object is present there through itself, even this power is superfluous. Besides, that mode of an eminent power for making a representation of the object in the simple entity of a created intellect is scarcely

intelligible; hence, since it is not necessary, it should not be invented. For the function of objectively representing an intelligible thing and the function of vitally understanding it are very different, and of themselves suffice to constitute and distinguish entities, as is clear in all other powers and objects. Therefore that identity or eminence is invented here in vain, especially since the object is present through itself and suffices.

11. *It is proved secondly.*—This is further made clear from the mode by which the blessed see God through the essence of God himself. For God is not said to concur toward that vision in place of a species only fontally and remotely because he infuses a certain light of glory so perfect that it has the active force not only of intellective light but also of an intelligible object, but because God through himself proximately has, in the vision, that concurrence which an intelligible species usually contributes to intellection, as was seen in the preceding tome, book 2, *On the Attributes*, chapters 14 and 15. But an angel sees himself intuitively through his substance in the same mode in which the blessed see God through his substance, as St. Thomas and all the cited authors rightly teach, nor can any probable reason for a difference be assigned. Therefore an angel is not said to understand himself through his substance because the intellect originally has from the substance not only the activity of the power but also that of the object. And indeed, if this opinion is admitted in the intellect of an angel with respect to his essence, I do not see why it cannot and should not be said of the light of glory that it is eminently a complete intellective power even as to the activity of the object, as some have wanted to say; for the reason is not dissimilar, because the light of glory is of a higher order than the angelic intellect and has, as it were, connaturality with the divine essence alone. But we rejected that opinion in the cited place. Therefore this mode of philosophizing about the angelic intellect must similarly be rejected. Another example or argument can be taken from the separated soul, which knows itself through its substance, although it is not plausible that the human possible intellect through itself is constituted in first act for knowing its soul. But because this example has its own peculiar difficulty, we defer it to the last book of the following treatise.

12. *It is proved thirdly.*—Next I show that nothing is repugnant in the substance of an angel, through itself, immediately concurring effectively with the intellect of the angel for knowing himself. First, because this is repugnant either because it involves an imperfection repugnant to such a substance, or because it exceeds its perfection, or because it is disproportionate for moving the intellect or constituting it in first act. But none of these can be said with probable foundation; therefore it is simply not repugnant, because no other

reason for repugnance can be conceived. The minor is proved as to the first part, because the divine essence through itself immediately concurs toward the created vision of itself without any imperfection, as was shown in the preceding tome, in the cited place; therefore much less will it be an imperfection in a created immaterial substance that it immediately concur toward the intuitive vision of itself, coeffecting that vision together with its intellect. And this is confirmed, because to effect, as such, pertains to perfection, that is, it supposes perfection and proceeds from it, and insofar as it is such, it does not posit imperfection in the agent, because it neither changes the agent nor posits anything in it. But I say *insofar as it is such*, because if the action remains and is received in the agent, this does not belong to it as it is an agent, but as it is passive; and as such, although it supposes the imperfection of potentiality or mutability, nevertheless this passion, which is to understand, adds great perfection, once the aforesaid imperfection is supposed. But this consideration has no place in the present case, because although the intellection of itself is effectively immediately from its substance in the notion of object, it is in no way immediately received in that substance, but in the vital power alone, from which it is denominated, with respect to which it is a proper immanent action, as was also said concerning the beatific vision.

13. *The proof begun in the preceding number proceeds.*—The second part of the minor is then proved, because although immediately eliciting an accidental action by way of proximate power perhaps exceeds the perfection of a created substance, nevertheless there is no reason why immediately acting by way of an intelligible object together with the power should exceed every finite perfection, nor why it should require infinite perfection in such an object. For that act of understanding itself supposes a vital power distinct from the substance and proportioned to it; but the cooperation of the substance is only for completing the activity of the act on the part of the object, so that it can be made by way of representation and likeness. But there is no reason why infinite perfection in the object is necessary for this. Therefore it suffices that it be immaterial, and hence intelligible in act and proportioned to such an act. This can be confirmed, because in vital acts not only the power, but also the very substance of the soul immediately influences the act by way of principal principle, as we will say more fully in the treatise *On the Soul*. What wonder, then, if it can also influence by way of object when it is appropriate? Finally, the last part is proved, because, as we showed in the cited place concerning the beatific vision, it is not of the nature of an intelligible object that it inhere in the intellective power or properly inform it so that it can concur with it toward the intellection of itself, if in some

way it is a thing intelligible in act; but although it is a subsisting form, it suffices that it be intimately joined to the power by some union or subordination between them. But the substance of an angel, although it neither inheres in its intellect nor informs it, but is subsisting, is intimately united to it and has that power subordinated to itself. Therefore this union is enough so that such a substance, when it understands itself, applies a twofold influence according to our mode of understanding, so to explain the matter: one influence of the one understanding by way of essence or principal principle, the other of the intelligible by way of the understood object. Therefore nothing is lacking for such efficiency.

14. *Common objections in the present matter are solved.*—Hence the common objections remain solved, by which it is usually proved that a substance cannot supply the place of an intelligible species, because a species inheres and a substance cannot inhere. Likewise, a species constitutes the intellect in first act, which a substance cannot do, because to constitute in first act is to inform, which a species can do but not a substance. Likewise, because a species, or that which constitutes in first act, is subordinated in acting to the intellect itself, because the intellect uses it; but the substance of an angel cannot be subordinated to its intellect in this way, since it is a more principal form in comparison with it. Therefore. These points were responded to at length above concerning the blessed vision, and proportionally the same response has place in the present case. For, as St. Thomas said in the cited art. 1, it is not of the nature of an intelligible form that it inhere; for it can be a subsisting form, and can sufficiently, or even better and more easily, effect through itself, if it is through itself united to the power. But when it is not through itself united to the power, it is united by the intervention of an intelligible species, which is an accident and consequently inhering. Through itself, however, a constitution of the power in first act by an informing form is not necessary; rather, it is enough that it be completed in the power of understanding through the intimate conjunction of a subsisting object. And then it can be said to be constituted in first act, not in being, but in acting, or in the notion of a complete principle for acting. And so too it is not necessary that the essence be subordinated to the power. For in an intelligible species such subordination arises from the fact that it is an accident informing the power, which, since it is active, uses its habits or first acts informing it. But when the very substance is at the same time understanding, it uses its power and at the same time applies the effort of the object, under which consideration it is subordinated rather to itself, according to our mode of understanding, than to the power. For this subordination is

nothing other than the concomitance of several things in acting, of which one is, as it were, initiating the action, and the others cooperate with it.

15. *Scotus's pressing objection ad hominem against St. Thomas.*—But Scotus, in 2, dist. 3, quest. 8, § *Against these things* and § *To the first*, vers. *To the second*, presses ad hominem against St. Thomas, because according to him, when the intellect effects intellection, the whole account of effecting is the object united to it; therefore, if that object is subsisting, then the intellect does nothing, because a subsisting form cannot denominate a power as operating. Just as, if the heat of wood were subsisting, although it were otherwise intimately joined to the wood, it could not denominate the wood as heating; therefore similarly the intellect will not be able to be called understanding from a subsisting object. But this objection supposes something false, because the object or intelligible species is not the whole account of effecting intellection, nor did St. Thomas ever say this. Rather, the intellect has its own activity per se, to which the activity of the object is joined, so that the proximate principle of understanding may be completed. And therefore, although the object is subsisting, the intellect always retains its activity, by reason of which it is truly said to produce intellection. But it is denominated as understanding not insofar as it effects, but insofar as it is informed by intellection, which the intellect alone immediately receives. But Scotus presses, also attributing to St. Thomas that he asserts that an intellect which is always in act receives nothing from an object present and intelligible in act; for although an angel always has intellection of himself, he always receives it from himself as from an object, since he is said to be the principle of intellection. But he does not expound St. Thomas correctly. For when he says that an intellect which always has an intelligible object present in act receives nothing from it, he is plainly speaking of the reception of an intelligible species, through which our intellect begins to be reduced from potency in nature. Likewise, he does not say that it receives nothing, but that it is not moved, certainly properly, because motion presupposes lack. And in this way, if we suppose that an angel is always in actual knowledge of himself, he also is not properly moved to that act, although he always receives that act from the object in its genus, insofar as the object in its own way always effects and conserves it.

16. *Third conclusion.—An angel does not need a distinct species for abstractive knowledge of himself. The first way of understanding and proving the conclusion, which Vasquez follows and commends.—It is proved first.—Objection.—Solution.—A response that could be brought forward.*—I say thirdly: an angel does not need a proper intelligible species of his essence because of abstractive knowledge of his proper essence. This assertion is against Scotus and the few

who follow him; for it seems to be common among the others, since they simply deny that an angel knows himself through a species in any way. It can be understood and proved in two ways. First, if we hold that an angel cannot have abstractive knowledge of himself; for if he cannot have it, he certainly will not need a species because of it. Second, if we assert hypothetically that, even though an angel can know himself abstractively, he still will not need a species for such knowledge. And each way must be discussed. Vasquez embraces the former, for he attacks the opinion of Scotus by denying that abstractive knowledge of himself is possible for an angel. For either that knowledge is proper and quidditative, or it is imperfect and, as it were, connotative, such as knowledge of spirit or substance and other things of this kind is in us, of which we do not have a proper species. This latter knowledge is against the perfection of an angel, who knows himself properly and quidditatively, as is self-evident and will be said below; and once quidditative knowledge is supposed, connotative knowledge is irrelevant. Therefore it is not in an angel concerning himself. You will say: the separated soul can have both kinds of knowledge at the same time; therefore so can an angel. I respond that the reason is not the same, since the soul will have two kinds of species, namely those acquired through the senses and those infused, or, with respect to itself, it will have its substance by way of a species. But an angel has only innate species, which are able to represent each thing according to its proper concept; and therefore that knowledge through alien species with respect to natural things does not pertain to the perfection of an angel. Nor is Scotus speaking in that sense, since he requires a proper species of the angel for such knowledge, whereas connotative conception is not through proper species but through alien species, as happens in us. But in the former way of understanding the conclusion, knowledge of oneself will be intuitive, because an angel knows his essence quidditatively; but existence is necessarily joined to the essence of the knowing angel. Therefore, consequently, he also knows his actual existence. Therefore such knowledge is necessarily intuitive. It can be responded that, since in an angel existence is in some way distinguished from essence, at least in this, that actually to exist is not of the essence of an angel, even if an angel actually exists, he can prescind from existence and contemplate the precise essence quidditatively; and such knowledge will be abstractive. Just as one angel can know another quidditatively, whether he exists or does not exist.

17. *Nevertheless the contrary is truer.—It is proved secondly.—It is proved thirdly.*—Nevertheless, I judge it most probable that, although one angel can have quidditative and abstractive knowledge of a possible and non-existing

angel, or perhaps of some angelic species, while not knowing any individual actually and in particular, nevertheless, if he knows quidditatively some singular and actually existing angel, he cannot know him with abstractive knowledge, but only with intuitive knowledge, nor is it in his choice to prescind one from the other in such knowledge. It is proved, because by the very fact that he contemplates a singular thing in particular, he knows it as it is in itself. Therefore, if the thing actually exists, such knowledge is necessarily terminated at it as actually existing, and consequently it is at the same time quidditative and intuitive knowledge. The consequence is proved, because in an actually existing thing, existence is not in reality distinguished from the singular essence. Hence I argue secondly: an angel, through the same species of a singular thing, without any change of it as to first act, intuitively knows that the singular thing exists when it exists, and that it does not exist when it does not exist. For by the very fact that he contemplates such a thing and does not intuit it as existing, he certainly knows that it does not exist at that time. And in this way he knows singulars as present when they actually are, and before that he does not know that they are future, but at most that they are possible. We will explain and confirm all these things below. Therefore, according to this doctrine, it is necessary to say that an angel necessarily intuits an existing singular thing, which in fact exists, if he is turned to contemplating it quidditatively. Therefore whenever an angel knows himself quidditatively, he necessarily knows himself intuitively, because he supposes himself existing. From this it is evidently concluded that a species of himself would be superfluous for an angel; for although he had it, through it he would know himself intuitively, because for eliciting such knowledge he would necessarily suppose himself existing. Hence what Bassolus says above, that intellection through a species is abstractive, if he means that it is necessarily and always abstractive, is false. For sight sees through a species the thing which it intuits, and one angel intuits another only through his species. But if he only means that knowledge through a species can be abstractive and intuitive, this is true according to the different states of the thing existing or not existing. But the same species cannot generate abstractive and intuitive knowledge of the same existing thing, if it is such that it represents that thing quidditatively and through a proper concept; for then the knowledge is not determined to the notion of intuitive knowledge except by the object present in its proper existence, as it is the term of such an act, for on the part of the principle the very same species effects such an act.

18. *Second way of understanding the conclusion.—It is proved first.*—I add further that, even if we admitted that in an angel there can be abstractive

quidditative knowledge of an actually existing singular thing, and consequently that he can know himself abstractively, he would not need an intelligible species distinct from his substance in order to know himself in this way. It is proved, for such knowledge in an angel can be understood in two ways, namely together with intuitive knowledge, or successively, that is, by ceasing from the intuition of himself through his substance. The former way is either impossible or certainly very superfluous and irrelevant; therefore it is not plausible that a connatural species was given to an angel for such simultaneous knowledge, because nature abhors what is superfluous. And besides, if those two cognitions can exist at the same time, the same principle suffices for them; for through the same species by which an angel intuitively sees an existing angel, he would know him abstractively if he did not exist. Therefore, if he can have both cognitions at the same time concerning an existing angel, he will have them through the same species, by using that species in different ways at his choice. For, as I will say below, intuitive and abstractive cognition do not differ on the part of the species or principle, but on the part of the term, or on the part of the mode of tending into the thing represented through the same species. Therefore, in a similar way, although an angel could know himself at the same time intuitively and abstractively, he would effect both acts through his substance, using it as a principle for a different mode of knowing in accordance with his freedom. The consequence is proved, because if cognition can be terminated at an existing singular essence while prescinding from actual existence, as that opinion supposes, the same existing essence will also be able to be the principle of knowing itself as an essence and not as an existence.

19. *It is proved secondly.*—And from this the same is easily proved, even if those cognitions occur only successively. This mode, first of all, supposes that an angel can naturally and by his freedom cease from intuitive knowledge of himself, which is not true, as I will say later. Next, even granting this, abstractive knowledge alone could be made through the proper substance by prescinding in the use of it from the existence of the object, since this is supposed to be possible in abstraction. Just as, conversely, if a species were given to an angel for knowing himself quidditatively, without doubt through the same species he could know himself intuitively, because it is not repugnant for intuitive cognition to be made through a species, and that species would be most sufficient, because by representing the singular essence it is sufficient for representing it as existing, if it is in that state. Therefore, just as a species is not posited because of intuitive knowledge, so neither should one be invented because of abstractive knowledge, whether such abstractive knowledge of himself is possible for an angel or not.

20. *How an angel knows his proper accidents.—Concerning necessary accidents.*—But someone will ask whether what has been said about the substance of an angel must be said about all accidents existing in an angel who knows himself. I respond that these accidents are twofold. Some are properties flowing from the essence, such as the intellect and will and any other, if there is one. Others are accidents either coming from without, although perhaps they are always given, as we will say below about intelligible species, or contingent, although they arise from within, such as free acts of understanding and willing, local motion, and its term. Concerning the former I judge that they are not only seen without a new species, but are also seen through the substance understood, and from its efficacy without the proximate and special influence of the powers themselves, because that influence is not necessary. For the substance itself suffices with the connatural light of the intellect for effecting comprehensive knowledge of itself. But by comprehending itself, it also comprehends its powers with regard to their natural capacity and with regard to their emanation from its substance. And therefore an angel also intuits them through his substance. But concerning the other accidents, a proper principle and a new objective efficiency, so to speak, seem necessary if they are to be known distinctly and in themselves, because since they are not necessarily connected with the substance, they are not known by virtue of it, nor by its efficiency alone in the notion of object.

21. *Concerning contingent things.*—But to explain through what they are known, these accidents must be subdistinguished according as they actually are and are seen as present, or according as they no longer are, but were, and are known as past. We will speak of their latter state when treating knowledge of future and past things, because they have a similar difficulty. Concerning the former, however, it must be said that an angel knows all contingent or common accidents which he has in himself through them themselves, and without intelligible species distinct from them. Thus Henry, Richard, and nearly all the scholastics teach in the cited places. And it is proved particularly, because one angel knows the intelligible species which he has of other things, and he does not know them through other species; otherwise one would proceed to infinity. Therefore he knows those very species through themselves, because they too are objects actually intelligible and united per se to the intellect. Hence by the same reason, if perhaps an angel has other intellectual habits, he sees them through those very habits; and the same holds for acts of the intellect, because all these are intelligible objects in act and united per se to the intellect. But concerning accidents inhering in the will, or immediately in the substance itself, as are place

and local motion, one can not without reason doubt, because they do not seem to be united per se to the intellect, since they do not inhere in it. And although they are in the same substance and consequently are proximately joined as to proximity or nondistance, nevertheless they do not seem sufficiently united in the notion of object and power, since they have no proper immediate union between themselves; and therefore it is probable concerning these that they are known through some proper species. Nevertheless, it can probably be defended that they are known through themselves, because in order that they be united to the intellect in the notion of intelligible and moving object, or object concurring per se toward knowledge of itself, that mutual inesse seems to suffice, not through mere local proximity, but also through real union in the same substance, which is the principal principle of such knowledge and can conjointly use such a power and an actually intelligible object inhering in itself, and hence subordinated to itself, for eliciting such an act of knowledge. And this part, just as it is more common, so also seems more probable.

22. *What is to be said of the act by which he understands himself.*—Finally, from what has been said it is clear how an angel knows himself with regard to the act by which he understands himself. For as I said, with regard to this an angel does not know himself through his substance, but through the act really elicited by him together with his known object. Here, however, it is usually treated by some whether an angel, in knowing himself, produces a word. But this question is general concerning every intuitive knowledge even of other angels, or of any things whatever, and has place both in the soul and in angels; and therefore we omit it. And for now we suppose that a word is nothing other than the intrinsic term of the action of understanding, as it is an action, which is terminated intrinsically at a certain quality, which quality in the intellect is the very act of understanding in completed being, which is also called concept and word. And therefore, just as it is certain that an angel understands himself by producing an act by which he is informed, so it is certain that he does not understand himself without a word produced by him and received in him. See what I said in the similar question concerning the word of the beatific vision in the preceding tome, tract. 1, book 2, chapter 11, and what I said more generally concerning the intrinsic term of immanent actions in disput. 48 of the *Metaphysics*, sect. 2, num. 16. It is also usually asked whether this act by which an angel knows himself is natural or free. But a more suitable place for this question will occur below; for now we suppose that it is natural, that is, necessary as to exercise. Finally, it can be asked whether that knowledge is not only intuitive and quidditative, but also comprehensive. Yet for now we suppose

the affirmative part. For since the light of the angelic intellect is proportioned and, as it were, adequate to its proper substance, and comprehension adds nothing to quidditative knowledge except the adequation of the power and act to the object, as I explained in the matter concerning the vision of GOD, it does not seem possible to deny that the intellection by which an angel knows himself through himself and through his natural light is in some way comprehensive knowledge. But how this is to be understood will be explained in what follows; and if any difficulty occurs in this, it will be settled there.

CHAPTER V
WHETHER EACH ANGEL UNDERSTANDS ALL OTHERS THROUGH THEIR ESSENCES OR THROUGH SPECIES, AND WHENCE HE COULD HAVE HAD THEM

1. *First opinion of Vasquez and others.—It is rejected.*—That each angel knows the others was proved above, and is almost self-evident, once the nature and existence of angels are supposed. Therefore only the mode of such knowledge remains to be discussed. But this mode can be considered either in the act itself or on the part of the medium. We will speak of the former later; now, however, we inquire about the medium by which such knowledge occurs, in the sense treated in the preceding chapter. Hence there are almost the same modes of speaking, which must be touched upon briefly. The first is that an angel, for knowing others, does not need any medium besides his intellect, because through it he is constituted in sufficient and complete first act for understanding all things without any other cooperation of the object, whether through the object itself immediately or through its species. Those who generally deny intelligible species seem to think this, and Vasquez explains and follows them in this way. But his opinion, insofar as it denies the proper concurrence of the object, is either singular or belongs to a few Nominalists, and is very foreign to the received doctrine about the senses and the other cognitive powers of the soul. But if this is admitted in the senses and in the intellect of man, as that author does, no probable reason for a difference in angels can be given, as I taught in chapter three. Hence from what was said there this opinion is sufficiently refuted according to the capacity of the matter.

2. *Second opinion.—Its foundation is refuted as heretical.*—The second mode of speaking is that each angel knows others through his essence: higher angels, indeed, as through an effect, and lower angels as through a cause. This seems to have been the opinion of the author of the book *On Causes*, prop. 8,

when he says: *Every intelligence knows what is above itself and what is below itself, because it is a cause for it, and it knows what is above itself because it acquires goodness from it.* As to the knowledge of intelligences among themselves, the sense of these words seems to be that a higher intelligence is the cause of lower ones immediately or mediately, and therefore through its substance, as eminently containing the lower ones, it knows them. But if an intelligence is compared to those higher than itself, it is their effect, and therefore through itself as through an effect it knows the higher ones as its causes. But St. Thomas, in his commentary on that book, explains that proposition in another catholic sense, which we will report in the following chapter. That opinion, however, is frequently attributed by the scholastics to Avicenna, tract. 9 of his *Metaphysics*, cap. 4, who said that God alone immediately created the first intelligence, and this created the second, and the second the third, and so consequently concerning all. For that mode of knowing seems to follow from this principle. And St. Thomas explains that view in this way, *Contra Gentiles* 2, cap. 98. But, as he says very well, that foundation is heretical, for God alone is the creator of all things, and so all angels were created by him alone, as was said above, and in *Metaphysics*, disput. 20, sect. 2, and the other places cited there. Hence no probable foundation for this view remains.

3. *First conclusion.—An angel does not know others through his own substance.*—Therefore it must be said first that one angel does not know others through the proper substance of the understanding intelligence. Thus divine Thomas teaches, in the cited Quest. 56, art. 2, and the cited cap. 98, and Quest. 8, *On Truth*, art. 7, and the other theologians commonly. It is proved briefly: for the proper essence of the understanding angel can be understood as a medium of knowing in two ways, that is, by way of intelligible species, which directly and immediately leads into knowledge of such an object, or as a known medium, as a cause or effect, when another thing is known through knowledge of it. We are here chiefly dealing with the former medium. Concerning it, the assertion is evident from what was said in chapter three, where it was shown that the substance of an angel is not intentionally representative of other things distinct from itself. And besides, although one angel were the effect of another, an angel made by another could not know his maker through himself as through a species through itself, because he would neither eminently contain his superior nor intentionally represent him. Conversely, however, on that hypothesis, if perhaps the superior could know the inferior through his substance, nevertheless he would not know him properly as through an unknown medium, but by knowing and comprehending himself, just as God knows creatures in

himself and through himself, certainly by comprehending himself and not otherwise. But extending the discussion to a known medium, since among angelic substances according to faith and true philosophy there is no relation of cause and effect, it follows consequently that one is not a known medium through which another is known as an effect in a cause, or as a cause from an effect. And besides, even if that were posited, knowledge through an effect would be imperfect, and through it a higher angel would not be known as he is in himself. And therefore even on this side that medium would be insufficient. For if one angel were the cause of another, he would be an equivocal cause of a higher species, as Avicenna supposed. Therefore the superior could not be known through the substance of the inferior as he is in himself. The antecedent together with the consequence is clear, because neither could a lower angel produce a higher one, nor within the same species could one create another, since they have no order among themselves; but through an equivocal effect alone the cause cannot be known perfectly and as it is in itself, since such an effect is inferior and does not equal the power and perfection of the cause.

4. *First objection.—Second objection.*—You will say: one angel can know the others through his known substance because of likeness, even if causality is excluded. It is proved, because by knowing himself an angel knows the intellectual grade; therefore he knows that under it there are various modes of participating in it, similar to one another although diverse in species; therefore by knowing himself in this way, he will know all other angels contained under the same grade. Add that angels know all species through the species of a genus, according to the view of St. Thomas to be treated below; but an angel, through his substance, knows the genus of angel; therefore he knows all the species of angels and consequently also the individuals. And then at least this argument will conclude that, if there are several angels of one species, each, by knowing himself through his substance, knows the other individuals of that species, both quidditatively because of equality, and intuitively because by seeing himself he also sees the actual relation of likeness to another angel similar in species, which cannot be seen without intuition of the term.

5. *What must be responded to the first objection.*—To this, first of all, it must be said that an angel, by knowing himself through his substance, knows the intellectual grade, or the genus of angel, as contracted in such a species, and such a species as determined to this individual, which is the very angel intuiting himself. For these things are essential to him; therefore he cannot know himself without knowing them. Hence further he will also be able to know, as if abstractly and precisely, such a genus or species, by knowing that such an

intellectual grade is multipliable or participable in various modes, or that such a species of angel can have several individuals; for this is, as it were, an intrinsic property of the created grade or nature. And therefore, through the same principle through which such a nature or grade is quidditatively known as to its actual essence, it is also known as to that capacity or participability. And in this way theologians to be cited below say that an angel, through his substance, can know other angels in that in which they are similar, or as to common predicates, but not as to proper ones. But by virtue of knowledge of himself an angel will not be able to know what the natures or possible species under that intellectual grade are, because specific natures are neither of the essence of the common intellectual grade, nor can they be known by virtue of knowledge of it, as it is contracted to one species only, in the way in which it is known by an angel knowing himself through his essence.

6. *It is responded in form.—The second argument is solved.*—To the first argument made in num. 4, it is responded that although through the substance of one angel the intellectual grade is known as participable in various modes, this is only confusedly as to the particular modes or differences, because that grade is known only as to the quasi-passive or objective capacity for several determinations; but the determinations themselves cannot be distinctly known through that principle alone. To the second, however, that principle is simply denied, namely, that an angel knowing some genus knows through the same principle all its species. For this is not true except perhaps when knowledge is made through an eminent and universal species which of itself and first concerns such a genus, as we will see below. But one's own substance, through which an angel knows himself, is not formally or eminently such a species. For it represents only itself and is, so to speak, adequate to itself; but higher things can be known through it only insofar as they are contained in it. And almost the same reason applies to the specific nature of an angel with respect to individuals. For granted that an angel, by knowing himself, knows that that species is capable of other individuals, nevertheless, by virtue of that principle he will not be able to know the other individuals according to their proper concepts and particular entitative properties, even by an abstractive concept, because the particular modes of other individuals are not represented in one known individual. For equality is not sufficient for this, although the matter is also uncertain about equality; rather, identity in particular entity is required, because through it the species is determined to the individual. Hence much less will an angel be able, through his substance, to know another intuitively, or the existence of another individual of the same species, because intellectual intuitive knowledge includes

the proper concept of the thing that is to be seen. Nor can the relation of likeness be a known medium through which the existence of the other term is known, because knowledge of the foundation and the term must rather be supposed for knowing the relation, since either it is nothing but a mutual denomination from the coexistence of both, or, if it is something in some way distinct, it results from them and essentially depends on them.

7. *The response of some.—It is attacked.*—But some add that although an angel cannot through his substance know another by a proper concept, as he is in himself, he can nevertheless know him by an alien and, as it were, connotative concept, by conceiving him after the likeness of himself, just as he knows God in an imperfect mode and after the likeness of himself, or as we, in our mode and after the likeness of certain material things, conceive angels. For for this mode of knowing there is not always required the relation of cause and effect, such as there is between God and angels, but another agreement or proportion, although imperfect, between one known thing and another suffices. But the other theologians deservedly passed over this mode of knowing, because in reality it is not suited to angels with respect to other angels. For first of all, one angel cannot in that way, by virtue of knowledge of himself, know that another angel exists, as he knows God, as we will see below, because such knowledge requires a relation of cause and effect, as is clear. Hence it follows that, for conceiving another angel after the likeness of himself and in an imperfect mode from knowledge of himself, either the knowledge that another angel exists must be supposed from elsewhere, or that concept cannot be particular of some angel even imperfectly, but only confused and common, as has already been explained by us.

8. *The attack proceeds.*—Each part is proved, because one angel through himself or from himself cannot know that another angel exists, since he is neither cause nor effect of him; therefore neither can he conceive another in particular, namely by a proper concept. I do not say *proper* in the sense of perfect or non-connotative, but I say *proper* in the sense of not common, because he has nothing from which, from knowledge of himself, he might conceive something particular and proper about another angel. In this there is a great difference between God and an angel. For an angel from himself knows God as creator and first spirit, which is a proper concept of God, that is, not common, although it is not proper in the sense of as he is in himself; rather, it is one by which God is conceived after the likeness of the knower, with added negations excluding imperfection. But concerning another angel, one angel cannot through himself form a concept fitting to that one alone, but only a

common concept, such as the concept of created spirit, or composed or immaterial, and similar to the knower in these properties, which are common to all other angels. And therefore then in reality other angels, or any of them in particular, are not known, but something common to all angels and even to the knower himself is known. Other theologians did not deny or omit this mode of knowing other angels through the substance of the knower, as we have already said and declared. Nor can such knowledge be called imperfect or through a connotative concept; for with respect to its proper and universal object it is proper and essential, but with respect to a particular it is confused and potential rather than actual, as I explained. Therefore a proper concept of another angel, even a connotative one that is not common to others, cannot be formed by another through his substance, unless it is supposed that he has from elsewhere particular knowledge of such an angel; and he certainly cannot have this except either through the substance or through the proper species of the known angel. This knowledge is most proper; indeed, it is also essential and quidditative, as I will say in the following chapter. Therefore once that is posited, the other knowledge, imperfect or through proportion or comparison to the knower, is irrelevant. For we use that mode of knowing in things which we cannot know through proper concepts and species, but not in things which we see clearly. Therefore much less does an angel. Likewise, even according to that mode of knowing, one can scarcely understand in one angel a concept of another which is not terminated at him as he is in himself, but after the likeness of the knower, and which is not common to the other angels distinct from the knower. Therefore one angel never knows another in particular in that way.

9. *Third opinion.*—The third mode of speaking is that one angel knows another through the essence of the understood angel. St. Thomas reports this opinion in the cited Quest. 8, *On Truth*, art. 9, and although he does not approve it, he says that the arguments against it can in some way be solved. Scotus follows it in part above, for he philosophizes in the same way about the knowledge of an angel concerning another and concerning himself, and he says that one angel intuitively knows another through the essence of the known one, but abstractively through an intelligible species. But we are not now dealing with this second part; for as to the necessity of a species we will treat it shortly after, and as to the distinction between abstractive and intuitive knowledge, what was said in the preceding chapter must be observed, and in the following chapter we will say something. Gabriel, Ockham, Bassolus, and others cited in the preceding chapter in the first and second opinions follow this opinion, and Molina follows it, although in a different way, as I will explain.

10. *It is proved.*—The foundation of this opinion is that an object, by the very fact that it is intelligible, can effectively concur with the intellect toward knowledge of itself, that is, of the object itself. Scotus affirms this no less of a material object; in that case his opinion is certainly not probable, as I will say below. But the ancients who held this opinion, as divine Thomas reports, spoke of the immaterial object in particular, and Molina also defends it in this way, and divine Thomas judges it to be probable in the cited art. 7 and in the cited cap. 98, *Contra Gentiles* 2, as does Ferrariensis there. And it is proved, because an immaterial substance is intelligible in act; therefore on this side it is no less able to effect intellection of itself in another intellect than in its own, because such an effect does not exceed the power of such a cause more because it occurs in another than when it occurs in the one understanding. Just as one angel can move another, as he moves himself, and can also illuminate another, as we will say below. Therefore there is no repugnance in this efficiency on the part of the active power. Nor is there any on the part of the required condition, because for this the conjunction of the angel to be understood with the intellect of the understanding angel through intimate proximity without distance between them suffices, which can easily be among angels, as is self-evident. For union through proper information or inherence is not necessary, as has already been said. Nor is a natural union necessary by way of essence and property, such as intervenes between the essence of an angel and his own intellect, because no reason appears why it is required for the efficiency of an intelligible object as such. Hence without such union the divine essence concurs through itself by way of object toward the effecting of the beatific vision. Why, therefore, will the same not hold proportionally in the essence of an angel objected to the intellect of another and intimately present to it without another union?

11. *This opinion is explained in two ways.—The prior way is rejected.*—This view can be understood in two ways: either by affirming that this mode of understanding others is the only one in angels, and so necessary that every other cognition through a species of the understood angel is excluded; or only by affirming that it is one mode by which one angel knows another, which he can use when he wishes and has the convenient presence of another, but that it is not the only and necessary mode, and that without such efficiency of the angel it can also occur that he is known intuitively by another. Understood in the former way, that view seems improbable to me. For otherwise one angel could never know another unless he had that angel intimately present to his intellect through his substance. Hence, by this alone, that one angel is distant from another by the smallest space, he will become absent and invisible to him. Both are incredible;

for it would be a great imperfection of the angelic nature, which should not be gratuitously attributed to it, since among men such dependence is not found for one to be able to be seen by another. Yet that consequent could be denied by saying that an angel can effectively concur toward intellection of himself in another angel even if he is locally distant from him, not by acting through a medium, but by acting immediately at a distance, or together with him. For thus Scotus and those who follow him teach. And in immaterial action this does not seem unfitting, because local distance or proximity is very accidental to spiritual things, and what proximity of place does in bodies, due order does in spirits, as Augustine said. This doctrine, taken in general, is probable, and perhaps at some time in what follows it will be necessary. Yet in the present point it does not seem suited, because in the present case there is required not only an intimate proximity between power and intelligible object in the notion of agent and patient, but chiefly in the notion of two coagents and things constituting one integral principle of vital action; and this constitution of one principle precedes in the order of nature the actual effecting. Therefore that proximity, or even a greater union, is necessary for it, as will be said immediately. Another unacceptable consequence is that the understanding angel would at least depend on the other understood angel in order to see him, so that he could not see him against the other's will, because the effective concurrence of an angel seems to be free to the effecting angel, as was said above. Finally, there is another unacceptable consequence, because then one angel could not be seen by several at the same time, because either he would not be proximate to several, or certainly he cannot at the same time effect several actions. Add that, although we granted that this mode is possible, it cannot be proved by any reason that it is necessary or the only one, as will be clear from what must be said.

12. *The latter way also is rejected, and the second conclusion is established.—One angel cannot understand others through their substances.—It is proved first by some.—It is confirmed.—These proofs are not altogether pleasing.*—But understood in the latter way, namely, that the mode of knowing another through the essence of the known one is possible, yet not necessary, that view is not improbable, as I reported from divine Thomas and Ferrariensis. Nevertheless I say secondly: one angel cannot know another through the essence of the understood angel, or, what is equivalent, one angel cannot effectively concur through his substance toward the intellection by which he is known by another. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in the cited places, although in the same places Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and the other modern Thomists follow him, and Capreolus, in 2, dist. 3, quest. 2, art. 3, to 8, first place posited against concl. 1,

where he goes too far by calling the contrary view erroneous. Other theologians more frequently hold the same, in 2, dist. 3: Bonaventure, Richard, Hervaeus, Major, Argentina, Giles there and in the treatise *On the Knowledge of Angels*, quest. 1, art. 3; Marsilius, in 2, quest. 7, art. 1, in its second part; Alexander of Hales, part 2, quest. 24, memb. 2. Henry holds the same, *Quodlibet* 4, quest. 7, and *Quodlibet* 5, quest. 14; for although he differs either in the number of species or in the name, calling the principle of this knowledge a sciential habit, nevertheless in reality he agrees, especially as to this, that knowledge of another is not made through the substance of the known one himself. And some think this view more certain about higher angels understanding lower ones, because an intelligible object, in order to aid the one understanding and to concur with him, must be equally immaterial with him. But a lower angel is not as immaterial as a higher one; therefore he cannot constitute him in the act of understanding and, as it were, perfect him. Therefore he must be elevated through a species proportioned to the perfection of the higher angel and made, as it were, more immaterial, so that he can cooperate with him toward knowledge of himself. Thus almost divine Thomas, in the cited Quest. 8, *On Truth*, art. 7. And it is a probable reason. It could also be formed otherwise regarding lower angels understanding higher ones, because a principle of understanding must be commensurate with the one understanding and with his intellect. Hence the divine essence, although it is supremely immaterial and intelligible, could not be known through itself by the angelic intellect, however perfect, unless it were elevated by a light of another, divine order. Therefore the substance of a higher angel also exceeds the intellect of a lower one, and therefore naturally cannot serve it by way of intelligible species, but must be adapted to the capacity of the lower angel through a less immaterial species. But neither of these reasons has place among angels of the same species, nor do they compel so much that they cannot be solved.

13. *It is also proved by others.*—Secondly, then, the assertion is proved otherwise, because if one angel through himself effectively concurred toward the intellection which another elicits of him, he would flow into that other's mind. But it is impossible for a created spirit to flow into the mind of another. Therefore. The major, or consequence, is proved, because to flow into the mind is nothing other than, by existing within it, effectively to change it; but one angel would do this in that case in the mind of another. The minor is proved from the common view of the theologians, who teach that only the Trinity flows into the mind, as Augustine, or otherwise Gennadius, said in *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*, cap. 83, otherwise 82, and the theologians have followed him. St. Thomas, 3 part,

quest. 8, art. 8, to 1, and quest. 64, art. 1, and he thinks the same with the Master, in 2, dist. 8, art. 5, to 3, and Ferrariensis explains him in this way, *Contra Gentiles* 4, cap. 18. Bonaventure teaches the same, in the same dist. 8, in its second part, art. 1, quest. 2; Hervaeus, dist. 9, quest. 1, art. 2, to 2; Argentina, dist. 7, quest. 1, art. 1, concl. 3, where he cites Fulgentius, *On Faith to Peter*, cap. 3, where he says of angels: *There is in each one a natural limit by which they are distinguished from one another, because none of them is in another.* Bernard also favors this, sermon 5, on the *Song of Songs*, near the end, saying that *none of the created spirits is applied through itself to our minds.* And below: *Nor do the angels themselves so take hold of one another.*

14. *This reason also is not pleasing, and in order to satisfy it, inflow is explained.—What sort of inflow is proper to God in creatures.*—Nevertheless, neither does this reason convince, because it is founded only on the signification of the name *inflow*, which can be multiple; and taken broadly, some inflow is not repugnant, and the proper one, which is repugnant, does not follow from the contrary assertion. It is proved, because an inflow taken broadly signifies only entering into the place of another; indeed, in strict Latin an inflow is said even if through the entrance of one thing another is expelled, as a river is said to flow into the sea. And in this way one substance could be said to flow into another, especially when, while the latter remains unchanged, the former enters into it, as the soul can be said to flow into the body, and one body to flow into another when by a miracle it passes through it and remains penetratively with it in the same place. In this way, therefore, an angel can easily be present according to substance intimately in a body or in the mind of a human being, and one angel can be present to another. Yet this is not enough for proper inflow, of which theologians speak. But if beyond this presence some operation of one upon another is added, then one comes closer to inflow, in which way Gregory said, book 17, *Moralia*, cap. 20, otherwise 18: *The demon, if his suggestion is not resisted at the beginning, suddenly flows entirely into the inner parts of the heart.* But this inflow also is judged improper and, as it were, accidental, indeed even extrinsic, because that operation is accidental and supposes only the proximity of the substance. But the inflow of one substance into another has been spoken of by theologians when one substance is in another by intimately containing it in its being, as having dominion and power over it, in the way our soul can be said to flow into the body and not conversely. And thus among spiritual substances only the divine substance flows into the others, because it alone contains all in being, and one angel does not depend on another in his being. And in this sense Bede said, Acts 5: *No creature can fill the soul and mind of a human being*

according to substance. And so too the saying of Fulgentius must be understood when he says that one angel is not in another, because none contains another in being or substance. Hence when he gives as the reason that a natural limit exists in each one, this must be understood not of the limit of corporeal quantity, but of essence and nature. For because of the limitation of each, one does not depend on another. Next, God alone also operates in the mind or in another spirit with efficacy and supreme power over it, and therefore he alone is also said to flow into the mind of a human being or angel. Bernard seems to have spoken in this sense above, and Bede, when he adds: *Satan sometimes fills the soul by inserting the poison of his malice, yet not by entering through himself, since this power belongs to the divinity alone.* And Gennadius also speaks in this way.

15. *Satisfaction is now given to the preceding reason.—The second reason is refuted.*—Thus, therefore, with inflow explained, it can easily be responded to the second reason that, in order for one angel to be known through his substance by another, and for the one who is understood to concur with the intellect of the other toward knowledge of himself, it is not necessary that the understood angel be in the one understanding as conserving him in being, nor as effectively dominating him, nor as giving the power of understanding, nor as existing in him in any other similar way proper to the divinity; rather, it is enough that he assist him, either altogether together with him according to substantial presence, or according to some other sufficient proximity, and that he objectively determine him to such an act, not only by terminating it, but also by coeffecting it. And thus it does not follow that proper inflow is attributed to one angel with respect to another, but only some coexistence and coefficiency. If this is called inflow in a broad mode, it will matter little, and the question will be only about the name, about which there is no need to contend when the thing is established. For that one angel can be intimately joined to another according to substantial presence and after the likeness of penetration, to explain the matter, is most certain. But that one can effect something in another even according to intellect is perhaps more probable, as we will see below when treating species, and more fully when treating the speech of angels. Nor does it follow from this that the singular inflow of God is attributed to an angel. Therefore even if those two things are conceded in the present case, an inflow impossible for a created spirit does not follow.

16. *The true reason for the second conclusion.*—Therefore the third and only reason seems probable to me to show that one angel cannot know another in this way through the substance of the known one, namely, because in order that one action proceed indivisibly and vitally from the object and the power, those

principles must be so united to one another that they preserve some subordination between themselves, so that at the motion or influence of one, the other cooperates with it. But this subordination is not found between the understanding angel and the substance of another. Therefore. The minor is self-evident, because prior by nature to the angel eliciting intellection of another, at most there can precede the presence of the angel to be known to the intellect of the knower through real nondistance, which does not suffice for subordination. The major, however, is explained and proved, because otherwise the action cannot be initiated from both these principles except per accidens and, as it were, contingently. It is proved, because, as I suppose, neither of those principles operates from the necessity of nature, because both the angel knowing another freely exercises the act, since he is master of it, and the angel known, if he offers some efficiency to another for knowledge of himself, freely offers it. For whatever an angel effects outside himself he effects freely, as I will shortly show in a similar case. Nor can one of them by his will necessitate the other to concur, because neither obeys the other's will at a nod, nor can a natural sympathy between them be invented with foundation. Hence one angel could wish to see another and not be able, because the other does not wish to concur, and conversely, although one wished to be known by another, the effect would not follow until the other wished to elicit the intellection. Therefore one angel cannot know another unless the wills of both concur at the same time. But those two wills cannot agree at the same time except either by fortune and chance, which is against the perfection and order of nature, or unless one foreknows the will of the other and assents to it. But this both supposes a great imperfection in the knower, namely, that he cannot know another unless the other wishes, and involves a repugnance. For how will he know the will of the other if he does not yet know him? Or how will he desire that the other cooperate with him if he is ignorant of the other? Therefore it is necessary that some conjunction or subordination precede between the power and the object, by reason of which one necessarily cooperates with the other, and so one proximate principle per se of such an act arises from both. But this union cannot exist between a created substance and another's intellect except through an intelligible species. Therefore.

17. *It is confirmed by induction.*—Hence it is confirmed and explained by induction. For an intelligible species, because it is in the power by way of form, has this subordination to it, so that by the very fact that the power strives toward the act, the species accompanies it, just as habits existing in powers cooperate. In an angel too, with respect to knowledge of himself, we explained above an easy

subordination, because the same principal principle in which the intellect is rooted and which uses it is the intelligible object itself, from which the action proceeds together with the intellect. In the blessed vision also the object seen through itself can be joined to the power, because there the intellect of the one seeing, illuminated by the light, is subordinated to God himself as to the first mover toward such vision, who can also, so to speak according to our manner, apply himself by way of object for effecting the same vision, as I explained in the proper place in the preceding tome. But between the intellective power of one angel and the substance of another, or whatever is intelligible in him, there is no union or conjunction which participates in or imitates this mode of operating; nor does mere proximity, even intimate proximity, suffice, as I explained. And therefore, with the natural order considered, it is not plausible that one angel can know another through the substance alone of the one known. But I say *with the natural order considered*, because God by his power could make it that an intuition proceeds from such object and power without a mediating species. Then, however, God would have to join them in some higher mode in order to the work, or apply and move them to such a mode of acting. And according to this the reason concerning inflow made above could be adapted, because without proper and strict inflow, a distinct object through itself cannot suffice for joining itself to another's power in the notion of first act sufficient for the other to understand. God alone can do this because of the reason given.

18. *Fourth opinion.*—The fourth mode of speaking is that an angel knows others through their substances mediately, that is, through species flowing from substances actually intelligible into the intellect of each understanding angel. This mode of speaking differs from the preceding one because it does not attribute to a spiritual and actually intelligible object immediate efficiency through itself in the act of another understanding it. Nevertheless, it agrees with it in this, that it attributes to such an object some immediate efficiency in the intellect of another, through which it in some way sends itself into the intellect of another, certainly in representative being through an intelligible species, by which the other is able to understand such an object. And thus this view acknowledges that one angel knows another through the species of that angel, and adds that he receives it from the known object. As to the former part, we suppose it, and it will be proved shortly. But as to the other, Scotus holds it, and all who generally teach that an angel receives species from things, even material things, with whom we will deal in the following chapter. And Alexander of Hales teaches the same view, part 1, quest. 24, memb. 2, where indeed he speaks in various ways. For while arguing in § *But it seems contrary*, he expressly says:

that the angel who is known, since he is light, makes his species in the other who knows, and below he says: *in angels there is a nature giving species to one another, because in them there is the nature of light, just as sensible light has the nature of giving a species of itself to sense.* And afterwards in the resolution he says *that one angel knows another through a species that is not innate, but rather acquired.* Yet he adds an obscure reason: *Because he himself*, he says, *makes it in himself.* These words are in conflict with the earlier ones. For if the angel who is known makes his species in another, then the angel who knows another does not make it for himself in himself, but receives it from another. Yet he seems below to suggest this harmony, because simply one angel receives the species of another from that other, but in order that he receive it, *there is required a conversion of the knower himself upon the known*, and therefore he is said in some way to make it in himself, although absolutely he receives it from another.

19. *It is proved.—This opinion is probable as possible.*—The foundation can be that the substance of an angel is intelligible act. Therefore it can impress a species of itself in the intellect of another. Therefore in fact this is how knowledge occurs among angels. The major is supposed as common and clear through itself. The first consequence is proved both because what is actually such can effect in that which is such in potency, and also because a spiritual thing is said to be intelligible in act not only in the notion of term, for in this way even a material thing is intelligible in act, but in the notion of a moving object. Therefore it has the power of moving the intellective power. But it does not move except by impressing a species. Therefore. Moreover, because every sensible in act can produce its species in a capable sense; therefore also an intelligible in act can do so, for there is a proportional reason, or certainly a greater one, because the intelligible object is more perfect and more actual. And it is confirmed, because the angelic intellect is a passive power, or natural receptive power, of the species of another angel, so that naturally it can be educed from its potency, because that species is an accident of the natural order educible from such a potency. Therefore to such a natural passive potency there can and must correspond some natural active potency eductive of such a species; therefore the actually intelligible object itself has that power most of all. Hence the other consequence is proved, because the natural order of providence is that the things which are contained in natural powers be made through those powers, and not immediately by the author of nature, if this can fittingly be done. And this view is indeed probable at least as possible. For the objection usually made against it, that a created substance is not immediately active of any form in another subject, does not compel, because perhaps among material

forms one can effect another similar to itself in nature, and among immaterial forms it is not unfitting that, in order to manifest itself, it make a form intentionally similar to itself. And just as above we said that the substance of an angel can immediately concur effectively toward the intellection of itself in the very angel understanding himself, so it does not seem unfitting that the substance of one angel can effect in another an intentional form through which it can be known by another. Finally, other arguments usually made against this view do not compel, as we will see in the similar matter when disputing about the speech of angels.

20. *Third conclusion in four parts.—One angel knows others through species co-created by God.—The first part of the conclusion is proved.*—Nevertheless it must be said thirdly that each angel knows others through species of them co-created in him by God, and consequently not received from the objects, and hence that an angel in no way, that is, neither mediately nor immediately, concurs effectively toward knowledge of himself with another knower. This is the view of St. Thomas, Quest. 55, art. 2, and *Contra Gentiles* 2, caps. 96 and 98, and of Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and other Thomists in the cited places, and of Capreolus, in 2, dist. 3, quest. 2, art. 1, and of other theologians whom we will report when treating material objects, because they speak generally and without distinction between immaterial and material things. And first, that one angel knows another through a species of the known one is gathered from the preceding by sufficient enumeration, because the intellect alone of the knowing angel is not the integral active power of such knowledge, nor is it completed by the substance alone of the understanding angel, nor by the substance of the understood angel. Therefore it is completed by a species. The antecedent has been proved above as to all parts. We conclude the consequence from sufficient enumeration, because no other medium of such knowledge can be devised. For we suppose that one angel knows others immediately in themselves, as was proved above. Hence it follows that such knowledge occurs without another previously known medium through which they are known. For although perhaps angels can also know one another in this way, such knowledge will either be perfect and in the cause, and thus it will be supernatural knowledge, about which we are not now dealing; or it will be through effects, for Alexander of Hales above contends that some angels can have this knowledge of others. But although that knowledge is perhaps not impossible, it is nevertheless very imperfect, and therefore little in accord with angels, who can know one another perfectly. And for this reason we are not dealing with it, because it has nothing singular, but is made through the same species through which the effect is

known, whence knowledge of the cause is taken. Therefore the perfect knowledge which one angel has of another or of others is not made through a known medium, but the other angel is the object immediately known through such an act. Therefore the medium by which he is known is an unknown medium, and hence cannot be anything except a species. For although Henry invented another thing, which he calls a sciential habit, I have already shown above that this cannot be anything except a species, whether it is said to be one or many; for that is not what we are now treating.

21. *The second part of the conclusion is proved.*—Next, that these species of other angels were co-created in each angel can be proved by the general reasons by which below we will show that the species of all natural things were implanted in all angels from the beginning; for these reasons press much more in the angels themselves with respect to one another. First, because the science of immaterial things is more excellent and is wisdom properly speaking, with which an angel is said to have been filled from the beginning, Ezekiel 28. Also, because the knowledge of angels among themselves is in some way necessary for the political life, so to speak, of the angels themselves, and for mutual society. Hence we gather that these species of spiritual things implanted in angels had to be not only of universal natures, as Scotus wants in the cited quest. 10, but of singulars, because science of universals cannot avoid being in some way confused and imperfect if it does not penetrate particulars. And especially because for mutual society and practical, or, so to speak, use-oriented knowledge, knowledge of the individual persons is necessary. Nor was it fitting that one angel depend on the angels themselves for knowing others by the mediation of reception of species, because this is a great imperfection. Otherwise, one angel could perpetually lack the intelligible species of another if that angel wished to conceal himself and did not wish to give the species of himself to another, which is certainly absurd, as I was saying above concerning the second conclusion. And what was said there proceeds equally in this mediate dependence as in the immediate dependence of which there was discussion there, and in the following point it will be further explained and confirmed. For from this we infer, in the third part of the assertion, that these species were co-created in angels by God alone, without efficiency of the objects, and consequently were not received from the objects.

22. *The third part of the conclusion is explained in two ways, and is taken in both.—An argument against the former way of explaining it.*—Yet in order to explain and prove this part more fully, I think its two senses must be distinguished. The prior is that those very species which one angel had about

other angels at the point of creation were not received from the objects, but were made by God alone. The other sense is that angels have no other species about the same objects received from those objects. And we understand the assertion in both senses. For against the prior one someone could think that, since all angels were created together in the same instant, each could have impressed species of himself on the others, and all could have received them at the same time, and thus they could have had them as connate from the objects. Just as, if the sun and air were created as proximate at the same time, light would be co-created in the air and yet at the same time would be made through the efficiency of the sun. For that co-creation need not be made through the same action nor by natural emanation from a created thing; rather, it is enough that it be a production accompanying creation. Just as grace is said to be co-created in a human being or angel who was created in grace. Hence such co-creation also does not always exclude the concurrence of a secondary cause when the form is natural and producible from a subject through the power of a secondary cause, as we were saying about light. Therefore, in this way someone could contend that the species of others were co-created in each of all the angels, and nevertheless were received from the objects, that is, made through the action of the objects. For such an action does not exceed the nature of such objects, and hence not their activity, as was suggested in the preceding opinion. And it is an indivisible and momentary action, and therefore can exist simultaneously with the creation of the object and the power. And among spiritual things it either does not require spiritual proximity, or even with such proximity all angels could have been created in heaven. And the same object could at once have poured out a species of itself into all intellects created with it, just as a visible object pours out a species at once through its whole sphere into all sights which it can reach. Conversely, the same angelic intellect could at once receive the species of all such objects, no less than if they were made by God alone, because no greater repugnance is discerned on the part of the species or on the part of the recipient of them, and otherwise the objects would not impede one another in acting. Therefore in this way it does not seem repugnant that angels always had these species, and that they received them through the efficiency of the objects.

23. *Nevertheless the said mode is maintained and proved by a dilemma.—The first member of the dilemma.*—Nevertheless the assertion must be taken also in the prior sense, and it is proved. For if one angel can effect a species of himself in another, either he makes it from the necessity of nature in the mode of a natural agent, or freely, so that he has dominion over such efficiency. The

preceding discourse seems to suppose the prior mode, but it does not seem to be admitted, because every free agent by its nature has dominion over all actions which it can do outside itself. This can be seen in God, indeed also in a human being, as to all transient actions which can proceed from the soul as it is rational. Therefore we must think the same about the freedom of angels. First, because, as I have often said, we cannot know anything about angels, who are as it were between God and human beings, except by comparison to the extremes or after their likeness. Also, angels have greater and more universal freedom than human beings, especially concerning actions ad extra, which do not pertain to the perfection of the operating angel but to that of others; and therefore dominion over such actions pertains to perfection. And it is confirmed, because if this necessity is attributed to the substance of an angel as it is an intelligible object in act, consequently it must be attributed to all accidents of the same angel, both powers and species, or habits if he has any, and also to the acts which he elicits. The consequent is absurd. Therefore. The inference is clear from parity of reason, or even a fortiori, because a substance is closer to itself than an accident is to the substance. Therefore, if an angel can subject his accidents to his freedom and contain them so that as intelligible objects they do not betray themselves and make a species of themselves, why will he not be able to do the same with his substance? Therefore conversely, if he cannot do this concerning his substance, neither will he be able to do it concerning his acts. But the minor, namely, that this is absurd, is proved, because otherwise angels could know the free thoughts and affections of other angels without their consent, which is altogether false, as we will see below. The consequence is proved, because by the very fact that an angel elicited an act of hatred, for example, that act would necessarily impress a species of itself in other angels, and consequently could be known by others before the consent of the will of the other, because one who has a species can use it and know the thing represented through it independently of the other's will, as we will say more fully below when treating thoughts of hearts and the speech of angels.

24. *The second member of the dilemma.*—The second mode as well, namely that an angel freely impresses on another a species of his substance, even if it is perhaps possible, is nevertheless not sufficient for us to be able to affirm that all angels had species of all others co-created through their efficiency. For since they would have to be freely impressed by all, how can it be established that all had that will in the first instant? Certainly it cannot be made plausible even by conjecture. Rather, since in the first instant of their creation angels were intent in their minds upon themselves, and upon God, and upon the whole natural

and most beautiful structure of this world, it is not plausible that they all then thought and deliberated about impressing an image of themselves in all the others. I add also that, since before this deliberation no knowledge of others is supposed in an angel, it can scarcely be conceived how he could have had a free will of impressing the species of himself in others. For this very will is in some way terminated at others and is not borne toward the unknown. Therefore it supposes some knowledge of them. But this could not exist without a species of them. Therefore that will supposes the species of the other angels, the opposite of which is supposed in this view. Perhaps it is said that for having that will it suffices to know the other angels confusedly and abstractly, which knowledge does not suppose their species, but can be had through their proper substance. But knowledge of others through the substance of the knower can at most be according to a universal concept, not of any angel in particular. But an operative action into another must concern a singular thing, and therefore supposes a proper species of such a thing.

25. *It is concluded that angels received species from the creator himself, and difficulties are met.*—Therefore, since it is consonant with the nature of angels that each of them be capable of knowing others independently of them and of their choice, it is certainly much more probable that all had the species of others from the beginning, implanted by the creator as due to the use and adornment connatural to those substances. Nor in these species, even if they are of singular things, do the difficulties arise which Scotus and others object about material things, as we will see later, both because these species are finite in number, or because God infuses them only of those angels whom he actually decreed to create; or because they are universal, and although finite in number, they can represent infinite things, which we will examine later. Nor does it follow from these species that angels see future things, but only present ones, and not all of them, because those species represent the substance of an existing angel, not the things which he will later do, indeed not even the things which he then freely does. And thus the distinction between the intellect and thoughts, the will, the power, and the free act of an angel is also very well preserved. For according to the common view of the saints and theologians, one angel can hide his free acts from another, but not his substance or the things natural to him. For the former is posited by all as the special privilege of thoughts of hearts, which confirms the rule as to all the other things which are in an angel, so that all can be known by others and cannot be hidden from another. But there is no other reason for this distinction except that each angel has from himself a sufficient principle for knowing those things which are natural to other angels, although he does not

have it for those things which are free, as we will see below. Therefore in neither way can it fittingly be said that species of the rest of the angels were given to angels and nevertheless were produced from the objects.

26. *The second mode of explanation posited in number 22 is also concluded against certain theologians.—One sense of theirs is attacked.—Likewise another sense is attacked.*—And hence we also infer that no species representing angels are made in individual angels by the rest as by objects intelligible in act. We note this against some theologians who said that, although one angel has the implanted species of others, nevertheless he receives other species from the same angels as from proportioned objects. For this can be thought in two ways. First, that those species, although they are of the same person, nevertheless represent in a different mode and serve different cognitions, and therefore it is not repugnant for them to exist at the same time, nor are they superfluous; for example, if one serves only abstractive knowledge and the other intuitive, or something similar. And this mode is not plausible. For such species represent singular angels and as they are in themselves; and therefore, as I will say below, the same species which suffices for knowing an existing angel intuitively will suffice for knowing him abstractively and as possible if he does not actually exist. For abstractive and intuitive knowledge do not differ on the part of the principle, but on the part of the object as terminating the knowledge, as we will see in what follows. And it is confirmed and explained, because one angel always knows another existing angel in one mode, when he knows him by proper knowledge and through a proper species. Therefore species representing angels existing are of the same nature both on the part of the mode of representing and on the part of the acts of knowing. Therefore the species of another angel, or respectively of all the others, cannot be multiplied in the same angel. In another way, then, someone could think that, although one angel has an innate species of Michael, for example, nevertheless Michael can effect another species altogether similar to the first in him, because such an object is effective of its species, as is supposed, and the power is naturally receptive of it, notwithstanding the prior species implanted in it per accidens; therefore it will effect it. But this mode too is not plausible. First, because it is superfluous, which nature abhors. Second, because those species would be of the same species and altogether similar in individuation, because they would represent altogether the same object. But accidents differing only in number in this way are not multiplied in the same subject. Third, because otherwise the same angel at various times would multiply several species of himself in another angel, because he is always active and the other is receptive of such a species. But if it is responded that after he

has once produced a species of himself in the intellect of another and it is conserved, he does not produce others in the same intellect, because it is already in act with respect to such an object and not in potency, we will respond the same when a co-created species of the same object precedes in an angel, because then too the intellect is supposed to be constituted in act, and therefore is not receptive of a new action of a similar species, because it is capable of such an action only if the object exists in potency.

27. *Finally the fourth part of the conclusion is urged.*—And hence finally I conclude that it is probable enough that spiritual substances as intelligible objects do not have a natural power of effecting an intelligible species of themselves in another angelic intellect. This is proved first on the part of the active power, at least a posteriori, because according to the natural order such a power can never operate such an effect; therefore such a power would exist in vain. But nature does nothing in vain. Secondly, on the part of the passive power, because the angelic intellect by its nature is not in potency with respect to such an act so that it can naturally lack it, but always and necessarily has it. Therefore in order to such an act it is not compared to all created agents as existing in passive potency, but only to the author of its nature. Therefore, conversely, created objects do not have natural efficacy in such a potency. Thirdly, on the part of the species themselves, because from their nature they demand to be made in an angel by co-creation with him. But one form demands or admits only one connatural mode of production for itself. Therefore the other production through efficiency per se from a created object is not according to the natural exigence of such a species, and consequently there cannot be in another angel a natural power effective of such a species. These arguments, however, to tell the truth, are not insoluble, and therefore this is asserted only as probable. But whether the same must be said with respect to the separated soul will be treated in its own place.

CHAPTER VI
HOW ANGELS KNOW SINGULAR MATERIAL THINGS

1. First supposition: Angels know singular material things.—Before we speak about God, it seems that material objects should be discussed, because although God, considered in himself, is more intelligible than other things and is the more principal object, nevertheless he is not known by an angel through himself, and can be known through other things. Therefore it is necessary first to speak about created objects, so that afterward we may explain how, from

them, an angel knows God, and from which of them especially they can know him. But concerning material objects, or things, we suppose as certain that they can be known by angels; for they are contained under the object of the angelic intellect, as was said in chapter two. Likewise this is no less certain concerning material individuals than concerning universals, both because these also are contained under the adequate object of the intellect, since they are in some way simply intelligible, and because they are known by us in a certain lowest mode and by God in the highest mode; therefore they are understood by angels in some intermediate mode. Also, angels are in some way causes and operate concerning singular material things, either by applying active things to passive things, or by guarding, tempting, instructing men, and so on. But they do not operate except through intellect and will. Therefore it is necessary that they know singulars. And thus this supposition is certain by faith; for in all those things which Scripture hands down concerning the operations and ministries of angels, it evidently supposes that they know these material and singular things, and nothing is more frequent in the mouth of the faithful and of the whole Church. The same also becomes evident from the arguments given and from the perfection of the angelic intellect. But the common objections which are usually raised against this will be solved in chapter eight.

2. Some philosophers are wrongly thought to have held the contrary.—Some philosophers are usually reported as holding the contrary, such as the Commentator, Avicenna, and Aristotle. But these philosophers said almost nothing about angels, or about the second intelligences, on this point in particular. Rather, because they are believed to have denied this clear and distinct cognition even to God, those who attribute this to them wish to infer from this that they held the same concerning angels. Nevertheless, even concerning God we defended that Aristotle did not teach this in disputation 3 of the *Metaphysics*, section 15, number 41; and concerning the moving angels he could not have doubted that they know them, from which it follows that they can also know the rest. And in book 10 of the *Ethics*, chapter 8, he said that "he who cultivates virtue is most dear to the gods"; therefore he judged that it is not unknown to them. Indeed, he adds that "the gods have care of human things," which cannot exist without cognition. And more things can be seen in Eugubinus, *De perenni Philosophia*, book 4, chapter 6 and following, and book 6, chapter 3; book 12 of the *Metaphysics*, question 36 and 56. But it is not necessary to say anything at present about the other philosophers. Therefore, supposing the Catholic truth that angels know singular material things, we will speak about

the medium by which they know them; afterward we will add something about the cognition of universals.

3. Second supposition: that they know the aforesaid singulars in themselves intuitively.—But concerning these singulars we further suppose that they are known by angels with proper cognition, and in themselves directly, and as they are in themselves. On these matters all theologians also agree, and they are all most certain. For first, if an angel did not know a material individual by proper cognition, that is, by a cognition that is not common, he would not know the individual, but something common. But if he had a proper concept of the individual, yet not a perfect one, and in that sense not proper, he would only know the material individual by a connotative concept, or a respective concept, or in some other similar mode, which cannot be attributed to angels without great imperfection, which should not be imagined without a compelling reason. And by the same reason it is proved that angels know material individuals directly and as they are in themselves. Certain people erred in this, as St. Thomas reports in part 1, quest. 57, art. 2, who said that angels know these singulars only in universal causes. Against them St. Thomas argues that from universal causes, as such, an individual cannot be known as to its particular properties, and thus the individual would not be known as it is such; for universal causes, of themselves, are indifferent to many individuals. But if it is said that an individual can be known in universal causes applied in this or that way, as a particular effect, then such cognition of the cause already includes cognition of the particular circumstances. Indeed, since such causes are supposed to be material, although cognition of them is cognition of universal things in causing, it is nevertheless cognition of particular and singular things in esse in; therefore such cognition involves cognition of individuals in themselves, and by whatever reason it is admitted concerning some, it is possible in the rest, and there is no reason why it should be denied to angels. Hence, finally, it follows that angels also intuitively know these material individuals actually existing, because they directly see them in themselves and as they are in themselves. And the chief difficulty of this point is placed in explaining this cognition and its principle or medium.

4. The first opinion is proposed and rejected.—And the first opinion is that an angel knows a material individual through the presence alone of the object, without any species of the object which he receives in himself. Scotus, Gabriel, Durandus, and others cited in chapter 3 think this, although not in the same way. For that opinion can be understood in two ways: first, so that an angel sees the present thing without its species, with the object itself effectively cooperating

with the angel's intellect for cognition; second, so that it happens without effective concurrence, through objective presence alone and the termination of the act. Scotus, Gabriel, and so on follow the former mode; Durandus, Vázquez, and so on follow the latter. But neither is approved by us, because from what was said in chapter three each is sufficiently disproved. The former, indeed, because a thing, or a material object, cannot immediately effect something in a spiritual power, nor produce a spiritual action. We will urge this reason more fully below concerning species. But the latter is not approved because the mere presence of the object is not sufficient, unless the power is supposed to be sufficiently constituted in first act for eliciting the act. But the power alone, without the conjunction of the object either through itself or through its species, does not have complete active virtue, nor is it sufficiently constituted in first act. And therefore the concurrence of the object in the character of a term is not enough, unless it also intervenes in the character of a motive or co-efficient. Thus, for seeing, the presence of a visible object before sight would not be enough if the object were prevented from impressing its species in sight.

5. Second opinion.—Its first argument.—Second argument.—An escape is blocked.—The second, or third, opinion is that an angel sees singular material things through species of them which he receives from the objects themselves. Alexander of Hales teaches this in part 2, quest. 23, member 3 and 4, and quest. 24, member 3; and Richard, in 2, distinction 3, quest. 2; Major, quest. 4; Bassolus, quest. 4, art. 3; Scotus, quest. 11; Gabriel, quest. 2, last doubt; Hervaeus, quest. 2 and quodlibet 5, quest. 6; and Marsilius, in 2, quest. 7, art. 1, in its second part, conclusions 5 and 9. The foundation is that an angel cannot have these species concreated; therefore he has received them from existing objects. The consequence is proved, because no other mode is given by which such species could come to be. The antecedent is proved, first, because otherwise an angel would have infinite species concreated, which must not be admitted. The sequence is proved, because a singular is not known through a universal species; otherwise it would not be known according to its proper features but according to common features. Therefore it must be known through a proper and singular species. Therefore an angel has as many species of them as he knows or can know singulars. Therefore, if he has at once the concreated species of all singulars which he can know, he has infinite species. The consequence is proved, because cognition of singulars can proceed to infinity, and thus the whole collection of singulars knowable by an angel is infinite; therefore so too is the collection of intelligible species which is given at once concerning all of them. Second, because otherwise an angel could know future material

individuals before they were in act. The consequent is false; therefore. The sequence is proved, because one who has the proper species of some thing can know it, even if it does not exist, because he has sufficient virtue and the complete principle of understanding. Once this is supposed, intellection does not depend on the actual existence of the intelligible object, because the intellect of itself abstracts from the object's existence. You will say: from this it is only proved that an angel can know a non-existing singular as possible, or according to the esse of an individual essence, but not according to a present or future esse of existence. But to the contrary: an angel does not have species of all possible singulars, but at most of those which will have existence in some difference of time. Therefore if he knows an individual insofar as it is possible and does not see it as actually existing, by that very fact he knows that it will exist at some time. Therefore he knows future things. But the falsity of the consequent is proved, because such individuals are ordinarily future contingently, since many come forth from causes acting freely, while others come from causes that can be impeded in acting even by free causes. Therefore, if an angel knows these future things, he knows future contingents. But the consequent is altogether false, as we will show below. Therefore.

6. Third argument from Scotus.—Scotus is explained.—Third, Scotus argues especially about intuitive cognition. For through a concreated species an angel cannot intuitively know a singular thing when it actually exists. Therefore it is necessary that from it, as now existing, he receive a species through which he can intuit it as existing. The antecedent is proved, because a concreated species abstracts in its representation from existence, and represents things only according to the esse of essence, because before a thing exists the species has its complete representation, and then it does not represent the thing as existing; otherwise it would represent something false. Therefore that species alone cannot be a sufficient principle for knowing the thing as actually existing, as it is seen through intuitive cognition. The consequence is proved, because cognition cannot exceed the representation of the species. Therefore, in order that a thing be intuitively seen by an angel, a new species is necessary for him, which determinately represents the thing as existing, and he cannot have it unless it is received from the object. Hence Scotus infers that although an angel in fact has innate species of singular material things, through which he can know them abstractively, or according to the esse of essence, nevertheless in order to intuit them as existing he receives species from them. Yet one must note that, since it is Scotus's view that the object itself existing outside, even if it is material, immediately effects, together with the angel's intellect, the intuitive cognition of

itself, when he says that an angel receives a species from the object which he intuitively sees, he cannot mean that he receives a new intelligible species which is the effective principle of such an act, but that he receives from the object itself the function which an intelligible species is accustomed to exercise, namely, the co-efficiency of such an act together with the angel's intellect itself. But once this immediate co-efficiency of the object concerning the act is removed, the argument seems to conclude that a new species received from the object is necessary, by the mediation of which it determines the power to such an act. And this can be confirmed, because intuitive cognition is experiential knowledge. But although someone may have innate knowledge, nevertheless he cannot have experiential knowledge unless it is acquired, as can be seen in the soul of Christ the Lord. The reason seems to be no other than that experiential knowledge is about a thing as actually existing. Therefore such cognition requires a new species received from the object. And from this Gabriel, Gregory, and others gather that, even for abstractive cognition of singular things, an angel receives species from the things themselves, because the principle for abstractive cognitions is left behind from intuitive cognition; and therefore the object concurring for intuitive cognition, through it, confers a species from which abstractive cognition arises.

7. Fourth argument.—Let the fourth argument be this: there is no repugnance at all in an angel receiving species from material objects present to him, and it belongs to the perfection of an angel that he can receive such species from things; therefore this power must not be denied to him. The major is proved, because the intellect of a man, although it is spiritual, can receive species from material objects. Therefore this is not repugnant absolutely. Nor does it matter that man has senses and an angel does not, both because there is no reason why the mode of receiving species from objects should be limited to the mode of receiving them by means of the senses, and also because in the senses themselves whatever precedes the impression of the intelligible species is material, and nevertheless it is elevated to effecting that species through the light of the agent intellect. Therefore there is no reason why it should be repugnant that in an angel a higher mode of receiving spiritual species from material things be found. But the minor is proved, both because an agent intellect is a perfection, and the ability to use a material thing as an instrument for receiving species is also a perfection, and also because the ability to acquire knowledge is a great perfection. Hence, on the contrary, to make angelic nature unable to acquire habitual knowledge, and consequently unable to have it unless it is infused by God, seems to be a great limitation and imperfection. And, as Major

says, it seems incredible that an angel created in heaven and without an infused species of heaven could not naturally see heaven, while a man created there would see it through sense and through intellect. Therefore this perfection must not be denied to angels. And this can be confirmed from Augustine, book 12, *De Trinitate*, chapter 7, saying: "God does not see for a time, nor does anything new come to be from his vision and knowledge when something is done temporally, as the senses are affected by it, whether the bodily senses of animals and men, or even the heavenly senses of angels."

8. Fifth recent argument.—Fifth, a certain modern author argues: if an angel could not have species unless infused by God, they would be supernatural forms no less than the light of glory is. The consequent cannot be said. Therefore. The sequence is proved, because those species can be made by God alone, just as the light of glory can, and an angel would be only in passive potency toward them, just as he is also toward receiving the light; and just as the light is infused without a previous disposing requirement, so also those species are infused, in which they differ from the rational soul. Therefore nothing is lacking to those species so as to prevent them from being supernatural, equally as the light of glory is. But the falsity of the consequent is proved, because if those species are supernatural, they can be withheld by God from an angel without any violence being done to him. Therefore an angel could lack cognition of all material things without any force being done to his nature, just as he could lack the light of glory and the vision of God without any violence. But this is plainly false; otherwise ignorance of natural things would not be contrary to the nature of an angel. Indeed, it would be in some way natural to him, which cannot be said. Therefore.

9. First conclusion.—An angel does not receive species from material objects.—Nevertheless, it must be said first that it cannot naturally happen that an angel receives species from material objects. St. Thomas teaches this in part 1, quest. 55, art. 2, and in book 2, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 96. In these places he seems to speak only about the fact, and indifferently about all things, both spiritual and material. But in both cases he grounds this in the natural capacity and order of things. And especially in the stated article, reply to 2, he distinctly says two things about material things: one, that an angel cannot abstract species from them; the other, that although he could, he would not abstract them, because he already has them as connatural. In the other place also he speaks professedly about material things, and denies not only the act but also the power. And thus Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and other moderns there follow this view, and Capreolus, in 2, distinction 3, quest. 2, conclusion 3, and in the

defense of them; Bonaventure, in part 2 of the distinction, art. 2, quest. 1; Giles, part 2, quest. 2, art. 1, doubt 2, and art. 2, doubt 2; Argentina, in the same place, 2, art. 4; Hervaeus, quest. 4, art. 3; Albert, art. 15, and in the summary, part 2, tract. 4, quest. 14, member 3, art. 2, and *De quatuor coaequaevis*, part 1, quest. 5, art. 12; Henry, quodlibet 5, quest. 14; Giles also in the tractate *De cognitione Angelorum*; William of Paris, in the tractate *De Universo*, book 2.

10. The conclusion is proved by attacking one way of speaking of the adversaries.—The assertion is proved briefly, because this reception of species from objects can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that on the part of the recipient there is only passive reception, but the giving is effectively from the object either alone or together with another operating. In another way, so that the angel himself effects such a species in himself, but is said to receive it from the object because he forms it in himself only in its presence and, as it were, through its excitation or occasion, just as a man is said to receive species from material things, although he himself effects them in himself through the agent intellect. But this reception can neither be understood nor be possible in either of these ways. Therefore it absolutely cannot happen, because besides those modes no other can be devised. The minor proposition is proved as to its former part, because a material thing cannot act upon a spirit, because it has no proportion to it, which is necessary between agent and patient. And by the same reason a material object cannot produce a spiritual form by natural virtue, because it is of an altogether inferior order.

11. An evasion is removed.—You will say: this only proves that a material thing cannot do this by itself alone, or by its own virtue; nevertheless, it can do so as illumined and elevated by the virtue of the angelic agent intellect. For some theologians have taught in this way that an angel understands singulars by emitting a certain light, and by that light reaching the material objects themselves, as Carthusianus reports in 2, distinction 3, quest. 4. But just as this cannot be understood, so neither should it be believed, since such a mode of effecting has not been revealed, nor is any efficiency of these objects in the angelic intellect proved to be necessary from elsewhere. But that that illumination of a material object, or conjunction with the angelic agent intellect, can be nothing, is proved, because if it is a true illumination, it must be real, and through a real action and a real light; otherwise it is nothing except in name. Therefore it is either through a material, corporeal, and extended light, or through an incorporeal spiritual light. The first is both fictitious and contrary to sense; for if such a corporeal light were given, it could be seen and sensed, apart from a miracle; and besides, it is irrelevant, because that light too, and the

material thing affected by such a light, would be equally disproportionate for acting upon a spirit. Nor can such an immaterial light be thought, since it can be received neither in the medium nor in the material object. Moreover, if an angel could of himself emit such a light by which the object would become apt to produce species, he could more easily receive those species in himself. In addition, if such a light proceeds naturally from the angel without the intervention of his will, that mode of acting is most imperfect and alien to angelic nature. But if it depends on the will, a preceding direction of the intellect is necessary, which would suppose cognition of the object to be illuminated; and for that cognition a species will be necessary, which is repugnant to the same view, for such a species cannot be received from the object, since one will proceed to infinity.

12. The conclusion is proved further by attacking the other way of speaking of the adversaries.—Likewise, the other mode cannot be understood. For if the angel who is said to receive the species effects it in himself alone, then in no genus of cause can the material thing concur for that effecting; therefore such a species cannot truly be said to be received from the object itself. This second consequence seems self-evident; for to receive from another denotes some causality in that place from which the thing is received, with respect to the reception, whether that causality is effective, as air receives light from the sun, or material, or quasi-material, as someone is said to receive a thing from the place in which it is. Therefore the first consequence is proved, because the material thing is not the efficient cause of such a species, as is supposed; nor is it the material cause, because the species is neither drawn out from it, nor contained in it; nor is it an exciting cause, because it cannot properly excite an angel to the production of such a species, since it is not foreknown by him; and by the same reason it cannot be an exemplar cause. Therefore it has no genus of causality.

13. It is confirmed.—Hence it is confirmed, because if the whole active virtue of such a species is in the angel, no reason can be given on the part of the thing to be represented why he should effect it now rather than before, because that species is not a mere relation, so that it would result when the foundation and term are posited without any new activity of the term, but is an absolute quality. Therefore it does not result newly in the angel precisely from the fact that the material thing begins to be in the manner of a term representable through such a species. But no other reason or condition can be thought of on account of which the angel should effect such a species now rather than before or afterward. For some local nearness is irrelevant, both because this condition is usually required only between things which are related as agent and patient,

and this relation does not intervene here, as is supposed; and also because by reason of that nearness that thing neither excites the angel more, nor gives him another occasion of acting, than when it is distant. Finally, it cannot be said that the existence of that thing to be represented is a necessary condition for its species to come to be, because the species is a permanent thing in the manner of a habit, and endures even if its object ceases to exist. Therefore there is no reason why an angel should effect such a species now rather than before. Therefore, if he can effect such species in himself, he effects them from the beginning, and thus he does not acquire them from objects, but has them concreated from the beginning, by natural necessity. Nor can it be said that that efficiency is free and afterward determined by the will, because this determination cannot happen without previous cognition and a species, as we have already argued. Finally, St. Thomas confirms this conclusion by a probable reason: because there is no passage from one extreme to the other except through a mean; and therefore neither is there a passage from a material object to an immaterial species except through the medium of a phantasm. Scotus attacks this reason, and Cajetan defends it. But there is no need to dwell on this, because the argument given is demonstrative; and that fittingness is to be reduced to it, as we will see in responding to the arguments.

14. Second conclusion.—An angel has concreated species of material things.—I say, second. An angel has concreated species of material things which he can know naturally. This assertion seems consequent upon the preceding one, because there is no other mode of receiving these species except either by acquiring them from objects or by receiving them from God. Therefore, once the former mode is excluded as naturally impossible, it is necessary to admit the latter, lest there follow the absurdity that an angel lacks these species and, consequently, cognition of these things. Nevertheless, although this argument rightly concludes that God alone is the effector of these species in an angel, it does not immediately conclude that such species are concreated with the angel. For someone could say that they are successively made by God according as objects successively become apt to be known intuitively, namely through actual existence. For in this way the difficulties posited above, which arise only from the concretion of these species, are avoided, and satisfaction is given to the natural necessity of the angel, because he intuitively knows a thing only when it exists, and he need not know it as future before it exists. Thus, although rational souls can be made only by God alone, nevertheless not all are made together from the beginning, but successively in bodies, as occasion requires. And this argument indeed proves to me that, if on account of other difficulties it had to

be denied that these species are concreated with angels, it would more probably be said that they come to be in this way than that they are received from material things. But because those difficulties do not compel us to deny that angels have always had these species, it is much more probably asserted that these species are concreated, as St. Thomas and the Thomists, Giles, Argentina, and others commonly teach. Indeed, Alexander of Hales also admits concreated species, although he also posits acquired species in angels, in which Gabriel does not seem to disagree with him.

15. It is proved from Sacred Scripture and the Fathers.—This can be proved, first, from Scripture, insofar as everywhere it signifies that angels were created full of wisdom and beauty, as is said of the Cherub in Ezekiel 28; for the fullness of knowledge extends also to material objects, and cannot exist without species. The assertion is also taken from Dionysius, chapter 7, *De divinis Nominibus*, where he speaks thus: "Scripture testifies that angels know those things which happen on earth, not, indeed, by drawing through sense those things which are sensible, but by the proper virtue and nature of a mind made according to the image of God." Here he plainly says that angels do not receive the knowledge of sensible things from those same sensible things, but by a virtue implanted by God. By this he does not mean the bare mind, or intellect, but also the species and images of things, by which it is, as it were, depicted by God himself, just as in other places he calls them the reasons of things, or intelligible signs, as we will see in what follows. Augustine also, book 2, *De Genesi ad litteram*, chapter 8, says that all corporeal creatures were first made in the minds of angels "according to the wisdom created in them" before they were made in themselves, and he adds: "For the angels did not progress, as we do, toward receiving wisdom." And he repeats similar things in chapter 30 and following, and often in that work.

16. Alexander of Hales presses.—It is satisfied.—But Alexander of Hales presses, because Augustine posits a twofold evening cognition of created things in angels: one through innate species, which he calls cognition in the angel himself; another through acquired species, which he calls cognition of things in themselves, or in their proper genus. And thus, although in the former part he favors this conclusion, in the other he contradicts the preceding one. I respond that Augustine never posited evening cognition in angels through species received from things, but said that through the same species an angel knows things in himself and in themselves. Perhaps he distinguished these cognitions as abstractive and intuitive, although they happen through the same species; or, as seems more likely, he distinguished them as the cognition by which creatures

are seen as if depicted in the angel who knows, and the cognition by which they are seen as they exist in themselves. We are not now disputing about this distinction of such cognitions, and perhaps it is not necessary, or it is more according to reason than according to the thing, as we will see in the following tractate, book one, chapter eleven. Yet now we suppose as certain that Augustine never taught that an angel has any cognition of things, especially material things, through a species received from the known thing, because the aforesaid words sufficiently indicate this, nor can any others be brought forward in which he signified something else.

17. The conclusion is also proved by reason.—Second, the conclusion is proved by reason, because unless an angel had concreated species, he would have ignorance of all material things, because he would have knowledge of them neither in act nor in habit, but only in remote potency, which does not exclude ignorance; indeed, it is the subject of ignorance in the way in which a subject in potency apt by nature is the subject of privation. Convinced by this reasoning, Scotus admits that angels had concreated species of natural things as to their genera and species, about which there is properly knowledge, and he only denies that they had species of singulars, about which there is not proper knowledge. But against this: cognition of a genus or species entirely abstracted from distinct cognition of individuals is confused and imperfect, because it does not reach the thing so as to know it as it is in itself. Therefore, if such was the cognition of angels in the beginning, it was very imperfect and similar to human cognition. Next, prudence and practical knowledge concern singulars; therefore they cannot exist in angels ignorant of singulars. Next, and this is the chief point, angels would have been made unable to know the heavens, the sun, the moon, and the elements as they were created and in particular, because they would not have proper species of such things, nor could they acquire them from the things themselves, as was shown.

18. An escape is cut off.—You will say: by this argument it is rightly proved that the species of those singular things which were concreated with them were concreated with angels, but not the species of others made afterward, until they were made; and then, successively, they were infused by God at the presence of the things. But against this are the effective arguments and fitting reasons of St. Thomas. For first, if an angel can never receive a species from an existing material object, the existence of such a singular object is awaited in vain so that its species may be conferred on the angel, since that species does not depend on the object. Next, because the place which the heavens have among other bodies, angels have among immaterial spirits. But the heavens are related to lower

bodies in such a way that they are created perfect in first act, although lower bodies are gradually perfected. Therefore angels surpass lower spirits, such as human souls, in this: that they are created perfect in first act, while souls acquire that perfection through the body. And this is in agreement with the natural condition and state of such spirits, both because angels are intermediate between God and souls, but God is always in second act, while the soul is created in potency even to first act. Therefore the intermediate nature requires that it be created at least in first act, although it is in potency to second act. Also, and especially, because the soul even in intellectual cognition depends on the body at least as on an organ, or medium, by which it is reduced to first act, and therefore is united to the body. But an angel does not depend in his cognition on a body, nor through it does he gather the principles for understanding material things, and therefore he is not united to a body as form. Therefore, by the same reason, he receives the species of them independently of the existence of material things.

19. Third conclusion.—An angel does not have both concreated and acquired species of the same object.—A proof of the conclusion ad hominem.—Hence I say, third. An angel does not have duplicated species of the same objects, or of singular material things, namely concreated species and species received from things. This assertion, taken absolutely, is against Alexander of Hales, who attributes both species concerning the same things to angels. And in this sense it is sufficiently proved from the first conclusion, because species received from things cannot be found in angels. But in another way, taken hypothetically, it is against Scotus, who, although he absolutely denies that an angel has concreated species of singular things, nevertheless says under a condition that, although an angel may have concreated species of singular things, he could receive other species from things, because he would need them for intuitive cognition of things. But St. Thomas teaches the opposite. For in the stated solution, reply to 2, even under the hypothesis he says: "Given that an angel could abstract species from material things, nevertheless he would not abstract them, because he would not need them, since he has concreated intelligible species." But Scotus replies that he always needs acquired species in order to know a thing intuitively. But against this I argue first ad hominem, because the necessary concurrence on the part of the object for intuitive cognition is an effective concurrence, which the material object through itself immediately provides, or can provide, for the very act of understanding of the angel, as Scotus himself admits in the stated question 10. Therefore a species received from such an object is superfluous, especially when another, innate

species concerning the same object is supposed. Hence I argue simply, second, because the concurrence on the part of the object necessary by the nature of the thing for intuitive cognition is not effective but is through the mode of a term, because this is enough for determining the power to such a mode of action, if in the power itself a sufficient active principle of such action is supposed. But this principle is supposed by the very fact that the power is supposed with an innate species representing the thing as it is in itself. Therefore another species would be superfluous, even if it could be produced by the object. And it is explained: for once such a species were acquired, it would remain in the power even if the object ceased to exist, and then the object could no longer be intuitively seen because of the lack of the terminating object. Therefore this is a sign that the object under that special character is a necessary condition for intellectual intuitive cognition beyond the species. But in the same case, if that thing existed again, it could be known intuitively by the angel by virtue of the species previously received from it, because it would be altogether of the same character as the one that could be newly acquired. Otherwise, as often as an angel ceases from the intuition of one thing and afterward intuits it again, he would acquire a new species, which is incredible. Therefore neither must that be said, even if the prior species was not taken from the object but innate from God.

20. Another proof simply.—The assertion can also be proved in another way, because two forms differing only numerically are not naturally together in the same power with respect to the same object. Therefore neither could a species of the same object naturally come to be in an angel who has an innate species of some thing, even if otherwise an intellect lacking the species of the object could receive it from that object. This reason also seems effective against Scotus, who posits these species, even as innate, in angels as commensurate to objects, so that single species are infused into an angel concerning single material individuals. For then he does not have acquired species which are distinguished essentially or specifically from the innate species. Therefore they are distinguished only numerically. Therefore by that very fact they could not be multiplied in the same power with respect to the same object. And given the hypothesis that one was concreated, now the subject would not be in potency to a similar species, and therefore would not receive it from the object, even if otherwise, supposing privation, it could receive it. But this reason does not seem to press so strongly in the view of St. Thomas, which we will defend immediately, namely that an angel does not know a singular material thing through a species, so to speak, adequate to it, but through a more universal one. For then the concreated species and the species received from the object would

not be of the same species, and consequently they could exist together, because the innate species is universal, while the one received from the singular object is adequate and commensurate to it alone. And thus I admit that on this side there would not have been repugnance; nevertheless, the argument taken from superfluity, which St. Thomas used, would even then have place. Hence, if that reception of a species from a material object, which is supposed in the hypothesis, depended on the freedom of the angel, he certainly would never receive it, at least by operating prudently, because it would be useless to him. But if it happened naturally from the object thus or thus proposed before the use of the angel's freedom, then indeed this species would necessarily be added to the prior one, because the more universal pre-existing species would not impede it, nor would it actuate the intellect by excluding the privation of such an act according to its own species. But then either one of those species would not be connatural, or certainly there would be superfluity in such a nature. And these things will become clearer from the solutions to the arguments, in which we will dispatch some doubts which can arise here.

21. The first argument posited in number four is satisfied.—Therefore the first argument asks whether an angel has single distinct species concerning single material things and individuals, or whether he knows many individuals through one universal species. For Scotus and others suppose this latter part in the argument, and from this infer that they must be received from things. On this point, first, we say that it does not follow that they are received from things, even if they are supposed to be so particular; but at most it follows that they are not given or infused by God at once. For although it were necessary, in order to avoid the inconvenience inferred there, that they not be infused at once, they could nevertheless be received successively from God supplying the inability of the proximate cause, as was touched upon above. But we further add that not even this follows strictly, even if we suppose that single material things are represented through single intelligible species, because notwithstanding this, all the species of single material things could have been infused at once, because they need not be infinite, as Major rightly said, quest. 3, to the last, because there would not be given species of all possible individuals, but perhaps of those which are future in some difference of time, about which we will speak below. But those are finite, because the generations of things will cease in some way. But if those are said to be infinite only in a broad way, because they are innumerable or very many, then it is not inconvenient for innumerable intelligible species to be in one intellect, because they neither impede one another nor burden the mind, but perfect it. But if an objection is pressed about

thoughts, which will be multiplied to infinity, because the succession of thoughts will endure forever. It is responded that these are not material things, nor are they counted in the order of natural things, but pertain to the cognitions of hearts, about which we will speak afterward, that they cannot be known except through speech and manifestation by the one thinking. Therefore it was not necessary that innate species of them were given from the beginning.

22. An angel knows many material objects through a single species.—What universality angelic species of material things have.—The solution to the first argument is deferred to chapter 14, number 17.—But responding directly to the doubt touched upon, we say that distinct and particular species of single material individuals are not given to angels. For that mode of knowing is very imperfect, and therefore it is not likely that the virtue of an angel is so limited that he needs species that are so particular. Therefore an angel knows many material individuals through one species in number. And to the argument it is responded that a species is called universal in two ways. In one way, because it represents precisely a universal nature and not the particular conditions constituting individuals. And thus some authors cited by Giles, tractate *De cognitione Angelorum*, questions 9 and 10, said that an angel knows individuals through universal species, with the angel supplying, by the perspicacity of his own intelligence, the defect of the species. But this must not be approved, both because angelic species would be very imperfect, and because just as the perspicacity of the intellect cannot absolutely supply the place of a species, as was proved above, so neither can it supply a defect of representation in the species by immediately knowing through it something which is not represented by it; also, besides this, because the angelic intellect could not by virtue of such a species be applied to knowing such an individual. For such application neither follows by necessity of nature by virtue of such a species, even if the intellect uses it, nor can it be through application of the will, because such a will would have to suppose cognition of such an individual. Moreover, the will cannot move the intellect to know through a species more than that species represents. Therefore I concede that an angel does not know singulars through species that are universal in this sense, because an individual thing adds to the specific character something of entity which cannot be known without a representing species. For whatever is represented in second act through the act of understanding must be represented by the species in first act; otherwise the power would not be constituted in complete proximate act for such an act. Therefore in another way a species is said to be universal in representing, or in causing in its own grade. And in this sense I say that an angel knows singular

material things through universal species, and therefore it is not necessary that he have single species concerning single individuals, but through one he can know many, more or fewer according to the perfection of the intelligible species. And this is the view of St. Thomas in the cited places, and part 1, quest. 57, art. 2, and quest. 8, *De Veritate*, art. 11, reply to 6, which the authors cited above in 2, distinction 3 frequently follow. And thus to the argument it is denied that through such a species only common predicates can be known, because that species is universal in such a way that it represents many not only in that in which they agree, but also according to what is proper to them. But how one indivisible species can in this way represent many as they are distinct, we will say in what follows. In the second argument the difficulty is touched upon whether an angel can know future contingents, which we will treat professedly below in chapter nine.

23. The third argument in number six is solved.—Angels acquire new rememorative species.—The third argument asks a special difficulty: how an angel through concreated species intuitively sees a present thing which he did not intuit before it existed. But it will be necessary to institute a special question about this point, and therefore now we say briefly that a concreated species is determined as to specification by a present object according to real existence for intuitive cognition of it, not through the production of a new species, nor through immediate efficiency into the act, but only in the character of a term and of a condition on the part of the terminating object necessary for intuitive vision. But what variation or change then intervenes either in the intelligible species or in the act of knowing, we will see later. To the confirmation about experiential knowledge we respond that this experiential knowledge can be twofold, or can have a twofold state, namely either concerning the present, by actually taking experience from such a thing, or concerning the past, by conserving the knowledge of such a truth taken through experience which was at some time present and has now passed. The former experience consists in intuitive cognition, or the actual perception of the object; the latter is placed in a certain memory of past experience. Therefore concerning the former I say: if it is intellectual experience, it can happen through innate species without the acquisition of a new species, in the same way in which we said that intuitive cognition can happen through concreated species alone, once the presence of the object is supposed, because such experience is nothing other than intuitive cognition, as I said. But concerning the latter, I concede that it does not happen without some acquired species, not received from the material object, but from the proper act of the knower, because it does not proximately and directly

represent the thing previously known, but represents to the angel that he has seen it. And therefore the acquisition of such a species is not contrary to the present doctrine, because it is not the reception of a species from a material object. But why it is necessary, and how it should be understood, we will say below when treating of the memory of angels and how they know past things. And with respect to this cognition of a past thing by way of memory, what Gabriel and those others add to the objection can be admitted: that abstractive cognition is born from intuitive cognition, because it is both true and does not harm us. But that principle, understood of every abstractive cognition, is false, because in angels there can be abstractive cognition concerning a thing that does not exist and that never existed, or never was intuitively known, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said.

24. The fourth argument in number seven is solved.—To the fourth argument, it has already been shown why it is naturally impossible for an angel to receive species from material objects. Hence we deny that this belongs to the perfection of an angel, because in man it is not a perfection simply, but only once a certain greater imperfection is supposed, namely that the soul is the act of the body; for unless a spirit is united to a body in this way, it cannot receive spiritual species from corporeal objects. And for this reason we said above that there is not in an angel a proper agent intellect, because it supposes an imperfection repugnant to an angel. Nor does an imperfection of ignorance or of something like stupidity result from this in an angel, because it is a greater perfection that he has connatural species and cannot lack them without a miracle, as I will say below. But if God had willed to work such a miracle, it is no wonder that an angel would remain imperfect violently and contrary to his nature until God wished to reduce him to his natural state. Finally, the example concerning the human intellect contributes nothing to the matter, because we do not say that it is impossible for an intellect, as such, to receive species from material things, but we say that it is impossible for a separated intellect, although it is possible for a conjoined intellect. But the reason why, without the intervention of its own body informed by a spirit, a spirit cannot immediately receive a species from a material thing is that naturally a spirit cannot immediately and directly undergo, be affected, or be excited by a material object, because it is altogether disproportionate to a spirit. Therefore, in order that a spirit be excited by a corporeal object, it is necessary that it be naturally united to a body, and that through it it begin its cognition, which it cannot do without the senses. And therefore it also cannot happen that without the ministry of the senses a spiritual power receives species from material things. Nor does it matter

that the cognition of the senses and of the material imagination is material, because in man they are rooted in the same spiritual soul, and this is enough so that through its ministry the intellect receives a species proportioned to itself. But what this ministry is like, and how such a species comes to be, must be said in the treatise *De Anima*. And from this some respond to the testimony of Augustine: he said that when something exists temporally, the senses of men, or even of angels, are affected by it, because, since he believed that angels are corporeal, it is no wonder that he consequently said that they can be affected by external objects. But Augustine was not so constant in that opinion concerning the bodies of angels that he would simply use it for handing down doctrine; nor did he posit such bodies of angels that he believed they also had senses. Hence in his words he did not speak simply about senses, but with a distinction he said: "the senses are affected by it, whether the bodily senses of animals and men, or even the heavenly senses of angels." Here he calls angelic intellects heavenly senses, and they are said to be affected "when something is done temporally and transitorily," because some change occurs in the angelic intellect, not as to first act, but as to the second act of intuitive cognition. This change depends on the object in the way touched on above by us and to be explained below.

25. The fifth argument in number eight is solved.—The species of angels are supernatural.—In the fifth argument I find no difficulty, because that inference, that the species of an angel are supernatural if they are concreated with him and are made by God alone, has no likelihood. Nor does the comparison of such species to the light of glory have any likelihood, because the light of glory is supernatural in its substance, whereas an intelligible species is natural in its entity. Likewise, the light of glory is not connatural to a created intellect, but that species is connatural to an angel. Likewise, although the intellect of an angel is in some way a passive potency toward each of those forms, nevertheless toward the light of glory it is only an obediential potency, but toward the intelligible species of a natural thing it is a natural passive potency. Finally, although each form is made by God alone, nevertheless the light is made by God as author of grace and operating above nature, whereas the species is made by God as author of nature, because it is made according to the requirement of nature. In this, the effecting of an angelic intelligible species is equated with the creation of the soul, which is natural, although it is made by God alone, because it is made according to the requirement of matter. Nor does it matter that the soul is not made except in disposed matter, while a species does not require a previous disposition. For this difference is quasi-material and arises from the fact that one is a substantial form, the other an accidental form.

But as to the thing and proportion, an intelligible species is as due to the intellect of an angel by reason of his capacity alone without any other previous disposition, as the soul is due to sufficiently organized matter, because the intellect of an angel through its own entity alone is determined to connaturally require such species, just as organized matter is determined to require a soul. This will be explained more in the following chapter, when treating of another difficulty concerning these species, which is requested in the same argument.

CHAPTER VII
WHETHER THE INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES CONCREATED WITH AN ANGEL EMANATE EFFECTIVELY FROM HIS INTELLECT, OR ARE MADE BY GOD ALONE, WITH THE ANGEL BEING ONLY PASSIVE

1. *First argument for emanation.*—The reason for doubting was touched on at the end of the preceding chapter, because intelligible species must be connatural to the angelic intellect; otherwise they would be created with them miraculously and not connaturally. Therefore they emanate from its essence either immediately, or at least through the mediation of the intellect. The consequence is proved, because if they are connatural and coeval by their nature, this cannot be except because of an intrinsic connection which they have with the nature of the angel. Therefore they are properties emanating from his essence, for this alone is usually the connection between the nature of a subject and a property inseparable from it. Hence I argue second, because if those species do not flow from angelic nature, they will not be its proper passions. Therefore they will be common accidents, such as are usually made by an extrinsic agent in a subject that is only passive. Therefore there is no principle for asserting that these accidents are coeval with all angels, because they do not flow from them, and the extrinsic agent by whom they are made does not act by necessity of nature, but freely. Hence he is not compelled to produce them together with the subject.

And this is confirmed from Aureolus, because it is unfitting to posit in an angel a natural passive potency for such species, and that there should not correspond to it a natural active potency by which that natural passive potency can be reduced to act. Therefore there is an intrinsic principle from which they actively flow. Third, the argument made above returns, because otherwise, although an angel were created without these species, no violence would be done to him, and consequently he could be created naturally in that way, which

in our view cannot be said, because otherwise an angel could naturally be not only ignorant, but also powerless to expel ignorance. But the consequence is proved, because what someone undergoes against an internal impulse is violent. But where there is not an internal principle from which a property actively emanates, there is not an internal impulse; for this is found only in active potency. Therefore, once that internal principle is removed, the privation of some form is not violent. Therefore neither will the lack of such species be violent for an angel, if they do not emanate intrinsically and actively from his essence.

2. *First opinion.*—On this point all authors who deny that angels have these connate species suppose as certain that they do not flow from the essence or intellect of an angel, because they do not think that lack to be against, or outside, the nature of an angel, but rather think it to be natural to him. But among those who think that angels have these concreated species, there are various opinions. The first affirms that they emanate actively and intrinsically from the intellect of an angel. Capreolus affirms this in 2, dist. 3, quest. 2, art. 3, to the argument of Aureolus against the third conclusion. This was nearly the second argument proposed by us, to which he responds that, just as our intellect flows from the soul, so the intellect of an angel, formed by species, proceeds from the substance of the angel. Cajetan indicates the same opinion in 1, 2, quest. 50, art. 6. For although at first he says only that *these species are connate to the angel from the author of nature*, he adds: *as heavy and light things have motion from the one generating them.* But motion natural to the thing generated does not occur without active emanation from the form of the thing generated. Therefore Cajetan thinks that species are made by God in angels in this way. And more expressly, quest. 51, art. 1, at the end, when he says that an angel has species from God, *not as though he previously existed and receives species from God, but because he has them in this way, because he possesses them as connate from God by a natural consequence upon his own essence*. He says the same more clearly in 3 part., quest. 9, art. 3, in the exposition of the title, where he says that the knowledge infused in an angel is a natural property, so accompanying the nature that by the same action by which the angel is created, intelligible species are impressed upon him. Medina follows the same there, and Bañez more fully, in the same quest. 55, art. 2, and he cites St. Thomas, 1 part., quest. 54, art. 4, reply to 1, saying *that in an angel knowledge is not generated, but is naturally present*. And in quest. 55, art. 3, reply to 1, because there he says that the universal notions of things exist first according to nature in angelic minds than in the things themselves. For he thinks that this cannot be true unless angelic species

flow from the essence of an angel, and there he multiplies other arguments, which are lighter; therefore, to avoid prolixity, I omit them, though I will touch on the response in passing. Hence Ripa also there, although he follows the opinion of Bañez, says that it does not necessarily, but fittingly, persuade. Yet he adds the place of St. Thomas, 1 part., quest. 64, art. 1, where he says that the natural cognition of an angel follows the nature of an angel, and therefore was not diminished in the demons. Valencia inclines to this, 1 part, disp. 6, quest. 6, at the end, but there he only contends that these species are natural properties, which he says Ferrariensis denied. But undeservedly, for rather others cite Ferrariensis for this opinion, because in book 2, *Contra Gentiles*, chap. 96, around argument 5, he says that angels have species from nature, and therefore connatural to them. But this is more general, and on this point there is no controversy between Capreolus and Ferrariensis, but on the mode of connaturality, as we will say.

3. *The extreme opposite opinion.*—Hence a second opinion can be reported, extremely contrary to the preceding one: that these species, even if they are concreated, not only do not actively emanate from the nature of an angel, but also are not connatural to him, or connaturally due. I see this opinion reported by no one. Yet it can not undeservedly be attributed to Alexander of Hales and to other authors who together posit in angels concreated species and species received from things, of the same objects and for the same kind of cognition. And Scotus too must have thought the same, since he asserted that although an angel had concreated species of the quiddities of material things, he could have acquired them if he did not have them connate. For from this doctrine it seems to follow that the species given to an angel at the beginning are not natural properties, nor connaturally due, since he could acquire similar ones. For the principles or instruments of operation which a created thing itself can acquire through its potencies and secondary causes are not due to any created thing. Therefore infused species are not due to man, because he can acquire them. Therefore, if an angel can receive species from things, they are not due to him through the action alone of the author of nature. Therefore, if they are concreated with him, they are not so because they are connatural to him, but from the liberality and a certain grace of the author of nature, willing to produce a thing in a state of perfection. Thus God also created man with habits and knowledge of natural things, although they were not connaturally due by force of such a nature. Hence those habits can be called supernatural according to the mode, that is, given in a preternatural mode. In this way, therefore, Alexander of Hales seems to think about angels; for he indicates that God created angels full

of sciences and intelligible species, not because all that perfection was due to them connaturally, but because of the magnificence of God making his works in a perfect state. Hence, just as the knowledge of Adam was infused per accidens, and in this respect above nature, so the concreated species of angels will be, according to this opinion, infused per accidens, because they have another connatural mode in which they are made. And it is confirmed: for a concreated species and a species acquired by an angel of the same object, and equally particular, are of the same species. Therefore each is acquirable by an angel. Therefore the one is infused per accidens, when from the freedom of God it was concreated.

4. *The third and true opinion.*—The third opinion is a mean between these extremes, and I judge it to be true. And to explain it I say first: the intelligible species concreated with angels did not effectively flow from the essence or intellect of the angel. Ferrariensis taught this opinion while opposing Capreolus, 2 *Contra Gentiles*, chap. 98, around the third part of the chapter, doubt 2. And Molina follows it and confirms it well, 1 part, quest. 52, art. 2, disp. 2, memb. 3, and Cumel in the same article, Pesantius there, conclusion 3, Daniel Malonius, in 2, dist. 3, disp. 11, Rada, in 2 part controversy, in 9, art. 3, who multiply several reasons. Yet I will touch only on those that seem effective; I will pass over the others. But first I am convinced that this was the opinion of St. Thomas, in the said quest. 55, art. 2, where he concludes as follows: *Angels attain their intelligible perfection through an intelligible outflow, by which they had received from God the species of known things together with their intellectual nature.* By these words he sufficiently indicates that God, by a special action distinct from the creation of the angel, effects these species at the same time as he creates the angels. And to 1, he repeats that *an angel has the likenesses of creatures from God, because as he is the cause of creatures, so in him the likenesses of things first exist.* Likewise, quest. 56, art. 2, reply to 4, he says that if God had created a new angel, he would either infuse, or would have infused, into the others the species of such an angel, which they do not now have, because such an angel is not going to exist. But then that species would not flow from the essence of the angels, as seems evident of itself, because a property flowing from an essence superflows. Therefore it would be infused by God, as St. Thomas thinks, through a proper action. Therefore he thinks that the species angels now have are infused in the same way. Moreover, in 3 part., quest. 9, art. 3, he says thus: *through the Word of God there were impressed upon the soul of Christ personally united to him intelligible species for all things for which the possible intellect is in potency, just as through the Word of God intelligible species were impressed upon the angelic mind*

at the beginning of the creation of things, as is clear through Augustine 2, Gennadius, ad lit., chap. 8. Here, both from the comparison he makes, and from the word "impressing," and from the distinction of that action from creation, it is manifestly clear that St. Thomas is speaking of the proper action of God infusing such species without intrinsic emanation from nature. For no one will say that God impressed intellect and will upon an angel when he created him. Finally, in other places he is accustomed only to say that these species are connate or concreated with angels, but he never suggested that they flow from the essence.

5. *The first conclusion is proved first.*—Let the first reason be, as it were, a posteriori: because things that flow from an essence are determined by nature; but from the intrinsic nature of an angel the certain species necessarily to be concreated with him are not determined, but are determined by divine providence. Therefore this is a sign that they do not flow from nature, but are infused by God. The major seems evident of itself, because the nature of each angel, taken individually, is determined just as in its essential perfection, so also in every perfection or property which it can emit from itself, as I may say, because essence is the root of all such properties. Hence, just as it is determined, so the properties that can flow from it are determined. But the minor is proved, because now individual angels have only the species of natural things that have been created in this world, or are in fact produced, at least as to their quiddities and species, as the common opinion holds. Therefore determination to such species is not from the intrinsic nature of the angel, but from the order of divine providence. The consequence is proved, because an angel, for example Gabriel, from his nature does not more determine fellowship with these angels with whom he has now been created than with other angels with whom he could be created; nor from his nature does he demand to be made with the heavens and the elements, or before them, or altogether without them. For he could be created in all these ways, and of himself he is indifferent to all of them. Therefore, that he is created in this or that way has been decreed by divine determination alone, or by the free will of God. But the determination of the intelligible species to be concreated with the angel depends on this determination or decree; for now he receives the concreated species of this visible world, because he has been created with it and in it. But if he were created with another world, as he could be, he would receive the species of that world and not of this one. But if only angels were created, so that God had decreed to create no material things, the species of material things would not have been infused into angels, but only those of angels. And if God had decreed

to create not these but other angels, he would have given them the species of the angels then to be created and not of those who have now been created, just as he has now given angels the species of their companions and not of others who could be created with them and are not going to be created. Therefore this is a sign that this determination of species depends on the free disposition of God. Therefore it is a sign that they are infused through the proper action of God and do not flow from the essences of angels.

6. *It is proved second.*—Second, I argue, or rather I explain the force of the same argument in another way, because if the intelligible species of other things knowable by an angel flow intrinsically from his essence, or intellective power, it follows that an angel has, and that there flow from that power, the species of all creatable things and essences. The consequent is false. Therefore. The consequence is proved, because all creatable things, speaking distributively, are knowable by any angel now created. Therefore, if some species of some knowable things necessarily flow from angelic nature, the species of all knowable things flow at once. The consequence is proved both because there is no greater reason for these than for those, and also because, although he cannot use all of them at once in second act, he has at once the power from which all flow, and he can be constituted by all of them at once in first act. And species do not impede one another in this, and their root is equally naturally determined to all, and conversely each of them can naturally flow from such an essence. Therefore they emanate at once. You will say that there is not the same reason concerning all things knowable by an angel, because not all are equally possible, since some are possible according to ordinary power, others according to absolute power only, and some are only possible, while others are not only possible, but also future. But this has been refuted in the first argument. For ordinary power and absolute power in the present case are not distinguished except by order to the free decree of the divine will, because, precisely looking at the possible things themselves of which we are speaking, all are of the natural order, and could be made through the same mode of creation or production. Therefore, only because God decreed to create these and not those, these are said to be possible according to ordinary power, others only through absolute power, and these only possible, those possible and future. Therefore those differences of possible things do not matter for varying the properties of an angel flowing from his essence, because, as I said, those properties do not have determination from the free decree of the divine will, but from the intrinsic nature and perfection of that essence from which they flow. Therefore.

7. *It is proved third.*—Hence I argue third, or explain the same difficulty in another way: because whatever can flow from some essence as an intrinsic property inhering in it always flows or results, unless it is impeded by a miracle. But the species of possible things, according to the contrary opinion, can flow from the essence of an angel, as is clear, because if God had willed to create those things, their species would be concreated with the angel, and so would flow from his essence. Therefore they flow even now, because that flow is natural and by necessary resultance, and it is not impeded by the fact that God has not decreed to produce the things representable through those species, because species can equally exist whether the thing exists or not, and consequently whether it is ever going to be or is not. It is also confirmed and explained in another way: for if God were now to create a new angel, all the other angels could know him. Therefore they would have a species of him. But not by natural resultance, because what belongs to a thing by natural resultance always belongs to it. Therefore that species would be given by the action of the author of nature alone. Therefore the same must be said of the others.

8. *What Bañez contrives concerning the preceding argument.*—Compelled by this argument, Bañez, in the said art. 2, doubt 1, responding to a certain confirmation, although he concedes that in that case angels could not know another angel newly created unless a new species were infused into them by God, nevertheless says that it is a problem whether the infusion of such a species would be supernatural or natural. For the first seems to be made probable, both from the fact that that intelligible species would not flow from the nature of the preexisting angels as their property and passion, otherwise they previously lacked some natural property, and also because that angel newly created would be above the nature of this universe, because without him this universe is most perfect in order to its natural end. Likewise, the second is made probable, because that newly created angel would now pertain to the order of this universe, and consequently his species would be due to all angels, to whom according to the order of nature the species of the whole universe and its parts are due. Therefore the infusion of that species would be natural, that is, naturally due, at least by the debt of universal nature, although it would not pertain to the nature of the individual angels. But first, these things do not evacuate the force of the argument, because that species would not flow from within, and as it were by natural necessity, from the other angels, but would be freely infused into them. Hence a sufficiently effective argument is drawn, that neither do the remaining species of coexisting angels flow from their essence, because it is irrelevant to the intrinsic emanation of the properties of an angel whether God

has decreed to create the angels together or at different times; for from this the intrinsic nature of an angel is not varied, nor is the necessary connection with such and such a property, as seems evident of itself.

9. *Nor does this accord with St. Thomas.—A newly created angel would not be above nor beyond the nature of the universe.*—Next, all those things are said in vain about that case, and they are alien to the doctrine of St. Thomas. For it is vainly imagined that if God created a new angel, he would newly infuse a species of him into the preexisting angels. For it is said much more truly that they would have had that species concreated from the beginning, as St. Thomas expressly teaches, quest. 56, art. 2, reply to 4. For although God would newly create a new angel, nevertheless he would not newly have decreed to create him, but from eternity would have disposed himself to do so. And therefore, just as from the beginning he infused into angels the species of material things, not only of those which he made together with angels, but also of those which he decreed to make, or foresaw would be, so if he had decreed after the first angels to make others at a later time, he would from the beginning have implanted the species of all into the angels created first; for there is the same or a greater reason. Hence it is also said in vain that that newly created angel would have been above the nature of the universe, since he would be a substance similar in grade and in some genus or species to the other angels, and therefore of the natural order. Nor does the universe determine for itself from the nature of the thing a certain number of angels so that it might be most perfect; rather, this depends on the predefinition of God. For who doubts that God could have created more angels from the beginning than he has now created, or that, if he had done this, all those angels would have had to pertain to the order and perfection of the universe? Therefore the same holds if he had decreed to create new angels in the course of time. For those already created would pertain to the order and perfection of the universe, because God is free to complete the perfection of the world either all at once or successively, in these or in those parts. Hence it cannot be thought with any probability that the creation of that new angel would be supernatural, since it would be of the same account as the creations of the preceding angels. Indeed, although, attending to the order of things which God has now predefined, it could be called preternatural, nevertheless on the supposition of such a case, it would not then even be preternatural, since by that very fact it is presupposed that God had predefined the consummation of the perfection of the universe and the number of angels in another way. From this it follows consequently that it cannot be doubted that the infusion of such a species would be as connatural to the angels as are the

species of other things which come to be in the universe either together or successively. These are required and are natural, not from universal nature, but from the proper condition and nature of the angel, although their determination presupposes the order of the universal nature of the whole universe, as we will explain a little later. And finally, although we say that in that case such a species would have been connate to the prior angels, the same argument remains, namely, that that concreation of species is not by way of intrinsic emanation, since it can vary when the existing things, or things future in some difference of time, are varied.

10. *It is proved fourth, and a priori.*—Fourth, I argue by explaining the reason a priori: for the essence of an angel cannot through itself be the species of all things intelligible by an angel, because it neither contains them eminently nor has been made through itself for the representation of them. And the intellect of an angel flowing from such an essence does not flow constituted in first act and having through itself the same power of representing which the species have, because the essence from which it flows in no way contains in itself, virtually or representatively, the things knowable by an angel. Therefore, for the same reason, the species of all things intelligible by an angel cannot flow from such an essence or from his intellect, in which they are not contained except as in a passive or receptive potency. And this reason is confirmed, because an intelligible species is required on the side of the object, not on the side of the knower, as I explained above. Therefore they do not flow through themselves from the knower, as he has the power of knowing, for this is distinguished from the object. It is ordered to the object by way of passive potency, which includes an order to the object either as to its mover, or as to the terminus and matter about which it is occupied, but it does not elicit it, nor that which supplies its place, either by proper efficiency or by natural resultance. And this can be explained further, because a species is, as it were, the seed and instrument of the object. Therefore from the nature of the thing it ought to come from the object, not from the knower, and consequently, when it does not come from the object or cannot be made from it, it must be made by a superior agent which has the idea or eminence of the object. Therefore it cannot flow from the knower, who is of a distinct and limited nature. Finally, if the nature of the angel as knower were such that these species could emanate from it, scarcely could a probable reason be given why the essence of the angel, either through itself or at least through its intellect, would not rather have the same power of representing which the species has, without the multiplication of new forms or entities.

11. *Second conclusion.—The infusion of species by God is connatural to angels.*—I say second: the infusion, or concreation, of intelligible species of things of the natural order, and the species themselves as forms, are connatural to an angel, so that without a miracle and some natural violence they cannot be denied to them. St. Thomas openly teaches this assertion in the places cited, and especially in the said quest. 55, reply to 2, he calls angelic species *connatural*, which Ferrariensis also defends above; and Valencia and others who call these species connatural properties of an angel properly intend the same, without requiring emanation. And it is proved briefly in this way: because for some form or property to be connatural, it is not necessary that it flow actively from that nature; but whatever else, apart from active emanation, is required or can suffice for some form or property to be connatural is found in angelic species. Therefore they are connatural properties. First, the major is proved from St. Thomas, 1, 2, quest. 6, art. 5, reply to 2, where he teaches that a form can be called connatural either from an active principle, as heat to fire, or from a passive principle only, and he gives the example of the motion of the heaven, which he says is connatural to it. Likewise it could be applied to quantity, which with respect to matter is a property connatural to it, although perhaps it does not actively flow from it; or also to matter itself, to which it is connatural to be under a form, indeed it naturally cannot be without some form, even if it does not have an active connection, so to speak, with it. Some also think that personality or subsistence does not actively result from human nature, although there is no doubt that it is connatural to it; and although perhaps it is more probable that it actively results, nevertheless it is more certain that connaturality does not necessarily demand efficiency. But the reason for this will be explained in proving the other part. Therefore I prove the other proposition assumed, namely, that once efficiency is set aside, whatever can be desired for a connatural property is found in these species. For first, the species themselves in their substance are of the natural order, since they are proportioned both to objects and to natural powers. Angels also are created with a natural potency for receiving them, as is evident of itself. God also, in their infusion, operated as author of nature, not only in effecting them, but also in giving them together with the nature and intellect, because the perfection of angelic nature requires and demands this no less than the heaven demands a round figure, which God made in it together with substance and quantity, with the heaven itself being only passive, without any efficiency by way of natural emanation, but only demanding that disposition as connatural to itself. Likewise this can be explained by that proportional argument which St. Thomas takes from the

matter of the heaven, in the said quest. 55, art. 2, because the matter of the heaven connaturally demands a form concreated with it, even if it does not have an influence as it were active into that form, but only demands it through a connatural potency demanding such an act as necessary to it and connaturally due. Therefore in the same way connaturality can and must be understood in angelic species, because angels also have a natural receptive potency for them, which because of its perfection demands to be completed, as to first act, by its author, since it can be completed by no other. And consequently it also demands to have this kind of complement of first act connate to itself, both because of its immateriality and its great actuality, by reason of which it demands always to be in first act with respect to its acts, and because there could be no natural reason why they would be deprived of such a natural perfection in the beginning, or why it would later be bestowed on them at this time rather than at that. Therefore this is a sign that it is natural to them to receive it from the beginning.

12. *To the first argument in number two.—To the second.*—To the first reason for doubting, therefore, the consequence is denied, for not every connatural property emanates from an essence. Nor is natural emanation of this kind alone the adequate reason for a natural connection between essence and property; rather, it can be founded on a natural receptive potency of such a condition that it naturally demands such an act as coeval with it and perpetually conjoined to it, as has been explained in matter and quantity, or form. And similarly to the second, the consequence is denied when it is inferred that these species are not the proper passions of angels; or, to remove a question about the name, the consequent is distinguished. For if a proper passion is said to be only that which flows from an essence, the inference is conceded. Nor is this any unfitting thing, because it will be able to be a natural property of another account, and thus it does not follow that it is a common accident. But that signification of proper passion is too strict and outside common usage. For quantity is truly and properly called a passion of matter, although it does not demand it effectively. Hence, taking proper passion as it signifies a property due to and naturally inseparable from a subject, in this sense the antecedent, or first inference, has rightly been denied. And thus the second also ceases, because between common accidents and those that actively flow from an essence, there are some connatural properties by reason of a passive potency requiring them, and such are the species of angels. Although they can be said to be connatural by reason of a natural active potency; not because the intrinsic potency of an angel is active with respect to such species, for in this respect it is rather passive, but because it is active with respect to its own acts, and in this it is not complete

through itself. Therefore it connaturally demands that the complement of that active principle be given to it by its author. Hence the final inference is also denied, namely, that once natural emanation is set aside no principle remains for asserting that these species are coeval and connatural to an angel. For this sufficient principle is the natural capacity and perfection, or, so to speak, the exigency of angelic nature itself. For this reason it makes no difference that God will confer these species freely and not from necessity of nature, because, once the creation of things is supposed, God operates the rest in a way consonant with the nature of each thing. Thus too God, not from absolute necessity but by his will, provides general aid to secondary causes; nor are the secondary causes themselves in any way active principles of such concurrence, even through some natural resultance, but they demand it according to the connatural order, and this suffices for it always to be given. Therefore the same must be said proportionally about angelic species.

13. *To the confirmation of Aureolus.*—And hence, to the confirmation of Aureolus, we respond that it would indeed be unfitting if there were some receptive potency of the natural order to which there did not correspond an active potency of the natural order, by which it could be reduced to act. But there is no unfittingness if that potency is not created, but is the very potency of the author of nature, because that potency also, according to the order of nature, sometimes operates immediately to complete the perfection which the creature requires. This is clear in the example just given concerning the concurrence of God, which is natural, although it can be conferred immediately by God alone. Likewise in the creation of the rational soul, for which matter is in natural potency, even proximate potency, when it is organized, and nevertheless it can be reduced to act by the author of nature alone. And just as in this example that does not arise from imperfection, but rather from the perfection of the rational soul, so in the present case it arises from the perfection of angelic nature that its natural capacity in this respect can be filled by the author of nature alone.

14. *To the third argument.—Concerning violence.*—The third argument asks whether violence would be done to an angel if species were not given to him. In this question one must omit the question, perhaps about the name, whether God, by doing or not doing something in created things miraculously or extraordinarily against their natures, must be said to do violence to a creature. And, so that the doubt may proceed, we are now speaking in this way, supposing that God can do violence to things. Having supposed this, I respond to the argument by denying the consequence, because in truth violence would be inflicted on an angel by depriving him of species, or by not providing them at

the due time. And what is assumed in the proof is false, that nothing is violent unless it is against an active impulse, as must be treated more fully in 1, 2. But now it is explained briefly, because the violent universally is that which is against natural appetite, even if it belongs to a passive potency requiring and demanding such an act for the complement of its nature, as is openly gathered from St. Thomas, 1, 2, quest. 6, art. 5, reply to 2. And here this natural appetite is called an internal impulse, and it is gratuitously limited to the natural appetite of an active potency. For certainly active potency, as it is in first act, before it acts either in time or in nature, does not have a greater impulse toward act than matter has toward form; and yet this suffices for privative violence, so to speak, such as is judged to exist when a natural agent, with all things required for acting in place, is deprived of general concurrence. Therefore an angel would suffer similar violence if he were deprived of species.

15. *Then, concerning coercion.*—But these things proceed concerning violence taken commonly, as it is common to things lacking cognition. For violence, as it is also coercion properly so called, is against elicited appetite. In this it agrees with violence, that it can also occur through privation alone, when that privation is against the internal impulse of elicited appetite. And thus there could also have been violence and a coerced lack of species in an angel, because it would be against his elicited appetite and desire; and because that desire is also natural, either as to exercise, insofar as an angel naturally loves himself and his perfection, or at least as to specification, because it would be conformed to that natural appetite by which every man naturally desires to know. Therefore from this side such a denial of species can be called both coerced and violent for an angel, considered according to the nature of the thing. For through grace and freedom an angel could conform his will with the divine in such a way that that lack would not be simply coerced for him with respect to the will; nevertheless it would always be violent with respect to nature. But once that case is posited, it is not surprising that an angel would both be perpetually ignorant of those things whose species had not been given to him, and be powerless to expel that ignorance through himself. For every creature can be deprived by its author of its proper perfection, even if he does this with violence and with a power which the creature cannot resist. Hence, in order for the species to be natural, it is enough that they always be due to the nature, and that the author of nature, as such, can by an action connatural to the angel himself remove that force.

CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER VIII
WHETHER AN ANGEL HAS CONCREATED SPECIES OF ALL UNIVERSAL AND SINGULAR EXISTING THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ORDER OF NATURE

1. *Three orders of things are distinguished.*—In order to explain the point of difficulty, some things must be supposed, some of which are certain, while some are to be disputed in what follows. Three orders of things must be distinguished: for some are of the supernatural order, such as grace and miracles; others are of the free order, so to speak, such as thoughts of hearts and acts of the will; others are of the natural order, as distinguished both from the supernatural and from the free, such as the heavens and the elements. Therefore in the present case we are not speaking of the first two orders, because each in its own way exceeds natural angelic cognition, and therefore from the nature of the thing it is not necessary that angels have species of them, or in what way they know those things; we will discuss this in the following chapters. But things of the third order can be subdivided into things that are contained in this created universe and are going to have existence in some difference of time, and into possible things that will never be, but lie hidden in the treasuries of divine omnipotence. I will speak of these latter in the tenth chapter; here we are dealing only with the former, because we have treated of them up to this point, from which some things must be supposed. The first is that angels have innate species of all things created and to be created from the beginning of the world to the end, not only as to genera and species, but also as to individuals. For all the things we have brought forward up to this point prove this.

2. *Resolution of the question as to the species of essence and existence.*—But because individuals can also be considered according to the esse of essence, or according to actual existence, present, past, or future, one can therefore ask whether according to these three or four states they are represented through the same or through diverse species, and if through the same, how the same species suffices for all these things. But as concerns the essence and existence of a singular thing, it was shown above against Scotus that, with respect to things existing at some time, the intelligible species is the same through which an angel knows both, because the essence of an existing singular thing is not distinguished in reality from its existence, and although they are distinguished by us in formal reason, they cannot be separated in angelic intuitive cognition.

For an angel, by intuiting, for example, the heaven perfectly and as it is in itself, knows it; and therefore that vision is essentially quidditative of such an object. Therefore it is cognition of the thing according to the esse of essence, and at the same time it is cognition of existence, because it is intuitive cognition. But the species through which such cognition occurs is one. Therefore that same species sufficiently represents that thing according to the esse of essence and of existence. For this reason, even if at some time such a thing does not exist, and therefore is known abstractively according to the esse of essence alone, for that cognition there is no need for a species distinct from the other one, through which an existing essence can be known intuitively and quidditatively at the same time, because those two cognitions are related as including and included. For the perfect cognition of an existing thing includes cognition of the existence and adds a peculiar mode of knowing it as actually existing; the other merely prescinds from this mode and represents the same essence. Therefore the same principle sufficient for the first is, a fortiori, sufficient for the second; for what can do more can also do less, when what is less is included in the greater. But whether conversely the species representing the essence of a thing in an angel can represent actual existence by the same species, or whether then something must be added to such a species, although in the preceding we said in passing that the same species suffices, nevertheless because of the opinions and for a greater clarification of the whole matter, we will speak in the following chapters about those three modes of knowing actual existence as present, past, or future.

3. *What must be resolved concerning the species of generic, specific, and singular grade.—First assertion of the true resolution.*—A similar doubt is usually treated about the species of genera, species, and individuals, namely, whether an angel not only has species of all these, but also whether such species are diverse among themselves. For Scotus, in 2, dist. 3, quest. 10, thinks that these species are distinct, since he says that angels have innate species of universal things, but not of singular things. But I, according to what we have disputed up to this point, think first that special species of universal predicates, or genera and specific natures, are not necessary for angels, since they have species of singular things. This is proved because those very species of singular things represent their quiddities. Therefore they represent the specific and generic account, without which a singular thing cannot be known quidditatively, as it is known by an angel. You will say: although he does not know a singular thing unless he knows the universals contracted in it, nevertheless, in order to know the universals themselves precisely and abstractly, he needs species representing universals. It is responded by denying the consequence, even if such cognition is

admitted in an angel, because, as I was saying a little earlier, the same principle that suffices for the greater suffices for the lesser which is included in the greater. But to know a species precisely and abstractly is less than to know quidditatively the individual in which it is included. Therefore, although an angel wills to contemplate the specific nature precisely, the intelligible species of any individual of that nature suffices for him, because by his freedom he can not use that species according to its whole representation, but only as it were in part, as we will say below concerning other species of angels that are universal on the side of the things represented.

4. *Second assertion, in two parts.*—Then I add that such species abstractly and precisely representing universals are not consonant with angelic nature, and consequently are not infused into it; and if in some way they are found in it, they are acquired rather than infused. The prior part is proved, because those species are especially connatural to angels through which each one can know things most perfectly, as far as is possible for him. But species representing a specific nature precisely and abstracted from all individuals do not suffice for knowing such a nature in the most perfect mode possible to an angel. Therefore such species are not consonant with angelic nature. Therefore such species are not infused into them, because the author of nature provides those things that are necessary for an operation fitting to nature, not those that fall short of the perfection of nature. In this reason only the minor needs some clarification, for the rest seems clear of itself. Therefore that proposition is proved and explained, because if a specific nature is considered as something potential, it is compared to an individual as potency to act. But every potency is known more perfectly as reduced into act than in potency only. Therefore a specific nature conceived abstractly and precisely is known imperfectly and confusedly, in comparison with the cognition of it in an individual, when the individual itself is seen distinctly and as it is in itself, quidditatively, as singulars are known by angels. But if specific nature is considered only as an actual whole, then also in any individual it is known most exactly and perfectly as to that which can be common; and further, by the very fact that that common thing is known according to a determinate mode and grade in some individual, it is perceived more distinctly and clearly, and, so to speak, is more penetrated. Therefore the species of singular things alone can most perfectly represent universals to angels, and consequently they alone are connatural to angels, at least as to infusion. Hence the last part is easily proved, because those species do not demand to be infused. Therefore, if in some way they are in angels, they will be only acquired. But whether they are, I will say at once.

5. *Objections.*—But against the prior part the common arguments can be objected. First, because for perfect science the science of universals is necessary, since, as Aristotle testifies, science is not of singulars, but of universals. But it is natural to angels to have perfect infused science. Therefore it is also natural for them to know universals, and therefore to have species of universals. Second, because at least in material things, singulars do not seem able to be represented through themselves first by immaterial species, which abstract from designated matter, for which reason the human intellect is said not to be able directly to know the singular. Therefore angelic species represent common nature through themselves, while singulars are known as it were per accidens, or secondarily, or by the power of the intellect, as we reported above from the opinion of certain authors. Third, because generic and specific nature, as such, cannot be known unless its community is known. But that community cannot be known through proper concepts of singular things, because through them the common nature is rather known as contracted. Therefore. But the response to these is easy.

6. *They are solved.—The given resolution is valid also in our species.*—To the first we respond, first, that there is perfect science of singulars in angels, just as there is also in God, because they are knowable by him who is able to know the natures or entities of things as they are in themselves. But human science, because it is imperfect, is by another special reason said to be of universals, because it cannot know the proper and individual conditions of singulars by proper science, but has science of them according to common predicates. But I add further that angels, by knowing singulars, know universals in them, by evidently intuiting the essences of the singulars themselves and their agreement or difference among themselves, as I will now say. To the second, the antecedent is denied; for a spiritual species can directly and properly represent a material singular thing, because the representation of an intelligible species is not through agreement in natural esse with the thing represented, but in a higher mode, as St. Thomas rightly said, quest. 57, art. 2, reply to 2, and he proves it best by the example of the divine ideas. But whether this is so in an intellect receiving species from material things through the medium of a phantasm is a controversy to be disputed in the last treatise. But I think the same must be said of the human intellect according to its capacity; for although it is said to receive a species from things by abstracting it from phantasms, this must not be understood of abstraction in representing, but in being, as we will say more fully there. To the third, the minor is denied, for the community of nature is not something in reality distinct from singulars, but is the likeness among the singulars themselves, which under the aspect of a common thing is abstracted

through our mode of conceiving. Yet the entire essence of the thing can be sufficiently known without such abstraction; for to this it is enough to know the foundation of that community or universality which we make by knowing.

7. *Whether an angel knows universals by a special concept.—The affirmative part.*—But in that argument it is asked whether angels know the common predicates of genera and species through proper and precise concepts of them, through which they do not actually know singulars. Scotus and all who attribute to an angel proper species of universals distinct from the species of singulars suppose the affirmative part; for they say that those species exist without these, or at least can exist, and that through them angels do not know singulars. Therefore they know universals and common things by abstracting from the cognition of singulars. Nor does St. Thomas seem to contradict this opinion on this point, for although he says that angels have species of singulars not received from things, he says that through them they know both universals and singulars, although he does not explain the mode of knowing. And the Thomists speak in almost the same way. By reason it can be urged that this mode of knowing is possible for an angel, because he is free to use an intelligible species adequately or inadequately as he wills, when no repugnance is found on the side of the thing. But cognition of universal nature by abstracting from singulars is only inadequate with respect to an intelligible species representing a singular thing, and it involves no repugnance, as is clear, because individuation is not of the intrinsic account of common nature. Therefore.

8. *The negative part is urged.*—Nevertheless the contrary can be persuaded first, because it is impossible to conceive a common nature abstracted from singulars except by distinguishing it from singulars at least by reason. But an angel cannot make this distinction by his intellect. Therefore neither can he conceive an abstract common nature. The major is clear, because by the very fact that one thing is separated from another, it is distinguished from it, certainly in the mode in which it is separated. Hence, if it is separated only by cognition, it is distinguished by reason. But that this is impossible for an angel is proved, because one who knows a thing as it is cannot fashion in it a distinction of reason; otherwise he would not know it as it is, since such a distinction is not in the thing. But angels know things as they are in themselves. Therefore they do not abstract or distinguish common nature from the singular. Second, because otherwise God too would have cognition of this kind of abstract universal nature, because this does not conflict with God because of his simplicity; for whatever an angel can know by diverse concepts, God can know by one most simple concept, if otherwise there is no repugnance on the side of the object.

Hence, if God cannot have that abstract cognition, it is only because he knows things as they are. But in this angels imitate God. Therefore they too cannot know universals in that way. And this argument confirms St. Thomas above, insofar as he explains the species and cognition of universals and singulars in an angel through the ideas and cognition of God. Third, because cognition of an abstract universal nature is very confused and in some way fabricated, because, since the nature in reality does not have such a mode of being, the common concept concerning it seems to be contrived. Therefore it is repugnant to an angel.

9. *Each part is judged probable, and the arguments of the negative part are satisfied.*—On this point each part can easily be defended, for no repugnance is given in such a mode of knowing, neither on the side of the thing to be known, as the foundation of the prior opinion proves at least, nor on the side of the angel, as will easily be clear by responding to the later reasons. For the first reason proves at most that an angel cannot make that distinction of reason through that act by which he actually knows a singular thing as it is. But an angel can, at his own choice, not actually know some singular, and then make a cognition of common nature from which a distinction of reason results. Indeed, even if an angel does not cease from the intuitive act of a singular thing, if at the same time he wills to contemplate its specific nature abstractly, no repugnance is involved, because then, if any distinction of reason results, it does not occur through the act by which the thing is seen as it is in itself, but through another by which it is not so seen, and this is not repugnant. For a blessed one seeing God, although by the vision itself he does not distinguish the divine attributes by reason, can distinguish them through the natural cognition which he has of God at the same time.

10. *What cognition of a thing as it is means.*—You will say: it is repugnant for an angel to know some natural object through its proper species and not as it is. I respond that "as it is" is equivocal. For it can signify the mode of existing which it has in reality, and in this sense, although the antecedent is true with respect to intuitive and proper cognition of an existing singular thing, it is not true with respect to every act of knowing of an angel, because he can have abstractive cognition which is not terminated in a thing actually existing or singular. Hence if the antecedent is taken in this universal sense, it must be denied, because it begs the question by assuming what is in controversy. But in another way, "as it is" can signify the mode of essence or existence, and in this sense it is true according to the proportion of cognition. And thus an angel knowing a specific nature abstractly knows it as it is in essential or specific esse,

for example, being rational or intellectual in such a grade and essential mode. And such cognition of the thing as it is does not necessarily exclude every distinction of reason, but can make it, or at least found it. For these two things must also be distinguished: the direct cognition alone of universal nature does not properly and formally make a distinction of reason, but makes its proximate foundation; for the remote foundation is in reality itself. But the distinction is completed through a reflex comparison between the thing thus known and the thing as existing in reality, which perhaps an angel can consequently have, because that cognition too is true, and there is no reason why it should be repugnant to an angel. Nor in this must an angel be equated with God, which is done in the second reason, because although those acts are not impossible, they are imperfect in some way, and therefore formally conflict with God, although God in an eminent mode knows all things that can be known through them. But it is otherwise with angels, to whom not every imperfection is repugnant. By this the third reason is solved. For what is added there, that the concept of common nature in common is a fabricated concept, is false, because it is a concept prescinded from the cognition of singulars, which occurs without any fabrication, because through that concept the known nature is not known to have in reality the mode of existing which it has in cognition. And therefore nothing is thought or fabricated, but only through that act one thing is known without another, which can be done without falsity or fabrication, even among those things that are not actually distinguished on the part of the thing.

11. *The author's judgment about the affirmative part.*—Therefore that mode of knowing is not impossible for an angel. But because it is imperfect, it seems alien, ordinarily speaking, to so perfect an intelligence; indeed, it also seems idle and superfluous. And therefore I think that angels operating in a prudent mode do not use this kind of cognition concerning those objects of which they have proper species and which they can know distinctly and as they are in themselves. Yet absolutely it is not repugnant; indeed it is necessary to posit such cognition in angels concerning common objects which they cannot know more distinctly. For we will see in what follows that there are some objects of this sort. And from this the last part of the assertion at the end of number 4 is left more explained, in which I said conditionally that if angels have species representing precise universals, they are not infused but acquired. For although these species are not infused, if an angel at some time exercises an act of abstract cognition of common nature, by force of that act of abstract cognition some species of the nature thus known can be left in the potency of the angel. Therefore that species will be acquired. But one must consider that, if such a species is left, it is only by

way of memory of a past thing, as I will say below. And therefore it does not immediately represent common nature, but represents the act by which that nature was abstractly known. For through that species an angel can remember that he had such an act, and because he cannot remember that act as it preceded in reality unless he knows of it that it was an act of abstract cognition of such a nature, therefore mediately and as it were obliquely it represents the abstract nature. And thus far concerning the species of things existing in some difference of time.

CHAPTER IX
WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN KNOW FUTURE THINGS THROUGH SPECIES GIVEN TO HIM FROM THE BEGINNING

1. *It is argued for the affirmative side. —It is now argued for the negative side.*—The reason for the difficulty arises from what was said in the preceding chapter, and was touched upon above, because from what was said it seems to follow that an Angel can know future things from the force of such species. It is proved, because an Angel from the beginning had species of future singulars; therefore through them he can know such future individuals. It will be responded from what was said above that he can indeed know those things which are future, simply, or as possible, but not that they are future. But on the contrary, first, because those species do not represent only non-complex things, which are, for example, the subject and predicate in a proposition about the future, but also represent the connection of those extremes; for the connection which we know by composing, an Angel knows by a simple act; therefore they are also represented to him by a simple species; therefore in fact those species which represent existing singular things to an Angel also represent that connection or union of the extremes, because in relation to angelic cognition it is a certain singular and individual thing; therefore through such a species they know non-complexly such a complex, or the union of the predicate with the subject. You will say that they know it indeed when it is present, but not before, so long as it is future. But on the contrary, because entirely the same species represents the present and existing thing, which was given from the beginning without any change made in it; therefore the same species suffices for knowing the same thing always, and thus also as future. But to the contrary, if future things could be known through those species, an Angel could also know future contingents, which is against Scripture. The consequence is clear, because the

argument made proceeds equally for all future things, whether they are future necessarily or contingently.

2. *First note for the resolution.*—To touch the point of the difficulty, some clearer things must be supposed and settled. First of all, a twofold mode of knowing a future thing must be distinguished. One is by knowing it in another, namely, in a cause, or in a sign of a cause, in the way a future eclipse is known in the motions of the heavens, and future rain in signs of the heavens, as in the color of clouds, or wind, and so on. Another mode of knowing future things is in themselves immediately and directly, by intuiting in itself the future truth itself, just as a present thing and actually existing thing is seen; in this way we understand God to know and see future things. But by comparison with intelligible species, the difference between these two modes must be considered, namely, that the former does not occur through the proper species of the future effect, but from the force of the species of the cause; for that suffices for such cognition of a future thing without another species of the future thing. But the latter cognition, if it is admitted in an Angel, will occur through the proper species of the future thing, because through it the thing is not known in another, or from another, but in itself; and the proposed difficulty proceeds concerning this mode of cognition. Another difference must also be noted, namely, that the former cognition of future things is through another known medium, namely, through the cause or sign; but the latter occurs without a known medium, through the species alone, which contributes to knowing the thing itself, even if the thing itself is unknown. We will speak of the former mode in this chapter, and of the latter in the following chapter.

3. *Second note.*—Second, future things must be distinguished. For some are those which come about by natural necessity, such as changes of seasons, and so on; others are those which come about contingently, of which three grades are usually distinguished from Aristotle: for some things happen rarely, others frequently, others indifferently toward either side. But for the present matter another distinction among them is more necessary. For in some, contingency arises from the mere concurrence or meeting of many natural causes impeding one another, without the intervention of any free cause acting; but in others contingency arises from the freedom of some cause, which can promote or impede the effect at its own discretion. Therefore concerning all these, as regards direct cognition which occurs immediately from the force of the representation of species and not from the cognition of the cause or causes, there seems to me to be the same reason, as I will say in the following chapter. But in cognition through the cause there is a great difference, which can be declared through

brief assertions; for in this mode of cognition scarcely any grave difficulty or variety of opinions can be found.

4. *First conclusion. — Second conclusion. Its twofold sense.*—First, therefore, it is certain that future things which proceed from causes acting naturally and immutably can be certainly foreknown by Angels through those same causes, as future. This is outside controversy, as is clear from St. Thomas, First Part, Quest. 57, art. 3, and all there, and in Book 2, distinction 3, because we suppose that Angels certainly know natural causes and their efficacy; therefore, when these are known, from them they will certainly know what they are going to do. Likewise wise men certainly know these future things, as an astrologer knows a future eclipse and similar things. Second, I assert that Angels can certainly know future contingents which will come about from natural causes alone without the intervention of any free cause; not, however, as they are contingent, but as necessary. For such future things can be considered under a twofold respect. First, under a respect to the proximate cause alone, without consideration of other natural causes which can occur and impede the effect. And thus it is manifest that cognition in such a cause cannot be certain even for Angels, because the medium of cognition is not infallible, since it can be impeded. Nor does it matter that the other cause which can intervene is of the same genus, that is, effective, or of another, as material, because whatever it may be, it introduces uncertainty of the future effect.

5. *It is proved, however, in the second sense.*—But by contemplating the future effect under the other respect to the complete concurrence of all causes, both efficient and material, and by comprehending it, it will be known most certainly which effect is going to occur or is not going to occur. This is proved, because from that collection of causes concurring in this way such or such an effect necessarily proceeds; for all act, or cause, naturally, as is supposed. Hence if they can impede one another, they will necessarily impede one another, and either a monstrous effect will emerge, and such an effect will be foreknown, or the effect will be entirely impeded, and this very thing will be foreknown. But Angels know not only the singular natural causes proximately acting, but they can also actually consider the disposition of the matter and the whole course of heavenly and earthly causes then concurring; therefore they can certainly know the future effect, because under that aspect it is not contingent, but necessary. And thus without doubt they are comprehended by St. Thomas, in the said art. 3, and in *Contra Gentiles*, Book 3, chapter 154, under that assertion by which he affirms that an Angel certainly knows the things which happen of necessity. For, as he himself teaches in *Contra Gentiles*, Book 1, chapter 67, argument 3, those

things which come about from a complete and unimpeded contingent cause come about of necessity. Hence in the same place he proves that God can certainly know such future things, because he certainly knows all the causes which can impede them and whether they impede them or not. There Ferrariensis also notes that such cognition is not of the contingent as contingent, but as necessary, and therefore can be certain. All of this has place in its own grade in Angels.

5. [bis] *The same St. Thomas and others act for the conclusion.*—Hence the same St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, Quest. 8, art. 12, said very well that Angels by natural power can know those things which are determined in natural causes, either in one cause alone, or in the collection of many, because something is contingent with respect to one cause which with respect to the concurrence of many causes is necessary. But Angels know all natural causes; therefore this cognition has place in them. And Albert, in Book 2, distinction 7, art. 5, Durandus, Quest. 3, number 4, Pesantius, said Quest. 57, art. 1, at the beginning, and Ripa in the same place, teach the same thing in substance. Nor do those who, speaking generally, deny that an Angel can naturally know contingents with certainty contradict this truth, because either they speak formally of contingents as they are contingent, and thus Alensis seems to speak, Part 2, Quest. 25, member 4, and Bonaventure, in Book 2, distinction 7, Part 2, art. 1, Quest. 3, Argentina, Quest. 1, art. 3, Giles, Quest. 2, art. 1, and Marsilius, in Book 2, Quest. 7, art. 1, Part 2 of that question, after the seventh conclusion; or they are unwilling to call these effects absolutely contingent, but rather necessary, as Gregory, in Book 1, distinction 38, art. 1, and I said almost the same in disputation 19 of the *Metaphysics*, section 19, conclusion 2, and Corduba gives this in the *Quaestiones*, Quest. 55, doubt 4. But I say "almost," because on this point there can be a question about the name, as I will say at once.

6. *Richard probably maintains the contrary.*—But Richard, said distinction 7, art. 3, question 1, reports a certain opinion to the contrary and defends it as probable, namely, that an Angel cannot certainly know natural effects which will come about from an impedible natural cause, even if he knows and considers the whole order of natural causes. And I find Hervaeus reported for the same opinion there, art. 2. But the Carthusian there, Quest. 4, not only approves it, but even condemns the contrary as an error because of a certain Parisian article which he alleges with Richard. But although Bañez does not attribute so grave a censure to the former opinion, nevertheless he gravely disapproves it and marks it as rashness; Malonia, said distinction 3, disputation 14, also agrees with him.

The foundation of this opinion is that those effects are simply contingent; therefore they can be and not be; therefore they cannot be certainly foreknown in their causes. Likewise, because often they are effects per accidens, which cannot be reduced to any cause per se, because they do not have one; therefore they cannot be known in a cause. Third, because it can never be certain that such a cause is not going to be impeded, because infinite impediments can intervene either through Angels or through men. Fourth, some add that passage from Wisdom 8, where it is singularly attributed to divine wisdom that it "knows signs and wonders before they happen, and the outcomes of times and ages."

7. *The author's judgment. — Bañez is refuted incidentally.*—Nevertheless I say that scarcely any opposition of opinions can be found on this point, unless some equivocation or question about the name intervenes. For the argument made is a demonstration, because an effect which has necessity in many causes taken together can certainly be known in all those causes considered together; but a contingent effect with respect to some natural cause taken precisely has this necessity, if it is considered in order to all the other causes occurring together; therefore it can certainly be foreknown in them, when all those causes are natural and it is certain that no free cause is going to intervene. This will be more evident by satisfying the foundations of the latter opinion. But before I respond to them, I will not omit to note that Dominic Bañez above supposes two things. One is that we assert that Angels know these future things in the motions and influences of the heavens alone, namely, how many ants there will be after a hundred years, or how they are to be moved, for he uses these examples. The other is that it is not certain that all effects in no way subject to created free choice come about by natural necessity with respect to all secondary causes, because perhaps they depend on the appetite and apprehension of brute animals, and can be impeded from that source. But neither is said with foundation, because first of all we place this certainty not in the heavenly causes alone, but we also say that material causes and all others which can concur must be considered, as I have already declared. Then, once a free cause has been set aside, dependence on the apprehension or appetite of brute animals will not stand in the way; for that too will be a natural and necessary effect, which an Angel can certainly foreknow. And therefore I comprehend this cause together with the other natural causes, and, with a free cause excluded, he certainly knows the future effect.

8. *To the first argument in number six.*—Therefore, with this supposed, the first argument either supposes what is false or does not infer rightly. For when it

assumes that these effects are simply contingent, one must distinguish, for the argument rests on the equivocation of that word alone. First, something can be called contingent either as considered in order to the proximate cause alone, or in order to all the causes which concur to promote or impede such an effect. In the former mode the antecedent is true; but then the consequences, in order to be good, must be taken with the same limitation, namely, that such an effect can be and not be as far as concerns the impedible cause, and therefore cannot be certainly known in that cause alone. But if the antecedent is taken in the latter sense, so that the sense is that the effect is contingent with respect to the collection of all causes, and this is signified by that particle "simply," then the antecedent is false and can be denied absolutely. Although the equivocation can be explained otherwise: for "contingent" can be taken as opposed to necessary, or as opposed to immutable, or unimpedible, as I might say. In the former mode the antecedent is false, because that effect here and now, and all things considered, is necessary, even if it does not have absolute necessity from within, as I might say, nor from one cause alone, but from that cause considered with such circumstances and applied to acting without impediment. In the latter mode the antecedent can be admitted, because that effect is impedible by its nature and could not be, because it could be impeded; but in this way the final consequence is denied, because nevertheless from the cognition of the other causes it can certainly be known that it is not going to be impeded, and therefore it can also be certainly known that it is going to be.

9. *To the second.*—To the second, granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied, because an effect can be per accidens and nevertheless come about by necessity, because that concurrence of causes, on the supposition of the order of the universe and of its causes, comes about necessarily. Hence just as that necessity does not proceed from one cause, but from two or many, so the effect is not known in one cause alone, but in all of them together. For although it happens by chance that a fiery body falling to earth finds combustible matter and burns it, which is the example of Richard and others, nevertheless, once the natural causes are supposed which at such a time and place generated that matter, and which set that body on fire in the air and moved it to the same place at the same time, that concurrence and the effect which follows from it per accidens necessarily follows. Therefore one who has known all those causes can certainly know that effect. And thus it is not repugnant for an effect to be casual and to occur necessarily, because for an effect to be necessary it is not required that it be intended per se, for these are very distinct. Hence Bañez contends in vain above that by the very fact that an Angel evidently knows that the effect is

not going to be impeded, the effect cannot be called casual or contingent with respect to the Angel. For this is false, both because an effect is not called contingent with respect to the cognition of an Angel or another, but with respect to the cause, as was declared from St. Thomas; and similarly it is not called casual with respect to an extrinsic knower, but with respect to the intention of the proximate agent. And thus an Angel can at the same time know that such an effect is going to occur and that it is going to occur beyond the intention.

10. *To the third. — Rare sublunary effects can certainly be foreknown by Angels.*—But the third argument removes the hypothesis which the question supposes, and so changes the sense and matter of the controversy, and concludes something which in fact is regularly true, but not, however, concerning what is possible. This is declared: for in the assertion we are speaking of contingent effects which either will be future per se from the concurrence of many natural causes, with no free cause intervening that is going to impede such a concurrence, or on the contrary will not occur per accidens because of a natural cause going to impede them, without the intervention of a free cause removing the impediment. But the argument either removes that supposition, or affirms that it cannot be foreknown by an Angel. The first is said gratuitously, because without doubt there are many concurrences of natural causes impeding one another which arise from the force of the universal order of the causes of the world and are not removed by free causes. And conversely it often happens that impedible natural effects are not impeded, and that this arises from the concurrence of natural causes alone without the intervention of a free cause. Indeed, among these effects some are such that the course of natural causes concurring or not concurring for them cannot naturally be impeded by created free causes. And then an Angel will evidently be able to know whether such an effect is to be impeded or not, and whether such a concurrence of causes will be future; and then the first opinion proceeds, and the assertion set down has its greatest place in these effects. For although the first cause can change or impede these meetings of causes, nevertheless in this cognition the freedom of the first cause is always supposed to be excepted, and the condition is understood: if it has not changed the course of things, or denied its concurrence. For this condition must be understood in every science of future things, however certain, even concerning effects simply necessary. But there are other effects and concurrences of causes impedible by good or evil Angels freely moving corporeal causes and applying or removing them. And then I confess that it cannot naturally be certainly known whether the effect will follow from that source or not. This is not against the assertion or the former opinion, which

supposes a course of natural causes which created free causes cannot change. Hence, because perhaps those sublunary and particular effects which cannot in some way depend on free causes are rare, it is therefore regularly true that such effects are not certainly known by Angels through natural cognition, as, for example, by demons, unless that condition is understood and applied: unless God has disposed otherwise, or has permitted it to be done or impeded by some created free cause. And so in the matter thus explained there can be no disagreement, as I said.

11. *To the place from Wisdom in the same number six.*—To the testimony of the Wise Man we respond that there the discourse is not about uncreated wisdom alone, nor is that cognition attributed to it as proper and singular, but it is extended to created, even human wisdom, and there also that wisdom is commended which man in this life can inquire into and acquire by his own labor with the help of grace. An evident argument of this is that he says of that wisdom that "it knows past things and estimates concerning future things, knows the craftiness of words and the solutions of arguments," and so on. Therefore from that place it is not gathered that that wisdom attains certain and infallible cognition of future outcomes or wonders, but it is said with a fitting division; for, speaking abstractly about wisdom, it knows all those things, but divine wisdom in one way, angelic in another, human in another, each according to its own mode, which mode the Wise Man does not declare. But speaking of human wisdom, it knows those things only through conjecture and prudent estimation; angelic wisdom, however, knows in a more perfect mode, as has already partly been said and in part remains to be said.

12. *Third conclusion. — That free future things cannot be naturally foreknown by an Angel is of faith.*—Third, it must be established that an Angel cannot foreknow with certain knowledge in their causes future contingent things which depend on free choice, by natural power. For this is how we speak, since it is certain that they can be foreknown by supernatural cognition, either through the clear vision of God, or by revelation outside the Word, as has been treated in other places. Thus, therefore, the conclusion is of faith according to the judgment of all theologians, because it is found expressed in Scripture. For certain cognition of future things is said to be a sign of divinity, Isaiah 41: "Announce the things that are to come in the future, and we will know that you are gods"; therefore it is supposed to be proper to God to foreknow these future things. Hence in chapter 46, through the same Prophet, God says: "I am God, and there is no God beyond, nor is there one like me, announcing the last thing from the beginning, and from the start the things not yet done, saying: My

counsel will stand, and all my will shall be done." This is confirmed from Daniel, chapter 3, where it is said as proper and singular of God: "He reveals deep and hidden things, and knows things established in darkness." And below: "There is a God in heaven revealing the mystery," where Jerome says: "You seek in vain from men on earth what God alone knows in the heavens," and so on. And hence prophecy, through which these future things are predicted, is a most certain sign, indeed even an evident sign, of divine truth and revelation, as is taken from 1 Corinthians 14. But it would not be a sufficient sign of divine truth unless God alone could know those future things, as Origen rightly taught, Book 6, against Celsus, Chrysostom, homily 32, on First Corinthians, and St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, Book 3, chapter 154, and it is taken from 2 Peter 2: "We have the firmer prophetic word."

13. *An argument is opposed against the cited testimonies.*—But someone could respond that a creature indeed cannot certainly know these future things in all their causes, insofar as the divine will is comprehended among them, on which these future things also depend, because they will not happen unless God wills or permits. Hence, because a creature cannot know the divine deliberation and will, therefore it cannot certainly foreknow these future things. And consequently a certain prediction of future things is a sign of divinity insofar as divinity alone has every secondary cause in its hand and will, so that it either impedes it or efficaciously inclines it to acting. And those last words of Isaiah indicate this sense, when he says, "my counsel will stand, and all my will shall be done," as if God had said: for this reason I alone can certainly predict future things, because all future things depend on my counsel and on my will. Therefore it will not be against these testimonies, nor against faith, to say that an Angel can have certain cognition even of those future things which depend on free choice, provided that the divine will and power are understood as excepted, just as we were saying of future things from natural causes that they are not foreknown with such absolute certainty that the condition must not always be understood: unless God has disposed otherwise. And this can be confirmed, because those testimonies do not speak specially of future things depending on a created free cause, but simply of future things, insofar as all depend on an uncreated free cause.

14. *Likewise the place of Isaiah is objected.*—And the difficulty is increased, because in the former place of Isaiah, past things are joined to future things; for it is said: "Announce the former things, which have been, and we will set our heart." Hence Cyril from that place only gathers that "it is proper and peculiar to divine glory to know all things, to be ignorant of absolutely nothing, neither of

past things, nor of present things, nor of future things." But Jerome explains it thus: "An apostrophe is made to the idols themselves, which are insensible and possess neither the faculty of hearing nor of responding. Tell us, he says, either past or future things, and from the outcomes of things demonstrate your power." Therefore the idols are not there accused because they will not be able to know future things depending on free choice, but because they are insensible and can announce neither past nor future things. Likewise because they are so powerless that they could not even foresee their own abolition; hence it is gathered that much less can they predict the evils of others, surely because they themselves are not like God, on whose will these things depend. So also in the other place Jerome explains: "Consider that besides me there is no God, nor could anyone else know future things except I, who through the Prophets announce the things which I am going to do, so that when I complete what was predicted, I may prove divinity by divination." Hence the difficulty is confirmed, because in this way an Angel not only cannot certainly know or predict the things which depend on the free will of another, but also not even those which depend on his own will, because although now, when he predicts what he is going to do, he has the intention of doing it, afterward he can be impeded and changed by God so that he does not do it. But God announces infallibly, because he announces those things which he is going to do either by himself or by others, or at least those things which, with him permitting, will infallibly happen, and without him permitting, will not happen. Therefore, by force of these testimonies, future things which also depend on the will of God are unknown or uncertain to Angels, not insofar as they depend on any other free will. And because of this reason Cyril of Alexandria, explaining chapter 46 of Isaiah, said that God demonstrates from this that he is true and God by nature, because all his counsel stands and no one can impede it, and therefore it is infallibly fulfilled when it is predicted by him.

15. *Daniel's place also is objected.*—Finally, that place of Daniel confirms this, where Daniel, after receiving the divine revelation and interpretation of the dream, says: "Blessed be the name of the Lord, because wisdom and strength are his." Here he joins strength to wisdom not without reason, but so that he may indicate that for this reason only God could know that mystery, because he alone was powerful to make it. Hence he adds: "He changes times and ages, transfers kingdoms and establishes them," as if declaring the foundation from which it arises that he alone also can certainly know and reveal such future things. And in the same way infallible prophecy is a certain sign of divinity, because what divinity predicts it is also powerful to do, as Jerome, cited above,

explained, saying: "therefore true prophecy can belong to God alone, because through the Prophets he announces the things which he is going to do." Therefore from these places it cannot be proved as of faith that free future things are unknown to Angels insofar as they depend on wills, but only insofar as they depend on the divine will. Hence Origen, homily 5 on Joshua, at the end, says that it is useless to inquire curiously into the things which are future: "For whatever God wills, these things are future." And in Book 1, against Celsus, after the middle, he says that spirit is required for foreknowing future things because they are future by the will of God. Hence in the same sense he says, Book 6, around the beginning, that "prediction of future things is the character of divine discourse." In a similar way Justin, in the responses to the questions of Christians, in the second question, which concerns these future things, as about future victory in war, the overthrow of cities, and so on, begins the response thus: "All things belong to the same God, both the prediction of the words and the outcomes of those things which through the Prophets and Apostles he announced beforehand that he was going to do." And from this principle he gathers that only divine oracles are certain, the rest uncertain and that they happen when God wills or permits. He repeats this more extensively in the last question. Hence he seems to think that the whole uncertainty of future outcomes with respect to any created intellect operating by natural truth comes from the fact that they depend on God's free will. But although other Fathers teach that demons, and consequently also other Angels, cannot by natural power know future contingents, they do not declare whether this arises from the fact that they are ignorant of the divine will, or from elsewhere, as can be seen in Eusebius, Book 5, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, chapter 10, and Damascene, Book 2, *De Fide*, chapter 4, and others to be reported below.

16. *Nevertheless the conclusion is proved further, notwithstanding the things just opposed.*—But although it is true that these future things, as knowable in their causes, have the greatest uncertainty with respect to every created intellect because they depend on the free will of God, nevertheless it is also most certain and of faith that such future things cannot be certainly known by Angels in their proximate cause. It is proved first from a similarity of reason, because the reason why an Angel cannot know future things in the divine will is twofold, insofar as the divine will can be considered in two ways, namely, either as it were in first act, as apt for willing, or in second act, that is, as now willing. Therefore in the former mode the future effect cannot be known in the divine will, because of itself it is indifferent and undetermined, and in an undetermined cause nothing determined can be known. This reason also proves that God himself cannot

know future things in himself, or in his will considered in this way. But in the latter mode God can know future things which he wills absolutely, because the will itself in act is now not known as future, but as present, and with it future effects can have an infallible connection. But an Angel cannot by natural power certainly know this will of God, and therefore neither can he know future things in that will. Now this reason proves equally of the cognition of a future effect in a created or proximate free cause. Because it can be viewed in the same two ways. And viewed in the former mode, as a power not yet eliciting its act, even when applied with all things required for acting, it is an indifferent cause and undetermined for acting; therefore in it, as such, nothing determined can be known. This reason proves not only of an Angel, but also of God as regards certain cognition in the cause, as was shown by us elsewhere. But when the created will is considered in the latter mode, as being under its act, in this it differs especially from the divine will, that the divine will does not have an act anew, nor in the future will it will anything that it has not always and from eternity willed, because it does not have temporal determination, but eternal determination; but the created will first lacks the act, and afterward has it, and the act which it now has, it afterward changes.

17. *The preceding proof proceeds.*—Hence if that act is considered before it happens, under which aspect it is truly future, it cannot be known in the power itself that it is certainly future, because of the reason stated, that the cause is indifferent. But if that act is now supposed to have happened, it will now not be known as future, but as present, and consequently not in the cause, but in itself. Nevertheless, although such an act is known to the one willing, it is hidden from others, because an Angel cannot know free thoughts, as we will see below. Hence if we speak of another external effect future from the force of such an act, even that cannot be known as it is future, because either that effect is simultaneous with the very act of will from which it remains, and thus it is now known as present, and it will not be known by others in its cause, that is, in the act of will, but rather conversely, the interior will will be known in and through the exterior act, as through an exterior effect. But if that effect is not simultaneous with the interior act of will, but is going to be afterward, then for two causes it will not be able to be known by other Angels, namely, both because they cannot know the present act of another's will by their natural power alone, and because, even if they knew the present act, they could not know whether the will will endure or be changed in the future, for neither of these is determined in such a will or its act, and therefore neither can the future effect depending on it be known with certainty in such a cause. Hence it happens that not even the

same Angel can certainly know about himself whether he will later do what he proposes that he will later do, because he does not know whether he will change his purpose. In this there is an infinite difference between God and an Angel. For God in his decree most certainly knows that what he has decreed will be future, because God's decree is immutable. But although an Angel now proposes that he is going to do something, he does not know certainly in that purpose the thing which he proposed he was going to do, both because he can change his purpose, and also because it can happen that God impedes that effect.

18. *It is confirmed first.*—Hence it is confirmed, because an Angel cannot foreknow in his own will what he is going to will or do, only because he is going to will freely; therefore much less will he be able to know this about others. And by this reason the Saints say that the evil Angel could not by his natural power foreknow his sin before he committed it, nor could the good Angel have been secure about his perseverance before he persevered, except by divine revelation, as Augustine supposed, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, Book 11, chapter 17, and *The City of God*, Book 11, chapter 13, and as Anselm teaches, *On the Fall of the Devil*, chapter 21. And he proves it by an excellent reason, because what can not be cannot be foreknown by certain knowledge; but before he sinned, an Angel could not sin; therefore he could not certainly foreknow that he was going to sin. This reason is convincing concerning foreknowledge in a cause, but not concerning knowledge of the thing in itself, as he adds there, and as we will soon explain.

19. *It is confirmed second.*—Moreover, in the same place he indicates another reason drawn from a principle of faith. For foreknowledge of an effect in a cause which would introduce antecedent necessity in an angelic or human will is impossible; but if an Angel were to foreknow with certainty a future effect by means of an angelic or human will in the will itself, such knowledge would introduce, or rather would suppose, antecedent necessity in such an effect as it is from such a will; therefore such knowledge is impossible. The major is clear, because antecedent necessity is repugnant to free choice as such, which is supposed by Anselm there as certain, and is treated more fully in the book *On Foreknowledge and Predestination*, and has been declared by us with him in other places. And from the same doctrine the minor is clear, because antecedent necessity is nothing other than necessity in the cause; for certain knowledge in the cause supposes this necessity of the effect in the cause; otherwise it does not have a source from which it takes such certainty. Finally, the consequence is proved, because such foreknowledge in the proximate cause removes its freedom, which is repugnant to the faith. Therefore it is of faith that an Angel

cannot certainly foreknow these future things in their proper causes, whether the free will of God is joined to them or whether they are viewed in themselves, because even in order to such causes those effects do not happen necessarily. Nor is there any difficulty against this except the one which Anselm indicates above from the foreknowledge of God. But that does not press here, because we also confess concerning God that he does not know these future things in their causes; but another genus of cognition will be treated below.

20. *It is confirmed third.*—Finally, if these future things were uncertain only because of dependence on the providence of God and his free will, there would be no difference between those things which come about from the created will and from other causes. The consequent is false and against faith, because natural effects are simply necessary, even if they depend on God, because God gives his concurrence in a natural mode and does not deny it except supernaturally, which does not remove natural necessity and certainty. But the things which depend on a created will do not have that natural necessity, as is clear from faith; therefore neither do they have that certainty.

21. *Fourth conclusion in two parts. — The first part is proved. — Why demons are accustomed to speak ambiguously.*—Fourth, it must be said that through some probable signs an Angel can conjecture future things plausibly, but not all. Each part is certain and clear. St. Thomas above and all the scholastics teach the first, and the matter is clear of itself, because even men can conjecture these future things through signs, or some effects, or present affections; therefore much more can demons. But demons are especially accustomed to use this genus of cognition in order to deceive men. And therefore Augustine attributes this cognition to evil Angels, *On the Trinity*, Book 4, chapter 17, and removes it from good Angels, not because it is impossible, but because it is imperfect; for concerning those things which it is expedient for them to know, they have certain knowledge in the Word of God; but concerning others they do not pronounce an absolute judgment, nor do they predict them, although they can predict danger. Augustine has the same doctrine in *The City of God*, Book 8, from chapter 14 through many following chapters, and Book 9, from the beginning up to chapter 23, and *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, Book 12, chapter 17, and broadly throughout the whole book *On the Divination of Demons*, and *Retractions*, Book 2, chapter 30. Hence demons use various modes and cunning to deceive men through predictions of these future things and responses of idols; for, emulating divinity, they usurp divination. For often they state things which are probable to them by some signs, and often things which have already begun in some distant place and by a certain natural order are

going to arrive here, and often things which they themselves dispose to do. And therefore they are easily and often accustomed to be deceived and to deceive; and for this reason, lest they be recognized as liars, they often speak ambiguously, as, besides Augustine above, Jerome notes on Isaiah chapter 41, Tertullian, *Apologeticus*, chapter 22, and Cyprian, *On the Vanity of Idols*, Eusebius, said Book 5, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, chapter 10, and Lactantius, Book 1, chapter 8, and Book 2, chapter 14 and following, and Justin, in the *Oration to the Greeks*, Athanasius, *Questions to Antiochus*, Quest. 27. Nor do these Fathers deny that demons can sometimes know future things certainly with physical, as I might say, certainty, namely, when they come about only from natural causes. But they say that ordinarily their cognition is uncertain, because even those things which seem to be natural can be impeded by divine providence or through the operations of holy Angels. And therefore when demons predict those things as altogether certain and as known and foreseen through divinity, they always lie, and often they are deceived and deceive in the things themselves. Finally Augustine teaches that sometimes demons know with certainty future things, even free future things, through the revelation of holy Angels, God so disposing because of hidden reasons of his providence; concerning this matter the discussion will return in the fourth book.

22. *The second part is proved. — Angels did not foreknow their fall.*—But I added in the second part of the assertion that there are some future things which cannot even by conjecture be naturally known by Angels. St. Thomas and others also teach this concerning those future contingents which happen rarely or even indifferently toward either side. For among contingents, those things can rather be presumed to be going to occur which happen frequently; therefore since the things which happen rarely are opposed to these, they also cannot be known even by conjecture. And by the same reason, if the contingency is equal on each side, the indications or conjectures will also be equal; therefore each side will be equally unknown. And in this way Anselm said, in the said book *On the Fall of the Devil*, chapter 21, that Angels were not foreknowing of their fall even by conjecture or a plausible judgment. He proves this from an unacceptable consequence, because otherwise the Angel could not then avoid being sad and grieving over his future fall, even if it were only judged probable, because, since he was then just and holy, such a loss would be very contrary to his purpose and will; therefore it could not fail to afflict him greatly, which would be contrary to that state, which with respect to Angels was as it were a state of innocence. But the reason a priori is that the Angel could with the greatest facility not fall, because this depended on his will, and he was more inclined to the good both by

the inclination of nature and by the power of grace; therefore he did not have a source from which he might probably believe that he was going to fall, although he was not ignorant of his mutability. Therefore in this way they are altogether ignorant of many other future things.

23. *Moderation of the preceding doctrine.*—But it must be noted that these future things must be considered in the individual and with particular circumstances, so that they may be constituted in such a grade of uncertainty or hiddenness. For it can happen that some things viewed in common seem contingent toward either side, or rarely occurring, which in particular with such circumstances can plausibly be conjectured to be going to occur. Thus that a studious man, endowed with good morals and habits, should be laid low by temptation is, from its genus, either more rarely occurring or at least contingent toward either side; and yet such an opportunity and such circumstances can occur that this becomes more plausible. Therefore, in order that a future thing be hidden from an Angel in the said grade, it is necessary that, in particular and after all circumstances have been inspected, that mode or grade of contingency persevere. Just as, conversely, in order that a demon can know a future thing plausibly, it is necessary that the indications in particular already be present. For if they are still future and depend on the choice either of man or of an Angel, no greater conjecture can be taken from them than is had concerning them themselves. And therefore the Fathers say that demons cannot foreknow future things, but only present things, because they can estimate future things only from present things. And thus far concerning the former mode of knowing future contingents in another, or through a known medium.

CHAPTER X
WHETHER THROUGH GIVEN SPECIES OF SINGULAR THINGS NOT YET EXISTING AN ANGEL IMMEDIATELY AND EVIDENTLY KNOWS IN THEMSELVES THAT THEY ARE FUTURE

1. *It is argued for the affirmative side. — In the little work on the knowledge of God, Book One, chapter eight, and in the second prolegomenon on Grace. — An escape is blocked in two ways.*—It remains to speak of the other mode of knowing future things immediately or directly, and in themselves, and through their species. In this there is somewhat greater difficulty, because these future things viewed in themselves, or on the part of the object, are knowable by certain knowledge before they happen; therefore they will also be able to be known by an Angel. The antecedent is proved from divine knowledge, because

God foreknows them, and not in the cause, as was said, or at least not in that alone, but in themselves, as is supposed from the matter concerning the knowledge of God. But he could not know them unless they were knowable according to themselves; therefore on their part they are knowable. And it is declared, because these future things have in themselves a determinate truth, although it is unknown to us, as has been shown by us elsewhere, and the argument from the knowledge of God proves this sufficiently. But every truth, as far as concerns itself, is knowable by certain knowledge, because the knowable object is above all truth. Therefore these contingent truths are of themselves knowable. Now, therefore, the consequence is proved, first, because there is no source from which such knowledge on the part of the Angel would be repugnant to him. Second, positively, because an Angel has proper species of such future singulars, as is supposed from what was said above; therefore through them he will be able, by the power of his intellectual light, to know whatever is true in the things represented through such species, because such species are adequate to the light, and conversely the intellect of an Angel has a natural power for knowing through a species whatever does not exceed the representation of that species. You will say that an Angel cannot know through a species except an existing object. But against this is, first, that intellect is not like sense, so that in its cognition it would depend on the presence and existence of the object. Second, because through that species the intellect knows the truth of an essence not yet existing. Third, because through that species it knows a past thing, when it now is not; therefore it will also know a future thing before it is.

2. *The negative part is established as of faith.*—Nevertheless, with the same certainty of faith it is indubitable that an Angel cannot by the power of his nature know future contingents in this mode. Thus St. Thomas and the scholastics teach, and all the Fathers cited suppose; and it is more evidently taken from the Scriptures cited, because from them we have that God alone certainly knows these future things; therefore no mode of certain cognition of these future things can be attributed to Angels; therefore neither this one, which is by way of a certain vision of the truth itself in itself. The first consequence is proved, because an absolute negation destroys all things. But the second is proved, because that cognition is most certain, and therefore it is especially repugnant to the Scriptures to attribute it to Angels. This is declared in this way, because cognition of future things in themselves, and divination or prediction founded on it, is so infallible that in no way, not even because of the dependence which these future things have on the free will of God, can the divination fail or be made false. But to attribute this to demons is against Scripture and the

Fathers alleged. Therefore. The antecedent is proved, because foreknowledge of a created effect in itself involves foreknowledge of the divine will determined to such an effect, or to giving the concurrence necessary for it without impediment; but the will of God once determined cannot be changed; therefore the future thing thus known cannot not be future; therefore neither can such cognition of it be false or be rendered false from a defect of will, since it is now supposed and the composite sense is made.

3. *The same truth is confirmed.*—And it is declared from knowledge of a present or past thing. For an Angel who intuits a present thing evidently knows in that effect the concurrence of God, and thence also evidently knows the will of God. Hence it cannot happen that that truth about the present is made false because of dependence on the will of God, because it is now supposed, and what is, when it is, is necessarily. And the same, with proportion, holds concerning the truth of a past thing, because one who evidently sees that a thing is past and affirms it can neither deceive nor be deceived because of the dependence of that effect on the will of God, because it is involved in the effect itself. Therefore the same will be true in knowledge of a future thing, if it is evidently known in itself, because it is necessary that in it the future concurrence of God be evidently known, and consequently also the will of God already determined to furnish it, because he does not furnish concurrence through a new determination of his will, but through an eternal and immutable one. And therefore a future thing known in this way is as necessary as a present or past thing, because what is supposed to be future is necessarily future, as Peter Damian rightly says, letter 4, *On the Omnipotence of God*, chapter 3. But Angels through their nature are not capable of so certain a cognition of future things, as has been proved from Scripture. Therefore. And it is confirmed, because otherwise demons both could naturally know these future things in that mode and in fact would know them, because their natural powers have remained entire in them, as Dionysius testifies, chapter 4, *On the Divine Names*, and it cannot be said with foundation that God miraculously denies them concurrence for such cognition, or miraculously impedes them from having natural operations. But it is certain that in fact they do not know those things with the said certainty, since they are often deceived, as Scripture teaches, and as is known by experience, which we brought forward from the Fathers. Therefore it is a sign that they do not have this natural power.

4. *The reason from Scotus for the same negative part.*—But the difficulty is in giving the reason why such a mode of cognition exceeds the natural power of Angels, which difficulty is demanded in the reason for doubting set down above.

Hence the first reason, according to the opinion of Scotus and others, is that Angels from their nature do not have species of existing singulars unless they receive them from the things themselves. But they cannot receive them from things until the things are; and therefore they cannot naturally know in themselves the things which do not yet exist, but only insofar as they are contained or indicated in those things which now exist, and consequently through a known medium, which with respect to these future things cannot exceed the force of conjecture. This reason also proceeds in its own way concerning future things which follow necessarily from naturally acting causes, because they too cannot be foreknown in themselves through species received from them, but only through species of their cause and through a known medium. And thence it is that they are never foreknown naturally with absolute certainty, but with a certainty including that condition: if God has not denied his concurrence or changed the order of causes. For through that foreknowledge the effect is not foreseen in the first cause, but only in the proximate cause. Hence, since it is not seen in itself either, there cannot be absolute certainty about the future influx of the first cause, but only conditional certainty, which can also be called natural.

5. *It is refuted.*—But this reason supposes something false, namely, that Angels receive species from singular things in order to know them. But it can be said that although they do not receive those species from things, nevertheless they are not given by God except at the presence of the objects. But this also is less probable, as we have shown. And besides, it does not show impossibility on the part of angelic nature, but recalls the reason to the will of God unwilling to give Angels the species of such things before the things are; no natural reason can be given for this will of God. For on the part of the Angel, a sufficient natural power of understanding is supposed for foreknowing these future things in the said mode, if species are given to him. Therefore, as far as concerns the Angel, such cognition is natural, and being deprived of the species is only voluntary on the part of God. Hence rather it will be preternatural for an Angel to be deprived of such cognition, because it is preternatural for him to lack species of those things for understanding which he has of himself a natural power and aptitude.

6. *The reasons of others that the future things with which we are dealing are not within the object of the natural intellect.*—Hence others, especially those who say that Angels do not know things through species, but by the force alone of their intellectual light, think that no natural reason can be given a priori why Angels cannot know contingent truths in themselves. They are moved by the

proposed reason for doubting, because those future things have truth knowable of itself and not exceeding the order of natural things, and therefore no natural reason can be given why they are known by God and not by an Angel. For the reason which is given by Thomists, that future things are really present to God according to coexistence in eternity, supposes what is false, if it is understood of real coexistence; but if the discussion is only of objective coexistence, why will such contingent truths not be able to be objectively present to an Angel? Vasquez thinks this in disputation 202, chapter 2. But he adds in chapter 4 that an Angel does not naturally know these future contingents before they are, because as they are future, they are not within the latitude of the object of the natural angelic intellect; for intellect and every knowing faculty operates naturally only concerning its proper object. But future things as future are not contained under the proper object of the angelic intellect. And he thinks the same must be said according to the opinion that Angels understand through species, namely, that those species, or the intellect furnished with them, is not the principle of knowing future things before they are, because future things are not objects proportioned to such species according to their nature. In this he speaks consistently, because in his opinion the angelic intellect by itself has the same force which, according to St. Thomas, it has when furnished with species.

7. *The said authors do not declare why the said future things are outside the object of the natural intellect.*—But in this opinion it remains to ask why these future things are not contained under the connatural object either of the intellect of an Angel or of the species connatural to him. For that author does not prove this, but says that he proved it above. But I do not find where he proved it. For in disputation 200 alone, chapter 3, touching on the same difficulty, he says that it is easily dissolved by saying that these future things are not known by an Angel because they are not objects which correspond to the angelic power according to its natural power and are equal to it. But that assertion is the same one, and he brings forward its proof in neither place. Nor could he have brought it forward, if it is true, as he had said earlier, that no natural reason can be given why these things cannot be naturally known by an Angel. For if one considers rightly, that those future things cannot be known and that they are not objects proportioned to the intellect or to the species are the same. Hence, when one is given as the reason for the other and there the matter stops, either the principle is begged and the same thing is proved by the same thing, or the reason taken from this, that future contingents are not objects proportioned to the angelic intellect operating according to natural power, is only assumed as believed and not as proved by reason or probable. And thus one

always persists in this, that no reason can be given by us why an Angel does not know these future things. Or certainly, if some reason for that disproportion between such an object and the power of an Angel is to be given, it is necessary that that author return to the reason taken from the eminence and eternity of God, which he had rejected, as I now declare.

8. *The true reason.*—I therefore think that the reason for this truth and for the disproportion between the intellect of an Angel and these future things is sufficiently effective because St. Thomas proves that an Angel cannot in this way know future things in themselves, since that mode of attaining future things in themselves and by way of things existing for their own times, before they are in reality, is proper to divine intellection because of its immutability and eternity, by reason of which it always and at once has all things present, not through the eternal real coexistence of the things known, but because of objective presence with respect to the divine intuition, which is most simple and of infinite comprehension. For for so sublime and perfect a mode of knowing, an infinite power of understanding is required, and a simple and immutable intuition, by which all differences of time are bound together. Therefore they cannot know future things in that mode. This reason proceeds concerning all future things, whether they come about contingently or necessarily, as St. Thomas rightly said. And according to this reason it is said very well that the future, as future and as to be known in itself, is an object disproportionate to the natural intellective power of an Angel and to the species naturally given to him, because it is proportioned only to an intellective power having infinite efficacy, simplicity, and eternity in understanding. And this is not because of the perfection of the future thing itself, but rather because of the disproportion, so to speak, of such an intelligible object.

9. *The said reason is explained in many ways.*—And this reason can be explained in various ways. First, because to know certainly and evidently some truth which is not necessary of itself, nor from the natural connection of the extremes, and not through some medium, nor through the existence of the thing seen in itself, but without a medium, by attaining what does not yet exist in the same way as if it now existed, certainly indicates the sublime mode of knowing proper to God, who calls the things which are not as those which are. And this can rightly be said to be known from the terms, as it were. For from this it seems to have settled in the minds even of unbelieving men that to know future things infallibly is proper to divinity; for their prediction has been called divination as if it were a divine action. And this can be explained in another way also, from the great difficulty which, conversely, theologians have in explaining

how God most certainly sees the truths of such future things. For although it is certain, indeed evident, that God foreknows these future things, the mode, however, is entirely unknown to men, and in this alone we rest: that since God has an infinite power of knowing, and the highest perfection of knowledge, and immutable and eternal fullness, he cannot be ignorant of these future things, nor could he have known them except from eternity. Therefore, contrariwise, a sufficient reason why they are not known by Angels is given from the fact that they are of limited power, and in their cognition are not measured by eternity.

10. *It is more correct to say that why God knows future things is hidden from us than why an Angel does not know them.*—Hence if one of these two things must be said to be above human reason, namely, why God knows these future things, or why an Angel does not naturally know them, this could certainly be affirmed rather of the former than of the latter. Or if the first is sufficiently proved to be so from the very excellence of God, even though the mode of knowing cannot be grasped or explained by reason, certainly from the fact that an Angel does not have that infinite eminence of God, it is also sufficiently concluded that he does not have this natural knowledge. For things which are attributed to God because of infinity, even if they are not understood, are not to be attributed to the natures of Angels. This can also be declared by examples. For although we attribute to God that through the same necessary act of love he freely wills or does not will without a real addition in the act itself, or that through the natural knowledge of simple intelligence he has knowledge of vision of future things without a real addition in the knowledge itself, and through the same act entirely unchanged he knows a thing as present, past, and future in order to its diverse times, we cannot with foundation attribute such things to Angels; indeed we think it evident that such things do not fall under a limited act, and one mutable of itself. Just as we also judge it evident that a finite essence cannot naturally be in diverse supposita, because this is believed of the divine essence because of infinity alone. Therefore it must be judged in the same way concerning intuitive knowledge of future contingents.

11. *Objection.—Solution.*—But you will object: for by this reason it would be proved not only that an Angel cannot know future things in themselves by nature, but also that he cannot know them even by grace or by supernatural created knowledge. The consequent must not be admitted; therefore the reason made does not conclude rightly. The consequence is clear, because every created knowledge is finite; therefore the reason made proceeds concerning all of it. But the falsity of the consequent is proved, because Christ through infused knowledge knows future contingents, and the Blessed see the same things in the

Word. It is responded, first, by denying the consequence, because from that reason we concluded only that that cognition cannot be connatural to an Angel, because it cannot be commensurate with a finite intellectual nature. But there are many things which cannot be done naturally by a finite power, which can be conceded to it through supernatural faculties. Just as we were saying just now that a finite substantial essence cannot be naturally in many supposita; but many think it can supernaturally, and at least with respect to divine supposita it is true. And similarly a finite intellect cannot naturally see God, but it can supernaturally. Thus, therefore, one could respond in the present matter. And the reason is that a natural action is commensurate with the natural perfection of the proximate agent, but a supernatural operation or cognition principally rests on the infinite power of God. And hence very well Theodoret, discourse 2 on Daniel, when he had said that it is proper to God to know future things, adds: "But he reveals to those to whom it seemed good to him the things which nowhere appear, but are hidden as if in some deep, since they have not yet happened." Origen also teaches this, Book 1 against Celsus, after the middle. But they speak of revelation through some medium; whereas immediate revelation, and in themselves outside the Word, perhaps never occurs, or perhaps even cannot occur. For concerning the very soul of Christ it is also sufficiently probable that outside the Word and through infused knowledge it does not know future contingents immediately in themselves, but through some known medium, as I said in volume one, third part, which is sufficiently consonant with those things which faith teaches concerning Angels, although it is less certain in that case, because that infused knowledge of the soul of Christ is more supernatural than angelic knowledge. But concerning beatific knowledge the reason is different, because it is through the light of a higher order and through a certain singular participation of eternity; and besides, that knowledge itself is not primarily in the future things themselves, but in the divine essence, not only as influencing by way of species, but also as a known medium, as was treated more fully in the proper places.

12. *To the argument in number one, and to the first proof of its consequence.* —And from these things the response to the reason for doubting set down at the beginning is clear. For, granting the antecedent, namely, that these future things are intelligible objects or knowable truths, the consequence is denied, namely, that they can be known naturally by Angels. For the natural knowledge of an Angel, since it is finite and mutable and in its own way measured by time, does not extend to all knowable things. But to the first proof to the contrary, namely, because it is not shown from where this is repugnant, it is responded, first of all,

that much less is that inference shown: these future things are knowable; therefore they are naturally knowable by an Angel, as if the natural knowledge of an Angel were adequate to every knowable thing. Finally, it is said that the repugnance because of which the inference does not hold has already been shown, namely, because these future things are not knowable before they are, except through an intuition which of itself is eternal and immutable, and which encompasses in its object all differences of time as if they were present, as we will explain in the two following chapters, in which we will also satisfy the remaining proofs of the said consequence.

CHAPTER XI
WHY ANGELS, JUST AS THEY SEE SINGULAR THINGS AS PRESENT WHEN THEY EXIST, DO NOT SEE THEM AS FUTURE BEFORE THEY ARE

1. *The difficulty is proposed.*—This difficulty was touched on above, and was appearing in the second proof of the preceding chapter, in number 1. And the reason for doubting is that innate species represent future things just as they represent present things. For, in order to avoid this difficulty, Scotus and others deny that angels have *implanted* species of singular contingent things, but hold that they receive them from the existing thing; and because they cannot receive them from future things, therefore they cannot know future things. But we suppose, with St. Thomas, that angels have an *innate* species of a thing which afterwards comes to be, and that through it they know the thing already made, although they cannot know it as to be made. The reason for this matter is difficult, and therefore there are various ways of responding.

The first way of explaining the proposed difficulty.—The first is that through an innate species an individual and singular thing can be known with all the individuating conditions of it; but before the thing exists, it is known only under possible being, because the species of itself suffices for this, but it is not known as future, because that species of itself is indifferent to a present, past, and future thing. Hence they consequently add that, through such a species, an existing thing is not known as such unless some change occurs in such a species, so that it receives into itself a new intrinsic mode. But a future thing, as future, is not known through that species, because it lacks such a special mode. Thus Daniel Malonius holds, distinction 3, disputation 14; nor does he cite another author, although the opinion is older, for it is reported by others, and Hervaeus suggests it in the same distinction.

2. *The aforesaid way is rejected, and the first pressing objection is removed.—The second pressing objection is removed.*—Against this opinion, however, it can first be objected that either the species, before it receives that mode, represents the singular thing, or it does not represent it. If the second is said, that species without such a mode is not truly a species of a singular thing. But if the first is said, since the singular thing is future, it will be known as future through that species. But to this it is easily responded that the species itself without that mode represents the singular thing, but not its futurition, so to speak; and therefore through it the thing which is future is known, yet not as future, but as possible. But they press: if through that species the future thing cannot be known, and afterwards, in order that it be known as present, it is necessary to add something to that species, it was superfluous to infuse such a species beforehand, because just as it is afterwards modified, so it could then also be infused. But neither does this press the point, because that species can beforehand be useful for knowing a singular thing with abstractive and quidditative cognition, and under possible being; and this cognition is a great perfection. And afterwards it is easier to add some mode to it than to produce it anew.

3. *A third pressing objection is proposed.—And confirmed.—The third response from Malonius.—A better response.*—Third, however, they press: if that species, with the mode added, represents the thing not only absolutely and abstractly, but also as present, in a similar way the same species, with another mode added, could represent the thing as future, as determinately future. Therefore it could have been infused from the beginning with that mode, and consequently the angels could, through innate species conveniently implanted, have known these future things in themselves. And consequently it is said without foundation in reason that the species of such things were implanted, but not with that mode with which they could be principles of knowing future things. And it is confirmed from the reasoning which Malonius uses to recommend his opinion, namely, that the species of angels are perfect. But the perfection of species consists in this, that they represent things in the manner in which the things themselves are disposed. And from this he concludes that the species must be modified and varied and changed in representation according as the represented things are changed, so that the angel can recognize that variation, as is agreeable to his nature. From this he wishes to conclude that, when a thing is changed from non-existing into an existing thing, its species also is changed from not representing it as present into representing it as present through some mode added to that species. Therefore, by the same reason, it would have to be concluded that from the beginning the angel had a species

with a mode representing the thing as future, as future, because in this way it would represent the thing according as it is disposed. Afterwards, when that thing is present, the species would be changed not only by acquiring a new mode but also by losing the old one. Afterwards, when the thing ceases to be, the species would be changed by losing the mode of representing the thing as present and acquiring a new mode of representing it as past; for the reason is the same. And thus it is concluded that an angel can know future things no less than present or past things. That author seems to respond that it pertains to angels to know mutable singular things and present changes, because through them they are administered; but that the knowledge of future things does not pertain to them, and therefore that mode of representing future things is not owed to them as the other mode of representing present things is. But this seems said gratuitously, both because, if that cognition was naturally possible, it was desirable for the angel in itself, and this was sufficient that a species with such a mode not be denied to him; and also because foreknowledge of future things contributes no less to prudence and the administration of those very things than knowledge of past things. Therefore it would be better responded that, although a mode of the species for representing the presence of a thing is possible, a mode of representing futurition is not naturally possible in the species itself. But it will be difficult to give the reason for this statement, namely, if the difference of present or past time is naturally representable by force of the species through a special mode of it, why the difference of future time is not also representable in the same way.

4. *That way of explaining is further rejected.—The evasion of Malonius.—* Besides, there is another difficulty in that opinion, because no suitable cause can be assigned which would make that change in the species of the angel. For it is not the object newly existing, because the thing is material, as is supposed, and nothing material can act upon a spirit, as was proved above; otherwise it would more easily make a species of itself. And it can be very distant from the angel. Nor is it the angel himself, because either he acts by a free action, and this would presuppose the cognition of such a thing, or by a natural action, and this cannot arise from the nature of the angel more because of the production of a material thing than without it. The said author responds that that change is made by the author of nature, not by way of a new illumination or through a special revelation, but through the general providence by which he provides to individual secondary causes his cooperation and concurrence according to the mode in which they naturally need it. For this author seems to suppose that the general concurrence with a secondary cause is, prior in nature, an influx into the

secondary cause itself rather than into its effect. And thus he says that through that influx of GOD, as prior, the species is changed and accommodated to represent the new thing produced. Or certainly, if not always and in all secondary causes he requires this influx into the cause, at least he says it is supplied when the secondary cause needs it in order to act. And indeed, once the opinion is supposed, this way of explaining it has been devised ingeniously. Nevertheless, the opinion is not pleasing, both because it is against St. Thomas in the places to be cited immediately, for he says that an angel knows an existing thing without any change made in him, namely, antecedent to the very act of knowing; and also because such an intrinsic mode added to an angelic species cannot be understood, by reason of which it would represent the actual existence of the thing which it previously represented as possible. Nor do I see why another similar mode cannot be devised concerning futurition itself. Finally, because that change is not necessary, as I will immediately explain.

5. *The second way of explaining the aforesaid difficulty.*—The second way of explaining the said difficulty is that of St. Bonaventure, in book 2, distinction 2, part 2, article 1, where he says that an angel knows existing individuals through innate species without any addition or change made in them, by the sole diverse composition or conjunction of them in the act of knowing. For he thinks that an individual thing is not known by an angel through one simple species, but through a composition of many. This should not be understood of a composition, so to speak, that is formal, by properly uniting one species with another, but of a quasi-effective composition, namely, by using many species to effect one act of knowing a singular thing. For because many accidents concur in one individual, which are contingently conjoined in it, such as figure, color, place, time, he does not judge that all those things together with the subject are represented through one species, but through various species. And therefore, for knowing an individual, he thinks it necessary that the angel compose, that is, simultaneously apply species, for example, of man, figure, color, time, and so on, and through them elicit the cognition of a man having such conditions, and thus know the singular man. And hence he infers in the solution to 2 that an angel cannot know future contingents before they exist, because he cannot make that composition with certainty, unless by directing his gaze to the thing, so that according to correspondence with it he composes the species; because otherwise it would be fiction and deception, as happens in the imagination of dreamers. But an angel cannot direct his gaze to a thing unless it exists, and therefore he also cannot know these future things certainly until they exist in reality. And in

this way, through this composition of species, he resolves many difficulties pertaining to this cognition of present or future singular things.

6. *It is attacked.*—Nevertheless, this way cannot be sustained, because, first of all, it supposes an uncertain and perhaps false thing, namely, that an angel does not know the common accidents of a subject through the species of the same subject, but through other distinct species, which must be disputed below. Next, it supposes a false doctrine concerning the individuation of singular things, namely, that a specific nature is individuated through the aggregation of contingent accidents; for such an aggregation supposes an individual subject in which it exists. And individuation in substance is substantial, and altogether belongs intrinsically and inseparably to the individual, so that even if all contingent accidents are removed from it, it remains the same in number, as was shown in the *Metaphysics*. Therefore, to represent a singular man, several species are not of themselves necessary, but one which represents such an individual substance, whatever may be the case concerning the heap of accidents which are gathered in that already individuated substance. Hence that response also supposes that a singular man is sufficiently represented through several species representing the specific nature of man and contingent accidents. This is impossible, since such accidents cannot be known in particular except as inhering in such an individual. And besides, either those accidents are represented through their species only as to their specific natures, and thus, even if they are composed a thousand times with the species of human nature, they will never represent an individual man, both because the species of a universal thing taken precisely is not a sufficient principle of knowing a singular thing, as was shown above, and also because all those accidents taken in common can be conjoined in infinitely many individuals. But if the species of accidents represent those accidents in particular, why not also the species of the substance? Or how will particular whiteness, for example, be represented as it is in itself, except in an individual subject? Besides, even once that opinion is supposed, the specific nature and its individual are represented through diverse species, which we showed above to be false in angels. Beyond these things, however, that opinion involves an open repugnance. For if that composition of species is made by chance, it will be uncertain and fictitious, as Bonaventure saw very well. And therefore he confesses that it is necessary that it be made *by directing the gaze to the knowable itself, so that according to that which is in reality, he composes species in himself*. Therefore such a composition supposes cognition of the particular thing according as it is in itself, because that direction of gaze upon the knowable either is nothing other than cognition, as the very word *gaze* indicates,

or, if it is referred to the intention of the will, it supposes cognition of the object to which the composition of species is to be directed.

7. *The same second way is still attacked.*—Finally, that composition does not resolve the difficulty concerning the cognition of future things for two reasons. One is that a future contingent consists not only in the conjunction of a common accident with a subject, but chiefly in the conjunction of actual existence with a possible nature or individual thing. But existence and essence taken in particular cannot be represented through diverse species, since, with due proportion preserved, they are not distinguished from each other, namely, possible essence from possible existence, and essence placed in act from actual existence. Therefore there is one simple species through which Peter's existing substance is seen, prescinding from accidents. Therefore, whatever may be the case about them, if that species was implanted in the angel from the beginning, why could he not through it know such a substance as future? Or, conversely, if through that species a future thing could not be known, how is an existing thing known through the same unchanged species? The same argument can be made about the species of accidents, even if they are posited as distinct. For before they are composed with the species of substance, they must represent such accidents as existing in act; otherwise, through that composition the subject will not be known as actually existing white, but as possibly white. Through what composition of species, then, is whiteness now known as existing? Or if it is not known through a composition of species but through the simple species of whiteness, the same difficulty remains, namely, how the same unchanged species shows existing whiteness, when before it existed, it did not represent its future actual existence.

8. *Another attack.*—But in another way the present difficulty is not resolved by that mode, because, once that plurality of species of substance and accidents is supposed, they can be composed in the same way before the thing exists as afterwards. Therefore, whether the cognition of such an existing thing by an angel occurs through one species or through a composition of many, the same difficulty remains. The consequence is evident of itself. But the antecedent is declared and proved, because let us suppose that the contingent thing is this white man of such a figure, and so on. Therefore that whole which at some time exists was previously possible. Therefore it can be known in both ways through innate species, whether the cognition occurs through one species or through a composition of many. Therefore, if from the representation through one species of that white man as possible before he exists there follows cognition of the same man as future, the same follows from a similar cognition through a composition

of many species; or, if it does not follow, the reason will have to be given in both cases. And thus that composition contributes nothing to resolving the present difficulty. For what was being said, that the composition of species cannot be made unless the gaze is directed to such a thing, helps nothing; because, speaking consistently in that opinion, although it cannot be directed to the thing as existing, it can be directed to the thing as possible and future, because that which can be the principle of that direction when the thing exists can be the principle of direction to the same thing abstractly known, although absolutely both involve repugnance in that opinion, as we have already argued.

9. *The third way of explaining the difficulty of this chapter.*—The third opinion, therefore, and a very common one, is that angels, through the innate species of singular things, do not know them to be future, because then the species would not represent them in act, but in potency; but after they exist, they know them as present because the species now represent them in act, which they can do without change. The reason is that representation occurs through assimilation. But one existing thing is not actually similar to another until the other exists; rather, the one existing beforehand can be said to be similar in potency, and afterwards, through the production of the other, begins to be actually similar to it without any change of itself. Thus, therefore, the authors of this opinion philosophize about the species of an angel: for before its object exists, it does not represent it in act, but in potency, and therefore cannot be a principle of knowing it as future; but after it begins to exist, by that very fact the species without change of itself actually represents it, because it is actually similar to it. And thus it can be the reason for knowing that thing as present and existing, without change of itself, by the change of the object, namely. Thus Cajetan thinks, *Summa Theologiae* II, question 57, article 2, § *As to the second*; Ferrariensis follows, *Contra Gentiles* II, chapter 95, in 2 of that part, § *For the evidence of these things*. And it seems to have been the opinion of Capreolus, in book 2, distinction 3, question 2, article 3, to 3 and 6 of Scotus, and to 1 of Gregory, against 2, conclusion; and they attribute it to St. Thomas, who indicates it in the said question 57, article 3, replies to 3 and 4, and question 8, *De Veritate*, article 9, reply to 3, and article 12, reply to 4. Giles also suggests it in book 2, distinction 7, question 2, article 1, reply to 2. And Cajetan and Ferrariensis declare it by the example of visible species. For when the object exists, they actually represent it, and therefore through them the present object is seen. Yet if, when the object had been destroyed, they were conserved in the eye by divine power, the eye could not through those species see the thing either as present or as future, because they would not have an actual likeness with it.

10. *The aforesaid third way of explaining is rejected by a dilemma.—The first part of the dilemma.—It adds an extrinsic denomination.*—This opinion, however, if it uses words properly and as they sound, supposes something false; but if it uses words metaphorically, it is ambiguous and solves the difficulty in no true sense. I declare each point. First of all, the name of assimilation can be taken properly, insofar as it signifies the predicamental relation of similitude. And in this sense it is truly said that, when the foundation exists without the term, the thing is similar in potency and not in act. But when the term has been produced, the other extreme, without change of itself and through the change of the term, becomes actually similar to it. But this doctrine is badly applied to an intelligible species and contributes nothing to solving the difficulty. First, because an intelligible species is not said to represent an object through formal agreement in nature, or in figure, or in some quality, and therefore, even if the object exists, a predicamental relation of similitude does not arise between the species and the object. Accordingly, neither was the species previously similar to the object in potency according to such a similitude, because it was never capable of such a relation. For a species is said to represent an object only intentionally, because it has the power of effecting an act which is in some way an image of the thing known and presents it to the mind according as it is in itself. Second, because even if such a relation could intervene between the species and the object, the species is not a principle of knowing the thing by reason of a relation resulting from the positing of foundation and term, but by reason of that absolute perfection which it has in itself, through which it constitutes the power in first act, whether the object exists or does not exist. For relation, as such, is neither a principle of acting nor does it add activity to a form, because it adds neither reality nor perhaps an intrinsic real mode, but a denomination arising from such coexistence of the extremes. This could also easily be confirmed by induction in all such relations. And besides, a relation cannot be a principle of knowing its term, since it is itself known through the term.

11. *The second part of the dilemma.—The twofold representation of an intelligible species.*—But if perhaps the other part is chosen, and it is said that that doctrine is not to be understood and applied with that propriety, but by a certain proportion, so that the representation of an intelligible species is declared after the manner of respective assimilation, then there is great equivocation in the words, because a twofold representation can be attributed to an intelligible species. One is that which it exhibits through itself and which it has in itself by force of its entity. The other is that which it makes through the

act of knowing. The former can be called formal in one sense, so that it may be distinguished from the effective, because it belongs to the species through its entity. The other is properly effective with respect to the species, for it can be attributed to it only as to an efficient principle; for formally it is made through second act, and it adds nothing to the species in itself, but in second act posits its action or efficiency. Hence the former representation belongs to the species not in potency, but in act, whether its object exists or does not exist, because it is as it were its formal nature and essential to it, and therefore constitutes the power in first act in intellectual being. Just as a habit of science, even if it does not operate, actually has whatever pertains to the notion of habit, and therefore actuates the power and in its own way inclines it. Hence, with respect to this part, by the sole existence of the object no representation more actual arises in the species, because no new relation results in it; nor, if one did result, would it contribute anything to intellectual representation, as I said. Nor does representation through second act result either, because this does not result necessarily from the existence of the object, but by the necessity and efficiency of the intellect through such a species, which in angels ordinarily depends on the free unfolding of the will. Therefore, before the power through that species effects an act, that representation is not more actual because of the existence of the object than it would have been before. Therefore in this sense the distinction is not rightly applied to the species considered according to itself and as prior to actual effective representation, that is, as it is prior at least in nature to effecting the act. Therefore it can only be said that a species represents in potency with respect to effective representation as long as it does not effect the act; and thus it can represent in potency both an existing and a non-existing thing. And therefore in this sense that distinction is useless, because either something false is said in it, or the principle is begged, because under different terms the same thing is said through the same thing. For if the sense is that that species, as long as the represented thing does not exist, is only in potency to acting and in no way in act, that is false. For through it the angel can then know the represented thing as possible, abstractively and quidditatively. But if the sense is that it is in potency with respect to intuitive cognition of an existing thing, the difficulty is not resolved by this, but only that is asserted in which the difficulty lies. For this is what is being asked: since that species of itself indifferently represents in first act an existing, non-existing, and future thing, why, just as through it a present thing is effectively represented in act when it exists, a future thing is not similarly represented when it is only future, if the angel wishes to use it as much as it can effect. Or, conversely, if that species is powerless for representing a

future thing in that way because of a defect of its own entity and, as it were, formal representation or actuality, how can that species, unchanged in itself and not increased in representing, be a principle of actually representing or seeing the same thing now existing?

12. *It is further attacked.—If the species is conserved in the eye, the object will be seen as present, although it no longer exists.*—Finally, in that sense that distinction about representation in act and in potency is not rightly applied to a species as representing an existing and non-existing thing. For it can represent an existing thing in potency and in act, and similarly it can represent in act and in potency a thing not yet existing in the way in which it can be known through it, namely, as possible. But if through that species the thing cannot be known as future, it is represented through it neither in act nor in potency; and we are inquiring into the reason for the distinction in this between a present and a future thing, which is not explained through that distinction. Hence the example about a species of sight is not to the point, because it of itself and in a natural way represents only an existing thing, and indeed a thing near to sight. And therefore it is not indifferent and quasi-universal to an existing and non-existing thing, as an angelic species is. Hence it matters little even if we grant that, when the thing is destroyed and the species is conserved, it will not be seen through it, because by its nature it is not a principle of knowing it except as existing. Nor is this because of a defect of actual relative similitude. For if the object existed elsewhere, the species would have the same relation, and yet it could not be seen there. Therefore it is not because of a defect of the relation of similitude, but because of a defect of active power. Nevertheless, it is probable that, if the species is conserved in the eye by divine power without the existence of the object, the eye can see the same thing, not abstractively, but by way of intuition, as if it existed in such a place, in which sense can be deceived, as will be said in the third treatise. But the case is not the same in an intellect which through a species sees a thing according as it is in itself and quidditatively, as is the angelic intellect.

13. *The true opinion.*—I say, therefore, that the reason for the difference between a present and future thing must be given not on the part of the intelligible species, but on the part of the knowable thing and its diverse states. For the species of itself is indifferently disposed to the present and future thing. But things are disposed in very different ways in those states in relation to terminating cognition. For the thing actually existing can terminate the intuitive cognition of an angelic intellect, but the thing not yet existing cannot at all, even if it is future, because to be future adds nothing intrinsic to the thing itself as

long as it does not exist. I declare this thus: an intelligible species does not represent, as it were complexly, that the thing exists or will exist, but simply represents it; and thus, by force of the species, only the represented thing is known by simple cognition. Hence, if the thing does not exist, through the species the essence of the thing and its existence are known incomplexly as possible in this or that time. But whether it is future in some time is not represented by force of the species, nor does it appear in the object itself as long as it is not actually, but depends on causes extrinsic to the thing and on its relation to them. This relation is not represented determinately through such a species, but generally under the notion of the possible, and also indifferently to future being or non-being, when the thing is apt to come to be from an undetermined cause. But after the thing now exists, it has in itself intrinsically actual existence, which can be seen; and therefore the same species which of itself represents the thing indifferently is a sufficient principle of that act by which it is seen as existing, because the very act of knowing, when terminated at the thing, finds it, so to speak, actually existing, and is terminated at it as such, and in it sees the determination of the cause to producing it.

14. *It is objected first.—Solution.*—Some object by asking why through that species an existing thing is seen with all its circumstances, namely, to be in this time and place, and from this cause, while through the same species it is not represented with the same circumstances of time, place, and so on, before it exists. For if before that it were represented with the same circumstances, it would now be known as future at such a time and place. Yet it is responded that what is supposed is false. For we do not say that before the thing exists it is known through such a species only abstractly and according to essence, but that it is known with all the circumstances of place, time, and so on, yet only possibly, and by abstracting from actual existence exercised, so to speak, because it is not in the known thing. But after the thing exists, that whole is seen through the species as actually existing, because it is found in reality in that way. Although the thing before it comes to be is known as possible at such a time, place, and so on, it is not known as future in them, because it is also known as possible in other places and times; and through the species it is not more represented as future in some time, even taken confusedly, because this also is by force of an undetermined cause, and the order to the cause is not represented otherwise by force of the species. But when the thing now exists, the actual existence of the thing itself objectively determines the representation of the species, not by making some change in it, but by terminating its act otherwise. Through this act the quasi-formal and expressed representation of the thing as

present is completed. And thus the actually existing object, although it does not change the species nor effectively concur in the act, nevertheless is, as it were, a necessary condition by way of a proportioned object or matter, concerning which the proper and determinate intuition of the actual existence of the thing can be engaged.

15. *A saying of St. Thomas is explained.*—And I think this was the mind of St. Thomas when he said that the species of an angel is of itself indifferent to a present or future thing, but that the thing itself is not related in the same way to the species of an angel when it is present and when it is future: *Because when it is present, it has a nature through which it is assimilated to the species which is in the mind of the angel*. For I understand this assimilation to be completed through the mediating act of seeing of the angel. But the existing thing is said to have a nature through which it is actually assimilated, because now it is apt matter, so that existing determinately may be seen in it, which was represented indifferently in the species. And therefore St. Thomas adds that *as long as the thing is future, it does not yet have a nature through which the angel can be assimilated to it*, namely intentionally, through intuitive vision and representation. And Capreolus seems to have understood St. Thomas in this way above when responding to Gregory. For at the end of the solution to 1, after he had reported the words of St. Thomas, he adds: *Then to the argument it is said that although future things certainly cannot be distinctly known by an angel as to their future being, this is not because the cognition of an angel depends on future things, but because they are not capable of proper and distinct cognition, nor subjectible to it*, namely, with respect to intuitive cognition. And this same thing seems to me to have been suggested by Theodoret in the words which I reported above, when he says that future things which do not yet exist are hidden as if in a certain deep, so that they are unable to appear, namely as they are future.

16. *A pressing objection against the preceding explanation.—Response.*—But against this explanation and response it can be pressed that it follows that not even GOD himself can see future things in themselves in such a way that, by force of the intuition of them, he evidently knows that they are future. The consequent is false and against St. Thomas and the better theologians; indeed, mediately it can be inferred to be against the faith, because God cannot know these future things in any cause. Otherwise, either they would come about from such a cause by necessity, or the cognition would be uncertain and fallible. Therefore, if by intuition he could not know them certainly, in no way could he have certain science of them, which is against the faith. Therefore the consequence is proved: because if a future thing, before it exists, is incapable of

the intuition of its proper existence as future at such a time, as we said, it will also have that incapacity with respect to divine cognition. Therefore not even God himself will be able in this way to intuit their futurition. I respond by denying the consequence, because it is proper and singular to God that, because of his infinity and eternity, he can equally intuit the existence of those things which in themselves do not yet exist but at some time will exist, no less than if they already existed. And this confirms the force of the reason by which we proved above that an angel cannot evidently know these future things, because they cannot be evidently known except in themselves. But a creature cannot extend its proper intuition to the existence of a thing as actual for the time in which it does not yet have it, because this exceeds the finite power of a creature and is granted to God alone because of his infinity, although the mode is not understood by us. For cognition of a future thing as future and not yet existing adds, beyond the simple representation and cognition of the thing and of its existence as possible in such a time, place, and so on, an evident and certain judgment that that thing is then and in such a way future. But this judgment is not by force of the species, but by force of intellectual light. That this is true in God also in its own way, if these two are distinguished by reason, can be understood from the things I said in the preceding volume, book 2, on the Attributes, chapter 3. But for making that evident judgment about such a future thing, which has being neither from itself nor in itself, nor in a necessary and determinate cause, the infinite efficacy of intellectual light is necessary. And therefore God alone can apprehend such a future thing, at the same time judging certainly that it is future and present to himself for its own time, which is to intuit it. Accordingly, intellectual intuition of a future thing is possible to God because it is not founded on the proper capacity of the object, but solely on non-repugnance with the infinity of light. But with respect to an angel this reason ceases, as has been declared.

17. *It is objected last.—First solution.—Second solution.*—Last, the second argument set down in chapter 6, number 5, and not solved, can be pressed: granted that an angel does not know these future things in themselves in that way, still, by knowing at least those things which are future as to individual essence and possible existence, he gathers that they are future from this, that he knows he does not have the species of all possible singular things, but only of those which at some time are future. It is responded first that, even if this is granted, nothing is inferred against what has been said, both because that cognition of a future thing is not by force of the species, nor through only an unknown medium, but through a known and very extrinsic medium, such as

that principle that an angel does not have species of possible things, but only of future things. Hence by force of such a medium it is not known clearly and distinctly when and how the thing is future, but absolutely and confusedly that it is at some time future. Next, I say that that cognition is not certain, but conjectural, because that principle, *I do not have species except of things at some time future*, is not evident or certain from the nature of the thing to the angel himself, because it is not a natural principle from which it may be evidently gathered, and it depends on the will of God, which is not necessarily revealed to him. Indeed, in reality it is quite uncertain. For granted that it is certain that an angel does not have species of all possible things, nevertheless that he has none of them is not certain, and this is enough so that, although he knows some individual to be possible, he does not immediately infer certainly that it is future. And this is declared: for either these individuals are of accidents or of substances. Concerning accidents, many things can be known by an angel as possible which will not be, especially among accidents which can come to be contingently and freely, as an angel knows that Lucifer could have had such a good act in the instant in which he sinned, which he did not have. And thus he knows many free acts possible for human beings which will not be done by them. But among substances, some are the angels themselves, and concerning these we grant that angels have only species of existing angels, after whom none will be future, because all were created together; and thus in them there is no place for cognition of a possible and future thing not yet existing. But if a case is imagined in which God had decreed to create other angels, whose species he would infuse from the beginning into the created angels, and they are supposed to know certainly that they have only species of angels at some time to be created, I grant that, through those species, they know that angels not yet existing are future. Yet I say that they know this through a virtual divine revelation, which is completed partly through the infusion of the species of future angels, partly through the manifestation of that principle, that species of angels are not infused except of angels at some time future. I have already said that this cannot be known certainly except by divine revelation; otherwise it is known only by conjecture, and thus the cognition of a future angel will not be certain, but conjectural. Other substances are material, not perpetual, and purely material, as are all generable things below man. And from these an angel knows many possible future things which will not be. Of this kind are many individuals of diverse species which can be made through natural causes and will not be, which are known by angels by force of the comprehension of causes,

in the manner to be stated below; and they can also have proper species of them, for what prevents it?

18. *An angel does not know individual things through individual species.*— Finally, in this order of material substances there are human beings, concerning whom on the part of bodies there seems to be the same reason as concerning other generable things. But on the part of souls there seems to be the same reason as concerning angels, because they can be made by God alone, just as angels can, and therefore God does not seem to infuse into angels species of souls except of souls at some time future, just as neither does he infuse species of angels. But although it is true that species of all souls simply possible are not infused into angels, I do not see an inconvenience if it is granted that species of many souls are infused into them, souls which would infallibly have to be created if such men were to marry such wives and organize various fetuses in such or such a way. For angels know that such conjunctions and organizations are possible. Why, then, could they not have species of those souls which would naturally be owed to those bodies, and through them know that they are possible, although they do not know that they are future and they never will be future? A general reason can also be added, because an angel does not know individual things through individual and particular species, but through one universal species in the way declared above and to be treated again below. Why, then, cannot it happen that one species representing many future individuals consequently represents others which will never be, not as if of itself from the primary intention of the one giving the species, but as if concomitantly, because the species is so perfect that it cannot habitually and in first act represent those without these. Thus, therefore, there is no inconvenience that an angel have species of many possible human beings and souls which will never be. But if the contrary is supposed, because it is probable, recourse must be had to what we were saying about angels: then the angel through the species of possible human beings knows that those human beings are future, but nevertheless either only by conjectural cognition, or through revelation, or through something equivalent, as I explained.

19. *To the two reasons for doubting in the chapter, number one, at the end.*— From all these things there is also a sufficient response to two of the reasons for doubting set down at the beginning of the preceding chapter. The prior was that an angel does not need the existence of the object in order to know. To this we say that he does not need it in order to be moved by the object or receive species, as sense needs it, nor even need it by way of a term necessary for every cognition, for he can abstractively know a non-existing thing. Nevertheless, he

needs it by way of a term and matter about which, proportionate and necessary for limited and created intuitive cognition, through which alone an angel can know the actual existence of the known thing, as has been declared. And thus the second reason concerning the cognition of the essence of the thing also ceases. For that precisely considered is abstractive and not intuitive cognition, and therefore the reason is not similar. But the third reason seeks a difficulty to be treated in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XII
HOW ANGELS CERTAINLY KNOW PAST THINGS THROUGH IMPLANTED SPECIES

1. *The reason for doubting.—The first conclusion is set down first.*—St. Thomas touched on this question, in the said question 57, article 3, reply to 3, and he seems to put past things on the same level as future things. For in the argument he had proposed the difficulty about these and future things, and afterwards says nothing about past things in particular, but only about future things; hence he seems tacitly to suggest that the same thing should be thought about past things. But to the contrary is that the cognition of past things is much easier than that of future things, because past things, even if they have been freely done, are now not contingent but necessary. From this it comes about that even human beings can know them certainly. Therefore this must first of all be supposed concerning angels, namely, that they can have certain cognition of past natural effects, even if they have been made freely and contingently, provided they were not thoughts of hearts; for we are not now dealing with these, and therefore I have spoken of natural effects in order to distinguish them from internal acts of will and reason. Thus, therefore, the assertion is certain and common among theologians: first from the reason given, that past things are naturally knowable; therefore an angel cannot lack a natural mode by which he knows them. Second, because science of past things is necessary for experience or sagacity in things to be done, and therefore the Fathers frequently attribute experience to demons, through which they are very sagacious and cunning for tempting. Third, because memory concerns past things as they are past. But angels have memory of things, for this belongs to perfection, and there is no reason why it should be denied to angels. For although memory properly so called in first act supposes some imperfection, namely, not always persevering in second act of a cognition once made, nevertheless, because this imperfection is found in angels, it is necessary that it be somehow supplied through the treasury

of memory, and consequently by reason of memory an angel will be able to know past things.

2. *The difficulty of knowing past things.*—But in order that this truth may be understood, it is necessary to explain the principle and mode of this cognition, for the matter is not without difficulty. For either an angel knows that past things have existed through innate species remaining unchanged in themselves, or through some change made in them, either through a modification of the old species or through the production of a new species. None of these seems able to be said; therefore such a mode of cognition cannot exist in an angel. The consequence is proved from the fact that no other mode can be thought of, once the necessity of species is supposed; or if it is imagined that an angel understands without species, the same difficulty will be found in that opinion, as we shall see. Therefore the minor is proved as to the first part, because through the innate species of some thing an angel cannot know it to be future before it exists. Therefore through the same unchanged species he cannot know it to be past, since it now does not exist. The consequence is proved, because just as in a future thing futurition is not something real actually existing in the thing itself, so that evident cognition of a future thing as such could be terminated at it, so in a past thing pastness, or to have been, is nothing real actually now existing in the thing which existed and now does not exist. Therefore it cannot, by force of the species alone, be known evidently in itself and by way of intuitive cognition. Likewise, the other part of the minor is proved, because if no change is made in the species concreated with the angel from the actual existence of the object, much less can one be made from the pastness of a thing. The consequence is proved, both because a past thing exists less than a present thing, indeed the past adds nothing to it, but rather removes its actual existence; for that thing is said to have passed which was and now is not, or which coexists with past time, not with present time. This negation can contribute nothing to changing angelic species. And also because all the reasons made above against the change of those species in the presence of the object prove the same about a past thing, because it cannot be understood what that change is, nor by whom or in what way it is made. And this reason proves that such a change cannot be a modification of the old species. But that it is not the production of a new species can be supposed from what was said above about the infused species of angels.

3. *A note for the resolution.—Another note.*—To explain this, I suppose that an angel can know a past thing in two ways, namely, as it were mediately and through another, that is, through a known medium, or directly, immediately, and in itself through its species, or through only an unknown medium, as we

said concerning future things. Concerning the prior mode of knowing through a known medium, therefore, there is no doubt that sometimes an angel can conjecture that some thing which now does not exist has existed, if it has left some signs or traces of its presence. In the same way, we also know that fire was here if smoke still remains, and from a present effect we know or conjecture a past cause; for from this we read that Joseph was troubled, Matthew 1. And concerning this kind of cognition there is no difficulty, because it does not occur through the proper species of the past thing, but through the species of the effect or trace left behind and still present. Likewise, there is another mode of knowing past things through the report and testimony of others. And in this way also it is clear that angels can know past things through the report of other angels who saw them. Yet this mode is imperfect, as is evident, and the prior one also does not suffice, both because it either does not provide certain cognition, namely, when the effects and signs are not evident, or at least because it is imperfect, since it is through some effect and not through proper cognition of the thing. And besides, not all past things can be known in this way. For many things pass in such a way that they leave no trace of themselves, such as passage through the sea and similar things which the Wise Man enumerates in Proverbs 30. Therefore, concerning the cognition of a past thing through the alien species of an effect or trace left by the past thing, one must think as concerning the cognition of any cause through signs or effects, or as concerning the cognition of future things through conjectures or certain signs. And therefore we do not speak of it, but the things we said about a similar cognition of future things can be applied proportionately. We are dealing, therefore, with cognition through the proper implanted species of the past thing. But an angel can be disposed toward a past thing of this kind in two ways. First, such that, although he has an implanted species of such a thing, nevertheless he did not see it or attend to it when it existed. For since an angel is not always in second act of his species, nor does he always attend to everything which happens in the world, it can easily happen that, although the thing previously existed, he did not see it as present and existing. Second, it can happen that he did see it, but now does not see it as present, because it has ceased to be. And it is necessary to explain each mode.

4. *The first opinion concerning the proper doubt of this chapter.*—For there is, as I find, the opinion of some, quite new to me, who say that an angel can through innate species very often see past things, and by mere intuition, even if he neither saw them as present nor thought about them. To explain it as well as possible, if we suppose that a new angel is now created by God, furnished with the same species with which other angels were furnished in the beginning, and

no others, they say, therefore, that this angel can, through those natural species by the power of his own genius or natural light, evidently know all natural effects and their productions as they were made from the beginning of time until now, even if they were contingently made and have wholly passed away and have left no trace of themselves in the world. Thus Vasquez holds in the said disputation 208, the last chapter, near the end. For although he believes that an angel knows without species, nevertheless concerning him he teaches that through his natural light alone he can in the said way know all past things which he never saw as present. And consequently he says that the same must be thought in the opinion which posits species, because, although between those opinions there is a diversity in the mode of constituting the angelic intellect in first act for understanding, either through the sole simple entity of the angelic intellect or through composition with a species, nevertheless in both ways it is conceived as of equal power for understanding; and therefore if, constituted in first act through itself, it can naturally know past things, it will be able to do the same even if it is constituted in the same first act through species. For this opinion he alleges no author, nor does he bring forward a positive reason, but a negative one: *because*, he says, *I find no reason why an angel cannot know past things in this way*. Hence he also argues from authority, because the Fathers and theologians deny to angels only the science of future contingents. Therefore they grant to them cognition of all other things, even of past things. Finally, an angel has species of past things; why, then, will he not know them?

5. *The contrary opinion, or the second conclusion proper to this chapter.*— But I judge that an angel cannot naturally know past things in the explained way. I have always taught this opinion, and Cumelius and Pesantius have followed it in the said article 3; and Gregory expressly teaches it in book 2, distinction 3, question 2, article 3, conclusion 1. St. Thomas does so in the said article 3, by introducing his text in the manner proposed at the beginning of the chapter. And I think the same can be attributed to the other theologians because of the identity of reason between past and future things with respect to this part, as I will immediately declare. Indeed, Vasquez himself, distinction 211, chapter 12, number 68, says that an angel cannot know the past cognition of another through memory unless he has first recognized it as present. And it is proved from this, that in Isaiah 41 the cognition both of past and of future things is in some way posited as a sign of divinity and is judged proper to God, when it is said: *Let them approach and announce to us the things which are to come, or tell the prior things which were*, and so on, where Jerome says: *Tell us either past or future things*, and so on. And Adam gathers the same from Isaiah 46, concerning

those words: *There is none like me, announcing from the beginning the last things*, and so on. Hence Gregory said, homily 1 on Ezekiel, that prophecy concerns not only future things, but also past things. There is, therefore, some mode of knowing past things proper to God, just as it is also proper to him to know future things, namely, by intuiting them in themselves before they exist. For just as this is proper to divinity because its eternal intuition extends to all future time as if it were present, so knowing past things immediately and in themselves is proper to divinity because its eternal intuition extends to all past time as if it were present. Therefore it is as impossible for an angel to intuit past things in that way as future things.

6. *The response of the adversaries is overthrown.*—He responds by denying the parity, and they give the reason, because the future as future is an object disproportionate to the natural light or intelligible species of the angelic intellect; but a past object is not so disproportionate. But this reason has been attacked in a similar case, because it begs the principle and does not give the reason for that diversity. And it is pressed further: just as the truth of a future contingent, although it does not have determination in a cause, is nevertheless determinate in itself and knowable, absolutely speaking, as we declared above, so the truth of a past thing contingent of itself is determinate, and it is as necessary that the future will be as that the past has been, once the supposition of truth has been made, as we said above from Peter Damian. Again, just as a future thing, as long as it remains in the state of being future, does not have actual existence in itself, so also a past thing which has ceased to be now does not have existence in itself, but is as much nothing as that which has not yet been. Therefore, just as created cognition by way of intuition, which would be terminated at the very thing, cannot be given concerning a future thing, so neither can it be given concerning a past thing. The consequence is proved from the difference posited between a future thing and a present thing, for the same difference obtains between a past thing and a present thing, because in each there is the diversity of an actual being from a non-being in itself. Nor do I see a probable reason for a difference which can be assigned. For that a past thing once existed, but a future thing has not, makes no difference. For from the fact that a thing has existed, there remains only a relation of reason on the part of the object. This relation not only cannot be the reason for knowing the pastness of the thing, but also cannot even be known or imagined unless one first somehow knows the existence of the thing in some past time. Hence it is confirmed: if an angel never knew or recognized that a thing existed, he is related to it just as if it had never existed. Therefore of himself he cannot know

more that such a thing existed, even if it existed in reality, than if it had not existed. The consequence is proved, because from the fact that that thing existed, no change has been made in the angel; and on the part of the object, after it has ceased to be, the thing is disposed just as if it had never existed. Therefore neither on the part of the species nor on the part of the object is there any principle or any condition because of which the angel can now know more that the thing has existed after it had being than before it had that being.

7. *To the negative reason in number four.—To the reason from authority in the same number.*—And thus the response to the negative foundation of the contrary opinion is clear, for we think the reason given to be not only sufficient but also convincing. Nor do we believe it likely that the said author, since he was of acute genius, did not see it; but we think it had no force for him because even concerning future contingents he had said that no sufficient reason can be given why they cannot be seen evidently and in themselves by angels. Hence, if he were looking to reason, he would say the same about future things; but because of authority he restrained himself. But we believe that what is certain by faith about future things is also founded on a sufficient reason, and because we find the same reason in past things, we judge that the same must be said about them. And consequently, to the argument from authority, we respond that Thomas and the other theologians, or also the Fathers, in this kind of cognition about which we speak, do not distinguish future things from past things, but only from present things. And in the difference which they posit between these, they sufficiently indicate that the same must be said about past things as about future things, with proportion preserved. But in the common manner of speaking they speak about future things rather than past things, because they suppose that angels can know present things and through them know past things through experience and memory. And therefore they do not simply deny that angels can know past things in the same way as future things. But whenever they declare how angels know past things, they say that they do it through recollection and experience. Therefore they think that an angel cannot know that a thing never seen by him has existed, unless it is revealed to him, or narrated, or shown through other conjectures. Accordingly, with respect to intuitive cognition, they think in the same way about past things as about future things. Finally, the last reason taken from the fact that angels have species of past things is the same as the similar reason made above about future things, and it must be solved proportionately in the same way, as is clear from what has just been said. For through that species the angel knows the past thing abstractly, and as to essence and possible existence, and also as to possible accidents; yet he does not know

how to discern by force of that species whether it has existed or not, nor whether it will be future, but he is disposed in the same way as if that thing had never existed.

8. *In what way memory is in an angel.—The opinion of Vasquez and its foundation.*—It remains, therefore, that whenever an angel does not know by indications or by the testimony of another that a past thing existed, he cannot through his species know its preceding existence. But it is otherwise if he saw it when it preexisted; for then from the past vision he can very well know that the thing existed. But it remains to be explained what that vision of a present thing contributes to cognition of the same thing as now past. And the reason for doubting is that after the thing has passed, the vision of it has also ceased. Therefore now it cannot through itself contribute to knowing that the thing existed. But neither can the innate species serve more after that cognition than before it, because it has not been changed, nor has that intuition of the present thing left anything in the angel from which such cognition of the past is made. For what is that? Or by what was it made? This difficulty seeks another one, namely, through what actual memory of the past is made in an angel. Vasquez above denies that this memory is made in an angel through a species left from the cognition of a present thing. He proves it because sensitive memory occurs without such a species of its past act. Therefore it will also be able to occur in an angel. The antecedent is clear, because no sense can sense its own sensation, because sensation is not sensible. Otherwise we would sense in what part sensation occurs and of what size it is. But he proves the consequence because, just as in sense we can defend memory of a past thing without a species of past cognition, through this alone, that the species representing the past thing is conserved in the sense with the same circumstances of time, place, and so on, with which it was previously known, so also in the intellect, and consequently also in an angel, we will be able to explain it in this way.

9. *The truer opinion, or the third conclusion of this chapter.—It is proved.*—But nevertheless I assert that it is necessary that through the cognition of a present thing something new and real be made in the intellect or species of an angel, so that afterwards he can know that such a thing once existed. Thus I have always taught in this matter, and Cumelius and Pesantius follow above. Marsilius thinks this in book 2, question 7, article 1, after the ninth conclusion, in a certain solution to 4, where he calls what is left in the mind of an angel *a habit of actual cognition, by which, when the angel wills, he remembers the thing previously known*. Gregory agrees, in book 2, distinction 3, question 3, article 3, conclusion 1, for he says that recollective cognition is made in an angel through

a species. And although he does not add that it is made through an acquired species, nevertheless he had previously said, from the doctrine of Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* II, chapter 17, and the whole book *De Divinatione daemonum*, chapters 3 and 4, that angels have experience, which is acquired from many memories, as Aristotle testifies at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, where he speaks about human beings. Nevertheless, with respect to this there is the same reason concerning angels, because it is contrary to the notion of experience, in whatever creature it may be, that it be infused, as we shall declare. This opinion is proved, first, from what has been said: because after the thing has passed, an angel cannot know that it existed through infused species precisely as such unless cognition of that existing thing, at the time when it existed, has preceded. Therefore it is necessary that this vision of the thing in its presence afterwards contribute something to knowing that such a thing existed; because if it contributes nothing, it is required superfluously. But it cannot contribute anything unless afterwards the angel remembers that he saw that thing, and by force of this memory knows that the thing existed. This is so both because, if he has altogether forgotten the past vision, he will be disposed just as if it had not preceded; and also because, if the preceding vision is required, it is so that it may be in some way a medium for knowing that the thing existed. But the past vision is not an unknown medium, because it is neither a species nor does it exist. Therefore it must be a known medium. But it is not a known medium unless the angel through recollection or memory now knows that he saw such a thing, because unless it is known in this way, it will be wholly unknown, and so it will not be a known medium. Therefore an angel through himself and his species knows that a thing existed in no other way than because he remembers that he saw it when it existed. But he cannot have this memory unless from the past vision something is left in his intellect, as in the treasury of memory. Therefore the angel cannot afterwards know that a thing existed unless he has acquired something, or unless some change has been made in his species by force of the preceding vision.

10. *Let the proof proceed.*—It remains only to prove the minor proposition just assumed, in which the difficulty lies. It is proved first because through innate species alone an angel could not know that he had seen such a thing before he saw it, as is known of itself, both because the species did not represent this, and because it would be a false representation and cognition, and because it has been shown concerning other things that an angel cannot know that they have existed unless he first saw them existing. Therefore he will much less be able through species to know that he has had such a vision which he has not yet

had; and consequently he could not see it as present either. But when an angel sees a present thing, he sees the vision itself not through species, but through itself, as was shown above, because species of his substance or of his accidents are not infused into an angel, which he can see through themselves, as also his substance. Among these accidents one is such a vision. Therefore, if that vision leaves nothing in the intellect of the angel, he will have no medium by which he remembers and knows that he had such a vision. Therefore, so that he can afterwards know that he saw the thing, and through the past vision as through a known medium know that the thing existed, it is necessary that from the vision of the present thing some change or acquisition of a species, or of a new mode of it, was made through the vision of the present thing.

11. *It is proved second.*—And the force of this reason is increased. For even if we granted that an angel has an implanted species of such a future vision of his own, and through it intuits the same vision when it exists, nevertheless, unless something had been added to it, the angel could not, after that vision had passed, remember that he had had it. This is proved from what was said concerning other things represented through the implanted species of angels. For by force of the species alone a thing is not known as existing unless in reality the object is present and actually existing; and therefore, through such a species, it is not known concerning a thing not yet existing that it is future. By the same reason it is not known that it was past unless some known medium intervenes. Therefore, by the same reason, an innate species of the vision, if there were one, could indeed represent it as present when it existed, because on the part of the object the necessary condition for intuitive vision concurs; but by force of such a species alone it could not be known as past after it had passed, if only the preceding species remained without any change or acquisition. For what some say, that it is enough that in the old species there remains a certain relation to the past act which it made, is plainly frivolous, because that relation can only be a relation of reason, which is nothing, and by many titles cannot be a principle of knowing; nor perhaps is it found in the angel if he does not feign it, or, in order to feign it, he must suppose cognition of the past vision as the term of such a relation.

12. *The foundation of the contrary opinion in number eight is met.*—Nor does the foundation of the former opinion stand against this. First, because even if concerning sensitive memory what is assumed in the antecedent were granted, the consequence is of no moment. For sensitive memory can be conceived in two ways. First, through the sole conservation of the species of the object previously seen without a species of the past vision, and then the act of memory

will be only to know again an absent thing which I had as present, without any cognition of the past vision of it, or that I saw it. Second, the act of memory can be such that one not only conceives the thing itself again, but also remembers that he saw such a thing. I say, therefore, that even if we granted that sensitive memory, especially in brutes, occurs only in the prior mode, which we do not now wish to define, nevertheless in intellective memory it cannot be denied that memory also occurs in the latter mode. It is proved because we experience this in ourselves, since we not only remember that we saw such a thing, but, if the memory is perfect, we remember where, when, and how often we saw it. Therefore much more does an angel have this kind of perfect memory; but he cannot have it without a real change or acquisition of a species, as I have shown. Indeed, a difference must be noted between a human being and an angel, because a human being does not have innate species of the intellect, but only acquired species. And therefore, even if he were to conserve in the absence of the object only the species of the thing seen, and not in any way the species of the vision, he could know by discourse that he saw it, because he experiences that he can remember such a thing by conceiving it; hence he gathers that he has its species, and consequently infers that he acquired it. And because he knows that such species are not acquired except through the senses, he will consequently infer that he saw such a thing or perceived it through some sense. But since an angel has innate species of things, if after the passing of the intuition of the present thing he retained nothing else except the prior innate species, in no way could he through such species know that that thing existed, neither directly and immediately, as has been proved, nor by formal or virtual inference, because, although in himself he experiences and sees that he has species by which he can conceive that thing and know it abstractively as possible, from this he cannot infer that he saw it as existing, since he did not receive the species from it.

13. *To the questions previously asked in the same number eight. To the former.*—To those questions, what is that which from the vision of a present thing is left in the mind of an angel, and by what is it made, I respond to the former that it is a certain proper species of the past vision, which indeed immediately and directly does not represent the thing previously seen, because the angel already has a permanent species of such an object and is not naturally capable of a new species of the same object, besides the fact that the object itself cannot impress that species. Therefore that species immediately and directly represents the act of past vision. For that act is a spiritual thing and consequently is an actually intelligible object; therefore it is representable

through a species. But we said from the beginning that an implanted species of such an act is not given to an angel, especially in particular and individual, because to know it as present when it exists a species was not necessary. But it could not be known as future, and therefore, so that it could be known as past, its species is necessary. Indeed, for the same end it was necessary that that species be acquired and not implanted. For if it were implanted, it would of itself be indifferent to representing a thing both as one which never existed, and therefore through it the thing could not be determinately known to have existed, because the thing in such a state does not determine the species to represent it. Rather, the present and actually existing thing determines it, as we have already explained. Therefore it is necessary that such a species be acquired. And the reason given from experience also proves this, because through actual cognition of a present thing habitual experience is left. Therefore it must necessarily be acquired through cognition of the present thing. The consequence is proved because if it were entirely implanted, it would not be founded in experience. And therefore in Christ, as we were saying above, although some science was infused per se and another per accidens, nevertheless experimental cognition had to be acquired, because an act of experience can be called acquired insofar as it is made by the one who takes experience. But habitual experience must be left from actual experience, or it is not experience.

14. *To the latter question.—As many rememorative species remain in the mind of an angel as there are acts of knowing.*—To the other question it is responded that the new species is made by the very act of seeing the present thing, which the angel previously had, because it can have no other cause more proportionate and proximate, and that one is most apt, because that act, although it is cognition, is also a knowable object and is intelligible in act. Hence of itself it is apt to impress a species of itself. But although such a species is not necessary so that that act, as long as it is present, may be seen by the angel himself, because it can be known through itself, nevertheless, so that it may conserve memory of itself, it is necessary that it leave a species as a kind of trace of itself. Indeed, so that that act can afterwards be known through such a species not only according to essence or possibility, but also according to the existence which it had, that is, so that it be known to have existed, it is necessary that the species through which it is known have been received from that act itself, so that it represents it not only as object, but also as cause. For the discourse made, in my judgment, sufficiently convinces this. But it can be pressed: it follows that an angel acquires as many species as he has and changes acts of knowing, which seems inconvenient. I respond: if memory of all and each of the preceding acts

is necessary, or very agreeable to the perfection of an angel, there can be no inconvenience in always acquiring something by which those multiplied acts are known as past. But one can say that these are not distinct species, but after the first has been acquired, it is afterwards modified and increased so that it can represent the other acts. But because I understand these modifications with difficulty, I find no inconvenience in that multiplication of species. Because from the side from which they are acquired and made by particular objects, they are commensurate with them and are altogether particular in representing, and so they can easily be distinguished either in species or in number; and on the part of the subject there is in that multiplication neither repugnance nor inconvenience.

15. *Objection.—Solution.—Which species concur for the act of recollection.* —Finally, someone can doubt because this mode of knowing past things seems imperfect, because it is only as if in one attesting. For when I know that something has been done only through the narration and attestation of another, I recognize it imperfectly and obscurely. But an angel is disposed in the same way when, through the sole recollection of his past act, he knows that the thing objected to that act at some time existed, because he as it were narrates to himself what he saw at another time, and assents not from the thing itself seen, but from his own testimony, so to speak. And it is declared further: because that species which an angel receives from his own act does not immediately represent the object of the preceding act, but the act itself bespeaking a relation to such an object. Therefore the cognition of a past thing through such a species is not cognition through a proper species, but through an alien one, and accordingly is imperfect. I respond that that cognition of a past thing, compared to the intuitive cognition of a present thing, can be called imperfect, because in reality an angel cannot intuit the past as he intuits the present; for this is proper to God, as I have declared. And therefore the cognition of a present thing occurs altogether immediately and directly, without a known medium, by force of the species alone and of the object proposed in a perfect way. But the cognition of a past thing always occurs through some known medium, as through recollection and cognition of a past act. Nevertheless, that cognition of a past thing is sufficiently perfect, as much as can be in a creature from its kind, because for it there concurs not only the species of the past act, but also the proper species of the thing which preceded, which represents it according as it was in itself and with all the conditions of existence which it had. But at the same time there concurs the species of the past act, which shows the most proper and intrinsic

medium that can be found in an angel for knowing that the thing existed in the way in which it is represented through such a species.

CHAPTER XIII
WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN KNOW ALL POSSIBLE THINGS OF THE NATURAL ORDER THROUGH INNATE SPECIES

1. *Explanation of the question.*—We have spoken of present, future, and past things; it remains now to speak of possible things that will never be future. But we are speaking, as is said in the title, of things of the natural order. For although the natural order is sometimes called that order which God established according to ordinary law and providence, under which only things that at some time will be future are included, nevertheless in the present case it is taken so as to be distinguished from works of grace and miraculous works, which are possible to God. And it includes possible things of the same nature and grade, or genus, as created things, although God has not decreed to make them, such as another universe, or other orders of angels, or of other substances, which without doubt God could make. Therefore the question concerns these things: whether angels have natural knowledge of such things, and consequently innate species of them.

2. *Henry seems to incline toward the affirmative side.*—In this matter, among the scholastics, I find only Henry to whom the affirmative side can be attributed. For although he does not admit species under that name in angels, nevertheless he posits a scientific habit co-created with the angel, which constitutes him in first act sufficiently for knowing all things naturally knowable by him. But above we showed that this habit, if it were given, would be a certain very universal intelligible species. And that this habit is the principle of knowing all possible things, Henry declares in that *Quodlibet* 5, quest. 14, letter R, saying: *that habit is perfected for all things naturally knowable by an angel; by its power all things are in every way knowable by him, and it has a natural connection with them, not according as they are, or are by nature apt to subsist outside, for this belongs accidentally to the knowable as knowable; for something is knowable simply from this alone, that it is something through its essence, having its account outside the thing in God.* Hence he concludes: *Therefore, once an angel has been created, and such a habit has been naturally co-created with him, by that habit he will be inclined to knowing the quiddites of all things.* In these words he is plainly speaking of the quiddites of all possible things, insofar as they are knowable, abstracting from every order of actual existence, and consequently as they are

possible. And in the same words he indicates the foundation, because all possible things are knowable by an angel, so far as concerns the angel himself, and it is accidental to the account of the knowable that God has resolved to create or not to create the knowable thing. Therefore all possible things are equally represented through that habit. The consequence is proved, both because that habit is given for constituting the angel in first act with respect to all things knowable by him, but all possible things are equally knowable, and also because there is no greater reason why it should represent these rather than those. For the reason cannot be taken from God's decree willing or not willing to produce these or those, since this is accidental to the account of the knowable. And it can be confirmed by speaking consistently within Henry's opinion. For if God had decreed to create other heavens, either along with those that now exist or without these, that angel would know them through the same scientific habit. Therefore even now it represents them, although they are only possible, because God's extrinsic decree does not change the nature of the habit. Therefore the same will be true of all possible things, because the reason is the same. The consequences are evident, and the antecedent is clear, because according to Henry that habit is not multiplied because of the multitude of knowable things. Otherwise he could have asserted on no foundation that this habit is now only one in each angel, even though innumerable objects are known through it.

3. *To whom the same opinion should be attributed.*—Second, almost the same manner of speaking must be followed by those who say that angels do not need intelligible species for knowing any existing things whatever, nor also the effective cooperation of objects, nor their actual existence in order to know them abstractively, but through the simple entity of their intellect they are in sufficient and complete first act for cognition of this kind. For from these principles it follows that an angel has within himself a connatural principle sufficient in every respect for knowing all possible things, and therefore, although he does not have species, nevertheless he has something equivalent to the species of all possible things, or more eminent than them, and therefore can also actually know them if he wills. This is proved. For what Henry attributes to the angelic intellect through one scientific habit, which is a thing distinct from the intellect of the angel, or what another might attribute to it through many species of all possible things, that opinion attributes to the angelic intellect through its simple entity. For through that alone it judges the angelic intellect to be of such actuality and efficacy as others think through the composition of a potential intellect with a habit or with species. Therefore, although this opinion

does not use a habit or species, in the thing itself it posits the angel as constituted in first act for knowing all possible things, or, what is the same, as having connatural knowledge of all possible things in first act; it has this not through a superadded entity, but through its simple intellectual light.

4. *Vázquez's doctrine in this matter, which constitutes the second opinion.*—But Father Vázquez, although he holds that opinion, denies simply that angels know possible things which God can create; indeed, he denies that they know any of them, except insofar as some things that will never be are contained in the active potency of things that have been made. For he says that they can know those through causes in whose power they are contained, as through a known medium, which we will see later. But he altogether denies this directly and immediately, as it were through a species, or through a merely unknown principle, in disp. 208, chapter 4, at the end, and he suggests two reasons. The first is that possible things are infinite; therefore an angel cannot know all of them; therefore he cannot know any, because there is no greater reason for one than for another. The second is that an angel does not have any natural principle by which he can know the individual things among such possible things. He had suggested a third reason in disp. 200, chapter 3, at the end, because possible things that are contained in God's potency alone are not objects that correspond to the angelic power itself according to its natural power and are equal to it. In this he equates those things with future contingents from a free cause. And therefore with respect to those things, he says, as they are such, an angel cannot operate naturally by his own proper power.

5. *The immediately preceding doctrine is weighed.*—Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand and defend how those two things cohere, namely, that an angel, through his intellect alone, is sufficiently constituted in first act for knowing all objects knowable by him, and nevertheless that he cannot know the essences of possible things that will never be. For the opposite seems first of all to be proved by Henry's foundation. For it is accidental to the account of a knowable being that God has decreed or has not decreed to make it, as is clear in the divine knowledge of simple intelligence, in which all possible things are knowable before God has decreed anything about them. Therefore, if on the part of the knower there is no lack of a principle and power of understanding, they are knowable with respect to any intellect. And the reason is that just as a thing does not have it from the will of God that it is possible, so neither does it have from that will that it is knowable. Rather, it has this by the very fact that in some way it is a being, because every being is necessarily true and knowable. Therefore possible things that, by the divine decree, never were to be, are of

themselves knowable according to essential being. Therefore, if such things belong to the natural order, for we are speaking only of these, they are proportioned to the angelic mind, because they are included under its adequate object. Nor does the decree of God contribute anything to this proportion. Therefore, if the intellect of an angel is of itself constituted in first act for knowing natural things, certainly it is also in first act with respect to its whole adequate natural object, because there is no greater reason for one part than for another. Therefore it will be able to know that whole, or any part of it.

6. *It is further attacked.*—Second, this is explained by confirming what has been said within Henry's opinion. For if God had decreed to create other heavens or animals, the angel, without a new species, or without addition or change of his intellect, would be able to know in this way through his own light, because then an angel would not need species or some added principle for knowing natural things any more than he does now. But those things would be natural things, as is clear. Therefore even now there is in the angel a sufficient principle for knowing those things. And on the part of the object, as regards quidditative and abstractive cognition, nothing is lacking, because, according to that opinion, the object does not concur effectively, and for terminating abstractive cognition the reality of the possible essence is sufficient, whatever it may be, whether it has been ordered to existing or not. For this is extrinsic and accidental. And this is confirmed from the difference between intuitive and abstractive knowledge: an object terminates intuitive cognition as actually existing, and therefore that knowledge naturally supposes the actual existence of the object. But abstractive knowledge is terminated at the object by abstracting from existence, and therefore of itself abstracts from present, past, and future existence, because it can be terminated at the quiddity alone as such. Therefore, if the intellect of an angel is of itself a sufficient principle of such cognition, nothing is lacking on the part of the object for it to be able to be known, even if it will never be future. Third, I argue: according to the common opinion, which holds that an angel needs species, if an angel had innate species of all possible things that are contained in God's potency, he could know each of them distinctly and quidditatively, because on the part of the principle he has whatever is necessary, and on the part of the object nothing is required except that it have a real essence. But according to this opinion, an angel without superadded species has through his light whatever he has through intelligible species according to the common opinion. Therefore, speaking consistently, it cannot be denied in that opinion that an angel can know those things. Finally, one who has habitual knowledge can use it with respect to any part of its object

unless he is impeded. But according to that opinion an angel has habitual knowledge of all possible things, because the habitual knowledge of an angel in that opinion is nothing other than his intellectual light. Therefore he can use it with respect to possible things, because he naturally has no impediment, nor does God, from the mere fact that he has not ordered such things to existing, place such an impediment, as seems self-evident. Therefore, if an angel does not need species, he can naturally know all possible things, and one cannot be coherently affirmed without the other.

7. *To the first reason in number four.*—And this is especially confirmed by the reasons of the aforesaid opinion, because they are no less out of harmony with its foundation or intention. For to the first, concerning the infinity and multitude of possible things, although the first consequence with its consequent may be granted, understanding it of the whole collection, that is, that an angel, although without species he understands things by the power of his own light, cannot simultaneously know the whole collection of possible things, nevertheless the second inference, that he cannot know any, has no force, because he can attend to each individually and not to the whole collection. Hence that proof, that there is no greater reason for one than for another, rightly proves that he habitually, or in first act, knows all things, but not that he knows them actually, because in this case a greater reason can easily be given from freedom of choice. And so by that argument only this is proved: that an angel can know each, or any one of them distributively, but not the whole collection simultaneously. But if the argument proceeds concerning all distributively, then the first consequence must be denied, because although possible things are infinite, according to that opinion they can be known simultaneously in habit, or in first act, and no less in complete active power than in passive power. This active power can be reduced to act divisively with respect to all, or with respect to any given one, although it cannot be reduced simultaneously to complete act with respect to all collectively.

To the second.—But the second argument, which immediately proceeds against this, assumes something contrary to the assertion of that opinion. For if the angelic light by itself and without species is a sufficient principle for knowing natural things, why will that same light not be a principle for knowing individual possible things, since the extrinsic ordination of God, that a possible thing is at some time future or is not, neither changes the object in the account of the knowable, nor diminishes the efficacy of the light for knowing?

To the third.—Hence I also do not see how what is assumed in the third reason can stand: that things which are only possible are not objects that

correspond to and are equal to the angelic power according to its natural power. For those things, even if they will not be future, are things of the natural order; and if God had decreed to make them, they would be proportioned to the angelic power. Therefore even now they are proportioned or equal to the intellective light of an angel in the account of a knowable object and of a cognitive power. For these accounts, as I have often said, are not varied because of God's extrinsic ordination that a thing is or is not.

8. *Third opinion.—It is proved.*—A third opinion on this point can be that each angel has species of all possible natural things, through which he can know them quidditatively and abstractively, even if those species are many and proper qualities distinct from the intellect and supplying the place of the object. It is proved first, because all these species are connatural to an angel according to his receptive potency and natural inclination; therefore they are infused into him from the beginning. The consequence holds from what was said in the preceding chapter. But the antecedent can be supported from what we have said in the present chapter: because God's extrinsic ordination concerning the actual being of a knowable object does not change the nature of the cognitive power or of the knowable object. Therefore there is the same natural capacity in the intellect of an angel, and the same natural inclination toward these knowable objects and their species, whether they have been ordered to existing or have not. Second, because otherwise it follows that an angel is perpetually deprived of cognition and species of infinite things naturally knowable by him, for which knowledge and species he has a natural inclination. But this seems too violent for an angel. Therefore species of possible things of this kind must not be denied to him. Third, we can add that there is no repugnance in innate species of all possible things being given to an angel. Therefore, since this is consonant with his nature, as has been shown, it must not be denied to him. The antecedent is proved because three repugnances are usually brought forward, but they either are not repugnances, or do not stand.

9. *The first repugnance that could be brought against this third opinion is excluded.—The second repugnance is excluded.—Objects infinite in number can be represented through species finite in number.—The third is excluded.*—The first repugnance is that it follows that an angel knows infinite things. To this it has already been responded: if it is understood of knowledge in habit, it is not inconvenient, much less repugnant; but if it is understood of actual knowledge all at once, this does not follow, as I have already explained; finally, if it is understood of actual knowledge, not all at once but through succession into infinity, then it is granted that it can be infinite syncategorematically, as they say,

or into infinity, because an angel will be able now to contemplate one possible thing, afterward another, and then another, and so into infinity. Nevertheless, he will never arrive at a terminus, nor will he exhaust that whole knowable object; and therefore the actual knowledge will never be actually infinite. The second repugnance is that it follows that an angel simultaneously has an infinite multitude of intelligible species, which must not be admitted, because it will be a certain actual infinite in multitude, or in transcendental discrete quantity, which infinite is repugnant even in spiritual things. But it can be responded either according to the opinion that denies there is repugnance in an actual infinite being given in the multitude of spiritual intentional species, or by saying that infinite intelligible things can be represented through a finite number of species. For one universal angelic species can represent infinite things in some genus or species, as we will see below. Therefore all creatable objects can be included under grades, or orders, or genera finite in number, and so they will also be able to be represented through a finite number of species, each of which represents one of those universal heads together with all the things contained under them. The third repugnance is that it follows that an angel comprehends God's omnipotence by comprehending all its effects. But this inconvenience does not follow, both because an angel does not know all those effects simultaneously, and also because, even if he knew all of them simultaneously, he would not know them in the Word, for then perhaps comprehension would follow, but would know them in themselves; and through all of them together he would never know God as he is in himself, and therefore neither quidditatively, much less comprehensively. This is especially so because the things about which we are speaking are not all the effects of divine omnipotence, since we are dealing only with natural effects. But besides all possible effects of this kind God can make effects of grace and miraculous effects, which perhaps cannot be represented through proper species. Therefore no repugnance appears in angels having co-created species of all possible natural things.

10. *The true opinion.—It is proved.—Abstractive cognition in God is founded upon intuitive cognition.*—Nevertheless, the common opinion is more approved by us; it affirms that species co-created with angels are directly only of singular things that will at some time be future, and consequently of the species or genera contained in them. St. Thomas openly supposes this opinion in the *Summa Theologiae* I, quest. 56, art. 2, reply to 4, where he says that if God were going to make a new angel whom he now has not made, he would have placed in the created angels another intentional species, which he does not now infuse into them. And the commentators agree there, and in quest. 55, art. 2, and there

especially Alexander Pesantius, concl. 6, and Daniel Malonius, on II, dist. 3, disp. 11. And it is proved first, because it is not natural to an angel to know possible things that will never have existence. Therefore there is no reason for us to believe that species of all of them are infused into angels, since they are infused only for natural cognition, that is, cognition owed to nature. The antecedent is explained and proved first, because the species of those things alone are connatural to an angel, or naturally owed to him, which things, namely, he could naturally know if he could take knowledge from the things themselves, because the author of nature supplies only those things that the natural order of things seems to demand. Second, because all cognition of possible things takes its beginning from existing things, and this seems to be the connatural order or account of knowing. Therefore it is not natural first and through itself to know possible things that will never have existence. This is best explained from divine knowledge, which does not turn upon possible things except from the comprehension of God's own existing essence. For by intuiting and comprehending himself, God knows possible things in himself; and thus even in God abstractive cognition is founded on intuitive cognition, at least of that thing in which another is contained. Much less, therefore, can it be natural to an angel directly and through a proper species to know all possible things that will never be future. Rather, if he knows some, he does not know this through their species, but through species of some existing things in which others are virtually contained. For in this way an angel is said to know things that are in the potency of natural causes, as we will see later. But all things that are contained only in God's potency he cannot naturally know through that potency itself, since he does not know it as it is in itself. Therefore he cannot know them in any connatural way, and consequently he does not connaturally require their species. Third, we can argue that the soul of Christ did not receive, through grace, knowledge of all possible things, as the more common opinion holds. Therefore much less do angels require that knowledge through nature.

11. *To the first proof in number eight.—To the second proof.*—But this will be confirmed further by satisfying the contrary objections. To the first argument, we deny what is assumed, namely, that all these species are connatural to an angel. And to the proof we say, first of all, that there is a difference between an intrinsic active potency, or quasi-active potency through natural emanation, and a purely receptive potency. For the former has from within a determinate effect that it can produce in its own way; but receptive potency is of itself indifferent to many things and is determined by the agent by which it is reduced to act. And thus prime matter, although it is capable of

several forms, is content with one, to which it is determined by the agent. Thus, therefore, since an angel's potency with respect to intelligible species is receptive only, it cannot be actualized simultaneously by all species which it can receive, but only by those to which it is consequently determined according to the order of things established beforehand by the author of nature. For passive capacity alone is not sufficient, as I said, without the due natural order, to which natural appetite is also judged to be conformed. For although it is not founded on intrinsic cognition, nevertheless it is ordered in its own grade, so that nature is judged metaphorically to desire what it would properly desire in an ordered way if it had cognition. But the species of those things that primarily exist are alone desired in an ordered way, because those things are through themselves apt to affect the power so that they may be known directly; but other things that do not exist and will not be future are not first knowable through themselves, but only insofar as they are contained in existing things. And therefore even the natural appetite, or the natural due, is not extended to those things that are only possible. And in this way there is also a response to the second, because things naturally knowable, as they are distinguished from supernatural, miraculous, and free things, are of two kinds, namely, knowable remotely or proximately. In the first way, purely possible things can be said to be naturally knowable by an angel, because if they existed, they would fall under natural cognition; nevertheless they are not proximately knowable, because they do not have a state accommodated to natural knowledge proper and distinct of the thing in itself. In the first way I concede that there are many things naturally knowable that an angel does not know. But that is not ignorance properly and privatively, but negative unknowing, because it is not the lack of knowledge that is due, but only of knowledge remotely possible. Consequently such unknowing is not violent, because the contrary knowledge is not naturally due, as has been explained.

12. In the third argument, the question is begged whether it was possible simply and by absolute potency for an angel to be given species of all possible things, granted that they were not due, nor possible according to the ordinary law. I treated this doubt in tome 3, disp. 27, sect. 4, when treating the infused knowledge of the soul of Christ, and I inclined to that side which says that it does not imply a contradiction for knowledge of all possible things outside the Word to be communicated to a creature through infused species and an intellectual light of the supernatural order. I now also judge this probable and, consequently, I admit that the third reason concerning the comprehension of God is not efficacious, as I taught more fully throughout that whole place. But because of the other two reasons, I add in the present case that, although

absolutely speaking it is not repugnant to have species of all possible things, nevertheless it is repugnant to have such exact cognition, or representation, through natural species commensurate with the natural light of the angelic intellect. For we do not admit that such full knowledge can be given through an infinite multitude of intelligible species, because we judge every such infinite multitude to be impossible. But if they are finite, it is necessary that each represent infinite species of things, because otherwise they cannot exhaust all the species of possible things. Yet such species cannot be connatural to an angel, because although an angel can have universal species, as we will say below, nevertheless not to such an extent that one represents infinite natures and species of things. The reason is that whatever is represented through one angelic species can be known by the angel by one simple act, as we will say later. But an angel cannot have an act by which he knows infinite things at once, I mean a natural act proportioned to his natural power, because it does not seem possible through a finite natural light to attend to infinite things at once, understanding each properly and perfectly. Therefore no species connatural to an angel can be given which, while being one, represents infinite things, especially things diverse in species. But it can be otherwise through species and a light of the supernatural order, and therefore there is a greater repugnance on this side in an angel having innate species proportioned to his nature which represent all possible things than there was in the knowledge infused per se into the soul of Christ, which was of a higher order, as I said there.

CHAPTER XIV
WHETHER THE SPECIES OF ANGELS ARE UNIVERSAL OR PARTICULAR

1. *The sense of the question.—First opinion.*—The sense of this question is known from what has gone before. For we do not call a species universal because it represents only a universal nature without singulars; for in this way it has already been said that angels have species of singular things, which also represent universal natures, not as abstracted, but as they are in singulars. Therefore we call a species universal on the part of the things represented, if these are many and distinct. But species that represent only individual things will be called particular. Therefore in this sense the first opinion says that all the species of angels are particular, that is, that through one species only one thing is represented, and consequently that there are multiplied in an angel as many species as there are things known by him through species, or able to be known.

All those who teach that species of singular things are not infused into angels but are taken from things think this way about the species of singular things: Scotus, on II, dist. 3, quest. 10, Bassolus, quest. 3, Major, quest. 6, Richard, art. 7, quest. 2. And because these doctors distinguish in angels species representing universal natures from species of singulars, therefore they say proportionally of those species that one intelligible species represents only one specific nature, and so for the rest.

2. *Its foundation.*—The principal foundation that concerns individuals seems to be that an angel takes species of singulars from things. Therefore one species cannot belong to many things, because one and the same species cannot be received from several things, both because the actions of such species differ from one another, and also because the first singular thing produces a species only of itself, while a second thing that afterward succeeds cannot increase, or as it were extend, the preceding species, for such an extension is not intelligible. Therefore it also produces its own proper species, and so for the rest. Second, they argue both about acquired species and about infused species, whether of individuals or of natures: a species is an indivisible thing representing the thing of which it is the species. But the same indivisible form cannot be the likeness of several dissimilar things. Therefore one species cannot belong to several things. The consequence is proved because the representation of a species is through assimilation, and if it belongs to several things only insofar as they are similar to one another, it will not be a principle of knowing them as they are distinct. Therefore it is necessary that it represent them insofar as they are distinct and in some way dissimilar, which seems impossible. Third, because just as a habit takes its species from the object, so also does a species, for it is a certain habit stating a transcendental relation to the thing that it represents. Therefore one species ought to have one adequate object. Therefore it can represent only one thing. This consequence is proved because, if it represents several things, neither of them will be the adequate object, nor can both be so together except under some common account. And consequently the species will not represent those things according to what is proper to them, but only according to that common account, and so it will not be the species of several particulars as such. But if it is said that the common account is the adequate object, not as precise, but as containing several things under itself, to representing which it is also extended according to their proper species, the objection against this is that it follows that infinite things are represented through such a species: either individuals, if that common account is specific, or, if it is generic, it will represent infinite specific essences that can be multiplied under the same genus. But this exceeds the

limitation of a finite form, because such a species will have infinite perfection. For the more things or natures a species represents, the more perfect it is; and thus by ascending in the number of things represented, the perfection of the species always increases. Therefore, if it represents infinite things, it will be of infinite perfection.

3. *First conclusion.—It is proved.*—Nevertheless, it must be said first that it is not repugnant for one intelligible species to represent several singular things either numerically only, or even differing in species. St. Thomas supposes this assertion in the *Summa Theologiae* I, quest. 55, art. 3, and it is the more common opinion of theologians, whom we will immediately cite in the second assertion. And it is proved by reason, first because no reason for repugnance can be assigned, as will easily be clear by solving the reasons of the contrary opinion, which try to show that such a species is impossible, but prove nothing, as we will see at the end. Second, St. Thomas explains this a priori, because these species immediately infused by God, for we speak only of these, are certain participations of the exemplars or divine ideas. But the most simple idea of God represents several things. Why, therefore, will there not be able to proceed from it some participation of it that imitates it in the representation of several things, although it cannot equal it either in mode or in multitude and variety? Certainly no reason can be given, because for representing several things in a limited mode there is no reason why absolutely infinite perfection should be necessary. Once that necessity is excluded, the comparison will easily be made in other respects. And so the inference from the uncreated form to a created form is valid, not because the latter is equal to the former, but because it can imitate it in that which does not require infinite perfection. For it pertains to the perfection of the uncreated idea that it can communicate itself through a certain eminent participation which does not include infinity simply.

4. *Richard's response to the immediately preceding reason is refuted.*—But what Richard and others respond, that there are also individual ideas of individual things or natures, and that infinite ideas can exist in God, but infinite species cannot exist in an angel, is frivolous, because ideas are not multiplied in God according to the thing, but according to reason. But we are speaking of an idea insofar as in reality it is a most simple thing and represents many things. And from this we conclude that this is not repugnant to a created form in its own grade. But just as that divine form, through its relation to several things, is distinguished by us into several ideas distinct in reason, so a species representing several things, although in reality it is one, can be distinguished in reason into several through its relation to the things represented. But here we

are dealing with real unity, not unity of reason. Third, this is explained from the same St. Thomas because a species is the proximate efficient principle of understanding. But two active powers of diverse effects and of an inferior order can be united in one higher power, as St. Thomas above gives an example in human prudence compared to the particular quasi-prudences of animals; and in book II of *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 98, he explains it through the more eminent powers of universal causes: *For this species*, he says, *is universal in power after the manner of an acting form in a universal cause, which, the more universal it is, the more things it extends to and the more efficaciously it produces.* Therefore, just as this is not repugnant in other created powers, there is no reason why it should be thought impossible in intelligible species.

5. *Second conclusion proved by authorities.—The intelligible species of angels are universal.—It is proved by reason.*—I say, therefore, second, that the intelligible species of angels are universal. So teaches St. Thomas, in the cited quest. 55, art. 3, and book II, *Contra Gentiles*, chapters 96 and 98, and on II, dist. 3, quest. 3, art. 2, where Capreolus, quest. 2, art. 1, concl. 7, and art. 3, to the arguments against it, and Bonaventure, second part of the distinction, art. 2, quest. 1, reply to 1, Giles, second part of the distinction, quest. 2, art. 2, doubts 3 and 4, Argentina, quest. 2, art. 4, and all the Thomists and modern authors in the cited places. And Albert held the same, *De quatuor coaequaevis*, part I, quest. 5, art. 12. And Henry thinks the same, *Quodlibet* 5, quest. 14, positing in an angel one habit that is the principle of knowing all things, for we showed above that this is an intelligible species. It is proved first because this universality of species is not impossible simply, as has been shown, nor does it exceed the grade of perfection of the natural order, because that whole perfection of one species can be in an entity of the natural order, because it includes no supernaturality either from the object, or from the mode, or from any other head. Therefore such universal species can be connatural to some created intellectual substance. Therefore in fact such species are connatural to created angels, and consequently such are the species that were infused into them from the beginning. The consequence is proved, first, because angels are in the highest grade of intellectual substances, and in that grade they have great efficacy and power of understanding. Therefore it is likely that they have a superior power of understanding, one that can understand several things through one principle, because the more perfect a power is, the simpler and more unified it is. Second, because the fact that human beings know individual things through individual species comes from imperfection and from the manner of acquiring species through the senses. Therefore, since angels are of a

higher order, and have a higher mode of obtaining species, and can easily receive universal species, this is more consonant with their natural perfection and the excellence of their light. For the things that are divided in lower beings are found united in higher beings. Third, this can be confirmed by solving the arguments to the opposite. For from these it will be clear that there is no repugnance or difficulty in this mode of understanding, indeed that it is highly consonant with the perfection of understanding which it is most likely is found in angels, and therefore that it must not be denied to them.

6. *To the contrary foundation in number 2.—To the second argument.*—To the first, then, its foundation is denied, namely, that an angel receives their species from singular things, speaking of natural things, as has already been shown by us. And so from this side it is not repugnant that the species of an angel be universal. Indeed, from this it is shown that this is more suitable, lest it be necessary for an angel to have at the same time as many distinct species as there will successively be individuals of substances and bodies from the beginning of the world until the end. But because angels acquire species of some internal acts, as we believe, we will afterward say in particular what must be thought about the universality of such species. The second argument would have some appearance of difficulty if an intentional species were a formal likeness of the thing that it represents. But it is not so. Rather, it is only an eminent principle, or a virtual likeness, insofar as it has the power to produce cognition through which the thing is conceived as it is in itself. And therefore there is nothing repugnant in a species, indivisible in itself, having a higher and universal perfection through which it can produce the expressed representation of several things, even things dissimilar among themselves. Indeed, it can also produce one simple act adequate to itself, which intentionally, expressly, and distinctly represents all those things. For things that in themselves are distinct and dissimilar, or even opposed, have no opposition or repugnance in the word of the mind representing them, because there they are contained in a higher mode, just as various and opposite things are represented in the divine ideas without opposition that they have among themselves as they are in God. Universal species imitate this mode of representation.

7. *To the third.—In three ways the adequate object of one species can be said to be one.—Concerning the first way, Scotus's opinion is rejected.*—To the third, concerning the adequation of the object, I respond that one species, even if it represents many things, can have one adequate object. Such an adequate object can be conceived in three ways. First, that it is one by a real unity existing in the nature of things. Second, that it is one through a formal agreement of all things

representable through such a species in some difference, predicate, or common grade in the genus of being, as one genus or one species. Third, through only an agreement in some condition under which all the things that are represented through one species are representable or knowable through the same act. Scotus seems to require the first mode in the object of any intelligible species, because, in order that one species be the principle of knowing several things, he thinks it necessary that first, through itself, and adequately it represent one thing which is singular in itself and virtually contains all the things that can be known through such a species. And he only gives the example of the divine essence. But in this sense we deny that such unity of the object is necessary, because such unity in the object is not necessary even for the unity of a power or habit. And where that unity of object is found, as in the divine essence, it is not the unity of a principle that is a principle of knowing several things after the manner of an intelligible species, but is the unity of a primary object in which the rest are known only in their cause. For creatures are not known immediately through the divinity as through an unknown medium; rather, the divinity itself is immediately known as an object, and through it as through a known medium the rest are known. Thus even if an angel, through the species of the sun, can know several properties or effects of the sun, if that species represents only the sun immediately, it is not universal in the account of a species, even if it can mediately contribute to the cognition of several things.

8. *Concerning the second mode, the opinion of Cajetan and Ferrariensis.*—Cajetan seems to require the second mode of unity of adequate object for the unity of an intelligible species, in the cited art. 3, section *But to the objection against the conclusion*, and Ferrariensis, on book II, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 98, after the third conclusion, section *For the evidence of this*. Although there he seems to say only indefinitely that this adequate object can, or that it is not repugnant for it to, consist of several things or quiddites contained under some one common thing that is the first and adequate object of the species, nevertheless he seems to think that a species representing several things cannot be one in any other way unless it has some common thing to them as its adequate object. But below, in section *For the evidence of these things*, although he defends this mode, he also admits the other that must immediately be handed on.

9. *It is disproved first.*—But it seems to me that it must be said simply that this mode of unity of object is not necessary for the unity of an intelligible species, as Capreolus noted in the cited art. 3, to 1 of Scotus against the seventh conclusion. And it is proved first because angelic species, as has been said, do

not through themselves first represent a common nature, but individuals. But they represent common natures only insofar as they are found in the singulars themselves, or insofar as they represent the individuals themselves as they are more or less similar to one another. Therefore they do not regard a common nature as the adequate object, as a habit through itself first regards an adequate object.

It is disproved second.—Second, because otherwise a species representing several individuals of one species would have the specific nature itself for its adequate object, and similarly a species representing several specific quiddites would regard their genus as its adequate object. The consequent is either false in itself, or at least not necessary, because otherwise a species representing several individuals would necessarily represent all possible things under the same species, because it would regard the specific nature as its adequate object, and consequently all things contained in its potency, because this belongs to the account of an adequate object. And in like manner a species of several natures under one genus would necessarily be a species of all specific essences capable of being multiplied under that genus, because it would regard the genus as its adequate object. But the consequent is false, as has often been said above, because otherwise species of this kind would necessarily represent infinite individuals or quiddites capable of being multiplied under the same species or under the same genus; and universal species representing all singulars at some time future would necessarily represent all things possible under those species or genera, which was rejected above.

10. *It is disproved third.*—Third, because there is no reason why it is necessary for the adequate object of a universal intelligible species to be some common or universal account: both because a species is not universal because it represents a universal nature, but because it represents several things; and also because in proper habits or powers this is not always necessary. For sight, for example, has an adequate object, even though perhaps not all visible qualities agree in one common genus in the genus of sensible being as what is included in the adequate object of sight. This is more certain in the common sense with respect to all sensibles. And the habit of faith is one, and yet it is not necessary that all credible things agree in one common account of supernatural being. And in the sciences, for example, in philosophy, it is sufficient that the objects agree in the mode of abstraction. For although sometimes the generic account, or another common account, is considered precisely and according to itself in science, nevertheless it is not necessary that it be the adequate object. Rather, it can be a partial object if it is considered according to its precise formal and

actual account, as the precise account of being is in metaphysics, or the account of mobile being in physics, as it is only a certain actual whole. For in this way it is considered in a certain part of that science, and in other parts the differences or more special modes included under the same abstraction or account of the knowable are considered. But in the universal intelligible species of angels, as I have said, there is not a per se relation to a common nature as it is common; and therefore that nature as such should not be viewed either as a partial object or as the adequate object of the species. Nor should the object be viewed from some generic or specific agreement of the things.

11. *The third mode of unity of object is explained and supported.*—Therefore the third mode must be preferred. And it must be said that the adequate object of one universal species is the collection or multitude of such singular things representable through such a species. This representability, indeed, is not a denomination from the species itself as possible, otherwise the principle would be begged and the same thing would be explained by the same, nor would a unity of object be designated which in its own genus would be prior to the unity of the species. Therefore it is some agreement or proximity among such things, either in the mode of being or in some condition of this kind, by reason of which they are more apt to be united among themselves in the representation of one species than with other things. From this agreement there does not arise some common account representable through such a species, which can be considered as the represented and adequate object; rather, there arises one account by reason of which they are representable through the same species, which is usually called the account under which. And thus the general reason for the assertion is that for the unity of a power or habit through itself, unity on the part of the object in some account under which is sufficient, even though there is no unity in the account that is attained. For example, light and whiteness, although perhaps they do not agree in one common account in the genus of sensible being as what is included in the adequate object of sight, yet it is enough that they agree in the mode of multiplying species or affecting the power, as in the account under which, which suffices for constituting the unity of the adequate visible object. The same can be seen in the common sense and its object. Likewise in one science, which can contemplate several species under one account of the knowable, although perhaps it does not consider a common genus. Likewise, one quality of a higher order usually has a universal power for making several lower qualities, which it regards in its own way as an adequate object, not because of agreement in the genus or species of being, but because of some other condition often unknown to us, by reason of which they preserve a

peculiar proportion with such a higher quality, so that they are contained in that power. And for the same reason I think it is not necessary for the unity of a universal species that, among the things it represents, one be the principal object containing the powers of the others, because such a species receives unity from none of them considered through itself, nor is this necessary on the part of the represented things themselves, because it is not necessary that one be ordered to another, or be represented on account of another. Rather, each can be represented through itself first and on account of itself, and therefore in the account of object there can be equality among them, although perhaps it happens in reality that one is more perfect than another in its entity, or in essence, or in individual, if there are several equal individuals; for this is accidental to the unity of the species.

12. *To the rejoinder made at the end of number two.*—And thus, in strictness, there has been a response to the last rejoinder, because it is not necessary that an intentional species representing several natures of the same species or genus represent all natures contained under the potency of the genus or species, because it can represent only some, to which it is more adapted because of some condition in which they agree and which contributes to the account under which they are representable. Nor is it necessary that a species representing a more perfect nature represent all possible less perfect ones, nor even that a species representing several individuals represent all equal or inferior ones, because there is no connection among these that seems necessary, both because more is required for representing all than for representing some, and because among some there can be some proximity or likeness that contributes to the truth of the species.

13. *It does not imply a contradiction for infinite things to be represented through one species.*—But in that argument an absolute question is touched upon: whether some angelic species can be so universal that it represents all individuals capable of being multiplied within the same species, or all quiddites capable of being multiplied under one genus. And the reason for doubting is that those seem capable of being multiplied into infinity, and one species does not seem able to represent infinite things simultaneously. I respond briefly that it is not inconvenient for one species to represent infinite natures essentially distinct under some genus, or infinite individuals of the same species, because there is no repugnance to this on the part of the multitude represented, since infinite things are represented in divine knowledge, and in the created vision of God, as was said in the preceding tome and in the first tome of the third part. Nor is there repugnance on the part of the species, because infinite or

supernatural perfection is not required for this, but finite perfection in a higher natural grade or species can suffice, as St. Thomas explained in a similar matter, *Quaestiones disputatae de Anima*, art. 18, reply to 2, and *Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 6, reply to 8, and Capreolus above and Cajetan, III, quest. 10, art. 3, note, and as we explained in the cited places.

14. *Two ways in which the aforesaid representation of infinite things can be established, and judgment concerning them.—Two other ways in which no absolute implication appears.*—This universal infinite representation can, however, be thought in various ways. First, because one intentional species can represent a certain multitude of natures contained between two terms, a maximum and a minimum in perfection, between which intermediate natures can be multiplied into infinity by greater and lesser approach to the extremes, distinct among themselves either in species or in number. Second, that multitude of natures can be understood in such a way that in it some maximally perfect nature is given, while on the side of the other extreme it is multiplied into infinity according to natures essentially diverse and less and less perfect into infinity. And these two modes are easier on the part of the excellence or perfection of the species. For since in both modes there is a maximum and finite terminus in the whole multitude that it represents, it will be of finite perfection intensively, although the multitude represented is infinite. Nevertheless, it is not certain that toward the imperfect terminus that multiplication is extended into infinity, and it is more doubtful whether intermediate natures can be multiplied into infinity between two finite termini; about this elsewhere. In a third way, that infinite multitude can be understood as having a certain terminus on the lower side and increasing into infinity toward the higher side without a maximally perfect terminus, but proceeding into infinity to another more perfect, and then another more perfect. And finally, a multitude can be understood as ascending and descending into infinity on both sides, as can easily be understood in the angelic grade. And in these modes infinite multiplication is more easily understood, especially in ascending. But the representation of that multitude through a finite species seems more difficult, since there is no terminus of finite perfection in the object. Nevertheless, I do not see a clear repugnance in this, that that whole multitude be represented through one species. For that whole object is simply finite; therefore it can be represented through a finite species. Likewise, because a finite species can represent God as he is in himself, which is much more than representing that multitude. Likewise, because it is not necessary that such a species be increased through infinite grades, as was

objected in the argument, but it is sufficient that it be an indivisible entity of a higher nature and more eminent entity, although it is finite in that grade.

15. *Nevertheless, according to ordinary potency another view must be held.*—Nevertheless, I add that among the connatural species of angels there is not, nor can there naturally be, a species that represents an infinite multitude not terminated at some finite extreme and one supremely perfect in that order. This is explained and proved, because no angel knows himself, or a superior angel, through a universal species, because he knows himself through his own essence, as through a species adequate to himself with respect to that act by which he knows and comprehends himself. And by a consequent reason, he knows any superior angel through singular species, namely, each one through its own proper and particular species, because a superior angel with respect to an inferior is an object exceeding his power in some way. And therefore both the act and the species representing one superior angel are adequate to the power of the inferior angel. For this reason, with respect to superiors, universal species are not given to an inferior angel, but particular ones. This reason also proves the same about equals, as I will immediately explain further. Hence, then, it follows that the universal species of angels always have a terminus in ascending in the perfection of the things that they represent. For if a universal species represents angels, either alone or together with other things, all will be less perfect than the angel whose species they are. But if it represents other things inferior to angels, even if it represents infinite things syncategorematically, all will be contained below the whole angelic order and below the lowest angel. Therefore a connatural intelligible species of an angel can never represent an infinite multitude of things ascending simply into infinity in the grade of perfection, but only insofar as, under some definite terminus of such perfection, one can proceed into infinity, either in equally perfect individuals, or in unequal species, and always less perfect toward the lowest grade.

16. *Whether, and to what objects, the universal species of angels are restricted.—A two-part resolution.*—And from this, in passing, an incidental doubt can be defined, namely, granted that an angel has universal species, whether it is necessary that all his species be universal, or whether he can at the same time have some particular ones; and if there is some variety in this, what reason should be given for it, or what rule should be observed in it. I respond briefly that among the species of angels some are naturally innate, which represent things of the natural order; others are acquired through the action of a created object, which represent internal and free acts of the mind; and others can be species of the supernatural order, divinely infused beyond what is due to

nature and representing supernatural things. Here we are dealing only with the first. And in them the rule touched upon seems true universally, namely, that each angel who knows through universal species has them concerning all inferior things, and concerning those alone. For he knows equal and superior things through particular species. The reason for the former affirmative part is that, once the capacity for universal species is supposed, there is the same reason for their universality with respect to all inferior things. Therefore an angel knows all through universal species. The consequence is clear, because diversity must not be established without a foundation. But the antecedent is proved because the reason for the universality of such species is the excellence of the angel's intellective power with respect to inferior objects, as has been said. But this reason has place in all cases. Therefore. The minor is proved, because no species representing only one inferior thing is adequate to the light of the intellect of a superior angel. Therefore all such species are infused into an angel as universal, that is, as representing several things together. But the other negative or exclusive part was proved at the end of the preceding chapter, and is easily shown from the contrary reason, because just as the proper essence of an angel is like a particular species for knowing himself, since that object is as it were adequate to such a power, so any angel preserves the same proportion of equality to the intellect of another angel equal to himself, if he has one. Therefore another angel knows each such angel through a particular species of him; and a fortiori the same is concluded concerning any more perfect angel. And so the reason for the difference between the two parts is at hand, because the representation and cognition of one thing of a higher order or species of perfection is equivalent to several inferior or less perfect things. And therefore the particular species of a thing of greater or equal perfection with the knowing angel himself is equivalent to, or exceeds, a universal species of inferior things. And therefore, although he receives universal species concerning inferiors, he receives particular ones concerning superiors or equals. Concerning species of free or internal acts that an angel acquires from the very things known, we also believe that the species are particular, as we said above concerning the species of past acts, and as we will say below concerning the thoughts of hearts. But what must be said about species of supernatural things of the order of grace, we will see below when treating the cognition of those things.

CHAPTER XV

CHAPTER XV
WHETHER THE HIGHER ANGELS UNDERSTAND THROUGH MORE UNIVERSAL SPECIES

1. In which opinion the question proceeds. — This question does not seem to have a place in the opinion of those who deny that angels understand through species, because if they do not have species, they will not have them either more or less universal. But although this is so, a similar question can be treated in that opinion concerning the expressed species, or concerning the act of understanding, namely, whether one angel knows, or represents, more things through one act, word, or expressed species than another. For as to this, the difficulty is the same, especially because below we will show that one must speak proportionally in this matter about the impressed species and the act. Therefore those authors should rather be passed over who absolutely deny universal species in angels, for they consequently, and a fortiori, deny species and acts more or less universal. But because they proceed from the same foundation, there is no need for us to dispute further with them. Next, those should be passed over who posit in angels only species received from things. For they also make all angels equal in this respect, and consequently do not admit in them a difference in the universality of species. But I am speaking of those who posit only acquired species. For if there are some who posit acquired species of material singulars, and posit infused species concerning universal natures, then, if they admit in these a universality in representing several natures, consequently they will also be able to attribute to those species a greater or lesser universality according to the diversity of perfection of the angels into whom they are infused. Third, the opinion of Henry must be passed over, who, through the contrary extreme, said that all angels understand all things through one species equally universal, or rather most universal. For such is the scientific habit which he posited in all angels, as we saw above. Yet both without foundation he was able to posit such a habit, as was shown above, and no less gratuitously he makes all angels equal in its universality; indeed, he does so even contrary to reason, as we will see immediately.

2. What Vasquez thinks in the proposed question. — Therefore, leaving all these aside, among those who attribute universal species to angels, I find no theologian who has absolutely denied that more perfect angels understand through more universal species. Vasquez alone, in 1 p., disp. 203, although he

absolutely denies species, nevertheless says, on the hypothesis that they are posited, that it cannot be affirmed with foundation that more perfect angels understand through more universal species. For even if no repugnance can be shown in this, as he himself also concedes, that is not enough for us to assert that it is so, because it is not repugnant, unless we show it by some positive reason. But here, he says, not only can we affirm nothing with certain reason about this variety of universal species, but we cannot even judge anything determinate by probable conjecture. He is founded on this: although from the greater and lesser perfection of angelic nature there is inferred a greater and lesser perfection in the species, nevertheless it does not follow that this inequality of perfection in intentional species is placed in greater or lesser universality, because that inequality can be in a better and more perfect mode of representing the same things. Indeed, even if these species are infused by God, he says it depends on his will whether he has infused more or less perfect species into different angels, because with an equal species a more perfect angel could understand more perfectly.

3. It is refuted. — But this author, first of all, does not speak consistently, and we can argue against him ad hominem, because in the preceding disputation he said that, supposing species, universal species are not to be denied to angels, because they are possible without contradiction. For "if they can be made," he says, "that which is of greater perfection ought not be denied to an angel, so that the more perfect angels are, the fewer species they understand through." In these words he expressly affirms not only the universality of species, but also that variety in it must be admitted in proportion to the perfection of angelic nature, if it is not repugnant. This is the common opinion, as we will see. Why, then, does he attribute to very weighty theologians that they spoke without probable conjecture, or how did he himself dare to affirm what he later said could not even be conjectured by probable reason? Next, once the non-repugnance of such more and less universal species is supposed, it appears at once, not only by probable reason but even, as it were, from the terms believed, that those species had to be distributed according to the proportion of angelic natures.

4. The true affirmative conclusion. — It is proved from Dionysius. — Vasquez's exposition of the cited place of Dionysius. — Therefore, speaking generally and simply, it can and must be affirmed that angels of more perfect nature and of more excellent intellectual light understand through more universal species, and accordingly that superior angels know the same multitude of things through fewer species. Thus St. Thomas, the said Quest. 55, art. 3, and

Cajetan follows him there, and almost all the other modern expositors; Capreolus, in 2, dist. 3, quest. 2, art. 1, concl. 8, and art. 3, to the arguments against it; Ferrariensis, *Contra Gentiles* III, ch. 98, in the last doubt, to the arguments against the third conclusion; Giles, in 2, dist. 3, part 2 of the distinction, quest. 2, art. 2, doubts 3 and 4, and Argentina there, quest. 2, art. 4, in its last part; Malonius, disp. 13, sect. 2; and Hervaeus is also cited there, quest. 4. All prove this assertion from Dionysius, ch. 12, *de cælesti Hierarchia*, whose words are: "The order of the Cherubim shares in higher wisdom and knowledge; but the orders of holy spirits which are beneath them are themselves indeed participants in wisdom, yet in a particular wisdom according to their own mode, and in an inferior one." There he teaches that the lower angels have an inferior knowledge, specifically in this, that they have it as particular, namely, with respect to the higher angels. Vasquez responds that he does not call the knowledge particular because it is through less universal species, for Dionysius has not a word about these species, but he calls it particular because it concerns fewer things. For the lower angels know fewer things than the higher. And he confirms this from the translation of Perionius, who renders the last words thus: "But nevertheless of that which is a part in relation to them, and which holds an inferior place." For he calls the knowledge of the lower angel a part of the knowledge of the higher on the side of the object, because it concerns fewer things.

5. It is rejected. — But in this sense the doctrine of Dionysius would be false. For he is speaking of the natural knowledge of the angels, in which there is no inequality among the angels with respect to the multitude of things known, as is agreed among all theologians and is sufficiently clear from what has been said so far. Indeed, the same is true also of supernatural and permanent knowledge, if I may speak so, because all things which must be known habitually and permanently in a supernatural way are known to all the holy angels, either in the Word or outside the Word. But some can know through special revelations certain things that are not known to all, concerning which there are usually special illuminations, as will be said below in its proper place. Yet Dionysius neither treats of these in that place, nor do superior angels always exceed inferior angels in them. For sometimes something pertaining to the ministry of a lower angel can be revealed to him which has not been revealed to all higher angels, because it did not pertain to their work, as the angelic annunciation or similar things. As for the translation, since we do not have the Greek text, first we say that the translation of Ambrose Traversari, which I reported before, is not of lesser authority. Next we add that the translation of

Perionius admits the same sense and must be taken in it, lest it contain a false opinion. Or certainly, if the knowledge of the lower angel is said to be a part of the knowledge of the higher on the side of the things known, this must be understood of actual knowledge, which is all at once, not of habitual knowledge, which can contemplate various things successively. For by comparing actual knowledges in this way, it can truly be said that the lower angel, other things being equal, actually knows fewer things than the higher; nevertheless, in habitual knowledge he is not inferior in the stated sense, because the lower can contemplate all things which the higher knows, although through more acts. And thus the same sense returns, whether the knowledge be called a part of actual knowledge, or partial, or more particular. But because species of themselves pertain to habitual knowledge, therefore by reason of species the knowledge of the lower angel cannot be called particular unless it is had through more particular species. And as to what is said, that Dionysius taught nothing about species, although perhaps this is true under that name, he comprehends them under the name of knowledge, or ray, and light. For we cannot deny that Dionysius attributes even habitual knowledge to angels, since he did not think that they always actually contemplate all things which they know, as we will see below. But habitual knowledge is not without species, as I said. And finally, if Dionysius thought that in the lower angel the act of angelic knowledge is a part, or is particular with respect to the higher, this is enough for us, so that consequently, according to his doctrine, the same difference must also be posited in the species, whether Dionysius spoke of species or did not, because species keep proportion with acts.

6. Another place of Dionysius is introduced. — The evasion of the preceding place has neither foundation nor weakens its force. — Dionysius is also alleged in the same book, ch. 15, where, explaining the metaphorical representation of an angel under the figure of a man, and applying that metaphor to the individual members of a man, he says the following about teeth: "Moreover, we believe that teeth express the division of the perfecting nourishment granted to them, and the nourishing perfection. For every spiritual substance, whatever single and uniform understanding it has received from a narrower source, divides and multiplies it by a provident power, while it also advances and raises the inferior according to its capacity." There he openly teaches that the higher angel perceives by one understanding what he multiplies into several in the lower angel, so that it can be perceived by him. Therefore he teaches that superior angels have more universal knowledge, and accordingly also more universal species, as we have argued. But the said author responds

that Dionysius is speaking there about the supernatural cognition of the angels, which they receive through divine revelation, and that he teaches about it that the higher angel knows by one concept many things which the lower distributes into several concepts according to his capacity. But perhaps the discourse of Dionysius is limited without cause. Still, let us grant that Dionysius is speaking about supernatural cognition, which descends from divine revelation to the lower angels through the illumination of the higher. From this, nevertheless, I first take an argument to natural cognition. For supernatural cognition is infused in a mode accommodated to nature, because each thing is received according to the mode of the receiver. Therefore, in supernatural revelation the higher angel perceives by one concept many things which the lower cannot fittingly conceive except by several. This is surely a strong argument that the connatural mode of knowing of the superior is simpler and more universal in this, that it knows many things by one act, and accordingly by one proximate principle, or by one species, from its nature. Next, from this I also take an indication for explaining the mind of Dionysius in the earlier place and similar ones, where he calls the cognition of the lower angel, in comparison with the higher, particular, or as it were a part. For he certainly speaks this way because the cognition of the lower is more divided and, as it were, distributed into parts with respect to the more perfect concept of the higher angel. Therefore the species, which are commensurate with the concepts, are related in the same way. And thus this opinion can be confirmed from what the same Dionysius hands down in ch. 7 of *de cælesti Hierarchia* concerning the first hierarchy and its excellent and universal mode of knowing; likewise from what he teaches about the soul and the intelligences in ch. 7 of *de divinis Nominibus*, where he says that it is natural to the soul "to know through lower and divided signs," but that the angelic nature knows more universally and gathers many things into one.

7. The conclusion is also proved by reason. — The same opinion is proved by reason, supposing the prior point that angels have universal species and arguing proportionally. For angelic nature is believed to have universal species because those species are possible and more perfect, and that perfection is sufficiently consonant with the excellence of angelic nature in its own grade, and there is no reason why it should be denied to it. But with the same proportion, more universal species are possible and more perfect than less universal species, and that greater perfection is consonant with the greater excellence of Seraphim or Cherubim, for example. Therefore there is no reason why it should be denied to them with respect to lower angels. For it is not enough to say that greater perfection can be sufficiently saved without greater universality, because there

can be a greater perfection that is, as it were, intensive, without the representation of more things. For if this evasion must be admitted, certainly no universality at all will be able to be proved in angelic species from this, as Scotus intends through a similar objection. But one who admits universal species, notwithstanding that evasion, certainly cannot, speaking consistently, use it to empty the reason given, since the same reason and proportion are preserved. Hence it must be said that it belongs no less to the excellence of an intellectual nature to conceive and penetrate many things by one single and simple principle than to know individual things more clearly and exactly. Indeed, by the very fact that a species has a more universal representation, it requires a higher light and also a higher act, and accordingly one representing the individual things in a more excellent mode. Therefore the more perfect power of the higher angel requires this excess in universality also together with the others, and there is no reason why it should be denied to it.

8. It is further confirmed. — And it is confirmed, for God, because he is supremely intellective, has not only the clearest, but also the most universal and simplest mode of knowing. And because angels most closely approach God in the grade of understanding, they participate in all those perfections of understanding together with universality in some way. Therefore, by the same reason, those angels who are nearer to God in essential perfection participate more in the universality and simplicity of cognition together with the other properties of perfect cognition. Therefore they will also have more universal principles of knowing, or species. Finally, among men the excellence of talent is praised not only in clarity but also in universality in some way, because greater acuteness of intellect consists also in this, that it knows many things from one principle. And a more excellent cause produces many things through one power, and the more excellent a power is, the more universal it is. Therefore why will we not think the same, with proportion, about the species of superior angels? Certainly all these things, carefully considered, do more than make a likely conjecture.

CHAPTER XVI
HOW VARIETY IN THE UNIVERSALITY OF SPECIES BELONGS TO DIFFERENT ANGELS

1. The question is not about different angels only numerically. — But about those different in genus or species. — In applying the rule handed down indefinitely to higher and lower angels, there is great difficulty among the

doctors. But before I propose it, I suppose that the question is not about angels differing only in number, if, according to our opinion, there are some such angels under all the ultimate species of angels. For among them there is without doubt no variety in the universality of species, but all angels of the same ultimate species have species equally universal or particular. For either all are absolutely and simply equally perfect, and thus the proposed rule has no place in them in any way; or, although there is among them some inequality in individual perfection, it is not sufficient for an inequality in the universality of species, because more and less universal species have essential diversity, since the more universal species is of a higher ratio and contains, as it were eminently, the lower and particular species. But individual substances, although unequal according to number, do not have acts or principles of operating diverse in species, but at most more or less perfect in their singular entities, as many think about souls and human intellects. Therefore the question concerns angels essentially different, among whom, as we noted in the preceding book, there can be a specific difference either under the proximate ultimate genus, or under a remote or more remote subaltern genus. For the first is judged to be among angels of the same order, or some such angels; the others can be thought to be among various orders or hierarchies, as was treated at length in the same first book. Therefore the present question is whether the difference in the universality of species is among angels differing in species, or only among those differing in proximate or remote genus, or among angels of diverse hierarchies or orders, or in some other similar way.

2. The first opinion asserting only generic diversity. — Ferrariensis above holds this latter way, explaining the third conclusion of St. Thomas, because, as he says, it is not necessary that all angels contained under the same proximate genus, although they differ in species, understand through fewer principles by the very fact that they are of a more perfect species. Thus it is not necessary that more perfect animals understand through fewer senses. And this was the opinion of Hervaeus above, art. 4, who speaks about angels differing in species under the same proximate genus, and says of them that all can understand through species equally universal, but that among those who differ in proximate genus there is found a difference in the universality of species. And Giles above inclines to the same opinion at the fourth doubt; indeed, he thinks that even angels of diverse proximate genera can understand through species equally universal. And he proves this a posteriori, because otherwise, if every angel, the higher he is, had more universal species, and accordingly fewer in number, then by ascending through the grades or natures of angels we would easily come to an

angel knowing all things through one species, and consequently one higher than him would know either through no species, or not through one more universal than another less perfect angel.

3. The second opinion asserting also specific diversity. — Nevertheless Capreolus teaches the contrary opinion above, to the argument against the seventh conclusion, and Cajetan, the said art. 3, and the modern Thomists and expositors of St. Thomas more frequently follow them in the said art. 3. For St. Thomas there speaks simply and indefinitely, saying, "The higher angels are, the more they understand through more universal species, because they are more like God." These words and this reason are applied with the same proportion to all angels more perfect in essence. He has the same in Quest. 8, *de Veritate*, art. 10. Yet he declared these places more expressly in the disputed question *de Anima*, art. 7, where in the body he says: "In spiritual substances the order of grades of diverse species is considered according to comparison with the first agent, which is most perfect; and therefore among them the first species is more perfect than the second, and so on down to the last." And with the same proportion he concludes: "The nearer a spiritual substance has been to the first agent, the more it has its goodness in its simple nature by a simple perfection, and the less it needs inhering forms for its completion. And this," he says, "is produced by grades down to the human soul, etc." And in the solution to 8 he repeats this, saying, "In diverse angels there are diverse intelligible species, and the nearer each one is to God, the more he has intelligible forms more elevated and more powerful for knowing many things." But it must be noted that St. Thomas speaks absolutely about all and each of the angels, because he supposes that all are diverse in species. But we speak proportionally about individual species of angels, and we count all angels of one species, as far as the present question is concerned, as one; and in this sense we will always use the same words. Hence this opinion can be confirmed from Dionysius above, insofar as he thought that every angel, even the lowest, understands through fewer or more universal species than a rational soul. For by the same reason the angel immediately superior to the lowest will understand through more universal principles than he, and so of the others.

4. The second opinion is approved. — Between these opinions there is greater uncertainty and ambiguity than in the general assertion of the preceding chapter. For the things that are more universal and more confused we attain more easily, and therefore more certainly; thus we believe almost certainly that there is an essential difference among angels, but whether this is among individuals, or how great or of what kind it is, is very ambiguous. Therefore,

although in the present matter it is much more probable that in angels there are not only universal species, but also that among them there is some variety in this universality, it is more obscure and ambiguous how great this variety is, or how it must be applied to the diverse species or orders of angels. Nevertheless, I judge absolutely that it is more probable that all angels, the more perfect they are in essence, understand through more universal species. For every angel, even the lowest, understands through species in some way universal; therefore a superior angel always understands through more universal species. The antecedent is clear from what was said in the preceding chapter, and is especially declared because it must first be understood of proper universality, which consists in the representation of several things, and especially substances, to omit that other less proper universality which others posit, concerning which I will speak below. Hence that antecedent must consequently be understood with respect to species representing things lower than, or less perfect than, the very angel understanding. For with respect to more perfect things something else must be said, as I touched on above and will touch on again a little later. And thus the reason for that antecedent is that any angelic power is superior to such things intelligible by it. Therefore it is compared to them as a universal power, which can comprehend several of them at once. Therefore it is capable of species specially representing things of this sort. Therefore, since it does not receive those species from things, but has them implanted by the author of nature, it is more likely that it receives them as universal and proportioned to its own power. From this, therefore, the first consequence is proved, because the more one angel surpasses another in essential perfection, the more universal and efficacious a power he has. Therefore he can comprehend more things at once and by one act. Therefore he also has more universal species with respect to the same intelligible objects. It is confirmed, because, as the logicians say, as what is simply is to what is simply, so what is more is to what is more. But an angel, by force of the spiritual grade, demands the aforesaid universality of species, and therefore in every species, even the lowest, he has it. Therefore the more he participates in the essential perfection and power of that grade, the more he will demand a greater universality of species. Finally, otherwise we could not affirm with foundation that any angel, even the lowest, knows through more universal species than a rational soul, because he could surpass it in another perfection of clarity or comprehension, and not in universality, just as the prior opinion philosophizes about angels essentially different from one another. And so the whole universality of angelic species is endangered. Therefore, speaking consistently, this latter opinion must be preferred.

5. To the example of the first opinion in number 2. — The more perfect the corporeal grade is, the more powers it has. — In spiritual things, the contrary. — Nor is the example concerning the number of powers or senses of animals, which Ferrariensis objects, of great moment. Otherwise it would also conclude against him that angels of diverse orders or genera are equal in universality or number of species, because perfect brute animals are of diverse genera, even remote ones, and, as it were, of diverse orders and quasi-hierarchies, if I may speak so, and nevertheless they do not differ in the number of senses, as is clear concerning terrestrial, winged, aquatic animals, etc. And next, in these corporeal things, as Giles notes, the more perfect a grade is, the more powers it has, and not conversely. Thus plants have more powers than inanimate things, and brute animals more than plants, and among brute animals the perfect have more than the imperfect, and man more than the rest. But in spiritual things the contrary occurs. For the more perfect that grade is, the fewer powers it has, though of a higher order. Hence it also happens that there is no diversity in the number of powers in the whole intellectual grade. And therefore the consequence, or the likeness of the example, is easily denied, because the number of powers follows the grade of the thing, or some very superior genus; but the mode of operating through individual powers follows the proper essence and species of the thing. But the multitude or universality of species is accommodated to the mode of operating, and therefore can also follow the specific ratio and essential perfection.

6. The a posteriori reason from Giles in the same number 2 is treated. — Ripa's opinion about the universality of species in representing. — The more difficult objection is the one Giles touched on, which consists in this: it does not seem possible for so great a variety in the universality of species to be saved in all angels without arriving either at some angel knowing without species, or at some angels unequal in nature and nevertheless equal in the number and universality of species. But this difficulty can be resolved in two ways. First, by denying both consequences. To give the reason and to explain the whole matter more, I suppose that this universality of angelic species must not be limited to the representation of several quiddities through individual species. For some say that all angels have universal species in representing several quiddities of things, or specific natures, and that in this universality the higher angel surpasses any lower one. And they attribute this to St. Thomas because he said that "the species of angels are more universal, as if each of them extends itself to more things," since under the name of several things they think individuals cannot be understood, but only essences or quiddities, because it is common to all angels

that they know all individuals of the same ultimate species through the same intentional species. Therefore the difference in universality must necessarily be in the plurality of represented quiddities.

7. It is rejected. — But this opinion is false, and it gratuitously supposes a false foundation, namely, that all individuals of the same nature are known by any angel, even the lowest, through one species. For whence is this established? Or on what foundation is so universal a representation and cognition attributed to all angels, even the lowest? Especially because I said above that the species of angels do not primarily represent common, specific, or generic natures of themselves, but singulars, in which, and in each of which, they represent the universal and common ratios. Therefore an intentional species representing singular things does not represent the common nature as the primary or adequate object, as was also proved. Therefore it is not necessary that a species representing a common nature in one or two individuals represent it in all, for no reason of such necessity can be given. Moreover, if a species representing certain individuals of one nature necessarily represented all, certainly by the same necessity it will represent all possible ones; but these authors do not admit this. The consequence is proved, both because the fact that individuals will at some time be future, or will not be, is extrinsic to the representation of the species. Therefore there is no greater reason why intrinsically it should necessarily represent these rather than those. And also because, if some of those possible individuals were made, they would be known through the same species. Therefore this is a sign that they are represented by it. The antecedent is clear, for if the opposite is granted, now a new species would be necessary for representing those individuals. Therefore individuals of the same nature can be represented through distinct species. Therefore the same can now happen concerning individuals which will at some time be future.

8. The true doctrine about the aforesaid universality. — I say, therefore, that it is sufficient for this universality that one species represent several singulars, whether of the same specific nature or of different natures. I also say that it is not necessary that a species representing several individuals of the same essence represent all similar ones. Hence I add further that in the same angel there can be found species more and less universal when other things are not equal. For example, the lowest angel can have several universal species of horses, each of which represents several horses, yet none all, nor in any number whatever, but each of them represents ten or twenty, for example. And nevertheless he may not have species of a lion so universal, because lions are more perfect in nature, and therefore fewer can be known at once through one

act and be represented through one species, and so of others. And therefore, when a comparison is made in universality, it must be made other things being equal on the side of the intelligible objects. And thus for the truth of the said opinion and assertion it is enough that the superior angel know more individuals of the same nature through one species than the lower; and in this way the assertion could be verified in all angels, although none of them, not even the highest, had universal species representing at once several quiddities, or several individuals differing in species, for example, a lion and a horse. For in order for a species to be universal, it is enough that through it many things can be known at once. Therefore, in order for it to be more universal, it is enough that in the same order or in the same species it represent more. There is also this: a species representing several individuals of the same species does not seem able to be extended to representing also individuals of another specific nature unless it first represents all individuals similar in specific nature. For the more similar these are among themselves, the more easily they seem able to be represented through the same species. This proceeds not only concerning things at some time future, but also concerning all possibles, because, as I have often said, to be future or not to be future is extrinsic and irrelevant to the intrinsic representation of a species. But it does not seem necessary that any angel, even the highest, have representing species so universal that they represent all possible individuals of one species, because those are infinite, and it is not necessary that a species represent infinite things. Therefore, by the same reason, it is not necessary that one species even of the highest angel represent several quiddities, but it is enough that each of his species represent more individuals under any specific nature whatever than the species of lower angels do, and the same is true proportionally of the rest.

9. Giles's reason is now responded to. — To the place of St. Thomas brought forward by Ripa in number 6. — Therefore, following this mode of speaking, the difficulty touched on by Giles and others is easily solved. For although the more perfect angels are, the more universal, and accordingly the fewer, species of the same things they have, nevertheless it does not follow that one must arrive at an angel who understands all things outside himself through one species. For all angels have at least as many intelligible species as there are specific essences, or quiddities of things, which they understand; and nevertheless concerning individual quiddities all the higher angels have more universal and fewer species with respect to the individuals of the same nature or species, or with respect to the whole potentiality of each specific nature. And because this potentiality, or multiplication of individuals under one species,

proceeds to infinity, it can happen that one never arrives at a highest angel who understands each quiddity through only one species, but through several. But if you urge that at least in the individuals that will at some time be future there is a definite finite limit, and thus one can arrive at an angel who knows all those individuals through one species, I respond that then another angel higher than he knows even those individuals through one species, but a more universal one, because it will represent not only future individuals, but also some from among possible individuals. For although a species representing possibles is not of itself owed to an angel, nevertheless it is not unfitting that consequently and from the abundance of the perfection of the species itself, its representation also be extended to possible individuals. And in this way, although it can happen that some angels unequal in perfection know all things that are through an equal number of species, nevertheless the superior angel will always know through more universal species by extension to the representation of possible things. Capreolus also indicated this mode of speaking as to this part. Nor will it be an obstacle that St. Thomas not only says that a superior angel understands through more universal species, but also through fewer. For that must be understood when other things are equal on the side of the things represented, namely, because they are the same in number and perfection.

10. The exposition about the universality of species is enlarged. — Finally, lest, according to this mode of speaking, we seem to limit the universality of angelic species in representing to only the representation of several individuals of the same nature through the same species, I add that perhaps they also have species representing several quiddities. Hence I once judged probable, which I do not see proved by others, that in the lowest order of angels there is only universality of species with respect to the representation of individuals, with proportionate variety within that grade. But in angels of a higher order there are also universal species representing several natures differing only in ultimate species and within a proximate genus; yet not by representing through one species all the specific natures of that genus, but some, and more or fewer according to the mode of perfection and with proportional variety. And so, in ascending proportionally, there are more universal species in order to many things differing more than in ultimate species and contained under more or less remote genera. For all this involves no repugnance and is consonant with the perfection of angels and with the things we said about their essential agreements and differences. For that distinction is very well explained through these various modes of knowing. And so the difficulty touched on also ceases. For since in these species and intermediate genera a certain process to infinity can be

conceived, and this universality of species can also be extended to possible quiddities never to be future, and those can be multiplied to infinity, it will never be necessary to arrive at an angel who understands all things outside himself through one species. And thus the difficulty ceases.

11. Another response to the aforesaid reason of Giles. — A single species representing all possibles is connatural to no creature. — Another mode of resolving that difficulty is by conceding the prior inference of the argument and denying the latter. It is therefore conceded that a very perfect angel, or one who would be highest, could understand through one species all created things outside himself. For although such a species were granted, it would be finite, and with respect to natural objects it would be of the natural order. Likewise, because if such an angel knows all created things through such a number of intelligible species, by ascending proportionally one can easily come to an angel who is able to know the same things through one species. Wherefore, when St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* III, ch. 98, seems to deny that such a species is possible, he is speaking of one species representing all possibles simply, about which it is more likely that it is not possible according to the order of nature, because it cannot be connatural to any angel, since every angel is of determinate and finite perfection, whereas that species would exceed proportion to any determinate and limited nature. Hence if such an angel existed, he would certainly be highest among all possibles; yet such cannot be granted, as I now suppose. But whether such a species is possible in the supernatural order has been disputed elsewhere, as we touched on in chapter 13, number 12. Nevertheless, the species that represents all created things, or all things to be created in some time, does not exceed the proportion of a finite and limited nature, and therefore it does not seem repugnant to arrive at an angel so perfect that he understands all things outside himself and God through one species. Indeed, Cajetan adds that the highest angel now understands in this way. But this is more uncertain and without doubt cannot be shown to be necessary. For although among angels differing in species the superior always understands through more universal species, nevertheless in the lowest angel as to nature there can be so great a multitude of intelligible species and so small a universality of each species that, although in all the higher ones there is a diminution of species, still in the highest there could be several. Anyone can easily think this, and since it depends on the disposition of divine providence, it is not difficult to understand that God could have disposed the universe in this way and accommodated the capacity of angels to this natural order. Yet just as this was possible, so it is not repugnant, nor does it seem unfitting, that in fact the highest angel knows all

natural things through one species. Nor is it incredible that God did this for the manifestation of his power and so that he might communicate himself, below the order of nature, in a certain highest way.

12. To the unfitting consequence brought forward at the end of the third number in Giles's reason. — Nevertheless from this there does not follow the other unfitting consequence that was inferred in the latter part of Giles's reason, namely, that a superior angel would know either through no species, or not through fewer species, because there cannot be fewer species than one, and consequently that he would not know through more universal species. None of these follows. To explain this, it must be recalled what I said above: this universality of species is only with respect to things lower, not with respect to superior or equal angels. For from this principle it is inferred that, in order for there to be some angel knowing through one species all other things besides himself, it is necessary that he have neither a superior nor an equal. For if he has them, although he knows all things below himself through one species, he will have to have as many other intelligible species as he has equal and superior angels. Therefore, if some angel is supposed to know all things outside himself through one species, it must consequently be supposed that he has no superior. Indeed, nor has he had one, not only because according to the ordinary law all angels were created together, and there will not be succession in their creation, as far as we understand from the doctrine of faith, but also because, even if we granted that another angel above all created angels would be created in the future, the angels would have had his species innate from the beginning, as we said above with St. Thomas, because angels received the innate species of all things that will at some time be future. Therefore, if an angel superior to all angels already created were to be created, by that very fact the highest angel now created would not know all things outside himself through one species, because he would at least have two: one of the superior angel to be created, and another of the remaining things. Hence it is finally concluded that by ascending one can never arrive at an angel who either knows things other than himself without a species, or who does not know all things through fewer species than another angel inferior to him in essence. For the inferior, beyond the species of lower things, always has another species of his superior, which the superior himself does not have, since he understands himself through his own substance.

13. A rejoinder. — It is resolved. — You will say: at least it follows that the lower angel knows all things other than himself through a species equally universal as the superior angel, which is no less repugnant to what has been said than to know through an equal number of species. The consequence is clear,

because each knows all things lower than himself through one species. But it is proved that this is repugnant, because if the angel superior in nature surpasses the lower in the universality of species, he must have more universal species concerning all things and objects, because all and each of the species must be proportioned to the light of the one into whom they are infused. Still, it is easily responded by denying the consequence, because, granted an angel knowing all things other than himself through one species, he will not know himself through that species. But a superior angel would know that one immediately lower than himself together with all other things through one species. And thus, although each would know all things lower than himself through only one species, nevertheless that species in the superior would be more universal, because it would represent something more, namely, the lower angel himself.

14. The solution of a further objection. — But you will press: for at least that lower angel will know the superior through a single species, just as the lower angel himself knows himself through his own essence. I respond that this is no unfitting consequence, because the superior angel knows himself in a higher mode, namely, through his own essence and not through a species. But the comparison in universality must be made between proper species and the cognitions which proceed from them. Indeed I add that even two angels unequal among themselves know a third angel superior to both through particular species, that is, species representing only that superior angel, because with respect to his superiors no inferior angel is capable of universal species, as I said above. Hence it necessarily follows that every lower angel knows all his superiors through individual species of them, and that in this respect there is no difference among the lower angels, even if they are unequal among themselves. Nor is this unfitting or repugnant to what has been said, because it is not necessary that in all and each intelligible species every superior angel surpass the lower with respect to the number of things represented. Rather, it is enough that indefinitely he have some species more universal in that mode of representing. Likewise, because this comparison in universality must suppose in the species a capacity for universal representation. But no angel is capable of universal species with respect to his superiors, indeed, not even with respect to equals, but only with respect to inferiors. And therefore the excess in universality is found in the species which represent lower things, but not in those through which they know superiors or equals.

15. The preceding solution proceeds further. — Nevertheless the species of a superior angel will always be more perfect in the angel immediately lower than in a remote or less perfect one, because in each it is according to the mode of the

receiver, and in the one who comes nearer to the perfection of the superior it is the principle of a more perfect cognition. Thus also, supposing a numerical distinction among angels, one angel has a more perfect intelligible species of another angel of the same species than a lower angel has of the same, even if neither species is properly universal in representing several things, according to what we have said. For one angel knows his equal more perfectly and exactly through his species than a lower angel knows that same angel as superior to himself. You will say that this excess of cognition comes from the light, not from the species. For so it happens among men: through equal species one better sight sees the same thing more perfectly, or a sharper intellect penetrates the same thing better; just as also a better artisan produces a more perfect effect with the same instrument. It is responded first that this very thing in men is defective and less perfect. For it belongs to consummate perfection that the instrument be proportioned to the principal power. Hence, although we grant that a better artisan operates more perfectly with the same instrument than a lower artisan, nevertheless the same better artisan would operate more perfectly with a more suitable instrument than with a less suitable one. Therefore, since in angelic nature all things ought to be most well-ordered and with great proportion, the better the light by which an angel knows some object, the better also the species he has, representing the same object in a more perfect mode. And perhaps also in the sight and intellect of man, just as there is inequality in individual perfection, so there can also be among visual or intellectual species, because by a sharper intellect more subtle, better, and more efficacious species are abstracted, at least speaking of itself and unless obstacles intervene.

16. Another response of certain Thomists. — Some Thomists also add that the superior angel not only has more universal species indefinitely, but also universally, that the individual species of the superior angel are more universal than the individual species of the lower angel. But they distinguish a twofold universality: one in the multitude of things represented, the other in the mode of representing the same thing, so that through the one more ratios of the same thing can be known than through the other. And concerning the former universality they confess that its excess is not necessary in all and each species of a superior angel. Some affirm this not only about species representing superior things, but even about species of lower things. But concerning the latter universality they say that at least its excess is necessary in all the species of the superior angel with respect to all things, both higher and lower, because a superior angel, even if he knows some things through the same species or the same number of species, always knows more ratios of such things, even if he

does not know more things. And so he will always in this respect have somehow more universal species. St. Thomas indicates this distinction in Quest. 8, *de Veritate*, art. 10, reply to 2, and Capreolus uses it above, to the fourth argument of Aureolus, to resolve the proposed difficulty; and Soncinas follows it in *Metaphysics*, quest. 60, reply to 1.

17. It is displeasing in part. — Yet this doctrine is not rightly accommodated to the species which each angel has about things lower than himself. For with respect to them the species of a more perfect angel cannot represent more universally, if I may speak so, the same thing than the species of a less perfect angel, namely, by representing to the more perfect angel more ratios of that thing than to the less perfect. For the lower angel, through species about things lower than himself, knows them perfectly on the side of the things themselves, because he knows those things not only quidditatively but also comprehensively, namely, as to their essence, properties, and whole natural capacity. Therefore with respect to such things a species cannot be more universal in mode, but must be so in the number of things represented. The consequence is proved because it cannot be sufficiently understood how, between two comprehensive cognitions of the same thing, one is more universal than the other in modes. Those modes, by reason, are either intrinsic and connatural, or extrinsic of the natural order, or extrinsic of the supernatural order. The first are necessarily known through comprehensive cognition, as is evident of itself. But the middle ones, before they adhere to the thing, are also known through the same species, at least as possible; but if they already are in the thing, they are also known through the same species, because it will be the principle not only of comprehending, but also of intuiting the thing. But the last are not known through natural species and therefore do not pertain to the matter, because by force of natural species they are unknown both by the superior and by the inferior angel, as we will see below. Therefore the greater or lesser universality of species with respect to lower things must be placed in the multitude of things represented.

18. It is admitted in part. — But with respect to superior angels, the mode of speaking of Capreolus can probably be defended. For it is probable that a lower angel does not comprehend a superior. Hence it follows that of two lower angels unequal among themselves, the one who approaches more closely to an angel more perfect than both also penetrates his nature, power, and mode of operating more, and accordingly knows more ratios and modes in him, either in himself or in order to effects which he can produce. Therefore he will consequently also have a species more universal in the said mode with respect to

that superior angel than an angel lower than himself has. Hence that distinction can probably be accepted, provided that, with a fitting division, its individual members are accommodated with respect to lower or superior things. For with respect to inferiors there is the proper universality of several things represented; but with respect to superiors it is only in the mode of representing. And besides, this latter mode is not certain, but probable, because it is not certain that a lower angel does not comprehend a superior, which must be examined later.

19. The last objection. — But there remains a final objection, because if the highest angel who now exists knows all things below himself through one species, as is supposed, then, positing another angel higher than this one, he would surpass him only with respect to the universality of the species, because through one species he would know both the angel immediately lower than himself and all the rest lower than them. But in the number of species there would only be this difference: the first angel knows all things besides himself through one species, while the second has a peculiar species of the first angel and knows all other things besides himself and the superior through another species. If, I say, this is so, as was said by us in responding, by the same reason and proportion the same should now be said about the second angel with respect to the first, and about the third with respect to the second, and so down to the last. And so the last angel would know through only one species all things that are below him, and would have multiplied species only of angels, and individual species of individual angels, both superior and equal. And similarly, in ascending from the lowest species of angels to the penultimate, the angel next above the lowest would know through one intentional species all material things, and besides these all angels lower than himself, and would have multiplied and particular species only of superiors and equals. And so consequently of the rest, by ascending through individual species. The consequent seems incredible. Therefore. The consequence seems clear from parity of reason and proportion. For the last angel is related to the things lower than himself with respect to proportional excess in perfection just as any other higher angel is related to all things lower than himself. Therefore he is also related in the same way with respect to the universality of cognition and species, preserving proportion. The falsity of the consequent is clear, both because there is no foundation for attributing so much universality in knowing to the lowest angel; and also because immediately beneath the lowest angel is the rational soul, which knows individual things only through particular species. Therefore it is not likely that there is an immediate transition to an angel having such universal cognition. And further, because it seems more difficult for all material

things, the heavens, the elements, mixed bodies, all living things, and all men, to be represented at once through one species, than for two equal angels or two immediately superior angelic species to be represented at once. But the lowest angel cannot know two superiors or equals through one species. Therefore neither can he know all material things through one species.

20. Its response. — I respond by conceding that all this very probably follows from that hypothesis, that one angel knows all things lower than himself, both spiritual and material, through one species. Nor, once this is posited, does anything follow against the variety of species according to the perfection of angels, because we have already said that this universality must be considered with respect to lower things. Hence, although it is supposed that individual angels know all things lower than themselves through one species, nevertheless the multitude of things lower than a more perfect angel is always greater than the multitude of things contained under a less perfect angel, because under the former are also contained the less perfect angel himself and all those equal to him, which are not comprehended under the latter. And therefore the species of the superior angel is always more universal. Yet at least from that hypothesis it follows that each angel has only one species properly universal and so from the multitude of things represented, namely, the one by which he knows all things lower than himself. For concerning the rest he does not have universal species in this way, as I said, but at most in the other improper mode explained above concerning superiors alone. But because, on account of the arguments made, it is difficult to believe that in all angels, even the lowest, there are species so universal with respect to lower things, since they are particular with respect to equals or superiors, therefore either that hypothesis must be denied and we must proceed according to what was said in the first mode of responding; or the consequence must be denied even granting the hypothesis, and consequently the proportion must be denied. And a reason can be given, because the greater the substantial perfection of a spiritual substance is, the more eminent the light it has, with a special excellence and universality that lower substances cannot attain, even if they are multiplied to infinity under that more perfect one. But because this cannot easily be explained by a fitting reason, I judge that the former mode should be preferred. We will add something about this below, when treating how angels can understand several things at once.

CHAPTER XVII

CHAPTER XVII
WHETHER ANGELS NATURALLY HAVE AN IMPLANTED PROPER SPECIES OF GOD, THROUGH WHICH THEY KNOW HIS ESSENCE DIRECTLY AND IMMEDIATELY

1. God is the proportionate object of the angelic intellect. — State of the question. — Although GOD in the genus of being is more excellent than all created things, nevertheless in the ratio of an intelligible object he has a certain greater proportion with the nature of the angelic intellect than many created things do, by reason of which he is somehow comprehended under the natural object of the intellect. Therefore, for this reason, the disputation about GOD as naturally knowable by an angel falls most fittingly into this place, after the other natural objects have been discussed and before we speak of free and supernatural ones. But concerning God, two modes of knowing must be distinguished, treated above, namely, directly and through only an unknown medium, such as a species is, or indirectly, or through another known medium; and we will speak of this latter mode in the following chapter. Now the former must be discussed briefly. And we suppose from the doctrine of faith that angels cannot naturally see God as he is by a clear and intuitive vision, for this is communicated to no one except through grace, as was said in the preceding volume. Therefore, for eliciting that vision, it is certain that angels did not have a connatural species of God. But whether they had it for another genus of natural cognition of God, less perfect but still direct and immediate, this is disputed. But we suppose that an immediate cognition of God through a species of him cannot exist except through a proper species of God, through which he is known quidditatively as he is in himself. First, because every other cognition is either confused, or through negation, or through connotation, or analogy to another; and therefore it cannot be except through a known medium and its species, or some species formed after its likeness, which accordingly supposes cognition of the same medium and tends through it into God. Also, because through a species there cannot be had a certain and evident cognition unless through it the thing is known by a proper concept and as it is in itself. For the evidence of a thing arises only from this, when it is not through a cause or effect. But here we are treating of natural cognition of God that is certain and evident. Therefore, in order that it be immediate by force of the species alone, it is necessary that through that species God be known by a proper and quidditative

concept. The question is about such a species, whether it is connatural to angels and therefore was implanted in them from the beginning.

2. The first affirmative opinion. — The first opinion affirms that all angels in the state of wayfarers had a proper species of God, through which they could know him in himself, immediately, and by a proper concept. Scotus thinks this, in 2, dist. 3, quest. 9, and in 4, dist. 49, quest. 11. In these places he calls that species both natural, because it is the principle of natural cognition, and supernatural, because it is freely infused by God and cannot be obtained otherwise. This is to say that it is natural as to substance, but supernatural as to mode. Yet if it is natural in substance, because an angel is in natural potency to it and because it completes with the intellect of the angel the natural active potency of the same natural cognition of God, it is certainly natural simply and in every way. For that it is freely made by God alone is not enough for it to be called supernatural as to mode, both because it has no other more connatural mode by which it could be made, and also because God makes it in such a way as the nature of the angel demands, and finally because otherwise even the generation of man, by reason of the creation of the soul, would have to be called supernatural. Although this may seem to pertain to the use of the word, it is necessary for understanding the authors and distinguishing opinions. For Bassolus follows Scotus openly in 2, dist. 3, quest. 3, art. 2, § "Against that"; and yet in his mode of speaking he says that an angel cannot naturally know God through a species, and nevertheless can do so through a supernaturally impressed species. Next he declares the supernaturality in no other way than Scotus, and finally confesses that, once such a species has been received, an angel naturally knows God as he is, abstractively. For he defends at length in Quest. 1 of the Prologue, art. 2, that these two are not repugnant. Major holds the same in 2, dist. 3, quest. 2, and he distinguishes nothing about natural and supernatural, yet insinuates the same sense in the solution to 5. Marsilius inclines to it in 2, quest. 7, art. 1, in the second part, concl. 8. Likewise Ockham there, quests. 14 and 15, and Quest. 1 of the Prologue, art. 5, at the beginning and to doubts 9 and 10; and Aliacensis there, quest. 1, art. 2; Gabriel, quest. 1, art. 3, and in 2, dist. 3, quest. 2, art. 3, in the second part of that article, concl. 3. These speak about what is possible, asserting it, but doubting about the fact, because they do not think it is a mode wholly natural. In this they also speak with the stated ambiguity.

3. Foundation of the preceding opinion. — The foundation of this opinion is that it is not repugnant for there to be a proper species of God of this kind, which is the principle of knowing his essence abstractively, and such cognition

does not exceed the natural powers of angels, if such a species is given to them. Therefore it was given to them. The consequence is clear from what was said above, because it is connatural to an angel to have species of all things which he can naturally know, and proportioned to all acts of cognition in his natural light. But the antecedent, as to the former part, is proved first because abstractive knowledge does not include intuitive knowledge, but prescinds from it. Therefore it can exist without it. Therefore there can be a species representing God abstractively and not intuitively. Nor is it repugnant to have such cognition of God before the vision, because although in the order of execution abstractive cognition supposes intuitive cognition when it draws its origin from it, nevertheless when the principle of abstractive cognition is infused from elsewhere, it is not necessary that intuitive cognition precede. But the other part of the same antecedent is not proved by Scotus, but is supposed as clear. For only the intuitive vision of God exceeds the natural powers of a creature; but as to abstractive cognition, there is no reason why it should exceed the natural faculty of an angel. Finally Scotus alleges Augustine, 4 *de Genesi*, and in other places where he treats of the morning cognition of the angels, and that it is attributed to all angels before the fall. Hence it follows that he could not have placed it in the clear and intuitive vision of God alone, because this was not in all angels. Therefore it could only be this abstractive cognition of God through a proper species.

4. The true negative opinion is proved by authority. — It is also proved by reason. — Quidditative cognition of God is always supernatural. — And intuitive. — Intuitive cognition of God adds nothing to quidditative cognition of him. — Nevertheless it must be said that this species of God is not connatural to angels, nor was it given to them in the beginning, and consequently that they did not have a proper and quidditative cognition of the essence of God. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, 1 p., Quest. 56, art. 2, whom Cajetan and all Thomists follow there; and Alensis thinks the same, part 2, quest. 24, memb. 1; Capreolus holds it, in 2, dist. 3, quest. 3, art. 1, concl. 6, and art. 3, to the argument against it; and Giles there, and others more frequently. The same is taken from Durandus, Quest. 3 of the Prologue, num. 7, where he attacks the opinion of Scotus. And Henry sufficiently indicates the same, quodl. 4, quest. 9. It can also be attributed to Augustine, book 2 *de Genesi ad litteram*, ch. 8, insofar as he says that species of creatures were implanted in angels from the beginning; but he never mentions a species of the creator. I also proved this assertion in book 4 *de Trinitate*, ch. 11, where I touched on the proper a priori reason for this resolution, namely, because quidditative cognition of God is supernatural as to

substance, so that it cannot be connatural to a creatable intellect, much less to angels already created. Therefore a species which is the principle of such cognition is of the same supernatural order, and accordingly cannot be connatural to angels. The consequence is very good, because the first and second act are of the same order, for they preserve proportion between themselves; and also because the first act is given for the sake of the second. Hence if the second is not owed to nature, neither can the first be. But the antecedent is proved because the intuitive vision of God is a supernatural act both for angels and for men, as is certain and was proved in the preceding volume, treat. 2, book 2, chs. 7 and 8, together with ch. 18. But quidditative cognition of God cannot be except intuitive. Therefore such cognition is also supernatural to an angel. The minor is proved because through quidditative cognition God is necessarily known as a being actually existing, indeed, as necessarily existing. Therefore he is seen intuitively. The antecedent is proved because through the quidditative cognition of any thing all those predicates are known which are of the essence of the known thing, and especially those in which it is distinguished from others. But it is of the essence of God to exist actually, since he is essentially necessary being, or being from himself, as was proved at length in other places. Therefore, if cognition of God is quidditative, it necessarily shows him actually existing. And it is declared, because one who knows God quidditatively necessarily knows that he is wise. But it is no less of the essence of GOD to be existing, or actually being, than to be wise. Therefore God as existing is known by the same necessity through the same quidditative cognition. And the same argument can be taken from any other attribute of God. But the first consequence is proved, because intuitive vision adds to quidditative cognition in creatures only that it be terminated at an existing thing as existing. But quidditative cognition of God formally and essentially includes this. Therefore it is necessarily intuitive. And thus with respect to God, intuitive cognition adds nothing to quidditative cognition, but explains what is necessarily included in it.

5. An evasion. — It is destroyed. — It can be responded from Scotus that intuitive cognition does not only add that it is of an existing thing, but also that it is of a present thing. For I can know a thing existing elsewhere, which therefore I do not intuit, because it is not present. In this way, therefore, he says, an angel can know God as he is in himself and as actually existing, and yet not see him as present, and accordingly not intuit him. Yet, lest we turn aside to the general question about the conditions required for intuitive cognition, we must speak only about the cognition of God, and with respect to it we say that the same argument proceeds concerning that condition. For that presence cannot be

understood except either according to time, or according to local nearness. Add, third, without an interposed obstacle that hides the thing known. But in all these ways quidditative cognition of God is necessarily of a present thing. First, according to existence and duration, because God is necessarily known as actually existing and as eternal, and consequently as now enduring and coexisting with cognition of himself. But presence according to time or duration consists in this, as is evident of itself. The second presence according to place, if it includes local nearness, pertains to sense; but in the intellect it is not necessary for intuitive cognition, as we will show below concerning angels. Nevertheless, even if it is admitted, it also cannot be lacking in quidditative cognition of God, because he cannot be distant according to essence or substance from any created thing. Therefore neither can he be distant from an angel knowing him. Therefore, from this side, the angel does not know him as absent, but as present. Likewise, the reason given about existence can be made about presence. For through quidditative cognition it is necessarily known of God that he is immense and everywhere, because this is of the essence of God. Therefore God is necessarily known as present. But the third condition necessary for presence can in no way be lacking in intellectual cognition, if it is supposed to be cognition of a thing existing and present, or not distant, as it is in itself. For, once such cognition is supposed, it is impossible that the object, or its existence or presence, be hidden. First, because when some thing interposed between the object and the power hides the object, it impedes cognition. Therefore conversely, if cognition is not impeded, and cannot be impeded, by an interposed thing, neither can intuitive cognition be impeded. Also, because that kind of impediment has a place only when cognition is made through a medium, namely, by receiving a species from the object itself through an interposed medium, as in sight or hearing, etc. But pure intellectual cognition, such as angelic cognition, does not occur through such a medium, and especially with respect to an immaterial object. Therefore in merely intellectual cognition such a kind of impediment has no place. For example, because an angel can see, as we now suppose, things which exist in distant places, although there are other things or bodies of any condition whatever interposed in the middle places, they will not be able to impede the intuition of the distant thing, because that cognition does not occur through a medium, and through it the thing is seen as existing in such a place and in such a mode with the other conditions of existence. And so the interposed bodies do not prevent the thing from being seen as intellectually present, although materially, if I may speak so, it is not present. Therefore in no way can quidditative cognition of God, through

which he is known as existing and immense, and accordingly really present, fail to be intuitive vision because of some obstacle. And these points can be confirmed a fortiori from what we said above: although created things do not have existence from themselves and from intrinsic necessity, nevertheless if they are supposed to be existing and are known through a proper species as they are in themselves, that cognition cannot fail to be intuitive.

6. The aforesaid true opinion is finally confirmed a posteriori. — The divine essence cannot be intuitively known without the persons. — Finally, the assertion can be confirmed a posteriori, because if an angel could through a natural species and cognition know God quidditatively, he could also naturally know that the divine essence is in three persons, and in fact, by knowing God through such a species, he would consequently also have known the mystery of the Trinity. The consequent does not seem to be admitted. Therefore. To this Major responds by denying the consequence, because it is not necessary that one who knows some thing know all things that are intrinsic to that thing, whether he knows it abstractively, he says, or intuitively. But he understands that the Trinity is only intrinsic to the divine essence, and therefore that it does not follow that, once the essence is known, the Trinity is known. He also adds that he is not speaking of actual cognition, but of a species and of the potency of producing such cognition. But this last point matters little, because the whole difficulty is about a complete power through a species. For once that is supposed, it is in the will of the angel to have its act; and if he had such a species from the beginning, it is more likely that he also had the act. But concerning the first point, it has been shown elsewhere that the divine essence cannot be seen intuitively without the persons. Hence, since it has been shown that there cannot be quidditative cognition of the divine essence without its being intuitive, it is consequently concluded that through such cognition the persons also are seen. Next, the first consequence can also be demonstrated directly, because to be communicable to three persons is of the essence of the divine nature. But through quidditative cognition whatever is essential is known. Therefore through such an act the divine essence is known as communicable to many, and that communicability itself is known quidditatively, what sort and how great it is, and consequently that it is to three persons. Indeed, since in God there is nothing potential, it will not be known as potential but as actual communication, which no one can conceive without the persons. But to attribute all this to an angel as connatural to him is most absurd. For what further is known in God through the beatific vision, especially from among those things which are formally within him? Or why would such cognition not

beatify an angel, and necessarily induce his will to the love of God, and render it impeccable? Therefore through such cognition, and accordingly through nature, an angel would be blessed, which cannot be said.

7. The foundation of the contrary opinion is responded to. — Therefore, to the foundation of the contrary opinion, first we say that the question turns on whether a created species of God as he is in himself is possible. For the Thomists deny that it is possible, and they will say the same about a species by which God is known quidditatively, because it cannot be the principle of such cognition without being the principle of intuitive vision. Hence, if there are reasons persuading that one species is not possible, the same can be applied to the other, if another must be named; and indeed in that opinion this is said consistently. But I, speaking absolutely, do not judge it impossible that a species be infused by which God is known quidditatively. Yet I say it is impossible to infuse a species which is the principle of quidditative cognition of God and not of intuitive cognition. Indeed, I also say that a species of another angel, or of a created object, is impossible if it suffices for knowing it quidditatively and not for seeing it intuitively, if such an object or angel is supposed to exist in reality, as is manifest from what was said about the mode by which an angel intuits existing things through innate species. But in God no hypothesis is necessary, because actual existence is included quidditatively in the very essence of GOD. Therefore, just as a species which is the principle of intuitively seeing God cannot be natural or proportioned to the natural light of an angel unless he is elevated by the light of glory, so neither can that species by which God is known quidditatively and as he essentially is in himself. And from this it is easy to respond to the proof introduced in the argument: although in other created objects abstractive cognition can prescind from intuitive cognition, in God it cannot, because of the special ratio which he has in this, that he is an object existing essentially. But to the testimony of Augustine about morning cognition we respond that in Augustine it is not distinguished from the clear and intuitive vision of God, as we will see in the following treatise. And there we will explain how Augustine attributed morning cognition to all angels, concerning which we will also speak in the fifth book of this treatise.

CHAPTER XVIII

CHAPTER XVIII
WHETHER AN ANGEL NATURALLY KNOWS GOD THROUGH HIS OWN SUBSTANCE

1. *Twofold medium of knowing.* — It is presupposed in this title what has already been said above, that an angel can naturally know God, and consequently through some medium, because knowledge that does not take place through the very substance or species of the thing known does not take place without some known medium. For, as I have often said, the medium of knowing is twofold, namely, unknown, which is the species, and known, which is reduced to cause or effect, leaving aside for now other extrinsic media. And indeed the unknown medium is always necessary, because knowledge cannot occur without some species. Yet there is a difference, because when knowledge is immediately of the thing itself in itself without another known medium, it occurs through the proper species of the known object, or through its essence united to the power in the manner of a species; but when a thing is known through another known medium, then it is known through an alien species, namely the species of the medium itself. Therefore, since it has been shown that an angel does not naturally know God through the proper species of God himself, it remains that he can know him only through an alien species, namely through the species of that thing which is the known medium through which God is known, or through the proper essence of the knowing angel. Therefore we shall speak first of the essence of the angel himself, afterward of other media, and finally of the comparison.

2. *Resolution affirming. — Doubt about the mode of this resolution. — Opinion holding that an angel knows God through his own substance as through a medium not known.* — First, therefore, it is certain that each angel, through his own substance through which he knows himself, also knows God. Thus teaches St. Thomas, Quest. 6, 56, art. 3, and *Contra Gentiles*, chap. 98, and the interpreters in the same places, whom I shall cite shortly. But concerning the mode by which an angel knows God through his own substance, there are three doubts. The first, which we treat in this chapter, is whether an angel knows God immediately through his own substance, or only by means of knowledge of himself. For since it is certain that an angel knows himself and God through his own substance, the difficulty is whether the knowledge of himself and of God are related only as concomitant, or whether they have an order per se, so that

knowledge of himself is the way to knowing God. Capreolus seems to follow the former mode in the place cited above in the proof of the conclusion, and more clearly in the response to the first objection of Scotus against the sixth conclusion, and more expressly Ferrariensis, in the said chap. 98, in its second part, § *For its evidence*, 1 and 2. They do not deny that an angel can know God through his own essence as through a known medium, but they say that this is not only in that mode, but also immediately, as through a species, though inadequate and imperfect. Cumelius follows them in the said art. 3, although he speaks very obscurely, and he also cites Cajetan in the said art. 3; but Cajetan does not say this clearly, although in responding to the second objection of Scotus he indicates it, unless he is explained in the way to be stated below. Alexander of Hales indicates it, part 2, quest. 24, memb. 1, insofar as he distinguishes knowledge of God through substance as through an image of God from knowledge of God through effects. Henry is also cited, but without reason. The foundation can be that an angel is a certain likeness of God, although an imperfect one, impressed by God; therefore he has the character of a species with respect to God.

3. *The negative part. — First assertion. — It is proved by reason. — What the authors of the preceding opinion respond.* — The contrary opinion is taken from Bonaventure, in 2, dist. 3, part 2, art. 2, quest. 2, replies to 4 and 6, and Richard, dist. 4, art. 1, quests. 1 and 2; Bassolus, dist. 3, quest. 3, art. 2, concl. 1; and among the moderns Vasquez, Molina, and Pesantius follow it. Now the controversy can be about a mode of speaking in one sense, and in another about the thing itself; in the former there is no need to contend, but only to explain the truth, while in the latter this second opinion must be preferred. I briefly explain both. For, first, I assert that an angel cannot know God through his own substance as through a principle of directly knowing God as an immediate object, apart from every known medium; and in this sense it cannot be said that an angel knows God through his own substance as through a species or through an unknown medium. This is what the second opinion intends. And it is proved, because an angel cannot know God through his own substance without knowing himself. Thus, if per impossibile an angel did not know himself, he could not know God through his own substance. Therefore it is a sign that the essence of an angel, considered only in itself, is not a principle of knowing God, but only as known. The antecedent seems self-evident, nor is it openly denied by the Doctors of the prior opinion. Yet they seem to deny the inference, and tacitly to respond to the consequence that from that antecedent it follows only that both cognitions, of himself and of God, are necessarily produced together by the

angel through his own essence, not because that essence only as known is the reason for knowing God, but because it is simultaneously the reason for knowing himself and God, and himself in a certain way more proximately and with greater proportion. And therefore, indeed, the angel cannot naturally use, so to speak, his essence as a principle for eliciting knowledge of God without at the same time eliciting knowledge of himself; nevertheless, it is not the reason for knowing God in only one way, namely as a known medium, but also as a reason of knowing sufficient per se.

4. *Yet they are rejected.* — Nevertheless, even in this sense that opinion does not please me, and the consequence can be pressed, because knowledge of God through the substance of an angel is not separable from knowledge of the angel himself, not only naturally, but not even supernaturally; rather, it depends essentially on it, or includes it. Therefore it is a sign that the angel's substance is not the immediate principle of knowing God, but only insofar as it is first the reason for knowing himself. The consequence seems clear, because mere concomitance would not suffice to introduce necessity even in relation to the power of God; indeed, even naturally it is asserted gratuitously and without foundation. The antecedent is proved first, because an angel cannot immediately form any concept of God through his own substance if he does not conceive himself. For either that concept of God would be proper to him as he is in himself, and no one says this, and a fortiori it is rejected from what was said in the preceding chapter; or God is known by a connotative concept, and such a concept necessarily supposes a concept of the angel, according to whose likeness God is conceived. Therefore there is an order per se and altogether necessary between those two objects as knowable through the essence of the angel. Therefore that that medium be known is presupposed per se for the knowledge of God. Second, the first knowledge of God through the substance of an angel is that by which the angel certainly and evidently knows that God exists without the use of any intelligible species of another thing. But that evident knowledge concerning God, that he exists, is impossible unless God is seen either in himself or in some effect of his. But he cannot evidently be known as existing in himself, because he is not known in himself, nor as he is in himself, nor quidditatively. Therefore that certitude and evidence must be founded on the knowledge of some effect; and because there is no other except the angel himself, therefore such evident knowledge of God per se essentially supposes or includes knowledge of the angel himself. Therefore it is a known medium, and only as such can it be the reason for knowing God.

5. *The rejection is carried further.* — Third, there is an a priori reason, because although the angel's essence is a likeness or image, or is made to the image of God, it is only a natural, imperfect, and inadequate likeness, not an intentional likeness of God. Therefore it does not lead to the knowledge of God immediately as an unknown medium. The antecedent, as to the former part, is the foundation of the prior opinion, which we admit as certain with respect to that part. But we add the latter part, which pertains to the matter, because the inference depends on it. That part, therefore, is proved first from an unacceptable consequence, because otherwise the essence of an angel, although in real being it would be an imperfect likeness of God, in intentional being would perfectly represent GOD, because this is the mode of representing proper to an intentional species, and it can exist together with an imperfect natural likeness, as is clear concerning other species. Second, it is proved a priori, because the essence of an angel is not made to be, as it were, an instrument of the divine substance, supplying its place under the aspect of an intelligible object, which is the proper office of an intelligible species; rather, it is made to be of such a nature in which it is in some way formally like God in its natural being. Therefore it is not a species. And this is confirmed, because the substance of an angel can never represent God according to what is proper to GOD, but only insofar as it participates in the likeness of God. Therefore that substance can never have, with respect to GOD, the character of a species through which God is immediately conceived by a proper concept of God. And here the first consequence remains proved, because only an intentional species is the immediate reason for knowing a thing distinct from the knower as an unknown medium. This is true of God, so that not even the divine essence is the reason for knowing creatures in themselves as an unknown medium, as I proved in the preceding volume when treating the vision of God. Therefore neither is the essence of an angel the reason for knowing God per se and immediately as an unknown medium.

6. *Next they are rejected from a twofold example.* — Fourth, I argue by a twofold example. The first is that one angel cannot know another angel through his own substance when it is not known, as through a species, although he is more like him than he is like GOD. Therefore neither will he be able to know God. They respond by denying the consequence, because his own substance is an effect of God. But this is irrelevant to the character of a species or of an unknown medium. For one angel knows another through his species, although that species is not an effect of the angel known, but of God. Therefore the reason for the antecedent is that that formal and natural likeness does not suffice for the

character of a species or of an unknown principle of knowing. Therefore neither will it suffice with respect to God. Another argument from a similar case is taken from the knowledge of GOD through the species of another angel. For one angel can know God through the species of another angel, as we shall say shortly. But that species cannot be the reason or principle of knowing God immediately and in himself, but only by means of knowledge of the angel whose species it is, as is known among all, because that species is not really the species of God, nor is God known through it by virtue of it, that is, because God is represented through it, but by virtue of the intellectual light of the knowing angel, because it has the power to know the cause in the effect. And by a similar reason, if the angel himself knew himself through an accidental species, that species would be compared to GOD in the same way as the species of another angel is now compared. Therefore, even if the angel now knows himself without a species through his own substance, nevertheless, with respect to the knowledge of GOD, the substance of the angel is compared in the same way, as it has the efficacy of a species. For it has that efficacy immediately concerning the knowledge of himself, because only with respect to this is it the proper object; but that knowledge is extended to God by virtue of the angelic light for knowing the cause in the effect. Therefore, per se and intrinsically, that essence is a known medium with respect to God, and it cannot effect knowledge of him in any other way.

7. *Second assertion.* — Nevertheless, it must be said, second, that in the way in which a cause is said to be known through the species of its effect when it is known in the effect or through the effect, God can also be said to be known by an angel through his own substance as through a species, that is, through that very substance having the concurrence of a species. This is proved, because an angel does not have another species through which he knows either himself or God per se besides his proper substance. Therefore that substance has the same concurrence toward the knowledge of God which the species of an effect has toward the knowledge of the cause; for example, the concurrence which the species of another angel has toward knowing God through that angel. And this is what pertains to the matter. Hence, if the authors of the prior opinion wished to say only this second point, they differ from the others only in the use of words. For the authors of the second opinion do not contradict this, but only Scotus and others who deny that an angel knows himself through his proper substance without another species can contradict it. Therefore, having supposed these two assertions, in which the truth of the matter consists, the mode of

speaking should not be extended to improper expressions that give rise to equivocation.

8. *First corollary.* — Hence I infer first that those who say that an angel knows God through his own substance as through a species of God do not speak correctly, although they can say that he knows God through his own substance as through a species of himself, or rather as through an intelligible object that does not need another species with respect to itself. This is proved, both because the substance of an angel is not really a species of God, as I have proved, and also because when a cause is known through the species of an effect, the species is not said to be the species of the cause, and consequently the cause is not then said to be known through its own species, but through the species of the effect. Therefore, similarly, the substance of an angel is not the species of God, nor does an angel know God through it as through a species of God, but as through a species of himself, who is an effect of God. Finally, because something is said to be known through something as through a species only when it is the immediate reason for knowing such a thing in itself and without the intervention of the knowledge of one thing through which one comes to the knowledge of another; but an angel does not know God in this way through his own substance, as has been explained. They will perhaps respond that when a cause is known through the species of an effect alone, then that species can be called the species of the cause, at least mediately. But this, as I said, can pertain to a question about the name. To me, however, that mode of speaking is not pleasing, because that species per se represents only the effect, while the cause is attained from the efficacy of the light of the knower; and therefore it does not form a proper concept of the cause as it does of the effect. But if sometimes, when an effect has been seen, the cause is known through a proper concept, then it is not known only through the effect, but also through a species of itself; as sometimes, when smoke has been seen, we know that fire is there, by distinctly conceiving fire, as experience shows. But if someone considers correctly, that conception does not arise by virtue of the effect alone, but through another species which we had of fire and which is stirred to operation when the smoke is seen. Hence, as to that, it is not properly knowledge through the effect, nor through the species of the effect. And thus the species of the effect never suffices for a proper concept of the cause, and therefore it cannot be called its species.

9. *Second corollary.* — Next I infer that it is not correctly said that the substance of an angel under different aspects is the reason for knowing God, as a known and unknown medium. For this would be true if an angel knew GOD

through his substance in two modes, at least distinct by reason, as through a known effect of God, and by immediately knowing God by virtue of his own substance considered precisely under the aspect of a species or principle of knowing as not known in this way. But this is false. For this latter mode of knowing is not true, nor does it have place in an angel, as has been proved. Therefore that distinction of two formal aspects under which the angel's substance concurs for knowing GOD is fictitious. Or conversely we can argue ostensively, because the knowledge of an angel insofar as it is terminated at GOD is not of a twofold character, but in only one way attains God as it were by resultance from the knowledge of himself, as has been proved. Therefore neither in the essence itself of the angel, insofar as it has the power of a species or principle of understanding, does that twofold aspect of concurring have a place. The consequence is clear, both because first act is proportioned to second act, and therefore if in second act a twofold aspect cannot be distinguished, neither will it be able to be distinguished in first act; and also because, just as the act of knowing of an angel is terminated by one as it were impulse, primarily at himself and secondarily at God, so the essence by one influx, and consequently under one aspect, is the reason for knowing God through the angel. Hence, if that twofold aspect of an unknown and known medium can be distinguished according to reason in the substance of an angel, it should not be distinguished, with both applying to God, but the former should be distinguished with respect to the angel and the latter with respect to God, only according to reason, as I shall now explain.

10. *Third corollary. — Why one angel is not the reason for knowing others.* — Finally I infer that some of the said doctors also distinguish in vain, from what has been said, an angel as an effect of God and as an image or likeness, so that under the former aspect he is said to be a known medium for knowing God, while under the latter he is the reason for knowing even when not known. For although the aspect of effect is more abstract, and under that consideration it is a distinct aspect, still the aspect of image intrinsically includes the aspect of effect, because origin is included in the notion of image, as St. Thomas taught, part 1, quest., art. 1, and as we said at length in the preceding volume. But the origin of an imperfect image of God, such as an angel is, is the creation of such an effect. Therefore the aspect of image in an angel includes the aspect of effect. And the aspect of likeness is to be taken with this restriction. For in a general way one angel has a likeness of another, and yet because it is not with origin, it is not the reason for knowing him, as Capreolus and Ferrariensis also noted. Therefore the likeness which an angel has to God conduces to knowledge of him

because it is with procession from him, and hence insofar as it includes the aspect of effect. And St. Thomas indicated this clearly enough in the said art. 3, saying: *Because the image of God is impressed in the very nature of the angel, through his own essence the angel knows God, insofar as it is a likeness of God*, namely as of the terminus and as of the principle, and hence insofar as it includes the aspect of effect. And therefore the same Saint adds at the end of the article, *And therefore that knowledge keeps itself with specular knowledge*, concerning which, namely, Paul said in 1 Corinthians 13: *We now see through a mirror in an enigma.* But it *keeps itself with specular knowledge* in this, that just as we do not know God in the mirror of creatures except through a known medium, so also an angel knows God in himself as in a mirror known by himself. It differs only because we, and the angel himself, know other effects or images of God through species of other things or images, while he does not recognize himself as an image of God through another species, but through himself. For this reason St. Thomas said that the knowledge which an angel has of God through himself is a medium between the vision face to face and specular knowledge, namely the one had in the mirror of other creatures. Therefore, just as an angel, by knowing GOD through himself as through an effect, knows God through a known medium, so when he knows God through himself as an image or likeness of God, it is also a known medium, both because even as an image it is not a medium except insofar as it includes the aspect of effect, and an effect as such is not the reason for knowing the cause except as known; and because it does not have the character of an intentional species with respect to God, but of a formal likeness, and in some way a natural one, although inadequate and imperfect. Therefore it does not lead into the knowledge of God unless it is known. Hence, although the essence of an angel with respect to the same angel can be called an unknown medium for knowing the angel himself, at least by antecedence of reason, because by nature it concurs as a principle for the knowledge of himself before it is known, nevertheless, with respect to God, it cannot be called an unknown medium, because in order for the angel's knowledge to pass over to God, by order of nature it supposes knowledge of himself.

CHAPTER XIX

CHAPTER XIX
WHETHER AN ANGEL KNOWS HIMSELF AND GOD THROUGH HIS OWN SUBSTANCE BY THE SAME ACT OR BY DISTINCT ACTS

1. *First opinion.* — On this point, which is the second doubt among the three which we counted in the preceding chapter, num. 2, I find nothing expressly said by St. Thomas, and his interpreters seem to speak and think in various ways. Some think that there are diverse acts, because one naturally arises from the other; but there cannot be a dimanation of one from the other without distinction. And Cajetan thinks this in response to the second objection of Scotus, saying that the essence of an angel, as thought under a higher mode, elicits knowledge of God. Likewise, because an angel knows himself intuitively, and GOD abstractively; but intuitive and abstractive knowledge are distinct acts. Because of this argument Molina especially adheres to this side in the said art. 3. And a similar point can be that the angel knows himself quidditatively, perfectly, and by a proper concept, but God very imperfectly and through a connotative, negative, or similar concept.

Second opinion. — Ferrariensis, Ripa, and others think the contrary, and they prove it chiefly because otherwise an angel would know God through discourse, since to discourse is nothing other than to gather one thing from another through a distinct act. Hence Scotus, in dist. 3, quest. 9, agreeing in this, as it seems, with the first opinion, that an angel cannot know himself and, outside himself, God by one act, gathers that absolutely an angel cannot know God through his own substance, because otherwise he would know him through discourse. And therefore Ferrariensis, in order to respond to Scotus, denies that there is discourse, because the knowledge of both objects occurs through one act. Second, I argue in this way: relation and terminus are known by the same act. But by knowing himself an angel knows God as the terminus of the transcendental relation which he has to him. Therefore he knows himself and God by the same act. The consequence is clear with the major. The minor is proved, because an angel, by knowing himself, knows God from this, that the knowledge is comprehensive of his own substance, and therefore he necessarily knows it as a participated being and as depending on another. Therefore by that same knowledge he necessarily attains the terminus of that dependence, which is God. But to attain him is to know that he exists and is the cause of his

substance; and this is to know God through himself. Therefore it is by the same act.

2. *For the true opinion, note of a twofold concept. — First conclusion. — An angel knows himself and God by the same act through a respective concept. — The contrary arguments in the preceding number are responded to.* — To me it seems that one must distinguish on this point. For God can be known in two ways. In one way by an as it were respective concept, by which he is known as the cause of some effect; and consequently he is also known evidently as to the question whether he is, because by evidently knowing the effect and the dependence of the effect on another, it is evidently known that that on which it depends exists. In another way God can be known by an absolute concept, as when he is thought as infinite being, omnipotent, and so on, without any attribute that includes a relation to an actually existing creature. For we experience in ourselves this concept of God; therefore it will be able to be much more perfect in angels. I say, then, that in the former way an angel knows God by the same act by which he knows himself. The reason given in the latter place proves this effectively for me. For I do not see how an effect as dependent can be known through an act that is not terminated at the cause itself, if such an effect and its dependence, as they are in themselves, are known evidently and quidditatively. Likewise the prior reason concerning discourse is suitable, although it depends on those things which are to be said below about the discourse of an angel. Nor do the motives of the prior opinion stand against this. For to the first I deny that there is one act which really proceeds from another; for there is only one act which is terminated primarily at one thing and consequently at the other because of a necessary connection. Therefore according to reason it is said to attain one thing before another, but not according to reality or real causality. To the second, however, we say that it is not unacceptable that with respect to diverse things one act should at the same time be intuitive knowledge of one and abstractive knowledge of another. For this is found in the very science of God or in the clear vision of GOD. And often an angel, in an existing thing which he intuits, knows that another is possible, which he knows only abstractively. And for the same reason it is not repugnant that the same knowledge be perfect with respect to the primary object and not with respect to the secondary, when the medium is not adequate, or when the secondary is far more excellent. You will say: therefore if an angel knows several angels at once, for example, or other effects of God, he will have several cognitions of God at once, because by knowing each angel he will know God through the same act; for he knows God through the species of another as he does through himself, as we shall say

shortly. I respond by conceding the consequence, for this is no unacceptable result, because those cognitions are of diverse characters, or concerning distinct primary objects, and from this they are multiplied, and each one can pass over to the secondary object, and nevertheless they remain distinct even in this, because they tend to him through diverse ways.

3. *Second conclusion. — An angel can form an absolute concept of God.* — I add, nevertheless, that an angel can have a proper act of knowledge and conception of God distinct from the act by which he knows himself, or other effects of God, and through them God. I prove this first by that reason, that an angel can sometimes know God by an absolute concept, that is, not as the terminus of the dependence or of another transcendental relation of that very angel, or of another creature, to God, nor even as having some relation to an actually existing creature, that is, under the concept of creator or another similar concept, but under a common concept with an added negation, as being from himself, or not from another, infinite, immense, omnipotent, and so on. For this concept of God, although absolutely it is imperfect with respect to God, is a great perfection with respect to the one having it. Therefore there is no reason why it should be denied to an angel. But that concept is distinct from the act by which the angel knows himself, because per se it has no connection with it. Hence I argue, second: an angel can think of God without thinking of any created object. Therefore that thought is an act distinct from every act of knowledge of himself or of another created object. The consequence is self-evident, because if that act were the knowledge of some created object, it would be thought of that object, which is contrary to the hypothesis. The antecedent, therefore, is proved first from St. Thomas, Quest. 8, *De Veritate*, art. 3, reply to 18, where in the argument he had assumed that an angel can think of God without thinking of any creature, and in the solution he concedes this of every wayfarer. And it seems to be known in us by experience, although perhaps few have it; yet they especially are accustomed to have it who leave everything behind in order to think purely of GOD, as Dionysius teaches. Therefore much more will an angel be able to do this. But how he can do it we shall try to explain, for it is not altogether easy and ready.

4. *To the second reason in the first number. — What is to be said to the first.* — Therefore the assertion is proved, third, because when an angel knows God by the same act by which he knows himself, he only conceives God as the secondary object of that act, and as the terminus of the relation and dependence of the angel on him. Therefore from this he can be sufficiently stirred to think of GOD according to himself and as the primary object of a new act, through

which he may know the perfections and attributes of God more abundantly and distinctly. For through the act by which he knows himself, perhaps he can know God only as his maker, and at most as the first cause of his being. But although the other attributes are contained virtually in this attribute, perhaps the angel cannot penetrate all of them by that same act without a greater application of his intellectual light. Therefore, through that first act, he can be stirred to apply his intellectual light, so that he may contemplate GOD more directly and absolutely, and know him not only as his own principle, but also as the first principle of every thing made or possible, infinite and omnipotent. Likewise, as supreme and pure act, and supremely intellectual, wise, and so on. For all these things are contained in that principle, that God is the terminus of the angel's dependence on his cause; nevertheless, they will not all be able to be penetrated in it unless he is known directly, per se, and with a great application of intellectual light. Therefore it is most likely that this act is distinct from that by which the angel knows himself and, through himself, God. And so the second reason made for the first opinion does not proceed concerning this act, because through this act GOD is not known only as the terminus of angelic dependence, but is known in a higher mode and by more absolute knowledge, as I have explained. Nor does the first foundation of the same opinion, or the argument of Scotus about discourse, press either, as will be explained more in the following doubt.

5. *The third doubt from those reviewed in the preceding chapter in num. 2. — And its twofold sense; resolution of the doubt in the former sense.* — For one can ask whether actual knowledge of God is necessarily and naturally conjoined in an angel with knowledge of himself, or depends in some way on the angel's freedom. This question can have a twofold sense. One is whether an angel, in knowing himself, necessarily knows GOD. The other is whether, in actually knowing God, he necessarily also knows himself. In the former sense the resolution is easy from what has been said. For one must distinguish concerning the twofold knowledge of God which an angel can have by virtue of knowledge of himself, as we explained. And concerning the former, by which God is known as the terminus of the angel's dependence on him, it must be said that it is necessarily and connaturally conjoined with the knowledge of himself by the very same angel knowing God. This is proved, both because it is the same indivisible act, and also because in that mode God is not known through such an act as its primary object, but as secondary, with which the primary is necessarily joined. But in this mode the primary object cannot be known without the secondary, just as a relation cannot be known without its terminus. But concerning the other knowledge of God, which is through an absolute

concept distinct from the act by which an angel knows himself, it must be said that it is not necessarily and naturally conjoined in an angel with knowledge of himself, but that this knowledge of himself can be exercised without it. This is proved first, because those are two acts really distinct in themselves and absolute, and the act by which an angel knows himself is prior by its nature. But that which is distinct in reality, prior, and absolute can be separated from what is posterior and can be without it. Therefore that prior act by which an angel knows himself will also be able to be without the posterior one by which he knows GOD according to himself and absolutely. Second, because through the very act by which an angel knows himself he also knows God as much as is necessary for knowing himself perfectly and comprehensively. Therefore whatever the other knowledge of God afterward adds is not simply necessary in order for the angel to have the act of knowing himself. Therefore there is no source from which it is necessarily inferred from that act. Third, that second act requires a special application of the angel's mind and attention, as I explained. But this application is free and depends on the will, because nothing can be assigned which necessitates the angel to it. Therefore, while knowledge of himself exists, it is in the angel's freedom not to apply his intellect to another special mode of thinking about God; and consequently he will be able to have the act of knowing himself without that absolute act of contemplating God.

6. *Resolution in the latter sense.* — In the other sense of the contrary comparison, it is clear according to what has been said that the former mode by which an angel knows God through his own substance cannot be without knowledge of himself. For this was chiefly treated in the prior point, both because the secondary object, as such, cannot be known without the primary, and also because God is known in that mode by the angel as through a known medium. Therefore only the doubt remains whether, conversely, an angel can in that latter mode actually know God by an absolute and direct concept even if the same angel does not know himself. But the question must be treated formally and, so to speak, through an intrinsic place, not through extrinsic concomitance. For there is a question among theologians, to be treated below, whether an angel can cease from knowledge of himself or whether by a natural necessity he always intuits himself. Hence, if we suppose that that side is true which affirms that knowledge of himself is necessary in an angel, certainly an angel will not be able to have knowledge of God without knowledge of himself. Yet that will not be per se and from something intrinsic, that is, because knowledge of himself is necessary for that knowledge of GOD, but because from another source the act of knowing himself is necessary and naturally cannot be

interrupted or suspended. In this sense also an angel cannot know another angel or any other thing without at the same time knowing himself. Therefore this concomitance is general and proceeds from an intrinsic cause; and for that reason it is not treated here, since it is as it were per accidens and pertains to the said question, which is extraneous to this place.

7. *Formal sense of the doubt: whether an angel can naturally know God without knowing himself or another effect of God at the same time. — Arguments for the negative side.* — Therefore the formal sense is whether knowledge of himself is per se necessary for an angel even for that absolute mode of knowing God; or, conversely, whether an angel can think of God in that mode, even if by something possible or impossible he is not actually thinking of himself. In this, moreover, it is certain that if an angel actually knows another angel, or any effect of GOD, he can think of GOD in that mode even if he does not think of himself, because through the knowledge of another effect he can ascend into the knowledge of GOD, just as he can through himself, as we shall say a little later. Therefore the difficulty must be proposed in such a way that the angel is posited as actually considering neither himself nor any other effect of GOD. For it seems impossible for an angel in that mode to have actual knowledge of GOD alone, because that knowledge cannot be through the proper species of God, since the angel does not have it, nor will it be through an effect, because he is then actually knowing no effect of God, and an effect does not lead into actual knowledge of the cause unless it is actually known, as has been shown. Nor can that be knowledge through the cause, as is self-evident. Therefore it can be in no way. Or otherwise: that knowledge of God is not elicited by the light of the angelic intellect alone without something determining or cooperating in the manner of first act. But, setting aside actual knowledge of some effect, there is nothing that can determine the angel's intellect and cooperate with it toward the knowledge of GOD. Therefore he cannot have that knowledge. Or otherwise: that knowledge of GOD must be certain and evident in the angel, because it is not apprehension alone prescinding from judgment, but includes certain assent that GOD exists and that he is such or such. But this evidence is not immediate and from the terms, as is self-evident. Therefore it is mediate. Therefore it is through an effect. Therefore one must actually think about an effect.

8. *Reasons for the affirmative side.* — To the contrary, however, is what we said above from St. Thomas, that an angel can think of God even if he thinks of no other thing. But to think is nothing other than actually to know and consider. For although strictly in us it sometimes signifies the inquiry of truth not yet sufficiently perfect, still commonly it is taken for any act of the intellect, as

Augustine testifies, book 14, *De Trinitate*, chap. 7, which is especially true when it is attributed to God or to angels. Therefore an angel can actually know God even if he actually knows no other thing, and consequently, even if he is posited to cease from consideration of himself, he could contemplate God by natural knowledge. Next this is proved concerning that absolute act of knowledge of GOD, because it is really distinct from knowledge of the angel, as was said, and does not depend on it essentially, either on the part of the object or on the part of the act. The first is proved, because through it God is not considered as cause of the angel himself, indeed not even as the actual cause of some creature, but can be considered abstractly as omnipotent. The second is proved, because although knowledge of himself, for example, is a certain occasion or stimulus for eliciting that act of absolute knowledge of God, still it is not a cause per se on which that knowledge of GOD depends in becoming and in being. Therefore an angel can sometimes, if he wishes, have this latter act without the former.

9. *The true resolution.* — The resolution, briefly, is that one must speak in one way about the beginning of such knowledge of God, or the first act of it before the habit of it has been acquired, and in another way about the repetition of it after the habit has been acquired. For the first absolute knowledge cannot be produced by an angel while he is actually thinking nothing about himself or about another effect. The previous arguments persuade this. For before an angel rests in the absolute consideration of God, he must ascend to him by mind. But naturally he cannot first and immediately ascend to him, because he does not have the principle by which he may ascend. Therefore he must first ascend through an effect as through a known medium, and for that reason knowledge of himself or of another effect must precede at least by the order of nature, and consequently also knowledge of GOD must precede as included in knowledge of himself, so that from this he may be stirred and assisted toward eliciting another act of knowledge of God. Hence I judge that it is not enough that knowledge of himself or of an effect, together with respective knowledge of God, have preceded in time. This is proved, because this act cannot be produced by the angel's intellect when bare and destitute of every first act, or of something having its place; otherwise it could from the beginning have such an act without another previous knowledge, which we have said is repugnant. Therefore it must be assisted by knowledge of himself or of another effect. Therefore that knowledge must be present. For if it no longer exists, it can assist nothing through itself, as is self-evident, nor through a power left behind, because either there is none, or at most it could leave behind a species of itself, which afterward can assist only, perhaps, toward eliciting a similar act of thought about himself,

or a remembrance that he had that act. And therefore it will not be able immediately to assist toward eliciting an absolute act of the knowledge of GOD, but it can assist toward thinking again about an effect of God, and consequently about God as it were obliquely, and from that afterward it can assist toward thinking directly, primarily, and absolutely about God.

10. *Objection. — Solution.* — But it can be objected that it follows that such knowledge of God is through discourse, which we now suppose is repugnant to an angel. The consequence is proved, because there is discourse when from one act one arrives at another, so that the posterior arises from the prior. But this happens in those acts according to what has been said. Hence it also follows that an angel cannot have one act of knowledge of God without at the same time having two, which seems unacceptable and superfluous. Concerning the prior part, we do not now wish to define whether an angel is capable of discourse, granted that he rarely needs it. For whatever may be true of this, we deny the consequence. For although from what has been said it will follow that there can be some succession or addition in acts, it does not follow that there is discourse properly so called. For through those acts one thing is not known from another, but from an imperfect knowledge or consideration of one object there is a transition to attending to and considering it more perfectly. But this is not discourse, but a transition from one act to another, which has place in angels, whether one of those acts precedes in time, or only in the order of nature, and whether the prior ceases when the posterior arrives, or perseveres together with it. To the latter part, however, we say that this is not unacceptable, because those acts have a source from which they are distinguished, even if they exist together, and otherwise, since God is not perfectly known through any of them, and the second can add something of perfection, it can be useful notwithstanding the prior; and the prior can be necessary so that it may be as it were a way to the further one.

11. *The case in which, finally, an angel thinks naturally about God without thinking about anything else at all. — What contemplation is. — Scientific assent without thought of the medium.* — But I add that, after an angel has once had absolute knowledge of God by means of knowledge of himself or of another effect, he can afterward actually think of God through a similar absolute knowledge or contemplation of God, even given the hypothesis that he does not actually know or consider himself or another effect through which he previously began to know. The points adduced in the latter place prove this, and experience seems to confirm it in us, which with greater reason we should admit in angels. We can explain this from the motion of contemplation. For that mode of

knowledge of God seems to pertain to the notion of contemplation, which must not be denied to angels. For contemplation is the simple intuition, speculation, or consideration of truth already found or known, which is the same as actual knowledge, as St. Thomas teaches, 2, quest. 180, art. 3, in the body and reply to 1, where he attributes a more excellent contemplation to the angel than to the human being. Therefore, after an angel has at the same time found, so to speak, God, and has known him secondarily through himself, he can afterward know him absolutely, even if he does not actually consider the medium through which he ascended to considering him in such a mode. Moreover, we can explain this by the example of scientific assent in us. For we cannot elicit the first scientific assent to a conclusion unless we actually think about the medium and know the connection. But after we have elicited scientific assent and acquired the habit, we can afterward contemplate the truth of the known proposition and offer it certain assent, even if we do not actually think about the medium. Therefore in the same way, preserving proportion and with greater perfection, something similar must be attributed to an angel in the knowledge of God which we are treating. Finally, the reason and mode are explained, because although we cannot in this life have a proper species of God, still after we have known God through alien species or through effects, and have formed some concept of him, a habit or some species is left in us through which we can by a simple act directly conceive God and think about him. Therefore this will be able to happen in an angel in a much more perfect mode. Hence I judge that through the first absolute act of knowledge of God, the angel obtains for himself a species representing God to him in the mode in which he conceived him through that act, which is left impressed in the mind by virtue of the same act, or word, or image of God contained in it. Through such a species, therefore, he can afterward proceed into a similar act, even if he thinks nothing about himself or about an effect.

12. *The contrary arguments in number seven are responded to.* — And thus the difficulties objected in the prior place cease. To the first, I say that that act is elicited through a species of God, not proper, that is, perfect and as he is in himself, but proper, that is, not common, although imperfect and proportioned to the prior knowledge. Hence, just as the prior knowledge was not formally through the effect or in the effect, but originally and as it were virtually, so that species can be the principle of a similar act, which also draws its origin from the effect insofar as that species flowed from the prior act and as it were contains it in seed. And therefore actual thought about the effect is not necessary for such an act. To the second, we deny the minor, because this species left behind from

the prior act can determine and assist the power in the manner of first act. To the third, I concede that that knowledge is with certain and evident judgment. But for this evidence the natural light of the angelic intellect suffices, habitually or in first act constituted through the species which flowed from an evident act and virtually contains and represents it, just as habitual science in us virtually contains the evidence of the medium, as we have now explained. And these points are sufficient concerning the knowledge which an angel can have or acquire of God through himself.

CHAPTER XX
WHAT SORT OF KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AN ANGEL CAN ACQUIRE THROUGH THE SPECIES OF OTHER EFFECTS

1. *It is certain that just as an Angel knows God through his own substance, so also he knows him through the species of other creatures.—But the question is which cognition is superior.*—From what has been said, what was proposed above about the knowledge of God that an Angel acquires through the cognition of other things can easily be settled. For without doubt, just as an Angel knows God through his own substance, so also he knows him through the species of other Angels. For he also knows them comprehensively, or at least quidditatively, and consequently as they are effects of God, and as they are like God, and made to the image of God. And not only through the species of Angels, but also through the species of colors and of the other things of the universe, he recognizes their creator, as Bonaventure notes in book 2, distinction 3, part 2 of the distinction, art. 2, quest. 2, reply to 2, and as all the interpreters of St. Thomas note on the said art. 3. And this is evident of itself. For if for human beings *the invisible things of God are seen, being understood through the things that have been made*, much more for Angels. Hence everything that we said in the whole preceding chapter about the act by which an Angel knows God through himself can be applied to the act by which he knows God through the species of another Angel, of heaven, of earth, and of the other things. For through all these, as through known means, he ascends to God, either by one and the same act or also by distinct acts, according to the diverse modes of tending into God. Therefore it remains for us to speak about the comparison between these means and the cognitions of God acquired from them. But since we distinguished a twofold cognition of God in Angels, one conjoined and identified with the cognition of themselves, the other separated and distinct from the cognition of the creature, in the present matter we can either compare

these cognitions with one another, or in each member compare several respective cognitions that occur through various means, or several absolute cognitions with one another.

2. *Resolution of the question with respect to whether God is, and through the same means.—Likewise with respect to what God is.*—If the comparison is made in the former way, it must be made between those two cognitions insofar as they can be had through the same means, either more proximately or more remotely. And so it can also be considered in them that through each of them God is known in some way with respect to the questions whether God is and what God is. Therefore I say that through each of them it is known with equal perfection that God is, although through the actual and formal cognition of a creature, as terminated in God, the reason compelling the intellect to judge that God is seems to be known more expressly. Hence that cognition seems more evident in this respect. For the other is evident in virtue of it, and because it rests upon it. Nevertheless, with respect to the cognition of what God is, the absolute cognition and contemplation of God seems more perfect. First, because this cognition has God as its primary and whole object, and secondarily can attain the creature as possible to God under some aspect of creatable being. But the other cognition primarily regards the creature, and attains God only secondarily and obliquely. Second, because through the former cognition the whole mind of the Angel is applied with greater effort to knowing God. And therefore he knows him more clearly, and can distinctly know more attributes of him, as I have already explained. But through the latter, of itself, the Angel's mind is applied only to knowing himself or another effect of God, and consequently attains God only as far as is necessary for the exact cognition of the effect. For this, an imperfect and confused cognition of God suffices. Nor should it seem strange if a more perfect cognition derives its origin from a more imperfect one, because it does not derive its origin from it as from a total or principal cause, but as from a cause in some way arousing and assisting. But the principal cause of that greater perfection is the light of the angelic intellect, operating more directly and with greater attention and effort concerning such an object.

3. *Another resolution when the aforesaid cognitions are had through diverse means.—The first corollary from the given resolution.*—Next, if we compare cognitions through diverse means, the comparison must be made with proportion preserved, that is, by comparing respective cognition with respective cognition, and absolute cognition with absolute cognition, in the same Angel operating with his whole power proportioned to such an act and means. For the whole reason for doubt lies in the diversity of the means, which is per se; but the

other inequality that can occur from the freedom of the agent, applying his power more or less, is per accidens and is not considered. Therefore it can seem that an Angel knows God more perfectly through a more perfect effect, because he knows God through an effect insofar as this is in some way like God. Therefore, the more like God an effect is, the more perfect will be the cognition of God through it. Hence it follows that an Angel knows God more perfectly through his own substance than through the cognition of any other inferior effect of God. This all seem commonly to teach.

4. *Second corollary.*—Second, it follows that an Angel who has other Angels equal to himself and of the same species knows God through the cognition of another Angel equal to himself as perfectly as through the cognition of himself. This is clear, because he knows God through an equal means, and through the same light, and with the same application of power. Nor will it stand in the way that he knows himself through his own substance and another through a species. For that does not prevent the cognition from being equal, because a species proportioned to the object produces a cognition of it just as perfect, other things being equal on the side of the power, as the object itself assisting the power per se does. Thus the vision of God would not be less perfect if elicited through a created species than it now is through the divine essence itself, if other things were equal, as I said above in the proper matter. And the Angel himself, if he knew himself through a species, would not know himself less perfectly, as I also touched upon above. Hence also one Angel does not know another Angel equal to himself, through the latter's species, less quidditatively and comprehensively, nor less clearly and intensely, than he knows himself through his own substance. Therefore neither does he know God less perfectly. The consequence seems evident, and the antecedent is clear, because on the side of the light there is equal efficacy for each cognition. But the species, since it is proportioned to the object, can cooperate adequately with the light no less than if the object itself immediately cooperated through itself. Finally, the reason is that an action that occurs through an instrument is not less perfect than one that occurs without it, when the instrument is proportioned.

5. *Objection against the proximate corollary.—Solution.*—You will say: God is better known through a means that more immediately and better represents him. But the substance of an Angel represents God better than an intelligible species does. Therefore. I respond: an equivocation is being committed. For in reality the means through which God is known is not the species, but the substance of the Angel known through such a species. But that substance represents God no less than another equal to itself. But if the discussion is about

an unknown means, then the substance of the Angel knowing God through it, although in its entity it is more perfect and more like God than the intelligible species of another Angel, nevertheless, in the account of a representative principle efficiently, it does not represent God more or more proximately than the species of another equal Angel. For just as his species does not represent God immediately, but by producing the cognition of another equal Angel, so neither does the substance of the Angel immediately represent God, but by effectively concurring to the cognition of himself. Therefore that difference makes no difference for the inequality of the cognition of God.

6. *The third corollary is proposed and discussed.—Bañez with Vitoria follows the affirmative side, or the proposed corollary.*—Third, it seems to follow from the stated foundation that each Angel knows God more perfectly through the species of a superior Angel than through his own substance, because if a cause is known through an effect, it will be known more perfectly through a more perfect effect and one more like it. You will say that this is true if other things are equal; but here this is not so. For an Angel comprehends himself and those equal to himself, but not superiors. But against this is that many judge that an inferior Angel comprehends a superior. Hence from this principle Bañez follows this corollary, and cites Vitoria. Yet even if an inferior Angel does not comprehend a superior, nevertheless the corollary and its reason seem to proceed. For although we grant that an inferior Angel does not know all things that are eminently contained in a superior as distinctly, or all his accounts, modes, or relations, this seems to make little difference for the cognition of God through the Angel known. For it seems to make far more difference that the inferior knows the superior Angel clearly and quidditatively, as more perfect in the intellectual grade and more sublime, as more to the image and likeness of God. For from this he is led to a better and more distinct conception of God's perfection in intellectual nature, omnipotence, and similar attributes.

7. *But it is argued to the opposite.*—On the contrary, however, it seems to be the case, because this comparison can be made either in the properties and perfections of the cognitions that are considered on the side of the light and of the one knowing, or from those things that are known in the object or depend upon it. But on the side of the one knowing no comparison can be made, because we are not now speaking about diverse Angels, but about the same one, who, through whatever means he knows God, can always operate by the same light and with the same intensity and efficacy. Nor also on the side of the thing known, namely God, can there be inequality. For first, the same God is known to be through any effect whatever, or whether he is. For in any effect, as small as

it may be or as great as it may be, an Angel knows that God is. Likewise, with equal evidence, because on the side of the thing there is as necessary a connection between the least effect, for example prime matter, and the existence of God, as there is between the supreme Angel and God; and on the side of the light the Angel sees that necessary connection with the same clarity, and evidence consists in this. Therefore, with respect to the question whether God is, the Angel knows God as perfectly through the cognition of earth as through the cognition of himself. Again, the Angel knows with equal evidence that God is infinite through earth as through himself, because through either means he knows him to be creator, and a perfection and power just as infinite is necessary for creating the least effect as for creating a greater one. Therefore through either means he knows that God is infinite, and consequently omnipotent and altogether perfect. And so through either means all the attributes of God are known. Therefore, on the side of the thing known, the Angel knows God equally perfectly, whether he knows him through himself, or through another superior or inferior, or through other things.

8. *Objection against what was just said.—Response.*—You will say: although in the things narrated there is some equality with respect to existence and with respect to the perfection, or the perfections known of God, according to our mode of speaking, nevertheless there can be inequality in the mode of knowing, even on the side of the thing known, namely, because he is conceived more distinctly and more clearly, namely, by forming a distinct or more perfect concept of God, or by conceiving him through relation to more effects. But against this is that through no effect of God, however perfect, can God be conceived by an Angel with a positive concept proper to God, but only by some common concept with the added negations of certain imperfections of creatures, or by respects proper to God. But either can be done equally by knowing God through an inferior effect as through a superior one. Therefore. The minor is proved, because through every effect God is known under the account of being from himself and not from another, and in himself, that is, not in another, and of pure act, that is, not composed, and so with the other negations, which can be added no less through one cognition than through another. And the positive common concept can at most be determined to the concept of spiritual and intellectual substance, which is not more perfectly conceived of God known through a superior Angel than through an inferior Angel, because whatever positive content is there is always common to every intellectual substance, and is determined to God only through the negation of composition, dependence, or limitation. But with respect to relations, by the

very fact that God is known as omnipotent, he is known under a relation to everything creatable. But the fact that the creatable things themselves are known in greater number or as better does indeed pertain to a better cognition of the creature, but seems to pertain in no way to a distinct cognition of God.

9. *First assertion concerning the third corollary.*—On this point three things seem to have to be said, distinguishing between the cognition that God is and what God is. The first is that through all the cognitions that one Angel has of God, whether through his own substance or through the species of other things more or less perfect, he knows equally perfectly that God is. This is proved from the things said above, because the same existence is known of God, and with equal evidence through all those cognitions. Therefore, with respect to this part, they are equal. The consequence is clear, because precisely in standing on the question whether God is, there is nothing else in which inequality can exist. But the antecedent, with respect to the first part, is proved because through any of those cognitions God is manifested as having existence of necessity and from himself, which existence is one and the same. But with respect to the other part, that antecedent has already been proved, because on the side of the means there is as much necessity and connection with the existence of God in the least effect as in the greatest. And this reason directly proves the point concerning any respective cognition of God, or one intimately conjoined with the cognition of an effect, so that it occurs through the same act. Consequently, however, the assertion also proceeds in absolute cognitions, by which God alone is considered per se and directly, as a necessary being and from himself, abstracting from the actual consideration of any effect in particular. For that cognition also concerns the same existence of God, and it cannot exceed the other in evidence, since it receives it from the other, insofar as it proceeds from it in some way and rests on it, or on the virtue left by it, as I declared above.

10. *Second assertion.*—Second, we say that, if the Angel is considered as knowing what God is through material effects alone, he does not know him more perfectly through a more perfect effect than through a less perfect one, nor more perfectly through many than through single ones, except very improperly and in a qualified respect. This is proved because the Angel does not know more perfections, nor with greater evidence, about God through more or better material effects than through one less perfect effect, as the reason made in the latter place proves. Nor also by force of such effects is God conceived in a clearer or more distinct mode. Therefore no excess of perfection in that cognition through better material effects can be considered, because there is no other property of cognition in which that excess can be observed. But the minor is

proved because no material thing is to the likeness or image of God. Hence all material things taken together do not transcend the account of a vestige, because they do not agree with God in his proper grade, which is intellectual, nor in the proper indivisible and spiritual mode of being. And therefore through all these material means no concept of God can be formed except a very metaphorical and improper one, such as can also be formed through the least effect. And this reason proceeds concerning every cognition of God founded on these effects, whether it is through the same act by which the effect is known or through a different one. And so the assertion must be applied with proportion to each.

11. *Objection against the proximate proof.—Solution.*—You will say: even in material things there are diverse grades. For besides the grade of substance, the grade of living thing and of thing knowing in some way is found. Therefore, even among material effects, God will be known more perfectly by an Angel through living effects than through non-living effects, and more perfectly through knowing effects than through those lacking cognition. For through these God will be known as living and knowing, but not through the others. I respond that even through a non-living effect God is known as necessarily living and knowing, because he is known to be of infinite perfection, and consequently to have the best mode of being and operating. And therefore the Angel penetrates this no less from the cognition of an imperfect effect than of a more perfect one, and from this side he knows equally what God is through those effects. But from another side, because material life and cognition do not attain the grade of divine life and cognition, they do not contribute to conceiving God more properly and distinctly. But if there is some excess, it is very imperfect and metaphorical. This is the way in which even corporeal light has a certain greater proportion for knowing through it the properties of God; nevertheless, because that is only by a certain proportionality and metaphor, that effect contributes little or nothing, with respect to an Angel, to knowing God better than he can be known through other material effects. And this will be confirmed more from the following assertion.

12. *Third assertion, divided into two parts.—The former part of the assertion is proved.*—Third, it must be said that an Angel knows what God is more perfectly through himself or through some other Angel than through all material effects; but among the Angels themselves, whether it occurs through the cognition of himself, or of others, or of inferiors, or of superiors, contributes little to increasing the cognition of God. This assertion must also be taken concerning both modes of knowing God, whether through the same act as the

effect itself or through a distinct act, with proportion preserved. And the comparison is not made in the truth, certainty, or evidence of cognition, because in these there can be no inequality, since the truth known is the same, and its necessity is the same, and the angelic light through which it is known is the same. Rather, the comparison is made in the mode of knowing and conceiving the same truth through diverse means. And thus the former part of the assertion is proved, because between God and Angels, and the same must be understood of the rational soul, there is a peculiar agreement and formal likeness in the intellectual grade, on account of which man is said to be made to the image of God, which belongs to the Angel in a more perfect mode, as St. Thomas teaches in Summa Theologiae I, quest. 93, art. 3. And therefore the Angel does not know God in himself as in just any effect whatever, but especially as in a likeness and image, known as such, as I declared above. And therefore by force of the cognition of himself or of another Angel, in a certain more special way, more proper and distinct, the Angel knows God than through all inferior effects. And in this respect it is most truly said that, although an Angel does not know in God a greater perfection and consequently not more attributes through this angelic means than through inferior ones, nevertheless, simply speaking, he knows him more perfectly with respect to what he is, because according to a more proper concept, or one less remote, he knows the life, cognition, and wisdom of God, and the proper quasi-specific grade in which God exists. For St. Thomas said above in this way that the likeness of an Angel to God is in some way in the account of species, and therefore attains the grade of image. And this assertion can be considered more evidently in that act of cognition by which an Angel through himself first contemplates God, not actually thinking through that act about the creature, nor about the created image as created, but at once passing over to God represented in that image, from a presupposed cognition of it, or from a quasi-habitual virtue left from it, as I explained above with St. Thomas, who speaks especially about this act in the said art. 3, quest. 8, *De Veritate*, reply to 18. Therefore through this act the Angel more expressly knows God with every supreme intellectual perfection in that grade, and conceives him in a higher mode than through inferior means, because in conceiving he rests upon his image, in some way proper and formal, and directly and chiefly applies himself in this, so that, according to his powers, he may conceive him and his perfections.

13. *The latter part of the assertion does not conflict with the former, and is proved.*—Yet from this the other part can seem difficult. For if the account of image in the means of knowing contributes to a better cognition of God, why

will a more perfect image not produce a more perfect cognition, other things being equal? But nevertheless that part does not conflict with the former. And it is declared and proved in this way, because in grade the likeness of all Angels to God is the same, and in one Angel there is not a greater agreement in the number of perfections or attributes, so to speak, but all are in all, although in one there are perfections with a greater participation of divine perfection than in another. But this difference among Angels seems to make little difference for knowing more distinctly or clearly what God is, because through the cognition of any Angel, even the most perfect, positively God is known only as an intellectual substance, and in order that this concept become proper to God, some negation must be added. But each can be done equally through the cognition of any Angel, because the intellectual grade, considered precisely, is found equally and univocally in all. And just as an Angel, in knowing God through himself, removes from God all the imperfections that he sees in himself, namely composition, limitation, and so on, so also he knows that every such imperfection in whatever grade and mode must be removed, and he knows this same thing about God through the cognition of any other Angel, whether inferior or superior. Therefore in this respect he knows God as perfectly through others as through himself, and through inferiors as through superiors. Nor does it appear what greater perfection there can be in the cognition of God by reason of a more perfect means, since that greater perfection does not contribute to forming a better or more proper concept of God, not only a specific one, but even a generic or analogous one.

14. *The argument made at the beginning of the preceding number is met.*— Hence that argument does not stand in the way: the account of image contributes to a more perfect cognition; therefore a more perfect image will contribute to a more perfect cognition. For this inference is denied, because the account of image adds a new formal agreement in a quasi-specific grade with God, which effects that are not to the image of God do not have. But a greater perfection within the latitude of image does not add a new formal agreement with God, nor does it make God be conceived by reason of it in a higher, or more proper, or express mode. And therefore the reasoning is not similar. And perhaps for this reason St. Thomas did not take care to say anything about the mode by which an Angel knows God through the species of other effects of God, but mentioned only the cognition of God through the substance of the knowing Angel, and attributed that to the Angel as quasi-unique. For he did not do this because he wished to deny the others, but because that cognition is most connatural to the Angel and quasi-inseparable from him. And the others that

can exist through the species of material things do not attain that cognition; but those that can be had through the species of other Angels add nothing of intensive perfection to the former cognition. But the extensive multiplication was clear of itself and did not need special explanation. And through these points the response to the reasons for doubting posed on both sides is sufficiently clear.

15. *An incidental doubt is resolved.*—From this an incidental doubt here is also easily settled, namely, whether more perfect Angels know God more perfectly than inferior Angels. For it must be said that on the side of the one knowing they know more perfectly, because by a greater light and by a clearer and simpler act, as is known of itself. But on the side of the thing known, not more perfectly, because they cannot know God's existence through more necessary means, nor can they form a more proper or express concept of his essence, nor does a superior Angel know about God more perfections distinct by reason, at least with respect to us, than an inferior. Therefore on the side of the thing known he does not know the inferior Angel more perfectly than the inferior knows himself, namely on the side of the thing known, although on the side of the one knowing he knows more lucidly and clearly. Therefore they are related in the same way with respect to God, because each knows about God whatever can naturally be known by any creature.

16. *Other questions about the cognition of Angels are resolved.—Objection. —Response.*—Hence also cease other inquiries that are usually made here, namely, whether an Angel knows God more perfectly through his own substance and through the species of another thing together than through his substance alone or through the species alone. Likewise, whether he knows more perfectly through a species representing all the heavens alone at once than through one representing only one Angel. Likewise, whether he knows more perfectly through the species of one supreme Angel than of all inferiors together, or than through the species of the whole universe, if the whole is represented through one species, or if we imagine that through several species an Angel simultaneously and perfectly uses them for the same cognition. In all these and similar cases, I judge that, if the intellectual grade is included in the means through which God is known, God is not known more perfectly, even if with the thing of that grade things of inferior grades are joined, nor less perfectly even if they are not joined. Nor does it matter that several Angels or only one is known in that grade, because the reason made in the second part of the third assertion proceeds equally in all these cases. And for the same reason, the cognition of one Angel will contribute more to knowing God better than the cognition of

many, or of all corporeal things without the intellectual grade. And for the same reason, the multitude of known effects will not make the Angel know God better if all those inferior effects do not transcend the grade of corporeal things, as is gathered from the first assertion and its reason. Only this seems to stand in the way, that a plurality of effects of diverse things seems to show more the power of the one operating, and thus to contribute to a better cognition of him. But, as I was saying, this increase is extrinsic with respect to power, especially where through each effect the infinity of power is known. Or certainly it could be said to contribute to a certain extensive increase of power, but not to an intensive increase of the quiddity or perfection of God.

CHAPTER XXI
WHETHER ONE ANGEL KNOWS THE INTERNAL ACTS OF THE WILL OF ANOTHER WITHOUT THE LATTER'S CONSENT

1. *Thoughts of the heart in man are partly spiritual, partly material.—Material thoughts of the heart according to physical existence, but not according to moral existence, become known to Angels.*—So far we have spoken about the cognition of natural things. Now we ascend to the order of free things, because although in their entity they can be of the same order as other natural things, namely with the substance and power from which they flow, nevertheless in the genus of knowable object they are judged to pertain to another order, on account of the reason to be assigned below. But these acts are found both in human beings and in Angels. In both they have the same account in this part, and therefore the question is understood of all of them. For even the testimonies of Scripture, which often speak only of human beings, are extended indifferently to Angels by the Fathers, as we shall see. But in Scripture these acts are usually called thoughts of hearts when they are said to be hidden from Angels, and the same must be carefully considered in the human being, who, by understanding, contemplates phantasms. Thoughts of hearts are found partly in the higher and spiritual part of the soul, partly in the lower and sensible part. Therefore in the present matter there is no question about the sensing part, whether with respect to the internal sense, or phantasy, or cogitative power, or with respect to the sensitive appetite. For concerning these the theologians agree with Augustine, book 12, *De Trinitate*, chap. 17, and with St. Thomas in the places to be cited below, that an Angel by natural power can know the internal acts of our phantasy and of the sensing appetite intuitively with respect to their whole entity or emanation from their proper powers, even if the moral properties of

these acts are hidden from them, which they can have through a respect or denomination from acts of the will. This belongs to the other member to be disputed. But the reason for this part is that these acts are material and, from their nature, necessary, insofar as they are elicited from their powers. And so they are not per se moral acts, nor do they pertain to rational nature as rational. And therefore they are not hidden per se, nor do the testimonies of Scripture speak about them, as we shall see.

2. *Other notes for the present question.—Angels can naturally have conjectural cognition of the thoughts of the heart.—This is proved.*—Again, in acts of the mind, acts of the intellect and of the will must be distinguished. They differ in this, that acts of the will are formally free, but acts of the mind only by denomination from an act of the will, as we now suppose. And therefore we distinguish questions about them, because they are not altogether of the same account; and first we deal with acts of the will, in which the doctrine is more certain. Yet in the will itself necessary and free acts can be distinguished. For the free acts are the ones that properly pertain to the present matter, although we shall also incidentally say something about natural acts. Finally, a twofold mode of knowing the internal free affection of the will must be distinguished, namely, either imperfectly and in another and by conjecture, or perfectly and in itself, or intuitively. We do not raise the question about the former mode, because it is certain that the demon can conjecture from internal and external sensible effects what a human being thinks in the mind or wills, because in this way we know the invisible things of God. What wonder, then, that through sensible signs an Angel can conjecture an internal effect? Likewise, the internal will has a sensible effect that is known to an Angel. Therefore through the effect he will be able to conjecture the cause with greater or lesser likelihood according to the mode of connection of the effect with the cause, or according to other occurring circumstances. Finally, human beings can do this, as is clear from experience. Therefore Angels by natural power can do this much more subtly, especially demons.

Observation concerning the cited place from Augustine.—And so St. Thomas teaches in Summa Theologiae I, quest. 57, art. 4, and in other places to be cited below. And Jerome says on Matthew 15, *From the heart come thoughts*: *We should not think that the demon searches the hidden things of the heart, but that from the disposition of the body and from gestures he estimates what we turn over within ourselves.* The same is found in Augustine, book 12, *Genesis ad litteram*, chap. 17, and in the book *De Divinatione daemonum*, chap. 5. Nor in book 2 of the *Retractationes*, chap. 5, did he retract this assertion with respect to its

substance, but with respect to a special mode there mentioned incidentally, as St. Thomas noted above. For rather, in the said chap. 5, he confirms the thing itself, saying: *that these things reach the knowledge of demons has been discovered also through some experiments*. But because in the former place he had said that from internal thoughts certain signs known to demons and hidden from us sometimes result in the body of the one thinking, he retracts this second point, not as false, but *as having been said too boldly, because it is hidden and cannot be known by human beings*. For if such signs are altogether hidden from us, how can we know that they are given in the thing itself and are known to Angels? But I will not omit noting that Augustine, in that book *De Divinatione daemonum*, proceeds in that view that demons have airy bodies and very acute senses by which they see very swiftly and subtly, and therefore devised those too subtle sensible signs in the bodies themselves which could be sensed by demons even if they are not evident to us. And he made no mention of the cognition of internal sensible affections or of thoughts of the phantasy, although these are the chief signs demons can use, although they are not hidden from them.

3. *First assertion, of faith, in the explained question.—It is proved from the Scriptures.*—Therefore, with these things supposed, one must speak about free acts of the will and their certain and evident cognition in themselves. On this point, omitting the particular opinions of theologians, the Catholic assertion is that an Angel cannot naturally know or intuit, in itself, with certainty and evidence, an act or free consent of a created will, unless it is manifested to another by the one having such a free affection. I judge this assertion, taken so without distinction, to be of faith, although in the mode of explaining it there can perhaps be some disagreement of opinions, or such disagreement can be permitted. And St. Thomas agrees in it, above, and in quest. 16, *De Malo*, art. 8, and quest. 9, *De Veritate*, art. 13, and book 3, *Contra Gentiles*, chap. 154, where Ferrara comments at length, and Cajetan and the other expositors on the said art. 4, Alexander of Hales, part 2, quest. 26, member 3, Bonaventure, in book 2, distinction 8, part 2, art. 1, quest. 6, and there Capreolus, Richard, and other theologians whom we shall cite in the course of this and the following chapter. And it is proved first from Scripture, in which it is said to be proper to God to intuit the hidden things of hearts. Paul testifies to this in 1 Corinthians 14, saying: *If all prophesy, and some unbeliever or unlearned person enters, he is convicted by all, he is judged by all; for the hidden things of his heart become manifest, and so, falling on his face, he will adore God, declaring that God truly is in you.* Paul relates this assertion in such a way that he also approves it and commends the necessity and efficacy of prophecy. Therefore, to reveal the

hidden things of the heart belongs to the true gift of prophecy, and therefore it is also proper to God alone to know these things. Hence in the second chapter of the same epistle the same Apostle had said: *Who among men knows the things of a man, except the spirit of the man that is in him?* This was said especially because of the hidden affections of the mind. And for the same reason God alone is said to be able to search the hearts of human beings in 3 Kings 8: *You alone know the heart of all the children of men.* And the same sense is had in 1 Chronicles 28, although the exclusive particle is not expressly added: *The Lord searches all hearts and understands all the thoughts of minds.* For this is attributed to God as quasi-proper and special. Hence in book 2, chap. 6, Solomon says: *Render to each one according to his ways, which you know that he has in his heart, for you alone know the hearts of the children of men.* Hence Psalm 43: *He knows the hidden things of the heart*; and Psalm 7: *God searching hearts and reins*; and Jeremiah 17: *The heart of man is corrupt and inscrutable; who will know it? I, the Lord, searching the heart.* There Jerome says: *From this we learn that no one knows the secrets of thoughts except God alone.* Similar things are found in Wisdom 1, Acts 1, Romans 8, where knowing and searching hearts is placed as singular to God. And especially in Hebrews 4 it is said of the Word of God that he is *the discerner of the thoughts and intentions of the heart*.

4. *Durandus's evasion concerning the cited testimonies.—It is refuted from the sacred page.*—But Durandus attempted to weaken these testimonies by saying that it is proper to God to know the affections of the heart absolutely, namely all, whether future, past, or present; but to know only thoughts already made is not proper to God, but is also possible to Angels. And accordingly the alleged testimonies must be understood in the former sense. But this gloss is erroneous and destroys the text. First, because Paul clearly speaks of present thoughts, and in the comparison that he makes in the latter testimony, he clearly says that just as no one searches the things that are in the will of God except the Spirit of God, so too no one searches the free wills of a human being. Second, because in the other testimonies Scripture speaks either of the thoughts that a human being actually has as present, and it says that God alone knows these, as in the said place of 2 Chronicles 6, or of thoughts by which God is either offended or worshiped, and which are judged and punished or rewarded by him alone. But these are not future thoughts, but thoughts already made. Further, one can add the passage in 1 Kings 16: *Man sees the things that are apparent, but the Lord intuits the heart*; and the passage in Acts 2: *You, Lord, who know the hearts of all*; and what Peter said to Jesus in John 21: *Lord, you know all things; you know that I love you*. There he speaks explicitly enough about a present act.

And although the exclusive particle is not added in those words, it is clearly signified that no one can intuit internal love except the one who knows all things.

5. *It is also otherwise refuted from Scripture.*—Hence, fourth, we can add those testimonies in which the Evangelists note that Christ the Lord was a knower of internal thoughts already existing, so that they might indicate that this was a certain sign of his divinity. As in Matthew 9: *When Jesus had seen their thoughts*, and so on; Matthew 12: *But Jesus, knowing their thoughts*; and Luke 15: *When Jesus knew their thoughts*, and chap. 11: *But when he saw their thoughts, he said*. From these words Jerome argues thus in Jeremiah 17: *Jesus sees thoughts, and no one can see internal thoughts except God alone; therefore Christ is God.* This argumentation is efficacious, once the doctrine is supposed by which Christ said that he was God. For otherwise even a holy human being or an Angel can know internal thoughts through divine revelation. But now that argument shows sufficiently for us that God alone can know the internal acts of the will by his natural power. And in this way the said testimonies of Matthew and Luke are expounded by the other Saints, who from them prove Christ's divinity, both on the said places and elsewhere: Jerome on Matthew 9 and 11, Ambrose on Luke 5 and 1 Corinthians 2, Chrysostom, homilies 30 and 42, on the cited words of Matthew 9 and 11, where he alleges other testimonies of sacred Scripture and in the same way gathers Christ's divinity from that effect. Theophylact imitates him in the same places, and there Christian Druthmarus says excellently: *The Lord responded to their thoughts, as if he were saying: if you have read that no one can forgive sins except God alone, you have likewise read that no one can know the thoughts of human beings except God alone.* And Peter Chrysologus has nearly similar things in treating the same words, sermon 50.

6. *Then the assertion is proved from the Fathers.*—Hence the truth can be confirmed by the common consensus and tradition of the Fathers. The testimony of Athanasius is excellent, since he equates the cognition of thoughts with the cognition of future things in quest. 27, to Antiochus. He says: *God alone is foreknower of things and knower of hearts; for neither can Angels see the hidden things of the heart or future things.* And Chrysostom, homily 23 on John: *The cognition of human hearts belongs to God alone, who formed them. Jesus had no need of witnesses in order to know the minds that he had formed.* Cyril, book 2 on John, chap. 19, weighing the words concerning Nathanael, *Rabbi, you are the Son of God*, says: *He knew that the hearts of human beings lie open to God alone. When he had perceived this to inesse in the Lord, he professes him to be the Son of God.* And book 3, chap. 3, he notes that *Christ was accustomed to look into the*

hearts of the Jews, and to examine their thoughts and movements, and to fit his speech to the things they were turning over in their mind. By this especially he showed himself to be God by nature. Origen demonstrates this by example in book 4, chap. 5, and book 1 on Job, concerning those words, *I have gone around the earth*. He says: *Seeing all things that are done in deed, but not knowing the things that are treated in the heart and in the mind.* Basil, book 3, against Eunomius, proves the divinity of the Holy Spirit from the words of Paul in 1 Corinthians 2 cited above, thus: *Just as no alien and stranger can inspect the inner thoughts of the soul, so he who communicates with God in secret with him is not alien or a stranger from him, because he can search his depth.* Damascene indicates this, book 2, chap. 3, insofar as he says that Angels have neither tongue nor ears, because *without the assistance of speech they communicate their thoughts and counsels among themselves*. For in this he supposes that an Angel does not know the thoughts or counsels of another unless they are communicated to him by that other.

7. Augustine supposes the same as certain in the said book 2 of the Retractationes, chap. 30, as I reported above, and he signifies the same in tractate 32 on John, and more clearly in Psalm 7. He says: Our works can be known to human beings, but with what mind they are done, only he knows who searches hearts, God. And in book 10 of the Confessions, chap. 2, he proclaims this as a singular excellence of God: To whose eyes the abyss of human conscience is bare. And on Psalm 41: Abyss calls to abyss, by "abyss" he interprets the heart of man: For what, he says, is deeper than this abyss? Whose thought is penetrated? Whose heart is inspected? And below: Yet that abyss is bare to the eyes of God, namely of God alone. And on Psalm 41, weighing the words of Paul in 1 Corinthians 4, Do not judge before the time, and so on, he says: Before this happens, in this pilgrimage of mortal life each one carries his own heart, and every heart is closed to every heart. Likewise on Psalm 141, he expounds those words, I pour out in his sight, and so on, of internal prayer, which is made by thought, and adds: Therefore pour out your prayer there, where only he who rewards sees. Hence Prosper, expounding the same words in the same place, says, that is, in the secret of the heart, which God alone hears and sees. And besides, concerning the words, There was no one who would know me, he expounds them of intention, saying: But no one knows this intention; hence deservedly he had said to God: You have known my paths. Cassian confirms the same in conference 7, chap. 13, bringing forward other places of Scripture. Hence finally Gennadius, De Ecclesiasticis dogmatibus,

chap. 81, said: We are certain that the devil does not see the internal thoughts of the soul.

8. *Note concerning the said testimonies.—Another note.*—In these testimonies of the Fathers, two things must be observed. One is that the Fathers often speak in particular about the hearts of human beings, that is, about their thoughts or affections, as Augustine expounds on Psalm 25, exposition 2, concerning the words: *Burn my reins and my heart*. Nevertheless, they understand the same a fortiori of angelic wills, because the angelic will is no less mistress of its acts than the human will, nor can any reason be found in the human will why its acts are hidden from others that would not have greater force in the will of an Angel. But the Fathers speak more often about human beings because they were speaking to them and for the instruction of their morals, just as Scripture also speaks. The other is that the Fathers also often say only that the heart of a human being is hidden from other human beings, as Gregory said in book 25 of the *Moralia*, chap. 7: *The hearts of others are closed to human eyes, and the one who is rejected is not known, because they cannot penetrate the things that are thought by each one.* And in book 18, chap. 27, otherwise 31, concerning human beings in beatitude, he says that *the corpulence of the members will not hide the mind of each one from the eyes of another*. Hence he signifies that now the heart of one human being is hidden from other human beings because of the impediment of the body, which without doubt cannot obstruct Angels. Nevertheless, Gregory did not wish there to render the adequate cause, but the one more familiar to human beings. And in the former place he immediately says that *the thoughts that are hidden from human beings are not hidden from the supreme judge*. And similarly the other Fathers exclude every creature, for they immediately add that God alone knows internal thoughts, and that particle *no one* is often taken in this sense in Scripture.

CHAPTER XXII
VARIOUS OPINIONS AGAINST THE RESOLUTION OF THE PRECEDING CHAPTER ARE REPORTED AND REJECTED

1. *The opinion of Durandus, already touched upon in the preceding chapter, number 4, is rejected.*—From the things said in the preceding chapter, the certainty of the assertion placed there is sufficiently proved. And consequently from this certain opinions of theologians are rejected, which seem to me not only less probable but also scarcely safe. The first was that of Durandus, who in book 2, distinction 3, quest. 7, number 18, and quest. 8, number 6, dared to say

that an Angel, although he does not see future acts of the will, nevertheless sees them as soon as they exist. This is without doubt erroneous. And therefore the same Durandus, distinction 8, quest. 5, after a long disputation, leaves the matter undecided as doubtful and probable on both sides. In this he also greatly errs, by calling a certain matter into doubt. And Scotus does not differ much from this opinion, in book 2, distinction 9, quest. 2, reply to 1 of the second opinion, and in book 4, distinction 45, quest. 4, reply to 2. For he seems simply to teach that Angels can know the hidden things of hearts by natural power, and in fact do know them. And Marsilius attributes this to him in book 2, quest. 8. But we shall speak better about his view in the following chapter.

2. *The opinion of Argentina is exploded.*—Another opinion, closely approaching this one, which did not greatly displease Durandus himself, says that an Angel can see the affections of the will when they are, but nevertheless not see of what sort they are, that is, whether it is love or hatred, complacency or displeasure, flight or pursuit. So Argentina, distinction 7, quest. 1, art. 2, at the end, where he adduces no reason concerning an act of the will, but only concerning an act of the intellect, about which we shall speak in the twenty-third chapter. Therefore this opinion must be altogether rejected, both because it immediately greatly conflicts with the doctrine of the saints founded in Scripture, and because by an evident consequence it can be shown either to destroy that doctrine or to say things that conflict. For if an Angel sees an act of the will, he sees it in itself and intuitively. Therefore he sees of what sort it is. Therefore he sees whether it is hatred or love. Durandus says that this argument is efficacious if a specific distinction between acts of the will, of hatred or of love, is supposed; but it can be solved if someone obstinately maintains that all acts of the will are of the same species. But first, this is enough for the absolute efficacy of the reason, because to say that between acts of complacency and displeasure, and similar acts, there is no specific difference is sufficiently improbable and incredible, as Durandus himself also admits. Yet even if there were not a specific difference, a numerical one would be enough, which certainly can in no way be denied between acts of complacency and displeasure concerning the same thing. Hence the argument is made, because the intuitive vision of an Angel is terminated at a singular thing as it is in itself, because universals are not seen, and because the cognition of an Angel is perfect. Therefore he sees whether it is an act of love or hatred. The consequence is proved, because neither in reality can an act be imagined that is not determined in the account of love or hatred or some other similar account; nor can anyone become from loving to hating without changing the act or a real mode of the act. But an Angel, if he sees the

act, sees every real mode of it, especially the essential and individual mode. Therefore that view says conflicting things, affirming that an Angel sees the act and denying that he sees of what sort it is.

3. *Hervaeus's opinion is refuted by Durandus as having little coherence.*—The third opinion is that of Hervaeus, in book 3, distinction 8, quest. 3, saying that an Angel knows acts of wills or hearts with respect to their substances, species, and relations to a determinate object, either by way of flight or pursuit, finally with respect to all things except the grade of intensity or effort. Durandus deservedly attacks this view as not speaking consistently. For if an Angel intuitively and evidently sees the love of my will, why will he not see the intensity of such love, since the species represents the thing as it is, and the light of the Angel is no less sufficient for intuiting the mode of intensity than for intuiting the act. Hervaeus responds that the reason is that the species of one Angel remotely represents what exists in the heart of another, and through a species that remotely represents, the thing is seen less exactly. But this is frivolous, because either Hervaeus is speaking about the thing thought by another Angel, or about the very thought of another Angel. If he is speaking about the object of the thought of another, the reason is irrelevant, because here we are not treating of the cognition of the object, but of the cognition of the act. Hence although it is true that through the species of another Angel's thought, the thing known by another is not known as perfectly as it is known by that other, it does not follow from this that the thought itself is not seen exactly by another, if he knows it through its species. And all the more because as soon as one Angel sees the love or thought of another about such a thing, he can simultaneously use the species that he has both of the love and of the thing loved by the other, and thus know each perfectly, and consequently see the love not only with respect to entity, but also with respect to intensity. But if Hervaeus is speaking about the act of a further Angel and about its species, which he grants that others have, what is the point of saying that that species remotely represents such an act, or that through it the act is remotely known? For such a species immediately represents the act itself, and the cognition that occurs through it is also immediately terminated at that act. Therefore it can equally be understood with respect to intensity as with respect to entity or the other conditions.

4. *The same opinion is charged with rashness.*—Therefore Hervaeus is deservedly refuted because he speaks inconsistently. But he is much more reprehensible because he boldly and rashly dared to interpret so great a multitude of testimonies according to his own judgment, as if in them it is only

said that God alone knows of the human heart what it loves more or how much it loves, but not that it loves or hates, and what it loves or hates. Yet almost all the cited Fathers speak absolutely about the very acts or thoughts of the heart, and testify that the cognition of them is reserved to God alone. And certainly Christ the Lord was not revealing in what grade of intensity the Jews were thinking and proposing this or that, but was absolutely showing that he knew their thoughts, and from this was showing his divinity, as the saints gather. And in this way the remaining testimonies can easily be brought against that view. But what its foundation was, and how it must be satisfied, will be explained in the following chapter, by giving the reason for the Catholic truth.

5. *The opinion of Henry.*—The fourth was the opinion of Henry, Quodlibet 3, quest. 13, saying that an Angel knows the elicited acts of the will of love or hatred and things of this kind, not only through effects, but in themselves, as they are concerned with such things by loving or hating, or universally by way of pursuit or flight. Nevertheless, he does not know to what end the one who has them directs them. For he says that this is hidden from every creature concerning the will of another, and that this is the secret reserved to God, which he calls the intention of the mind and the internal virtue. And Henry seems to have said this second point in order to respond in some way to the Scriptures and Fathers, for he brings forward no other reason. But he proves the first by the common difficulty to be treated below, because it does not appear why these acts, placed in the nature of things, are objects disproportionate to the natural cognition of Angels. This reason proceeds as much concerning acts of the intellect as of the will. And therefore Henry, although at the beginning of that question he seems to speak only about acts of the intellect, afterward extends the discussion to acts of affection conceived in the will. Hence, in sum, his view is that only the intention of the will is hidden from an Angel, but that he knows the remaining acts of the will, even free ones.

6. *It is refuted as rash.—And as scarcely consistent.—And as contrary to reason in one sense that it can have.—Another sense more intended by Henry.—* But the same judgment must be passed on this view as on the preceding one. For it cannot be excused from boldness and rashness in limiting in this way the statements of Scripture and the Fathers, because they speak not only about intention, but absolutely about all acts of the free will. For Scripture does not say of one act or another, but of the very heart of man, that God alone knows or intuits it. And Christ showed his divinity not only by revealing intentions, but also thoughts about these or those matters. Next, Henry does not speak consistently, because he cannot give a reason why my intention is hidden from

an Angel any more than my love or will is. Therefore, if he denies one because he does not find a reason, let him also deny the other; or if he does not dare to deny both, and believes one without reason because of authority, let him also believe the other, because it is no less confirmed by the same authority. Besides, this view is not only without reason, but also against reason. I show this in this way, because by intention Henry either understands a special act of the will distinct from choice, use, and the others, as moral philosophers commonly speak, or he understands a special mode of an internal act, or any act whatever of the will with respect to its proper motive. Without any doubt Henry is not speaking in the former sense. For he thinks that no act really elicited by the will and distinct from it and added to it is hidden from the natural cognition of an Angel, because the reason he brings about thoughts proceeds equally in all, because all are created things and have natural entities, and accordingly are knowable. Hence it is manifest, if we suppose the common moral doctrine that the intention of the will is a special act of it, that it is contrary to reason to say that it cannot be known by an Angel in itself, if other acts can naturally be seen by him, because other acts are also free and morally good or evil, and conversely intention also has its own natural entity and is representable through its own species. Therefore Henry intends another sense. For he says that intention is not something intelligible beyond the substance of the will, but is a certain respect founded in it and not distinct from it in reality; and nevertheless by that respect the other acts are directed, and therefore as directed in this way they cannot be known naturally, because that respect also cannot be known.

7. *This is also rejected.—Why only the divine will wills without a real addition of an act.*—But this view, explained in this way, is singular and utterly cannot be understood. First, because the intention of the will is something positive and free, not by way of a power, as the will itself is, but by way of an act. Therefore through intention the will freely wills something that it did not will before, and therefore it merits as operating well, or demerits as sinning, not by purely omitting, but by committing or acting. Therefore it is impossible to understand such an intention without every entity or positive real mode added to the will and distinct from it. The consequence is proved, first because through that intention the will is really and positively related otherwise than before; second, because there is no other reason why other actual affections of the will necessarily add something to the will distinct from it, except that through them it wills something that it did not will before; third, because otherwise a created will through itself and without a physical change of itself would begin to will, by intending this or that, which is incredible. For only concerning the divine will,

on account of its infinity, do we believe that through an eternal and necessary act it freely wills this or that without a real addition. And in that very will we would not admit this unless from eternity it immutably willed all things that it wills, or, what is equivalent, if it could in time begin to will something. Therefore, since a created will begins anew to intend something, which is to will, it is impossible that it do this without a real change of itself. Therefore it is necessary that intention be something real distinct from the will itself. It will therefore be knowable by an Angel, if whatever real thing exists anew in the will is knowable by an Angel. Finally, intention cannot be only a respect of reason without a real foundation, because such a respect cannot exist unless voluntarily devised, as is evident of itself. But this foundation is not only the power of the will, for the power itself can exist with the thought of such an object and the other required things, and not have such an intention. Therefore it is some other real thing added to the will, and consequently either it is not a respect, but an absolute thing, or if it is a respect, it will be real, at least transcendental, and not only of reason. And consequently it will not be more hidden on this head than the other acts of the will.

8. *Henry is then disproved with respect to the act of the will on account of an intrinsic end.*—Finally, that view is attacked because a twofold intention of the will can be thought of. One is intrinsically included in the act, insofar as it tends to the object on account of its intrinsic motive. The other is because something is intended on account of an account extrinsic to it, as almsgiving on account of vainglory, or on account of satisfaction for sins. When the intention is of the former mode, it is impossible to see intuitively the real act or affection of the will and not see by what intention it is done. For if I am affected toward knowledge on account of its uprightness, that act of affection has a special real intrinsic mode, and, as is more probable, an essential mode from such an object and intrinsic motive. Therefore, if an Angel sees such an affection intuitively and quidditatively, he necessarily sees by what intention it is done, because in that act to intend is nothing other than to will on account of such uprightness proper to such an object. Therefore the intention cannot be more hidden than the affection in such an act. The same is true of an act of love or hatred on account of malice found in the object. But if in these we distinguish the absolute will, which they call simple, and which St. Thomas posits as distinct from intention and prior to it, an efficacious argument is taken from one to the other. For an Angel cannot intuitively see such a will or love of something without seeing the motive for loving, with which it has an intrinsic connection. Therefore, even if beyond that act the will has an intention of pursuing such a good, the intention

itself will be known in the same way, both with respect to the substance of the act, on account of Henry's general reason, which, if it is efficacious, proceeds concerning all acts, and with respect to its esse of intention, because it is essential to such an act and is known quidditatively. Hence it is also necessary that it be known with respect to the formal motive and account of the end, because from that it receives its specific essential or entitative account, as I suppose from I-II. This reason proceeds equally concerning every real account that is an intrinsic mode of the act, because if an Angel sees the act intuitively, he certainly sees every real mode existing in it. Nor can greater repugnance be thought of in one than in another, as we were saying against the preceding opinion.

9. *Likewise with respect to an act on account of an extrinsic end.*—And the same discourse can be applied to the intention of an extrinsic end, because if the acts themselves can be known with respect to substance, they will also be known with respect to this relation, which is to know about the act by what intention it is done. Therefore the assumed proposition is proved, because an act of the will is not referred to an extrinsic end except through the command of another act, by which that end is intended and in whose virtue the other act is elicited or done. But an Angel seeing the commanded act can also see the commanding act, because it is a distinct thing actually existing in the will, just as the commanded act is, and Henry's foundation proceeds equally in both. But by seeing each act, he sees by what intention each is done, because concerning the act of intention itself he sees this by force of its object, because he knows it quidditatively, as was proved in the immediately preceding point. But by seeing the act of choice or the commanded act, he also sees both the efficacy of the commanding act and the emanation of the commanded act, because he perfectly knows or comprehends each. Therefore he also necessarily sees for the sake of what end the commanded act is done. Finally, the relation of such an internal act of the will to an extrinsic end necessarily adds something real to the will itself in some act of it, because that relation does not occur except by willing, nor does willing occur without an act. Therefore, if other acts are seen by an Angel, this one too will be seen, as has already been proved. Therefore the relation to the extrinsic end that occurs through it is seen. Nor does it matter whether the relation is actual or only virtual, because the former occurs through a present act, concerning which the reason made proceeds, while the latter occurs in the truth of a past act, which also could be seen and retained in memory; and its present virtue, insofar as it is something physical or real, will also be able to be seen.

10. *Fifth opinion, asserting that necessary acts of the will, but not free ones, are known by an Angel.*—The fifth opinion can be that some elicited acts of the will cannot be known by an Angel, but that some are known to him. For acts elicited by the will are of two kinds: some free, others natural, because, namely, they occur necessarily. Therefore this opinion says that the latter acts are not disproportionate to angelic cognition, but only the former. And the reason for the difference can be given, because the latter acts do not proceed from the will as it is will, but as it is a certain nature, as St. Thomas is accustomed to speak, and therefore they do not transcend the order of other natural effects. Therefore, just as an Angel knows other natural things, so also he knows those acts. But it is otherwise with free acts, because they pertain to a certain higher order, as we shall explain after the following chapter. And this view can be attributed to St. Thomas, because wherever he teaches that an Angel cannot know acts of the heart or acts elicited by the will, he gives as the reason the freedom of the will. For thus, in the said art. 4, he says that the actions of internal habits are not known by an Angel, because each one uses habits when he wills, as in the said chap. 154 of book 3 of *Contra Gentiles*, and in the other cited places he always reduces this to the freedom of the will, as we shall see. Hence the Thomists also incline to this view.

11. *The opinion is not probable with respect to necessary acts from lack of advertence.*—Nevertheless, in order that this opinion be probable, it is necessary to distinguish concerning acts that occur without freedom. For some are such that per se and intrinsically they occur as if by natural flowing forth, as is the love in the Fatherland, once the vision is supposed. And within the order of nature some judge that an Angel loves himself in this way by necessity of nature, and perhaps also God as author of nature, at least with a love of proper concupiscence. Other acts are such that per se they have the character of being done freely, but per accidens it happens that they occur naturally from a defect of advertence of the intellect, such as the first-first movements in us. Concerning these latter acts the said opinion is not true or probable. First, because in these acts what is per se must be considered more than what is per accidens. But these acts per se and by their nature require to be done freely. Therefore they follow the property of free acts, and accordingly they are outside the natural object of things knowable by an Angel. Second, because the same act elicited by the will, remaining altogether unchanged in itself, and at first not done freely, can begin to be free by the addition only of greater advertence in the intellect. Therefore if it were known before, it would also be known afterward through the same principle through which it was known before. You will say: it is indeed known

afterward also with respect to its whole entity, but nevertheless it is not known whether it is free. But on the contrary, if the very act of the will is known in itself, much more will the greater or lesser advertence of the intellect that precedes it be known. But once the advertence is known, it will be known whether that act is free or not. Therefore, if such acts can be known when they are not free, they would also be known when done freely. Finally, for those acts to be hidden when they occur in this or that mode, it is necessary that their substance be hidden and that a necessary principle be lacking for intuiting them as they have been made in reality, as we shall declare in the chapter after the following one. Therefore, however they occur, they are always hidden.

12. *Evasion.—Response.*—You will say: suppose an Angel or demon does not know these acts of the will in themselves through their proper species, he will at least see them in the movement of the phantasy and of the sensing appetite, because from that the internal movement of the will naturally follows. And the demon knows very well that it is not in our power not to be touched by things seen. Therefore he will know the movement of the will resulting from the movement of the appetite. First, I respond by conceding the whole, because this is not against what has been said, since that is not to see the act of the will, but to know it by conjecture, and this conjecture can sometimes be so great that it induces certainty. For an external action sometimes evidently shows the internal will. But I add that even from the movement of the appetite the first movement in the will does not necessarily follow, unless advertence in the intellect concerning such an object is supposed with such and so great lack of consideration, because the will is not moved by the appetite except through the mediation of the intellect, nor is it necessitated except on account of lack of consideration and inattention of reason. But the demon does not see the acts of the intellect in themselves, as I shall say later. And therefore, although he sees the movement of the appetite, he does not evidently see that a conforming movement in the will results from it, because he does not see whether the intellect immediately attends sufficiently so that the will can restrain its movement. Nor from phantasms alone can he know with certainty what reason attends to, *because from the same phantasms our reason tends to diverse things by thinking*, as St. Thomas rightly said in quest. 8, *De Veritate*, art. 13, reply to 4. And therefore, although the demon can make a great conjecture about these movements, nevertheless he cannot acquire absolute evidence even from causes or effects.

13. *Consequently, it is improbable concerning acts of the will in this life.—What about love of oneself in Angels and the separated soul.*—For this reason,

since in us in this life there are no acts of the will that are simply and per se necessary with respect to exercise, no distinction is needed, but it must be asserted simply that all acts of our will are hidden from Angels. But concerning the will of an Angel considered only in its nature, there is controversy whether it has some act per se necessary with respect to exercise. For some think that Angels necessarily love themselves and God, so that whatever consideration of the intellect they have, they cannot suspend such an act; and perhaps they will say the same about the separated soul. And in this opinion I judge that it is not unfitting to admit that such an act is known to all, because of the reason made above. Yet perhaps the opposite is more probable, namely, that those acts are not per se necessary with respect to exercise, and therefore the same universal assertion also has place in Angels and in the separated soul, because they too have no act of the will per se necessary, nor do they have indeliberate movements.

CHAPTER XXIII
WHAT IS THE PROPER ACCOUNT ON ACCOUNT OF WHICH ANGELS CANNOT NATURALLY KNOW THE ACTS OF ANOTHER'S WILL

1. The difficulty is opened in the opinion denying species in angels. Liberty does not add a real mode to the act, but an extrinsic denomination. On this point theologians labor greatly, because it is in truth difficult. And the difficulty is opened. First, and especially according to the opinion asserting that an angel knows all natural objects, or objects proportioned to his natural light, without species, by his intellectual light alone given by nature. For the angelic intellect is able to know perfectly and intuitively these acts of wills, and, on the contrary, those acts are intelligible objects in act, because they are spiritual and not disproportionate to the angelic intellect by excess. Therefore he will be able to know them naturally, if he wishes. The consequence seems evident, as if from the identity of the terms, because to have a natural power and to be able naturally are the same. But the antecedent is proved as to both parts, first, because that act does not have such great perfection in the genus of being that by reason of it it exceeds the intellective power of an angel; for the will itself is more perfect, and yet it is known by any angel. Nor is the mode by which it comes to be freely sufficient for that disproportion. Both because to come to be freely does not add to the act an intrinsic real mode, but only a denomination from the acting power together with an intrinsic power of not acting. Hence,

since an angel knows the will of another, he sees in it both parts of the power, namely of acting and of not acting, and therefore, if the act by reason of its entity is not disproportionate, neither will it be so on account of that mode, because, when the act and the power are seen, the denomination that results from them will be seen. Also because, although the act comes to be freely, after it has been done it is now determined to one thing and necessary by that necessity by which what is, must be. Therefore, although that mode of effecting makes that act a disproportionate object so that it can be known naturally as future, nevertheless it does not do so as present and now existing. Finally, because acts commanded by a free will also come to be freely, and therefore as future they cannot be foreknown; nevertheless, once done, they are seen by an angel and are proportionate objects. Therefore, by the same reason, in elicited acts already done, no disproportion arises from liberty alone, and accordingly on their part they are visible from the very fact that they have been done. But on the part of the angel power is not lacking, because, beyond natural light, no other principle of acting is necessary to him according to this view. Therefore he has in himself and of himself a natural power. Second, the same antecedent is proved, because an angel in fact sees the affections of another if the latter consents. Therefore he has in himself sufficient power for knowing them, because the consent of another does not give him power nor increase his intellectual light, and he himself does not need another principle or another power.

2. The same difficulty is shown in the opinion granting acquired species. Second, the same difficulty is opened according to the opinion of those who say that an angel understands through species received from things. For angels can take species from all other created things of the natural order and actually existing; therefore also from these acts. The antecedent is supposed in this view, because angels can know all other things naturally, and this is their natural mode of knowing. But the consequence is proved against the same view, first, because these acts are intelligible in act. Therefore, if an angel can receive species from material things and from the actions of our imagination and sentient appetite, since all these are only intelligible in potency, he will be able to receive them still better from these acts. And, conversely, these acts, when compared to angelic substance and power, are lower objects and, so to speak, less intelligible. Therefore, if an angel can receive species from lower and higher objects, he will also be able to receive them from these intermediate objects actually existing. Second, because when another angel consents, one angel receives a species from his act so that he may know it; for he can now know it, and consequently he can know it through a species to be received from it, according to this opinion.

Therefore he will be able to receive the same species without the other's consent. The consequence is proved because an angel receives species from things through the power of his agent intellect, according to the aforesaid view. But the power of the agent intellect of one angel is not diminished or increased by the consent or dissent of another. Therefore of itself it is able to receive the species, even when the other does not consent. But if someone says that an angel does not receive a species from any thing without the cooperation of the object itself, the objection is still urged, because this efficiency can belong to the act of one angel upon the intellect of another much better than to a material object. Therefore it will have it. Nor can it be said that in this it depends on the will of the angel whose act it is, because that act will act in the manner of an intelligible object. Therefore it acts naturally. Therefore it acts independently of the will of the angel in whom it is. This is confirmed from a similar case. For above we said that an angel knows that a past thing has been, through a species left behind from the cognition of the same thing as present; for that species naturally flows from such an act, nor can it be impeded by the will of the angel knowing. Therefore, similarly, if the act of will of one angel effects a species in another angel, it will naturally effect it, and consequently through it one angel will be able to know the act of will of another without any other manifestation, because the act itself naturally betrays itself.

3. The difficulty is declared in the opinion granting innate species to angels. A power capable of second act is also capable of first act. Futurity posits nothing in the object. Third, the difficulty is declared in the opinion that angels know through innate species, which they have from the beginning of their creation for knowing all things that they will know in the course of time. For one angel, from himself and from his nature, is capable of the species of the acts of any created free will. Therefore he receives them as innate from the beginning. Therefore through them he will be able to know these acts as soon as they come to be, without dependence on the consent of him whose act it is. The first antecedent is clear, because an angel is naturally capable of the cognition of such acts, since at length in some way he knows them without supernatural light, but by natural light alone. Therefore he is also naturally capable of the species of such acts. The consequence is proved, both because a power capable of second act is also capable of first act, and also because the natural receptive power of the intellect with respect to species extends on the part of objects as far as the natural active power of intellections extends, since each is of a proportionate and connatural object. And therefore each preserves proportion with the other; otherwise they would not be well instituted, since the natural

active power of the intellect cannot elicit an action unless first, insofar as it is passive, it is reduced to first act. But the first consequence of the principal reason seems to be supposed by this view, according to which we are arguing. For angels from their nature require that they always be constituted in first act for all second acts that they can elicit by natural power, as this view supposes. But angels in the course of time elicit second acts by which they know these acts. Therefore from the beginning they were constituted in first act for such second acts. Therefore they received innate species of the acts of others, which they afterward know through their intellections. Second, the same inference is proved, because an angel can know these acts before they come to be, as possible, with respect to quidditative cognition of them. For this does not exceed the natural power of an angel. Therefore at least for this end he will have innate species of such acts. Just as we said above that an angel has innate species of singular contingent futures, because he can always know those singular things quidditatively and under possible being, although he cannot know them as future, so the same will be true of these acts. And from this, finally, the other principal consequence of the argument is proved, because through the species of a singular possible thing the same thing can be seen intuitively by an angel from the very fact that such a thing exists, as was explained above. Therefore, since an angel has the species of my free consent as possible at such a time, from the very fact that at such a time there is such an act, he will be able to intuit it. And in this there is a great distinction between these acts as future and as now done. For although an angel already has innate species of them and knows them as possible, he will not know them as future before they come to be, because futurity posits nothing in the object that would terminate an act of intuitive vision. But the actual production of them posits in them a real entity through which they can terminate intuitive cognition. Therefore, from the very fact that they come to be, they will be able to be seen by other angels having their species. Nor can the will of him whose act it is impede this, since it neither diminishes the power of understanding of others, nor the representation of the species, nor places any covering, so to speak, upon the act that could impede cognition of it.

4. Various opinions in dispatching the proposed difficulty. The first has recourse to the denial of divine concurrence. In dispatching this difficulty and giving the reason for this mystery, there are various opinions of theologians. The first reduces the whole, as it were physical, account of this matter to the divine will. For the authors of this view say that, on the part of the angel, nothing is lacking by which he could not naturally know these acts, as the arguments made seem to prove. Yet God has decreed not to concur with any angel for seeing the

free acts of another, unless that other wills and orders, as far as concerns himself, his act toward the other so that the other may know it. And thus the reason why he cannot know them otherwise is only that he does not otherwise have the concurrence of God prepared. But I said that no other physical reason is given by these authors, because they will easily give the moral reason on account of which God decreed not to give concurrence, as we also will say below. Ockham held this opinion in 2, quest. 20, where, speaking of the natural power of an angel for seeing acts absolutely, he affirms that an angel has it. But concerning the denial of divine concurrence he only says, *perhaps God does not wish to cooperate*, and consequently under the same doubt says that *perhaps in fact an angel does not know these acts*. Gabriel speaks in almost the same way, lecture 31, on the Canon, and in 2, dist. 9, quest. 2, art. 2; for, once the power is posited in an angel, he says that in fact he does not always know these acts, because God does not always concur. Hence he indicates that no law has been established about this, but that God has reserved it to his will. But immediately regarding demons he says simply that God does not concur with them, while in good angels he adds the particle *perhaps*. And Bassolus follows this there, quest. 2; Lichetus, quest. 1; Major, quest. 3, who speaks more determinately in both cases about the fact. And Holcot, in 2, quest. 4, to 2, principal, where in sum he says that the whole depends on divine ordination. And finally the principal author of this view seems to have been Scotus, who in 2, dist. 9, quest. 2, to the arguments of the second question, absolutely affirms that an angel can, but in fact says nothing. But in 4, dist. 10, quest. 8, to 3, concerning demons he says absolutely that they do not know these acts because they are not permitted; but concerning good angels he says nothing. And he speaks more harshly in 4, dist. 45, quest. 4, to 2.

5. The proximate view is examined. This view, insofar as it simply affirms that an angel can by his natural powers know these acts, is little in agreement with Scripture and the Fathers, because Scripture attributes to God alone that he knows these things, certainly not because he alone in fact knows these things; for holy and blessed angels know these things either in the Word or by revelation. Therefore it attributes this because God alone can know these things by his own power and native power. And for this reason I said above that, from the fact alone that Christ shows himself to have cognition of the thoughts of hearts, it is not rightly inferred immediately that he is God, because he could have known them by supernatural revelation even if he were a mere man. Nevertheless, because he was affirming that he was true God and consequently was professing that he knew the thoughts of hearts by his own power, from that

he rightly showed that he was God. Therefore it is against this doctrine to attribute this divine property to angels. To this Scotus responds in two ways, in the last cited place. One is that it is proper to God to know these things as the universal judge of hidden things, in which way angels cannot know them. The other is that God knows these things perfectly and universally, so that he can be impeded by no one, which angels do not have. But the first is very frivolous, because the office of judge being joined with it is very extrinsic to the force of cognition or knowledge. For when Scripture in this matter heightens the singular knowledge of God, it does not consider and commend the office of judge, but the power of knowing. And Christ, by revealing the hidden things of hearts, showed himself to be God, not from the fact that he showed himself to be universal judge; for this belonged to another matter, but precisely from the singularity of the cognition, as the saints gather. Nor does the other satisfy, because in that way to know an ant also is proper to God, because he alone cannot be impeded, or because he knows it in an infinite mode. For an angel can be impeded from knowing it if God does not wish to concur. But who would say that God alone knows an ant, because he alone knows it without the concurrence of another, or in an infinite mode? Besides, in that way someone would say that angels can naturally know contingent futures, although they can be impeded through the denial of divine concurrence, and that it is proper to God alone to know them most perfectly and so that he can be impeded by no one. But the consequent is absurd. Therefore so is the prior claim. This last consequence is proved, because in this respect Scripture and the saints speak in the same way about the cognition of acts of the heart as they do about the cognition of futures. From this the argument can be converted. For angels are ignorant of futures in such a way that they also cannot know them, and they cannot know them not because they do not have concurrence, but rather, because they cannot, therefore they do not have concurrence prepared. Therefore similarly they cannot know the hidden things of hearts. The consequence is proved because Scripture speaks in the same way about hidden things of hearts and about futures, and attributes to God alone the power of knowing them, and the saints similarly set down the cognition of each equally as a sign of divinity.

6. Another mode of explaining the aforesaid view. The objection is urged against it. Major's evasion by various examples is removed. But it can be responded otherwise, that according to this view it can simply be said that angels cannot know these things, even if the impotence arises from the lack of divine concurrence, because that lack is such that it is not in their power to have

the cooperation of God. For since that is a necessary condition for operating, the lack of it without the power of having it induces impotence simply. Just as, if someone were perpetually deprived of light without the power of having it, he could truly and simply be said to be unable to see. But I press first, the cited authors do not speak in this way, but rather say simply that angels can. And in fact they doubt whether they are sometimes allowed to use that power or are impeded. Hence they do not think that concurrence is denied by a certain and ordinary law. But that it is sometimes denied, if it is also sometimes given, is not enough for impotence simply, even if it is explained in the said way. Then, if someone, setting aside the manner of speaking of those authors, says that that concurrence is denied by a certain and ordinary law and therefore induces absolute proximate impotence contrary to a power that includes all prerequisites for acting, although in manner of speaking it is less repugnant to that doctrine of Scripture and the Fathers, nevertheless in reality it does not satisfy nor does it fit the mind of the saints. For that impotence does not arise from the nature of angels, but altogether from the will of God; but Scripture and the saints intend that this impotence is intrinsic to the creature and arises from its imperfection, and conversely, that because of God's infinite perfection it is singular to him that he can know all these things. And besides, that view, explained in the said way, is greatly repugnant to natural reason. For it is alien to ordinary and natural divine providence not to allow a creature to carry out its natural movements, or always and by an established law to deny the concurrence necessary and due to nature to all species and individuals having such a power. And it would have been very superfluous to give angels an integral internal power for knowing these hidden things of the heart and to deny general concurrence. To this reason Major tries to respond by bringing forward various examples to the contrary. But none is similar. For we admit that natural agents can be impeded by contraries, or by other circumstances, from producing their effects; also that demons are very often not permitted by God to exercise the whole power they have, because they would disturb all things; also that God has sometimes impeded the action of second causes by denying his concurrence. Nevertheless, never by denial of concurrence alone does he impede in a whole species and in all its individuals the use of a natural power; and when he does this in some rare case, it is considered miraculous. But that angels do not know these hidden things is not miraculous nor preternatural, but is their natural condition, insofar as is gathered from Scripture.

7. The second opinion has recourse to disproportion between the angelic intellect and the free acts of another's will. Six accounts of disproportion. The

second principal account of this angelic impotence is given on the part of the object, namely, because the act of a free will is by its nature a disproportionate object for the natural intellect of any creature distinct from the very one exercising such an act. But several accounts of this disproportion are given. The first belongs to St. Thomas, in the cited art. 4. Because these acts are such that the will in effecting them outside itself is subject only to divine motion and efficacy, and therefore they are subject only to God with respect to cognition, outside the one operating. He has the same account in the cited Quest. 8, *De Veritate*, art. 13, and Quest. 16, *De Malo*, art. 8, saying that the movement of the human will depends on the highest cause; but that what falls under the order of a higher cause cannot be known by an inferior cause, but only by the same supreme cause that moves, and by him who is moved. The second account is that these acts are formally and intrinsically free, and depend intrinsically on an indifferent cause, and therefore they are no less disproportionate objects than future things. Capreolus and Cajetan use this account and try to reduce St. Thomas's reasons to it. The third account is that this object is such that by its nature it requires some illumination on its own part, which illumination is through the will of the one who has such a free act. For just as in a visible object, beyond its species and the power, a light illuminating the object is required, so in the present matter this is the nature of such acts, that they need the illumination or manifestation of the one operating. But the reason for this necessity is given because these acts are in a higher order of things beyond natural things, and therefore unless in some way they are reduced to this order through manifestation, they are of themselves hidden and need a special illumination. And thus some also interpret St. Thomas's reason, for through it, as they say, the root is explained from which this condition of these acts arises. The fourth account is Gregory's, because in order for an object to be visible, it must be sufficiently near to the knower. But these acts require an intimate nearness to the knower, that is, that they be in him as in a subject; nor is another nearness sufficient, even if intimate and by penetration. And therefore they cannot be known except by him in whom they are and who elicits them. Richard, cited below, adds a fifth, almost similar, account, namely, because the simplicity of an angel is of some limited spiritual magnitude, in which there is also a limited depth, and therefore an angel or demon cannot intuit the thoughts of the soul *as long as it keeps them in its depth*. Hence he adds that, although it is conceded to a demon that a demon can know some thing anew without a new species, he could not see acts of the heart *unless the soul were to place them in its exterior*, as he says. Alexander indicates a sixth account above, founded on the

great simplicity of these acts. Hence he says that they can be known through signs, and not in themselves, because judgments are not as simple as the affections or wills themselves. Richard has another almost similar account, which I will touch on below.

8. The first preceding account of disproportion is weighed. Nevertheless all these accounts are difficult and do not seem to satisfy. For the first account of St. Thomas does not seem sufficient, because, as Durandus argues well, effects proper to God alone, and which cannot be made by another, after they have been made, are naturally known by an angel, as is clear concerning the substance of the soul, or of an angel, or of the heaven. Likewise concerning powers, habits, and species innate in one angel by God alone, all of which other angels know. You will say that St. Thomas speaks of actions. But on the contrary, because from things the best argument is taken to actions. For what greater reason is there? And then also an action proper to God, in the way in which it is outside him, can be naturally known by an angel, as creation itself, insofar as it is in the creature, and the infusion of a natural intelligible species. Finally, even in these acts there is something in the manner of a quality and term. Therefore it will be known by an angel, and consequently also the intrinsic action through which it comes to be will be known, because it is not more hidden than the term. It is customarily said otherwise that St. Thomas speaks of movements that are made by a creature moved by God alone. But this too matters little. For the same argument is taken from parity of reason; for if those things that are made by God alone are naturally knowable by creatures, why not also movements or acts that are made by the same God moving the creature and by the creature cooperating? Then the act of the will does not seem to depend more on God alone than the act of the sentient appetite or of the imagination, for all these depend on God alone as on the first and universal cause, and each depends on its own power as on its proper and per se cause. Therefore on account of this dependence the acts of the will are not more hidden than the acts of the other powers. Perhaps it will be responded that this is special to will and intellect, that antecedently they can be moved by God alone through the impression of species, of light, or of a habit, or of another similar motion. But what, I ask, does this do so that the act is known to God alone? For that very previous motion of God through the impression of a species, or a habit, or any other thing whatsoever, which is not an act of the will but precedes it as its cause, if it is of the natural order, will be able to be known by an angel and is not reserved to God alone, even if it can be made by him alone, as all admit and as we will say in the following chapter. Therefore, although the act of will in some way depends

essentially on such a motion of God distinct from general concurrence, it does not follow from this that it is known to God alone. This is especially so because even what is taken from such a motion, if it is understood of a motion per se necessary for an act of will and distinct from the thought of the intellect and from general concurrence, is uncertain and perhaps is not true. Finally, through that account it is not explained how such an act can be hidden from an angel if, otherwise, the angel naturally has a sufficient principle for knowing it.

9. The second is weighed. Hence, therefore, Ferrariensis and others among the Thomists add the second account taken from the liberty of the will, and they think it must be joined to the account of St. Thomas. Nevertheless, first of all, that is not the account of St. Thomas. For he does not give the reason why such acts are hidden by their nature from liberty, but from the peculiar subordination they have to the highest cause, as we have seen, and as he declares most expressly in the places cited, especially in that question *De Malo*. Then that account wants a principle, or a rather hidden matter, to be believed as per se known. For the question is why free acts are by their nature hidden. Therefore to respond, because they are free, is to resolve the same through the same, or to suppose that the condition of liberty is a sufficient cause of that hiddenness, without any further proof, as if this were per se known, when in truth it is not. For although the act comes to be freely, after it has been done it is now determined to one thing and has sufficient necessity and actual entity through which it can terminate an intuitive vision of itself. And in this there is a great difference between these acts already done and future acts. Finally, there are many acts freely done that nevertheless are not hidden from an angel from the very fact that they have been done, as is this very motion of the hand by which I now write, and other similar movements of man. For the fact that these acts are free only as commanded, while others are free as elicited, that is, that they are made by the will through the mediation of another power and not by itself and immediately, what does that matter for their being unable to be seen once they have been done? For as future they have the same disproportion or unknowability, because they have indetermination, whether they have it from the immediate faculty operating or from the will commanding. Therefore, by equal reason conversely, after each act has been determined to one thing, the liberty of the cause will not be able to stand in the way of its being knowable, whether the liberty is from the eliciting will or from the commanding will. Or, if the liberty of the cause conceals the act even once it has been produced, it will equally conceal an act freely commanded, just as an act freely elicited.

10. Ferrariensis's example about the motion of the heaven does not satisfy. Ferrariensis objects a similar argument to himself about the motion of the heaven, supposing that it is made freely by an angel, and he responds that that motion is not hidden because it is also in the form of the heaven. But this is, first of all, not said consistently, because if it is from an angel, the heaven is only passive; or if it results from the form, the motion of the angel is superfluous. And besides, although each cause is imagined to be necessary, in order for the act to be hidden it will be enough that it depend on a free will, even if it proceeds at the same time from another cause, as an act of the free will will be hidden, even if it is posited as proceeding effectively from the object. Besides this, an angel can move a stone upward with a motion that is in no way from the form of the stone, and nevertheless such a motion will be known by others. Ferrariensis responds that that motion is natural to other things, and that this is enough for it to be able to be known. But this is irrelevant, both because, although that motion in species can be natural to others, this one in the individual cannot, because it cannot be in another subject. But in order for it to be known, it is not enough to know the common species of that motion, but to intuit this one in particular and in the individual. Also because an angel can move air in its sphere by a circular motion from the north to the south, since the motion is natural to no body and is not violent to air, but neutral. But the air concurs only passively toward it, and it is made by the free will of an angel alone, and nevertheless it is not hidden. Besides, here Durandus's objection also presses, because all motions and effects are free to God, and not on that account hidden from angels. Therefore, although the act of an angel's will is a certain free effect for him, from this no sufficient reason is given why it is hidden. Finally, the liberty of an act only adds a denomination from the power from which the act proceeds. Therefore on account of that alone the act cannot be hidden or rendered unknowable, if otherwise in another angel there is intellectual light sufficient of itself for knowing that act and having a species representing it. And thus the difficulty always remains whole: why a power sufficiently constituted in first act with respect to such an object cannot know it on account of the extrinsic denomination of liberty alone, especially since this denomination can be sufficiently known through the same light, once the act and the principle from which it proceeds are known.

11. The third is weighed. Likewise, the third account either supposes that the will of one angel operates something in another angel in the manner of light or species so that he is able to know his act, which the authors do not admit should be said, as we will see, or it is very frivolous. It is declared, because the

will of an angel consenting that his act be seen by another can have no character of illumination. For illumination can occur either on the part of the power or on the part of the object. Illumination of the power posits some light in it. But that will does not posit any light in the angel to whom such an act is manifested, but supposes it to be of itself sufficient. Therefore there is not illumination on the part of the power. But illumination on the part of the object strengthens it for producing its species, and therefore as it were completes it in the character of an object, as happens in the object of sight. But the voluntary consent of an angel does not give another a light or species for knowing, as the authors of that account suppose. Therefore they say in vain that he is illuminated through that will. For this is illumination in name only, to flee the difficulty by words, because in reality it has no property of illumination. Hence the difficulty touched on remains whole, because before that will the other angel has all the intrinsic principles necessary for knowing the act of another's heart, and his act cannot be hidden by dissent or lack of consent in the other, because that act of itself is intelligible and apt to terminate the cognition of another. This termination cannot be impeded by the will of him whose act it is, because the will is neither the medium through which the tendency of the act toward the object must be made, nor can another account of impediment be thought of there. Therefore such an illumination is imagined in vain. Finally, every immaterial being is of itself intelligible in act, and consequently sufficiently illuminated objectively, or in the character of a term apt to terminate cognition, if in another there is a power of understanding. Therefore no other illumination is necessary per se.

12. The fourth is weighed. The act does not need to inhere in the one knowing it. Gregory's fourth account effectively proves only that one angel cannot know the act of another through that very act of the other as through a principle of knowing that same act. For for this there is necessary a conjunction of the same act with the very one knowing, in the manner of a form or by another intrinsic and connatural union, just as was said above about the cognition of the substance of an angel through itself as through a principle; for the reason is the same, preserving proportion. But for proving absolutely that an act of will is hidden from all others, the account is futile. Because the act of another's will can be known intuitively and in itself not only through itself, but also through some intelligible species. But for it to be known through a species, it need not inhere in the knower, nor be joined to him by some special union. Therefore, if in another there is both light and the species of such an act, it cannot be hidden from him on the sole ground that it does not inhere in him. The major is proved openly by a general reason and by induction from other

things intelligible in act; for they cannot be seen in this way. And the minor is proved by the same reason and induction, from which acts of the will cannot be excepted by any reason. And each point is also shown convincingly, because these acts are known by other angels when those whose acts they are consent. Then, therefore, they are seen through species and without inherence in the knower. Therefore that inherence is not per se necessary for such cognition. Therefore from the lack of it the reason cannot be given why an act of will is hidden as long as the will itself does not consent that it be known by another, if before that will light and species are found in another.

13. It is further attacked. It is confirmed, because an angel knows the habits and species of another angel, nor, in order to know them, need they inhere in the knower, because it is enough that he have species of them. Therefore the same will be true of acts. Nor does Gregory bring any special reason on account of which that condition is necessary in acts. But the leading indication or conjecture that Gregory uses does not press. For he speaks thus: although one angel is intimately joined to a human being and, as it were, by penetration in him and in his soul and will, he will not be able to intuit the acts of the same will. Therefore it is a sign that, in order to intuit an act, it is necessary that it inhere intimately in the knower himself. It is responded first, that this conjecture begs the principle, because it takes what is in question. Then it is responded that there is no inference and no such sign. For this can come about from another source. For example, if one angel did not have the species of the substance of another, or of our soul, even if he were without distance, or by penetration in them, he would not see those substances, or their species or habits, and yet the reason would not be that inherence, or another intimate real union, is necessary for knowing these things, but that an intentional union through a species is necessary, which is lacking there as supposed. Therefore similarly in the present matter, given that antecedent which is supposed, the reason why the act is hidden will not be that it is not inesse in the angel knowing, but will have to be sought elsewhere.

14. The fifth is weighed. The sixth is weighed. Richard's fifth account moves little, because it either begs the principle, or by metaphorical words that cannot be explained it flees the difficulty. For what in the soul or in an angel is that depth into which another angel cannot enter by cognition? For if it is some special condition of the will concealing its acts, we are investigating this condition and its account. For the mere affirmation of such a depth without another reason is the same as repeating the assertion and not giving the account of it that we are seeking. But if something else is signified by the name of depth,

let it be declared what that is. For in the depth of the soul itself is the will itself, and there an angel enters to intuit the will and the intellect, and in the intellect he sees the species, and in the will the habits, and perhaps also merely natural acts, if they are given, all of which are in the same depth. Hence what Richard adds, that although a demon could see something new without a new species, even if he did not previously have the species of such a thing, nevertheless he could not intuit the act of the will. This, I say, I consider false, as I will say a little later, and it is asserted without reason, because no account of it is given, which is what we are laboring over. Finally, Alexander's sixth account has no weight. First, because greater simplicity in spiritual things does not conceal a thing, but makes it more intelligible. Second, because an act of free will is not simply more simple than a natural act, nor is an act more simple than a habit, or than the power itself, or than the substance. Third, because acts of the human will are not so simple, since in the spiritual order they are the lowest.

15. What other account Vázquez brings forward. It is attacked. Second. Therefore, pressed by these difficulties, others succumb, saying that the reason for the hiddenness of these acts is only that they are objects disproportionate to the natural angelic light; but no other reason for this disproportion should be requested except that this is the nature of such acts, which we gather from those things that have been revealed to us about them. For since the angelic nature is not sufficiently known to us, it is not surprising that we are also unable to discern when some objects are disproportionate to them, although we infer that they are such from authentic testimonies. This is the very long resolution and conclusion of Father Vázquez's disputation in disput. 209, and he was led into it as if by a certain necessity, because he thinks that an angel knows without species by the power of his own light. But he could not acknowledge a defect of power in the angelic light itself except by positing a disproportion on the part of the object, and therefore he has recourse to it, although he admits that he does not know its reason. But we cannot rest in this account. First, because it is not absolutely true that an act of the will is an object disproportionate to the angelic intellect. For in the very angel eliciting such an act, it is an object sufficiently proportionate to his intellect. Therefore it does not seem possible for it to be a disproportionate object of the intellect of another angel who is more perfect or equally perfect. Hence such a disproportion seems to be affirmed not only without reason, but also against reason. For every disproportion between object and power arises either from the excellence of the object or from the defect of the power. But that act is not more excellent with respect to an equal or superior angel than with respect to the same angel, nor is the light of the intellect less

perfect. Therefore. Second, because when the angel whose act it is consents, it can be known by another. Therefore it is a proportionate object. But the consent of that angel did not make this proportion, because that consent changes neither the object nor the power of the other. Therefore before this it was a proportionate object, and the difficulty remains whole, how the mere lack of consent of one angel could impede another from understanding an object proportioned to him.

16. It is attacked third. Third, I declare the matter thus, because a twofold character is considered in an object: of moving, or of terminating. Either, therefore, that act is called disproportionate in the character of a moving object, and this is irrelevant, because if another angel does not need an impressed species for understanding such an act, then he does not need the motion of the object either, because the object of a cognitive power is not moving except in order to a species; or certainly, if a species is required, this of itself is posited in the angel, as other authors have taught. Or that act is called disproportionate in the character of a term, or of a terminating object, as they call it, and this cannot be said if in the other there is supposed a light sufficient for knowing the entity of such an act, and its species, if it should be necessary. For once these are posited, no special proportion is necessary in the object so that it may terminate the act, because this termination is not something in the object, but is a denomination from the act, nor is it made as if by a passage of the act upon the object, but by the representation alone that is made through the act formally in the cognitive power, and it can be made from the power of knowing and the impressed species without a new capacity required on the part of the object. Hence material things, which in the character of a moving object are maximally disproportionate, if they are present intentionally within the power through species, from that very fact are apt to terminate the act. And supernatural objects, which seem maximally disproportionate with respect to natural light, if they are made proportionate as in the character of a moving object through species and infused light, from that very fact are proportionate in the character of a terminating object. Therefore, if on the part of the active principle the intellect has whatever is necessary for knowing acts of this sort, for either a moving object is not necessary, or it is already proportionate to the power under that character, therefore also in the character of a terminating object it will be proportionate, because this latter proportion is not separable from the prior one.

17. The true reason why angels do not know internal free acts is the lack of a concreated species of such acts. I say, therefore, that the account of this truth must be given from the side of the first act necessary for knowing these free acts

of a created will. Namely, angels by their nature are not sufficiently constituted in first act for eliciting the cognition of such acts, and therefore they cannot know them naturally. The inference of this reason is manifest. But the antecedent is declared, because first act requires two things, as we suppose: light or power, and species. On the part of light, or active power, we admit that nothing is lacking, as is plainly clear in the cognition of these acts after the consent of those who have them. For through that consent the light or active power of the angelic power does not grow. Therefore on that side angels were previously sufficiently constituted in first act for that cognition. But the other thing required for complete first act, namely species, could have been lacking in angels. Therefore it must be said that it was lacking to them, and that this is the reason why they cannot know these acts unless they are manifested to them through speech or in another way. This last consequence is proved from what has been said, by a sufficient enumeration of the parts, because an object cannot be hidden from another if that other has a sufficient power and all the principles required on his part for knowing such an object, as all the arguments brought forward against the other accounts and opinions plainly prove. Therefore it is necessary to say that some principle of this cognition is naturally lacking to an angel. Therefore, since it is not lacking on the side of light, it must be lacking on the side of species.

18. Richard expressly hands down this account in 2, dist. 8, art. 2, quest. 4, in his first reason, and Capreolus there, quest. 1, art. 1, at the end of the first conclusion, explains the account of St. Thomas there in this way from the same St. Thomas, Quest. 8, *De Veritate*, art. 13, and in sum proposes the reason thus: *To whom first act does not belong, neither does second act; but an angel does not naturally have first act with respect to this second act, which is the proper and distinct cognition of the will of another; therefore he is ignorant of it.* The minor is proved because the intelligible species of the angelic intellect are not naturally representative properly and directly of the movements of another's will. And in art. 3, in the solution to 1 of Durandus against the first conclusion, he repeats the same, saying that an angel does not naturally have a concreated species representing to him the volition of another. And he adduces an excellent place of St. Thomas, Quest. 16, *De Malo*, art. 8, reply to last, where, when he had adduced in the argument a proposition of Augustine saying that an angel understands through species concreated to him from the beginning, in the response he limits it so that it is understood of natural things, not of internal acts of the will. Ferrariensis, in the cited chap. 154, § *But concerning*, and Cajetan, in the cited art. 4, and there almost the other modern expositors,

explain the aforesaid account in almost the same way, although perhaps not in the same sense. They say that the species concreated to angels do not represent the free acts of the will, and they give the reason that they are of another order in this, that they do not depend on natural causes determined to one thing, and thus they introduce the account of St. Thomas.

CHAPTER XXIV
OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ACCOUNT POSITED ARE MET

1. Against the account just given, so that it may be explained more, it can first be objected that it is said gratuitously that an angel does not have innate species of the acts of another's will, since he has concreated species of all other natural things, because the intellect of an angel is in natural passive potency to the cognition of these acts. Therefore by its nature it requires a species by which it may be constituted in first act for such cognition. Therefore it should no less have that species innate from the beginning than the others. This last consequence is proved, both because the whole reason for positing innate species in angels is that, on account of their perfection, they require always to be in first act in those things for which they have a natural power; and also because these free acts are said in vain to be of another order, since according to their entity they are natural and are proportionate to the light of the angelic intellect, as has been proved. Finally, because the species of an angel representing the substance also represents its accidents, and can represent them whether they remain from it naturally or freely, nor is another diversity of order found there.

2. Second difficulty. Second, I argue, because an angel can quidditatively know these acts before they come to be, also knowing them as possible, although not as future. Therefore he has species of them. Therefore through those species he will know them intuitively when they exist. The antecedent seems known and conceded by all, and is proved, because those acts with respect to quiddity and possibility have a necessary connection with natural things, that is, with the substance and will of another angel or soul, and they are proportionate to angelic light. The first consequence is proved because the quiddity of a thing cannot be known without a species. You will say that it is known through the species of the substance and will of another angel. It is responded that it matters little, even if this is granted, because that species will be universal in its own way, and thus will be a species of the acts, which suffices for the force of the first consequence. The second, therefore, is proved, because above it was said that through the same unchanged species through which a

singular thing is known as possible, it is known as present when it is, and thus we dispatched the difficulty about the cognition of futures. Therefore, in a similar way, from the very fact that the act begins to be in another's will, it is knowable as present and actually existing through the same species through which it was previously known as possible. And then the difficulties posited return, that that power is in first act, and the act is a knowable and proportionate object, nor can it be hidden by the will alone or its cognition impeded.

3. Third. The third and principal difficulty is that, if an angel lacked species of such acts, they would consequently have to be produced anew in him when he becomes able to know those acts, and thus he would afterward know them through acquired species, not through concreated species. But this seems repugnant to the doctrine of St. Thomas, which he follows, that an angel does not acquire species from things. And it runs into the same, or even new, difficulties. For if such a species is newly made in an angel, by what, I ask, is it made? For if it must be infused by God, why was it not innate from the beginning? But if it must be taken from the object, either through the power of the agent intellect of the angel understanding, and not this, both because there is no such agent intellect, as was said above, and because, even if it were admitted, either it will naturally effect that species immediately, and the act will not be hidden, or that effecting will have to proceed from some previous conjunction with the object, which cannot be understood, as was generally proved above. Or, finally, that species is made by the angel himself whose act is to be understood, and this also cannot be said, because either it is made immediately by the will of the angel, and not this, because an angel can effect nothing in another through his will except local motion, or it is made through the very act to be known by another, as through an actually intelligible object, and thus the species will naturally and necessarily flow from that object, and consequently it will not be a hidden object, but naturally and necessarily known. And finally there is a special difficulty in human beings, because they cannot effect a species in angels. Therefore angels will never be able naturally to see the free acts of human wills, which seems absurd.

4. A note for solving the first difficulty in number one. To the first difficulty we respond that not gratuitously, but with a great foundation, a distinction is established between free acts and substance and natural accidents, that the species of these natural things are concreated to angels, but not the species of free acts. But to explain the reason, we note from what was said above that it is not naturally due to an angel that the natural power he has for

understanding and for receiving species of things naturally knowable by him be in every respect complete and constituted in first act. For he has a natural power for species of possible things, and yet, speaking per se, he does not have them concreated. Likewise he does not have concreated species of his past acts, although he has a natural passive capacity for them. Therefore, from the mere passive capacity for some species, nor from the power of the natural light of the angelic intellect for effecting some acts, it is not rightly gathered immediately that such species are concreated. Therefore it must be added that that rule is regular, so to speak, but not so universal that it does not admit an exception. But the exception will be general unless, on account of a peculiar cause and reason, something else is more fitting to angelic nature itself. Or, if the rule is taken generally, it is rightly limited to natural things; but by natural things are understood things pertaining to the order of the universe and things that can come from them by natural necessity. Other things, which are only possible by the power of God, or which intrinsically require a peculiar mode of free effecting, are not contained under the order of natural things. And just as in possible things there is a special reason on account of which species of them are not naturally due to angels, and in past acts there is their own particular reason, which we handed down above, so regarding free acts of the will sufficient reasons can be given on account of which such species are not connaturally due to angels.

5. Why angels do not have innate species of free acts. The first and best reason is that in these acts of will an angel bears himself not only as a natural or physical agent, but especially as a moral agent, and therefore species of such acts are not due to him except as accommodated and proportioned to the moral order. But for the right moral order it would not have been fitting that every intellectual creature have concreated species of all free acts of other wills. For in this way all the free acts of each would be known to all the others, which is against the good order of a multitude and society of rational persons, which they naturally require, because from this hatreds, contentions, and similar things would arise. And especially demons could rage more sharply against human beings if they knew their affections intimately, as indeed they could if they had their species. Therefore such a nature does not require such species. Or, second, we can argue from the contrary, because a rational creature naturally desires to conceal its intimate acts, which most of all are its free decrees. Therefore it cannot connaturally require that which is repugnant to the concealment of such acts. But having concreated species of such acts is of this sort, as has been shown. Therefore it does not require their concreation as connatural to itself.

Third, it is declared otherwise, because when a nature has a proper and intrinsic mode of obtaining some perfection, it does not require that perfection immediately from the author of nature through infusion or concreation. But rational nature otherwise requires the communication of its own thoughts and affections through mutual speech. Therefore it does not require the concreation of species, through which such speech would become either impossible or useless. Finally, it was said above that intelligible species do not actively flow from the intellect of an angel, and consequently, since they are infinitely multiplicable with respect to objects, they are determined through divine providence so that they are determined in such number and measure as was more suited to created and rational nature. Therefore also, with respect to these species of free acts, the determination was made by the author of nature according to the mode of order and governance more fitting for such a nature. But that mode was that they not be concreated, but be communicated in another and more proper way.

6. To the first proof in the same number one. To the second. To the third. Hence to the proof brought forward in that first difficulty we respond that it does not belong to the natural perfection of an angel that he be constituted in first act adequately and in order to all second acts that he can have in the course of time, but with the limitations stated, as is manifest in the cognition of past things. To the second we say that these acts are not said to belong to another order with respect to the grade of physical entity, but with respect to moral being, which arises especially from liberty. For from this the best reason is taken why these acts should also be established in another order of knowable things, and according to the mode accommodated to such an order should also receive species of such acts through mutual communication, not through extrinsic concreation. To the third, whatever the case may be concerning the representation of other accidents, whether it is made through the species of substance or through a proper species, about which it was said above, concerning these acts we deny that they are known through the species of substance. Because substance as substance does not pertain to the moral order as these acts do. And although we grant that by absolute power there could have been given a species representing together the substance or power and these acts, we deny that such a species is naturally due to angels, or that it is possible according to ordinary law. And this is enough for an angel to be unable naturally to know these acts.

7. To the second difficulty in number one. Hence, to the second difficulty about the cognition of these acts as possible, I respond that these acts, like other

effects, can be known as possible in two ways: in one way through only the species of the cause and from the force of cognition of the cause; in another way through proper species of possible quiddities. I say, therefore, that an angel cannot know these acts as possible in this latter way, namely through their proper species, especially in the individual, because they do not have such species of all singular free acts, as was said. And because universal quiddities abstracted from individuals are not represented to angels through proper species confusedly representing, as was said above, therefore neither are genera or species of such acts known by an angel through innate species, but through species of singular acts, when they are given to them. But in the former way, namely in the cause and through its species, I concede that an angel knows these acts as possible, yet not distinctly and in the individual, but confusedly and in general, as we will say more fully below when explaining the mode of an angel's cognition. And therefore the consequence is denied, because that mode of knowing a possible thing is not sufficient for knowing it intuitively as existing without a proper species directly representing such a thing in the individual. We spoke of this species above, when we were treating of the cognition of futures, and therefore no argument can be taken from that.

8. To the third difficulty in number three. The third difficulty touches on the grave question about the speech of angels, without which this matter cannot be completed or exactly understood, and therefore after the following chapter we will treat it. For now we respond briefly that the species of these acts is given to an angel when another orders and manifests his act to him through speech. For then it is the fitting and necessary time for speech to have place. Nor is it beyond the nature of an angel to acquire some species, but only with respect to natural things, in the manner explained above, just as we also said in the cognition of past things. But then such a species is not made by God alone, nor by an agent intellect, nor always by the will of the angel alone as by the proximate principle, but by the object itself applied through that will. And therefore it is not made naturally, but voluntarily by the one revealing his act. But how these points are to be understood and defended, we will say in the cited chapter; for first it is necessary to speak about acts of the intellect.

CHAPTER XXV

CHAPTER XXV
WHETHER NOT ONLY THE AFFECTIONS OF THE WILL, BUT ALSO THE COGNITIONS OF THE INTELLECT ARE HIDDEN FROM ANGELS

1. *Reason for doubting.*—The reason for doubting is that an act of the intellect is not in itself formally free, as an act elicited by the will is; therefore it is not hidden in the same way as an act of the will. We suppose the antecedent, because the intellect is not a formally free power as the will is, and so its act is not free except denominatively, insofar as it proceeds from a free will. But the consequence is proved, because acts that are free only by denomination, as being commanded by a free act of the will, are not hidden in themselves as to their entity and existence, but only as to the act of the will from which they proceed. This is evident in the acts of imagination and appetite, which Angels know very well, although they do not know whether the will consents to them or not. The same is manifest concerning free actions that are done through the body. Nor can the difference between these be set in this, that those are material actions, whereas acts of the intellect are spiritual, for this difference is irrelevant to the character of a hidden or manifest object. Indeed, the immateriality of an object of itself conduces to knowability. Nor can the distinction be set in this, that bodily actions are less subject to the will than the intellect is, both because a difference according to more and less does not suffice if the formal character of freedom is lacking in both, since this freedom is judged to be the proper reason for this concealment. Especially because even among bodily acts some obey the will more than others, and nevertheless all are manifest when they occur, although it is not known how they occur insofar as they emanate from an act of the will. And also because this is not true, for the intellect sometimes also operates naturally and anticipates the will; and conversely in the members of the body there are some motions that do not occur without a motion of the will, such as progressive motion, writing, and so on. Hence it is confirmed first, because in the act of the intellect considered in itself that reason concerning moral being and an order other than the physical also ceases, because an act of the intellect is not moral except as it is commanded by the will, and therefore it is not virtuous or sinful except by reason of the will; therefore it is not hidden except as to the denomination from the will. Finally, it is confirmed because in these acts that reason ceases, namely that God alone operates in them, for an

Angel also operates immediately in the intellect by introducing thoughts, according to that text of Psalm 77: *Sendings through evil Angels*, as Bernard treats in sermon 64 on *The Song of Songs*, and that text of John 13: *When the devil had already put it into the heart*, as Augustine treats there, tractate 55, saying that this is done by the demon not corporally but spiritually.

2. *First opinion. — Thoughts of the intellect as to their substance are known to Angels. — What Henry wrote for this opinion is weighed. — Henry, confusing acts of the intellect with acts of the will, is rejected.*—For this reason some theologians held the opinion that thoughts of the intellect are known to Angels according to their own substance and precisely insofar as they pertain to the intellect, but not insofar as they can be from the will, because although an Angel sees me thinking, he does not see whether I consent to this thought through the will, nor with what intention I think, and so on. This opinion can be attributed to Henry, in the said quodlibet 3, question 13, where he holds that thoughts of the intellect are hidden only as to the intention from which they are had. Giles consents in part, in II, distinction 7, question 2, article 3, where he says that one Angel knows of another what he thinks in general, because he knows what species he uses, but not in particular whether he thinks by assenting or dissenting, and the like, because a thought can be made in different ways through the same species, which do not appear in the mere use of the species, because they do not make a new change in the intellect. The Argentine says the same there, and Hervaeus in part, chapter 22 of the cited work. But if these authors are read attentively, they do not think differently of thoughts than of acts of the will, but speak in the same way of them. For although Henry excepts intention, he does not think that it is an act, nor that it adds anything to acts of the intellect or of the will. Hence, as to the part by which they affirm that thoughts of the intellect are known by an Angel, they bring forward no new foundation, and that will be discussed immediately. But as to the limitations they apply, against Henry what was said above suffices, by which it was shown that he supposes something false when he denies that intention is a special act of the mind. Once that foundation is destroyed and the contrary posited, he is easily refuted ad hominem, because if other acts of the will are known, intention also will be known, since it too is an act. But this attack does not proceed absolutely, because someone can say generally that intention and all acts of the will are hidden, and nevertheless think differently about thoughts of the intellect and set up a difference, which is the proper point of the present question.

3. *Likewise Giles, the Argentine, and Hervaeus.*—But against Giles, the Argentine, and Hervaeus the arguments made above about acts of the will

proceed when applied proportionally. For if an Angel knows cognition according to its substance or common character, certainly he intuits it according to all its particular modes, because he sees it intuitively and as it is in itself, as we argued about an act of the will. Hence, conversely, if they think it necessary to save something hidden in acts of the intellect, even as they are in the intellect itself, it is certainly necessary that they admit that those acts are hidden absolutely, because in distinct, quidditative, and intuitive cognition the common cannot be separated from the particular. Nor is Giles's argument of any weight, because, first, it supposes what must be proved, namely that an Angel necessarily sees about another that he uses an intelligible species and which one he uses. For those who say that intellectual thoughts are hidden deny this. For to use a species is nothing other than to produce an act of thought or of intellect through it. Therefore, one who affirms that the act is hidden consequently says that the use of the species is hidden. For that use cannot be seen in the species, but must be seen in itself. For the species in itself is not changed through its use, but changes the intellect by making an act in it. Hence the use of the species is not distinguished from the act of understanding, or from the action by which it comes to be, which is really the same as its term; and therefore the use of the species can be seen in no other way than by seeing the production of its act. Therefore Giles supposes in vain that one Angel sees which species another uses, unless he also admits that one Angel sees the act of the other made through such a species. But if he sees the act, he certainly sees what sort it is, namely whether it is assent or dissent, and with what effort it is made, and so on. And therefore one who sees the use of such a species necessarily sees not only which species the other uses, but also what sort the use is, because he does not see this in the species, nor in a change that occurs in it, but in the act itself that is made through it, which he sees in particular and as it is in itself.

4. *Second opinion distinguishing between the aforesaid acts and limiting the former opinion to acts of the intellect that wholly precede acts of the will.*— Therefore, properly speaking, the opinion that pertains to the present question is the one that sets up a difference between acts of the intellect and of the will in this: that although all acts of the will are hidden, nevertheless acts of the intellect, as they are in it, can be perfectly seen in species and in the individual, and in their relation to the object, both material and formal, as they pertain to the intellect, and whether the act is assent or dissent, intense or remiss, and so on; and that it is hidden only as to the intention or consent of the will, and universally as to all denominations that the act of the intellect can receive from the act of the will. I do not now find this opinion in any of the ancient

theologians; nevertheless Durandus reports it, in II, distinction 8, question 5, number 8, and rejects it as to the difference or distinction. Nevertheless Vasquez, disputation 210, chapter 2, although he professes to define nothing, nevertheless tries to free this opinion from every suspicion, and says that it is not improbable. He reports that Father Alphonsus Deza, an outstanding man in his time and of great authority, publicly taught it. Besides, he draws Saint Thomas and his disciples into the same opinion, insofar as the reason for which they say that an act of the will is hidden is reduced directly to the freedom of the act of the will, and is not extended to an act of the intellect, as we have already argued. Finally, he adds that the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers do nothing against this opinion, because when they say that our thoughts are not known by a creature, they speak of the thoughts of the heart. But a thought of the heart, according to the phrase of Scripture, signifies an act of the intellect with affection, because heart is said not of thought alone, but of thought joined with affection of the will. He shows this from other places of Sacred Scripture, in which by the name of heart affection is especially signified, as Proverbs 8: *Keep your heart with every guard.* Ecclesiasticus 8: *Do not reveal your heart to every man*, and chapter 21: *The heart of a fool is like a broken vessel, and it will not hold any wisdom.* Thus, therefore, in the places cited at the beginning they are called thoughts of the heart insofar as they pertain in some way to affection. For example, Matthew 9, when Christ said: *Why do you think evil things in your hearts?* to think evil things is the same as to think with an evil intention, just as also chapter 15: *From the heart proceed evil thoughts*, that is, thoughts that proceed from a corrupt affection; and Luke 12: *That thoughts from many hearts may be revealed*, that is, what sort they are and from what affections they proceed; and Acts 8: *If perhaps this thought of your heart may be forgiven you*, where without doubt affection is involved under the name of thought.

5. *The true affirmative opinion.—It is proved from the theologians.—* Nevertheless I judge that it must be said that the thoughts of the heart, as to the very acts of the intellect, are hidden from Angels in such a way that they cannot see them in themselves and intuitively, unless they are manifested to them. This is the express opinion of Saint Thomas in the said article 4, where he says as follows: *In another way thoughts can be known as they are in the intellect, and affections as they are in the will; and in this way God alone can know the thoughts of hearts and the affections of wills.* There he could not have spoken more distinctly about both acts. And in the solution to 2 he expressly says that *one Angel knows the intelligible species of another, but not the use of them according to actual consideration.* And in the solution to 3, regarding imagination and

appetite, he uses that distinction that an Angel knows the acts of those powers according to their substance and as they proceed from them, *but not insofar as they are moved by the will and reason*. He never applied this distinction to acts of the intellect, but posits the thoughts of the intellect as equally hidden as the affections of the will. And the same is manifest from other places, and all his interpreters, ancient and modern, have understood and followed him in this way. And the other theologians also who judge that the thoughts of hearts are hidden absolutely in themselves speak no less about thoughts as they are in the intellect than about acts of the will; and others who say that they are known according to something and hidden according to something think the same of both acts. Hence Durandus said that that distinction is applied *rather lightly*, because the same reason is found in both acts. But perhaps he said this because he also judged that acts of the intellect are free. Therefore for now we only assert that that distinction is foreign to the common mind of theologians.

6. *It is proved from Sacred Scripture and the Fathers.*—Second, the assertion is proved from the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers alleged above. In these, first, those that speak distinctly of both acts should be noted, as 1 Chronicles 28: *The Lord searches all hearts and understands all thoughts of minds.* And in Hebrews 4 the Word of God is called *the discerner of the thoughts and intentions of the heart*. Therefore thoughts are not hidden only by reason of intentions, but also according to themselves; both thoughts and intentions are reserved to God alone. For it is proper to him to know *what a man thinks and with what mind he thinks*. Moreover, when it is attributed to Christ in the Gospel that he knows the thoughts of hearts, it is not judged to have been a sign of divinity only that he knew with what intention they thought, but that he knew what they thought. For thus it is said in Matthew 9 that the scribes said within themselves, *This man blasphemes*, words that signify an act of the intellect, namely its judgment. And it is added: *When Jesus had seen their thoughts*, he said, *Why do you think evil things?* Here it can be weighed that he did not say, *you think evilly*, namely with an evil intention, but *why do you think evil things*, that is, by judging and believing an unjust thing. And chapter 12, when the Pharisees inwardly judged that Christ cast out demons by a pact with demons, the Evangelist says: *Jesus, knowing their thoughts, said to them: Every kingdom divided against itself will be made desolate*, and so on. In this I weigh that Christ does not argue in order to convict them of an evil intention, but of a rash judgment, and of the fact that they thought and judged contrary to reason. Therefore when the Evangelist says, *knowing their thoughts*, he attributes this to him chiefly as singular, that he knew what they thought and judged. And from

this very fact Jerome and other saints infer that Christ showed himself to be God. Therefore they will think that even the thoughts and judgments of the intellect are reserved to God alone. And thus Jerome says there: *The Lord responds not to the things said, but to the things thought, so that even in this way they might be compelled to believe*, and so on. But things thought are said of those things that are in the intellect and as they are in it, and Jerome speaks in the same way in the other places alleged above. The words that speak distinctly of acts of the mind, thoughts, and internal counsels must be weighed, for these especially pertain to the intellect. And Damascene in particular says not only that Angels use their own speech and locution to manifest their affections and intentions, but also to communicate counsels and thoughts.

7. *Heart in Scripture is accustomed to imply not only the will, but also the intellect. — Why acts of the intellect are called thoughts of the heart.*—Finally, although Scripture and the Fathers very often speak of the secrets of hearts, it must be weighed that thoughts properly signify only acts of the mind. But by the name of heart, in Sacred Scripture, not only the will but also the intellect is commonly signified. For Solomon was speaking of the intellect when he prayed, 3 Kings 3: *You will give your servant a docile heart, so that he may judge your people and discern between good and evil.* For by these words he asked for wisdom, as the Lord immediately said; and wisdom pertains to the intellect. The same is taken from Jeremiah 5: *Hear, foolish people, who do not have a heart, who have eyes and do not see.* Often it also includes the whole internal mind as including the will and the intellect. For thus it is said in the person of Christ in Psalm 21: *My heart has become like wax melting in the midst of my bowels*, and Paul says in Romans 10: *With the heart one believes unto justice*. In this signification it also seems to be taken by the Church when, in the Preface of the Mass, she admonishes: *Lift up your hearts*. For she commands both the intellect and the will to be raised to God, indeed first the intellect, so that the will may follow it. Thus, therefore, heart is taken when it is said to be proper to God to know the thoughts of the heart. For proving this, the words of Christ in Luke 24 are best: *Why are you fearful, and why do thoughts arise in your hearts?* This must be understood of thoughts properly so called, which occur in a solicitous and wavering mind, although the affection or intention is the same. And nevertheless even by those words Christ showed himself to be God, as Theophylact noted there, and Maldonatus very well. And for the same reason, when Scripture says that only God searches the heart, it is rightly understood of the whole mind, intellect and will. Augustine seems to explain Psalm 7 in this way: *You search the hearts and reins, O God*, saying, *Thoughts are signified by the*

name of heart, and delights are understood by the name of reins, and he has similar things in his second exposition on Psalm 25. Therefore, when the thoughts of the heart are said to be hidden, this is not to be restricted to acts of the will and the denominations that proceed from them, but must be taken absolutely of the internal acts of the mind, and of thoughts, which are properly said of acts of the intellect according to their substance, and are called thoughts of the heart insofar as they are purely mental and are not manifested outwardly, and because through them the heart, that is, the will, is stirred and regulated, as we shall say presently. Nor does the said restriction have any foundation in the words of Sacred Scripture or of the Fathers. Hence, since the locutions are absolute and negative, it is not lawful for us to restrict them, especially since the same reason and difficulty are found in both acts, as we shall say presently.

8. *The true opinion is then proved by reasons.*—Third, therefore, it is proved by reasons, and incidentally we have touched on two a posteriori reasons that are not to be despised. One was from the unacceptable result, because it follows that acts of the intellect are no more hidden than acts of the imagination or of the sentient appetite; but this is contrary to Saint Thomas and to all. The other is that otherwise locution among Angels would be only for manifesting affections, not concepts or cognitions of the intellect, which is contrary to all, and especially to Damascene, book 2, chapter 3, saying that it is for communicating thoughts and counsels; there Clichtoveus makes an equation in this matter between men and Angels, which explains the matter very well. The third and a priori reason is that it belongs to the fitting state of intellectual nature that not only the affections, but also the counsels and judgments, or doubts or deliberations, of its mind be reserved to itself. For there is found no lesser moral reason for secrecy or concealment in these than in those. Therefore counsels, judgments, and similar acts of the intellect are hidden in themselves no less than affections or intentions of the will. Fourth, from this we apply the a priori reason, because Angels did not have innate species through which they could know these acts, nor were such species naturally owed to them, because they were not fitting to rational nature as such; rather, another mode either of communicating or of retaining such concepts within oneself is more accommodated and more fitting to rational nature. These reasons are not so much complete and distinct by themselves as composing one reason. For the proper reason is that the species of these acts are not connatural to Angels. But the reason for this is given from the other two, namely that the property and power of concealing these acts is more fitting and more consonant with rational nature, and consequently there is in it another mode of communicating and

acquiring cognition of these acts that is more connatural, to which it is repugnant to have such species naturally innate. This reason will be made clearer by solving the foundation of the contrary opinion.

9. *To the contrary reason in number one. — Why acts of the intellect are hidden.*—Therefore, to the reason for doubting placed at the beginning, it is responded that although the freedom of the will is in some way the reason why the thoughts of the heart are naturally hidden, nevertheless the freedom alone of an elicited act is not the adequate reason for this property or condition of the act. Rather, it is enough that it be an act of free choice, as free choice is a faculty of will and reason; and under this both acts of the intellect and of the will are comprehended. Accordingly, although an act of the intellect is not formally free except from an act of the will, nevertheless it is the root and, as it were, rule and measure of freedom in the act of the will. Hence, if the advertence of reason is perfect, the act of the will will be perfectly free; if the advertence is diminished, the freedom of the act also is proportionally diminished. Therefore, for this reason, it was consonant with intellectual nature that the whole heart, as it includes both the root and the use of freedom, be so deep that without the opening of the one who has it, no one would have the key by which he could enter there, that is, the species by which he could intuit the deliberations of the intellect or of the will. And in this there is a true and sufficient distinction between acts of the intellect and acts of the other lower powers, which can also occur from the free motion of the will. For we do not say that acts of the intellect are hidden because they are commanded by a free act of the will, but because they are, as it were, part of the use of freedom itself and the root, rule, and measure of it. Under this aspect, even an act of the intellect can be called moral, as pertaining to the moral order, just as prudence is called a moral virtue because it is the rule of moral virtues, although it does not have a special formal freedom without the free motion of the will. Finally, for this reason too the human intellect cannot be immediately changed by a demon, but only by God; nor does he introduce a thought into the intellect otherwise than by proposing sensible objects or by stirring up phantasms, as we shall say more broadly in book four. But the remaining things that were added for this side by the other opinion have been sufficiently refuted from what has been said.

10. *Whether some genus of thoughts of the intellect is excepted from the handed-down opinion.*—But someone could doubt whether all acts of the intellect are hidden, as we said about acts of the will, or whether some distinction should be used. For some distinguish between apprehensions and judgment, and they hold that judgments are hidden, but not apprehensions. The

Argentine and Giles, cited above, signify this, and it seems it can be persuaded, because the reason given does not persuade the former, since it is judgment that moves the will, not mere apprehension. It can be distinguished in another way concerning a natural and free act of the intellect. For Saint Thomas places in this the reason why an act of the intellect is hidden, because it occurs only at the nod of the will; but this is not true except of a free act. Therefore an act of the intellect that does not occur from the motion of the will will not be hidden. Yet, from another consideration, it could conversely be said that natural acts, which precede the will and stir it, are by their nature hidden, because they are properly the rule and root of freedom, and their secrecy is necessary so that the free act of the will may be perfectly hidden. For once the prior disposition of the intellect is known, it would easily be known what the will would will, if not with the greatest certainty of evidence, at least with moral certainty, because the will regularly follows the intellect. But concerning the acts that follow the consent of the will, this does not seem necessary, because they are now compared to the will as external acts are compared to internal acts; but those need not be hidden. A third distinction can be thought of concerning acts of the speculative or practical intellect, so that these latter should be held hidden, but not the former, since practical acts are the proper rule of the will and lead it to act, and they pertain more to the order of moral acts. But the speculations of the intellect are more natural acts and do not have that connection or relation to free acts of the will.

11. *No genus is excepted.*—Nevertheless I judge that none of those distinctions or limitations should be admitted, but that it must be said absolutely and generally that no thought or actual consideration of the intellect can be seen by an Angel distinctly and as it is in itself, because all pertain to a certain order of things whose intelligible species are not naturally owed to an Angel; and because the speech of Scripture and of the Fathers is universal, and no sufficient reason occurs for making an exception. For first, apprehension and judgment perhaps are not acts so distinct that some character of judgment is not included in apprehension, insofar as it includes some cognition, which has special place in Angels. But if perhaps they are distinguished, this does not matter, for apprehension is for the sake of judgment, and they are of the same order; indeed they are counted as one, and therefore the cognition of both is by its nature reserved, so that the species of neither is owed to an Angel. Next, that thoughts anticipating the will are hidden, although they are not formally free, is proved by that reason that they are the root and, as it were, the proximate cause and rule of free acts of the will. Likewise, just as we said above that first-first motions of the

will are hidden, although they are not actually free, because they are of the same order and of themselves can occur freely, so we say of these antecedent thoughts that they are of the same order and are apt to occur from the motion of the will, although when they are prior they do not occur in that way. And let that reason of Saint Thomas, so that it may be universal, be understood as saying not only the act, but also the aptitude, that is, that those acts of themselves are apt to occur from the free motion of the will.

12. *The proximate resolution proceeds. — Why speculative acts of the intellect are hidden from Angels.*—Concerning acts of the intellect that occur from the consent of the will, it must also be held no less certainly that they are hidden per se, as, for example, the act of divine faith is, and the mental heresy contrary to it, which theologians call per se hidden; and this is true not only with respect to men, but also with respect to demons. Hence in this too Christ the Lord demonstrated his divinity, because he beheld internal faith, how great it was and of what sort. And Saint Thomas said that those acts of the intellect especially, which do not occur without the free consent of the will, are known to God alone, surely not only because they are free as commanded acts, but because at the same time they are of the same order. Hence I add further that those acts that occur from some consent of the will are also principles and rules of other moral acts, which they stir up in the will. Finally, for the same causes the speculative acts of the intellect should not be excepted either, for they too are free thoughts, and on them the free acts of the will and the institution of internal morals depend very greatly. For the speculative intellect also moves something, and easily passes into the practical intellect. And, to conclude in a word, from the very fact that rational nature requires that it be able to have thoughts and affections secret and hidden from every creature, each power, intellect and will, absolutely has that natural property, that all their acts that occur freely or can occur freely cannot be known by another without its own consent, nor are their species connatural to others. Hence from this rule at most there could be excepted the act by which an Angel always intuits himself, if it is wholly natural, as we were saying about love.

CHAPTER XXVI
WHETHER ANGELS MANIFEST THEIR INTERNAL CONCEPTS OR AFFECTIONS TO OTHERS THROUGH SENSIBLE OR SPIRITUAL SIGNS

1. *It is certain that one Angel can manifest his concepts to another.*—Saint Thomas treated the question of the locution of Angels in I, question 107, by separating it greatly from the preceding question. But because the chief difficulty resulting from the previous question cannot be resolved without the declaration of this point, for this reason we have judged that all those things that pertain to locution should be added in this place, while the other things that pertain to illumination we shall reserve for book 4. First, however, we suppose that it is no less certain that one Angel can know the thoughts of another when the latter consents and wills, than it is certain that he cannot know them when the latter does not will. For just as it is fitting to angelic nature that these acts be hidden in the way stated, so it is also very necessary that at least when the Angel whose acts they are wills, they can be known, because otherwise there could not be social life among Angels, nor order or governance, which is contrary to the perfection and condition of rational nature, and also conflicts with the Scriptures, as we shall see.

2. *Likewise, it is certain that in fact they manifest them, which is that locution is given among Angels. — Angels, in order to speak among themselves, do not need assumed bodies.*—Hence, second, it is certain that there is locution among Angels, by which they mutually manifest their concepts and acts. Thus Saint Thomas teaches above, and all the theologians in II, distinction 11. And this is taken from Paul, 1 Corinthians 13, when he says: *If I speak with the tongues of men and of Angels.* In this he supposes that there is locution in Angels, as Chrysostom notes there, homily 32, Ambrose, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Anselm, and Saint Thomas, and Prosper in the letter to Demetrias. For although Paul intended to signify by exaggeration a most perfect tongue, the exaggeration would have no place unless he supposed that there is in Angels a more excellent mode of tongue, namely a spiritual and intellectual one, as Theophylact indicated. Finally, in other places of Scripture Angels are often said to speak among themselves, as Zechariah 2 and 3, Apocalypse 7 and 9; and although they are introduced as speaking in assumed bodies so that they can be heard by men, nevertheless they are supposed to speak among themselves. Nor

can it be thought that they need bodies in order to speak among themselves, since they do not naturally have bodies. And Jude in his epistle says that Michael the Archangel disputed with the devil, which need not have occurred in assumed bodies. And this is what Damascene intends, book 2, chapter 3, saying that Angels communicate their thoughts and counsels among themselves in a spiritual mode. And Basil and Gregory, to be cited a little later, intend the same. And Dionysius and the other Fathers suppose the same when they say that there are among Angels higher and lower orders, so that the lower learn from the higher and obey them, as we touched on above from Dionysius, *The Celestial Hierarchy*, and shall say more broadly below in books 4 and 6. And from the cited place, Zechariah 2, Isidore confirms this, book 1 of the *Sentences*, chapter 10, § *Among Angels*, where he hands down that not only good Angels but also evil ones observe this order among themselves, and indeed that evil ones sometimes learn from good ones, in *Whether Angels know in the Word*, saying that demons learn some things through revelation from holy Angels. Augustine also supposes this, book *On the Divination of Demons*, chapters 5 and 6. Finally, the reason is that an Angel does not know the mental acts of another while the latter keeps them hidden; but he can know them if the other wills. Therefore the other must be able to reveal them; but this revelation is called locution.

3. *The locution of one Angel and the hearing of another have the connection of teaching. — One opinion affirming sensible signs. — In what way some explain the said sensible signs, and they are rejected.*—With these things posited, there is doubt about how this locution occurs on the part of the speaker; and because to every locution hearing and understanding correspond, so that it can be fruitful, it must consequently be explained how one Angel hears another, and how he becomes able to understand what before he could not, indeed also how he is moved and stirred to this. This matter has seemed very obscure to theologians. Hence they have been divided into various opinions, which, so that I may report and examine them in a fitting order, I suppose that one Angel's manifesting his concept to another can be understood in two ways. First, only in the testimony of the one speaking, so that the Angel who hears does not see the thing said to him, nor the concept of the speaker, intuitively and clearly in itself, but only in the word and testimony of the one speaking. Second, that the locution is such that it clearly manifests the act of the speaker in itself. Therefore in this chapter we shall speak about the prior mode, in the following about the latter. Therefore some theologians followed the prior mode, who said that Angels speak among themselves through certain signs by which they indicate their concepts to others, just as we express them through words. But regarding these signs, some

said that they are sensible and are formed by them in some body, just as we produce words or letters in the air or on paper. Durandus reports this opinion, in II, distinction 11, question 2, together with Hervaeus, in question 1, and in it he distinguishes two modes. One is that those sensible signs are figures made in the heaven, having a peculiar signification among Angels. And he rejects this in number 7 as frivolous, because neither such a figuration made in the heaven, nor its signification, whether natural or at pleasure, is intelligible. And what we shall say against the following modes will attack this mode a fortiori.

4. *The explanation of others.—It is rejected first.*—He adds another mode in number 12, namely that those signs are either sensible sounds formed in the air after the manner of words, or nods and signs made in assumed bodies, just as men also speak among themselves. And Durandus proves this mode almost as the only one, speaking strictly of proper locution. Nevertheless, although Angels can now speak among themselves in that way, as we were reporting from Sacred Scripture, it is nevertheless altogether improbable to attribute this mode of speaking to them either as necessary or as connatural to them, as Bonaventure rightly teaches, in II, distinction 10, article 3, question 1. And this is shown first because mutual communication among Angels is natural to them and, within their degree, necessary to them; therefore locution among them is natural and necessary in the same way. But angelic nature, with every natural property and with what is necessary in that degree, is independent of bodies. Hence locution could exist among them even if bodies did not exist. Therefore that mode of locution is accidental and, as it were, coming to Angels from outside. Therefore, besides it, a mode of locution must be assigned to Angels that belongs to them per se and is proportioned to spiritual nature. And this is shown first because such sounds or nods do not signify except at pleasure, from human imposition or custom, which Angels know well and imitate. But who would say that the locution of Angels depends on human imposition or manner?

5. *It is rejected second.*—Second, I weigh that although Angels in assumed bodies speak among themselves in that way on account of men, nevertheless those sensible signs cannot reach the intellect of the Angel who hears so as to change it, as words change the minds of men. And the reason is that there are no phantasms in Angels, nor is there a natural connection of the senses with the intellect, so that through them a sensible change may penetrate all the way to the intellect, as occurs in man. And therefore among Angels sensible speech cannot have that power of locution that reaches the changing of the intellect, but only has the power of signifying in such a way that it can be understood by another if he wills to attend. And therefore another proper and spiritual locution

is necessary, through which Angels both speak and stir others to hear without tongue and words. And this is what Damascene intends in the said chapter 3, when he says: *Not having need of tongue and ears, but communicating their thoughts and counsels among themselves without the assistance of speech*—namely sensible speech. And in the same sense what Basil says must be taken, homily 3, on *Attend to yourself*, namely that the use of speech—namely sensible speech—was given to men because of the impediment of the body. *For if*, he says, *we lived as soul itself, visible and naked to the eyes of all, we would at once come together among ourselves through mutual understanding of thoughts.* Not indeed because this occurs among pure spirits without any locution, but because they do not need sensible signs, but in a spiritual mode through free consent, which he signifies through those words, *we would come together among ourselves*. And Gregory, book 18 of the *Moralia*, chapter 3, is explained in the same way by Saint Thomas, said question 107, article 1, reply to 1, as we also touched on above. For he excludes from spirits lacking a body the necessity of sensible signs, not every manifestation of their concepts and affections.

6. *Second opinion affirming spiritual signs.*—The second principal opinion is that Angels speak among themselves through spiritual signs signifying instrumentally, as they say; for these now we properly call signs, as though by antonomasia. Durandus also reports this above, and Giles follows it, in II, distinction 10, question 3, article 1, and explains it in this way: that an Angel, after the direct cognition of a thing that he has, can will to make in himself a sign of that word which he has formed about the thing. This sign is not by its nature hidden, but known to others, and therefore the formation of that sign is the expression and locution of his concept. But he indicates that that sign is not an act of knowing in the very speaker, but something distinct from every act, from the intelligible species, and from habit. And this opinion is followed by the Argentine, in the same distinction 10, question 1, article 2, Gregory, question 2 at the end, Marsilius, in II, question 7, article 2, Clichtoveus on Damascene, book 2, chapter 3, Molina, on the said article 4, where Vasquez is sufficiently inclined toward it. It is also usually attributed to Capreolus, in II, distinction 11, question 1, article 1, in the proof of the first conclusion, from Saint Thomas in the same place, question 1, article 3, where he generally says that it is true that Angels speak through signs; but they speak in another sense, as we shall see in the following chapter.

7. *This second opinion is examined through seven questions.*—But this opinion has been rejected by the other theologians, and Durandus especially attacks it above, although not very effectively, as I shall say at once. For in order

to render a judgment about it, it is necessary first to ask and weigh a few things about it. First, what these signs are in their reality or entity. Second, how they signify. Third, how they come to be, that is, whether freely or necessarily. Fourth, in what subject they come to be, that is, whether in the speaker or in the hearer. Fifth, if they are in the speaker, whether something results from them in the hearer. Sixth, whether such signs, once made, are always permanent like writings, or how long they last, or whether they last only while they are being made, like words or nods that are made through motion. Finally, whether these signs are altogether necessary, so that Angels cannot otherwise know the concepts of others except through these signs, speaking per se and excluding locution through sensible sounds or through assumed bodies. For once these things are explained, then, as I think, it will easily appear how much difficulty or probability there is in this opinion.

8. *First question: what the said spiritual signs are.—They are not vital acts of the speaker or hearer.—Likewise they are not intelligible species.—Nor habits or other qualities known to us.*—Concerning the first point, I find nothing affirmative, so to speak, explained by the defenders of this opinion, but only negative. For they more often say that these signs are not vital acts or intellectual concepts, because if they are in the speaker himself and are acts of the mind, they will not be able to be seen by another, and consequently they will not be able to signify to him or serve for speech. For through those signs the speaker would know, but not another. But if they are in the hearer, they cannot be made in him by the speaker, as we shall immediately prove. But the sign of locution must be made by the speaker, because to speak is to represent the mind by effecting some sign of it, as we shall say at once, although Major thought otherwise on this, as I shall note a little below. Next, these authors deny that these signs are intelligible species, both because they do not serve for knowing the thing signified in itself, but only in the sign; and also because they are not the intelligible species of the speaker, because he does not acquire them but has them innately, whereas he himself makes these signs. Likewise, because although one Angel who hears sees the intelligible species of another Angel who speaks, through them he does not see what he thinks or loves. Therefore, if these signs were some species of the speaker, they would signify nothing to the hearer. Nor can they be species of the hearer himself, because either they would be innate from the beginning, and thus through them he could know the acts of another without their manifestation, or they would be impressed by the speaker, and those authors think this impossible, especially because they do not posit these signs as effectively representing the thing in itself, but as objectively and

instrumentally representing the thing in the sign. And from this it is concluded a fortiori that, according to these authors, these signs are not habits or any of the qualities known to us. But what they are, they do not say, but only that they are signs.

9. *Nevertheless, they are real qualities.—The proposed explanation of signs is difficult.*—Nevertheless it seems necessary to say that they are real qualities, in which that signification is founded, whether that signification is a relation of reason or a real relation. For it must always be founded in some thing or in some real mode newly made. For when an Angel speaks through these signs, he really effects something. Therefore that effecting has some real term. But that term can only be in the species of quality. For it cannot be in the species of relation, because there is no per se action or change toward a relation. But this sign does not come to be without some change, which occurs by real efficiency in that in which such a sign inheres, which is prior to the relation of sign and its foundation. Therefore it is something absolute prior to relation. Therefore it is a quality, because by running through the other predicaments, it is certain that it can be in no other. Finally, it seems that one must judge about these signs as the more probable theologians think about character, namely that it is a real quality, as I said in volume 3, on the Third Part, disputation 11, section 2, and as Vasquez excellently hands down, volume 2, on the Third Part, disputation 134, chapter 2; for the discussions made there can very well be accommodated here. And from this resolution the first difficulty, which is not small, begins to become known in that opinion. For it is extremely difficult to understand what or of what sort that quality could be, or what its primary and proper formal effect is, on account of which it was instituted by nature. For signification cannot be the formal effect or the intrinsic end of such a quality, as will be evident from what will be said. And therefore I think it is extremely difficult to explain the nature of such a quality. Hence in the case of character we are led by principles of faith to believe that quality, which is also more easily admitted because character is a supernatural quality and comes to be in a supernatural mode. But if there are such signs in Angels, they will be qualities of a connatural order and must come to be in a connatural mode, and therefore they are believed with more difficulty, especially if they are not inferred by necessity from natural principles.

10. *Second question: whether the said signs are natural or by institution.—Distinction of formal and instrumental sign.*—Yet, once qualities are admitted, when they are posited for signifying internal acts, the second question immediately occurs, namely how they signify. In this matter I suppose that, just as in the foregoing we distinguished a twofold medium of knowing, namely a

known and an unknown medium, so here a twofold sign can be distinguished, namely a known and an unknown sign, although in reality, according to the description of sign that dialecticians hand down, a sign is properly only a known medium. For a sign is said to be that which, besides the species it brings to the senses, makes something else come into cognition. This description is given concerning a sensible sign and can be applied proportionally to an intelligible one. In it it is supposed that a sign first offers itself to be known, and through it a transition is made to the cognition of another thing, which is to be a known medium. Nevertheless, because everything that represents another in some way takes on the character of a sign, because to represent and to signify are almost the same, for this reason an intelligible species, just as it represents that of which it is the species, so also signifies it, and consequently can be called a sign of it. And according to this mode of speaking an intelligible species will be called an unknown sign, because it does not lead to the cognition of another through cognition of itself, nor does it require that cognition per se. And in this sense Capreolus speaks of signs, with Saint Thomas above. Therefore, this distinction being admitted, here we suppose that these signs we are treating are not posited as unknown signs, because they are not believed to be intelligible species, but certain objects knowable by Angels through the innate species they have, by the very fact that such signs are posited in reality. And thus, when known, they lead to cognition of the acts of the heart, and therefore they can be called known signs. But these goods are accustomed to represent in two ways, namely either naturally, as smoke indicates fire, or at pleasure, as they call it, or by institution, as words or writings among us. Therefore we ask by which of these modes these signs signify to Angels.

11. *The response of some: that they are natural.—The proximate response is rejected.*—The first mode of speaking can be that this signification is connatural. And this can be persuaded, both by excluding signification at pleasure among Angels, because it can scarcely be understood, as we shall immediately argue, and directly, because, supposing that such qualities are possible, there does not seem to be any repugnance in the fact that among them one should by its very nature be apt to lead to the cognition of such an internal act, another to the cognition of another, and so on for the rest. And it is confirmed from the similar case of characters, because there are some who say that each of the three characters, of Baptism, Confirmation, and Order, has by its nature a proper signification on account of which it is impressed. And thus Vasquez, above, according to this opinion, regards this part as more probable and thinks it is the more common among its authors. But truly I cannot understand it, and so, since

it has neither been revealed nor proved by reason, I do not judge that it should be believed. For every natural signification is founded either in a formal likeness, such as is in an image, or in some necessary connection between sign and signified; but this connection cannot exist except in some genus of cause and effect. For a purely relative connection, such as there is between two correlatives or a relation and a term, does not serve for this, because one relation can never be a sign through which one arrives at the cognition of the term or of another relation; for in order for a relation to be known, it is necessary that the term or correlation be known at the same time. For this reason we also said above that a relation cannot be a known medium through which one arrives at cognition of the term or correlative.

12. But in the present case these qualities, which are said to be signs through which Angels speak among themselves, are not formal likenesses or images of the acts of the heart, because they are not vital acts, nor do they agree with them in essence; nor can an agreement be imagined in figure or in some similar accidental form in which that signification or representation is founded. Nor is such a quality the cause of the act it represents, as is evident per se; nor is it the effect, because it is neither an act of life, nor a habit, nor an intelligible species. Besides these, an act of the mind does not have any effect; indeed, even concerning these not everyone concedes it. An argument can also be made ad hominem, because this representative quality cannot by necessity of nature be made or emanate from the act to whose cognition it leads, otherwise that act would always manifest itself through such a sign. Nor can it emanate freely, because the said authors do not want to admit free efficiency in these acts of intellect or will, once their existence is supposed. Therefore that quality cannot represent such an act as its proper effect. Therefore no reason or foundation of natural signification is found in it. For besides the things said we find no other, nor can another easily be understood or thought out. But if someone says that there can be other modes of signs naturally representing, although we do not understand them, the response would have place if faith compelled us to believe such signs. But since we proceed by natural reason, such a response is not to be admitted, especially because reason proves effectively, from a sufficient enumeration of the parts, that there cannot be natural signification in one known object unless it has a connection with the thing signified; nor can this connection be without the foundation of cause or effect, once the nexus between relatives, which does not pertain to the matter, is set aside. Durandus brings other reasons against this natural signification, which I omit because they are of little weight.

13. *The response of others: that they are instituted signs.—It is attacked as to one part, namely that those signs are reflexive concepts.*—Therefore another mode of speaking is that this signification is at pleasure. This does not displease Major, in II, distinction 9, question 5, in the penultimate mode of speaking. But he indicates there that the quality imposed for signifying is a reflexive concept, which naturally represents only another act upon which it falls and which it has as object. But it can be imposed at pleasure to signify either the direct act that it also naturally represents, or even another act that of itself it in no way represents. He says that that imposition is made by the very Angels among themselves, agreeing about it. And in the same place he attributes to Gregory that he posits these signs as signifying at pleasure, but Gregory neither says that these signs are direct or reflexive concepts, nor explains the mode of signifying. And as to the former part, Major seems to suppose that the concepts and acts of the angelic intellect are not by their nature hidden from others, as he openly teaches, because otherwise it would not be clear how they would speak through those signs. For if acts of the intellect are hidden by their nature, they are not apt for that signification, because no one can perceive such a signification if he cannot see the quality itself imposed for signifying. And this reason has place no less in a reflexive act than in a direct one, because if any is hidden, all also are by their nature hidden without exception, as I said, and as I shall say in particular a little later.

14. *It is attacked as to the other part, namely that they are by institution.*—But as to the other part concerning signification at pleasure, Durandus attacks it above with two reasons. The first supposes that Angels always and naturally have such signs. But this is false and contrary to the mind of those who defend this opinion. For they consequently say that it is in the power of the speaker to effect or not effect such a sign. But the other reason very well attacks that mode of signifying from the imposition of the same Angels. For either the imposition will be useless, or it involves a repugnance. For if each Angel imposes his own signs for signifying, either that imposition is unknown to others, and thus it is useless, because such a sign will not be able to signify to others; or it is known by others, and then either it is known through the locution of the one instituting such a sign, and thus he first needs to have signs through which he may speak, and the same question will return about them; or it is known without locution, and this is repugnant to the position, for the Angel who imposed the signification did this by a free will. But this free will cannot be known by another without locution. Therefore a repugnance is involved in it. But if these signs are not imposed by each privately, but through the agreement of all, then

in order to make such an imposition, so that they may agree in it, they need to speak among themselves and mutually manifest to each other their wills and judgments in such a matter. And so either they will first speak without signs at pleasure, or they will speak through signs not yet imposed, all of which are repugnant. By this discourse, in my judgment, it is evidently proved that such an imposition cannot be made through the Angels themselves. Nor is it similar with men, both because before imposition they can understand each other through nods, or they can materially utter a name, designating through nods the thing they wish to signify by that name, and so of other things. Although this mode is difficult, nevertheless it is not impossible; indeed, by use and custom, men seem to learn their native tongue in infancy in this way. But in Angels there are no spiritual nods of this sort distinct from signifying qualities, and therefore either the signification must be natural and perfect, or certainly it cannot be through an imposition made by the Angels themselves.

15. *Nevertheless, it does not seem repugnant that they are by the institution of God.*—Nevertheless someone could say that such signs are given and imposed by God. For although they themselves are not immediately innate from God, nevertheless knowledge of them must necessarily be handed down by God, because Angels could not freely effect such signs unless they had knowledge of them. But God, by infusing such knowledge, taught Angels not only what those qualities were, but also what he wished to be signified through each of them. Just as it is likely that he infused into Adam and Eve the knowledge, imposition, and signification of some language, for example, Hebrew, so that as soon as they were created, they could converse with themselves and understand each other by words, lest it first be necessary for them to use nods among themselves for imposing new names on things, or so that Eve might grasp what Adam wished to signify to her through words already imposed. And in this mode of signifying at pleasure I do not find a repugnance, if once there is supposed in Angels a power for freely effecting similar qualities, which are neither vital acts nor principles of them. Nevertheless, even when the possibility of such signs is admitted, other difficulties remain in admitting the locution of Angels through such signs, especially three. One is that that mode alone is imperfect and, with another mode, irrelevant. Another is that either it does not suffice for stirring another, which is necessary for locution, or if it is posited so as to suffice for this too, it is irrelevant. The third is that, according to that mode, angelic locution will not be able to be secret, but will be public to all, which is also greatly repugnant to the perfection of that nature. By treating these three difficulties, we shall better resolve the other questions.

16. *Third question: whether the aforesaid signs of Angels would have to be free or necessary.—They must be free.*—The third question was whether the effecting of such signs is necessary or free. Durandus above seems to impose on the authors of these signs that they posit them as always existing connaturally in the Angel speaking. But I do not find this in the aforesaid authors, nor can it be said consequently, as I was saying above; otherwise the acts represented through these signs could be read in the mind of another by anyone who wished to attend and inspect it, namely what the other thinks or wills. And thus they would not be hidden, but naturally open, at least through those signs. Therefore it must be said that those signs are made freely. Indeed, this seems to be of the necessity of the locution of human or rational nature, for locution was given to it so that it may open its internal mind if it wills, not so that it may necessarily manifest it; otherwise such locution would destroy the perfection of such a nature.

17. *Nevertheless they do not seem producible through acts of the will.*—But the difficulty is whether those significative qualities are made immediately through the act of the will by which an Angel wills to speak, or rather through those acts of intellect or will that he wishes to manifest through such signs. Neither seems probable. Not the first, because an Angel cannot effect qualities through his willing, as is the common doctrine. For, as we shall see below, the most received opinion is that Angels cannot alter bodies by their will, because they cannot effect bodily qualities; therefore a fortiori they will not be able in that way to effect spiritual qualities, because spiritual qualities are more perfect. Perhaps it will be said that that received teaching must be understood with respect to others, because in himself he can make something through an act of his will, for an act makes a habit. But this is not rightly said, because an act of the will effects a habit in the will itself naturally and in the mode of a certain form acting upon what is similar or proportionate to itself; it does not, however, effect it by willing that it come to be. And in this way we say that the will of an Angel is not active of a quality, even in the Angel himself, but only of local motion. Therefore in this way he cannot make those qualities that are said to be signs of internal acts.

18. *Nor do they seem producible through acts of the intellect.—An insufficient response is excluded.*—Nor can he make them through those acts that he wishes to manifest, because immanent acts are not active of qualities that are not principles of similar acts, such as habits are. You will say that they are also active of qualities signifying themselves. But on the contrary, because, considered in their real nature, signification is extrinsic and accidental to those

qualities, since they are supposed to exist by institution alone. Therefore, considered in the nature of internal acts and of such qualities, there is no basis from which those acts can have the power to effect such qualities. For the nature of such qualities must be considered for this, not the signification that comes from outside. For if those acts by their nature effect those qualities, they would equally produce them even if they had not been imposed for signifying. This seems difficult to believe, because those qualities are not of their nature ordered to perfecting the powers of intellect and will in the task of understanding or willing. Therefore neither are they by their nature producible through acts of such powers. There is also another reason against this, because whatever such acts can produce in the one operating, they produce not freely but naturally, so that, although the act occurs freely, by the very fact that it exists it naturally makes whatever it can make. For thus an act makes a habit and a species that it leaves in memory. But it does not effect these qualities naturally, even if they are supposed to exist, but freely, as has been proved. Therefore they can in no way effect them. And we shall confirm these arguments more in what follows.

19. *Fourth and fifth questions concerning the subject of the aforesaid signs.—Concerning the subject which, the response of some.—They are attacked with a twofold difficulty.—Marsilius's evasion.*—The fourth little question was in what object these signs come to be, and the question can be asked either about the principal subject, that is, the suppositum, or about the proximate subject in which they inhere. And in the former part, the common sense of the said authors is that they come to be only in the Angel speaking, without any efficiency in the hearer. Gregory expressly teaches this, and Vasquez above, number 53, criticizes certain moderns who attributed the opposite to the said authors. But these authors seem to suppose that one Angel cannot effect any quality in another, nor do I see what other foundation for this part they could have. But against this two great difficulties occur. One is that it follows that an Angel speaking does not stir another to hear, because stirring cannot be understood without efficiency. But the consequent is contrary to the character of locution, and we shall press this argument more below. The other is that an Angel will never be able to speak secretly to one, without others understanding if they will. The said authors indeed concede this consequently, but it is greatly discordant with rational nature and its prudent institution. Seeing this, Marsilius tries to deny the consequence, because Angels can have some signs general to all, and others special to individuals. For since they signify at pleasure, some could have been imposed for a certain signification known to all, and could have

another signification known only to one or another, so that Angels have one common language and as many other particular languages as there are Angels.

20. *This is not pleasing.*—But this opinion becomes more incredible by such a multiplication of signs. Otherwise, there will be as many institutions of these signs as there are species of Angels, besides one common to all. But if in the individual species there are several individuals, a peculiar signification will be necessary for each individual, so that one may, if he wills, speak so secretly to only one individual that others, even of the same species, do not perceive it. Hence if an Angel wishes to speak at once only to two who differ in species, he certainly will not be able to do so, for if he uses a common sign, others will understand; if a private one, only one will perceive. Therefore a third genus of signs will be needed, which are known to two only; and consequently, if he wishes to speak to only three at once, a different genus of sign will be necessary. And so they could have been multiplied almost to infinity, even though these and similar things seem ridiculous, unless perhaps someone says that then an Angel makes two locutions at once, or more if he speaks to more at once, which also seems very imperfect and improbable. Besides, it is no less difficult for an Angel to effect these signs in himself than in another, as is understood from what was said in the third point.

21. *A more accommodated response concerning the aforesaid subject which. —Yet it too is difficult.*—For this reason I judge that, in this opinion, it is said more consequently that the Angel speaking impresses such a sign in the one with whom he wishes to speak, as though describing his mind in him, and thus stirring him to hear; in this way the first difficulty is easily avoided. Nor is this efficiency in another more improbable than in himself, since it is the effecting of a certain quality that is not an act of life; and if it is in some way a principle of knowing, it helps the hearer to know rather than the speaker. But through these things the other difficulty is not altogether avoided, for by the very fact that such signs come to be in another, although they do not stir others, they themselves will be able to know and understand them if they will to attend. And thus the locution will not be secret. Therefore someone could add that the Angel speaking first effects a sign in himself, and through it impresses the species of the same sign in the hearer, just as we form a word in the mouth and send its species into the hearing of another, and thus each difficulty is avoided. And certainly, once the prior efficiency of the sign in the speaker himself is admitted, the other efficiency concerning the species can very easily be defended, as I shall say below in a similar case. And, as I think, it will be said more consequently in this way, because it is not necessary that an Angel have innate species of such

signs, since they are not merely natural things, but of the free order; and since they are otherwise spiritual and actually intelligible, it is not unfitting that they impress a species of themselves. Nevertheless, all these things show how difficult this mode of locution is.

22. *Concerning the subject by which, or the proximate subject, the response.—The aforesaid response is not without difficulty.—A more accommodated response.—Grace and character are immediately in the substance of the soul.—* Concerning the other part, about the proximate subject in which these signs inhere, whether they are in the speaker or in the hearer, the sense of the question is whether these qualities imposed for signifying inhere in the intellect, or in the will, or in the essence or substance of the Angel. On this point I find nothing sufficiently explained by the said authors; nevertheless they indicate that they are in the intellect, because locution is an operation of the rational faculty, and hearing likewise. Hence the production of such a sign seems to be made immediately through the intellect, and consequently to occur also in the intellect, whether it remains in the speaker or comes to be in the hearer, because he hears through the intellect. Nevertheless this is not without difficulty, because a subject must be attributed to this quality according to its nature considered in itself, and as proportioned to the physical formal effect that such a quality has by its nature. For imposition for signifying is very extrinsic, and can equally be imposed on that quality in whatever subject it is. And it contributes nothing to its physical inherence, just as a word or writing comes to be in a body or in a subject physically accommodated to it. But the intellect does not seem to be the proportioned subject of such a quality. This is proved because that quality is not operative, since it is not an intelligible species, nor a habit, nor another principle of intellectual operation. But the intellect is only a subject capable of its operation or of qualities that are principles of it. Therefore neither is the intellect itself capable of such a quality, nor does that quality imply a relation to an operative power as to a subject, since it is not a principle of operation nor does it dispose for it. Besides, it is wrongly supposed that such qualities are made through the intellect, because the production of such a quality, physically and considered in itself, is not an operation of the rational faculty, because that quality of itself does not pertain to the intellect, but only by reason of imposition. This does not change the nature of such a quality, nor the mode of its physical efficiency, but can only make it be done with this or that order of reason, which it can have even though it is done through the will or another power. Therefore this quality will be posited more consequently immediately in the substance, because it will dispose it absolutely and according to itself,

without respect to work, just as I said concerning grace and character for a similar reason, on the Third Part, volume 3, disputation 11, section 4, and Vasquez consents, disputation 134, chapter 4. Nor does this hinder or matter to the signification any more than that writing occurs on this or that paper; for the substance can be, as it were, the paper on which Angels write spiritually. But if it seems difficult to someone that there be a natural quality, that is, a non-supernatural quality, immediately affecting the substance of an Angel or soul, we shall respond that this whole difficulty arises from the exposition of those signs, but, once they are admitted, it is necessary to swallow the rest.

23. *Sixth question: whether those signs would be transitory or permanent.—It is argued that they do not seem transitory.—Nor even permanent.*—Concerning the sixth question, I find nothing said by the authors, namely whether these are transitory, so to speak, or dependent in coming to be and in being on the actual will of the Angel speaking, or whether, once made, they remain. For the former seems difficult to believe. First, because they are spiritual qualities, and they are not immanent or vital acts, nor physical principles of them. Why, then, will they be transitory or dependent in coming to be and in being on the vital influx of a power? But if these signs or qualities, once made, remain, even if either the will of making them or the cognition that comes through them ceases, it follows that they are perpetual, because they have no contrary and are in an incorruptible subject. Hence they have no source from which they would naturally cease to be. By this argument I proved elsewhere that character is a quality by its nature indelible and incorruptible. But once this is posited in these qualities of Angels, which are said to be made for expressing their concepts and affections, it consequently follows that innumerable qualities of this nature are multiplied and remain perpetually in Angels, as many as are successively made through various locutions and will be made in perpetuity. But it seems little credible that a quality perpetually enduring comes to be on account of a single and, as it were, momentary signification, and afterward endures without any use or utility, and that similar qualities are increased in a huge number and multiplied to infinity. And besides, from so great a multitude of signs remaining together in any Angel, there cannot fail to arise great confusion and ambiguity as to whether such signs are new and of present things, or old and of past things, especially if such signs, when they are newly made, do not impress new species in the other Angels. For Angels cannot always attend so as actually to know all such signs that are newly made by all Angels. Therefore, when they see some new signs, how do they know whether they are then being newly made or were made before and they themselves did not attend? And similar things can easily be

thought of, which perhaps do not have a manifest repugnance, and so are not to be feared by those who easily admit everything. Nevertheless, without evident necessity such things are not easily to be asserted, which bring with them more wonder than credibility.

24. *Seventh question: whether the mode of locution through signs at pleasure would be the only and necessary mode in Angels.—Various affirmative modes of responding.—The negative part is established.*—The last question was whether this mode of locution is said to be only possible, or necessary and the only one by which Angels manifest their concepts to others, because in this too not all the cited authors agree. For some first exclude all other modes of angelic locution thought out by other authors, so that they may set their foot on this one alone. Others, however, only contend that this mode of speaking is possible for Angels and that they sometimes use it, although they can communicate and open their counsels among themselves by another mode or modes. Indeed some of those who say that the thoughts of hearts are known to Angels by their nature also say that a place is left for this mode of speaking, because someone can speak to another about a thing already known to him, just as we also speak to God. Nevertheless, first, it does not seem likely to me that this mode of speaking through signs at pleasure is the only and necessary one, so that one Angel cannot know the thought of another by another mode or way. I am moved because this mode of knowing through signs at pleasure is very imperfect. For through such signs the thing is not known in itself, and consequently neither is the truth of the locution evidently seen, but it is only believed through a certain faith resting on the authority of the speaker. But it is not likely that an Angel can arrive at knowing the internal acts of another only in this way. Therefore. The major is known, because from the force of a sign at pleasure, no principle is given by which the thing signified may be known as it is in itself. But an Angel from himself does not have a principle for knowing the acts of another in themselves. Therefore through mere signs at pleasure he cannot know them perfectly. The minor also seems clear per se, because although it is expedient that the internal acts of Angels be so hidden that they are not open to others without the manifestation of the one who has them, nevertheless that it be naturally altogether impossible for Angels to intuit them clearly, even when those whose acts they are will and consent and do what is in them so that they may clearly be open to others, is very slight and seems a great imperfection of angelic nature. For those acts do not exceed the natural power of the angelic intellect, the sign of which is that each one can know his own acts intuitively and perfectly. Therefore an Angel also ought to have some natural way of having

species through which he can attain perfect cognition of such acts when their master consents. For this reason, therefore, it is not likely to me that the whole locution of Angels is reduced to these signs, nor that there is no other way by which one Angel can more certainly and evidently manifest to another the acts of his heart.

25. *The author's resolution.—Angels do not use instrumental signs.—Various objections.—Response to them.*—Hence, finally, I conclude that it seems far more probable that such signs are not found in Angels, nor such a mode of locution. All the things we have inquired about these signs persuade this much more than probably. For they are extremely difficult to understand, and otherwise they are not sufficient, as I have shown, and consequently they are not necessary. Therefore on what probable foundation will we believe that the locution of Angels occurs through such signs? Someone will say that, just as it is not fitting that Angels not be able to show their concepts in themselves, but only in these signs, so conversely it is not fitting to exclude from Angels the manifestation of their concepts through these signs. For from this it follows that whenever an Angel wishes to communicate his mind to another, he is compelled to show it in itself and not only in a sign; and consequently that among Angels there is no locution that must be believed on the testimony and authority of the speaker, nor is there among them an angelic faith, so to speak, as there is human faith among men, which seems diminished and imperfect. Hence it will consequently happen that, from the nature of the thing, there can be no deception or lie among Angels, which also seems said gratuitously. Likewise, in Angels there is divine faith, which does not seem able to be understood without revelation founded on these signs; indeed, neither does illumination seem able to exist in Angels without signs of this sort. Moreover, the locution of an Angel is not always immediately about his own act, but can also be directly and proximately about a thing known by him. How, then, will it exist without these signs signifying things at pleasure? For it cannot be through intelligible species of things. The same holds if one Angel speaks to another by immediately narrating an act that he sees in another, for he cannot show the act of another in that other itself. Therefore he needs to manifest it through these signs. But we shall respond to all these things in what follows, and we shall show, through another true mode of locution, that all these things can stand and be explained without these signs at pleasure, insofar as they can be fitting or necessary to angelic nature.

CHAPTER XXVII
WHETHER ONE ANGEL, BY EFFECTING NOTHING IN THE HEARER, MANIFESTS HIS ACTS TO HIM

1. *First general opinion.—Second general opinion.* Once instrumental signs, but signs signifying at will, by which speech is customarily carried on among men, have been removed, it is difficult for us to grasp what other mode of speech can be possible. Therefore various modes of this speech have been devised by theologians. Among them a certain general agreement and difference must be noted, so that we may examine the several opinions more properly. Some, therefore, think that this speech takes place without any efficiency of the speaking Angel upon the hearer, indeed without the addition of any thing that is made in the hearing Angel, by which he receives some principle for knowing the acts of the speaker, but only because, on the part of the speaker, the veil, so to speak, is removed from his acts, or the secret is only opened objectively, which the other at once can know by his own power. But others think that some efficiency of the speaker upon the hearer is necessary; and under each mode there are various opinions, which we shall set out in this chapter, passing judgment on each, so that we may choose the one we believe to be more true. In the following chapter we shall satisfy certain difficulties.

2. *First explanation of the first general opinion, that speech is reflective thought upon the direct thoughts themselves.* The first opinion is that one Angel speaks to another in no other way than by knowing, because by the very fact that he knows something, he speaks to himself, and through the same word by which he speaks to himself, he can express his concept, or the thing conceived through that concept, to others, and thus speak to another either about his own act or about the thing represented through his word. For the word of the mind, although with respect to the one eliciting it, formally represents to him, nevertheless can also represent to others objectively, immediately indeed itself, but mediately and as though instrumentally the thing known by another through that very word. This is not by signification at will, as Major, cited in the preceding chapter, was saying, but by natural representation, inasmuch as that word expresses a natural relation to its object in the manner of its expressed image. But this opinion declares that not every thought of an Angel has the character of speech, even if perhaps it is known to others, but only that thought which is reflective, or quasi-reflective, upon the act about which speech occurs.

For by directly conceiving some thing, someone does not yet speak to another, because he does not yet manifest his concept to another from his own intention, even if otherwise the concept itself can be known by others in the way in which other things can be known without speech on their part. Therefore, they say, the Angel must have a reflected act by which he explains that he has such a concept about such a thing, and then by this same act he explains his concept to another and thus also speaks. And by a similar reason, with regard to proper acts, and those elicited by the will, an Angel, by knowing them in himself, as though reflectively, through the same act by which he knows his own affection, manifests it to another. Vasquez teaches this opinion at length, disputation 211, chapter 11, and attributes it to Henry, *Quodlibet* 5, quest. 15, and to Hervaeus, in 2, distinction 11, quest. 11, and to Major, distinction 9, last quest. Indeed he also cites St. Thomas for his own opinion, but his mind is far otherwise, as we shall discuss later. Major also spoke in another, far different sense, namely concerning signs at will, as I noted above. But Henry speaks very obscurely, so that his mind is scarcely understood, while Hervaeus, although he seems in some part to incline this way, nevertheless supposes a false opinion concerning acts of the mind known or hidden from an Angel, as was seen above. Therefore that opinion, as proposed by that author, is singular and proper to himself.

3. *Foundation of the proposed explanation.* The only foundation is that the speech of an Angel is an act of the intellect of the speaking Angel; therefore the act itself of the intellect is as it were the nod, or sign, or word, by which one Angel speaks to another. But it is not a sign at will, as has already been said; therefore it is a natural sign, and no foundation for such signification can be devised except the connection that it has with its object, which it represents. Therefore no better mode of angelic speech can be devised. He proves the major from the Fathers, from Theophylact on 1 Corinthians 13, from whom he reports these words: *For indeed the tongue of Angels is a certain power of understanding, by which they communicate divine thoughts among themselves.* From these words he gathers that Theophylact says that the tongue of Angels is their intellective power, and therefore that their voice is the very word which they form within themselves. And Theodoret says in the same place: *The tongues of Angels are said to be not those which are perceived by sense, but those which are perceived by understanding, through which they both praise the God of all and discourse among themselves.* But praise and disputation are acts of the intellect; therefore the intellect itself is the tongue of an Angel, and consequently its act is speech. Bede, in book 2 on Job, chapter 7, on those words, *If he suddenly appears*, etc., says concerning Angels, *what they will, they immediately announce*. But to announce

is an action of the intellect. And this opinion can also be persuaded by reason, because to speak is to express and signify one's own concept, or other known things, or it is to command, or to ask and petition, all of which pertain to the intellect.

4. *The proposed explanation is rejected.* But this opinion is not pleasing for many reasons. First, it supposes that the speech of one Angel to another consists in an act purely immanent in the speaking Angel, without any action that passes to the hearer, and consequently that an Angel does not have the power to arouse another by his speech to hear, because by an immanent act, as such, he cannot arouse another, but only denominate him extrinsically; and accordingly the said author admits this consequence. The consequent is against St. Thomas, and indeed against reason, as we shall see below. Second, that opinion supposes that thoughts of the intellect are, of themselves and by their nature, manifest to all Angels, and consequently that speech among Angels does not take place of itself for manifesting the thoughts of the intellect to others, but for the acts of the will alone, and is a necessary manifestation. But this is false; therefore so also is the assertion. The major is proved, because if an Angel speaks to another by his thought and by the word of his mind, either that word is hidden from the other Angel, or manifest of itself. If the first is said, another intellectual word will be necessary for manifesting it, and the same question will return concerning that other word, and there will be an infinite regress. But if that word is known of itself to other Angels, for the same reason every other word, or thought of the mind, will be known to others, and consequently no speech will be necessary for its manifestation. But it could be said that direct concepts of the mind about things themselves are hidden from other Angels, and are manifested through speech, but reflected concepts about prior direct concepts, or about acts of the will, are not hidden, but are known by all Angels. But this distinction is given gratuitously, because there is no greater reason concerning some thoughts than concerning others, nor do Scripture or the Fathers distinguish between these, but speak generally. Therefore either all must be said to be hidden, or all to be of themselves known to others, by interpreting Scripture and the Fathers otherwise. And thus consequently that author concedes this, laying this foundation for declaring that opinion. And consequently he says that one Angel can speak to another about the thoughts of the mind, not so as to manifest them anew, but so that on his part he may order them to another; but it is otherwise concerning affections of the will, because they cannot be known by another unless they are manifested through speech. But this foundation has been sufficiently disproved by us.

5. And besides, I argue third: for from that it follows that speech about the thoughts of the mind, although it is not impossible among Angels with regard to that direction or ordering, is useless and idle, because it can have no utility in them; but speech without utility is idle. The assumption is explained, because when a man speaks to another about a thing known to that other, he does this either because he is unaware that it is known to him, or so that he may declare it better, or understand it, or be made more certain about it through another, or so that he may move another to consideration, or certainly for some other similar utility, if any can exist. But none of these has place among Angels, especially according to that opinion, because if the thoughts of the intellect of all the others are known to Angels, none of the others can be ignorant of his thought, or know it imperfectly, or need confirmation or greater certainty, since he knows that he can see it intuitively and perfectly in itself; for we are treating of speech precisely as it is distinguished from illumination. But the utility of arousing another to consideration of a thing which he can know of himself has no place among Angels, according to the said opinion. Therefore such speech is altogether useless and idle.

6. *An objection against the preceding third argument is met.* You will say that by this argument speech to God would be proved idle. I respond that it is not similar, for speech to God in man, if it is made by sensible voice, has many utilities with respect to that same man. For through that speech he is aroused to greater attention of mind and affection of heart, and through it he offers worship and reverence to God. But if it is made by the pure mind, it is made rather by acts of the will and the intellect, by which the soul subjects itself to God and acknowledges its dependence on him, and therefore such speech is most fitting and most useful, both intellectually, so to speak, and morally. But among Angels among themselves, either these utilities are not found, or certainly they are not considered in speech, but it is made of itself for communicating their concepts and counsels among themselves, as Damascene said, book 2, *De Fide*, chapter 3. Hence, just as the Fathers teach that thoughts of the mind are of themselves hidden from Angels, so, when they speak of their communication or speech, they certainly suppose that it is free to speakers, not only with regard to the intention or direction that is done voluntarily, but also with regard to their manifestation; and for this end they chiefly posit speech among Angels. And thus St. Thomas, quest. 109, art. 1, says that speech among Angels occurs *so that the concept of one mind may become known to another*, and in reply to the first he says that *when an Angel wills to manifest his concept to another, it is*

immediately known by the other, supposing that before this the other did not know it, and that this is ordered to the other so that it can be known by him.

7. *Evasion.—It is attacked.* Fourth, from that opinion it follows that an Angel cannot know his own affection, proposal, or intention of will without manifesting those acts to others. The consequent seems absurd; therefore. The consequence is clear, because by the very fact that an Angel has that quasi-reflective cognition of the acts of his will, that thought is of itself known to all, because in it, as in a natural sign, the object of the same cognition is known, according to that opinion. But that object is an internal act of the will; therefore by the very fact that it is known reflectively, that act is manifested to others. But if someone says that it is indeed manifested objectively, but speech has not yet occurred about it, because ordering is lacking, this does not solve but increases the difficulty. First, because it follows that the interior acts of the will become known by an Angel without speech, which is against all and against the nature of hidden acts. Second, also because that ordering adds nothing pertaining to the arousal of another's mind, nor to the manifestation of the act, as far as it is of itself, as that author concedes. Hence it pertains more to a certain moral denomination and consideration than to physical speech, as I shall explain below. But the minor, or that the consequent is absurd, is proved because an act of the will is so unknown that, without the consent of that same will, it cannot be known by others outside God.

8. *Escape.—It is disproved.* You will say that by the very fact that an Angel wills to think about his affection and know it reflectively, he ought to make it known, even if he does not will to, because that will is efficacious, at least virtually, since the Angel is not unaware that by the very fact that he thinks about his effect, that thought can be known by others, and through it the affection itself also; but the other nilling will only be able to be inefficacious and in a certain respect, namely, I would not wish it. But indeed this itself is a great inconvenience, and foreign to the manner of speaking of Scripture and the Fathers treated above, namely, that a man or Angel could not consider his desire, or an internal proposal of the will, or a present or past affection, without its being able to be known by a demon, even against the man's will. Indeed, from this it further follows that, speaking ordinarily and regularly, a demon knows the interior desires and consents of men, which cannot be said. The consequence is proved, because a man can scarcely desire without noticing and knowing his desire, nor can he consent interiorly without noticing that he consents. For before a man consents, he thinks about consenting, and therefore, as if by a natural necessity, while he gives consent, at the same time or

consequently he knows that he consents. A sign of this is the memory that is left of the preceding consent, for unless it were known when present, it could not be left in memory. Therefore by almost the same natural necessity, or at least moral necessity, a demon would know the internal assents and sins of man, which I judge most absurd.

9. Fifth, that opinion is very displeasing because it consequently says that one Angel cannot manifest the secret of his heart, or his affections, to another without manifesting them to all, although he is not said to speak to all if he directs his concept to one alone. And so, to explain in our way, an Angel will not be able to speak to another except publicly, and in the manner in which we speak in a loud voice before many, and consequently by necessarily permitting others to hear, if they wish. That author also accordingly concedes this. And the consequence is clear, because an Angel cannot speak about an act of his will unless he thinks about it reflectively; but this reflected cognition is known to all by its nature, and when it is known, its object is known, according to that opinion. Therefore he who thus speaks to someone necessarily manifests his act to all, and as to the physical thing, with a certain equality, because he does not arouse one more than another, since he arouses no one, nor does he manifest his affection to all otherwise than in such a sign. There will only be a moral difference, or a difference in extrinsic denomination, which arises from the intention of manifesting the act to one rather than to another; and this certainly has little bearing on the character of a hidden or secret act. But that the consequent must not be admitted, because it is contrary not only to the common doctrine but also to right reason, we shall show below. Sixth, we can argue that if angelic speech had to be made through some interior act that is naturally known to other Angels through itself, it would be much more easily, and with fewer inconveniences, attributed to an act of the will than to an act of the intellect, as I shall explain in the following opinion.

10. *To the contrary foundation in number three.—To the words of Theophylact.* Nor is the foundation of the contrary opinion solid. First, because although we grant that the speech of an Angel is an act of the intellect, it does not follow that it is an act naturally known to others without the will and consent of the one having it, nor does it follow that it becomes known to others without a special ordering, or even without a voluntary efficiency of the speaker. Then it can easily be denied that the intellect, and not the will, is the tongue of the Angel. For speech to God that is purely mental either is made by the will alone, or certainly is not made without it; and it principally consists in it, as I declared in book 1, on Prayer, chapters 4 and 5. Hence the same can easily be

said of Angels. Nor do the sacred doctors who are cited signify the contrary. For the words of Theophylact, according to the version corrected by Philip Montanus, read thus: *Moreover, the tongue of Angels is intellectual, namely that power by which they mutually impart to themselves the understanding of divine things and divine thoughts.* There he treats, not in general, but in particular, of that speech which is illumination, about which we shall speak expressly in book four. Yet the words can be understood universally with proportion. But in them he does not say that the tongue is the intellect itself, but that it *is intellectual*, that is, spiritual and of another order than a bodily tongue; just as we are accustomed to say of the will that it is not a sensible appetite, but an intellectual appetite. And thus, although the tongue of an Angel is his will, it will also be an intellectual tongue and will be *the power by which Angels mutually impart thought to themselves*. In these last words, moreover, I note in passing that by them it is signified that this tongue is not some power naturally communicating, or representing what it signifies, but is a power voluntarily and freely conveying the thoughts and meanings of one to another. For the word itself *imparting* signifies this mode of communication.

11. *To the words of Theodoret in the same number three.—To the saying of Bede.* And Theodoret speaks in the same way when he says that *the tongues of Angels are perceived by understanding*; for this is general, since the will too is perceived by understanding. But concerning the praise of God, I said in the said chapter 5 of the first book, on Prayer, that purely mental praise is presupposed to speech, and is an acknowledgment by the intellect of divine excellence; but it is constituted in the character of speech, with respect to God, by the affection of the will by which such acknowledgment is made so that, as far as is on our part, it becomes known to him; but with respect to an Angel, by that act in which speech among Angels exists, whether it belongs to the intellect or to the will, as I explained more fully there. But Theodoret speaks of the praise of God as Angels communicate it among themselves through speech, and thus it can easily be attributed to the will. The same must be understood proportionally concerning disputation, because disputation in itself, inasmuch as it consists in a certain inquiry or judgment, is a work of the intellect; nevertheless, inasmuch as it is communicated through speech, it can belong to the will with regard to execution, although it is directed by reason. Finally, although Bede says that Angels immediately announce what they will, he does not say that this announcement is something distinct from the will. Indeed, a little earlier he had said, *whose*, that is, the Angels', *conversation I judge to have been a certain mobile agreement of wills*, etc. Therefore these Fathers are cited in vain, since they speak

almost indifferently of intellect and will, because in reality each power concurs, and they do not dispute subtly in which of them speech properly is, although they exclude the necessity of sensible signs. But what especially pertains to the matter, they also intend and teach, namely, that this speech occurs among Angels in order to manifest among themselves what was hidden, and that this does not happen without the consent of the will.

12. *Second explanation of the first general opinion, that speech occurs by direction of concepts.—The author's judgment concerning the mind of Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Albert, and Henry.* This opinion, then, being set aside, the second is very celebrated in the schools. It teaches that one Angel speaks to another only by ordering his concept to another through the will, that is, by willing that another understand his free affection or his thought. For by this will alone that which was previously hidden becomes open to the other Angel, and therefore it can at once be seen by him through the species which he has as concreated, which suffices for speech. Hence, according to this opinion, angelic speech does not concur of itself with the hearing of another, but only as removing an impediment. This is the opinion of Capreolus, in 2, distinction 11, quest. 1, where he declares it especially in conclusion 3 and in the solutions to the arguments. Cajetan follows, 1 part, quest. 107, art. 1, and many modern Thomists. It is also usually attributed to Alexander of Hales, 2 part, quest. 27, member 6. But there he only affirms that angelic speech occurs by nods, and declares that these nods are not something distinct from the concept of the speaking Angel, as ordered to another by the will. But in what way these nods come to the knowledge of another he does not explain there, nor does he deny that the speaking Angel impresses something upon the hearer; and what he thought elsewhere we shall say below. Bonaventure is also cited, 2, distinction 10, quest. 1, and he can seem especially to favor this in the solution to the penultimate argument. Yet if he is read attentively, he teaches the contrary, as I shall show below. Nor does Albert think otherwise, though he too is cited for this side in the second part, tractate 9, quest. 35, article 2. Henry is also cited, *Quodlibet* 5, quest. 15, but he speaks so diffusely and obscurely that his mind is scarcely perceived, and therefore I pass him over.

13. *On what this second explanation is founded, or what it supposes.* This explanation, or opinion, supposes first that one Angel can effect nothing in the intellect of another, standing precisely within the order of nature, to which speech pertains. Second, it supposes that an Angel has innate species through which he can understand these acts, if they are not hidden by another. Third, it supposes that these acts are hidden as long as he does not will them to be seen

by another, because that nilling is as it were the veil by which they are hidden. Hence they conclude that speech is made through the will alone of the speaking Angel, because by ordering his act to another through it, the Angel removes the impediment that hides it. Cajetan confirms this, because an act ordered to another through that will pertains to the one to whom it is directed; therefore this is enough for it to be able to be known by him, because each Angel can know those things that pertain to him.

14. *Durandus explains the aforesaid direction otherwise.* Durandus seems to follow this opinion, 2, distinction 11, quest. 2, number 12, but he speaks in a far different sense. For he thinks that the thoughts of the heart are not hidden from Angels, and consequently that speech among Angels is not necessary in order that one manifest his concepts or affections to another. For another can know them of himself, but speech occurs only so that one Angel may direct his acts to another. For this, the will of the speaking Angel suffices, even if he does nothing in the other. Durandus confirms this opinion by two signs. One is taken from speech among men. For if Peter speaks in a loud voice to John before many, he is not said to speak to all, but only to John, even if others hear and understand the same voice, because Peter directs his discourse only to John, although from that direction no greater alteration occurs in John than in the other bystanders. Therefore likewise, in order that an Angel be said to speak especially to someone, it is enough that he order his acts to him and not to others, even though the others know them equally. The other argument is that we speak to God, although all our acts are open to him, and this speech occurs only through the spiritual direction of our acts to God. Therefore Angels will be able to do the same among themselves. We can add a third argument, because we speak to Angels and to the Saints, in whom we do nothing and whom we do not alter, but by ordering our acts to them. Therefore the same can exist among Angels among themselves. Finally, other doctors too, who say that Angels have an intrinsic natural power to see acts of the heart, yet in fact are not permitted to see them because they do not have God's concurrence ready, could easily consent to this opinion by saying that God gives concurrence to an Angel by the very fact that another, through the will, orders his act to him; and consequently, through this ordering, one Angel speaks to another without efficiency in him, but because he immediately becomes simply able to see such acts, because he then has God's concurrence, which previously was denied to him.

15. *Durandus is rejected.* Nevertheless, to begin with this latter opinion, it supposes a false foundation, namely that acts of the heart are known to Angels by their nature, and especially known in fact, as Durandus thinks. Once this

foundation is removed, his opinion collapses, and the examples are not to the point, because they lack the likeness that is supposed in the argument. And besides, the first example assumes what is false in strictness. For really and physically, one who speaks in a loud voice before many speaks to all, even if he does not direct his discourse to all. This is proved, because that speech is in reality supposed to be about a thing hidden from all the hearers, and consequently through that speech a thing previously unknown is manifested to all. But that manifestation does not occur without a signification of the hidden thing that suffices to alter all those present, even if the discourse is not directed to all from the speaker's intention. Therefore that signification does not occur without speech to all, because speech is nothing other than an expression of the mind through some sign sufficient for giving another knowledge of a hidden thing. And lest perhaps the question be about the name, one could say that he who speaks thus speaks to all by a physical character, although by moral consideration he is said to speak especially to the one to whom he directly orders his discourse. For for physical speech with respect to all, it is enough to will to speak in a loud voice, which can both alter all and be understood by all, whether the speaker intends to be heard by all or merely permits this, for this is accidental to physical speech. And this is clear, because when he speaks, all the others truly and physically hear from him; therefore he also speaks physically to all. For these are correlatives. Therefore the special intention of ordering discourse to another person is necessary only for the moral mode of speaking to another.

16. *A further attack against Durandus and the remaining authors of the second explanation.* In addition, the mere direction of a concept through the will does not suffice for speech unless signification and speech are presupposed, upon which that intention and direction fall, as one may consider in the example itself. But according to Durandus's opinion, no speech is presupposed to that ordering, because no signification of one's own act, nor any expression or declaration, nor alteration of another occurs by force of that will. Rather there is only a certain consent or special complacency in this, that another sees acts that he sees of himself and by his own power. But this does not seem to suffice for speech, since the substance of speech consists in signification, while direction adds only a moral respect, as I have declared. And this reason also seems to proceed against the opinion of the Thomists. For according to it, too, no signification or expression of the mind is given, but only consent of the will concerning the other's cognition.

17. *It is further argued against both.* And a certain argument from the preceding opinion can be applied against both opinions, because it follows that angelic speech is an act of the will and not of the intellect, which seems foreign to reason, because to express a concept does not belong to the will but to the intellect; indeed even to express an affection is said to belong to the intellect, and therefore command and prayer are believed to be acts of the intellect. But to this the said authors, especially Durandus, will respond that there is a twofold speech: one expressing the hidden mind, another only ordering one's own act to another, even if otherwise it is known to him. The reason given proceeds concerning the former, but not concerning the latter. And the reason can be given, because the former speech is ordered to manifesting a hidden thing, and that manifestation cannot occur except through some signs, and thus it happens in human speech. But the other speech is ordered only to showing affection toward another, by voluntarily subjecting one's own acts to his cognition, which can occur through an act of the will alone without another sign. And therefore, although the former speech pertains to the intellect, the latter can occur through the will. And to confirm this there is an excellent example from speech to God, concerning which we conceded both in the first book on Prayer, chapters 4 and 5, and Scotus teaches it openly in 2, distinction 9, quest. 2, to the first argument of the second question; nor can it be understood otherwise.

18. *It is intercepted insofar as it could be brought forward for Durandus.—Likewise insofar as it could be brought forward for the others.* Nevertheless, although this is rightly said concerning speech to God, the same reason does not seem to hold concerning angelic speech. And first against Durandus, because an Angel does not speak to another about a thing known to him, but about a hidden thing, since according to sound doctrine the internal acts of the speaking Angel are not known to the rest; and therefore it is necessary that through speech they be manifested to them. This is otherwise concerning God, as is evident of itself. Then against the former opinion, because in it the example concerning God has no place, because both we and Angels speak to God about a thing known to him; and therefore we can speak to God only through this, that we voluntarily subject our heart to his knowledge, willing that it be open to him and, as far as is in us, desiring to give him knowledge of our acts, if it could be done, as Scotus rightly said above. Hence that speech can not badly be said to be more in affection than in effect. But one Angel speaks to another about a thing hidden and unknown to him, speaking of itself. For although sometimes they can also speak about a thing already known to both, as also happens among men, that is accidental, and how it occurs we shall say below. But now we are

treating of speech concerning internal acts, which are of themselves hidden, as the said authors suppose with us. Therefore, with respect to them, speech in affection does not suffice, but it ought to be in effect, and therefore it does not seem to consist in the will alone of ordering an act to be known, but it is necessary that the manifestation of the act intervene, and that the ordering of the will fall immediately upon the manifestation of the act, not upon the act itself. But manifestation is the same as speech. Therefore it is not the ordering itself of the will, but is something middle between the will, through which speech is ordered to another person, and the act that is manifested through speech.

19. *Likewise another escape.* But nevertheless the said authors can respond that although an Angel speaks to another by manifesting to him his own acts, hidden from him, nevertheless through the will alone ordering the act to another, so that it be known by him, speech is sufficiently made, without another signification or expression of the act intervening. And the reason is that the speech of an Angel to another does not occur so that the other may acquire a principle for understanding a thing previously hidden, as happens among men, but occurs so that the veil that was hiding the thought of the speaking Angel may be removed. For the other to whom speech is made already had sufficient principles for knowing that act once the impediment is removed. But this impediment or veil was nothing but the will of the Angel, not willing, or at least not yet willing, that another know his acts. And therefore that very will by which one Angel wills his acts to another both is speech, not expressing the act, but removing the impediment. And the same response would have place according to the opinion that posits the impediment in the negation of concurrence, if it is supposed to be God's law that at the consent of the speaker he immediately supplies his concurrence.

20. But this response indeed would give no satisfaction, if I could grasp what it supposes; and I would easily concede that speech, on the part of an Angel, is an act of the will, as I said above. For the will can also order its own act, or an act of the intellect, to another, and can also remove an impediment that intervenes only on its own part. But what this opinion supposes, namely that acts of the heart are hidden from an Angel by the veil of the will alone of the one whose acts they are, cannot be understood, as was seen above by Scotus, and by Durandus and most others, to whom Cano among the Thomists has been added, whom Vasquez reports and follows, and Cumel also agrees. And this has been proved by us above. For either that impediment exists only by a pact of God, who does not will to concur with the others for knowing until the one

whose acts they are wills; and this was refuted above against Scotus. Or it exists from the nature of the thing and the intrinsic efficacy of free will; and this seems plainly impossible.

21. First, because it supposes that an act of the heart is an object actually intelligible of itself by any angelic intellect, and that this intellect has the species of it, with sufficient light for knowing that act, if it is not impeded. Therefore it cannot be understood that it is impeded by the will alone of another. The consequence is proved, both because such a will neither alters the object nor binds the power of another nor works anything outside itself. How, then, can it either hide such an object or impede another from understanding it? Also because such hiding is said to occur sufficiently not only through a contrary nilling, but even through the mere lack of the will ordering the act to another, which seems much more repugnant. But if mere nilling or the lack of will cannot be a veil, certainly neither can the mere ordering will be speech, because it cannot remove the veil, since it can only exclude either the privation of itself or a contrary nilling. Hence we also argue directly, because that will does not make the act that it orders to another more intelligible, since it adds to it only an extrinsic denomination or relation of reason, nor does it increase in others the power or principle of understanding, as the said authors suppose. Therefore by that will alone it cannot formally be brought about that an act ceases to be hidden and becomes not hidden.

22. Second, I argue from Scotus above, because otherwise one Angel could hide his substance from another and make himself invisible to another, which we taught above to be false. And similarly he could hide his power or habit, which Marsilius concedes in the said quest. 6, art. 2. And certainly, consequently, if hiding occurs by the will alone from the nature of the thing, because in a certain way a second act is more intelligible than a first act, then if, notwithstanding this, an act can be hidden, why not a habit? But the consequent is absolutely false, as we also saw above. And certainly the reason is no other than that the will alone does not suffice to hide an intelligible object from one who has its species along with the power of understanding. Third, there is another principal reason against that opinion, because through angelic speech another is not only permitted to know the act about which the speech occurs, but is also aroused to hearing and knowing it. But this arousal cannot occur through the mere extrinsic ordering of another Angel, for this posits nothing in the other. But arousal cannot be understood without some intrinsic motion of the one who is aroused. But this reason must be treated expressly in what follows.

23. *To the three things that were supposed as foundation in number thirteen.—To the confirmation from Cajetan in the same place.* To the foundation of the contrary opinion it is responded that it is not solid. For first of all, its second supposition is false, as we said above; and a little later we shall show that the first is also false. But the third, insofar as it says that the acts of one Angel are hidden from others as long as he does not will them to be manifest to others, is most true; but insofar as it says that they are formally hidden or manifested through the will alone, it too is false, as we have proved. To the confirmation from Cajetan, the principle that he assumes can be denied, namely that by the will alone of one ordering his act to another, that act pertains to the one to whom it is ordered. For that word *pertains* is very general and equivocal, and by explaining the various relations that it can import, the principle will be found either false or irrelevant. For it can be understood to pertain to another as his act, and this is false; or as an object already proportioned to his natural knowledge, without any impediment, and in this sense it begs the question and, formally speaking, is false, as we have proved; or it is said to pertain to him because it is concerned with him, and in this way it is irrelevant, because this is not enough for the act to be knowable by another Angel. For a thought about him, or love of him, or suspicion about his affairs, etc., also pertains to him, and yet is not enough for it to be known by him. But what Cajetan adds there, namely that merely because an act ordered to another is among the things pertaining to him, it has the power of arousing him while positing nothing in him, because the things divided among lower beings are united among higher beings, is very obscure, both in the assertion and in the reason, and almost unbelievable. Concerning the assertion this is clear, both from the discourse and division made, and also because the arousal at issue is something prior to cognition and adds something beyond the intelligibility of the object, or objective capacity, and it is not in the object but in the one who is aroused. Therefore if it posits nothing in him, there certainly can be no arousal. Concerning the reason, this is clear, because it contributes nothing at all to the present matter. For granted that intellectual power and speech have in a more eminent mode the things that are in sensible speech and cognition, nevertheless they ought truly and formally to have the things that belong to the nature of speech that arouses another to hear; otherwise there will not be true and formal arousal.

Some explanations of the Second General Opinion Brought Forward in Number One are Examined.

24. *First explanation of Scotus, that speech occurs as though by sending outward.* The first explanation of the opinion maintaining that speech occurs through some efficiency in the hearer is that it occurs, so to speak, by sending outward, because an Angel speaks to another by effecting in the hearer a second act of understanding the thing about which speech occurs, whether it is about an act of the will or intellect of the speaker himself, or about an extrinsic thing, so that with respect to that act by which the thing that the speaker hands on is known by the hearer, the hearer is only passive. And thus this opinion distinguishes between hearing and speech as between action and passion. For it is the same quality or motion which, as it proceeds from the speaker, is speech, but as it is received in the hearer, is hearing. Hence it also says that speech, as speech, does not constitute an understanding one, but as hearing it formally renders one understanding; and therefore hearing, as such, will be a certain act of understanding, differing in this from other proper intellections, which are called visions or simple cognitions, because those are elicited by those understanding, but proper hearing is not. This was the opinion of Scotus, 2, distinction 9, quest. 2, § *To that question*, and Cajetan, Capreolus, and all the Thomists report it in this way.

25. *Scotus is excused by Herrera.—The excuse is rejected.—Foundation of the aforesaid first explanation.* Nevertheless Herrera, since he cannot defend that opinion in this sense, excuses Scotus, saying that he did not say that the hearing Angel is merely passive with respect to the act by which he knows and understands that another speaks, but only that he is passive with respect to the speech, because it is necessary that the speaker's word be received from the speaker, at least in some species of it. But Scotus, in the said §, speaks clearly enough about the very act of knowing, which he says is impressed by the speaker and only received by the hearer. And in § *To the further point*, he says more expressly that the speaker can sometimes cause only an act of understanding in the hearer, and sometimes cause both act and species, although sometimes he produces only the species, as he explains more fully there. And Bassolus also understood Scotus in this way, 2, distinction 9, quest. 2, to 1, near the end, and he tries to defend him, although in responding to the arguments he plainly indicates that he does not satisfy himself. Hence he

concludes, *If this does not suffice, I see no other escape.* The foundation of this opinion is that speech can occur in this way, which is most perfect. The antecedent is proved, because the speaking Angel is sufficiently active with respect to such cognition, and the other is sufficiently passive; but one who speaks acts as far as he can in order to express his concept, and the other understands the thing better in this way, as it is known by the speaker. Therefore.

26. But this opinion is disproved by the remaining authors, as can be seen in Ockham, in 2, quest. 20, and in *Quodlibet* 1, quest. 2, Gabriel, 2, distinction 9, quest. 2, art. 4, Capreolus, Cajetan, and others. Gregory and Vasquez especially attack it and multiply various reasons. But I omit those to which Scotus perhaps could give satisfaction. Therefore the chief reason against him is that he affirms without cause and without foundation that the cognition of the hearing Angel concerning the thing narrated to him occurs by mere receiving; for this is against the intrinsic nature of a vital act, such as cognition is, as we shall often say in the treatise on the Soul and in 1, 2. Hence more and graver theologians judge that it is so repugnant for someone to understand by an act merely received and not elicited by himself that even by absolute power it involves contradiction. But others, although they do not admit this, at least deny that it can occur naturally, and in this almost all doctors agree. And it is almost evident of itself, since we cannot conceive either actual cognition or love without vital motion, or a motion of life without efficiency. This at minimum evidently indicates that the connatural mode of knowing is by effecting in oneself the motion or act of knowing. But in the speech of Angels cognition occurs in a connatural mode and without miracles. Therefore it is not likely that it occurs without the efficiency of the hearer.

27. *Second reason.* Moreover, it is argued against Scotus that either the speaking Angel effects cognition in the hearer through the act that he has of knowing the thing about which he speaks, or through the species of the same object. Not the first, because an immanent act is not a principle for operating another's act; otherwise by the love of myself which I have in myself, I could effect love of myself in another, and similar things, which are plainly absurd. Hence Scotus does not choose this part, but the other, concerning the species. Against this I also argue, because either he understands that the intelligible species alone existing in the mind of the speaker is the efficient principle of the act of knowing in the hearer, and this is impossible, because a species alone is not a sufficient principle of an act in the very one who has it, therefore much less in another; or he understands that the intellect of the hearer, assisted by the

species that is in the speaker, effects the act in the hearer. And this is repugnant to Scotus himself, because now the hearer would concur actively, and not merely passively, with that act. And besides, it is easily attacked from what was said above, because the species must be united to the power so that the power can cooperate with it, which we shall also confirm a little later. Or the meaning is that the speaker, through his intellect, effects the intellection of the hearer, and this too is proved false on the part of the intellective power. First, because the intellect is not a power active by a vital and physical action upon another power, but upon itself by an immanent action, because it does not act in order to communicate itself, but for its own perfection, as is known by experience and as almost a first principle in philosophy. Second, because otherwise the said absurdities follow, namely that the will of one could effect an act of loving in another's will, and similar things.

28. *Third reason ad hominem.—Attention is operation.* I argue further ad hominem, because Scotus himself says that if a superior Angel is actually considering one thing, and an inferior wishes to speak to him about another by impressing cognition upon him, he will not be able, because he can neither distract the other from his consideration, nor will the other be able to have both cognitions at once. Therefore he supposes that the hearing Angel ought to concur actively with the act of hearing. For if hearing consisted only in the reception of an act, an Angel could at once receive many acts of knowing from many speakers, and hear all at once, and besides consider another thing by himself, because there is no repugnance in pure reception, if otherwise the forms are not contrary to each other. Therefore if this is repugnant, it is because of the necessity of attention, which cannot exist at once concerning many things in a way to be treated below. But attention, if it adds anything besides reception, can only be an action or cooperation of the power; for what else can be understood? Therefore hearing requires some cooperation of the power of the hearer; therefore it does not occur through the efficiency of another's intellect.

29. *The foundation of the Scotistic opinion in number twenty-five is destroyed.* Hence it is clear that Scotus's foundation concerning sufficient and proximate active and passive principles, etc., is weak. For once that is granted in a sound sense, it is denied that it is found here, because the intellect is not active upon another, but upon itself, nor passive from another as to the act of knowing, but only from itself. Nor is proximity sufficient for this action; rather identity between active and passive is necessary, because it is intrinsically immanent. Nor is the difference that Scotus assigns between intellectual hearing and vision necessary, both because Augustine, book 15, *De Trinitate*, chapter 10, teaches

that hearing and vision are not distinguished in the intellect, and because, although they can be accidentally distinguished, it is not necessary that they differ in the efficiency of the knower. For just as they agree in the character of cognition or intellection, so it is necessary that they be alike in emanation from an intrinsic active principle. Therefore they will be able to be distinguished either in the mode of knowing the thing in another's mind or in itself, or in the principle of knowing through an innate species or one received from the speaker, as we shall now explain.

30. *Second explanation, that speech occurs by generating in the hearer a principle of knowing, the Angel speaking to another by impressing a species upon him.* Therefore the second principal exposition of the opinion is that an Angel speaks to another by giving him a species or principle of knowing the act about which he speaks to him. This opinion is held by Alexander of Hales, 2 part, quest. 27, members 3 and 5. Bonaventure is of the same opinion, in 2, distinction 10, art. 3, quest. 1, for he says *that in Angels speech adds an effect or respect above thought. For since that thought is secret by its nature, it is not made manifest unless the one thinking offers something to another as to a hearer, and by opening himself causes what he has within himself, as if by the mediation of a certain nod, to reach the intellect of another as to an ear.* And explaining this further, he says that what the speaking Angel offers to the hearer is not a sensible sign, and therefore it does not need a medium, because *just as the angelic intellect of the hearer is of itself apt to receive, so the other is apt to offer; and therefore for speaking*, he says, *the intelligible species itself suffices for the Angel, which from the intellective power of that Angel himself, through the force of the will, can be extended to another.* What, I ask, is "to be extended," if not to be extended and communicated through efficiency? For it cannot be extended materially. And therefore he had said that the hearer receives something from the speaker, on account of which he also adds below that although this extension occurs without a medium, because it is spiritual, nevertheless it requires a determinate distance, obviously because of efficiency; otherwise he would require a determinate limit of distance in vain. Richard agrees, distinction 9, art. 2, quest. 1, although concerning the mode in which an Angel receives such a species, he has a singular and plainly inexplicable opinion, which has no bearing on the present matter, but will be treated below. Aureolus hands this down more expressly and distinctly in the same distinction 9, quest. 1, arts. 1 and 4. Scotus can also be counted for this opinion, for although he says that the speaking Angel impresses upon another an act of knowing, nevertheless he adds that he at least impresses a species when he cannot produce the act; and

Bassolus follows the same. But Herrera, as I said, interprets him as speaking only of the production of a species, and hence he is altogether in this opinion, which some modern expositors of St. Thomas, especially Cumel and Pesantius, follow.

31. *Ockham and Gabriel seem to be of the same opinion.—The difference between Ockham and Gabriel themselves and the others is rejected.—The aforesaid second explanation brought forward in the preceding number is admitted and is clarified through the following assertions.* And not without reason it can in some way be attributed to Ockham, in 2, quest. 20, and *Quodlibet* 1, quest. 7, and to Gabriel, 2, distinction 9, quest. 2, art. 4, insofar as they say that an Angel speaks to another by showing him his thought, which he shows by effecting, as through an object, cognition of it in the other hearing Angel, while he himself cooperates and coeffects his act. For these agree with the preceding authors in this, that the speaker effects something in the hearer, and likewise in this, that he in some way coeffects the act of the hearer through his word which he has in himself. But they differ because they do not posit an intermediate species, but immediate efficiency of the speaker's act upon the hearer's act, as of an object upon knowledge. This difference arises from another, foundational difference concerning intentional species. For these nominalists think that the extrinsic objects themselves can concur with the powers for cognition of themselves without the intervention of species; and therefore the said authors do not require a species, although they demand the efficiency of the object for speech. But nevertheless what they suppose is false, as has already been shown in treating of species. Hence, by the same reason by which one Angel cannot through his substance, as through an intelligible object, effect in another cognition of himself, even partially or by cooperating with the other's intellect, so neither through his concept or love as through an intelligible object can he immediately effect cognition of his own act in another. For the reason is the same, since in both cases the object is extrinsic and is not united to the power nor subordinated to it as is necessary for eliciting cognition. In addition, on that opinion it would consequently have to be said either that an Angel speaking to another imposes necessity on him for eliciting cognition of his act, or certainly that he cannot arouse him, nor be conjoined with him of himself, but only as if by chance, for eliciting such cognition. The consequence is manifest of itself and from what was said above. But each is quite inconvenient, as will be clear to one considering easily. Therefore, setting aside this opinion as to its peculiar mode, the preceding opinion, concerning the impression of a species, which has always pleased me, must gradually be declared and confirmed.

32. *First conclusion.—Angelic speech occurs through arousal by the speaker.* I say, therefore, first. One Angel does not speak to another merely by permitting him to see his acts, but also by arousing him to hear. This assertion belongs to St. Thomas, 1 part, quest. 107, art. 1, argument 3 with the solution. For the argument was: *the speaker arouses another to hear*, etc. But the response is that in the blessed Angels, because of the clear vision of God, arousal is not necessary; nevertheless it is necessary from the nature of the thing, either among Angels considered in pure nature or among demons. Add that even among the blessed it would be necessary if they spoke among themselves about a thing that they do not see in the Word, for then they do not speak as blessed. And in this all the cited authors agree, nor could Cajetan deny it, as we shall see below. Vasquez alone was compelled to deny it, because he could not otherwise either defend his own opinion or attack ours. But this foundation is very consonant with the Scriptures, for in the Prophets one Angel is often said to cry to another, as in Isaiah 6: *Seraphim cried one to another*; and in Revelation 7, one Angel *cried with a great voice to the four Angels*, saying: *Do not*, etc., as if commanding them; and similar is that in Zechariah 2: *Run*, etc. Likewise one questions another, as the Saints expound that passage of Isaiah 63: *Who is this who comes from Edom*, etc., and that of Psalm 23: *Lift up the gates*, etc., *Who is this King of glory?*, which the Fathers expound concerning the questions of the holy Angels. But these and similar things, which are read in the Prophets, cannot be understood without some arousal of one toward another.

33. *The response to the cited passages is insufficient.* Nor does it matter that in those passages Angels are introduced as speaking in assumed bodies, because, as I have already said, these things are narrated as done by Angels with sensible voices and in assumed bodies so that they could be heard and seen by men; yet through them it is signified to us how Angels administer human affairs by conversing among themselves, calling, commanding, asking, and the like. Certainly these things are not intelligible if one cannot arouse another to hear his voice or cry. You will say that similar things are said of men or Angels with respect to God, for we cry to the Lord and our cry ascends to him. Likewise we petition, ask, invoke, etc. Therefore, just as these things occur toward God without active arousal in him, so they will be able to occur among Angels. I respond that there is no likeness. For God always watches and attends, and therefore he does not need formal arousal, so to speak, in himself, but objective arousal in us, because as soon as it occurs he necessarily sees it, or rather has foreseen it from eternity. But Angels do not always consider all things, nor do they necessarily attend, even if the object exists as open of itself and apt to be

known. Therefore, in order that they can be called, questioned, commanded, and the like, some force of provoking them to attend is necessary.

34. *It is persuaded by reason.* And from this the reason for the assertion is manifest, because for the same end for which speech is necessary among Angels, arousal is equally necessary. For speech has been given to them so that they may have a political society and commonwealth, so to speak, among themselves, as we said above. But this speech will be defective and most imperfect for that end unless it has the power of arousing. Therefore. The minor is proved, because, excluding arousal, however much one superior Angel strives to intimate his affection to another, of himself he will not be able to do so, but it will be by chance if the other attends, or at most if he takes care to attend to another, whether that other proposes something new to him. Indeed, even in this way the Angel who is going to hear will not be able to apply his mind to such an act or such an act, because it would be necessary to will to use the species of such and such an act, and not of others. But he has no motive principle by which his will may be determined to this; therefore attention to such an act will always be by chance. But this is very repugnant to the perfection and governance of angelic society, considering its pure nature. This is explained from a likeness: if men could speak to others only by written signs, but could not in any way apply or arouse their eyes to reading the writing, human speech and society would thereby be very imperfect and defective. Indeed, in that example, men would surpass Angels, because beyond written signs they could by nods and bodily movements either apply those signs to sight or impel men to look at them; and nevertheless that mode of communication would be very imperfect if they could not directly and immediately arouse the mind by words. Therefore much more imperfect would the society of Angels be if it lacked all arousal, since they lack other extrinsic signs, as we showed in the preceding chapter.

35. *Second conclusion.—Angelic speech does not occur without some real action and impression of the speaking Angel; this is proved by the authority of St. Thomas.—Cajetan's interpretation of the words of St. Thomas is rejected.* I say, second. This arousal does not occur without some real action of the speaking Angel, by impressing some species, or some real mode of it, upon the hearer. This is the opinion of the authors whom I reported in number 30, and St. Thomas expressly handed it down, 1 part, quest. 107, art. 1, reply to 1, where, after he conceded that the speaking Angel arouses another, he adds: *Just as the sense is moved by the sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. Therefore, just as the sense is aroused through a sensible sign, so through some intelligible power the mind of an Angel can be aroused to attend.* Concerning

these words Cajetan reports or proposes an exposition, *as though St. Thomas intended to posit some special intention having an arousing force for hearing. But*, he says, *although it soothes the ears, it does not accord with my intellect.* But I judge not only that the words of St. Thomas can be understood in this way, but also that they cannot be understood otherwise. First, because he expressly says that through this arousal the intellect is moved by the intelligible, namely as by a moving object, just as the sensible object is with respect to sense. But a moving object, or its motion, cannot be understood without some real efficiency and impression. Second, because if St. Thomas had wished to say this, he could scarcely have said it in clearer words. For although he does not say that the speaking Angel gives an intelligible species to another, for we do not now attribute this to him, he nevertheless says clearly enough that he impresses or does something in him, and that he has power for this. For what is power for, if not for doing something? Finally, compelled by these words, Cajetan concedes an intelligible arousing power in the speech of an Angel, but afterward, in explaining this power, he says that it is only the ordering of the will of the speaker, through which he makes this concept to be among the things pertaining to the hearer. Yet it has already been shown above that it is irrelevant whether it is or is said to be among the things pertaining to him, because it says nothing except a certain extrinsic denomination, through which at most it can be brought about that another is permitted to see such an act, but not that he is aroused to seeing it. For this reason, all the things Cajetan adds concerning eminent containment are mere words that in no way declare the matter.

36. *Arousal is not only an extrinsic denomination.* Hence the reason for the assertion is rather that arousal does not occur through an extrinsic denomination alone; therefore it is necessary that it occur through some intrinsic change. The consequence is proved because those are immediately opposed, nor does any middle seem thinkable. But the antecedent seems known of itself; and from this theologians teach that the arousal of God's grace is something in those who are aroused. And on the contrary they teach that our prayers are not for arousing God, but the one praying or others. But if arousal could consist in extrinsic denomination alone, there would be no reason why it would be repugnant to God. Therefore, if one Angel arouses another by his speech, certainly he does not merely denominate him extrinsically, but intrinsically, and consequently he effects something in him.

37. *Third conclusion.—An Angel aroused to hearing a previously hidden thing receives a new species.—It is proved by reason.* I say, third. An Angel aroused to knowing the mind of another that was previously hidden receives in

himself a new species, or principle, by which he is able to know the act of another, which before the arousal he could not know. This is proved from what was said above. For it was said that acts of the heart are hidden from Angels by their nature, and the reason for this secrecy was placed by us in this, that Angels do not by nature have an intentional union with these objects that is necessary for knowing them, or, what is the same, because they do not have species of such objects implanted by nature. But through speech these acts become knowable, and those who are aroused become able to know them. Therefore, while they are aroused, they receive what was lacking to them; therefore they receive a species, or proximate principle of knowing necessary on the part of the object, for they already had power on the part of the power. It is confirmed and declared, because an Angel not yet aroused cannot know such an act, and afterward he can. Therefore either he has received some intrinsic principle necessary of itself for such complete power, or some impediment has been removed. The second cannot be assigned. Therefore the first must be asserted. The first antecedent is supposed. But the first consequence is known of itself, because if someone has all the principles intrinsically required for a proximate power and for acting of itself, and at the same time has the required conditions, without impediment he will simply be able. Therefore, conversely, if he is said not to be able, this will be either from the defect of some principle of itself or from an impediment. But that this inability cannot be from an impediment or from the defect of a necessary condition is proved from what has been said, because only two things can be thought of: either the defect of divine concurrence or the defect of the free consent of the other thinking one. But concurrence cannot be lacking, as we said, if in the second cause there is the whole proximate power and no other impediment underlies it. Likewise, the mere dissent of the other could not impede the power if it were complete in every respect, as has also been proved. And this is clear because if God grants me the power of knowing another's thoughts, then, once this grace is supposed, without a new miracle I shall see them even if he does not consent. Therefore this is a sign that this consent is not required of itself except insofar as it is necessary for completing in another the power of knowing such an act. Therefore before speech there is supposed to be a defect in the intrinsic principle necessary of itself for such cognition. Therefore, if an Angel who is aroused becomes able to understand, he receives something in himself by which he is intrinsically and of itself completed in this power; and this can be nothing except a species, or something that takes the place of the object in such cognition.

38. *Fourth conclusion, two-part.—It is proved as to the former part.—Some have said that the impression in the hearer is made by God alone.* I say, therefore, fourth. The speaking Angel impresses in the hearer a species, or something new pertaining to a species, which represents his act to him; and in this way spiritual speech among Angels occurs. This assertion follows from what has been said. Hence the first part is proved because in angelic speech some newness occurs in the species of the one to whom speech is made. Therefore either it is made by God alone at the presence of the will and consent of the speaking Angel, or by the very one who speaks, with God concurring. The first is not likely; therefore the speaking Angel is the one who makes such incitation in another. The antecedent is clear from the preceding conclusion, and the first consequence is known from sufficient enumeration, because no other cause of such a change can be thought of there. But some have said that this impression is made by God alone, as if from a certain natural pact. For they think that one Angel cannot in any way naturally alter the intellect of another, and therefore that this action pertains to God as author of nature; but that he makes it at the opportune time, according to the demand of such a nature, and therefore gives that species as soon as the speaking Angel wills, and not before. I would prefer this mode of speaking to all those handed down above, if such an action of God were necessary, because it seems to me to have fewer inconveniences. Absolutely, however, I do not judge it to be necessary or true.

39. *Nevertheless it is shown that it is made at the same time by the speaker.* Hence I prove the minor assumed above, because God leaves to a second cause the doing of whatever is agreeable to its nature and does not surpass its perfection. But this action is very agreeable to angelic nature for its communication and necessity, and there is no reason why it should exceed the natural power of an Angel. Therefore it is made by the speaking Angel himself. The major is known, and so is the minor as to its former part concerning the agreeability of the action. But as to the other part, that it does not exceed the perfection of an Angel, it is proved first a posteriori, because otherwise the Angel would not properly speak, but God would speak at his petition, so to speak; nor would one Angel arouse another, but God would arouse at the presence of his will. But this is against the manner of speaking of Scripture, and greatly diminishes the perfection of angelic nature. For Angels would be as though mute and infants, who could not communicate with one another or mutually arouse one another, but could only obtain from God that he do this from his providence. But a priori it is proved because the interior acts of intellect and will are objects intelligible in act of themselves. Therefore it does not exceed

their perfection that they impress a species of themselves, and thus alter the intellect of another. For, as St. Thomas, cited a little earlier, said, the intelligible in act is apt to move the intellect, as the sensible in act moves sense. We shall explain and defend this reason more in what follows.

40. *The second part of the conclusion is proved.* And from this the other part of the assertion is easily concluded, namely that speech of an Angel occurs in this way. First, because in this way one Angel manifests his act to another, ordering it to him by his will. Therefore in this way speech sufficiently and optimally occurs. For thus what St. Thomas teaches is always preserved, that this speech occurs through the free ordering of the speaker's concept. For this is both most true and necessary, so that acts of the mind may be hidden of themselves. But that this ordering occurs through consent and a will that operates nothing, but only through denomination alone, is neither necessary nor can it be true, once the power of arousing and manifesting a hidden act, necessary for speech, is supposed. But each is optimally perfected in that mode. For the impression of a species is sufficient both for arousing another and for manifesting what was hidden, by giving a principle representative of it. Therefore nothing is lacking to it for true spiritual speech. This is confirmed first, because in this way it is best explained how the cognition of an Angel is secret, that is, how it occurs to one while others do not know, namely because the species is impressed upon one and not upon others. Likewise the excellence of angelic speech over human speech is declared, because by human speech acts manifested through speech are known only in a sign, but by angelic speech they are shown in themselves. Finally, it is confirmed because this mode of speaking in a most obscure matter is better understood and has no inconveniences, if they are rightly weighed. For the things that are objected against it are more clearly resolved. Therefore we rightly prefer it to the others. But so that this may be more evident, in the following chapter we shall pursue everything that can introduce difficulty concerning the said mode, or be asked, or be desired.

CHAPTER XXVIII
THE RESOLUTION OF THE PRECEDING CHAPTER IS CONFIRMED BY THE SOLUTIONS OF SEVERAL DIFFICULTIES AND DOUBTS

1. *First difficulty.*—The first difficulty is that it is new and unusual to say that an angel can produce any qualities; indeed, this is commonly denied, as we shall see in the fourth book. But the species of immanent acts are certain qualities. Therefore one angel cannot effect them in another. Hence, on this

ground, all deny that one angel can have efficiency upon another, except perhaps with respect to local motion, as St. Thomas teaches in Quest. 110 and Quest. 111 of his first part. And this is confirmed, because otherwise the angel would flow into the mind of the one speaking, which is contrary to the teaching of the saints.

2. *Its resolution.—Activity for the communication of their own being is denied to angels, not activity for the manifestation of themselves.*—To this difficulty, however, we respond that the common doctrine is not so universal that it admits no exception and clarification. For almost all theologians introduce some exception, as is clear from all the doctors cited in the preceding chapter for the third and fourth opinions. Likewise from others cited above, who say that one angel, through his substance, effects an intellection of himself in another, either immediately and by impressing a species. Finally, from St. Thomas, who acknowledges that one angel moves another intentionally when he excites him. And below we shall show that illumination cannot be understood without some efficiency. But the way of explaining that axiom which is most accommodated to the present purpose and very consonant with reason is this. There is a twofold mode of action. One is when the action is made for the communication of one's own being and perfection, which is usually called real action. The other is when it is made only for the manifestation of oneself, or for cooperating with a knowing power, which is usually called intentional action. For in this way some forms are not active, or productive of things like themselves in natural being, which are active of intentional species, as is clear in colors. Therefore we say that an angel does not have the power of effecting in others in the former way, but that he can in the latter way, because this efficiency is intentional and is ordered not to the communication of his own being but to the manifestation of himself. Or it is explained otherwise, for an intellectual substance can effect something in two ways. In one way, by way of one commanding, from the efficacy of his will, and in this way we now grant that an angel can effect nothing except local motion. But in another way an angel can effect something by way of an intelligible object, and in this way we say that he can effect an intentional species of his acts, because in this way they too are objects intelligible through themselves, and with respect to such intelligible species the intellects of other angels are passive. Therefore this efficiency of angels does not exceed their power.

How the thoughts of Angels can be Hidden,
If they Impress a Species of Themselves.

3. *The antecedent of the argument is proved by induction.—It is also proved by reason.*—A second difficulty arises from the preceding solution, because it follows from it that the internal acts of angels are not hidden by their nature, but necessarily betray themselves to all angels. The consequence is proved, because although an immanent act is free to the one operating with respect to this, that it can come to be or not come to be, nevertheless, after it has come to be, if it has some proper efficiency, in that efficiency it is not subject to the freedom of the one having such an act, but effects by natural necessity, whether it is considered as an act or as an object. Therefore if the acts of an angelic mind are productive of intentional species, they produce those species by necessity of nature, and through them they necessarily manifest such acts. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is proved by induction. For an act that is productive of a habit, although it comes to be freely, necessarily effects the habit, and in this it is not subject to the freedom of the one operating as it is subject in its coming to be. Likewise, if an act of the intellect leaves a species of itself in the memory, it leaves it naturally, although it effects it by way of an object. Therefore the same will hold in the production of a species in another intellect, if it can produce it. Then both the first antecedent and this inference are proved, because if a spiritual immanent act is productive of an intelligible species, certainly the power of the angel whose act it is and in which that act exists does not cooperate in that production, but the whole active principle of that species is the act itself. Therefore in that action it is not subject to the freedom of the will. The antecedent is proved, both because the production of such a species is not a vital act, and therefore it is not made proximately by a vital power, even if it is made by an act existing in that power; and also because the species made does not represent the power, but only the act, and the act alone is the formal object to be known through such a species. Therefore it alone is the moving object impressing such a species, just as whiteness alone is the ground of impressing a visible species, and the subject does not cooperate except by sustaining the whiteness. For acts of intellect or will impressing a species of themselves are related in this way. But the first consequence is proved, because the dominion of the will, which through itself and first is over itself, extends only to the powers of the soul subordinated to it; but to the things that are in the powers it extends

only insofar as they do not operate without the powers. And in this way we use habits when we will, because we use the powers in which the habits inhere, and habits through themselves do nothing without the powers. But if a habit through itself could be the principle of some action, certainly in that action it would not depend on the command of the will. Therefore since the aforesaid acts, if they effect species, effect them through themselves alone, in that efficiency they are not subject to the freedom of the will.

4. *Response to the second difficulty.—The divine essence as object freely flows into the clear vision of itself.*—It is responded, with the authors mentioned, that these acts are subject in the efficiency of their species to the freedom of the one whose acts they are. Thus he teaches in the cited Quest. 27, member 3, saying that the angel is related in this way, *as if a mirror, when it wished, gave its likeness to another mirror*; and Richard, in that way of his, says that this extension of the ray takes place according to the command of the will of the angel speaking. The same is taught by Pesantius and others, who hand this down without distinction as something clear. Yet Aureolus, 2, distinction 9, Quest. 1, art. 1, disputes and proves this expressly better than the rest. There first of all he sets down this proposition: *volition and cognition are subject to the will of an angel even with respect to moving the intellects of others, or with respect to the second act, which is to beget a likeness of itself in the intellect of another.* Then he proves that this assertion is possible by certain examples taken from the heat of muscles and from the species of phantasy, which I omit because they can be attacked. He also introduces the example of the divine essence, which, as an intelligible object, freely furnishes influx for the clear vision of itself, and in this is in its own way subject to its freedom. What wonder, therefore, if the acts of an angel are subject to the angel in sending forth a species of themselves? For this, which is the a priori reason, is not contrary to the character of an intelligible object or to its activity, as the example of the divine essence suggests. For if this is not repugnant with respect to proximate influx into the second act, why will it be repugnant with respect to the first? Or if it is not repugnant in an uncreated object, why will it be repugnant in a created one? For this does not belong to any singular excellence of God. Nor does it exceed the perfection of created free choice, because neither is infinite perfection required for this, nor does it exceed the perfection of such command or dominion, considering the condition of such a nature. Therefore there is no reason on account of which it should be judged impossible for the angelic will to have dominion over its acts, not only so that it may make them or not make them, but also so that through them it may operate outside itself, or continue the action. And this is confirmed, for it is

certain from a doctrine consonant with the faith that these acts are free not only so that they come to be or not come to be, but also consequently so that they become known to others or are hidden. What wonder, therefore, if they are also free with respect to that efficiency on which their concealment or manifestation depends?

5. *Dissolution of the opposite argument in number three.—To the induction made there to persuade the antecedent of the argument.*—And this will be confirmed more by responding to the reason for the opposite. Therefore that antecedent, taken universally, or the proof of the consequence, is denied, namely that a free act, once made, necessarily effects whatever it can effect. Although it could also be distinguished either concerning efficiency about the one operating himself or about another. And concerning the former it is conceded or passed over, for we do not now wish to assert that part, which does not matter for our purpose. But the latter, which pertains to the matter, is denied. Hence, to the induction, the inference is denied, because those examples concern the efficiency of an act in the very one operating, whereas we are speaking of efficiency in another intellect. But the reason can be given, first, because the efficiency of a habit is for the perfection of the very one operating and so that he may acquire greater power of acting about similar acts, and the species left in memory tends to the same ends. Therefore an act is determined by natural necessity to such efficiency. For this is expedient for the one operating and pertains to his good, and therefore the efficiency of such an act is in the manner of the natural emanation of a proper property from a form. But the efficiency of a species in another intellect is ordered to the perfection of another, and therefore it pertains to the perfection of the one whose act it is that he have dominion over such an efficiency of his act. Especially since such dominion is very necessary for his natural perfection, because the secret of his heart depends on it. Therefore provident nature could easily give such dominion to an intellectual nature over its act, in relation to acting ad extra, although it did not give it ad intra, to explain the matter in this way. Just as the form of water gave a power of making the water itself cold, at least through natural emanation, if it is deprived of native cold, although it did not give to the same form a natural power of immediately making other things cold. Or as in the body of man it made the motion of the heart, as being internal and necessary for the good of the same suppositum, natural and independent of free choice, but subjected external progressive motion to freedom.

6. *To the reason by which the same antecedent is proved in the same number three.*—But to the reason, which has been ingeniously devised, it is responded,

first, that although the impression of an intelligible species, as it flows from an act as from an intelligible object, is not a vital action and is made by that object alone as by the eliciting principle, nevertheless, as it is intellectual speech, it is in some way a vital act. For to speak is an act of reason and of life, at least with respect to direction and command, and therefore on this side it depends on the faculty of reason and will, and consequently on free choice. So too progressive motion, immediately and through itself, or elicitively, is made only by the motive and executive power which is in the members of the body; nevertheless, because that motion, as progressive, is vital, in brutes it depends on phantasy and appetite, while in man, if it is made in a human way, it depends on free choice, to which that motive power, which is like the instrument of that motion, is subject. Thus, then, an act of internal thought and affection, although it is the proximate principle of effecting a species in another, nevertheless, because it is as it were an organ for speaking, was subordinated by nature to the freedom of choice of the one whose act and instrument it is. For why could the natural constitution and perfection of man require that the motive power of the members of the body, and especially of the tongue, be subject to the dominion of man's free choice, and could it not grant to angels that their internal acts be instruments of speech among themselves, and that in that action they be subject to the free choice of the one speaking in the efficiency which is necessary for that speech? The only thing that can be said is that progressive power is a connatural power and rooted in the same soul, whereas an internal act is not implanted by nature but elicited by angels. But this does not stand in the way, both because even that act is from an intrinsic principle, although it is not through natural emanation, and also because angels can have something higher and nobler, namely that they have dominion not only over their powers but also over their acts for every use of them consonant with the perfection of their nature.

7. *Another response to the said reason from Aureolus.*—Then another reason can be given, which Aureolus indicates above and which seems to me worthy of consideration. For the inner thought of an angel, if it is productive of an intelligible species in the intellects of other angels, is of itself able to effect it in all, and consequently is indeterminate toward effecting it in this one or that one. Hence it comes about that it needs something determining it to act in this one or that one, and this can be nothing except free choice. For if it acted naturally, it would at the same time effect a species of itself in all, because all are capable of it, and nearness of place either is not necessary or it can be supposed that all are at the due distance. But one form of limited power cannot at the

same time effect so many forms or likenesses of itself. Otherwise, even if angels were multiplied to infinity, it could act on all at once, which seems to exceed finite power. Therefore, in order that it be determined to effect in such or such a subject, it was necessary that this efficiency be subject to free will, through which it is determined. So in a similar case it is said of the executive power of God, supposing it to be distinct from the intellect and will. And from this another difference is given between the efficiency of an act in the very one operating or in others, for the former is determined by nature to such a subject and to such a single effect, whereas the latter is not at all, and therefore it needs a mover freely determining and commanding.

Whether, and to what distance, an Angel can Speak to an Angel.

8. *Twofold sense of the difficulty.—First, whether nearness is required so that the hearer may understand what is said to him.*—A third difficulty, and perhaps the chief one against our opinion, is that it follows that one angel cannot speak to another if he is distant. The consequent is false; therefore. The consequence is clear, because he speaks by effecting, as is supposed. But efficiency requires a certain nearness. Therefore speech does too, and therefore it will be able to be impeded because of distance. This difficulty can arise from a twofold source: first, from the very formal cognition as it is cognition, insofar as it says an ordering to the object as to its term; second, from that which is sometimes presupposed for cognition, as in the present case motion by the object. Or otherwise, although it comes to the same thing, since a twofold character is distinguished in the thing to be known, namely of a terminative object and of a motive object, the difficulty can arise from either, and so there will be a twofold question. One is whether the cognition of an angel requires a certain distance or nearness to the object from the fact precisely that it is terminated to it. The other is whether the cognition of an angel, insofar as it can antecedently depend on the object as motive, demands a certain sphere of nearness. The former question is common to every intuitive angelic cognition of an existing thing as existing, whether it is made through speech or in some other way. But the latter more properly has place regarding speech.

9. *Response in the first sense.*—In the former, therefore, it seems clear that distance cannot impede the cognition of an angel, if the angel is supposed to be constituted in first act and to have intentional union with the object through an intelligible species, and consequently not to depend on it as on a motive object. For then distance alone cannot prevent the act of the intellect from being able to

reach the object and to be terminated to it. And this, at a minimum, St. Thomas and many theologians teach in the places to be cited. And it is proved, because then cognition does not occur through any efficiency of the object in the power, since the power is supposed to be sufficiently constituted in first act in another way. Once this is posited, no prior efficiency on the part of the object is necessary. Nor is cognition made through the efficiency of the intellect in the object, because the object is not changed through an immanent act. Rather, the whole efficiency is the intellect's about itself, as if depicting in itself the object to be known. Consequently, under this title also, nearness to the object is not necessary. Therefore it is necessary for no reason. The consequence is proved, because, setting aside efficiency, there remains only extrinsic termination, which does not occur through real touching and as it were extension to the object, but only through the transcendental ordering of the act to the object, from which there results in the object only an extrinsic denomination, which does not depend on distance. This is confirmed in abstractive cognition, in which not only nearness but even the actual existence of the object is not necessary. Therefore the same will hold in intuitive cognition, if a species sufficiently representing the existing object with all the conditions of existence is supposed. Hence Gregory, in 2, distinction 9, Quest. 9, at the end, and Major, distinction 16, Quest. 5, penultimate opinion, require a determinate sphere in angelic speech in vain, since they think it occurs without efficiency of the one speaking in the one hearing.

10. *The second sense is discussed, namely whether nearness is required for exciting the angel hearing.—The affirmative opinion.*—Therefore, this part having been supposed as clear, the difficulty is whether, if there is some cognition in an angel depending on a prior motion and efficiency of the object about the intellect of the angel, it can be impeded by distance. This doubt has its place chiefly in angelic speech and according to our opinion. And in it the affirmative part, namely that nearness is required and that it can be impeded because of distance, is held by Gregory, 2, distinction 9, Quest. 2; Scotus, Quest. 2, § *To the question*, verse *But against this*; Major, Quest. 2; Richard, art. 2, Quest. 1, reply to 3; Basil, Quest. 2, art. 2; and Gabriel supposes it there, final art., doubt 2, conclusion 3, with Ockham, Quest. 20. Bonaventure holds the same, in 2, distinction 10, art. 3, Quest. 1. The same is held by Scotus, in 4, distinction 45, Quest. 2.

11. *First way of the aforesaid opinion.—Yet it appears difficult.—Second way.* —But this opinion can be understood in two ways. First, so that any distance impedes speech, and consequently that immediate nearness of both angels is

necessary for one to be able to speak and the other to hear, that is, for one to be able to impress a species of his thought into the other. For this impression cannot be through a medium, nor can it be immediately into what is distant. Therefore the aforesaid nearness is necessary. But this way of speaking is difficult, because it places an excessive limitation on the speech of angels, which seems greatly opposed to their perfection and to their political society. The other sense is that not every distance impedes speech, but that an impression of an intelligible species can occur immediately from one angel into another distant in place, yet not at any distance whatever, but within a certain sphere which has a defined terminus, because the active power of the object is finite. And in this sense the cited authors have spoken.

12. *It does not please the Thomists.—The reason from Vásquez why it does not please.*—Nevertheless, the contrary opinion is commonly defended by the Thomists. They certainly speak consistently, because they think that speech occurs without efficiency, through the mere removal of a veil which was hiding the object, which the angel does in himself, so to speak, by willing that another be able to see his act, and by thus ordering his act to another. He can do this at any distance, since with respect to the other only an extrinsic denomination results from it. And so Cajetan and more recent authors teach consistently. And St. Thomas is of the same opinion, Quest. 9, *de Veritate*, art. 6, where in reply to 4 he indicates the reason, *because the angel speaking does nothing in the hearer.* He has the same assertion in 1 part, Quest. 107, art. 4, where it does not seem it can be founded on the aforesaid reason, since a little earlier there he had taught that the angel speaking excites the one hearing, and consequently effects something in him. Alensis thinks the same, 2 part, Quest. 27, member 7, where he says that the speech of an angel does not depend on local distance or nearness, but on spiritual distance or nearness, *which*, he says, *is still hidden from us*. Marsilius has the same opinion, 2, Quest. 7, art. 2, reply to the last, but he does not seem to posit the efficiency of one upon another. But once that is posited, Cumelius holds the same, in the said Quest. 57, art. 4, and Quest. 107, arts. 3 and 4. And Vásquez, disp. 212, chapter 2, although he does not admit this efficiency, says conditionally that even if speech occurred through the efficiency of the one speaking in the one hearing, nevertheless it would not be impeded because of distance. His reason is that this speech occurs through an entirely spiritual action, which is not diffused through a medium, and therefore is not impeded because of distance or diminished because of greater distance, but will occur just as well in one remote as in one near. This inference is proved, because in a material agent nearness is required because a transitive material action is

diffused through a medium, and consequently the effect is extended and multiplied through the medium. Therefore the sphere of such an action and of its effect is terminated at a certain distance, because a being cannot at the same time increase its effect according to extension to infinity, since it is of finite power. But a spiritual action, such as the production of a species, is not diffused through a medium, but is immediately from the object into the power. Therefore it is neither increased nor diminished because of distance.

13. *The resolution of the author, that it is not improbable that every kind of distance is required to be absent.—Yet more probably every kind of distance is not required to be absent.*—I treated this point in the *Metaphysics*, disp. 18, num. 44 and following, where I left the matter doubtful, though I inclined to the side that this speech requires nearness of substances among angels, so that they are distant from one another by no space, neither true nor imaginary. And although even now I judge that this is not improbable and has no inconvenience, since angels are most swift and can overcome any distance suddenly or by the swiftest motion, nevertheless I do not freely adhere to that opinion, both because it is too singular and also because, as I said a little before, it is not sufficiently consonant with angelic perfection. Hence, as concerns this action, because it is purely mental and internal, it seems that it should be said that it can be made by an angel without nearness in situation or substantial presence, either because such an action does not occur through a medium and has no ordering to space, or because order among angels is the same as situation in bodies, and therefore a merely intellectual action, such as this speech is, does not depend on medium or situation. This reason is taken from St. Thomas, *Quodlibet* 9, art. 10, reply to 2, and in 2, distinction 11, Quest. 1, art. 3, reply to 3.

14. *Whether, however, no distance impedes it, a problem.*—But whether, notwithstanding this power of exciting a distant angel through speech, the excitation is stronger with respect to one near than with respect to one distant, and therefore the sphere of this activity in each angel is certain and defined, or rather whether all this nearness or distance is irrelevant, and therefore the excitation is equal into one distant and one near, and consequently can occur to any distance whatever into infinity, I do not now define, but leave as a problem. For each appears probable. The first, indeed, because the activity of such an object is finite, and therefore seems to have a limited sphere. Likewise, because although the action is not to be carried through a medium, nevertheless the nearness of the agent to the patient seems through itself a condition more accommodated to the agent's overcoming and in some way subjecting the patient to itself. From this it is said quite consistently that it acts more strongly

on one near than on one distant, and consequently that a terminus is given in the sphere of such activity. The second also becomes probable by that reason that nearness in situation or presence of substance seems very accidental to a merely spiritual and intellectual action, and therefore it occurs equally well at any distance, especially since the patient in no way resists but rather desires perfection of this kind. Nor does this exceed finite power, because the distance will always in reality be finite, since it must necessarily be between definite terms. And in either opinion it can easily be defended that in fact the speech of angels is not impeded because of distance within the whole universe, because the power of any angel can easily be extended to it, and the intervening bodies cannot impede this action, because it does not pass through them.

Whether Reciprocal Speech is given among Angels in any Direction.

15. *Resolution of the fourth difficulty.*—A fourth doubt is whether this speech can be reciprocal among angels, both of inferiors to superiors and of superiors to inferiors. For the latter is supposed as manifest, but in the former the reason for doubting arises from the aforesaid opinion, because it seems to follow that inferior angels cannot speak to superiors, because they cannot act on them or perfect them, since it is against the due order that the more perfect be perfected by inferiors. But this doubt is easily resolved. For one must distinguish between speech and illumination. For although illumination is speech, it nevertheless adds something peculiar, on account of which not every speech is illumination. What this is we shall say more fully in the fourth book. But now it can be clarified by a likeness, for among men, although teaching occurs by speaking, nevertheless not every speech is teaching. Therefore to illuminate among angels is the same as to teach among men. Hence, speaking of illumination, it is true that superior angels teach inferior angels, and not conversely. Nevertheless, speech is reciprocal, and inferior angels can speak to superior angels, as all theologians concordantly teach with St. Thomas, Quest. 9, *de Veritate*, art. 5, and 1 part, Quest. 107, art. 2, where he very well explains the difference between illumination and speech with respect to this part. But we now omit it, because we have not yet explained the other extreme of that comparison.

16. And the resolution can easily be shown, first, because superior angels are no less ignorant of the internal acts of inferiors than conversely. Therefore inferiors can manifest their acts to superiors; otherwise the superior angels would be in a worse condition. Second, because all have union in the same

society and as it were republic. Therefore they need mutual reciprocal communication, which occurs through speech. Third, because from the very fact that inferior angels can be illuminated by superiors, consequently they can also question them, as when they were saying, *Who is this king of glory?* They can also ask and petition that they teach them. A fourth reason can be added, because all angels can speak to God. Therefore much more can inferiors speak to superiors.

17. *Angels address God in one way, and other angels in another way.—Response to the fourth difficulty itself.*—But in this reason a difference must be noted. For angels do not speak to God in order to manifest something new to him, nor in order to excite him, and therefore with respect to God the difficulty touched upon ceases. And as regards him, it is true that it does not occur through efficiency but through the mere voluntary ordering of one's own act, which the angel makes to God, as I explained in the said first book, *On Prayer*, chapter one, at the end. But an inferior angel speaks to a superior so as to manifest to him what was hidden from him, as has been proved. Hence to the difficulty we respond that there is no inconvenience in an inferior effecting something in a superior, both because what he effects is not for supplying a defect of light but only for joining the object to the power, and the superior angel can lack this conjunction even if he has a much more perfect light; and also because, although one angel is simply more perfect than another, nevertheless insofar as he is in potency to something in which another is in act, there is no inconvenience if the superior can be reduced to act by the inferior and perfected secundum quid. For in that respect he is also imperfect secundum quid. So also sight receives a species from an actually visible object, which is simply less perfect.

Whether one Angel can Speak to many at Once.

18. A fifth difficulty is whether one angel can speak to many angels at once. For from what has been said it seems to follow that he cannot, because otherwise he could speak at once to many in any number whatever, since there is no greater reason for one number than for another. But this does not seem possible if speech occurs through efficiency, because one finite power cannot produce several effects at once, especially since each of them is adequate to it; and much less can it increase that effect to infinity according to discrete extension by producing many at once in any number. But to the contrary, not only does he seem to be able to speak to many at once, he even seems

necessarily to speak to many, because he speaks to one, indeed to all who exist. For this follows not only from many opinions which we have related, but also seems to follow from ours. For if speech occurs through the impression of an intelligible species, from the very fact that such a species is impressed on one angel, all the others can know it, because according to the doctrine of St. Thomas handed down above, although an angel cannot see the free use of species, he can see the species themselves. But if other angels see the species impressed on one angel by another, by that very fact they see that this one has spoken to that one, and through the same species as through a sign they will see concerning what matter he had spoken. Therefore the speech will not be secret.

19. *Two points of the difficulty.—What is properly inquired in the first point.* —In this difficulty two things are sought. One is whether an angel can speak to many at once; the other is whether he necessarily does this. Concerning the first, one must first suppose that the discussion is only when an angel speaks about one matter. For if it is asked whether he can speak at once not only to distinct persons but also about distinct things, another question not yet treated is mixed in, namely whether an angel, whether speaking or hearing, can at once think of many and diverse things. Hence the difficulty that arises from that question has place not only with respect to several angels, but also with respect to the same angel, namely whether one angel can speak at once to another about diverse things. Therefore we are not treating this, because it does not pertain to this place. Rather, we inquire only whether the same speech, and about the same matter, can be made at once to several. Indeed, even in this we suppose as clear that, if he wishes, an angel can reveal the same thing to many at once, and consequently speak to several at once, because even if efficiency is required, it is not difficult for it to occur at once with respect to several, just as a visible object actuates several sights at once.

20. *It is responded first according to the various opinions about angelic speech regarding efficiency.*—Therefore the difficulty is to how many he can speak at once, or whether no terminus can be designated in that multitude. But this question has no difficulty in the opinion of those who place angelic speech only in an extrinsic ordering, or in a mere spiritual quasi-writing by spiritual signs made in himself by the angel speaking, or in the concept alone of the intellect of the one speaking, extrinsically proposed to another. For in that way it is manifest that one angel can speak to many at once in any multitude, without any certain terminus or number. For it is not necessary that the angel distinctly think of each of those to whom he wishes to speak, nor that he direct his intention in particular to such or such a person. For if this were necessary,

although such an intention could at once be referred to some distinctly thought, nevertheless from the same source it could have a terminus in the multitude of those to whom it could be distinctly directed, because an angel cannot actually and distinctly think of several others in any multitude whatever. But for speech, according to the said opinion, this distinct thought would not be necessary; rather, a confused ordering to some multitude could suffice.

21. *According to the true opinion about the efficiency of the angel speaking, a two-part response from Scotus.—The first part of the response is admitted and proved.—In the second it is asked whether one angel can speak to not so many that he cannot speak to more.*—But once efficiency is posited, there is a peculiar difficulty, which Scotus touches upon in 2, distinction 9, Quest. 2, § second, etc. But there he proposes it as something to be asked, and resolves nothing. Yet in the scholium there it is added that from the reportations of the same Scotus it is gathered that an angel cannot speak to infinite angels at once; but to how many he can speak, God alone knows. The first part of this opinion is clear, because neither can that infinite multitude of angels be given, nor, if it were given, could an angel effect infinite species at once. But the second part is true with respect to us, if the discussion is about certain knowledge or about a definite number. Yet with respect to the angels, certainly if in this they have a limited power to a certain multitude, each of them knows very well to how many angels he can speak at once and not to more. Nor do we inquire into the definite number of that multitude, for we cannot attain this even by conjecture, but absolutely whether that multitude has a terminus in each one according to his power, or whether within a finite number it has no terminus, but he can speak at once to any greater and greater multitude of angels, even if it increases to infinity.

22. *It is argued for the affirmative.*—And the affirmative part seems able to be persuaded, because that efficiency will always in reality be finite. Therefore it is not repugnant for it to occur in this way. Therefore there is no reason for it to be denied to angels, since it is a possible perfection and sufficiently proportioned to their nobility. The antecedent is known from what has been said, because an infinite multitude is always excluded as an extrinsic term, so to speak, of this power. The second consequence likewise is supposed, because it is clear enough through itself. Therefore the first is proved, because it is not repugnant that a superior finite power be able to increase some effect to infinity, or to effect a greater and greater one to infinity. Why, therefore, will it not be so in the present case? The antecedent is clear, because it is probable that an angel can increase the speed of motion to infinity, especially where the mobile does not resist, as in the motion of the heaven. This increase seems more difficult,

because it is as it were intensive. Then, in extensive increase through the mere multiplication of forms of the same ratio, this seems easier when the action is perfective and without contrary or resistance, and with the same nearness and other conditions necessary for the ease or equality of the action. For a visible object, just as it can send a species at once to two or three eyes, so it could send it to a hundred or a thousand and in any number whatever, if all could be applied equally, as could happen to infinity through penetration. For once this is posited, there is no greater difficulty on the part of the object in impressing a species on three than on two, nor on four than on three, and so to infinity. Therefore it is a sign that the mere multiplication of such an effect does not increase the difficulty or diminish the efficacy of the agent in each one, but that the whole is as it were applied to each part of the multitude and to that whole multitude. Therefore with greater reason we can philosophize in this way about angels. For in them either nearness is not necessary for this action, or it can most easily be found equally in any multitude of angels. Another guidance can also be added from another example. For the sun illuminates at once all the stars equally near to it as perfectly as if there were only one, and in the same way it would illuminate them if they were more, in any finite number whatever. Therefore, preserving proportion, the same will be able to occur among angels. You will say that this happens in the stars because they are parts of one continuous magnitude, the whole of which the sun, as far as depends on itself, could illuminate equally according to all its parts, if it were equally capable according to all parts. And so there the multitude of discrete quantity in the stars is as it were per accidens, whereas in angels it is per se. But this difference is very material with respect to the efficacy of a finite power. For if a finite material power can equally effect lights that are actually discrete, in many subjects, even if they are multiplied in that way to infinity, why will angelic power not be able to do something similar? For that those forms are extended and of themselves continuable in one continuous magnitude, or that they are indivisible and incapable of continuation, seems surely accidental.

23. *The denying part is proved more.*—This way of speaking is probable and can easily be defended, but because it depends on a general physical question, we do not wish to limit the present doctrine about angels to that opinion. For it can be said without any inconvenience that an angel cannot speak at once with many except within a certain quantity or number, because he speaks by operating and by multiplying the action in many. Hence, because he operates through a limited power, he can also have some finite and maximum terminus in the multitude of actions which he can at once perform about others. But what

that terminus is is not evident to us, and perhaps it is not the same in all, but is according to the perfection of each. And from the supposition of the said efficiency, Vásquez judges that this opinion should be chosen, disp. 211, final chapter. But once that is supposed, he gives the best reason why this efficiency of the angel speaking is free, because since of itself it is not sufficient to inform all other angels at once through the efficiency of such species, and is not determined by extrinsic circumstances, it is necessary that it be ordered through free will. Hence, on the contrary, Ockham and Gabriel, who say that an angel through his act effectively concurs with all others toward the cognition of it, and that this efficiency is natural and necessary, are consequently forced to follow the former way of speaking. Hence they say that that act is of itself known to all and can be known at once by all, and consequently that the same act can effectively concur at once with any multitude of angels toward cognition and manifestation of itself. I also add that according to the former way of speaking, for the speech of an angel the confused intention or will of manifesting his act to several angels, or to so great a multitude, is not sufficient, because all this is common and ambiguous and does not sufficiently determine the principle of acting. Therefore an ordering to so many and such angels in particular will be necessary, according to the efficacy of the angel speaking.

24. *To the second point proposed in number nineteen.*—In the second point the doubt already touched upon above is sought, namely whether it is within the power of an angel to speak secretly to one only. Some with Scotus wish to settle this by saying that there is no doubt that one angel can speak to only one, because although he cannot so manifest his act to one that others do not understand, nevertheless he can order his concept to one only, which is enough for him to speak to that one alone. But, as I said above, in this way the difficulty is not clarified but evaded by words. For in reality, if all understand, or can understand if they wish, what is revealed to one, the speech of itself is not secret but public, whatever the one speaking intends. Hence those who say that one angel cannot speak to another except through signs that are of themselves public and visible and intelligible by others certainly deny that secret speech can intervene among angels.

25. *True response that an angel can speak secretly to another.—The volition of an angel intending to speak to one only is the radical reason for secret speech; but the formal reason is the commanded impression of a species on one and not on others.*—Yet I judge it much more probable and altogether true that it is within the power of an angel to speak secretly to one, while the others hear nothing. Thus St. Thomas teaches, 1 part, the said Quest. 107, art. 5, and all his disciples

follow, as do Richard, Marsilius, in the places cited above, and many others. Although they vary in the mode and foundation, according to the different way of explaining how the thoughts of the heart are hidden and how they are manifested, nevertheless all, with few exceptions, endeavor to preserve in angels the power of speaking secretly, if they wish. And certainly considered in itself this is very likely, and the contrary almost incredible. For the same moral necessity that exists in intellectual nature for the thoughts of the heart to be hidden also exists for the revelation of them to be able to be public or secret according to the choice of the one speaking, as I have already said above. Therefore St. Thomas places this secrecy in the will of the angel speaking, because he wills to direct his concept to one and not to another. The Thomists judge this limitation of will and direction to be the sufficient and formal cause of this secrecy, and in this they speak consistently. But we say that it is the radical cause of this secrecy, for from this it happens that the angel impresses the species of his act only on the one to whom he directs it, and consequently that it can be perceived and heard only by that one. And the Scotists could give this reason in their opinion if speech occurred by impressing on another cognition of one's act, for that impression would not occur by necessity of nature but freely, and therefore it could be made in one and not in others. And thus Bassolius held above. Ockham and Gabriel, who think that an angel through his act as object coeffects cognition in another, could and should say the same, for that efficiency too on the part of the one speaking would not be necessary but free, and therefore could be given to one and not another. But they posit that efficiency of the object as merely natural, and therefore they say that from the nature of the thing speech cannot be secret. Nevertheless they try to preserve secrecy from God's ordering, namely that he does not will to concur except with that angel to whom the other wishes to speak. But this has already been rejected above, together with other contrary opinions that are founded on that false principle.

26. *To the difficulty set down in number eighteen.—The one hearing cannot transmit the species of speech to others.*—But to the difficulty objected against our opinion I respond that it is not necessary that other angels see the intelligible species impressed on the angel hearing, because they do not have innate species through which they may know it. For by the same reason that from the beginning they did not receive species of free acts, by the same reason they did not have species of such acts. Nor is it necessary that the species impressed by the one speaking on one angel be productive of another similar to itself in others, and much less is it necessary that it produce it in a natural way and by

necessity. Rather, it seems to me more likely that the angel hearing or receiving from another the proper species of his act cannot, even if he wishes, transmit a similar species to others, but at most can manifest to others his own act, which he elicits through such a species and by which he knows the cognition of the other, and thus impress on another a species of his own act, through which others will be able to come to cognition of the prior speech made in secret. But this will not be from the force of the prior speech, but of another subsequently following. Hence it only follows that the speech of an angel can never occur so secretly that it cannot be revealed by the hearer to others, speaking from the nature of the thing alone and abstracting from whether the revelation is licit or illicit. For this is as connatural to angels as to men. Nor is it contrary to their perfection, because it follows necessarily upon the power of speaking joined with freedom, which is mutable by its nature from the very fact that it has been made from nothing. Therefore we only say that the speech of an angel can be secret from the force of the will and action of the one speaking himself, which can so be concerned with one that of itself it does not overflow to others.

Whether Speech is in the One Speaking or in the One Hearing.

27. A sixth doubt is what kind of action angelic speech is, whether immanent in the one speaking or transitive into the hearer. For that it is transitive seems to follow from our opinion, because it occurs by impressing a species in the one to whom the speech is made. Therefore the proximate and formal term of that action is in the hearer. Therefore the action is in the same one, for action is in the same subject in which its term is. Therefore it is a transitive action. But St. Thomas seems to teach the contrary of this, 1 part, the said Quest. 107, art. 4, reply to 1. For he says that angelic speech is interior, and therefore is in the angel speaking and where the angel speaking is. And he has the same in Quest. 9, *de Veritate*, arts. 5 and 6, in the replies to the arguments. And the Thomists commonly think so, as do all who deny that the angel speaking effects anything in the hearer. And there is no doubt that St. Thomas, in that question *de Veritate*, approaches that opinion most of all. Yet in 1 part he seems to have to be explained otherwise, lest he seem to have taught contrary things in the same articles. For certainly a merely immanent act in the angel speaking, if it has no transitive efficacy into the angel hearing, does not appear able to excite him to hearing and attending.

28. *The true resolution, first part.—Second part.—The sayings of St. Thomas are reconciled according to both parts of the resolution.*—Therefore it must be said

that angelic speech does not occur without some action passing into the hearer. The reason given proves this, and all who posit that the angel speaking effects something in the hearer also teach this. And it can be explained from divine speech, because it does not occur without some effect passing into the hearer, as I said in the first book, *On Prayer*, chapter four, with Gregory, book 2, *Moralia*, chapter 4, otherwise 5, and book 38, chapter 2. Therefore the same can hold in angelic speech, which is made to another creature, because in this it agrees with divine speech, that it manifests something unknown to the hearer. Nevertheless, it can probably be said that that action which occurs in the hearer is not the formal speech itself, but is rather the effect of angelic speech. For through that transitive action there is made in the hearer only the intelligible species of that act which the one speaking wishes to manifest. But speech is not the production of an intelligible species, but is as it were the instrument or word by which such a species is made. This is clarified from human speech. For although through it a sensible species is impressed, nevertheless human speech is not that action by which a species is produced in hearing, but is the word of voice which proximately impresses that species on the sense. Thus, therefore, it can be understood in angelic speech. According to this way of speaking, we shall conclude that angelic speech is an act formally remaining in the agent and virtually transitive, as many speak of God's production ad extra, and hence that it is that word which is the proximate principle of effecting an intelligible species in the one operating. According to the former part we can explain the opinion of St. Thomas in the said art. 4. But we add the latter both on account of the reason given and from the doctrine of St. Thomas, on account of the necessity of that power and activity for exciting the mind of the hearer. And, our opinion being supposed, no difficulty remains in this unless someone wishes to contend about the way of speaking.

Whether Speech is an Act of the Intellect or of the Will.

29. But immediately a seventh doubt arises, namely what act in the angel speaking is the speech itself, and consequently which power, the intellect or the will, is the proximate principle of speech. For since speech is an immanent act in the sense explained, it must be of intellect or will, because there is no other power in an angel eliciting immanent acts. But it cannot be an act of both powers at once, since it is a simple act and one entity; nor can this act be now of the intellect and now of the will, because speech is always of the same ratio. Therefore it will be either of the intellect or of the will. But it cannot always be a

work of the intellect, because the intellect cannot always impress the species necessary for manifesting the act about which the speech is, because it can be an act of the will; and for the same reason it cannot always be an act of the will. Therefore in our opinion it is difficult to explain which power is the proximate principle of angelic speech.

30. *In what way the difficulty should be resolved according to the Thomists.—In what way according to others.—Finally according to others.*—Briefly, it must be said that in sensible speech three things corresponding to speech can be distinguished. The first is the will of manifesting a concept, which applies the organs of voice. The second is the directing intellect. The third is the executing power, which as it were proximately elicits the word that introduces the species to the senses. Therefore in angelic speech it is certain that the first two are necessary, because the speech of an angel is free, as we have said, and therefore depends on the will, which must be directed by the intellect. But about the third there is difficulty, which must be explained in different ways according to the various opinions. For the Thomists, who judge that speech is consummated in an act of the will ordering its concept or act so that it can be understood by another, cannot introduce any power executing speech besides the will, because after that volition the one who speaks does nothing more. Therefore he needs no other power through which he speaks. Therefore, according to that opinion, the will will be the proximate organ by which an angel speaks to another, and the volition of ordering his act to another by willing that it be understood by him will be the speech itself. Hence Cajetan and others say that by the very ordering of the will the ordered act is constituted in the ratio of an intelligible object and of what pertains to the one to whom it is ordered. And St. Thomas, Quest. 9, *de Veritate*, art. 4, reply to 9, says that the very ordering of thought to another is called the exterior speech of an angel. But, conversely, those who say that the speech of an angel is nothing other than some concept known by its nature to another angel hearing, who through cognition of it comes to cognition of another act or object to be manifested to him, consequently say that the intellect alone is the power eliciting speech, and that no other executing power is necessary. But those who say that this speech occurs through spiritual signs that are not vital acts or intentional species but other qualities signifying naturally or by convention, besides the intellect as directing and the will as willing to manifest its act, must posit a power immediately effecting such signs. They can say either that it is the will itself, which by willing immediately effects such qualities, just as by willing it immediately moves, according to the opinion of many; or they can say that it is the intellect, which through the concept of the

thing it wishes to manifest as it were depicts or describes such signs; or finally they can say that it is another power executing such an act at the nod of the will. All of these are difficult enough to understand.

31. *The more probable resolution of the author.*—Therefore, according to our opinion, it must be said that this power as it were eliciting speech is sometimes the intellect, sometimes the will, according to the requirement of the species that must be impressed by such speech on the angel hearing. It is clarified thus: sometimes the angel speaking manifests to another an act of his will, but sometimes a thought of the intellect. Therefore when he manifests an act of the will, speech is made proximately through the will; but when he shows a thought of the intellect, he does this through the intellect itself. It is proved: because the angel by speaking impresses on another a species of the act that he first and through itself manifests. But he impresses it through that act as through an actually intelligible object, as was said above. Therefore when by speaking he manifests an act of the will, the same act is the proximate principle of the impressed species which represents it; but when a thought of the intellect is manifested, the thought itself impresses a species of itself. Therefore each act respectively and proportionately has the power of speech. The consequence is proved, because that has the ratio of a word with respect to another which proximately impresses a species in him and which is the immediate principle of efficiently exciting him, as I explained in sensible speech, and there is the same reason or proportion in spiritual speech. Likewise, when speech occurs through signs, the proximate principle of effecting the signs is the proximate principle of speech. But the signs of angelic speech are nothing except species, as is clear from what was said above and as St. Thomas handed down, in the said Quest. 9, *de Veritate*, art. 4, reply to 4, and in 2, distinction 11, Quest. 1, art. 1. Therefore that act which is the proximate reason of impressing a species is the proximate principle and as it were word of angelic speech, although it does not have the ratio of word except as determined by the will. But this can belong both to an act of the will and to an act of the intellect, as has been explained. Therefore the speech of an angel belongs proximately and elicitively, or executively, to that power whose act is directly manifested through such speech. Nor do I see any reason of any weight against this. For the speech of an angel can be said to be of the same ratio insofar as it is always made by means of an act impressing a species of itself by way of an object. Yet just as that species can be distinct and have a distinct object and consequently a distinct representation, so also its principle can be distinct and from a diverse power. And perhaps for this reason the ancient Fathers do not attribute this to the will or to the intellect, but in

common say that it is a certain spiritual power, which is perceived not by sense but by understanding, by which they mutually communicate their thoughts and counsels to one another, as is clear from Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Theophylact, 1 Corinthians 13, at the beginning, and Damascene, book 2, chapter 3.

Whether the Thing is Manifested to the Angel Hearing Intuitively or Abstractively.

32. *It is argued that it is manifested intuitively.—It is argued that it is manifested abstractively.*—But this resolution will be explained more by adding and considering an eighth doubt, namely whether through speech an angel manifests his act to another intuitively through only an unknown medium, which is the species, or whether he only makes it known in some sign, from cognition of which the hearer comes to cognition of the other thing manifested. For from what has been said it seems to follow that an angel only manifests his act to another so that the other sees it intuitively, because he manifests it by impressing its proper species on another. But an angel receiving the proper species of an existing thing sees it intuitively and in itself. Therefore. But on the contrary, first, this seems to be contrary to the proper ratio of speech. For when an object presents itself to be seen intuitively by impressing a species of itself on sight, it does not speak to the one seeing except very metaphorically, as the heavens are said to tell the glory of God. Nor is it enough that that production of the species is from the command of a free will, both because that motion of the will is extrinsic and does not change the nature of the other action by which the object impresses a species representing it intuitively, and also because otherwise God would properly speak to the blessed when he presents himself to be seen intuitively by them, because on his part he does this freely. Second argument, because it belongs to the ratio of speech that the cognition communicated through it be founded on the authority of the one speaking. But intuitive cognition occurs through the power of the proper light of the very one seeing, and only the species is given by another, as it is usually given by an object. Third, because otherwise there would not be angelic acquired faith among angels, nor could one angel lie to another, which seems contrary to what is written about the devil: *he is a liar and the father of lying*. For this seems to have been said not only with respect to men but also about the angels themselves among themselves, for among the evil ones the superior induced and seduced the others when they sinned, as we shall see later.

Whether Angelic Speech is only about Internal Acts, or also about other Things.

33. *It is argued that an angel cannot speak except about his own internal acts.—It is confirmed.*—Before we define this doubt, a new doubt must be proposed, for the resolution of the preceding depends on this one. The doubt is about what things one angel can speak to another. For in the preceding doubt it seems to be supposed that an angel's speech can be only about the acts of the one speaking himself, and indeed it seems to be so. For angelic speech is only for manifesting to another what was unknown to him. But an angel is ignorant of nothing that can be manifested by another except the thoughts of his heart. Therefore speech can be only about them. The major is known from what has been said. The minor is also clarified from what has been said, because here we are not dealing with illumination, which properly concerns supernatural things, as will be said below in its place, but we are dealing with speech insofar as it could be or would be necessary among angels in their pure nature. But in such a state and order angels are ignorant of nothing except future contingents or acts of the mind or heart. But one angel cannot speak to another about future things, because so long as they are future, they are unknown to all; but when they are now present, they are known to all. Therefore one can speak to another only about his own internal acts. And this is confirmed especially in our opinion, because an angel does not speak except by impressing on the hearer some intentional species. But he cannot impress a species except of his own acts. Therefore he can speak only about them. The consequence with the major is known from what has been said. But the minor is proved, both because he can impress a species only through something that is an actually intelligible object and subject to his freedom, but only his own internal act is such an object; and also because other things either are simple or incomplete, and the concrete species of these things are in all angels, or they are some complex and contingent truths unknown to angels, and these are not represented through simple species but through the light of the intellect, which one angel cannot effect in another.

34. *On the first two-part assertion, which is the response to the nearest ninth difficulty.—From where the first part is proved.—For the latter it is shown that speculative speech is given among angels.*—To these doubts, it must first be said that one angel can speak to another first and through itself about his own

internal acts, but consequently also about the things that are objected to those acts, especially when they are such that they can become known to one angel through the speech of another. The reasons for doubting placed in the preceding doubt sufficiently prove the first part of the assertion, and from what has been said it is sufficiently known. But I explain the other part by distinguishing a twofold mode of speech about things of this kind. One I call speculative, because through it some truth alone is indicated, or that something is or is not. The other I call practical, because it moves another to do or not do something. The former is chiefly handed down by Scotus, 2, distinction 9, Quest. 2, especially § *To the further*, and by others commonly, and it is clarified by induction. For one angel can speak to another about a past act which he had and, while it existed, did not manifest, because that act will always remain hidden to another unless it is revealed to him. Therefore it is a suitable matter for speech, and many occasions for manifesting it can occur. Hence it is not likely that angels lack a mode by which they speak about these past things. And the same reason proves the same about any past thing that contingently happened, yet was not actually considered by the angel when it existed. For then another who actually knew it when it was will afterward be able to bear witness about it to others. Likewise it is proved concerning a singular effect which is now contingently occurring, if one angel does not notice it. For then another seeing such an effect will be able to narrate it to the other and excite him to attend to it. And so the prior reason made to the contrary in number thirty-three does not proceed as regards this point: it is not necessary that an actually existing thing be actually known by all angels. Moreover, even if future contingents, before they occur, cannot naturally be known certainly by any of the angels, still they can be known conjecturally. Hence it can happen that one knows more conjectures of some future thing than another. Therefore one will then be able to speak to another about such a future thing, at least within the breadth of conjectural cognition. Then one angel can know that something will be future in his own proposal, namely because he has the intention of doing it. Therefore he can intimate this very thing to another, and thus affirm to him that such a thing will be future. Furthermore, although angels habitually know natural things, they do not always actually consider all things. Therefore one who actually considers one effect, for example, the heaven, can speak about it to another and excite him actually to consider it.

35. *It is shown that practical speech is also given.*—The latter mode of practical speech is easily shown, because one angel can ask, petition, or command another to do something. Thus in Zechariah 2 one angel said to

another, *Run, speak to this young man.* And in Apocalypse 7, *one angel cried out to the four angels, saying: Do not harm the earth and the sea*, etc. And this is the more frequent mode in which angels are introduced in Sacred Scripture as speaking among themselves. But this speech is not only about the acts of the angel speaking, but also about those things which the one to whom the other speaks is going to do; and often speech about some future thing is joined with it, and the will of God is revealed. Therefore there is no doubt that angels speak about other things distinct from their own acts. Hence the aforesaid second part is also easily clarified, namely that speech about other things outside the internal acts of the angel speaking is manifested only by the means of internal acts of this kind. For the reason for doubting set down in the last doubt proves this: an angel does not speak to another except through his act as through an actually intelligible object, by impressing on him a species representing itself. Therefore from the force of such speech the cognition of the angel hearing is immediately borne to the act represented through itself first by such a species, and if anything else is manifested through such speech, it is only as a mediated and secondary object with respect to the intelligible species impressed through such speech. And this is confirmed because an angel cannot impress a species of other things, and therefore cannot speak of them immediately, as men can, because such immediate speech can occur only through words immediately signifying the things themselves. But these signs, apart from species, cannot be natural but only by convention. Angels, however, do not use these signs except per accidens, so to speak, insofar as they receive them from men and, in assumed bodies for the instruction of men themselves, use them by a certain imitation. Therefore through themselves and by their proper spiritual speech they cannot speak immediately except about their own acts, and through these as means, about the things with which such acts are concerned.

36. *The aforesaid latter part proceeds in almost every opinion.—Speech first expresses the mind of the one speaking.*—And this proceeds not only in our opinion but in almost any other. For if speech occurs only through the will ordering its act to another, it is clear that speech is immediately about one's own act, because the angel speaking has dominion only over his own acts, and so only they can fall immediately under such ordering and depend on it so that they can be known by another. And the other authors seem to think the same, however they explain this speech. Scotus alone seems to have taught that an angel can speak to another about an extrinsic thing by immediately effecting in him the very act of knowing such a thing. Nevertheless, both that efficiency is impossible, as we showed, and even if it were imagined, it would not be proper

speech, because through it the mind of the other speaking would not be expressed to the recipient, but only the external thing. But proper speech must first express the mind of the one speaking.

37. *The first assertion, also two-part, by which the eighth difficulty is satisfied.—The former part common among the Thomists, etc.—In what way it is proved in the author's doctrine.*—Second, for the resolution of the eighth doubt, it must be said that the angel speaking manifests to the hearer the internal act about which he speaks intuitively and in itself; but other things only abstractively, insofar as they can in some way be known in such an act. The former part is common among the Thomists, who say that once the ordering by the will of the angel speaking is posited, another angel can through innate species see the internal act, just as he can see other existing natural things. Ockham and Gabriel acknowledge the same, saying that the act itself as a present object effects cognition of itself in the hearer together with his intellect. Scotus also concedes that the cognition made in the hearer by the one speaking is intuitive of the thing about which the speech is. Hence if the speech is about one's own act, it will also cause intuitive cognition of it. But in our opinion it is very well proved by the reason given above, because the angel speaking manifests his act to another by impressing on him its proper species. But an angel having the proper species of any object can intuit it. Therefore he also intuitively knows such an act.

38. *Molina holds the opposite, but he is rejected by solving the first and second arguments set down in number thirty-two for the second part of the eighth difficulty.*—But against this part Molina opines, in the said Quest. 57, art. 4, because he thinks that not only are species of thoughts not implanted in angels, but also that they cannot be impressed by the one speaking. Yet he persuades this by no new reason. Nor is it contrary to the ratio of speech that through it intuitive cognition of the thing be provided. For although this is not of the ratio of speech, nor can it belong to that speech which is through signs alone by convention, nevertheless it is not repugnant to the ratio of speech taken abstractly and insofar as it can be spiritual and perfect. For that speech impresses a species by way of object is found even in sensible speech. For a word pronounced by the mouth or written impresses a species on the sense as its object. Therefore in spiritual speech it will be able immediately to impress a species on the intellect of the hearer. Therefore if that species is perfect and proper, it will be able to effect intuitive cognition. Nor is this contrary to the ratio of hearing, for it is said without reason that it is of the ratio of cognition acquired through speech that it be abstractive or that it lean on the authority of

the one speaking. For this has place only in that speech which is through imperfect signs or signs signifying by convention. But it will be otherwise if it occurs through the proper species of the thing. For if that impression is made by an intelligent being from the intention of manifesting his act, then it has the ratio of proper speech, even if that species begets intuitive cognition of the act manifested through speech. And as to the argument about the beatific vision, there is no inconvenience in admitting that it is at the same time a speech through which God speaks to the blessed, because vision and hearing can be the same in the intellect, as Augustine testifies. Hence what Paul said about himself, *I heard secret words which it is not permitted for man to speak*, many weighty Doctors interpret as meaning that he heard those mysteries through the beatific vision. Then, strictly speaking, the equivalence can be denied, because speech through itself first tends to manifest the mind of the one speaking and his acts; but the beatific vision through itself first shows the divine substance, essence, and quiddity, and therefore it is named vision rather than hearing.

39. *The latter part of the assertion is proved.*—The latter part of the assertion, namely that the cognition about other things outside the act of the one speaking received through speech is not intuitive but abstractive, must first be understood formally of that cognition insofar as it occurs through that medium. And so it is easily proved by the reasons proposed in the ninth doubt. For an angel through his act or thought cannot impress the proper species of the object of such an act, because thought is a thing distinct from the thing known and does not represent it by way of object. Hence it does not have the power of impressing its proper species. And from another source, the other either does not need such a species for knowing extrinsic things, whose innate species he already has, or the thing itself about which the speech is cannot be represented by a proper species, as if the speech is about a future thing or a past thing as such, or if it is about the will or precept of God which one angel intimates to another. For these and similar things neither can be seen intuitively by angels naturally in themselves, nor are they representable through proper species, as was said above.

40. *Exception from the aforesaid latter part.*—But I said that this part must be understood formally, because it can happen that the same thing about which cognition is manifested through speech is an act of will or intellect which can also be manifested through its own proper species. And then it will indeed be able to be known intuitively through the same species, yet not from the force of cognition of another act in which it can also be manifested. For example, if an angel has an act of love and as it were reflexively knows that he has it, and

manifests to another this thought or cognition of his love, and does not wish to impress on him the proper species of his act of love, then through that speech he manifests to another both the thought of his love and the love itself, and thus he speaks about both, yet in a diverse way. For he speaks about the cognition by showing it through its species and consequently intuitively; but about the love he speaks only as about a thing thought, and indicated in some way in the thought itself, and consequently not intuitively or in itself, but in another. And in this way it is universally true that through speech about a thing manifested by means of some act of which it is the object, the thing is not known in itself or intuitively. But in the said case, an angel could will to show another not only the thought of his love but also the love itself in itself, by giving him the species of both, and then the other will know intuitively not only the thought but also the love thought. But then he does not know the love only by means of the thought, nor does he know it intuitively in that way, but by another way concomitantly present. Hence if the act of love were now past, it could not impress a species of itself, and consequently the angel who had it could not speak about it to another by affirming that he had had it except in his word and thought. And therefore that speech would be through intuitive cognition with respect to the thought, but not with respect to the love, which would be known not in itself but only in his word and thought. And this can easily be applied to other things, for it can happen that speech is about a thing habitually known to another, of which he has proper species, and then one angel, excited by the speech of another, will be able to see that thing intuitively through its proper species, if nothing else stands in the way. Yet he will not receive that intuition through the speech, but through the species that he had from himself.

41. *To the third argument in number thirty-two.*—And from this is solved the difficulty touched upon in the last confirmation of the eighth doubt, namely whether the assent begotten in the angel hearing from the discourse of another speaking can be called an assent of angelic faith, that is, founded on the saying and truth of the one speaking. For I say that if this speech is considered with respect to that act which the angel manifests in himself intuitively and through its proper species, then there is no place there for an assent of faith. It is proved because that hearing is also vision, for in an act of the intellect these can be the same. But what someone sees he does not believe, at least through that act by which he sees. Whatever may be the case about whether it can at the same time be believed through another act and through another medium, this is irrelevant to the present disputation. Hence as regards this part, we acknowledge that such speech does not introduce angelic faith, but science or evident experience. But

insofar as speech is about a thing manifested not in itself but in another, as in a thought about a past or future act and similar things, such cognition can in some way have the ratio of angelic faith, because through that cognition the thing is not seen evidently in itself, but only in the saying and cognition of another.

42. *The nearest doctrine is weighed.—Whether, when the act is known, its object is known.—Aureolus denies it.—See the author on the Incarnation, disp. 27, sect. 3.*—But because this doctrine supposes that in the word, when the cognition of another is known, its object is also known, this remains to be examined. Aureolus treats this doubt in these terms, 2, distinction 9, Quest. 1, art. 2, and in sum responds by denying that the object of the act is known in any way from the force of the cognition of the act alone, which he calls direct. He proves it, because otherwise one seeing the beatific vision of one angel would intuitively see God, and thus could be blessed from natural powers. He proves the first consequence because through vision its object is known. Therefore if the prior vision, for example, of God is intuitive, and that vision itself is seen intuitively, then even the vision of the vision would be an intuitive vision of God. But this reason is of little weight. For first, given the first consequence, the second is the worst possible. Because the clear vision of God cannot be seen from pure natural powers, since it is supernatural as to its substance, as I suppose from its own matter and as will be touched upon in the following chapter. Hence one who admitted the first consequence would consequently say that the vision of God cannot be seen intuitively except through some vision similar to the vision of God himself. Nevertheless, even the first inference is not good, because although the object of a thought is known in the same thought, it need not be known as perfectly as the thought itself, and therefore it will not be known intuitively, even if the thought is seen intuitively, because it is not known through its own species but through another's. But that opinion can be proved otherwise, because the concept of a thing represents its object only by way of a form formally affecting the power, just as an intelligible species represents effectively. But neither of these forms represents that thing objectively by way of a formal image of the same thing. Therefore in that concept objectively known there cannot be known the thing which that concept formally represents to the one having it, just as it cannot be known in an intelligible species objectively known.

43. *The affirmative resolution of many.*—Nevertheless, it must be said that an angel, by manifesting his thought to another through speech, consequently manifests in that thought the object of his thought, and consequently also,

conversely, the angel hearing, by knowing the thought of the one speaking, consequently knows in it or through it the thing thought by him. This resolution, taken absolutely, is asserted, or rather supposed, by some theologians: Ockham, *Quodlibet* 1, Quest. 7, and in 2, Quest. 20, and Gabriel there, distinction 9, Quest. 2, art. 4. They say that an angel seeing the thought of another in it as in a natural sign somehow knows its object. Hence Major there, final question, falsely attributes to Ockham that he said that an angel seeing the thought of another does not see the object, because he sees the thought in the genus of a thing and not in the genus of a sign. For he says the contrary expressly. But Major himself judges that opinion probable, although in the end he does not adhere to it. Hervaeus, 2, distinction 11, Quest. 1, and Henry, *Quodlibet* 5, Quest. 15, seem more to suppose this, and Vásquez supposes the same as known in the said disp. 211, chapter 11, n. 62, at the end, and he had said the same in disp. 38, chapter 4. Henry also greatly favors it, in the *Summa*, art. 33, Quest. 2, insofar as he says that, when a visible or intelligible species is seen, the object representable through such a species is seen in it. For there does not seem to be a greater reason, although perhaps he thought otherwise about an act. Finally, St. Thomas and all his disciples certainly suppose this. For on the one hand they acknowledge that the cognitions of angels are not only about their own acts and concepts, but also about other things, as we have now explained, and on the other hand they think that this speech is made immediately only through the manifestation of their own acts or concepts. Therefore they suppose that when acts are manifested, things also are in some way manifested, and consequently that by the hearer the objects of the acts are known through the acts or in the acts themselves.

44. *And it is proved a posteriori.*—Hence it can first be proved a posteriori, because angels can speak among themselves not only about the acts which they presently have when they speak, but also about past or future things, or things otherwise revealed or narrated to them. But they cannot speak about these immediately and directly. Therefore they can speak about other things only by manifesting the acts which they then exercise about them when they speak about them. Therefore, conversely, it is necessary that the hearer, by knowing through speech the acts of the one speaking, know through those very acts their objects. It can be responded from Aureolus above that an angel, by seeing the thought of another, can indeed see the thing thought, yet not directly and from the force of such cognition alone, but indirectly and by inference, namely by comparing that thought with another thought of his own, reflecting on it. For example, if by seeing some thought of another he considers a similar one in

himself and recognizes it as terminated to a rose, then from this he would know that a similar thought which he sees in another is also terminated to a rose. But this response first supposes that an angel has cognition of this kind through his own discourse, which is foreign to angelic nature, as we shall say later. Then it explains angelic speech in a very imperfect way. For strictly speaking, one angel cannot narrate to another what he has seen, or what he thinks or judges about some particular thing, but only materially, so to speak, show his present act, so that the other may then run through it and as it were divine what the other says or about what matter he speaks. But this is incredible and plainly unworthy of angelic nature.

45. *The a priori reason.*—The a priori reason is that thought essentially says a transcendental ordering to an object, and such a singular thought, however materially taken, says a similar ordering to such a particular object. But an angel by speaking manifests to another clearly, quidditatively, and intuitively his particular thought. Therefore consequently he manifests to him the object with which such thought is concerned. Therefore it is known directly by the hearer. *Directly*, I say, that is, from the force of the species of such an act impressed on him by the one speaking, and by the same motion or act by which he knows the thought of another. Yet, comparing these two among themselves, namely the act and its object, from the force of such speech the act is known primarily and as it were directly, while its object is known secondarily and as it were obliquely. Aureolus responds by denying the first consequence, because an act is only the foundation of a relation; but although an actual relation is not known without its term, nevertheless the foundation can be known without it. But this has place in a predicamental relation; the reason given proceeds about the transcendental ordering essentially included in the act, as it is included in a habit or power with respect to an object. For an act cannot be known, especially essentially and intuitively, unless the transcendental ordering is known; nor can this be known without the object. And therefore the inference is very good, that an angel speaking, by manifesting his act, consequently manifests the object, not through discourse or because the act is a sign of the object, but because of the intrinsic connection of one with the other, by reason of which the intelligible species representing one consequently represents the other, although not in the same way, because it represents the act as its own and immediate object, but represents the thing which is the object of the act secondarily and as it were by resultance, in the way in which a term is placed in the definition of motion, and similar things. And from this it also happens that although the thought manifested through speech is seen in itself and intuitively, nevertheless the thing

thought is known only insofar as it was necessary for perfect cognition of the thought. For this it is enough that the thing thought be known abstractively and in an imperfect way. But Henry, where above, teaches that the object is not seen less perfectly in the species objectively known than through it. But he does not prove this, nor does it seem probable. On this, see the treatise *On the Soul*.

46. *An inference from what has been said about speech of the intellect to a similar other in the will.*—You will say: therefore, just as an angel, by manifesting to another through speech the word of his mind, also manifests to him the thing thought, so also by manifesting an act of his will, he will manifest the thing loved or hated. The consequent does not seem to be admitted; otherwise speech would be made no less through the will than through the intellect. Therefore. The consequence is clear, because an act of the will has as much connection with its object as an act of the intellect has with its own. Nor does it matter that they are orderings of diverse things: for in the word it is by way of image, and in love by way of impulse. This, I say, does not stand in the way, because in truth the object is not seen in the word as in an objective image, as was proved above in arguing, but one is seen with the other because of connection. This reason is found formally in the act of love, although the mode of connection is diverse, which is something material.

47. *The nearest inference is admitted.*—Therefore I easily concede the consequence, nor do I judge it inconvenient that angelic speech, even about the things themselves, can occur as much through the will as through the intellect. For just as we proved this above about the acts themselves with respect to their manifestation, so it must be proved about all things that have a connection with those acts, for there is the same proportional reason. And there is no inconvenience in an act of the will, insofar as it impresses on another a species of itself through which the other can concomitantly know another thing, being in some way a word with respect to the hearer, because it is not a word formally representing, but objectively and actively. Hence it differs from an act of thought, because this is also a word with respect to the one thinking himself and formally represents to him alone. Therefore one who thinks, by that very fact, speaks to himself, but one who loves does not. It is otherwise with respect to another. For if the one who thinks and loves some thing wishes to manifest to another his thought and love, he speaks to him through both, both about the acts themselves and about the thing thought or loved. Yet another difference can be noted among these, for one who at the same time thinks and loves can speak to another about his thought and manifest it, without manifesting the love. But conversely he cannot manifest the love without manifesting the thought,

because love necessarily includes or supposes it. And from this source also, one who shows his love to another necessarily also speaks about the thing loved, whether he does this through love or through the thought which he also manifests.

48. *A certain doubt is proposed.—Its resolution is deferred.*—But perhaps someone will ask on this point whether the cognition of the object thought or loved acquired through such speech is evident from the force of the natural light of the angel hearing and of the species given to him by the one speaking, or whether it is in some way obscure and, as to assent and judgment, founded on the authority of the one speaking, and consequently whether, considering the matter from pure natural powers, falsehood can underlie that cognition, as in faith founded on the testimony of a creature. But before the resolution of this doubt, it is necessary to know how falsity or deception can be in the mind of an angel, and how an angel is capable of the revelation of faith or of illumination by one from another. Therefore I defer the response until the end of the present book and partly until the fifth and sixth books.

Whether, and How, the Angel Hearing Discerns the One Speaking.

49. *It has two members.—The first member is affirmed.*—A tenth doubt remains, which can easily be resolved from what has been said, namely whether the angel hearing knows who is speaking to him, and how he knows this; or if several speak, whether he can hear all at once and discern among their discourses. To the first part of the question, I first respond that it is necessary both that the one speaking be able to indicate himself to the hearer and that the hearer be able to judge certainly and evidently who is speaking. Those writing on this matter seem to suppose this, and deservedly. First, because just as communication of secrets through speech is necessary for political society, so for a fitting and morally necessary communication it is fitting that the hearer know who is speaking to him, and consequently that the one speaking be able to manifest himself to the one to whom he speaks. Otherwise speech would be most imperfect and very confused. This can be known by experience among men. For if the hearer does not know how to discern who is speaking, he remains very uncertain, and is not properly said to have human communication or society with the person so speaking as such. And by the same reason a letter or writing whose author is unknown is judged very imperfect. Therefore much more among angels. Second, because if one angel could not know the one

speaking in particular, neither could he know his act in particular. For how would he know the act without knowing whose it is and in whom it is? But it has been shown that speech is chiefly about the acts of the one speaking and through intuitive vision of them. Therefore it is necessary that through speech the hearer understand who is speaking, because he cannot see the act intuitively except by seeing in what subject it is.

50. *The mode of discerning which angel is speaking has proportion with the mode of discerning the man who is speaking.*—And from this it is first gathered how the one hearing can know and discern who is speaking to him. For among men this is known in two ways, namely either by sight, as when I not only hear but also see the one speaking, or by intellect, as when, perceiving the voice by hearing alone, from prior experience I judge in my mind that the voice belongs to such a person. Therefore in the same modes, applied with proportion, an angel can know the same thing. First, because while one angel speaks, the other sees intuitively the act of the one speaking manifested by him. Therefore he sees that that angel is the one who speaks. Then, because through the species which he receives from another, he knows that it could not have flowed from anyone else except from the one whose act it represents, and consequently that he is the one who speaks. Then, because the angel evidently knows that no one else can manifest the hidden act of the heart except the one whose act is manifested through speech. Therefore by seeing the act he also sees who is speaking to him. And this reason, applied with proportion, has place in that opinion which affirms that speech occurs by manifesting something in the one speaking himself, whether what is manifested is the act itself or some sign of it. But if through speech the acts of the one speaking himself were not immediately manifested, but the things themselves, as Scotus suggests when he says that speech occurs by impressing cognition of the very things known by the one speaking, then it would be difficult to know the one speaking, because those things can be known by many angels, and cognition of them could also be impressed by many. But perhaps someone would say that each angel has a peculiar mode of cognition which he impresses and which is known by the recipient. This certainly can neither easily be understood nor is it likely, because cognition is according to the mode of the one knowing and eliciting it, not of another extrinsic agent.

51. *How one should respond to the second member.*—To the other part of the question St. Thomas, in 2, distinction 11, Quest. 2, art. 3, reply to 4, thinks that one angel can at once hear several speaking to him. And although he adds that *this is principally true in the blessed angels*, still, when he adds *principally*, he

thinks that strictly speaking even the non-blessed can do this, and the reason he provides is general, namely because an angel always intuits himself, and consequently all things that pertain to him and of which he himself is the reason of knowing. But if this is true, it is consequently easy to understand how the hearer discerns among several speaking to him, because by knowing the individual speeches he knows from which angel each proceeds, in the mode just explained. Therefore although several speak at once, the hearer will discern who they are and to whom each of such speeches belongs.

52. *The aforesaid response is shown to be difficult.*—Yet the first thing that is supposed, asserted so indefinitely, is not without difficulty. Because otherwise, even if a thousand angels speak to one at once, he will be able at once to attend to all, know all, and discern all the things said by each and consider them actually. But this does not seem able to be conceded absolutely, because an angel cannot at once understand many things actually, especially taken indefinitely and in any multitude, as we shall say later. St. Thomas responds in effect that an angel can know many things by way of one; but then he knows several speaking by way of one, because he knows all those speeches as pertaining to himself, and so knows all those things through himself as through the reason of knowing them, which is to know them by way of one. But the reason is difficult, both because speech, as regards the thing manifested through it, does not pertain to the hearer in any way other than by way of an object knowable by him; but in this way an angel cannot at once know all things pertaining to himself, as is self-evident; and also because the angel hearing himself is not the reason of knowing all things that are said to him, just as he is not the reason of knowing all objects pertaining to himself. For the proper reason of knowing each thing is its proper species. But just as he knows other things through distinct species, so also he receives in himself several species of several speeches, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore just as he knows other things, so also he knows the things manifested through several speeches through distinct species. Therefore he knows them through several reasons of knowing.

53. *The true resolution of the aforesaid second member.—An angel can receive from many the species of their speeches, yet he cannot understand through all at once, or exercise many hearings.*—Therefore in our opinion I judge that two things must be distinguished, namely the impression of the species which is made by the one speaking in the hearer, and the use of the species, which is made by the hearer himself when he knows the thing about which the speech is. For just as in human and sensible hearing these two are easily distinguished, so also in spiritual and angelic hearing, because the first consists in reception, the

second in the vital action of the hearer. Therefore I say that as to the first, an angel can at once receive the speech of several in any number whatever, because the intellect of the hearer is capable of all those species at once, and the agents are many and do not impede one another. But as to the second, I say that an angel cannot at once elicit several acts by which he hears and perceives all the things about which several speak to him at once, except in an imperfect way and within some certain terminus or number. The reason given proves this to me, because for hearing of this kind a special attention to the individual things is necessary, and since the power of an angel for attending is finite, when applied to several at once it becomes less in each, and so it must have a certain terminus. Finally, with respect to this, the same reason seems to hold concerning cognitions of the things manifested through speech as concerning any others, as the reason given also shows. And therefore we remit the fuller explanation of this reason to the question to be treated below, how an angel can know several things at once, for it depends on that question. But in the former part there remains a difficulty which we shall touch upon in the following doubt.

In what Excitation for Hearing Consists.

54. *It is argued that it does not seem to consist in the reception of the species alone.—It is argued, on the contrary, that it does not seem to consist in some cognition.*—For the eleventh doubt is what kind and how great the excitation of the angel hearing by the one speaking is. And the reason for doubting is that either that excitation consists in the reception alone of an intelligible species without any vital attention, or at the same time it includes vital attention and consequently cognition. But neither can satisfy. For if the first is said, that is not really excitation, because that reception of a species is not perceived and so does not move one to operate, which is what it is to be excited. Just as an object impressing a species in the eye, when a man is so distracted through imagination and intellect that he in no way attends, does not excite the man but is related as if it were impressing it in a mirror; so therefore that impression of a species in an angel will be, if he does not actually attend to it. And this is confirmed, because if the angel then does not attend or perceive the impression of the species, so that afterward he may use it, he will need another exciting cause, for he will not be able to be applied by himself. Therefore angelic speech is either irrelevant, or at least imperfect or insufficient. For by whom will such excitation afterward occur? Or why will it occur afterward rather than then? Or if it never occurs, what will that speech profit? But if the other part is chosen,

and it is said that the angel to whom speech is made perceives the impression of the species, it follows that he is necessitated by the one speaking to hear and to know the act, because that attention and perception does not occur without actual cognition. But the consequent is false, both because no creature has power over another's intellect to necessitate it, because it is a spiritual power, which, just as it is made by God alone, so also can be effectively moved and determined by him alone; and also because each angel freely uses innate species. Therefore he also freely uses a species impressed on him by the angel speaking, because it is not more efficacious or more powerful. Therefore it is within the power of the angel receiving such a species to use it or not to use it. Therefore through its impression he is not compelled to attend, and therefore it is said without foundation that he always attends and knows whenever such a species is impressed, because that cognition must be some use of that species, not necessary but free.

55. *What Vásquez responds.*—For this reason some say that it is superfluous to posit the impression of an intelligible species on account of the excitation of the angel hearing, because in reality there can be no such excitation that effectively moves to actual cognition. But if it does not move in this way, it is not excitation. And Alensis seems to favor this opinion, 2 part, Quest. 27, final member, proposing the question whether hearing in another necessarily follows upon the speech of one angel. For he distinguishes between speech of grace or of nature, and affirms that hearing necessarily follows from speech of grace, but denies that it necessarily follows from speech of nature. But he does not assign a reason for either member or for the difference between them. Nevertheless, speech through grace seems to be the same as illumination, about which I have determined to say nothing now, because below it must be disputed specially. And therefore I now assert nothing about the first member. But in the latter part Alensis seems to favor the preceding opinion, although elsewhere he holds that speech does not occur without some impression of a species or likeness. Richard also, in 2, distinction 9, art. 1, Quest. 1, favors the same opinion. For although he holds that angelic speech occurs by means of a species to which the hearer is changed, nevertheless he indicates in the solution to 2 that it is within the power of the angel to whom speech is made to impede the species from being made in him. For when he says that the angel speaking can change the intellect of another to an intelligible form, he adds, *unless the proper will of that angel prohibits this change*. He thinks, therefore, that the one speaking cannot compel another to hear.

56. *What St. Thomas writes on this matter.*—But St. Thomas, 1 part, Quest. 107, art. 1, reply to 3, simply concedes that an angel can be excited by the one speaking through some intelligible power; but he does not explain the mode. And similarly in Quest. 9, *de Veritate*, art. 4, reply to 6, he says: *It must be said that angels, from the very fact that they turn themselves to others while they are in act of some forms in order to others, in some way excite others to intuit them.* But what that particle *in some way* imports he does not explain. But some of the Thomists explain it as *that is, objectively*, because an angel, by ordering his concept to another, objectively excites him without any efficiency. From this it also follows openly that through this no necessity is imposed on the other to attend.

57. *The first declaration of the true opinion.—Second declaration.*—Nevertheless, in our opinion we consequently say, first, that whether the one speaking can impose necessity on the hearer for attending or not, an impression of a species is necessary so that the hearer may be constituted in first act and proximately able to know the act of the one speaking. For he did not have this proximate power before, and he could not receive it through a mere extrinsic denomination, as has been proved. Second, from this I consequently assert that the angel speaking impresses the species on the one to whom he orders his concept, independently of the will of the recipient. It is proved, because freedom through itself is not for suffering or not suffering, but for acting or not acting, because freedom belongs to an active power as active, as we have shown elsewhere, and the subordination of one power to another exists only among active powers, as is clear from the doctrine on the soul and experience sufficiently shows. But I said *through itself*, because by placing an impediment through a free power, or by removing the patient from the agent, a passive power can be impeded by the will from suffering, as is self-evident. Yet this always occurs immediately by using some active power, as by closing or turning the eyes away so that they do not receive a species. But this cannot have place in angels, because no impediment can be interposed, and the distance that can be thought either does not impede speech, according to what was said above, or certainly an angel cannot be so distant from another that the other, if he wishes, may not at once draw near to him by the speed of nature. Therefore with respect to the impression of the species, to which the hearer is related only passively, there is no freedom in the recipient if the other wishes to impress it.

58. *Richard's invention concerning the mode of impressing a species in the angel hearing is rejected.*—Hence in this we do not agree with Richard, for he posits that that species is made not by the one speaking alone but also by the

one hearing, indeed principally by the one hearing and instrumentally by the other. And therefore he could consistently say that the change to that species depends on the freedom not only of the one speaking but also of the one hearing. Nevertheless, for the explanation of his opinion, he says some things that can neither be proved nor defended. For first, he supposes that there are in angels certain intellectual rays, concreated with them and rooted in their substance, which are not substance but accidents, and nevertheless are not received in another subject as solar rays are, but are conserved in themselves through their own being in their root. And they are spiritual and do not have extension, and nevertheless they are stretched forth or transmitted outside the substance of the angel himself in whom they are rooted, and can exist somewhere where that substance is not, and so can reach all the way to another angel to whom the speech is directed and become present to him, even if he is distant, by existing at the same time in the intermediate space without a subject. This whole supposition is asserted by him without proof and without authority, although it contains many incredible things. For when those rays are transmitted, either they are newly made or they are only moved locally. He himself does not say the first, since he posits them as concreated with angels. Nor can it be said, because they would have to be created, since they would be made outside a subject. The second also is not intelligible. For who understands an accident inhering in a subject being moved locally through itself outside the subject, through the intermediate space where the subject is not present, to the place where another angel is? But that such motion would be necessary is clear, because he himself says that there is a transmission and that through it the ray exists where the substance of the angel in which it is rooted does not exist and where the ray itself was not before. Therefore there is a real change in the ray, which can be nothing other than local.

59. *The same opinion is further attacked.*—Then that ray cannot be rooted in the substance of the angel except by inhering in it. But when it is stretched forth or transmitted, it is not extended, as he acknowledges, because otherwise it would be corporeal. Therefore the whole that is in the substance would be outside the substance, and so an accident would at the same time be whole in the subject and outside the subject through the whole space all the way to another angel. This is plainly monstrous and impossible. For if the same accident cannot be transmitted from the subject in which it is into another in such a way that it is in both at once, how will it be able to be transmitted through an intermediate space all the way to another distant substance, existing at the same time in itself and in another substance? There is added that these

rays are superfluous, for they can have no formal effect or service. For first, in the angel himself in whom they are rooted, they cannot have a formal effect of illuminating him. For how will a ray flowing from the sun illuminate the sun itself? What formal effect, therefore, will it have in him? Or how will it be in him as in a subject if it has no formal effect in him? Or how will it be rooted in him if it is not in him as in a subject, since it is supposed to be a true accident? Nor will it be able to have a formal effect in the intermediate space or in another angel, since in neither is it as in a subject, as is supposed. Hence, consequently, it will not be able to have any service.

60. *Richard's evasion is overturned.*—But Richard says that it serves so that the angel speaking, from the potency of that ray, may draw out a species which he objectively presents to another. But first, if the ray is anything that can be conceived, it is only a certain imperfect light in the manner of a solar ray. Hence it is not a passive potency such that a species can be produced from its potency. Then that species is useless, since it is not subjectively in the angel hearing, as he says, nor can it serve him for hearing. Therefore it is irrelevant. He responds that it does serve the other, because it is presented to him, and by means of it as an instrumental agent, the angel hearing himself, through his principal active power, effects in himself a similar species through which he may know the act of the one speaking. But I ask: how does the ray affected by the species present it to another angel? Either that presentation occurs through cognition, so that the angel sees the species presented to him and from it is moved to form another similar one in himself. And then it is necessary to suppose in the angel a species through which he can see both the ray and its species; therefore it will be easier to suppose a species by which he sees the act of the angel speaking, when he himself wishes, or at least one by which he sees the species existing in the angel speaking himself. For the species which is imagined to exist in the diffused ray drawn out from its potency must necessarily have first been drawn out from the ray itself as rooted in the angel himself. Therefore it could have been seen there by another angel without another diffusion. Or that presentation is only objective and occurs only through local nearness and diffusion. And then, first, that transmission is superfluous, because for mere objective presence it is not necessary, both because it is not impeded by distance, as I said above, and especially because the angel speaking could easily approach the other by himself as much as was necessary, without that unintelligible transmission of accidents. And then, once that objective presence is posited, which the angel to whom it is made does not see, how will he be able to be excited by it to hearing, or to be joined to the ray through himself and from his intention, in order to effect in

himself a species of the act of another angel? Therefore one will have to say that by the very fact that the ray affected by the species arrives at such a local presence of another angel, then that angel, by necessity of nature and without his direct will and intention, is joined to the ray as an instrument for effecting in himself such a species, which is also incredible. Therefore that whole opinion as to this part is singular and plainly absurd.

61. *Third declaration.*—Then we say that when the angel speaking effects a species of his act in the hearer, then the hearer necessarily senses the change made in himself, and at least perceives and virtually attends to the species which is made in him, and in this respect hearing in some way necessarily follows from speech. I prove this first, because this at least is necessary for some excitation, as the objections made prove. But that some true excitation is necessary has, I think, been sufficiently proved above. For certainly angels would be very stupid, so to speak, with respect to moral society, if no one could call or address another so as in some way to move him to hearing. Then the arguments made to the contrary do not proceed against this, because that present-sensing, so to speak, of such a species is not the use of it as a species, but as an actually intelligible object joined through itself to the power. But although the use of the species in relation to the thing represented is free, it is not necessary that the cognition of the species as an object knowable through itself always be free. Add that the intellect is not formally a free power, and therefore it is not surprising that if it is touched, so to speak, antecedently to every free use of its will, it present-senses that touch, preceding the same free will in this. Especially because perhaps cognition of the species even implanted in the angel was natural to him from the beginning. Therefore when a new species is impressed, it will also be able to be known naturally. Finally, it seems to pertain to the natural perfection of an angel that there be no change in him which he does not perceive, and about which or about whose use he cannot deliberate.

62. *Fourth declaration.—Free attention does not impede natural attention.*—Finally I say that hearing itself, as to the actual cognition of the matter about which the speech is, is not simply necessary, but can be suspended according to the choice of the hearer. The objections made probably persuade this part, chiefly the one that the use of species is free to an angel, as we shall see below. Likewise, the intellect through itself is subject to the will with respect to exercise. But here no cause intervenes that necessitates the intellect, because as soon as it precedes the will by perceiving the species given to it, the will can restrain it from operating immediately through that species, or apply it so strongly to considering something else that it cannot at the same time use the

new species. You will say: by the same reason, when the species is impressed, the angel could be so attentive to another thing that he could not even attend to the new species impressed on him. It can be responded that even if this were allowed, it would not be a great inconvenience, because it is enough that an angel have the power of exciting another in a morally efficacious way, although sometimes because of the excessive application of the other angel he can be impeded, as happens in the senses. And then, although the species is not perceived when it is impressed, as soon as the angel has ceased from that excessive attention and has returned to himself, so to speak, he will see the species in himself and will use it if he wishes. Or certainly, better, the consequence is denied, for free attention, however great it may be, does not impede natural attention, such as is the one that follows from the impression of the species, as I have said. Finally, the declaration is proved, because for excitation it is not necessary that the angel hear by necessity and think about the thing said, but it is enough that he perceive the speech itself as to its being. The angel does this by seeing the new species in himself, although he is free in the use of it, which pertains to his perfection.

On Speech between Angels and Men, or also God.

63. *The first part is discussed, whether we can speak to angels.*—A twelfth, two-part difficulty arises about speech between us and angels. For it follows that we can speak with angels by impressing on them species of our acts, and that angels can speak with us by impressing a species of their acts. But both are plainly false. Therefore. The former part of the consequence is proved. For an angel of himself has the power of producing such a species, as we say, and our intellect is capable of it. A sign of this is that the separated soul is capable of such a species, for an angel will be able to speak to it. Therefore even now the intellect of the conjoined soul is capable of such a species, because it is the same intellect and has the same passive capacity. Therefore in fact an angel, if he wishes to speak with a man, will be able to impress on him a species of his acts. The consequence is proved, because the interposed body or local distance does not impede such an action, as was said above; and even if it did impede it, it could be removed by the angel's natural power, by entering within the body of the man and establishing himself locally with absolutely no distance from the soul itself. But the falsity of the consequent is clear, because when such a species has been received, our conjoined soul could naturally hear the speech of an angel and his

acts independently of phantasms, because it does not receive that species through phantasms.

64. *The second part of the difficulty is also discussed, whether angels can speak to us.*—The other part of the consequence is proved, because our separated soul can speak to an angel, as seems certain. Therefore, according to our opinion, it will speak to him by impressing on him a species of its act, because in this respect the same reason holds for the soul and the angel, both because no other mode can have place in the soul, as will be easily clear by applying what was said in the preceding chapters, and also because the conjoined soul has the power of impressing a similar species on an angel, if it wishes. This is proved: for in itself the conjoined soul has the same power as the separated soul, and its acts are equally spiritual and can equally be applied by the will to that action, and that action is not impeded by the body, because it need not be carried through it, and no condition is lacking, because local nearness either is not necessary or can occur so as not to be lacking. Why, then, will the action not be able to follow? But the consequent seems through itself incredible, for if the soul cannot without the body either know or be affected or move the body, who would believe that it can change the intellect of angels?

65. *It is responded to the first part of the difficulty that we can speak to angels.*—To the former part we respond, first, that we can speak to angels. This is certain from faith concerning the holy angels, because we can pray to them and manifest our hearts to them. But regarding them, one could say that through the beatific vision or through other divine revelations they know our acts when we speak to them. Nevertheless, even naturally some discourse of ours can be made by us and perceived by angels, for even those who have association with demons speak with them. And just men sometimes speak to them, not by petitioning or praising, but by rebuking and reproving, and by commanding from faith in God, which is also evident by experience.

66. *The said speech can occur through sensible signs.—It matters whether an angel has innate species of the things about which a man speaks, or not.—It matters whether a man speaks to a man or to an angel.*—Then this speech can be made by men through sensible signs, such as through voices, writings, etc. For angels, even evil ones, easily see these signs through innate species, and have their meaning understood by natural science or experience. Hence through them they easily understand the matters about which the speech occurs, in that way, certainly, by which one man understands the speech of another. Hence it happens that from the force of this speech an angel does not see the things about which a man speaks to him in themselves, but only in a sign, and consequently

cannot assent to the things said in this way from the force of the same speech except through human faith, because voices and signs by convention do not through themselves confer proper cognition of the things signified and in themselves. But I say through themselves, because if an angel otherwise has innate species of the things about which the man speaks to him, by using them he will be able to see whether they are so or not. But with respect to the internal acts of the man speaking himself, if the angel does not have innate species of them, as we suppose, he will not be able to know them in themselves, even if the man in that sensible way speaks to him about them. For if a man speaking to a demon says that he believes his words, the demon will not be able to know whether he says what is true by seeing the internal faith itself, but only from the words and from other conjectures or effects which he will be able to weigh more acutely and deeply than a man. In this kind of speech another difference between a man and an angel must also be noted: a man not only makes the object present to the man to whom he speaks, but effectively excites him and of itself moves him by means of the senses. But he cannot excite an angel in this way, because sensible words cannot effect anything in an angel, as is self-evident and from what was said above, because angels do not take species from material objects. Therefore through these sensible signs a man can only notify to angels the things about which they speak, if they themselves wish to attend, just as a man speaks to men through writing. Hence it also happens that through this speech a man cannot speak to one angel in such a way that all cannot understand if they wish.

67. *But whether the said speech can occur purely mentally is doubted.—What the Thomists respond.—A response not absurd can be brought forward in the author's opinion.*—But the proper difficulty is whether a man can speak to an angel purely mentally through intellect and will, without any sensible signification. According to the opinion of the Thomists, that this speech occurs through the mere extrinsic ordering of the will, it will have to be affirmed altogether, and they themselves seem to think so consistently. For a man can easily will that an angel know his thought or affection. And on the part of the angel nothing else is desired, because he is supposed to have innate species of these acts and a sufficient light. Hence from the force of such speech the angel will see intuitively the acts themselves of the man, for the same reason. Only true excitation is lacking to him, but it will be only objective, as they speak, which I do not judge inconvenient between a man and an angel, as I shall say immediately. And so in this way of speaking there remains only the difficulty about what is supposed, namely that the angel has innate species for seeing the

acts of the human heart, and nevertheless depends in the use of them on the will of the man himself. This can never be sufficiently explained unless by recourse to God's providence or impediment. But supposing that the angel does not have such a species, according to our opinion, someone could freely say that we can speak mentally to an angel by giving him a species of our act which he does not have. Nor is this new. For all theologians who teach that angels take species from things will much more easily say that they can receive them from our existing acts, at least when we wish. For according to those doctors, that taking of species does not occur without the efficiency of the objects, whether whole or partial. But if Scotus and others attribute this efficiency even to material objects, what wonder if it is attributed to spiritual acts of our soul? Therefore, although this efficiency cannot be effectively proved, I do not see why it should be called incredible, or by what effective reason it is shown to be impossible.

68. *The more probable denying response.—Response to the objection in number 64.—Prevented by death, he did not complete this; see, however, in the posthumous treatise On the Soul, disp. 14, Quest. 6, n. 9.*—Nevertheless, I add that it seems more probable that a soul joined to a body cannot impress on an angel a proper species of its internal act. For that action is too spiritual, while the soul joined to a body cannot perform an action so purely spiritual that it is not made in some way according to the imitation of a material thing. For by this reason it also cannot understand without conversion to phantasms. But to the objection about the separated soul we first say that it can be turned into doubt whether a separated soul can speak with angels as perfectly as they speak among themselves, because it is of an inferior order. We leave this to be disputed in the third treatise, which will be on the soul, and its last book. But now we grant that the separated soul can speak to angels by manifesting to them its acts which it elicits in that state, by giving them the proper species of them. Nevertheless, we deny the equivalence with the conjoined soul. And a sufficient reason could be given, because this conjunction to the body impedes the soul from being able to effect species without the conjunction of the body, as is evident to us from experience of other acts. Although perhaps we cannot give another a priori reason except that the mode of operating follows the mode of being. Therefore this is sufficient in the present matter. But we can explain the reason more, because this species must be impressed through the act itself which is manifested by speech, as through an actually intelligible object. But the act of the separated soul is an actually intelligible object. The act of the conjoined soul, however, although it is immaterial and from that side seems to be an intelligible object in act, nevertheless is in some way only intelligible in potency. And

therefore it cannot act on a spirit or impress a merely spiritual proper species of itself. For just as the conjoined soul is not apt to understand *except in conformity with material things*, as St. Thomas says, Quest. *de Anima*, art. 18, so neither is its act apt to effect a species except one proportioned to itself, in the same way preserving some conformity to material things. This can be seen in the species which the act of our intellect leaves in our memory, for it always represents the act with some order to material things, just as the act from which it flowed represented in second act. But species of this sort are not proportioned to angels, and the conjoined soul does not have acts through which it can effect better species. Therefore it cannot effect species of its acts in angels. But when separated it will have a more spiritual mode of operating, and so will make nobler acts, either in entity or at least in mode, through which it can speak with angels in a higher mode and, so to speak, face to face. Hence it must consequently be said that in this life we cannot intrinsically excite angels to hear us speaking, nor can they naturally intuit our acts, even if we wish. For each follows from this principle, that we cannot impress species on them. Nor is this an inconvenience, because from the nature of the thing men do not belong to the same society or republic as angels. But I say from the nature of the thing, because according to the order of grace they belong to one mystical body, and therefore it is likely that God gives holy angels species by which they know our acts when we speak to them, unless they see those acts in the Word. But in the evil angels, because they are now completely cut off from that body, it is not necessary that species be given, and therefore they can never intuit our acts.

69. *To the second part of the difficulty in number 64.—First declaration.—Second.—Third.*—To the latter part, concerning the speech of an angel to men, first, it must not be denied that angels can speak with men, either through imitation of human speech, as they do in assumed bodies, or by forming sensible voices in the air, or by inwardly exciting phantasms, and so either by tempting men, as the evil do, or by illuminating and helping, as the good do. All these things must be treated extensively in the fourth book. Then we acknowledge that an angel can speak to a separated soul in the angelic mode and by impressing on it species of his proper acts. This we now suppose, for it must be treated in the last book of the following treatise. Third, nevertheless, we say that an angel cannot speak to a man or a conjoined soul by merely spiritual speech, or by impressing on us species of his proper acts representing them as they are in themselves. The reason is that the soul joined to a body is incapable of such cognition and mode of knowing, and therefore is also incapable of its principle.

70. *Fourth declaration, by which the third is clarified.*—But to explain this we add fourth, that although we imagine such a proper species of a spiritual thing to be impressed on a conjoined soul, or posit that it is infused by God, nevertheless the soul in such a state could not use that species by the powers of nature alone, because it exceeds the natural mode of understanding of the soul in such a state. Hence although the soul of Christ could understand through species infused through themselves without conversion to phantasms, that power was not merely natural, but was with help and concurrence exceeding nature. Yet, supposing such species and such light, such concurrence and such a mode of operating were due, and therefore it can be called connatural by reason of such light, just as the beatific vision is connatural supposing the light of glory. Nevertheless, with respect to a conjoined soul, such a mode of operating includes a special supernaturalness, and therefore cannot occur without special help and concurrence. And therefore, even if per impossibile we granted that an angel impressed a species of his act on the conjoined intellect, it would be superfluous and idle, because the conjoined soul could not use that species naturally, nor could the angel impressing it help the soul to use it.

71. *The third declaration itself is further confirmed.*—Finally, from this we confirm what we have now said, that the conjoined soul is naturally incapable of such species for such a state. We prove this a posteriori, because if the conjoined soul were naturally capable of species representing without any order to phantasms, and if, once given, it could naturally use them, certainly the author and provider of nature would not always and on every occasion and concerning all things deny such species to the conjoined soul, because it pertains to the author of nature to fill a natural capacity, especially when natural appetite also assists and when it is not filled through other inferior agents and through species that can be taken from them. But God impresses no such species, and, to explain the matter, neither can he, precisely considered as the author of nature, provide them. Therefore it is a sign that the conjoined soul does not have such a natural capacity, and much less can an angel naturally effect such species in the conjoined intellect. Hence St. Thomas, in the said Quest. *de Anima*, art. 18, rightly said that *the natural capacity of the conjoined soul is for receiving forms of things from material things*, and that therefore it is united to a body in order to receive species of this kind, nor does it have a greater natural power for understanding than insofar as it is perfected through these forms determined in this way. And for this reason, while it is conjoined, it has an aspect inclined to lower things, so that it may receive proportionate species from them, but when separated it has an aspect to higher things, from which it receives the influx of

intelligible species. These are almost the words of St. Thomas. From them it is very well concluded that angels cannot impress such proper species of their acts on the conjoined soul, both because they can do nothing beyond the natural capacity of the recipient, and also because everything that is received is received according to the mode of the recipient. And therefore it would be necessary that such a species represent the act of an angel in the likeness of some material thing. But an angelic act cannot effect such a species.

72. *Speech between God and angels is deferred.*—Finally, it can be desired here that we say how angels can speak to God, or God to them. But the first has been explained by us in the matter of mental prayer, book 1, chapter 5, num. 12, because the chief speech of an angel to God is through petition. Nor does that question contribute any further to the present place, because through that speech the angel does not acquire cognition, but unfolds what he has. Hence from the very fact that he has it, he unfolds it sufficiently to God, because all things are open to the eyes of God. And through speech to God the angel can add only the intention or will of exercising some act of his mind, so that God may intuit it, as I explained in the aforesaid place. But the other question can indeed pertain to this matter of the cognition of angels, because through God's speech to them they can be taught and know something new. Yet because this chiefly occurs through divine illuminations and revelations pertaining to the order of grace, it will therefore be treated below, where we shall discuss the gifts of grace of the holy angels. For there illumination in general must be discussed.

CHAPTER XXIX
WHETHER THINGS SUPERNATURAL IN THEIR SUBSTANCE ARE COMPREHENDED UNDER THE NATURAL OBJECT OF THE ANGEL'S INTELLECT, SO THAT IN SOME WAY THEY CAN BE KNOWN NATURALLY BY THEM

1. Division of supernatural things, into which God does not enter. — We distinguished above three orders of knowable things, namely, natural things, free acts, or the thought of the heart, and supernatural works, which are called the mysteries of grace by St. Thomas in the cited Quest. 57, art. 5. Therefore, after the first two kinds of things have been treated, it remains to speak of the third. Now in the title it is supposed that there are some things supernatural in their substance, and the common distinction is suggested concerning a twofold kind of supernatural works, namely, with respect to substance, or only with respect to mode. We have often treated this distinction in other places of

theology, especially in book 2, *On Grace*, chapter 4, and it is now briefly explained, while supposing that the discussion is about created or made things. For God himself is, in a more excellent way, above the nature of every creature. And thus the mystery of the Trinity, although it is connatural to God himself, is altogether supernatural with respect to creatures, and concerning it we suppose that it cannot in any way be known naturally by an angel, that is, neither intuitively, because God himself cannot naturally be seen intuitively, as we suppose from the matter concerning the vision of God, nor abstractively, because it has no connection with any natural effect, as is demonstrated more fully in the matter concerning the Trinity. And thus God, even as one, can be called a supernatural object in relation to the clear vision of himself, on account of the eminence of his being, although in relation to abstractive knowledge he is a natural object, on account of the necessary connection that he has with natural effects. All these things have been treated above, and therefore in the present matter we do not include God.

2. The aforesaid division is explained. — But among created things, that is called supernatural in substance which, considered in its own entity, is of the supernatural order, that is, above the nature of the subject in which it is, so that it cannot be connatural to that subject or to another created thing. But things that are only made supernaturally and, after they have been made in that way, either connaturally inhere, or subsist in their own being, or can otherwise be made by natural causes, are called supernatural with respect to mode. These, however, are of two kinds. For some things, after they are made in a supernatural mode, afterwards endure and are conserved naturally, as the life of a man raised from the dead, or the sight of a blind man who has been illuminated. Others are things that are both made supernaturally and, once made, are conserved only supernaturally, although nothing supernatural in itself is made in them, but only a preternatural multiplication of things or modes that are otherwise natural, as the existence of one body in two places, or of several bodies penetratively in the same place, or the existence of matter without form. The reason for all these can easily be given from what has been said. For the former are not supernatural from the mode in which they are made, but in themselves and considered in themselves. Hence they are not supernatural because they are made supernaturally, but rather conversely, because in their own entity they are supernatural, and therefore they are made supernaturally, or rather, because they cannot be made except supernaturally. But it must be considered that among these things supernatural in substance there is none that is properly and absolutely a substance, because no created substance can be

supernatural, as was said in the preceding volume, book 2, *On the Attributes*, chapter 9, number 14. Hence, when these things are called supernatural in substance, "substance" is there taken for entity or essence. But among them some can properly be accidental entities, that is, qualities distinct from their subjects, as grace, virtues infused per se, acts supernatural per se, as the blessed vision, the light of glory, and the like. Others are only modes, either accidental, as the mode of existing of Christ's body in the Eucharist, or substantial, as the mode of union of the humanity to the Word. For although it is a mode, nevertheless there is also in that mode the sort of entity and essence that a thing supernatural with respect to substance has, because both in becoming and inesse it is always above the condition of created nature. But things that are called supernatural with respect to mode truly have supernaturalness either only in the action alone, which is a certain mode in becoming, as resurrection and the supernatural illumination of a blind man, or in this, that the same natural effect is supernaturally multiplied, or comes to be, or is conserved, without a connatural cause.

3. The difficulty proposed in the title is opened. — Therefore, in the present chapter we are treating only of things supernatural in their own substance, and we are asking whether they can be known naturally by an angel. We understand this both of proper quidditative or intuitive knowledge and of abstractive and imperfect knowledge through an extraneous medium. And because whatever can be known naturally in one of these modes is contained under the adequate object of the power, therefore we ask absolutely whether entities of this sort are comprehended under the adequate object of the angel's intellect. With these points set down, it will not be necessary to report dissenting opinions, not because there are none on this point, but because, in explaining our own position, we shall touch on the contrary opinions more briefly and more easily.

4. First conclusion. — Proof from St. Thomas. — I say first. Qualities or acts supernatural in their own substance cannot be known naturally by angels quidditatively and through a proper concept, and consequently cannot be seen intuitively either, when they exist. This is taken from St. Thomas, Quest. 57, arts. 4 and 5, insofar as he generally denies that all mysteries of grace are known naturally by angels. Cajetan and other Thomists agree with him in this. Alexander holds the same, 2 p., Quest. 26, member 1, and more clearly Durandus, in 2, dist. 3, Quest. 7, n. 19, and Quest. 8, n. 6, and in dist. 10, Quest. 4, n. 6, and there many other theologians, whom I shall report shortly. St. Thomas proves the assertion because these gifts depend on God's will alone, for

the Spirit distributes them as he wills. But an angel cannot know those things that depend on God's will alone. Therefore. The minor is proved, both from that text in 1 Corinthians 2: "The things of a man no one knows except the spirit of the man that is in him; so too the things of God no one knows except the Spirit of God." And also because, if an angel cannot know the thought of another angel, much less will he be able to know those things that depend on God's will alone. But this reason proves excellently that an angel cannot know that these mysteries are future before they have been made, because they depend on the free will of God, and thus they can be known as future much less than other contingent futures, which can freely occur from created free causes.

5. The stated proof is examined. — But when speaking of things already existing, the reason is difficult. For essential dependence on the free will of God alone is not enough for an effect of God, once made, to be hidden from angels. Otherwise one angel could not naturally know the substance of another, because the angelic substances also, in their existence, depend altogether on the free will of God. Second, the comparison to the acts of the heart is not made correctly. For if the mysteries of grace were not hidden when they exist by reason of their entity, but only by reason of that dependence, then, just as an angel's own acts are not hidden from him although another's acts are hidden, so too his own grace and infused virtues would not be hidden, but he would see justice and grace in himself through natural knowledge, although he could not see them in others. For the proportion must be preserved. But St. Thomas will not admit the consequent, as is plainly clear. Third, according to the same proportion, it would have to be said that an angel has of himself the light and species by which he can see these supernatural objects by his natural powers, if they are ordered to him by the extrinsic will of God, as it were permitting him to see them, just as the Thomists say that internal acts are seen by an angel when the one whose acts they are consents, although he bestows on him no principle of understanding. And although according to our view it can be responded that species at least are necessary, nevertheless, if this is applied proportionally to the aforesaid reason, one will have to say consequently that God's liberty alone is not the proximate reason for this incapacity of the angel for knowing these mysteries, but the lack of species, although this lack can be remotely founded on God's liberty, because God did not will to infuse into the angels the species of those things that he was going to make according to his own judgment. Yet at least this follows consequently, that an angel through natural light has powers sufficient on the side of the power for knowing things of this kind, if proportionate species are given to him. But the consequent is false, as will be clear from what follows.

Hence I argue fourth, because at least it follows that an angel can naturally know quidditatively and abstractively these essences of supernatural things, even if he cannot either foreknow them as future or behold them as existing. But the consequent is false, as we asserted in the conclusion. Therefore. The sequence is clear, because things of this kind in the esse of essence or possible existence do not depend on the free will of God. Therefore the stated reason ceases in them when so considered. But from another source, according to the stated reason, it follows that an angel by his own light can know these things if the species is not denied. But no reason is available why they should be denied, since both the reason drawn from the liberty of the divine will ceases, and otherwise species proportionate to the angelic natural light are owed.

6. The true proof of the conclusion. — Therefore, setting aside for now this reason, which is not easy to defend, the proper reason must be taken from the nature of such things or qualities, because the intelligibility of each thing is proportionate to its own nature and entity. Therefore, just as such things are above the nature of an angel, so also in intelligibility they exceed his nature. Second, I argue on the part of the angel. For he has a way and mode naturally owed to him for knowing those things that are comprehended under his natural object, and therefore species are naturally owed to him for them, and thus they either have been implanted from the beginning or are acquirable through natural causes. But for knowing these supernatural entities an angel does not have natural means, because the species of such things are no more naturally owed to him than the qualities of grace themselves are, nor can such species be made through natural causes. For although some might contend that they can be made by the qualities themselves, nevertheless the supernatural qualities themselves cannot be called natural causes, because they do not pertain to the order or number of natural causes; besides, even that seems very far from true, as can be gathered from the following reason. Therefore third, we can argue that proper species representing these supernatural entities as they are in themselves must be of the same order as the entities themselves. Therefore they must be supernatural. Therefore they cannot be owed to angels any more than the supernatural gifts themselves. The first antecedent is proved because a species must have entity and immateriality proportionate for representing the object as it is, and therefore it must be of the same order, as I said in the preceding volume, book 2, *On the Attributes*, chapters 12 and 13, concerning the species for seeing God; for this is a proportional reason. But the consequences are known per se, and from this we can consequently infer that these supernatural objects cannot be seen as they are in themselves except through a supernatural

act and one of the same order, because the reason concerning that act is the same. Consequently, they cannot be seen through natural light alone, but through some infused light, because these three, act, species, and light, preserve a proportion among themselves, as we said in the cited book, concerning the light of glory from chapter 14 onward, and concerning the knowledge infused per se in the soul of Christ, in volume 1, 3 p., disp. 27, sect. 3.

7. The opinion of Scotus against the proposed assertion. — Against this assertion Scotus holds, in 4, dist. 10, Quest. 8, conclusion 2, and to the principal arguments, where he says generally that all mysteries of grace, after they have been made, can be seen intuitively by an angel through natural power, and he teaches this especially concerning infused virtues. Bassolus follows him there, Quest. 4, art. 3, for although he speaks especially of the mode of existing of Christ's body in the Eucharist, in his reason he extends the discussion to all created entities. Yet Tartariensis especially defends this, in 4, dist. 10, giving examples from the mysteries of grace in all the sacraments and their effects, with respect to the conferral of grace. Aureolus too seems to suppose this, in 2, dist. 9, when he says that an angel can see the beatifying vision from pure natural powers. Henry indicates the same in *Summa*, art. 33, Quest. 2, insofar as he supposes that, if there were given a created species representing the divine essence as it is in itself, that species could be known naturally by an angel quidditatively and perfectly. Hence he supposes that such a species could have been known naturally if it were given, although it could only be supernatural. But these doctors speak incidentally and do not bring forward a foundation.

8. The foundation of Scotus. — But Scotus seems to be founded in this, that every entity, although it is made by supernatural action and power, after it has been made is a certain natural entity, and accordingly is naturally knowable by an intellect that does not take knowledge from the senses, as the angelic intellect is. He proves the antecedent because an entity is called supernatural only by relation to the agent, but taken in itself it can be natural, although it is made supernaturally by its cause. For "the relation to the agent alone does not entail that something is one thing and another thing in itself," according to Augustine, book 3, *On the Trinity*, chapter 9. This is confirmed from the same point, because every created substance is an object proportionate to every angelic intellect with respect to its natural power. Therefore so too every created accident, of whatever character it may be. The consequence is proved because substance is more perfect than every accident that can be in it.

9. The cited authors are argued to think incorrectly about supernaturalness. — But these authors think in this way about the knowledge of these things

because they do not think correctly enough about their supernaturalness. Therefore Scotus seems to have believed that no quality is supernatural in its own entity, for in the cited place, to the arguments, he expressly says that every entity, although it cannot be made except supernaturally, is knowable naturally, because however supernaturally it is made, by the very fact that it is posited in being, it is now a certain natural entity and proportionate to the power knowing naturally. But this could be sustained probably concerning any entity that, although in fact it is made supernaturally, has of itself and from its own nature a connatural mode by which it may be made by natural causes, or according to their requirement and their natural order. For such a thing is then properly supernatural with respect to mode, concerning which we shall speak in the following chapter. But if an entity is made supernaturally in something and from some subject in such a way that it cannot be made in any other natural mode, or by natural causes, either in that subject or in another subject in which it can be made connaturally, I do not see why such an entity should be called absolutely and simply natural. For, as I said, the discussion is about accidents, because a substance cannot be supernatural. But an accident of such a kind that it cannot be made naturally in any subject, even if it is made in some subject, cannot be connatural to that subject. This is clear, because since the subject is something natural, namely a certain substance or its natural power, an accident cannot be connatural to it unless there is a natural way and cause through which such an accident can be made in such a subject in a natural mode. For some naturally active power corresponds to every naturally receptive power; otherwise provident nature would be defective and diminished, if it had given no natural mode for obtaining connatural properties or perfections. Therefore, conversely, if an accident is of such a kind that it cannot be made except supernaturally, this is an excellent indication that it is also supernatural with respect to the subject, and accordingly that it is simply and in its own entity supernatural.

10. Scotus's evasion. — It is refuted. — See in the treatise on beatitude, last disputation. — Obediential potency is congenial to nature. — Neither the effects nor the active power of the sacraments can be known naturally. — But if perhaps Scotus says that for such an accident to be called natural it is enough that it can be made, and that the subject by its own nature is capable of it, because in such a subject there is always a natural inclination to such a form or perfection, we respond first that this latter point is false and repugnant, as I said in the preceding volume, book 2, *On the Attributes of God*, chapter 4, and more fully in the matter on grace, prolegomenon 4, chapter 1, and book 8, chapter 2, and it will occur again in what follows when treating of beatitude. Then in the

same places, and in many others, he shows that not only natural potency properly so called, but also obediential capacity, can be congenial to nature, and this can very well be directed to an accident altogether supernatural. Yet as regards the present point, lest the disagreement become one about a name, we say that at least it cannot be denied that such an accident, even with respect to the subject, is so above its nature that it cannot be called connatural to it, as though it were connaturally demanded by it or naturally owed to it. Hence, also with respect to universal nature, or with the universal order of nature considered, it must be called supernatural, that is, not pertaining to the constitution or completion of nature, but to another and higher order elevating nature. This, therefore, is enough for us to say that the proper knowledge of such entities is not naturally owed to angels insofar as they are certain natural entities, and accordingly that there are not in angels natural principles accommodated to such knowledge, and accordingly that such entities cannot be known naturally by them. Finally, that the blessed vision, as it is in itself, can be seen naturally by an angel certainly seems unbelievable, since that vision is so proximately joined to God that it can scarcely be seen without God being seen. But if that vision cannot be seen, certainly neither can the light, nor grace, and similar things, which belong to that order. Therefore it is false that the effects of the sacraments can be known naturally. For either those effects are habitual grace and its gifts, or they are intrinsic helps of that order, concerning all of which the reason is the same; or they are other extrinsic effects of divine perfection and protection. And these are much more hidden, because they depend on the free will of God alone, and thus the reason of St. Thomas proceeds excellently in them. Finally, for the same reason the active power of the sacraments and their mode of acting cannot be known, because this is not something intrinsic in them, but depends on the will of God.

11. Response to the foundation of Scotus in number eight. — Therefore, to the foundation of Scotus, the antecedent is simply denied, namely, that every entity taken in itself is natural, although it is made supernaturally. But lest another equivocation of the word be committed, I note that every entity indeed has its own essence, which is also commonly called a nature, and thus God has his own nature, and according to it an entity can also be called natural. So too we say that the vision of God is connatural to the light of glory, and that grace by its nature makes a man holy. In this sense, therefore, it is true that every entity is natural, that is, of some proper nature. But in this sense what is assumed under it is false, that every natural entity in the stated sense is naturally knowable by an angel through proper and quidditative knowledge. Otherwise God too would be

connaturally knowable by an angel and clearly visible, and so would the mystery of the Trinity and the like. And the reason is that an entity that in itself is natural in the stated sense can be above angelic nature and order, and therefore not be naturally knowable. Therefore, in the present matter a natural entity is not taken in the stated sense, but by comparison to the suppositum in which it is. And in this sense we say that the antecedent is false, for the act or quality of the clear vision of God, considered in its own essence and nature, is above the natural condition of an angel and of every created substance. For if it were natural, it could be made by the natural powers of an angel. The inference is proved, because if it is a natural entity with respect to such a power, then it is a natural cognition; therefore it could be made by a natural cognitive power. But this cannot be said. Therefore that vision, compared to an angel, is simply supernatural to him. And consequently the same is true of grace, and of its proper virtues and acts, as we treat more fully in its proper matter.

12. To Scotus's proof in the same number eight. — To the confirmation. — It is doubtful whether supernatural accidents are nobler than substances. — To Scotus's proof taken from Augustine, that relation to the agent does not vary the nature of the effect, we respond that, although relation to the agent is not essential per se, nevertheless when it is adequate it can be a sufficient indication of diversity in the essence or grade of the effect itself. Thus if an effect is such that it cannot be made by any bodily cause, this is an excellent indication that such an effect is either not bodily or not connatural to a body. Thus, therefore, if an effect is such that it cannot be made naturally by any created cause, nor be connaturally demanded, it is a sign that such an entity is of another order and is simply supernatural. But when the relation to the agent is inadequate, because the same thing can be made in various modes and by distinct agents, then essential diversity in the entity of the effect cannot be gathered from such a relation. And Augustine can be understood in this way even if he were speaking of causes per se, for in that place he speaks only of accidental causes that concur by applying active things to passive things, concerning which the matter is very clear. To the confirmation we say that there is doubt whether, in the genus of entity, the substance of an angel is more perfect than grace; leaving that to its own place, namely book 6, *On Grace*, chapter 13, number 10, we say that supernatural entities, although they are accidents, are of a higher order in their entity, and therefore also are of a higher order in knowable being. Nor is the argument valid from the greater in one genus to the lesser in that genus, if in another genus it is more excellent. Thus an angel can know the substance of another angel and not his internal acts, because although these acts are less

perfect, they have a special mode and condition on account of which they are less knowable. But here a special difficulty occurs, whether each angel can at least see these gifts in himself. I shall speak of this at the end of the chapter.

13. Second conclusion. — I say second: Modes of being supernatural in that grade of entity which they have cannot be known naturally by an angel quidditatively, nor, after they have been made, can they be seen intuitively. St. Thomas also manifestly intends this assertion in the cited art. 5, as do Cajetan there and the Thomists more commonly, and in particular, concerning the mode of the Incarnation, theologians teach it by almost common agreement, as I said in its proper matter. Likewise, concerning the mode of existing of the body of Christ in the Eucharist, St. Thomas teaches the same, 3 part, Quest. 76, art. 7, whom many follow, whom I cited there in disp. 53, sect. 5. Hence we can first prove the assertion by induction, because an angel cannot naturally know those two supernatural modes; therefore he can know none. The antecedent is supposed from the common opinion of the doctors, proved in their own places, and we shall immediately say more about it. The consequence is proved, both because scarcely any other supernatural mode made by God is found, or at least no other is so certainly established; and also from parity of reason, because those modes are not unknown because they are such, but because they are supernatural. Therefore the same will be true of all. But the reason is the same as in the preceding assertion, because these modes too, insofar as they are real entities, are of a higher order than all natural entities. Therefore they are not comprehended under the adequate natural object of the angelic intellect. Therefore they cannot be seen naturally by it. Likewise, because such entities do not pertain to the natural order of the universe, therefore their species are not owed to angels, and consequently neither were they implanted in them from the beginning, nor can the angels themselves receive them from such objects. Therefore they cannot by a natural way know them in themselves, whether abstractively and quidditatively before they exist, or also intuitively after they exist, because neither knowledge can occur without a proper species.

14. Scotus holds the contrary. — Herrera reports it in 2, disp. 11, Quest. 8, near the end. — Against this assertion Scotus can be cited in the place above mentioned, for since he generally teaches that every entity, although it is made by divine supernatural power alone, by the very fact that it has been made can be known naturally by an angel, he seems a fortiori to hold the same about supernatural modes. For even with respect to the subjects in which they inhere, they will be called natural, because they perfect them, and they have an innate capacity for them. And thus, concerning the union of the humanity to the Word,

or concerning the Incarnation, that it can be known naturally by an angel, Anglis holds and attributes to Scotus in *Flores* around disp. 3, Quest. 4, difficulty 12, conclusion 1, where after the general conclusion that an angel can naturally know the mysteries of grace, he adds, "namely, the Incarnation, that is, the ineffable union of the humanity assumed by the Word." And Vasquez, disp. 214, number 18, attributes to Scotus that he asserts that an angel by natural power sees Christ in the Eucharist, with respect to the very union of the body and blood of Christ with the divinity. But I do not find in Scotus where he asserted this about that union specifically and in particular. Nor does it necessarily follow from that general principle, that every created entity is naturally knowable, because although the hypostatic union is created, since it consists in a relation, especially in the view of Scotus, it cannot be known without its term, which is the Word of God; and on this side it includes an uncreated entity, and therefore this mystery could be excepted from that principle, even if it were admitted concerning purely created things.

15. Those who assert that the hypostatic union can be known naturally are disproved. — But whatever Scotus thought, certainly it is not probable that the hypostatic union is seen as it is in itself by the natural power of an angel. First, because of the reason given, since knowledge of it involves knowledge of the divine person, and consequently knowledge of the mystery of the Trinity, which cannot in any way be reached by natural knowledge. Unless perhaps someone says that that union cannot indeed be known as it is in itself intuitively, nor abstractively through natural effects, yet it can be known abstractively from some supernatural effect and with respect to whether it is. But this also is false and contrary to all, as I suppose from the matter concerning the Trinity. It could be said better that only this is proved from it, that the union cannot be known comprehensively and as terminated to such a person, though it can be known as terminated to a divine person, not by knowing what sort of person that one is, but abstractly, as it could be even if the person of God were one and absolute. But although in this way it is probable that this union can be known through some knowledge without the Word being known as Word, and consequently without the mystery of the Trinity being known, as I said in its place concerning the knowledge infused per se into the soul of Christ, disp. 27, sect. 5, *On the Incarnation*, nevertheless it is not probable that it can be known in this way by natural knowledge, even angelic knowledge, because in itself it is a thing most supernatural and of a higher order than the vision of God itself and the other gifts of grace and glory, as St. Thomas excellently taught, 3 p., Quest. 7, art. 13, reply to 3, and as we noted in that volume, disp. 9, sect. 2. Finally, the reasons of

the previous conclusion also prove this, because angels, considered according to pure natural powers, did not have innate species of any substantial composite from God and created nature, nor of the union from which it arises, nor can such a species be naturally owed to an angel. Therefore the natural light of his intellect does not extend to the knowledge of such an object in itself. And that it also cannot be known naturally through effects is clear, because it has no necessary connection with any effect that can be known evidently. But I am speaking of the composite itself, God-man, and of the positive mode of union, because concerning the lack of subsistence in the humanity there can be a special doubt, of which I shall speak in the fourth conclusion.

16. Nor can the mystery of the Eucharist be known naturally. — Furthermore, concerning the mystery of the Eucharist there are many who contradict, and because many things are contained in that mystery, we are not speaking of those things that are more common, such as the hypostatic union, which is supposed for that mystery, although contained in it, and the efficacy or effect of the sacrament, whose reason is common. The discussion therefore concerns those things that are proper to it. Among these some are negative, concerning which we shall speak in the third and fourth conclusions; others are positive, among which the chief is the positive mode of existing of the Lord's body under the species. And I disputed broadly about this in volume 3, 3 p., disp. 53, sect. 5, around the middle, where I reported several scholastics asserting that an angel can, by natural power, behold that mode and know it quidditatively. But I taught the contrary there, with St. Thomas, there Quest. 76, art. 7, and all the Thomists there, and in 4, dist. 10, where Richard and Bonaventure also hold the same. For although he speaks here more expressly of the human intellect, nevertheless he understands the same of every created intellect as natural, as he indicates more in the last question. And this is taken from Alexander of Hales, whom Bonaventure openly imitates, in 4 p., Quest. 40, member 3, art. 4, and in Quest. 10, member 7, art. 3, § 8, where he speaks of intellect, and in the solution to 1, says that "that mystery is above the capacity of the intellect, insofar as it is human or natural." And Durandus holds the same, in the cited dist. 10, Quest. 4, art. 6, for he says that an angel cannot naturally know that, though the substance of bread does not exist there, the body of Christ is there.

17. The contrary view of Vasquez is rejected. — Nevertheless Vasquez, 1 p., disp. 2, art. 22 and following, follows the contrary view, but he brings forward nothing concerning which it is necessary to delay, because we touched on all these things in the cited place and responded to them all. Nor does he explain to

us through what species an angel naturally knows that mode. For either it is through a proper species of that mode, and he does not say this, nor is it probable, because just as that mode is not owed to natural things, so neither is its species; or it is through the species of the quantity of Christ's body, and not this, because that species rather represents the natural mode of quantity. He responds that by the very fact that the proper mode of quantity is not seen through that species, that positive mode of the body of Christ is seen, because from the lack of the natural mode that positive mode immediately follows. But this does not satisfy, both because the supernatural mode does not properly follow from the lack of the natural mode, but rather the supernatural mode added to the quantity of Christ's body impedes the natural mode; nor could it be impeded otherwise, although the cited author says the contrary without proof.

18. The same view is still refuted. — But there he confuses two things that are very different, namely, the removal of the whole quantity and of its primary formal effect, with the removal only of the mode of existing in relation to place while the quantity is preserved. For concerning the first it is true that one must begin from the removal of the quantity in order that its formal effect be impeded, or rather taken away, and then without a new positive supernatural mode the substance would remain indivisibly in place, that is, not filling space in a bodily mode, although it would not necessarily remain whole in the whole and whole in every part, as I have said elsewhere. But this does not matter in the present matter, because it has not been done in this way in the body of Christ. But in the second mode, the quantity is not removed, but a certain mode of it is impeded, and this occurs through the positing of another supernatural mode. Furthermore, whatever may be the case concerning that order of causality, for a mutual order between those two things can be considered in different genera of causes, from knowledge of the negation of one mode, knowledge of the contrary positive mode does not follow. For it can be known that some thing is not cold, and yet be unknown whether it is hot. But if it is said that those two modes are immediate, I respond that this very thing can be unknown to an angel. Then I say that although it is known abstractively that, when one mode has been removed, another is substituted in its place, it does not follow that this mode can be known in itself and intuitively, because the first can be known through an alien species, but the second requires a proper species. Especially because negation is not known directly and in itself through a proper act, and therefore it is known through an alien species; indeed it is known in such a way that falsity can underlie such knowledge, as I shall say immediately. But for the

positive knowledge of a real mode as it is in itself, there is required an act that tends directly to that mode and occurs through a proper species.

19. The mode of Christ's existence in the Eucharist is supernatural in entity. — Furthermore, there is no satisfaction of that reason that such a mode is supernatural with respect to its substance, as Cajetan teaches, 3 p., Quest. 76, art. 3, saying that Christ's existence there is utterly supernatural, or is supernatural in its own entity, in the view of St. Thomas there. And it is proved, because that mode of being cannot be connatural to any creature, because it cannot be connatural to a body, which is known per se, nor even to an angel, because that mode is bodily, whereas an angel is spiritual. Nor does it matter that it is natural to an angel to be whole in the whole and whole in any part of place, just as the body of Christ is also whole under the species and under any part of them. This, I say, does not obstruct, because nevertheless those two modes differ in species and substance, and therefore one can be connatural to a creature and not the other, even though they have some common or generic agreement with each other. For even the love of God is connatural to an angel, and nevertheless the love of charity is supernatural in substance, because it is of another and higher species, although they agree in genus. You will urge: this has a place when the species that is said to be supernatural with respect to substance is also more perfect, but this mode is less perfect by the very fact that it is material. I respond that this is irrelevant, for comparisons in perfection and in order or grade of supernaturalness are of different reasons, and therefore the argument from one to the other is fallacious, as Cajetan rightly said in responding to Scotus, and as was touched on above. Hence bodily properties, if they are natural to no body, but of another order, will be supernatural simply with respect to bodies, and then with respect to all subjects that they can affect, even if they are less perfect in the grade of entity than spiritual properties. Thus the light of a glorified body is material and less perfect simply than the natural light of the intellect, and nevertheless perhaps it is supernatural in entity, that is, above every natural light that can be connatural to bodies. This is enough for it not to be knowable naturally by an angel. Thus, therefore, we judge concerning the mode of existing of the body of Christ the Lord under the species of the Eucharist.

20. Likewise the mode of quantity, if it is positive. — I think the same in the case of the mode of existing of quantity without a subject in the same sacrament, if it is positive. For concerning this there is controversy among authors. Many think that that mode is only the privation of inherence in a subject, concerning which we readily admit that it is known naturally by an

angel in the mode to be explained below. But if, beyond that lack, the consecrated quantity has a peculiar mode of subsisting, I say that it is not known naturally by an angel directly and by a proper and quidditative concept, on account of the same foundation, namely, that an angel does not have an innate species of that mode, and that this mode can be connatural to no thing, because not to an accident, nor even to a substance, because although substance has its own subsistence, which an angel naturally knows, it is of another reason and species, although they have a certain general agreement. Nor can that accidental mode of an accident be known through the species of the substantial mode of a subsistent nature, except through a certain proportion, but not by a proper concept, because it is always an alien species. But it is objected that this mode of subsisting of accidents necessarily follows and as it were flows from the very entity of quantity, by the very fact that quantity is deprived of a subject and of inherence in it. Therefore that mode cannot be supernatural in any entity it may have. For from the natural entity of quantity a supernatural mode cannot result. I respond by denying the antecedent, because that positive mode of subsisting of accidents cannot result from the entity of quantity or come to be in that mode, neither per se and by its own proper action, for quantity is not active in this mode, nor by natural emanation, because an accident is not such an entity from which a mode of subsisting can naturally result, since naturally it only seeks esse in another.

21. In what way the aforesaid mode is understood to come to be. — Therefore it must be understood that this mode comes to be per se in the quantity supernaturally from God, either alone or through the words of consecration as through an instrument. No one can deny this, since at a minimum it is certain that this mode is supernatural on the side of the efficient cause, which is enough for it to be unable to come to be unless it is made by God through supernatural power. Therefore it does not come to be from quantity as if by natural emanation, for this is inconsistent with supernatural efficiency. God, therefore, wishing to conserve quantity when the substance has been taken away, gives to it a positive mode of subsisting, because without it the quantity could not exist. Hence this mode is not rightly said to follow necessarily from the very entity of the accident. And much more improperly and falsely is it said to follow necessarily from the negation of substance, or of subject, or of inherence in it. For from those negations there would rather follow from the nature of the thing the non-being of the accident. Both because, speaking per se, a positive thing does not follow from a negation except perhaps as from the terminus from which, or as from a material disposition prior in its own genus by

nature; but then it is necessary that both a positive agent and also a positive form intervene and precede by nature in their own genera. And also because much less can something positive and supernatural follow from the negation of a natural order, such as the negation of substance. Therefore, from the nature of the thing, from such a negation or destruction of the substance the ceasing to be of the accidents should rather follow. But so that this does not follow, God by his power makes a supernatural mode that expels the inherence of the accident, rather than that the supernatural mode follows upon the negation of that inherence.

22. It is shown further that the mode of quantity comes to be only supernaturally. — Hence, in order that that mode be supernatural, another dispute, which is mixed in here without reason, is irrelevant, namely, whether a positive mode of subsisting is given to those accidents because their subject is expelled, or conversely, whether the accidents are made subsistent because they are separated from the substance, and from this the expulsion of the substance follows. For whatever one thinks about this point, it is always necessary that the positive mode of subsisting be supernatural by a special action from God, and this is enough for the solution of the argument. For although we grant that the ceasing to be of the substance precedes in the order of nature, the mode of subsisting of the accident does not follow from the nature of the thing from such a negation, but follows from God's omnipotence, supposing the will that he had to conserve those separated accidents, notwithstanding the ceasing to be of the subject, which without such a mode, as is supposed, he either could not or did not will to do. And although from this it immediately follows only that this mode is supernatural in relation to the efficient cause, we indeed defend this, because it is true and necessary; and we add that this mode can be such that it cannot be connatural to any creature, as has been proved. And thus the assertion, proved by induction, is also left standing in these modes of the supernatural order that we know God has made.

23. Third conclusion. — Something is known as possible in two ways. — I say third: all these entities supernatural in their own substance so exceed the intellect of an angel that by natural light alone he cannot evidently know that they are possible, even through extrinsic means, or through alien concepts and formal or virtual discourse. For one can know in two ways that some non-existent thing is possible. First, through a proper species by knowing abstractively and essentially a thing having a true possible essence and nature; and we excluded this mode in the preceding assertions. Second, this can be known through signs or extrinsic means, as by inferring from one effect that

another is possible, or by gathering the same possibility from the non-repugnance found in some work according to the omnipotence of God. We speak of this mode in this assertion, and deny that it falls under the natural knowledge of an angel with respect to things supernatural in their own substance. But we are speaking of evident knowledge, for it is not inappropriate that through probable conjecture an angel can naturally conjecture that something supernatural is possible, as if from the fact that he knows God to be omnipotent and does not see a repugnance in some work, he conjectures that the work is possible by divine power. This will be proved more from what will be said. But the case is otherwise with evident knowledge, because there are no evident natural principles from which the possibility of things of this kind is evidently inferred. And in this sense the assertion is more commonly accepted by theologians, either in St. Thomas in the cited art. 5, Quest. 57, 1 p., or when they dispute about particular mysteries. And so a certain induction can first be made. For concerning the mystery of the Incarnation, in volume 1, 3 p., disp. 3, sect. 1, we showed that it cannot be known naturally by any created intellect that it is possible. I showed the same concerning the beatific vision in the preceding volume, book 2, *On the Attributes of God*, chapter 7, where, although I did not expressly speak of angels, nevertheless the reasons proceed concerning every intellectual creature. And from that principle the same is concluded concerning all gifts of grace infused per se, indeed the same reason holds for all of them. For they are all either acts supernatural with respect to substance, or habits that are ordered to those acts. Finally, concerning the mystery of the Eucharist, in volume 3, p., disp. 46, sect. 7, I said that it cannot be demonstrated by natural reason to be possible with respect to three things, namely, with respect to the existence of accidents without a subject, with respect to the mode of existing of a body of great quantity under the small species of bread, and especially whole in the wholes and whole in any part of the species, and with respect to actual existence simultaneously in heaven and in very many parts of the world under different consecrated hosts; and the reason given there proceeds also of the angelic intellect. But in these are contained all the mysteries supernatural in their own being, or if others lie hidden in the treasures of divine wisdom, the same reason holds concerning them. Therefore.

24. First objection concerning the example given from the Eucharist. — But so that the universal reason may be more explained and new arguments solved, it is objected first concerning the mystery of the Eucharist, because angels naturally know that God is omnipotent. Therefore they know that he can do everything whose being made is not repugnant. But they can also evidently

know that those things that occur in this mystery are not repugnant. Therefore from the created terms themselves they can know that this mystery is possible negatively, that is, that it is not repugnant or not impossible. Therefore from the omnipotence of God they will know that it is positively possible, for possible in this mode is nothing but a denomination from the power of the agent. The first antecedent was proved by us above. But the first consequence is evident, because the reason of omnipotence consists in this, that it extends to every non-repugnant effect. But the subsumed minor with the other consequence must be taken in such a way that they do not comprehend the mystery of the Incarnation, which is in some way involved and contained in the Eucharist, because in that mystery God, or the Son of God, is intrinsically included, whom angels neither comprehend nor see by natural power, and therefore they cannot naturally know whether it is repugnant to his perfection to be united substantially to created nature, nor whether this can occur without a change of the Word. But concerning the other things that are purely created, that minor together with the consequence is proved. For angels comprehend, for example, the essence of an accident, and consequently they know that it does not depend essentially on actual inherence in a subject. They also see that an accident is a thing distinct from its subject. Therefore they see clearly in the very terms or known things that it is not repugnant for an accident to be conserved without a subject, and consequently that this is possible through divine omnipotence. The same argument can be made concerning quantity and its mode of existing in extended place, because those two things also are distinguished in reality, and the mode is not of the essence of quantity, all of which an angel knows evidently. Therefore in them he evidently knows that it is not repugnant for one to be conserved by God without the other, and therefore that the mystery of the Eucharist is possible.

25. Second objection concerning the example of the beatific vision. — Second, the principal objection concerns the blessed vision, which is supernatural in its own entity, and nevertheless some theologians think that it can be demonstrated by natural reason to be possible, namely Scotus, in 4, dist. 49, Quest. 8, whom Vasquez follows, 1, 2, disp. 21, chapter 2, where he uses two reasons that I solved sufficiently in the place cited above, and therefore I pass them over. But he adds a third, which I omitted in the same place, even though it was indicated above by Scotus, because he did not perceive its difficulty. The reason is this: God is comprehended under the adequate object of the angelic intellect. Therefore it is not repugnant for him to be seen intuitively by that intellect. The antecedent was proved by us above, and the consequence is proved

first because, if God is the object of the angelic intellect, it will not be repugnant for it to operate perfectly concerning him; otherwise the capacity and inclination of that intellect will not be satisfied. Therefore it will be able to operate intuitively concerning God, because that alone is perfect knowledge. Second, the same consequence is proved because it is not repugnant for the intellect to be aided so that within the limits of its adequate object it operates as perfectly concerning one object as concerning others. Therefore it is evident that it is not impossible for a man to be elevated to the vision of God, and thus that an angel can know that that vision is possible. Third, the argument is formed differently, because God as clearly visible is the object of the intellect, even if the intellect cannot tend to him by its powers alone, but only as aided by divine help. Therefore it does not imply contradiction for it to be elevated in this way. The antecedent is proved, both because otherwise the intellect could not be elevated to such an object, because it cannot operate outside its object; and because God, as visible, is of himself supremely intelligible and is contained under entity, which is the adequate object of the intellect. The former consequence is also proved, both because the whole impediment on account of which the intellect cannot naturally see God is not on the side of the object, but from a defect of the powers of the potency. But God can elevate the potency so that it operates whenever it neither operates outside its object nor exceeds the mode in which it can operate concerning other objects, namely, intuitively. And also because, if our intellect could not see God either by its own powers or by divine power, God as clearly visible would not be the object of our intellect, the opposite of which has been proved.

26. Third objection. — The third principal objection also is this: angels know that the power of God is infinite. Therefore they know evidently that God can make more things, and more perfect things, than he has made. Therefore they know that he can make another order of things higher than all those that he has made. Therefore they truly know naturally that God can make entities belonging to the order of grace, and consequently that other supernatural things are possible, although they do not know distinctly what they are like. And the points adduced in the preceding objection confirm this, both because the clear vision of God is supernatural in its own entity, whence if an angel naturally knows that it is possible, there is no reason why he cannot know this concerning all the others; and also because that vision is the end of all the other gifts of the supernatural order. Therefore, if the end is known as possible, the means either proximately ordered to that end or even possible cannot be hidden. It is confirmed second, because the remission of sins is a work of grace and

supernatural, and yet it seems evidently possible through divine power. Therefore the same will be true of the rest.

27. To these objections we concede what is assumed in all of them, that an angel evidently knows that the power of God is infinite simply, and accordingly that God is omnipotent, so that on his part he is not impotent for doing whatever is not repugnant to be made from itself. But we deny that an angel evidently knows everything that is not repugnant to be done above the natures of things. In this matter two things must be carefully distinguished, namely, that it is not evident that something is repugnant, and that it is evident that it is not repugnant. For it is manifest from the terms that these two are different, as affirmative and negative, and that one does not follow from the other. For more is required for positive evidence of non-repugnance than for the lack of evidence concerning the repugnance itself. For it is not evident to us that it is repugnant for matter to exist without form, or for the substance of the soul to exist without intellect; indeed, we more probably believe that these and similar things are not repugnant. Nevertheless, it is not evident to us that some repugnance is not hidden there. And in a similar way, we cannot evidently prove that the mysteries of our faith are not impossible. Yet we evidently establish that they are not demonstrated to be impossible, and consequently that evident repugnance is not found in them.

28. What the objections made truly assume. — To the first objection in number four. — Thus, therefore, I respond to the examples adduced in the first objection that they prove only that an angel does not know an evident repugnance in them, but they do not show that he evidently knows that they are not repugnant. Hence in the example about accidents, angels indeed evidently see that quantity is distinguished in reality from substance, if in reality it is so distinguished, and perhaps they also see that the mode of actual inherence is in reality distinct from the entity of quantity, and accordingly is not its genus or specific difference, and in this sense is not of its essence. From this too they do not see a clear repugnance in quantity being conserved without substance. Yet they do not on that account see evidently that this is not repugnant, because it is not evident to them that quantity is capable of existing otherwise, or of subsisting per se. Nor is it evident to them whether it can lack both modes, and perhaps this seems more repugnant. Hence, finally, they do not see evidently that the dependence on a subject which is in the genus of material cause is not so essential to an accident for existing that it can be supplied in another way, or that it is not repugnant for quantity to exist without it. The same holds proportionally in the other example, concerning the separation between

quantity and its mode of existing in place with extension. For although those two things are somehow distinct in themselves, it does not immediately become evident that it is not repugnant for them to be separated in reality, because that separation perhaps cannot occur either without another positive mode of a higher order, which an angel does not recognize, at least evidently, to be possible, or without the penetration of the parts of quantity, concerning which also it is not evident that it is not repugnant. Hence, just as it can happen that an angel knows two extremes, for example, humanity and God, and does not see a clear repugnance in their being substantially united, and nevertheless does not evidently see that there is no contradiction or repugnance in it, so too it can happen that, seeing two things united in the separation of which he does not recognize a clear repugnance, he does not evidently see that it does not imply contradiction for one to be conserved without the other, or for a thing existing in this way also to be able to exist in another mode. Nor is it necessary that an angel seeing two such extremes evidently know all the principles on which knowing whether it implies contradiction for them to be united or separated depends. In this matter Father Vasquez holds the same, 1 p., disp. 214, chapter 3, number 14.

29. Resolution against the second objection made in number 25. — First reason. — Second reason. — This doctrine has a place in exactly the same way in the second objection concerning the beatific vision, and the discourses made there do not persuade further. Therefore I think it far truer that angels, not to mention men, cannot by the natural light of the intellect alone evidently know that the clear vision of God is possible for an angel or for a soul, as theologians more commonly hold, 1 p., Quest. 12, arts. 1 and 4, and 1, 2, Quest. 3, art. 1, where Medina, and Supplement, Gabriel in 4, dist. 49, Quest. 1, art. 3, doubt 2, Salas, 1, 2, Quest. 3, tract. 2, dist. 2, last sect., number 73, and I said the same in the preceding volume, book 2, *On the Attributes*, chapter 7. And now I find no force or efficacy in the reasons of the objector. Nor do I see how it can consistently be affirmed that we or angels can evidently know that the blessed vision is possible, and denied that charity and the other infused and sanctifying habits through inherent justice can evidently be known to be possible, as Father Vasquez openly denies in 1, 2, where above, because he does not deny that the blessed vision is also supernatural with respect to substance.

30. A principle for the beatific vision that cannot be demonstrated. — Then, in order that the blessed vision be demonstrated to be possible, it is necessary that certain true principles be evidently proved, which certainly, as far as I can attain, are not demonstrable by natural light. The first is "that a creature

can be elevated to eliciting a vital act that it cannot elicit by the natural powers of its intellect or will." For this principle is necessary for the clear vision of God to be possible for a creature. For I suppose that created intellect does not have sufficient natural active power for eliciting that act. Therefore, in order for it to be evident that that act is possible, it is necessary that it also be evident that it is not repugnant for the potency to be elevated to eliciting a vital act by a power given from outside, either entirely, as some will, or at least in the more principal principle, while the potency itself also concurs partially, either through natural power as such, or insofar as it has a certain obediential power. But from where, I ask, can it be naturally evident that one of these modes is possible or non-repugnant? For there are opinions about all of them among theologians, and each of them is judged possible by some and impossible by others. For many most probably think it repugnant that that vital act, constituting the intellect as formally understanding, be elicited in the intellect or by the intellect through only an extrinsic active power or one added from outside, because this is contrary to the reason of vital action. Others think it impossible that the intellect, through natural active power as it is natural, elicit that act supernatural with respect to substance, whether as a total principle or as a partial principle, because a natural potency cannot in any way operate outside its own sphere. Others find great repugnance in that obediential potency, and especially in an active one; nor can it easily be persuaded except from principles of faith, much less be demonstrated without them, that it is possible. Therefore, if no mode of verifying that principle can evidently be shown to be possible, how will the possibility of that principle be able to be demonstrated? Or, without that principle being demonstrated, how will it become evident that the act of seeing God is possible? This discourse proceeds especially concerning men; nevertheless, as far as we can attain, it proves the same concerning angels.

31. Another similar and bipartite principle. — The stated principle cannot be demonstrated with respect to the first part. — The second principle is that "either it is not repugnant for a supernatural species representing God himself as he is to be infused by God, or certainly that the very essence of God by itself supply the role of a species in a created intellect." For one of these is necessary in order that there be an act of seeing God. Therefore one of them must be possible in order that the vision be possible. Therefore one of them must be demonstrated possible in order that the vision be demonstrated possible. But concerning neither of those principles can it be evidently shown that it does not involve repugnance. Concerning the species, it is proved among men by experience, for many great talents and most learned men not only did not

believe that it could be demonstrated that such a species is not repugnant, but even thought that it could be shown more probably to be impossible. Then, those who think it possible suppose from faith that the vision is possible, and from this they gather that the species too is possible. But so far I have not seen any reason that a priori, or from other principles, or without supposing the possibility of the vision, persuades with sufficient probability that that species is possible, much less with evidence. Add to this that that species would be, with respect to substance, supernatural, as those who concede that it is possible admit. But it cannot be demonstrated, even by an angel, that supernatural forms are possible, as has been said, and this will be confirmed more in responding to the third objection. Therefore on the side of the species that possibility cannot be demonstrated.

32. Nor can it likewise be demonstrated with respect to the second part. — Therefore, concerning the other part, namely, that it is possible for the very essence of God by itself to supply the role of a species, I do not see how this can be evidently demonstrated. For theologians are not lacking who contend that it is impossible: either because then the divine essence would effect something immediately and by itself ad extra, or because it is, and not only because it wills, and consequently from necessity of nature, which is repugnant; or because the divine essence cannot be united to the intellect in the mode of a form, and so on. Although these reasons have little force, and are solved in such a way that it is evidently shown that this is not proved impossible, nevertheless we can never positively show evidently that this is not repugnant. For there is no evident principle from which it is evidently gathered, nor is it apparent from where angels could have this. And the reason is that we do not naturally know God as he is in himself, and thus we do not know evidently whether through his essence immediately, as he is essence, he can effect something, nor whether his essence, as such, obeys, so to speak, the will in acting, nor even do we know evidently whether a union can precede between the intellect and the essence, or whether without a prior true union the essence can constitute the intellect in first act for seeing it. Therefore, just as we were saying concerning the mystery of the Incarnation that, at least on the side of one extreme, namely the divine Word, it cannot naturally be known evidently whether it is possible, because the Word itself is not seen, nor how without change of itself it can be substantially united to another, so too concerning the mystery of the vision of God, because it involves a peculiar respect to God himself in himself, from his side we do not have a principle by which we may evidently show that God is visible by a created intellect, either through a species or without a species.

33. Third reason. — Third, in order that the vision of God be evidently shown possible, it is necessary evidently to know that an intuitive or quidditative vision can be distinguished from a comprehensive vision with respect to God. But this can scarcely be naturally perceived, much less evidently demonstrated. Therefore neither can the former. The major is proved because it is not only certain, but also evident, that God cannot be comprehended by a creature. Therefore, in order for it to be evident that he can be seen, it is also necessary that it can be evidently shown that the clear vision of God can subsist without comprehension and be separated from it. But the minor is proved from the difficulties that theologians suffer in explaining that difference, which certainly they solve more from believed principles than from evident ones. And therefore they show rather that those difficulties do not conclude, because they take principles that cannot be evident to us, since they concern divine things as they are in themselves, than evidently and directly prove that they assume or conclude what is false.

34. The immediately preceding doctrine is clarified. — And it is clarified from the thing itself by parity of reason. For God is the most simple and supremely indivisible object, and his essence and quiddity most simply includes all his attributes. No man or angel naturally attains this excellence as it is in itself. Therefore he cannot have a principle by which he may evidently show that God can be seen without comprehension, since God cannot be seen unless he is seen whole, and whatever is of his essence is seen. But those distinctions concerning seeing the whole or wholly, or concerning the vision of all things that are formally or eminently in him, by which that distinction between vision and comprehension is usually clarified, although they are sufficient for showing evidently the identity between vision and comprehension, nevertheless they are not sufficient for showing evidently that they are distinct and separable in reality. For there is no principle by which it is evidently shown either that through the vision of God other things are seen which are contained in him only eminently, or that only the eminences of them, so to speak, are seen, which in God are formally and are essential and altogether the same, and therefore are necessarily seen if God is seen as he is in himself. And consequently it is not evidently known how in so utterly simple an object those two, namely seeing the whole and seeing wholly, can be distinguished. And this reason will become more evident from the fact that through it the reason by which the possibility of the beatific vision is thought to be naturally demonstrated is evidently weakened and shown to be feeble, as will be wholly clear in responding to it.

35. The reason proposed in the second objection, in n. 25, is dissolved. — To the first proof. — Therefore, to the reason objected in the second place, we deny that an angel can naturally know with evidence that the blessed vision is possible. For that reason, together with others treated elsewhere, gives some conjecture, but not evidence; indeed not even an inference that is very compelling. Hence, given that antecedent, that God absolutely speaking is contained under the adequate object of the angelic intellect, the consequence is denied, namely, that he can be seen. To the first proof I say that something can be the natural object of some power, and yet it be repugnant for it to be seen perfectly by that power. And as to the unacceptable consequence, that the capacity of the intellect would not be perfectly satisfied: first, this would not be a great inconvenience, even if it were admitted, because this itself would pertain to the natural imperfection of the nature, not to any impotence of God. Strictly, however, the consequence is not good. For the capacity of created intellect does not extend proximately to that object, especially as it is in itself, but proximately it is directed to such an act as it can effect concerning such an object, and consequently to the object as it can be attained through such an act. Therefore this capacity can be filled naturally, because it does not extend to intuitive vision.

36. The defect of the aforesaid proof is shown. — And the defect of the reason is shown in comprehension. For if the inference were good, it would also prove that it is not repugnant for an angel to comprehend God. This is proved because he has God for an object. Therefore it is not repugnant for him to know God perfectly. Therefore comprehensively, because comprehension alone is the perfect knowledge of any object. Therefore, just as it is not unacceptable that it be repugnant for a power to comprehend something comprehended under the adequate object, so too it is not unacceptable that it be repugnant for it to behold it, or at least the opposite is not evidently demonstrated. Finally, this is clarified further by distinguishing capacity. For the discussion is either about natural capacity or about obediential capacity. Concerning the former I say that a power is not always naturally capable of perfect operation concerning any particular object comprehended under its adequate object. Nor is the opposite evident, indeed nor is it true, because created intellect does not have natural power for seeing God; and thus natural capacity is fulfilled without a perfect act of knowing God, not only one that is comprehension, but also one that is the vision of God. But if the discussion concerns obediential capacity, I respond that by natural light it is not known evidently that such capacity, especially active capacity, is in things. And therefore, although intellect has this capacity for the

vision of God, nevertheless an angel does not know evidently that it has it, or that it is not repugnant for it to have it and be fulfilled through vision.

37. To the second proof in the same n. 25. — To the second proof, when the antecedent is taken in this way: "It does not seem repugnant that the intellect be aided," and so on, this can be understood as it sounds only negatively, namely, that there is no evident repugnance. And in this way the antecedent could easily be conceded and the consequence denied, because, as I said, from the fact that some repugnance is not evident, it does not follow that the opposite non-repugnance is evident. For it can happen that neither is evident, namely, neither that it is repugnant nor that it is not repugnant, as we experience in many cases, and the same can happen in angels, as the objector also admits elsewhere, as I have already cited. But I add that even that antecedent, as it is generally assumed, is not true, namely, "that it does not seem repugnant that the intellect can be aided so that within the limits of its adequate object it operates as perfectly concerning any object whatever as concerning others." For this is found to be openly false in comprehension. For an angel can comprehend many created substances. Therefore, if he can be helped so that he knows God, comprehended under the adequate object of his intellect, as perfectly as he knows other substances, he will be able to be helped so that he comprehends God. But if one responds that a special repugnance is found in comprehension, from this very thing we conclude that that universal principle is not formally true, but in order for it to be true, it must be added, unless it is repugnant from another source. But once this is posited, when it is added so as to be applied to the vision of God, it will be necessary to show that no repugnance is found in that vision. Therefore that principle is wrongly assumed in order to prove the possibility or non-repugnance of the vision, since it must be supposed for that principle to stand.

38. The sense of the argument formed in n. 25 is set forth. — In the third argument the proposition assumed in the major, and which is said to be the whole foundation of the demonstration, must be considered, namely, "God as clearly visible is the object of the intellect." For first, either that proposition is assumed as evident absolutely and from natural reason alone, or it is assumed only as believed, or, what is equivalent, as evidently inferred from things believed. If it is taken in the former sense, let it be made into a modal proposition so that the reason proceeds consistently, namely, "It is evident that God, as clearly visible, is contained under the object of the intellect, or is one of the objects of the intellect." And in this way the major is denied. For although the proposition concerning inesse, namely, that God clearly seen is the object of

the intellect, is true, nevertheless it is not naturally evident, and thus the modal is false. And considering the matter carefully, if the proposition is assumed in that sense, the principle is begged in the reason, and what must be proved is assumed. For that God is clearly visible in some way, either by the proper powers of nature or by powers superadded, and that the vision of God is possible, are the same, because for God to be visible is an extrinsic denomination from a possible vision. But if someone responds that the reduplication or specification, "as visible," is taken in such a way that it states only non-repugnance on the part of God, both as an object that moves and as an object that terminates, so that he may be seen, we respond first that this is not enough for God to be said absolutely to be an object visible by a created intellect unless his vision is supposed to be possible. Then we say that that very non-repugnance on the part of God in the reason of object, at least as object that moves, is not evident, as has been declared.

39. To the proofs of the antecedent of the stated argument. — Therefore to the proofs of that proposition assumed in that sense, it will be easy to respond. To the first it is said that from the negation of that modal proposition it does not follow that created intellect cannot be elevated to the vision of God, but that it is not evident that created intellect can be elevated to that vision, and this we concede and defend. But if someone argues: God is contained under the object of the intellect; therefore God as clearly visible is the object of the intellect, it is responded that the consequence is not formal nor evident, because in order for God absolutely to be the object of the intellect, it is enough that he can be attained by some act of the intellect. But in order for God, insofar as visible, to be the object of the intellect, he must be able to be attained through vision. For this particular affirmation does not follow from the former general affirmation, and therefore the antecedent can be evident and not the consequent. To the second, however, we say that God is indeed supremely visible, but to a proportioned intellect. But it is not evident that he is so visible by an intellect of a lower order. Thus he is not visible to bodily sight on account of lack of proportion, for although there is not an equal lack of proportion, nor in reality the same reason, nevertheless it is not evident that the lack of proportion and excess of such an object over created intellect is not sufficient for him to be simply invisible to it, just as it is established that he is naturally invisible to it. Hence what is added in the same proof, that God as clearly visible is contained under entity, which is the adequate object of the intellect, if it is understood that this is evident, is false. For although the reason of entity as such is the object of the intellect, nevertheless naturally it is not the adequate object according to all

the differences and modes of entity that it comprehends under itself. For the hypostatic union is contained under entity, and nevertheless it is not contained under entity as it is the adequate natural object of the intellect. Hence it cannot naturally be known evidently that the hypostatic union is intuitively visible by the intellect, because if it cannot be known evidently to be possible, how will it be known evidently to be intuitively visible, since nothing can be seen unless it exists? For we are speaking of true vision, not apparent vision.

40. To the productions of the consequence of the same argument. — But if that fundamental proposition, and the other propositions assumed consequently in the stated argument, are not taken in that sense, but only as propositions true concerning inesse and as known from things believed, in this way they are useless for concluding the intended point. For in this way, given that antecedent, namely, that God as clearly visible is the object of the intellect, and given the consequence, namely, that it is not repugnant for God to be seen, what is intended is not concluded, namely, that from this it is evidently known that the vision of God is possible, because this is not inferred from that antecedent taken simply. Hence, if the inference is made in this sense, the consequence is denied, because just as the antecedent is not evident, so neither is the consequent. And to the first proof of the consequence it is said first that God indeed cannot be seen naturally by created intellect because of the defect of its powers; nevertheless, that impotence is also founded in the object, because it is God, not because of a defect of his intelligibility, but rather on account of his excess. And on this side it is not evident whether the excellence of that object is so great that it cannot be overcome or attained by any finite power, of whatever perfection it may be, just as he also cannot be comprehended. And therefore also on the side of the object it is not evident that a created vision of such an object is possible. Second, it is said that, although according to faith it is true that the defect of the powers of the potency can be supplied through grace or the light of glory, nevertheless this is not evident, as I proved. Nor is there proof of this assertion. For what is suggested, that then the potency would not be elevated outside its adequate object nor beyond the mode possible to it concerning other objects, proves nothing, both because under the same form of argument it would be concluded that a created intellect can be elevated through God's help to the comprehension of God, because then too it would not be elevated outside the adequate object nor beyond a mode possible concerning other objects, for the intellect can naturally comprehend many other things. And also because then the potency would be elevated beyond its connatural object and beyond the mode in which it can naturally attain that object. But it is not evident that it can

be elevated in this way, although it is believed by faith, as was shown. And thus the second proof too has no force for proving that it is evident that God as clearly visible is the object of our intellect, but proves only that this rightly follows from that principle of faith that God can elevate the intellect beyond the whole order of natural cognitions. For from this alone it follows that God as clearly visible is the object of the elevated intellect. But that the intellect can be elevated is not evident; nor do I find in that whole discourse any showing or trace of this evidence.

41. To the third principal objection in n. 26. — To the third principal objection it is responded that at most it concludes that an angel naturally knows that God can always create effects more perfect than he has created. For although some theologians have also either denied this or called it into doubt, nevertheless it certainly seems to be concluded evidently from the simple infinity of divine omnipotence, to which no created effect can be adequate. But it is denied that from this it is proved or rightly inferred, especially with evidence, that God can create another order or grade of things that is not natural. For this does not follow evidently from that principle of the infinity of God's power. For one could believe that for the infinity of God's power, not only in the mode of operating by creation, but also in the creatable object, it is enough that he can create essentially more numerous and more perfect substances without end. Hence, as regards this, we concede the first consequence, namely, that God can always make more and more things. But the second consequence, namely, therefore he can produce entities of another order, namely of grace and the supernatural, is not evident, nor good or formal. This is clear from the reason just given, and it is clarified by an example, because even now God can make things more perfect than he has made, and yet we cannot evidently infer from this either that God can make a vision of God more perfect in its species, or that he can make another order of things higher than the order of grace, because perhaps none is possible besides the hypostatic union.

42. The defect of the second consequence of the aforesaid principal objection is shown. — Hence, although that consequence occurs materially, it has a difficult proof, and not yet an evident one. It is clarified and proved. For first, it could be inferred in this way too: God can always make more perfect substances. Therefore he can make another order of supernatural substances, which could see God by their own powers. For there is the same form of inferring. But if this inference is denied because of the special repugnance of such substances, for the same reason someone will be able to deny the same consequence in whatever genus of entities it is made, by affirming that there is

also repugnance in the claim that there are accidents of another order than every order of substantial creatures, or accidents that are not natural to them. For Scotus too seems to deny that there are accidents supernatural in their own entity, nor will the contrary be demonstrable with evidence. Therefore, from the infinity of God's power alone it is not immediately evident that there can be entities of a supernatural order, because they must be either substance or accidents. But they cannot be substances, and from this it follows that it is not evident concerning accidents either that they are possible as supernatural in their own entities, because accidents essentially and connaturally regard substance, immediately or mediately, and therefore they can seem to have to regard connaturally a subject of the same order. Accordingly, just as substance cannot be supernatural, so neither can accident be, because neither can there be in substance a natural capacity for an entity of a higher order, nor is obediential capacity evident, nor is it evident that an accident can have a connatural aptitude for a subject not proportioned to it. Although these arguments do not show impossibility in these accidents, nevertheless they show that it cannot be shown evidently that such accidents are possible, or that they are comprehended under a non-repugnant object, and accordingly that it is not demonstrable from the infinity of God's omnipotence alone that these accidents are possible.

43. To the first confirmation in the same n. 26. — To the second confirmation in the same place. — And this can be confirmed from what has been said in the preceding objection, by turning back the prior confirmation of the third objection. Because it cannot be demonstrated that the beatific vision is possible, therefore neither can the other gifts of grace. The consequence is proved, both because all are of the same order, and also because all the others are ordered to the vision as to the end, whence unless the end is demonstrated possible, neither can the principles or means be demonstrated; and finally because the reasons given concerning vision have a place proportionally in love and in every other act of the intellect and will supernatural with respect to substance. But if the acts are not demonstrated possible, much less the habits, which exist only on account of the acts. Finally, to the other confirmation, concerning remission of sins, we say that sin can be understood to be remitted in two ways: in one way through a physical action productive of grace, either alone or together with moral remission; or through only the moral mode of divine condonation. We deny that the former mode is evidently possible, just as it is also impossible to know naturally that men by sinning lose some quality of grace, but this is believed by revelation alone. Concerning the latter mode, even if it is admitted to be evidently possible, it will not be against our assertion,

because that would not be a physical effect, but a moral one; nor could it be called supernatural with respect to substance, but only free and voluntary to God, to omit that many theologians doubt whether that mode is possible, concerning which elsewhere.

44. Fourth conclusion. — It is first proved universally. — Fourth, it must be said that, even after effects supernatural in substance have been made, an angel cannot through signs or conjectures evidently know abstractively that such effects have been made, unless there is evidence in the one testifying. The Thomists and other theologians cited for the other assertions more commonly hold this. The general reason is that we suppose that these mysteries or entities supernatural per se, even after they have been made, are not known naturally in themselves through proper species, as has been shown. But they do not have effects through which they can be evidently known, even only with respect to existence confusedly known. Therefore they cannot be known evidently in any way, setting aside the testimony of someone infallible, concerning which I shall speak at the end. The consequence is proved because evident knowledge a posteriori cannot exist except through effects that necessarily depend on such a cause. For no other signs can be thought of that naturally and infallibly demonstrate such a thing, which are not effects necessarily depending on it. Therefore the minor is proved, because those effects are either supernatural in substance or natural. If they are supernatural, they too cannot be known evidently except through other effects, concerning which the same argument will return. But if they are natural, they will not be able evidently to indicate a cause supernatural in substance. For a natural entity does not depend per se on a supernatural one. Indeed, although a natural effect is made in a supernatural mode, and that can be known evidently from circumstances and indications, as we shall see in what follows, nevertheless it cannot be a sufficient medium for arriving at evident knowledge of some effect supernatural in substance that has been made. For it is much easier for a natural thing to be made in a supernatural mode than for an absolutely supernatural thing to be made; and therefore the former never depends necessarily on the latter, or certainly that so necessary dependence cannot naturally be evident, since supernatural things themselves, as they are in themselves, are never known naturally.

45. It is proved second, specifically. — From the mystery of the Incarnation. — So that it may be proved from the mystery of the Eucharist, the first objection is made. — The efficacy of this reason will become better known by descending to particular mysteries and by making, as it were, an induction; and, incidentally, the difficulties that occur will be touched on and set forth.

And we shall run through the three principal supernatural works, which are the Incarnation, the Eucharist, and sanctifying grace, with its acts. Concerning the Incarnation, the matter is manifest, because it had no physical and naturally knowable effect that could not be made by God through a mere man. Therefore, from the effects alone, or the miracles or signs of Christ, the divinity of Christ could not be evidently known, but rather that his humanity was personally united to God, as I said at length in the second volume of the third part, disp. 81, sections two and three, and more briefly in volume 1, disp. 3, section two; there I also touched on that common difficulty, because angels naturally knew the lack of created subsistence in Christ's humanity, which I sufficiently solved there. And therefore it is not necessary to say more here about that mystery, especially because with respect to this mystery there is no controversy concerning the assertion.

46. But concerning the mystery of the Eucharist a similar objection is made, because even a bad angel naturally sees that, after the consecration, the substance of bread is not under the consecrated species. Therefore he sees that the accidents exist without a subject. Therefore he sees that they are subsistent per se, and thus he sees that they have a certain supernatural mode of existing, although they do not see the mode itself in itself and directly or essentially. The consequences seem clear; and the antecedent is proved because the positive thing and its negation or privation are of the same order and can be known through species of the same order. But the substance of bread is an entity of the natural order. Therefore the absence of bread is also of the same order. Therefore, just as the substance is naturally seen by an angel when it exists, so too its lack is naturally seen when it has been destroyed. A similar argument is made concerning Christ's body itself and its presence. For first, the soul of Christ, even as informing the body, and the body itself, even as united to the soul and as affected by quantity, are natural entities, and therefore they are known by an angel under the species. Then the angel evidently sees the quantity of Christ's body, although it extends the parts of Christ's body in themselves, nevertheless there it does not extend them in relation to place, and accordingly it lacks the peculiar mode of extending parts that it has in other quantities. For that mode is a natural thing, and therefore its lack is of the same order, whence it can equally be known naturally. From this, finally, an angel will evidently conclude that Christ's body has there another supernatural mode of existing, although perhaps he does not know that mode itself directly and intuitively or quidditatively.

47. First response to the stated objection. — Negation is not directly representable in itself. — To this objection I respond first generally that from that whole discourse it is not concluded that an angel knows anything supernatural with respect to substance. And thus it does not proceed against the assertion; indeed, it can be turned to confirm it in this way. For if in that already-made mystery anything supernatural per se could be known evidently, it would especially be known through the stated discourses. But they are not sufficient for knowledge positively evident, so to speak, but at most for a strong suspicion by which, from one supernatural effect, a conjecture is made that it is not repugnant for something supernatural of a higher order to have been made there. Therefore. The minor, together with the whole reason, is shown by responding to the individual points. And indeed in the prior part it can be denied that an angel evidently knows that the substance of bread is not there by directly seeing that lack in itself; rather he only conjectures this by a virtual discourse, under which falsity can strictly lie. For an angel does not have a proper species of privation or negation of substance, so that he could see it directly, because a negation alone is nothing in itself, and therefore is not directly representable in itself through an intelligible species, nor does negation have real existence to which intellectual intuitive knowledge can be directly terminated. Therefore it is not seen directly and intuitively in itself in the way in which the previously existing substance was seen. Nevertheless, it can be known evidently through another thing and according to a certain reflection of the intellect upon itself. For when the substance is lacking there, the angel does not know it, and then, as it were by reflection, he knows by a positive and evident act that he does not know it and cannot see it, even if he wills to use the species of such a substance. From this, therefore, he gathers that the substance is not there, from a certain natural principle by which he evidently judges that he has sufficient principles for beholding natural substances if they exist, and that this is in his natural power. Yet this principle virtually includes the condition, unless he is impeded by a superior cause. Therefore the absolute judgment concerning the absence of bread does not remain simply evident, but only under the same condition virtually understood: here there is not the substance of bread, unless perhaps it is hidden from me by God.

48. First pressing against the stated response. — Second pressing. — But some may deride this response, first, because an angel cannot prudently doubt or fear that he is deceived in a matter that he evidently knows. Otherwise, neither would we, when seeing dark air, be certain about the lack of light in it, for we can doubt whether perhaps we are impeded by divine power. And thus

there would be certainty about no natural thing. Second and chiefly, because an angel not only by certain knowledge through discourse and alien species, but even by a proper and quidditative concept, sees the lack of bread, just as he knows blindness and other natural privations. Because that absence of the substance of bread is a certain natural privation or negation, just as the substance itself is, and therefore it is referred to the same natural potency, just as Aristotle said about light and darkness in *On the Soul* 2, chapter 10, text 103, and book 3, chapter 2, text 138, that they pertain to the same sense. Therefore, just as an angel's intellect naturally sees intuitively the substance that exists, so too it sees its absence when it does not exist. Therefore, just as it sees the substance when it exists by a positive act terminated at it as existent, so too it sees the absence of bread by a positive act terminated directly at it in itself. Therefore in both there is equal certainty and evidence. But nevertheless I think the response is sufficient and solid. Because, even if the substance of bread were there, God could concur with the angel for seeing the accidents, and not concur with him for seeing the substance, for there is no repugnance in this. Therefore, then, if he judged that the substance was not there, he would do so with the same certainty with which he now judges it, and yet he would be deceived. Therefore the knowledge he now has concerning the absence of bread is not so certain that falsity cannot underlie it, for it is of the same reason as the other. Therefore, if the angel wishes to attend to all the causes from which it can arise that he does not see the absence of bread there, he cannot judge with certainty that bread is not there, but rather, if he conducts himself prudently, since he is ignorant of that cause, he will suspend assent, or at most he will judge that either the substance is not there, or he is divinely impeded from knowing it.

49. The first solution is carried forward. — Nor does it follow from this, as was objected in the first reason, that there is no natural evidence, or that men can always fear that there are tricks and illusions in what they see with their eyes. For the same reason for fear or doubt does not always occur, and we do not say that natural effects evidently known can be prudently doubted when they occur in a natural mode and there is no reason for doubting. Rather, we say that when an effect natural in substance appears to occur in such a way that it could not have been made without some miracle or supernatural mode, and that mode can be manifold, it cannot be evident or certain to an angel by which of those modes determinately it occurs. For an angel does not naturally see directly and in itself the mode in which that effect occurs. Therefore, although he knows that something supernatural intervenes there, he will rightly doubt what sort of thing it is. But so it is in the present case. For since an angel evidently sees that the

accidents remain there and does not see the substance, he will very well gather that the substance could not have been destroyed there naturally, because neither is substance destroyed naturally except by a prior change in the accidents, nor do accidents naturally remain when the substance has been destroyed. Therefore the angel can rightly doubt what sort of supernatural effect has intervened there, because that substance can be hidden from him either because it is not there or because he himself is impeded. Nor can it be certainly established for him which of these is the case. Indeed, he seems rather to have to judge that he is impeded than that the substance is not there, because the former can very easily occur and without a great miracle, and the angel evidently knows that it is possible, because he evidently knows the dependence that he has in his acts on God's concurrence. But the latter is more difficult and more supernatural, and on the side of the accidents perhaps it is not evident whether it is possible for them to be conserved without a subject. Thus, therefore, the prior objection is dissolved.

50. Solution to the second pressing. — But concerning the latter, it has already been said that a privation is never seen intuitively so directly in itself as a positive thing is, both because a privation is not seen through a proper species but through the species of the habit, and also because it can never be known by an absolute concept that does not in some way include the positive thing itself, as is taken from St. Thomas, 1 part, Quest. 14, art. 10, at the end of the body, and Quest. 15, art. 3, reply to 1, and Quest. 18, art. 4, reply to 4. In those places he teaches that even in God proper ideas of privations are not given, because God too does not know them through proper reasons of them, but through the positive things to which they are opposed. Thus, therefore, an angel does not know a privation except through the species of the habit, and in this way he knows the absence of substance through the species of substance, because negation is not otherwise representable or knowable. Yet this does not prevent an angel from knowing that negation or privation quidditatively, insofar as it is knowable, because in reality negation does not have quiddity, but the lack of quiddity. Yet in the mode in which it is conceived to have it, since it consists wholly in the removal of such a form or substance, it can be sufficiently known through the species of the same form.

51. The present solution is shown more from the distinction between intuition of a form and of a privation. — And from this there also seems to be a great difference between the intuitive knowledge of a positive thing, such as substance, and the intuition of its absence. For in a positive thing there is real existence and truly something that can terminate intuitive knowledge; but in

absence there is nothing, and therefore intuitive knowledge of privation is never so direct and absolute, so to speak, as the intuition of a positive thing. Hence I judge it most probable that no one ever sees a privation except by at the same time seeing and experiencing that he does not see the positive thing, just as we do not positively see darkness through bodily sight, but only do not see light, and then through the intellect we judge that darkness exists. In that judgment another is necessarily involved, by which we judge that we do not see light by sight. Thus, therefore, an angel seems to judge that a thing is not because he does not see it, and not to be able to have the former judgment unless it involves the latter. And therefore he can either be deceived in the virtual inference or doubt about it and not make the other judgment about the absence of the thing. Therefore, whatever may be the mode of speaking, whether intellectual knowledge of privation or of the absence of bread should be called intuitive, even if it is so called, it must be said that it is not so direct and simple that it does not occur through an alien species and with dependence on knowledge that is as it were reflected, namely, that the opposed positive thing, as for example light or substance, is not seen there. And on this side, in that judgment, "here there is not substance," an angel can fear lest he be deceived in it, when such a lack cannot exist in reality without another miraculous work, as I explained. And this can be further clarified by a sensible example. For if someone who was certain that the sun or another luminous thing was here did not see light in the air, even if he were certain that he had sight without a natural or sensible impediment, he could doubt whether the sun supernaturally was not illuminating the air, and therefore whether the air was really dark, or whether he himself was rather lacking the species or concurrence for seeing. For the other mode would be necessary, and since each is preternatural, it could not be certainly discerned in particular. Therefore in the same way the angel can be disposed in the stated case.

52. Second response to the same objection in number 26. — But second and principally we respond by admitting that an angel evidently and naturally knows that the substance is not there, and by denying that it follows from this that he evidently knows that something supernatural with respect to substance has been made there. For this destruction of the substance, even though it occurs there in a supernatural mode, is natural in itself, and thus pertains to effects that are supernatural only with respect to mode. But the mode itself of conversion is not seen by an angel, as I shall say in the following chapter. Similarly too, the lack of inherence that is consequently seen in the accidents is of the natural order, although the mode of its removal is supernatural. Then the

accident itself conserved without a subject is a natural thing, although the mode of conserving it is supernatural. But this mode is not seen. Hence, although those accidents have a supernatural mode of subsisting, not only does an angel not see it intuitively, as I have already said, but he also does not evidently know abstractively that they have some positive mode, because it is not evident that an accident cannot be conserved by God without actual inherence and without a positive mode of existing per se.

53. Confirmation. — And it is confirmed from a similar case. For an angel naturally saw the humanity of Christ lacking its own subsistence, and nevertheless he did not know evidently that it had a positive mode of union to another suppositum. They respond by denying the antecedent, because the demon did not see in Christ the lack of subsistence, but was deceived and thought that he subsisted in the mode of other men. For the lack of subsistence in that humanity could not be known from the lack of another subject or of a thing distinct from it, as the lack of inherence in accidents is evidently known from the lack of a subject. And the reason for the difference is clear, because the subsistence of the humanity is not a mode as it were respective, as the mode of inherence is, but is in itself absolute from every subject or extrinsic term. And therefore its lack can follow only from the positive mode of union, and consequently can be known only by seeing the union of the humanity to another person. Therefore, since the demon cannot see the mode of union, neither could he see the lack of its own subsistence. This mode of speaking is indeed probable, as in volume 1, 3 p., disp. 3, sect. 2. Nevertheless it is not certain, nor does that difference altogether satisfy.

54. First, because even if it is true that subsistence cannot be taken away except through union to another person, nevertheless, after it has once been taken away, it is a certain privation of the natural order, just as is the subsistence of which it deprives. Therefore it can be known in itself by intuitive knowledge, as privation is knowable according to the view of the argument, although the union from which it comes cannot be seen. For often the effect can be seen without the cause being seen, as a rustic at the time of an eclipse sees darkness, although he does not know the cause. And if God were to deprive the matter of the heaven of its form by introducing another form that an angel could not see, nevertheless the angel would see in that matter the lack of the prior form. Therefore similarly in the present case. Second, because although perhaps it is so in reality that humanity cannot be deprived of its own subsistence except through union, nevertheless this is not naturally evident even to an angel, both because it is not evident to him that through that union it can be deprived, and

therefore not that it can be deprived through that alone; and because it is not evident that it cannot be deprived through another union; and especially because, since that subsistence is something distinct from the nature of the thing and separable from human nature, perhaps God, by the removal of the divine concurrence by which he conserves that positive mode in human nature, can remove the subsistence while persevering in the influx by which he conserves the humanity. For although this is not evidently possible, by a like reason it is not evidently impossible. And finally it is not evident that the humanity cannot be conserved as existent without its own subsistence and union to another person. And accordingly, from the hypothesis, it is always true that, even if the demon saw the negation of subsistence, it does not follow from this that he saw the union to God, because he can see the humanity precisely and be ignorant of the other things, or also doubt, as I was saying before, whether the subsistence of the humanity is hidden from him, or even whether it is not in it, and much more how it is not. From these points, therefore, it is clear that the induction in which we have been engaged from number 45, concerning the mystery of the Eucharist, does not fail.

55. Last objection concerning sanctifying grace, from the resolution of which the induction for the fourth conclusion is completed. — Finally, there is difficulty concerning grace that makes one pleasing, for an angel seems able naturally to know and experience it, at least each one in himself. For one angel cannot see in another, nor an angel in our soul, anything from which he may evidently know that supernatural gifts have been made in him, because he cannot see those gifts in themselves, nor their proper effects, because one cannot know the acts of another. But each one in himself seems able to know the effects of these gifts, and consequently through them to know the gifts themselves. For an angel wayfarer who believes evidently knows that he believes, and similarly knows that he loves. Therefore he knows what sort of act that is and from what habit it proceeds, and consequently he also knows the supernatural habits themselves. And it is clarified, for if an angel had implanted natural species of these gifts, without doubt he would be able to see them. But each angel does not need species in order to know his own acts, because the acts themselves are most closely joined to him as objects actually knowable. Therefore an angel will also be able to know his own supernatural acts through themselves, by the very fact that they occur in the angel himself, and consequently through the acts he will be able to know the habits.

56. What should first be said to the objection. — The opinion of those who think that for knowing supernatural objects proper species alone are sufficient.

— I respond first that this objection, if it proves anything, concludes not only concerning abstractive and imperfect knowledge, but also concerning intuitive and perfect knowledge, and consequently also proceeds against the first conclusion. Then the objection can press against those who think that only proper species are necessary for knowing these supernatural objects. For they think that, once these are posited, the natural light of the angelic intellect is sufficient for using such a species and for knowing through it the thing represented by that thing, however supernatural it may be. They also hold this concerning the very essence of God. For if this is so, certainly a believing angel will evidently see, and as it is in itself, the act of his faith, what sort it is, because that act is united per se to the power, and does not need another intelligible species in order that it can be seen. But if this is conceded, then the angel naturally sees a thing supernatural with respect to substance by the very fact that it has been made. For I suppose that even in an angel the act of believing is supernatural with respect to substance, and so the argument will proceed from one act to the rest, because acts of the will also seem to be united per se sufficiently to the intellect, as we touched on above, or if in this matter some distinction is established between acts of the will and of the intellect, at least from the act of the intellect the acts of the will that arise from it will be known, which are of the same order, and through acts the habits will be known. Especially because it is probable that the proper habits of the angel himself are seen by the same angel per se, without other species, and consequently it will come about that grace existing immediately in the substance is seen per se, just like the substance itself.

57. Besides those species a supernatural light is required. — Now the last objection, in n. 54, is directly solved. — But I suppose that besides the species a supernatural light proportioned to the species and object is required, as I treated broadly in the matter concerning the vision of God and concerning the knowledge infused per se into the soul of Christ. Supposing this, I respond with respect to acts that a believing angel evidently experiences that he believes, but nevertheless he does not see intuitively or quidditatively the substance and ultimate difference of such an act. And this is not from a defect of species, but from a defect of light and of the power of understanding such objects. The same must be said of love and of the other acts by a like or greater reason. And much more must it be said of the habit of grace and of the others infused per se. And by this reason it is common to an angel with a man that, even if he has been justified, he does not evidently know his justice. You will say: this proceeds only concerning intuitive knowledge; nevertheless, by the very fact that an angel

experiences his faith and does not see it intuitively, he will evidently infer that it is supernatural faith, because if it were natural, he would see it clearly, just as the demon clearly beholds the faith he has when he believes and trembles. I respond that this argument also presses against those who think that from the negation of knowledge the knowledge of the positive thing is gathered evidently as to its existence. But we respond consistently that, although an angel wayfarer has not evidently seen the acts of his faith, he could be ignorant of the cause, namely, whether this was because the act by which he believed was of another order than the acts naturally knowable by him, or because it was hidden from him by God on account of the reasons of his providence, of which he himself is ignorant, as has been explained in the other mysteries.

CHAPTER XXX
WHETHER ANGELS NATURALLY KNOW EFFECTS THAT ARE SUPERNATURAL ONLY AS TO THEIR MODE

1. *Division of the question.*—Concerning these effects the same things can be treated as concerning things supernatural as to their substance. For these effects can be considered either after they have been made, that is, as existing, or before they are made, namely as possible, and according to esse of essence alone. And although in possible esse they are prior to being actually made, nevertheless the knowledge of them seems easier after they have been made than before they are made. Therefore we will speak first of them as now existing, and afterward of their possibility. But in those already made two things can be distinguished, namely the existence of the effect, and the mode by which it is made or endures.

2. *First conclusion concerning effects already produced.*—I say, therefore, first: effects made in a supernatural mode, if in themselves they are of the natural order, after they have been made can be known naturally by an angel, both intuitively and quidditatively, no less than if they had been made naturally. Scotus, and all who say absolutely that all supernatural effects, or all mysteries of grace, are known by an angel by natural power, hold this a fortiori. For those who think that such beings are supernatural only as to mode say this. And so many think when speaking in particular about the mode of existing of Christ's body in the Eucharist. But Durandus, in Book 4, distinction 10, question 4, by distinguishing the supernatural in mode or in itself, more properly teaches this assertion. It is easily proved, because these effects in themselves are things of the natural order, and distinct from the mode by which they are made. Therefore

they can be seen, without the mode being seen, by one who has light and species proportioned to them. But an angel has species and light of this sort. Therefore he can know these things, however they may be made. Second, a thing made in this way, considered in itself, is wholly similar and of the same nature as another thing made in a natural mode, as a man raised to life is like a man never dead. Therefore they can equally be known by an angel who has the species of each. Hence, if there were three men, one created, another generated, and another raised to life, and an angel created after them were to see them existing, he would know them equally, and would not know how to discern how each of them had been produced, because the productions, as such, have now passed away, and he cannot now see them. But their conservation is, speaking per se, of the same mode and nature in all. Therefore the supernatural mode of production is not sufficient to hide the thing made, when that thing in itself is natural, although the mode is supernatural. Finally, this can be made evident by induction in Lazarus raised to life, in the eyes of the man born blind, in wine made from water miraculously converted into it, in the multiplication of the five loaves, in walking upon the waters, and in similar cases. For these and similar things were manifest even to human beings. Yet angels, even evil angels, saw more evidently the truth of those effects, and the proper being and nature of each, because they had innate species of such things and sufficient light for knowing them as they are in themselves.

3. *The contrary opinion is undeservedly attributed to St. Thomas, etc.*—But the contrary of the assertion is usually attributed to St. Thomas and his school, because St. Thomas simply denied that angels naturally know the mysteries of grace. For these works also, supernatural only as to mode, are miraculous and are counted among the mysteries of grace. Likewise, because the reason of St. Thomas, namely that these mysteries depend on the free disposition of God, also has place in these effects. Yet I judge that neither St. Thomas, nor Cajetan, nor others doubted the assertion as it has been stated and proved, both because the matter seems very clear, and also because they formally speak of the mysteries of grace as they are supernatural. But natural things, although made in a supernatural mode, considered in themselves are natural. Yet it can be objected here that it follows that the demon could have known the virginity of Mary both before the birth, because he could have seen that she had not been known by a man, and in the birth and after the birth by seeing her bodily integrity. But this seems contrary to the doctrine of the Fathers. I respond by conceding the consequence about what was possible, but as to the fact, that he was impeded by divine providence from attending to this, and the Fathers must

be understood in this way. On this matter St. Thomas may be seen, third part, question 29, article 1, reply to 3, and what we noted there.

4. *Doubt.—Reasons for the negative side of the doubt.*—But it can be asked whether these things can be known not only as to their natural being but also as to their supernatural mode. In this there is no doubt that it can be known abstractly and in general that they were made beyond nature. For the angel sees that the man was previously truly dead, but now lives, and consequently that he has been raised to life. But the doubt is whether he can see the very mode by which the thing has been made supernaturally distinctly and in itself. For that he cannot know the mode in this way, or at least from the fact that it is supernatural, seems to be suggested by this: the angel does not have a natural principle by which he can know a supernatural mode, because he has neither an innate species of such a mode, since that mode exceeds the whole natural order, and innate species are only of things and actions of the natural order; nor can that mode be evidently known from natural effects, because it has no necessary connection with them. And it is confirmed, because in the preceding chapter we said that an angel cannot know supernatural modes, even after they have been made. But the same reason seems to hold concerning this mode, because although the thing which is made through it is natural, nevertheless the mode itself is supernatural. And perhaps in this sense the negative side can be attributed to the Thomists, for in this sense the arguments given proceed: that these works, as they underlie such a mode, pertain to the mysteries of grace and depend on the free will of God.

5. *Resolution of the difficulty through a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic supernaturalness.*—Nevertheless, on this point I use a distinction. For such a mode sometimes, and often, is supernatural only extrinsically and according to a certain relation to other natural causes, or to the order constituted in them by God. But sometimes a mode can be supernatural in itself and in the being which it has. I say, therefore, that when a thing is made supernaturally only in the former mode, not only the thing made, but also the mode by which it is made, can be known naturally by an angel. But when a thing is made supernaturally in the latter mode, although the thing itself is known, the determinate mode by which it was made is not known by an angel. The distinction is first explained. For the whole supernaturalness of these effects consists in their being made, because the things made are natural, as is supposed. But I say *in being made*, not as being made is distinguished from being conserved, but as it is distinguished from the term, whether newly made or conserved. For the action through which such an effect is made can

sometimes be only in being made, as when water was converted into wine. For although such a production of wine was supernatural, nevertheless the wine so made was afterward naturally conserved. But sometimes as long as the effect endures, it is always supernaturally conserved, as that the boys remaining in the furnace of fire were not burned was supernatural as long as it lasted. And similarly, if God illuminated the night without the sun or a second cause, it would be considered a supernatural work as long as it endured. Nevertheless, in both modes the supernaturalness consists in the action alone, either transient or permanent, and in this way we say that in these effects only the being made is supernatural, that is, only the action.

6. *Examples of an action extrinsically supernatural.—Examples of an action intrinsically supernatural.*—Therefore this action is sometimes called supernatural only by an extrinsic denomination, so to speak, that is, because it is done without an ordinary and natural cause, or beyond the common concurrence of nature. But sometimes it can be supernatural because in itself it is truly of a nature different from every action through which such a thing can be produced in a connatural mode. The matter is made clear by examples. For the sudden conversion of water into wine is supernatural only in the former mode. For if the substantial transmutation is considered there, it was only a formal conversion by the eduction of the form of wine from the matter of water, expelling the form of water. And so in reality there was there only a certain generation and corruption of the same nature as the natural generation and corruption of the same things. But if the disposition of the matter is considered there, it too was made through an alteration productive of the same natural accidents of wine; and the supernatural mode was that it was made suddenly, at Christ's command, without another natural cause. This mode does not intrinsically change the species or nature of the alteration, but only as to speed and relation to the cause. Perhaps it was similar in the resurrection of Lazarus, because the repeated union of the same soul to the same body was an action natural in species, of the same nature as the first union, since in the substantial union itself nothing peculiar and supernatural in itself was found. Rather, the whole supernaturalness of that action was placed in the repeated disposition and organization of the body, which in itself, by reason of alteration, does not transcend in its being. Yet because by that action the proximate capacity for the same soul was restored to the body, that action had a supernatural mode. For that alteration, especially when made suddenly and by command alone, was no longer within the power of natural causes. The same is more clearly evident in light made and conserved by God alone, and likewise in fire not burning the

three boys, because that absence of action, and the conservation of the boys given that absence, are natural in themselves, and are supernatural only because they occur beyond the laws of nature. But an example of an action supernatural in itself can be the transubstantiation of bread into the body of the Lord, and of wine into the blood. For that mode of conversion is not found in nature, nor can it be the connatural production of any natural being. Likewise any action or production of any term, even a natural one, made by God through a creature as through a physical instrument elevated by God through obediential power, without another innate power, can be called an action supernatural in itself, because it cannot be connatural to any creature, either on the part of the instrument or even on the part of the term, because no thing is by its nature apt to be made in such a mode. And perhaps there can be other modes of such actions supernatural in themselves, although they are not known to us insofar as they are such, as, for example, the production of Eve from the rib of Adam, the multiplication of the five loaves, the constitution of a man in several places, and any similar things.

7. *The first part of the preceding resolution stated in number 5 is proved.*— Now therefore the former part of the resolution given, concerning a mode only extrinsically supernatural, is proved. For in it not only the term, but also the action, is natural and of the same nature and essential mode as similar actions made by natural agents. Therefore not only the thing made, but also the action by which it is made, can be known by an angel. And so the angel could have seen the transient action by which Christ converted water into wine, and by which he united the soul of Lazarus to the body, and the whole alteration of the body, or the disposition of the matter, made suddenly. Again, it was evident to the angel that no natural cause was there, or could have been there, which would make that action in such a mode, but that the divine power, because of its infinity, was sufficient for this. Therefore he could also know that action, or that mode of production, even as supernatural. For it is supernatural only either by negation, so to speak, of a natural cause, which the angel could easily know, or by knowledge of the divine power for effecting a natural action without a natural cause, which also the angel can naturally know, as I will say at once, and as is sufficiently clear in itself. For if this air were illuminated without the sun or another luminous thing, the angel would easily know that the illumination was not made by a natural agent, and that it could be made by God, and that in that case it was made by God, because it cannot be made without a cause, and no other cause intervenes there.

8. *What kind of action penetration is.—The reasons in number 3 are satisfied.*—And in a similar way the angel evidently sees that the fire did not burn the boys, and that this could not happen naturally, and consequently that it was done by divine power. Indeed, he could also naturally know the mode, namely by the suspension of the divine concurrence. For perhaps it is evident that no other impediment intervened there, and that this was possible by divine freedom. Likewise, when God places two extended bodies penetratively in the same space, the angel clearly intuits both bodies, and the where of each, and their distance and penetration. And he sees the mode by which that work is done, namely through two natural actions which are done simultaneously by God, where naturally they could not be done in that way, although each could be done. Nor is there there another supernatural mode in the action which could be hidden from the angel. Therefore that the angel knows these supernatural things even as to their supernatural mode does not exceed the natural power of an angel. Nor is the reason given above an obstacle to this knowledge, namely that the supernatural as such, of whatever sort it may be, is disproportionate to the angelic intellect. For it is responded that if the supernaturalness arises only from the excess of divine power over natural causes, it is not disproportionate to the angelic natural light, when otherwise it is established that in the thing itself or in the action there is no repugnance, since otherwise it is natural in itself. Nor is it an obstacle that such an action depends on the freedom of God, because the discussion is not about a future action, but about a present or already made action, nor about an internal act, but about an action placed ad extra, which can be seen even if it was freely made, as we argued above against that reason.

9. *The second part of the same resolution is proved.*—Then the other part, concerning an action supernatural in itself, is proved by the same reasons by which it was proved that other supernatural modes pertaining to a thing in being made, or which are in the term of actions, cannot be naturally known by angels. For since they have supernaturalness of the same nature, it matters little whether the mode itself pertains to the action or to the term. It is confirmed: for if the action is supernatural in itself, the angel will not have its innate species, because he has innate species only of natural things, by the force of his nature, as we are speaking. Therefore he will not be able naturally to know those actions, because he cannot know anything without a species. And thus what was said about other supernatural things or modes can be applied.

10. *It is argued against the preceding doctrine from transubstantiation.—Vasquez, disputation 214, chapter 4, at the end.*—But those who say that an angel

can naturally know transubstantiation as it is such seem to think against this opinion. And they seem to suppose that it is not supernatural in substance, but only in mode and divine ordination. For they think that transubstantiation is nothing but the local bringing of Christ's body under the accidents of bread, with the exclusion of the substance of bread, insofar as that exclusion is necessary by the force of the words, that is, so that they can be true, and has a connection with the introduction of Christ's body in the words, so to speak, not in itself. Hence they argue in effect in this way. The bringing is a certain local change, which the angel can naturally know; and similarly he knows the destruction of the bread, because he sees that its substance is not there; and besides, he knows very well that those words were said by Christ for this effect, for this is a certain human fact; and similarly he experiences the truth of the words and recognizes that each of those things is necessary for the truth of the words. Therefore he naturally sees the transubstantiation which is made there. Hence we can argue in this way: if any mode of production were so supernatural that it could not be naturally known by an angel, it would especially be transubstantiation; but this is not such, because it can be known by an angel; therefore no other such mode can be found.

11. *The example of transubstantiation does not stand in the way of the aforesaid resolution, if a supernatural mode in being made is given there.—Even if, with Scotus, only an adductive action is posited as transubstantiation.*— Nevertheless, I judge that an angel cannot naturally know transubstantiation as it is such. Henry taught this in *Quodlibet* 11, question 12, where he says that even if an angel sees there the absence of bread and Christ, he cannot naturally know whether the substance of bread has been annihilated or converted into Christ's body, or how Christ's body has esse under those species, because all these things, he says, are supernatural. Durandus thinks the same, in Book 4, distinction 10, question 4, number 6. And St. Thomas, third part, question 75, article 8, reply to 3. And certainly all the saints speak of that conversion as of a thing maximally supernatural. But because all those things can be explained by an action supernatural as to mode, in order to declare the matter itself by reason, I note that we can proceed in two ways in explaining that mystery. First, in such a way that in the term of that action or conversion there is nothing supernatural as to substance, which that author supposes. Second, in such a way that in the term there is something supernatural in its esse and being, which we more truly believe. For at least the mode of existing of Christ's body under the species, and the positive mode of subsisting of the accidents, are supernatural, as I said. Therefore, if we suppose this second view, it will certainly be clear that

transubstantiation, as it includes actions by which those two modes are produced, is so supernatural that it cannot be known by the angelic natural light, just as the modes themselves cannot be known, because an action cannot be known without its term. Therefore, although transubstantiation on the part of the change of Christ's body were only adductive, as that author seems to think with Scotus, it could not be naturally known, because it would be a bringing to a supernatural mode of existing, and therefore supernatural in itself by reason of its formal term. And besides, the connection between those two actions or changes concerning the bread and concerning Christ, which is necessary for the notion of conversion and transubstantiation, cannot be naturally known by an angel, because there is no natural principle from which it may be inferred, as will be clear in the following point.

12. *Yet it seems to stand in the way of the same resolution if only a natural mode in being made is posited there.*—But the greater difficulty is if we suppose, and grant gratuitously, that in that mystery as it is in being made nothing supernatural in being is given, whether nevertheless transubstantiation can be supernatural in itself and naturally unknown to an angel. For this seems necessarily to have to be said by us, so that the example may be suited. For in the conclusion we asserted that it can happen that the term is in itself wholly natural, and nevertheless the mode by which it is made is so supernatural that it cannot naturally be known by an angel. But this is difficult, because every action productive of such a term will be natural, since it cannot take a supernatural species from a natural term. And this is explained in that same mystery, because if the action which concerns the body of the Lord is only adductive of it, it will only be a local change productive of such a mode of existing, and therefore, if the mode itself is natural and naturally knowable, the change tending toward it will also be of the same order. But if that action is substantial and of itself productive or conservative of the substance of Christ's body, then just as the substance itself is natural, so also that action. Therefore, on the part of that action, as it is terminated at the body of Christ, nothing is so supernatural in its esse in that change that it cannot be naturally known by an angel. And the same argument can be made about the accidents, if the mode in which they exist there is not supernatural in itself. And it is confirmed, because creation is a more difficult action than transubstantiation, as St. Thomas thinks in the cited place, and more broadly in Book 4, distinction 11, question 1, and article 3, question 3, Bonaventure, distinction 10, in its second part, article 1, question 1. But an angel can naturally know creation. Therefore he can also know transubstantiation.

Finally, in all the examples adduced, nothing supernatural appears in such actions that cannot be naturally seen by an angel.

13. *Yet the stated resolution is maintained.—First, because an action can be supernatural although the material term is natural.—Second, it is explained by examples.*—Nevertheless, even concerning a natural term I judge that God can effect some natural thing by such a supernatural mode that, although the thing made is naturally seen, the mode cannot be seen through a species and natural light. It is proved first by a general reason, because a change or action can have a peculiar mode and relation from elsewhere than from the term taken quasi materially, because it regards not only the term to which it tends, but also the principle from which it proceeds, and, in its own mode, the term from which it goes out, just as in creation it is specially considered that it is from nothing. And therefore, although the action tends to a natural term, it can tend in such a mode that it is not natural, nor is known through natural species. And this reason will be made clearer by running through examples. First, in other places I said that the making of grace in the soul through the physical efficiency of the sacraments is diverse from the making of the same grace by God alone, because it has a relation of dependence not only on God, but also on a bodily instrument. For this reason, although someone had a species of grace precisely representing it with those things that are connatural to it, through that species he could not see that mode or that action by which grace is made through the water of Baptism, because that action is extraordinary even in that genus. Therefore I judge that although the holy angels can see grace through species of a higher order, nevertheless they will not see the physical efficiency of the sacraments unless they are specially illuminated concerning this through particular species representing that mode of acting. Therefore in like manner, although the conversion of water into wine, even miraculously made by God alone, can be naturally seen by an angel through naturally given species, nevertheless, if it is posited as made by Christ through the word or act of his will as through a physical instrument, that mode of efficiency cannot be seen by an angel through natural species, because it is not connatural either to the thing so made or to any created agent. Hence, at least on this side, the angel cannot naturally see the consecration of the Eucharist as it is actually made, because it is made through the words of consecration as through a physical instrument, as I suppose. And the same holds for any other miraculous works of Christ the Lord or of the saints, if they are supposed to be made by them in the stated real and physical mode.

14. *And especially by the example insisted on concerning the Eucharist in number 12.*—Next it is explained in the example of transubstantiation, because first, the absence of substance, even if it is a privation or negation of some thing of the natural order, nevertheless, because there it is conjoined with other works surpassing nature, cannot be intuitively seen by an angel, if perhaps intuition cannot fall upon privation; or at least it will not be able to be known evidently and with natural certitude, as I said above, because the angel could always doubt in what that prodigy which he sees in the accidents consists, whether in the fact that they truly lack a subject, or because the subject is hidden. Hence it follows that although we grant that the angel sees Christ's body there, he does not see evidently whether it is there together with the substance of bread, because from the mode of existing he sees that it could have been together with it, just as it is with the quantity of bread, and otherwise he is not certain that the substance is not there. Therefore consequently he does not see the mode by which Christ's body has been placed there, namely whether by conversion or by local bringing. But if it is said that the angel is made certain of this by the signification and truth of the words, this is no obstacle. Both because, although we firmly believe that the words were spoken in that sense, and consequently that this is necessary for the truth of the words, perhaps this is not in reality so manifest that it is naturally known evidently by an angel; and also because, granting this, that evidence would not be about the thing itself in itself, but in the testimony of him on whose authority it is supposed that those words could not have been false. But here we are treating of natural knowledge through evident cognition of the thing in itself, or through effects, setting aside evidence in the testifier.

15. *The same example of the Eucharist is still pressed.—The response of the adversaries.*—And besides, even if we grant that the angel evidently knows the absence of the substance, perhaps it is not evident to the angel that it has entirely ceased, so that even as to matter it does not exist in reality. For it could have been constituted under another form by divine power and transferred elsewhere, with the angel ignorant of this; or even if he knows that it has ceased, how will he know that it has been converted into Christ's body, and not rather that it has been annihilated? You will say that by the very fact that the angel sees that Christ's body has been introduced under the species in its place, he sees that a conversion has been made, and not an annihilation of the substance of bread. But to the contrary: that whole effect could have been made without conversion, through only two changes concomitantly related, namely the bringing of Christ's body and the annihilation of the substance of bread. They respond that it could have been done through other words, or without words; nevertheless, through

these simple words, containing a single utterance, *This is my body*, those changes could not have been made without a connection between them, because the truth of the words requires it, and therefore neither could it have been done without conversion, and this whole thing is naturally evident to the angel.

16. *It is refuted.*—But this response, first of all, supposes a false doctrine concerning that conversion, namely that it is not a true and physical conversion, which exists in reality itself, but only in relation to the signification of the words. For according to that opinion, that change does not have that it is transubstantiation from precisely what it is or has in reality, but from the fact that it is so signified, or because it is made under such a signification of words. Hence it also follows that true transubstantiation cannot be made without a similar signification of words, which is certainly difficult to believe. Next, granted that for the truth of those words the presence of Christ's body and the absence of bread are necessary, how does it become evident that it is necessary that those two things happen with a connection between them sufficient for conversion, and that it is not enough that in fact the words are not uttered unless each happens? This can be by mere concomitance without another connection, for then the words would also be true. This reason presses especially against the stated thinkers, because they suppose that the words of consecration do not effect what they signify, but signify what is done by God. For from this it follows very well that however it happens, provided that in the terminative instant of the words this is only Christ's body, that is, and not bread, the words will be true, whether those two things happen only concomitantly or with another connection. Nor do I doubt that in fact the mystery is made through a connection sufficient for conversion, because this has been handed down to us from the doctrine of faith. But what I inquire is whence this could be evident to an angel from the signification of the words alone. And finally I add what I touched on above: although this whole thing were conceded, nevertheless that would not be evidence of the thing in itself, but in the authority of the one saying those words, because unless the angel is first supposed to believe that the signification of those words is true, not in just any way but in a very proper and rigorous sense, he will not evidently know that the real change made there is a true conversion and transubstantiation. Therefore, simply speaking, he does not evidently know transubstantiation in itself, but only by relation to the truth of the one uttering those words. For these reasons, therefore, I judge that an angel cannot evidently know the nature and mode of that passage of the substance of bread into the body of Christ, or by what connection or mode it happens on the part of God and of the words of Christ.

17. *Response to other examples indicated also by the adversaries at the end of number 12.*—But concerning the other examples the matter is not so manifest. For the conversion of water into wine could have happened by some mode evidently known to angels, namely through the mere generation of one and corruption of the other, by means of natural dispositions sufficient for the introduction of one form and the expulsion of the other, made suddenly or with great speed. This speed, even if it were momentary, the angel could easily know evidently, because although it exceeds the power of natural causes which perhaps could have concurred there, nevertheless it is not absolutely above the natural order. Yet Christ could have effected that conversion in another higher mode, which would not be so evident to the angel. And the same holds for the multiplication of the loaves and the formation of Eve from the rib of Adam; and especially the angel could be ignorant whether those effects were made by the addition of matter newly created or taken from adjacent things. Yet even this does not seem to be per se hidden from the angel, although it could happen that he is ignorant of it because he was not attending when the work was done, and afterward this does not appear evidently in the work itself.

18. *The same about the example of one body in several places.*—Likewise, in the work of constituting the same body in several places in an extended or quantitative mode, there is no doubt that the angel can evidently see such a body constituted in both places, because each where is natural, and from the fact that they are simultaneously in the same subject, they do not exceed the angel's natural knowledge or the power of his light or species. Likewise, the mode of constituting such a body in those places does not seem to include anything of the supernatural order, because it can be either through the simultaneous creation of the same body in several places, or through changes successively made, so that once made in one place it acquires another without the loss of the former. And in both modes there is included the same action or conservation of substance repeated in several places, and the effecting of several wheres which simultaneously occurs in the same body. But this whole does not exceed the natural order except in this, that those two wheres are made simultaneously in the same body, which is supernatural only according to mode and in relation to the agent. Therefore, if nothing else is added in that miracle, it does not seem to exceed the natural knowledge of an angel after it has been made. But it will be otherwise if something further is added, as that it happens through an extraordinary conversion or through an instrument by its nature powerless to effect it. For according to relations of this kind, the mode of affecting will be able to transcend natural knowledge, as was said about the others.

19. *The last conclusion, in three parts.*—Lastly I say concerning these supernatural works or effects only according to mode, that even before they happen an angel can evidently know in general that God can do something of this kind, and in particular also he can know many things to be possible, although not all. The first part is proved, because the angel knows that God is omnipotent. Therefore he knows that God can operate beyond the laws of nature whatever is not repugnant. But in these there are many things supernatural as to mode. Therefore he knows simply that God can make something supernatural in the stated mode. And it is confirmed: for the angel also evidently knows that God acts freely outside himself, for this pertains to perfection simply and follows necessarily from intellectual nature. Therefore he knows that God has not made all things that he can make, since he has infinite power. He also knows that God is not confined by the laws of nature or of lower agents, since he is above all. Therefore from this he can evidently know that God can make many things above the order of nature, which we call supernatural according to mode. Finally, speaking in common, it can be evident that in changing such a mode of effecting there is no implication of contradiction, nor repugnance, and therefore that it can be done by God. But this will become more evident by descending to particulars.

20. *The second part of the conclusion is proved.—Annihilation is in some way more supernatural than creation.*—Therefore the second part of the assertion is proved, because the angel knows that God is omnipotent, and therefore that he can do what is not repugnant. But in many things he can evidently know this non-repugnance. Therefore. I prove the minor first in the miracle of restraining natural agents so that they do not act on a capable and nearby patient, as that fire does not burn the boys or martyrs, that the sun does not illuminate, and so on, because the angel evidently knows that these agents depend on God in acting, and that God freely supplies concurrence. Therefore he knows that it is not repugnant to suspend the concurrence, and consequently that God can effect such a miracle. Second, from this he can evidently know that God can change the universal order of nature, namely make the sun stand still, make the heaven move more swiftly, and similar things. For he knows that all these depend on the concurrence of God and on the law constituted by him. Third, from this he will evidently know that it is not repugnant that God reduce created things, even incorruptible things, to nothing, because they depend on him in being made and conserved, and each is done freely by him. But the annihilation of things is counted among supernatural works in some way more than creation. For creation, since it supposes nothing, can scarcely be called

natural or supernatural, because it is neither according to nature, which does not yet exist, nor against it. Yet it pertains more to the natural order with respect to those things which can be made only through creation, as incorruptible substances are, and all the rest on the part of matter, because all these things of themselves require this mode of production through which they are constituted in the order of natural things. And therefore it can be called natural, as the institution or beginning of nature, and as conforming to nature. But annihilation, although in its own mode it proceeds from the same power, is nevertheless against the appetite of nature already made, and consequently beyond natural laws. And therefore when it happens, it is considered miraculous. Therefore the angel can then naturally know that this miracle is possible.

21. Fourth, he also seems evidently to recognize that it is possible for God to repair the same corrupt thing in number, raise the dead, recreate what has been annihilated, give sight to the blind, and similar things. For he can evidently know that in these things there is no repugnance on the part of things, nor impotence on the part of God, because his power was not diminished by the prior production, nor does the thing become incapable of existence because it once had it, nor is it more difficult to make from nothing what previously existed and has been annihilated than to make from nothing what never existed. Fifth, he can know that God can make without second causes those things which are made through them, since he eminently contains the power of the causes and since in the beginning he made them in this way. But this work of effecting the effects of second causes without second causes is counted among things supernatural as to mode. From these examples the reason can be gathered, because in many effects which are made in a supernatural mode, non-repugnance is founded either in some divine property well known by natural light to angels, as in freedom joined with omnipotence and independence from every created thing in acting, or in the natural things themselves, in which such a proportion, connection, or likeness is found that through it non-repugnance is evidently manifest. And from this the objection is also solved: how can what is supernatural, even as possible, fall under evident natural cognition? For it is responded that although it is supernatural compared to created causes, it is natural with respect to God, even as knowable by the light of nature, that is, according to the properties which are naturally known about him. And the non-repugnance itself is also in some way natural, insofar as it is contained in natural principles.

22. *The third part of the conclusion is proved.*—Finally, the other part is proved. First by the general reason given above, that not concerning all supernatural works considered per se before they happen is it naturally evident that they are not repugnant. For although repugnance is not evidently known, neither is non-repugnance demonstrated, because it is not sufficiently contained in natural principles. Just as we too know spiritual things imperfectly through material things, and from creatures we attain some things about God and are ignorant of many more, so also from natural things an angel can know that some supernatural things are not repugnant, but concerning others he cannot attain this, because they do not have a sufficient connection with natural things. This can also be shown by examples. For that it is not repugnant for the same body to be circumscriptively in several places is perhaps not evident to an angel, just as it did not seem evident to human beings, even those believing the mystery of the Eucharist. The same perhaps holds for the penetration of two bodies in the same place. For since there is a natural repugnance in these things, and its foundation always remains, it is not easy to think of a natural medium by which it is evidently demonstrated that that repugnance can be overcome and that its effect can be made, when that repugnance and its foundation are not removed. It seems that some repugnance is involved in this. Another example is the elevation of a created thing to act through its own being beyond the sphere of its activity and above its natural power as an instrument of God. And the same perhaps holds for the existence of accidents without a subject, or, what is equivalent, for their elevation to subsisting; likewise for the action of fire on a spirit and similar things. Nor does any new difficulty occur in this conclusion.

23. *A difficulty which is deferred to another place.*—But it remained to be investigated in this place, since these mysteries of grace are not entirely outside the object of the angelic intellect, by what means and modes they can be known by them, and what in fact they knew about them. Nevertheless, because in this place we treat only of the angelic intellect considered purely in its nature, we defer whatever pertains to their supernatural knowledge to the fifth and sixth books. For there we will speak of their state of grace and glory, to which knowledge of these mysteries pertains.

CHAPTER XXXI
WHETHER THE NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF ANGELS WITH RESPECT TO ALL NATURAL OBJECTS WHICH THEY KNOW THROUGH PROPER SPECIES IS COMPREHENSIVE

1. *Angelic intellection must be explained through human intellection.—See in the treatise On the Soul, disputation 5.*—Thus far we have disputed about the object of the angelic intellect and about intelligible species, which take the place of objects and have the nature of a medium of knowing on the part of the object, and which constitute the intellect in first act, or in proximate potency to understanding. Hence it follows in a suitable order that we discuss intellection itself, which constitutes the intellect in second act and makes it knowing. And first the nature and essence of angelic intellection must be explained. At the same time we will speak of its properties, and finally we will explain the necessity in its use. But we cannot explain angelic intellection better than by comparison with our own, because we do not know it as it is in itself, nor through its proper species. But it cannot be perfectly known through the effects of the angels themselves, and thus we have no natural medium more suited by which we might attain some knowledge of angelic intelligence than by ascending from our intellection to knowledge of the intelligences, and by conceiving and explaining their acts after the manner of our acts, while removing the imperfections repugnant to pure spirits. Hence it must be supposed that all things which in our acts signify a perfection suited to a creature agree with the acts of angels, as, for example, being an act of life, being elicited by a power of understanding with an object, and being spiritual and immaterial. Likewise, being a quality or being distinct from the intellect and the species, and finally being a form formally representing to the intellect the thing known, and by informing it in this way constituting it as actually understanding. All these things must be disputed by us concerning the soul in the third treatise, and therefore, as general and essential to created intellection, they are here supposed by us.

2. *The threefold operation of the human intellect is reviewed.*—Therefore only those things which are proper to angelic nature must be investigated, which we can explain only through the excess which they have over our nature. But in our intellect philosophers distinguish three works: simple apprehension or cognition, composition, and discourse. Aristotle called the first understanding

of indivisibles, because through it simple concepts of things are formed by apprehending each thing absolutely and simply, or by knowing what it is. The second is made through the attribution or comparison of one thing simply conceived to another, which is done by us by composing one simple concept with another. And it can happen either by joining or affirming one thing conceived of another, or by removing it or denying it. And in each mode composition generally taken is found, although affirmation is usually called composition in a special mode, and negation division. The third operation is made through another greater composition of several simpler compositions, inferring one from another and joining them to one another through a note of inference. And therefore sometimes Aristotle comprehends this third operation under composition and enumerates only two operations. Yet because the mode of composition is greater and far diverse, and is ordered to a distinct end, this third operation is deservedly distinguished from the second and is called by its proper name, discourse or reasoning. Therefore by running through these three operations, we will explain both the mode of understanding of angels and, insofar as it can be done, the essence of their acts.

3. *In angels there is simple cognition corresponding to the first operation of our intellect.—How great its perfection is, and three grades of it are proposed.*—In this chapter, then, we treat only of the first operation, to which it pertains per se to know what each thing is. For this reason Aristotle said that the definition of a thing pertains to the first operation of the intellect. Therefore we know as per se known that in angels there is simple conception or understanding of things, because in us this is the first operation and the foundation of the others, because without it they cannot exist. For composition cannot exist unless simple things are supposed. Therefore this operation is necessary in angels, because if they compose, they need simple concepts; but if they do not compose, at least they must know through simple acts, just as even God could not know without a most simple act. But because in this simple cognition there can be variety according to greater or lesser perfection, it remains only to explain how great this simple cognition's perfection is in angels. Three grades can be distinguished in this genus of cognition. The first is imperfect simple cognition, by which the thing is not known as it is in itself, nor through its proper species, but through another species, such as the cognition which both we and angels can naturally have of God. The second is cognition of the thing as it is in itself through its proper species, and quidditative, but not adequate and comprehensive, such as the cognition which the blessed have of God in heaven. The third is perfect and comprehensive cognition, such as God has of himself. A fourth could be added,

which may be called super-comprehensive and exceeding, such as the knowledge which God has of creatures; but we comprehend this under comprehensive cognition, because it does not exceed it on the part of the object, since through comprehension the whole that is in the thing, and totally, is known. And super-comprehension can add only an excess of perfection on the part of the knower, namely that he knows by a greater light and clarity than would be necessary for the comprehension of the thing. There is no need to say anything in particular about this excess. For, given comprehension, it is clear that there will be perfection on the part of the one understanding in him who has a higher and more perfect light of understanding.

4. *First supposition.—Angelic cognition is not comprehensive unless it is through proper or more eminent species.*—Therefore from these three grades of simple cognition, we suppose first that angels do not know comprehensively, indeed not even quidditatively, those things which they do not know through a proper species, or a higher or more eminent one. And therefore we do not raise a question about them. This is clear in the natural knowledge of God, about which enough has been said above. But outside God, angels do not seem to have another natural object which they know or apprehend simply in this imperfect mode, because they have proper species of all natural objects, and so they know them by a proper concept and as they are in themselves. But concerning free acts there could be doubt, because they do not know them nor have their species before those acts are manifested to them, as we said. But in these it must be considered that these acts are hidden from angels only as to absolute existence, not however as to the essence conceived as possible, or which the act will have if it occurs about such an object under such a reason. For although Gabriel, for example, does not know of Raphael whether here and now he is using such a species, nevertheless he knows that if he uses it, he will effect an act of such species and essence. And thus they never have of these acts an imperfect or, so to speak, analogous conception, but only an abstractive or intuitive one, perfect in its own order. And therefore the cognition of those acts does not pertain to that first grade.

5. Supernatural things, about which we also said that they cannot be known naturally by angels, could more plausibly pertain to that order. But since these are not comprehended under natural objects, they also do not pertain to the present supposition. Yet although these things are not naturally known, they can nevertheless be known perfectly and through their proper species, if God wills to infuse them with a proportioned light, as is very probable concerning the blessed angels, as we will say in Book 6. And so they will be able to have

quidditative cognition of these things; but whether they can also have comprehensive cognition, we will see there. Likewise these things can be known by angels by some genus of natural cognition, given some apprehension of such things from natural reason, or from revelation or preaching made to others, just as now the demons know, and against their will believe, the incarnation, the justification of human beings, grace, and similar things, which they apprehend through the preaching of faith and are compelled to believe from signs. And with regard to this mode of cognition, the supposition made also has place in these things, because such cognition is neither quidditative nor through a proper concept of the thing as it is in itself, but through analogous or universal concepts determined by some negation or relation or comparison to such things, just as we conceive these things. For in this respect angels considered in pure nature can be equated with us. For this imperfection does not arise adequately from the body or from phantasms, but from the imperfection of any created intellect compared to supernatural objects. And therefore such imperfection also has place in angels, although perhaps it is less in them because of the greater acuity of their intellect.

6. *Second supposition.—Angelic cognition through proper species is quidditative.*—Second, I suppose that angels know quidditatively all things which they know through proper species. This is certain concerning things lower than the knower himself. Yet it is also most true with respect to a superior. For even a lower angel knows a superior through the superior's proper species and through a light sufficiently clear and sufficient for the knowledge of any finite thing. For there is no reason why such cognition should exceed the intellective powers of angels. For although the superior exceeds the inferior in specific difference or in some subordinate difference, nevertheless in the notion of a knowable object, any angel, by the very fact that he is finite, is a proportioned object, so that through a proper species and a finite light perfect in the intelligible genus he could be known according to his ultimate difference, which pertains to knowledge quidditatively. For God, although infinite, is known quidditatively by the blessed through a light of the same order, even though finite. Therefore much more can a superior angel be known quidditatively by an inferior through a natural light of the same order.

7. *Third supposition.—An angel comprehends an inferior angel and the other lesser things.*—Third, I suppose that a superior angel knows inferiors, and consequently all less perfect natural objects, not only properly and as they are in themselves and quidditatively, but also comprehensively. This is the more common opinion, as we will see. And it is proved, because angels have proper

species of such things and a light of understanding perfect in its own order and free from every bodily impediment. Therefore, if they are supposed to be perfections in nature above the things known themselves, they will be able to comprehend them. For what can stand in the way? Perhaps someone will say that it can happen that an angel, for example, a superior compared to an inferior, or the lowest angel compared to a rational soul, is more perfect in the genus of being, and nevertheless, compared in the genus of knower and knowable, or of power and object, the power's strength does not equal the knowability of the object. Just as the rational soul is more perfect than the sun in the genus of being, and nevertheless cannot comprehend the sun, because its power of understanding does not equal the knowability of the sun. I respond that there is no foundation in things or in nature for thinking or suspecting this, because each being, insofar as it is such, is knowable or intelligible, and therefore to the extent each thing has being, to that extent and not more does it have knowability. But by a similar proportion angels are essentially intellective. Therefore each, to the extent it has perfection of being, to that extent has perfection of understanding. Therefore each with respect to himself has a power of knowing adequate to his own knowability, and with respect to inferiors also exceeding. Therefore nothing can stand in the way of their being able to comprehend themselves and inferiors. Nor is the case similar regarding our soul with respect to the sun, because our soul does not know except through the mediation of the body, and therefore it does not know the sun, indeed not even lower substances, through proper species, and therefore it does not know them quidditatively. But whether, when separated, it can know comprehensively all things inferior to itself, we will see below in the proper treatise.

8. But someone will press: for comprehension it is necessary that nothing of the thing known be hidden from the knower. But no angel, even if he is superior, can know an inferior or our soul in this way, because he cannot scrutinize its heart, nor penetrate all its internal acts. Therefore, at least among intellectual creatures, there cannot be comprehension, either of superiors with respect to inferiors or conversely. Hence in this there seems to be some difference between each angel with respect to himself and with respect to others, even inferiors. For with himself he has a certain greater proportion, whence he can know himself totally, so to speak, that is, his substance, powers, and acts. But he cannot know an inferior so exactly, because he does not have him so intimately united to himself as he has himself. Because of this argument certain moderns deny that a free creature can be comprehended by another creature. For for comprehension it is necessary not only to know all things which

formally inesse in the thing, but also all things which can be drawn from it as from a cause, because all these in some way pertain to it. Hence they infer that for comprehension it is also necessary to know internal thoughts and free decrees.

9. *The objection is dissolved.—How many kinds of self-comprehension there are, and what is required for it.*—Nevertheless, I judge the common opinion to be true, and the argument turns on an equivocation. Hence I note that in the name of comprehension there can be an equivocation, or variety according to the diversity of objects to which it is compared. For we can speak of the comprehension of the nature or essence of a thing, or of the comprehension of all things which inesse in the thing, in whatever way they agree with it. Therefore, speaking of the comprehension of a thing as to its essence and nature, it is not necessary for comprehension that through it all things which inesse in the thing or are in fact done by it be known, because there are many things in a thing which neither pertain to its nature nor, as existing or inhering in fact, have a connection with it. And so an herb, for example, will be comprehended if its essence and every intrinsic power and property are known, even if common accidents which are customarily in it from outside are not known. Therefore in this mode we say that a superior angel comprehends an inferior, because for this comprehension it is not necessary that he see in the other what he actually wills or thinks, for this is accidental to his nature. Therefore it is sufficient that he know what he can think or will, for this is intrinsic and has a connection with his essence. And in this way we speak of comprehension. For comprehension taken in the other sense is not cognition of one thing, but of many things which are accidentally joined, and therefore they can be separated in cognition. And then, although cognition of one thing is not comprehension of that composite or aggregate, nevertheless it will be comprehension of that thing which is known, because nothing pertaining per se to its nature is hidden from the knower. And thus the response to the objection made by us is clear. But to the reason of the contrary opinion, or of those moderns, we respond that it is true that it pertains to comprehension to know not only what formally inesse, but also what can be drawn from the thing as from a cause. Yet I say that it is not necessary to know whether those things which can be drawn are actually made, when they are not drawn necessarily, but it is sufficient to know that they can be made by it, which one angel rightly knows about another, even if he does not see his actual operation.

10. *Whether, conversely, an inferior angel comprehends superiors.—The response of certain people is excluded, and the reduplication "as knowable" is*

weighed.—But from this arises a difficulty concerning an inferior angel with respect to superiors: whether he also comprehends them. For from what has been said it seems to follow that he comprehends them as to essence and nature, if it is not necessary for comprehension to know free acts. It is proved, because apart from thoughts of the heart, an inferior angel knows whatever is formally in the superior, that is, his whole substance and quiddity and powers, and whatever can be done by him, stopping at possible esse. Therefore, properly and per se speaking, there is nothing in the superior angel that is hidden from the inferior knower. Therefore he comprehends him. Some respond that the inferior does not know the superior as much as he is knowable, for he is known more perfectly and exactly by himself, and therefore he is not comprehended, because it belongs to the notion of comprehension that through it the thing be known as much as it is knowable. But this does not seem rightly said, because that reduplicative phrase, *as much as it is knowable*, can be taken in two ways. In one way, on the part of the object or thing known, and thus to be known as much as it is knowable is nothing other than for the thing to be known as to all things which are knowable in it and from it per se. In another way, that reduplication can be taken on the part of the knower, and thus for the thing to be known as much as it is knowable is nothing other than for it to be known with the greatest clarity and most perfect act by which it can be known. In the former way it is false that an inferior angel does not know the superior as much as he is knowable. For the reason given proves this: that an inferior angel knows in the superior whatever is in him, and whatever can arise per se from him, insofar as it is possible. Nor does the angel himself know more about himself, nor does the superior know more about the same inferior. Therefore on this side nothing necessary for comprehension is lacking to the inferior. But in the latter way it does not belong to the notion of comprehension that it be as great as it can be concerning such a thing in clarity, subtlety, and similar properties. Otherwise neither would an angel comprehend himself, nor a superior an inferior, but God alone would comprehend all, because God alone knows all things as much as they are knowable on the part of the knower. This is made clear by a similar case, because an inferior angel knows God as perfectly on the part of the object as a superior does, though not equally on the part of the knower. That is, the inferior knows naturally as many attributes and essential predicates, and as many modes and formal aspects, in God as a superior angel does, although not equally perfectly. Therefore also concerning a superior angel the inferior knows all things which the superior knows about himself, although not with such great

clarity. Therefore, just as the superior comprehends himself, so also the inferior comprehends him, because lesser clarity does not prevent comprehension.

11. *Those who follow the affirmative side proposed.—Argument from the words of St. Thomas for the same side.*—Because of these things some theologians have taught that all angels comprehend one another, both inferiors their superiors and conversely. Thus Bañez has it, first part, question 56, article 2, doubt 2, and he reports Victoria and Scotus. And Vasquez agrees on the supposition that cognition of free acts is not necessary for comprehension. St. Thomas is alleged for this opinion, *Contra Gentiles*, Book 2, chapter 98, insofar as he says that *every intellectual substance, insofar as it is such, is comprehensive of all being, not through its substance alone, but through a species*. And below he again says that these species must be many for the comprehension of all being. But this place has no bearing on the matter, because there the word *comprehending* is not referred to the perfection of cognition, but to the extension and breadth of the object, just as we are accustomed to say, for example, that metaphysics comprehends all beings under its object. And as St. Thomas says there, the object of the intellect comprehends all the differences of being. Then another place of St. Thomas is added, in the first part, question 109, article 3, reply to 3, where he says that there is no illumination among angels in natural things, because all from the beginning knew those things which pertain to natural cognition. Hence an argument is formed. For if an inferior angel did not comprehend a superior, he could be ignorant of something among those things which pertain to the natural excellence of the superior angel, about which he could be taught and illuminated by him. Or conversely, if an inferior angel knows through himself all things which a superior angel has and which pertain to the excellence of his nature, he certainly comprehends him. For what is it to comprehend, except to know a thing exactly, so that nothing in it or about it remains to be known among those things which are natural to it, either as essential or as per se second, conjoined with the essence?

12. *Others follow the negative side.*—Nevertheless other modern theologians simply deny that an inferior angel can comprehend a superior. St. Thomas seems to favor this opinion, question 16, *On Evil*, article 8, where he says that an inferior angel cannot comprehend the intelligible species of a superior angel, nor know them perfectly. And in the question *On the Soul*, article 18, reply to 1 of the second order, he says that a separated soul does not comprehend angels. And plainly he understands that it cannot comprehend any of them, and therefore not even the lowest of all and nearest to itself. Therefore by the same reason the lowest angel will not be able to know the one

immediately superior to himself, and a fortiori neither the remaining, more superior ones; and the same reason will hold for all. This side is supported by reason, because comprehensive cognition requires at least a certain adequation between object and power. But I say *at least*, because if the power exceeds, it will be more than adequate and exceeding. Yet this excess is not necessary, and so God comprehends himself although he does not exceed, because he has adequation with himself. But an inferior angel is not adequate to a superior in the notion of knowable object and knowing power. Therefore he does not comprehend him. The major seems clear from the very name of comprehension, and from material things, from which the word is transferred. For one containing surface does not comprehend another contained surface unless it is commensurate with it at least according to equality. And for this reason an intellect informed by the light of glory can never comprehend God, because it can never have adequation with him. Therefore the minor is proved, because just as an angel is intellective by reason of his nature, so also he is intelligible. Therefore, just as the greater perfection of angelic nature makes him more intellective, so also it makes him more intelligible. But an inferior angel is not adequate to a superior in efficacy of understanding. Therefore his intellective power is not adequate to the intelligibility of the superior, because these preserve proportion with one another. Therefore neither will he be able to comprehend him. And it is explained by the reason suggested by St. Thomas above: because an inferior angel cannot comprehend the species of a superior angel, since they are more universal, and just as they exceed the capacity of the inferior for using them, so also they exceed in the notion of object, because an inferior angel cannot distinctly comprehend their whole representation. Therefore with greater reason an inferior angel will not be able to comprehend the substance or essence of a superior, because he cannot distinctly and exactly know his mode of understanding, nor all his relations and formal aspects.

13. *The author's judgment.—What the act by which a thing is comprehended must be.—One comprehension is not made from several.—Consult the author, disputation 27, On the Incarnation, section 4.*—On this point I do not believe that anything certain can be defined, because we do not have firm principles from which we are able to elicit a certain resolution. For I note that for comprehension it is necessary that there be one act through which the essence of the thing is known so exactly that by force of the cognition of the essence all things which per se, intrinsically, and necessarily agree with it, and are knowable by force of the essence, are also evidently comprehended. Hence, although we posit, for example, that a rational soul can know about an angel through various

acts all things which naturally agree with him, by knowing his essence through one act, his intellect quidditatively through another, and through another his will or executive power, and the like, nevertheless it will not comprehend the angel, because it does not have one act by which the angel is exactly known, and from several acts one comprehension is not made. For that essence is always known in a higher mode when, by force of the cognition of it, all things which are contained or rooted in that power are penetrated. And thus concerning those who see God, many theologians very probably teach that although by another cognition distinct from vision someone knew quidditatively all possible things which are in the divine power, nevertheless he would not comprehend God, because he does not know those things by force of the vision of God, and consequently does not see the essence and power of God in the most perfect mode in which they can be seen. But, conversely, if the soul, by knowing the substance and quiddity of an angel, knew by force of that and through the same act all things which naturally, intrinsically, and per se first or second agree with an angel, it would truly comprehend the angel, even if it did not know those things with the greatest clarity or sublimity by which they can naturally be known by a creature, because this certainly is not necessary for comprehension, as the reason given proves, and as was said in the former volume.

14. *To the reasons of the affirmative side in numbers 10 and 11.—What is required on the part of the power for comprehension.—The negative side is more pleasing.*—From this I first gather that the reason of the former opinion does not sufficiently conclude that an inferior angel comprehends a superior. For although we concede that an inferior angel knows all natural things about a superior, which is proved at most from the testimonies of St. Thomas and the reasons given, nevertheless comprehension does not follow, because it can happen that the inferior does not know all these things about the superior by force of quidditative cognition of his substance, nor through one act of comprehension, but through several species and acts, and in a lower mode. And according to this that response also has place, that for comprehension it is necessary that there be cognition through which the thing is known as much as it is knowable, that is, by one act and by force of the cognition of its quiddity and essence. For although all things which are in the thing are known through a multiplication of acts and almost dividedly, through none of those acts, nor through the collection of all, is the thing known as much as it is knowable, because it is knowable by a simple act penetrating the essence in such a way that in it and through it all its faculties and their relations are perfectly known. In this mode it is never known through a multiplication of acts. Hence it is also

very probable that for a gift of knowing of this sort, which comprehension requires, there is necessary a light and power of knowing which is at least adequate to the object known in the degree of perfection, both in the genus of being and in the mode and specific grade of its immateriality, as was explained in the proof of the later opinion. For in order that a power have an act adequate in the stated mode to the knowability of the object, it is necessary that the act proceed proximately from a power adequate to the essence known, and radically from the very essence itself, or from another equal or more perfect. And in this sense, to the reply made at the beginning of this difficulty, that for comprehension it is required that through it the thing be known as much as it is knowable, on the part of the object known, not on the part of the knower, the response is clear. For on the part of the object a declaration is required, namely as much as it is knowable through one perfect act. And consequently it is also necessary on the part of the knower, not in the sense proposed there, namely that it has to be known with the greatest possible clarity, for this is rightly attacked there, but in another sense just suggested, namely that on the part of the knower there must be light at least adequate to the perfection of the intelligible object. In this way, therefore, the later opinion becomes very probable, which has always pleased me.

15. *Nevertheless, in favor of the affirmative side the reasons of the negative side in number 12 are solved.—If an inferior angel comprehends a superior created angel, he also comprehends any creatable angel.*—Nevertheless, it is not certain to me, and the contrary can easily be defended. For it has not yet been demonstrated that, for comprehending the substance of some angel in the mode explained by us, equality of perfection between knower and known in the specific notion of being is necessary. For someone could say that agreement in the purely spiritual and perfect intellectual grade is sufficient, although there is inequality in difference, whether specific or even generic. For since every created object within that grade is finite, in the notion of an intelligible object it will be able to be adequate to a finite power, even if in the notion of being it is more excellent. Just as substance is more perfect in the genus of being than the intellective power, and nevertheless in the notion of object it is proportioned to it, and they can have a certain equality between themselves. Thus, therefore, it could be said that the angelic intellect, by force of its grade and most general genus, is comprehensive of every finite substance, however perfect it may be in that grade, and can know it by one act as much as it is knowable as to essence and as to all things which can be known by force of the essence. For this does not exceed the capacity of a finite power, nor is it repugnant that any angelic

intellect have this capacity, just as it has capacity for knowing infinite things, or things to infinity. Hence the argument that adequation is required for comprehension seems to be satisfied by a distinction: namely, in the notion of object and power it is true; in the genus of being it is denied, because the intellective power itself, even of a superior angel, is not adequate to the substance of an inferior angel in the genus of being, and nevertheless in the notion of power and object it is adequate and exceeds. Nor does that reason, that a spiritual thing has from the same perfection that it is intellective and intelligible in act, conclude that equality in perfection of being is necessary for the comprehension of a finite thing, because however much it grows in perfection, it is a finite intelligible object, and from that it has that it is proportioned to a finite intellect, even if in the species of being it is lower. Therefore in this way the opinion affirming that an inferior angel comprehends a superior can be sustained. And according to it, consequently, it must be said that any created angel can comprehend every creatable angel, even if he is more and more perfect to infinity. But because this is difficult to believe, and because, although the contrary is not demonstrated, much less can it be shown that in any angelic intellect there is a capacity adequate to any finite intelligible object, however excellent it may be, therefore, considering the metaphysical reason, the former opinion seems simply more probable.

CHAPTER XXXII
WHETHER ANGELS KNOW BY COMPOSING AND DIVIDING

1. *Comprehensive cognition of an angel is not complex.*—Given the explanation of terms proposed in the preceding chapter, it seems to follow manifestly from what was said in that same chapter that an angel does not compose in those things which he knows comprehensively, but sees by a simple intuition what we cannot know except by composing. And the same follows with proportion concerning those things which he knows quidditatively through a simple act, even if the cognition does not reach the perfection of comprehension. It is proved, because we compose because we do not see the predicate in the subject, but by conceiving each by itself, we must compare one with another in order to conceive that this is that. But in the things which he comprehends, the angel sees by one intuition the predicate in the subject, that is, he sees the whole substance of the thing and the property, and whatever we can enunciate of it per se. Therefore with regard to these he does not need composition. Indeed, he cannot exercise it, because if he knows the thing

perfectly, he also knows it in a mode connatural to himself, and therefore he so forestalls composition through a simple act that he leaves no place for it. And this is best explained by the example of the beatific vision, in which there can be no composition, because by one simple intuition it shows all things which it can show in God, even if the cognition is not comprehensive but only quidditative.

2. *Nor likewise is the cognition of things about which he has one species complex.*—And hence also theologians frequently say that in those things which an angel knows through one species alone he does not compose, but by a simple intuition sees whatever we could know by composing and dividing about the things represented through such a species. Thus if an angelic species represents, for example, the genus of terrestrial animals with its species, through it by one simple intuition the angel sees what a horse is and what properties it has, and he knows the same about a lion, and consequently also sees that a horse is not a lion, and so on for the rest which are represented by the same species. And the reason is that such a species perfectly represents all those things to him, as far as is from itself; and the intellective power of the angel is adequate to the species, for angelic species are infused proportioned to their minds. And therefore whatever is represented through one species is known perfectly by the angel. But through one species an angel can elicit one simple act adequate to it. Therefore through that act, without composition, he knows whatever is represented through such a species. Yet there are some who do not admit this. But they disagree in the foundation concerning the universality of species, as we will soon see.

3. *Whether an angel understands by composing and dividing outside the aforesaid cases.—First reason for doubting, for the affirmative side.*—Therefore the difficulty remains whether outside these cases angels understand by composing and dividing, or are entirely abstracted from composition of this sort, or incapable of it. And the first reason for doubting is that they know and judge many things not through one species, but through several. Therefore then they must use composition. The consequence is proved, both because the reason for knowing and judging by a simple act, whether a thing is such or is not, ceases then, as is clear from what has been said; and also because a human being composes because he cannot attribute one thing to another except by using diverse species. Now the antecedent is shown, first in composition or affirmation, then in division or negation. For first, one angel does not know the free love of another through the same species through which he knows the substance of the same angel. Therefore through the species of love he knows that such an act of love inesse in an angel known through another species, and this is

to compose. For in us there is no other composition among simple internal acts. The same argument has place in the other accidents contingently coming to an angel, for he knows all those through distinct species. Consequently, through one act elicited by the species of the accident, he applies that accident to such a subject already known according to itself and prescinding from such an accident, and this is to compose. Next the other part is proved concerning division or negation. For although among those things which are represented through the same species, it is easily understood how an angel by one simple act sees the differences between those things, and consequently that one is not another, yet among those things which are represented through various species, several acts are necessary: two simple acts by which those two things are known singly and absolutely, each through its own species, and a third by which they are compared with one another, and it is directly judged that this thing is not that one. And this is to compose, or to divide by composing, and to deny one of the other.

4. *Second and principal reason for the same side.*—The second reason for doubting, and nearly the principal one, is taken from the cognition of those truths which the angel does not see directly in themselves, but believes by faith. And the difficulty is shown especially in supernatural objects, which can be believed by an angel. For then it is necessary that, prior in time or by nature to the angel's providing assent, he apprehend the truth to be believed as sufficiently proposed, or as credible. But that apprehension cannot be without intellectual composition. Therefore the angel is capable of composition of this sort. The minor is proved, since the rest is clear, because through simple apprehension not including even a simple judgment, the thing is not known as it is in itself, but is apprehended through some alien species. Therefore through such an act it is only apprehended under some common reason, namely of being, or of substance, or another similar reason. Therefore, as apprehended in this way, it is not an object of faith. Therefore it is necessary that something else be composed with it, and thus before the simple assent of faith some composition is necessary. For example, before an angel believes the Trinity, it is necessary that he apprehend that God is three and one. Therefore in that apprehension it is necessary that a simple concept of God intervene, and then that being three be joined to it, which must be apprehended by another concept and attributed to God. And this difficulty can be applied to other objects of faith, not only supernatural faith, but also natural faith, such as is found in the demons.

5. *The negative side of several theologians.—See in the treatise On the Soul, disputation 5, question 6.*—Nevertheless, the common opinion of theologians is

that an angel never composes in his cognition. Thus St. Thomas teaches without limitation, in the stated question 52, article 4, and there all the Thomists, and in Book 2, distinction 3, where also Giles, third part of the distinction, question 2, article 3, Durandus, question 3, and others. Yet this opinion needs some limitation. And in general, an exact resolution of this point depends on perfect cognition of the second operation of the human intellect, which they call composition and division, which is difficult, as we will see below in the treatise On the Soul. Meanwhile, therefore, I suppose that in this second operation complex apprehension can be distinguished from judgment. For whether these two are distinguished really or in another way, there is no doubt that for cognition of truth, such as is found in the second operation of the intellect, each is necessary, because no one can make a judgment except about the thing which he apprehends in the mind, nor does apprehension without judgment suffice for cognition of the thing. Next, in this operation there is found composition between the extremes of the proposition, which are the predicate and subject through the mediation of the copula. Hence a twofold composition can be thought in this operation. One is of the predicate with the subject, which can be considered both in apprehension and in judgment, or rather there is controversy in which of them it is. The other is between apprehension and judgment. For if these are distinct, apprehension has itself in the manner of matter, and judgment in the manner of form, and so they can be considered as composing one perfect cognition of the thing. Concerning all these things we now define nothing as to the intellect of the conjoined soul, but only propose those things in which such composition can be thought, or among which we must run through and examine in what such composition is or what sort it is. Next, I distinguish in an angel a twofold genus of cognition. One is evident, such as concerns natural and necessary things, or even free things manifested through speech. Another is inevident, as concerning future contingents, or concerning the internal acts of others, not manifested by them, or in general concerning those things which are known only by faith.

6. *First conclusion.—Angels in evident cognition do not need composition or division, nor distinct apprehension from judgment.—It is proved first concerning composition between predicate and subject.*—Therefore I say first: in those things which an angel knows evidently, he does not need any composition in order to apprehend and judge those things which we are accustomed to signify through composite propositions, both affirmative and negative. I prove it, because he neither needs composition of predicate and subject, nor does he need composition from apprehension and judgment. But no other composition can

be thought in the second operation of the intellect, omitting now discourse, about which we will speak in the following chapter. The antecedent as to the first part is proved first in all those things which do not have distinction in the known object, as are generic predicates and differences, in which we compose because we do not know things as they are in themselves. But the angel knows them as they are, and therefore he does not compose in these. Likewise in properties or distinct things, if they are represented through one species, because then there is no reason for multiplying acts, as has already been shown. Yet even if he knows through diverse species those things which he joins or separates, he does not need composition in order to know their agreement or disagreement, but can see it by a simple act elicited from both species in the manner of one. And first, as regards affirmation, many judge that an angel always knows through the same species the substance of a thing and all the accidents which inesse in it. This is probable, at least concerning accidents that are quasi external, that is, existing outside intellect and will, and which do not depend per se on one's own freedom. Yet although the opposite is supposed in some accidents, nevertheless the assertion is proved to be universally true even in them.

7. And first in affirmations I explain it in this way. Suppose that an angel knows through two species the substance of an angel and some of his accidents, for example an internal thought or a free love, and can through them elicit two acts, one by which he absolutely intuits the substance of the angel with its properties, and another by which he knows the loving angel. Nevertheless, he does not compose those two acts with one another. Therefore from that mode of knowing through several species, composition does not follow. The consequence is clear, because plurality of things or concepts is not enough for composition, unless they are united with one another in some mode. Therefore the antecedent is proved, because first, through the species of substance the substance itself is known by an absolute and simple act insofar as it is knowable through such a species with such intellectual light. Therefore that act per se does not require composition with another. Next, through another species the act of love is also seen quidditatively and intuitively in such a species and individual. Hence, because such a species represents that love as inhering in such a will and as freely flowing from it, through that species also, and through one simple and absolute act produced by it, the angel sees the act of the other in the concrete, so to speak; that is, he sees the angel loving, and accordingly he sees the whole of what we signify through this composition: *The angel loves*. Hence it follows that the act of the angel elicited through this species of love is not composed with

another elicited through the species of the angel's substance, because it does not attain that substance as directly represented through the proper species of itself, but as represented obliquely through the species of the act of love. And the best sign is that although the angel does not actually know another through the proper species of his substance, nevertheless he can have an equally integral and perfect act elicited through the species of his love, and through it he will intuit the same angel as loving. Therefore those acts are mutually independent of one another, and do not acquire any special mode from the fact that they are simultaneous or joined to themselves. Therefore this is a sign that they do not have composition between themselves.

8. *Objection.—Solution.—In the cited fifth disputation On the Soul.*—You will say: therefore through the species of love whatever is known through the species of the angel's substance is known, and something beyond it. Therefore it is more perfect; indeed, the other species seems superfluous. It is responded by absolutely denying the first consequence, because through that species the substance of the angel is not known directly, but obliquely, as I said. And therefore by force of that species the substance is not known quidditatively, nor are all its other properties known, but it is known only as much as is necessary for intuitively and quidditatively knowing the act of love of the angel. And therefore the species of substance is far more perfect, and it is not superfluous, but maximally necessary. Add that it is probable that an angel can also simultaneously use both species, so that he may know that complex perfectly and quidditatively, namely, the angel loving, not through a composition of acts, but through one more perfect simple act, by which he knows both the substance of the angel quidditatively and his love also quidditatively, in the mode in which we will speak immediately about negations.

9. *The preceding conclusion is then proved concerning division between predicate and subject.*—And this discourse has place in every other accident of any substance, if it is supposed to be known through the stated species distinct from the substance. For it is always known through its own species perfectly, quidditatively, and intuitively, if it exists, and so distinctly that its very adhesion and information are clearly known as they are in themselves. And therefore it is known simply and without composition. And in this there is a great difference between us and an angel, because we know both not only through diverse species, but also imperfectly. We know the predicate and the subject by species, and therefore we need some composition in order to know that one is the other. For example, although we intuit whiteness by sense, nevertheless the intellect does not clearly intuit the union of whiteness with the subject as it is in itself.

And therefore, in order to know the matter more distinctly, it forms a diverse concept of man, and attributes to him, so conceived, being white through composition, as we will see expressly in the proper place.

10. Next the assertion is proved in negations or distinctions of things represented to angels through diverse species, because an angel can simultaneously join those species in the manner of one adequate principle for eliciting one simple act by which he simultaneously knows those two extremes related to one another, and consequently intuits that one is not the other. Therefore he can know by a simple act that negation which we know by division in composing. Therefore in fact he knows it in this way, because it is a more perfect mode of knowing, and therefore he uses it if he can. The consequences are clear. And the antecedent is proved, because in that mode of operating there is no repugnance, since two distinct qualities can often be joined to compose the adequate principle of some action, and our imaginative power sometimes operates in this way, by eliciting one simple concept of a golden mountain from the species of mountain and gold. Therefore much more perfectly will an angel be able to do this, if he wills, because on the part of the power there is no lack of strength for such a use of species, and on the part of the object there is sufficient unity for the unity of the act, because they are known not absolutely but respectively and in the manner of one.

11. I explain this in the following way, because an angel can know simultaneously two distinct things represented through diverse species in two ways. First, by absolute concepts, knowing of each what it is; second, by a comparative concept, comparing one with the other. In the former mode, although virtually, and so to speak in exercised act, he knows those things as distinct, nevertheless formally and directly he does not judge that one is or is not the other. Hence in this mode of cognition there is no composition or division, but only a plurality of simple acts. Whether these can exist simultaneously we will see a little later. But in the latter mode the angel directly knows the distinction of such things and indicates that one is not the other, not by composing the prior concepts, nor by applying to them some new mode, but by intuiting the distinction through one simple act. An angel can have this act even if he does not have the prior acts, but ceases from them. For since by reason of relation he knows those things in the manner of one object, and because this does not exceed the power of his light, he can also use the species in the manner of one principle and elicit such a simple act.

12. *First, second, third, and fourth objections.*—But some object that this is an evasion thought up without foundation. First, because an angel cannot know

several things at once and by one act except insofar as they are represented through one species, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas. Second, because we cannot judge of the distinction of formal concepts except from the distinction of species. Therefore it is asserted vainly and without foundation that there is some simple concept if it is made by several species. Third, because otherwise a human being could also know in this way the negation of one thing of another by a simple concept, by using several species in the manner of one, and therefore a human being also would not compose. Fourth, because otherwise an angel by one concept could simultaneously deny all the things of the world of man, because there is no greater reason concerning one than concerning another. But the consequent seems false, because he cannot deny one of another unless he actually considers each and also compares them. But he cannot do this about all things simultaneously.

13. *Response.—To the first objection.*—But these have little force. For first, that is not said without foundation, because the very perfection of angelic light sufficiently induces us to attribute to them this perfect mode of knowing. For if an angel can perfectly know distinct things both absolutely and comparatively, and consequently both affirmatively and negatively, by one simple species and act, it is not surprising that by one simple act he can know through several species diverse things compared with one another as to the negation of one of the other. For from the natural mode of knowing and from the power of the light this is maximally connatural to an angel, and the distinction of species alone does not stand in the way of the angel being able to use them in the manner of one. For if our imagination can sometimes, through several phantasms, conceive one monster or fictive thing by one concept, what is surprising if an angel, in order to intuit the distinction of things, can use several of their species in the manner of one? Hence to the first it is responded that an angel does not know several things simultaneously and by one act except through one species when he knows them perfectly, both by knowing each absolutely as much as he can and by knowing exactly every relation between them. But when he simultaneously considers several things in a qualified way, that is, only as much as is necessary for knowing the distinction and the negation of one from another, St. Thomas never denied that angels can use several species for eliciting a simple act. Indeed, he teaches this in effect when he says that an angel by a simple concept denies one of any other, although elsewhere he teaches that angels do not have one simple species of all things.

14. *To the second objection.*—To the second it is responded that formal concepts are not rightly distinguished from species, or at least not always, nor

adequately, but distinction must be taken from proper formal objects. Hence if there is sufficient unity in the object, and the power of the potency is sufficient, the distinction of species alone will not suffice for distinguishing or multiplying acts, because they can be taken as partial principles composing one adequate principle. And so it is in the present case, because this comparative object, this is not that, or is distinct from that, has sufficient unity, and the angelic light has sufficient power that by one and simple motion it attends to that whole. And therefore it is not impeded because of the distinction of species.

To the third objection.—To the third there are some who also admit that mode of a simple comparative act in human judgment. But because this is not common, and because, if it is posited, it is difficult to preserve composition in the human intellect when it divides, or to explain the difference between it and an angel, we therefore do not now use that response, nor do we disapprove it, but defer the matter to be examined in the treatise On the Soul. And we respond by denying the consequence, because the human intellect is much more imperfect and cannot so easily use several species to elicit a simple act of judgment among many things, because it does not have the power to tend directly and attend to many things through a simple act, which we cannot deny to an angel. And perhaps a human being is also impeded by conversion to phantasms, as will be said in its place.

15. *To the fourth objection.*—To the fourth, if the consequent is understood of the distinct and express negation of all things, the consequence must be denied because of the reason given in the very argument. For the angelic light does not suffice for considering all things distinctly at once so that it may compare them with one another, not only through a simple act but not even through several, as we will say later. But he can easily consider two things by that act, and by a simple act judge and know their distinction. But if the consequence is understood of cognition confused on the part of the other extreme, the consequence is conceded. For by the same act by which he knows man, the angel can judge expressly and formally that man is not any other being whatever, or that he is not irrational, nor purely intellectual, because to conceive in this way all other things simultaneously in confusion, together with the distinct concept of one thing, does not exceed the power of an angel. Yet it seems probable that this is also not done by an angel through the species of man alone without some concurrence and assistance of other species. For this act, including in its object this formal and express negation, is distinct from the simple act by which it is absolutely known what man is, or what is affirmed of him, with no distinction made from others, whether they are known distinctly

or confusedly. But if the object is diverse, then the act too must be diverse in some way, because it is extended to expressly knowing a certain negation which is not considered through the other act. Therefore it is also necessary that besides the species of man, some other species concur in that act. Yet it could be said that by force of the species of man alone it can be distinctly known and judged that whatever does not have the ultimate difference of man is not man. And thus the species of man suffices for that act, and consequently the act adequate to that species always includes distinct knowledge of that negation or division from every other thing which lacks such a difference. Therefore in these modes it is easily understood that an angel does not need composition of the concepts of predicate and subject in order to know their affirmation or negation.

16. *Finally, the conclusion is proved by excluding in angels a distinction between apprehension and judgment.*—Finally, that much less does he need composition from apprehension and judgment, which some posit in human cognition, is proved, because where there is no distinction, there can be no composition. But in evident angelic cognition, apprehension is not distinguished from judgment. Therefore there can be no composition there from apprehension and judgment. The minor, for the rest is clear, is proved, because apprehension is nothing other than the concept of the thing apprehended. But in an angel this concept is naturally formed through the proper species of things and with evidence of truth, and it concerns the things themselves as they are in themselves, and by clearly seeing what they are or what they are not. Therefore that same concept is intrinsically and essentially cognition of such truth, and consequently judgment, because to judge is nothing other than to know that this is or is not such. And it is confirmed: for by this reason the beatific vision most simply and without any composition is at once apprehension and judgment, because it is a concept of God as he is in himself, through which whatever can be affirmed or denied of God is clearly seen. And the same holds for the act by which an angel knows himself, and the same reason holds for the others. Nor does there seem to be any special difficulty in this part.

17. *Second conclusion.—Angelic cognition concerning inevident things probably needs composition.*—I say second: in those things which an angel does not know evidently, it is probable that he knows by composing, or by comparing diverse concepts, and also apprehension and judgment, in the mode in which they can be composed in us. Those theologians who admit some discourse in angels, whom we will report in the following chapter, must admit this assertion. For the reason is the same, since discourse is not without composition, and the root of both is the same, as St. Thomas rightly said in the stated question 58,

article 4. Hence the assertion can be proved by the reason of the same St. Thomas in the same article, taken from the contrary. For a human being composes and divides because his intellect cannot at once, in the apprehension of some first object, inspect whatever is contained in it virtually. This happens from weakness of the light in us. But the angelic intellect is compared in this mode to those things which it cannot know evidently. Therefore with respect to them it is capable of composition, and needs it as much as the human intellect does. The consequence holds from parity of reason. But the minor is proved first and principally in supernatural things, as long as they are not evidently revealed by supernatural light, because then the angelic natural light is very weak for knowing such predicates. And not only can it not inspect the predicates in the apprehended subjects, but it also cannot know them evidently about those subjects through any medium. Therefore with respect to them the angel has the same cause and root of composition.

18. Next, the same is discerned in future contingents, because even for knowing them the angelic light is weak, since it cannot know them in themselves. Therefore in the first apprehension of such a cause, even if he arrives at quidditative cognition of it, the angel will not immediately inspect what it is going to do. Therefore he must use composition to predicate such a future action of such a cause. Finally, the reason has place also in internal acts of the mind which have already been made and have not been manifested, because even for knowing them in that state, an angel is powerless. And although that impotence does not properly arise from weakness of light, but from defect of species, this suffices so that an angel, as long as he lacks such a species, cannot intuit such a predicate in a subject by a simple act. Therefore, if through conjecture he wishes to attribute such an act to such a person, or to remove it from him, he must do this by composing or dividing, because formally the same reason subsists. Therefore in all these things it is difficult to assign a difference between the human and angelic intellect.

19. *The same conclusion is proved secondly.*—Second, the assertion is chiefly explained and proved concerning the composition which can be considered in a human being between apprehension and judgment. For the same thing, with proportion preserved, is found in angels with regard to the stated matter, which we can call exceeding the evidence of angelic cognition. For in that whole matter, given the apprehension of a complex object, the angel does not necessarily assent. Therefore the same reason for distinction between apprehension and judgment which is found in a human being is given there, and consequently also the same reason for composition of a completed cognition

from apprehension and judgment. The antecedent is explained best in divine faith, and from there it can easily be applied to angelic faith, or faith founded on created authority, and to an opinion conceived from conjectures. For this truth of faith to be believed, God is three and one, was first proposed to angels, prior, I say, at least in the order of nature and by consequence of subsisting, because it is necessary that the hearing of faith precede faith; as is said in Romans 10, hearing is through the proposition of faith. But given the proposition and hearing, faith can fail to follow, because it is free. Therefore the proposition of that truth precedes. Therefore the apprehension of that credible truth precedes, because from the proposition of faith that apprehension or conception is proximately generated. And it seems to happen with composition, which is shown by applying the higher reason, because in the apprehension of God it is not immediately inspected in him that he is three, and therefore a new formal concept and composition seem necessary for apprehending this whole: that God is three. After these follows the assent of faith, which, when joined to that apprehension, completes the obscure cognition of that truth. This assent seems to be an act distinct from apprehension, both because it is separable from it, and because it can be supernatural in substance, although the apprehension is natural in being, and because it is a new free determination of the intellect. And not undeservedly it is said to be composed with apprehension, because it informs it and, as it were, perfectly connects its extremes with respect to the one assenting. Therefore for this reason there also seems to be composition in the angelic mind, no less than in the human. And the same discourse can be made in human or angelic faith, such as that which the demons have, who believe and tremble, and in the opinative assent which an angel, speaking from the nature of the thing, can have, and which evil angels often have, so far as we can conjecture. But this discourse supposes some distinction between apprehension and judgment, and consequently composition. Concerning this, we now say only that it is so in angels, as to these matters, as in a human being. But how this distinction and composition are found in a human being, we will explain in the treatise On the Soul.

CHAPTER XXXIII
WHETHER COGNITION THROUGH DISCOURSE IS FOUND IN ANGELS

1. *First opinion, that Angels discourse, even concerning natural and evident things.*—On this point there are two extreme opinions of theologians. The first is

that Angels know by discoursing even in those things that they know naturally and evidently. Not, indeed, in all things, because they must begin their cognition from some things known through themselves without discourse, since this is necessary even in human beings, but in other things that are evidently deduced from first principles through some means. Thus Scotus thinks, in the *Prologue*, quest. 4 and 5, letter h, at the beginning, and in 2, dist. 1, last quest., near the beginning, and dist. 7, single quest., § *Against the conclusion*, after the middle of it, where he says that it does not seem probable to deny every discourse to Angels, and he cites the first place from the *Prologue*. Gregory follows him, in the same dist. 7, quest. 5, art. 2; Gabriel, dist. 3, quest. 2, art. 3, concl. 9; Ockham, 2, quest. 16.

2. *Foundation.—What is required for discourse on the part of the object and of the subject.*—They are founded on this, that an Angel does not know all things by one act, nor does he know all things, even natural things, at once, nor does he know all things as known through themselves, but many as known through another. But on these principles is founded the capacity, indeed also the necessity, of discourse with respect to the cognition of many things. Therefore Angels discourse in every matter. The consequence is clear, and the major as to the first part was proved above in treating of angelic species, and together with the second will be shown in the following chapters. As to the third part, however, it is clear through itself, because an Angel knows truths as they are in themselves; but not all truths in themselves are known through themselves, as is clear concerning this: *An eclipse of the sun or moon will occur at such a time; man is visible*, which have a true and real middle cause between subject and predicate, through which they can be known. But the minor is explained and proved, because discourse is only cognition of one thing through another. Hence, on the part of the object, it first requires that it be about a truth that has a means and cause of the truth. But on the part of the one knowing, it can at most require three things. The first is that the cognition of the means be the cause of the cognition of the conclusion. The second is that the cognition of the principle be an act distinct from the cognition of the conclusion. The third is that it be prior either by nature or perhaps even by time. But all these things can occur in an Angel. For on the part of the object it has already been said that an Angel knows many things that are not first principles, which have immediate truth from the terms alone. Then, from the fact that he does not know all things by one act, it can happen that by one act and through one species he sees the principle, and by another act the conclusion; for example, that by one act he sees the orbs of the sun and moon and their motions, and by another he sees a future

eclipse from such a concurrence of such stars. And in this way also the prior act will be the cause of the second, and consequently prior at least by nature. For priority of time, according to the opinion of many, is not necessary for discourse; or, if someone contends that it is necessary, it will also be able to have a place in Angels, either because from the very fact that he does not know all things at once, his capacity can be filled in the cognition of principles, as in the example given, in the cognition of all the heavenly orbs and their motions together with the earth. Therefore he will then not be able at the same time to attend to what is inferred from such a foundation. Therefore cognition of the principle will precede in time. And it is explained by an example: for if the world were going to last forever, an Angel could not at once know all future eclipses, since they are infinite. Indeed, even if we suppose that it was going to last for ten thousand years, not all Angels could at the beginning of the world at once know all future eclipses in all those years. Therefore cognition of the cause will be able to precede in time the cognition of some eclipse. Therefore an Angel could and ought to discourse in order to know that effect in particular.

3. *Second opinion, extremely opposed, that Angels are altogether incapable of discourse.*—The second opinion, extremely contrary, is that an Angel so lacks discourse that he is capable of it in no matter. This seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, First Part, quest. 58, art. 3, and quest. 79, art. 8, and quest. 85, art. 5, and II-II, quest. 108, art. 6, reply to 2, and I-II, quest. 89, art. 4, where he says that *the intellect of an Angel is not discursive, so as to proceed from principles into conclusions by understanding each separately*. The same more broadly in 3, *Contra Gentiles*, ch. 44 and 91, and in quest. 8, *De Veritate*, art. 15, quest. 24, art. 4, and Cajetan and Ferrariensis, and the more recent Thomists in their commentaries, with Capreolus, 2, dist. 3, quest. 2, art. 1, concl. 10; Alexander of Hales, 2 part, quest. 20, member 5. Giles is also cited, in 2, dist. 3, second part of the distinction, quest. 2, art. 3, but there he says nothing. Others refer him to book 3 of the *Sentences*, which I could not see; nor Albert, who is also cited in the second part of the *Summa*, quest. 9. And first this opinion is founded on the authority of the Saints. The first is Dionysius, ch. 7, *De Divinis Nominibus*, where although he does not expressly speak about discourse so as to deny it to Angels, nevertheless he universally declares the simplicity of their intelligence in so many words that he seems to have thought this. For he says that they have *simple and blessed intelligences, not gathering divine knowledge by indivisible or divisible things, whether by senses or by extended words*, and below, *purely spiritually, and apart from matter, they penetrate the uniquely intelligible divine things*, and below, *individual spiritual things*, etc. Afterward, however,

concerning our soul he adds: *Likewise, through divine wisdom, souls have the power of reasoning, striving by discourse and by a far-reaching habit toward the truth of things, and in this they are inferior to those singular spirits.* When these words are carefully compared with one another, he seems plainly to place the difference between the soul and an Angel in this, that the soul obtains knowledge by discoursing, but the Angel in a simpler mode. The second is Augustine, book 4, *De Genesi ad litteram*, ch. 2, 9, and 35, saying that Angels have at once morning and evening cognition of creatures, and he indicates that they have both by one intuition. The third cited is Bernard, sermon 5, on the *Canticle*, because concerning angelic nature he says that it does not know spiritual things from bodies as we do, *but by the sole force and vivacity of its nature penetrates the highest and lowest things*, and below he says that the heavenly inhabitant reaches *by his innate subtlety and sublimity, with all speed and ease*, that at which we strive to arrive from the consideration of simple things.

4. *It is confirmed by reasons.*—This opinion is also confirmed by reasons. First, because angelic intellect and human intellect are customarily distinguished chiefly in this, that the latter knows by discoursing, the former by simple intelligence. Hence, to indicate this difference, our spirits are customarily called rational, but Angels intelligences. Second, St. Thomas argues from a certain proportional comparison of spirits to bodies; for angelic spirits are compared to human spirits as heavenly bodies are to earthly bodies. But heavenly bodies differ from earthly bodies in this, that the latter have their perfection without motion, whereas the former attain it through motion. Thus, therefore, human beings need discourse, which is like a spiritual motion, so as to arrive at cognition of truth; but heavenly spirits intuit it without discourse. Third, the same St. Thomas gives an a priori reason: for man discourses because, in knowing first principles, he does not immediately see in them all things that are contained in them virtually. *But Angels, in the things that they naturally know, immediately inspect all things that can be known in them. Therefore.* St. Thomas tacitly proves the minor because Angels have the fullness of intellectual light. The fourth reason is taken from the same St. Thomas, *in the same article, reply to the first*, because in discourse there is progress from things unknown to things known. But this imperfection has no place in Angels, because they know at once all things that can be known through the species they use.

5. *For asserting the true opinion the division of discourse into discourse of causality and of succession is explained.—A third member of discourse is rejected.* —Between these opinions we must walk a middle way, as we did in the

preceding chapter. But first it is necessary to set forth the common distinction of discourse: for some call it discourse of succession, another discourse of causality. Thus St. Thomas teaches, First Part, quest. 14, art. 7, and quest. 8, *De Veritate*, art. 4, reply to 14, and Gregory, in 2, dist. 7, quest. 5, art. 2, who adds a third member, not necessary, as I shall now say. For these two members agree in this, that in each discourse is between several acts of the intellect, with some order between them, namely by proceeding from one to another. For this is of the necessity of discourse properly so called, unless we wish to abuse words. For discourse indicates a motion of the intellect, or at least a transition from one thing to another, for if it elicits a simple act and remains in it, it cannot be said to discourse, unless against common sense we abuse the word discourse and its use. For this reason Scotus, in the places cited above, said without reason that discourse is found in the beatific vision itself only because in the object the blessed person sees the cause primarily and the effect secondarily through the cause itself, or rather in the cause itself. In that mode even God would discourse, because he too, through his knowledge, sees himself primarily, and through himself as through a cause sees what he can make or is going to make. Likewise, it belongs to the account of discourse that from the nature of the thing there be some order of prior and posterior, at least of nature and causality, between the acts of the mind. But in one most simple act true causality cannot be found, nor order of nature, but at most of reason. Therefore there is no formal discourse there. But if someone says that there is virtual or eminent discourse, we do not contend about that, for we are treating of formal and proper discourse. Although in divine knowledge and in the beatific vision it is probably defended that not even virtual discourse through acts distinct by reason is contained, but that through one complete and most simple act the secondary object is attained by the force of the primary, as I explained in the preceding tome, book 3, on the Attributes of God, ch. 2. And therefore I said that the third member of discourse added by Gregory is not necessary, namely, that to discourse is to understand one thing through another. For if this is done by one act, by seeing at once the mediate truth in the means, or through the means, in which the extremes are joined, that is not formal discourse, but simple cognition eminently containing discourse, as Capreolus rightly notes, in 2, dist. 3, quest. 2, art. 3, reply to 2, Gregory, against the 10th conclusion. But if the cognition of one thing through another is through several acts, it already belongs to discourse of causality. Therefore without reason does Scotus fashion discourse in the beatific vision itself, since it is a most simple intuition, although on the part of the object it

represents one thing in another or through another. And Augustine indicated this, 13, *Confessions*, ch. 15, and Bernard, the cited sermon 5, on the *Canticle*.

6. *The difference between each member of discourse.—Why discourse of causality and of succession are so called.—It is concluded that discourse of succession is given in Angels.*—Therefore, since both successive and causal discourse require several acts ordered among themselves, the difference between them is that the former does not require causality between the acts, and therefore necessarily requires succession according to prior and posterior in time. For some real priority between several acts is of the account of discourse; for if someone has several acts merely concomitantly, he is not said to discourse from one to another, but as it were to divide and partition his attention into several acts. But real order is only of time, or of nature or causality. Therefore, since the former discourse does not require causality, and consequently neither order of nature, it occurs through succession of time, by passing from one act to another without any other connection of them among themselves, either voluntarily, as in Angels, or by chance, because various objects successively move, as happens in us. And therefore this discourse is named successive, as if by antonomasia, or with exclusion, because it has no order of acts except successive order. But the other is called discourse of causality because it is a progress from one act to another that the prior effects because of the connection it has with it; and the same is called causal. Indeed, according to the usage of philosophers and dialecticians, the name discourse said absolutely signifies causality, because the former is only a certain course and motion of the intellect, whereas the latter in a special way has the account of discourse. Hence in the former course there does not result an operation in some way one and composed of many, but there is a mere succession of several operations. In the latter there is some composition from several acts because of some connection of causality, and thus there results an operation in some way composed, which is called the third operation in the human intellect. But what this causality of one act upon another is, since it is discourse, is usually treated in the later books and will be discussed by us in the treatise on the Soul. For now let us suppose that it is both effective on the part of the power, and in some way formal on the part of the object, insofar as through one act there is proposed the means and the reason for assenting through another. Therefore, in the present matter we are not treating of the former, merely successive discourse, because it is most certain that it is found in Angels, because he does not know all things at once, as we will see below. And in this way Augustine said, Letter 57, to Dardanus, and in other

places, that God moves the spiritual creature through time, namely time consisting in the succession of intellectual operations.

7. *Whether in discourse of causality real succession of duration is included.—The affirmation of St. Thomas.—The opposite opinion is more probable.*—Therefore the difficulty concerns discourse of causality. Yet so that the aim of the dispute may be certain, it is fitting to know whether in the intrinsic account of this discourse there is also included real succession of duration between the acts from which it consists, one of which is the cause of the other. For St. Thomas, First Part, quest. 14, art. 7, plainly affirms it, saying that the second discourse, namely causal discourse, includes the first, namely successive discourse, *because he who proceeds from principles to a conclusion*, he says, *does not consider each at once, but proceeds from things known to things unknown.* He has the same, quest. 58, art. 3, reply to 1, and Capreolus defends it, 2, dist. 2, quest. 2, art. 3, reply to 1, against the 10th conclusion, and Major above, and others who speak about human discourse, for they do not admit angelic discourse. And so I spoke in tome 1, Third Part, disp. 28, sect. 2. But a sufficiently received opinion is that succession of acts is not of the account of discourse, but that there is discourse whenever from the judgment of one truth the intellect progresses to the judgment of another, even if it does both in the same instant. Scotus, Gregory, and others to be cited below hold this. For although these things are done at once, or supposing that they can be done at once, the intellect so understanding truly proceeds from one thing to another, and from things known to things unknown at least according to the order of nature, in which way perhaps St. Thomas could be explained.

8. *Whether discourse of causality, now explained, is given in Angels.*—But this question about succession between those acts, insofar as it concerns our soul, joined or separated, will be disputed below in its proper treatise. But insofar as it concerns Angels, the whole difficulty is whether there is in them discourse as it consists of several acts connected among themselves by causality, whether they occur at once or not. For even if they occur at once, there will be composed cognition and not simple, although it is not successive, just as cognition through the composition of predicate with subject is composed cognition, although the extremes are known at once, and the whole difficulty lies in this distinction of acts and composition. For once that is admitted, there is no controversy about succession. For it will easily be credible that those acts can be elicited at once by an Angel with order only of nature, just as in the same instant in which something becomes luminous, it begins to illuminate; and in the same instant in which a species is impressed in the eye, vision occurs; and in

the same instant in which assent to the premises is completed, assent to the conclusion occurs. Nor is it difficult that the intellect, especially the angelic intellect, attend to both at once, both because through the prior act it is as it were completed in the power of effecting the second, which it can make without succession because it occurs through an instantaneous action; and also because it knows the objects of each act in the mode of one; and furthermore because, supposing the distinction of acts, the prior act does not effect the second except while it exists. Therefore, at least in that instant in which the second begins, they are simultaneous. Therefore, by the same reason, they could have been simultaneous from the beginning, because the first act immediately acts, and the second can occur in an instant. Therefore the whole difficulty turns on the distinction of acts with the emanation of one from the other. These things, then, having been posited:

9. *First conclusion.—Angels do not discourse in evident cognition of natural things.*—I say first: it seems more probable that Angels do not discourse in the cognition of natural things that they know evidently and as they are in themselves. In this assertion we agree with the former opinion, and perhaps according to it St. Thomas can be explained. And it is proved first from what was said in the preceding chapter. For discourse supposes composition, because the third operation of the intellect supposes the second, and the greater composition supposes the lesser, especially when they are subordinated. But in Angels there is no composition in natural and evident cognition of this sort. Therefore neither is there discourse. It is proved second. For there is a twofold evident cognition in an Angel, one abstractive, the other intuitive. But in neither does he discourse. Therefore in none. The former part of the minor is proved concerning abstractive cognition, because that cognition is either of the effect through the cause, or of the cause through the effect; but in neither does an Angel discourse. Therefore. The minor is proved, because, first, whenever he knows a cause, and through it the effect, he knows both at once, because there is no reason for succession or delay concerning the cognition of the effect after cognition of the cause, if the cognition of the cause is such that through it the effect can be known. For the intellect of an Angel, when applied, operates as much as it can, and there is nothing to impede or retard it. Therefore, if he knows the cause so perfectly that through it he can know the effect, in the same instant in which he has cognition of the cause, he passes immediately into cognition of the effect. And conversely, if then he could not know the effect, neither could he afterward, because afterward he is not more powerful, nor does the cognition of the cause

afterward grow or become more virtuous or more efficacious for conferring cognition of the effect.

10. *The proof is advanced.*—Then he knows the effect in the cause not only at once but also by one act, because he does not then know the cause and the effect through diverse species, but through the same species, as is clear from what was said above about angelic species. Therefore he also knows the cause by the same act. The consequence is proved, both because the light of the angelic intellect is perfect and adequate to its species, and so by one simple act elicited through such a species it knows every effect, because through such a cause it can evidently be known. Also because an Angel knows the thing that is the cause through its proper species, either comprehensively or at least quidditatively. Hence by the same act he knows its essence and properties, and consequently its effects, insofar as they can be abstractive known through such a cause. And this reason also proceeds concerning the cognition of the cause through the effect. For then also through the species of the effect he knows the cause, and consequently at once and by the same act. As we said above, an Angel knows God through his own substance by the same act by which he knows himself. And although afterward he can have another, more perfect concept of God, he does not have it through causal discourse, but through discourse of succession, namely because afterward he applies himself in another mode more direct and more efficacious for eliciting such a concept. And the same holds for the other causes, if there are any, which an Angel evidently knows through effects.

11. *Next it is proved concerning intuitive cognition.*—It remains to prove the other part concerning intuitive cognition. And it is proved first, because intuition by its own kind occurs without discourse, because in the intellect in which it is perfect it includes judgment about the thing seen, and it has evidence of truth not from the cause or effect, but from the fact that through a clear light the thing itself is seen in itself. Therefore much more will it be so in Angels, in whom intuition is very perfect and clear. Second, in us the assent to first principles, even if it includes or supposes composition because of the distinct concepts of the extremes, is nevertheless given without discourse, because it is given by way of intuition of immediate truth, although the existing truth is not seen. But an Angel, by intuitively seeing some existing truth, sees it as immediate, because he does not see it to be so as led by some means through which the extremes are joined, but because he sees immediately the unity itself of the extremes as it is in the thing. Therefore in such a mode of knowing he necessarily sees without discourse. Third, it is clarified by examples. For although the air is illuminated by the sun, nevertheless light and air are

immediately united among themselves: *immediately*, I say, with respect to the sun, although there is an intrinsic quality in the middle. Hence an Angel who intuitively sees illuminated air judges it to be so from the immediate union that he sees in the extremes, *without* any discourse, even virtual discourse, much less formal discourse. But if by the force of such an act an Angel passes to cognition of the cause, then that act, insofar as it is terminated at the cause, will not of itself be intuitive, as far as comes from the force of that means, as is manifestly clear in the cognition of God that an Angel has through cognition of his own substance. For with respect to his own substance it is intuitive, but with respect to God abstractive; and therefore, according to the former part, one must see whether with respect to God that cognition is discursive or not, or whether it occurs by the same simple act or by a distinct act, as was seen above. And this reason proves not only that an Angel does not actually discourse in these matters, but also that he cannot discourse, because that is the natural mode of his knowing, which he cannot change, as can be shown by similarity or a fortiori from what I said in the cited tome 1, Third Part, disp. 28, sect. 2, at the end.

12. *Objection.—Response of others.*—But one objection remains against the latter part. For from it it follows that with respect to Angels there is no mediate proposition, but every proposition is immediate and known through itself. The consequent is false. Therefore. The sequel is clear, because an Angel sees every truth as it is in itself and by a proper concept, and therefore sees it as in itself immediately true. But the consequent is false, because just as there are propositions immediate in themselves, which with respect to every intellect are immediate, if they are known as they are, so there are propositions mediate in themselves, which with respect to every intellect are mediate, even if they are known as they are in themselves. Therefore such propositions, even if they are intuitively seen by an Angel, are known as mediate, and consequently through at least virtual discourse. To this objection some respond that with respect to an intellect knowing things as they are in themselves, no proposition is mediate, but all are known through themselves and from the terms, because all have their formal entities through which they are immediately objected to an intellect seeing things as they are in themselves quidditatively, and therefore they are known not by deduction from others, but immediately and through themselves. And consequently the distinction of mediate and immediate proposition has place only with respect to an intellect knowing things through alien concepts, as we know. Father Vázquez teaches this doctrine at length in the cited disp. 22, ch. 2, and commends it as first discovered by himself and afterward approved and published by other learned men.

13. *The true opinion.*—But I think that the ancient doctrine of St. Thomas and of the Peripatetics is that some propositions are known through themselves in themselves, which by no intellect knowing things as they are in themselves are known through a means, but only by us, who do not penetrate their terms, and these are therefore said to be known through themselves in themselves, but not to us. But other propositions are mediate even in themselves and intrinsically, and are known as mediate by every intellect, even one knowing things as they are in themselves. Indeed, because they are known as they are in themselves, they are therefore known as mediate. I do not say through discourse, for this is not necessary on the part of the object, but from the imperfection of the one knowing. But I do say that a proposition is known as mediate because one of its extremes is not known to be joined to the other except by the force of such a means.

14. *Intuitive cognition, as such, is always immediate.*—But on this point I nevertheless make a distinction between intuitive cognition, which is terminated at the thing as existing, and abstractive cognition, through which the essence of the thing and the properties connatural to it and its effects as possible, abstracting from actual existence, are known. And with respect to intuitive cognition penetrating and seeing the thing as it is in itself, I confess that every truth so thought is known as immediate and known through itself, because although in the thing it has the cause of its truth, nevertheless intuitive vision of itself does not regard that cause, but is terminated at the effect itself as existing, and in that effect immediately sees what sort of thing it is. And although the same intellect can at once see the emanation of the effect from such a cause, nevertheless this cognition is not the reason for the other, insofar as it is intuitive cognition. Rather, it is as it were a new act, which can be joined with the other and separated from it. For example, if someone through the intellect intuitively sees that water is hot, even if he does not see the fire or another heating cause, he evidently judges that the water is hot, not a priori, nor a posteriori, nor through some means, but by the force of intuition, which is a peculiar mode of evidence, as it were experiential, which is plainly simple and without discourse. Hence it happens that such cognition can be evident concerning a contingent truth placed in esse, because for this evidence there suffices that composite necessity by which a thing, when it is, is said necessarily to be. And in this way that truth is said to be immediate and known through itself in order to clear intuition, because it is objected to such cognition through itself and immediately.

15. *In intuitive cognition, for it to be immediate, it makes no difference whether the connection of the extremes is necessary or contingent.*—And within the breadth of this cognition an Angel sees as evidently that water is hot as that fire is hot. Yet further he also sees intuitively in existing fire the emanation of heat from the form of fire, which he does not see in water, and nevertheless even then he does not intuitively see that fire is hot through a means. For the intuition of that emanation is as it were accidental to the proper evidence of intuitive cognition, since this can equally be without that. Therefore that is a new intuitive cognition of another truth, namely that this heat flows intrinsically from the subject in which it is, which it does not have in water, and this truth too is intuitively seen as immediate. And the same judgment holds for every intuitive cognition through which some thing is immediately seen in itself. But I say *immediately seen*, because it is necessary that there be in the thing some immediate union of the extremes; for if the union is only in another, it will be necessary to see two unions intuitively for a mediate union to be seen intuitively. Yet the truth will always be seen as in itself and known through itself. It is clear by examples in two branches united in a trunk, for the conjunction of the branches with each other cannot be seen intuitively except by seeing the unions of each with the trunk. And corporeal substance cannot be intuitively seen as white, or as existing somewhere, except by seeing the union of whiteness or of place with quantity, and the union of quantity with substance. But once these are seen, the substance is seen as white and as existing somewhere, not through a means, but as something known in itself and through itself.

16. *In abstractive cognition there are propositions that cannot be known except through some means.*—But in evident abstractive cognition, quidditative and through the proper concept of the essence and its properties, there are truly mediate propositions that cannot be known except through a means, even if they are known by a simple act without discourse. Gregory above supposes this, and Capreolus admits it, and all those hold it as established who confess that on the part of the object an Angel knows one thing through another, and so that on the part of the object the capacity for discourse is not lacking, although the knower, because of the excellence of the species and light, can know one thing through another without discourse. And the reason is that abstractive cognition, even if it is through a proper concept, is not terminated at the thing existing in itself; and therefore through it the extremes of the truth to be known are not seen as immediately united in the thing itself, but as unible or connaturally connected, or abstracting from time, as dialecticians say. And therefore, if they are unible only through some means or cause, the truth that arises from their

union will not be able to be evidently seen except through such a means or in such a cause. The matter is clarified by an example in a future or present eclipse of the sun. For before it occurs, although the proposition *An eclipse will occur* is true, it is not, nevertheless, known through itself even to an Angel, because he cannot see it intuitively, and therefore he necessarily must know it through the cause; and if one has been ignorant of the cause, it is impossible for him to know it evidently. But after it has occurred, he sees it intuitively and immediately, even if perhaps he is ignorant of the cause.

17. *The difference between intuitive and abstractive knowledge.—Response to the objection made in number twelve.*—And in this the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition is clearly discerned. For, to explain the matter in this way, intuitive cognition begins from the thing itself as made, but abstractive cognition begins from the cause. In the same mode this can be declared in essence and in mediate and immediate properties, as, for example, intellect and will are in the soul or in the substance of an Angel. For the will belongs to such a substance by reason of intellect, and therefore this truth, *this substance has intellect*, is known through itself and immediate in itself; but this, *such a substance has will*, is mediate and demonstrable taken in itself and abstracting from time. This mediation is not only of our reason, but of the thing, because those powers are truly distinct. Hence, therefore, it happens that the former is not knowable as mediate by an intellect knowing the thing as it is in itself, which is also clear through itself. But the latter is always known as mediate, even by an intellect knowing the thing as it is in itself, because even an Angel does not see the connection between these two extremes, namely essence and will, to be necessary, except because he sees that the substance is through itself intellective, and that will necessarily follows from intellect; and so he also evidently sees that the connection between essence and will is not so immediate as between the same essence and intellect. The same is the case in these: *man is capable of wonder*, and *is visible*, and in all similar cases. And so to the objection made we respond by admitting the sequel with respect to proper intuitive cognition, and denying it with respect to abstractive and scientific cognition, as has been declared.

18. *Second conclusion.—An Angel discourses in supernatural things or in things known through conjecture.*—I say second: in supernatural matter, and in all those things that an Angel judges not evidently but through conjecture, he does discourse. This assertion, both a fortiori and specifically, is taught by Scotus, Gabriel, Ockham cited above, and Marsilius, 2, quest. 9, art. 2; Malonius, 2, dist. 3, disp. 6; Pesantius, First Part, quest. 58, art. 1 and 3, where Bañez

reports that several Thomists think this, and says that it is probable, although he himself thinks the contrary more probable. And St. Thomas himself seems to concede a place for this assertion in First Part, quest. 60, art. 2, at the end of the body, for when he had said that there is no ratiocinative cognition in Angels, he adds: *But these things have been said, setting aside those things that are above nature; for nature is not a sufficient principle of these.* Hence in Third Part, quest. 44, art. 2, reply to the second, with Augustine, book 9, *De Civitate Dei*, ch. 22, he says: *Christ the Lord became known to the demons, as much as was fitting, through certain temporal effects of his power. And thus*, he says, *seeing Christ hunger after fasting, they judged him not to be the Son of God.* From Ambrose, book 4, on Luke, around the first temptation, and the expositors on Matthew 4 commonly teach the same. Chrysostom, homily 3, and above in the *Imperfectum*, and above from various authors on Matthew, Theophylact, Euthymius, and others. Then St. Thomas adds: *Afterward, once the miracles had been seen, by a certain suspicion he conjectured him to be the Son of God*, and he cites Chrysostom saying that the demon had not certain and firm knowledge of the coming of God. And Bede, on Luke 4, saying that he had suspicion rather than certainty. Hence the same St. Thomas, quest. 16, *De Malo*, art. 6, reply to 3, from the points posited in the second place, says: *The demon, in those things that God supernaturally does in creatures, sometimes fails by opining falsely.* And he has the same in the cited quest. 58, art. 5, saying that a demon can be deceived by judging about things that are supernatural from the things that he knows naturally, as if, by seeing that Christ is man, he judges him not to be God, etc. Finally, in quest. 57, art. 3, he says that Angels can know future contingents not with certainty, but through conjecture, as a physician foreknows the health of a sick person; and similarly in the fourth article he says that an Angel can conjecture acts among us from external indications, bringing in Augustine for this, in the book *De Divinatione Daemonum*, and 2, *Retractationes*, ch. 40, and *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, ch. 81 and 82.

19. *The assertion is proved by reason.*—From all these things the assertion is proved. For in those things that an Angel does not know evidently, which are reduced to those three, namely supernatural things, contingent effects not present, and thoughts of the mind, an Angel can know all these, I say, by opining something and through conjecture. Therefore he can discourse. The antecedent has been sufficiently proved and is manifest from everything said. But the consequence is proved, because there occur there those things that are necessary for discourse. For first, one thing is known through another, namely that God is man, through his testimony confirmed by such signs; or that this will be future,

or that this person will consent if he is tempted in this matter, because he is affected in this or that way, and similar cases. Then, he knows one thing from another by distinct acts and judgments, one of which occurs from the efficacy and impulse of the other. The distinction of acts is proved, because one is true and another often false, one evident, as we suppose, and another non-evident, one necessary and another free. Therefore they are distinct. For properties so distinct, indeed also opposed, cannot belong at once to the same act, nor in us can greater indications of diverse acts be thought. But once the distinction of acts is posited, the causality of one from the other is evident, because the whole reason for assenting to one object is the assent to the other; as when *the demons believe and tremble*, the reason for believing is that they see miracles, hear words, read the Scriptures, and understand, and from some testimony so known they evidently infer that the matter is so, sometimes through assent naturally evident, namely with this principle joined, that God cannot lie, or another similar principle; sometimes through only a likely deduction. Therefore nothing is lacking there for the propriety of discourse. It is confirmed first, for by this reason we said in the preceding chapter that an Angel can use composition and division in these matters, because he does not know one subject so perfectly that he knows the predicate in it. But something similar happens in the cognition of a cause from a sign or effect, or in the cognition of a thing from testimony. Therefore by the same reason an Angel discourses. It is confirmed second, because although discourse is not a perfection simply simple, nevertheless, supposing some imperfection, namely that a thing cannot be known evidently and as it is in itself, either in itself or in another, it is a great perfection that at least in some way such a truth can be known. But Angels have that imperfection in the aforesaid matters, as is supposed. Therefore it is not contrary to their perfection to discourse in those matters. Indeed, it seems necessary for that same perfection.

20. *A pressing objection.—Solution.*—But to the contrary: although all these things conclude that an Angel can know these truths or effects in some way less perfect than others, they do not prove that he knows by discoursing, because suddenly and by one intuition they see that such signs, or indications, or testimonies, or all these taken together, indicate such an effect, and so they know the thing without discourse, although not in itself but in signs. I respond, first, that by this argument at most it is proved that then the discourse of an Angel is not with succession and delay of time, which certainly is likely, because the acts themselves are indivisible in themselves and can occur in a moment, and by their nature they require to occur at once, because they occur with connection

and dependence of one upon another; and on the part of the Angel there is no impediment preventing him from immediately operating as much as he can, by knowing both what he sees or hears and whatever can be known through them, and in the way in which it can. Nevertheless, discourse is not thereby removed, for it consists in the dimanation of one act from another, even if it occurs without succession. And so this assertion in reality will not be contrary to St. Thomas, although in words it seems to be so as to this part.

21. *They limit St. Thomas when he denies a certain discourse in Angels.—Yet he seems to speak universally.*—Hence some have tried to explain St. Thomas as speaking only about discourse in material and evident matter, and he himself seems to favor this explanation in First Part, quest. 79, art. 8, saying that *Angels, who perfectly possess cognition of intelligible truth according to the mode of their nature, do not need to proceed from one thing to another, but apprehend truth simply, without discourse*. By these words he seems to limit this to things that are perfectly known. Nevertheless, in several places he speaks too universally. For in the cited third article he posits an absolute assertion, and in the solution to 3 he says that an Angel does not discourse even in cognition through experience, and in other places he says that he is not discursive. But in particular, in quest. 8, *De Veritate*, art. 5, reply to 2, he indicates that an Angel does not discourse even in supernatural things. And reply to 4, he says *that Angels intuit the hidden things of the heart in the motions of the body, just as causes are seen in the likenesses of their effects without any discourse*, and reply to 1 he says the same about the experimental cognition of demons. And thus Capreolus understood St. Thomas in the solution cited above, reply to 1, Gregory, against the 10th conclusion. But he adds that St. Thomas is speaking of that discourse that occurs with true succession of time, which certainly it is not necessary to admit in Angels. But we are speaking of the discourse that consists only in the cognition of one thing from the cognition of another, so that one act proceeds from another, although between them there is no order of time, but of nature.

22. *In angelic conjectural discourse the antecedent is discerned in various ways, and likewise the consequence, sometimes modal, sometimes absolute.—Concerning the antecedent one must note first.*—Yet further I note that in this conjectural cognition two things must be considered. One is the cognition of the effects or signs that make up, as it were, the antecedent from which some other thing is known, which is like the conclusion of the discourse. And this conclusion in turn can be twofold, namely either a modal proposition or a proposition of inesse, to speak in our manner. For sometimes from conjectures it is judged only that what is indicated through those signs is likely, probable, or

credible, as that Peter will consent or will not consent, or that this or that contingent thing will be future, or that Christ is God, or something similar. But sometimes it is concluded that this or that thing that is likely indicated is so, or will be. Therefore, as regards the antecedent, it can sometimes be known by an Angel by one act, sometimes by several, and sometimes all at once, but sometimes successively. It is explained, because sometimes there can be such signs and conjectures that they both occur at once and are represented by one species. And then all can be known together by one simple act, because it occurs through the same species, as we will teach more generally a little later. But sometimes, although the signs occur at once, nevertheless they can be so multiple and varied that they are represented by distinct species, as if, for conjecturing a contingently future effect, it is necessary to join and consider at once several heavenly and earthly causes, and history, or Scripture, or examples, all of which very often are not known by an Angel through the same species, although they can be considered at once in order to one thing. And then that antecedent grows together from several acts, although not through discourse, because one is not inferred from another. But one is accumulated with another, and perhaps not through a proper composition of propositions, but through the conjunction of two partial causes for producing one effect, because the things that do not help individually help when gathered together. But they can be joined at once through several acts having themselves concomitantly, or at most coupled, as if by a simple copula, to which in the mind of an Angel there corresponds an actual consideration that all those indications taken together are sufficient, whether this consideration is through a new distinct act and is as it were the minor proposition of a syllogism, or whether it occurs through all those acts at once, compared among themselves in some way.

23. *Second note.*—Finally, in this sort of cognition of the antecedent succession can sometimes intervene, because not all the necessary signs occur or present themselves at once, but successively, and so they are known gradually. For in this way the demon did not immediately recognize that Christ was God, but gradually; for first he was deceived by judging the contrary, afterward he began to doubt, then he came into suspicion, and at last believed unwillingly. Thus also Augustine said that demons conjecture many things because of long experience, which they acquired successively. But in this succession proper causal discourse does not intervene, but only successive discourse, because it does not occur by inferring one thing from another, but by accumulating one with another. And besides, although this occurs successively, at the end, when the antecedent is completed, it is necessary that the memory of past things and

the force of experience concur with the last sign so that the conclusion may be inferred, because if the past indications were not in some way represented in the present, at least confusedly, they could no more move or cooperate toward the present act than if they had not been previously known.

24. *Concerning the modal consequence one must note.*—But concerning the conclusion, I note that when it is modal, it can be inferred necessarily and evidently from the cognition of the signs or of all the motives, when all are considered at once and perfectly, as is the case by an Angel. For although signs or testimonies do not evidently conclude that the matter is so, they can evidently conclude that it is likely or probable. For this is only a certain extrinsic denomination taken from the indications themselves, and therefore it can be known evidently from them; and with respect to this part, succession of time is not necessary for forming this judgment about the conclusion, because, since it is evidently inferred, if the intellect attends to or has apprehended the conclusion, it immediately necessarily assents to it. Indeed, as to this, perhaps in an Angel an illative discourse of one thing from another through diverse acts is not necessary, because in the antecedent itself he can see by one simple act that such a truth or assertion is made likely from such signs. But I said that it *can be inferred necessarily*, because sometimes it can happen that something is judged probable or likely which in reality is not, nor is it evidently shown to be such; and then the judgment of probability can be free and sometimes rash, or given from passion, which perhaps sometimes happens in evil angels. And then the same reason applies to such a judgment of the modal conclusion as applies to the inference of a proposition of inesse, concerning which it remains to speak.

25. *Concerning the absolute consequence one must note.*—Therefore a conclusion of this sort can sometimes be evident, at least in the attester, God, or Christ, or a holy Angel who, by reason of his state, cannot lie, and such is the coerced faith of demons, for such evidence imposes necessity on the intellect. Hence it also happens that such collection in an Angel does not require succession. Nevertheless, it does not seem to occur without a new act elicited by the force of the prior, because it is an act far different in species and does not transcend a certain account of faith. But sometimes, and ordinarily, such a conclusion of inesse is free with respect to assent, because, since it is not evidently inferred, it does not necessitate the intellect. For only evidence induces the intellect of necessity to the exercise of assent. Therefore such assent is free; and from this side it can be later in time than the whole cognition of the antecedent, because free choice can hesitate and suspend the act, and apply the intellect so that it considers more; and if it finds nothing new to the contrary, at

last it can will and assent. And then that assent is without doubt an act distinct from the preexisting cognition, since it is or can be later than it, whence it is also from causal and successive discourse. This latter point is clear through itself, since it occurs later in time. But the former is also clear, because it is given in virtue of the premises. Nor will it stand in the way that it is not given at once or from necessity, because from this it only follows that the assent to the premises is not a necessitating cause for such assent, but is subordinated to the free will with respect to the exercise of such an act. Yet by this it is not excluded from being a true cause and reason for assenting to the conclusion, which suffices for causal discourse. And this is more intrinsic to it, because it belongs to its intrinsic account, whereas succession is not so necessary, because it depends on the free will, which can freely will to assent immediately in the same instant.

26. *Blessed Angels, even in conjectural cognition, are not deceived, demons often are.—In the state of innocence no error could exist.*—From this doctrine, the difference between good and bad Angels should be noted in passing. For the former, even in this kind of conjectural cognition, are never deceived; but the latter often are. For I do not approve what I find written in Malonius, cited disp. 6, sect. 1, near the end: *Good Angels are sometimes deceived, but bad Angels very often.* For good Angels cannot be deceived, since this is repugnant to the beatific state. For deception is a certain evil, at least penal, and a great imperfection, which is repugnant to that most happy state. Likewise, for this reason, even in the state of innocence there could not be error before sin; how, then, could there be error in beatitude? Finally, the blessed are most prudent, and therefore they expose themselves to no danger of error. Therefore there is a difference between good and bad Angels: the good, although sometimes they do not have certain revelation about matters of this sort, as is gathered from Daniel 10 and noted by the Fathers and St. Thomas, cited quest. 8, *De Veritate*, art. 15, nevertheless concerning these unknown things of which they do not have certainty, do not judge absolutely that the thing is or is not, or that it will be, etc., but judge only modally, that it likely appears so, according to the measure and degree of the indications, which they weigh most prudently and most evidently. But evil Angels easily judge from conjectures that the things themselves are so or are not so, as they are led by hatred or another affection. And therefore the latter are often deceived, the former never. This seems so clear to me that I think Malonius, a learned and erudite man, was not ignorant of this, but either an error crept into those words, with the particle *never* changed into the particle sometimes, or he broadly called it deception when the thing does not turn out as it probably appeared; as Aristotle said that many false things are more probable

than true things, but nevertheless even in these things there is no deception with respect to one who did not judge absolutely that it was going to be, but that it was likely that it would be.

27. *To the arguments of the former opinion in number two.*—We admit the arguments of the former opinion insofar as they can confirm the second assertion. But insofar as they seem to proceed against the first, we respond that they prove only that there are, with respect to an Angel, mediate propositions and propositions to be known through another, which we conceded and proved above. But discourse is not rightly inferred from this, because one thing can be known through another on the part of the object, and nevertheless both can be known by a simple act. As we explained above concerning the cognition that an Angel has of God through his own substance. Nor in natural and evident angelic cognition is it ever necessary to admit another mode of knowing. For whether he knows the cause through one species, or whether sometimes the means through which the effect is known includes a concurrence of several causes that can be known not by one species but by several, the effect is always known in the cause through the species of the cause or means, and therefore the effect is known in the cause and because of the cause by the same act and without discourse. To the example concerning the multitude of several eclipses augmentable to infinity, if the world were going to last eternally, Capreolus does not judge it unfitting that all those eclipses be seen by an Angel in one simple intuition, because it does not follow that the act is infinite, but that it belongs to a certain higher account and comprehension. But perhaps not all Angels could at once actually comprehend all future concurrences in all eternity, and coexisting with them on individual days, if the world and the motions of the heavens were always going to be. And therefore, granting this, it would be responded that causal discourse does not follow from it, but successive discourse. For some effects will always be known in known and considered causes without discourse. But when the cognition of causes is varied, other effects would be seen in a similar way; but that variation in the cognition of causes would occur only through successive discourse.

28. *To the arguments of the second opinion from the authority of the Fathers in number three.*—To the arguments of the second opinion. First, from the Fathers cited there, Augustine and Bernard say nothing in those places about discourse in particular. For Augustine speaks only of blessed Angels, for they alone have morning cognition, through which it is certain that they do not discourse, because it is the very vision of God. But that holy Angels, along with this and at once, have evening cognition of creatures, that is, natural cognition

and cognition in the proper genus, between which there is no causal discourse, because one does not arise from another, nor is successive discourse necessary, because they will be able to exist at the same time. But whether evening cognition itself is perfected by an Angel without discourse, Augustine does not declare there. Hence those places pertain more to the question to be treated in the following chapters, concerning those things that Angels can or cannot consider at once, than to the present one about discourse. The words of Bernard too are very general, and can indicate discourse, at least of succession, insofar as through the speed of angelic cognition he declares its perfection. Dionysius also speaks obscurely and with general words. Hence he can more than sufficiently be explained according to the former assertion.

29. *To the reasons of the same opinion in number four.*—And in the same way the reasons brought forward for that opinion are satisfied. For the difference between us and Angels in this regard is sufficiently taken from the ordinary mode of understanding those things that can be known perfectly and through their proper natural knowledge by Angels. And the same suffices for Angels to be called intelligences. Although sometimes they are also called rational by the Fathers, as is clear from Gregory, Homily 10, *De Epiphania*, Damascene, and Bernard above. To the second, however, we say that that proportion between Angels and heavenly bodies can prove very little, if it must be preserved to the letter; for from it it would follow that an Angel does not discourse, even by successive discourse, because heavenly bodies do not acquire their perfection even in this mode. Therefore let it suffice for that proportion if we say that Angels have a perfect natural light of intelligence and do not discourse in those things that are perfectly subject to that light. Nor does the third reason prove more. Indeed, from it, by an argument from the contrary, our second assertion is confirmed: for if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation will be the cause of negation, and conversely. Therefore, if an Angel knows by a simple act those things whose principles and causes he perfectly comprehends, and therefore does not discourse about them, other things, which he does not know so perfectly, he attains not by simple intuition, but by discourse. And the same is said to the fourth reason, for in reality in those things that an Angel attains only by conjecture, he proceeds from things known to things unknown. For demons, from the things that they saw, were inquiring into what they did not know, namely that Christ is God, and similarly concerning other things.

CHAPTER XXXIV

CHAPTER XXXIV
WHETHER ANGELS ALWAYS ACTUALLY CONSIDER ALL THINGS THAT THEY CAN KNOW IN FIRST ACT

1. *What is excluded from the present question.—The point of the question.—* We have spoken about those things that can be investigated by us concerning the essence, mode, or properties of angelic intellection. Now it remains to speak about the exercise or use of such acts. St. Thomas treats this question in the cited quest. 58, art. 1, under these words, whether an Angel is sometimes in potency, sometimes in act; and he responds under a distinction, both concerning first and second act, and concerning intellect compared to natural or supernatural objects. But now we are treating only of natural objects, because all supernatural things we reserve for the second part of this treatise. Nor are we dealing with first act, because in our intellect this is twofold, namely an impressed species and an acquired habit. And concerning the former, insofar as it is also necessary in Angels, it has already been said that Angels are always in first act in order to natural objects, which St. Thomas also confirms in the cited art. 1. But we excepted the internal acts of the mind, with respect to which the intellect of an Angel can be in potency, even in order to first act, because he is naturally ignorant of them. What St. Thomas says in the same place about supernatural objects has a certain similarity of reason, with due proportion preserved. Nor does anything else remain to be said about this first act. But the other first act, which by common use is properly called a habit, where it is found so that it belongs to the natural order, is posterior to second act; for it is generated through second act. And therefore, after all things that pertain to the second act of Angels, we reserve this dispute about the habits of Angels for the last chapter of this book. Therefore in the present matter we inquire only about second act, whether an Angel is always in second act adequate, so to speak, to his first act with respect to the object intelligible by him, whether by one act or by several he knows all those things.

2. *First opinion.—An Angel can, but is not always, in second act adequate to first act.*—On this point, the first opinion is that an Angel can at once be in the second act of all things knowable by him, although he is not always or necessarily in this actual consideration. This latter part is not singular, but common to all. But the former was taught by Gregory, in 2, dist. 11, quest. 1, following Aureolus, there quest. 3, art. 3. And he proves it first from Augustine,

book 5, *De Genesi ad litteram*, ch. 29 and following. For in ch. 29, he says that Angels can first contemplate the eternity of the creator and the mutability of the creature, and from this cognition praise the creator, and he adds: *All this they can do at once; all this they do at once; they can and they do.* Explaining this more, ch. 32, he says: *According to the spiritual power of the angelic mind, it comprehends at once by very easy knowledge all things that it wills.* Surely, if *all things at once*, there is nothing that an Angel can know that he cannot at once actually consider; and if by *very easy knowledge*, that knowledge cannot be rendered more difficult from the multitude of things known, and therefore concerning all things about which it can be successively, dividedly, it will also be able to be collectively at once. Augustine seems to add this in these words, ch. 33, saying: *The angelic mind can do all things at once that speech has distinguished one by one through the order of connected causes.* Second, the same is proved by reason, which we can form in this way. For either an Angel knows without species, or through them. But in either mode he can at once consider all things that he can know individually. Therefore. I prove the minor as to the former part. For if he understands without species, by the power of his light alone he will be able to apply his intellect so that it operates at once according to its whole power. Therefore he will be able at once to know all things that fall under his capacity. But Gregory, because he supposes that Angels know through species, proves the other part in this way: because an Angel can have at once as many acts of understanding as he has species. Therefore he can understand at once all things of which he has species. The consequence is evident, and the antecedent is proved because the intellect concurs toward act in two ways, namely by receiving and by acting. But as receiving it can equally receive several acts as fewer or one, because they do not have repugnance among themselves, and in the potency there is capacity, as he proves more broadly in the first book, dist. 1, quest. 1, art. 3. Likewise, also as an active principle it can do the same, because the intellect of an Angel effects intellection with a species only as a partial cause. Therefore, as many species as it has, so many acts of understanding it can effect at once, and consequently it can consider all things at once by many acts. The consequence is proved, because every partial agent, with one and another partial coactive principle, can equally effect several operations at once with such principles, just as fewer with fewer principles, or one with one principle, unless by acting it is weakened or diminished, or depends on another principle that causes weakening in understanding, as happens to us, because we depend on phantasms and corporeal organs. But the angelic intellect is neither weakened in itself nor depends on anything by which it is wearied. Therefore. He proves the

major only by the example of a luminous thing, which partially effects a species with the objects of the senses, and in this action it is not weakened; and therefore it can effect as many species as the objects that concur, even if they are multiplied to infinity.

3. *Second opinion.—That by an Angel all things of which he has species are always necessarily actually known.*—But supposing this latter part, namely of those positing species, a second opinion can easily be thought, saying not only that an Angel can understand at once all things of which he has species, but also that from the necessity of nature he is always in this sort of actual operation. It is proved first, because if an Angel can at once know all things that are represented through all the species that he has at once, it belongs to his perfection always to persevere in all those acts and never to cease from them. Therefore it is more likely that he always actually understands all those things. The consequence is proved, because it will be a greater perfection in this not to depend on the will, but to be determined by nature to this sort of complete second act, whether it is only one act or a collection of several. Just as in God it belongs to his perfection necessarily always actually to know all things that he can know, because he is able to know all those things at once. For in us, because we cannot know all things at once, it was necessary and belonged to the perfection of rational nature that it could freely apply itself to this or that cognition. But in Angels, if they can know at once all things of which they have species, that liberty was not necessary nor fitting, but it will be of greater perfection that from the necessity of nature they always have all those acts, and in this actuality and necessity more imitate the divine perfection.

4. Moreover, although the will of an Angel has some power in this, it cannot have a reasonable cause for ceasing from this actual consideration adequate to his intellect, because in it he is not tired nor wearied, nor is it necessary to cease from one act in order to have another. Why, therefore, will an Angel deprive himself of that ultimate perfection? Besides, some argue that the intelligible species is a form naturally acting. Therefore, once placed in the angelic intellect, it determines it so that it necessarily operates. Hence the collection of species will determine it to having cognition of all things at once. Finally, this opinion can be simply persuaded, because if an Angel ceases from one act, he will not be able again by himself, and from his purpose and intention, to apply himself to it. But this is a great imperfection. Therefore it must be said that he never ceases. The consequence is clear along with the minor. But the sequel is proved because an Angel cannot by himself be applied to something except through his will. But through his will he could not apply

himself to such an act from which he has ceased, that is, to thinking about heaven, or earth, or Rome, or another similar thing, because nothing is actually willed unless it is actually foreknown. But when the consideration of Rome ceases, Rome is now not actually known. Therefore neither can an Angel will anything concerning it. Therefore neither can he will to consider it, and consequently he will not be able to apply himself directly and by himself to such consideration.

5. *Durandus seems to teach the preceding opinion.*—And in this way Durandus seems to have thought, in 2, dist. 3, quest. 8. For he says that an Angel actually knows at once the things that can be naturally known by him, namely himself and all corruptible things, and all actually existing things that are not supernatural, and all effects necessarily future by reason of them; but not contingents, because the natural power of an Angel does not extend to them. *But as soon as they exist*, he says, *they are actually known by an Angel, even if they are internal acts of the will or intellect*. For Durandus himself does not posit that an Angel knows through species, but from the power alone of his natural light with the presence of a proportionate object. He thinks natural intelligible things have this presence to an Angel by the very fact that they exist in themselves or in natural and necessary causes. And from this he concludes that an Angel always actually understands all these things, because, he says, *each thing is understood through this, that it is present to the intellect*. But Durandus says nothing about past things, although since he asserts that an Angel always knows all present things, he consequently seems about to say that he always also knows past things by the force of that cognition that he had of them when they were present. But when Durandus so absolutely affirms that an Angel actually knows all these things, he sufficiently and more than sufficiently indicates that in that actual consideration he does not depend on the will, but by the very fact that the object is present in that mode devised by him, and that the Angel has intellectual light, he actually considers it by natural necessity. This is in the mode in which sight, when the visible is present, speaking in itself, necessarily sees as to exercise, and in this does not depend on the free will except insofar as it can turn aside or close the eyes or remove the object. For if Durandus did not think in this way about the intellect of an Angel, he could not with foundation affirm that an Angel always exercises a work depending on his liberty in exercise. Especially because he adds that an Angel knows all those things not only at once but also by a single act. But there is no doubt that he posits that an Angel is necessarily in some second act. Hence in the solution to the second he says that an Angel is not in potency with respect to actual cognition except in order to

supernatural things and future free things, and that with respect to these he is unlike God, but in the remaining things he is like God, in this, that with respect to them he is not in potency, but always in act.

6. *The true opinion.—Not all Angels can naturally know all things at once, even natural things of which they have species.*—Nevertheless the true opinion is that not all Angels can know at once all things that they can consider individually or successively, even from natural things, both things actually existing and things contained in them virtually or in potency, or even necessarily future things. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, cited quest. 58, art. 1, where Cajetan and the other moderns think the same. And Capreolus, 2, dist. 3, quest. 2, art. 1, concl. 9; Ferrariensis, 2, *Contra Gentiles*, ch. 101; Major, 2, dist. 3, quest. 8, where Bonaventure, Richard, Giles, Scotus, and others hold it as established; and Henry, *Quodlibet* 5, quest. 14. And first, that the opposite cannot be affirmed with foundation will easily be shown by solving the foundations of the other opinions. But now it is shown directly thus, because a greater power of understanding is required for considering many things at once than for contemplating only one of them, other things being equal in the perfection of the act and in other circumstances necessary on the part of the object. Therefore, with proportion, a greater power of understanding will be necessary for knowing at once many things in a greater number than fewer things, other things also being equal. Therefore the intellective power sufficient for contemplating at once all things that are in the world, and that occur and will occur by the necessity of nature, must be very great, by comparison with an intellect that can actually consider either a few things of the universe or only one thing. But it cannot be clear to us that all Angels have that greatest power of understanding, which can attend at once to all these things that are and occur in the world. For whence can we demonstrate or persuade this, since not all Angels are equally perfect? This whole discourse is evident, once that foundation taken in the first antecedent has been posited. For the other things follow by necessary proportion and inference. But that first foundation seems known from the terms, because for a more perfect and more difficult effect a greater and more perfect cause is necessary. But to know many things at once is without doubt more perfect and more difficult than only one of them. Therefore that principle, that a greater power is necessary for knowing many things at once than only one, is indeed evident.

7. Second, we prove the assertion directly and positively, so to speak, by supposing that an Angel knows through species, because Angels do not know all natural things through one species. Therefore they do not know all those things

at once in second act. The antecedent was proved above. The consequence is proved, because in cognition that occurs through species, an Angel cannot at once have except one act proportioned to one innate and universal species. Therefore neither can he know all things at once, but at most those things that can be represented through one species. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent will be treated more broadly in the following chapter. Now it is proved briefly, because infused species are given to Angels proportioned to the power and light of each one. Therefore, if the intellective power of any Angel were so efficacious and universal that he could at once actually contemplate all the things of the world, and know them as perfectly as if he knew each one individually, then certainly one species also would be given to each, through which he would know all those things. The consequence is proved, because on the part of the species there is no repugnance, because we suppose that universal and more universal species are possible, and in this ascent one can without repugnance arrive at that grade, for no special repugnance can be shown on the part of the species. And otherwise, on the part of the angelic intellect as receptive of species, there will be the greatest proportion to such a species, just as the act would be proportioned to understanding at once all things that are represented through such a species. Therefore, supposing this sort of capacity of the intellect, certainly such a species would be proportioned and connatural to it. Therefore, conversely, since it is clear that not all Angels have such species, it is a great argument that to each is given a species proportioned to the power he has for comprehending so many or more objects at once. Hence it follows consequently that each one can know at once only all those things that are represented through one species, and then that they cannot actually contemplate all things naturally intelligible by them. And for this reason in the conclusion I did not say that none of the Angels can contemplate all these things at once, because perhaps there is some Angel who understands all things through one species, as someone can suspect or contend concerning the supreme species of the supreme angelic order, not without probability, as was discussed above. But I said that not all Angels can do this, because we assert only this concerning all those understanding through several species, who are almost all or perhaps all, since only this is sufficiently shown by the reasons given.

8. *To the reason of the first opinion, in number two, from Gregory of Rimini. —In two ways one agent can operate through several actions at once.*—To the reason of Gregory, therefore, which directly militates against this last foundation, that principle is denied, namely that one partial principle coacting with other partial co-principles can equally operate several acts at once by

effecting them with those principles as it can operate one by effecting it with one partial co-principle. For one agent can be understood in two ways to operate two actions and effects at once through distinct forms or qualities. The first is that each form is the whole proximate principle of its action, but the suppositum is only denominated principal operator through those forms, and with respect to it the individual forms are called partial principles of operating. And in this way it is true that the same suppositum can equally well and easily operate two effects and actions at once through two forms, just as one through only the one. Because the suppositum itself does not confer special activity or influx through its entity, but only sustains the form or forms through which it acts; and so, strictly speaking, the whole power of acting belongs to the form. Therefore, when the forms are multiplied with the same proportion, the actions are multiplied; and thus water at once cools and moistens equally as if it effected only one of the two. But in another way one power operates with two forms, not only as sustaining them, but as proximately flowing in with all of them, and with each one completing the integral proximate principle of such an action. And then the principle taken by Gregory is false. For it is necessary that the power that cooperates at once with several forms operate more weakly with each, because, as I suppose, it is a finite power, which has a limited efficacy, and therefore when distributed among several, it must be diminished in each; and in that division it has a term, because this is not done mathematically, through proportional parts, but physically, through grades of activity necessary for individual effects.

9. *The preceding solution is clarified.*—And it can be clarified, for if a form or power is the total principle and immediately effects several actions, it is divided and diminished in each, and therefore it will necessarily have a term. But when it is a partial principle cooperating in the stated way with many, it preserves the same proportion with regard to what it contributes on its part to the action. Therefore the same reason applies in it. And it is clarified by sensible examples. For if someone has the strength for carrying a weight as ten, and he helps one person carry a weight as twenty, he will not be able at the same time to help another, even if he concurs partially with the first. And our imagination, if it attentively uses one phantasm, will not at the same time be able to operate equally easily with another, because it applies its own proper power with each. Nor does this come only from weakening, for immediately at the beginning of the action, before the power or organs have been wearied, that difficulty is felt as arising from that distraction of its proper active power. But every created intellect, even an angelic intellect, operates through several species by flowing in

with each toward individual acts by its own power, and it does not behave merely as sustaining the species, as I now suppose manifest from the common doctrine on the Soul and on vital acts. Therefore that principle applied to angelic cognition is false. Hence it also does not seem probable in this to equate the power of intellect as receptive of species with itself as active, because for receiving species, attention and actual influx and communication of its own perfection are not required, but they are required for understanding.

10. *To Gregory's example at the end of the same number 2.—Solution to the pressing objection.*—Nor does Gregory prove that principle. For the example of the visible object and light, which alone he brings forward, strictly takes something false, because light is not the partial principle of the visible species, but the object itself is the whole principle of its proper species. And then, even granting that antecedent, the same light is not cooperating with each sensible object, for each object can receive in itself a part of the light, and each is assisted by its proper light received in itself or conjoined to itself. Nor likewise does Gregory sufficiently solve all the things that he objects against his own opinion, especially this: that in any intellect it belongs to a greater power to operate at once through several species than through one alone, and then that to be able actively to operate at once with many and more species to infinity, however much they are multiplied, requires a certain infinity of active power, which it seems improbable to attribute to every angelic intellect. For if someone said that any Angel can through more universal and more universal species to infinity, if they are given to him, know adequately, he would certainly say something incredible through itself. But it is almost the same to be able to understand more and more things to infinity through several acts at once. But if Gregory presses concerning a power that alone can carry a weight as four, and joined together with another can carry a weight as eight without increase of itself, this is not to the point, because we do not say that some greater power is necessary in the intellect for operating with one species, but for cooperating at once with many. And so if that example is completed, it will rather prove the contrary, as I was saying a little earlier. For if one person wishes at once to carry with many persons various weights as eight, he will not be able unless his power is multiplied. Hence, stopping at one act of carrying a weight as eight together with another, in reality he effects no more than if alone he carried a weight as four, for to bear eight partially is the same as to bear four alone or totally.

11. *To the testimonies from Augustine.*—To the testimonies of Augustine that Gregory brings forward, we cannot respond fully here, because we have not yet spoken of evening and morning cognition, which Augustine treats there, and

we reserve that for the treatise on the Work of the Six Days, book 1, ch. 11. There, therefore, we will explain the mind of Augustine, for one of the difficulties of that opinion is what Augustine understood by morning cognition, and how through it he posited all things to be known at once by Angels. Now, therefore, we say first that, to save the opinion of Augustine, it suffices that in angelic nature taken indefinitely there can be an evening cognition so universal that it can contemplate at once all things made by God, at least with respect to those things that were created in the beginning, and refer them to the praise of God. But it is not necessary to attribute so perfect a cognition to individual Angels, nor did Augustine explain this. But that there is in some angelic order so great an excellence of understanding is not improbable. Indeed, for Augustine's intention it would be enough that in Angels taken together there could at once be those days through the morning and evening cognition of all things, even if not all things were at once in the minds of each, but some in these Angels, others in those, according to the distribution of divine wisdom. Likewise, Capreolus responds that Augustine's mind is not that an Angel knew all things in a moment of our time through evening cognition, but very briefly and with the highest speed, for this was enough for his intention. Finally, if perhaps Augustine exceeded in this by attributing more to Angels than was fitting, so that he could explain his opinion about the six days in angelic minds, just as we do not assent to that opinion of his, so neither is it necessary to believe the rest. Especially since the same Augustine in other places confesses that Angels do not know all things at once, but are moved through times according to various cognitions, as he declares in 8, *De Genesi ad litteram*, ch. 20 and 21, and book 9, ch. 14, at the end.

12. *To the arguments for the second opinion in number three.—To the second proof in number four.—To the final difficulty for the second opinion.*—To the things that we brought forward for the second opinion, I say that the former discourse proceeds sufficiently consequentially and probably, supposing the opinion of Gregory. Yet just as that opinion is false, so that whole discourse collapses when its foundation has been removed. Nevertheless, from it one could take an argument against Gregory by reducing it to an inconvenience, because from the opinion of Gregory it follows that an Angel not only can, but also actually does, consider all things at once from necessity. Since, therefore, he himself does not concede this, neither ought he to have asserted the first. But the things adduced for that opinion probably persuade the sequel. Still, they do not proceed simply, because if an Angel does not have the power to know all things at once, how will he be able always necessarily to have such cognition, since

even if he wills he cannot? To the second proof concerning species naturally acting, Henry, in the cited *Quodlibet* 5, quest. 14, because of a similar argument, denies species and posits a scientific habit, but without reason, because the same account applies to each, as I said above. Therefore I respond that species of themselves do not act naturally or freely, but are subordinated in acting to the power in which they are, just as other habits are. For they are not forms active through themselves, so to speak, as complete proximate principles, but are for assisting the power of the intellect and are as it were its instruments. And therefore they act when the intellect uses them. But the intellect by its nature is subordinated to the will with respect to the exercise of act, and therefore the activity of species also depends on the will. But the other difficulty touched on in the last place there, concerning the mode by which an Angel reduces himself from potency or first act to actual consideration, requires a special dispute and consideration, which we will later give.

13. *To the objections from Durandus in number 5.*—Finally, it is clear from what has been said what must be responded to Durandus, for partly he proceeds from false foundations, and partly he speaks without foundation. For what he supposes, that an Angel understands without species, is false. What he also supposes, that all Angels can at once know all things that are in the universe, and actually know their natures quidditatively, and contemplate at once all singulars and all things that occur in the world, is also false, as is clear from what has been said. Finally, in what he says, that they actually know all existing things below supernatural things, insofar as he includes free acts, he speaks falsely, as was said above. But as to other things, he speaks without foundation, even supposing the power in an Angel. For if he understands that an Angel freely has that actual cognition, without foundation he divines about the use of angelic liberty. But if he understands that an Angel is necessitated to this sort of actual consideration, he can assign no cause of such necessity. He will respond that he is necessitated by the presence of the object. But we will ask what he understands by presence. For if the discussion is about the presence of actual cognition, this presupposes cognition or is constituted by denomination from it. Therefore such presence cannot introduce the necessity of cognition. But if he calls the mere existence of the object presence, as he seems to think, this cannot introduce necessity into an Angel so that he attends, speaking of things outside the Angel, while we omit the special difficulty about the cognition of himself to be treated immediately, and also omit the speech of Angels, about which we have spoken above. For the remaining objects, although they exist, neither move nor excite an Angel. How, then, can they impose necessity on him, so that he

attends and actually considers them? Therefore that is said without foundation. Hence an Angel not only does not consider at once all things that occur, but also does not always attend to all particular things that occur, although he could attend to them if he wished, because this depends on his liberty, as we will say in the following chapters.

CHAPTER XXXV
WHETHER AN ANGEL IS NECESSARILY ALWAYS IN SOME SECOND ACT OF UNDERSTANDING

1. *Why in God there cannot be a cessation from the act of knowing, but not so in an Angel. — The twofold difficulty proposed in the title of the question.* — We have said that an Angel not only is not always in the greatest second act, so to speak, or in an act adequate to the whole extension of its object, but that he cannot even be so. On the contrary, it is manifest that he can be in some inadequate act, and as it were partial with respect to an adequate object, because he can actually understand. And likewise it is evident that he is not always determined to one and the same particular act, as the divine intellect is determined to one perpetual intellection, because in God that determination pertains to perfection, both because it is adequate to the divine intellect and to every intelligible object by him, and because it is not distinguished from his substance, and because in itself it is altogether immutable. But in an Angel, once his limitation in understanding is supposed, it would be a great imperfection always and necessarily to be in consideration of the same object, and never to be able to be applied to considering others, and by time to be changed from one act to another, as Augustine speaks. Therefore a twofold difficulty remains. One is whether he has some singular act in which he necessarily always perseveres. The other is whether at least he is always and necessarily in some act, speaking confusedly, although the determination to this or that, or the change from this into that, is free. The former must be treated in the present chapter, the latter in the following.

2. *The first difficulty is treated. — The first affirmative opinion is common, and St. Thomas indicates it.*—Concerning the first, the chief difficulty is about the act by which an Angel knows himself through his own substance: whether by necessity of nature an Angel is brought to understand himself, or whether according to his freedom he can suspend even the actual intellection of himself. On this point the common opinion is that this act is natural to an Angel, so that it is not in his power to suspend it. St. Thomas suggests this opinion in the first

part, Quest. 56, art. 1, reply to 3, insofar as he indicates that the angelic intellect is not in potency to knowledge of itself. Likewise, book 2, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 97, where he teaches that an Angel always and necessarily actually understands; nevertheless he does not say that he always understands himself, nor does he say that he always understands the same object or by the same act. And although he says that *the operation of Angels is continuous*, he is not speaking of proper continuity, such as that of quantity, but as it is opposed to cessation from operating. Hence that continuity could be either in the same act or in a continuous passage from one act to another without interruption through the suspension of every act. Yet in the eighth question *De Veritate*, art. 6, reply to 7, he expressly says that the intellect of an Angel is not in potency with respect to his own essence, but is always in act; but with respect to other intelligibles, it can be in potency. Hence he is evidently speaking of potency to second act, because with respect to first act an Angel is not in potency, even in order to other intelligible objects. But in art. 14, reply to 6, he expressly says *that the mind of an Angel always actually understands itself*. Hence, in the first part, Quest. 58, art. 1, he only said indefinitely that an Angel, as to second act, can be in potency with respect to the things which he naturally knows. He did not say, *with respect to all things*. Hence he adds: *he does not always actually consider all the things that he naturally knows*. He did not, however, say *none of them*, or anything similar. Indeed, in the solution to the third he says: *Nor is the intellect of an Angel in potency in such a way that it is without act*. And in 2, distinction 11, quest. 2, or 1 of the second part, art. 3, reply to 4, he says that an Angel is always in consideration of himself.

3. And this opinion is followed by Capreolus, 2, distinction 3, quest. 2, art. 3, reply to 2; Aureolus, against the ninth conclusion and reply to 6 against the same conclusion, previously placed in second place after the arguments of Gregory; Cajetan, on the said Quest. 58, art. 2; Ferrara, on the said chapter 97; Durandus, distinction 3, quest. 8, number 6, although he asserts the same about other objects. Hervaeus also agrees, 2, distinction 3, quest. 4, reply to 1, and Aegidius there, in part 2 of the distinction, quest. 2, art. 1, doubt 1, reply to 2. There he says that an Angel can understand himself more intensely and less intensely, but never cease altogether from knowledge of himself. The foundations of this opinion are various. The first is that that knowledge is a perfection of an Angel and does not impede other perfections. Therefore there is no reason why an Angel would wish to cease from it; therefore he never ceases. The second is that otherwise an Angel could cease from every vital second act. But the consequent seems unfitting. Therefore. The inference is proved: because

if he can cease from knowledge of himself, therefore he can cease from any other knowledge. But the minor is proved: because no living thing ceases altogether from the operation of life, but has some operation altogether natural to it. Therefore also an intellectual living thing, since it is more perfect, ought to have some operation of life from which it never ceases, and therefore especially knowledge of itself. Third, because an Angel understands himself through his own essence, which he always has present, and by which he is always informed in intelligible being. Therefore he also always understands himself.

4. *The second opinion, that of Vázquez, against the preceding.*—Against this opinion Vázquez tacitly thinks, in the first part, disputation 219, chapter 3, where he admits that there is no theologian who has asserted that an Angel can cease from knowledge of himself; yet he says that it cannot be sufficiently proved that the Angel necessarily endures in that act, and he solves the stated foundations and incidentally attacks that opinion. First, because there is nothing that necessarily moves an Angel to knowledge of himself. Therefore he will be able freely to cease from it. Nor is it an obstacle that in the first reason it was objected that an Angel is not impeded by knowledge of himself from other acts of knowing. Both because, even if he is not impeded, he can cease according to his freedom; and also because perhaps he is impeded, since while he is considering himself he cannot consider as many other objects as he could if he ceased from knowledge of himself. Second, in a purely intellectual nature, because it is perfect, every operation of life is voluntary to it, and this pertains to its perfection. Therefore it is not surprising that according to its will it can cease from every operation of life. And thus the second contrary foundation is solved. Hence he objects third, because that argument also seems to assume something false. For although vegetative and sensitive living beings, as to merely natural action, cannot cease, animals do cease from every operation of sense, and a human being from every operation of intellect. Therefore an Angel too will be able to cease. Fourth, because an Angel could always be in an actual operation of life even if he ceased from knowledge of himself; for he could cease from any designated act, although confusedly, or collectively, he could not cease from every act. Fifth, the final reason of the prior opinion seems to be of little weight, because although an Angel knows himself through his own essence, the essence is not the intellection of himself, but is by way of a species. Hence, just as an Angel can cease from the use of other species, even though he has them from the beginning, so also he will be able to cease from the use of the essence by way of species. And in this way Gregory seems to have hesitated about this opinion, or to have been doubtful, in distinction 11, quest. 2, where in the final words of

the question he leaves undecided whether through his freedom an Angel can simply deprive himself of every intellection.

5. *First conclusion. — An Angel cannot cease from every act of cognition.*— Nevertheless, I judge first of all that an Angel cannot deprive himself of every intellection, or suspend every act of intellect, for this comes back to the same thing; because without an act of intellect no act of will endures, and besides these there is no act of life in Angels. St. Thomas proves this, in the cited book 2, *Contra Gentiles*, by four reasons, from which one effective reason can be gathered. Namely, always to be in second act is a perfection simply simple, which God has through essence, and which the heavenly bodies and other lower living things participate in their own way insofar as they are capable. Therefore it is very likely that intellectual creatures demand this perfection by their own nature, and as to the lack of such perfection are not subject to their own will or freedom. And in this sense the reason that can be constructed from the first and second foundation of the first opinion is sufficiently effective. For both tend to this, as will be explained more in the course of the argument.

6. Second, we can argue for the same conclusion: because, in order for an Angel to suspend every act of intellect, it is necessary that he do this voluntarily. But he cannot voluntarily do this. Therefore he absolutely cannot. The major is proved, because after an Angel has an act of intellect, in order for him to remain in it an actual will is not necessary, but it is sufficient that a contrary will not be present, because the will was necessary only as applying the intellect. But after the intellect has been applied, it alone, through the species that it has in itself, elicits the act. Therefore it will always endure in that act if it is not called away by the will. The consequence is proved, because the intellect of itself is a natural potency, and therefore it cannot by itself, and as it were intrinsically, suspend the act. Therefore unless the will intervenes to recall it, it will always endure in that act. For I suppose that in an Angel there are no other natural impediments that can interrupt attention, as are found in us. Therefore, if in the intellect of an Angel there is a suspension from every act, it must be from the command of the will. Therefore the minor is proved, namely that this involves a repugnance, because that will must be a positive act. Therefore that act supposes an act of intellect. But the will cannot by the same act will to suspend the act of intellect on which that very act of will is founded. Therefore it cannot simply will to suspend every act of intellect. The minor is proved, because the intellect of an Angel obeys the will at a nod, since it is not impeded by troublesome phantasms, as ours is. Therefore in the same instant in which the will wills that the intellect have some act, the intellect has it; for I suppose that the will is

efficacious, and consequently is concerned with an act that is in the power of the intellect. And by the same reason conversely, if through the will it efficaciously wills that the intellect not operate, the intellect ceases from operation, although for that same instant it cannot cease from that act of will. Therefore it is repugnant that it efficaciously will to cease from every act of intellect, because it will both cease in the same instant on account of the efficacy of the will, and it will not cease, because since there is then a volition, there cannot be no thought.

7. *Escape. — It is destroyed. — Whether human beings can cease from every act of intellect.*—Perhaps it will be said that he can efficaciously will to cease from every act immediately after this, and so also cease from that actual will. But against this: because what an actual efficacious will does not accomplish when the act is present, it will not be able to accomplish immediately after the act of will has ceased, because what does not exist no longer moves or impedes, especially since it leaves behind no power. And thus it is most probable to me that human beings cannot in that way, through a direct will, cease from every thought of the intellect; but if at times they cease altogether, this is because the imagination is not aroused either by external senses or by internal images, nor is it disposed to cooperate with the intellect. Hence also in an Angel the same is very probable to me because of the reason given, even though otherwise in individual acts he would have freedom as to exercise, as will be explained more in the following point. Third, that total suspension of thought seems especially repugnant to an Angel, because then it would be impossible for him to return to thinking from within, which seems very repugnant to the perfection of an Angel, as already seems clear.

8. *Second conclusion. — An Angel cannot cease from knowledge of himself.* — Hence, therefore, I say further that an Angel cannot in particular suspend the consideration and intellection of himself. Besides the authority of the theologians, this opinion is especially persuasive to me because of the reason just touched upon. For if he ceased from knowledge of himself, afterward he could not freely apply himself to thinking anything. The consequent is very absurd. Therefore. The inference is proved: because either an Angel, by ceasing from knowledge of himself, ceases at the same time from every other thought, or he remains in some thought. If the first is said, consequently it must also be said that he ceases from every act of will, because nothing is willed unless it is first known. From where, then, will he afterward begin to operate by intellect or will? Not indeed from the will, because it is necessary that the intellect go before. But if from the intellect, then not freely, nor from himself, because the intellect exercises an act freely only when it is moved by the will. But if the

second is said, namely, that although an Angel ceases from knowledge of himself, he does not cease from every act, but operates through some species, the same argument returns with respect to all the other things that he does not actually consider. For how will he voluntarily apply himself to considering all those things, or this or that, when he does not have an act of intellect on which such a will can be founded? For the sole thought in which he perseveres does not propose the other unconsidered objects, or the acts that can be concerned with them, because it is neither a direct thought of those objects, nor a reflex thought about the possible thought of them. Therefore that thought is not sufficient for an Angel to be able freely to apply himself to considering other objects. Therefore, at least for this end, it is necessary that an Angel always remain immobile in the consideration of himself, so that that knowledge of himself can be the foundation of other acts of cognition as to their free exercise.

9. *Ferrara's evasion. — It is rejected from Augustine.* — To this reason one can respond with Ferrara, 2, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 101, doubt 1, reply to 2, at the end, that it is not necessary for actual knowledge to precede every volition, but habitual knowledge suffices; and therefore, in order that an Angel will to use one of the species that he has, the habitual notice which he has through the species itself suffices, without actual knowledge, together with the freedom of the one understanding. But this is repugnant to all reason, because the principle of Augustine, book 10, *De Trinitate*, chapter 1, that the will is not borne toward the unknown, is understood of actual cognition, and the same reason applies in every volition. For habitual science, or a species, if it does not actually propose the object, cannot arouse or move the will, as is self-evident and will be said more broadly in the treatise *De Anima*.

10. *Another evasion of Gregory. — Its first persuasion.* — Gregory responds otherwise, 2, dispute 11, quest. 1, reply to the first principal argument against the second conclusion, saying that it is not necessary for an elicited volition to precede every freely elicited knowledge. He tries to explain and persuade this by a rather obscure discourse about direct and reflex knowledge, because a human being sometimes knows some direct object before he knows reflexively that he knows it, and afterward freely begins to have that reflex act, about which no thought has preceded, and consequently no volition either. Therefore that reflex knowledge occurs freely without a preceding volition. Otherwise one would have to proceed to infinity in notices, if a volition had to precede before each of them. And earlier, in the solution of the second objection made against the second conclusion, he suggests another reason. Because in order that an Angel cease from an act of intellect, it is not necessary that a volition precede, but it is

enough that he perseveres by not willing. Therefore similarly, in order that he begin to understand, it is not always necessary that a volition precede.

11. *It is attacked.* — But this response can in no way be sustained, because there cannot be a free act except either through the formal freedom of the eliciting potency, or through the freedom of another potency moving it, or through denomination from its act. But an act elicited by the intellect cannot be free through the formal freedom of the eliciting potency, because the intellect is not a formally free potency. Therefore, in order that it be free, it is necessary that it participate freedom through the motion and denomination of the moving potency. But this potency moving the intellect can only be the will, and the will cannot freely move the intellect except through a volition that precedes the act of intellect. Therefore, in order that a notice, or an act of intellect, be freely elicited, it is necessary that a freely elicited volition precede, from which the intellection is denominated free. This is a moral demonstration, granted the principles assumed in the antecedent, which I suppose as certain from Metaphysics and which we shall show in the third treatise: that the intellect is not a formally free potency, but the will alone, which is the chief foundation. Once this is posited, the falsity of the proposition assumed by Gregory is evidently established. And it is confirmed, because when an Angel uses a determinate species, he does not do this by chance, nor from necessary determination. Therefore he must do it from his own intention, which is an act of the will and a certain volition.

12. *To the first persuasion of Gregory in number ten. — Free thought begins in one of two ways. — The first way.*—But to Gregory's prior persuasion, which assumes that a human being can have direct knowledge of some object without reflex knowledge of the prior direct knowledge, and afterward can freely have such reflex knowledge without a prior volition, the assumption is denied as to this latter part, which coincides with the conclusion to be proved. Hence I say that either the reflex knowledge does not begin freely when it afterward occurs, or, if it begins freely, a free volition precedes by which it is commanded. Nor does an infinite process follow, because finally one must stop in some non-free thought. This is briefly explained in us: because often we have the first direct knowledge without the motion of the will, and therefore not freely, as in first thoughts, by which we are involuntarily anticipated and think of something without adverting to what we are thinking, and consequently without directly willing the thought. Then the thought is natural and not free, and it is usually called a first-first movement. Then, therefore, it is impossible for us to have reflex knowledge freely, that is, to advert to the thought that we have, unless

some arousal precedes from God, an Angel, or another object, or from a phantasm, which in some way makes us advert. And then neither the first thought nor the advertence, or reflex knowledge, is free, until the will in some way intervenes and consents, either directly or at least indirectly by not restraining the thought when it already can. For although in order freely to begin an act of intellect, a positive act of the will applying the intellect is necessary, nevertheless after the intellect has naturally begun the act, in order that it endure freely in it, it is enough that the will freely does not restrain the thought or turn the intellect away to other things, when now this had been in its power, by means of reflex knowledge, as I have explained. But all this has no place in Angels, because they do not have those natural movements of intellect, as we shall now say.

13. *The second way.* — In another way, however, it also happens in us that the direct thought of some object is free from the beginning, because a free will to think about that thing precedes. Then, however, reflex knowledge about the direct thought necessarily precedes, not as already made, because it is not yet supposed, but as possible and suitable, or delightful, or honorable. And on this thought of a thought another will is founded, namely the will to think directly about such a thing. But that prior reflex thought will not be free, but will come from without; and thus there is never free thought without a prior will, nor does one proceed to infinity, because the stopping point is in some non-free thought. And this, with proportion, is also necessary in Angels for the thing we say, namely that natural thought about himself is necessary.

14. *To Gregory's second persuasion in the same number ten.*—And from this the other reason of Gregory remains solved, because the reason is very different for the continuation of an act and for its inception. For a free act cannot begin without a mover freely moving. But when it is not free as elicited, but only as commanded, it can endure without the actual motion of the will, because after it has been made it no longer depends in being conserved upon a positive motion of the will, but it is enough that it not be impeded or interrupted by it. It is true, however, that in that case the continuation of the thought is not free by a new direct freedom, but only by the freedom of the first motion. I say *direct*, because if during the whole time in which the thought endures it is in the power of the will to remove the thought, and it ought to remove it, and does not do so, then the continuation itself is indirectly free. And by like reason, in order that the lack of thought be indirectly free, it could be sufficient that the will freely not apply the intellect. But in order that such non-application be free, it is necessary that some thought, as it were reflex, about the other direct thought should

precede, although this one is not free. Just as the omission of prayer cannot be free unless prayer itself first comes somehow into the mind, as is manifest from I-II, Quest. 6.

15. *At what point intellection can cease, both necessarily and freely.* — But on the contrary, after the intellect has begun some thought, in us it can indeed cease naturally because of the distraction of the imagination or a new motion of the senses. But freely a human being cannot cease from that thought unless a positive act of the will precedes. Because the intellect through itself cannot suspend its influence, since it is not free. Therefore it is necessary that it do this through the command of the will, and that command in itself cannot be except through a positive act. Hence, while the will behaves negatively, whether without advertence or with it, it rather permits and leaves the intellect to remain in the thought it had begun. And thus in Angels, in order that they can freely cease from acts of intellect, a preceding free volition is necessary, which cannot exist without a prior thought; and that thought cannot always be free, lest one proceed to infinity. Therefore one must stop in some natural thought, which can be none other than knowledge of oneself.

16. *According to Vázquez's opinion, in an Angel all first thoughts except knowledge of himself are necessary. — And sent by God.* — Nevertheless, Father Vázquez, disputation 221, chapter 4, while he grants against Gregory that a thought cannot be free without a prior volition, lest he admit that thought about oneself in an Angel is natural and necessary, denies that the other first thoughts of Angels are free. And he says that whenever an Angel begins to use a new species of his intellect, by thinking about a thing altogether distinct from the thing about which he was previously thinking, his intellect is moved naturally by some extrinsic mover, and therefore by God himself. For the angelic intellect can be moved by no other extrinsic created cause, as he admits, not only in the cognition of universal things, but also in the intuitive cognition of singulars, indeed even in the cognition by which he hears another speaking, because no extrinsic cause can physically act upon an Angel. Nor can an Angel from within apply himself to a new thought; not naturally, for what principle intrinsic to an Angel of such natural motion can be conceived? Nor freely, because before the first thought the use of freedom cannot precede, since the will is not borne toward the unknown. Therefore it is necessary that that thought come from God himself. And he attributes this opinion to Capreolus, 2, distinction 3, quest. 2, art. 3, reply to 8 against the ninth conclusion, after Gregory's arguments, and to St. Thomas, I-II, Quest. 9, art. 4, and Quest. 109, art. 2, insofar as he says that

first cognition is from the author of nature, as he also explains at length in Quest. 6, *De Malo*, the single article.

17. *The immediately preceding opinion is attacked.* — But this opinion rests on no other foundation except that the way of saving the freedom of an Angel in the use of his intelligible species, by positing that the cognition of himself and of the species that he has in himself is perpetual and necessary, does not have certainty, and therefore is not a firm foundation. But that very foundation is far weaker and more uncertain. For in a matter that has not been revealed and cannot be demonstrated from sensible things, we have a much greater foundation of authority and reason for asserting that an Angel always and naturally knows himself than for denying it. Therefore, for our capacity, that should be judged a sufficiently firm foundation for saving the freedom of an Angel in other thoughts, if it can be done fittingly. I add also that, if no other foundation remained, this one from a posteriori ought to be judged sufficient, since in it neither repugnance nor difficulty of great moment appears. This is proved, because from the contrary opinion it follows that an Angel has no free thought as to exercise, that is, that he cannot freely apply himself to thinking this or that. But this appears incredible. Therefore. The inference is admitted in that opinion as to all first thoughts of an Angel, and this itself is difficult enough to believe, because a great imperfection and limitation are attributed to an Angel without foundation. Yet from it further seems to follow that all thoughts of an Angel are necessary from without, and that none can be free, which is incredible. I prove the inference, because every thought of an Angel, at least direct thought, seems to be first. For here we call *first* that thought which cannot proceed freely from another prior thought. But every thought of an Angel, according to this opinion, is such. Therefore every thought is first, and therefore not free.

18. *The aforesaid attack.* — Hence we suppose the major from the common explanation of the words themselves. For the first thought of an Angel is not here called the thought which he had from the beginning in his creation, about which there is a special reason, as we shall say below when treating the sin of Angels. Rather, that thought is called first which is first in each affair, or which is not aroused by another preceding thought, as in us that thought is called first which first occurs at the beginning of any day, or which begins in us when we were thinking of a thing far different and having no connection with the other. Therefore in this sense we infer from the stated opinion that every thought of an Angel is first, and therefore is not free. The inference is therefore proved, because when an Angel is applied to the thought of some thing, by that very fact

he at the same time thinks about every thing that has a necessary connection with the object of that thought, or he simultaneously has every thought that can be aroused by force of that first thought, whether that is one thought in reality and many only according to reason, or many in reality and one by connection and order. For in either way, that whole thought is made by way of one. Therefore if the first application to thinking is natural, the whole thought is natural on account of the necessary connection, and thus the whole is first insofar as it is one. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is proved, because the angelic intellect, once applied, acts as much as it can, because there is nothing to impede or detain it. Therefore if it is applied to thinking about some object, it immediately thinks about every thing to which it can be aroused by force of such a thought. Therefore it can never freely apply itself to thinking something new, beyond that which from the beginning it once thought by force of the application. It thinks about all things necessarily concurring with the thing about which it has been compelled to think. Therefore that thought cannot serve it in order that it apply itself by its own will to thinking about other things, because those other things are then offered to the mind, neither directly nor indirectly, as thinkable. Therefore neither can the will move the intellect to think about them.

19. But that this should not be granted is proved first, because thus an Angel would never have free thought as to exercise, and consequently no lack of consideration could be imputed to him, because if considering is not in my power, neither will lack of consideration be imputed to me. But the consequent is against the theologians who say that an Angel sins from lack of consideration. Second, it would follow from this that it is not in the power of an Angel to turn away from or remove the thought that he received from God, which at once appears absurd. The inference is proved, because either an Angel turns away one thought by passing to another, and he will not be able to do this, because he cannot freely apply himself to another thought, as has been deduced; or he turns away the thought as it were privatively, by suspending it, and this, speaking consequently, seems impossible, both because if the intellect of an Angel by its own nature is not subject to the will as to eliciting thought, there is no reason why it should be subject as to suspending it; and also because that suspension cannot occur without a positive will, nor can that will be had without a new thought, but this thought will not be in the power of the Angel. I see that it can be responded that the thought of an Angel is reflex in an eminent and simple way, for while he thinks, by the same act he knows that he thinks, and this is sufficient for him to be able to have a will not to think. But then the difficulty

touched upon above presses: for how will an Angel through the will suspend that same thought of the intellect in which the same volition is founded? Likewise it is not enough that he know that he thinks in order to will to suspend the thought, but it is necessary that he think it good, useful, or suitable to suspend the thought. This is not thought without a new act. But to this thought the Angel will not be able to apply himself by his will, for for this volition he would need another thought, and so one would proceed to infinity.

20. *It is uncertain whether a guardian Angel sees in the Word all things pertaining to his office.* — Third, in the thoughts of demons, it seems to have a peculiar absurdity to say that all are sent into them by God, and that they have them not from their wicked will, but by necessity imposed by God. For the thoughts of demons are most evil and proportioned to their wicked intention and will. Therefore it must in no way be believed that they proceed from divine premotion and the necessary application of God, but from their free and wicked will. Fourth, it is difficult to understand how the holy Angels can perform their ministries in a moral and fitting way if they cannot freely apply themselves to thinking these or those things. For if the guardian Angel of Peter, for example, is now not thinking about him, but about another thing altogether distinct, he will not afterward be able to apply himself to the office of guarding Peter, nor to thinking about him, unless he first receives that thought extrinsically from God. And the same must be said in each single occasion, which seems alien both to angelic perfection and to fitting providence. For it would be easier for God, so to speak, to arouse or guard Peter immediately than to arouse the Angel to help him. Perhaps it will be said that the holy Angels see in the Word all things that pertain to their state, and therefore through the vision of God are applied to their ministries in all opportunities that occur. Nevertheless, what is assumed is uncertain, namely that the holy Angels see all these things in the Word as to all occurring circumstances. And besides, the beatific vision is not of itself necessary for such ministries and operations of Angels, whom we are now considering precisely insofar as they can operate morally and freely through the species and principles of knowing that they have about things in their proper genus, whether in the state of nature or of grace, setting aside the beatific state, which is extrinsic and as it were accidental to the proper change of Angels, whether in thoughts or in actions.

21. *The first opinion in number two is approved and proposed more fully.* — For these reasons, therefore, the opinion posited above has always greatly pleased me, which says that an Angel naturally always intuits himself, and by intuiting himself sees the species that he has in himself, and in them at least

confusedly and imperfectly knows of what things they are species. For, as I said above in treating the speech of Angels, once an intentional likeness is seen, the thing represented through it is known in some way; not perfectly when the species is not the reason for knowing, but a known medium, for then the represented thing is not seen immediately and in itself, but is seen imperfectly and confusedly. Yet this suffices so that, given this natural cognition, an Angel freely wills to use this or that species, and consequently to think distinctly about this or that thing. And likewise it suffices so that after he has thought about some thing, he can freely cast aside that thought and assume another species for thinking according to his freedom. Thus Aegidius taught, from the cited authors, in the said solution, reply to 2, saying that an Angel always intuits himself and all the species that he has: *And hence he can freely turn himself upon this species and upon that one, because otherwise he would use this species or that by chance*, that is, apart from his intention, which he judges unfitting, even if with respect to God it would not happen by chance but from the motion of God. Ferrara approves the same opinion, 2, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 101, doubt 1, reply to 2. And it is taken from St. Thomas there, insofar as he says: *Since an intellectual substance is mistress of its act, it is in its power, after it has an intelligible species, to use it by actually understanding, or, if it has many, to use whichever one it wishes.* There he does not reduce such determination to God determining the intellect to the use of such a species, but to the free volition of the Angel. Hence he necessarily supposes that the Angel has a prior cognition of the species, which can only be natural and not free.

22. *It is proved by reason.* — The reason for this opinion is that nature does not fail in necessary things. But for Angels, in order to exercise their own intellectual and free life in a fitting way, some natural or necessary act is necessary by which they fully intuit themselves, which can be the origin and, as it were, foundation of the first volition and of other thoughts. Therefore it seems very credible that such an act has been given to Angels by nature. And this confirms the saying of the Commentator, in the book *De Caelo*, commentary 8, that in all things all non-uniform motions must be reduced to some uniform motion, especially when they need that motion so that they may be founded on it. It is added that such necessity of that act is not against the perfection of an Angel, because to be in actual knowledge of oneself is in itself a great perfection; and to be able to lack that act does not pertain to perfection. Indeed, that object, namely, the lack of such an act, is so contrary to the angelic nature itself that it does not seem appetible by it, just as the non-being of one's proper suppositum is not of itself appetible to the will of the same suppositum. Therefore it was not

necessary, nor fitting, that such an act be subject to the will as to exercise, but rather that it follow upon the substance of an Angel, joined at the same time to his intellect, by way of a natural property. For it is not repugnant to a vital action to follow in this way from the principle of life by a necessary vital emanation, just as the motion of the heart and other natural motions, or motions of the lungs, follow upon the sensitive or vegetative soul. For although this necessity in these living beings supposes imperfection and a need to guard themselves from contraries and to preserve life, which necessity is not found in Angels, nevertheless in Angels there is another imperfection, namely not always to be in a completed intellectual act, and a capacity for change from one intellection into another; by reason of this, it is necessary for an Angel to have this natural act of knowledge of himself, which knowledge is as it were the foundation of other intellectual changes, so that they can be exercised in a perfect way, freely and from within.

23. *The first objection against the immediately preceding reason.* — But although this reason, according to the capacity of the matter, is sufficiently effective, nevertheless in order that it be more solid it is necessary to satisfy some objections that occur. Let the first be this: because the discourse proceeds only about knowledge of the substance, but proves nothing about knowledge of the species. Therefore the force of that reason is none, because that knowledge of oneself contributes little to the use of other thoughts. The consequence is proved, because for the aforesaid end the perpetual presence of the proper substance alone does not suffice, unless the intelligible species are also always actually known, because this knowledge is necessary so that the will can freely will that the intellect use this or that species. But the first antecedent is clear, because that knowledge of oneself, if it is necessary, only results naturally from the intellect of an Angel as informed in intelligible being by his substance. Therefore necessary knowledge of himself alone immediately follows from this, not knowledge of the species. The antecedent is proved, because the intellect of an Angel is not informed, as it were naturally and from within, except by his own substance alone. For species are added to it from without by the providence of the author of nature. Therefore by force of the intrinsic denomination, at most there immediately follows knowledge of the proper substance. And from this it is further proved that that knowledge is not extended to the species, because those species do not flow intrinsically from the substance or intellect, nor are they known in it as in a root or as a property in an essence. Therefore by force of such knowledge they are not necessarily known; indeed, they cannot even be known, because a receptive potency alone is not sufficient for the form to be

known in it. A sign of this is that if God had not infused species into the Angel, the Angel would know himself in the same way and would know no species. Or if God were to create other things, he would have placed other species in the Angel, which are not now known by force of the knowledge of the substance of the Angel. Therefore this is a sign that even now the Angel does not know the species that he has by force of the knowledge of his own substance.

24. *Solution. — An Angel necessarily always knows not only himself, but also all things that inhere in him.* — To this argument I concede, first, that according to the aforesaid reason and discourse it must consequently be asserted not only that the knowledge of his own substance and intellect is perpetual and necessary in an Angel, but also the actual knowledge of the species; for the objection made establishes this. Then I concede that an Angel does not know the species that he has in himself by force of the knowledge of his substance, nor through that knowledge alone as having the role of an intelligible species, nor even through it as through a cause; for all this is effectively proved by the objection made. Nevertheless, I add that an Angel always perfectly intuits himself, not only as to substance and potencies, but also as to all forms and perfections existing in them. To this cognition he is naturally determined, because all of it is necessary, both for the greater perfection and actuality of the Angel and especially for the free use of his potencies. Or, so to speak, so that he may be in a complete first act for using his will and intellect in his other acts. For although this perfect cognition of himself is in itself a second and ultimate act in that natural order, nevertheless in order to the subsequent acts it is compared as a first act, insofar as it disposes to them and places the Angel as it were in the final preparation. But in this cognition, insofar as it is terminated at the species and at the known object, the proximate principle of knowing is not the essence, but the species themselves, and the direct and proximate terminus are at the same time the species themselves. For they are actually intelligible objects and are per se united to the intellect, which is not impeded nor dependent upon phantasms. And therefore, just as the essence determines the potency to knowledge of itself, so too do the species. Or certainly the intellect itself is determined by nature to intuite always itself and all things that it has in itself, so that afterward it can use itself also with all its acts or species fittingly, and in a way accommodated to its nature and perfection.

25. *Second objection.* — But it is objected secondly: for either the Angel understands all these things naturally by one simple act, or by many. Not by one, both because that cognition is immediately from many species and from the essence by way of species, and because that cognition can be changed, at least by

increase. For intelligible species can be multiplied in an Angel, especially according to our opinion posited above concerning the speech of Angels and concerning the cognition of past things through species left by acts. For just as the species are increased, so it will be necessary for their perpetual cognition to be increased because of the same use. But the same simple act cannot be increased according to extension. Nor does it seem that so many acts can be multiplied at once, because otherwise they will be multiplied to infinity with the multiplication of thoughts and speeches among Angels through all eternity, since new species will always be added and consequently new acts by which they are always known. But this seems incredible. Indeed, it is absolutely difficult to believe that so many acts are made at once by an Angel as he has intelligible species, besides the knowledge of his own substance and of other things.

26. *Response. — From many intelligible species an Angel can elicit one act. — Whether the same act can be extended to new objects by only a new mode.* — I respond that, since an Angel intuits himself with all his accidents by way of one adequate object, no such power or attention is necessary for that cognition as would seem to exceed the capacity of the angelic intellect. But once this is posited, it does not matter much whether he knows himself completely by one act or by many acts that are as it were partial. Either can be probably conceived, although neither can be defined with certainty. For first, even if the species are distinct, nevertheless with the intellect and substance of the Angel they compose one actually intelligible object, and therefore all those forms or entities together can partially concur by way of one proximate principle for eliciting one act. But afterward, if an Angel acquires new species of the same order, as it were contingently, it is indeed credible that once they have been acquired they are always seen; for this is very consequential upon the other things we have said. Yet that cognition can perhaps be had without a new distinct act through some new mode naturally added to the prior act. And perhaps this is what Aegidius meant above when saying: *An Angel can have this act of knowledge of himself full and diminished, but never simply fall away from it.* For I see no other fullness or diminution that that act can have. For in its proper intensity, which is taken from the effort of the potency, that act does not seem to admit of more and less, since that act is natural, and therefore is always made by the whole natural effort by which it can be made, or which is necessary and sufficient. Therefore it seems to be understood of fullness on the part of the object, which first can be lesser and afterward in some measure increased in the aforesaid way, although after the increase it cannot afterward be diminished in that respect. Then, it is not impossible that several acts be conjoined there: one as it were foundational and

primary, which is quidditative cognition of the Angel himself as to his substance and potencies; and secondary acts by which he intuits his species, and especially those which come contingently. For that increase of the same indivisible act by extension to new objects and by a new mode added to it is difficult to understand. And that distinction of acts increases the difficulty little or not at all, because since they are ordered to one thing, there is no greater attention of the potency, nor is a greater power necessary. Indeed, it is more difficult and requires greater power to conceive so many and such varied things by one simple act.

27. *Third objection. — It is dissolved.* — The third objection is that from this it follows either that an Angel knows at once all the things of which he has species, or that that knowledge of the species is useless for their free use. This is proved, because either by knowing his intelligible species an Angel knows what thing each one represents, and so he will know at once all the things of which he has species; or he only knows the species as it were materially, as to that quality, and so afterward he will not be able by force of such knowledge freely to use this or that species to know this or that thing, because he does not know what thing each represents. But to this one must respond by conceding that an Angel knows the species themselves perfectly and quidditatively, and consequently knows in some way what each represents, and so in some way knows all things at once, as they are the termini of that representation. Nevertheless, through that act, or those acts, he does not know all things simply, distinctly, and quidditatively. Because, as we said above, although, when an act of understanding or a mental word is known as object, the thing represented through it is known in some way, nevertheless it is not seen directly in itself, as it is seen through a proper word directly representing its object. Therefore the same must be said about an intelligible species, because it too represents intentionally, and although through it as through a medium not known the thing is seen perfectly, nevertheless through the same species as a known medium the thing is only indirectly and in a qualified sense attained. Therefore in this way an Angel can simultaneously attain imperfectly the things that the individual species represent. And this is enough so that afterward he can freely use this or that species for knowing individual things directly and perfectly. For in that perfect way an Angel cannot know at once all the things represented through his species, and about that way we spoke above. And thus all things are easily reconciled.

28. *Final objection.* — Finally, it can be objected that if in this way an Angel reduces himself into second act of cognition, it follows that the first act of thinking something outside himself, which an Angel had in his creation, was

free to him and not from the author of nature. The consequent seems false. Therefore. The inference is proved, because even in that first instant the Angel first by nature naturally knows himself before he thinks about other things. Therefore immediately, in the same instant of time, with posteriority of nature, he could freely apply himself to considering this or that, because for the use of freedom priority of nature suffices, as is established. The minor is proved first, and especially according to the opinion of St. Thomas, who indeed says that the first act of thought of a mind is from the author of nature, in the first part, Quest. 82, art. 4, reply to 3, and I-II, Quest. 9, arts. 2, 4, and 5, and Quest. 109 throughout. And for this cause he also says in the first part, Quest. 63, art. 5, that an Angel could not have sinned in the first instant, because it would be attributed to the author of nature directing his mind. It is also proved by reason, because even given that natural cognition of himself and of all the species, there is nothing that can determine the will of an Angel to willing the use of this species, or knowledge of such a thing, more than of that one. Therefore it is necessary that something from without help in the determination.

29. *Solution.* — I respond that in rigor the inference is good, and no inconvenience appears in the consequent. Indeed, this pertains to angelic perfection. But St. Thomas, when in the prior places he reduces the first thought to the author of nature, is speaking of us, and not only of the first thought of life, but also of any first thought in the day, or at any time, or whenever in some series of thoughts there is one that cannot follow from a prior one. Yet he does not say that such thought is always from the author of nature immediately. For often a first thought is aroused in us from sensible objects that occur, yet because the disposition of those things comes from divine providence, it is ultimately reduced to him. But in an Angel this motion through objects has no place, except perhaps in the speech of one Angel to another, or of God, which is not always necessary for an Angel to begin to have a new thought. Therefore the first thought in him is the very thought of himself, which he has from the author of nature, and every other thought is simply second, and therefore can already be from himself freely using his own potencies. Perhaps, however, in the first instant of creation the author of nature has his special providence in this matter around his free creatures; we shall discuss this in books three and seven of this treatise. But to the reason it is responded that the freedom of the will suffices for applying the intellect wherever it wills, once sufficient cognition of the things among which it can choose is supposed. For this has place not only in the first instant, but at every time, as we shall presently say.

CHAPTER XXXVI
WHETHER AN ANGEL NECESSARILY KNOWS ANYTHING OUTSIDE HIMSELF

1. *Opinion asserting that Angels are necessarily always in actual knowledge of God.* — But there remains to be investigated what we placed second in the preceding chapter, number five, at the end: whether an Angel naturally and necessarily knows anything besides himself, which can be asked both about God and about some other created object. Cajetan and Ferrara, cited above, affirm this about God, and some moderns follow them. They are founded on this: that knowledge of God is as it were the ultimate natural beatitude of an Angel, and an Angel can have it together with knowledge of himself and of another thing insofar as this is fitting and sufficient for an Angel. Therefore it is not likely that an Angel ever ceases from natural knowledge of God. The consequence is proved, for the other points seem clear and will be more evident from what will be said, because either an Angel would cease from such knowledge by his own will, or because of an extrinsic impediment. The latter cannot be thought with probability, and the former is not likely. For why would an Angel wish to deprive himself of his natural beatitude? Yet he would will this by willing to cease from natural knowledge of God, because his natural beatitude either consists in that knowledge, or certainly cannot subsist without it. And whatever may be the case concerning beatitude, at least that actual consideration is a great perfection, and no utility can come to an Angel from lacking it. Why, then, would he not will it? And from this there arises a probable conjecture that the intellect of an Angel, as to that act, is not subject to the command of the will, because that subjection is not fitting nor consonant with such a nature.

2. *Contrary opinion denying this.* — But other doctors, who deny that an Angel is always and necessarily in actual knowledge of himself, consequently deny that he is in actual knowledge of God. First, from parity of reason, or a fortiori, because knowledge of oneself could seem more natural, since it seemed more necessary for the other operations of an Angel. Second, because the proper substance is an object nearer, more intrinsic, and more proportioned to an Angel. Therefore if he does not always know this object by intrinsic necessity, how will he be determined to an object more excellent and extrinsic? Third and chiefly, because an Angel primarily knows God through his own substance.

Therefore if he does not necessarily understand his own substance, neither does he actually always and necessarily know God.

3. *The true opinion. — An Angel necessarily always thinks about God, at least indirectly.* — But the true resolution must be given according to what was said above about the natural knowledge that Angels have of God. For we distinguished a twofold cognition of God: one indirect, in which God is known only as the terminus of the relation and dependence of the Angel upon him; the other direct and more absolute, by which an Angel directly considers God and tries to understand him as much as he can. About the prior cognition, I first say that it is as natural and necessary as knowledge of one's own substance. This is proved, both because, since an Angel comprehends himself, he cannot know himself without knowing himself as a work of God, and consequently without knowing God in some way. Also because by one and the same act he knows himself and God in this way, as was shown above. Indeed, I add that even if an Angel did not always necessarily understand his own substance in particular, nevertheless, if he necessarily understands something confusedly or disjunctively, this or that, although in particular he knows no created object by necessity, nevertheless he necessarily always has this cognition of God. Because even by knowing heaven or earth or another Angel, he necessarily knows God, and therefore although he knows no created thing in particular by necessity, he will always know God in particular, because all things tend to him as to a center and depend equally essentially on him.

4. *Yet not always necessarily directly.* — But about the other cognition of God, we say that an Angel does not have it by necessity, but freely, and therefore can cease from it. This is proved, both because no sufficient reason for this kind of necessity can be assigned, and also because such an act of knowledge of God requires a special and great attention and application of the power of understanding, which does not have a necessary cause in the Angel himself and can be impeded by attention to considering other created things. Conversely, that same attention will also impede the Angel from being able to consider other things as fully and freely. Also because it seems likely that demons are not occupied in this sort of consideration of God, because they have a depraved affection with respect to him, and they neither love him on account of that honorableness, nor find delight or advantage in it. Nor do they desire that cognition on account of natural beatitude, because they also lack that beatitude, as we shall say later. Nor is it necessary to respond further to the arguments of either side.

5. *An Angel does not necessarily know any determinate created object besides himself, either directly or in an oblique way.* — But concerning created objects, supposing the resolution of chapter 34, against Durandus and others, it seems clear that an Angel does not by necessity have actual consideration of any determinate and particular created object. This is proved, because they do not by necessity consider all things at once, as we have said. Therefore they consider no one thing determinately. The consequence is proved, both because there is no greater reason about one than about another, and also because by the same reason it could be said that that object is the adequate object of actual consideration, and consequently that the Angel could know nothing else besides the thing he naturally knows.

6. *Those who thought the contrary. — They are refuted.* — Nevertheless, some say that with his own substance an Angel naturally knows all things that pertain to himself; indeed, that he knows them through his own substance. Thus St. Thomas seems to teach in 2, distinction 11, quest. 2, art. 3, reply to 4, where from this principle he teaches that an Angel knows the speech of another through his own substance. Ferrara teaches the same, 2, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 101, near the end, to a certain second doubt; and from the same principle he infers that an Angel moving the heaven knows the heaven and its motion through his own substance, and always thinks about it. Aegidius is also cited, treatise *De cognitione Angeli*, quests. 5 and 9, and Hervaeus, in 2, distinction 3, quest. 4. But it does not seem likely to me that an Angel knows all these things through his own substance, because they do not pertain to him as intrinsically connected with his essence, but as extrinsically entrusted or coming to him; and I said this above about speech. And the same applies to heaven, for in no way is it contained in the substance of an Angel so as to be known through it. And what we have said about the knowledge of species confirms this a fortiori. Hence I consequently assert that these things are not known naturally but freely, because they do not pertain to knowledge of his proper nature, and are extrinsically ordered or committed, and must also be fulfilled freely.

7. *Whether at least an Angel necessarily knows something indeterminately outside himself.* — Therefore the difficulty remains whether an Angel at least confusedly or indefinitely always considers something by using some species, so that he is never moved from act to non-act, nor from not understanding to understanding, but passes from one act to another. Some absolutely deny that an Angel is necessitated to any act outside knowledge of himself, or to using any infused species, either determinately or confusedly; because he is simply free, and there is no cause necessitating him either to one singular act or to this or

that or another indefinitely or confusedly. This opinion can easily be defended, because the opposite cannot be disproved by an entirely compelling reason. And for this one could bring in the arguments by which Gregory, 2, distinction 11, quest. 1, art. 2, proves that although an Angel can understand all things at once by using all his species at once, he does not necessarily always consider all things, but according to his freedom can suspend whichever acts he wishes, even if he does not apply the intellect to others. For the same reason applies to any act, even if an Angel posits only one.

8. *Affirmation.* — Nevertheless, St. Thomas everywhere seems to think that an Angel is always in an act adequate to his power of understanding, and therefore is always moved from act to act, and not from privation to act, nor conversely. Hence in the first part, Quest. 50, art. 1, reply to 1, expounding Damascene, book 2, chapter 3, who says that an Angel is in perpetual motion, he says: *An Angel is called an always mobile substance because he is always actually understanding, and not sometimes in act and sometimes in potency, as we are.* And in Quest. 56, art. 1, reply to 3, he says: *The intellect of an Angel is not in potency, especially as to this, that it understands itself.* Here I weigh the particle *especially*, for it signifies that even in other things the intellect is not in potency, but especially about itself, because concerning itself it is always in the same act, while concerning other things it is so indefinitely. And in 2, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 97, he absolutely teaches that a separate substance always actually understands, and in chapter 101 he declares that it also always actually understands through species, using one that it wishes, but not all at once; *and therefore there is in it a certain succession of understandings, in which act does not succeed potency, but act succeeds act*. And in 2, distinction 3, quest. 2, art. 4, reply to 4, at the end, he says that the intellect of an Angel is always in act, because it unceasingly shines for actually considering something, although it does not always use the same species so as actually to understand one thing.

9. *The judgment of the author.* — And this position seems to me very consonant with reason and with the perfection of angelic nature. For to be always in a complete act of understanding pertains of itself to perfection, and an Angel can do this without impediment or weariness. Why, then, would he altogether desist from that act and remain as if sleeping? For, given his limitation and inability to know all things at once, the ability to pass from one act into another was necessary to such a nature for its perfection. Yet to desist from every use of species brings no utility to such a nature. Therefore it is very likely either that the angelic intellect by its own nature is not subordinated to the will as to the pure suspension of an act, but can be compelled to leave one act

only insofar as it is applied to another which it cannot have together with the former; or that the will itself is by its own nature determined to move the intellect in such a way and not another, because natural perfection connaturally demands this manner of existing in ultimate act. Finally, even if an Angel did not necessarily understand himself, he could not suspend every act, as was proved above. Therefore, in like manner, although through his substance he necessarily understands himself, he will not be able to keep his intellect from every use of his species, for there is the same proportion and reason. And conversely, if an Angel could adequately use all his species at once, he would always remain in that state, as from what was said above seems very probable. Therefore, within the latitude of his power, it is very probable that he is always in some act adequate to him, although it is free to him to elicit this or that act and to transfer himself from one to another.

CHAPTER XXXVII
WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN UNDERSTAND SEVERAL THINGS AT ONCE BY ONE ACT OR BY SEVERAL ACTS

1. We have said that an Angel can neither know at once all things that are intelligible by him, nor can he lack every act and every consideration of the things that he can know through his species. It remains now to explain how great this angelic power is with respect to those things that he can consider at once, or with respect to the distinct acts that he can have at once, or with respect to the multitude of species that he can use at once. On this point it must be supposed that the discussion concerns acts that an Angel can elicit through the powers of his nature. For about supernatural acts, which he can bring about through the powers of grace, we shall speak in books five and six, and there we shall explain whether he can elicit them together with natural acts, or whether in the supernatural order itself he can have several at once. But now we examine only the natural powers of an Angel.

2. *It is certain that an Angel can have a natural and a free act at once.* — Next, the question is not about acts of intellect of which one is free and the other natural, or necessary as to exercise. For the natural act is only one, or by way of one, namely knowledge of himself, which is extended to God and to the species that he has in himself. Once this is supposed, it is certain that besides that act he can have a free act that exists together with it. Because, since an Angel cannot cease from knowledge of himself, if together with that act he could not have another free act at the same time, he could never directly and perfectly know

anything other than himself and his species, which cannot be said. Therefore, supposing the stated opinion, we also suppose as certain that an Angel can have several acts of understanding at once, one necessary and another free. And so St. Thomas and all suppose. But St. Thomas gives the reason, Quest. 1, *De Veritate*, art. 14, reply to 6, because when an Angel knows himself and something else at the same time, he knows those things by way of one, because his essence is the reason for knowing himself and other things, although not equally perfectly, because it is of itself a sufficient reason for knowing himself, but not other things without a superadded species.

3. *The reason of St. Thomas is weighed.* — But the reason is difficult. For when it is said that the essence of an Angel is the reason for knowing himself and other things, I ask about which reason for knowing the discussion concerns. For it can be said to be the reason for knowing on the part of the knower, because it is the principal principle of knowing all things. But this does not suffice, because the essence also has this with respect to all things knowable through all its species, and thus it would know all things by way of one. Hence, if this sufficed, it could know all things at once. Or it can be called the reason for knowing in the way in which a species is a medium for knowing that is not known. And so it is not true that the substance of an Angel is the reason for knowing himself and other things that are known through species, because with respect to other things it in no way concurs as species, but only as potency or principal principle. Or third, it can be called the reason for knowing because it is a known medium conducive to knowing something else. And so either the proposition is also false, or it is not rightly applied. For a thing represented by a species is known by an Angel in two ways: either imperfectly, by knowing the species objectively and, through it as through a known medium, attaining in some way the thing represented by the species. And so the substance of an Angel is truly called the reason for knowing other things imperfectly, by comprehending the species under the substance of the Angel. But in this way the proposition is not to the point, because that imperfect cognition of the other thing is not other than the natural cognition by which an Angel knows himself and his species, and we are not treating of that. Therefore another cognition is perfect cognition of the thing represented by the species, by which it is directly known in itself. And for that cognition neither the substance nor the species behaves as the reason for knowing, as a known medium. Therefore with respect to this perfect cognition, which we are treating, the substance of an Angel does not seem to be such a reason for knowing as suffices for knowing several things by way of one.

4. *The more probable reason of the author.* — Hence it can probably be said that an Angel knows those things at once even if he knows them by way of several. And the reason can be given that those acts are of a different order, natural and free, and therefore they do not impede each other. Or, more clearly, because the power of an Angel for attending and effecting is not exhausted in one natural act, either alone or together with others, if he has some as it were accessory acts; because beyond all that he operates from necessity of nature about himself, he has power for some free use of species, because this involves no repugnance, indeed no difficulty, and is consonant with, or rather necessary for, the perfection of such a nature.

5. *How the free and natural cognition of an Angel can be judged to be elicited by way of one, and thus the reason of St. Thomas can stand.* — Finally, to remove the question about the manner of speaking, it is certain that when an Angel knows himself through his own substance and another Angel, for example, through that Angel's species, he elicits two distinct acts of intellect, and from them does not compose one, nor does he refer one to the other, or the object of one to the act of the other. And in this sense it can be said that he knows those things at once as several. For that those acts are distinct no one denies, especially since one is said to be necessary and the other free, and since they are made through diverse species, or, what is more, one through a species and the other through substance as the proximate principle of knowing; and besides, they have altogether distinct objects which are known perfectly as they are in themselves. And therefore, just as in themselves they are altogether absolute and do not compose one, so also the acts by which they are known are not united or referred in any way to one another, but are only simultaneous in the same intellect. In this sense, therefore, those things are truly said to be known as several, or together by way of several. Nevertheless, those acts can be said to have among themselves a certain natural order, because in an Angel the cognition of another thing supposes, in the order of nature, the cognition of himself, and in some way is founded upon it, as I explained above. And in this sense it can be said that the substance of an Angel is in some way a reason for knowing things other than himself. Hence if on this account that cognition is said to be by way of one, I do not contend about the name.

6. *What it means that an Angel knows all things by way of his substance.* — And so also, to note this incidentally, in a sound way that proposition must be understood which St. Thomas adduces in the said solution to 6 from the book *De causis*, that *an intelligence knows all things by way of its own substance*. For one must not think that it understands all things in the likeness of its own

substance, so that on the part of the object it conceives them by an improper and as it were connotative concept, as we know spiritual things by way of material things. For in Angels this is not so; rather, it knows other created things perfectly as they are in themselves and through their proper species. Therefore Angels are said to know all things by way of their own substance as to the perfection and quality of the act by which they know them. This is better explained by the words of Dionysius, which the same St. Thomas adduces from chapter 7, *De divinis Nominibus*, that *an Angel knows all things according to his own power and nature*. These words are not found formally, or in signate act, so to speak, in Dionysius, but in exercised act, while he explains the angelic mode of knowing according to its proper character and nature. And so much concerning natural and free cognition.

7. *The question remains about free acts. — First opinion. — Second opinion. — Third opinion.* — Therefore the difficulty remains concerning those things that an Angel freely considers, whether he can know several things at once simply and as several. The affirmative side is defended by many, especially Gregory and Durandus, cited above, who attribute to an Angel not only the simultaneous cognition of several things, but also of all things. But St. Thomas holds the other extreme, that an Angel cannot know several things at once formally, so to speak, that is, as they are several, but only one thing, or several by way of one. Thus he teaches in the said Quest. 58, art. 1, and *De Anima*, quest. 58, art. 4, and 1, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 55, and book 2, chapter 101, Quest. 8, *De Veritate*, art. 14, and *Quodlibet* 7, art. 2; Capreolus, 2, dispute 3, quest. 9, conclusion 9, and to the arguments against it; and there Aegidius, part 2, quest. 2, art. 3, and treatise *De Angelorum cognitione*, quest. 7; Cajetan, Ferrara, and other Thomists. Hervaeus is also cited, treatise *De motu Angeli*, quest. 1, to the third difficulty, and in 2, distinction 11, quest. 2. Scotus agrees with this opinion, 2, distinction 3, quest. 9, *Dico igitur*, verse *Responsio*, and Herrera notes and follows it, 2, dispute 12, quest. 1. But the third opinion can be a middle one between these, that an Angel cannot know all things at once, nor is he limited to one object, nor to several by way of several. Thus think many moderns: Molina, Vázquez, Valencia, and Soto, book 1 *Posteriorum*, quest. 1, reply to 4; and Major seems to think the same in 2, distinction 3, quest. 5, disputing against Gregory.

8. *The present controversy is in large part about the manner of speaking.* — Yet this controversy can be in large part about the manner of speaking, because all admit that an Angel, indeed even a human being, can know several things at once. But that difference, whether only by way of one or by way of several, is so equivocal that Durandus, in the said quest. 8, number 7, says that an Angel

knows all natural things at once, yet by way of one, indeed also by one act. St. Thomas also, as I was saying a little earlier, says that an Angel knows himself and other things at once and by several acts, and nevertheless by way of one. Indeed in *Quodlibet* 9, art. 7, he says that a blessed Angel simultaneously sees God and knows something through an innate species in its proper genus, yet by way of one, because the very vision of God is in some way the reason for knowing all other things. Therefore, to remove the question about the word, we shall first propose the things that seem certain or more probable to us, and from this conclude what must be said about the disagreement of the opinions.

9. *First conclusion.* — First, therefore, we say that an Angel can at once know all the things that are represented through one species, and know all and each of them perfectly as much as he can, and thus distinctly and absolutely, as if he knew them through several acts; and consequently that he knows them as several on the part of the material objects, even if on the part of the species and act, and consequently under some aspect of one formal object, he knows them by way of one. This assertion is without doubt intended by St. Thomas, and thus Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrara, and all moderns in the first part who admit universal species agree in it. And the reason is clear from what was said above, because species more or less universal are given to an Angel because they are given proportioned to the light and to its efficacy, which he can have in the free use of his species. Therefore an Angel can use one species according to its whole universality and activity adequately and fully. Therefore he can know perfectly all and each of the things that are represented through it. And therefore, if the things represented through one species are beings altogether absolute among themselves, that is, not composing one thing nor having any relation among themselves besides a transcendental one, so to speak, he knows each one by an absolute concept, as if he knew it alone. But because he knows them at the same time perfectly, consequently he will also see either the likeness or the difference among them, which relation I call transcendental. And from this it will occur that he also knows those things by way of one on account of some agreement that they have among themselves, according to what was said above about species.

10. *It is confirmed.* — And it is confirmed first, because it is no more repugnant that several things be represented through one expressed species, or word, than through one impressed species. Therefore, once the stated universality in the species is admitted, it must also be admitted in the act, because on the part of the angelic intellect, as I said, there can be no defect of power for attending, since the species has been implanted according to the

measure of the light. Otherwise a universal impressed species would be superfluous if an expressed species could not correspond to it. It is finally confirmed from the beatific vision, for through it several things are seen in God, because according to the measure of the light of that order, one species, or the divine essence, is united by way of one species to the blessed intellect. Therefore the same is true in an Angel, with proportion preserved in its own order.

11. *Objections are solved.* — But it can be objected that it follows that an Angel can at once know distinctly and clearly infinite individuals, because the universal species of one nature of itself represents all the individuals of that nature, even if infinitely many will exist and can successively be known as present. For through the adequate object of that species all those things are known at once, at least as possible. To this it can be responded that this progress to infinity is not found in substances, because generations will not endure to infinity. But in accidents there is no inconvenience that an Angel simultaneously conceive infinite things syncategorematically. But it is more easily said that it is not necessary that all future individuals of one nature be understood by an Angel through one species, much less all possible ones, as was said in the preceding. And thus there is no need to limit the conclusion. For the reason given either proves it absolutely and simply, or proves nothing.

12. Second, it is objected that it follows that an Angel cannot have adequate acts of his species whenever he has other objects about which he always considers. For an Angel moving the heaven is always in consideration of it, because he is always in the will of moving the heaven, which he cannot have without actual consideration of the heaven, as St. Thomas teaches, 2, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 97. Likewise, a guardian Angel always attends to the person entrusted to him, and a demon always thinks about the fire of hell, and so on. To this some respond that an Angel knows all these things through his own substance, because they pertain to him, and thus are contained under natural cognition, which does not impede free cognition. Thus Ferrara, 2, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 101. But this was rejected by us in the preceding chapter. And therefore I respond briefly, first, that, granted the inference, the consequent is not unfitting, because species are given to an Angel according to the capacity of his nature. But it is accidental that because of a special occupation of the mind, so to speak, an Angel cannot freely use other species adequately. Second, it is said that perhaps this never occurs. For in the first example, concerning the movers of the heavens, perhaps that imperfect consideration which they have of the heavens in their intelligible species objectively known suffices for them to move the heavens, or certainly they are distracted so little by that cognition that

they are not impeded from being able to know all things represented through one species, although perhaps with some lesser effort as to attention. But concerning guardian Angels it is said that through the beatific or supernatural vision they are always in that watchfulness without impediment to natural cognition. Concerning demons, I judge there to be no inconvenience if they are impeded, although God will be able to necessitate them, if he wishes, to that actual consideration of their own state, and to leave them free for understanding other things.

13. *Second conclusion.* — Second, it must be said that if an Angel has one act adequate in attention from extension to one universal species implanted in him, he cannot actually know anything else at the same time. In this also all agree. And it is proved from the same principle, because one universal species is adequate to the power and light of the angelic intellect in which it is naturally implanted. Therefore if he operates adequately according to it, he absolutely has an action adequate to his activity. Therefore he cannot simultaneously elicit another action. We suppose the antecedent from the commensuration of the species to the light of the angelic intellect, as we have explained. And the first consequence is known from the terms, because if two things are adequate to one third thing, they are also adequate among themselves. Therefore, if the intellection is adequate to the species, and the light of the intellect is adequate to its universal species, then the intellect and the intellection are also adequate among themselves. Hence the second consequence is easily proved, because what is full cannot be increased; nor can an Angel existing in an adequate place simultaneously be in another or in a greater place; nor can a potency be extended beyond its adequate object. For in the present matter, although the adequate object of one species is not simply adequate to the potency, nevertheless it is adequate to the potency as operating equally, that is, beyond the intellection as it were resulting from nature, as has already been explained. Nor do I find in this assertion difficulty or anyone formally contradicting it. For even Scotus, who thinks that every species of an Angel, even if they are particular, is adequate to the power of the angelic intellect, consequently says that he cannot have at once more than one act, even if it is about one thing alone represented through one species. He speaks consequently, although he restricts too much and limits the power of attending simultaneously and actually understanding in Angels.

14. *Third conclusion proceeding from a supposition. — Objection against the supposition. — Response.* — Third, it must be said that if an Angel wishes to use his universal species inadequately, he can very well understand many things at

once by several and distinct acts elicited through several and distinct species. This assertion supposes that an Angel can use a universal species inadequately. Ferrara taught this, 2, *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 101, and cites St. Thomas, Quest. 8, *De Veritate*, art. 13, replies to 2 and 8, where he says that from one habitual species various thoughts can proceed. And although St. Thomas is there speaking about the human intellect, Ferrara nevertheless takes an argument from it: because if a human being can fail to have an act adequate to his species, but through the species of human being, for example, now consider that he is animal, now that he is rational, why cannot an Angel in his own order, through a species representing several things, actually consider some of them, or even one alone? Therefore I judge this supposition true, because, as I said above, the species is not of itself determined to acting by way of a natural form, but is subordinated to the potency in which it is, so that the potency may use it according to its own mode. Likewise, the intellect of an Angel is not naturally borne to considering intelligible objects, whether they are represented through several species or through one, but is subject to the motion of the will. Therefore the will, according to its freedom, can apply the intellect to considering this or another thing through the same species, and there is no reason why it should be necessitated to the adequate use of such a species even if it wishes to use it. And it is confirmed, because the reason is the same for part and whole. Therefore, if the whole use of the species is free, it will also be free to use such a species in part and not integrally. Just as it is also free for an Angel to apply himself to an adequate or inadequate place, or to move himself or another thing with greater or lesser velocity, so also this inadequate use of an intelligible species is possible for an Angel. Yet I note that for that use the prior natural act by which the intellect intuits its species and attains their objects in at least some imperfect way is especially necessary. Otherwise it cannot be understood how he could voluntarily use a species for considering this or that thing, and not adequately for the whole object, and so on. But it can be objected that the inadequate act will not be of the same species as the adequate one. But the power of an Angel seems determined to eliciting acts of such a species. It is responded that perhaps those acts differ only as more or less perfect within the same species. Or it is not unfitting that the same potency elicit acts diverse in species through the same eminent principle, when it uses that principle inadequately according to its freedom.

15. *The conclusion is now proved as to the plurality of intellections.* — Therefore, once this is supposed, the assertion is proved, namely that an Angel can at once use two species by eliciting two acts inadequate to them, through

which he knows several things at once, and each of them perfectly insofar as it can be known by that Angel. First, because to know so many things at once does not exceed the power of such an Angel. Therefore from this side it is not repugnant that he have those acts at once. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is evident, because the same Angel, by adequately using one of those species, could know more quiddities of things, as is supposed. But the multitude of things represented inadequately by two species, that is, partly by one and partly by another, can be of equal intelligibility, so to speak, both in the multitude of things and in the perfection, ease, or difficulty of the intelligible object, as can easily be considered and compared with due proportion. Therefore on the part of the things known it will not be more difficult to know that multitude of things at once through two species taken inadequately than another multitude through one species taken adequately. But once this is supposed, the distinction of species cannot impede, indeed cannot even make more difficult, the attention to all those objects, because then the distinction of species behaves as it were materially, and the intellect does not apply its whole power through either of them, and is informed by both at the same time. Therefore it can use both together partially just as well as afterward use one of them totally. And granted but not conceded that from that division of species some difficulty in attending or operating simultaneously were to arise, from this it would only perhaps follow that he cannot understand so many things with complete equality through several species partially as through one totally. Nevertheless, he could simply know several things, by diminishing something, if necessary, either from the number of things known or from their perfection, as much as would be necessary to compensate for that difficulty. But in truth, little or no difficulty seems to arise from the distinction of species alone.

16. *Then as to their perfection, both on the part of the object — and on the part of the acts.* — Hence it is also concluded that all those things and each of them are known perfectly on the part of themselves, and objectively, so to speak, by way of several, because they need not be known with the relation of one to another, nor with any diminution, but as perfectly as if they were known through one species, or as if only some of them were considered without the others. This is proved from what has been said, both because they are not known less perfectly than if they were known through one species, but the things known through one species, or through its adequate act, are known with the stated perfection; and also because on the part of the intellect there is sufficient power and capacity, as has been shown, and on the part of the species each one is proportioned to the part of that adequate object, and the distinction alone

among the species behaves materially and cannot impede, as has been proved, because it distracts the mind or the power of acting little or not at all. Therefore. From this it follows that on the part of the acts those things are also known by way of several, because they are known through several acts. In this, the cognition of several things through the inadequate use of several species is distinguished from the cognition of several things through the adequate use of one species. For through one species all things are known by one act, but through several species by distinct acts, as seems more likely. First, because the proximate principles of knowing are distinct, as is supposed, and although the potency uses them simultaneously, it always uses them as distinct, because it does not join them in acting, namely by ordering them to something one, as we suppose. Therefore it elicits two acts as several. For mere concomitance or simultaneity of duration in acting does not suffice for the act to be one.

17. Second, here the reason of St. Thomas has maximum place, because one act requires some unity of the object. But things that are known precisely through several species and without composition of one with another are not known under some aspect of one object, but plainly as disparate and distinct. Therefore they are known through several acts. And otherwise they are not composed among themselves, nor do they have any order among themselves. Therefore they also occur as several. Third, because if those acts were begun not simultaneously but one after another, they would without doubt be distinct. For example, if an Angel, having one species of all animals and another of all vegetative things, first through the former considered only the nature of a lion, and afterward through the latter some nature of plants, without doubt this act would be distinct from the first, nor could the prior act be extended through the efficacy of the other species. Therefore, although they occur simultaneously, they will be distinct. I shall say something below about the efficacy of this reason; for now the prior reasons suffice. And they can be confirmed, because an Angel can simultaneously hear several speaking and intuit several thoughts of others when those others will it, because in none of those acts is the whole power of understanding of the Angel exhausted. Hence if Angels having universal species of natural things receive new particular species concerning several singular acts, without doubt they can at once use such species, even adequately as to the things represented by those species, because none of them is adequate to the intellective power of such an Angel. For they are made particular only because they are impressed by a particular object, as we suppose about internal acts, in which alone this has place.

18. *First objection from the authority of Aristotle. — The testimonies of Aristotle are explained.* — Yet in order that this matter be made clearer and the question about the name be removed, it is necessary to meet some objections. Let the first be from the authority of Aristotle, book 2 of the *Topics*, chapter 4, where he distinguishes knowing and thinking in this, because, he says, *it is possible to know many things, but not to think them*, that is, it is not possible to think many things; and therefore it is commonly reported that he said, *to think only one thing*. Likewise, book 4 of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 4, text 10, at the end, is alleged, saying: *it is not possible to understand anything unless one is understanding one thing*. By these words he seems to signify that everyone understanding always understands one thing, or at least by way of one. But the first testimony proves little in the present matter, both because Aristotle is speaking of human beings, not of Angels; and because there he only sets this down by way of example, and exact truth is not always required of examples; and especially because he does not say, *it is not possible to think except one thing*, but says that *it is possible that one who knows many things thinks only one thing*, which is as different as affirmation differs from negation. Hence that affirmation is particular and self-evident, while the other, negative, is universal and, in rigor, false even in us. And the prior affirmative sense suffices for the intention of Aristotle. For he proves that this proposition is false: to know many things is to think many things. He proves this very well, because it is possible to know many things and not to think many things. But the other testimony is more alien from the present purpose, because Aristotle there does not say that one who understands must conceive one thing, or by way of one. For he was not treating of this matter, but was treating of the signification of names, and had said that it is necessary that one name signify only one thing, or, if it is manifold, that it be taken for a determinate thing. Because, as he says, *not to signify one thing is to signify nothing, and when names do not signify, disputation perishes*. And then he adds the reason through the cited words, whose sense is that unless the disputant conceives through the words some one determinate thing, he understands nothing in the whole disputation. This is very well said and must be greatly observed in disputations.

19. Second, the authority of St. Thomas is objected, for in the places alleged above he seems to think that an Angel cannot understand several things at once through his species as several. And since, as I said, in that reduplication *as several*, there can be great equivocation and variety, St. Thomas certainly seems to understand that several things are then known as several when they are known by several acts, but as one when they are known by one act. And thus he

seems to think the contrary of our assertion. That this is his sense is proved from his own reason. For in the first part, Quest. 85, art. 4, he proves from this that a created intellect cannot know at once through several species, because it cannot be perfected at once by several forms of the same genus and of diverse species, that is, by several acts, or, what is the same, by several intelligible species reduced into act. And in the first part, Quest. 12, art. 10, and Quest. 58, art. 2, he absolutely denies that an Angel can know at once through several species, because the things that are represented through diverse species have the character of diverse intelligibles, and so cannot be known by one act, and consequently not at once. In this discourse he seems to suppose that an Angel cannot know many things at once except through one act. And thus Cajetan admits that it is counted as the same for several things not to be able to be known at once, and not to be able to be known by one act; because if they are known by one act, they are now not known as several, and if they must be known by several acts, they will not be able to be known at once. Hence the same St. Thomas, first part, Quest. 62, art. 7, reply to 3, absolutely says: *one potency cannot have two operations at the same time unless one is ordered to the other*.

20. *First exposition of the saying of St. Thomas.* — To this objection I respond that it is uncertain in what sense St. Thomas used those words *by way of one* or *by way of several*. For they can be expounded in three ways. First, so that by way of one is the same as through one simple species, properly taken, and by way of several is the same as through several species. And St. Thomas seems to indicate this sense in the said art. 2, in the body and reply to 2, and in the said Quest. 12, art. 10. This St. Thomas so affirms not only in Angels but also in us, that even when we know diverse things at once by affirming or denying one thing of another, he thinks that this occurs through one simple species and by one act, as is clear from the first part, Quest. 85, art. 4, reply to 4, and 1 *Contra Gentiles*, chapter 55, reason 1. There Ferrara explains the opinion of St. Thomas in this way, saying that whenever several things are known as one, namely by knowing their difference or another relation among them, they are known through one species, which the intellect abstracts from the similar species of singulars.

21. *The immediately preceding exposition is rejected.* — But this opinion so explained can neither be defended universally, nor attributed to St. Thomas. The former part is clear in us, because without doubt we use diverse species at once for composing, dividing, and syllogizing, and we make these acts not through simple and single acts, but through several acts, by composing them in some

way. Otherwise there would never be true composition in the second or third operation of our intellect, but we would know all things through simple acts, which is established to be false. Then, in Angels, it was shown above that sometimes they necessarily use many species at once to know the difference of certain things, or even their union. And although in that way they often know through simple acts, nevertheless there we also showed that sometimes they can do this by composing several. Besides, that St. Thomas did not intend to deny this is taught by all the Thomists in the cited places, who say that St. Thomas comprehended under one species the use of several, even if it is with many acts ordered among themselves. For St. Thomas teaches that in this way the angelic intellect can have them, in the said Quest. 58, first part, art. 7, reply to 2, and the said Quest. 62, art. 7, reply to 3, and Quest. 8, *De Veritate*, art. 14, reply to 6.

22. *Second exposition.* — Therefore the second explanation is that to know several things by way of one is to know several things through one act, either composite in us or simple in an Angel, or at least through several acts ordered in some way among themselves, as are knowledge of himself through his own substance and knowledge of other things through species. To know several things by way of several is to know through several acts in no way united or ordered among themselves. Hence, because in Angels, according to St. Thomas, composition is not found among the simple acts of intellect, therefore, speaking ordinarily and of cognition through proper species, it must be said that an Angel then knows several things by way of several when he knows them through several acts; but by way of one whenever he knows them through one act, even if several species concur for such an act. And because this concurrence does not occur except when the things represented through those species are known with some relation among themselves, that is, as differing, or as similar, or as united in some way, therefore those things too will be said to be known by way of one which are known under some similar relation; for under that relation they compose an intelligible object in some way as one. And this exposition is sufficiently accommodated to the terms themselves, and is much suggested by St. Thomas in the said places. But I said *speaking ordinarily and of cognition through proper species*, because only in the cognition of himself through his own substance and of another object through its proper species does St. Thomas seem to admit several acts of the natural order, because they are simultaneous in the intellect of an Angel, among which he posits another order, as was seen above; to these he adds the cognition of God through his essence, which is supernatural. And thus Ferrara too seems to think, in the said chapter 55, and others.

23. *It is not approved.* — Nevertheless we cannot approve that doctrine universally. For we believe that an Angel can know several things at once through several acts and species, and consequently by way of several in the direct sense, that is, so that neither are the species joined for producing one act, nor are the acts themselves composed among themselves, nor are their objects compared with some relation among themselves, nor even so that one act is under some consideration the reason for another, but only that they behave concomitantly, from the free will of the Angel. This was sufficiently proved in confirming the third assertion. Likewise, in our intellect this can happen in some way, and even in the senses, as we shall show below in the proper treatise *De Anima*. Hence an Angel can know several things through several species and acts in no way composed or referred among themselves, not only in the way explained in the assertion, but also in another way. Namely, by using one species adequately as to all things represented through it, but not as to the attention and effort of the potency or the intensity of the act. For then that act will not be adequate to the activity of the potency, and therefore that potency will at the same time be able to operate through another species by understanding something, or some things, in an imperfect way, either as to the number of things known or as to the mode of the attention of the potency and the intensity of the act. This is proved, because just as an Angel is free to use a species adequately or inadequately as to the universality of the object, so also he is free to apply the intellect with greater or lesser effort. Therefore, just as by using a species inadequately in the prior way he can at once use another species and elicit another altogether distinct act, so by using one species imperfectly on the part of the object, he will be able to apply what remains of the activity, so to speak, to another act and object. And this is confirmed: for if our intellect or sense can in this way have several acts at once, this is not from inadequacy of the act to the species in order to the extension of the object, because our species do not represent several things; but it is from inadequacy in the mode of attending. Therefore the same can be found in Angels.

24. *The third exposition by which the second objection is rightly satisfied if St. Thomas allows it.* — Nevertheless, even in these cases it can be said that an Angel knows several things in some way by way of one, not indeed on the part of the object or from the composition or subordination of the acts, but on the part of the potency, insofar as it effects all those acts as equivalent to one act adequate to it, or as one effect adequate to its power, just as fire heating at the same time several pieces of wood or bodies existing within its sphere can be said to heat all of them by way of one effect adequate to it. Hence, on the contrary, an

Angel would then be said to know several things by way of several only if he effected several acts, each of which was adequate to his power, or if beyond one adequate act he could have another at the same time. And according to this sense of the terms, the doctrine of St. Thomas, that an Angel cannot know several things as several, is very well saved universally. But I do not dare to say that St. Thomas spoke in this sense, because that explanation of those terms, *by way of one* and *by way of several*, does not seem commonly used. Nevertheless the thing itself is true, and is clear from what has been said. And it can be explained by the example of the place of an Angel: because he cannot be in many places by way of several, because he can only be in one adequate place, and yet he can be wholly in many partial places by way of one. But from this it can be objected that an Angel cannot be simultaneously in several inadequate places by way of several, that is, divided altogether among themselves. Therefore similarly he cannot through the intellect attend at once even inadequately to several things altogether divided among themselves, that is, in no way ordered or connected. It is responded that the antecedent, which is not certain, is granted, and the consequence is denied, because in place the very substance of an Angel is constituted, and it cannot as it were divide itself by constituting itself in distant places. But by understanding an Angel knows things as it were in himself, and receives in himself the acts by which he knows them. And thus he is not divided in himself from the fact that he applies his adequate attention through several acts, just as an Angel can also simultaneously be in several bodies contained within his sphere and operate at once in all of them, even if they are not united or connected among themselves.

25. *Third objection. — From the example of figures, motions, and colors.* — A final common objection remains in this matter: because the same body cannot be affected by several figures at once, nor be moved locally by several motions, nor be informed by several colors diverse in species. Therefore neither can it understand by several acts of intellect at the same time. The consequence is proved, because from those examples an induction is made that two forms of the same genus cannot simultaneously inform the same potency. But acts of understanding are forms of the same genus. Therefore. It is confirmed, because the same motion cannot tend to two termini at once. Therefore neither can the same intellect tend to two altogether distinct objects, for they are as it were the termini of the intellect's tendency toward them.

26. *Response to the example of figures.* — But first, material examples of themselves prove little. For Gregory not badly presses the example of figures with the example of several species and habits simultaneously informing the

intellect. For the common response, that they do not fully inform because they do not actually operate simultaneously, does not satisfy, because operating is different from inherence and information. But the repugnance of forms, such that they cannot be together in the same subject, must be considered in information or inherence, not in efficient causality. Hence the species existing in the air, since they cannot operate upon it, fully inform it, and likewise a mirror. Then, that example is very extrinsic and as it were metaphorical, so to speak. Hence the consequence could be denied without another reason for the difference, merely because there is no connection between the antecedent and the consequent. But I add that in diverse figures respectively of the same subject, there is found not only diversity but also repugnance, because several figures cannot exist at once in the same body unless its parts are at the same time constituted in distinct places or partial positions, which is naturally repugnant. But acts of intellect do not have among themselves a special repugnance, for we are speaking about those acts. We can also add that in one whole body there can only be one adequate figure, but in the parts there can be several partial figures. So too, therefore, in one intellect there is only one adequate act according to such a mode of operating; and when that one is not present, there can be several inadequate and as it were partial acts. Yet they will not be in diverse parts of the subject, as several partial figures are, because the integral subject of figures is divisible, but the subject of species is indivisible, and the whole can be actualized by several inadequate forms, because none of them actualizes it totally, so to speak; just as an Angel can be whole in the whole and whole in any part, although he is not totally in any part.

27. *To the example of motions. — To the example of colors.* — And almost the same applies to the example of several motions. For if they do not include a special repugnance, they can be together in the same subject, indeed in the same part, such as motion and alteration, indeed also increase, and several alterations at once, indeed even several local motions, if one is per accidens and another per se, or if they occur through spaces that are not opposed. Finally, the same can also be said about colors, because they always have some repugnance among themselves, either as contrary extremes, such as whiteness and blackness, or as more and less approaching the other extreme. It can also be added that sometimes it can happen that the passive capacity of the subject is filled by one perfect form of one genus, and therefore it cannot receive another together with one, as happens in matter with respect to substantial form and quantity, and perhaps with respect to certain qualities. Yet from this a universal rule cannot be inferred, that several forms of the same genus cannot exist simultaneously in the

same subject. At most, it will have place in forms adequately actualizing the potency, as I said in the *Metaphysics*, disputation 5, section 8. In this sense that principle does not proceed in the present matter, because we are speaking of incomplete acts that do not fully actualize the intellect.

28. *To the confirmation of the preceding objection. — Why one motion cannot be toward several termini.* — To the confirmation of that objection, the response is easy from what has been said. For if it proved anything, it would also conclude that one species, or one act of understanding, cannot represent several things as they are several and distinct in the genus of being, because neither can one motion tend in this way to several termini. Therefore the example is not similar. Rather, from it one could at most infer that one action of understanding can only be terminated at one intrinsic terminus, that is, at one word. But not that the same word cannot be terminated at several objects, at least distinct in the being of a thing, although the same motion cannot in this way be terminated at several termini. For the reason is very diverse, because motion is nothing other than the terminus itself in coming to be, and therefore if the coming to be is one, the things per se primarily made through it cannot be several. But the word, or act of understanding, and the same applies in its way to the intelligible species, are qualities distinct from the things that they represent, and they represent them not by formal agreement or assimilation, but by a higher intelligible mode; and therefore one expressed species can represent several things, just as we said above about impressed species. Hence it follows that that argument applied to the intellect itself has much less weight, for the intellect is not the very tendency toward the object. Hence it is better compared with the movable thing than with the motion. And therefore, although the same motion is terminated only at one terminus, the intellect can at the same time tend to several objects, not only as they are several things, which it can do through one act, but also as they are several objects, when it attains them by diverse acts which are not adequate to the power of the potency.

29. *A fuller resolution concerning several simultaneous intellections. — As to reception, a simultaneous plurality of intellections is not repugnant.* — Therefore, for a greater comprehension of this point, a distinction can be applied here, which Gregory uses in 2, distinction 11, quest. 1, art. 1. For the intellect is compared to its acts in two ways, namely by way of passive potency and active potency. Therefore, considered in the prior way, it is not repugnant to it to be informed by several acts of understanding from the fact alone that they are several. I add this because there could be other acts contrary or repugnant among themselves, and for that reason they could not exist together. But per se,

from plurality alone, they are not repugnant, if they are compared to the intellect only as receiving. Because in mere reception no repugnance appears, just as there is none in receiving species or habits, because if activity were not necessary, no greater repugnance could be assigned in acts. And therefore also about intense and universal acts, or acts equal in representing universal species, this could easily be admitted if the power of receiving alone were considered, as Gregory grants above, and in 2, distinction 7, quest. 2, art. 1, at the end, and in 1, distinction 1, quest. 1, art. 3. And as to this Vázquez does not oppose him, disputation 221, chapter 3. Therefore reasons that try to prove that an Angel cannot understand several things as several, or cannot have several acts at once, solely because several accidents cannot inform the same receptive potency, are weak.

30. *Nor likewise is it always repugnant as to the effecting of them. — There is a determinate limit in the multitude of acts that an intellect can naturally elicit at once.* — But if the intellect is considered as an active potency of definite power, on that side it is repugnant to it to have more than one adequate act. But to effect several inadequate acts is not repugnant to it, even if they have no special union either in the object or in the principle or in some other relation that they have among themselves, but only from the fact that they do not exceed the adequate power of the potency, and several together are equivalent to one adequate act, as I explained. Yet I would believe that in this respect too the potency has some limit to the multitude of acts. For one could argue that the multitude of acts can be increased to infinity if each of them is always more diminished, and in this diminution one can always proceed to infinity. But I say that this process must not be admitted. Both because the very determination of the power and the attention of the potency to several things as several increases the difficulty in understanding, and therefore the difficulty can increase so much from the multitude of objects altogether distinct that it exceeds the power of the potency. Also because it is more likely that for understanding each thing absolutely and simply, and by abstracting from every intensity or diminution of the act, a determinate grade of power is required, and consequently that there is a determinate limit in the multitude of acts that even an angelic intellect can elicit at once.

31. *A doubt arising from what has been said.* — Finally, one objection or doubt remains about what has been said. For from what has been said it seems to follow that an Angel can also elicit through one species several distinct acts of understanding at once concerning diverse things represented by such a species. But the consequent does not seem to be admitted. The inference is proved,

because an Angel can through one inadequate species elicit one act; therefore he will also be able to elicit several at once, because it is not repugnant either on the part of reception or on the part of active power. Likewise, because an Angel can elicit several inadequate acts through several species, and through several species also in some way united among themselves he can elicit one simple act inadequate with respect to the individual species, and perhaps adequate with respect to both together. Therefore he will also be able to elicit, through one universal species, several particular acts, using it as a power equivalent to several. But that this must not be admitted is proved, because all the things represented through one universal species of an Angel are represented under some aspect of one object, and are understood under the same aspect through the same species, by way of one. Therefore they cannot be understood through several acts. Therefore this objection asks whether an Angel can simultaneously and through the same species know several things as several on the part of the objects and of the acts, that is, through several acts distinct in reality and terminated at things absolutely, as distinct and without any order among themselves. Father Vázquez teaches the negative part, in the said disputation 221, chapter 3, at the end, only from this principle, that the unity of an intellection must be taken from the unity of the principle. And this opinion pleased me when, as a young man, about forty years ago, I first publicly taught this matter. Cumelius followed it, in the said art. 2, quest. 3, conclusion 5, and it is very probable.

32. *The affirmative side is more approved. — That the same act cannot be extended to new objects is more probable.* — But now I judge that the opposite can probably be defended, because of a certain argument touched upon above, number 17, which appears difficult to me. For, supposing that an Angel can use a universal species inadequately, as we all agree, he could successively elicit through the same species distinct acts of understanding, as, for example, through a species representing all quadrupeds he could now elicit cognition of a lion, afterward of a horse, then of a bull. These acts will be distinct among themselves, perhaps not only in number but also in species through adequation to this or that thing distinct in species. Therefore on the part of the distinction of acts it will not be repugnant that those acts exist simultaneously. And thus the reason taken from the unity of the principle ceases, for since the principle is as it were eminent and its use particular, distinct effects and actions can proceed from the same principle. Indeed, even if the distinction of those acts is only numerical, it will not be repugnant in an Angel for them to exist simultaneously in the same subject, because each tends to diverse termini or objects. Therefore

there is no reason why an Angel, if he wishes, could not elicit those acts simultaneously, because it is free to him to use his species as he wishes, if there is in the species power for such a use. But there is in the species sufficient power for such a use, because it can successively elicit those distinct acts, and power for attending to both at once is not lacking, as is established, nor capacity for receiving them. Therefore what will stand in the way? Then let us posit an Angel considering only a horse through that species. He can will to consider a lion without abandoning the consideration of the horse, as seems self-evident. Therefore he elicits a new concept of the lion, and will have both at once. It will be responded that he does not elicit a new act, but extends the prior one. But this extension of acts has seemed difficult to me, because it cannot be without the addition of a new entity, which is not understood, how it is united to the pre-existing one. And therefore it is easier to grant that they are two distinct inadequate acts. Hence it would be better responded that, even if in that case an Angel does not wish to desist from the consideration of the horse, he will necessarily leave the prior act and elicit a new indivisible and more eminent one, representing at the same time the lion and the horse, when through the same species he wishes to consider both at once. But although this is possible and perhaps happens in this way, because it is more perfect, it is difficult to show that there is in an Angel a necessity of understanding in this way, and that he cannot simultaneously perform the acts that he can perform successively when they are inadequate to his power. Therefore I judge this side probable. But let the reader choose whichever pleases him more.

CHAPTER XXXVIII
WHETHER THERE ARE INTELLECTUAL HABITS IN ANGELS, WHETHER NATURAL OR ACQUIRED

1. *Habit is divided in the most common way, and another subdivision is handed down.*—We have spoken of the power and acts of the angelic intellect; it remains that we add one word about habits. Now two kinds of habits are commonly distinguished: some disposing the subject in order to itself, to its nature, and to its esse; others disposing the subject in order to operations, as can be seen in St. Thomas, I-II, quest. 49, arts. 1 and 3. The former have no place in angels, as the same St. Thomas adds, I-II, quest. 50, art. 6, at the end of the body. For the substance of angels is immaterial, simple, and incorruptible, and therefore in itself cannot need any natural habit. But concerning the latter habits, which are immediately in the powers, there can be some doubt, which we

now treat concerning the intellect, for we shall speak of the will later. Next I observe that intelligible species are sometimes, as I said above, counted among the habits of the intellect, insofar as they are added to the power, can remain in it in first act alone, and the one who has them uses them when he wishes. Hence a twofold habit is commonly distinguished: one holding itself on the side of the object, as a species does; another holding itself on the side of the power, which it strengthens, inclines, and renders more ready for operating, such as science, faith, or opinion is in us. Therefore, concerning the former habits we have already spoken, because of the connection they have with objects, whose place they take. But concerning the other genus of habits we treat at present. Again, this habit can be twofold, namely of the natural or supernatural order. Concerning this latter genus of habits, which by antonomasia are called infused, we are not now treating, but we reserve that for the fifth book and the following books. Therefore we are treating of habits of the natural order, which are truly and properly called acquired; nevertheless, because this very point can come into question, we use the more common term. For in three ways such a habit can be conceived in angels, as also in human beings. First, as natural not only with respect to its entity, but also with respect to the mode of its production, namely because it flows from nature, or from the angelic light, after the manner of an intrinsic property, as heat or dryness is called natural to fire. Second, as natural and added to nature, but nevertheless placed in from the beginning by the author of nature himself, as we said concerning the intelligible species of angels. Third, as acquired by their own acts.

2. *First conclusion.—In angels there is no habit emanating from the essence. —Medina's contrary opinion is rejected.*—Therefore, to separate the certain from the uncertain, we establish that there is in angels no intellectual habit of this sort after the manner of a natural property emanating from the essence of an angel, either immediately or through the mediation of the angelic light. This is the common assertion, and almost outside controversy. And the sufficient reason is that it is superfluous to imagine in an angel such a habit, which would be a quality distinct from his intellect and naturally flowing from it, rendering it more apt, or more powerful, or more ready for operating. For if this perfection is natural and intrinsic to the angelic intellect, it is better understood to belong to the light of the angelic intellect through itself and through its simple quality, so that the intellect of an angel has that whole perfection as essential to itself, and with that whole perfection flows from the substance of the angel in its simple entity. Therefore the angelic intellect is such, and any other multiplication of entities and composition would be superfluous, and consequently gratuitously

imagined. Hence theologians who think rightly also deny that the habit of principles in us is a quality distinct from our intellect and connatural to it, as a property flowing from it or from the soul, because the intellect through itself can bring with it the whole natural perfection for judging about those principles which the nature of man intrinsically requires. Finally, because by reason one may imagine that the light of the angelic intellect does not through itself have the whole natural perfection which such a nature connaturally requires in the proximate power of understanding, but that it is composed out of two, someone could say that even the second quality is not sufficient, but that it must be perfected by another, and thus one would proceed to infinity, or stop at a fixed number arbitrarily. Therefore one must stop at the simple entity of the power, and every other natural quality must be cast aside. Medina seems to think against this assertion, I-II, quest. 51, art. 1, around the last conclusion, saying that all theologians posit in angels habits of science naturally placed in them. But I do not see who those theologians are, unless perhaps he calls the very light of the intellect a habit, which is indeed distinct from the species, but not from the intellect, and therefore is improperly called a habit.

3. *Second conclusion.—Habits placed in them by the author of nature do not inhere in angels.—It is proved first concerning habits for the substance of the act.—* Second, by the same reason, it is certain that angels do not have some proper habit placed in them by the author of nature and superadded to the intellect. It is proved: for either such a habit is necessary for the substance of the act, or for operating more readily. Neither can be said. Therefore. The minor is proved, as to the former part, by a discourse almost already made. For if such a habit were necessary for the substance of the act, it would be necessary so that an angel could elicit an act of understanding, because without it he simply could not elicit the act, even if he had the species, since such is the necessity of a habit for the substance of an act, as we suppose from the use of the terms. But the consequent is plainly false, because from it it would follow that the intellect of an angel is not a complete intellective power on the angel's side, but is only half-complete and inchoate in that genus, which is contrary to the perfection of the angelic and human intellect. Hence in this matter a great difference must be noted between an intelligible species and another habit holding itself on the side of the power. For species are required on the side of objects, and therefore they are added to the power, even if the activity of the power is complete, insofar as it can be on the part of the power itself. For this is the nature of intellect, or rather of every cognitive faculty, that it is not by itself the complete principle of its act, but always needs the cooperation of the object, whose place is supplied by the

species. And therefore, although they are necessary for the substance of the act, they are distinguished from the power, and were placed in angels from the beginning so that they would be perfectly constituted in first act for understanding. But proper habits, concerning which we are now speaking, are added to powers as if to increase the power of acting on the side of the powers themselves, and therefore for acts of the natural order such habits are not necessary for the substance of the act, since the powers have on their own side what is sufficient for acts of this sort.

4. *It is then proved concerning habits for the readiness of the act.*—And from this the other part of the minor is easily proved, because the angelic light is perfect and knows natural truths without impediment, and therefore it does not need with respect to them a habit facilitating the power, as we shall at once prove. And although it were capable of such a habit, it would not have it infused from the beginning, because such a habit could be acquired through its own acts; and therefore it would not be infused accidentally, for that mode is supernatural and extraordinary in acquired habits, especially in angelic nature, which could acquire them with the greatest speed if it needed them. Nor does St. Thomas dissent from these two conclusions, I-II, quest. 50, art. 5, where he posits habits in angels which they always have not only in potency but in first act. For there he is openly speaking of intelligible species, as is clear from these words: *An angel needs to be perfected habitually through certain species for his proper operation.* And he repeats the same in the reply to 2. And in a similar way Henry, *Quodlibet* 4, quest. 7, and *Quodlibet* 5, quest. 14, in positing in angels an innate or natural scientific habit, seems to posit it after the manner of a universal species, as we said above. But Ferrariensis, *Contra Gentiles* I, ch. 56, at the end of reason 5, says that in angels a habit is a certain aptitude distinct from the species, but immediately adds, *whether it is something distinct from the intellect, or whether it is the very light of the angelic intellect*; but without doubt the latter is true, unless some acquired habit must be posited in angels, which remains to be seen.

6. *Against the preceding two conclusions Bañez and Cumelius hold an opinion.*—Against this conclusion and the preceding one Bañez seems to hold an opinion, and Cumelius more clearly, on the cited quest. 58, art. 4, positing in angels one natural habit, distinct from the species, for judging rightly about all knowable things. Medina agrees, nevertheless multiplying those habits, as is clear in I-II, quest. 51, art. 1, in the last conclusion, where he says that all theologians posit in angels habits of science naturally placed in them. And in quest. 54, art. 4, disapproving Cajetan, who teaches the contrary, he says that in

angels, at the beginning of creation, besides the intelligible species, habits of science for judging rightly were infused. They are led by the fact that according to St. Thomas, as they think, the habit of principles in us is placed in us by nature and is distinct from the species. For they think that an angel is disposed toward all things naturally knowable just as we are toward first principles. But this foundation sins first of all in its inference. For even if in our soul that imperfection of a distinction between the intellect and the natural light were admitted, it would not for that reason be proper to attribute such imperfection to angels, since they are more perfect and simpler. Next, something false is assumed, because the habit of principles in us either is not distinct from the intellect, or is not given by nature but acquired, as I have also said according to the mind of St. Thomas in *Metaphysics*, disp. 1, sect. 4, num. 14, and disp. 44, sect. 13, num. 7, where I consequently taught concerning angels that they do not have natural habits of sciences besides the species; and I judge this to be the common opinion of theologians, whom I shall immediately cite.

6. [bis] *On acquired habits, the first opinion denying them.*—Therefore it remains to speak about acquired habits of the intellect. Concerning these in angels authors speak in various ways. Some absolutely and without distinction deny that habits are given in an angel. Thus Durandus, in III, dist. 23, quest. 1, reply to 1, where he says that an intellectual nature not joined to a sensitive nature does not need habits, and therefore that in angels there are no acquired habits. Scotus holds the same, in dist. 3, quest. 11, § *Against that opinion*, verse *To the other it must be said*, saying that if habit is taken for an aptitude of a power, then there is no need to posit any habit in the intellect of an angel, because by its own nature it is sufficiently apt. And Maironius follows, in III, dist. 33, quest. 1, art. 5, at the end. Cajetan is also attributed to this, I-II, quest. 54, art. 4, and quest. 63, art. 1. And Malonius follows, II, dist. 3, disp. 12. Vasquez taught it more distinctly, saying that an angel does not acquire a habit either through evident assents or through probable assents of natural faith or opinion. The foundation is that the species suffice, supposing the readiness in understanding which an angel has for assenting and judging, without impediment, either in knowing all the reasons for assenting which he can know through the species, or in giving assent according to the requirement and merit of such a medium.

7. *Second opinion, affirming entirely.*—The contrary opinion, absolutely and generally, both in evident things and in non-evident things, at least problematically, is affirmed by Ferrariensis above, and follows from Medina's opinion, at least as to non-evident assents, and as to evident ones if perhaps

habits are not given to angels as infused from the beginning for all such things. And Father Molina holds this opinion more precisely, on the cited quest. 58, art. 1. It is founded on the fact that in angels there is apprehension and judgment, and through species they are completed and perfected in order to apprehension; therefore they need another habit by which, as regards judgment, they may be inclined and determined. They confirm this especially by the example of the habit of first principles, which they posit in us as acquired. For our intellect is as inclined toward first principles as the angelic intellect is toward all evident truths; but notwithstanding that natural inclination, we acquire a habit concerning first principles. Therefore angels too will acquire one concerning all evident things.

8. *The true opinion.—Disp. 35, sect. 4, nums. 23 and 24; disp. 44, sect. . . . num. 8.—First conclusion.—An angel does not acquire a habit concerning evident things.*—But in the *Metaphysics* I used a distinction which even now is approved by me. It is a distinction between those things which an angel knows evidently and those which he attains only through conjecture or created authority, and to which he gives the assent of faith or opinion. I say, therefore, first: concerning evident things an angel does not acquire a habit. Cajetan alone above teaches this conclusion in rigor, for he treats only of the science of angels and of things evidently known. And in the same way I spoke in tome 1, part 3, disp. 29, sect. 2, at the end. And perhaps Durandus and Scotus intend no more. It is proved, however, because an angel does not need an acquired habit concerning such objects; and consequently he does not have a natural capacity for it. This is proved, because either he needs it for the substance of the act, or for the power simply to elicit the act, or for readiness. Neither can be said. Therefore. The former part of the minor is clear, both from the first and second assertion, because if such a habit completed the power for eliciting the act, it would be natural intrinsically, or at least placed in it with nature, because the power of understanding, complete on the side of the one understanding, is natural, especially in angels; and chiefly because it is repugnant for a habit to be necessary for the ability and yet to be acquired, because an acquired habit is acquired through acts. Therefore the act occurs before the acquired habit. But the act supposes the power simply. Therefore so does such a habit. Therefore it cannot be necessary for the sake of the power. But the other part, concerning readiness, is proved because the light of the angelic intellect is of itself sufficient and wholly inclined to assents to those things which it attains evidently, and from elsewhere it has nothing from which it would suffer delay or difficulty in such assent. Therefore it does not need such a habit for readiness.

9. *The inference from our habits to angels is not valid.*—Hence they are not rightly compared with us, even in the habit of principles, although we suppose that this habit is acquired in us, because they know the truth of a conclusion, as connected with its principle, far more readily than we know the immediate connection of first principles, in understanding which we suffer many impediments and difficulties. Although this difficulty in one or another principle, which is almost manifest to the senses, is small or none, nevertheless generally concerning principles it is great, and therefore we can need such a habit, so that we can readily apprehend the terms in such a way that in them, and by the same act, we at once intuit the truth of the principle. But angels suddenly, and with the greatest speed and readiness, apprehend and see conclusions in principles; nor in them is apprehension of such things distinguished from judgment. And therefore on no title do they need such a habit for judgment. Indeed, just as through species they are perfectly constituted in first act for apprehending, so through the light of their intellect they are constituted for judging. In the same way also, conversely, just as the intellect contributes activity with the species for apprehending, and is sufficient of itself for that without another facilitating habit, so too it suffices for judging, with the help of the species, if perhaps the species contributes something to judgment.

10. *Objection.—Response.*—You will say that habits can serve angels so that they may more readily assent to certain truths dependent on other principles, even if they do not actually consider the principles, but only the truth of the conclusion. This will be especially fitting when the resolution to first principles is made through many middle principles and many formal or virtual inferences, all of which an angel cannot readily and without great application consider at once, either because they are represented through several species, or because the angel is at the same time attending to other things and cannot consider so many things at once. Therefore then a habit will be useful for assenting promptly with less actual consideration of the principles. I respond: an angel never makes an evident judgment except by clearly intuiting the truth, either as existing in itself, as happens in proper intuitive cognition, or by knowing abstractively the connection of the extremes evidently. If this connection is immediate, it does not depend on other principles in order to be known evidently; but if it has a middle between predicate and subject, it is necessary that the angel actually consider that middle, which is as it were the bond of the extremes, because in an angel to judge is to see the connection itself, when the connection is evident, and the angel does this with the greatest readiness by the power of his own light with the proper species of the thing as it is in itself. And therefore that difficulty

arising from virtual and long discourse is gratuitously imagined. But the other difficulty, which can arise from distraction of mind or attention to other things, is not a difficulty to be overcome by a habit, but by the will removing the other thought. For if it does not do this, even if the habit is present, it will not be able to overcome that difficulty, for rather there is a natural impossibility, according to what was said in the preceding chapter.

11. *Corollary from what has been said.*—And from this assertion it is clear that in angels the intellectual virtues, which in us are numbered as understanding, wisdom, science, prudence, and art, are not distinguished from their intellect. For in all of these there is the same account, insofar as they are principles of evident cognition. And so, remaining within that, there is no new difficulty. But in the use of practical habits there is commonly a difficulty in us. Nevertheless, in art this arises either on the side of the imagination, or on the side of the organs or members which we use for the works of art; and this difficulty has no place in angels, as is evident of itself. But in prudence it can arise from a bad disposition of the affection, either of the sensitive appetite or of the will. Although from the former head it has no place in angels, from the latter it can be found. But whatever it may be, it must be referred to the will itself; for the intellect will always be ready if it is applied by the will.

12. *Second conclusion.—Concerning probable things an angel can acquire a habit.*—Second, I say that if an angel knows certain truths or apprehensions through only probable media, and judges that they are so or are not so, he can acquire an intellectual habit inclining him to a similar assent. Thus I said in the cited place of the *Metaphysics*. And Pesantius agrees with us in both parts, on the cited quest. 58, art. 1; Herrera, II, dist. 12, quest. 1, note 1. And in this Cumelius and Bañez think the same in the same place. And it is proved first, because an acquired habit has place wherever the power is not sufficiently determined to one or the other side. But the intellect of an angel is not of itself determined to assents of this sort. Therefore it is very likely that it acquires through these same assents habits through which its intellect remains more inclined and in a certain way determined to similar assents. But I say *in a certain way*, because a habit cannot simply determine the intellect, as regards exercise or specification, to a non-evident act; for in these matters the habit will always be subject to the free motion of the will, just as the intellect itself is. But it is said to determine in a certain way, because it increases the inclination and propensity toward that side. And it is confirmed, because in these matters almost the same foundation for habit is found in angels as in us. For in us the indifference of the power seems sufficient for a capacity for habit, so that it may be more inclined to

one side. But that indifference is also found in the intellect of an angel as to this part. Likewise the necessity of discourse also seems sufficient; but in these things it is probable that an angel discourses, as we said above. Finally this can be confirmed, because demons have natural faith concerning the mysteries of faith, which cannot be infused, both because it is imperfect and because it is not infused as a natural gift, since it is concerned with supernatural things, at least materially, and supposes supernatural revelation made elsewhere. Therefore it is acquired. Likewise, in the same way Augustine, in *On the Divination of Demons*, posits in evil angels experience acquired by long custom.

13. *First objection from the doctrine of St. Thomas.—Second objection.—It is confirmed.*—But it can be objected, first, that St. Thomas, on the cited quest. 58, art. 1, absolutely denies that the intellect of an angel can be in potency to first act. But if it could acquire some habits, it would first be in potency to such habits, which are certain first acts. Second, because all those things can be preserved through species alone. For first, when an angel has present all the conjectures which move him to assent, and actually considers them, he does not need a habit. Therefore he never needs one. The consequence is proved, because an angel is so clear-sighted and free from every impediment that with the greatest readiness he considers all things that make a thing probable or credible, and with the same readiness he can assent to it if he wishes. Hence, of all the motives which he knew previously, afterwards through the species which he has in himself he most readily remembers them. Therefore by the power of the species he will assent with the same readiness. Therefore afterwards he does not need a habit any more than at the beginning. Therefore it is not acquired. And this argument presses most when those conjectures evidently compel the intellect, at least through extrinsic media and through evidence in the one testifying, as is the case in the faith of demons. For then they efficaciously determine and necessitate the intellect. Therefore a habit can add no readiness. Finally, when conjectures do not compel the intellect in that way, the determination to assent must be from the motion of the will, because, once posited, by natural power the intellect obeys most readily. Therefore in the intellect a habit is not necessary.

14. *Response to the first objection.*—To St. Thomas I respond that he is speaking of first act which holds itself on the side of the object, that is, of intelligible species, for he has handed down almost nothing to us concerning the other proper habits of angels. I add also that he is speaking of first and second act belonging of themselves to the natural perfection of the angelic intellect. But this conjectural cognition, concerning contingent things or things naturally

hidden from angels, does not belong of itself to the perfection of an angel. The same is true of imperfect cognition through extrinsic media, which involve divine testimony; for that not only does not pertain of itself to the natural perfection of an angel, but is also preternatural to him. And therefore this whole genus of cognition is not owed to him, even as to first act; and accordingly nothing prevents an angel from being in potency to such a first act. This is true not only of proper habits, but also of some intelligible species, as was treated above and will immediately be said again.

15. *To the second objection it is conceded that for some acts species suffice for angels without habits.*—Therefore the second argument especially moves Father Vasquez, who spoke about these habits more particularly than others. But we can press him to the man, because he thinks that an angel acquires no species, either for memory or for experience of past effects. Therefore, if a demon acquires neither species nor other habits, how can he now judge more readily about these things which he previously knew and believed than he could before? For who would doubt that a demon now more readily knows Christ as God than he knew him at the beginning while Christ was living? Since it is clear that at the beginning he doubted, and afterwards at last, having been convicted, believed, and now believes even unwillingly. Therefore this change made in the angel requires something newly acquired in him. And indeed we admit that for some effects species left from preceding cognitions suffice, as for memory of past things which were known evidently in themselves; because by the power of the species they are at once represented with the clarity and experimental evidence with which they were known before. And therefore for this genus of experience, insofar as it consists only in the memory of several past acts, acquired species suffice. We cannot deny such species to angels concerning singulars, as previously known by them, as we said above.

16. *But that habits are altogether required for some acts is demonstrated.—To the confirmation at the end of num. 13.*—But when, beyond singular effects evidently known in themselves, one has come from them to a probable and opinative judgment of some conclusion indicated in those effects, then, so that afterwards an angel may be more inclined to this judgment, species do not suffice, but a habit is necessary. Both because even at the beginning, although an angel with great clarity and readiness saw that such a conclusion was likely indicated by such signs, nevertheless he still remained as it were doubtful and indeterminate whether it was so or not; and in this indetermination from the nature of the thing there is necessarily some difficulty, which without doubt is lessened by the custom of assenting to one side. This also has place in an angel.

But this lessening of difficulty comes from a habit and cannot come from elsewhere. And also because, just as an angel can afterwards readily remember all the signs or conjectures which led him to such an assent, so too he can readily fail to apply his mind immediately to considering all these things, and nevertheless, once that probable proposition is proposed, by use he can be determined to assent to it with greater readiness and inclination. Hence in the evident faith of demons, although the former reason ceases, because the intellect is sufficiently determined by evidence, nevertheless the second reason does not cease, because the non-evidence of the thing in itself is sufficient for the readiness of assenting to be able to come from a habit. For when a proposition is evident through an intrinsic reason, an angel, seeing that thing through its proper species, sees the evidence of the truth by the power of natural light alone, and therefore he does not need a habit. But when a proposition is not evident to the angel through an intrinsic medium, nor through itself, because it is of a higher order, then he can readily consider it and the non-intrinsic media which induce him to assent to it, which are commonly various and can be represented to an angel through several species. Then, therefore, an angel will be able to be prompt and ready for assenting from a habit, although he does not see or actually consider all the signs which at the beginning compelled the intellect. Thus demons, having heard the name of Christ, recognize him as God and tremble, even if they do not actually consider all the signs of his divinity which suffice to compel the intellect. Therefore that determination comes from a habit. Hence to the last confirmation we say that when this cognition is evident, at least in the one testifying, the determination does not depend on the will, and thus neither is a habit necessary in it. But in other things, which are only probable, perhaps the will too acquires its own habit, and nevertheless there will always be place for a habit of the intellect, so that it may incline the intellect through itself and render it more prompt for obeying the will.

CHAPTER XXXIX
WHETHER TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD CAN NATURALLY BE FOUND IN THE MINDS OF ANGELS

1. *First doubt.—Second.*—Truth or falsehood is specially attributed to cognition by the mode of a certain property or passion of it, and in its own way it can belong both to acts and to habits. Therefore, for the completion of this book, something remains to be said about this property as it is found in angels, with St. Thomas, quest. 58, art. 5, where the interpreters comment. And first it

must be seen absolutely concerning the whole disjunct, whether it has a place in angels as to any part of it. The reason for doubting is that angelic cognition seems capable neither of truth nor of falsehood. For Aristotle says that truth and falsehood are found in the composition and division of the mind, not in simple conception, *On the Soul* III, ch. 6, and *On Interpretation* I, chs. 1 and 3. But in angels there is no composition and division, as was said above. Therefore neither proper truth nor falsehood is found in them. Second, it must be seen, granted that in angels there is a capacity for truth or falsehood, whether they are indifferent to both, or are capable only of one side, namely truth. And the reason for doubting can be that angels in natural things are like very clear lights, which suffer no darkness. For they comprehend all things, or at least therefore know evidently. But if there are some things which they do not know evidently, as, for example, future contingents or internal thoughts, concerning these they have only ignorance of negation or of privation, but not ignorance of bad disposition through error or falsehood. Or if they conjecture these things through some signs or effects, they evidently know that through those signs what is more likely in the hidden effect is shown, and they judge only this, and in this they cannot be deceived. Therefore, if the angelic mind is capable of truth, it is determined to it, and will not be capable of falsehood. But each part is easy and can be resolved briefly.

2. *First conclusion.—The intellect of an angel is by its nature capable of truth.* —Therefore it must first be said that the intellect of an angel is by its nature capable of truth. The assertion is most certain and outside controversy. First, because truth is a great perfection of the intellect and does not include an imperfection repugnant to an angel, as will easily be clear by responding to the reason for doubting. Second, because the divine intellect is supremely true in knowing and judging, even if it is most simple. Therefore angels participate this perfection from it, much more than man does. Third, because truth belongs to the account of science, and angels have the most perfect natural science and wisdom. Finally, because whatever we judge by composing and dividing, they judge in a more eminent way, whether by simple intuition or sometimes by composing or dividing according to the various opinions. Therefore, in whatever way they put forth judgment, they state truth, or put forth a true judgment; and accordingly in such judgment there is truth.

3. *The first doubt in the preceding number is resolved.—In which simple apprehension truth is properly given.*—And from this the prior reason for doubting is easily resolved, which asked whether truth is only in complex cognition or also in simple intelligence. I treated this at length in the

Metaphysics, disp. 8, sect. 3. And therefore, omitting those things, I briefly assert: when a simple intelligence is such that through a simple act it is clearly and distinctly known that this thing is such or such, no less than if it were done through several concepts by composing one with another, in such a simple act there is proper truth, indeed in a higher and more perfect mode than there is in our complex cognition, because it has the same conformity to the object, known better and more clearly, in which that truth consists. And Cajetan intends this response, cited quest. 58, art. 5, and others follow. Nor does Aristotle stand in the way, both because he spoke about the human intellect, and because even in the intellect of a human being not every truth is excluded from simple intelligence. But whether in some simple act of the human intellect there can be found truth as proper as in composition will be treated in the last part of this work, to which it belongs.

4. *Second conclusion for the second doubt.—A non-blessed angel is capable of falsehood in probable things.—The blessed angels are incapable of falsehood by reason of their state.—A doubt that occurs is deferred.*—Next we say that the intellect of an angel is capable of falsehood in those things which he does not know evidently and which he can attain and judge through conjectures or faith founded on created authority. This is proved by supposing that an angel can have similar judgments, which was partly proved above. For we are speaking of angels considered in their pure nature, and abstracting from the beatific state and its circumstances. Therefore let an angel so considered, if concerning things which he did not know evidently he could have probable conjectures or sufficient credible testimony, judge not only that this is credible or probable, but also absolutely that it is so or is not so. Therefore such a judgment could sometimes be false, and the habit generated from it would be exposed to falsehood. But I speak of an angel considered in pure nature, because the holy angels by reason of their state do not have assents of this sort, since they cannot be deceived, nor do they judge definitely about uncertain things until they are instructed by God about them, as Augustine excellently teaches, *The City of God* IX, ch. 22. But evil angels operate in a mode natural to themselves, and they abuse it by an evil will, and therefore they are often deceived. Nevertheless, the same could happen to them in pure nature, though perhaps more rarely, because they would not so readily rush headlong or be carried into determining an absolute judgment about an uncertain thing. Still, there is no doubt that they could do this, which is enough for them to be capable of falsehood. And this is manifest from what has been said, as regards speculative cognition. But there occurred here a doubt concerning practical and moral judgment about things to

be done, whether in that too an angel could be deceived. Nevertheless, because in this judgment truth and falsehood depend in some way on affection, we shall speak of it better in the following book, or below when treating of the sin of angels.

CHAPTER XL
WHETHER IN ANGELS THERE IS MORNING AND EVENING COGNITION, AND WHAT EACH IS

1. *Morning and evening cognition.*—St. Thomas treats these matters at the end of this material concerning the cognition of angels, First Part, quest. 58, arts. 6 and 7. And it is commonly treated by theologians in II, dist. 3 or 11. Yet in that distinction the principal member, namely morning cognition, pertains to the blessed science of the angels, and from this side that distinction pertains more to quest. 62 of St. Thomas or to the fifth book, which will be about that cognition. Without knowledge of it, evening cognition too, as signified by that name, cannot be sufficiently understood. Nevertheless, because that cognition was specially devised by Augustine to explain the six days of the creation of the world, therefore we reserve it for the treatise on those days, because there it is especially necessary, and from the matter placed before us, after cognition of the beatific state of the angels has already been had, it will be understood better and more readily. Therefore we shall speak about it in the following treatise, book 4, ch. 11. And therefore let these things suffice concerning the angelic intellect.

END OF BOOK TWO

Summa Theologiae

The Summa Theologiae: Commentaries & Disputations presents in English the theological writings of Francisco Suárez, S.J., the Doctor Eximius, one of the great masters of Catholic theology. Written in sustained engagement with the Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas Aquinas, these works are not merely commentaries, but a vast and ordered theological course: a rigorous unfolding of sacred doctrine through scholastic precision, philosophical depth, and fidelity to the tradition of the Church.

Suárez treats the principal divisions of theology with extraordinary breadth. The series includes his works on God one and triune, the divine attributes, predestination, grace, angels, creation, the rational soul, the ultimate end of man, law, sin, merit, faith, hope, charity, religion, the Incarnation, the life of Christ and His Most Holy Mother, the sacraments, penance, purgatory, indulgences, and ecclesiastical censures. It also includes the theological opuscula connected with the De Auxiliis controversy, where Suárez addresses divine concurrence, providence, freedom, efficacious grace, and God's knowledge of future contingents.

Contained in this Series:

P. I: Disputations on *Prima Pars.*
P. II: Disputatons on *Prima Secunda.*
P. III: Disputations on *Secunda Secundae.*
P. IV: Commentaries on *Tertia Pars.*

Claude Sonnet 4.6

AI-assisted translation